diff --git a/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Kodashim/English Explanation of Mishnah Arakhin/English/Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp.json b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Kodashim/English Explanation of Mishnah Arakhin/English/Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..9639399c88c3f33573ac3cc0e0975f3e2c8150d4 --- /dev/null +++ b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Kodashim/English Explanation of Mishnah Arakhin/English/Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp.json @@ -0,0 +1,357 @@ +{ + "language": "en", + "title": "English Explanation of Mishnah Arakhin", + "versionSource": "http://learn.conservativeyeshiva.org/mishnah/", + "versionTitle": "Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp", + "status": "locked", + "license": "CC-BY", + "shortVersionTitle": "Dr. Joshua Kulp", + "actualLanguage": "en", + "languageFamilyName": "english", + "isBaseText": true, + "isSource": true, + "isPrimary": true, + "direction": "ltr", + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה ערכין", + "categories": [ + "Mishnah", + "Modern Commentary on Mishnah", + "English Explanation of Mishnah", + "Seder Kodashim" + ], + "text": { + "Introduction": [ + "Our tractate is called Arakhin, the plural of “erekh” which means “value.” The tractate deals mostly with Leviticus 27, whose topic is evaluating people, animals and land whose value were donated to the Temple. For instance, a person who says, “My value (erekh) is upon me” means to say that he wishes to donate to the Temple his value. The value of a person is fixed according to Leviticus, and it will depend on a person’s gender and age. In addition, a person can dedicate to the Temple the value of an animal or a piece of property, topics that are also covered in Leviticus 27. Sometimes these values are fixed and sometimes they are individually assessed. As background to this tractate, it would be highly advisable to read this chapter of the Torah. I have included it below for your convenience. There are also laws in our tractate concerning the sale of ancestral property, a topic dealt with in Leviticus 25. While these laws are no longer practical, since we don’t have a Temple, they can teach us a lot about how people would have donated money to the Temple, as well as how the value of people and land was assessed. I think that you will find it to be a very interesting tractate, although as you know, I always say that. Good luck! " + ], + "": [ + [ + [ + "Introduction\nIn order to understand our mishnah we must understand the distinction between an “evaluation” and vowing someone’s monetary worth. When a person makes a statement such as “My value is upon me,” he must dedicate to the Temple the sum that the Torah determines to be his/her value. He can also make such a statement with regard to another person, i.e. “So and so’s value is upon me.”\nHowever, if he states, “My monetary worth is upon me,” then an actual evaluation of his value must be made. This is done by assessing how much he would be worth as a slave if he was sold in the market. Again, one can also make such a statement with regard to another person, i.e. “So and so’s monetary worth is upon me.”\nIn other words there are two types of evaluation. For the first, where he uses the word “erekh,” or value, we use the Torah’s fixed sum. For the second, where he uses the word “monetary worth” we evaluate his actual worth.", + "All [persons] are fit to evaluate or to be made the subjects of evaluation, are fit to vow [another's worth] or have their worth vowed: priests, Levites and [ordinary] Israelites, women and slaves. Generally, all people can evaluate and be evaluated meaning they can either say, “My value is upon me” or have that said about them by another. In this case, the money they or others will owe to the Temple depends upon the value prescribed by the Torah (Leviticus 27). Similarly, all people can vow to give their or another’s person’s monetary worth to the Temple. This is when they say, “My monetary worth is upon me” or have that said by another person. As we shall see, this is just the general rule. There are indeed exceptions, people who cannot evaluate or be evaluated, vow or be vowed.", + "The tumtum and the hermaphrodite are fit to vow [another's worth], or to have their worth vowed, and are fit to evaluate, but they are not fit to be made the subjects of evaluation, for the subject of evaluation must be definitely either male or female. A tumtum is a person’s who has neither male nor female genitalia and a hermaphrodite has both male and female genitalia. The gender of these two people is in doubt. Both can vow another’s monetary worth or have their worth vowed by another, because vowing one’s monetary worth has nothing to do with establishing a certain gender. They can also evaluate another person by saying “So and so’s value is upon me” because they are considered to be intelligent. The one thing they can’t do is have their value dedicated by themselves or by others because in order to be evaluated one must have a certain gender. This is because the Torah determines the value of a human being partly based on the person’s gender. One without a gender cannot have his/her value determined.", + "A deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor are fit to have their worth vowed or be made the subject of evaluation, but they are not fit to make either a vow [of another's worth] or to evaluate, because they have no intelligence. A deaf-mute, imbecile and minor are not considered to be of intelligence and therefore they cannot dedicate anything to the Temple, neither through an evaluation nor a vow. However, they are of value, both according to the Torah’s assessment and as slaves sold in the market, therefore their value or monetary worth can be dedicated.", + "A person less than one month old may have his worth vowed but not his valuation. The Torah assigns value only to children who have reached thirty days. This is probably because life was so fragile for the first thirty days and so many children would have died (see Leviticus 27:6). Therefore, a child below thirty day’s value cannot be dedicated. But their monetary worth can be vowed because they could be sold on the slave market, even though their value might not be high due to their fragility." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn today’s mishnah Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Judah debate whether a non-Jew can dedicate his value or have his value dedicated to the Temple.", + "A non-Jew: Rabbi Meir says: he can be evaluated but he cannot evaluate. According to Rabbi Meir a non-Jew can be evaluated by others. This means that if a Jew says, “The value of so-and-so [a non-Jew] is upon me,” the Jew will be liable to pay the fixed value of the non-Jew to the Temple. However, he can’t evaluate himself or others.", + "Rabbi Judah says: he can evaluate but cannot be evaluated. Rabbi Judah holds the opposite. A non-Jew can evaluate himself or others, but he cannot be evaluated. It seems that these two rabbis debate the applicability of Leviticus 27:2, “Speak to the Israelite people and say to them….” The verse can be read as saying that the laws in the chapter refer only to Jews. However, which aspect of the chapter is not clear evaluating others or being evaluated? That is what they debate.", + "Both agree that he can vow another's worth and have his worth vowed by others. Both Rabbi Judah and Rabbi Meir agree that the non-Jew can vow his own worth or someone else’s worth to the Temple by stating, “The monetary worth of so-and-so is upon me.” Since this type of dedication is not the topic of Leviticus 27, the non-Jew is not excluded. As an aside, it is clear from many historical sources, both rabbinic and non-rabbinic, that non-Jews did donate money to the Temple in Jerusalem." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn today’s mishnah three sages debate whether a person who is about to die can have his worth or value dedicated to the Temple.", + "One at the point of death or about to be put to death cannot have his worth vowed, nor be evaluated. A person about to die, either naturally or by being executed, has no worth. Therefore, another person cannot dedicate the dying person’s monetary worth or his value to the Temple. The first opinion in the mishnah makes no distinction between the amount set by the Torah (value) and the amount estimated by his value in the marketplace (his worth).", + "Rabbi Hanina ben Akavia says: he can be evaluated because his value is fixed, but his worth cannot be vowed because his worth is not fixed. Rabbi Hanina ben Akavia does make a distinction between the two. A person’s “value” is set by the Torah and it doesn’t matter whether he is about to die or is alive. Therefore, if someone says, “So and so’s value is upon me,” he is liable to make that payment. However, his monetary worth cannot be vowed through a statement such as, “So and so’s monetary worth is upon me.” This is because there is no fixed “worth” to a human being, and since this human being is about to die, his life has no worth.", + "Rabbi Yose says: he may vow, evaluate, and consecrate [to the sanctuary], and if he caused damage, he is obliged to make restitution. Rabbi Yose adds that when it comes to the dying person vowing to give someone’s worth or value to the Temple or consecrating an object to the Temple, he has the same ability as everyone else does. Since he will be dead before he pays off these debts, the money will have to be taken out of his estate. Similarly, if he damages another’s property, his inheritors will have to pay out the restitution." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nSince yesterday’s mishnah dealt with the status of someone who was about to be executed, our mishnah continues to provide some information in this subject. It has nothing to do with evaluations.", + "If a woman is about to be executed, they do not wait for her until she gives birth. The rabbis considered delaying execution to be cruel to the executed person. The ideal was to sentence the person and execute them immediately so that they would not have to wait around a long time contemplating their death. We should remember that in order to sentence someone to death, the proof had to be overwhelmingly certain. In rabbinic law, a conviction would almost never be overturned, and therefore, it would be cruel to delay carrying out the sentence. Our mishnah teaches that this is so even for a pregnant woman. While this may seem cruel, it is in essence stating that the woman takes precedence over her fetus, which is not yet considered to be a full “life.”", + "But if she had already sat on the birthstool, they wair for her until she gives birth. However, if she has already begun to have contractions, and is sitting on the birthstool to give birth, they must wait until she gives birth to execute her. It seems that at this point the fetus is close enough to being an actual human being, that it would not be legal to execute it with the mother.", + "If a woman has been put to death one may use her hair. It is forbidden to derive any benefit from a dead body. However, if a person has been executed, it is permitted to derive benefit from the hair because the rabbis don’t consider hair to be alive, such that it has the status of a dead body.", + "If an animal has been put to death it is forbidden to make any use of it. When it comes to an animal executed for committing a crime (murder or sex with a human being) the law works differently. Once an animal has been sentenced to die it is immediately forbidden to derive benefit from any part of its body, even from its hair. When it dies, it continues to be forbidden to derive benefit from the entire body, and this prohibition continues to apply to its hair. In other words, when it comes to human beings, death makes the body prohibited, and therefore the prohibition does not apply to hair, which is not prohibited. When it comes to animals, sentencing makes the body prohibited and therefore it applies to the entire body, including the hair." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah begins by discussing upper and lower limits for evaluations. Afterwards, the remainder of the mishnah and the remainder of the chapter continues to discuss various issues unconnected to evaluations, but whose halakhot have the same literary format as the first sentence of the mishnah.", + "There is no evaluation less than one sela, nor more than fifty selas. Leviticus 27:8 states, “But if one cannot afford the equivalent, he shall be presented before the priest, and the priest shall assess him; the priest shall assess him according to what the vower can afford.” Thus if a poor person vows to pay the value of an adult male (whose value is 50 shekel/sela) and he can’t afford to pay the whole amount, he can pay less. Our mishnah teaches that this payment cannot be less than a sela. The maximum amount is 50 selas, as is stated explicitly in Leviticus 27:3.", + "How so? If one paid a sela and became rich, he need not give any [more]. But if he gave less than a sela and became rich, he must pay fifty selas. The mishnah now explains what happens if after the poor person gave a sela he then becomes rich. If he gave a sela, then he has fulfilled his obligation and even if he becomes rich, he need not give the full amount of fifty selas. But if he gave less than a sela, and then he became rich, he must give the full amount, because by giving less than a sela, he did not fulfill his obligation.", + "If he had five selas in his possession: Rabbi Meir says: he need not give more than one; The sages say he must give them all. The sages now debate what happens if a person has more than a sela, but does not have the full amount that he vowed. Let’s say he vowed to give the value of an adult male (50 selas) and all he has in 5 selas. According to Rabbi Meir, since he can’t give the full amount, he needs to pay only a sela, the lowest amount. The other rabbis hold that he must give whatever he can, even if he can’t pay the full amount.", + "There is no evaluation less than one sela, nor more than fifty selas. This is a repeat of section one. It is repeated here because the mishnah now begins a long list of halakhot taught with the literary format of “there is not in X less than A nor more than B.”", + "If a woman makes a mistake in her reckoning there is no re-opening for her [of the niddah count] earlier than seven, nor later than after seventeen days. This somewhat complicated halakhah has to do with counting a woman’s menstrual cycle, in order to know the difference between menstrual blood (which causes a woman to be impure for 7 days, even if she continued to bleed all the way through the seventh day) and non-menstrual blood (which causes a woman to be impure for one day, unless she sees blood for three straight days, in which case she is impure for 7 full days after she stops seeing blood). The rabbis instituted an 18 day cycle to calculate when blood was menstrual and when it is non-menstrual. When a woman first sees blood she considers it to be menstrual blood and she is impure for seven days, from the time she saw the first blood. After these seven days, any blood seen over the next 11 days is considered to be zivah (non-menstrual blood). After these eleven days are over, she returns to counting seven days, during which any blood is considered to be menstrual blood. Our mishnah deals with a situation where a woman made a mistake in counting these days (i.e. she didn’t know whether she was in the seven days or in the eleven) and she saw blood. She doesn’t know whether the blood she saw is to be considered menstrual, in which case she is impure for seven days, or zivah, in which case she is impure for only one day, or a full seven days if she sees zivah for three straight days. Our mishnah teaches that the beginning of her days of menstrual blood cannot be less then seven days after she doesn’t see any more blood, nor more than seventeen days, all counted from the time she first saw blood. How this works out is a bit complicated, but I shall try to explain very briefly. Let’s say she saw blood for one day, if these were “days of niddah” she could begin to count her next days of niddah after seventeen days, which is the maximum amount. This would mirror the normal situation. However, if she sees blood for several straight days, it may be possible that she only has to wait seven more days after not seeing blood to begin counting her menstrual blood days. Let’s say she sees blood for three straight days, she can then begin counting her menstrual days after seven days without seeing blood, because it doesn’t matter if the blood she saw was menstrual or not, seven days are sufficient to begin counting again. I realize that this is all very complicated, and indeed entire books exist dedicated to these complicated calculations. We will learn much more about this subject when we learn Tractate Niddah.", + "No signs of leprosy are shut up for less than one week and none more than two weeks. This calculation deals with isolating a person or house that might have shown signs of “negaim” which we should understand as some sort of skin affliction or house fungus. The minimum time of such an isolation is seven days, which is how long the isolation is for a person (see Leviticus 13:21, 26). The maximum time is three weeks, which is only for a house. We shall learn more about this in Tractate Negaim (I bet you can’t wait!)." + ], + [ + "There are never less than four full months in the year, nor did it seem right to have more than eight. Every month in the Jewish calendar has 29 or 30 days, depending on when witnesses come to testify that they saw the new moon. The rabbis realized that there had to be about six “missing” months and six “full” months a year, in order to keep the schedule correct (an actual lunar cycle is between 29 and 30 days long). Therefore, they instituted a minimum of four full months and a maximum of eight to keep the calculations as close to correct as possible. Today, the Jewish calendar is fixed, and generally, there are six full and six missing months.", + "Two loaves were eaten, never earlier than the second day, nor later than the third day. The “two loaves” refers to the two loaves eaten on Shavuot. Generally, they were eaten the day after they were baked. They would be baked on erev Shavuot, and eaten on Shavuot. This is “the second day.” However, if Shabbat fell before Shavuot, they would be baked on Thursday and eaten on Sunday, the third day. For more information see Menahot 11:9.", + "The shewbread was eaten never earlier than the ninth day, nor later than the eleventh day. The showbread was the bread baked in the Temple on a weekly basis. Generally, it would have been baked on Friday and eaten the following Shabbat, on the ninth day. However, if there were holidays on Thursday and Friday, it might have been eaten on only the eleventh day. For more info see Menahot 11:9.", + "An infant may never be circumcised earlier than the eighth nor later than the twelfth day. Normally, a boy is circumcised on the eighth day. However, if he is born at dusk, at a time when it might be already the next day, he would have to be circumcised on the ninth day (which might be the eighth day). If he is born at dusk on erev Shabbat, he is circumcised on the following Sunday, the tenth day, because he can only be circumcised on Shabbat if it is certain that it is the eighth day. If he is born on erev Rosh Hashanah, when it falls on Thursday-Friday, he will be circumcised on the twelfth day, which is the following Sunday, because he couldn’t be circumcised on Thursday, Friday or Saturday . Unless the baby is unhealthy, the circumcision cannot be delayed any longer." + ], + [ + "There are never less than twenty-one blasts in the Temple and never more than forty-eight. There was a minimum of 21 daily trumpet blasts in the Temple and a maximum of 48. The explanation of this section can be found in Sukkah 5:5. The maximum number of blasts was sounded on erev Shabbat during Sukkot.", + "There are never less than two harps, nor more than six. The harps were played to accompany the singing of the Levites.", + "There are never less than two flutes, nor more than twelve. The flutes were played on special occasions, namely holidays, as the rest of the mishnah explains.", + "On twelve days in the year the flute was played before the altar: At the slaughtering of the first pesah, At the killing of the second pesah, On the first festival day of Pesah, On the festival day of Atzeret (, And on the eight days of Sukkot. The flute was played on the first day of each holiday, and also on any day that a pesah sacrifice was slaughtered (the fourteenth of Nissan, and the fourteenth of Iyyar). During Sukkot it was played every day.", + "And they did not play on a pipe [abuv] of bronze but on a pipe of reed, because its tune is sweeter. The flute that they played was a pipe made of reed, for its sound is sweeter (according to rabbinic tastes) than the bronze pipe.", + "Nor was anything but a single pipe used for closing a tune, because it makes a pleasant finale. At the conclusion of the song, they would end with a single pipe (flute) which is more pleasant than completing with two (or more) at the same time." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is a continuation of yesterday’s, which discussed the blowing of the flutes on holiday occasions.", + "They were slaves of the priests, the words of Rabbi Meir. According to Rabbi Meir, it was slaves owned by priests who would play the flute.", + "Rabbi Yose said: they were of families from Bet Hapegarim, Bet-Zipparya and from Emmaus, places from which priests would marry [women]. Rabbi Yose seems to think that it would not have been appropriate for slaves to fulfill such a function. Rather, people from important families, families whose daughters were able to marry priests (see Kiddushin 4:5), would play the flute. These three locations are in the region of Judea. In face, Emmaus is on my regular bike-riding route (near Latrun). Next time I’m out, I’ll try to listen for some flutists!", + "Rabbi Hanina ben Antigonos said: they were Levites. Rabbi Hanina ben Antigonus says that just as Levites would sing, so too they were the ones to play the flute." + ], + [ + "There were never less than six inspected lambs in the chamber of lambs, enough for Shabbat and the [two] festival days of Rosh Hashanah, and their number could be increased infinitely. Every day there were at least two lambs that were used as the daily tamid offering, one in the morning and one at night. These lambs needed to be examined four days before being used, a halakhah found in the Torah in connection with the passover sacrifice offered in Egypt (see Exodus 12:3, 6). There was a special chamber where these lambs were kept (see Tamid 3:3). Generally, there were eight lambs in the chamber, enough for four days. Every morning they would take out two for that day, and then in the evening they would examine two new lambs to make sure that they were unblemished. There always had to be at least six checked lambs in the chamber, in case Rosh Hashanah fell immediately before or after Shabbat. If this happened they would need six lambs for the tamid, two for each day. There is no upper limit as to how many lambs they could put into the chamber. Of course, space, noise and stench might have become an issue at a certain point, but theoretically, they could keep adding as many as they wanted.", + "There were never less than two trumpets and their number could be increased infinitely. There always had to be at least two trumpets in the Temple. These trumpets were used on various occasions. See for instance Number 10:2, 10. They could have a much greater number. Indeed in II Chronicles 2:5, 12, we hear about 120 priests blowing on trumpets in the Temple.", + "There were never less than nine lyres, and their number could be increased infinitely. But there was only one cymbal. In the Temple they would use at least nine lyres, and they could use many more, but only one set of cymbals." + ], + [ + "There were never less than twelve levites standing on the platform and their number could be increased into infinity. There always needed to be twelve Levites standing on the platform in the Temple singing. This would mean one for every lyre (nine), one for every harp (two) and one for the cymbals. This number is also referred to in I Chronicles 25:9.", + "No minor could enter the court of the sanctuary to take part in the service except when the Levites stood up to sing. Minor Levites would go into the courtyard while the Levites were singing in order to aid them. However, they could only go in while the Levites were singing.", + "Nor did they join in the singing with harp and lyre, but with the mouth alone, to add flavor to the music. The minors only sang. They did not play the harp and lyre.", + "Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob said: they did not count in the required number, nor did they stand on the platform. Rather they would stand on the ground, so that their heads were between the feet of the levites. And they were called the youth of the Levites. There are two versions of this section. The version I have quoted here is one that Albeck seems to prefer. Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob is referring to the youth mentioned in sections 1-2. The other version, found in the Rambam’s commentary reads, “trouble-makers of the Levites.” The Rambam explains that this refers to the musicians, those playing the instruments, for they would drown out the beautiful voices of the Levites." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "The law of evaluation is sometimes lenient, and at others times strict.
The law of the field of possession is sometimes lenient, and at others times strict.
The law concerning a warned ox that has killed a slave is sometimes lenient, and at others times strict.
The law of the rapist and the seducer and the defamer is sometimes lenient, and at others times strict.
The law of evaluation is sometimes lenient, and at others times strict. How so? Whether one has evaluated the fairest in Israel, or the ugliest in Israel, he must pay fifty selas. But if he said: “Behold, his monetary worth is upon me,” he pays only as much as he is worth.
Like the second chapter, the third chapter also begins with a discussion of evaluations and through associative thinking goes on to discuss other laws that have a similar phenomenon. In this case, the phenomenon is that sometimes the law is lenient and sometimes it is strict.
Sections 2-4 will be explained in mishnayot 2-5, so I will not explain them here.
Section five: This section demonstrates how sometimes the laws of evaluation are strict and sometimes they are lenient. If a person vows the evaluation of a very good looking person, one who might be worth more than 50 selas, he still owes only 50 selas, because the Torah determines the person’s value as such. This is a leniency. But if the person is ugly and is really worth less than 50 selas, the vower still pays 50 selas. This is a stringency. We should note that this is true as long as the person’s whose worth is being donated is a male between the ages of 20 and 50. For older and younger males and for females, the evaluation is different. Nevertheless, the principle would be the same for all.
As we explained in the introduction, if the vower uses the word “monetary worth” instead of “value” then he owes the actual worth, be it higher for the good looking person, or lower for the ugly person." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nLeviticus 27:16 states, “If anyone consecrates to the Lord any land that he holds, its assessment shall be in accordance with its seed requirement: fifty shekels of silver to a homer of barley seed.” Verse 22 of the same chapter deals with a case where a person dedicated land that he purchased.\nOur mishnah deals with both of these laws. The same topic will be discussed again later in tractate Arakhin.", + "“The law of the field of possession is sometimes lenient and sometimes strict.”
How so? Whether one dedicates a field in the sandy plain of Mahoz or in the orchards of Savaste, [if he would redeem it] he must pay fifty shekels of silver for [every part of the field sufficient for] the sowing of a homer of barley. Similar to a case where a person dedicated the value of another human being, when one dedicates a field of possession, meaning one that is part of his ancestral inheritance, he must pay a fixed amount in order to redeem the field. That amount is set by the Torah as being fifty shekels of silver for every part of a field that can grow enough to sow a “homer” of barley. This is a standard amount set by what an average field can produce. It is not based on what the field actually dedicated produces. There are two regions mentioned in this section. The first is the sandy plains of a region called “Mahoz.” I do not know where this region is, but since there are many sandy regions in Israel, and “Mahoz” is a generic term meaning “the district” it probably could be in a variety of different places. Savaste is in Samaria. According to Albeck, Herod expanded this area and planted there gardens and orchards, and he was the one who called it by this name.", + "But if it was a field which he bought, he must pay what it is worth. If he dedicated a field that he bought and not one that he inherited, when he redeems the field he owes whatever the field is actually worth.", + "Rabbi Eliezer says: it is all the same whether it is a field of possession or one that he bought. What is the difference between the field of possession and one that he bought? A field of possession he must pay the [added] fifth, whereas for a field that he has bought he need not pay the added fifth. Rabbi Eliezer reads these verses differently and holds that in both cases, the person must redeem the field for fifty shekels of silver for [every part of the field sufficient for] the sowing of a homer of barley. The only difference between the two is that when one redeems a dedicated field of possession he must add an extra fifth (see Leviticus 27:19), whereas when one dedicates a field which he bought, he need not add the extra fifth. Chapter seven will deal more with this subject." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah deals with the warned ox, the “muad.” This is an ox that has gored three times. The owner of a “warned ox” that kills a person is liable to pay the value of the person (see Exodus 21:30). However, if the ox kills a slave, he pays 30 shekels no matter the value of the slave (vs. 32).", + "“The law concerning a warned ox that has killed a slave is sometimes lenient and sometimes strict.”
How so? Whether it killed the fine looking slave or an ugly slave, he must pay thirty selas. If a warned ox kills a slave, the owner of the ox pays thirty selas (equivalent to the Torah’s shekels) to the slave’s owner, no matter how valuable the slave was. Sometimes this can create a stringency (if the slave was worth less) and sometimes a leniency (if the slave was worth more).", + "If it killed a free man he must pay what he is worth. As stated in the introduction, if the ox kills a free person, he must pay the value of the person, no matter the how great or small the value is. The fixed amount is only for the slave.", + "If it wounded, whether this one or the other, he must pay the full damage. The distinction between the slave and the free person is only in case the ox kills one of them. If the ox wounds them, its owner is liable to pay the actual worth in both cases." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah deals with the rapist or seducer, topics discussed in Deuteronomy 22:28-29 and Exodus 22:15-16. As was the case with the warned ox, any time the Torah sets a fixed amount as a fine, the result can be lenient or strict.", + "“The law of the rapist and seducer is sometimes lenient and sometimes strict.”
How so? Whether he raped or seduced a girl from among the best of the priestly stock or the humblest in Israel, he must pay fifty selas. Whether one rapes or seduces a girl from a good family, for instance a priestly family, or from a humble/poor family, he pays the father fifty selas as compensation. This fine is fixed no matter how much the girl is actually worth. It is interesting to note that unlike the case of evaluations or killing the slave, where the mishnah referred to the looks of the one evaluated or killed, here the mishnah refers to the family of the girl. This probably reveals quite a bit about marriage choices in mishnaic times. A girl’s worth was largely dependent upon her familial status and far less upon her individual personal characteristics. A girl from a good family was worth more in the eyes of the society than one from a lesser family. While this is not at all surprising, it is still interesting to note such concrete evidence of this social phenomenon.", + "But compensation for shaming and for blemish is in accord with the [circumstances] of him who shames and of the one who suffers the shame. Deuteronomy and Exodus refer only to a fine paid to the father by a man who rapes or seduces his daughter. The rabbis made an innovation that rape is to be treated also as a case of personal injury to the girl, and not just a loss to the father. A rapist is liable to pay not only a fine, but also compensation for shaming her and her family and for any blemish that occurred. In truth he is also liable to pay for her suffering and any loss of work. These amounts, unlike the fine, are not set by the Torah. When it comes to shaming, the payment depends upon the social status of the shamer and the person who was shamed. This halakhah is true in all cases of personal injury. For more information see Ketubot 3:7." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe final mishnah of this chapter refers to the “defamer,” one who falsely claims that a girl he married was not a virgin (see Deuteronomy 22: 13-22).", + "The law of the defamer is sometimes lenient and sometimes strict.
How so? Whether he defamed a girl from among the best of the priestly stock or the humblest in Israel, he must pay one hundred selas. The Torah sets a one hundred shekel fine for the defamer, no matter whether he defamed a girl from a good family or from a lesser family. Again, any time the Torah sets an amount, this will create a potential stringency and a potential leniency as well, depending on the actual circumstances.", + "Thus it turns out that he who speaks with his mouth suffers more than he that commits an act. Here the mishnah notes the paradox that a man who rapes or seduces a girl pays a fine of fifty shekels, whereas one who defames her pays double the amount. This is generalized into a value statement one who speaks against someone with his mouth can, at least at times, do more harm than one who acts out physically.", + "For thus we have also found that the judgment against our fathers in the wilderness was sealed only because of their evil tongue, as it is written: “Yet you have tested me these ten times, and you have not listened to My voice” (Numbers 14:22). The mishnah now midrashically connects this idea with the Israelites’ experience in the desert. After complaining to God about the report of the spies (see Numbers 14:1-3), God says that they have tested Him “ten times.” These ten times surely included not only the Israelites’ typical grumbling, but physical acts as well (for instance, worshipping the golden calf). Nevertheless, the terrible punishment that none of the adults who left Egypt would reach Canaan (save Caleb and Joshua) was not meted out until this instance. Furthermore, the following verse states, “All those who have vexed Me shall not see it (the land of Canaan).” This implies that the punishment was for verbally vexing God." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "The sufficiency of means is according to the ability of the vower.
And the age is according to the subject of the vow.
The evaluation is according to the subject of the evaluation.
And the evaluations [shall be paid according to the rate prescribed] at the time of the evaluation.
The sufficiency of means is according to the ability of the vower. How so? If a poor man evaluated a rich man, he pays only the valuation of a poor man. But if a rich man evaluated a poor man, he must pay the valuation of a rich man.
Our chapter provides several central rules as to how the amount paid for evaluations is determined. We should note that the literary structure of this chapter is the same as that of the previous chapter the first mishnah gives brief headlines that are further explicated in the rest of the chapter. Therefore, I will again leave the explanation of these headlines for subsequent mishnayot.
Section five: Leviticus 27:8 states, “But if one cannot afford the evaluation, he shall be presented before the priest and the priest shall assess him; the priest shall assess him according to what the vower can afford.” Our mishnah teaches that this is an assessment of the means of the person who made the vow, and not the person whose value was vowed. So if a poor person vows to give the value of a rich person he only pays the amount that a poor person could afford to pay. This estimate has nothing to do with the fact that the person being evaluated was rich. Conversely, if a rich person vows the value of a poor person, he must pay the full amount because he is rich. It does not matter at all that the person whose value he vowed is poor." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah draws a distinction between one who makes a vow of evaluation and one who undertakes to bring someone else’s sacrifices. Whereas in the case of the former, the priest estimates the ability of the vower to pay his vow, in the case of sacrifices the priest estimates the financial ability of the person who was originally obligated to bring the sacrifice, and not the one who took on his obligation.", + "But it is not so with sacrifices. The law with regard to one who vows to bring someone else’s sacrifice is different from the law regarding someone who vows to give someone else’s worth. The mishnah will now explain.", + "If he said: “I take upon myself the sacrifices of this metzora,” and the metzora was poor, he brings the sacrifices of a poor metzora. But if the metzora was rich, he must bring the sacrifices of a rich man. The sacrifices that a metzora, one afflicted with skin disease, brings at the end of his affliction depend upon his financial means. If he is rich he brings the full array of sacrifices (see Leviticus 13) but if he is poor, he can bring fewer sacrifices. In this case, one person vowed to bring the sacrifices of another person who was becoming pure from being a metzora. The vower must bring whatever the metzora was obligated to bring. If the metzora was poor, the vower brings a poor person’s sacrifice, even if the vower himself was rich. Conversely, if the metzora was rich and the vower poor, he must bring the sacrifices of a rich person. In both cases, the obligation goes according to the metzora and not the one making the vow.", + "Rabbi says: I say the same applies with regard to an evaluation. Why is a poor man who evaluated a rich man obliged to pay only the evaluation of a poor man? Because the rich man is not obligated at all. But if the rich man said: “My value is upon me” and the poor man, hearing that, said: “What this man has said, I take upon myself,” then he must pay the evaluation of a rich man. Rabbi says that he can find a situation involving evaluations where we go according to the one being evaluated. First of all, he notes that if a poor man vows the value of a rich man we of course have to go according to the poor man’s means, because the rich man didn’t do anything at all. It would make no sense to do otherwise. But if a rich man vowed his own value, and the poor man said that he wanted to vow what the rich man had already vowed, he must pay the same amount that the rich main vowed. Thus Rabbi has found a case where we go according to the one being evaluated, and not the vower.", + "If he was poor and then became rich, or rich and then became poor, he must pay the evaluation of a rich man. Rabbi Judah says: even if he was poor and became rich and then again became poor he must pay the evaluation of a rich man. If the person who made the vow was rich at the moment he vowed and then he became poor before he paid his debt, we estimate his financial ability as if he were rich, because his liability cannot go down over time. If he made the vow when he was poor and then became rich before he paid his vow, he again pays according to the means of a rich man. This is because at the time he pays his debt he is already of means, and why should he be allowed to pay any less. Rabbi Judah goes even further. Even if he was poor, then became rich and then became poor again (perhaps he jumped onto the dot-com bubble?) he pays according to the means of a rich person. Again we see that once the obligation is set, it can never be reduced, even though it can be increased." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn yesterday’s mishnah we learned that when a person vows another person’s value, whether he was rich at the time of the vow or at the time that he comes to pay his debt, he pays as a rich man. Our mishnah contrasts this with the laws of bringing a sacrifice.", + "But it is not so with sacrifices. When it comes to sacrifices, whether he was rich and became poor, or poor and became rich, he always brings the sacrifices according to his financial means at the time he is actually bringing them.", + "Even if his father was dying [when a man vowed] and left him ten thousand, or if he had a ship on the sea and it brought to him ten thousand, the sanctuary has no claim at all on them. This section relates a halakhah common to both evaluations and sacrifices. If a person has money coming to him, whether through an inheritance or from a boat that is bringing him a large delivery, we ignore his future imminent income and determine his means according to his current financial situation. So if a person is about to become rich, but is still technically poor, he pays his evaluation debt or brings his sacrifices as a poor man." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah, the final mishnah of chapter four, explains the sections of mishnah one that have not yet been explained.", + "“And the age is according to the subject of the vow:” How so? If a child evaluates an old man, he must pay the value of an old man. And if an old man evaluates a child he must pay the value of a child. The amount owed is reckoned according to the person whose value was vowed, and not according to the age of the vower.", + "The evaluation is according to the subject of the evaluation. How so? If a man evaluated a woman, he must pay the value of a woman. And if a woman evaluated a man, she must pay the value of a man. Similarly, the gender is determined by the one whose value is being vowed and not the gender of the vower.", + "“And the evaluations [shall be paid according to the rate prescribed] at the time of the evaluation.” How so? If he evaluated one who was less than five years of age, and he became [meantime] older than five years of age, or if [he evaluated one] who was less than twenty years of age and he became twenty years old, he must pay [only] in accord with the age at the time of the valuation. The value of a person is determined partly by age (and partly by gender). When we determine his age we determine it according to his/her age at the time the vow was made, and not at the time that the vow is paid off.", + "The thirtieth day is considered to be under this age. The fifth year or twentieth year is considered to be under this age. The rest of the mishnah states that the day that someone reaches a certain age, thirty days, five years, twenty years or sixty years, is not yet counted with the older age. Thus a kid who just turns thirty days does not yet have any value (value begins at thirty days). A kid who just turned five, still counts as a kid between the age of thirty days and five years.", + "For it says: “And if he is from sixty years old and upward” (Leviticus 27:7), thus we can learn thus with regard to all others from what is said about sixty years: just as the sixtieth year is considered to be under this age, so also the fifth and twentieth years are under this age. The mishnah proves that the day of the birthday counts with the lower age by quoting the verse concerning the sixty year old. Since the Torah says that he is above sixty years, the implication is that one who is exactly sixty years still pays the higher amount of a person from 20-60.", + "Is that so! Just because [the Torah] accounts the sixtieth year to be under this age, thereby being more stringent, shall we make the fifth or the twentieth year be considered under this age, in order to be lenient? The mishnah now critiques its own midrash. Treating a sixty year old as still belonging to the younger category creates a stringency his value is 50 and not 15. But treating a 5 year old or a 20 year in the younger category creates a leniency since the younger ages have lower values. The mishnah says that just because we treat a sixty year old as being in the younger category does not mean that we would necessarily treat 5 and 20 year olds as being in the younger category.", + "Scripture says, “Years,” “years” as a gezerah shavah: just as with the sixtieth year the word “years” means that it is considered under this age, so the word “years” with the fifth and with the twentieth year are considered under this age, whether this results in being lenient or being stringent. The mishnah now brings another midrash to defend the halakhah that we always treat a person on the day of the birthday as if he still belongs to the previous age category. This is done with a technique called a “gezerah shavah”. What this technique consists of is taking a law from one situation and applying it to another because the Torah uses the same word in both situations. In our case the word is “years” and it is used in connection to one who turns 60 and one who turns 5 and 20. Since it is used in both connections, the same halakhah applies to both.", + "Rabbi Elazar says: [this rule holds good] until they are a month and a day beyond the year. Rabbi Elazar extends the halakhah even further. A person doesn’t enter the new category until he is one month and one day into that category. For instance, one who is 60 doesn’t go down in value to 15 shekels until he is 60, one month and one day." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah deals with a person who dedicates his weight to the Temple.", + "One who said: “I vow my weight,” he must pay his weight, in silver [if he had said in] silver, or in gold [if he had said in] gold. If one vows his weight to the Temple, he must fulfill this vow by paying his weight, either in gold or in silver, depending on how he made his vow.", + "It happened with the mother of Yirmatia, who said, “I vow my daughter's weight.” She went up to Jerusalem and weighed her and then paid her weight in gold. Now this is one of the best stories I’ve ever read in the Mishnah. I can just picture poor Yirmatia being absolutely mortified that her mother had the audacity to vow her weight to the Temple. And then, the poor girl has to get on the scale in front of all of those priests! I wonder if this was all a ruse by the mother to get her daughter on a diet.", + "[If a man said: “I vow] the weight of my hand,” Rabbi Judah says: let him fill a barrel with water and put it [his hand] in up to the elbow. Then let him weigh the flesh, bones and sinews of a donkey and put it into the barrel until it is filled up again. Rabbi Yose said: “But how is it possible to account exactly one kind of flesh against another kind of flesh, and one kind of bones against another kind of bones? Rather: one estimates what the hand is likely to weigh. This mishnah address the Archimedean problem of how to weigh one’s hand. Rabbi Judah employs a system of water displacement, and then comparison of the weight of one’s hand with the weight of a donkey’s bones, sinews and flesh. Rabbi Yose criticizes him for assuming that donkey flesh weighs the same as human flesh. It seems, according to Rabbi Yose, that live human flesh cannot be weighed. The best one can do is just estimate how much the hand weighs. It is unclear how exactly one would do this." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah continues to deal with cases where a person dedicates the value or worth of a body part.", + "[If one said] “The worth of my hand is upon me,” they estimate his worth with his hand and [what it would be] without his hand. In yesterday’s mishnah the vower dedicated the weight of his hand. In this section, he dedicates the “worth of his hand.” This is evaluated the same way that worth is always estimated by examining how much a person would be worth on the slave market. In this case, they first estimate his worth when complete (with his hand), and then how much he would be worth without his hand.", + "In this respect vows of worth are more stringent than vows of value. Later in this mishnah we will learn that if one says, “The value of my hand is upon me,” he is not liable to pay anything. Therefore, in this aspect, vows of “worth” are more stringent than vows of “value” for when one vows the worth of his hand, he must pay its worth.", + "There is an aspect of vows of value that is more stringent than vows of worth. As is typical of the mishnah, once we note that vows of worth are in one way more stringent than vows of value, the mishnah now notes that sometimes the opposite is true.", + "How so? If one said: “My value is upon me” and then he dies, his heirs must pay it. [But if he said:] “My worth is upon me,” and then he dies, his heirs need not pay anything because dead persons have no worth. If one vows his value and then dies, the heirs must pay his value. This is because his value is set by the Torah and is not dependent upon an evaluation. However, if he vows his worth and then dies before they can estimate his worth, his heir need not pay anything because a dead person has no worth. Note that the obligation to pay is only incurred when the estimate is made, and since he has no worth when the estimate is made, the heirs owe nothing.", + "[If he said,] “The value of my hand or foot is upon me,” he has said nothing, [But if he said,] “The value of my head is upon me,” he must pay his whole value. This is the general rule: Anything upon which his life depends, he must pay his full value. If one vows the value of his foot or hand he is not liable to pay anything because the foot and the hand are not synonymous with his life. Since one can only vow the “value” of his life, in this case he has not vowed anything. In contrast, if one vows the value of his head, he has dedicated his full value because one can’t live without a head. He will now have to pay his full value, dependent upon his gender and age. The general rule that ends this mishnah explains just that if one vows the value of an organ that one can’t live without, he is liable to pay his entire value." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with someone who dedicates half of his worth or value.", + "[If one said:] “Half my value is upon me,” he must pay half his evaluation. In this case, he pays half of his value, which is what he intended when he made his vow.", + "[But if he said,] “The value of one half of me he is upon me,” he must pay his full value. Here he phrased his vow slightly differently. Saying “the value of one half of me is upon me,” is like saying “the value of my head is upon me” because no one can live without half of his body. Therefore, as we learned in yesterday’s mishnah, he must pay his full value.", + "[If he said] “Half of my worth is upon me,” he must pay half his worth. Similar to section one, in this case he pays only half of his worth.", + "[If he said,] “The worth of half of me is upon me,” he must pay his whole worth. Although one can estimate how much a slave missing a hand would be worth, there is no way to estimate how much a slave missing half his body would be worth, because he would be worth nothing. Therefore, the worth of half of his body is synonymous with the worth of his whole body and he must pay his entire worth.", + "This is the general rule: Anything on which his life depends, he must pay his whole worth. This is a similar rule to that which we saw in mishnah two concerning vows of value. If someone vows the worth of a body part that he can’t live without, he must pay his entire worth." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah deals with a person who vows another person’s worth or value.", + "If he said: “The value of so-and-so is upon me,” if both the vower and the subject of the vow died, then the heirs must pay it. When the vower dies, the heirs of the vower incur the obligation to pay his vow. Even though the subject of the vow died they can pay his value, because the value is fixed and is not dependent upon an evaluation.", + "[If he said,] “The worth of so-and-so is upon me,” and the vower died, the heirs must pay it. But if the subject of the vow died, the heirs need not pay anything because dead persons have no worth. Here the vower dedicated someone else’s worth, which does require an evaluation. If the vower dies before he pays off his debt, the heirs must pay his debt. But if the subject of the vow dies, then the heirs do not owe anything because a dead person has no worth. This is basically the same halakhah that we learned in mishnah two." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nSince yesterday’s mishnah dealt with cases where a person dedicated the value of another person and then that person dies, today’s mishnah deals with a person who dedicated an animal or a house and then the animal dies or the house falls down.", + "[If someone said:] “This ox shall be an olah [a whole burnt offering],” or “This house shall be an olah,” and the ox died or the house fell down, he is not obligated to pay. In this case, the person dedicated a specific ox or house to the Temple. If the ox dies or the house falls down he is exempt, because his only liability was to give to the Temple “this ox” or “this house.”", + "[But if he said:] “This ox is upon me as an olah” or “this house is upon me as an olah” and the ox died, or the house fell down, he is obligated to pay [their worth]. Here since he said the words, “upon me,” he is obligated to pay the value of the ox even if it dies or the house even if it falls down. “Upon me” means that he is responsible for making sure that the value of the object gets to the Temple" + ], + [ + "With regard to those who made a vow of value: they take a pledge from them.
With regard to those obligated to bring a hatat or asham: they do not take a pledge.
With regard to those obligated to bring an olah or a shelamim: they do take a pledge.
And even though he is not atoned for unless he is willing [to pay his obligation], as it is said: “willingly” (Leviticus 1:3), they coerce him until he says: I agree.
The same is true in the case of divorce documents: they coerce him until he says: I agree.
This famous mishnah deals with how a court enforces a person to pay various obligations.
Section one: If someone makes a vow of value (or worth) and is late in paying his debt, the court can take a pledge (an object of value) from him in order to force him to pay his debt.
Section two: However, if someone has transgressed and is obligated to bring either a hatat (sin offering) or an asham (guilt offering) and he is late in bringing it, the court does not take a pledge from him. The general rule is that if the obligated item comes to atone for a sin, the court does not take a pledge.
Section three: If the person vowed to bring an olah (a burnt offering) or a shelamim (an offering of well-being) the court does take a pledge, because these are not sacrifices that atone for sin.
Section four: This and especially the next section are famous because they deal in general with the ability of the court to enforce obligations. The Torah states that an olah must be brought willingly. If so, how can the court force him to bring an olah or shelamim? The answer is that they force him to say that he agrees. Even though he clearly does not want to bring the sacrifice, the fact that he verbalizes his desire to do so is sufficient. Similarly, when it comes to divorce, the court can force him to write out a divorce document. As we know from other sources, a man can only divorce his wife willingly, but we know that under many circumstances the court forces him to divorce his wife (see for instance Ketubot 7:10; see also Gittin 9:8). Again, how can something be enforced and yet still be done willingly on the part of the person being coerced? The answer is that the court forces him to say that he agrees to the divorce. And as we learn in Gittin, this enforcing can be done even through physical coercion.
The Rambam, in his commentary on this mishnah, notes that although it seems that when the person says, “I agree” he doesn’t really mean it, we attribute to him that he does have the correct intention because he is doing what he should have done of his own free will. According to the Rambam, it is as if his evil urge not to perform the correct act overcame him, and by force the court makes him do what his good side really wanted to do in the first place. We should recognize that this is a dangerous principle and could be broadly applied to many categories. However, the Mishnah does not turn this into a blanket rule, but rather only mentions it in reference to these two categories sacrifices and divorce." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nChapter six deals with the consequences of dedicating one’s property to the Temple. How is the money collected? How does his dedication effect his other obligations? These and other questions are addressed in this mishnah and in the subsequent ones.", + "[The property] of orphans which has been evaluated [must be proclaimed for] thirty days. Occasionally the court needs to sell orphans’ property in order to pay back their father’s debts. When they do so, they proclaim that the property is for sale for thirty days in order to get the best offer.", + "And [the property of] the Sanctuary which has been evaluated, [for] sixty days. When a person dedicates a piece of land to the Temple, the Temple treasury proclaims that the land is for sale for sixty days. This gives them twice as long to get the best offer.", + "They must make the proclamation in the morning and in the evening. The proclamation is made twice a day morning and night.", + "If a man dedicates his property to the Sanctuary and he is still liable for his wife’s ketubah: Rabbi Eliezer says: when he divorces her he must vow that he will not derive any further benefit from her. Rabbi Joshua says: he need not do so. The man’s prior commitment to pay his wife’s ketubah means that if he divorces her, she can collect her ketubah money from the property that he has already dedicated to the Temple. This is not under discussion and indeed is obvious. The problem is that we fear that the man might divorce his wife, allow her to collect her ketubah and then remarry her. This would end up cheating the Temple out of the property that he dedicated to it. To avoid this problem, Rabbi Eliezer says that when he divorces her, he must take a vow never to receive benefit from her again. In this way, he cannot remarry her. Rabbi Joshua seems not to be concerned that a man will go through this ruse in order to cheat the Temple out of its due and therefore he does not obligate the man to take such a vow.", + "Similarly, Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel said: Also if one guarantees a woman's ketubah and her husband divorces her, the husband must vow to derive no benefit from her, lest he make a conspiracy against the property of that man [the guarantor] and take his wife back again. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel brings up another similar situation where we make a husband divorcing his wife take a vow not to derive benefit from her. If a man had a guarantor sign on his ketubah and then he divorced his wife, if the man cannot afford to pay, the guarantor must pay in the husband’s place. In this situation, we fear that the husband will divorce his wife and allow her to collect from the guarantor. Then he will remarry, thereby cheating the guarantor. To protect the guarantor, we make the husband vow that he will not derive any more benefit from his wife." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah continues to deal with the case of a husband who dedicates his property to the Temple while still owing his wife her ketubah money.", + "A man who dedicates his possessions to the sanctuary while he is still liable for his wife's kethubah or in debt to a creditor, the wife cannot collect her ketubah from the consecrated property nor the creditor his debt. Rather he who redeems them must redeem for the purpose of paying the wife her ketubah or the creditor his debt. As I stated in the explanation to yesterday’s mishnah, when a man dedicates his property to the Temple and has a prior debt to his wife or a creditor the wife and creditor must certainly receive their due. However, they do not simply collect from sanctified property, because sanctified property cannot become non-sacred without being redeemed. Rather, what needs to happen is that the person who redeems the property must pay more than the value of the debt or ketubah. Then the money for the debt or ketubah goes to the creditor or to the woman and the property becomes non-sacred. The extra money will go to the Sanctuary.", + "If he had dedicated ninety maneh, worth of property, and he owed one hundred maneh, then he [the creditor] must add one dinar more and he redeems the property for the purpose of paying the ketubah to the wife or the debt to the creditor. In this case, there is a problem because if the person redeeming the property gives the ketubah to the wife or the debt to the creditor, nothing will be left over for the Sanctuary. In a sense, the person is not redeeming the property but rather just purchasing it from the woman or creditor. To avoid this, the redeemer must pay an extra dinar, over the amount owed to the woman or to the creditor. In this way, the Sanctuary will receive at least some money." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah relates to mishnah 5:6, where we learned that the court take pledges (objects of value) in order to force a person to pay his vows of value.\nToday we learn that certain items are not taken by the collector.", + "Even though they said: they take pledges from those who owe vows of value, they allow him food for thirty days, clothing for twelve months, bed and bedding, shoes and tefillin. For himself, but not for his wife and children. When they take the pledge from the person who owes his vow to the Temple, they leave him with certain basic needs, food, clothing and tefillin. However, they don’t leave him with money to support his wife and family. Evidently, those who depend upon him will have to look elsewhere for support. Note that this does not mean that they take his wife’s property. It just means that they don’t leave him with money to buy food for her or his children.", + "If he was a craftsman, they leave him two tools of every kind. If he was a carpenter, they leave him two axes and two saws. If he is a craftsman, he is left with two kinds of each of his tools. This way he can continue to make a living to pay off his debt. An example is a carpenter, who is left with two axes and two saws.", + "Rabbi Eliezer says: if he was a farmer, they leave him his yoke [of oxen]. If a donkey driver, they leave him his donkey. Rabbi Eliezer adds that if he is a farmer they leave him with a pair of oxen to pull his plow. And if he is a donkey driver, they leave him his donkey. These are considered the tools of the donkey driver or farmer’s trade, just as an ax or saw is the tool of a carpenter’s trade." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is a continuation of yesterday’s, which discussed what property the court seizes when taking a pledge from one who owes the Temple money for his vow.", + "If he had many [tools] of one kind, and few of another kind, they may not say to him to sell the many and buy some of the few, but one leaves him two of the kind of which he has many and all that he has from those of which he has few. If he only has one of a certain type of tool, but many of another, he doesn’t get the opportunity to sell some tools in order to buy a second tool of the kind of which he has only one. Rather, they just apply the rule as it is normally applied they leave him with two of every kind, and if only has one, too bad for him.", + "One who consecrates [all] his possessions to the Sanctuary, they count his tefillin in the evaluation. Tefillin count in assessing the value of one’s property. So if one dedicates the value of his property to the Temple, he must include in the assessment the value of his tefillin. [This brings back memories of the day my wife and I bought our first apartment. I remember taking out the mortgage and buying the house and then realizing that before that moment, the most valuable item I owned were my tefillin!]" + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah continues to deal with how the Temple assesses a person’s belongings if they have dedicated all of their property to the Temple.", + "Whether one consecrates his property or evaluates himself, it [the Sanctuary] has no claim to his wife's garment or his children's garment or to the dyed clothes which he had dyed for their use or to the new sandals which he has bought for their use. When a person dedicates all of his property to the Temple, the Temple can make claim only to property that is his they have no share in his family’s property. Even if he bought clothes for his wife or kids, they belong them and not to him. The mishnah goes even further. If the husband has clothes dyed in order to give them to his wife and kids, they already belong to them, even if they have not yet worn them. Similarly, if he buys new sandals for them, they do not belong to the husband, even if the wife and kids have not yet worn them. The mere intent that these items should belong to his family already takes them out of his property.", + "Although they said: “Slaves are sold with their garments to increase their value,” because when a garment for thirty denars is bought for him his value is increased by a maneh. And likewise with a cow, if it is kept waiting to the market-day it increases in value, and similarly a pearl, if brought to a big city increases in value. Nevertheless, the Sanctuary can only claim the value of anything in its own place and at its own time. The main point of this section is that when the Temple’s treasurer estimates the value of a person’s property, he estimates how much it is worth now, and not how much it might be worth in the future. There are three examples in which an owner could easily raise the value of his property. A slave dressed in fine clothing, worth 30 denars, will see his value in the market value go up 100 denar (a maneh) [this is similar to painting your house or fixing your car before you sell it the house increases in value more than the cost of the paintjob]. Similarly, a cow and a pearl that are given time to grow can have their market value greatly increase. In sum, slaves, animals and precious stones can have a large degree of variance in their value. Nevertheless, when the Temple collects from the person who dedicated his property, they assess its worth based on its current value. " + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nChapter seven and the beginning of chapter eight deal with the laws concerning a person who dedicates his ancestral field to the Temple. These laws are found in Leviticus 27.\n16 If anyone consecrates to the Lord any land that he holds, its assessment shall be in accordance with its seed requirement: fifty shekels of silver to a homer of barley seed. 17 If he consecrates his land as of the jubilee year, its assessment stands. 18 But if he consecrates his land after the jubilee, the priest shall compute the price according to the years that are left until the jubilee year, and its assessment shall be so reduced; 19 and if he who consecrated the land wishes to redeem it, he must add one-fifth to the sum at which it was assessed, and it shall pass to him. 20 But if he does not redeem the land, and the land is sold to another, it shall no longer be redeemable: 21 when it is released in the jubilee, the land shall be holy to the Lord, as land proscribed; it becomes the priest's holding.\nWe should note that from the Second Temple period and onward these laws would have been completely theoretical Jews no longer lived on land that they “held,” meaning land that was part of their ancestral possession. However, these laws are found in the Torah and therefore they are of interest to the rabbis.", + "One may not consecrate [a field of his possession] less than two years before the Jubilee, nor redeem it less than one year after the Jubilee. Vs. 18 states, “But if he consecrates his land after the jubilee, the priest shall compute the price according to the years that are left until the jubilee year, and its assessment shall be so reduced.” I have emboldened the word “years” because the halakhah in this mishnah is based on a midrash on that word. “Years” implies that there must be at least two years remaining before the Jubilee. If there are fewer, he cannot consecrate his land. If one has dedicated his land and then wishes to redeem it and it is still the first year of the Jubilee, he must pay the full amount, “fifty shekels of silver to a homer of barley seed” (fifty shekels for every piece of land that requires a homer of barley to sow it). He doesn’t get to reduce the amount because of the months that have passed since the Jubilee.", + "One does not reckon months to [the disadvantage of] the Sanctuary, but the Sanctuary does reckon months [to its own advantage]. The mishnah now notes a general rule with regard to taking months into account. As we already learned, when a person redeems his land, he doesn’t take into account the months that have already passed. Rather he pays according to the full years that have passed since the Jubilee. However, the Sanctuary does benefit from the months that the land has already stayed in the hands of the dedicator. They benefit because he has to pay for them. [Note that this rule is somewhat repetitive].", + "If a man consecrated his field at a time when the law of the Jubilee is in force, he must pay fifty shekels for [every piece of field sufficient for] the sowing of a homer of barley. This states the basic law as found in verse sixteen. Another version of the mishnah reads not “in the time of the Jubilee” but “during the year of the Jubilee.” The Hebrew of these two versions is nearly identical. This would then be an interpretation of verse 16 the verse applies to a person who dedicated his land during the year of the Jubilee. If after the Jubilee, the payment is reduced.", + "If the field contained ravines ten handbreadths deep or rocks ten handbreadths high, they are not included as part of the field. But if less than this, they are included. Ravines and rocks don’t count in measuring the size of the field as long as they are ten handbreadths high or deep. This is because they are considered to be their own domain and not part of the field. However, if they are less than ten high or deep, they are assessed with the field.", + "If he consecrated it two or three years before the Jubilee, he must pay one sela [shekel] and one pondion for each year. Who’s ready for some math? The full price of the field is 50 sela (shekels) for 49 years between one Jubilee and the next. A pondion is worth 1/48 of a sela, so the price per year is one sela and 48/49 of a pondion. The mishnah rounds up in favor of the Temple he pays a full pondion per year.", + "If he says: “I shall pay for each year as it comes,” they do not listen to him, rather he must pay for all the years together. The payment made for redeeming the field must be done in full immediately, even though the field is only worth one sela and one pondion per year." + ], + [ + "It is all the same whether the owner or anyone else [redeems the field].
What is the difference between the owner and any other man? The owner must add one fifth, whereas any other man need not add one fifth.
The reckoning of the value of the field is basically the same whether the owner or another person redeems it. The only difference is that the owner adds another fifth to the value of the field. This is stated in Leviticus 27:19: “And if he who consecrated the land wishes to redeem it, he must add one-fifth to the sum at which it was assessed, and it shall pass to him.” The mishnah reads the words “and if he who consecrated the land” to mean that only if the owner consecrates it must he add another fifth. If others do, there is no added fifth." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah deals with the continuation of the verses about dedicating one’s “and of possession.” These verses read: 20“But if he does not redeem the land, and the land is sold to another, it shall no longer be redeemable: 21 when it is released in the jubilee, the land shall be holy to the Lord, as land proscribed; it becomes the priest's holding.”\nAs we can see, if the owner does not redeem the land, then the land becomes the property of the priests.", + "If a man consecrated [his field] and then redeemed it, it does not go out of his possession in the Jubilee. If the owner redeems it himself, it reverts to being his possession, and stays that way even after the Jubilee.", + "If his son redeemed it, it reverts to his father in the Jubilee. Similarly, if his son redeems it, it goes back to the father, because the son is the eventual inheritor of the land.", + "If another person, or a relative redeemed it, and he redeemed it from his hand, it goes out [to the priests]. However, if other people, and even other relatives redeem the land, it is theirs only temporarily until the Jubilee at which point it becomes the property of the priests, as is stated in the final verse.", + "If one of the priests redeemed it, and it was still in his possession, he cannot say: “Since it goes out to the priests in the Jubilee, and since it is now in my possession, therefore it belongs to me.” Rather, it goes out of his possession to all his fellow priests. If one of the priests redeemed the land before the Jubilee, he is treated just like any other person. It is his until the Jubilee and then it becomes the possession of all the priests. He cannot claim that since he is a priest, at the Jubilee it should become his sole possession." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe rabbis now debate what happens to the land if it is not redeemed before the Jubilee. This is explained in verses 20-21, “But if he does not redeem the land, and the land is sold to another, it shall no longer be redeemable: when it is released in the jubilee, the land shall be holy to the Lord, as land proscribed; it becomes the priest's holding.”", + "If the Jubilee arrived and it was not yet redeemed then the priests enter into possession of the land and they pay its value, the words of Rabbi Judah. According to Rabbi Judah, while the priests do get the rights to the land, they must pay for the Temple for the land. It seems that he holds that when a person dedicates his field to the Temple, the Temple must receive compensation. It is not sufficient for the priests to take over.", + "Rabbi Shimon says: they enter [into possession] but they do not pay [its value]. According to Rabbi Shimon, the priests do not need to pay for the land. It becomes “holy” by virtue of it becoming their possession.", + "Rabbi Eliezer says: they neither enter [into possession] nor pay [its value]. But it is called an abandoned field until the second Jubilee. If the second jubilee has arrived and it was not yet redeemed, it is called a ‘twice abandoned field’ until the third Jubilee. The priests never enter into possession of the field until someone else had redeemed it. Verses 20-21 state that “if the land is sold…it becomes the priest’s holding.” The implication is that if the land is never sold to another person, it does not become the property of the priest. This is Rabbi Eliezer’s position. The land can remain abandoned through several Jubilees and not become the possession of the priests until someone buys the land and then the next Jubilee year arrives." + ], + [ + "If one bought a field from his father, and his father died and afterwards he consecrated it, it is considered a field of possession. A field that is not a “field of possession” reverts to its original owner during the Jubilee, as is stated in Leviticus 27:22-24. When a son buys a field from his father, it is questionable whether that field is considered a “field of possession” because it might eventually become his possession, or whether we treat this as a field that was purchased. If the father dies and then the son consecrates the field, it is considered a field of possession because even if the son had not bought the field, it would have become his (or at least partly his) before he consecrated it.", + "If he consecrated it and afterwards his father died, then it is considered a field acquired by purchase, the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Judah and Rabbi Shimon say: it is considered a field of possession, as it is said: “And if a field which he has, which is not a field of his possession” (Leviticus 27:22) a field which is not capable of becoming a field of his possession, thus excluding a field which is capable of becoming a field of possession. However, if he consecrated it before his father died, there is a debate as to the status of the field. According to Rabbi Meir it is considered a field acquired by purchase. If he redeems it, he need not add an extra fifth, as is the rule with a field of possession. And if he doesn’t redeem it, during the Jubilee it reverts to its original owners. Rabbis Shimon and Judah disagree and derive through a midrash that any field that could become one’s through inheritance cannot be put into the category of a purchased field. Therefore, even if he dedicates the field purchased from his father before his father dies, it still retains the status of a “field of possession.” If he redeems it he will need to add an extra fifth, and if he doesn’t redeem it, it will become the possession of the priests during the Jubilee year.", + "A field acquired by purchase does not go out to the priests in the year of the Jubilee, for no man can consecrate an object not belonging to him. A field that is purchased does not really belong to the purchaser because the field will eventually revert to the original owner’s possession during the following Jubilee. Therefore, it never becomes the possession of the priests. The purchaser cannot truly consecrate it because it was never his.", + "Priests and Levites may consecrate [their fields] at any time and redeem at any time, both before and after the jubilee. There are special laws concerning a priest or Levite who dedicates his field. They may dedicate their field even within two years of the Jubilee (compare with mishnah one) and they can redeem their own field even after the Jubilee. This is different from an Israelite who can never redeem his field after the Jubilee." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah begins to deal with the laws of consecrating one’s inherited field at a time when the Jubilee was no longer observed. The mishnah describes a time when the Temple is still standing, meaning that the law of the Jubilee was not observed during the Second Temple period.", + "If one consecrated his field at a time when the [law of the] Jubilee was no longer observed, they say to him: “You open [the bidding]!” because the owner must pay an added fifth, whereas others do not pay an additional fifth. When the Jubilee was no longer observed, a consecrated field was redeemed through an auction. The first bidder was always the original owner and if he did not want to redeem the Temple officials would force him to make at least a minimum bid. The preference for redeeming the field goes to the owner because when he redeems the field he adds an extra fifth. In contrast, when the Jubilee year was still observed, they didn’t force the owner to redeem his field because an unredeemed field eventually would belong to the priests.", + "It happened that one consecrated his field because it was bad. They said to him: “You open the bidding.” He said: “I will acquire it for an issar.” Rabbi Yose said: he did say that, but rather “for an egg,” because consecrated objects may be redeemed by either money or money's equivalent. He [the Temple treasurer] said to him: It’s yours. It turns out he lost an issar and the field was his again. In this somewhat amusing story, an owner of a field consecrates a field because due to its poor quality. They then force him to at least put forth a bid. His bid is extremely low, an issar, which is 1/24 of a dinar. Rabbi Yose says that he offered an egg for the field, an object probably worth about an issar, if not more. In any case, with this tiny bid, he has acquired his field. He loses the issar to the Temple, but the field is restored to his possession." + ], + [ + "If one said: I will acquire it for ten selas, and another, [for] twenty, and another for thirty, and another for forty, and another for fifty, If he [that bid] fifty reneged, they take pledges from his property up to ten selas. If he [that bid] forty reneged, they take pledges from his property up to ten selas. If he [that bid] thirty reneged, they take pledges from his property up to ten selas. If he that bid twenty reneged they take pledges from his property up to ten selas. If he that bid ten reneged they sell [the field] for what it is worth, and collect what remains from him who bid ten.
In this imaginative scenario there is initially a bidding war for the field, each person upping the previous bid by ten selas. Finally, the bid is won by the person who bid 50 selas. Then all of the bidders begin to renege. The mishnah delineates how the Temple deals with this situation. Note—the idea is that the Temple should collect the highest bid, but that all of those who bid should have to pay something. Basically the Temple takes a pledge from each person equivalent to the amount that he upped the previous bid ten selas. When they get to the last person, they simply sell the field and then take from him the difference between ten and the sale price. In this way, the Temple collects fifty selas, but no more than fifty selas.", + "If the owner bid twenty and any other man bid twenty, then the owner comes first, because he must add one fifth.
If the owner and another person put forth the same bid, the owner's bid is accepted because he must add an extra fifth. In this way the Temple maximizes its profits." + ], + [ + "Introduction
This mishnah deals with a case where the owner of the field is slightly outbid by another. The complicating factor is that the owner has to add an extra fifth, thereby increasing the profit gained by the Temple. Sometimes, a lower bid by the owner is actually better for the Temple than a higher bid by others.
The added fifth in rabbinic law is calculated by being a fifth of the final amount. Thus an added fifth of twenty is five, because 1/5 of 25 is five. If I remember my algebra the equation for this would be: x=(y+x)/5, where x is the added fifth and y is the original bid. This is called in rabbinic terminology, an outside fifth.", + "If one said I will acquire it for twenty-one selas, then the owners must pay twenty-six. [If one said] Twenty-two, the owners must pay twenty-seven. Twenty-three, the owners must pay twenty-eight. Twenty-four, the owners must pay twenty-nine. Twenty-five, the owners must pay thirty, For they need not add one fifth to what the other bids more.
In all of these cases the owner bid twenty. If the other person bid 21, then the owner's bid of 20 will end up more profitable for the Temple, because it is actually 25. He must pay 26 because we can't allow the principal that he pays to be less than that of the other bidder. So of the 26 he pays, 21 is considered principal and 5 is the extra fifth. Note that the owner is forced to pay the extra sela, even though his original bid would have caused him to pay only 25. The same is true in cases where others bid 22-25—the owners add the fifth to their bid, taking them to 25, and then they add the number that by which the other's bid was greater than theirs.
The final line of this section explains that the owners don’t have to pay an added fifth for the extra amount that they pay to surpass the other's bid. In other words, their principal, upon which they pay the added fifth, remains 20. This is because the other bid did not surpass their bid and the added fifth.", + "If one said: I will acquire it for twenty-six, if the owners want to pay thirty-one and an extra denar, the owner comes first. And if not, we say to the other: It has become yours.
In this case, the other bid was higher than the owner's bid and the added fifth taken together. In order to beat the other bid the owner will need to pay thirty-one selas and one denar. This consists of the original twenty five of their own bid (20 +5). Then they need to pay an extra six selas to add up to the twenty-six the other guy bid. For the extra sela which they were outbid they need to pay an added fifth, because in this case the extra amount bid was higher than his bid. This added fifth is one denar, because a sela is four denars. So it turns out that the owner pays 31 selas and one denar.
In this case the owner has the option to not pay the higher amount and allow the field to go to the other bidder. " + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe remainder of chapter eight deals with Leviticus 27:28: “But of all that anyone owns, be it man or beast or land of his holding, nothing that he has proscribed for the Lord may be sold or redeemed; every proscribed thing is totally consecrated to the Lord.” From this verse we see that a person can devote part of his property to God. The word for “proscribed” is “herem.” According to the Torah, when a person “proscribes” any of his property to God it cannot be sold or redeemed. Rather it permanently becomes the property of the priests (see below in mishnah six).", + "A man may proscribe [part] of his flock or of his herd, of his Canaanite slaves or female slaves or of his field of possession. But if he proscribed all of them, they are not considered [validly] proscribed, the words of Rabbi Eliezer. A person can proscribe some of a certain type of possession. For instance, he can proscribe some of his flock, herd or slaves. But he cannot proscribe all of them, and if he tries to do so, they are not considered to be sacred. This halakhah may come from a midrash on the words “of all that anyone owns” and not “all that anyone owns.” The implication is that one cannot proscribe all of his property and not even all of any one type of property.", + "Rabbi Elazar ben Azaryah said: just as when it comes to the Highest One, one is not permitted to proscribe all of his possessions, how much more so should one be careful with his property. Rabbi Elazar ben Azaryah learns a moral lesson from the previous halakhah. One is not allowed to dedicate all of a certain type of property to the Temple, because that would be too great of a loss to his estate. The Torah prevents a person from acting so rashly when it comes to his own property even though the designee of this proscription is God what could be better than that! From here we can draw the lesson that people should be careful not to lose their property, a lesson that we might heartily agree with, even after two thousand years. Indeed, to this day, when a person gives a large percentage of his property to charity, he is praised, but if he gives all of it away, leaving himself with nothing to live on, he is probably considered foolish." + ], + [ + "If one proscribes his son or his daughter, or his Hebrew slave or female slave, or the field which he acquired by purchase, they are not considered [validly] proscribed, for one can proscribe something that does not belong to him. One can proscribe only things that belong to him as permanent possessions. This is stated quite clearly in Leviticus 27:28, “But of all that anyone owns, be it man or beast or land of his holding.” Thus one cannot proscribe his children, his Hebrew slaves (whom he does not own) or land which he acquired through purchase. Such land will revert to its original owners when the Jubilee year comes, so it doesn’t really belong to its current owner.", + "Priests and Levites cannot proscribe [their belongings], the words of Rabbi Judah. Rabbi Shimon says: the priests cannot proscribe, because things proscribed belong to them. But Levites can proscribe, because things proscribed do not belong to them. As we stated in the introduction, when someone proscribes (he uses the language, herem) his property, he is giving it to the priests. Therefore, if priests proscribe their property, nothing happens to it. According to Rabbi Judah, Levites too cannot proscribe their property. Rabbi Shimon holds that while priests cannot proscribe, Levites can, because the property they proscribe does not become theirs, but rather the priets.", + "Rabbi says: the words of Rabbi Judah seem acceptable in cases of immovable property as it is said: “For that is their perpetual possession,” (Leviticus 25:34) and the words of Rabbi Shimon seem acceptable in cases of movable property, since things proscribed do not fall to them. Rabbi [Judah Hanasi] functions in this mishnah as a halakhic decisor in the debate between Rabbi Judah and Rabbi Shimon concerning whether Levites can proscribe their property. Rabbi agrees that when it comes to immovable property, i.e. land, a Levite cannot proscribe his property. This is because states that the land that the Levites own is their “perpetual possession.” If they were allowed to proscribe their land, they could lose it. Therefore, they cannot proscribe any of their land. However, when it comes to movable property (animals, possessions, etc.) they can proscribe it, as Rabbi Shimon stated. This is because they don’t have the complication that priests have that the proscribed property would become theirs." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn today’s mishnah the sages and Rabbi Judah ben Batera disagree as to whether things that are proscribed without specification go to the priests or to a fund for Temple repairs. We should note that the first says, “every proscribed thing is totally consecrated to the Lord.” The meaning of “to the Lord” is disputed in our mishnah.", + "Things proscribed for [the use of] the priests cannot be redeemed but are to be given to the priests. That things proscribed cannot be redeemed is stated explicitly in the Torah, “nothing that he has proscribed for the Lord may be sold or redeemed.” According to this opinion, the proscribed things become the property of the priests. The source of this can be found in section three below.", + "Rabbi Judah ben Batera says: things proscribed without specification fall to [the fund for] Temple repairs, as it was said: “Every proscribed thing is most holy to the Lord” (Leviticus 27:25). Rabbi Judah ben Batera and the sages argue over whether things that are proscribed without specification, meaning the person did not state where he wanted the things to go, are given to the fund for Temple repair or to the priests. According to Rabbi Judah ben Batera, they are given to Temple repair. This is the meaning of “most holy to the Lord.”", + "But the sages say: things proscribed without specification go to the priests, as it is said: “As a field proscribed: its possession belongs to the priest” (Leviticus 27:21). If so, why is it said: “Every proscribed thing is most holy to the Lord”? This teaches that it applies to most holy and less holy things. The other sages point out that Leviticus 27:21 (and Numbers 18:14) clearly state that proscribed things belong to the priests. This then causes them to ask why the Torah says, “Every proscribed thing is most holy to the Lord.” They interpret this verse as if it says, “Every proscribed thing, even a most holy thing, is holy to the Lord.” The next mishnah will discuss this halakhah." + ], + [ + "A man may proscribe his holy things, whether they are most holy things or less holy things.
If [they had been] consecrated as a vow, he must give their value, if as a freewill-offering, he must give what it is worth to him.
[If he said:] “Let this ox be an olah,” one estimates how much a man would pay for the ox to offer it as an olah, which he was not obliged [to offer].
A first-born, whether unblemished or blemished, may be proscribed. How can it be redeemed? They estimate what a man would give for this first-born in order to give it to the son of his daughter or to the son of his sister.
Rabbi Ishmael says: one verse says, [All first-born males] you shall sanctify,” (Deuteronomy 15:19) and another verse says: [“The first-borns among beasts] no man shall sanctify it” (Leviticus 27:26). It is impossible to say: “You shall sanctify,” since it was said already: “No man shall sanctify,” and it is impossible to say: “No man shall sanctify,” since it is also said: “You shall sanctify”? Therefore resolve [thus]: you may sanctify it by consecrating its value [to the owner], but you may not sanctify it by consecrating it to the altar.
Today’s mishnah explains how one proscribes something that is already holy.
Section one: As we learned in yesterday’s mishnah, a person can proscribe his most holy things (such as an olah a whole burnt offering) or his less holy things (such as a shelamim a wellbeing offering). Our mishnah describes what happens when he does after all, if something is already sanctified, how can he proscribe it either to the priests or for the upkeep of the Temple?
Section two: There are two ways of consecrating something: 1) as a vow; 2) as a freewill offering. Consecrating something as a vow means that he said, “I vow to bring an olah or a shelamim.” Then he sets aside an animal to be the olah or shelamim (a burnt offering and an offering of wellbeing). In this case, if something should happen to the animal he would have to bring another in its stead in order to fulfill his vow. He then proscribes this animal. In this case, since he was responsible for the animal, he can proscribe its entire value. This value must be given either to the priests or to the upkeep of the Temple.
Section three: The other way of consecrating something is by saying, “This animal will be an olah or a shelamim.” In this case, if something should happen to the animal, he is not responsible to bring another in its stead. Thus the animal was not worth to him its full value (as it was in the previous case) because if it gets lost or dies, he need not bring another. We now have to evaluate how much it was worth to him. There are two ways of understanding how this is done. The first is that we evaluate how much a person would pay to offer an olah when he is not obligated to do so. A person might feel some pleasure from bringing a sacrifice and we could even give a monetary amount to this benefit. This is the amount that he would have to pay to the priests or to the upkeep of the Temple.
The other interpretation of this section is that we find how much a priest who is not currently on his watch at the Temple would pay a person to wait until his watch to bring his olah so that he could have the benefit of offering it up. This amount of money is what the person who proscribed the animal would be obligated to give to the priests or to the upkeep of the Temple.
Section four: A person can proscribe a first born animal, whether it is blemished (and edible to its owner) or unblemished (and must be given to the priest). The mishnah now explains how we evaluate how much the one who proscribed the first-born owes in a case where he was obligated to give it to a priest (an unblemished animal.) This animal cannot be given to a priest in return for money. But he could give it to his daughter’s son, if his daughter married a priest or to his nephew if his sister married a priest. We estimate how much a person would pay to give such a gift to his nephew or grandson and that is the amount he owes.
Rabbi Ishmael now provides a midrash to prove that one can dedicate a first born so that its value goes to the Temple or to the priests but one cannot dedicate a first-born for it to become a sacrifice. He points out that in reference to the first born one verse says, “you shall dedicate” and another verse says, “you shall not consecrate.” These two verses seemingly disagree with one another. He resolves them by having them refer to our situation you can dedicate the first born so that its value goes to the priests, but you cannot dedicate a first born so that it is put onto the altar as a different type of sacrifice." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah deals with the laws of selling one’s ancestral land to another person when the Jubilee was still observed. Concerning this law, Leviticus 25 states:\n13In this year of Jubilee, each of you shall return to his holding. 14 When you sell property to your neighbor, or buy any from your neighbor, you shall not wrong one another. 15 In buying from your neighbor, you shall deduct only for the number of years since the Jubilee; and in selling to you, he shall charge you only for the remaining crop years: 16 the more such years, the higher the price you pay; the fewer such years, the lower the price; for what he is selling you is a number of harvests. 17 Do not wrong one another, but fear your God; for I the Lord am your God.", + "If one sold his field [of possession] at the time when the Jubilee was in force, he may not redeem it for two years, as it says: “According to the number of the years of the crops he shall sell to you” (Leviticus 25:15). When one sells his ancestral land he can redeem it until the following Jubilee (Leviticus 25:10). In essence, what he is actually selling is the right to use the land until the owner redeems it, or until the Jubilee comes. Since the Torah uses the word “years” when referring to selling or buying ancestral land, the rabbis deduce that no sale can be for less than two years.", + "If there was a year of blight or mildew, or a seventh year, it is not included in the count. If there was a year in which the purchaser could not plant, either because it was the seventh year or because of bad weather or blight, that year does not count towards the two.", + "If he only broke the ground [without planting] or left it fallow [for a year], that year is included in the count. However, if the purchaser decided of his own volition not to plant during a one of the first two years of his acquisition, that year counts towards the two year minimum.", + "Rabbi Elazar says: if he sold it to him before Rosh Hashanah year, and it was still full of fruit, he enjoys three crops in two years. Rabbi Elazar points out that sometimes a person can get a “three for two” deal. If he buys a piece of land right before Rosh Hashanah and it is full of produce, he can harvest that produce and then he still gets a full two years to work and harvest the land. He only pays for two years, so he is getting one harvest for free. It seems that when we reckon the years we don’t begin from the point of purchase but rather from Rosh Hashanah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah continues to deal with how one redeems one’s ancestral field.", + "If he sold it to the first for one hundred [denars] and the first sold it to the second for two hundred, then he need reckon only with the first, as it says, “With the man to whom he sold” (Leviticus 25:27). In this case, the person who wishes to redeem his field must reckon only with the person to whom he sold the field, and not with the person who bought from him. The way this is done is by first dividing the price of the field according to the number of years between the purchase and the next Jubilee. Let’s say he bought the field for 100 denars and there were ten years until the next Jubilee. When the owner comes to redeem his field he will pay ten denars for every year left. Then, the purchaser will have to restore the remainder of the money to the one who bought it from him, according to the value to which he sold it to him. So if the field was redeemed in the fifth year, the redeemer will give fifty to the first buyer, and the first buyer will have to give another 100 to the second buyer, who paid 20 denars a year for the field.", + "If he sold it to the first for two hundred, and the first sold it to the second for one hundred, then he need reckon only with the second, as it says: “With the man” ( the man in possession of the field. If the first buyer sold it to the second buyer for a lesser amount of money, the original owner need reckon the redemption price only with the second buyer. The mishnah’s midrash takes the word “the man” from the same verse as above, and isolates it, as if it means, “sometimes the original owner reckons with the first buyer and sometimes with the second buyer.” The halakhah ends up being lenient in both cases on the original owner, a person who grew so poor he had to sell his ancestral holdings. The lesson learned here is that the Torah wants the original owner to be able to acquire his ancestral land back, and therefore will make the law as lenient as possible to achieve such a goal.", + "One may not sell a distant field in order to redeem a near one, or a poor field in order to redeem a good one. One may not borrow [money] in order to redeem, nor redeem it in halves. There are, however, certain restrictions when it comes to redeeming the ancestral land that he sold. One cannot sell some ancestral property in order to redeem other property, even if the property he wants to redeem is closer to his current residence, or the property he wants to redeem is of better quality than the property he wants to sell. One cannot borrow money in order to redeem his land. This may be a measure meant to prevent a poor person from going into even greater debt. Finally, one cannot redeem half of the property it’s either the whole thing or none.", + "But in the case of objects consecrated all these things are permitted. In this respect the laws concerning a person’s [property] are more stringent than those concerning sacred things. These limitations do not apply to redeeming land dedicated to the Temple. In such a case, we allow him to borrow in order to redeem the land, or redeem it piece by piece. It seems that there is a desire to make it a bit easier for the Temple to receive the money for the dedicated land. The mishnah concludes by noting that in this respect, the laws concerning redeeming land from another person are more stringent than those governing redeeming land from the Temple. This is indeed an oddity, because usually the laws regarding holy things are more stringent." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah and the remainder of the chapter deal with Leviticus 25:29-35, the verses that talk about a person selling a home within a walled city. The seller has one year to redeem his home, and if he does not redeem it, it becomes the property of the purchaser.", + "If one sold a house among the houses of a walled city, he may redeem it at once and at any time during twelve months. When it comes to redeeming a house sold in a walled city, the seller may redeem it immediately. There is no waiting period as there is for inherited fields.", + "This is a kind of interest, yet it is not interest. Selling a house in order to redeem it looks like interest, which is prohibited, but it is not interest. If Reuven sells his house to Shimon and it stays with Shimon for a period of months and then Reuven buys it back, it looks like Shimon has loaned Reuven the money in return for use of the house. If this was actually a case of lending money, the deal would have been prohibited. It is allowed because this is actually a sale and not a loan.", + "If the seller died, his son may redeem it. If the purchaser died, it may be redeemed from his son. If the seller dies, his son has the right to redeem the house. Similarly, if the purchaser dies, the seller may redeem it from his son.", + "One counts the year only from the time that he sold it, as it is said, “Before a full year has elapsed” (Leviticus 25:30). The year in which he has to redeem it is reckoned according to the date that the original owner sold the field. This is true even if his son is redeeming it, after he inherited the right to do so from his father. No matter the case, the field can be redeemed for only one year from the point of the original sale.", + "When it says a “a full” [year] the extra month is included. Rabbi says: he is allowed a year and its extra month. During a leap year, the seller has an extra month to redeem his field. Rabbi holds that a person is allowed a full lunar year, plus the extra eleven days separating a lunar year from a solar year. This is true regardless of whether the year was a leap year or not. One always gets a solar year in which to redeem the house. This is interesting because we are used to saying that the Jewish calendar is based on the moon. While this is true with regard to the months, it seems to be less true with regard to the year. When it comes to the year, we have a mix between a lunar calendar and a solar calendar." + ], + [ + "If the [last] day of the twelve months has arrived and it was not redeemed, it becomes his permanent [possession].
This applies whether he bought it or received it as a gift, as it is said: “beyond reclaim” (Leviticus 25:30).
In earlier times, he [the buyer] would hide on the last day of the twelve months, so that [the house] might become his permanent [possession].
Hillel enacted that he [the seller] could deposit his money in the chamber and break down the door and enter, and that the other [the buyer], whenever he wanted, might come and take his money.
Section one: If the last day of the twelve months passes and the owner doesn’t redeem his property, the house becomes the permanent possession of the purchaser. The house doesn’t go back to its original owner during the Jubilee year.
Section two: Leviticus 25:30 reads, “If it is not redeemed before a full year has elapsed, the house in the walled city shall pass to the purchaser beyond reclaim throughout the ages.” The words “beyond reclaim” and “throughout the ages” seem to be redundant. The rabbis use this redundancy as a source from which to conclude that the same laws that apply to selling the land also apply to giving it away. One who gives his house to another can redeem it, although all he must do is claim it in return.
Section three: Before Hillel, the seller would have to actually find the purchaser in order to redeem his house. It seems that they would quite frequently they would wait until the last possible day to redeem the house. This led to the purchaser hiding from the seller so the latter couldn’t reclaim possession of his house. In order to fix this problem, and to allow the sellers, who were assumedly poor and in desperate need of money, to reclaim their homes, Hillel allowed them to deposit their money in the chamber of the treasury in the Temple. Then he could go back to his house, break down the door and enter legally. The purchaser could come and collect his money from the Temple whenever he wanted.
We should note that there are other “takkanot” (rabbinic enactments) that are ascribed to Hillel in which we find Hillel shaping the halakhah to improve the lot of the poor. The most famous of them is the “prozbul” which allowed a creditor to collect his debt after the sabbatical year. There too Hillel acted to protect the poor, for if creditors could not be assured of their ability to collect their loans, they would never lend to the poor in the first place." + ], + [ + "Whatever is within the [city] wall is regarded as the houses in a walled city, with the exception of fields. Rabbi Meir says: even fields.
Anything inside the walled city is governed by the laws regarding houses in the walled city. The first opinion holds that fields are the exception. The implication would be that can be redeemed, if sold, up until the Jubilee year. Rabbi Meir says that even fields within the city must be redeemed within a year, or they become the permanent property of the buyer.", + " A house built into the wall: Rabbi Judah says: it is not considered a house within a walled city. Rabbi Shimon says: its outer wall is regarded as its [city] wall.
In thickly walled cities, houses were often built right into the walls. We see this in the Tanakh in connection with Jericho. According to Rabbi Judah these houses are not considered to be within the walled city. Rather they are like houses in a courtyard, a topic which mishnah seven will discuss.
Rabbi Shimon says that the outside wall of the house counts as the wall of the city and therefore these houses are considered part of the city." + ], + [ + "Introduction
Houses in cities that are not surrounded by walls are not treated in the same way as house in walled cities. These are called “houses in courtyards” and we will the halakhot which govern them tomorrow. Our mishnah discusses what cities count as being walled.", + "A city whose roofs [look as if] they form its wall,
If the city does not really have a wall, but its houses are so close together that they look like a wall, it still does not count as a walled city.", + "Or that was not encompassed by a wall in the days of Joshua ben Nun, is not considered like houses in a walled city.
In order for a city to count as a walled city it has to have had a wall around it in the time of Joshua. In other words, the status of walled or not walled is determined by the status of the city when the land was first conquered and then divided up to the original tribes. This is probably because these laws refer to ancestral inheritance, and ancestral inheritance begins at the time of Joshua.", + "[A house in any of] the following counts a house in a walled city: [those in a city] of no less than three courtyards, having two houses each, which have been encompassed by a wall in the days of Joshua ben Nun, such as the old acroplis of Tzippori, the fort of Gush-Halav, old Yodfat, Gamla, G'dod, Hadid, Ono, Jerusalem and other similar cities.
In order to count as a walled city the city must fulfill two main conditions:
1) Firstly, it must be large enough to be considered a city. The mishnah requires the city to have at least three courtyards, each with two houses.
2) Second, the city has to have been surrounded by walls at the time of Joshua. There are eight such cities listed here. Tzippori and Yodfat are in the Lower Galilee, and Gush-Halav and Gamla are in the Upper Galilee. G’dod (or in other versions, G’dor) is on the other side of the Jordan and Hadid and Ono are in Judea, near Lod. Jerusalem, I am assuming, is familiar to everyone." + ], + [ + "Introduction
Leviticus 25:31 reads, \"But houses in courtyards that have no surrounding walls shall be classed as open country: they may be redeemed, and they shall be released through the Jubilee.\"
Our mishnah discusses how we treat houses in walled cities.", + "Houses in courtyards - we accord to them the advantages of houses in a walled city and the advantages given to fields:
When an owner sells a house found in a courtyard (and not in a walled city) he has a much easier time redeeming it. It has all of the advantages that a house in a walled city has over a field and all of the advantages that a field has over a house in a walled city.", + "They can be redeemed at once, and at any time within the twelve months like houses [in a walled city], and they return [to the owners] in the Jubilee or [at an earlier time] by [payment of a] reduced price like fields.
It has the advantages of a house in a walled city in that it can be redeemed immediately and throughout the twelve months that he has to buy it back. This is different from fields which can be redeemed only after they are with the purchaser for at least two years.
There are two advantages that these houses have for the seller over houses in walled cities. First, they revert to their owner at the Jubilee. Second, when the seller buys the house back, he reduces the money for the amount of time that the house was in the hands of the purchaser, as is the case with fields but not with houses in a walled city.", + "The following are considered houses in courtyards: [a city which has] two courtyards, each having two houses, even though they have been encompassed by a wall since the days of Joshua ben Nun, they count as houses in courtyards.
This section is the opposite of the last section of yesterday’s mishnah. If the house was in a place too small to be considered a city, or in a walled city that was not surrounded by walls then it counts as a house in a courtyard, and not a house in a walled city. " + ], + [ + "Introduction\nHouses owned by Levites in the cities that were allotted to them have rules that differ from those that apply to houses owned by Israelites. This is states in Leviticus 25:32-33:\n32 As for the cities of the Levites, the houses in the cities they hold the Levites shall forever have the right of redemption. 33 Such property as may be redeemed from the Levites houses sold in a city they hold shall be released through the jubilee; for the houses in the cities of the Levites are their holding among the Israelites.\nThe second half of the mishnah deals with the status of the lands that surround the Levites cities. This issue is dealt with in Numbers 35: 1-5:\n1 The Lord spoke to Moses in the steppes of Moab at the Jordan near Jericho, saying: 2 Instruct the Israelite people to assign, out of the holdings apportioned to them, towns for the Levites to dwell in; you shall also assign to the Levites pasture land around their towns. 3 The towns shall be theirs to dwell in, and the pasture shall be for the cattle they own and all their other beasts. 4 The town pasture that you are to assign to the Levites shall extend a thousand cubits outside the town wall all around. 5 You shall measure off two thousand cubits outside the town on the east side, two thousand on the south side, two thousand on the west side, and two thousand on the north side, with the town in the center. That shall be the pasture for their towns.", + "If an Israelite inherited from his mother's father who was a Levite, he cannot redeem it according to the order prescribed here. Also if a Levite inherited from his mother's father who was an Israelite, he cannot redeem it according to the order prescribed here, As it says, “As for the houses of the cities of the Levites” (Leviticus 25:32) [this order does not apply] unless he is a Levite and in the cities of the Levites, the words of Rabbi. We can see from Leviticus 25:32-33 that Levites always retain the right to redeem their houses, and if they don’t redeem them, they are released in the Jubilee year. According to Rabbi, the rules in these verses apply only to Levites that have sold ancestral Levitical lands. So if an Israelite inherits Levitical land from his Levite maternal grandfather, he is treated like an Israelite. Similarly, if a Levite inherits land from his Israelite maternal grandfather, the land is not considered to be the land of the Levites.", + "The sages say: these things apply to the cities of the Levites. According to the sages, these rules apply to all Levitical land, even if it is owned by an Israelite. They agree, however, that Israelite land inherited by a Levite is treated like Israelite land. The rules depend on the land, not on the person.", + "One may not turn a field into pasture land, nor pasture land into a field, nor pasture land into a city, nor a city into pasture land. In the passage from Numbers that I quoted above, there seems to be a significant discrepancy between verse four, which says “one thousand cubits” and verse five, which says, “two thousand cubits.” In Sotah 5:3, Rabbi Eliezer, the son of Rabbi Yose Hagalili says that one thousand cubits refers to pasture land, land which is not used for planting or for houses, and the two thousand cubits beyond that refers to fields for planting crops. Our mishnah teaches that when it comes to the cities of the Levites, one may not turn pasture land into a field or vice versa, and similarly one may not turn the pasture land into a city by enlarging the city. The status of these lands is given by the Torah and it does not change.", + "Rabbi Elazar said: When is this so? When it comes to the cities of the Levites, but when it comes to cities of Israelites one may turn a field into pasture land, pasture land into a field, pasture land into a city, but not a city into pasture land, in order that they should not destroy the cities of Israel. Rabbi Eliezer says that these rules work differently when it comes to Israelite cities. One may turn a field into pasture and pasture into a field (this is according to one reading of the mishnah other readings state that one may not turn pasture into field). One can also turn pasture land into a city. The one thing that cannot be done is to destroy parts of the city in order to turn them into pasture land. The mishnah prohibits this in order not to destroy the cities of Israel.", + "Priests and Levites may sell [a house] at any time and redeem it at any time, as it is said: “The Levites shall forever have the right of redemption” (Leviticus 25:32). Priests and Levites can sell and redeem their ancestral land, even within the first two years of their sale. They do not have the same restriction of two years that applies to Israelites (see mishnah one). They can also redeem their houses even after a year has passed (see also mishnah 7:5). Congratulations! We have finished Tractate Arakhin! It is a tradition at this point to thank God for helping us finish learning the tractate and to commit ourselves to going back and relearning it, so that we may not forget it and so that its lessons will stay with us for all of our lives. The laws of Arakhin have basically not been in effect for thousands of years; some of them weren’t even applied when the Temple still stood. Nevertheless, there are some very interesting issues about the worth of human beings that can be found in the beginning of the tractate. As we learned, a person can be evaluated in two ways: 1) by an absolute value that is not determined at all by what s/he does, by how much money they make, by their abilities etc. This value is completely determined by the Torah. While we cannot quite say that everyone has the same value according to this system, because the Torah assigns different values based on age and gender, at least within an age group and gender group there is equality. 2) By how much a person could be sold on the slave market. This will depend on a person’s abilities, their looks, their health, etc. Every person will have a different worth, mostly based on their own accomplishments. I think that these two ways of evaluating people remain with us today. We have an ideal: that all human beings are created equal, but we realize that in reality, some people are worth more to the society than others, some people earn more money their others, and some people are more intelligent than others. While we strive for the ideal, we realize that the reality also has to be recognized. I hope you have enjoyed Arakhin. Tomorrow we begin Tractate Temurah." + ] + ] + ] + }, + "schema": { + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה ערכין", + "enTitle": "English Explanation of Mishnah Arakhin", + "key": "English Explanation of Mishnah Arakhin", + "nodes": [ + { + "heTitle": "הקדמה", + "enTitle": "Introduction" + }, + { + "heTitle": "", + "enTitle": "" + } + ] + } +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Kodashim/English Explanation of Mishnah Arakhin/English/merged.json b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Kodashim/English Explanation of Mishnah Arakhin/English/merged.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..62b4c98b8831dff517ae26a16f7c238a2f5a0358 --- /dev/null +++ b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Kodashim/English Explanation of Mishnah Arakhin/English/merged.json @@ -0,0 +1,354 @@ +{ + "title": "English Explanation of Mishnah Arakhin", + "language": "en", + "versionTitle": "merged", + "versionSource": "https://www.sefaria.org/English_Explanation_of_Mishnah_Arakhin", + "text": { + "Introduction": [ + "Our tractate is called Arakhin, the plural of “erekh” which means “value.” The tractate deals mostly with Leviticus 27, whose topic is evaluating people, animals and land whose value were donated to the Temple. For instance, a person who says, “My value (erekh) is upon me” means to say that he wishes to donate to the Temple his value. The value of a person is fixed according to Leviticus, and it will depend on a person’s gender and age. In addition, a person can dedicate to the Temple the value of an animal or a piece of property, topics that are also covered in Leviticus 27. Sometimes these values are fixed and sometimes they are individually assessed. As background to this tractate, it would be highly advisable to read this chapter of the Torah. I have included it below for your convenience. There are also laws in our tractate concerning the sale of ancestral property, a topic dealt with in Leviticus 25. While these laws are no longer practical, since we don’t have a Temple, they can teach us a lot about how people would have donated money to the Temple, as well as how the value of people and land was assessed. I think that you will find it to be a very interesting tractate, although as you know, I always say that. Good luck! " + ], + "": [ + [ + [ + "Introduction\nIn order to understand our mishnah we must understand the distinction between an “evaluation” and vowing someone’s monetary worth. When a person makes a statement such as “My value is upon me,” he must dedicate to the Temple the sum that the Torah determines to be his/her value. He can also make such a statement with regard to another person, i.e. “So and so’s value is upon me.”\nHowever, if he states, “My monetary worth is upon me,” then an actual evaluation of his value must be made. This is done by assessing how much he would be worth as a slave if he was sold in the market. Again, one can also make such a statement with regard to another person, i.e. “So and so’s monetary worth is upon me.”\nIn other words there are two types of evaluation. For the first, where he uses the word “erekh,” or value, we use the Torah’s fixed sum. For the second, where he uses the word “monetary worth” we evaluate his actual worth.", + "All [persons] are fit to evaluate or to be made the subjects of evaluation, are fit to vow [another's worth] or have their worth vowed: priests, Levites and [ordinary] Israelites, women and slaves. Generally, all people can evaluate and be evaluated meaning they can either say, “My value is upon me” or have that said about them by another. In this case, the money they or others will owe to the Temple depends upon the value prescribed by the Torah (Leviticus 27). Similarly, all people can vow to give their or another’s person’s monetary worth to the Temple. This is when they say, “My monetary worth is upon me” or have that said by another person. As we shall see, this is just the general rule. There are indeed exceptions, people who cannot evaluate or be evaluated, vow or be vowed.", + "The tumtum and the hermaphrodite are fit to vow [another's worth], or to have their worth vowed, and are fit to evaluate, but they are not fit to be made the subjects of evaluation, for the subject of evaluation must be definitely either male or female. A tumtum is a person’s who has neither male nor female genitalia and a hermaphrodite has both male and female genitalia. The gender of these two people is in doubt. Both can vow another’s monetary worth or have their worth vowed by another, because vowing one’s monetary worth has nothing to do with establishing a certain gender. They can also evaluate another person by saying “So and so’s value is upon me” because they are considered to be intelligent. The one thing they can’t do is have their value dedicated by themselves or by others because in order to be evaluated one must have a certain gender. This is because the Torah determines the value of a human being partly based on the person’s gender. One without a gender cannot have his/her value determined.", + "A deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor are fit to have their worth vowed or be made the subject of evaluation, but they are not fit to make either a vow [of another's worth] or to evaluate, because they have no intelligence. A deaf-mute, imbecile and minor are not considered to be of intelligence and therefore they cannot dedicate anything to the Temple, neither through an evaluation nor a vow. However, they are of value, both according to the Torah’s assessment and as slaves sold in the market, therefore their value or monetary worth can be dedicated.", + "A person less than one month old may have his worth vowed but not his valuation. The Torah assigns value only to children who have reached thirty days. This is probably because life was so fragile for the first thirty days and so many children would have died (see Leviticus 27:6). Therefore, a child below thirty day’s value cannot be dedicated. But their monetary worth can be vowed because they could be sold on the slave market, even though their value might not be high due to their fragility." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn today’s mishnah Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Judah debate whether a non-Jew can dedicate his value or have his value dedicated to the Temple.", + "A non-Jew: Rabbi Meir says: he can be evaluated but he cannot evaluate. According to Rabbi Meir a non-Jew can be evaluated by others. This means that if a Jew says, “The value of so-and-so [a non-Jew] is upon me,” the Jew will be liable to pay the fixed value of the non-Jew to the Temple. However, he can’t evaluate himself or others.", + "Rabbi Judah says: he can evaluate but cannot be evaluated. Rabbi Judah holds the opposite. A non-Jew can evaluate himself or others, but he cannot be evaluated. It seems that these two rabbis debate the applicability of Leviticus 27:2, “Speak to the Israelite people and say to them….” The verse can be read as saying that the laws in the chapter refer only to Jews. However, which aspect of the chapter is not clear evaluating others or being evaluated? That is what they debate.", + "Both agree that he can vow another's worth and have his worth vowed by others. Both Rabbi Judah and Rabbi Meir agree that the non-Jew can vow his own worth or someone else’s worth to the Temple by stating, “The monetary worth of so-and-so is upon me.” Since this type of dedication is not the topic of Leviticus 27, the non-Jew is not excluded. As an aside, it is clear from many historical sources, both rabbinic and non-rabbinic, that non-Jews did donate money to the Temple in Jerusalem." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn today’s mishnah three sages debate whether a person who is about to die can have his worth or value dedicated to the Temple.", + "One at the point of death or about to be put to death cannot have his worth vowed, nor be evaluated. A person about to die, either naturally or by being executed, has no worth. Therefore, another person cannot dedicate the dying person’s monetary worth or his value to the Temple. The first opinion in the mishnah makes no distinction between the amount set by the Torah (value) and the amount estimated by his value in the marketplace (his worth).", + "Rabbi Hanina ben Akavia says: he can be evaluated because his value is fixed, but his worth cannot be vowed because his worth is not fixed. Rabbi Hanina ben Akavia does make a distinction between the two. A person’s “value” is set by the Torah and it doesn’t matter whether he is about to die or is alive. Therefore, if someone says, “So and so’s value is upon me,” he is liable to make that payment. However, his monetary worth cannot be vowed through a statement such as, “So and so’s monetary worth is upon me.” This is because there is no fixed “worth” to a human being, and since this human being is about to die, his life has no worth.", + "Rabbi Yose says: he may vow, evaluate, and consecrate [to the sanctuary], and if he caused damage, he is obliged to make restitution. Rabbi Yose adds that when it comes to the dying person vowing to give someone’s worth or value to the Temple or consecrating an object to the Temple, he has the same ability as everyone else does. Since he will be dead before he pays off these debts, the money will have to be taken out of his estate. Similarly, if he damages another’s property, his inheritors will have to pay out the restitution." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nSince yesterday’s mishnah dealt with the status of someone who was about to be executed, our mishnah continues to provide some information in this subject. It has nothing to do with evaluations.", + "If a woman is about to be executed, they do not wait for her until she gives birth. The rabbis considered delaying execution to be cruel to the executed person. The ideal was to sentence the person and execute them immediately so that they would not have to wait around a long time contemplating their death. We should remember that in order to sentence someone to death, the proof had to be overwhelmingly certain. In rabbinic law, a conviction would almost never be overturned, and therefore, it would be cruel to delay carrying out the sentence. Our mishnah teaches that this is so even for a pregnant woman. While this may seem cruel, it is in essence stating that the woman takes precedence over her fetus, which is not yet considered to be a full “life.”", + "But if she had already sat on the birthstool, they wair for her until she gives birth. However, if she has already begun to have contractions, and is sitting on the birthstool to give birth, they must wait until she gives birth to execute her. It seems that at this point the fetus is close enough to being an actual human being, that it would not be legal to execute it with the mother.", + "If a woman has been put to death one may use her hair. It is forbidden to derive any benefit from a dead body. However, if a person has been executed, it is permitted to derive benefit from the hair because the rabbis don’t consider hair to be alive, such that it has the status of a dead body.", + "If an animal has been put to death it is forbidden to make any use of it. When it comes to an animal executed for committing a crime (murder or sex with a human being) the law works differently. Once an animal has been sentenced to die it is immediately forbidden to derive benefit from any part of its body, even from its hair. When it dies, it continues to be forbidden to derive benefit from the entire body, and this prohibition continues to apply to its hair. In other words, when it comes to human beings, death makes the body prohibited, and therefore the prohibition does not apply to hair, which is not prohibited. When it comes to animals, sentencing makes the body prohibited and therefore it applies to the entire body, including the hair." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah begins by discussing upper and lower limits for evaluations. Afterwards, the remainder of the mishnah and the remainder of the chapter continues to discuss various issues unconnected to evaluations, but whose halakhot have the same literary format as the first sentence of the mishnah.", + "There is no evaluation less than one sela, nor more than fifty selas. Leviticus 27:8 states, “But if one cannot afford the equivalent, he shall be presented before the priest, and the priest shall assess him; the priest shall assess him according to what the vower can afford.” Thus if a poor person vows to pay the value of an adult male (whose value is 50 shekel/sela) and he can’t afford to pay the whole amount, he can pay less. Our mishnah teaches that this payment cannot be less than a sela. The maximum amount is 50 selas, as is stated explicitly in Leviticus 27:3.", + "How so? If one paid a sela and became rich, he need not give any [more]. But if he gave less than a sela and became rich, he must pay fifty selas. The mishnah now explains what happens if after the poor person gave a sela he then becomes rich. If he gave a sela, then he has fulfilled his obligation and even if he becomes rich, he need not give the full amount of fifty selas. But if he gave less than a sela, and then he became rich, he must give the full amount, because by giving less than a sela, he did not fulfill his obligation.", + "If he had five selas in his possession: Rabbi Meir says: he need not give more than one; The sages say he must give them all. The sages now debate what happens if a person has more than a sela, but does not have the full amount that he vowed. Let’s say he vowed to give the value of an adult male (50 selas) and all he has in 5 selas. According to Rabbi Meir, since he can’t give the full amount, he needs to pay only a sela, the lowest amount. The other rabbis hold that he must give whatever he can, even if he can’t pay the full amount.", + "There is no evaluation less than one sela, nor more than fifty selas. This is a repeat of section one. It is repeated here because the mishnah now begins a long list of halakhot taught with the literary format of “there is not in X less than A nor more than B.”", + "If a woman makes a mistake in her reckoning there is no re-opening for her [of the niddah count] earlier than seven, nor later than after seventeen days. This somewhat complicated halakhah has to do with counting a woman’s menstrual cycle, in order to know the difference between menstrual blood (which causes a woman to be impure for 7 days, even if she continued to bleed all the way through the seventh day) and non-menstrual blood (which causes a woman to be impure for one day, unless she sees blood for three straight days, in which case she is impure for 7 full days after she stops seeing blood). The rabbis instituted an 18 day cycle to calculate when blood was menstrual and when it is non-menstrual. When a woman first sees blood she considers it to be menstrual blood and she is impure for seven days, from the time she saw the first blood. After these seven days, any blood seen over the next 11 days is considered to be zivah (non-menstrual blood). After these eleven days are over, she returns to counting seven days, during which any blood is considered to be menstrual blood. Our mishnah deals with a situation where a woman made a mistake in counting these days (i.e. she didn’t know whether she was in the seven days or in the eleven) and she saw blood. She doesn’t know whether the blood she saw is to be considered menstrual, in which case she is impure for seven days, or zivah, in which case she is impure for only one day, or a full seven days if she sees zivah for three straight days. Our mishnah teaches that the beginning of her days of menstrual blood cannot be less then seven days after she doesn’t see any more blood, nor more than seventeen days, all counted from the time she first saw blood. How this works out is a bit complicated, but I shall try to explain very briefly. Let’s say she saw blood for one day, if these were “days of niddah” she could begin to count her next days of niddah after seventeen days, which is the maximum amount. This would mirror the normal situation. However, if she sees blood for several straight days, it may be possible that she only has to wait seven more days after not seeing blood to begin counting her menstrual blood days. Let’s say she sees blood for three straight days, she can then begin counting her menstrual days after seven days without seeing blood, because it doesn’t matter if the blood she saw was menstrual or not, seven days are sufficient to begin counting again. I realize that this is all very complicated, and indeed entire books exist dedicated to these complicated calculations. We will learn much more about this subject when we learn Tractate Niddah.", + "No signs of leprosy are shut up for less than one week and none more than two weeks. This calculation deals with isolating a person or house that might have shown signs of “negaim” which we should understand as some sort of skin affliction or house fungus. The minimum time of such an isolation is seven days, which is how long the isolation is for a person (see Leviticus 13:21, 26). The maximum time is three weeks, which is only for a house. We shall learn more about this in Tractate Negaim (I bet you can’t wait!)." + ], + [ + "There are never less than four full months in the year, nor did it seem right to have more than eight. Every month in the Jewish calendar has 29 or 30 days, depending on when witnesses come to testify that they saw the new moon. The rabbis realized that there had to be about six “missing” months and six “full” months a year, in order to keep the schedule correct (an actual lunar cycle is between 29 and 30 days long). Therefore, they instituted a minimum of four full months and a maximum of eight to keep the calculations as close to correct as possible. Today, the Jewish calendar is fixed, and generally, there are six full and six missing months.", + "Two loaves were eaten, never earlier than the second day, nor later than the third day. The “two loaves” refers to the two loaves eaten on Shavuot. Generally, they were eaten the day after they were baked. They would be baked on erev Shavuot, and eaten on Shavuot. This is “the second day.” However, if Shabbat fell before Shavuot, they would be baked on Thursday and eaten on Sunday, the third day. For more information see Menahot 11:9.", + "The shewbread was eaten never earlier than the ninth day, nor later than the eleventh day. The showbread was the bread baked in the Temple on a weekly basis. Generally, it would have been baked on Friday and eaten the following Shabbat, on the ninth day. However, if there were holidays on Thursday and Friday, it might have been eaten on only the eleventh day. For more info see Menahot 11:9.", + "An infant may never be circumcised earlier than the eighth nor later than the twelfth day. Normally, a boy is circumcised on the eighth day. However, if he is born at dusk, at a time when it might be already the next day, he would have to be circumcised on the ninth day (which might be the eighth day). If he is born at dusk on erev Shabbat, he is circumcised on the following Sunday, the tenth day, because he can only be circumcised on Shabbat if it is certain that it is the eighth day. If he is born on erev Rosh Hashanah, when it falls on Thursday-Friday, he will be circumcised on the twelfth day, which is the following Sunday, because he couldn’t be circumcised on Thursday, Friday or Saturday . Unless the baby is unhealthy, the circumcision cannot be delayed any longer." + ], + [ + "There are never less than twenty-one blasts in the Temple and never more than forty-eight. There was a minimum of 21 daily trumpet blasts in the Temple and a maximum of 48. The explanation of this section can be found in Sukkah 5:5. The maximum number of blasts was sounded on erev Shabbat during Sukkot.", + "There are never less than two harps, nor more than six. The harps were played to accompany the singing of the Levites.", + "There are never less than two flutes, nor more than twelve. The flutes were played on special occasions, namely holidays, as the rest of the mishnah explains.", + "On twelve days in the year the flute was played before the altar: At the slaughtering of the first pesah, At the killing of the second pesah, On the first festival day of Pesah, On the festival day of Atzeret (, And on the eight days of Sukkot. The flute was played on the first day of each holiday, and also on any day that a pesah sacrifice was slaughtered (the fourteenth of Nissan, and the fourteenth of Iyyar). During Sukkot it was played every day.", + "And they did not play on a pipe [abuv] of bronze but on a pipe of reed, because its tune is sweeter. The flute that they played was a pipe made of reed, for its sound is sweeter (according to rabbinic tastes) than the bronze pipe.", + "Nor was anything but a single pipe used for closing a tune, because it makes a pleasant finale. At the conclusion of the song, they would end with a single pipe (flute) which is more pleasant than completing with two (or more) at the same time." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is a continuation of yesterday’s, which discussed the blowing of the flutes on holiday occasions.", + "They were slaves of the priests, the words of Rabbi Meir. According to Rabbi Meir, it was slaves owned by priests who would play the flute.", + "Rabbi Yose said: they were of families from Bet Hapegarim, Bet-Zipparya and from Emmaus, places from which priests would marry [women]. Rabbi Yose seems to think that it would not have been appropriate for slaves to fulfill such a function. Rather, people from important families, families whose daughters were able to marry priests (see Kiddushin 4:5), would play the flute. These three locations are in the region of Judea. In face, Emmaus is on my regular bike-riding route (near Latrun). Next time I’m out, I’ll try to listen for some flutists!", + "Rabbi Hanina ben Antigonos said: they were Levites. Rabbi Hanina ben Antigonus says that just as Levites would sing, so too they were the ones to play the flute." + ], + [ + "There were never less than six inspected lambs in the chamber of lambs, enough for Shabbat and the [two] festival days of Rosh Hashanah, and their number could be increased infinitely. Every day there were at least two lambs that were used as the daily tamid offering, one in the morning and one at night. These lambs needed to be examined four days before being used, a halakhah found in the Torah in connection with the passover sacrifice offered in Egypt (see Exodus 12:3, 6). There was a special chamber where these lambs were kept (see Tamid 3:3). Generally, there were eight lambs in the chamber, enough for four days. Every morning they would take out two for that day, and then in the evening they would examine two new lambs to make sure that they were unblemished. There always had to be at least six checked lambs in the chamber, in case Rosh Hashanah fell immediately before or after Shabbat. If this happened they would need six lambs for the tamid, two for each day. There is no upper limit as to how many lambs they could put into the chamber. Of course, space, noise and stench might have become an issue at a certain point, but theoretically, they could keep adding as many as they wanted.", + "There were never less than two trumpets and their number could be increased infinitely. There always had to be at least two trumpets in the Temple. These trumpets were used on various occasions. See for instance Number 10:2, 10. They could have a much greater number. Indeed in II Chronicles 2:5, 12, we hear about 120 priests blowing on trumpets in the Temple.", + "There were never less than nine lyres, and their number could be increased infinitely. But there was only one cymbal. In the Temple they would use at least nine lyres, and they could use many more, but only one set of cymbals." + ], + [ + "There were never less than twelve levites standing on the platform and their number could be increased into infinity. There always needed to be twelve Levites standing on the platform in the Temple singing. This would mean one for every lyre (nine), one for every harp (two) and one for the cymbals. This number is also referred to in I Chronicles 25:9.", + "No minor could enter the court of the sanctuary to take part in the service except when the Levites stood up to sing. Minor Levites would go into the courtyard while the Levites were singing in order to aid them. However, they could only go in while the Levites were singing.", + "Nor did they join in the singing with harp and lyre, but with the mouth alone, to add flavor to the music. The minors only sang. They did not play the harp and lyre.", + "Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob said: they did not count in the required number, nor did they stand on the platform. Rather they would stand on the ground, so that their heads were between the feet of the levites. And they were called the youth of the Levites. There are two versions of this section. The version I have quoted here is one that Albeck seems to prefer. Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob is referring to the youth mentioned in sections 1-2. The other version, found in the Rambam’s commentary reads, “trouble-makers of the Levites.” The Rambam explains that this refers to the musicians, those playing the instruments, for they would drown out the beautiful voices of the Levites." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "The law of evaluation is sometimes lenient, and at others times strict.
The law of the field of possession is sometimes lenient, and at others times strict.
The law concerning a warned ox that has killed a slave is sometimes lenient, and at others times strict.
The law of the rapist and the seducer and the defamer is sometimes lenient, and at others times strict.
The law of evaluation is sometimes lenient, and at others times strict. How so? Whether one has evaluated the fairest in Israel, or the ugliest in Israel, he must pay fifty selas. But if he said: “Behold, his monetary worth is upon me,” he pays only as much as he is worth.
Like the second chapter, the third chapter also begins with a discussion of evaluations and through associative thinking goes on to discuss other laws that have a similar phenomenon. In this case, the phenomenon is that sometimes the law is lenient and sometimes it is strict.
Sections 2-4 will be explained in mishnayot 2-5, so I will not explain them here.
Section five: This section demonstrates how sometimes the laws of evaluation are strict and sometimes they are lenient. If a person vows the evaluation of a very good looking person, one who might be worth more than 50 selas, he still owes only 50 selas, because the Torah determines the person’s value as such. This is a leniency. But if the person is ugly and is really worth less than 50 selas, the vower still pays 50 selas. This is a stringency. We should note that this is true as long as the person’s whose worth is being donated is a male between the ages of 20 and 50. For older and younger males and for females, the evaluation is different. Nevertheless, the principle would be the same for all.
As we explained in the introduction, if the vower uses the word “monetary worth” instead of “value” then he owes the actual worth, be it higher for the good looking person, or lower for the ugly person." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nLeviticus 27:16 states, “If anyone consecrates to the Lord any land that he holds, its assessment shall be in accordance with its seed requirement: fifty shekels of silver to a homer of barley seed.” Verse 22 of the same chapter deals with a case where a person dedicated land that he purchased.\nOur mishnah deals with both of these laws. The same topic will be discussed again later in tractate Arakhin.", + "“The law of the field of possession is sometimes lenient and sometimes strict.”
How so? Whether one dedicates a field in the sandy plain of Mahoz or in the orchards of Savaste, [if he would redeem it] he must pay fifty shekels of silver for [every part of the field sufficient for] the sowing of a homer of barley. Similar to a case where a person dedicated the value of another human being, when one dedicates a field of possession, meaning one that is part of his ancestral inheritance, he must pay a fixed amount in order to redeem the field. That amount is set by the Torah as being fifty shekels of silver for every part of a field that can grow enough to sow a “homer” of barley. This is a standard amount set by what an average field can produce. It is not based on what the field actually dedicated produces. There are two regions mentioned in this section. The first is the sandy plains of a region called “Mahoz.” I do not know where this region is, but since there are many sandy regions in Israel, and “Mahoz” is a generic term meaning “the district” it probably could be in a variety of different places. Savaste is in Samaria. According to Albeck, Herod expanded this area and planted there gardens and orchards, and he was the one who called it by this name.", + "But if it was a field which he bought, he must pay what it is worth. If he dedicated a field that he bought and not one that he inherited, when he redeems the field he owes whatever the field is actually worth.", + "Rabbi Eliezer says: it is all the same whether it is a field of possession or one that he bought. What is the difference between the field of possession and one that he bought? A field of possession he must pay the [added] fifth, whereas for a field that he has bought he need not pay the added fifth. Rabbi Eliezer reads these verses differently and holds that in both cases, the person must redeem the field for fifty shekels of silver for [every part of the field sufficient for] the sowing of a homer of barley. The only difference between the two is that when one redeems a dedicated field of possession he must add an extra fifth (see Leviticus 27:19), whereas when one dedicates a field which he bought, he need not add the extra fifth. Chapter seven will deal more with this subject." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah deals with the warned ox, the “muad.” This is an ox that has gored three times. The owner of a “warned ox” that kills a person is liable to pay the value of the person (see Exodus 21:30). However, if the ox kills a slave, he pays 30 shekels no matter the value of the slave (vs. 32).", + "“The law concerning a warned ox that has killed a slave is sometimes lenient and sometimes strict.”
How so? Whether it killed the fine looking slave or an ugly slave, he must pay thirty selas. If a warned ox kills a slave, the owner of the ox pays thirty selas (equivalent to the Torah’s shekels) to the slave’s owner, no matter how valuable the slave was. Sometimes this can create a stringency (if the slave was worth less) and sometimes a leniency (if the slave was worth more).", + "If it killed a free man he must pay what he is worth. As stated in the introduction, if the ox kills a free person, he must pay the value of the person, no matter the how great or small the value is. The fixed amount is only for the slave.", + "If it wounded, whether this one or the other, he must pay the full damage. The distinction between the slave and the free person is only in case the ox kills one of them. If the ox wounds them, its owner is liable to pay the actual worth in both cases." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah deals with the rapist or seducer, topics discussed in Deuteronomy 22:28-29 and Exodus 22:15-16. As was the case with the warned ox, any time the Torah sets a fixed amount as a fine, the result can be lenient or strict.", + "“The law of the rapist and seducer is sometimes lenient and sometimes strict.”
How so? Whether he raped or seduced a girl from among the best of the priestly stock or the humblest in Israel, he must pay fifty selas. Whether one rapes or seduces a girl from a good family, for instance a priestly family, or from a humble/poor family, he pays the father fifty selas as compensation. This fine is fixed no matter how much the girl is actually worth. It is interesting to note that unlike the case of evaluations or killing the slave, where the mishnah referred to the looks of the one evaluated or killed, here the mishnah refers to the family of the girl. This probably reveals quite a bit about marriage choices in mishnaic times. A girl’s worth was largely dependent upon her familial status and far less upon her individual personal characteristics. A girl from a good family was worth more in the eyes of the society than one from a lesser family. While this is not at all surprising, it is still interesting to note such concrete evidence of this social phenomenon.", + "But compensation for shaming and for blemish is in accord with the [circumstances] of him who shames and of the one who suffers the shame. Deuteronomy and Exodus refer only to a fine paid to the father by a man who rapes or seduces his daughter. The rabbis made an innovation that rape is to be treated also as a case of personal injury to the girl, and not just a loss to the father. A rapist is liable to pay not only a fine, but also compensation for shaming her and her family and for any blemish that occurred. In truth he is also liable to pay for her suffering and any loss of work. These amounts, unlike the fine, are not set by the Torah. When it comes to shaming, the payment depends upon the social status of the shamer and the person who was shamed. This halakhah is true in all cases of personal injury. For more information see Ketubot 3:7." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe final mishnah of this chapter refers to the “defamer,” one who falsely claims that a girl he married was not a virgin (see Deuteronomy 22: 13-22).", + "The law of the defamer is sometimes lenient and sometimes strict.
How so? Whether he defamed a girl from among the best of the priestly stock or the humblest in Israel, he must pay one hundred selas. The Torah sets a one hundred shekel fine for the defamer, no matter whether he defamed a girl from a good family or from a lesser family. Again, any time the Torah sets an amount, this will create a potential stringency and a potential leniency as well, depending on the actual circumstances.", + "Thus it turns out that he who speaks with his mouth suffers more than he that commits an act. Here the mishnah notes the paradox that a man who rapes or seduces a girl pays a fine of fifty shekels, whereas one who defames her pays double the amount. This is generalized into a value statement one who speaks against someone with his mouth can, at least at times, do more harm than one who acts out physically.", + "For thus we have also found that the judgment against our fathers in the wilderness was sealed only because of their evil tongue, as it is written: “Yet you have tested me these ten times, and you have not listened to My voice” (Numbers 14:22). The mishnah now midrashically connects this idea with the Israelites’ experience in the desert. After complaining to God about the report of the spies (see Numbers 14:1-3), God says that they have tested Him “ten times.” These ten times surely included not only the Israelites’ typical grumbling, but physical acts as well (for instance, worshipping the golden calf). Nevertheless, the terrible punishment that none of the adults who left Egypt would reach Canaan (save Caleb and Joshua) was not meted out until this instance. Furthermore, the following verse states, “All those who have vexed Me shall not see it (the land of Canaan).” This implies that the punishment was for verbally vexing God." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "The sufficiency of means is according to the ability of the vower.
And the age is according to the subject of the vow.
The evaluation is according to the subject of the evaluation.
And the evaluations [shall be paid according to the rate prescribed] at the time of the evaluation.
The sufficiency of means is according to the ability of the vower. How so? If a poor man evaluated a rich man, he pays only the valuation of a poor man. But if a rich man evaluated a poor man, he must pay the valuation of a rich man.
Our chapter provides several central rules as to how the amount paid for evaluations is determined. We should note that the literary structure of this chapter is the same as that of the previous chapter the first mishnah gives brief headlines that are further explicated in the rest of the chapter. Therefore, I will again leave the explanation of these headlines for subsequent mishnayot.
Section five: Leviticus 27:8 states, “But if one cannot afford the evaluation, he shall be presented before the priest and the priest shall assess him; the priest shall assess him according to what the vower can afford.” Our mishnah teaches that this is an assessment of the means of the person who made the vow, and not the person whose value was vowed. So if a poor person vows to give the value of a rich person he only pays the amount that a poor person could afford to pay. This estimate has nothing to do with the fact that the person being evaluated was rich. Conversely, if a rich person vows the value of a poor person, he must pay the full amount because he is rich. It does not matter at all that the person whose value he vowed is poor." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah draws a distinction between one who makes a vow of evaluation and one who undertakes to bring someone else’s sacrifices. Whereas in the case of the former, the priest estimates the ability of the vower to pay his vow, in the case of sacrifices the priest estimates the financial ability of the person who was originally obligated to bring the sacrifice, and not the one who took on his obligation.", + "But it is not so with sacrifices. The law with regard to one who vows to bring someone else’s sacrifice is different from the law regarding someone who vows to give someone else’s worth. The mishnah will now explain.", + "If he said: “I take upon myself the sacrifices of this metzora,” and the metzora was poor, he brings the sacrifices of a poor metzora. But if the metzora was rich, he must bring the sacrifices of a rich man. The sacrifices that a metzora, one afflicted with skin disease, brings at the end of his affliction depend upon his financial means. If he is rich he brings the full array of sacrifices (see Leviticus 13) but if he is poor, he can bring fewer sacrifices. In this case, one person vowed to bring the sacrifices of another person who was becoming pure from being a metzora. The vower must bring whatever the metzora was obligated to bring. If the metzora was poor, the vower brings a poor person’s sacrifice, even if the vower himself was rich. Conversely, if the metzora was rich and the vower poor, he must bring the sacrifices of a rich person. In both cases, the obligation goes according to the metzora and not the one making the vow.", + "Rabbi says: I say the same applies with regard to an evaluation. Why is a poor man who evaluated a rich man obliged to pay only the evaluation of a poor man? Because the rich man is not obligated at all. But if the rich man said: “My value is upon me” and the poor man, hearing that, said: “What this man has said, I take upon myself,” then he must pay the evaluation of a rich man. Rabbi says that he can find a situation involving evaluations where we go according to the one being evaluated. First of all, he notes that if a poor man vows the value of a rich man we of course have to go according to the poor man’s means, because the rich man didn’t do anything at all. It would make no sense to do otherwise. But if a rich man vowed his own value, and the poor man said that he wanted to vow what the rich man had already vowed, he must pay the same amount that the rich main vowed. Thus Rabbi has found a case where we go according to the one being evaluated, and not the vower.", + "If he was poor and then became rich, or rich and then became poor, he must pay the evaluation of a rich man. Rabbi Judah says: even if he was poor and became rich and then again became poor he must pay the evaluation of a rich man. If the person who made the vow was rich at the moment he vowed and then he became poor before he paid his debt, we estimate his financial ability as if he were rich, because his liability cannot go down over time. If he made the vow when he was poor and then became rich before he paid his vow, he again pays according to the means of a rich man. This is because at the time he pays his debt he is already of means, and why should he be allowed to pay any less. Rabbi Judah goes even further. Even if he was poor, then became rich and then became poor again (perhaps he jumped onto the dot-com bubble?) he pays according to the means of a rich person. Again we see that once the obligation is set, it can never be reduced, even though it can be increased." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn yesterday’s mishnah we learned that when a person vows another person’s value, whether he was rich at the time of the vow or at the time that he comes to pay his debt, he pays as a rich man. Our mishnah contrasts this with the laws of bringing a sacrifice.", + "But it is not so with sacrifices. When it comes to sacrifices, whether he was rich and became poor, or poor and became rich, he always brings the sacrifices according to his financial means at the time he is actually bringing them.", + "Even if his father was dying [when a man vowed] and left him ten thousand, or if he had a ship on the sea and it brought to him ten thousand, the sanctuary has no claim at all on them. This section relates a halakhah common to both evaluations and sacrifices. If a person has money coming to him, whether through an inheritance or from a boat that is bringing him a large delivery, we ignore his future imminent income and determine his means according to his current financial situation. So if a person is about to become rich, but is still technically poor, he pays his evaluation debt or brings his sacrifices as a poor man." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah, the final mishnah of chapter four, explains the sections of mishnah one that have not yet been explained.", + "“And the age is according to the subject of the vow:” How so? If a child evaluates an old man, he must pay the value of an old man. And if an old man evaluates a child he must pay the value of a child. The amount owed is reckoned according to the person whose value was vowed, and not according to the age of the vower.", + "The evaluation is according to the subject of the evaluation. How so? If a man evaluated a woman, he must pay the value of a woman. And if a woman evaluated a man, she must pay the value of a man. Similarly, the gender is determined by the one whose value is being vowed and not the gender of the vower.", + "“And the evaluations [shall be paid according to the rate prescribed] at the time of the evaluation.” How so? If he evaluated one who was less than five years of age, and he became [meantime] older than five years of age, or if [he evaluated one] who was less than twenty years of age and he became twenty years old, he must pay [only] in accord with the age at the time of the valuation. The value of a person is determined partly by age (and partly by gender). When we determine his age we determine it according to his/her age at the time the vow was made, and not at the time that the vow is paid off.", + "The thirtieth day is considered to be under this age. The fifth year or twentieth year is considered to be under this age. The rest of the mishnah states that the day that someone reaches a certain age, thirty days, five years, twenty years or sixty years, is not yet counted with the older age. Thus a kid who just turns thirty days does not yet have any value (value begins at thirty days). A kid who just turned five, still counts as a kid between the age of thirty days and five years.", + "For it says: “And if he is from sixty years old and upward” (Leviticus 27:7), thus we can learn thus with regard to all others from what is said about sixty years: just as the sixtieth year is considered to be under this age, so also the fifth and twentieth years are under this age. The mishnah proves that the day of the birthday counts with the lower age by quoting the verse concerning the sixty year old. Since the Torah says that he is above sixty years, the implication is that one who is exactly sixty years still pays the higher amount of a person from 20-60.", + "Is that so! Just because [the Torah] accounts the sixtieth year to be under this age, thereby being more stringent, shall we make the fifth or the twentieth year be considered under this age, in order to be lenient? The mishnah now critiques its own midrash. Treating a sixty year old as still belonging to the younger category creates a stringency his value is 50 and not 15. But treating a 5 year old or a 20 year in the younger category creates a leniency since the younger ages have lower values. The mishnah says that just because we treat a sixty year old as being in the younger category does not mean that we would necessarily treat 5 and 20 year olds as being in the younger category.", + "Scripture says, “Years,” “years” as a gezerah shavah: just as with the sixtieth year the word “years” means that it is considered under this age, so the word “years” with the fifth and with the twentieth year are considered under this age, whether this results in being lenient or being stringent. The mishnah now brings another midrash to defend the halakhah that we always treat a person on the day of the birthday as if he still belongs to the previous age category. This is done with a technique called a “gezerah shavah”. What this technique consists of is taking a law from one situation and applying it to another because the Torah uses the same word in both situations. In our case the word is “years” and it is used in connection to one who turns 60 and one who turns 5 and 20. Since it is used in both connections, the same halakhah applies to both.", + "Rabbi Elazar says: [this rule holds good] until they are a month and a day beyond the year. Rabbi Elazar extends the halakhah even further. A person doesn’t enter the new category until he is one month and one day into that category. For instance, one who is 60 doesn’t go down in value to 15 shekels until he is 60, one month and one day." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah deals with a person who dedicates his weight to the Temple.", + "One who said: “I vow my weight,” he must pay his weight, in silver [if he had said in] silver, or in gold [if he had said in] gold. If one vows his weight to the Temple, he must fulfill this vow by paying his weight, either in gold or in silver, depending on how he made his vow.", + "It happened with the mother of Yirmatia, who said, “I vow my daughter's weight.” She went up to Jerusalem and weighed her and then paid her weight in gold. Now this is one of the best stories I’ve ever read in the Mishnah. I can just picture poor Yirmatia being absolutely mortified that her mother had the audacity to vow her weight to the Temple. And then, the poor girl has to get on the scale in front of all of those priests! I wonder if this was all a ruse by the mother to get her daughter on a diet.", + "[If a man said: “I vow] the weight of my hand,” Rabbi Judah says: let him fill a barrel with water and put it [his hand] in up to the elbow. Then let him weigh the flesh, bones and sinews of a donkey and put it into the barrel until it is filled up again. Rabbi Yose said: “But how is it possible to account exactly one kind of flesh against another kind of flesh, and one kind of bones against another kind of bones? Rather: one estimates what the hand is likely to weigh. This mishnah address the Archimedean problem of how to weigh one’s hand. Rabbi Judah employs a system of water displacement, and then comparison of the weight of one’s hand with the weight of a donkey’s bones, sinews and flesh. Rabbi Yose criticizes him for assuming that donkey flesh weighs the same as human flesh. It seems, according to Rabbi Yose, that live human flesh cannot be weighed. The best one can do is just estimate how much the hand weighs. It is unclear how exactly one would do this." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah continues to deal with cases where a person dedicates the value or worth of a body part.", + "[If one said] “The worth of my hand is upon me,” they estimate his worth with his hand and [what it would be] without his hand. In yesterday’s mishnah the vower dedicated the weight of his hand. In this section, he dedicates the “worth of his hand.” This is evaluated the same way that worth is always estimated by examining how much a person would be worth on the slave market. In this case, they first estimate his worth when complete (with his hand), and then how much he would be worth without his hand.", + "In this respect vows of worth are more stringent than vows of value. Later in this mishnah we will learn that if one says, “The value of my hand is upon me,” he is not liable to pay anything. Therefore, in this aspect, vows of “worth” are more stringent than vows of “value” for when one vows the worth of his hand, he must pay its worth.", + "There is an aspect of vows of value that is more stringent than vows of worth. As is typical of the mishnah, once we note that vows of worth are in one way more stringent than vows of value, the mishnah now notes that sometimes the opposite is true.", + "How so? If one said: “My value is upon me” and then he dies, his heirs must pay it. [But if he said:] “My worth is upon me,” and then he dies, his heirs need not pay anything because dead persons have no worth. If one vows his value and then dies, the heirs must pay his value. This is because his value is set by the Torah and is not dependent upon an evaluation. However, if he vows his worth and then dies before they can estimate his worth, his heir need not pay anything because a dead person has no worth. Note that the obligation to pay is only incurred when the estimate is made, and since he has no worth when the estimate is made, the heirs owe nothing.", + "[If he said,] “The value of my hand or foot is upon me,” he has said nothing, [But if he said,] “The value of my head is upon me,” he must pay his whole value. This is the general rule: Anything upon which his life depends, he must pay his full value. If one vows the value of his foot or hand he is not liable to pay anything because the foot and the hand are not synonymous with his life. Since one can only vow the “value” of his life, in this case he has not vowed anything. In contrast, if one vows the value of his head, he has dedicated his full value because one can’t live without a head. He will now have to pay his full value, dependent upon his gender and age. The general rule that ends this mishnah explains just that if one vows the value of an organ that one can’t live without, he is liable to pay his entire value." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with someone who dedicates half of his worth or value.", + "[If one said:] “Half my value is upon me,” he must pay half his evaluation. In this case, he pays half of his value, which is what he intended when he made his vow.", + "[But if he said,] “The value of one half of me he is upon me,” he must pay his full value. Here he phrased his vow slightly differently. Saying “the value of one half of me is upon me,” is like saying “the value of my head is upon me” because no one can live without half of his body. Therefore, as we learned in yesterday’s mishnah, he must pay his full value.", + "[If he said] “Half of my worth is upon me,” he must pay half his worth. Similar to section one, in this case he pays only half of his worth.", + "[If he said,] “The worth of half of me is upon me,” he must pay his whole worth. Although one can estimate how much a slave missing a hand would be worth, there is no way to estimate how much a slave missing half his body would be worth, because he would be worth nothing. Therefore, the worth of half of his body is synonymous with the worth of his whole body and he must pay his entire worth.", + "This is the general rule: Anything on which his life depends, he must pay his whole worth. This is a similar rule to that which we saw in mishnah two concerning vows of value. If someone vows the worth of a body part that he can’t live without, he must pay his entire worth." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah deals with a person who vows another person’s worth or value.", + "If he said: “The value of so-and-so is upon me,” if both the vower and the subject of the vow died, then the heirs must pay it. When the vower dies, the heirs of the vower incur the obligation to pay his vow. Even though the subject of the vow died they can pay his value, because the value is fixed and is not dependent upon an evaluation.", + "[If he said,] “The worth of so-and-so is upon me,” and the vower died, the heirs must pay it. But if the subject of the vow died, the heirs need not pay anything because dead persons have no worth. Here the vower dedicated someone else’s worth, which does require an evaluation. If the vower dies before he pays off his debt, the heirs must pay his debt. But if the subject of the vow dies, then the heirs do not owe anything because a dead person has no worth. This is basically the same halakhah that we learned in mishnah two." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nSince yesterday’s mishnah dealt with cases where a person dedicated the value of another person and then that person dies, today’s mishnah deals with a person who dedicated an animal or a house and then the animal dies or the house falls down.", + "[If someone said:] “This ox shall be an olah [a whole burnt offering],” or “This house shall be an olah,” and the ox died or the house fell down, he is not obligated to pay. In this case, the person dedicated a specific ox or house to the Temple. If the ox dies or the house falls down he is exempt, because his only liability was to give to the Temple “this ox” or “this house.”", + "[But if he said:] “This ox is upon me as an olah” or “this house is upon me as an olah” and the ox died, or the house fell down, he is obligated to pay [their worth]. Here since he said the words, “upon me,” he is obligated to pay the value of the ox even if it dies or the house even if it falls down. “Upon me” means that he is responsible for making sure that the value of the object gets to the Temple" + ], + [ + "With regard to those who made a vow of value: they take a pledge from them.
With regard to those obligated to bring a hatat or asham: they do not take a pledge.
With regard to those obligated to bring an olah or a shelamim: they do take a pledge.
And even though he is not atoned for unless he is willing [to pay his obligation], as it is said: “willingly” (Leviticus 1:3), they coerce him until he says: I agree.
The same is true in the case of divorce documents: they coerce him until he says: I agree.
This famous mishnah deals with how a court enforces a person to pay various obligations.
Section one: If someone makes a vow of value (or worth) and is late in paying his debt, the court can take a pledge (an object of value) from him in order to force him to pay his debt.
Section two: However, if someone has transgressed and is obligated to bring either a hatat (sin offering) or an asham (guilt offering) and he is late in bringing it, the court does not take a pledge from him. The general rule is that if the obligated item comes to atone for a sin, the court does not take a pledge.
Section three: If the person vowed to bring an olah (a burnt offering) or a shelamim (an offering of well-being) the court does take a pledge, because these are not sacrifices that atone for sin.
Section four: This and especially the next section are famous because they deal in general with the ability of the court to enforce obligations. The Torah states that an olah must be brought willingly. If so, how can the court force him to bring an olah or shelamim? The answer is that they force him to say that he agrees. Even though he clearly does not want to bring the sacrifice, the fact that he verbalizes his desire to do so is sufficient. Similarly, when it comes to divorce, the court can force him to write out a divorce document. As we know from other sources, a man can only divorce his wife willingly, but we know that under many circumstances the court forces him to divorce his wife (see for instance Ketubot 7:10; see also Gittin 9:8). Again, how can something be enforced and yet still be done willingly on the part of the person being coerced? The answer is that the court forces him to say that he agrees to the divorce. And as we learn in Gittin, this enforcing can be done even through physical coercion.
The Rambam, in his commentary on this mishnah, notes that although it seems that when the person says, “I agree” he doesn’t really mean it, we attribute to him that he does have the correct intention because he is doing what he should have done of his own free will. According to the Rambam, it is as if his evil urge not to perform the correct act overcame him, and by force the court makes him do what his good side really wanted to do in the first place. We should recognize that this is a dangerous principle and could be broadly applied to many categories. However, the Mishnah does not turn this into a blanket rule, but rather only mentions it in reference to these two categories sacrifices and divorce." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nChapter six deals with the consequences of dedicating one’s property to the Temple. How is the money collected? How does his dedication effect his other obligations? These and other questions are addressed in this mishnah and in the subsequent ones.", + "[The property] of orphans which has been evaluated [must be proclaimed for] thirty days. Occasionally the court needs to sell orphans’ property in order to pay back their father’s debts. When they do so, they proclaim that the property is for sale for thirty days in order to get the best offer.", + "And [the property of] the Sanctuary which has been evaluated, [for] sixty days. When a person dedicates a piece of land to the Temple, the Temple treasury proclaims that the land is for sale for sixty days. This gives them twice as long to get the best offer.", + "They must make the proclamation in the morning and in the evening. The proclamation is made twice a day morning and night.", + "If a man dedicates his property to the Sanctuary and he is still liable for his wife’s ketubah: Rabbi Eliezer says: when he divorces her he must vow that he will not derive any further benefit from her. Rabbi Joshua says: he need not do so. The man’s prior commitment to pay his wife’s ketubah means that if he divorces her, she can collect her ketubah money from the property that he has already dedicated to the Temple. This is not under discussion and indeed is obvious. The problem is that we fear that the man might divorce his wife, allow her to collect her ketubah and then remarry her. This would end up cheating the Temple out of the property that he dedicated to it. To avoid this problem, Rabbi Eliezer says that when he divorces her, he must take a vow never to receive benefit from her again. In this way, he cannot remarry her. Rabbi Joshua seems not to be concerned that a man will go through this ruse in order to cheat the Temple out of its due and therefore he does not obligate the man to take such a vow.", + "Similarly, Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel said: Also if one guarantees a woman's ketubah and her husband divorces her, the husband must vow to derive no benefit from her, lest he make a conspiracy against the property of that man [the guarantor] and take his wife back again. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel brings up another similar situation where we make a husband divorcing his wife take a vow not to derive benefit from her. If a man had a guarantor sign on his ketubah and then he divorced his wife, if the man cannot afford to pay, the guarantor must pay in the husband’s place. In this situation, we fear that the husband will divorce his wife and allow her to collect from the guarantor. Then he will remarry, thereby cheating the guarantor. To protect the guarantor, we make the husband vow that he will not derive any more benefit from his wife." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah continues to deal with the case of a husband who dedicates his property to the Temple while still owing his wife her ketubah money.", + "A man who dedicates his possessions to the sanctuary while he is still liable for his wife's kethubah or in debt to a creditor, the wife cannot collect her ketubah from the consecrated property nor the creditor his debt. Rather he who redeems them must redeem for the purpose of paying the wife her ketubah or the creditor his debt. As I stated in the explanation to yesterday’s mishnah, when a man dedicates his property to the Temple and has a prior debt to his wife or a creditor the wife and creditor must certainly receive their due. However, they do not simply collect from sanctified property, because sanctified property cannot become non-sacred without being redeemed. Rather, what needs to happen is that the person who redeems the property must pay more than the value of the debt or ketubah. Then the money for the debt or ketubah goes to the creditor or to the woman and the property becomes non-sacred. The extra money will go to the Sanctuary.", + "If he had dedicated ninety maneh, worth of property, and he owed one hundred maneh, then he [the creditor] must add one dinar more and he redeems the property for the purpose of paying the ketubah to the wife or the debt to the creditor. In this case, there is a problem because if the person redeeming the property gives the ketubah to the wife or the debt to the creditor, nothing will be left over for the Sanctuary. In a sense, the person is not redeeming the property but rather just purchasing it from the woman or creditor. To avoid this, the redeemer must pay an extra dinar, over the amount owed to the woman or to the creditor. In this way, the Sanctuary will receive at least some money." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah relates to mishnah 5:6, where we learned that the court take pledges (objects of value) in order to force a person to pay his vows of value.\nToday we learn that certain items are not taken by the collector.", + "Even though they said: they take pledges from those who owe vows of value, they allow him food for thirty days, clothing for twelve months, bed and bedding, shoes and tefillin. For himself, but not for his wife and children. When they take the pledge from the person who owes his vow to the Temple, they leave him with certain basic needs, food, clothing and tefillin. However, they don’t leave him with money to support his wife and family. Evidently, those who depend upon him will have to look elsewhere for support. Note that this does not mean that they take his wife’s property. It just means that they don’t leave him with money to buy food for her or his children.", + "If he was a craftsman, they leave him two tools of every kind. If he was a carpenter, they leave him two axes and two saws. If he is a craftsman, he is left with two kinds of each of his tools. This way he can continue to make a living to pay off his debt. An example is a carpenter, who is left with two axes and two saws.", + "Rabbi Eliezer says: if he was a farmer, they leave him his yoke [of oxen]. If a donkey driver, they leave him his donkey. Rabbi Eliezer adds that if he is a farmer they leave him with a pair of oxen to pull his plow. And if he is a donkey driver, they leave him his donkey. These are considered the tools of the donkey driver or farmer’s trade, just as an ax or saw is the tool of a carpenter’s trade." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is a continuation of yesterday’s, which discussed what property the court seizes when taking a pledge from one who owes the Temple money for his vow.", + "If he had many [tools] of one kind, and few of another kind, they may not say to him to sell the many and buy some of the few, but one leaves him two of the kind of which he has many and all that he has from those of which he has few. If he only has one of a certain type of tool, but many of another, he doesn’t get the opportunity to sell some tools in order to buy a second tool of the kind of which he has only one. Rather, they just apply the rule as it is normally applied they leave him with two of every kind, and if only has one, too bad for him.", + "One who consecrates [all] his possessions to the Sanctuary, they count his tefillin in the evaluation. Tefillin count in assessing the value of one’s property. So if one dedicates the value of his property to the Temple, he must include in the assessment the value of his tefillin. [This brings back memories of the day my wife and I bought our first apartment. I remember taking out the mortgage and buying the house and then realizing that before that moment, the most valuable item I owned were my tefillin!]" + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah continues to deal with how the Temple assesses a person’s belongings if they have dedicated all of their property to the Temple.", + "Whether one consecrates his property or evaluates himself, it [the Sanctuary] has no claim to his wife's garment or his children's garment or to the dyed clothes which he had dyed for their use or to the new sandals which he has bought for their use. When a person dedicates all of his property to the Temple, the Temple can make claim only to property that is his they have no share in his family’s property. Even if he bought clothes for his wife or kids, they belong them and not to him. The mishnah goes even further. If the husband has clothes dyed in order to give them to his wife and kids, they already belong to them, even if they have not yet worn them. Similarly, if he buys new sandals for them, they do not belong to the husband, even if the wife and kids have not yet worn them. The mere intent that these items should belong to his family already takes them out of his property.", + "Although they said: “Slaves are sold with their garments to increase their value,” because when a garment for thirty denars is bought for him his value is increased by a maneh. And likewise with a cow, if it is kept waiting to the market-day it increases in value, and similarly a pearl, if brought to a big city increases in value. Nevertheless, the Sanctuary can only claim the value of anything in its own place and at its own time. The main point of this section is that when the Temple’s treasurer estimates the value of a person’s property, he estimates how much it is worth now, and not how much it might be worth in the future. There are three examples in which an owner could easily raise the value of his property. A slave dressed in fine clothing, worth 30 denars, will see his value in the market value go up 100 denar (a maneh) [this is similar to painting your house or fixing your car before you sell it the house increases in value more than the cost of the paintjob]. Similarly, a cow and a pearl that are given time to grow can have their market value greatly increase. In sum, slaves, animals and precious stones can have a large degree of variance in their value. Nevertheless, when the Temple collects from the person who dedicated his property, they assess its worth based on its current value. " + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nChapter seven and the beginning of chapter eight deal with the laws concerning a person who dedicates his ancestral field to the Temple. These laws are found in Leviticus 27.\n16 If anyone consecrates to the Lord any land that he holds, its assessment shall be in accordance with its seed requirement: fifty shekels of silver to a homer of barley seed. 17 If he consecrates his land as of the jubilee year, its assessment stands. 18 But if he consecrates his land after the jubilee, the priest shall compute the price according to the years that are left until the jubilee year, and its assessment shall be so reduced; 19 and if he who consecrated the land wishes to redeem it, he must add one-fifth to the sum at which it was assessed, and it shall pass to him. 20 But if he does not redeem the land, and the land is sold to another, it shall no longer be redeemable: 21 when it is released in the jubilee, the land shall be holy to the Lord, as land proscribed; it becomes the priest's holding.\nWe should note that from the Second Temple period and onward these laws would have been completely theoretical Jews no longer lived on land that they “held,” meaning land that was part of their ancestral possession. However, these laws are found in the Torah and therefore they are of interest to the rabbis.", + "One may not consecrate [a field of his possession] less than two years before the Jubilee, nor redeem it less than one year after the Jubilee. Vs. 18 states, “But if he consecrates his land after the jubilee, the priest shall compute the price according to the years that are left until the jubilee year, and its assessment shall be so reduced.” I have emboldened the word “years” because the halakhah in this mishnah is based on a midrash on that word. “Years” implies that there must be at least two years remaining before the Jubilee. If there are fewer, he cannot consecrate his land. If one has dedicated his land and then wishes to redeem it and it is still the first year of the Jubilee, he must pay the full amount, “fifty shekels of silver to a homer of barley seed” (fifty shekels for every piece of land that requires a homer of barley to sow it). He doesn’t get to reduce the amount because of the months that have passed since the Jubilee.", + "One does not reckon months to [the disadvantage of] the Sanctuary, but the Sanctuary does reckon months [to its own advantage]. The mishnah now notes a general rule with regard to taking months into account. As we already learned, when a person redeems his land, he doesn’t take into account the months that have already passed. Rather he pays according to the full years that have passed since the Jubilee. However, the Sanctuary does benefit from the months that the land has already stayed in the hands of the dedicator. They benefit because he has to pay for them. [Note that this rule is somewhat repetitive].", + "If a man consecrated his field at a time when the law of the Jubilee is in force, he must pay fifty shekels for [every piece of field sufficient for] the sowing of a homer of barley. This states the basic law as found in verse sixteen. Another version of the mishnah reads not “in the time of the Jubilee” but “during the year of the Jubilee.” The Hebrew of these two versions is nearly identical. This would then be an interpretation of verse 16 the verse applies to a person who dedicated his land during the year of the Jubilee. If after the Jubilee, the payment is reduced.", + "If the field contained ravines ten handbreadths deep or rocks ten handbreadths high, they are not included as part of the field. But if less than this, they are included. Ravines and rocks don’t count in measuring the size of the field as long as they are ten handbreadths high or deep. This is because they are considered to be their own domain and not part of the field. However, if they are less than ten high or deep, they are assessed with the field.", + "If he consecrated it two or three years before the Jubilee, he must pay one sela [shekel] and one pondion for each year. Who’s ready for some math? The full price of the field is 50 sela (shekels) for 49 years between one Jubilee and the next. A pondion is worth 1/48 of a sela, so the price per year is one sela and 48/49 of a pondion. The mishnah rounds up in favor of the Temple he pays a full pondion per year.", + "If he says: “I shall pay for each year as it comes,” they do not listen to him, rather he must pay for all the years together. The payment made for redeeming the field must be done in full immediately, even though the field is only worth one sela and one pondion per year." + ], + [ + "It is all the same whether the owner or anyone else [redeems the field].
What is the difference between the owner and any other man? The owner must add one fifth, whereas any other man need not add one fifth.
The reckoning of the value of the field is basically the same whether the owner or another person redeems it. The only difference is that the owner adds another fifth to the value of the field. This is stated in Leviticus 27:19: “And if he who consecrated the land wishes to redeem it, he must add one-fifth to the sum at which it was assessed, and it shall pass to him.” The mishnah reads the words “and if he who consecrated the land” to mean that only if the owner consecrates it must he add another fifth. If others do, there is no added fifth." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah deals with the continuation of the verses about dedicating one’s “and of possession.” These verses read: 20“But if he does not redeem the land, and the land is sold to another, it shall no longer be redeemable: 21 when it is released in the jubilee, the land shall be holy to the Lord, as land proscribed; it becomes the priest's holding.”\nAs we can see, if the owner does not redeem the land, then the land becomes the property of the priests.", + "If a man consecrated [his field] and then redeemed it, it does not go out of his possession in the Jubilee. If the owner redeems it himself, it reverts to being his possession, and stays that way even after the Jubilee.", + "If his son redeemed it, it reverts to his father in the Jubilee. Similarly, if his son redeems it, it goes back to the father, because the son is the eventual inheritor of the land.", + "If another person, or a relative redeemed it, and he redeemed it from his hand, it goes out [to the priests]. However, if other people, and even other relatives redeem the land, it is theirs only temporarily until the Jubilee at which point it becomes the property of the priests, as is stated in the final verse.", + "If one of the priests redeemed it, and it was still in his possession, he cannot say: “Since it goes out to the priests in the Jubilee, and since it is now in my possession, therefore it belongs to me.” Rather, it goes out of his possession to all his fellow priests. If one of the priests redeemed the land before the Jubilee, he is treated just like any other person. It is his until the Jubilee and then it becomes the possession of all the priests. He cannot claim that since he is a priest, at the Jubilee it should become his sole possession." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe rabbis now debate what happens to the land if it is not redeemed before the Jubilee. This is explained in verses 20-21, “But if he does not redeem the land, and the land is sold to another, it shall no longer be redeemable: when it is released in the jubilee, the land shall be holy to the Lord, as land proscribed; it becomes the priest's holding.”", + "If the Jubilee arrived and it was not yet redeemed then the priests enter into possession of the land and they pay its value, the words of Rabbi Judah. According to Rabbi Judah, while the priests do get the rights to the land, they must pay for the Temple for the land. It seems that he holds that when a person dedicates his field to the Temple, the Temple must receive compensation. It is not sufficient for the priests to take over.", + "Rabbi Shimon says: they enter [into possession] but they do not pay [its value]. According to Rabbi Shimon, the priests do not need to pay for the land. It becomes “holy” by virtue of it becoming their possession.", + "Rabbi Eliezer says: they neither enter [into possession] nor pay [its value]. But it is called an abandoned field until the second Jubilee. If the second jubilee has arrived and it was not yet redeemed, it is called a ‘twice abandoned field’ until the third Jubilee. The priests never enter into possession of the field until someone else had redeemed it. Verses 20-21 state that “if the land is sold…it becomes the priest’s holding.” The implication is that if the land is never sold to another person, it does not become the property of the priest. This is Rabbi Eliezer’s position. The land can remain abandoned through several Jubilees and not become the possession of the priests until someone buys the land and then the next Jubilee year arrives." + ], + [ + "If one bought a field from his father, and his father died and afterwards he consecrated it, it is considered a field of possession. A field that is not a “field of possession” reverts to its original owner during the Jubilee, as is stated in Leviticus 27:22-24. When a son buys a field from his father, it is questionable whether that field is considered a “field of possession” because it might eventually become his possession, or whether we treat this as a field that was purchased. If the father dies and then the son consecrates the field, it is considered a field of possession because even if the son had not bought the field, it would have become his (or at least partly his) before he consecrated it.", + "If he consecrated it and afterwards his father died, then it is considered a field acquired by purchase, the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Judah and Rabbi Shimon say: it is considered a field of possession, as it is said: “And if a field which he has, which is not a field of his possession” (Leviticus 27:22) a field which is not capable of becoming a field of his possession, thus excluding a field which is capable of becoming a field of possession. However, if he consecrated it before his father died, there is a debate as to the status of the field. According to Rabbi Meir it is considered a field acquired by purchase. If he redeems it, he need not add an extra fifth, as is the rule with a field of possession. And if he doesn’t redeem it, during the Jubilee it reverts to its original owners. Rabbis Shimon and Judah disagree and derive through a midrash that any field that could become one’s through inheritance cannot be put into the category of a purchased field. Therefore, even if he dedicates the field purchased from his father before his father dies, it still retains the status of a “field of possession.” If he redeems it he will need to add an extra fifth, and if he doesn’t redeem it, it will become the possession of the priests during the Jubilee year.", + "A field acquired by purchase does not go out to the priests in the year of the Jubilee, for no man can consecrate an object not belonging to him. A field that is purchased does not really belong to the purchaser because the field will eventually revert to the original owner’s possession during the following Jubilee. Therefore, it never becomes the possession of the priests. The purchaser cannot truly consecrate it because it was never his.", + "Priests and Levites may consecrate [their fields] at any time and redeem at any time, both before and after the jubilee. There are special laws concerning a priest or Levite who dedicates his field. They may dedicate their field even within two years of the Jubilee (compare with mishnah one) and they can redeem their own field even after the Jubilee. This is different from an Israelite who can never redeem his field after the Jubilee." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah begins to deal with the laws of consecrating one’s inherited field at a time when the Jubilee was no longer observed. The mishnah describes a time when the Temple is still standing, meaning that the law of the Jubilee was not observed during the Second Temple period.", + "If one consecrated his field at a time when the [law of the] Jubilee was no longer observed, they say to him: “You open [the bidding]!” because the owner must pay an added fifth, whereas others do not pay an additional fifth. When the Jubilee was no longer observed, a consecrated field was redeemed through an auction. The first bidder was always the original owner and if he did not want to redeem the Temple officials would force him to make at least a minimum bid. The preference for redeeming the field goes to the owner because when he redeems the field he adds an extra fifth. In contrast, when the Jubilee year was still observed, they didn’t force the owner to redeem his field because an unredeemed field eventually would belong to the priests.", + "It happened that one consecrated his field because it was bad. They said to him: “You open the bidding.” He said: “I will acquire it for an issar.” Rabbi Yose said: he did say that, but rather “for an egg,” because consecrated objects may be redeemed by either money or money's equivalent. He [the Temple treasurer] said to him: It’s yours. It turns out he lost an issar and the field was his again. In this somewhat amusing story, an owner of a field consecrates a field because due to its poor quality. They then force him to at least put forth a bid. His bid is extremely low, an issar, which is 1/24 of a dinar. Rabbi Yose says that he offered an egg for the field, an object probably worth about an issar, if not more. In any case, with this tiny bid, he has acquired his field. He loses the issar to the Temple, but the field is restored to his possession." + ], + [ + "If one said: I will acquire it for ten selas, and another, [for] twenty, and another for thirty, and another for forty, and another for fifty, If he [that bid] fifty reneged, they take pledges from his property up to ten selas. If he [that bid] forty reneged, they take pledges from his property up to ten selas. If he [that bid] thirty reneged, they take pledges from his property up to ten selas. If he that bid twenty reneged they take pledges from his property up to ten selas. If he that bid ten reneged they sell [the field] for what it is worth, and collect what remains from him who bid ten.
In this imaginative scenario there is initially a bidding war for the field, each person upping the previous bid by ten selas. Finally, the bid is won by the person who bid 50 selas. Then all of the bidders begin to renege. The mishnah delineates how the Temple deals with this situation. Note—the idea is that the Temple should collect the highest bid, but that all of those who bid should have to pay something. Basically the Temple takes a pledge from each person equivalent to the amount that he upped the previous bid ten selas. When they get to the last person, they simply sell the field and then take from him the difference between ten and the sale price. In this way, the Temple collects fifty selas, but no more than fifty selas.", + "If the owner bid twenty and any other man bid twenty, then the owner comes first, because he must add one fifth.
If the owner and another person put forth the same bid, the owner's bid is accepted because he must add an extra fifth. In this way the Temple maximizes its profits." + ], + [ + "Introduction
This mishnah deals with a case where the owner of the field is slightly outbid by another. The complicating factor is that the owner has to add an extra fifth, thereby increasing the profit gained by the Temple. Sometimes, a lower bid by the owner is actually better for the Temple than a higher bid by others.
The added fifth in rabbinic law is calculated by being a fifth of the final amount. Thus an added fifth of twenty is five, because 1/5 of 25 is five. If I remember my algebra the equation for this would be: x=(y+x)/5, where x is the added fifth and y is the original bid. This is called in rabbinic terminology, an outside fifth.", + "If one said I will acquire it for twenty-one selas, then the owners must pay twenty-six. [If one said] Twenty-two, the owners must pay twenty-seven. Twenty-three, the owners must pay twenty-eight. Twenty-four, the owners must pay twenty-nine. Twenty-five, the owners must pay thirty, For they need not add one fifth to what the other bids more.
In all of these cases the owner bid twenty. If the other person bid 21, then the owner's bid of 20 will end up more profitable for the Temple, because it is actually 25. He must pay 26 because we can't allow the principal that he pays to be less than that of the other bidder. So of the 26 he pays, 21 is considered principal and 5 is the extra fifth. Note that the owner is forced to pay the extra sela, even though his original bid would have caused him to pay only 25. The same is true in cases where others bid 22-25—the owners add the fifth to their bid, taking them to 25, and then they add the number that by which the other's bid was greater than theirs.
The final line of this section explains that the owners don’t have to pay an added fifth for the extra amount that they pay to surpass the other's bid. In other words, their principal, upon which they pay the added fifth, remains 20. This is because the other bid did not surpass their bid and the added fifth.", + "If one said: I will acquire it for twenty-six, if the owners want to pay thirty-one and an extra denar, the owner comes first. And if not, we say to the other: It has become yours.
In this case, the other bid was higher than the owner's bid and the added fifth taken together. In order to beat the other bid the owner will need to pay thirty-one selas and one denar. This consists of the original twenty five of their own bid (20 +5). Then they need to pay an extra six selas to add up to the twenty-six the other guy bid. For the extra sela which they were outbid they need to pay an added fifth, because in this case the extra amount bid was higher than his bid. This added fifth is one denar, because a sela is four denars. So it turns out that the owner pays 31 selas and one denar.
In this case the owner has the option to not pay the higher amount and allow the field to go to the other bidder. " + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe remainder of chapter eight deals with Leviticus 27:28: “But of all that anyone owns, be it man or beast or land of his holding, nothing that he has proscribed for the Lord may be sold or redeemed; every proscribed thing is totally consecrated to the Lord.” From this verse we see that a person can devote part of his property to God. The word for “proscribed” is “herem.” According to the Torah, when a person “proscribes” any of his property to God it cannot be sold or redeemed. Rather it permanently becomes the property of the priests (see below in mishnah six).", + "A man may proscribe [part] of his flock or of his herd, of his Canaanite slaves or female slaves or of his field of possession. But if he proscribed all of them, they are not considered [validly] proscribed, the words of Rabbi Eliezer. A person can proscribe some of a certain type of possession. For instance, he can proscribe some of his flock, herd or slaves. But he cannot proscribe all of them, and if he tries to do so, they are not considered to be sacred. This halakhah may come from a midrash on the words “of all that anyone owns” and not “all that anyone owns.” The implication is that one cannot proscribe all of his property and not even all of any one type of property.", + "Rabbi Elazar ben Azaryah said: just as when it comes to the Highest One, one is not permitted to proscribe all of his possessions, how much more so should one be careful with his property. Rabbi Elazar ben Azaryah learns a moral lesson from the previous halakhah. One is not allowed to dedicate all of a certain type of property to the Temple, because that would be too great of a loss to his estate. The Torah prevents a person from acting so rashly when it comes to his own property even though the designee of this proscription is God what could be better than that! From here we can draw the lesson that people should be careful not to lose their property, a lesson that we might heartily agree with, even after two thousand years. Indeed, to this day, when a person gives a large percentage of his property to charity, he is praised, but if he gives all of it away, leaving himself with nothing to live on, he is probably considered foolish." + ], + [ + "If one proscribes his son or his daughter, or his Hebrew slave or female slave, or the field which he acquired by purchase, they are not considered [validly] proscribed, for one can proscribe something that does not belong to him. One can proscribe only things that belong to him as permanent possessions. This is stated quite clearly in Leviticus 27:28, “But of all that anyone owns, be it man or beast or land of his holding.” Thus one cannot proscribe his children, his Hebrew slaves (whom he does not own) or land which he acquired through purchase. Such land will revert to its original owners when the Jubilee year comes, so it doesn’t really belong to its current owner.", + "Priests and Levites cannot proscribe [their belongings], the words of Rabbi Judah. Rabbi Shimon says: the priests cannot proscribe, because things proscribed belong to them. But Levites can proscribe, because things proscribed do not belong to them. As we stated in the introduction, when someone proscribes (he uses the language, herem) his property, he is giving it to the priests. Therefore, if priests proscribe their property, nothing happens to it. According to Rabbi Judah, Levites too cannot proscribe their property. Rabbi Shimon holds that while priests cannot proscribe, Levites can, because the property they proscribe does not become theirs, but rather the priets.", + "Rabbi says: the words of Rabbi Judah seem acceptable in cases of immovable property as it is said: “For that is their perpetual possession,” (Leviticus 25:34) and the words of Rabbi Shimon seem acceptable in cases of movable property, since things proscribed do not fall to them. Rabbi [Judah Hanasi] functions in this mishnah as a halakhic decisor in the debate between Rabbi Judah and Rabbi Shimon concerning whether Levites can proscribe their property. Rabbi agrees that when it comes to immovable property, i.e. land, a Levite cannot proscribe his property. This is because states that the land that the Levites own is their “perpetual possession.” If they were allowed to proscribe their land, they could lose it. Therefore, they cannot proscribe any of their land. However, when it comes to movable property (animals, possessions, etc.) they can proscribe it, as Rabbi Shimon stated. This is because they don’t have the complication that priests have that the proscribed property would become theirs." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn today’s mishnah the sages and Rabbi Judah ben Batera disagree as to whether things that are proscribed without specification go to the priests or to a fund for Temple repairs. We should note that the first says, “every proscribed thing is totally consecrated to the Lord.” The meaning of “to the Lord” is disputed in our mishnah.", + "Things proscribed for [the use of] the priests cannot be redeemed but are to be given to the priests. That things proscribed cannot be redeemed is stated explicitly in the Torah, “nothing that he has proscribed for the Lord may be sold or redeemed.” According to this opinion, the proscribed things become the property of the priests. The source of this can be found in section three below.", + "Rabbi Judah ben Batera says: things proscribed without specification fall to [the fund for] Temple repairs, as it was said: “Every proscribed thing is most holy to the Lord” (Leviticus 27:25). Rabbi Judah ben Batera and the sages argue over whether things that are proscribed without specification, meaning the person did not state where he wanted the things to go, are given to the fund for Temple repair or to the priests. According to Rabbi Judah ben Batera, they are given to Temple repair. This is the meaning of “most holy to the Lord.”", + "But the sages say: things proscribed without specification go to the priests, as it is said: “As a field proscribed: its possession belongs to the priest” (Leviticus 27:21). If so, why is it said: “Every proscribed thing is most holy to the Lord”? This teaches that it applies to most holy and less holy things. The other sages point out that Leviticus 27:21 (and Numbers 18:14) clearly state that proscribed things belong to the priests. This then causes them to ask why the Torah says, “Every proscribed thing is most holy to the Lord.” They interpret this verse as if it says, “Every proscribed thing, even a most holy thing, is holy to the Lord.” The next mishnah will discuss this halakhah." + ], + [ + "A man may proscribe his holy things, whether they are most holy things or less holy things.
If [they had been] consecrated as a vow, he must give their value, if as a freewill-offering, he must give what it is worth to him.
[If he said:] “Let this ox be an olah,” one estimates how much a man would pay for the ox to offer it as an olah, which he was not obliged [to offer].
A first-born, whether unblemished or blemished, may be proscribed. How can it be redeemed? They estimate what a man would give for this first-born in order to give it to the son of his daughter or to the son of his sister.
Rabbi Ishmael says: one verse says, [All first-born males] you shall sanctify,” (Deuteronomy 15:19) and another verse says: [“The first-borns among beasts] no man shall sanctify it” (Leviticus 27:26). It is impossible to say: “You shall sanctify,” since it was said already: “No man shall sanctify,” and it is impossible to say: “No man shall sanctify,” since it is also said: “You shall sanctify”? Therefore resolve [thus]: you may sanctify it by consecrating its value [to the owner], but you may not sanctify it by consecrating it to the altar.
Today’s mishnah explains how one proscribes something that is already holy.
Section one: As we learned in yesterday’s mishnah, a person can proscribe his most holy things (such as an olah a whole burnt offering) or his less holy things (such as a shelamim a wellbeing offering). Our mishnah describes what happens when he does after all, if something is already sanctified, how can he proscribe it either to the priests or for the upkeep of the Temple?
Section two: There are two ways of consecrating something: 1) as a vow; 2) as a freewill offering. Consecrating something as a vow means that he said, “I vow to bring an olah or a shelamim.” Then he sets aside an animal to be the olah or shelamim (a burnt offering and an offering of wellbeing). In this case, if something should happen to the animal he would have to bring another in its stead in order to fulfill his vow. He then proscribes this animal. In this case, since he was responsible for the animal, he can proscribe its entire value. This value must be given either to the priests or to the upkeep of the Temple.
Section three: The other way of consecrating something is by saying, “This animal will be an olah or a shelamim.” In this case, if something should happen to the animal, he is not responsible to bring another in its stead. Thus the animal was not worth to him its full value (as it was in the previous case) because if it gets lost or dies, he need not bring another. We now have to evaluate how much it was worth to him. There are two ways of understanding how this is done. The first is that we evaluate how much a person would pay to offer an olah when he is not obligated to do so. A person might feel some pleasure from bringing a sacrifice and we could even give a monetary amount to this benefit. This is the amount that he would have to pay to the priests or to the upkeep of the Temple.
The other interpretation of this section is that we find how much a priest who is not currently on his watch at the Temple would pay a person to wait until his watch to bring his olah so that he could have the benefit of offering it up. This amount of money is what the person who proscribed the animal would be obligated to give to the priests or to the upkeep of the Temple.
Section four: A person can proscribe a first born animal, whether it is blemished (and edible to its owner) or unblemished (and must be given to the priest). The mishnah now explains how we evaluate how much the one who proscribed the first-born owes in a case where he was obligated to give it to a priest (an unblemished animal.) This animal cannot be given to a priest in return for money. But he could give it to his daughter’s son, if his daughter married a priest or to his nephew if his sister married a priest. We estimate how much a person would pay to give such a gift to his nephew or grandson and that is the amount he owes.
Rabbi Ishmael now provides a midrash to prove that one can dedicate a first born so that its value goes to the Temple or to the priests but one cannot dedicate a first-born for it to become a sacrifice. He points out that in reference to the first born one verse says, “you shall dedicate” and another verse says, “you shall not consecrate.” These two verses seemingly disagree with one another. He resolves them by having them refer to our situation you can dedicate the first born so that its value goes to the priests, but you cannot dedicate a first born so that it is put onto the altar as a different type of sacrifice." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah deals with the laws of selling one’s ancestral land to another person when the Jubilee was still observed. Concerning this law, Leviticus 25 states:\n13In this year of Jubilee, each of you shall return to his holding. 14 When you sell property to your neighbor, or buy any from your neighbor, you shall not wrong one another. 15 In buying from your neighbor, you shall deduct only for the number of years since the Jubilee; and in selling to you, he shall charge you only for the remaining crop years: 16 the more such years, the higher the price you pay; the fewer such years, the lower the price; for what he is selling you is a number of harvests. 17 Do not wrong one another, but fear your God; for I the Lord am your God.", + "If one sold his field [of possession] at the time when the Jubilee was in force, he may not redeem it for two years, as it says: “According to the number of the years of the crops he shall sell to you” (Leviticus 25:15). When one sells his ancestral land he can redeem it until the following Jubilee (Leviticus 25:10). In essence, what he is actually selling is the right to use the land until the owner redeems it, or until the Jubilee comes. Since the Torah uses the word “years” when referring to selling or buying ancestral land, the rabbis deduce that no sale can be for less than two years.", + "If there was a year of blight or mildew, or a seventh year, it is not included in the count. If there was a year in which the purchaser could not plant, either because it was the seventh year or because of bad weather or blight, that year does not count towards the two.", + "If he only broke the ground [without planting] or left it fallow [for a year], that year is included in the count. However, if the purchaser decided of his own volition not to plant during a one of the first two years of his acquisition, that year counts towards the two year minimum.", + "Rabbi Elazar says: if he sold it to him before Rosh Hashanah year, and it was still full of fruit, he enjoys three crops in two years. Rabbi Elazar points out that sometimes a person can get a “three for two” deal. If he buys a piece of land right before Rosh Hashanah and it is full of produce, he can harvest that produce and then he still gets a full two years to work and harvest the land. He only pays for two years, so he is getting one harvest for free. It seems that when we reckon the years we don’t begin from the point of purchase but rather from Rosh Hashanah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah continues to deal with how one redeems one’s ancestral field.", + "If he sold it to the first for one hundred [denars] and the first sold it to the second for two hundred, then he need reckon only with the first, as it says, “With the man to whom he sold” (Leviticus 25:27). In this case, the person who wishes to redeem his field must reckon only with the person to whom he sold the field, and not with the person who bought from him. The way this is done is by first dividing the price of the field according to the number of years between the purchase and the next Jubilee. Let’s say he bought the field for 100 denars and there were ten years until the next Jubilee. When the owner comes to redeem his field he will pay ten denars for every year left. Then, the purchaser will have to restore the remainder of the money to the one who bought it from him, according to the value to which he sold it to him. So if the field was redeemed in the fifth year, the redeemer will give fifty to the first buyer, and the first buyer will have to give another 100 to the second buyer, who paid 20 denars a year for the field.", + "If he sold it to the first for two hundred, and the first sold it to the second for one hundred, then he need reckon only with the second, as it says: “With the man” ( the man in possession of the field. If the first buyer sold it to the second buyer for a lesser amount of money, the original owner need reckon the redemption price only with the second buyer. The mishnah’s midrash takes the word “the man” from the same verse as above, and isolates it, as if it means, “sometimes the original owner reckons with the first buyer and sometimes with the second buyer.” The halakhah ends up being lenient in both cases on the original owner, a person who grew so poor he had to sell his ancestral holdings. The lesson learned here is that the Torah wants the original owner to be able to acquire his ancestral land back, and therefore will make the law as lenient as possible to achieve such a goal.", + "One may not sell a distant field in order to redeem a near one, or a poor field in order to redeem a good one. One may not borrow [money] in order to redeem, nor redeem it in halves. There are, however, certain restrictions when it comes to redeeming the ancestral land that he sold. One cannot sell some ancestral property in order to redeem other property, even if the property he wants to redeem is closer to his current residence, or the property he wants to redeem is of better quality than the property he wants to sell. One cannot borrow money in order to redeem his land. This may be a measure meant to prevent a poor person from going into even greater debt. Finally, one cannot redeem half of the property it’s either the whole thing or none.", + "But in the case of objects consecrated all these things are permitted. In this respect the laws concerning a person’s [property] are more stringent than those concerning sacred things. These limitations do not apply to redeeming land dedicated to the Temple. In such a case, we allow him to borrow in order to redeem the land, or redeem it piece by piece. It seems that there is a desire to make it a bit easier for the Temple to receive the money for the dedicated land. The mishnah concludes by noting that in this respect, the laws concerning redeeming land from another person are more stringent than those governing redeeming land from the Temple. This is indeed an oddity, because usually the laws regarding holy things are more stringent." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah and the remainder of the chapter deal with Leviticus 25:29-35, the verses that talk about a person selling a home within a walled city. The seller has one year to redeem his home, and if he does not redeem it, it becomes the property of the purchaser.", + "If one sold a house among the houses of a walled city, he may redeem it at once and at any time during twelve months. When it comes to redeeming a house sold in a walled city, the seller may redeem it immediately. There is no waiting period as there is for inherited fields.", + "This is a kind of interest, yet it is not interest. Selling a house in order to redeem it looks like interest, which is prohibited, but it is not interest. If Reuven sells his house to Shimon and it stays with Shimon for a period of months and then Reuven buys it back, it looks like Shimon has loaned Reuven the money in return for use of the house. If this was actually a case of lending money, the deal would have been prohibited. It is allowed because this is actually a sale and not a loan.", + "If the seller died, his son may redeem it. If the purchaser died, it may be redeemed from his son. If the seller dies, his son has the right to redeem the house. Similarly, if the purchaser dies, the seller may redeem it from his son.", + "One counts the year only from the time that he sold it, as it is said, “Before a full year has elapsed” (Leviticus 25:30). The year in which he has to redeem it is reckoned according to the date that the original owner sold the field. This is true even if his son is redeeming it, after he inherited the right to do so from his father. No matter the case, the field can be redeemed for only one year from the point of the original sale.", + "When it says a “a full” [year] the extra month is included. Rabbi says: he is allowed a year and its extra month. During a leap year, the seller has an extra month to redeem his field. Rabbi holds that a person is allowed a full lunar year, plus the extra eleven days separating a lunar year from a solar year. This is true regardless of whether the year was a leap year or not. One always gets a solar year in which to redeem the house. This is interesting because we are used to saying that the Jewish calendar is based on the moon. While this is true with regard to the months, it seems to be less true with regard to the year. When it comes to the year, we have a mix between a lunar calendar and a solar calendar." + ], + [ + "If the [last] day of the twelve months has arrived and it was not redeemed, it becomes his permanent [possession].
This applies whether he bought it or received it as a gift, as it is said: “beyond reclaim” (Leviticus 25:30).
In earlier times, he [the buyer] would hide on the last day of the twelve months, so that [the house] might become his permanent [possession].
Hillel enacted that he [the seller] could deposit his money in the chamber and break down the door and enter, and that the other [the buyer], whenever he wanted, might come and take his money.
Section one: If the last day of the twelve months passes and the owner doesn’t redeem his property, the house becomes the permanent possession of the purchaser. The house doesn’t go back to its original owner during the Jubilee year.
Section two: Leviticus 25:30 reads, “If it is not redeemed before a full year has elapsed, the house in the walled city shall pass to the purchaser beyond reclaim throughout the ages.” The words “beyond reclaim” and “throughout the ages” seem to be redundant. The rabbis use this redundancy as a source from which to conclude that the same laws that apply to selling the land also apply to giving it away. One who gives his house to another can redeem it, although all he must do is claim it in return.
Section three: Before Hillel, the seller would have to actually find the purchaser in order to redeem his house. It seems that they would quite frequently they would wait until the last possible day to redeem the house. This led to the purchaser hiding from the seller so the latter couldn’t reclaim possession of his house. In order to fix this problem, and to allow the sellers, who were assumedly poor and in desperate need of money, to reclaim their homes, Hillel allowed them to deposit their money in the chamber of the treasury in the Temple. Then he could go back to his house, break down the door and enter legally. The purchaser could come and collect his money from the Temple whenever he wanted.
We should note that there are other “takkanot” (rabbinic enactments) that are ascribed to Hillel in which we find Hillel shaping the halakhah to improve the lot of the poor. The most famous of them is the “prozbul” which allowed a creditor to collect his debt after the sabbatical year. There too Hillel acted to protect the poor, for if creditors could not be assured of their ability to collect their loans, they would never lend to the poor in the first place." + ], + [ + "Whatever is within the [city] wall is regarded as the houses in a walled city, with the exception of fields. Rabbi Meir says: even fields.
Anything inside the walled city is governed by the laws regarding houses in the walled city. The first opinion holds that fields are the exception. The implication would be that can be redeemed, if sold, up until the Jubilee year. Rabbi Meir says that even fields within the city must be redeemed within a year, or they become the permanent property of the buyer.", + " A house built into the wall: Rabbi Judah says: it is not considered a house within a walled city. Rabbi Shimon says: its outer wall is regarded as its [city] wall.
In thickly walled cities, houses were often built right into the walls. We see this in the Tanakh in connection with Jericho. According to Rabbi Judah these houses are not considered to be within the walled city. Rather they are like houses in a courtyard, a topic which mishnah seven will discuss.
Rabbi Shimon says that the outside wall of the house counts as the wall of the city and therefore these houses are considered part of the city." + ], + [ + "Introduction
Houses in cities that are not surrounded by walls are not treated in the same way as house in walled cities. These are called “houses in courtyards” and we will the halakhot which govern them tomorrow. Our mishnah discusses what cities count as being walled.", + "A city whose roofs [look as if] they form its wall,
If the city does not really have a wall, but its houses are so close together that they look like a wall, it still does not count as a walled city.", + "Or that was not encompassed by a wall in the days of Joshua ben Nun, is not considered like houses in a walled city.
In order for a city to count as a walled city it has to have had a wall around it in the time of Joshua. In other words, the status of walled or not walled is determined by the status of the city when the land was first conquered and then divided up to the original tribes. This is probably because these laws refer to ancestral inheritance, and ancestral inheritance begins at the time of Joshua.", + "[A house in any of] the following counts a house in a walled city: [those in a city] of no less than three courtyards, having two houses each, which have been encompassed by a wall in the days of Joshua ben Nun, such as the old acroplis of Tzippori, the fort of Gush-Halav, old Yodfat, Gamla, G'dod, Hadid, Ono, Jerusalem and other similar cities.
In order to count as a walled city the city must fulfill two main conditions:
1) Firstly, it must be large enough to be considered a city. The mishnah requires the city to have at least three courtyards, each with two houses.
2) Second, the city has to have been surrounded by walls at the time of Joshua. There are eight such cities listed here. Tzippori and Yodfat are in the Lower Galilee, and Gush-Halav and Gamla are in the Upper Galilee. G’dod (or in other versions, G’dor) is on the other side of the Jordan and Hadid and Ono are in Judea, near Lod. Jerusalem, I am assuming, is familiar to everyone." + ], + [ + "Introduction
Leviticus 25:31 reads, \"But houses in courtyards that have no surrounding walls shall be classed as open country: they may be redeemed, and they shall be released through the Jubilee.\"
Our mishnah discusses how we treat houses in walled cities.", + "Houses in courtyards - we accord to them the advantages of houses in a walled city and the advantages given to fields:
When an owner sells a house found in a courtyard (and not in a walled city) he has a much easier time redeeming it. It has all of the advantages that a house in a walled city has over a field and all of the advantages that a field has over a house in a walled city.", + "They can be redeemed at once, and at any time within the twelve months like houses [in a walled city], and they return [to the owners] in the Jubilee or [at an earlier time] by [payment of a] reduced price like fields.
It has the advantages of a house in a walled city in that it can be redeemed immediately and throughout the twelve months that he has to buy it back. This is different from fields which can be redeemed only after they are with the purchaser for at least two years.
There are two advantages that these houses have for the seller over houses in walled cities. First, they revert to their owner at the Jubilee. Second, when the seller buys the house back, he reduces the money for the amount of time that the house was in the hands of the purchaser, as is the case with fields but not with houses in a walled city.", + "The following are considered houses in courtyards: [a city which has] two courtyards, each having two houses, even though they have been encompassed by a wall since the days of Joshua ben Nun, they count as houses in courtyards.
This section is the opposite of the last section of yesterday’s mishnah. If the house was in a place too small to be considered a city, or in a walled city that was not surrounded by walls then it counts as a house in a courtyard, and not a house in a walled city. " + ], + [ + "Introduction\nHouses owned by Levites in the cities that were allotted to them have rules that differ from those that apply to houses owned by Israelites. This is states in Leviticus 25:32-33:\n32 As for the cities of the Levites, the houses in the cities they hold the Levites shall forever have the right of redemption. 33 Such property as may be redeemed from the Levites houses sold in a city they hold shall be released through the jubilee; for the houses in the cities of the Levites are their holding among the Israelites.\nThe second half of the mishnah deals with the status of the lands that surround the Levites cities. This issue is dealt with in Numbers 35: 1-5:\n1 The Lord spoke to Moses in the steppes of Moab at the Jordan near Jericho, saying: 2 Instruct the Israelite people to assign, out of the holdings apportioned to them, towns for the Levites to dwell in; you shall also assign to the Levites pasture land around their towns. 3 The towns shall be theirs to dwell in, and the pasture shall be for the cattle they own and all their other beasts. 4 The town pasture that you are to assign to the Levites shall extend a thousand cubits outside the town wall all around. 5 You shall measure off two thousand cubits outside the town on the east side, two thousand on the south side, two thousand on the west side, and two thousand on the north side, with the town in the center. That shall be the pasture for their towns.", + "If an Israelite inherited from his mother's father who was a Levite, he cannot redeem it according to the order prescribed here. Also if a Levite inherited from his mother's father who was an Israelite, he cannot redeem it according to the order prescribed here, As it says, “As for the houses of the cities of the Levites” (Leviticus 25:32) [this order does not apply] unless he is a Levite and in the cities of the Levites, the words of Rabbi. We can see from Leviticus 25:32-33 that Levites always retain the right to redeem their houses, and if they don’t redeem them, they are released in the Jubilee year. According to Rabbi, the rules in these verses apply only to Levites that have sold ancestral Levitical lands. So if an Israelite inherits Levitical land from his Levite maternal grandfather, he is treated like an Israelite. Similarly, if a Levite inherits land from his Israelite maternal grandfather, the land is not considered to be the land of the Levites.", + "The sages say: these things apply to the cities of the Levites. According to the sages, these rules apply to all Levitical land, even if it is owned by an Israelite. They agree, however, that Israelite land inherited by a Levite is treated like Israelite land. The rules depend on the land, not on the person.", + "One may not turn a field into pasture land, nor pasture land into a field, nor pasture land into a city, nor a city into pasture land. In the passage from Numbers that I quoted above, there seems to be a significant discrepancy between verse four, which says “one thousand cubits” and verse five, which says, “two thousand cubits.” In Sotah 5:3, Rabbi Eliezer, the son of Rabbi Yose Hagalili says that one thousand cubits refers to pasture land, land which is not used for planting or for houses, and the two thousand cubits beyond that refers to fields for planting crops. Our mishnah teaches that when it comes to the cities of the Levites, one may not turn pasture land into a field or vice versa, and similarly one may not turn the pasture land into a city by enlarging the city. The status of these lands is given by the Torah and it does not change.", + "Rabbi Elazar said: When is this so? When it comes to the cities of the Levites, but when it comes to cities of Israelites one may turn a field into pasture land, pasture land into a field, pasture land into a city, but not a city into pasture land, in order that they should not destroy the cities of Israel. Rabbi Eliezer says that these rules work differently when it comes to Israelite cities. One may turn a field into pasture and pasture into a field (this is according to one reading of the mishnah other readings state that one may not turn pasture into field). One can also turn pasture land into a city. The one thing that cannot be done is to destroy parts of the city in order to turn them into pasture land. The mishnah prohibits this in order not to destroy the cities of Israel.", + "Priests and Levites may sell [a house] at any time and redeem it at any time, as it is said: “The Levites shall forever have the right of redemption” (Leviticus 25:32). Priests and Levites can sell and redeem their ancestral land, even within the first two years of their sale. They do not have the same restriction of two years that applies to Israelites (see mishnah one). They can also redeem their houses even after a year has passed (see also mishnah 7:5). Congratulations! We have finished Tractate Arakhin! It is a tradition at this point to thank God for helping us finish learning the tractate and to commit ourselves to going back and relearning it, so that we may not forget it and so that its lessons will stay with us for all of our lives. The laws of Arakhin have basically not been in effect for thousands of years; some of them weren’t even applied when the Temple still stood. Nevertheless, there are some very interesting issues about the worth of human beings that can be found in the beginning of the tractate. As we learned, a person can be evaluated in two ways: 1) by an absolute value that is not determined at all by what s/he does, by how much money they make, by their abilities etc. This value is completely determined by the Torah. While we cannot quite say that everyone has the same value according to this system, because the Torah assigns different values based on age and gender, at least within an age group and gender group there is equality. 2) By how much a person could be sold on the slave market. This will depend on a person’s abilities, their looks, their health, etc. Every person will have a different worth, mostly based on their own accomplishments. I think that these two ways of evaluating people remain with us today. We have an ideal: that all human beings are created equal, but we realize that in reality, some people are worth more to the society than others, some people earn more money their others, and some people are more intelligent than others. While we strive for the ideal, we realize that the reality also has to be recognized. I hope you have enjoyed Arakhin. Tomorrow we begin Tractate Temurah." + ] + ] + ] + }, + "versions": [ + [ + "Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp", + "http://learn.conservativeyeshiva.org/mishnah/" + ] + ], + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה ערכין", + "categories": [ + "Mishnah", + "Modern Commentary on Mishnah", + "English Explanation of Mishnah", + "Seder Kodashim" + ], + "schema": { + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה ערכין", + "enTitle": "English Explanation of Mishnah Arakhin", + "key": "English Explanation of Mishnah Arakhin", + "nodes": [ + { + "heTitle": "הקדמה", + "enTitle": "Introduction" + }, + { + "heTitle": "", + "enTitle": "" + } + ] + } +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Kodashim/English Explanation of Mishnah Bekhorot/English/Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp.json b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Kodashim/English Explanation of Mishnah Bekhorot/English/Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..9dc74ea2e1ec13182fc21123112c7e9456752978 --- /dev/null +++ b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Kodashim/English Explanation of Mishnah Bekhorot/English/Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp.json @@ -0,0 +1,510 @@ +{ + "language": "en", + "title": "English Explanation of Mishnah Bekhorot", + "versionSource": "http://learn.conservativeyeshiva.org/mishnah/", + "versionTitle": "Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp", + "status": "locked", + "license": "CC-BY", + "shortVersionTitle": "Dr. Joshua Kulp", + "actualLanguage": "en", + "languageFamilyName": "english", + "isBaseText": true, + "isSource": true, + "isPrimary": true, + "direction": "ltr", + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה בכורות", + "categories": [ + "Mishnah", + "Modern Commentary on Mishnah", + "English Explanation of Mishnah", + "Seder Kodashim" + ], + "text": { + "Introduction": [ + "Introduction to Tractate Bekhorot", + "Bekhorot means first-born (almost the same word as Bikkurim, first fruits). Our tractate deals with three different types of first-borns, each with their own particular rules.", + "1) The first-born of a donkey. Exodus 13:11-13 (full text below) says that the male first-born of a donkey must be redeemed with a sheep, meaning that the sheep becomes holy. According to Numbers 18:15-18 and other verses in Numbers (see below) the first born of every impure (non-edible) animal must be redeemed. This would include camels, horses and other domesticated but impure animals. There were some ancient Jews, including some rabbis, who thought that all impure animals must be redeemed. However, the halakhah dictated that only the first-born of donkeys needs to be redeemed.", + "2) The male first-born of a pure animal. This first-born as the status of a sacrifice, as we learned in Tractate Zevahim. If it is blemished it cannot be sacrificed, but it still must be given to the priest.", + "3) The male first-born of a human being. This first-born is redeemed by giving five shekels to the priest.", + "In addition, Bekhorot finishes with a chapter dedicated to the cattle tithe, the giving of the tenth-born of every domesticated animal to the priest. ", + "Below are the verses that are relevant to the topic of bekhorot. As you can see, this is a topic that receives quite a bit of “coverage” in the Torah.", + "Exodus 13 2 \"Consecrate to Me every first-born; man and beast, the first issue of every womb among the Israelites is Mine.\"", + "Exodus 13 11 \"And when the LORD has brought you into the land of the Canaanites, as He swore to you and to your fathers, and has given it to you, 12 you shall set apart for the LORD every first issue of the womb: every male firstling that your cattle drop shall be the LORD's. 13 But every firstling ass you shall redeem with a sheep; if you do not redeem it, you must break its neck. And you must redeem every first-born male among your children.", + "Exodus 22 28 You shall not put off the skimming of the first yield of your vats. You shall give Me the first-born among your sons. 29 You shall do the same with your cattle and your flocks: seven days it shall remain with its mother; on the eighth day you shall give it to Me.", + "Exodus 34 19 Every first issue of the womb is Mine, from all your livestock that drop a male as firstling, whether cattle or sheep. 20 But the firstling of an ass you shall redeem with a sheep; if you do not redeem it, you must break its neck. And you must redeem every first-born among your sons. None shall appear before Me empty-handed.", + "Leviticus 27 26 A firstling of animals, however, which -- as a firstling -- is the LORD's, cannot be consecrated by anybody; whether ox or sheep, it is the LORD's.", + "Numbers 3 13 For every first-born is Mine: at the time that I smote every first-born in the land of Egypt, I consecrated every first-born in Israel, man and beast, to Myself, to be Mine, the LORD's.", + "Numbers 18 15 The first issue of the womb of every being, man or beast, that is offered to the LORD, shall be yours; but you shall have the first-born of man redeemed, and you shall also have the firstling of unclean animals redeemed. 16 Take as their redemption price, from the age of one month up, the money equivalent of five shekels by the sanctuary weight, which is twenty gerahs. 17 But the firstlings of cattle, sheep, or goats may not be redeemed; they are consecrated. You shall dash their blood against the altar, and turn their fat into smoke as an offering by fire for a pleasing odor to the LORD. 18 But their meat shall be yours: it shall be yours like the breast of elevation offering and like the right thigh.", + "Deuteronomy 15 19 You shall consecrate to the LORD your God all male firstlings that are born in your herd and in your flock: you must not work your firstling ox or shear your firstling sheep. 20 You and your household shall eat it annually before the LORD your God in the place that the LORD will choose. 21 But if it has a defect, lameness or blindness, any serious defect, you shall not sacrifice it to the LORD your God. 22 Eat it in your settlements, the unclean among you no less than the clean, just like the gazelle and the deer. 23 Only you must not partake of its blood; you shall pour it out on the ground like water." + ], + "": [ + [ + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah teaches that donkeys owned, or even partially owned, by non-Jews are exempt from the obligation to have their first-born redeemed.", + "[An Israelite] who buys a fetus of a donkey belonging to a non-Jew or who sells one to him, although this is not permitted, or who forms a partnership with him, or who receives [an animal] from him to look after or who gives [his donkey] to him to look after, is exempt from the [law of the] bekhor, for it says: [“I sanctified to me all the firstborn] in Israel,” (Numbers 3:13) but not in non-Jews. In order for a Jew to be liable to redeem the first-born of a donkey, a non-Jew cannot have any ownership or partial ownership over the donkey. So if a Jew buys a fetus (assumedly he buys a pregnant donkey) from a non-Jew it is exempt from the laws of the first-born, because it was conceived under non-Jewish ownership. Similarly, if he sells the fetus to the non-Jew, it is exempt. The mishnah notes that selling a donkey to a non-Jew is not permitted because it is forbidden to sell a large animal to a non-Jew (see Avodah Zarah 1:6). Nevertheless, if one does sell the donkey, it is exempt. If a Jew and a non-Jew are partners in owning a donkey it is exempt. If a Jew receives a donkey to take care of, and in return he keeps some of the offspring, or if he gives the donkey to the non-Jew to take care of and the non-Jew keeps some of the offspring, in both of these cases, the donkey is exempt because the non-Jew has some level of ownership over the animal. The exemption of non-Jews from these laws is derived from the word “in Israel,” which means that the law of the bekhor applies only to animals fully owned by Israelites.", + "Priests and levites are exempt through [an argument made by a] kal vehomer: if they exempted the first-born belonging to the Israelites in the wilderness, it follows all the more so that they should exempt their own. In Numbers 3:45 God instructs Moses to take the Levites in place of the first-born and to take the cattle of the Levites in place of the cattle of the first-born. From here the mishnah derives a kal vehomer (a fortiori) argument. If the Levites exempted the cattle of the first-born in the desert, then their own first-born animals are all the more so exempt from the law of the bekhor. Thus animals owned by priests and Levites are exempt from these laws. As we shall see, the same holds for children of priests and Levites." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with cases where the offspring of an animal is not the same species as the mother.", + "If a cow gave birth to a species of donkey, or a donkey gave birth to a species of horse, it is exempt from [the law of] the firstling, for it is said, “the firstling of a donkey,” “the firstling of a donkey,” twice [to teach that the law of the firstling does not apply] until that which gives birth is a donkey and that which is born is a donkey. In order for the owner of the animal to be liable to redeem the first-born donkey, it must be a donkey (at least look like a donkey) and be born from a donkey. If a cow gives birth to a donkey (I don’t really know if this is possible) or a donkey gives birth to a horse (perhaps the reference is to a mule) then there is no liability. This is derived from the fact that the Torah twice states “the first-born of a donkey” once in Exodus 13:12 and again in Exodus 34:20. The Torah repeats itself, according to the midrashic way of thinking, in order to teach that both the mother and the offspring must be donkeys.", + "And what is the law with regard to eating them? If a clean animal gave birth to a species of unclean animal, it is permitted to be eaten. But if an unclean animal gave birth to a species of a clean animal, it is forbidden to be eaten, for that which comes out of the unclean is unclean and that which comes out of the clean is clean. When it comes to determining whether an animal is kosher, the status of the animal follows its mother. Anything that comes out of a clean (kosher) animal is clean. So if a cow gives birth to a horse, one can eat the horse, but if a horse gives birth to a cow, the cow is not kosher. This is the matrilineal principle in the animal world. As an aside, some scholars surmise that the source of the idea that a child’s ethnicity/religion is determined by his mother is derived from the idea that an animal’s species is determined by its mother. While there is no conclusive proof of this, it is an intriguing theory.", + "If an unclean fish swallowed a clean fish, it is permitted to be eaten. But if a clean fish has swallowed an unclean fish, the latter is forbidden to be eaten, because it is not [the clean fish's] growth. The rule works differently if the animal coming out of another animal was not born but rather swallowed. If a clean fish swallows an unclean fish, and the unclean fish is found in the clean fish’s stomach, one may not eat the unclean fish. The opposite also holds true if one finds a clean fish in the stomach of an unclean fish, it may be eaten." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah introduces the complication of a donkey that gives birth to twins and it is unknown which came out first the male donkey, in which case the owner would be liable to redeem the donkey, or a female donkey, in which case the owner would not be liable. In addition the mishnah presents scenarios where several donkeys give birth and it is unknown whether the donkey the first-borns were male or female.", + "If a donkey that had never before given birth gave birth to two males, he gives one lamb to the priest. In this case, while we don’t know which donkey was born first, it is certain that a male was born first. Therefore, he must give one lamb to the priest to redeem the donkey.", + "[If it gave birth to] a male and a female, he sets aside one lamb [which he keeps] for himself. Here he doesn’t know whether the first born was the male, in which case he must redeem it by giving a lamb to the priest, or if it was the female, in which case he is exempt. He must set aside a lamb to redeem the donkey, but he need not give the lamb to the priest. This is because the priest cannot prove that the owner was liable, and there is a rule in monetary matters the burden of proof is upon the claimant. So the lamb stays with its owner.", + "If two donkeys that had never before given birth gave birth to two males, he gives two lambs to the priest. In this case, even if we don’t know which donkey gave birth to which male offspring, we know that each one had a male. He must give two lambs to the priest.", + "[If they gave birth to] a male and a female or two males and a female, he gives one lamb to the priest. If the two donkeys gave birth to one male and one female or two males and one female (one had twins) then we can be sure that at least one male was a first-born. The other male might be a first-born, or it might not. The mishnah teaches that since this other male is only doubtfully a first-born he can use one lamb to redeem both the certain first-born and the doubtful first-born. The lamb must be given to a priest.", + "[If they gave birth to] two females and a male or to two males and two females the priest receives nothing. If there were two females, then there is a possibility that the first born of each donkey was a female, no matter how many males were also born. Thus he need not give any lambs to the priest. However, the Tosefta notes that he must set aside one lamb and redeem the males that were born and might have been first-borns. He keeps this lamb for himself, as he did in section two." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first part of this mishnah is a continuation of yesterday’s mishnah. In these cases two animals give birth, one which had previously given birth and one which had not.\nThe second half of the mishnah begins to discuss the lamb used to redeem the donkey.", + "If one donkey had given birth before and one had not given birth before and they gave birth to two males, he gives one lamb to the priest. Since both donkeys gave birth to a male, it is certain that the donkey that had never given birth before gave birth to a male. So the owner is liable to give one lamb to the priest.", + "[If they gave birth to] a male and a female, he sets aside one lamb [which he keeps] for himself. If the two donkeys gave birth to a male and a female, then we don’t know whether the donkey which had never before given birth gave birth to the male, in which case it must be redeemed, or whether the other donkey gave birth to the male, in which case it is not a first-born. This is another case where there is doubt about whether the owner owes a lamb to the priest. As in the cases in yesterday’s mishnah, he sets aside a lamb to redeem the male donkey who might need to be redeemed, but he need not give the lamb to the priest, because the priest cannot prove that the male was a first-born.", + "For it says, “And the firstling of a donkey you shall redeem with a lamb” (Exodus 34:20), [the lamb can come either] from the sheep or the goats, male or female, large or small, unblemished or blemished. This verse is brought here not to prove the sections which immediately precede it, but to bring Scriptural proof that a first-born of a donkey must be redeemed with a lamb. As long as this lamb is from a sheep or a goat, it can be used, no matter what type of lamb it is.", + "He can redeem with the same lamb many times. He can use one lamb to redeem as many donkeys as he wants, and thereby derive benefit from the donkey by taking away its sacred status. In other words, if he doesn’t give the lamb to the priest, he can keep using it to redeem other donkeys. However, there is a mitzvah to give the priest a lamb for each donkey being redeemed.", + "[And the lamb] enters the pen to be tithed. If an Israelite owns a lamb that he used to redeem a donkey, the lamb counts as far as tithing for that year goes. When he goes to count the lambs born in that year, this lamb too enters the pen to be counted.", + "If it dies [before he gives it to the priest], he can benefit from it. If the lamb dies he can derive benefit from its corpse. According to the Talmud, this means that the priest derives the benefit from the corpse, because from the time the lamb was set aside it belongs to the priest, even though it was still in the Israelite’s house." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah provides limits as to what type of animal can be used to redeem the first-born of a donkey.", + "We do not redeem with a calf, a wild animal, an animal slaughtered, a terefah, kilayim (a mixed or a koy. The redemption must be done with a lamb, one born of a sheep or a goat. A calf, born of a cow or a wild animal cannot be used. The lamb must be alive when used to redeem the donkey. It cannot be either slaughtered or a terefah (died without being properly slaughtered). Kilayim is a mixed breed. Here it refers to an animal born of a mix between a sheep and a goat. According to the first opinion, a kilayim is not a lamb. A koy is an animal which the rabbis couldn’t identify as either a domesticated or a wild animal (see Hullin 6:1). Since its status is not known, it cannot be used to redeem the first-born donkey.", + "Rabbi Eliezer permits [redemption] with kilayim because it is a lamb. But he forbids with a koy, because its nature is doubtful. Rabbi Eliezer disagrees with regard to the kilayim. Since both a sheep and a goat have offspring that are called “lambs (seh)” this animal can be used. He agrees, however, that a koy cannot be used.", + "If he gave [the first-born of a donkey] itself to the priest, the latter may not keep it, until he sets aside a lamb in its place. He cannot simply give the first-born donkey to the priest. If he does so, the priest must return it to him, until the Israelite sets aside a lamb to redeem the donkey. At this point, the priest may keep the donkey, if the Israelite wants him to have it." + ], + [ + "If one sets aside [a lamb] for the redemption of the first-birth of a donkey and it died: Rabbi Eliezer says: he is responsible as is the case with the five selas for the redemption of the first-born. But the sages say: he is not responsible, as is the case with the redemption of the second tithe. In this case the lamb used to redeem the first-born of a donkey dies before it can be given to the priest. Rabbi Eliezer says that he must separate a new lamb and give it to the priest. This is the same rule as would apply if he lost the five selas that he must give to the priest in order to redeem his first-born son. To Rabbi Eliezer the donkey is not redeemed until the owner actually gives the lamb to the priest. Until that point the lamb belongs to the owner and if it dies, it is his loss. The other rabbis hold that once the lamb is set aside, the first-born of the donkey has been redeemed. The lamb has now taken the place of the donkey and the only thing missing is giving it to the priest. If the lamb dies now, it is the priest’s loss and he need not give another lamb to the priest. This is the same rule as applies to money used to redeem second tithe produce. Once the produce has been redeemed it is non-sacred and the money is holy. If the money is lost, he need not go back and redeem it again.", + "Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Zadok testified concerning the redemption of the first-born of a donkey which died that the priest receives nothing [in such circumstances]. Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Zadok testify that the halakhah is in accordance with the sages. If the lamb dies after it has been set aside to redeem the first-born donkey, the priest doesn’t receive anything. However, it seems that the priest would receive the corpse, because after all, the lamb was already his.", + "If the first-born of a donkey died [after the lamb for redemption had been set aside]: Rabbi Eliezer says: it shall be buried, but the lamb may be used. But the sages say: it does not need to be buried and the lamb belongs to the priest. If the first born of the donkey dies after the lamb has been set aside, Rabbi Eliezer believes that the donkey was still holy. Therefore, it must be buried and one cannot derive any benefit from its corpse. However, the holiness of the donkey had not yet been transferred to the lamb, because this only happens when the lamb is given to the priest. Therefore, the lamb can still be used. Note that this is consistent with Rabbi Eliezer’s position above. The other rabbis hold that as soon as the lamb is set aside, it takes on the holiness of the donkey. Therefore, it the donkey dies it need not be buried. The lamb, however, must be given to the priest because as soon as he set it aside, it belongs to the priest." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah begins by discussing a person who does not wish to redeem his first-born donkey by giving a lamb to the priest. It continues by dealing with a variety of other issues in which one way of performing a mitzvah takes priority over another way.", + "If he does not wish to redeem it, he breaks its neck from behind with a large knife and buries it. Exodus 13:13 states that if he doesn’t redeem the first-born donkey he must break its neck. This is done with a large knife. After he breaks its neck, he must bury it, because he may not derive any benefit from the corpse.", + "The mitzvah of redemption takes priority over the miztzah of breaking its neck, for it says: “And if you don’t redeem it, you must break its neck” (Exodus 13:13). Clearly, the Torah prefers that one redeem the first-born donkey, rather than break its neck. Associative thinking now brings the mishnah to discuss other cases where there is a preferred way of performing the mitzvah.", + "The mitzvah of designation takes priority over the mitzvah of redemption, for it says: “Who has betrothed her to himself, he must let her be redeemed” (Exodus 21:8). When a man buys a young slave girl, he has an option of either betrothing her to himself, or letting her be redeemed from slavery. Priority is given to marrying her, rather than letting her be redeemed by someone else. Indeed, it seems likely that the sale of a young girl was meant to be a marital type arrangement and the master would allow her to be redeemed only if he did not want to marry her. Allowing her to be redeemed was, in essence, an annulment of the original agreement.", + "The mitzvah of yibbum is prior to the mitzvah of halitzah. [This was so] at first when they intended to carry out the mitzvah. But now that they do not intend to carry out the mitzvah, the [rabbis] have said: the mitzvah of halitzah takes priority over the mitzvah of yibbum. Yibbum is levirate marriage, and halitzah is the release from levirate marriage. Clearly, the Torah prefers that the brother marry his dead brother’s wife, and only if he refuses to do so, is halitzah provided as an option. However, the priority of yibbum over halitzah is only in a case where the brother marries his widowed sister-in-law in order to have a child on behalf of his deceased brother. If he does so just because he wants to have relations with her, for his own enjoyment, then, the rabbis claim, it would be better for them to do halitzah. The mishnah presents this as a type of “good old days” scenario. In the “good old days” men had religious intentions when they performed yibbum. In those times, yibbum was preferable. Now they are just plain old sleeping with their dead brother’s wife, and therefore we should encourage halitzah.", + "The mitzvah of redemption [of an unclean animal whose value has been dedicated to the Temple] is upon the owner. He takes priority over any other man, for it says: “If it is not redeemed, then it shall be sold according to your evaluation” (Leviticus 27:27). If one dedicates an unclean animal to the Temple, such as a horse, then the animal must be redeemed and the money goes to the Temple’s treasury. Anyone can redeem the animal and thereby it becomes his. However, the first right to redeem the animal belong to the owner who dedicated it in the first place. Only if he does not wish to do so, is someone else allowed to come along, redeem the animal and thereby acquire it for himself." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nChapter two begins to discuss the first-born of a pure animal, such as a cow. This first-born is holy and must be sacrificed and the meat is eaten by the priests. If it is blemished, it must still be given to the priest, but it need not be sacrificed.", + "[An Israelite] who buys a fetus of a cow belonging to a non-Jew or who sells one to him, although this is not permitted, or who forms a partnership with him, or who receives [an animal] from him to look after or who gives [his cow] to him to look after, is exempt from the [law of the] bekhor, for it says: [“I sanctified to Me all the firstborn] in Israel,” (Numbers 3:13) but not in non-Jews. This is the same exact halakhah as was taught in the 1:1. See there for commentary.", + "Priests and Levites are subject [to the law of the first-born pure animal]. They are not exempt from [the law of] the first-born of a clean animal, but only of a first-born son and the first-born of a donkey. Priests and Levites are exempt from two of the three types of bekhorot the first born of a donkey and their own first-born son. They are, however, liable for the first-born of a pure animal. If a priest or Levite owns a pure animal and it gives birth for the first time and the offspring is male, it must be sacrificed. Then the priest eats the meat, as is always the case." + ], + [ + "All consecrated animals whose permanent physical blemish preceded their consecration and were then redeemed:
Are subject to the law of the firstling and to the priestly gifts,
And when they become like hullin [by being redeemed] they may be shorn and may be put to work.
And their young and their milk are permitted after they have been redeemed.
And he who slaughtered them outside the sanctuary is not liable.
And they do not render what is substituted for them [holy].
And if they died they may be redeemed, except for the firstling and the tithe of cattle.
This mishnah and tomorrow’s mishnah are an exact replica of Hullin 10:2. They are brought here in Tractate Bekhorot because they have some rules concerning bekhorot. My commentary, including the following introduction, is the same as that found in Hullin.
An animal that has a permanent physical blemish cannot be sacrificed. Our mishnah distinguishes between cases where the blemish preceded the consecration of the animal, versus cases where the consecration preceded the blemish.
If the animal had a permanent blemish before it was consecrated, then the animal itself doesn’t become holy. Instead, the consecrator has in reality dedicated the value of the animal to the Temple. Thus this animal is treated like a hullin, non-sacred, animal, except that it has to be redeemed before any use can be made of it. If it gives birth to a firstling, the firstling is holy, as is the case with a hullin animal. When one slaughters it, he must give the shoulder, cheeks and stomach to the priest. After it becomes hullin by being redeemed, it may be shorn and work may be performed with it. Similarly, its young and its milk are not prohibited. One who slaughters it outside the Temple is not liable for he has slaughtered a non-sacred animal. If one tries to exchange it for another animal, the other animal is not holy. If the animal dies, it will still need to be redeemed, so that its meat can be given to dogs.
The only exception to all of these rules is if this animal that had a permanent blemish is itself a firstling or a tithed animal. The firstling is holy from the moment it is born even if it has a blemish. Similarly, even blemished animals must be tithed (see Leviticus 27:33). Thus these animals are holy regardless of whether they have blemishes and therefore they cannot be treated as the animals above were treated." + ], + [ + "All [consecrated animals] whose consecration preceded their permanent, or their impermanent blemish [preceded] their consecration and subsequently they contracted a permanent blemish, and they were redeemed:
Are exempt from the law of the firstling, and from priestly gifts;
And they are not like unconsecrated animals to be shorn or put to work;
And [even] after they have been redeemed their young and their milk are forbidden;
And he who slaughtered them outside the sanctuary is liable;
And they render what was substituted for them [holy],
And if they died they must be buried.
An animal that is first consecrated and then becomes blemished is a consecrated animal, even though it cannot be sacrificed. Similarly, if an animal has a passing blemish, and then it is consecrated, it is a consecrated animal. These animals must be redeemed, and the money used to buy a new sacrifice. However, they remain consecrated even after redemption.
Therefore, their offspring is exempt from the laws of tithe and firstling, as are the offspring of all consecrated animals. One who slaughters them after their redemption need not give the shoulder, cheeks and stomach to the priest. Even after they are redeemed, it is forbidden to shear them or to perform any work with them. Their offspring and their milk remain prohibited, even after they have been redeemed. Indeed, it seems like the only thing that can be done with them is to eat them.
Our version of the mishnah says that if one slaughters them outside of the Temple, he is liable. This is difficult, because what it he supposed to do with them he can’t offer them as sacrifices nor can he slaughter them outside of the Temple. There is a version which reads “exempt” instead of “liable.” However, the Talmud reads “liable” and explains that this mishnah is according to Rabbi Akiva who holds that if an animal with a blemish was put onto the altar, it is not to be removed (Zevahim 9:3). Thus, although this animal should not be sacrificed, if it is put on the altar, it can be sacrificed.
If one exchanges this animal for another, the other animal also becomes holy. Consecrated animals cannot be exchanged one for the other, and if one tries to do so, the original animal remains holy and the new animal becomes holy.
Finally, if they die before they are redeemed, they must be buried, because no one can derive benefit from their meat." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah discusses a Jew who receives a flock of sheep or goats from a non-Jew under “iron terms.” What this means is that all responsibility for the flock lies with the Jew, and he pays the non-Jew a fixed sum per year in return for use of the flock and the use of the offspring. Alternatively, instead of paying a fixed sum, the Jew and the non-Jew split the profits and the offspring.", + "If one receives flock from a non-Jew on “iron terms” their offspring are exempt [from the law of] the first born. In mishnah one we learned that the flock itself is exempt from the laws of the first born. Our mishnah teaches that if one of the offspring of the original flock gives birth, that offspring is also exempt from the law of the first born, meaning its first born is not holy. The reason for this exemption is that if the Jew reneges on his payment to the non-Jew, the non-Jew can take the offspring as part of his payment. This means that they are in some sense owned by the non-Jew and as we have learned, animals owned by non-Jews are not subject to the law of the first-born.", + "But the offspring of their offspring are liable [to the law of the first born]. However, the offspring of the offspring are liable meaning that the first born offspring born of this offspring are holy and must be treated as such.", + "If [the Israelite] put the offspring in the place of their mothers, then the offspring of the offspring are exempt, but the offspring of the offspring of the offspring are liable. If the Jew tells the non-Jew that he is going to pay him back not with the original flock but with its offspring, then the exemption is extended another generation, to the first born of the offspring of the offspring. (It might help you to use names here, Debbie, born of Charlene, born of Becca, born of Alice apologies to those with these names!). Again, since the non-Jew can claim these animals (Charlene), they are considered to be in his possession in order to exempt their offspring (Debbie).", + "Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: even for ten generations the offspring are exempt [from the law of the first born] since they are pledged to the non-Jew. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says that all subsequent offspring are pledged to the non-Jew, no matter how many generations removed. Therefore, they are all exempt from the laws of the first born (so Eunice is exempt, as if Freda, and Gladys and Harriet, and Iris would you like me to go to Z for Zoey, my daughter’s name?)." + ], + [ + "If a ewe gave birth to what looked like a kid, or a [female] goat gave birth to what looked like a lamb, it is exempt from [the law of] the first born. As we learned in connection with the donkey, in order for the offspring to be liable for the law of the first born, it must be of the same species as its mother. If the offspring of a sheep looks like a goat, or the offspring of a goat looks like a sheep, it is exempt.", + "But if it some of the signs of [its mother] it is liable [to the law of the first born]. If it looks a bit like its mother, then it is liable." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses cases where the ewe seems to give birth to two first-borns at the same time.", + "If a ewe which never before had given birth bore two males and both heads came forth simultaneously: Rabbi Yose the Galilean says: both belong to the priest for scripture says: “The males shall be the Lord’s” (Exodus 13:12). But the sages say: it is impossible, therefore one remains [with the Israelite] and the other is for the priest. Rabbi Tarfon says: the priest chooses the better one. Rabbi Akiva says: we compromise between them. According to Rabbi Yose the Galilean both males are considered to be first-borns and both are given to the priest. This is derived midrashically from the plural use of “males” in Exodus 13. The other rabbis, however, disagree with Rabbi Yose and say that this is impossible (doesn’t sound too pleasant for the sheep either). Rather, one must have been the first-born, even if we don’t know which one it was. Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva debate about how we determine which of the two animals goes to the priest. According to Rabbi Tarfon, the priest can choose which of the twins he wants. Rabbi Akiva says that they estimate the value of the two kids, and the priest and the owner divide the amount. However, the Tosefta and the Talmud state that the owner keeps the fatter, more valuable of the two kids. This is because of the principle, “the burden of proof is upon the claimant.” Since the priest cannot prove that the better of the two is his, he can only take the lesser.", + "The second one [in the Israelite's possession] is left to pasture until it becomes blemished and the owner is liable for the [priest's] gifts. Rabbi Yose exempts him. The animal kept by the owner cannot simply be eaten, because it might be a first-born. Therefore, the solution is to let it become blemished and then it can be eaten by its owners. When he slaughters it he must give the priestly gifts, the shoulder, the cheeks and the stomach, to the priest. For if the animal was a first-born then he should have given it all to the priest. And if the animal is not a first-born, then he is liable to give the priestly gifts, as is always the case when one slaughters animals (see chapter ten of Hullin). Rabbi Yose exempts. We will see Rabbi Yose’s reasoning below in mishnah eight.", + "If one of them died: Rabbi Tarfon says: they divide [the living one]. Rabbi Akiva says: the burden of proof is upon the claimant. If one of them dies, Rabbi Tarfon says that they can split the value of the living one. Rabbi Akiva holds that since the priest cannot prove that the one that died was the second born he has no right to claim the live one. Again, Rabbi Akiva employs the principle of “the burden of proof is upon the claimant.”", + "If it gave birth to a male and a female, the priest receives nothing [in such circumstances]. In this case, when a male and female were born, it is possible that there is no first-born because the female might have been born first. Therefore, the priest doesn’t receive anything. The male animal must go out to pasture until it becomes blemished and after that point, the owner can eat it. He can’t eat it beforehand because it might be a bekhor." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah is similar to yesterday’s mishnah except that today’s mishnah deals with two sheep that had never given birth before, whereas yesterday’s mishnah dealt with one ewe that had twins. Most of this mishnah is the same as that which we learned yesterday, so I refer the reader to my commentary there.", + "If two ewes which had never previously given birth bore two males, both belong to the priest. If both of the first-borns are males, then obviously, both go to the priest.", + "[If they gave birth] to a male and a female, the male belongs to the priest. If one is a male and the other is a female, then we know that the male is a first-born and it goes to the priest.", + "[If they gave birth] to two males and a female, one remains with him, and the other belongs to the priest. Rabbi Tarfon says: the priest chooses the better one. Rabbi Akiva says: we compromise between them. In this case, one male is certainly a first-born, but we don’t know which one. Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva again debate how we determine who gets which of the two. For an explanation, see yesterday’s mishnah.", + "The second one [in the Israelite's possession] is left to pasture until it becomes blemished and the owner is liable for the [priest's] gifts. Rabbi Yose exempts him. This is identical to the debate in yesterday’s mishnah.", + "If one of them died: Rabbi Tarfon says: they divide [the living one]. Rabbi Akiva says: the burden of proof is upon the claimant. See yesterday’s mishnah.", + "[If they gave birth to] two females and a male or two males and two females, the priest receives nothing in such circumstances. If they gave birth to two females, it is possible that there was no male first-born. Therefore, the priest doesn’t receive anything. The Tosefta adds that the males must go out to pasture and become blemished before they can be eaten. This is because they might be first-borns and all doubtful first-borns must become blemished before they can be eaten." + ], + [ + "If one [of the ewes] had given birth and the other had never previously given birth and they bore two males, one remains with him and the other belongs to the priest. Rabbi Tarfon says: the priest chooses the better one. Rabbi Akiva says: we compromise between them.
The second one [in the Israelite's possession] is left to pasture until it becomes blemished and the owner is liable for the [priest's] gifts. Rabbi Yose exempts him. For Rabbi Yose says: wherever the priest receives [an animal] in its place, he is exempt from the priestly gifts. Rabbi Meir however makes him liable.
If one of them died: Rabbi Tarfon says: they divide [the living one]. Rabbi Akiva says: the burden of proof is upon the claimant.
If they gave birth to a male and a female, the priest receives nothing [in such circumstances].
This mishnah is a continuation of yesterday and the previous day’s mishnah. Much of the explanation for the mishnah can be found there.
Section one: Again, we have here a situation where we know that one of two males is a first-born and one is not. One goes to the priest and again Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva argue about how we determine who gets which animal. See mishnah six for an explanation.
Section two: Most of this section is the same as in mishnah six. We learn here, finally, the reason that Rabbi Yose exempts the animal that stays with the owner from being liable for the priestly gifts. Whenever a priest receives one animal in return for another, the animal that is exchanged is exempt. In this case the priest receives one animal in return for giving away the other animal. It is as if he received the animal and then exchanged it for another. Any animal owned by a priest is exempt from the priestly gifts, and therefore the animal that goes to the original owner is exempt. Rabbi Meir disagrees and says that he is still liable.
Sections three and four: These are the same as the end of mishnah six. See there for an explanation." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah deals with an animal born through what is today called a cesarean section. The term the Mishnah uses is “one who came out through the wall” because this animal was taken out through the wall of its mother’s stomach.", + "With regard to [an animal] that was born through a cesarean section and the first born which came after it:
Rabbi Tarfon says: both go out to pasture until blemished and are eaten with their blemishes by the owners. Rabbi Tarfon believes that both animals are doubtful first borns. The one born through cesarean section was the first born and the second one was the one who opened its mother’s womb, the phrase the Torah uses to describe a first born (see Exodus 13). Therefore, both must go out to pasture until they become blemished and then they may be eaten (blemishes and all) by their owners.", + "But Rabbi Akiva says: neither of them is a first born; the first because it did not open its mother’s womb, and the second, because another preceded it. According to Rabbi Akiva, in order for the rule of the first born to apply, the animal must be a first born and be the first to open its mother’s womb. The first born did not open its mother’s womb and the second was not the first born, so the law of the first born does not apply to either." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah deals with a person who bought an animal from a non-Jew and doesn’t know whether it had yet given birth. If it had not, then the first animal born in Jewish possession would be considered a first born and would have to be treated accordingly.", + "If one buys an animal from a non-Jew and it is not known whether it had given birth or had not given birth: Rabbi Ishmael says: that born of a goat in its first year certainly belongs to the priest; after that, it is a questionable case [of a first-born]. That born of a ewe two years old certainly belongs to the priest; after that, it is a questionable case [of a first born]. That born of a cow or a donkey three years old certainly belongs to the priest; after that, it is a questionable case [of a first born]. Rabbi Ishmael says that we can estimate whether the animal had given birth by checking the age of the animal. If the goat gives birth within its first year, we can assume that it is a first born. If the goat is beyond its first year, then it is a case of a doubtful first born. As we have seen previously, doubtful first borns go out to pasture until they become blemished, at which point they may be eaten by their owners. Rabbi Ishmael proceeds to give ages in which we can expect that a ewe and a cow would give birth.", + "Rabbi Akiva to him: if an animal were exempted [from the law of the first born] only with the birth of [actual] offspring, it would be as you say. But they said: the sign of offspring in small cattle is a discharge [from the womb]. In large cattle, the after-birth; in a woman, the signs are the fetus and the after-birth. Rabbi Akiva disagrees with Rabbi Ishmael because the rabbis taught that if an animal or woman miscarries before having her first born, the next animal/child is not considered the first born, at least not to be treated as holy. Therefore, even if the animal gives birth within that time period, there is no way of knowing if it had previously miscarried. Rabbi Akiva now gives signs by which we can know whether an animal or woman had miscarried. This would be important to distinguish between a true miscarriage and non-miscarriage discharge.", + "This is the general rule: Whenever it is known that it had given birth, the priest receives nothing. Whenever it had never given birth, it belongs to the priest. If there is a doubt, it shall be eaten blemished by the owners. Having rejected Rabbi Ishmael, Rabbi Akiva must provide an alternative way to treat the animal bought from the non-Jew. He relies on general rules of certain/doubtful property cases. If we know for a fact that the animal had never given birth, then the first born in Jewish possession must be treated as a first born and given to the priest. If the animal definitely had given birth before, then obviously the priest doesn’t receive anything. Finally, if it is doubtful, then the animal must go out to pasture, become blemished and then it can be eaten by its owners.", + "Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob says: if a large domestic animal has discharged a clot of blood, it [the clot] shall be buried, and it [the mother] is exempted from the law of the first born. As an addendum to our mishnah, Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov states that if a large animal discharges a blood clot, the blood clot should be buried. This will allow people to know that the clot is being treated as a miscarriage and that the next born animal is not the first born." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn this mishnah Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel teaches that when one sees an animal nursing, he can assume that it is nursing its own offspring. As we shall see, this has certain halakhic ramifications for determining which animal is a first born.", + "Rabban Shimon b. Gamaliel says: if one buys a nursing animal from a non-Jew, he need not fear that perhaps the offspring belongs to another [animal]. If one buys a nursing animal from a non-Jew, one can assume that it is nursing its own animal and therefore, one does not have to treat the next born animal as a first born.", + "If he went among his herd and saw animals which had given birth for the first time nursing and animals which had not given birth for the first time nursing, we need not fear that perhaps the offspring of this one came to the other or perhaps the offspring of the other came to this one. Similarly, if one sees animals in his own herd nursing, he can assume that they are nursing their own offspring. For instance, if he sees an animal that he knows has already given birth nursing a female and an animal that has not given birth is nursing a male, he can be sure that the male is a first born. If the offspring of the one that has given birth is a male, he can be sure that it is not a first born." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIt is prohibited to shear a first born (this is based on a midrash on Deuteronomy 15:22). Our mishnah discusses how one can remove some of the hair of the first born without transgressing this prohibition.", + "Rabbi Yose ben Meshullam says: one who slaughters the first born, [first] clears a space with the [butcher's] knife on both sides and tears the hair, as long as he does not remove the wool from its place. If one wants to make space on the first born’s neck so that it can be properly slaughtered, what he should first do is use the butcher’s knife to clear some hair to the sides. Then he can pull out some of the hair but he should leave it stuck elsewhere in the animal’s wool so that it doesn’t look as if he is shearing. Someone who sees him act in such a manner will know that his intent is to clear some room on the animal’s neck, and not to remove the animal’s wool.", + "And similarly one may tear the hair to show the place of the blemish [to a sage]. The same procedure should be followed if one wants to clear some hair from the animal to show the blemish to a sage so that the sage could declare it blemished." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah continues to deal with the prohibition of shearing a first born, even a blemished first born that may be slaughtered and eaten. We should note that not only is it forbidden to shear the animal, but if it is sheared, it is forbidden to derive benefit from its wool. However, this prohibition is in effect only if the animal was sheared while it was alive. Once dead or slaughtered the wool that is subsequently removed can be used. Specifically, our mishnah deals with wool that fell off the animal while it was alive.", + "If [a portion of] the hair of a blemished first born fell out and he placed it in the window, and then he slaughtered the animal, Akavya ben Mahalalel allows it. But the sages forbid it, the words of Rabbi Judah. Wool that falls off when the animal is alive is forbidden as long as the animal is alive. In the case in this mishnah, the person put the wool that fell out of the animal in a hole in the window to store it so that he could use it after he slaughtered the animal. Akavya ben Mehalalel allows the use of that wool after the animal was slaughtered. Since the slaughtering allows the wool that is on the animal when it is slaughtered, it also allows wool that fell out of the animal while it was still alive. Note that Akavya would not allow wool that was sheared when the animal was alive, because shearing is a prohibited action. The other sages forbid this wool. This is the version of the debate according to Rabbi Judah.", + "Rabbi Yose said to him: Akavya ben Mahalalel did not allow [only] in this case, but [even] in the case where the hair of a blemished first born which fell out and he placed it in the window, and the animal died subsequently, [even] in this case Akavya ben Mahalalel allows, but the sages forbid. Rabbi Yose has a different version of the debate. According to Rabbi Yose if the animal was slaughtered, then even the rabbis agree that the wool that fell off when it was alive may be used. Rabbi Yose holds that they debated a case where the wool fell off and then the animal died on its own. In this case, it is prohibited to derive benefit from both the meat and the wool that is on the animal. Therefore, the wool that fell off the animal is also prohibited. According to Rabbi Yose, Akavya allows the wool even in this case.", + "If the wool of a first born is hanging loose, that part which appears [on a level] with [the rest of] the wool is permitted, whereas that which does not appear [on a level] with [the rest of] the wool is forbidden. Here we deal with some wool that has become detached from the animal but is still stuck to the rest of the animal’s wool. When he slaughters the animal, the part that is seen on level with the rest of the wool is permitted, because it does not look like wool that fell off while the animal was alive. However, if it is noticeable that the wool fell off when the animal was still alive, then it is forbidden. This is according to Rabbi Judah’s opinion, that the sages prohibit wool that fell off the animal when it was still alive, even if the animal was properly slaughtered. Rabbi Yose would hold that this wool is permitted in any case." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nWhen a first born is born into an Israelite’s herd, the Israelite is not allowed to immediately give it to the priest. Rather, he must take care of it for a period of time and then transfer the animal to the priest. Our mishnah discusses how long he needs to take care of the animal.\nAs background to this mishnah, we must remember that after the Temple was destroyed, the priest would have to hold on to the first born until it became blemished, at which point he could slaughter it and eat it. During this period he couldn’t use it for anything else. When the Temple was still standing, he could sacrifice it whenever he wanted to, as long as it was already eight days old.", + "For how long is an Israelite bound to take care of a first born? In the case of small cattle, for thirty days, and large cattle, fifty days. Rabbi Yose says: in the case of small cattle, three months. It is in the priest’s interest for the Israelite to take care of the animal as long as possible, to feed it and fatten it up. Therefore, the mishnah sets a mandatory period in which the Israelite must take care of the animal. According to the first opinion, this time period is longer for large cattle such as oxen, because they need to be fattened up more. According to Rabbi Yose the opposite is true. The period is longer for small cattle such as goats and sheep because their survival is more precarious.", + "If the priest says [to the Israelite] during this period “Give it to me,” he must not give it to him. One would think that if the priest is willing to take the animal at an earlier period, the Israelite would be allowed to give it to him. The mishnah rules that this is forbidden. The problem is that if priests start helping Israelites out in preparing that which they must give them, then there is a danger of a quid pro quo situation being created “you take the animal earlier, and I will give it to you and not another priest.” Ultimately, this would be against the priests’ best interests, so the mishnah makes such behavior prohibited. Also, the Torah says that these must be given to the priests, and not that the priests should have to work in order to receive their gifts.", + "But if the first born was blemished and the priest said to him “Give it to me so that I may eat it,” then it is allowed. However, if the animal is blemished already, then the priest can eat it immediately, as opposed to holding on to it until it becomes blemished. Therefore, in this case the Israelite can immediately give it to the priest.", + "And in Temple times, if [the first born] was in an unblemished state and the priest said to him “Give it to me, and I will offer it up it was allowed.” When the Temple still stood the priest could sacrifice the animal immediately. Therefore, the Israelite can give it to him as soon as the priest asks for it.", + "A first born is eaten year by year both in an unblemished as well as in a blemished state, for it is said: “You shall eat it before the Lord your God year by year” (Deuteronomy 15:20). The first born must either be eaten or sacrificed (when the Temple still stood) within its first year. If it is not blemished within this year, then the priest must sacrifice it. This is derived from the verse in Deuteronomy. Obviously, once the Temple was destroyed, the priest might have to wait longer for it to become blemished. " + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah is a direct continuation of yesterday’s mishnah, where we learned that a priest is supposed to eat the first-born within its first year.", + "If a blemish appeared on it in its first year, he is permitted to keep it all the twelve months. If it is blemished before the year is up, he can wait up to a year to eat it.", + "If after the twelve months, however, he is not permitted to keep it except for thirty days. If the year has already passed, he must slaughter it within thirty days. It is interesting to note that the reason someone might want to wait to slaughter his first born is probably because he doesn’t want to eat such a large quantity of meat until there is some special occasion (wedding, perhaps). People in the ancient world did not eat meat on a regular basis. The Torah (and Mishnah) need to prohibit waiting, because otherwise, people might hold on to their first borns for a long time." + ], + [ + "If one slaughtered the first born and then showed its blemish [to an expert]:
Rabbi Judah permits,
But Rabbi Meir says: since it was not slaughtered by the instructions of the expert, it is forbidden.
One of the main functions of rabbis was to examine first born animals and to determine whether they had a blemish that would prohibit the animal from being sacrificed. After the Temple was destroyed, this was obviously a very important matter, one of grave economic significance, because other than slaughter and eat the first born, nothing else could be done with it. Indeed, one of the major aspects of rabbinic ordination was allowing a student to become a rabbi in order to allow first borns to be eaten. In order to receive such ordination one must be an expert in determining what animals are blemished and trustworthy to allow the blemished ones and forbid the unblemished ones.
Generally, the animal would first be shown to an expert (a rabbi) and then, if the rabbi determined that it was blemished, the animal could be slaughtered and eaten. However, in the case in our mishnah, the person slaughtered it and then brought it to a rabbi. At this point, the rabbi must determine whether there was a blemish on the animal before it was slaughtered.
According to Rabbi Judah, if the sage sees such a blemish, the meat may be eaten. Rabbi Meir, however, prohibits the meat because he did not follow the proper procedure." + ], + [ + "If one who is not an expert sees a first born and it was slaughtered by his instructions, in such a case it shall be buried and he shall make reparation from his own pocket.
If a [non-expert] judge gave a judgment and declared innocent a person who was really liable or made liable a person who was really innocent, declared unclean a thing which was clean or declared clean a thing which was really unclean, his decision stands but he has to make reparation from his own pocket.
If the judge was an expert [sanctioned by the] court, he is exempt from making reparation.
It happened once that a cow's womb was removed and Rabbi Tarfon gave it [the cow] to the dogs to eat. The matter came before the sages at Yavneh and they permitted the animal. Todos the physician said: no cow or pig leaves Alexandria of Egypt before its womb is removed in order that it may not breed. Rabbi Tarfon said: “There goes your donkey, Tarfon.” Rabbi Akiva said to him: you are exempt, for you are an expert and whoever is an expert sanctioned by the court is exempt from reparation.
Our mishnah deals with the consequences of a judge who issues an errant ruling.
Section one: A person who is not an expert has no business declaring a first born blemished such that it can be slaughtered. If he does declare that it is blemished and the animal is slaughtered, the meat is prohibited and it must be buried. [Rabbi Judah would allow an expert to see if it was blemished, see yesterday’s mishnah]. In addition, the non-expert who allowed the animal to be slaughtered must repay the owner from his own pocket. Clearly, this is meant to discourage a non-expert from declaring an animal blemished.
Section two: The same is true in other cases of judicial decisions. If a non-expert judge renders a decision and later it is found that he made the wrong decision, he must make restitution from his own pocket. Non-experts should simply not make decisions, and if they do, they run the risk of incurring liability.
Section three: The mishnah now brings an interesting story of a mistaken judgment. A cow is brought in front of the sages so that they can determine whether the cow is a terefah, an animal with a wound/disease that would cause it to die within a short period. Such an animal may not be eaten. The sages in Yavneh determined that the animal was indeed a terefah. After making this determination, Todos, a doctor, testified that in Alexandria they would regularly remove the wombs from cows and pigs before they would allow the animal to leave the city. They would do this because they thought their cows and pigs were of superior breed and they didn’t want others to breed them. In any case, this proves that a cow with its womb removed is not a terefah.
Rabbi Tarfon realizes that he has made a mistake and therefore, exclaims to himself, “Tarfon, there goes your donkey!” Rabbi Tarfon is now going to have to sell his donkey to pay back for the loss of the cow.
Rabbi Akiva assures Rabbi Tarfon that he has not lost his donkey, because he is an expert, and an expert doesn’t have to make restitution when he renders a mistaken judgment.
I don’t know whether the mishnah is intentionally being ironic, but I find it funny that Rabbi Tarfon is an expert, even though he doesn’t know that the halakhah is that he doesn’t have to pay back the loss. In other words, he is an expert despite the fact that he has made two mistakes in one mishnah." + ], + [ + "If one takes payment for seeing first borns, they must not be slaughtered by his instructions unless he was an expert like Ila in Yavneh whom the sages permitted to accept four isars for small cattle and six as for large cattle, whether unblemished or blemished. Generally speaking it is forbidden for a sage to take wages in return for examining a first born to see if it is blemished or not. If a sage does take a wage and he declares it blemished the animal may not be slaughtered because it is feared that the wage acted as a bribe. The one exception is men who are like the legendary Ila in Yavneh. Ila was a great expert in blemishes and many priests would bring him their animals for examination. He was also wealthy enough that he didn’t need their payments. A bribe wouldn’t cause him to allow an unblemished animal to be slaughtered. Finally, he was known to be an honest man who would not lie in return for money. Because he exhibited all of these qualities, he was allowed to charge a fee for examining first borns. However, it is important to note that he collected his fee whether or not he declared the animal to be blemished. Obviously, it would be extremely problematic for him to collect his fee only if he declared it blemished. This would truly be a recipe for bribes." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to deal with a judge or other official who takes payment for performing his work.", + "If one takes payment to act as a judge, his judgments are void; to give evidence, his evidence is void; to sprinkle or to sanctify, the waters are considered cave waters and the ashes are considered burned ashes. If one takes payment in order to fulfill legal or ritual functions, his actions are void. To sprinkle refers to a priest who sprinkles the red heifer waters on an impure person. To “sanctify” means to place the ashes in water. “Cave waters” and “burned ashes” are the way that the mishnah says that the water and ashes are invalidated from purifying the impure. All of these are functions that people must perform without taking payment.", + "If he was a priest and he was made unclean regarding his terumah, he must give him food and drink and rub him with oil. The mishnah now notes that while a priest or sage should not take a wage for rendering their services, they are not obligated to incur a loss. We should note that there will be a fine line between preventing a loss and rendering payment. The first part is concerned with a priest who loses his ability to eat terumah. Normally, a priest eats terumah which he receives as a gift from Israelites. The fact that he receives terumah from Israelites seems to be, at least partially, a payment for his rendering priestly services. If while rendering one of the services mentioned in section one a priest becomes impure, the person who requested his services must provide him with food, drink and oil from his own expense. This is not payment for the services but rather compensation for the loss of the priest’s ability to eat, drink and anoint with terumah.", + "And if he was an old sage, he mounts him on a donkey. If an old sage comes to render any of these services, the person requesting his help must give him a donkey to ride around on. The old man doesn’t have to walk around himself if this would be difficult for him. Providing transportation is no considered paying for the sage’s services.", + "He also pays him as he would a workman. Finally, and quite importantly, the person requesting the judge or priest’s help must pay him the wages that he would have been earning in his regular profession had he not been rendering judgment etc. Thus if the priest/sage was a laborer making five dollars an hour, then he would have to be paid five dollars for every hour taken up with the person’s case. If he worked in a more lucrative profession, he would earn the higher wage. This is not considered to be paying him for services rendered, but rather compensating him for wages he cannot earn." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah deals with a person who is suspected of not treating his first born animals as holy. For instance, he slaughters an unblemished first born, or he intentionally blemishes it. The problem with such a person is that we must be concerned that many of the products that he might sell are actually derived from first borns who were illicitly slaughtered (or sheared).", + "If one is suspected in connection with first borns, one must not buy from him even deer's flesh or unprocessed hides. The law of the first born applies only to domesticated animals cows, sheep and goats. Seemingly, one could buy deer’s flesh from a person suspected of slaughtering his first born animals without concern. However, the mishnah rules that we must be concerned even with this because the meat of a calf can look like the meat of a deer. We must be concerned that he is really selling the meat of a calf and just telling people it is deer meat. One also can’t buy from him unprocessed hides, lest they come from a first born. However, one may buy from him a processed hide because if he had slaughtered a first born he would want to sell it is quickly as possible so that he would not be caught.", + "Rabbi Eliezer says: one may buy from him female hides we may buy from him. Rabbi Eliezer says that one can buy hides from him if it is obvious that the hides come from a female, because females are not treated halakhically as first borns. We are not concerned that he would make hides from a male look like hides from a female, assumedly because this is not easy to do.", + "One may not buy from him washed or dirty wool, but one may buy spun wool or garments. We cannot buy from him wool, whether it has been washed or is still dirty, because we must be concerned lest it come from a first born. As we have learned, it is forbidden to shear a first born, even one that is blemished. However, we can buy wool that has been more fully processed for the same reason that we can buy processed hides. A person who illicitly shears his first born animal is going to want to sell the wool as soon as possible in order to hide his crime from the authorities." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nSince yesterday’s mishnah dealt with a person suspected of selling first borns, today’s mishnah deals with a person suspected of transgressing the laws of the sabbatical year. This would include one suspected of planting on the sabbatical year, or of selling sabbatical year produce as merchandise.", + "If one is suspected of [ignoring the] sabbatical year, one may not buy from him flax, even combed; but spun or woven flax may be bought from him. One should not buy flax from a person who is suspected of transgressing the laws of the sabbatical year lest that flax was sewn during the sabbatical year. Alternatively, even if it was not sewn that year, the seller is not supposed to be treating sabbatical year produce as merchandise. One shouldn’t buy even combed flax, because the seller, suspected of transgressing these laws, would not hesitate to take this small step in processing the flax. However, one can buy spun or woven flax from him, for the same reason we explained in yesterday’s mishnah. If he is suspected of transgressing the sabbatical year, he would not take the time to process the flax to such a great extent for fear of getting caught. Therefore, we can assume that this flax was not sabbatical year flax." + ], + [ + "If one is suspected of selling terumah as hullin, one may not buy even water and salt from him, the words of Rabbi Judah. Rabbi Judah rules strictly one can’t buy any food products from someone suspected of selling terumah as if it were hullin, even water and salt, which obviously are not subject to the laws of terumah. This is a punishment for the fact that he sells terumah as hullin, which is a serious offense, akin to a butcher who today would sell non-kosher meat as kosher meat.", + "Rabbi Shimon says: [one may not buy from him] whatever is connected to terumah and tithes. Rabbi Shimon rules more leniently one can’t buy from him only objects that are liable for terumah, namely agricultural products. It is permitted to buy from this person water and salt. This would be like saying today that if a kosher butcher sells non-kosher meat one could still buy drinks, bread etc. from him." + ], + [ + "One who is suspected of ignoring the sabbatical year is not suspected of ignoring [also] the tithes. Someone who is suspected of not properly observing the sabbatical year is not automatically suspected of not tithing his food. This would mean that when it is not the sabbatical year, a person could buy or eat his produce without concern that the food is not tithed.", + "One who is suspected of ignoring tithes is not suspected of ignoring [also] the sabbatical year. Similarly, one who is generally suspected of not tithing, is not automatically suspected of not observing the sabbatical laws. The two are not connected, even though they are in the same general set of prohibitions.", + "One who is suspected of ignoring both is suspected of ignoring the rules of purity. However, one who is suspected of transgressing both the sabbatical year laws and of not tithing is suspected of not observing the purity laws. What this would mean is that he cannot be trusted to state that the food that he is selling is pure. This would have ramifications only for a person who is interested in eating all of their food in a state of purity, a custom that was attributed to the Pharisees.", + "And it is possible for one to be suspected of ignoring the rules of purity and yet not be suspected of ignoring the two laws [cited above]. The opposite of section three is not true one can be suspected of not observing the purity laws, but trusted with regard to the sabbatical laws and tithing. It seems that certain purity matters were easily ignored, perhaps because fewer people observed them in the mishnaic period or perhaps because it is not really a transgression to eat food without it being pure. Therefore, one who transgresses more consequential laws such as tithing and the sabbatical year, is suspected of transgressing the less consequential matter of purity.", + "This is the general rule: one who is suspected of [transgressing] something must not give judgment on it or testify concerning it. A person is suspected of transgressing a certain law cannot give testimony or render judgment concerning this law. We shall see this statement again below in 5:4." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nAnimals that have been dedicated to the Temple and then became blemished can be sold, the profit going to the Temple. Our mishnah teaches that this works a bit differently for blemished first borns.", + "All dedicated animals which became unfit [for the altar] are sold in a market, slaughtered in a market and weighed by the liter, except for a first born or a tithed animal, as their profit goes to the owners, [whereas] the profit on dedicated objects which became unfit goes to the Temple. It is considered somewhat disgraceful that a once holy animal should be slaughtered and sold in the marketplace like common meat. However, this is also the most profitable way to sell the animal’s meat. Normal dedicated animals may be slaughtered and sold in the market, and weighed using weights because we want to maximize the profit that goes to the Temple. In contrast, the profit from selling a blemished first born or tithed animal goes to the priests (or in certain cases the original owners), therefore, we are not concerned with maximizing the profit. In such a case, we want to minimize the disgrace to the animal and its meat. The animal should be slaughtered and sold privately, at one’s home. The meat should not be weighed on scales using known weights, but rather its weight should be estimated.", + "One can weigh one piece of meat of the first-born against another piece of ordinary meat. While one cannot weigh the meat of the first born on a scale using set weights, it is permitted to weigh it on a scale using another piece of meat of known weight. This is not considered to be as disgraceful." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThere are two topics in our mishnah. The first section deals with a Jew sharing a blemished first born with a priest. The second section deals with blood letting a first born in order to heal it.", + "Bet Shammai says: An Israelite must not be invited to share [a blemished first born] with a priest. But Bet Hillel permits this, even in the case of a non-Jew. According to Bet Shammai, if a priest owns a blemished first born which he can eat, he should not invite an Israelite to share it with him. The mishnah does not explain why Bet Shammai prohibits this and the Talmud gives a midrashic reasoning. Perhaps Bet Shammai fear that the priest may be bribing the Israelite to give him the blemished first born. To prevent bribes, Bet Shammai prohibits this. Bet Hillel permits, and they even allow a non-Jew to share in eating the first born. The reason to mention that a non-Jew can share in eating the first born is to teach that the priest can do with it as he pleases, as long as he doesn’t shear it or sell its meat in the market (as we learned in yesterday’s mishnah).", + "If a first born has a blood attack, even if it is going to die, its blood may not be let, the words of Rabbi Judah. It is prohibited to blemish a first born animal so that it can be eaten (see tomorrow’s mishnah). According to Rabbi Judah, even if the blemish is done through blood letting with the intention of saving the animal’s life, it is still prohibited.", + "But the sages say: he may let its blood, as long as he does not make a blemish. And if he made a blemish, he must not slaughter it on account of this. The sages permit the animal’s blood to be let, as long as he does it in a way that the animal will not be halakhically considered blemished. And if it does become halakhically blemished, he can’t count this blemish as grounds to slaughter the animal. Rather he would have to wait until the animal becomes blemished in another way and only then can he slaughter it. Note that he cannot sacrifice it after the first blemish because one can never slaughter a blemished animal.", + "Rabbi Shimon says: he may let blood, even though he makes a blemish. Rabbi Shimon is even more lenient and allows one to let the blood of an animal, even if he does it in such a way that it will cause a blemish. According to the Talmud, Rabbi Shimon would also let him slaughter the animal based on this blemish. Since his intention was to save the animal’s life (so he could properly slaughter it and eat it) this is not considered intentionally blemishing an animal, a topic to be discussed in tomorrow’s mishnah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah deals with the status of first borns who were intentionally blemished by their owners. It contains two very interesting stories.", + "If one makes a slit in the ear of a firstborn animal, he may never slaughter it, the words of Rabbi Eliezer. But the sages say: when another blemish appears, he may slaughter it on account of it. According to Rabbi Eliezer, if one intentionally blemishes a first born, he can never slaughter the animal. Even if it is subsequently blemished in another way, he is penalized and he still cannot slaughter it. The other sages adopt a more lenient position. The blemish that he put on the animal itself is not sufficient to allow him to slaughter it. However, he can slaughter and eat the animal when it is blemished in another way.", + "It happened that a quaestor (a Roman saw an old male lamb with its long wool hanging down and asked: what is the meaning of this? They replied: “It is a first born and is not to be slaughtered until it has a blemish,” [The quaestor] took a dagger and slit its ear. The matter came before the sages and they permitted it. After they had permitted, he went and sliced the ears of other [first borns]. The [sages] forbade them. It is forbidden to shear first born animals, so if they are not blemished and they can’t be sacrificed because the Temple is no longer standing, they will grow very long hair. Upon seeing one such strange beast, a Roman official asked the Jews what is going on with their goat. The Jews explained that they could not slaughter the animal until it became blemished. The Roman official, being a very helpful non-Jew, proceeded to intentionally blemish the animal. When the Jews brought the animal to the sages, the sages permitted it. Seeing that he had been so helpful to the Jews, the Roman official decided to be even more helpful and he went and blemished other first borns (I never knew Romans were so interested in helping Jews perhaps he just liked to slice the ears of goats?). This time the sages didn’t permit the first borns to be eaten. Once the Roman knew that by his blemishing them they could be eaten, his actions could no longer allow the first born to be eaten.", + "Once children were once playing in a field. They tied the tails of sheep one to the other and one tail which belonged to a first born was severed. The matter came before the rabbis and they permitted [the first born]. When the children saw that they had permitted [the first born to be slaughtered], they proceeded to tie the tails of other first borns. The [sages] forbade [the other first borns]. A similar story is related concerning some children, who while playing a game, blemished a first born animal. Since they didn’t know that their actions would allow the animal to be eaten, the sages permitted it. However, when they began to intentionally blemish other animals, the sages did not permit them.", + "This is the rule: wherever the blemish is caused with the knowledge and consent [of the owner] it is forbidden, but, if it is not with his knowledge and consent, it is permitted. The general rule is that if the blemish was done without the knowledge or consent of the owner of the animal, the first born may be eaten. But if the owner knew that what he was doing was going to permit the animal to be eaten, or if he consented to someone else blemishing the animal, it cannot be eaten, at least not based on that particular blemish." + ], + [ + "If a first born was running after him and he kicked it and thereby blemished it, he may slaughter it on account of this. Since this person did not intentionally blemish the first born in order to slaughter it and eat it, it can be slaughtered on account of this blemish.", + "Any blemish which might have been made by a person, Israelite shepherds are trustworthy whereas shepherds who are priests are not trustworthy. The mishnah now returns to the issue of trustworthiness. An Israelite shepherd is trusted if he says that a blemish that could have been done by a person happened naturally, because the Israelite does not get to eat the animal himself. The assumption is that a person won’t lie in order to provide benefit to another person. However, the priest shepherd is not trusted because he himself could benefit from his lie.", + "Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: he is trustworthy with regard to somebody else's first born, but he is not trustworthy with regard to his own. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel refines the previous section. The priest shepherd can be trusted if he is testifying concerning another priest’s first born. His lack of trustworthiness is limited to his own animals, where has a vested stake in their being deemed blemished.", + "Rabbi Meir says: one who is suspected of neglecting a religious matter must not issue judgment on it or give evidence concerning it. Rabbi Meir disagrees with Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel and says that if a person is not trusted with regard to a certain matter, such as first born blemishes, then he is not trusted to testify with regard to any issue that is connected with that matter. Thus if a priest is not trusted with regard to his own first borns, then he can’t be trusted to testify with regard to other priest’s first borns." + ], + [ + "A priest is trusted to say, “I have shown this first born [to an expert] and it is blemished.” In yesterday’s mishnah we learned that priests were suspected of blemishing their first born animals so that they could eat them. Today’s mishnah teaches that they are not suspected of completely lying and saying that they showed a first born to an expert who declared it blemished, when in reality they did not. This is actually a very interesting insight as to the mentality of the priests. They will not eat an unblemished first born, because the Torah clearly states that an unblemished first born must be sacrificed. However, they might intentionally blemish a first born, because all this amounts to is “cheating the system.” It does not seem to be a direct violation of the prohibition of eating an unblemished first born.", + "All are trust worthy with regard to the blemishes of a tithed animal. A tithed animal is brought to Jerusalem, its innards are sacrificed and the remainder of its meat is eaten by its owners. In contrast, a tithed animal that becomes blemished after it has been set aside as tithe is not sacrificed and can simply be eaten by its owners. An Israelite is not suspected of intentionally blemishing his tithed animals because had he wanted to lie, he could have blemished the entire herd before he set aside one of them as a tithe, and then the whole herd could have been exempt. Whenever a person could have achieved his goals without lying, he is trusted to not lie.", + "A first born whose eye was blinded or whose fore-foot was cut off, or whose hind-leg was broken, may be slaughtered with the approval of three [persons] of the synagogue. But Rabbi Yose says: even if twenty-three were present, it must not be slaughtered except with the approval of an expert. Generally, a person must bring his first born to a qualified rabbinic expert for him to determine whether the blemish renders the animal unfit for sacrifice. However, if the blemish is completely obvious, such as the loss of an eye or a limb, then there is a leniency, according to the first opinion in the mishnah. He can bring the animal to three “people of the synagogue.” These are people who are generally cautious in their performance of mitzvoth, they are not “amei haaretz,” but they are not experts in the laws of blemishes. It seems that their function is to certify that he brought the animal to them, but not actually have to render a ruling whether or not the animal was blemished. Rabbi Yose demands that a rabbi who is an expert in what blemishes disqualify a person must be present. Even if there are twenty-three judges, the number necessary to constitute a small Sanhedrin, the animal cannot be slaughtered unless there is an expert." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah deals with a butcher who sells meat that comes from an animal that should not have been slaughtered.", + "If one slaughtered a first born and it became known that he had not shown it [to an expert]: That which [the purchasers] have eaten, they ate, and he must return the money to them. That which they have not yet eaten, the flesh must be buried and he must return the money to them. If the butcher slaughters and then sells the meat of a first born without first showing it to an expert to determine whether it was blemished, the meat cannot be eaten. If they have already eaten some of the meat, there is nothing they can do about it. However, he still must pay them their money back, even though they ate the meat. This is a penalty for selling a first born without making sure it was first blemished. The meat that has not yet been eaten must be buried, as is the rule for a sacrifice that was slaughtered outside the Temple. Obviously, he must also pay them back for this meat.", + "And likewise if one slaughtered a cow and sold it and it became known that it was terefah: That which [the purchasers] have eaten, they ate, and he must return the money to them. That which they have not eaten, they return the flesh to him and he must return the money to them. If [the purchasers], sold it to non-Jews or cast it to dogs, they must pay him the price of a terefah. The rule is similar for a butcher who sells the meat of an animal that was actually a terefah (an animal with a wound or illness that would have caused it to die such an animal cannot be eaten). The butcher must pay his customers back for the meat they ate because he is penalized for carelessly selling terefah meat. Meat that they have not eaten should be returned to him and he can either feed it to animals or sell it to non-Jews, since it is permitted to derive benefit (but not eat) a terefah. Obviously, he must pay them back for this meat. If they had already sold the meat to non-Jews or gave it to an animal, then they must pay him the amount that a terefah costs, which is much cheaper than a kosher animal. If they already paid him for kosher meat, he will have to return to them the difference." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nChapter six delineates the types of blemishes that disqualify a first born animal from being sacrificed. The Torah lists only two types of blemishes “lame and blind” (see Deuteronomy 15:21). However, the same verse also states, “any serious blemish.” From this verse the rabbis derive that any blemish that is significant like being lame and blind, renders the animal unfit. The general rule is that the blemish must be visible and a type of blemish that doesn’t heal.\nToday’s mishnah deals with blemishes of the ear.", + "In consequence of the following blemishes a first-born animal may be slaughtered:
If its ear has become defective, from the cartilages [inward] but not if the defect is in the ear-flap; In order for the defect in the ear to disqualify the animal, it must be in the inner, cartilage part of the ear, and not in the flappy outside part. To be defective means that part of the ear has been removed.", + "If it is slit although there was no loss [of substance]; The animal is also disqualified if the entire cartilage part is slit, even if no part of the ear is missing.", + "If it is perforated with a hole as large as a karshinah A karshinah is a type of legume. If the ear has a hole in it the size of this legume, the animal is disqualified.", + "Or if [the ear] has become dry. What is considered “becoming dry”? If when pierced no drop of blood comes out. Rabbi Yose ben Meshullam says: [it] is dry when it crumbles [when touched]. A dry and withered out ear also disqualifies the animal. There are two opinions as to what makes an ear considered to be dry and withered out. The first is that it is void of blood. The second is that it is so dry that it crumbles when touched." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with blemishes of the eye. Leviticus 21:20 states that a priest that has a blemish in his eye cannot serve on the altar. Our mishnah explains what that means, at least with regard to the blemished animal.", + "One whose eyelid is pierced, defected or slit, If the eyelid is pierced, defected or slit, the animal is considered blemished.", + "Or if the eye has a cataract, or a tevalul, halazon [snail-shaped], nahash [snake-shaped] or a [berry-shaped] growth on the eye, [the animal is disqualified]. Most of this section deals with various growths on the eye. A cataract will also disqualify the animal.", + "What is a tevalul? The white of the eye breaking through the ring and entering into the black. But if the black breaks through the ring and goes into the white, it is not a [disqualifying] blemish, because there are no disqualifying blemishes as regards the white of the eye. The mishnah now explains “tevalul” which is the word used in Leviticus 21:20 for an eye blemish. If a white thread goes out from the white of the eye and enters the pupil, the animal is considered blemished, because this would affect its vision. However, if the black has broken through to the white the animal is not considered blemished, because blemishes have to be the pupil and not to the white part of the eye." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah continues to deal with blemishes of the eye.", + "Havarvar [white spots] on the cornea and water constantly dripping from the eye, [are disqualifying blemishes]. The two blemishes discussed here are white spots on the cornea, which is probably a type of cataract and water dripping from the eye, which probably means that the animal has an eye infection.", + "What do we mean by a permanent hawarwar? If it remained for a period of eighty days. Rabbi Hanina ben Antigonus says: we must examine it three times in the eighty days. In order for the white spots to be considered a blemish they must be present for eighty days in a row. Rabbi Hanina ben Antigonus adds in that we must check at least three times during the eighty days. It is not sufficient if we know that the white spots were there in the beginning of the eighty days and at the end.", + "And the following are cases of constant dripping from the eye [and how to test its permanency]: if it ate [for a cure] fresh [fodder] and dry [fodder] from a field sufficiently watered by rain [it is a permanent blemish, if not cured]. [If it ate] fresh [fodder] and then dry [fodder] from a field requiring artificial irrigation, or if it ate dry [fodder] first and then fresh [fodder from field watered by rain] it is not a blemish unless it eats dry [fodder] after the fresh. There is a cure for a dripping eye to eat first fresh fodder and then dry fodder from a field irrigated by rain. If the animal eats this cure and it isn’t healed then the animal has a permanent blemish. However, if he eats fodder from an artificially irrigated field or dry fodder and then fresh fodder from a rain-irrigated field, and the eye continues to drip, it is not a sign of a permanent blemish because the animal did not eat the proper cure." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah deals with defects of the nose and mouth.", + "If its nose is perforated, defective, or slit, or its upper lip perforated, defective, or slit [these are disqualifying blemishes]. If there is any defect of the nose or upper lip, the first born is considered blemished and it may be slaughtered.", + "If the outer incisors are defective or leveled [to the gum] or the molars are torn out [completely], [these are disqualifying blemishes]. But Rabbi Hanina ben Antigonus says: we do not examine behind the molars, nor the molars themselves. I have translated this section to refer to the defects of the teeth. The words may also be understood as referring to defects of the gums. In any case, the rule is stricter with regard to the outer incisors than it is for the inner molars. For the inner molars to be considered defective, they must be completely torn out." + ], + [ + "Today’s mishnah deals with defects in an animal’s genitalia.
If the sheath [of the penis] is defective or the genitals of a female animal in the case of sacrificial offerings [it is defective.] If the sheath that holds the male penis is defective, it won’t heal and therefore it constitutes a permanent wound. A female animal whose genitalia are defective cannot be offered as a sacrifice. It is not relevant to say that it cannot be a first-born since a bekhor (a first-born) must be a male.", + "If the tail is mutilated from the bone but not from the joint; or if the top end [root] of the tail is bared to the bone; or if there is flesh between one joint and another [in the tail] to the amount of a finger's breadth [the animal is defective]. There are three defects listed here: 1) If the tail is mutilated on its bone part, then the animal is defective because the wound will not heal. However, if it is mutilated on the joint between the segments it can still be sacrificed as a first born. 2) If the root end of the tail is bared to the bone. 3) If there is too much space between the joints of the tail." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to deal with blemishes to an animal’s genitalia.", + "If [a first born] has no testicles or if it only has one testicle, [it is a blemish]. The lack of one or both testicles is considered a defect.", + "Rabbi Ishmael says: if it has two pouches, then it has two testicles, but if it only has one pouch, then it only has one testicle. The remainder of the mishnah deals with how one determines if an animal has both testicles [since this is not a test that I have ever administered, I will assume that how many testicles an animal has is not readily apparent.] Rabbi Ishmael says that one simply counts the pouches. If it has two pouches, then it has two testicles and is not defective.", + "Rabbi Akiva says: [the animal] is placed on its buttocks and he squeezes [the pouch]. If a testicle is [in there, inside the pouch] it will eventually come out. Rabbi Akiva does not believe that if there are two pouches there are necessarily two testicles. Rather one must test the animal to see if there are really two inside there.", + "It happened that one squeezed it and [the testicle] did not come out, but when it was slaughtered [the testicle] was found attached to the loins, and Rabbi Akiva permitted [the animal] while Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri prohibited it. It seems that this story supports Rabbi Ishmael’s view, because Rabbi Akiva’s test does not work. The animal is tested and the testicle does not come out, even though it is later revealed to have been there. This animal had both testicles and therefore it should not have been slaughtered. Generally, if a first-born is slaughtered when it shouldn’t have been, the meat is prohibited. However, Rabbi Akiva allows the animal to be eaten, because according to Rabbi Akiva if the testicle does not emerge when squeezed it is blemished. Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri prohibited the animal because it was not blemished and should not have been slaughtered." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with defects in the legs and feet.", + "If [a first born] has five legs or if it has only three legs, or if its feet are uncloven like that of a donkey, or if it is a shahul or a kasul [these are blemishes]. An extra or a missing leg renders an animal defective, as do several other defects in the leg.", + "What is a shahul? [An animal] with a dislocated hip. What is a kasul? [An animal] one of whose hips is higher than the other. The mishnah now defines the terms shahul and kasul. The first term refers to an animal with a dislocated hip, whereas the second term refers to an animal whose hips are of different height. Both defects make a first born animal fit for slaughter." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah begins by continuing to discuss blemishes of the leg. It then continues with a discussion of some additional blemishes that were added by a sage named Ila.", + "If the bone of the fore-leg or of its hind-leg is broken, even though it is not noticeable, [this is a blemish]. A broken leg counts as a blemish even if the break is not noticeable.", + "These blemishes Ila enumerated in Yavneh and the sages agreed with him. As we learned in mishnah 4:5, Ila was an expert on animal blemishes, perhaps we might call him the veterinarian of his times. The above list of blemishes was recited by Ila in front of the sages in Yavneh, after the destruction of the Temple. They agreed with him that these blemishes disqualify the first-born animal from being sacrificed.", + "He also added another three cases [of blemishes]. They said to him: we have only heard these [already mentioned previously]. The above list was one that Ila had received from his teachers, and therefore the rabbis accepted it. In other words, Ila’s authority stemmed from his knowledge of tradition and not his scientific acumen. We know this because when Ila added a few more blemishes, the rabbis disagreed with him. They were willing to accept only the blemishes that they had already heard about, and not those that Ila personally added.", + "[The three added by Ila were]: one whose eyeball is round like that of a human or whose mouth is like that of a pig or if the greater part of the speaking part of the tongue has been removed. A subsequent court ruled however: each of these cases is a [disqualifying] blemish. The mishnah now lists the blemishes that Ila added. Interestingly, a subsequent court agreed with Ila. Perhaps this demonstrates a shift in how courts adjudicated halakhah. While the earlier rabbis accepted only tradition, later rabbis began to accept the authority of the innovations of individual rabbis." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah lists a few additional blemishes which disqualify the first born.", + "It happened that the lower jaw [of a first born] was larger than the upper jaw. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel asked the sages [for a ruling] and they said: this is a blemish. In this case an animal seems to be blemished, but Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel is not sure if the blemish is sufficient to disqualify it. He brings the animal in front of the other sages and they rule that it is a blemish and it is disqualified.", + "The ear of a kid which was doubled: the sages ruled: if it is all one bone, it is a blemish, but if it is not all one bone, it is not a blemish. If the kid seems to have one ear inside of another ear, the kid is considered blemished if the ear has only one “bone” meaning one ear lobe. This would seem to refer to a case where the external lobe was bent over and turned into the internal ear. However, if the “bone” (the lobe) is split at the top, the animal is not blemished. We should note that the reason for this is unclear and indeed the Rambam has a different and opposite version of the mishnah: if it is one bone it is blemished but if it is not one bone, it is not blemished.", + "Rabbi Hanina ben Gamaliel says: if the tail of a kid is like that of a pig, or if the tail does not possess three vertebrae, this is a blemish. If a kid’s tail looks like a pig’s tail, or does not have the full three vertebrae, the animal is blemished." + ], + [ + "Rabbi Hanina ben Antigonus says: if [a first born] has a wart in its eye or if a bone of its fore-leg or hind-leg is defective, or if the bone of the mouth split, or one eye is large and the other small, or one ear is large and the other small, being visibly so and not merely in measurement [all of these are blemishes].
Rabbi Judah says: if one testicle is as large as two of the other [this is a blemish]. But the sages didn’t agree with him.
In the first section of this mishnah, Rabbi Hanina ben Antigonus adds several more defects to the list. In the second section, Rabbi Judah adds another defect, but the other sages disagree with him.
Since the mishnah is quite clear on its own, there is no commentary below." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis is the final mishnah that lists blemishes that disqualify an animal.", + "If the tail of a calf does not reach the joint, [it is a blemish]. The sages said: the growth of all calves is in this manner, as long as [the animals] grow, the tails also extend [below]. To which joint does this refer? Rabbi Hanina ben Antigonus says: the joint in the middle of the hip. According to the first opinion, if the tail does not reach the joint in the middle of the hip, the joint that connects the thigh bone with the thigh, the animal is defective. The other sages disagree and say that it is normal for the tail to grow slowly. Thus if early in life the tail does not reach the hip joint, it is not a blemish because it will grow later.", + "In consequence of these blemishes we may slaughter a firstborn animal, and consecrated animals rendered unfit [for the altar] in consequence of these blemishes may be redeemed. This section relates to all of the blemishes listed above in the chapter. If a first born has any one of these blemishes it may be slaughtered and it need not be brought to the Temple as a sacrifice. If a consecrated animal develops one of these blemishes it cannot be offered as a sacrifice and must be redeemed for money." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe blemishes listed in this mishnah disqualify an animal from being valid as a sacrifice. However, they are not permanent blemishes and therefore if the animal is a first born, it may not be slaughtered. Basically, all the owner can do is wait until either the blemish goes away or a permanent blemish develops.", + "And in consequence of the following blemishes one may not slaughter a first born either in the Temple or in the rest of the state: This is an introduction to the rest of the mishnah.", + "White spots on the cornea and water [dripping from the eye] which are not permanent, These blemishes were listed in mishnah three. If they are not permanent, the animal may not be slaughtered, although it may not be sacrificed.", + "Or molars which have been broken but not torn out [completely]; Problems with the molars were listed in mishnah four. Since they have not been torn out, the blemish is not permanent.", + "Or [an animal] affected with garav, a wart, or hazazit. A garav and a hazazit are kinds of boil. Since boils and warts are impermanent, they do not allow the first born to be slaughtered.", + "An old [animal] or a sick one, [an animal] of offensive smell; An old, sick or foul-smelling animal cannot be sacrificed, but since these are not exactly blemishes, they also can’t be slaughtered.", + "Or [an animal] which with a transgression has been committed or an animal which is known to have killed a human being on the testimony of one witness or of the owners. If two witnesses see an animal commit a transgression, either having sexual relations with a human or killing a human, the animal must be executed and can obviously not be sacrificed. However, if there is only witness, or if the owners were the witnesses, then the animal need not be executed. However, since it did commit a capital crime, it cannot be sacrificed but neither can it be slaughtered to be eaten.", + "A tumtum or a hermaphrodite cannot be slaughtered, neither in the Temple or in the rest of the state. Rabbi Ishmael however says: there is no greater blemish than that [of a hermaphrodite]. But the sages say: it is not considered a first-born and it may be shorn and worked with. A tumtum is an animal (or human being) with neither male nor female genitalia, whereas a hermaphrodite has both sets of genitalia. There are three opinions as to the status of a first born that is a tumtum or a hermaphrodite. According to the first opinion, while it cannot be sacrificed, because it is blemished, it also cannot be slaughtered and eaten. Rabbi Ishmael holds that it is blemished and therefore it can be slaughtered and eaten. The other sages say that such an animal is not even considered a first born because it may not be a male. They too would hold that it can be slaughtered and eaten." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nSince chapter six dealt with blemishes that render an animal unfit to be a sacrifice, this chapter lists blemishes that disqualify a priest from serving in the Temple.", + "These blemishes [named above], whether permanent or transitory, make human beings unfit [to serve in the Temple]. The same blemishes that disqualify animals also disqualify priests from serving in the Temple. That a priest with a blemish cannot serve in the Temple is stated in Leviticus 21:21, “No man among the offspring of Aaron the priest who has a defect shall be qualified to offer the Lord’s gift; having a defect, he shall not be qualified to offer the food of his God.” Our chapter will explain and expand the list found in this chapter of Leviticus.", + "There are more than this concerning human beings: kilon, liftan, makkaban, one whose head is angular or shekifas . There are other defects that also can prevent a man from serving as a priest. The defects in this section refer to various types of misshapen heads. A kilon is one with a wedge-shaped head, a laftan is one with a turnip shaped head, a makkavan is one with a hammer-shaped head and a shekifas is one with a bent head. In other words, for a priest to serve in the Temple, his head must be shaped in a normal fashion.", + "A hunchback: Rabbi Judah considers him fit, Whereas the sages consider him unfit. The sages debate whether a hunchback can serve as a priest in the Temple. Rabbi Judah says that it does not disqualify him from serving, whereas the sages consider him unfit." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah deals with various defects concerning the hair on one’s head.", + "A bald-headed person is unfit [for the priesthood]. What is considered bald-headed? One who does not have a line of hair from ear to ear. If he has one, then he is fit. One who is bald cannot serve in the Temple. However, this is limited to one who is really bald, a man who doesn’t even have a line of hair from one ear to the other. Those, like me, who are bald but have a little bit of hair, can, thankfully, fulfill their role as priests (now if only my father was a kohnen..).", + "One who has no eyebrows or has only one eyebrow [is unfit], this being the gibben mentioned in the Torah. Rabbi Dosa says: one whose eyebrows lie flat [overshadowing the eyes]. Rabbi Hanina ben Antigonus says: one who has a double back or a double spine. In the chapter dealing with the blemishes of the priest, the Torah lists the “gibben” (Leviticus 21:20). The rabbis debate what this word means. According to the first opinion, a “gibben” has a problem with his eyebrows. He either has no eyebrows, or only one. Rabbi Dosa says that the problem is slightly different his eyebrows are long and hang over his eyes. Rabbi Hanina believes that the problem has nothing to do with eyebrows, but rather with the back. The person looks as if he has two backs or two spines." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah continues to deal with defects of the eyes.", + "A harum is unfit [for the priesthood]. What is a harum? One who can paint both of his eyes with one movement. A harum is one who can paint both of his eyes with one movement. This is interpreted to mean that his nose is sunken in, so that he could paint both eyes with one stroke.", + "If both of his eyes were above or both of his eyes were below; or if one one eye was above and the other below; The mishnah now continues to list other eye defects. If both eyes are higher or lower than normal, or if they are uneven, one eye being higher than the other, then he may not serve in the Temple.", + "Or one who sees the room and the ceiling in one glance; This seems to mean that he is cross-eyed, one eye looking up and one eye looking down.", + "Or one who covers [his eyes] from the sun; If he is extremely photo-sensitive, he can’t serve. We should note that the Temple was not shaded, so for a priest who can’t bear the sun, serving at the altar might have been unbearable.", + "A zugdos and a tziran. A zugdos is interpreted as being a person with eyes or eyebrows of different colors. A tziran is one whose eyes constantly water. All of these visual defects disqualify a priest from serving in the Temple.", + "One whose eyelashes have fallen off is unfit [for the priesthood] for appearance sake. The rabbis stated that one whose eyelashes have fallen out cannot serve in the Temple, because his appearance is strange. In other words, he does not have a defect that prevents him from serving, but we don’t let him serve because of his strange appearance." + ], + [ + "One whose eyes are as large as a calf's or as small as those of a goose;
Or whose body is [unduly] large for his limbs, [unduly] small for his limbs; or whose nose is [unduly] large for his limbs, or whose nose is [unduly] small for his limbs;
A tzimem and a zimea. What is tzimea? One whose ears are very small. What is tzimem? One whose ears resemble a sponge.
If some of a person’s limbs, nose or ears are either too large or too small, the person cannot serve as a priest. Basically, we can summarize that the rabbis thought the priest should look normal and have normal proportions.
I might want to add at this point, that in the ancient world it was thought that a strange outer appearance reflects a problematic inner self, perhaps lack of morality or lack of intelligence. While today we know that this is often, and perhaps usually not so, we should, I believe, acknowledge, that it is sometimes so, and that sometimes, mental problems accompany physical defects. It is not surprising that people in the pre-modern world, including rabbis, took this as the rule. Thankfully, though, we now understand better that, as they say, “one should not judge a book by its cover.”
The mishnah is pretty straightforward, so I will explain only where I feel necessary.
Section three: The only section that probably needs explanation is the “tzimem” whose ears resemble a sponge. According to Rashi, this means that they are shrunken and closed. Maimonides interprets it to mean large and swollen. In either case, they are deformed." + ], + [ + "If the upper lip overlaps the lower or the lower lip overlaps the upper, behold this is a blemish.
One whose teeth have fallen out is unfit [for the priesthood] for appearance sake.
If his breasts hang down like those of a woman, or his belly is swollen, or his navel sticks out, or if he is epileptic, even once every few days, or he is subject to melancholy, a me'ushkan and a ba'al gever [all these are unfit for the priesthood].
If he has no testicles, or only one testicle, this is the “meroah ashekh” mentioned in the Torah. Rabbi Ishmael says: anyone whose testicles were crushed. Rabbi Akiva says: anyone who has wind in his testicles. Rabbi Hanina ben Antigonus says: one who has a black complexion.
More blemishes!
The first two sections are straightforward so there is no explanation below.
Section three: A “me’ushkan” is one whose testicles are unusually large. A “ba’al gever” is one whose penis is unusually large. Please do not ask me how large is too large. I’m also not sure if they had a measuring stick in the Temple ☺.
Section four: Leviticus 21:20 uses the word “meroah ashekh” to refer to a disqualifying blemish and in this section the rabbis debate its meaning. This is similar to the debate at the end of 7:2.
According to the first three opinions, the “meroah ashekh” has a problem with his testicles, either he is missing them or they are crushed. Rabbi Akiva says that the problem is that he has “wind in his testicles” meaning they are distended. As in 7:2, Rabbi Hanina ben Antigonus offers up a completely different explanation. The word “ashekh” sounds like “hoshekh” which means “dark” or “black.” So the “meroah ashekh” is one whose complexion is black." + ], + [ + "If one knocks his ankles [against each other, in walking] or rubs his legs [against each other]; a ba’al pikah and an ikkel. What is an ikkel? One whose knees do not touch each other when he puts his feet together.
If he has a lump protruding from his thumb, or if his heel projects backward, or if his feet are wide like those of a goose.
Or if his fingers lie one above the other.
If they are webbed up to the joint, he is fit, if below the root, if he cuts it, he is also fit.
If he has an additional finger and he cut it off, if there was a bone in it, he is unfit, but if not, he is fit.
If he has additional fingers and additional toes, on each hand and foot six fingers and six toes, [making altogether] twenty-four [fingers and toes]: Rabbi Judah declares him fit, But the sages declare him unfit.
One who has equal strength in both hands: Rabbi declares him unfit; But the sages declare him fit.
A kushi, a gihur, a lavkan, a kippeah, a dwarf, a deaf-mute, an imbecile, one intoxicated, or afflicted with plague marks which are clean – [these defects] disqualify in human beings but not in animals.
Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: a mad animal is not a choice sacrifice.
Rabbi Eliezer says: also those afflicted with dangling warts they are unfit in human beings but are fit in animals.
Section one: This section has to do with various unusual ways of walking.
Section two: A “lump” seems to be an extra appendage sticking out of either his thumb or big toe.
Section four: If his fingers are webbed, but only up to the middle joint, he is still fit. If they are webbed past the middle joint, he is still fit if he cuts the skin (ouch!).
Section five: If he had an extra finger that had a bone in it, he is unfit, even if he cut off the extra finger (double ouch!). If there was no bone in it, then he is fit, as long as he cuts it off.
Section six: According to II Samuel 21:20, Goliath had an extra digit on each hand and foot. Perhaps this leads Rabbi Judah to say that as long as the number of digits on each hand and foot is the same, he is not defective and can serve in the Temple. The other rabbis disagree. Just as someone with one extra finger or toe is disqualified, so too is one with an extra digit on each hand and foot.
Section seven: The rabbis considered left-handedness to be a weakness, as did pretty much everybody in the ancient world. Rabbi [Judah Ha-Nasi] thought that someone ambidextrous was simply weak in the right hand, and therefore, he was flawed. The other rabbis attributed this ability to the strength of the left and not the weakness of the right, and therefore, held that he could serve in the Temple.
Section eight: A “kushi” is a dark-skinned person. A “gihor” is a red-skinned person. A “lavkan” is an albino. A “kipeah” is a very tall and thin person. All of the types of people listed in this section cannot serve in the Temple because they are unusual and were therefore were considered to be in some way defective.
The inclusion here of a drunken priest and a priest afflicted with a plague, albeit one considered ritually clean, is exceptional for two reasons. First of all, drunkenness and being afflicted with plagues are temporary conditions, whereas the other conditions are permanent. Second, and more importantly, all of the other categories refer to priests with blemishes in their personal appearance, whereas drunkenness is not. It seems likely that the mishnah included these two categories here because they belong with the list of things that disqualify a human being but not an animal.
Section nine: According to Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel, a mad animal may also not be offered as a sacrifice.
Section ten: Rabbi Eliezer adds in another blemish which disqualifies human beings from serving, but not animals from being sacrificed hanging warts (yick!)." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah deals with blemishes that do not disqualify human beings, even though they do disqualify animals from being sacrifices.", + "The following are fit in the case of human beings, but unfit in the case of animals:
A father with his son, It is forbidden to slaughter an animal and its offspring on the same day. If one does slaughter both on the same day, the second one cannot be used as a sacrifice (see Hullin, chapter five). However, a priest and his son can both serve in the Temple on the same day.", + "A terefah; A terefah is an animal that has been wounded or is sick and is going to die from the wound or illness (see Hullin, chapter three). If a priest has the signs of being a terefah, he may still serve in the Temple.", + "One born by means of a caesarean section. An animal born through a caesarean section cannot be sacrificed, but a person born of a caesarean section can still serve in the Temple.", + "One with which a sin has been committed or has killed a person; An animal with which a sin (such as a sexual sin) has been committed or an animal has killed a person cannot be offered as a sacrifice (see above 6:12). However, these do not disqualify a priest from serving in the Temple.", + "A priest who contracts an illegal marriage is unfit [for the priesthood] until he vows not to derive any benefit from the woman. Leviticus 21 lists women whom a priest may not marry. If a priest marries such a woman he must divorce her. Marrying such a woman disqualifies him from serving at the altar until he takes a vow not to derive any more benefit from the marriage, neither sexually nor financially. Once he takes the vow he can serve again, even before he divorces her.", + "One who makes himself unclean through contact with the dead is unfit, until he undertakes that he will no longer make himself unclean through the dead. A priest is forbidden from intentionally coming into contact with the dead, except for his seven close relatives. If a priest intentionally defiles himself by coming into contact with the dead, he cannot serve at the altar until he promises to stop doing so. In this case, he need not take a vow, probably because it is less tempting for him to continue to defile himself, then it is for him to continue to be with his prohibited woman." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah deals with the laws concerning the human firstborn. There are two special rules with regard to the human first born: 1) he gets a double portion of his father’s inheritance (see Deuteronomy 21:17); 2) he must be redeemed from the priest for five shekels (see Numbers 18:16). Determining who is a firstborn is, however, different for these two matters. Our mishnah defines what firstborn counts as a firstborn for which of these two laws.", + "There is one who is [counted as] a firstborn [with respect to] inheritance but not with respect to redemption from a priest; a firstborn with respect to redemption from a priest but not a firstborn [with respect] to inheritance; a firstborn [with respect to both] inheritance and redemption from a priest; and a firstborn [in respect] to neither inheritance nor redemption from a priest. This is an introduction to the remainder of the chapter. When it comes to who is considered a firstborn for the two relevant matters, all possibilities are open.", + "Which is a firstborn [with respect] to inheritance but not to redemption from a priest? One which follows one which was not viable whose head came forth alive, or one born in the ninth month whose head came out dead, or when a woman aborts something that looks like an animal, beast or bird, the words of Rabbi Meir. But the sages say: [it is not considered an opening of the womb] until [the abortion] has the form of a human being. This section lists infants that count as being the firstborn for matters of inheritance but do not need to be redeemed from the priest. The first case seems to be that of twins. The first child is not viable, meaning that he is premature. This child’s head emerges from the womb and then it goes back into the womb, after which the other child is born. The child that is born counts as the first born for inheritance, but does not need to be redeemed. A firstborn male needs to be redeemed only if he “opened his mother’s womb” and since the other child opened his mother’s womb, the second child need not be redeemed. However, he does inherit because he is the first child actually born. There are some problems with this interpretation, namely that it is impossible for one of a set of twins to be premature whereas the other is ready to be born. Nevertheless, it seems possible, in my mind, that the rabbis believed that a pregnant woman could become pregnant again and therefore have “twins,” one of whom is more mature than the other. The second case is where a fully mature child (a nine months child) has his head emerge from the womb but is dead. Then his head goes back into the womb and the other twin is born. The live twin counts as the first born for inheritance but since he didn’t open the womb, he need not be redeemed. Finally, if a woman aborts a fetus that has the shape of an animal or bird, the first opinion counts this as “opening the womb” and therefore the next born male need not be redeemed. However, since the miscarriage did not have a human form, it does not count as the first born for matters of inheritance and the second child receives the double portion. This is Rabbi Meir’s opinion. The other sages hold that if the miscarriage does not have a human form it does not count as having opened the womb. The next child is a first-born for both matters.", + "If [a woman] aborts a sandal or a placenta or a fetus having an articulated shape, or if an embryo came out by pieces, [the infant] which follows after them is a first-born [with respect] to inheritance but not a first-born for redemption from a priest. In all of these cases the woman aborts something that is considered as having opened the womb, but does not count as a firstborn. Therefore, the next born child receives the double inheritance but does not need to be redeemed. The first case is a “sandal.” This seems to be a flat piece of flesh that resembles a sandal. It seems to either accompany a fetus or once was a fetus. The second case is a placenta that inevitably accompanies a fetus, so it is a sign that there was at some point a fetus. The third case is a fetus that has a human shape, and the fourth case is where the aborted fetus is recognizably human but is cut up into pieces. In all of these cases the fetus counts as having opened the womb, but does not count as being the first born for matters of inheritance.", + "If one who never had children married a woman who had already given birth, even if she had given birth when she was a slave but is now free, or [had given birth] when she was a non-Jew but has since converted, if after coming to the Israelite she gave birth, [the infant] is considered a first-born [with respect] to inheritance but not a first-born for redemption from a priest. Rabbi Yose the Galilean says: [the infant] is a firstborn [with respect] to inheritance and for redemption from a priest, as it says: “Whatever opens the womb in Israel” (Exodus 13:2), meaning only if it opens the womb in Israel. In these cases a man who has never had children marries a woman who has had children. This is his firstborn but not hers. In general, this means that the child gets the double inheritance from the father, but does not need to be redeemed because he did not open the mother’s womb. This is true even if the first child was conceived and born while the woman was not Jewish (or not free). Since her first free, Jewish child did not open the womb, he is not the first born for redemption. Rabbi Yose the Galilean holds that the child does not count as having opened his mother’s womb unless he is born while she is Jewish and free. He interprets “opens the womb in Israel” to mean that the child opens the womb of a woman who is alread “in Israel,” of Jewish status.", + "If one had children already and married a woman who had never given birth previously Sections five, six, seven and eight describe cases where the child counts as a firstborn with regard to being redeemed by a priest but not for the sake of inheritance. We will start with section five. In this case, the man has already had kids so the first-born with his next wife cannot be the first born for matters of inheritance.", + "Or if she converted when pregnant, or if she was freed when pregnant, and she gave birth; If a woman became pregnant for the first time while a non-Jew or a slave and was then converted or freed and then gave birth, since her child was born while she was already an Israelite, the child counts as a first-born for matters of redemption. However, it does not inherit from its father because the child was conceived while the woman was still not a Jew.", + "If she and a priestess gave birth, she and a Levite’s daughter, she and a woman who had already given birth; This section deals with kids who get mixed up at birth. If a child of a woman who has never given birth is mixed up with a child of a woman who is exempt, such as the son of a priestess, woman of Levite descent or a woman who already gave birth, both children need to be redeemed, because either of them could be the true first born.", + "And similarly [if a woman] who did not wait three months after her husband's death, married and gave birth and it is not known if the infant was born in the ninth month since the death of the first [husband] or in the seventh month since she married the second, it is a firstborn for redemption from a priest but not a first-born [with respect] to inheritance. A widow should wait three months to remarry after her first husband has died in order to determine whether her next child is the first husband’s or the second’s. If she does not wait, and she becomes pregnant immediately, the child does not inherit from either father, because the “certain” inheritors can claim that the child cannot prove who his father was. The child does need to be redeemed because he is a first-born to his mother. However, he will have to redeem himself when he gets older, because he has no “certain” father who is obligated to do so on his behalf.", + "Which is a firstborn both [in respect] of inheritance and for redemption from a priest? If [a woman] miscarries a sac full of blood or full of water or full of pieces of flesh; or if [a woman] miscarries something with the shape of fish or locusts or reptiles, or creeping things, or if she discharges on the fortieth day [of conception], [the infant] which follows after [these discharges] is a firstborn both [in respect] of inheritance and for redemption from a priest. Finally the mishnah lists some cases where the child is a first-born for both matters, even though there might be reason to think otherwise. In all of these cases the woman has either a very early miscarriage or some sort of discharge that does not have the shape of a human fetus. These various types of discharges do not count as having opened her womb and therefore the child born afterwards is considered to be the first-born for both inheritance and redemption." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah deals with matters relating to a child born of a caesarean section, called in Hebrew one who goes out from the wall.", + "A fetus extracted by means of a caesarean section and one that follows neither is a first-born for inheritance or a first-born to be redeemed from a priest. According to the first opinion, a child born through a c-section does not count as a first born because he wasn’t actually “born.” He doesn’t inherit, nor does he need to be redeemed because he didn’t open his mother’s womb. However, the next child doesn’t count as the first born either, because he is not his father’s first child. Also, even if the mother survives the c-section and has another child, it is not considered the first-born for redemption, because his mother already had a viable child, even though it didn’t “open her womb.” We should note that in mishnaic times, it would have been exceedingly rare for a woman to survive a c-section. Nevertheless, the mishnah accounts for the possibility.", + "Rabbi Shimon says: the first is a first-born for inheritance and the second is a first-born as regards [the redemption] with five selas. Rabbi Shimon disagrees completely. The first child, born of a c-section, counts as the first for inheritance, because it is its father’s first born. The second child needs to be redeemed because it “opens its mother’s womb.” It must be redeemed from the priest for five selas, which are equivalent to the five shekels mentioned in the Torah." + ], + [ + "If a man's wife had never before given birth and she gave birth to two males, he gives five sela's to the priest.
If one of them dies within thirty days [of birth] the father is exempt.
If the father dies and the sons survive: Rabbi Meir says: if they gave the five sela's before the property was divided up, then what they gave is given; but if not, they are exempt. But Rabbi Judah says: there is a claim on the property.
If she gave birth to a male and a female, the priest receives nothing.
This mishnah deals with a case where twins are born, but it is unclear which child came out first.
Section one: One of these boys is certainly the first born and one is certainly not. Therefore, the father pays five selas to the priest, but does not pay twice.
Section two: A child who dies before he reaches thirty days never has a chance to be redeemed and his father is exempt. In this case, since we don’t know if the first or second born died, the father is exempt, because he can say to the priest, “prove to me that the first born survived and I will give you your five selas.” This accords with the general principle that the burden of proof is upon the claimant.
Section three: If the father dies before he has a chance to redeem one of the sons, then legally the sons must redeem themselves. However, the problem is that each son can claim that he is not the first-born and therefore doesn’t need to be redeemed. According to Rabbi Meir, if they already gave five selas to the priest before the property was divided up, then they cannot get their money back. However, if their father’s property was divided up before the five selas were given to the priest, they are exempt because each son can claim that he is not the first born.
Rabbi Judah disagrees and holds that there is a debt hanging over the father’s property and that debt must be paid off, regardless of the fact that we don’t know which of the sons is a first born." + ], + [ + "Two women who had never before given birth gave birth to two males: he [the father] gives ten selas to the priest.
If one of the children dies within thirty days [of its birth], if he gave the redemption money to one priest alone, he returns five selas to him, but if he gave it to two priests, he cannot reclaim the money from them.
If they gave birth to a male and a female or to two males and a female, he gives five selas to the priest.
If they gave birth to two females and a male, or to two males and two females, the priest receives nothing.
If one woman had given birth before and the other had never given birth, and they gave birth to two males, he gives five selas to the priest.
If one of the children died within thirty days [of its birth], the father is exempt.
If the father dies and the sons survive: Rabbi Meir says: if they gave the five sela's before the property was divided up, then what they gave is given; but if not, they are exempt. But Rabbi Judah says: there is a claim on the property.
If they gave birth to a male and a female, the priest receives nothing.
This mishnah deals with a case where two different women gave birth for the first time and their children got mixed up. Note that this mishnah is very similar to the mishnah concerning animals whose first borns are mixed up (see 2:7).
Section one: In this case both children are certainly first born males, so the father must give ten selas to the priest.
Section two: In this case one of the sons dies before he reaches thirty days. The father should have given only five selas to one priest. If he had already given ten selas to one priest, then he can ask for five back. However, if he had given five selas to one priest and five to another, he can’t recover either, because both priests can claim that their money was used to redeem the living son.
Section three: If the two women gave birth to one male and one female, or between them two males and one female, then there is only one child who is certainly a first born male. The other male may be the younger brother of the first born female. Therefore, he only gives five selas to the priest.
Section four: If there are two females and either one or two males, then it is possible that neither male is a first-born, so the priest receives nothing.
Section five: In this case, one child is certainly a first-born and one is certainly not. Therefore, he gives five selas to the priest.
Section six: This is the same debate we saw in section three of yesterday’s mishnah. For reference, see there.
Section seven: If the two give birth one to a male and one to a female, the priest receives nothing because we can’t be sure that there was a first born male." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah introduces other various scenarios where children become mixed up and it is unclear if one is liable for redemption as a first born.", + "If two women who had never before given birth married two men and gave birth to two males, the one father gives five selas to the priest and the other gives five selas to the priest. Since both children are first born boys, it is obvious that both fathers must give five selas to a priest to redeem their sons.", + "If one of the children died within thirty days [of its birth], if they gave the redemption money to one priest alone, he returns five selas to them, but if they gave the money to two priests, they are not able to recover it from them. Since one died before reaching thirty days, only one of the fathers needed to redeem his son. It is uncertain which father must give. If they both gave the five selas to the same priest, the priest must return five selas and they can split it between them. However, if they gave the money to two priests, then each priest can claim that he received the money for the living child and he doesn’t have to return it. The fathers will not be able to recover any money.", + "If they gave birth to a male and a female, the fathers are exempt, whereas the son must redeem himself [as in any case he is a first-born]. In this case, the male is definitely a first born but it is unclear who his father is. The father is therefore exempt from redeeming the son. However, the son, who is after all a first born, must redeem himself when he is old enough to do so.", + "If they gave birth to two females and a male or to two females and two males, the priest receives nothing. In this case, it is possible that none of the children is a first born male, and therefore the priest receives nothing." + ], + [ + "If one woman had given birth before and the other had never before given birth, the two women belonging to two husbands, and they gave birth to two males, the one whose wife had never before given birth gives five selas to the priest. In this case, two men each have one wife and one wife has previously given birth and one has not. If they both give birth to a male, it is obvious that the husband of the wife who has never given birth owes five selas.", + "If they gave birth to a male and a female, the priest receives nothing. If one woman gives birth to a boy and the other to a girl, the priest doesn’t receive anything because it is possible that the boy was born to the woman who had already given birth.", + "If the son dies within thirty days although he gave the priest [the five selas], he must return them. This section refers to a son who is certainly a first born. If he dies before he is thirty days old, then there was never any obligation for him to be redeemed, and if the father has already given the money to the priest, the priest must return it.", + "If he dies after thirty days, although he has not yet given the five selas, he (the must give them. If the son dies after thirty days, the father is still obligated to redeem his son. In other words, the obligation to redeem comes into existence when the son hits thirty days. The fact that the son has died before the father gave the money to the priest does not annul this obligation.", + "If he dies on the thirtieth day, it is as if he died on the previous day. But Rabbi Akiva says: if he gave [the five selas] he cannot reclaim them, but if he had not yet given, he need not give. According to the first opinion, the obligation to redeem doesn’t exist until the thirty days are completed. Therefore, if the son dies on the thirtieth day, the priest does not receive the five selas and if he has already received them he must return them. Rabbi Akiva says that the status of the thirtieth day is doubtful. If the father has already given the money, then the priest does not need to return it. But if the father has not yet given the money, then the priest cannot make his claim.", + "If the father dies within thirty days, [the infant] is under the presumption of not having been redeemed until proof is brought that he has been redeemed. If the father dies after thirty days, the infant is under the presumption of having been redeemed until he [the son] is told that he was not redeemed. The obligation for the son to be redeemed doesn’t change just because his father dies. However, there is a chance that we don’t know if the father had given the money or not. Therefore, we must make an educated guess. If the father dies within thirty days after his son’s birth, the assumption is that he did not redeem his son, because this would not be typical. Therefore, the son must redeem himself, unless he can prove that his father already did. If, however, the father dies after thirty days, we can assume that he did redeem his son, and the son is exempt, unless people know that he was not redeemed.", + "If both he and his son need to be redeemed, the father takes precedence over his son. Rabbi Judah says: his son comes first for the command to redeem him was upon his father, and the command of his son is upon him. If a man grows up and then has a son, and realizes that he himself has not yet been redeemed, he must first redeem himself and then his son. Perhaps this is because his debt is longer overdue. Alternatively, the reason may be that if he doesn’t redeem himself, who will? Rabbi Judah disagrees. First the father must redeem his son, because that is a mitzvah incumbent upon him. Only afterwards, when he has enough money, must he redeem himself, for his redemption was supposed to be his father’s mitzvah." + ], + [ + "The five selas of a first-born [are paid in] the standard of Tyrian maneh. When we come to reckon how much the father has to pay the priest, the five selas, which are the five shekels mentioned in the Torah, are reckoned in the standard of the Tyrian maneh. A Tyrian sela consists of 14.34 grams of pure silver, so the father would have to give five times this amount.", + "As regards the thirty shekels of a slave and likewise the fifty shekels of the rapist and seducer and the one hundred shekels for one who spreads an evil name in all these cases the payment is in the holy shekel, in the standard of Tyrian maneh. Any payment that is given as a fixed monetary amount in the Torah must be paid out in holy shekel, evaluated according to the standard of the Tyrian maneh, just as is the case with redeeming the first-born. There are four such cases listed here: 1) If an ox kills a slave, the owner of the ox pays the owner of the slave thirty shekels (Exodus 21:32). 2) If a man seduces a virgin, he pays the father fifty shekels (Exodus 22:15-16). 3) If he rapes a virgin, he pays fifty shekels (Deuteronomy 22:28-29). 4) If a husband defames his wife by falsely claiming that she was not a virgin on their wedding day, he is fined 100 shekels (Deuteronomy 22:19).", + "All of these are redeemed with money or the equivalent of money with the exception of shekel payments. In all cases where something needs to be redeemed, such as a first born son or an item dedicated to the Temple, the redemption can be done either with money or with something of equivalent value. The redemption need not be done just with coins. The exception is the half shekel that is paid on a yearly basis to the Temple in Jerusalem. This half shekel must be paid in coinage." + ], + [ + "We must not redeem [a first-born] with slaves, nor with notes of indebtedness, nor with immovable properties, nor with objects of hekdesh. While a first born can be redeemed with the equivalent of money (as we learned in yesterday’s mishnah), he must be redeemed with things that are similar to money, which is a type of “moveable property.” Thus a firstborn could be redeemed by giving the priest five selas worth of grain, or five selas worth of meat, for example. In contrast, slaves, while obviously moveable, are compared with land, and therefore firstborns cannot be redeemed with either slaves or land. If someone has a debt document in which his fellow owes him five shekels, he cannot use it to redeem his first born, because this debt document is not the same as actual money. It has no inherent value. The word “hekdesh” means property dedicated to the Temple and the word does not really belong here in this mishnah, because one cannot use Temple property to redeem a first born. It is probably here due to the similarity between this mishnah and Bava Metzia 4:9 and Shevuot 6:5. The Talmud interprets it to mean that just as one cannot redeem a first born with slaves, etc., so too one cannot redeem property dedicated to the Temple with these things.", + "If one gives a written acknowledgment to a priest that he owes him five selas he is bound to give them to him, although his son is not considered as redeemed. Therefore, if the priest wishes to give him [the note of indebtedness] as a gift he is permitted to do so. A first born must be redeemed by the father actually giving money to the priest. If the father writes a note to the priest that he is liable to give him five shekels, the father has to give the priest five shekels, but this does not count as redeeming his son. The priest can give these five shekels back to the father, because they didn’t count towards the redemption. The priest cannot, however, give back the five shekels used to redeem the son.", + "If one set aside the redemption money of his son and it became lost, he is responsible for it, because it says: “Shall be for you [but] you shall surely redeem” (Numbers 18:15). If someone sets aside five shekels to use to redeem his son, and then loses them, he must restore them. This is learned midrashically from the verse in Numbers. The five shekels are only effective for redemption once they have reached the priest’s hands. Before this moment, he is not redeemed." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first-born takes a double share in the inheritance. Our mishnah mentions several limitations on this halakhah.", + "The first-born takes a double share of the father's estate but he does not take a double share of the mother’s estate. The first born takes a double share in his father’s estate, but not in his mother’s, should the sons inherit from their mother.", + "He also does not take a double share of the improvement in the value of the estate. If the value of the father’s estate has gone up from the time of the father’s death before the division of the estate, the first born takes his double share only from the value of the estate at the time of death. For instance, if there are three sons, the first born will take half of the estate. If the estate is worth 1,000 at death, he takes 500 and the other sons take 250 each. But if the estate goes up 300 in value from death to division, he only takes 100 of the added value.", + "Nor from what will fall due [to the estate] as he does of what is held in possession. If there is money or property that will eventually belong to his father but does not belong to the father at the time of his death, the first born son does not take a double share of it. For instance, let’s say the father dies before his own father dies. When the grandfather dies, the grandsons will inherit the part of the estate that their father would have inherited. Out of this part the first born grandson does not take a double portion.", + "Nor can a woman claim with her ketubah [from these], Nor can daughters claim their support. Nor can a yavam make a claim [from these]. None of these take from the improvement in the value of the estate, nor of what will fall to the estate as they do of what is now held in possession. There are three other instances where collection is limited in the same way that the first born’s collection is limited. 1: A woman collecting her ketubah payment from her husband’s estate. 2: Girls being maintained by the money left over from their father’s estate. 3: A man (yavam) who has performed yibbum (levirate marriage) with his dead brother’s wife. The yavam inherits all of his brother’s property. He would also inherit his brother’s portion of his father’s estate, but he would only take from his father’s estate and not his mother’s. Similarly, he would not take his brother’s share from the improvement. Finally, he would only take his brother’s share of his father’s estate if his father dies first, and they don’t have time to divide up the property before his brother dies and he does yibbum." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nAccording to Leviticus 25, if a person grows poor and sells his ancestral lands, the lands return to him during the Jubilee year. From here we can learn that if a person receives land as an inheritance and then he sells that land, the land is returned to him during the Jubilee year.", + "The following do not return [to their owners] in Jubilee year: Our mishnah deals with cases where a person inherits land, it does not go back to its original owners to be divided up again during the Jubilee, in the same way that land that a person inherits does not leave his possession during the Jubilee.", + "The share of the first-born, The extra portion that a son receives for being the first born. When the Jubilee year comes, this portion stays with the first born.", + "[The inheritance of] one who inherits his wife's [estate] One who inherits his wife’s estate. Although this is not his own ancestral land, when the Jubilee years comes, it stays with him and does not go back to his wife’s family.", + "[And of] one who performs yibbum with his sister-in-law As we learned in mishnah nine, when a brother performs yibbum, he inherits his brother’s estate. Again, this property stays with him at the Jubilee.", + "And a present, the words of Rabbi Meir. But the sages say: a present is like a sale. There is a debate over whether a present is restored during the Jubilee year. According to Rabbi Meir, if a person gives a piece of land to someone else as a present, the land does not revert to its original owner during the Jubilee year. The other sages disagree and hold that a present is just like a sale.", + "Rabbi Elazar says: all of these return in the Jubilee. Rabbi Elazar takes a more radical approach and holds that all of this property returns during the Jubilee to its original owners.", + "R. Johanan ben Berokah says: if one inherits his wife's estate, he returns it to the members of the family and he deducts from the purchase money. Rabbi Yohanan ben Berokah disagrees with Rabbi Meir as well and holds that a man must return his wife’s inheritance to her family at the Jubilee. However, he seems to hold that the family pays him back for the property. From this amount, he should reduce the amount that he benefited by owning the property for the years that he owned it. In this way, he doesn’t unduly profit." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThe last chapter of Bekhorot deals with the laws of animal tithes. Leviticus 27:32 states: “All tithes of the herd or flock of all that passes under the shepherd’s staff, every tenth one shall be holy to the Lord.” The laws of animal tithes are in tractate Bekhorot because they are similar in many ways to the laws regarding an animal first born. The main difference is that while a first born pure animal must be given to the priest, animal tithes are brought to Jerusalem where they are eaten as sacrifices (shelamim) by their owners.", + "The law concerning the tithe of cattle is in force in the Land and outside the Land, in the days when the Temple exists and when it does not exist, The tithing of animals is in force at all times, and in all places. Once the Temple was destroyed, one would have had to wait until the animal became blemished, and then it could be eaten anywhere. We should note that from Talmudic times and onward the laws of animal tithes were no longer observed.", + "[It applies] to hullin (non- animals only but not to consecrated animals. Only non-sacred animals must be tithed.", + "It applies both to cattle and flock animals, but they are not tithed together. Both herd (cows) and flock animals (sheep and goats) must be tithed, but they cannot be tithed together. This is because the verse says “of the herd and of the flock,” thereby separating them into two categories.", + "To lambs and to goats, and they are tithed together. Different types of flock animals can be tithed together.", + "To the new and the old, but they are not tithed together. However, animals born in different years are not tithed together. We will learn more about how an animal’s year is determined in mishnayot five and six.", + "Now it might be logical: seeing that new and old animals which are not treated as kilayim in regard to one another are yet not tithed one for the other, lambs and goats which are treated as kilyaim in regard to one another, all the more should not be tithed one for the other. Scripture therefore states: “And of the flock” all kinds of flock are considered one [for purposes of tithing]. The mishnah now notes a discrepancy in logic. Goats and sheep are considered kilayim (mixed species) together, meaning they cannot be crossbred. In contrast, new and old animals of the same type are of course not kilayim and can be crossbred. It would therefore make sense for new and old animals to be tithed together but not for sheep and goats to be tithed together. Therefore, the Torah states “of the flock” thereby combining all flock animals into one category." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nA person must tithe the tenth animal of each of his “herds.” The question is how far apart can animal’s be and still be considered as belonging to the same herd? Our mishnah deals with this issue.", + "Animals are combined for purposes of tithing so long as they can still pasture within the distance that cattle wander. If the animals are close enough together such that the shepherd can keep an eye on them while they are out pasturing, they are considered as one herd.", + "And what is the distance over which they wander while pasturing? Sixteen mils. This distance is determined to be 16 mils. A mil is about a kilometer, so 16 mils is equivalent to about 10 miles. If an owner has animals wandering around and grazing at less than this distance, they all count as one herd. But if they go beyond this distance, they don’t count as one herd and if there are ten of them born in one year, they do not join together for the purpose of tithing.", + "If there was between two groups of animals a distance of thirty-two mils, they do not combine for the purpose of tithing. If however there was one in the middle [of the distance of thirty-two mils] he brings them into the middle and tithes them. Animals separated by 32 mils, are considered to be at a “wandering distance” from one another, but not a “pasturing distance.” If all of the animals are separated by more than 16 mils, they do not join together for the sake of tithing. However, if there is one animal exactly in between the two separate herds, this animal can join the two separate herds together, and they are tithed together. In other words, if the herd to the east is 16 mils from the one in the middle which is 16 mils from the herd to the west, the middle animal joins the other two herds together.", + "Rabbi Meir says: the [river] Jordan is regarded as forming a division as regards the tithing of animals. Rabbi Meir says that if one has herds on opposite sides of the Jordan, they do not join together for tithing, because the Jordan separates them." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with animals that are exempt from the cattle tithe.\nOur mishnah mentions the “kalbon.” This is a surcharge that one has to pay when one pays the years half-shekel to the Temple. There are two relevant rules here: 1) if a father pays the ½ shekel for his son, he need not pay the kalbon. 2) If two people pay their ½ shekel together they pay only one kalbon and not two.", + "An animal bought or given as a present is exempt from the law of cattle tithe. A person is liable to tithe only the animals that are born into his property, not those that he bought or was given as a present.", + "If brothers became partners, though they are still bound to pay the kalbon [surcharge], they are exempt from the tithe of cattle. And when they become liable to tithe of cattle, they are exempt from paying the kalbon. This section refers to two different types of partnerships between brothers who have inherited from their father. The first type is when they have already divided up the inheritance and then pooled their money together to form a business partnership. In such a case they are liable for the kalbon as are all partners who pay each other’s kalbon, but they are exempt from paying the tithe on animals since partners do not pay this tithe on their shared animals. The second partnership is one in which they have not yet divided up the inheritance. In such a case the money is treated as if it still belonged to the father. They are liable for the cattle tithe but they are exempt from the kalbon, for a father who pays the half shekel for his son is exempt from the kalbon (for more information on the kalbon, see the first chapter of tracate Shekalim).", + "If they acquired from the estate, they are bound [to tithe them]. But if not, they are exempt from tithing. If the brothers bought animals from their father’s estate, when these animals give birth, they must tithe them. However, if they didn’t buy the animals from the estate, but rather shared the money from the estate and used it to buy animals, then the animals born to them are exempt, because they are owned by partners.", + "If they first divided up the estate and then again became partners, they are bound to pay the kalbon and are exempt from tithe of cattle. Once the brothers divide their father’s estate, each piece becomes each brother’s own property. The property is disconnected from the father, and therefore they must pay the kalbon. But when they form a partnership they become exempt from the animal tithe. Note that this is a repeat of the halakhah found in section two." + ], + [ + "All [domesticated animals] enter the shed to be tithed except kilayim, a terefah, offspring brought forth by means of a caesarean section, an animal too young for sacrifice, and an “orphan”. There are several types of animals that do not need to be tithed: 1) Kilayim the offspring of a mixed species. For instance, if a ram and a female goat have offspring, the offspring need not be tithed. 2) A terefah an animal with a physical defect that would cause it to die. 3) An animal born through a c-section. Such an animal doesn’t need to be tithed, because it is not, in a sense, considered to have been born. 4) An animal too young to be sacrificed an animal cannot be sacrificed until it is seven days old. It cannot be tithed until that age either. 5) An orphan animal. This is explained in the next section.", + "And what is an “orphan”? When its mother has died during its birth or was slaughtered [and subsequently gave birth.] But Rabbi Joshua says: even if the mother has been killed, if the hide is still intact the offspring is not an ‘orphan’ animal. The issue of the orphan is related to Leviticus 22:27, which states that an animal needs to be “under its mother” for seven days before it can be offered up as a sacrifice. If an animal is an orphan it need not be tithed, although it can eventually be sacrificed. According to the first opinion, if the mother doesn’t survive the birth, the offspring is an orphan and is not tithed. Rabbi Joshua says that as long as the mother’s hide is intact when the offspring is born, it is not an orphan. Albeck relates this to the practice of covering the offspring in its mother’s hide to keep it warm should the mother die during, or right before childbirth. Such an animal is “under its mother” and is therefore subject to the tithe." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah deals with when a person is supposed to tithe his animals. The concept is that one tithes one out of every ten animals born in a given year, not one out of every ten animals. Therefore, our mishnah and tomorrow’s mishnah must determine when this year begins.", + "There are three periods [lit. threshing floors] for the tithe of cattle: in the peras of Pesah, in the peras of Atzeret ( and in the peras of the Feast [of Sukkot], the words of Rabbi Akiva. “Peras” means “before” and it is interpreted in the Talmud as being fifteen days. According to Rabbi Akiva, a few weeks before all three of the pilgrimage holidays it becomes forbidden to eat any of the animals that were born since the previous holiday until he first separates any necessary animal tithes. These periods are referred to as “threshing floors” which is the end of the processing of grain. At the threshing floor produce becomes liable for tithing. The language is borrowed from that context.", + "Ben Azzai says: on the twenty-ninth of Adar, on the first of Sivan and on the twenty-ninth of Av. Ben Azzai lists the three dates in a slightly different manner. The twenty-ninth of Adar is about two weeks before Pesah, the first of Sivan is less than a week before Shavuot, and the twenty-ninth of Av is one month before Rosh Hashanah.", + "Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon say: on the first of Nisan, on the first of Sivan and on the twenty-ninth of Elul. Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon also provide slightly different dates the first of Nissan (the month with Pesah), the first of Sivan (the month with Shavuot) and the twenty-ninth of Elul, the day before Rosh Hashanah. One needs to tithe before Rosh Hashanah because Rosh Hashanah is, according to these two rabbis, the new year for animal tithes. We shall learn more about this in mishnah six (see also Rosh Hashanah 1:1).", + "And why did they say the twenty-ninth of Elul and not the first of Tishrei? Because it is a Yom Tov and you cannot tithe on a Yom Tov. Consequently they moved it up to the twenty-ninth of Elul. One cannot tithe on Rosh Hashanah because it is a festival (Yom Tov). Therefore, they moved the day up to the last day of the preceding month, Elul.", + "Rabbi Meir says: the first of Elul is the New Year for the tithe of cattle. Rabbi Meir disagrees with Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon with regard to the date for the new year for animal tithes. While they hold that it is on the first day of Tishrei, he holds that it is on the first of Elul. The anonymous opinion in the first mishnah of Rosh Hashanah accords with Rabbi Meir.", + "Ben Azzai says: those born in Elul are tithed by themselves. Ben Azzai doubts whether the halakhah is according to Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon or Rabbi Meir. The result of this doubt is that animals born in Elul are tithed on their own, because we don’t know if they should be tithed with those born before them (Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon’s opinion) or those born after them (Rabbi Meir’s opinion)." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah continues to discuss in what situation animals born at different times of the year combine for matters of tithing.", + "All those born from the first of Tishrei until the twenty-ninth of Elul combine [for matters of tithing]. Five lambs born before Rosh Hashanah and five born after Rosh Hashanah do not combine. The new year for tithing begins on Rosh Hashanah, the first of Tishrei and goes all the way to the 29th of Elul, the end of the year. Any animals born that year can and must be tithed together. This means that if ten sheep, for instance, are born that year, the owner must set aside one sheep as a tithe. However, as the mishnah illustrates, if five are born before Rosh Hashanah and five after, he need not set aside a tithe at all. To be even more extreme, if nine were born on the twenty-ninth of Elul and one was born on the first of Tishrei, no tithe must be given.", + "But five lambs born before the period [of tithing] and five after the period [of tithing] do combine [for tithing]. In mishnah five we learned about periods of the year in which one is liable to tithe. These three periods are not significant with regard to animals joining together to become liable for tithing. So if five are born before one of these periods, when the period comes he need not yet tithe. When another five are born, when the next period comes along he will have to tithe, as long as they were all born in the same calendar year.", + "If so, why did they speak of three periods for the tithe of cattle? Until the arrival of the [tithing] period it is permitted to sell and slaughter [the animals], but when the period has arrived he must not kill, but if he killed, he is exempt. The mishnah asks the logical question if the tithing periods do not effect the combining of animals, then what significance do they have? The answer is that when a tithing period comes, one must tithe one out of every ten animals that has been born from the time of the last tithing period. It is forbidden to slaughter or sell the animals until they are tithed, or at least counted for purposes of tithing. However, if he transgresses this and does slaughter the animal, there is no punishment, nor is the animal prohibited." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nAs often happens with the Mishnah, the most important information is placed last. The final two mishnayot of the tractate discuss how the animal tithe is actually done.", + "How does one tithe animals? He brings them to a shed and makes for them a small opening so that two cannot go out at the same time. And he counts them with a rod: one, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine. And the one that comes out tenth he marks with red chalk and he says: “Behold, this is [the tithe].” This section explains the basic procedure for tithing animals. This seems to be related to the description of the animal tithe in Leviticus 27:32, “All tithes of the herd or flock of all that passes under the shepherd’s staff, every tenth one shall be holy to the Lord.” In order to fulfill this mitzvah, there must be a formal counting, and it is preferable that this formal counting be done with a rod, counting the animal’s one at a time.", + "If he did not mark it, or if he did not count them with a rod, or if he counted them while they were crouching or standing, they are still considered tithed. As long as he counts the animals that he is tithing, he has fulfilled his duty and the animal that comes out tenth is tithed. It is better to count them with a rod, while they are passing through the opening and to mark the tenth one, but as long as he counts them one at a time, everyone agrees that the tithe counts.", + "If he had one hundred [lambs] and he took ten or if he had ten and he took one [without counting], this is not [a valid] tithe. Rabbi Yose bar Judah says: this is a [valid] tithe. However, if he takes out the tithed animals without formally counting, then the tithe does not count. Rabbi Yose bar Judah disagrees and says that even in this case, the tithe counts.", + "If one [of the lambs] already counted jumped back into the flock [in the shed] they are all exempt. If one of the lambs that has already been counted jumps back into the flock that has not yet been counted, then there will be a mixture of animals exempt from tithing with those liable for tithing. In such a case the law is lenient and the entire group is exempt.", + "If one of the lambs that was a tithe jumped back into the flock [in the shed], they all go to pasture until they become unfit for sacrifice, and the owners may eat them in their unfit state. However, if one of the animals that were set aside to be tithed gets mixed up with untithed animals, then every animal in the pen is potentially tithe. In such a case all of them must go out to pasture until they become blemished. A blemished tithe animal can then be eaten by its owners." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe final mishnah of the tractate deals with a case where the person erred when counting his animal tithes or a case where multiple animals came out of the pen at the same time. An interesting phenomenon to note in this mishnah is the power of words if he calls something the tenth animal, it is often holy, even if it was not actually the tenth animal that came out of the pen. This matches the typical rabbinic emphasis on the power of language to actually transform the status of real things.", + "If two [lambs] came out at the same time, he counts them in pairs. If all of the animals come out in pairs (kind of like Noah’s ark!) then he counts them in pairs. When he gets to the tenth pair, which are the 19th and 20th animals, both are holy. Another explanation for this section is that if two come out at the same time he counts them as two, as if they came out one at a time.", + "If he counted [the two] as one, the ninth and the tenth are spoiled. If he counted two as one, then both the ninth and tenth have been spoiled. The animal that he calls ninth is the tenth and should have been the tithe. The animal that he calls tenth is not the tenth but rather the eleventh. In other words, one actually is the tenth and one is called the tenth. Therefore both animals have to go out to pasture and can be eaten only when they are blemished.", + "If the ninth and the tenth came out at the same time, the ninth and the tenth are spoiled. If the ninth and tenth both come out at the same time then both are potentially the tenth and as in the previous section, both must go out to pasture until they become blemished at which point they may be eaten.", + "If he called the ninth the tenth, the tenth the ninth and the eleventh the tenth, all three are holy: the ninth can be eaten when it becomes blemished, the tenth is the tithe and the eleventh is sacrificed as a shelamim, and it can make a substitute, the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Judah said: can one substitute make another substitute? They said in the name of Rabbi Meir: if it were a substitute, it would not have been sacrificed. Here he really messed up the counting. The ninth, which he called the tenth, can be eaten when it becomes blemished. The tenth is the actual tithe, even though he called it the eleventh. The eleventh, which he also called tenth, has to be offered up as a shelamim offering. There is now a debate whether or not it is possible for the eleventh animal that is offered as a shelamim to make another animal into its substitute. Making a substitute means that if one tries to substitute the holy animal for another animal, the substituted animal becomes holy, even though the original one remains holy. Rabbi Meir says that this eleventh animal can make a substitute. Rabbi Judah questions this because in his opinion this animal is itself a substitute for the tenth animal, the real tithe. Since we hold that a substitute animal cannot make another substitute (and if one tries to do so, the substitution has no validity) this shelamim cannot effect a substitute. Rabbi Meir responds that the eleventh animal offered as a shelamim is not a “substitute” for if it was it couldn’t be sacrificed as a shelamim. Rabbi Meir holds that if an animal is substituted for a tithed animal, the substituted animal cannot be sacrificed. Since this is not a substitute but rather a regular shelamim, it can make another animal into a substitute.", + "If he called the ninth the tenth, the tenth the tenth and the eleventh the tenth, the eleventh is not holy. The following is the rule: wherever the name of the tenth [animal] has not been taken away from it, the eleventh is not consecrated. If he makes a mistake, but does call the tenth the tenth, then the eleventh is not holy. The general rule explains if the tenth receives its proper appellation, then anything that follows it is not holy. However, the ninth, which he accidentally called the tenth is still holy and must go out to pasture until it is blemished at which point it can be eaten. Congratulations! We have finished Tractate Bekhorot! It is a tradition at this point to thank God for helping us finish learning the tractate and to commit ourselves to going back and relearning it, so that we may not forget it and so that its lessons will stay with us for all of our lives. Although Bekhorot was mostly full of technical information, we should not lose sight of the religious idea that stands behind the idea of the holiness of the bekhor. As is well-known, the final plague on Egypt was the slaying of the first-born. The loss of every first-born, animal and human, was so great in the eyes of the Egyptians that they finally allowed the children of Israel to leave Egypt. I have often wondered why this plague caused them to finally let the people go? Surely many, perhaps even more, people died in the other horrible plagues. What was it about this plague that made it so much worse than the others? Regardless of how we answer that question, after that event, the first-borns of Israel owed God their lives and in order to express this debt, they had to be redeemed. As a first-born male, I was redeemed when I reached thirty days, and since my first child is a male, I redeemed him when he reached thirty days. While I don’t remember the first event, I remember the redemption of my own son as being a meaningful event in his life, as well as mine and my wife’s. Again, congrats on making it through Bekhorot. Tomorrow we begin Tractate Erkhin." + ] + ] + ] + }, + "schema": { + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה בכורות", + "enTitle": "English Explanation of Mishnah Bekhorot", + "key": "English Explanation of Mishnah Bekhorot", + "nodes": [ + { + "heTitle": "הקדמה", + "enTitle": "Introduction" + }, + { + "heTitle": "", + "enTitle": "" + } + ] + } +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Kodashim/English Explanation of Mishnah Bekhorot/English/merged.json b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Kodashim/English Explanation of Mishnah Bekhorot/English/merged.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..523607b4e2298e118838a9572bd41a70cf8c5e31 --- /dev/null +++ b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Kodashim/English Explanation of Mishnah Bekhorot/English/merged.json @@ -0,0 +1,507 @@ +{ + "title": "English Explanation of Mishnah Bekhorot", + "language": "en", + "versionTitle": "merged", + "versionSource": "https://www.sefaria.org/English_Explanation_of_Mishnah_Bekhorot", + "text": { + "Introduction": [ + "Introduction to Tractate Bekhorot", + "Bekhorot means first-born (almost the same word as Bikkurim, first fruits). Our tractate deals with three different types of first-borns, each with their own particular rules.", + "1) The first-born of a donkey. Exodus 13:11-13 (full text below) says that the male first-born of a donkey must be redeemed with a sheep, meaning that the sheep becomes holy. According to Numbers 18:15-18 and other verses in Numbers (see below) the first born of every impure (non-edible) animal must be redeemed. This would include camels, horses and other domesticated but impure animals. There were some ancient Jews, including some rabbis, who thought that all impure animals must be redeemed. However, the halakhah dictated that only the first-born of donkeys needs to be redeemed.", + "2) The male first-born of a pure animal. This first-born as the status of a sacrifice, as we learned in Tractate Zevahim. If it is blemished it cannot be sacrificed, but it still must be given to the priest.", + "3) The male first-born of a human being. This first-born is redeemed by giving five shekels to the priest.", + "In addition, Bekhorot finishes with a chapter dedicated to the cattle tithe, the giving of the tenth-born of every domesticated animal to the priest. ", + "Below are the verses that are relevant to the topic of bekhorot. As you can see, this is a topic that receives quite a bit of “coverage” in the Torah.", + "Exodus 13 2 \"Consecrate to Me every first-born; man and beast, the first issue of every womb among the Israelites is Mine.\"", + "Exodus 13 11 \"And when the LORD has brought you into the land of the Canaanites, as He swore to you and to your fathers, and has given it to you, 12 you shall set apart for the LORD every first issue of the womb: every male firstling that your cattle drop shall be the LORD's. 13 But every firstling ass you shall redeem with a sheep; if you do not redeem it, you must break its neck. And you must redeem every first-born male among your children.", + "Exodus 22 28 You shall not put off the skimming of the first yield of your vats. You shall give Me the first-born among your sons. 29 You shall do the same with your cattle and your flocks: seven days it shall remain with its mother; on the eighth day you shall give it to Me.", + "Exodus 34 19 Every first issue of the womb is Mine, from all your livestock that drop a male as firstling, whether cattle or sheep. 20 But the firstling of an ass you shall redeem with a sheep; if you do not redeem it, you must break its neck. And you must redeem every first-born among your sons. None shall appear before Me empty-handed.", + "Leviticus 27 26 A firstling of animals, however, which -- as a firstling -- is the LORD's, cannot be consecrated by anybody; whether ox or sheep, it is the LORD's.", + "Numbers 3 13 For every first-born is Mine: at the time that I smote every first-born in the land of Egypt, I consecrated every first-born in Israel, man and beast, to Myself, to be Mine, the LORD's.", + "Numbers 18 15 The first issue of the womb of every being, man or beast, that is offered to the LORD, shall be yours; but you shall have the first-born of man redeemed, and you shall also have the firstling of unclean animals redeemed. 16 Take as their redemption price, from the age of one month up, the money equivalent of five shekels by the sanctuary weight, which is twenty gerahs. 17 But the firstlings of cattle, sheep, or goats may not be redeemed; they are consecrated. You shall dash their blood against the altar, and turn their fat into smoke as an offering by fire for a pleasing odor to the LORD. 18 But their meat shall be yours: it shall be yours like the breast of elevation offering and like the right thigh.", + "Deuteronomy 15 19 You shall consecrate to the LORD your God all male firstlings that are born in your herd and in your flock: you must not work your firstling ox or shear your firstling sheep. 20 You and your household shall eat it annually before the LORD your God in the place that the LORD will choose. 21 But if it has a defect, lameness or blindness, any serious defect, you shall not sacrifice it to the LORD your God. 22 Eat it in your settlements, the unclean among you no less than the clean, just like the gazelle and the deer. 23 Only you must not partake of its blood; you shall pour it out on the ground like water." + ], + "": [ + [ + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah teaches that donkeys owned, or even partially owned, by non-Jews are exempt from the obligation to have their first-born redeemed.", + "[An Israelite] who buys a fetus of a donkey belonging to a non-Jew or who sells one to him, although this is not permitted, or who forms a partnership with him, or who receives [an animal] from him to look after or who gives [his donkey] to him to look after, is exempt from the [law of the] bekhor, for it says: [“I sanctified to me all the firstborn] in Israel,” (Numbers 3:13) but not in non-Jews. In order for a Jew to be liable to redeem the first-born of a donkey, a non-Jew cannot have any ownership or partial ownership over the donkey. So if a Jew buys a fetus (assumedly he buys a pregnant donkey) from a non-Jew it is exempt from the laws of the first-born, because it was conceived under non-Jewish ownership. Similarly, if he sells the fetus to the non-Jew, it is exempt. The mishnah notes that selling a donkey to a non-Jew is not permitted because it is forbidden to sell a large animal to a non-Jew (see Avodah Zarah 1:6). Nevertheless, if one does sell the donkey, it is exempt. If a Jew and a non-Jew are partners in owning a donkey it is exempt. If a Jew receives a donkey to take care of, and in return he keeps some of the offspring, or if he gives the donkey to the non-Jew to take care of and the non-Jew keeps some of the offspring, in both of these cases, the donkey is exempt because the non-Jew has some level of ownership over the animal. The exemption of non-Jews from these laws is derived from the word “in Israel,” which means that the law of the bekhor applies only to animals fully owned by Israelites.", + "Priests and levites are exempt through [an argument made by a] kal vehomer: if they exempted the first-born belonging to the Israelites in the wilderness, it follows all the more so that they should exempt their own. In Numbers 3:45 God instructs Moses to take the Levites in place of the first-born and to take the cattle of the Levites in place of the cattle of the first-born. From here the mishnah derives a kal vehomer (a fortiori) argument. If the Levites exempted the cattle of the first-born in the desert, then their own first-born animals are all the more so exempt from the law of the bekhor. Thus animals owned by priests and Levites are exempt from these laws. As we shall see, the same holds for children of priests and Levites." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with cases where the offspring of an animal is not the same species as the mother.", + "If a cow gave birth to a species of donkey, or a donkey gave birth to a species of horse, it is exempt from [the law of] the firstling, for it is said, “the firstling of a donkey,” “the firstling of a donkey,” twice [to teach that the law of the firstling does not apply] until that which gives birth is a donkey and that which is born is a donkey. In order for the owner of the animal to be liable to redeem the first-born donkey, it must be a donkey (at least look like a donkey) and be born from a donkey. If a cow gives birth to a donkey (I don’t really know if this is possible) or a donkey gives birth to a horse (perhaps the reference is to a mule) then there is no liability. This is derived from the fact that the Torah twice states “the first-born of a donkey” once in Exodus 13:12 and again in Exodus 34:20. The Torah repeats itself, according to the midrashic way of thinking, in order to teach that both the mother and the offspring must be donkeys.", + "And what is the law with regard to eating them? If a clean animal gave birth to a species of unclean animal, it is permitted to be eaten. But if an unclean animal gave birth to a species of a clean animal, it is forbidden to be eaten, for that which comes out of the unclean is unclean and that which comes out of the clean is clean. When it comes to determining whether an animal is kosher, the status of the animal follows its mother. Anything that comes out of a clean (kosher) animal is clean. So if a cow gives birth to a horse, one can eat the horse, but if a horse gives birth to a cow, the cow is not kosher. This is the matrilineal principle in the animal world. As an aside, some scholars surmise that the source of the idea that a child’s ethnicity/religion is determined by his mother is derived from the idea that an animal’s species is determined by its mother. While there is no conclusive proof of this, it is an intriguing theory.", + "If an unclean fish swallowed a clean fish, it is permitted to be eaten. But if a clean fish has swallowed an unclean fish, the latter is forbidden to be eaten, because it is not [the clean fish's] growth. The rule works differently if the animal coming out of another animal was not born but rather swallowed. If a clean fish swallows an unclean fish, and the unclean fish is found in the clean fish’s stomach, one may not eat the unclean fish. The opposite also holds true if one finds a clean fish in the stomach of an unclean fish, it may be eaten." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah introduces the complication of a donkey that gives birth to twins and it is unknown which came out first the male donkey, in which case the owner would be liable to redeem the donkey, or a female donkey, in which case the owner would not be liable. In addition the mishnah presents scenarios where several donkeys give birth and it is unknown whether the donkey the first-borns were male or female.", + "If a donkey that had never before given birth gave birth to two males, he gives one lamb to the priest. In this case, while we don’t know which donkey was born first, it is certain that a male was born first. Therefore, he must give one lamb to the priest to redeem the donkey.", + "[If it gave birth to] a male and a female, he sets aside one lamb [which he keeps] for himself. Here he doesn’t know whether the first born was the male, in which case he must redeem it by giving a lamb to the priest, or if it was the female, in which case he is exempt. He must set aside a lamb to redeem the donkey, but he need not give the lamb to the priest. This is because the priest cannot prove that the owner was liable, and there is a rule in monetary matters the burden of proof is upon the claimant. So the lamb stays with its owner.", + "If two donkeys that had never before given birth gave birth to two males, he gives two lambs to the priest. In this case, even if we don’t know which donkey gave birth to which male offspring, we know that each one had a male. He must give two lambs to the priest.", + "[If they gave birth to] a male and a female or two males and a female, he gives one lamb to the priest. If the two donkeys gave birth to one male and one female or two males and one female (one had twins) then we can be sure that at least one male was a first-born. The other male might be a first-born, or it might not. The mishnah teaches that since this other male is only doubtfully a first-born he can use one lamb to redeem both the certain first-born and the doubtful first-born. The lamb must be given to a priest.", + "[If they gave birth to] two females and a male or to two males and two females the priest receives nothing. If there were two females, then there is a possibility that the first born of each donkey was a female, no matter how many males were also born. Thus he need not give any lambs to the priest. However, the Tosefta notes that he must set aside one lamb and redeem the males that were born and might have been first-borns. He keeps this lamb for himself, as he did in section two." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first part of this mishnah is a continuation of yesterday’s mishnah. In these cases two animals give birth, one which had previously given birth and one which had not.\nThe second half of the mishnah begins to discuss the lamb used to redeem the donkey.", + "If one donkey had given birth before and one had not given birth before and they gave birth to two males, he gives one lamb to the priest. Since both donkeys gave birth to a male, it is certain that the donkey that had never given birth before gave birth to a male. So the owner is liable to give one lamb to the priest.", + "[If they gave birth to] a male and a female, he sets aside one lamb [which he keeps] for himself. If the two donkeys gave birth to a male and a female, then we don’t know whether the donkey which had never before given birth gave birth to the male, in which case it must be redeemed, or whether the other donkey gave birth to the male, in which case it is not a first-born. This is another case where there is doubt about whether the owner owes a lamb to the priest. As in the cases in yesterday’s mishnah, he sets aside a lamb to redeem the male donkey who might need to be redeemed, but he need not give the lamb to the priest, because the priest cannot prove that the male was a first-born.", + "For it says, “And the firstling of a donkey you shall redeem with a lamb” (Exodus 34:20), [the lamb can come either] from the sheep or the goats, male or female, large or small, unblemished or blemished. This verse is brought here not to prove the sections which immediately precede it, but to bring Scriptural proof that a first-born of a donkey must be redeemed with a lamb. As long as this lamb is from a sheep or a goat, it can be used, no matter what type of lamb it is.", + "He can redeem with the same lamb many times. He can use one lamb to redeem as many donkeys as he wants, and thereby derive benefit from the donkey by taking away its sacred status. In other words, if he doesn’t give the lamb to the priest, he can keep using it to redeem other donkeys. However, there is a mitzvah to give the priest a lamb for each donkey being redeemed.", + "[And the lamb] enters the pen to be tithed. If an Israelite owns a lamb that he used to redeem a donkey, the lamb counts as far as tithing for that year goes. When he goes to count the lambs born in that year, this lamb too enters the pen to be counted.", + "If it dies [before he gives it to the priest], he can benefit from it. If the lamb dies he can derive benefit from its corpse. According to the Talmud, this means that the priest derives the benefit from the corpse, because from the time the lamb was set aside it belongs to the priest, even though it was still in the Israelite’s house." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah provides limits as to what type of animal can be used to redeem the first-born of a donkey.", + "We do not redeem with a calf, a wild animal, an animal slaughtered, a terefah, kilayim (a mixed or a koy. The redemption must be done with a lamb, one born of a sheep or a goat. A calf, born of a cow or a wild animal cannot be used. The lamb must be alive when used to redeem the donkey. It cannot be either slaughtered or a terefah (died without being properly slaughtered). Kilayim is a mixed breed. Here it refers to an animal born of a mix between a sheep and a goat. According to the first opinion, a kilayim is not a lamb. A koy is an animal which the rabbis couldn’t identify as either a domesticated or a wild animal (see Hullin 6:1). Since its status is not known, it cannot be used to redeem the first-born donkey.", + "Rabbi Eliezer permits [redemption] with kilayim because it is a lamb. But he forbids with a koy, because its nature is doubtful. Rabbi Eliezer disagrees with regard to the kilayim. Since both a sheep and a goat have offspring that are called “lambs (seh)” this animal can be used. He agrees, however, that a koy cannot be used.", + "If he gave [the first-born of a donkey] itself to the priest, the latter may not keep it, until he sets aside a lamb in its place. He cannot simply give the first-born donkey to the priest. If he does so, the priest must return it to him, until the Israelite sets aside a lamb to redeem the donkey. At this point, the priest may keep the donkey, if the Israelite wants him to have it." + ], + [ + "If one sets aside [a lamb] for the redemption of the first-birth of a donkey and it died: Rabbi Eliezer says: he is responsible as is the case with the five selas for the redemption of the first-born. But the sages say: he is not responsible, as is the case with the redemption of the second tithe. In this case the lamb used to redeem the first-born of a donkey dies before it can be given to the priest. Rabbi Eliezer says that he must separate a new lamb and give it to the priest. This is the same rule as would apply if he lost the five selas that he must give to the priest in order to redeem his first-born son. To Rabbi Eliezer the donkey is not redeemed until the owner actually gives the lamb to the priest. Until that point the lamb belongs to the owner and if it dies, it is his loss. The other rabbis hold that once the lamb is set aside, the first-born of the donkey has been redeemed. The lamb has now taken the place of the donkey and the only thing missing is giving it to the priest. If the lamb dies now, it is the priest’s loss and he need not give another lamb to the priest. This is the same rule as applies to money used to redeem second tithe produce. Once the produce has been redeemed it is non-sacred and the money is holy. If the money is lost, he need not go back and redeem it again.", + "Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Zadok testified concerning the redemption of the first-born of a donkey which died that the priest receives nothing [in such circumstances]. Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Zadok testify that the halakhah is in accordance with the sages. If the lamb dies after it has been set aside to redeem the first-born donkey, the priest doesn’t receive anything. However, it seems that the priest would receive the corpse, because after all, the lamb was already his.", + "If the first-born of a donkey died [after the lamb for redemption had been set aside]: Rabbi Eliezer says: it shall be buried, but the lamb may be used. But the sages say: it does not need to be buried and the lamb belongs to the priest. If the first born of the donkey dies after the lamb has been set aside, Rabbi Eliezer believes that the donkey was still holy. Therefore, it must be buried and one cannot derive any benefit from its corpse. However, the holiness of the donkey had not yet been transferred to the lamb, because this only happens when the lamb is given to the priest. Therefore, the lamb can still be used. Note that this is consistent with Rabbi Eliezer’s position above. The other rabbis hold that as soon as the lamb is set aside, it takes on the holiness of the donkey. Therefore, it the donkey dies it need not be buried. The lamb, however, must be given to the priest because as soon as he set it aside, it belongs to the priest." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah begins by discussing a person who does not wish to redeem his first-born donkey by giving a lamb to the priest. It continues by dealing with a variety of other issues in which one way of performing a mitzvah takes priority over another way.", + "If he does not wish to redeem it, he breaks its neck from behind with a large knife and buries it. Exodus 13:13 states that if he doesn’t redeem the first-born donkey he must break its neck. This is done with a large knife. After he breaks its neck, he must bury it, because he may not derive any benefit from the corpse.", + "The mitzvah of redemption takes priority over the miztzah of breaking its neck, for it says: “And if you don’t redeem it, you must break its neck” (Exodus 13:13). Clearly, the Torah prefers that one redeem the first-born donkey, rather than break its neck. Associative thinking now brings the mishnah to discuss other cases where there is a preferred way of performing the mitzvah.", + "The mitzvah of designation takes priority over the mitzvah of redemption, for it says: “Who has betrothed her to himself, he must let her be redeemed” (Exodus 21:8). When a man buys a young slave girl, he has an option of either betrothing her to himself, or letting her be redeemed from slavery. Priority is given to marrying her, rather than letting her be redeemed by someone else. Indeed, it seems likely that the sale of a young girl was meant to be a marital type arrangement and the master would allow her to be redeemed only if he did not want to marry her. Allowing her to be redeemed was, in essence, an annulment of the original agreement.", + "The mitzvah of yibbum is prior to the mitzvah of halitzah. [This was so] at first when they intended to carry out the mitzvah. But now that they do not intend to carry out the mitzvah, the [rabbis] have said: the mitzvah of halitzah takes priority over the mitzvah of yibbum. Yibbum is levirate marriage, and halitzah is the release from levirate marriage. Clearly, the Torah prefers that the brother marry his dead brother’s wife, and only if he refuses to do so, is halitzah provided as an option. However, the priority of yibbum over halitzah is only in a case where the brother marries his widowed sister-in-law in order to have a child on behalf of his deceased brother. If he does so just because he wants to have relations with her, for his own enjoyment, then, the rabbis claim, it would be better for them to do halitzah. The mishnah presents this as a type of “good old days” scenario. In the “good old days” men had religious intentions when they performed yibbum. In those times, yibbum was preferable. Now they are just plain old sleeping with their dead brother’s wife, and therefore we should encourage halitzah.", + "The mitzvah of redemption [of an unclean animal whose value has been dedicated to the Temple] is upon the owner. He takes priority over any other man, for it says: “If it is not redeemed, then it shall be sold according to your evaluation” (Leviticus 27:27). If one dedicates an unclean animal to the Temple, such as a horse, then the animal must be redeemed and the money goes to the Temple’s treasury. Anyone can redeem the animal and thereby it becomes his. However, the first right to redeem the animal belong to the owner who dedicated it in the first place. Only if he does not wish to do so, is someone else allowed to come along, redeem the animal and thereby acquire it for himself." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nChapter two begins to discuss the first-born of a pure animal, such as a cow. This first-born is holy and must be sacrificed and the meat is eaten by the priests. If it is blemished, it must still be given to the priest, but it need not be sacrificed.", + "[An Israelite] who buys a fetus of a cow belonging to a non-Jew or who sells one to him, although this is not permitted, or who forms a partnership with him, or who receives [an animal] from him to look after or who gives [his cow] to him to look after, is exempt from the [law of the] bekhor, for it says: [“I sanctified to Me all the firstborn] in Israel,” (Numbers 3:13) but not in non-Jews. This is the same exact halakhah as was taught in the 1:1. See there for commentary.", + "Priests and Levites are subject [to the law of the first-born pure animal]. They are not exempt from [the law of] the first-born of a clean animal, but only of a first-born son and the first-born of a donkey. Priests and Levites are exempt from two of the three types of bekhorot the first born of a donkey and their own first-born son. They are, however, liable for the first-born of a pure animal. If a priest or Levite owns a pure animal and it gives birth for the first time and the offspring is male, it must be sacrificed. Then the priest eats the meat, as is always the case." + ], + [ + "All consecrated animals whose permanent physical blemish preceded their consecration and were then redeemed:
Are subject to the law of the firstling and to the priestly gifts,
And when they become like hullin [by being redeemed] they may be shorn and may be put to work.
And their young and their milk are permitted after they have been redeemed.
And he who slaughtered them outside the sanctuary is not liable.
And they do not render what is substituted for them [holy].
And if they died they may be redeemed, except for the firstling and the tithe of cattle.
This mishnah and tomorrow’s mishnah are an exact replica of Hullin 10:2. They are brought here in Tractate Bekhorot because they have some rules concerning bekhorot. My commentary, including the following introduction, is the same as that found in Hullin.
An animal that has a permanent physical blemish cannot be sacrificed. Our mishnah distinguishes between cases where the blemish preceded the consecration of the animal, versus cases where the consecration preceded the blemish.
If the animal had a permanent blemish before it was consecrated, then the animal itself doesn’t become holy. Instead, the consecrator has in reality dedicated the value of the animal to the Temple. Thus this animal is treated like a hullin, non-sacred, animal, except that it has to be redeemed before any use can be made of it. If it gives birth to a firstling, the firstling is holy, as is the case with a hullin animal. When one slaughters it, he must give the shoulder, cheeks and stomach to the priest. After it becomes hullin by being redeemed, it may be shorn and work may be performed with it. Similarly, its young and its milk are not prohibited. One who slaughters it outside the Temple is not liable for he has slaughtered a non-sacred animal. If one tries to exchange it for another animal, the other animal is not holy. If the animal dies, it will still need to be redeemed, so that its meat can be given to dogs.
The only exception to all of these rules is if this animal that had a permanent blemish is itself a firstling or a tithed animal. The firstling is holy from the moment it is born even if it has a blemish. Similarly, even blemished animals must be tithed (see Leviticus 27:33). Thus these animals are holy regardless of whether they have blemishes and therefore they cannot be treated as the animals above were treated." + ], + [ + "All [consecrated animals] whose consecration preceded their permanent, or their impermanent blemish [preceded] their consecration and subsequently they contracted a permanent blemish, and they were redeemed:
Are exempt from the law of the firstling, and from priestly gifts;
And they are not like unconsecrated animals to be shorn or put to work;
And [even] after they have been redeemed their young and their milk are forbidden;
And he who slaughtered them outside the sanctuary is liable;
And they render what was substituted for them [holy],
And if they died they must be buried.
An animal that is first consecrated and then becomes blemished is a consecrated animal, even though it cannot be sacrificed. Similarly, if an animal has a passing blemish, and then it is consecrated, it is a consecrated animal. These animals must be redeemed, and the money used to buy a new sacrifice. However, they remain consecrated even after redemption.
Therefore, their offspring is exempt from the laws of tithe and firstling, as are the offspring of all consecrated animals. One who slaughters them after their redemption need not give the shoulder, cheeks and stomach to the priest. Even after they are redeemed, it is forbidden to shear them or to perform any work with them. Their offspring and their milk remain prohibited, even after they have been redeemed. Indeed, it seems like the only thing that can be done with them is to eat them.
Our version of the mishnah says that if one slaughters them outside of the Temple, he is liable. This is difficult, because what it he supposed to do with them he can’t offer them as sacrifices nor can he slaughter them outside of the Temple. There is a version which reads “exempt” instead of “liable.” However, the Talmud reads “liable” and explains that this mishnah is according to Rabbi Akiva who holds that if an animal with a blemish was put onto the altar, it is not to be removed (Zevahim 9:3). Thus, although this animal should not be sacrificed, if it is put on the altar, it can be sacrificed.
If one exchanges this animal for another, the other animal also becomes holy. Consecrated animals cannot be exchanged one for the other, and if one tries to do so, the original animal remains holy and the new animal becomes holy.
Finally, if they die before they are redeemed, they must be buried, because no one can derive benefit from their meat." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah discusses a Jew who receives a flock of sheep or goats from a non-Jew under “iron terms.” What this means is that all responsibility for the flock lies with the Jew, and he pays the non-Jew a fixed sum per year in return for use of the flock and the use of the offspring. Alternatively, instead of paying a fixed sum, the Jew and the non-Jew split the profits and the offspring.", + "If one receives flock from a non-Jew on “iron terms” their offspring are exempt [from the law of] the first born. In mishnah one we learned that the flock itself is exempt from the laws of the first born. Our mishnah teaches that if one of the offspring of the original flock gives birth, that offspring is also exempt from the law of the first born, meaning its first born is not holy. The reason for this exemption is that if the Jew reneges on his payment to the non-Jew, the non-Jew can take the offspring as part of his payment. This means that they are in some sense owned by the non-Jew and as we have learned, animals owned by non-Jews are not subject to the law of the first-born.", + "But the offspring of their offspring are liable [to the law of the first born]. However, the offspring of the offspring are liable meaning that the first born offspring born of this offspring are holy and must be treated as such.", + "If [the Israelite] put the offspring in the place of their mothers, then the offspring of the offspring are exempt, but the offspring of the offspring of the offspring are liable. If the Jew tells the non-Jew that he is going to pay him back not with the original flock but with its offspring, then the exemption is extended another generation, to the first born of the offspring of the offspring. (It might help you to use names here, Debbie, born of Charlene, born of Becca, born of Alice apologies to those with these names!). Again, since the non-Jew can claim these animals (Charlene), they are considered to be in his possession in order to exempt their offspring (Debbie).", + "Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: even for ten generations the offspring are exempt [from the law of the first born] since they are pledged to the non-Jew. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says that all subsequent offspring are pledged to the non-Jew, no matter how many generations removed. Therefore, they are all exempt from the laws of the first born (so Eunice is exempt, as if Freda, and Gladys and Harriet, and Iris would you like me to go to Z for Zoey, my daughter’s name?)." + ], + [ + "If a ewe gave birth to what looked like a kid, or a [female] goat gave birth to what looked like a lamb, it is exempt from [the law of] the first born. As we learned in connection with the donkey, in order for the offspring to be liable for the law of the first born, it must be of the same species as its mother. If the offspring of a sheep looks like a goat, or the offspring of a goat looks like a sheep, it is exempt.", + "But if it some of the signs of [its mother] it is liable [to the law of the first born]. If it looks a bit like its mother, then it is liable." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses cases where the ewe seems to give birth to two first-borns at the same time.", + "If a ewe which never before had given birth bore two males and both heads came forth simultaneously: Rabbi Yose the Galilean says: both belong to the priest for scripture says: “The males shall be the Lord’s” (Exodus 13:12). But the sages say: it is impossible, therefore one remains [with the Israelite] and the other is for the priest. Rabbi Tarfon says: the priest chooses the better one. Rabbi Akiva says: we compromise between them. According to Rabbi Yose the Galilean both males are considered to be first-borns and both are given to the priest. This is derived midrashically from the plural use of “males” in Exodus 13. The other rabbis, however, disagree with Rabbi Yose and say that this is impossible (doesn’t sound too pleasant for the sheep either). Rather, one must have been the first-born, even if we don’t know which one it was. Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva debate about how we determine which of the two animals goes to the priest. According to Rabbi Tarfon, the priest can choose which of the twins he wants. Rabbi Akiva says that they estimate the value of the two kids, and the priest and the owner divide the amount. However, the Tosefta and the Talmud state that the owner keeps the fatter, more valuable of the two kids. This is because of the principle, “the burden of proof is upon the claimant.” Since the priest cannot prove that the better of the two is his, he can only take the lesser.", + "The second one [in the Israelite's possession] is left to pasture until it becomes blemished and the owner is liable for the [priest's] gifts. Rabbi Yose exempts him. The animal kept by the owner cannot simply be eaten, because it might be a first-born. Therefore, the solution is to let it become blemished and then it can be eaten by its owners. When he slaughters it he must give the priestly gifts, the shoulder, the cheeks and the stomach, to the priest. For if the animal was a first-born then he should have given it all to the priest. And if the animal is not a first-born, then he is liable to give the priestly gifts, as is always the case when one slaughters animals (see chapter ten of Hullin). Rabbi Yose exempts. We will see Rabbi Yose’s reasoning below in mishnah eight.", + "If one of them died: Rabbi Tarfon says: they divide [the living one]. Rabbi Akiva says: the burden of proof is upon the claimant. If one of them dies, Rabbi Tarfon says that they can split the value of the living one. Rabbi Akiva holds that since the priest cannot prove that the one that died was the second born he has no right to claim the live one. Again, Rabbi Akiva employs the principle of “the burden of proof is upon the claimant.”", + "If it gave birth to a male and a female, the priest receives nothing [in such circumstances]. In this case, when a male and female were born, it is possible that there is no first-born because the female might have been born first. Therefore, the priest doesn’t receive anything. The male animal must go out to pasture until it becomes blemished and after that point, the owner can eat it. He can’t eat it beforehand because it might be a bekhor." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah is similar to yesterday’s mishnah except that today’s mishnah deals with two sheep that had never given birth before, whereas yesterday’s mishnah dealt with one ewe that had twins. Most of this mishnah is the same as that which we learned yesterday, so I refer the reader to my commentary there.", + "If two ewes which had never previously given birth bore two males, both belong to the priest. If both of the first-borns are males, then obviously, both go to the priest.", + "[If they gave birth] to a male and a female, the male belongs to the priest. If one is a male and the other is a female, then we know that the male is a first-born and it goes to the priest.", + "[If they gave birth] to two males and a female, one remains with him, and the other belongs to the priest. Rabbi Tarfon says: the priest chooses the better one. Rabbi Akiva says: we compromise between them. In this case, one male is certainly a first-born, but we don’t know which one. Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva again debate how we determine who gets which of the two. For an explanation, see yesterday’s mishnah.", + "The second one [in the Israelite's possession] is left to pasture until it becomes blemished and the owner is liable for the [priest's] gifts. Rabbi Yose exempts him. This is identical to the debate in yesterday’s mishnah.", + "If one of them died: Rabbi Tarfon says: they divide [the living one]. Rabbi Akiva says: the burden of proof is upon the claimant. See yesterday’s mishnah.", + "[If they gave birth to] two females and a male or two males and two females, the priest receives nothing in such circumstances. If they gave birth to two females, it is possible that there was no male first-born. Therefore, the priest doesn’t receive anything. The Tosefta adds that the males must go out to pasture and become blemished before they can be eaten. This is because they might be first-borns and all doubtful first-borns must become blemished before they can be eaten." + ], + [ + "If one [of the ewes] had given birth and the other had never previously given birth and they bore two males, one remains with him and the other belongs to the priest. Rabbi Tarfon says: the priest chooses the better one. Rabbi Akiva says: we compromise between them.
The second one [in the Israelite's possession] is left to pasture until it becomes blemished and the owner is liable for the [priest's] gifts. Rabbi Yose exempts him. For Rabbi Yose says: wherever the priest receives [an animal] in its place, he is exempt from the priestly gifts. Rabbi Meir however makes him liable.
If one of them died: Rabbi Tarfon says: they divide [the living one]. Rabbi Akiva says: the burden of proof is upon the claimant.
If they gave birth to a male and a female, the priest receives nothing [in such circumstances].
This mishnah is a continuation of yesterday and the previous day’s mishnah. Much of the explanation for the mishnah can be found there.
Section one: Again, we have here a situation where we know that one of two males is a first-born and one is not. One goes to the priest and again Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva argue about how we determine who gets which animal. See mishnah six for an explanation.
Section two: Most of this section is the same as in mishnah six. We learn here, finally, the reason that Rabbi Yose exempts the animal that stays with the owner from being liable for the priestly gifts. Whenever a priest receives one animal in return for another, the animal that is exchanged is exempt. In this case the priest receives one animal in return for giving away the other animal. It is as if he received the animal and then exchanged it for another. Any animal owned by a priest is exempt from the priestly gifts, and therefore the animal that goes to the original owner is exempt. Rabbi Meir disagrees and says that he is still liable.
Sections three and four: These are the same as the end of mishnah six. See there for an explanation." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah deals with an animal born through what is today called a cesarean section. The term the Mishnah uses is “one who came out through the wall” because this animal was taken out through the wall of its mother’s stomach.", + "With regard to [an animal] that was born through a cesarean section and the first born which came after it:
Rabbi Tarfon says: both go out to pasture until blemished and are eaten with their blemishes by the owners. Rabbi Tarfon believes that both animals are doubtful first borns. The one born through cesarean section was the first born and the second one was the one who opened its mother’s womb, the phrase the Torah uses to describe a first born (see Exodus 13). Therefore, both must go out to pasture until they become blemished and then they may be eaten (blemishes and all) by their owners.", + "But Rabbi Akiva says: neither of them is a first born; the first because it did not open its mother’s womb, and the second, because another preceded it. According to Rabbi Akiva, in order for the rule of the first born to apply, the animal must be a first born and be the first to open its mother’s womb. The first born did not open its mother’s womb and the second was not the first born, so the law of the first born does not apply to either." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah deals with a person who bought an animal from a non-Jew and doesn’t know whether it had yet given birth. If it had not, then the first animal born in Jewish possession would be considered a first born and would have to be treated accordingly.", + "If one buys an animal from a non-Jew and it is not known whether it had given birth or had not given birth: Rabbi Ishmael says: that born of a goat in its first year certainly belongs to the priest; after that, it is a questionable case [of a first-born]. That born of a ewe two years old certainly belongs to the priest; after that, it is a questionable case [of a first born]. That born of a cow or a donkey three years old certainly belongs to the priest; after that, it is a questionable case [of a first born]. Rabbi Ishmael says that we can estimate whether the animal had given birth by checking the age of the animal. If the goat gives birth within its first year, we can assume that it is a first born. If the goat is beyond its first year, then it is a case of a doubtful first born. As we have seen previously, doubtful first borns go out to pasture until they become blemished, at which point they may be eaten by their owners. Rabbi Ishmael proceeds to give ages in which we can expect that a ewe and a cow would give birth.", + "Rabbi Akiva to him: if an animal were exempted [from the law of the first born] only with the birth of [actual] offspring, it would be as you say. But they said: the sign of offspring in small cattle is a discharge [from the womb]. In large cattle, the after-birth; in a woman, the signs are the fetus and the after-birth. Rabbi Akiva disagrees with Rabbi Ishmael because the rabbis taught that if an animal or woman miscarries before having her first born, the next animal/child is not considered the first born, at least not to be treated as holy. Therefore, even if the animal gives birth within that time period, there is no way of knowing if it had previously miscarried. Rabbi Akiva now gives signs by which we can know whether an animal or woman had miscarried. This would be important to distinguish between a true miscarriage and non-miscarriage discharge.", + "This is the general rule: Whenever it is known that it had given birth, the priest receives nothing. Whenever it had never given birth, it belongs to the priest. If there is a doubt, it shall be eaten blemished by the owners. Having rejected Rabbi Ishmael, Rabbi Akiva must provide an alternative way to treat the animal bought from the non-Jew. He relies on general rules of certain/doubtful property cases. If we know for a fact that the animal had never given birth, then the first born in Jewish possession must be treated as a first born and given to the priest. If the animal definitely had given birth before, then obviously the priest doesn’t receive anything. Finally, if it is doubtful, then the animal must go out to pasture, become blemished and then it can be eaten by its owners.", + "Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob says: if a large domestic animal has discharged a clot of blood, it [the clot] shall be buried, and it [the mother] is exempted from the law of the first born. As an addendum to our mishnah, Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov states that if a large animal discharges a blood clot, the blood clot should be buried. This will allow people to know that the clot is being treated as a miscarriage and that the next born animal is not the first born." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn this mishnah Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel teaches that when one sees an animal nursing, he can assume that it is nursing its own offspring. As we shall see, this has certain halakhic ramifications for determining which animal is a first born.", + "Rabban Shimon b. Gamaliel says: if one buys a nursing animal from a non-Jew, he need not fear that perhaps the offspring belongs to another [animal]. If one buys a nursing animal from a non-Jew, one can assume that it is nursing its own animal and therefore, one does not have to treat the next born animal as a first born.", + "If he went among his herd and saw animals which had given birth for the first time nursing and animals which had not given birth for the first time nursing, we need not fear that perhaps the offspring of this one came to the other or perhaps the offspring of the other came to this one. Similarly, if one sees animals in his own herd nursing, he can assume that they are nursing their own offspring. For instance, if he sees an animal that he knows has already given birth nursing a female and an animal that has not given birth is nursing a male, he can be sure that the male is a first born. If the offspring of the one that has given birth is a male, he can be sure that it is not a first born." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIt is prohibited to shear a first born (this is based on a midrash on Deuteronomy 15:22). Our mishnah discusses how one can remove some of the hair of the first born without transgressing this prohibition.", + "Rabbi Yose ben Meshullam says: one who slaughters the first born, [first] clears a space with the [butcher's] knife on both sides and tears the hair, as long as he does not remove the wool from its place. If one wants to make space on the first born’s neck so that it can be properly slaughtered, what he should first do is use the butcher’s knife to clear some hair to the sides. Then he can pull out some of the hair but he should leave it stuck elsewhere in the animal’s wool so that it doesn’t look as if he is shearing. Someone who sees him act in such a manner will know that his intent is to clear some room on the animal’s neck, and not to remove the animal’s wool.", + "And similarly one may tear the hair to show the place of the blemish [to a sage]. The same procedure should be followed if one wants to clear some hair from the animal to show the blemish to a sage so that the sage could declare it blemished." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah continues to deal with the prohibition of shearing a first born, even a blemished first born that may be slaughtered and eaten. We should note that not only is it forbidden to shear the animal, but if it is sheared, it is forbidden to derive benefit from its wool. However, this prohibition is in effect only if the animal was sheared while it was alive. Once dead or slaughtered the wool that is subsequently removed can be used. Specifically, our mishnah deals with wool that fell off the animal while it was alive.", + "If [a portion of] the hair of a blemished first born fell out and he placed it in the window, and then he slaughtered the animal, Akavya ben Mahalalel allows it. But the sages forbid it, the words of Rabbi Judah. Wool that falls off when the animal is alive is forbidden as long as the animal is alive. In the case in this mishnah, the person put the wool that fell out of the animal in a hole in the window to store it so that he could use it after he slaughtered the animal. Akavya ben Mehalalel allows the use of that wool after the animal was slaughtered. Since the slaughtering allows the wool that is on the animal when it is slaughtered, it also allows wool that fell out of the animal while it was still alive. Note that Akavya would not allow wool that was sheared when the animal was alive, because shearing is a prohibited action. The other sages forbid this wool. This is the version of the debate according to Rabbi Judah.", + "Rabbi Yose said to him: Akavya ben Mahalalel did not allow [only] in this case, but [even] in the case where the hair of a blemished first born which fell out and he placed it in the window, and the animal died subsequently, [even] in this case Akavya ben Mahalalel allows, but the sages forbid. Rabbi Yose has a different version of the debate. According to Rabbi Yose if the animal was slaughtered, then even the rabbis agree that the wool that fell off when it was alive may be used. Rabbi Yose holds that they debated a case where the wool fell off and then the animal died on its own. In this case, it is prohibited to derive benefit from both the meat and the wool that is on the animal. Therefore, the wool that fell off the animal is also prohibited. According to Rabbi Yose, Akavya allows the wool even in this case.", + "If the wool of a first born is hanging loose, that part which appears [on a level] with [the rest of] the wool is permitted, whereas that which does not appear [on a level] with [the rest of] the wool is forbidden. Here we deal with some wool that has become detached from the animal but is still stuck to the rest of the animal’s wool. When he slaughters the animal, the part that is seen on level with the rest of the wool is permitted, because it does not look like wool that fell off while the animal was alive. However, if it is noticeable that the wool fell off when the animal was still alive, then it is forbidden. This is according to Rabbi Judah’s opinion, that the sages prohibit wool that fell off the animal when it was still alive, even if the animal was properly slaughtered. Rabbi Yose would hold that this wool is permitted in any case." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nWhen a first born is born into an Israelite’s herd, the Israelite is not allowed to immediately give it to the priest. Rather, he must take care of it for a period of time and then transfer the animal to the priest. Our mishnah discusses how long he needs to take care of the animal.\nAs background to this mishnah, we must remember that after the Temple was destroyed, the priest would have to hold on to the first born until it became blemished, at which point he could slaughter it and eat it. During this period he couldn’t use it for anything else. When the Temple was still standing, he could sacrifice it whenever he wanted to, as long as it was already eight days old.", + "For how long is an Israelite bound to take care of a first born? In the case of small cattle, for thirty days, and large cattle, fifty days. Rabbi Yose says: in the case of small cattle, three months. It is in the priest’s interest for the Israelite to take care of the animal as long as possible, to feed it and fatten it up. Therefore, the mishnah sets a mandatory period in which the Israelite must take care of the animal. According to the first opinion, this time period is longer for large cattle such as oxen, because they need to be fattened up more. According to Rabbi Yose the opposite is true. The period is longer for small cattle such as goats and sheep because their survival is more precarious.", + "If the priest says [to the Israelite] during this period “Give it to me,” he must not give it to him. One would think that if the priest is willing to take the animal at an earlier period, the Israelite would be allowed to give it to him. The mishnah rules that this is forbidden. The problem is that if priests start helping Israelites out in preparing that which they must give them, then there is a danger of a quid pro quo situation being created “you take the animal earlier, and I will give it to you and not another priest.” Ultimately, this would be against the priests’ best interests, so the mishnah makes such behavior prohibited. Also, the Torah says that these must be given to the priests, and not that the priests should have to work in order to receive their gifts.", + "But if the first born was blemished and the priest said to him “Give it to me so that I may eat it,” then it is allowed. However, if the animal is blemished already, then the priest can eat it immediately, as opposed to holding on to it until it becomes blemished. Therefore, in this case the Israelite can immediately give it to the priest.", + "And in Temple times, if [the first born] was in an unblemished state and the priest said to him “Give it to me, and I will offer it up it was allowed.” When the Temple still stood the priest could sacrifice the animal immediately. Therefore, the Israelite can give it to him as soon as the priest asks for it.", + "A first born is eaten year by year both in an unblemished as well as in a blemished state, for it is said: “You shall eat it before the Lord your God year by year” (Deuteronomy 15:20). The first born must either be eaten or sacrificed (when the Temple still stood) within its first year. If it is not blemished within this year, then the priest must sacrifice it. This is derived from the verse in Deuteronomy. Obviously, once the Temple was destroyed, the priest might have to wait longer for it to become blemished. " + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah is a direct continuation of yesterday’s mishnah, where we learned that a priest is supposed to eat the first-born within its first year.", + "If a blemish appeared on it in its first year, he is permitted to keep it all the twelve months. If it is blemished before the year is up, he can wait up to a year to eat it.", + "If after the twelve months, however, he is not permitted to keep it except for thirty days. If the year has already passed, he must slaughter it within thirty days. It is interesting to note that the reason someone might want to wait to slaughter his first born is probably because he doesn’t want to eat such a large quantity of meat until there is some special occasion (wedding, perhaps). People in the ancient world did not eat meat on a regular basis. The Torah (and Mishnah) need to prohibit waiting, because otherwise, people might hold on to their first borns for a long time." + ], + [ + "If one slaughtered the first born and then showed its blemish [to an expert]:
Rabbi Judah permits,
But Rabbi Meir says: since it was not slaughtered by the instructions of the expert, it is forbidden.
One of the main functions of rabbis was to examine first born animals and to determine whether they had a blemish that would prohibit the animal from being sacrificed. After the Temple was destroyed, this was obviously a very important matter, one of grave economic significance, because other than slaughter and eat the first born, nothing else could be done with it. Indeed, one of the major aspects of rabbinic ordination was allowing a student to become a rabbi in order to allow first borns to be eaten. In order to receive such ordination one must be an expert in determining what animals are blemished and trustworthy to allow the blemished ones and forbid the unblemished ones.
Generally, the animal would first be shown to an expert (a rabbi) and then, if the rabbi determined that it was blemished, the animal could be slaughtered and eaten. However, in the case in our mishnah, the person slaughtered it and then brought it to a rabbi. At this point, the rabbi must determine whether there was a blemish on the animal before it was slaughtered.
According to Rabbi Judah, if the sage sees such a blemish, the meat may be eaten. Rabbi Meir, however, prohibits the meat because he did not follow the proper procedure." + ], + [ + "If one who is not an expert sees a first born and it was slaughtered by his instructions, in such a case it shall be buried and he shall make reparation from his own pocket.
If a [non-expert] judge gave a judgment and declared innocent a person who was really liable or made liable a person who was really innocent, declared unclean a thing which was clean or declared clean a thing which was really unclean, his decision stands but he has to make reparation from his own pocket.
If the judge was an expert [sanctioned by the] court, he is exempt from making reparation.
It happened once that a cow's womb was removed and Rabbi Tarfon gave it [the cow] to the dogs to eat. The matter came before the sages at Yavneh and they permitted the animal. Todos the physician said: no cow or pig leaves Alexandria of Egypt before its womb is removed in order that it may not breed. Rabbi Tarfon said: “There goes your donkey, Tarfon.” Rabbi Akiva said to him: you are exempt, for you are an expert and whoever is an expert sanctioned by the court is exempt from reparation.
Our mishnah deals with the consequences of a judge who issues an errant ruling.
Section one: A person who is not an expert has no business declaring a first born blemished such that it can be slaughtered. If he does declare that it is blemished and the animal is slaughtered, the meat is prohibited and it must be buried. [Rabbi Judah would allow an expert to see if it was blemished, see yesterday’s mishnah]. In addition, the non-expert who allowed the animal to be slaughtered must repay the owner from his own pocket. Clearly, this is meant to discourage a non-expert from declaring an animal blemished.
Section two: The same is true in other cases of judicial decisions. If a non-expert judge renders a decision and later it is found that he made the wrong decision, he must make restitution from his own pocket. Non-experts should simply not make decisions, and if they do, they run the risk of incurring liability.
Section three: The mishnah now brings an interesting story of a mistaken judgment. A cow is brought in front of the sages so that they can determine whether the cow is a terefah, an animal with a wound/disease that would cause it to die within a short period. Such an animal may not be eaten. The sages in Yavneh determined that the animal was indeed a terefah. After making this determination, Todos, a doctor, testified that in Alexandria they would regularly remove the wombs from cows and pigs before they would allow the animal to leave the city. They would do this because they thought their cows and pigs were of superior breed and they didn’t want others to breed them. In any case, this proves that a cow with its womb removed is not a terefah.
Rabbi Tarfon realizes that he has made a mistake and therefore, exclaims to himself, “Tarfon, there goes your donkey!” Rabbi Tarfon is now going to have to sell his donkey to pay back for the loss of the cow.
Rabbi Akiva assures Rabbi Tarfon that he has not lost his donkey, because he is an expert, and an expert doesn’t have to make restitution when he renders a mistaken judgment.
I don’t know whether the mishnah is intentionally being ironic, but I find it funny that Rabbi Tarfon is an expert, even though he doesn’t know that the halakhah is that he doesn’t have to pay back the loss. In other words, he is an expert despite the fact that he has made two mistakes in one mishnah." + ], + [ + "If one takes payment for seeing first borns, they must not be slaughtered by his instructions unless he was an expert like Ila in Yavneh whom the sages permitted to accept four isars for small cattle and six as for large cattle, whether unblemished or blemished. Generally speaking it is forbidden for a sage to take wages in return for examining a first born to see if it is blemished or not. If a sage does take a wage and he declares it blemished the animal may not be slaughtered because it is feared that the wage acted as a bribe. The one exception is men who are like the legendary Ila in Yavneh. Ila was a great expert in blemishes and many priests would bring him their animals for examination. He was also wealthy enough that he didn’t need their payments. A bribe wouldn’t cause him to allow an unblemished animal to be slaughtered. Finally, he was known to be an honest man who would not lie in return for money. Because he exhibited all of these qualities, he was allowed to charge a fee for examining first borns. However, it is important to note that he collected his fee whether or not he declared the animal to be blemished. Obviously, it would be extremely problematic for him to collect his fee only if he declared it blemished. This would truly be a recipe for bribes." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to deal with a judge or other official who takes payment for performing his work.", + "If one takes payment to act as a judge, his judgments are void; to give evidence, his evidence is void; to sprinkle or to sanctify, the waters are considered cave waters and the ashes are considered burned ashes. If one takes payment in order to fulfill legal or ritual functions, his actions are void. To sprinkle refers to a priest who sprinkles the red heifer waters on an impure person. To “sanctify” means to place the ashes in water. “Cave waters” and “burned ashes” are the way that the mishnah says that the water and ashes are invalidated from purifying the impure. All of these are functions that people must perform without taking payment.", + "If he was a priest and he was made unclean regarding his terumah, he must give him food and drink and rub him with oil. The mishnah now notes that while a priest or sage should not take a wage for rendering their services, they are not obligated to incur a loss. We should note that there will be a fine line between preventing a loss and rendering payment. The first part is concerned with a priest who loses his ability to eat terumah. Normally, a priest eats terumah which he receives as a gift from Israelites. The fact that he receives terumah from Israelites seems to be, at least partially, a payment for his rendering priestly services. If while rendering one of the services mentioned in section one a priest becomes impure, the person who requested his services must provide him with food, drink and oil from his own expense. This is not payment for the services but rather compensation for the loss of the priest’s ability to eat, drink and anoint with terumah.", + "And if he was an old sage, he mounts him on a donkey. If an old sage comes to render any of these services, the person requesting his help must give him a donkey to ride around on. The old man doesn’t have to walk around himself if this would be difficult for him. Providing transportation is no considered paying for the sage’s services.", + "He also pays him as he would a workman. Finally, and quite importantly, the person requesting the judge or priest’s help must pay him the wages that he would have been earning in his regular profession had he not been rendering judgment etc. Thus if the priest/sage was a laborer making five dollars an hour, then he would have to be paid five dollars for every hour taken up with the person’s case. If he worked in a more lucrative profession, he would earn the higher wage. This is not considered to be paying him for services rendered, but rather compensating him for wages he cannot earn." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah deals with a person who is suspected of not treating his first born animals as holy. For instance, he slaughters an unblemished first born, or he intentionally blemishes it. The problem with such a person is that we must be concerned that many of the products that he might sell are actually derived from first borns who were illicitly slaughtered (or sheared).", + "If one is suspected in connection with first borns, one must not buy from him even deer's flesh or unprocessed hides. The law of the first born applies only to domesticated animals cows, sheep and goats. Seemingly, one could buy deer’s flesh from a person suspected of slaughtering his first born animals without concern. However, the mishnah rules that we must be concerned even with this because the meat of a calf can look like the meat of a deer. We must be concerned that he is really selling the meat of a calf and just telling people it is deer meat. One also can’t buy from him unprocessed hides, lest they come from a first born. However, one may buy from him a processed hide because if he had slaughtered a first born he would want to sell it is quickly as possible so that he would not be caught.", + "Rabbi Eliezer says: one may buy from him female hides we may buy from him. Rabbi Eliezer says that one can buy hides from him if it is obvious that the hides come from a female, because females are not treated halakhically as first borns. We are not concerned that he would make hides from a male look like hides from a female, assumedly because this is not easy to do.", + "One may not buy from him washed or dirty wool, but one may buy spun wool or garments. We cannot buy from him wool, whether it has been washed or is still dirty, because we must be concerned lest it come from a first born. As we have learned, it is forbidden to shear a first born, even one that is blemished. However, we can buy wool that has been more fully processed for the same reason that we can buy processed hides. A person who illicitly shears his first born animal is going to want to sell the wool as soon as possible in order to hide his crime from the authorities." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nSince yesterday’s mishnah dealt with a person suspected of selling first borns, today’s mishnah deals with a person suspected of transgressing the laws of the sabbatical year. This would include one suspected of planting on the sabbatical year, or of selling sabbatical year produce as merchandise.", + "If one is suspected of [ignoring the] sabbatical year, one may not buy from him flax, even combed; but spun or woven flax may be bought from him. One should not buy flax from a person who is suspected of transgressing the laws of the sabbatical year lest that flax was sewn during the sabbatical year. Alternatively, even if it was not sewn that year, the seller is not supposed to be treating sabbatical year produce as merchandise. One shouldn’t buy even combed flax, because the seller, suspected of transgressing these laws, would not hesitate to take this small step in processing the flax. However, one can buy spun or woven flax from him, for the same reason we explained in yesterday’s mishnah. If he is suspected of transgressing the sabbatical year, he would not take the time to process the flax to such a great extent for fear of getting caught. Therefore, we can assume that this flax was not sabbatical year flax." + ], + [ + "If one is suspected of selling terumah as hullin, one may not buy even water and salt from him, the words of Rabbi Judah. Rabbi Judah rules strictly one can’t buy any food products from someone suspected of selling terumah as if it were hullin, even water and salt, which obviously are not subject to the laws of terumah. This is a punishment for the fact that he sells terumah as hullin, which is a serious offense, akin to a butcher who today would sell non-kosher meat as kosher meat.", + "Rabbi Shimon says: [one may not buy from him] whatever is connected to terumah and tithes. Rabbi Shimon rules more leniently one can’t buy from him only objects that are liable for terumah, namely agricultural products. It is permitted to buy from this person water and salt. This would be like saying today that if a kosher butcher sells non-kosher meat one could still buy drinks, bread etc. from him." + ], + [ + "One who is suspected of ignoring the sabbatical year is not suspected of ignoring [also] the tithes. Someone who is suspected of not properly observing the sabbatical year is not automatically suspected of not tithing his food. This would mean that when it is not the sabbatical year, a person could buy or eat his produce without concern that the food is not tithed.", + "One who is suspected of ignoring tithes is not suspected of ignoring [also] the sabbatical year. Similarly, one who is generally suspected of not tithing, is not automatically suspected of not observing the sabbatical laws. The two are not connected, even though they are in the same general set of prohibitions.", + "One who is suspected of ignoring both is suspected of ignoring the rules of purity. However, one who is suspected of transgressing both the sabbatical year laws and of not tithing is suspected of not observing the purity laws. What this would mean is that he cannot be trusted to state that the food that he is selling is pure. This would have ramifications only for a person who is interested in eating all of their food in a state of purity, a custom that was attributed to the Pharisees.", + "And it is possible for one to be suspected of ignoring the rules of purity and yet not be suspected of ignoring the two laws [cited above]. The opposite of section three is not true one can be suspected of not observing the purity laws, but trusted with regard to the sabbatical laws and tithing. It seems that certain purity matters were easily ignored, perhaps because fewer people observed them in the mishnaic period or perhaps because it is not really a transgression to eat food without it being pure. Therefore, one who transgresses more consequential laws such as tithing and the sabbatical year, is suspected of transgressing the less consequential matter of purity.", + "This is the general rule: one who is suspected of [transgressing] something must not give judgment on it or testify concerning it. A person is suspected of transgressing a certain law cannot give testimony or render judgment concerning this law. We shall see this statement again below in 5:4." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nAnimals that have been dedicated to the Temple and then became blemished can be sold, the profit going to the Temple. Our mishnah teaches that this works a bit differently for blemished first borns.", + "All dedicated animals which became unfit [for the altar] are sold in a market, slaughtered in a market and weighed by the liter, except for a first born or a tithed animal, as their profit goes to the owners, [whereas] the profit on dedicated objects which became unfit goes to the Temple. It is considered somewhat disgraceful that a once holy animal should be slaughtered and sold in the marketplace like common meat. However, this is also the most profitable way to sell the animal’s meat. Normal dedicated animals may be slaughtered and sold in the market, and weighed using weights because we want to maximize the profit that goes to the Temple. In contrast, the profit from selling a blemished first born or tithed animal goes to the priests (or in certain cases the original owners), therefore, we are not concerned with maximizing the profit. In such a case, we want to minimize the disgrace to the animal and its meat. The animal should be slaughtered and sold privately, at one’s home. The meat should not be weighed on scales using known weights, but rather its weight should be estimated.", + "One can weigh one piece of meat of the first-born against another piece of ordinary meat. While one cannot weigh the meat of the first born on a scale using set weights, it is permitted to weigh it on a scale using another piece of meat of known weight. This is not considered to be as disgraceful." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThere are two topics in our mishnah. The first section deals with a Jew sharing a blemished first born with a priest. The second section deals with blood letting a first born in order to heal it.", + "Bet Shammai says: An Israelite must not be invited to share [a blemished first born] with a priest. But Bet Hillel permits this, even in the case of a non-Jew. According to Bet Shammai, if a priest owns a blemished first born which he can eat, he should not invite an Israelite to share it with him. The mishnah does not explain why Bet Shammai prohibits this and the Talmud gives a midrashic reasoning. Perhaps Bet Shammai fear that the priest may be bribing the Israelite to give him the blemished first born. To prevent bribes, Bet Shammai prohibits this. Bet Hillel permits, and they even allow a non-Jew to share in eating the first born. The reason to mention that a non-Jew can share in eating the first born is to teach that the priest can do with it as he pleases, as long as he doesn’t shear it or sell its meat in the market (as we learned in yesterday’s mishnah).", + "If a first born has a blood attack, even if it is going to die, its blood may not be let, the words of Rabbi Judah. It is prohibited to blemish a first born animal so that it can be eaten (see tomorrow’s mishnah). According to Rabbi Judah, even if the blemish is done through blood letting with the intention of saving the animal’s life, it is still prohibited.", + "But the sages say: he may let its blood, as long as he does not make a blemish. And if he made a blemish, he must not slaughter it on account of this. The sages permit the animal’s blood to be let, as long as he does it in a way that the animal will not be halakhically considered blemished. And if it does become halakhically blemished, he can’t count this blemish as grounds to slaughter the animal. Rather he would have to wait until the animal becomes blemished in another way and only then can he slaughter it. Note that he cannot sacrifice it after the first blemish because one can never slaughter a blemished animal.", + "Rabbi Shimon says: he may let blood, even though he makes a blemish. Rabbi Shimon is even more lenient and allows one to let the blood of an animal, even if he does it in such a way that it will cause a blemish. According to the Talmud, Rabbi Shimon would also let him slaughter the animal based on this blemish. Since his intention was to save the animal’s life (so he could properly slaughter it and eat it) this is not considered intentionally blemishing an animal, a topic to be discussed in tomorrow’s mishnah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah deals with the status of first borns who were intentionally blemished by their owners. It contains two very interesting stories.", + "If one makes a slit in the ear of a firstborn animal, he may never slaughter it, the words of Rabbi Eliezer. But the sages say: when another blemish appears, he may slaughter it on account of it. According to Rabbi Eliezer, if one intentionally blemishes a first born, he can never slaughter the animal. Even if it is subsequently blemished in another way, he is penalized and he still cannot slaughter it. The other sages adopt a more lenient position. The blemish that he put on the animal itself is not sufficient to allow him to slaughter it. However, he can slaughter and eat the animal when it is blemished in another way.", + "It happened that a quaestor (a Roman saw an old male lamb with its long wool hanging down and asked: what is the meaning of this? They replied: “It is a first born and is not to be slaughtered until it has a blemish,” [The quaestor] took a dagger and slit its ear. The matter came before the sages and they permitted it. After they had permitted, he went and sliced the ears of other [first borns]. The [sages] forbade them. It is forbidden to shear first born animals, so if they are not blemished and they can’t be sacrificed because the Temple is no longer standing, they will grow very long hair. Upon seeing one such strange beast, a Roman official asked the Jews what is going on with their goat. The Jews explained that they could not slaughter the animal until it became blemished. The Roman official, being a very helpful non-Jew, proceeded to intentionally blemish the animal. When the Jews brought the animal to the sages, the sages permitted it. Seeing that he had been so helpful to the Jews, the Roman official decided to be even more helpful and he went and blemished other first borns (I never knew Romans were so interested in helping Jews perhaps he just liked to slice the ears of goats?). This time the sages didn’t permit the first borns to be eaten. Once the Roman knew that by his blemishing them they could be eaten, his actions could no longer allow the first born to be eaten.", + "Once children were once playing in a field. They tied the tails of sheep one to the other and one tail which belonged to a first born was severed. The matter came before the rabbis and they permitted [the first born]. When the children saw that they had permitted [the first born to be slaughtered], they proceeded to tie the tails of other first borns. The [sages] forbade [the other first borns]. A similar story is related concerning some children, who while playing a game, blemished a first born animal. Since they didn’t know that their actions would allow the animal to be eaten, the sages permitted it. However, when they began to intentionally blemish other animals, the sages did not permit them.", + "This is the rule: wherever the blemish is caused with the knowledge and consent [of the owner] it is forbidden, but, if it is not with his knowledge and consent, it is permitted. The general rule is that if the blemish was done without the knowledge or consent of the owner of the animal, the first born may be eaten. But if the owner knew that what he was doing was going to permit the animal to be eaten, or if he consented to someone else blemishing the animal, it cannot be eaten, at least not based on that particular blemish." + ], + [ + "If a first born was running after him and he kicked it and thereby blemished it, he may slaughter it on account of this. Since this person did not intentionally blemish the first born in order to slaughter it and eat it, it can be slaughtered on account of this blemish.", + "Any blemish which might have been made by a person, Israelite shepherds are trustworthy whereas shepherds who are priests are not trustworthy. The mishnah now returns to the issue of trustworthiness. An Israelite shepherd is trusted if he says that a blemish that could have been done by a person happened naturally, because the Israelite does not get to eat the animal himself. The assumption is that a person won’t lie in order to provide benefit to another person. However, the priest shepherd is not trusted because he himself could benefit from his lie.", + "Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: he is trustworthy with regard to somebody else's first born, but he is not trustworthy with regard to his own. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel refines the previous section. The priest shepherd can be trusted if he is testifying concerning another priest’s first born. His lack of trustworthiness is limited to his own animals, where has a vested stake in their being deemed blemished.", + "Rabbi Meir says: one who is suspected of neglecting a religious matter must not issue judgment on it or give evidence concerning it. Rabbi Meir disagrees with Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel and says that if a person is not trusted with regard to a certain matter, such as first born blemishes, then he is not trusted to testify with regard to any issue that is connected with that matter. Thus if a priest is not trusted with regard to his own first borns, then he can’t be trusted to testify with regard to other priest’s first borns." + ], + [ + "A priest is trusted to say, “I have shown this first born [to an expert] and it is blemished.” In yesterday’s mishnah we learned that priests were suspected of blemishing their first born animals so that they could eat them. Today’s mishnah teaches that they are not suspected of completely lying and saying that they showed a first born to an expert who declared it blemished, when in reality they did not. This is actually a very interesting insight as to the mentality of the priests. They will not eat an unblemished first born, because the Torah clearly states that an unblemished first born must be sacrificed. However, they might intentionally blemish a first born, because all this amounts to is “cheating the system.” It does not seem to be a direct violation of the prohibition of eating an unblemished first born.", + "All are trust worthy with regard to the blemishes of a tithed animal. A tithed animal is brought to Jerusalem, its innards are sacrificed and the remainder of its meat is eaten by its owners. In contrast, a tithed animal that becomes blemished after it has been set aside as tithe is not sacrificed and can simply be eaten by its owners. An Israelite is not suspected of intentionally blemishing his tithed animals because had he wanted to lie, he could have blemished the entire herd before he set aside one of them as a tithe, and then the whole herd could have been exempt. Whenever a person could have achieved his goals without lying, he is trusted to not lie.", + "A first born whose eye was blinded or whose fore-foot was cut off, or whose hind-leg was broken, may be slaughtered with the approval of three [persons] of the synagogue. But Rabbi Yose says: even if twenty-three were present, it must not be slaughtered except with the approval of an expert. Generally, a person must bring his first born to a qualified rabbinic expert for him to determine whether the blemish renders the animal unfit for sacrifice. However, if the blemish is completely obvious, such as the loss of an eye or a limb, then there is a leniency, according to the first opinion in the mishnah. He can bring the animal to three “people of the synagogue.” These are people who are generally cautious in their performance of mitzvoth, they are not “amei haaretz,” but they are not experts in the laws of blemishes. It seems that their function is to certify that he brought the animal to them, but not actually have to render a ruling whether or not the animal was blemished. Rabbi Yose demands that a rabbi who is an expert in what blemishes disqualify a person must be present. Even if there are twenty-three judges, the number necessary to constitute a small Sanhedrin, the animal cannot be slaughtered unless there is an expert." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah deals with a butcher who sells meat that comes from an animal that should not have been slaughtered.", + "If one slaughtered a first born and it became known that he had not shown it [to an expert]: That which [the purchasers] have eaten, they ate, and he must return the money to them. That which they have not yet eaten, the flesh must be buried and he must return the money to them. If the butcher slaughters and then sells the meat of a first born without first showing it to an expert to determine whether it was blemished, the meat cannot be eaten. If they have already eaten some of the meat, there is nothing they can do about it. However, he still must pay them their money back, even though they ate the meat. This is a penalty for selling a first born without making sure it was first blemished. The meat that has not yet been eaten must be buried, as is the rule for a sacrifice that was slaughtered outside the Temple. Obviously, he must also pay them back for this meat.", + "And likewise if one slaughtered a cow and sold it and it became known that it was terefah: That which [the purchasers] have eaten, they ate, and he must return the money to them. That which they have not eaten, they return the flesh to him and he must return the money to them. If [the purchasers], sold it to non-Jews or cast it to dogs, they must pay him the price of a terefah. The rule is similar for a butcher who sells the meat of an animal that was actually a terefah (an animal with a wound or illness that would have caused it to die such an animal cannot be eaten). The butcher must pay his customers back for the meat they ate because he is penalized for carelessly selling terefah meat. Meat that they have not eaten should be returned to him and he can either feed it to animals or sell it to non-Jews, since it is permitted to derive benefit (but not eat) a terefah. Obviously, he must pay them back for this meat. If they had already sold the meat to non-Jews or gave it to an animal, then they must pay him the amount that a terefah costs, which is much cheaper than a kosher animal. If they already paid him for kosher meat, he will have to return to them the difference." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nChapter six delineates the types of blemishes that disqualify a first born animal from being sacrificed. The Torah lists only two types of blemishes “lame and blind” (see Deuteronomy 15:21). However, the same verse also states, “any serious blemish.” From this verse the rabbis derive that any blemish that is significant like being lame and blind, renders the animal unfit. The general rule is that the blemish must be visible and a type of blemish that doesn’t heal.\nToday’s mishnah deals with blemishes of the ear.", + "In consequence of the following blemishes a first-born animal may be slaughtered:
If its ear has become defective, from the cartilages [inward] but not if the defect is in the ear-flap; In order for the defect in the ear to disqualify the animal, it must be in the inner, cartilage part of the ear, and not in the flappy outside part. To be defective means that part of the ear has been removed.", + "If it is slit although there was no loss [of substance]; The animal is also disqualified if the entire cartilage part is slit, even if no part of the ear is missing.", + "If it is perforated with a hole as large as a karshinah A karshinah is a type of legume. If the ear has a hole in it the size of this legume, the animal is disqualified.", + "Or if [the ear] has become dry. What is considered “becoming dry”? If when pierced no drop of blood comes out. Rabbi Yose ben Meshullam says: [it] is dry when it crumbles [when touched]. A dry and withered out ear also disqualifies the animal. There are two opinions as to what makes an ear considered to be dry and withered out. The first is that it is void of blood. The second is that it is so dry that it crumbles when touched." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with blemishes of the eye. Leviticus 21:20 states that a priest that has a blemish in his eye cannot serve on the altar. Our mishnah explains what that means, at least with regard to the blemished animal.", + "One whose eyelid is pierced, defected or slit, If the eyelid is pierced, defected or slit, the animal is considered blemished.", + "Or if the eye has a cataract, or a tevalul, halazon [snail-shaped], nahash [snake-shaped] or a [berry-shaped] growth on the eye, [the animal is disqualified]. Most of this section deals with various growths on the eye. A cataract will also disqualify the animal.", + "What is a tevalul? The white of the eye breaking through the ring and entering into the black. But if the black breaks through the ring and goes into the white, it is not a [disqualifying] blemish, because there are no disqualifying blemishes as regards the white of the eye. The mishnah now explains “tevalul” which is the word used in Leviticus 21:20 for an eye blemish. If a white thread goes out from the white of the eye and enters the pupil, the animal is considered blemished, because this would affect its vision. However, if the black has broken through to the white the animal is not considered blemished, because blemishes have to be the pupil and not to the white part of the eye." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah continues to deal with blemishes of the eye.", + "Havarvar [white spots] on the cornea and water constantly dripping from the eye, [are disqualifying blemishes]. The two blemishes discussed here are white spots on the cornea, which is probably a type of cataract and water dripping from the eye, which probably means that the animal has an eye infection.", + "What do we mean by a permanent hawarwar? If it remained for a period of eighty days. Rabbi Hanina ben Antigonus says: we must examine it three times in the eighty days. In order for the white spots to be considered a blemish they must be present for eighty days in a row. Rabbi Hanina ben Antigonus adds in that we must check at least three times during the eighty days. It is not sufficient if we know that the white spots were there in the beginning of the eighty days and at the end.", + "And the following are cases of constant dripping from the eye [and how to test its permanency]: if it ate [for a cure] fresh [fodder] and dry [fodder] from a field sufficiently watered by rain [it is a permanent blemish, if not cured]. [If it ate] fresh [fodder] and then dry [fodder] from a field requiring artificial irrigation, or if it ate dry [fodder] first and then fresh [fodder from field watered by rain] it is not a blemish unless it eats dry [fodder] after the fresh. There is a cure for a dripping eye to eat first fresh fodder and then dry fodder from a field irrigated by rain. If the animal eats this cure and it isn’t healed then the animal has a permanent blemish. However, if he eats fodder from an artificially irrigated field or dry fodder and then fresh fodder from a rain-irrigated field, and the eye continues to drip, it is not a sign of a permanent blemish because the animal did not eat the proper cure." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah deals with defects of the nose and mouth.", + "If its nose is perforated, defective, or slit, or its upper lip perforated, defective, or slit [these are disqualifying blemishes]. If there is any defect of the nose or upper lip, the first born is considered blemished and it may be slaughtered.", + "If the outer incisors are defective or leveled [to the gum] or the molars are torn out [completely], [these are disqualifying blemishes]. But Rabbi Hanina ben Antigonus says: we do not examine behind the molars, nor the molars themselves. I have translated this section to refer to the defects of the teeth. The words may also be understood as referring to defects of the gums. In any case, the rule is stricter with regard to the outer incisors than it is for the inner molars. For the inner molars to be considered defective, they must be completely torn out." + ], + [ + "Today’s mishnah deals with defects in an animal’s genitalia.
If the sheath [of the penis] is defective or the genitals of a female animal in the case of sacrificial offerings [it is defective.] If the sheath that holds the male penis is defective, it won’t heal and therefore it constitutes a permanent wound. A female animal whose genitalia are defective cannot be offered as a sacrifice. It is not relevant to say that it cannot be a first-born since a bekhor (a first-born) must be a male.", + "If the tail is mutilated from the bone but not from the joint; or if the top end [root] of the tail is bared to the bone; or if there is flesh between one joint and another [in the tail] to the amount of a finger's breadth [the animal is defective]. There are three defects listed here: 1) If the tail is mutilated on its bone part, then the animal is defective because the wound will not heal. However, if it is mutilated on the joint between the segments it can still be sacrificed as a first born. 2) If the root end of the tail is bared to the bone. 3) If there is too much space between the joints of the tail." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to deal with blemishes to an animal’s genitalia.", + "If [a first born] has no testicles or if it only has one testicle, [it is a blemish]. The lack of one or both testicles is considered a defect.", + "Rabbi Ishmael says: if it has two pouches, then it has two testicles, but if it only has one pouch, then it only has one testicle. The remainder of the mishnah deals with how one determines if an animal has both testicles [since this is not a test that I have ever administered, I will assume that how many testicles an animal has is not readily apparent.] Rabbi Ishmael says that one simply counts the pouches. If it has two pouches, then it has two testicles and is not defective.", + "Rabbi Akiva says: [the animal] is placed on its buttocks and he squeezes [the pouch]. If a testicle is [in there, inside the pouch] it will eventually come out. Rabbi Akiva does not believe that if there are two pouches there are necessarily two testicles. Rather one must test the animal to see if there are really two inside there.", + "It happened that one squeezed it and [the testicle] did not come out, but when it was slaughtered [the testicle] was found attached to the loins, and Rabbi Akiva permitted [the animal] while Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri prohibited it. It seems that this story supports Rabbi Ishmael’s view, because Rabbi Akiva’s test does not work. The animal is tested and the testicle does not come out, even though it is later revealed to have been there. This animal had both testicles and therefore it should not have been slaughtered. Generally, if a first-born is slaughtered when it shouldn’t have been, the meat is prohibited. However, Rabbi Akiva allows the animal to be eaten, because according to Rabbi Akiva if the testicle does not emerge when squeezed it is blemished. Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri prohibited the animal because it was not blemished and should not have been slaughtered." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with defects in the legs and feet.", + "If [a first born] has five legs or if it has only three legs, or if its feet are uncloven like that of a donkey, or if it is a shahul or a kasul [these are blemishes]. An extra or a missing leg renders an animal defective, as do several other defects in the leg.", + "What is a shahul? [An animal] with a dislocated hip. What is a kasul? [An animal] one of whose hips is higher than the other. The mishnah now defines the terms shahul and kasul. The first term refers to an animal with a dislocated hip, whereas the second term refers to an animal whose hips are of different height. Both defects make a first born animal fit for slaughter." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah begins by continuing to discuss blemishes of the leg. It then continues with a discussion of some additional blemishes that were added by a sage named Ila.", + "If the bone of the fore-leg or of its hind-leg is broken, even though it is not noticeable, [this is a blemish]. A broken leg counts as a blemish even if the break is not noticeable.", + "These blemishes Ila enumerated in Yavneh and the sages agreed with him. As we learned in mishnah 4:5, Ila was an expert on animal blemishes, perhaps we might call him the veterinarian of his times. The above list of blemishes was recited by Ila in front of the sages in Yavneh, after the destruction of the Temple. They agreed with him that these blemishes disqualify the first-born animal from being sacrificed.", + "He also added another three cases [of blemishes]. They said to him: we have only heard these [already mentioned previously]. The above list was one that Ila had received from his teachers, and therefore the rabbis accepted it. In other words, Ila’s authority stemmed from his knowledge of tradition and not his scientific acumen. We know this because when Ila added a few more blemishes, the rabbis disagreed with him. They were willing to accept only the blemishes that they had already heard about, and not those that Ila personally added.", + "[The three added by Ila were]: one whose eyeball is round like that of a human or whose mouth is like that of a pig or if the greater part of the speaking part of the tongue has been removed. A subsequent court ruled however: each of these cases is a [disqualifying] blemish. The mishnah now lists the blemishes that Ila added. Interestingly, a subsequent court agreed with Ila. Perhaps this demonstrates a shift in how courts adjudicated halakhah. While the earlier rabbis accepted only tradition, later rabbis began to accept the authority of the innovations of individual rabbis." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah lists a few additional blemishes which disqualify the first born.", + "It happened that the lower jaw [of a first born] was larger than the upper jaw. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel asked the sages [for a ruling] and they said: this is a blemish. In this case an animal seems to be blemished, but Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel is not sure if the blemish is sufficient to disqualify it. He brings the animal in front of the other sages and they rule that it is a blemish and it is disqualified.", + "The ear of a kid which was doubled: the sages ruled: if it is all one bone, it is a blemish, but if it is not all one bone, it is not a blemish. If the kid seems to have one ear inside of another ear, the kid is considered blemished if the ear has only one “bone” meaning one ear lobe. This would seem to refer to a case where the external lobe was bent over and turned into the internal ear. However, if the “bone” (the lobe) is split at the top, the animal is not blemished. We should note that the reason for this is unclear and indeed the Rambam has a different and opposite version of the mishnah: if it is one bone it is blemished but if it is not one bone, it is not blemished.", + "Rabbi Hanina ben Gamaliel says: if the tail of a kid is like that of a pig, or if the tail does not possess three vertebrae, this is a blemish. If a kid’s tail looks like a pig’s tail, or does not have the full three vertebrae, the animal is blemished." + ], + [ + "Rabbi Hanina ben Antigonus says: if [a first born] has a wart in its eye or if a bone of its fore-leg or hind-leg is defective, or if the bone of the mouth split, or one eye is large and the other small, or one ear is large and the other small, being visibly so and not merely in measurement [all of these are blemishes].
Rabbi Judah says: if one testicle is as large as two of the other [this is a blemish]. But the sages didn’t agree with him.
In the first section of this mishnah, Rabbi Hanina ben Antigonus adds several more defects to the list. In the second section, Rabbi Judah adds another defect, but the other sages disagree with him.
Since the mishnah is quite clear on its own, there is no commentary below." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis is the final mishnah that lists blemishes that disqualify an animal.", + "If the tail of a calf does not reach the joint, [it is a blemish]. The sages said: the growth of all calves is in this manner, as long as [the animals] grow, the tails also extend [below]. To which joint does this refer? Rabbi Hanina ben Antigonus says: the joint in the middle of the hip. According to the first opinion, if the tail does not reach the joint in the middle of the hip, the joint that connects the thigh bone with the thigh, the animal is defective. The other sages disagree and say that it is normal for the tail to grow slowly. Thus if early in life the tail does not reach the hip joint, it is not a blemish because it will grow later.", + "In consequence of these blemishes we may slaughter a firstborn animal, and consecrated animals rendered unfit [for the altar] in consequence of these blemishes may be redeemed. This section relates to all of the blemishes listed above in the chapter. If a first born has any one of these blemishes it may be slaughtered and it need not be brought to the Temple as a sacrifice. If a consecrated animal develops one of these blemishes it cannot be offered as a sacrifice and must be redeemed for money." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe blemishes listed in this mishnah disqualify an animal from being valid as a sacrifice. However, they are not permanent blemishes and therefore if the animal is a first born, it may not be slaughtered. Basically, all the owner can do is wait until either the blemish goes away or a permanent blemish develops.", + "And in consequence of the following blemishes one may not slaughter a first born either in the Temple or in the rest of the state: This is an introduction to the rest of the mishnah.", + "White spots on the cornea and water [dripping from the eye] which are not permanent, These blemishes were listed in mishnah three. If they are not permanent, the animal may not be slaughtered, although it may not be sacrificed.", + "Or molars which have been broken but not torn out [completely]; Problems with the molars were listed in mishnah four. Since they have not been torn out, the blemish is not permanent.", + "Or [an animal] affected with garav, a wart, or hazazit. A garav and a hazazit are kinds of boil. Since boils and warts are impermanent, they do not allow the first born to be slaughtered.", + "An old [animal] or a sick one, [an animal] of offensive smell; An old, sick or foul-smelling animal cannot be sacrificed, but since these are not exactly blemishes, they also can’t be slaughtered.", + "Or [an animal] which with a transgression has been committed or an animal which is known to have killed a human being on the testimony of one witness or of the owners. If two witnesses see an animal commit a transgression, either having sexual relations with a human or killing a human, the animal must be executed and can obviously not be sacrificed. However, if there is only witness, or if the owners were the witnesses, then the animal need not be executed. However, since it did commit a capital crime, it cannot be sacrificed but neither can it be slaughtered to be eaten.", + "A tumtum or a hermaphrodite cannot be slaughtered, neither in the Temple or in the rest of the state. Rabbi Ishmael however says: there is no greater blemish than that [of a hermaphrodite]. But the sages say: it is not considered a first-born and it may be shorn and worked with. A tumtum is an animal (or human being) with neither male nor female genitalia, whereas a hermaphrodite has both sets of genitalia. There are three opinions as to the status of a first born that is a tumtum or a hermaphrodite. According to the first opinion, while it cannot be sacrificed, because it is blemished, it also cannot be slaughtered and eaten. Rabbi Ishmael holds that it is blemished and therefore it can be slaughtered and eaten. The other sages say that such an animal is not even considered a first born because it may not be a male. They too would hold that it can be slaughtered and eaten." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nSince chapter six dealt with blemishes that render an animal unfit to be a sacrifice, this chapter lists blemishes that disqualify a priest from serving in the Temple.", + "These blemishes [named above], whether permanent or transitory, make human beings unfit [to serve in the Temple]. The same blemishes that disqualify animals also disqualify priests from serving in the Temple. That a priest with a blemish cannot serve in the Temple is stated in Leviticus 21:21, “No man among the offspring of Aaron the priest who has a defect shall be qualified to offer the Lord’s gift; having a defect, he shall not be qualified to offer the food of his God.” Our chapter will explain and expand the list found in this chapter of Leviticus.", + "There are more than this concerning human beings: kilon, liftan, makkaban, one whose head is angular or shekifas . There are other defects that also can prevent a man from serving as a priest. The defects in this section refer to various types of misshapen heads. A kilon is one with a wedge-shaped head, a laftan is one with a turnip shaped head, a makkavan is one with a hammer-shaped head and a shekifas is one with a bent head. In other words, for a priest to serve in the Temple, his head must be shaped in a normal fashion.", + "A hunchback: Rabbi Judah considers him fit, Whereas the sages consider him unfit. The sages debate whether a hunchback can serve as a priest in the Temple. Rabbi Judah says that it does not disqualify him from serving, whereas the sages consider him unfit." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah deals with various defects concerning the hair on one’s head.", + "A bald-headed person is unfit [for the priesthood]. What is considered bald-headed? One who does not have a line of hair from ear to ear. If he has one, then he is fit. One who is bald cannot serve in the Temple. However, this is limited to one who is really bald, a man who doesn’t even have a line of hair from one ear to the other. Those, like me, who are bald but have a little bit of hair, can, thankfully, fulfill their role as priests (now if only my father was a kohnen..).", + "One who has no eyebrows or has only one eyebrow [is unfit], this being the gibben mentioned in the Torah. Rabbi Dosa says: one whose eyebrows lie flat [overshadowing the eyes]. Rabbi Hanina ben Antigonus says: one who has a double back or a double spine. In the chapter dealing with the blemishes of the priest, the Torah lists the “gibben” (Leviticus 21:20). The rabbis debate what this word means. According to the first opinion, a “gibben” has a problem with his eyebrows. He either has no eyebrows, or only one. Rabbi Dosa says that the problem is slightly different his eyebrows are long and hang over his eyes. Rabbi Hanina believes that the problem has nothing to do with eyebrows, but rather with the back. The person looks as if he has two backs or two spines." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah continues to deal with defects of the eyes.", + "A harum is unfit [for the priesthood]. What is a harum? One who can paint both of his eyes with one movement. A harum is one who can paint both of his eyes with one movement. This is interpreted to mean that his nose is sunken in, so that he could paint both eyes with one stroke.", + "If both of his eyes were above or both of his eyes were below; or if one one eye was above and the other below; The mishnah now continues to list other eye defects. If both eyes are higher or lower than normal, or if they are uneven, one eye being higher than the other, then he may not serve in the Temple.", + "Or one who sees the room and the ceiling in one glance; This seems to mean that he is cross-eyed, one eye looking up and one eye looking down.", + "Or one who covers [his eyes] from the sun; If he is extremely photo-sensitive, he can’t serve. We should note that the Temple was not shaded, so for a priest who can’t bear the sun, serving at the altar might have been unbearable.", + "A zugdos and a tziran. A zugdos is interpreted as being a person with eyes or eyebrows of different colors. A tziran is one whose eyes constantly water. All of these visual defects disqualify a priest from serving in the Temple.", + "One whose eyelashes have fallen off is unfit [for the priesthood] for appearance sake. The rabbis stated that one whose eyelashes have fallen out cannot serve in the Temple, because his appearance is strange. In other words, he does not have a defect that prevents him from serving, but we don’t let him serve because of his strange appearance." + ], + [ + "One whose eyes are as large as a calf's or as small as those of a goose;
Or whose body is [unduly] large for his limbs, [unduly] small for his limbs; or whose nose is [unduly] large for his limbs, or whose nose is [unduly] small for his limbs;
A tzimem and a zimea. What is tzimea? One whose ears are very small. What is tzimem? One whose ears resemble a sponge.
If some of a person’s limbs, nose or ears are either too large or too small, the person cannot serve as a priest. Basically, we can summarize that the rabbis thought the priest should look normal and have normal proportions.
I might want to add at this point, that in the ancient world it was thought that a strange outer appearance reflects a problematic inner self, perhaps lack of morality or lack of intelligence. While today we know that this is often, and perhaps usually not so, we should, I believe, acknowledge, that it is sometimes so, and that sometimes, mental problems accompany physical defects. It is not surprising that people in the pre-modern world, including rabbis, took this as the rule. Thankfully, though, we now understand better that, as they say, “one should not judge a book by its cover.”
The mishnah is pretty straightforward, so I will explain only where I feel necessary.
Section three: The only section that probably needs explanation is the “tzimem” whose ears resemble a sponge. According to Rashi, this means that they are shrunken and closed. Maimonides interprets it to mean large and swollen. In either case, they are deformed." + ], + [ + "If the upper lip overlaps the lower or the lower lip overlaps the upper, behold this is a blemish.
One whose teeth have fallen out is unfit [for the priesthood] for appearance sake.
If his breasts hang down like those of a woman, or his belly is swollen, or his navel sticks out, or if he is epileptic, even once every few days, or he is subject to melancholy, a me'ushkan and a ba'al gever [all these are unfit for the priesthood].
If he has no testicles, or only one testicle, this is the “meroah ashekh” mentioned in the Torah. Rabbi Ishmael says: anyone whose testicles were crushed. Rabbi Akiva says: anyone who has wind in his testicles. Rabbi Hanina ben Antigonus says: one who has a black complexion.
More blemishes!
The first two sections are straightforward so there is no explanation below.
Section three: A “me’ushkan” is one whose testicles are unusually large. A “ba’al gever” is one whose penis is unusually large. Please do not ask me how large is too large. I’m also not sure if they had a measuring stick in the Temple ☺.
Section four: Leviticus 21:20 uses the word “meroah ashekh” to refer to a disqualifying blemish and in this section the rabbis debate its meaning. This is similar to the debate at the end of 7:2.
According to the first three opinions, the “meroah ashekh” has a problem with his testicles, either he is missing them or they are crushed. Rabbi Akiva says that the problem is that he has “wind in his testicles” meaning they are distended. As in 7:2, Rabbi Hanina ben Antigonus offers up a completely different explanation. The word “ashekh” sounds like “hoshekh” which means “dark” or “black.” So the “meroah ashekh” is one whose complexion is black." + ], + [ + "If one knocks his ankles [against each other, in walking] or rubs his legs [against each other]; a ba’al pikah and an ikkel. What is an ikkel? One whose knees do not touch each other when he puts his feet together.
If he has a lump protruding from his thumb, or if his heel projects backward, or if his feet are wide like those of a goose.
Or if his fingers lie one above the other.
If they are webbed up to the joint, he is fit, if below the root, if he cuts it, he is also fit.
If he has an additional finger and he cut it off, if there was a bone in it, he is unfit, but if not, he is fit.
If he has additional fingers and additional toes, on each hand and foot six fingers and six toes, [making altogether] twenty-four [fingers and toes]: Rabbi Judah declares him fit, But the sages declare him unfit.
One who has equal strength in both hands: Rabbi declares him unfit; But the sages declare him fit.
A kushi, a gihur, a lavkan, a kippeah, a dwarf, a deaf-mute, an imbecile, one intoxicated, or afflicted with plague marks which are clean – [these defects] disqualify in human beings but not in animals.
Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: a mad animal is not a choice sacrifice.
Rabbi Eliezer says: also those afflicted with dangling warts they are unfit in human beings but are fit in animals.
Section one: This section has to do with various unusual ways of walking.
Section two: A “lump” seems to be an extra appendage sticking out of either his thumb or big toe.
Section four: If his fingers are webbed, but only up to the middle joint, he is still fit. If they are webbed past the middle joint, he is still fit if he cuts the skin (ouch!).
Section five: If he had an extra finger that had a bone in it, he is unfit, even if he cut off the extra finger (double ouch!). If there was no bone in it, then he is fit, as long as he cuts it off.
Section six: According to II Samuel 21:20, Goliath had an extra digit on each hand and foot. Perhaps this leads Rabbi Judah to say that as long as the number of digits on each hand and foot is the same, he is not defective and can serve in the Temple. The other rabbis disagree. Just as someone with one extra finger or toe is disqualified, so too is one with an extra digit on each hand and foot.
Section seven: The rabbis considered left-handedness to be a weakness, as did pretty much everybody in the ancient world. Rabbi [Judah Ha-Nasi] thought that someone ambidextrous was simply weak in the right hand, and therefore, he was flawed. The other rabbis attributed this ability to the strength of the left and not the weakness of the right, and therefore, held that he could serve in the Temple.
Section eight: A “kushi” is a dark-skinned person. A “gihor” is a red-skinned person. A “lavkan” is an albino. A “kipeah” is a very tall and thin person. All of the types of people listed in this section cannot serve in the Temple because they are unusual and were therefore were considered to be in some way defective.
The inclusion here of a drunken priest and a priest afflicted with a plague, albeit one considered ritually clean, is exceptional for two reasons. First of all, drunkenness and being afflicted with plagues are temporary conditions, whereas the other conditions are permanent. Second, and more importantly, all of the other categories refer to priests with blemishes in their personal appearance, whereas drunkenness is not. It seems likely that the mishnah included these two categories here because they belong with the list of things that disqualify a human being but not an animal.
Section nine: According to Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel, a mad animal may also not be offered as a sacrifice.
Section ten: Rabbi Eliezer adds in another blemish which disqualifies human beings from serving, but not animals from being sacrificed hanging warts (yick!)." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah deals with blemishes that do not disqualify human beings, even though they do disqualify animals from being sacrifices.", + "The following are fit in the case of human beings, but unfit in the case of animals:
A father with his son, It is forbidden to slaughter an animal and its offspring on the same day. If one does slaughter both on the same day, the second one cannot be used as a sacrifice (see Hullin, chapter five). However, a priest and his son can both serve in the Temple on the same day.", + "A terefah; A terefah is an animal that has been wounded or is sick and is going to die from the wound or illness (see Hullin, chapter three). If a priest has the signs of being a terefah, he may still serve in the Temple.", + "One born by means of a caesarean section. An animal born through a caesarean section cannot be sacrificed, but a person born of a caesarean section can still serve in the Temple.", + "One with which a sin has been committed or has killed a person; An animal with which a sin (such as a sexual sin) has been committed or an animal has killed a person cannot be offered as a sacrifice (see above 6:12). However, these do not disqualify a priest from serving in the Temple.", + "A priest who contracts an illegal marriage is unfit [for the priesthood] until he vows not to derive any benefit from the woman. Leviticus 21 lists women whom a priest may not marry. If a priest marries such a woman he must divorce her. Marrying such a woman disqualifies him from serving at the altar until he takes a vow not to derive any more benefit from the marriage, neither sexually nor financially. Once he takes the vow he can serve again, even before he divorces her.", + "One who makes himself unclean through contact with the dead is unfit, until he undertakes that he will no longer make himself unclean through the dead. A priest is forbidden from intentionally coming into contact with the dead, except for his seven close relatives. If a priest intentionally defiles himself by coming into contact with the dead, he cannot serve at the altar until he promises to stop doing so. In this case, he need not take a vow, probably because it is less tempting for him to continue to defile himself, then it is for him to continue to be with his prohibited woman." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah deals with the laws concerning the human firstborn. There are two special rules with regard to the human first born: 1) he gets a double portion of his father’s inheritance (see Deuteronomy 21:17); 2) he must be redeemed from the priest for five shekels (see Numbers 18:16). Determining who is a firstborn is, however, different for these two matters. Our mishnah defines what firstborn counts as a firstborn for which of these two laws.", + "There is one who is [counted as] a firstborn [with respect to] inheritance but not with respect to redemption from a priest; a firstborn with respect to redemption from a priest but not a firstborn [with respect] to inheritance; a firstborn [with respect to both] inheritance and redemption from a priest; and a firstborn [in respect] to neither inheritance nor redemption from a priest. This is an introduction to the remainder of the chapter. When it comes to who is considered a firstborn for the two relevant matters, all possibilities are open.", + "Which is a firstborn [with respect] to inheritance but not to redemption from a priest? One which follows one which was not viable whose head came forth alive, or one born in the ninth month whose head came out dead, or when a woman aborts something that looks like an animal, beast or bird, the words of Rabbi Meir. But the sages say: [it is not considered an opening of the womb] until [the abortion] has the form of a human being. This section lists infants that count as being the firstborn for matters of inheritance but do not need to be redeemed from the priest. The first case seems to be that of twins. The first child is not viable, meaning that he is premature. This child’s head emerges from the womb and then it goes back into the womb, after which the other child is born. The child that is born counts as the first born for inheritance, but does not need to be redeemed. A firstborn male needs to be redeemed only if he “opened his mother’s womb” and since the other child opened his mother’s womb, the second child need not be redeemed. However, he does inherit because he is the first child actually born. There are some problems with this interpretation, namely that it is impossible for one of a set of twins to be premature whereas the other is ready to be born. Nevertheless, it seems possible, in my mind, that the rabbis believed that a pregnant woman could become pregnant again and therefore have “twins,” one of whom is more mature than the other. The second case is where a fully mature child (a nine months child) has his head emerge from the womb but is dead. Then his head goes back into the womb and the other twin is born. The live twin counts as the first born for inheritance but since he didn’t open the womb, he need not be redeemed. Finally, if a woman aborts a fetus that has the shape of an animal or bird, the first opinion counts this as “opening the womb” and therefore the next born male need not be redeemed. However, since the miscarriage did not have a human form, it does not count as the first born for matters of inheritance and the second child receives the double portion. This is Rabbi Meir’s opinion. The other sages hold that if the miscarriage does not have a human form it does not count as having opened the womb. The next child is a first-born for both matters.", + "If [a woman] aborts a sandal or a placenta or a fetus having an articulated shape, or if an embryo came out by pieces, [the infant] which follows after them is a first-born [with respect] to inheritance but not a first-born for redemption from a priest. In all of these cases the woman aborts something that is considered as having opened the womb, but does not count as a firstborn. Therefore, the next born child receives the double inheritance but does not need to be redeemed. The first case is a “sandal.” This seems to be a flat piece of flesh that resembles a sandal. It seems to either accompany a fetus or once was a fetus. The second case is a placenta that inevitably accompanies a fetus, so it is a sign that there was at some point a fetus. The third case is a fetus that has a human shape, and the fourth case is where the aborted fetus is recognizably human but is cut up into pieces. In all of these cases the fetus counts as having opened the womb, but does not count as being the first born for matters of inheritance.", + "If one who never had children married a woman who had already given birth, even if she had given birth when she was a slave but is now free, or [had given birth] when she was a non-Jew but has since converted, if after coming to the Israelite she gave birth, [the infant] is considered a first-born [with respect] to inheritance but not a first-born for redemption from a priest. Rabbi Yose the Galilean says: [the infant] is a firstborn [with respect] to inheritance and for redemption from a priest, as it says: “Whatever opens the womb in Israel” (Exodus 13:2), meaning only if it opens the womb in Israel. In these cases a man who has never had children marries a woman who has had children. This is his firstborn but not hers. In general, this means that the child gets the double inheritance from the father, but does not need to be redeemed because he did not open the mother’s womb. This is true even if the first child was conceived and born while the woman was not Jewish (or not free). Since her first free, Jewish child did not open the womb, he is not the first born for redemption. Rabbi Yose the Galilean holds that the child does not count as having opened his mother’s womb unless he is born while she is Jewish and free. He interprets “opens the womb in Israel” to mean that the child opens the womb of a woman who is alread “in Israel,” of Jewish status.", + "If one had children already and married a woman who had never given birth previously Sections five, six, seven and eight describe cases where the child counts as a firstborn with regard to being redeemed by a priest but not for the sake of inheritance. We will start with section five. In this case, the man has already had kids so the first-born with his next wife cannot be the first born for matters of inheritance.", + "Or if she converted when pregnant, or if she was freed when pregnant, and she gave birth; If a woman became pregnant for the first time while a non-Jew or a slave and was then converted or freed and then gave birth, since her child was born while she was already an Israelite, the child counts as a first-born for matters of redemption. However, it does not inherit from its father because the child was conceived while the woman was still not a Jew.", + "If she and a priestess gave birth, she and a Levite’s daughter, she and a woman who had already given birth; This section deals with kids who get mixed up at birth. If a child of a woman who has never given birth is mixed up with a child of a woman who is exempt, such as the son of a priestess, woman of Levite descent or a woman who already gave birth, both children need to be redeemed, because either of them could be the true first born.", + "And similarly [if a woman] who did not wait three months after her husband's death, married and gave birth and it is not known if the infant was born in the ninth month since the death of the first [husband] or in the seventh month since she married the second, it is a firstborn for redemption from a priest but not a first-born [with respect] to inheritance. A widow should wait three months to remarry after her first husband has died in order to determine whether her next child is the first husband’s or the second’s. If she does not wait, and she becomes pregnant immediately, the child does not inherit from either father, because the “certain” inheritors can claim that the child cannot prove who his father was. The child does need to be redeemed because he is a first-born to his mother. However, he will have to redeem himself when he gets older, because he has no “certain” father who is obligated to do so on his behalf.", + "Which is a firstborn both [in respect] of inheritance and for redemption from a priest? If [a woman] miscarries a sac full of blood or full of water or full of pieces of flesh; or if [a woman] miscarries something with the shape of fish or locusts or reptiles, or creeping things, or if she discharges on the fortieth day [of conception], [the infant] which follows after [these discharges] is a firstborn both [in respect] of inheritance and for redemption from a priest. Finally the mishnah lists some cases where the child is a first-born for both matters, even though there might be reason to think otherwise. In all of these cases the woman has either a very early miscarriage or some sort of discharge that does not have the shape of a human fetus. These various types of discharges do not count as having opened her womb and therefore the child born afterwards is considered to be the first-born for both inheritance and redemption." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah deals with matters relating to a child born of a caesarean section, called in Hebrew one who goes out from the wall.", + "A fetus extracted by means of a caesarean section and one that follows neither is a first-born for inheritance or a first-born to be redeemed from a priest. According to the first opinion, a child born through a c-section does not count as a first born because he wasn’t actually “born.” He doesn’t inherit, nor does he need to be redeemed because he didn’t open his mother’s womb. However, the next child doesn’t count as the first born either, because he is not his father’s first child. Also, even if the mother survives the c-section and has another child, it is not considered the first-born for redemption, because his mother already had a viable child, even though it didn’t “open her womb.” We should note that in mishnaic times, it would have been exceedingly rare for a woman to survive a c-section. Nevertheless, the mishnah accounts for the possibility.", + "Rabbi Shimon says: the first is a first-born for inheritance and the second is a first-born as regards [the redemption] with five selas. Rabbi Shimon disagrees completely. The first child, born of a c-section, counts as the first for inheritance, because it is its father’s first born. The second child needs to be redeemed because it “opens its mother’s womb.” It must be redeemed from the priest for five selas, which are equivalent to the five shekels mentioned in the Torah." + ], + [ + "If a man's wife had never before given birth and she gave birth to two males, he gives five sela's to the priest.
If one of them dies within thirty days [of birth] the father is exempt.
If the father dies and the sons survive: Rabbi Meir says: if they gave the five sela's before the property was divided up, then what they gave is given; but if not, they are exempt. But Rabbi Judah says: there is a claim on the property.
If she gave birth to a male and a female, the priest receives nothing.
This mishnah deals with a case where twins are born, but it is unclear which child came out first.
Section one: One of these boys is certainly the first born and one is certainly not. Therefore, the father pays five selas to the priest, but does not pay twice.
Section two: A child who dies before he reaches thirty days never has a chance to be redeemed and his father is exempt. In this case, since we don’t know if the first or second born died, the father is exempt, because he can say to the priest, “prove to me that the first born survived and I will give you your five selas.” This accords with the general principle that the burden of proof is upon the claimant.
Section three: If the father dies before he has a chance to redeem one of the sons, then legally the sons must redeem themselves. However, the problem is that each son can claim that he is not the first-born and therefore doesn’t need to be redeemed. According to Rabbi Meir, if they already gave five selas to the priest before the property was divided up, then they cannot get their money back. However, if their father’s property was divided up before the five selas were given to the priest, they are exempt because each son can claim that he is not the first born.
Rabbi Judah disagrees and holds that there is a debt hanging over the father’s property and that debt must be paid off, regardless of the fact that we don’t know which of the sons is a first born." + ], + [ + "Two women who had never before given birth gave birth to two males: he [the father] gives ten selas to the priest.
If one of the children dies within thirty days [of its birth], if he gave the redemption money to one priest alone, he returns five selas to him, but if he gave it to two priests, he cannot reclaim the money from them.
If they gave birth to a male and a female or to two males and a female, he gives five selas to the priest.
If they gave birth to two females and a male, or to two males and two females, the priest receives nothing.
If one woman had given birth before and the other had never given birth, and they gave birth to two males, he gives five selas to the priest.
If one of the children died within thirty days [of its birth], the father is exempt.
If the father dies and the sons survive: Rabbi Meir says: if they gave the five sela's before the property was divided up, then what they gave is given; but if not, they are exempt. But Rabbi Judah says: there is a claim on the property.
If they gave birth to a male and a female, the priest receives nothing.
This mishnah deals with a case where two different women gave birth for the first time and their children got mixed up. Note that this mishnah is very similar to the mishnah concerning animals whose first borns are mixed up (see 2:7).
Section one: In this case both children are certainly first born males, so the father must give ten selas to the priest.
Section two: In this case one of the sons dies before he reaches thirty days. The father should have given only five selas to one priest. If he had already given ten selas to one priest, then he can ask for five back. However, if he had given five selas to one priest and five to another, he can’t recover either, because both priests can claim that their money was used to redeem the living son.
Section three: If the two women gave birth to one male and one female, or between them two males and one female, then there is only one child who is certainly a first born male. The other male may be the younger brother of the first born female. Therefore, he only gives five selas to the priest.
Section four: If there are two females and either one or two males, then it is possible that neither male is a first-born, so the priest receives nothing.
Section five: In this case, one child is certainly a first-born and one is certainly not. Therefore, he gives five selas to the priest.
Section six: This is the same debate we saw in section three of yesterday’s mishnah. For reference, see there.
Section seven: If the two give birth one to a male and one to a female, the priest receives nothing because we can’t be sure that there was a first born male." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah introduces other various scenarios where children become mixed up and it is unclear if one is liable for redemption as a first born.", + "If two women who had never before given birth married two men and gave birth to two males, the one father gives five selas to the priest and the other gives five selas to the priest. Since both children are first born boys, it is obvious that both fathers must give five selas to a priest to redeem their sons.", + "If one of the children died within thirty days [of its birth], if they gave the redemption money to one priest alone, he returns five selas to them, but if they gave the money to two priests, they are not able to recover it from them. Since one died before reaching thirty days, only one of the fathers needed to redeem his son. It is uncertain which father must give. If they both gave the five selas to the same priest, the priest must return five selas and they can split it between them. However, if they gave the money to two priests, then each priest can claim that he received the money for the living child and he doesn’t have to return it. The fathers will not be able to recover any money.", + "If they gave birth to a male and a female, the fathers are exempt, whereas the son must redeem himself [as in any case he is a first-born]. In this case, the male is definitely a first born but it is unclear who his father is. The father is therefore exempt from redeeming the son. However, the son, who is after all a first born, must redeem himself when he is old enough to do so.", + "If they gave birth to two females and a male or to two females and two males, the priest receives nothing. In this case, it is possible that none of the children is a first born male, and therefore the priest receives nothing." + ], + [ + "If one woman had given birth before and the other had never before given birth, the two women belonging to two husbands, and they gave birth to two males, the one whose wife had never before given birth gives five selas to the priest. In this case, two men each have one wife and one wife has previously given birth and one has not. If they both give birth to a male, it is obvious that the husband of the wife who has never given birth owes five selas.", + "If they gave birth to a male and a female, the priest receives nothing. If one woman gives birth to a boy and the other to a girl, the priest doesn’t receive anything because it is possible that the boy was born to the woman who had already given birth.", + "If the son dies within thirty days although he gave the priest [the five selas], he must return them. This section refers to a son who is certainly a first born. If he dies before he is thirty days old, then there was never any obligation for him to be redeemed, and if the father has already given the money to the priest, the priest must return it.", + "If he dies after thirty days, although he has not yet given the five selas, he (the must give them. If the son dies after thirty days, the father is still obligated to redeem his son. In other words, the obligation to redeem comes into existence when the son hits thirty days. The fact that the son has died before the father gave the money to the priest does not annul this obligation.", + "If he dies on the thirtieth day, it is as if he died on the previous day. But Rabbi Akiva says: if he gave [the five selas] he cannot reclaim them, but if he had not yet given, he need not give. According to the first opinion, the obligation to redeem doesn’t exist until the thirty days are completed. Therefore, if the son dies on the thirtieth day, the priest does not receive the five selas and if he has already received them he must return them. Rabbi Akiva says that the status of the thirtieth day is doubtful. If the father has already given the money, then the priest does not need to return it. But if the father has not yet given the money, then the priest cannot make his claim.", + "If the father dies within thirty days, [the infant] is under the presumption of not having been redeemed until proof is brought that he has been redeemed. If the father dies after thirty days, the infant is under the presumption of having been redeemed until he [the son] is told that he was not redeemed. The obligation for the son to be redeemed doesn’t change just because his father dies. However, there is a chance that we don’t know if the father had given the money or not. Therefore, we must make an educated guess. If the father dies within thirty days after his son’s birth, the assumption is that he did not redeem his son, because this would not be typical. Therefore, the son must redeem himself, unless he can prove that his father already did. If, however, the father dies after thirty days, we can assume that he did redeem his son, and the son is exempt, unless people know that he was not redeemed.", + "If both he and his son need to be redeemed, the father takes precedence over his son. Rabbi Judah says: his son comes first for the command to redeem him was upon his father, and the command of his son is upon him. If a man grows up and then has a son, and realizes that he himself has not yet been redeemed, he must first redeem himself and then his son. Perhaps this is because his debt is longer overdue. Alternatively, the reason may be that if he doesn’t redeem himself, who will? Rabbi Judah disagrees. First the father must redeem his son, because that is a mitzvah incumbent upon him. Only afterwards, when he has enough money, must he redeem himself, for his redemption was supposed to be his father’s mitzvah." + ], + [ + "The five selas of a first-born [are paid in] the standard of Tyrian maneh. When we come to reckon how much the father has to pay the priest, the five selas, which are the five shekels mentioned in the Torah, are reckoned in the standard of the Tyrian maneh. A Tyrian sela consists of 14.34 grams of pure silver, so the father would have to give five times this amount.", + "As regards the thirty shekels of a slave and likewise the fifty shekels of the rapist and seducer and the one hundred shekels for one who spreads an evil name in all these cases the payment is in the holy shekel, in the standard of Tyrian maneh. Any payment that is given as a fixed monetary amount in the Torah must be paid out in holy shekel, evaluated according to the standard of the Tyrian maneh, just as is the case with redeeming the first-born. There are four such cases listed here: 1) If an ox kills a slave, the owner of the ox pays the owner of the slave thirty shekels (Exodus 21:32). 2) If a man seduces a virgin, he pays the father fifty shekels (Exodus 22:15-16). 3) If he rapes a virgin, he pays fifty shekels (Deuteronomy 22:28-29). 4) If a husband defames his wife by falsely claiming that she was not a virgin on their wedding day, he is fined 100 shekels (Deuteronomy 22:19).", + "All of these are redeemed with money or the equivalent of money with the exception of shekel payments. In all cases where something needs to be redeemed, such as a first born son or an item dedicated to the Temple, the redemption can be done either with money or with something of equivalent value. The redemption need not be done just with coins. The exception is the half shekel that is paid on a yearly basis to the Temple in Jerusalem. This half shekel must be paid in coinage." + ], + [ + "We must not redeem [a first-born] with slaves, nor with notes of indebtedness, nor with immovable properties, nor with objects of hekdesh. While a first born can be redeemed with the equivalent of money (as we learned in yesterday’s mishnah), he must be redeemed with things that are similar to money, which is a type of “moveable property.” Thus a firstborn could be redeemed by giving the priest five selas worth of grain, or five selas worth of meat, for example. In contrast, slaves, while obviously moveable, are compared with land, and therefore firstborns cannot be redeemed with either slaves or land. If someone has a debt document in which his fellow owes him five shekels, he cannot use it to redeem his first born, because this debt document is not the same as actual money. It has no inherent value. The word “hekdesh” means property dedicated to the Temple and the word does not really belong here in this mishnah, because one cannot use Temple property to redeem a first born. It is probably here due to the similarity between this mishnah and Bava Metzia 4:9 and Shevuot 6:5. The Talmud interprets it to mean that just as one cannot redeem a first born with slaves, etc., so too one cannot redeem property dedicated to the Temple with these things.", + "If one gives a written acknowledgment to a priest that he owes him five selas he is bound to give them to him, although his son is not considered as redeemed. Therefore, if the priest wishes to give him [the note of indebtedness] as a gift he is permitted to do so. A first born must be redeemed by the father actually giving money to the priest. If the father writes a note to the priest that he is liable to give him five shekels, the father has to give the priest five shekels, but this does not count as redeeming his son. The priest can give these five shekels back to the father, because they didn’t count towards the redemption. The priest cannot, however, give back the five shekels used to redeem the son.", + "If one set aside the redemption money of his son and it became lost, he is responsible for it, because it says: “Shall be for you [but] you shall surely redeem” (Numbers 18:15). If someone sets aside five shekels to use to redeem his son, and then loses them, he must restore them. This is learned midrashically from the verse in Numbers. The five shekels are only effective for redemption once they have reached the priest’s hands. Before this moment, he is not redeemed." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first-born takes a double share in the inheritance. Our mishnah mentions several limitations on this halakhah.", + "The first-born takes a double share of the father's estate but he does not take a double share of the mother’s estate. The first born takes a double share in his father’s estate, but not in his mother’s, should the sons inherit from their mother.", + "He also does not take a double share of the improvement in the value of the estate. If the value of the father’s estate has gone up from the time of the father’s death before the division of the estate, the first born takes his double share only from the value of the estate at the time of death. For instance, if there are three sons, the first born will take half of the estate. If the estate is worth 1,000 at death, he takes 500 and the other sons take 250 each. But if the estate goes up 300 in value from death to division, he only takes 100 of the added value.", + "Nor from what will fall due [to the estate] as he does of what is held in possession. If there is money or property that will eventually belong to his father but does not belong to the father at the time of his death, the first born son does not take a double share of it. For instance, let’s say the father dies before his own father dies. When the grandfather dies, the grandsons will inherit the part of the estate that their father would have inherited. Out of this part the first born grandson does not take a double portion.", + "Nor can a woman claim with her ketubah [from these], Nor can daughters claim their support. Nor can a yavam make a claim [from these]. None of these take from the improvement in the value of the estate, nor of what will fall to the estate as they do of what is now held in possession. There are three other instances where collection is limited in the same way that the first born’s collection is limited. 1: A woman collecting her ketubah payment from her husband’s estate. 2: Girls being maintained by the money left over from their father’s estate. 3: A man (yavam) who has performed yibbum (levirate marriage) with his dead brother’s wife. The yavam inherits all of his brother’s property. He would also inherit his brother’s portion of his father’s estate, but he would only take from his father’s estate and not his mother’s. Similarly, he would not take his brother’s share from the improvement. Finally, he would only take his brother’s share of his father’s estate if his father dies first, and they don’t have time to divide up the property before his brother dies and he does yibbum." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nAccording to Leviticus 25, if a person grows poor and sells his ancestral lands, the lands return to him during the Jubilee year. From here we can learn that if a person receives land as an inheritance and then he sells that land, the land is returned to him during the Jubilee year.", + "The following do not return [to their owners] in Jubilee year: Our mishnah deals with cases where a person inherits land, it does not go back to its original owners to be divided up again during the Jubilee, in the same way that land that a person inherits does not leave his possession during the Jubilee.", + "The share of the first-born, The extra portion that a son receives for being the first born. When the Jubilee year comes, this portion stays with the first born.", + "[The inheritance of] one who inherits his wife's [estate] One who inherits his wife’s estate. Although this is not his own ancestral land, when the Jubilee years comes, it stays with him and does not go back to his wife’s family.", + "[And of] one who performs yibbum with his sister-in-law As we learned in mishnah nine, when a brother performs yibbum, he inherits his brother’s estate. Again, this property stays with him at the Jubilee.", + "And a present, the words of Rabbi Meir. But the sages say: a present is like a sale. There is a debate over whether a present is restored during the Jubilee year. According to Rabbi Meir, if a person gives a piece of land to someone else as a present, the land does not revert to its original owner during the Jubilee year. The other sages disagree and hold that a present is just like a sale.", + "Rabbi Elazar says: all of these return in the Jubilee. Rabbi Elazar takes a more radical approach and holds that all of this property returns during the Jubilee to its original owners.", + "R. Johanan ben Berokah says: if one inherits his wife's estate, he returns it to the members of the family and he deducts from the purchase money. Rabbi Yohanan ben Berokah disagrees with Rabbi Meir as well and holds that a man must return his wife’s inheritance to her family at the Jubilee. However, he seems to hold that the family pays him back for the property. From this amount, he should reduce the amount that he benefited by owning the property for the years that he owned it. In this way, he doesn’t unduly profit." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThe last chapter of Bekhorot deals with the laws of animal tithes. Leviticus 27:32 states: “All tithes of the herd or flock of all that passes under the shepherd’s staff, every tenth one shall be holy to the Lord.” The laws of animal tithes are in tractate Bekhorot because they are similar in many ways to the laws regarding an animal first born. The main difference is that while a first born pure animal must be given to the priest, animal tithes are brought to Jerusalem where they are eaten as sacrifices (shelamim) by their owners.", + "The law concerning the tithe of cattle is in force in the Land and outside the Land, in the days when the Temple exists and when it does not exist, The tithing of animals is in force at all times, and in all places. Once the Temple was destroyed, one would have had to wait until the animal became blemished, and then it could be eaten anywhere. We should note that from Talmudic times and onward the laws of animal tithes were no longer observed.", + "[It applies] to hullin (non- animals only but not to consecrated animals. Only non-sacred animals must be tithed.", + "It applies both to cattle and flock animals, but they are not tithed together. Both herd (cows) and flock animals (sheep and goats) must be tithed, but they cannot be tithed together. This is because the verse says “of the herd and of the flock,” thereby separating them into two categories.", + "To lambs and to goats, and they are tithed together. Different types of flock animals can be tithed together.", + "To the new and the old, but they are not tithed together. However, animals born in different years are not tithed together. We will learn more about how an animal’s year is determined in mishnayot five and six.", + "Now it might be logical: seeing that new and old animals which are not treated as kilayim in regard to one another are yet not tithed one for the other, lambs and goats which are treated as kilyaim in regard to one another, all the more should not be tithed one for the other. Scripture therefore states: “And of the flock” all kinds of flock are considered one [for purposes of tithing]. The mishnah now notes a discrepancy in logic. Goats and sheep are considered kilayim (mixed species) together, meaning they cannot be crossbred. In contrast, new and old animals of the same type are of course not kilayim and can be crossbred. It would therefore make sense for new and old animals to be tithed together but not for sheep and goats to be tithed together. Therefore, the Torah states “of the flock” thereby combining all flock animals into one category." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nA person must tithe the tenth animal of each of his “herds.” The question is how far apart can animal’s be and still be considered as belonging to the same herd? Our mishnah deals with this issue.", + "Animals are combined for purposes of tithing so long as they can still pasture within the distance that cattle wander. If the animals are close enough together such that the shepherd can keep an eye on them while they are out pasturing, they are considered as one herd.", + "And what is the distance over which they wander while pasturing? Sixteen mils. This distance is determined to be 16 mils. A mil is about a kilometer, so 16 mils is equivalent to about 10 miles. If an owner has animals wandering around and grazing at less than this distance, they all count as one herd. But if they go beyond this distance, they don’t count as one herd and if there are ten of them born in one year, they do not join together for the purpose of tithing.", + "If there was between two groups of animals a distance of thirty-two mils, they do not combine for the purpose of tithing. If however there was one in the middle [of the distance of thirty-two mils] he brings them into the middle and tithes them. Animals separated by 32 mils, are considered to be at a “wandering distance” from one another, but not a “pasturing distance.” If all of the animals are separated by more than 16 mils, they do not join together for the sake of tithing. However, if there is one animal exactly in between the two separate herds, this animal can join the two separate herds together, and they are tithed together. In other words, if the herd to the east is 16 mils from the one in the middle which is 16 mils from the herd to the west, the middle animal joins the other two herds together.", + "Rabbi Meir says: the [river] Jordan is regarded as forming a division as regards the tithing of animals. Rabbi Meir says that if one has herds on opposite sides of the Jordan, they do not join together for tithing, because the Jordan separates them." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with animals that are exempt from the cattle tithe.\nOur mishnah mentions the “kalbon.” This is a surcharge that one has to pay when one pays the years half-shekel to the Temple. There are two relevant rules here: 1) if a father pays the ½ shekel for his son, he need not pay the kalbon. 2) If two people pay their ½ shekel together they pay only one kalbon and not two.", + "An animal bought or given as a present is exempt from the law of cattle tithe. A person is liable to tithe only the animals that are born into his property, not those that he bought or was given as a present.", + "If brothers became partners, though they are still bound to pay the kalbon [surcharge], they are exempt from the tithe of cattle. And when they become liable to tithe of cattle, they are exempt from paying the kalbon. This section refers to two different types of partnerships between brothers who have inherited from their father. The first type is when they have already divided up the inheritance and then pooled their money together to form a business partnership. In such a case they are liable for the kalbon as are all partners who pay each other’s kalbon, but they are exempt from paying the tithe on animals since partners do not pay this tithe on their shared animals. The second partnership is one in which they have not yet divided up the inheritance. In such a case the money is treated as if it still belonged to the father. They are liable for the cattle tithe but they are exempt from the kalbon, for a father who pays the half shekel for his son is exempt from the kalbon (for more information on the kalbon, see the first chapter of tracate Shekalim).", + "If they acquired from the estate, they are bound [to tithe them]. But if not, they are exempt from tithing. If the brothers bought animals from their father’s estate, when these animals give birth, they must tithe them. However, if they didn’t buy the animals from the estate, but rather shared the money from the estate and used it to buy animals, then the animals born to them are exempt, because they are owned by partners.", + "If they first divided up the estate and then again became partners, they are bound to pay the kalbon and are exempt from tithe of cattle. Once the brothers divide their father’s estate, each piece becomes each brother’s own property. The property is disconnected from the father, and therefore they must pay the kalbon. But when they form a partnership they become exempt from the animal tithe. Note that this is a repeat of the halakhah found in section two." + ], + [ + "All [domesticated animals] enter the shed to be tithed except kilayim, a terefah, offspring brought forth by means of a caesarean section, an animal too young for sacrifice, and an “orphan”. There are several types of animals that do not need to be tithed: 1) Kilayim the offspring of a mixed species. For instance, if a ram and a female goat have offspring, the offspring need not be tithed. 2) A terefah an animal with a physical defect that would cause it to die. 3) An animal born through a c-section. Such an animal doesn’t need to be tithed, because it is not, in a sense, considered to have been born. 4) An animal too young to be sacrificed an animal cannot be sacrificed until it is seven days old. It cannot be tithed until that age either. 5) An orphan animal. This is explained in the next section.", + "And what is an “orphan”? When its mother has died during its birth or was slaughtered [and subsequently gave birth.] But Rabbi Joshua says: even if the mother has been killed, if the hide is still intact the offspring is not an ‘orphan’ animal. The issue of the orphan is related to Leviticus 22:27, which states that an animal needs to be “under its mother” for seven days before it can be offered up as a sacrifice. If an animal is an orphan it need not be tithed, although it can eventually be sacrificed. According to the first opinion, if the mother doesn’t survive the birth, the offspring is an orphan and is not tithed. Rabbi Joshua says that as long as the mother’s hide is intact when the offspring is born, it is not an orphan. Albeck relates this to the practice of covering the offspring in its mother’s hide to keep it warm should the mother die during, or right before childbirth. Such an animal is “under its mother” and is therefore subject to the tithe." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah deals with when a person is supposed to tithe his animals. The concept is that one tithes one out of every ten animals born in a given year, not one out of every ten animals. Therefore, our mishnah and tomorrow’s mishnah must determine when this year begins.", + "There are three periods [lit. threshing floors] for the tithe of cattle: in the peras of Pesah, in the peras of Atzeret ( and in the peras of the Feast [of Sukkot], the words of Rabbi Akiva. “Peras” means “before” and it is interpreted in the Talmud as being fifteen days. According to Rabbi Akiva, a few weeks before all three of the pilgrimage holidays it becomes forbidden to eat any of the animals that were born since the previous holiday until he first separates any necessary animal tithes. These periods are referred to as “threshing floors” which is the end of the processing of grain. At the threshing floor produce becomes liable for tithing. The language is borrowed from that context.", + "Ben Azzai says: on the twenty-ninth of Adar, on the first of Sivan and on the twenty-ninth of Av. Ben Azzai lists the three dates in a slightly different manner. The twenty-ninth of Adar is about two weeks before Pesah, the first of Sivan is less than a week before Shavuot, and the twenty-ninth of Av is one month before Rosh Hashanah.", + "Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon say: on the first of Nisan, on the first of Sivan and on the twenty-ninth of Elul. Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon also provide slightly different dates the first of Nissan (the month with Pesah), the first of Sivan (the month with Shavuot) and the twenty-ninth of Elul, the day before Rosh Hashanah. One needs to tithe before Rosh Hashanah because Rosh Hashanah is, according to these two rabbis, the new year for animal tithes. We shall learn more about this in mishnah six (see also Rosh Hashanah 1:1).", + "And why did they say the twenty-ninth of Elul and not the first of Tishrei? Because it is a Yom Tov and you cannot tithe on a Yom Tov. Consequently they moved it up to the twenty-ninth of Elul. One cannot tithe on Rosh Hashanah because it is a festival (Yom Tov). Therefore, they moved the day up to the last day of the preceding month, Elul.", + "Rabbi Meir says: the first of Elul is the New Year for the tithe of cattle. Rabbi Meir disagrees with Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon with regard to the date for the new year for animal tithes. While they hold that it is on the first day of Tishrei, he holds that it is on the first of Elul. The anonymous opinion in the first mishnah of Rosh Hashanah accords with Rabbi Meir.", + "Ben Azzai says: those born in Elul are tithed by themselves. Ben Azzai doubts whether the halakhah is according to Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon or Rabbi Meir. The result of this doubt is that animals born in Elul are tithed on their own, because we don’t know if they should be tithed with those born before them (Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon’s opinion) or those born after them (Rabbi Meir’s opinion)." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah continues to discuss in what situation animals born at different times of the year combine for matters of tithing.", + "All those born from the first of Tishrei until the twenty-ninth of Elul combine [for matters of tithing]. Five lambs born before Rosh Hashanah and five born after Rosh Hashanah do not combine. The new year for tithing begins on Rosh Hashanah, the first of Tishrei and goes all the way to the 29th of Elul, the end of the year. Any animals born that year can and must be tithed together. This means that if ten sheep, for instance, are born that year, the owner must set aside one sheep as a tithe. However, as the mishnah illustrates, if five are born before Rosh Hashanah and five after, he need not set aside a tithe at all. To be even more extreme, if nine were born on the twenty-ninth of Elul and one was born on the first of Tishrei, no tithe must be given.", + "But five lambs born before the period [of tithing] and five after the period [of tithing] do combine [for tithing]. In mishnah five we learned about periods of the year in which one is liable to tithe. These three periods are not significant with regard to animals joining together to become liable for tithing. So if five are born before one of these periods, when the period comes he need not yet tithe. When another five are born, when the next period comes along he will have to tithe, as long as they were all born in the same calendar year.", + "If so, why did they speak of three periods for the tithe of cattle? Until the arrival of the [tithing] period it is permitted to sell and slaughter [the animals], but when the period has arrived he must not kill, but if he killed, he is exempt. The mishnah asks the logical question if the tithing periods do not effect the combining of animals, then what significance do they have? The answer is that when a tithing period comes, one must tithe one out of every ten animals that has been born from the time of the last tithing period. It is forbidden to slaughter or sell the animals until they are tithed, or at least counted for purposes of tithing. However, if he transgresses this and does slaughter the animal, there is no punishment, nor is the animal prohibited." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nAs often happens with the Mishnah, the most important information is placed last. The final two mishnayot of the tractate discuss how the animal tithe is actually done.", + "How does one tithe animals? He brings them to a shed and makes for them a small opening so that two cannot go out at the same time. And he counts them with a rod: one, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine. And the one that comes out tenth he marks with red chalk and he says: “Behold, this is [the tithe].” This section explains the basic procedure for tithing animals. This seems to be related to the description of the animal tithe in Leviticus 27:32, “All tithes of the herd or flock of all that passes under the shepherd’s staff, every tenth one shall be holy to the Lord.” In order to fulfill this mitzvah, there must be a formal counting, and it is preferable that this formal counting be done with a rod, counting the animal’s one at a time.", + "If he did not mark it, or if he did not count them with a rod, or if he counted them while they were crouching or standing, they are still considered tithed. As long as he counts the animals that he is tithing, he has fulfilled his duty and the animal that comes out tenth is tithed. It is better to count them with a rod, while they are passing through the opening and to mark the tenth one, but as long as he counts them one at a time, everyone agrees that the tithe counts.", + "If he had one hundred [lambs] and he took ten or if he had ten and he took one [without counting], this is not [a valid] tithe. Rabbi Yose bar Judah says: this is a [valid] tithe. However, if he takes out the tithed animals without formally counting, then the tithe does not count. Rabbi Yose bar Judah disagrees and says that even in this case, the tithe counts.", + "If one [of the lambs] already counted jumped back into the flock [in the shed] they are all exempt. If one of the lambs that has already been counted jumps back into the flock that has not yet been counted, then there will be a mixture of animals exempt from tithing with those liable for tithing. In such a case the law is lenient and the entire group is exempt.", + "If one of the lambs that was a tithe jumped back into the flock [in the shed], they all go to pasture until they become unfit for sacrifice, and the owners may eat them in their unfit state. However, if one of the animals that were set aside to be tithed gets mixed up with untithed animals, then every animal in the pen is potentially tithe. In such a case all of them must go out to pasture until they become blemished. A blemished tithe animal can then be eaten by its owners." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe final mishnah of the tractate deals with a case where the person erred when counting his animal tithes or a case where multiple animals came out of the pen at the same time. An interesting phenomenon to note in this mishnah is the power of words if he calls something the tenth animal, it is often holy, even if it was not actually the tenth animal that came out of the pen. This matches the typical rabbinic emphasis on the power of language to actually transform the status of real things.", + "If two [lambs] came out at the same time, he counts them in pairs. If all of the animals come out in pairs (kind of like Noah’s ark!) then he counts them in pairs. When he gets to the tenth pair, which are the 19th and 20th animals, both are holy. Another explanation for this section is that if two come out at the same time he counts them as two, as if they came out one at a time.", + "If he counted [the two] as one, the ninth and the tenth are spoiled. If he counted two as one, then both the ninth and tenth have been spoiled. The animal that he calls ninth is the tenth and should have been the tithe. The animal that he calls tenth is not the tenth but rather the eleventh. In other words, one actually is the tenth and one is called the tenth. Therefore both animals have to go out to pasture and can be eaten only when they are blemished.", + "If the ninth and the tenth came out at the same time, the ninth and the tenth are spoiled. If the ninth and tenth both come out at the same time then both are potentially the tenth and as in the previous section, both must go out to pasture until they become blemished at which point they may be eaten.", + "If he called the ninth the tenth, the tenth the ninth and the eleventh the tenth, all three are holy: the ninth can be eaten when it becomes blemished, the tenth is the tithe and the eleventh is sacrificed as a shelamim, and it can make a substitute, the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Judah said: can one substitute make another substitute? They said in the name of Rabbi Meir: if it were a substitute, it would not have been sacrificed. Here he really messed up the counting. The ninth, which he called the tenth, can be eaten when it becomes blemished. The tenth is the actual tithe, even though he called it the eleventh. The eleventh, which he also called tenth, has to be offered up as a shelamim offering. There is now a debate whether or not it is possible for the eleventh animal that is offered as a shelamim to make another animal into its substitute. Making a substitute means that if one tries to substitute the holy animal for another animal, the substituted animal becomes holy, even though the original one remains holy. Rabbi Meir says that this eleventh animal can make a substitute. Rabbi Judah questions this because in his opinion this animal is itself a substitute for the tenth animal, the real tithe. Since we hold that a substitute animal cannot make another substitute (and if one tries to do so, the substitution has no validity) this shelamim cannot effect a substitute. Rabbi Meir responds that the eleventh animal offered as a shelamim is not a “substitute” for if it was it couldn’t be sacrificed as a shelamim. Rabbi Meir holds that if an animal is substituted for a tithed animal, the substituted animal cannot be sacrificed. Since this is not a substitute but rather a regular shelamim, it can make another animal into a substitute.", + "If he called the ninth the tenth, the tenth the tenth and the eleventh the tenth, the eleventh is not holy. The following is the rule: wherever the name of the tenth [animal] has not been taken away from it, the eleventh is not consecrated. If he makes a mistake, but does call the tenth the tenth, then the eleventh is not holy. The general rule explains if the tenth receives its proper appellation, then anything that follows it is not holy. However, the ninth, which he accidentally called the tenth is still holy and must go out to pasture until it is blemished at which point it can be eaten. Congratulations! We have finished Tractate Bekhorot! It is a tradition at this point to thank God for helping us finish learning the tractate and to commit ourselves to going back and relearning it, so that we may not forget it and so that its lessons will stay with us for all of our lives. Although Bekhorot was mostly full of technical information, we should not lose sight of the religious idea that stands behind the idea of the holiness of the bekhor. As is well-known, the final plague on Egypt was the slaying of the first-born. The loss of every first-born, animal and human, was so great in the eyes of the Egyptians that they finally allowed the children of Israel to leave Egypt. I have often wondered why this plague caused them to finally let the people go? Surely many, perhaps even more, people died in the other horrible plagues. What was it about this plague that made it so much worse than the others? Regardless of how we answer that question, after that event, the first-borns of Israel owed God their lives and in order to express this debt, they had to be redeemed. As a first-born male, I was redeemed when I reached thirty days, and since my first child is a male, I redeemed him when he reached thirty days. While I don’t remember the first event, I remember the redemption of my own son as being a meaningful event in his life, as well as mine and my wife’s. Again, congrats on making it through Bekhorot. Tomorrow we begin Tractate Erkhin." + ] + ] + ] + }, + "versions": [ + [ + "Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp", + "http://learn.conservativeyeshiva.org/mishnah/" + ] + ], + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה בכורות", + "categories": [ + "Mishnah", + "Modern Commentary on Mishnah", + "English Explanation of Mishnah", + "Seder Kodashim" + ], + "schema": { + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה בכורות", + "enTitle": "English Explanation of Mishnah Bekhorot", + "key": "English Explanation of Mishnah Bekhorot", + "nodes": [ + { + "heTitle": "הקדמה", + "enTitle": "Introduction" + }, + { + "heTitle": "", + "enTitle": "" + } + ] + } +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Kodashim/English Explanation of Mishnah Chullin/English/Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp.json b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Kodashim/English Explanation of Mishnah Chullin/English/Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..27dcd0de38d523ed775f14e6e2f871b79f46f189 --- /dev/null +++ b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Kodashim/English Explanation of Mishnah Chullin/English/Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp.json @@ -0,0 +1,527 @@ +{ + "language": "en", + "title": "English Explanation of Mishnah Chullin", + "versionSource": "http://learn.conservativeyeshiva.org/mishnah/", + "versionTitle": "Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp", + "status": "locked", + "license": "CC-BY", + "shortVersionTitle": "Dr. Joshua Kulp", + "actualLanguage": "en", + "languageFamilyName": "english", + "isBaseText": true, + "isSource": true, + "isPrimary": true, + "direction": "ltr", + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה חולין", + "categories": [ + "Mishnah", + "Modern Commentary on Mishnah", + "English Explanation of Mishnah", + "Seder Kodashim" + ], + "text": { + "Introduction": [ + "Hullin means non-sanctified things. As the name of our tractate it refers to non-sacrificial meat, the topic that most of our tractate deals with. It is indeed the opposite of what Seder Kodashim is all about—holy meat. The meat in our tractate is thus called by what it is not. ", + "We should note that according to many biblical scholars, before the Temple was established, all meat that was eaten would have been sacrificial. A person who wanted to eat meat would bring an animal to the local sanctuary where it would be slaughtered. Some of the meat would be given to the priests, and the remainder could be eaten by the owners. When the Temple was established, it became prohibited to offer sacrifices anywhere but the Temple in Jerusalem and therefore people who wanted to eat meat had to eat it in a non-sacrificial manner.", + "Deuteronomy 12:20-24 teaches what one is to do should one want to eat non-sacrificial meat.", + "20 When the LORD enlarges your territory, as He has promised you, and you say, \"I shall eat some meat,\" for you have the urge to eat meat, you may eat meat whenever you wish. 21 If the place where the LORD has chosen to establish His name is too far from you, you may slaughter any of the cattle or sheep that the LORD gives you, as I have instructed you; and you may eat to your heart's content in your settlements. 22 Eat it, however, as the gazelle and the deer are eaten: the unclean may eat it together with the clean. 23 But make sure that you do not partake of the blood; for the blood is the life, and you must not consume the life with the flesh. 24 You must not partake of it; you must pour it out on the ground like water: 25 you must not partake of it, in order that it may go well with you and with your descendants to come, for you will be doing what is right in the sight of the LORD. 26 But such sacred and votive donations as you may have shall be taken by you to the site that the LORD will choose.", + "The Torah itself does not describe how meat is supposed to be slaughtered. However, by the very need to drain the blood (vs. 23) it is likely that the Torah presumes that the animal’s neck will be sliced. The other laws of “shechitah”—slaughtering, are oral laws, transmitted by Jewish tradition, but not found in the Torah. Our tractate will deal with these laws at length. ", + "In order to make the tractate a bit easier I will explain two terms here that will come up throughout: Nevelah: An animal that died without having been properly slaughtered. See Deuteronomy 14:21. Terefah: An animal that is wounded or sick and will eminently die. Such an animal is prohibited even if it is properly slaughtered. The word “treif” which colloquially is used to mean “unkosher” comes from this word.", + "There are other prohibitions concerning slaughtering and eating animals that come up throughout the tractate, but I shall introduce them as we go along.", + "As we learn the tractate we should remember that despite the fact that most of us do not slaughter our own meat, and hence these laws are not really practical for us, they are still observed today, and indeed until recently, before refrigeration was invented, all slaughtering would have been local. “Buy local” wasn’t just an environmental slogan; it was a culinary necessity. Hence, butchers would have been found in every community. Indeed, when Jews moved to a new place first and foremost they needed three things: a mikveh for women to immerse in, a mohel and a shochet. Without these three institutions, no traditional Jewish community could exist. Furthermore, we should remember that usually a person would raise his own animals and then bring them to the shochet for him to slaughter. People would have seen the slaughtering occur, and while not everyone was an expert in these laws and many people never performed them, they would have at least seen them being performed. Personally, I think that the study of Tractate Hullin is a good opportunity for us to reflect on the meaning of eating meat in our society and in our personal lives.", + "Enjoy the Tractate!" + ], + "": [ + [ + [ + "Introduction Our mishnah teaches some general rules with regard to who may slaughter and when.", + "All may slaughter, and their slaughtering is valid, except a deaf-mute, an imbecile or a minor, lest they mess up [the animal] through their slaughtering. And if any of these slaughtered while others were standing over them, their slaughtering is valid. Anyone may slaughter an animal. The only exceptions are the three categories of people who are not considered to have “da’at,” intelligence. They are not allowed to slaughter and if they do slaughter, the animal is not kosher. The problem is that one cannot tell if an animal was validly slaughtered just by looking at it afterwards. Thus there is no way to check the results if one wasn’t there watching when the animal was slaughtered. Furthermore, these three people cannot be trusted to report on what they have done, because they are not considered to have intelligence. Therefore, their slaughtering is invalid. However, if an adult is watching them while they slaughter and sees that they do it correctly, the slaughtering is valid.", + "That which is slaughtered by a non-Jew is a nevelah and defiles by carrying. A non-Jew cannot ritually slaughter for a Jew. If he does, the animal is considered a nevelah (carrion) and it imparts defilement by being carried (as do all nevelot, see Leviticus 11:40). The mishnah probably notes that this meat defiles in order to teach that this animal is “deoraita” (by the Torah) considered a nevelah, and that this rule is not just a stringency initiated by the rabbis.", + "If one slaughtered at night, and also a blind man that slaughtered, the slaughtering is valid. Obviously, it would be better not to slaughter at night, and it is problematic for a blind person to slaughter. However, an animal slaughtered at night or by a blind person is still valid, as long as it was slaughtered properly.", + "One who slaughtered on Shabbat or Yom Kippur, even though he is liable for his own life, the slaughtering is valid. Slaughtering is a prohibited labor on Shabbat and Yom Kippur and one who does so is liable for the death penalty (Shabbat) or karet (Yom Kippur). Nevertheless, the animal is still kosher. Just because the person sinned, doesn’t mean he didn’t slaughter in the correct way." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to provide general rules with regard to slaughtering including the instrument with which one slaughters. We should note that modern halakhah dictates that Jewish slaughter must be done only with an extremely sharp knife, one designed specially for such a purpose. The Mishnah still reflects a time when Jews used other instruments as well.", + "If one slaughtered with [the smooth edge of] a hand sickle, with a flint or with a reed, the slaughtering is valid. All of these instruments have smooth cutting surfaces and therefore can be used to slaughter.", + "All may slaughter; at all times one may slaughter; and with any implement one may slaughter, except a scythe, a saw, teeth or a finger nail, since these strangle. This section summarizes that which we have learned up until now. It then adds a caveat concerning instruments that can’t be used. These instruments do not sever the trachea and esophagus, as is required, but rather tear them out, thereby causing strangulation. An animal slaughtered with one of these instruments is considered a nevelah.", + "One who slaughtered with a scythe, moving it forward only: Bet Shammai declare it invalid, But Bet Hillel declare it valid. The scythe’s teeth are bent back, pointing only in a backwards direction. Therefore, if one slaughters by moving the scythe forward, the teeth won’t tear the neck and the neck will effectively be sliced. Neverthless, Bet Shammai declare it invalid lest he bring the scythe back and tear the neck. Bet Hillel declare the animal valid.", + "If the teeth of the scythe were filed away it is regarded as an ordinary knife. If the teeth are filed away, then the scythe can be treated as a normal knife and one can use it for slaughtering." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nSlaughtering must be performed on the animal’s neck below the larynx, preferably below the first hard ring of the trachea and up to the place where the bronchial tubes begin to branch. Cutting outside of this area is called “hagramah” and renders the animal invalid. Our mishnah deals with a case where a person cuts right below the first hard ring of the trachea.", + "If one slaughtered [by cutting] at the [top] ring [of the trachea] and left a hair's breadth of its entire circumference [towards the head], the slaughtering is valid. As stated in the introduction, the cut should be made below the first hard ring of the animal’s trachea. If he makes the cut at this top ring, the slaughtering is valid as long as a hair’s breadth of the trachea on the side of the head remains. According to the first opinion, the hair’s breadth of the trachea must remain on the entire circumference of the highest ring.", + "Rabbi Yose son of Rabbi Judah says: if there was only left [towards the head] a hair's breadth of the greater part of its circumference, [the slaughtering is valid]. Rabbi Yose son of Rabbi Judah says that it is sufficient for the hair’s breadth to remain on the greater part of the circumference, and not necessarily the entire circumference." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nAnimals are slaughtered and sacrificed by having their throats slit. Non-sacrificial birds are also slaughtered in this manner. However, sacrificial birds are slaughtered by a process called “nipping” which is done from the back of the neck. For more information on “nipping” see Zevahim 6:4.\nOur mishnah compares the laws of nipping with the laws of slaughtering.", + "If one cut at the side [of the neck], the slaughtering is valid. If one nipped off [the head of a bird sacrifice] from the side of the neck, the nipping is invalid. The side of neck is valid for slaughtering but not for nipping bird sacrifices. Some commentators hold that this is only ex post facto meaning one should not slaughter from the side but if one does, the slaughtering is valid. Others hold that even “lechatchila” (a priori) one can slaughter from the side. The side is considered to be part of the front.", + "If one cut at the back of the neck, the slaughtering is invalid. If one nipped off [the head] from the back of the neck, the nipping is valid. Slaughtering cannot be done from the back of the neck, whereas this is the place where nipping must occur.", + "If one cut at the front of the neck, the slaughtering is valid. If one nipped off [the head] from the front of the neck, the nipping is invalid. Slaughtering should be done at the front of the neck, whereas nipping done at the front is invalid.", + "For the whole of the back of the neck is the appropriate place for nipping, and the whole of the front of the neck is the appropriate place for slaughtering. It follows, therefore, that the place which is appropriate for slaughtering is inappropriate for nipping, and the place which is appropriate for nipping is inappropriate for slaughtering. This section explains the general rule any place that is valid for nipping is not valid for slaughtering and vice versa." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nYesterday’s mishnah concluded by noting that the place on the neck where slaughtering is performed is exactly where nipping cannot be performed and vice versa.\nThe remainder of our chapter deals with other opposite types of situations. At first these deal with sacrificial issues, but then they move on to other issues as well.", + "[The age] which qualifies turtle doves [for sacrifice] disqualifies pigeons, and [the age] which qualifies pigeons [for sacrifice] disqualifies turtle doves. Turtle doves are valid as sacrifices when they are older and pigeons when they are younger. There is no overlapping period when both are valid.", + "At the period when the neck feathers begin to turn yellow in either kind they are disqualified. However, both are invalid when the neck feathers begin to turn yellow. When the young birds hit three months their feathers begin to fall off, first from the body and then from the neck and head. Once all of their baby feathers have fallen off, they get new adult feathers. The new feathers on the head are at first yellow in appearance. Once this yellowish color has appeared, the birds are no longer considered to be young, but they are not yet considered old. Therefore, neither turtle doves nor pigeons can be used at this in-between age." + ], + [ + "[The method of killing] which renders the red cow valid renders the heifer invalid, and the method which renders the heifer valid renders the red cow invalid. The red cow used in the purificatory process is slaughtered by shechitah, having its neck sliced, the same way all sacrificial animals are slaughtered (see Numbers 19:3). The heifer is the calf killed when a corpse is found and it is unknown who murdered the person. This heifer is killed by having its neck chopped from behind (see Deuteronomy 21:4). One cannot slaughter the red cow by chopping its neck from behind or the heifer by slicing it from the front.", + "[The disability] which does not disqualify priests disqualifies Levites, and [the disability] which does not disqualify Levites disqualifies priests. Levites can serve in the Temple from the age of 20 to 50 (see Numbers 4:3). In contrast, priests can serve in the Temple from the time they reach majority age and they can continue as long as they want. In that sense, the age which disqualifies Levites does not disqualify priests. Priests who have certain physical blemishes cannot serve in the Temple (we will learn about this more in the seventh chapter of Bechorot). These blemishes do not disqualify Levites.", + "That which cannot be rendered unclean in earthenware vessels can be rendered unclean in all other vessels, and that which cannot be rendered unclean in all other vessels can be rendered unclean in earthenware vessels. When something impure enters the airspace of an earthenware vessel, it is rendered impure. However, if it touches the outside of the vessel, the vessel is pure. In contrast, other vessels are rendered impure when something impure touches them, either from inside or outside, and they are not impure when something enters their airspace without touching them.", + "That which cannot be rendered unclean in wooden things can be rendered unclean in metal things, and that which cannot be rendered unclean in metal things can be rendered unclean in wooden things. A vessel that does not have a receptacle is considered “simple” in mishnaic terms. A simple wooden vessel cannot become impure, whereas a simple metal vessel can. Unfinished metal vessels that can be used cannot become impure until they are completed. In contrast, an unfinished wood vessel can become impure as soon as it is usable.", + "When bitter almonds are subject to tithing sweet almonds are exempt, and when sweet almonds are subject to tithing bitter almonds are exempt. Bitter almonds are edible when they are small and inedible when they become larger. Therefore they are liable for tithes when they are small and not when they are big. Sweet almonds are opposite. When they are small they are inedible and therefore exempt from tithes. When they become larger and edible, they are liable for tithes." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe final mishnah of our chapter continues to describe cases where a halakhah is opposite in different situations.", + "Temed: Before it has fermented it may not be bought with second tithe money and it renders a mikveh invalid; After it has fermented it may be bought with second tithe money and it does not render a mikveh invalid. Temed is a drink made from grapes that have already been squeezed in order to make wine. Until temed has fermented the rabbis consider it to be like water. One can buy food and drink with second tithe money but not water (see Maaser Sheni 1:3, 5) and therefore not temed. Since unfermented temed is water it also has the power to render a mikveh invalid. Only drawn water can invalidate a mikveh other liquids do not. Once it has fermented it is no longer water and therefore it can be bought with second tithe money and it does not invalidate a mikveh.", + "Brothers who are partners [in their inheritance]: When they are liable to pay the kalbon, they are exempt from the cattle tithe, And when they are liable to the cattle tithe, they are exempt from the kalbon. The kalbon refers to an extra amount that people had to pay over the half shekel that every Israelite was obligated to pay to the Temple each year (see Shekalim 1:7). When sons split their fathers inheritance and then shared it in a partnership, they are treated as are all partners and they are obligated to pay the kalbon. In other words, even though at one point all of the money was jointly owned by their father, they are now regarded as regular partners. If they jointly own animals they are exempt from paying the cattle tithe, as is always the rule for partners. However, if they have not yet divided their inheritance, then we treat the inheritance as if it still belongs to their father. In such a case, they are obligated for the cattle tithe but not for the kalbon, because whenever a father pays the ½ shekel for his children, he is not liable to pay the kalbon.", + "Whenever there is [the power] to sell, there is no fine, and whenever there is a fine there is no power to sell. This section is found in Ketubbot 3:8. There are two rights discussed here: 1) the right of a father to sell his daughter as a slave and 2) his right to receive the fine paid out by one who rapes her or seduces her. The father has the right to sell her while she is still a minor (ketanah), but not when she reaches the age of a na’arah (about 12). At this age there is no fine levied on the rapist or seducer. Once she becomes a na’arah there is a fine which goes to the father. However, he no longer has the right to sell her.", + "Whenever there is the right of refusal there can be no halizah, and whenever there can be halizah there is no longer the right of refusal. The right of refusal refers to a girl’s right to annul marriage when that marriage was arranged by her mother or brother because her father had already died (see Yevamot 13:1-2). The right of refusal exists only when she is a minor. However, a minor girl cannot perform halitzah (release from levirate marriage, see Yevamot 12:4). Thus if she was married off by her father and then her husband died before she reached majority age, she cannot perform halitzah until she is of majority age.", + "When the shofar is blown there is no havdalah, and when there is habdalah the shofar is not blown. [Thus], if a festival falls on the day before Shabbat the shofar is blown but there is no havdalah; If it falls on the day following Shabbat there is havdalah but the shofar is not blown. How do they recite havdalah [on a festival that follows Shabbat]? “Who distinguishes between holy and holy.” Rabbi Dosa says: “Who distinguishes between the more holy and less holy day.” On Friday evening right before it became dark they would blow the shofar six times to let people know that Shabbat was beginning (see Sukkah 5:5). If this was a day in which they were blowing the shofar to let people know about Shabbat, then it definitely could not be time to recite the havdalah to separate a holy day from a non-holy day. However, if it was a time to recite havdalah, then there would be no shofar blasts. On a normal Saturday evening this is clear. However, it is not always so clear, as we shall see now. If the festival fell on Friday before Shabbat, then they would blow the shofar on Friday evening, as was normal. Blowing the shofar on a festival is not prohibited. However, they would not recite any havdalah at the end of the festival, since the sanctity of Shabbat is greater than that of the festival. If the festival fell immediately after Shabbat, the opposite is true. They would recite havdalah, but not blow the shofar. The final piece of the mishnah describes how the blessing was recited on Saturday night when a festival begins right after Shabbat. One could not simply recite “who distinguishes between a holy day and a profane day” because both Shabbat and the festival are holy. Therefore, according to the first opinion, one recites “who distinguishes between the holy and the holy.” Rabbi Dosa differs slightly and says that one should note that Shabbat is holier than the festival." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah returns to the subject of slaughtering. Slaughtering involves cutting the trachea and the esophagus. Our mishnah deals with a case where the slaughterer did not fully cut both organs.", + "If one cut one [of the organs of the throat] in the case of a bird, or both organs in the case of cattle, the slaughtering is valid. There is a difference between slaughtering birds and slaughtering cattle (cows, sheep and goats). In order for the cattle to be valid both organs must be cut, whereas it is sufficient for one of the organs to be cut for a bird to be valid.", + "The greater part of an organ is equivalent to [the whole of] it. Rabbi Judah says: he must cut through the veins. If he cuts through most of the organ, the animal is valid. Rabbi Judah says that he must at least cut through the veins. The Talmud states that this applies only to the bird.", + "[If one cut] half of one organ in the case of a bird, or one and a half organs in the case of cattle, the slaughtering is invalid. Cutting through half of an organ is not sufficient. Therefore, if one cuts through half of one organ of a bird or one and a half organs of an animal, the slaughtering is not valid.", + "[If one man cut] the greater part of one organ in the case of a bird, or the greater part of each organ in the case of cattle, the slaughtering is valid. However, cutting through the greater part of the organ counts as cutting through the organ. Therefore, if he cuts through the greater part of one of the bird’s organs, or the greater part of both of the animal’s organs, the slaughtering is valid" + ], + [ + "If one slaughtered two animals simultaneously, the slaughtering is valid. As long as the slaughtering is performed in a valid manner, if two animals are slaughtered together they are both valid.", + "If two persons held the knife and slaughtered, even if one cut higher up and the other cut lower down [in the neck], the slaughtering is valid. Similarly, if two people hold the knife, even if they hold different parts of the knife, the slaughtering is valid, as long as it was performed in a valid manner." + ], + [ + "If he chopped off the head with one stroke, the slaughtering is invalid. Slaughtering must be done with a to and fro motion with the knife and not by chopping. Chopping the head off, which is called \"derasah (pressing),\" invalidates the animal.", + "He was slaughtering and he cut through the neck with one stroke, if the knife was as long as the neck, the slaughtering is valid. When is this so? When the slaughterer moved the knife forward and not backward, or backward and not forward; but if he moved the knife to and fro, however small it was, even if it was a scalpel, the slaughtering is valid. In this case, while slaughtering, which means bringing the knife back and forth, he pressed the knife into the neck, and cut the organs. If the part of the knife that has already passed through the neck is as long as the neck, then the slaughtering is valid. The reason is that we can assume that he has already slaughtered properly with the part of the neck that was already passed through the neck.", + "So too, if he slaughters two animals at the same time, and he presses down on one of them. If the length of one knife has already passed through both necks, the slaughtering is valid.", + "These limitations are necessary if he had passed the knife only in one direction. But if he had already passed the knife in both directions, it doesn’t matter how large the knife is, since we can assume that he slaughtered it before he chopped it.", + "If a knife fell down and slaughtered [an animal], even though it slaughtered it in the proper way, the slaughtering is invalid, for it is said, \"And you shall slaughter and eat,\" that which you slaughter, you may eat. Slaughtering must be performed by a person slicing the neck, not by a knife that somehow falls down and slices a neck without being held by a person. While this doesn't seem to be a real possibility, perhaps what it means to say is that there must be human involvement in the slaughtering process. It can't just happen on its own, even if it happens in a valid fashion.", + "If [while slaughtering] the knife fell and he picked it up, if his clothes fell and he picked them up, if he sharpened the knife, or if he got tired and his friend came and [continued] slaughtering, if he delayed the time that it takes to slaughter, it is invalid. Rabbi Shimon says: if he delayed the time it takes to examine the slaughtering. The mishnah lists various reasons that a person might stop in the middle of slaughtering an animal. If he stops for any of these reasons, and doesn’t resume slaughtering for the amount of time it would take to slaughter an animal, then the slaughtering is invalid. In other words, the second half of the act of shechitah does not join with the first act and therefore the animal was not fully slaughtered in the correct manner. Stopping in the middle of slaughtering is called \"shehiyah,\" delaying, and it is one of the things that renders slaughtering invalid. ", + "Rabbi Shimon says that if he delays the amount of time necessary for someone to check if the slaughtering was done properly, then it is invalid. This is a longer time than it would take to actually slaughter." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn our mishnah Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yeshevav argue about whether an animal that has been improperly slaughtered is a “nevelah” or a “terefah” two terms that I explained in the introduction to Hullin. While neither animal can be eaten, the nevelah causes impurity while the terefah doesn’t. Thus there is some practical difference between the two. Today, since neither animal can be eaten, it doesn’t really matter whether an animal is a nevelah or a terefah.", + "If one first sliced the esophagus and then cut away the windpipe, or first cut away the windpipe and then sliced the esophagus; or if he sliced one of these organs and paused until the animal died; or if he thrust the knife underneath the second organ and cut it: [In all these cases] Rabbi Yeshevav says: the animal is nevelah; Rabbi Akiva says: it is terefah. “Slicing” is how I have translated “shachat” which means to validly slaughter. “Cut away” is my translation of the verb “pasak” and it is an invalid method of slaughter. So if one properly slices one of the two organs and then improperly slices the other one, or if he slices one of the organs and then doesn’t slice the other one and the animal dies, or if instead of slicing the organ he thrusts the knife under the organ and slices up (this is called haladah, burrowing), the animal cannot be eaten. The rabbis argue as to the status of the animal. According to Rabbi Yeshevav the animal is a nevelah. As we in section two, Rabbi Yeshevav says that whenever an animal cannot be eaten because it was slaughtered improperly, the animal has the status of nevelah. Rabbi Akiva says that it is a terefah.", + "Rabbi Yeshevav stated this general rule in the name of Rabbi Joshua: whenever an animal is rendered invalid by a fault in the slaughtering it is nevelah; whenever an animal has been duly slaughtered but is rendered invalid by some other defect it is terefah. And Rabbi Akiba [ultimately] agreed with him. Rabbi Yeshevav provides a general rule for determining what is a nevelah and what is a terefah. We have already explained nevelah above. A terefah is an animal that was slaughtered correctly but couldn’t be eaten because there was some other previously existing problem with it. We shall learn what causes an animal to be a terefah in chapter three. Ultimately, Rabbi Akiva agrees with Rabbi Yeshevav. My definitions of nevelah and terefah in the introduction to Hullin reflect this mishnah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn order for food to become susceptible to impurity it must come into contact with one of seven liquids (see Leviticus 11:38). When an animal is slaughtered, assumedly blood will come out and render the meat susceptible to impurity. Our mishnah discusses a situation where an animal is slaughtered and blood does not come out.", + "If one slaughtered cattle or a wild beast or a bird and no blood came out, they are valid and may be eaten by him whose hands have not been washed, for they have not been rendered susceptible to impurity by blood. Although blood did not come out of the animal (be it wild or domesticated) or the bird, the animal can still be eaten. We don’t assume that the animal was already dead when it was slaughtered and therefore no blood came out. We also don’t prohibit the animal because of the blood inside the animal, because blood that is inside an animal is not prohibited. Since the meat cannot receive impurity, one who has impure hands because he has not washed them can eat the meat without fear of causing it to be impure. This would have important ramifications if the animal was sacred and was being eaten by priests. Alternatively, it would have ramifications if the person simply desired to eat his meat in a state of purity.", + "Rabbi Shimon says: they have been rendered susceptible to impurity by the slaughtering. Rabbi Shimon says that the very act of slaughtering renders the animal susceptible to impurity. Since the slaughtering causes the animal to become permitted for eating, it also causes the animal to become susceptible to impurity." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah deals with slaughtering a dying animal. This would have been a very important issue because if the animal dies without having been slaughtered it becomes a nevelah and is inedible. Slaughtering a dying animal, therefore, would have been of utmost economic importance. However, for it to be edible it must be determined that the animal died from being slaughtered and not on its own.", + "One who slaughtered a dying animal: Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: [the slaughtering is invalid] unless it jerked its foreleg and its hind leg. Rabbi Eliezer says: it is enough if it spurted [the blood]. Rabbi Shimon said: even if one slaughtered [a dying animal] by night and the following morning he got up early and found the sides [of the throat] full of blood, the slaughtering is valid, for this proves that it spurted [the blood], as is Rabbi Eliezer's measure. The sages say: [the slaughtering is invalid] unless it jerked either its foreleg or its hind leg, or it moved its tail to and fro. There are basically two different opinions as to how to determine whether or not the animal died from the slaughtering or on its own. According to Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel if the animal doesn’t jerk its foreleg and hind leg when slaughtered, it is a sign that the animal was already dead. The sages in section four add that wagging its tail is also a sign that it died from slaughtering. Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Shimon believe that the sign is the spurting of blood from the neck at the time of slaughtering. Rabbi Shimon adds that even if he slaughtered the dying animal at night, probably because he felt that he couldn’t wait until morning, and he didn’t see blood at the time of slaughtering, but the next morning he saw blood stains around the animal’s neck, the slaughtering was valid.", + "This is the test both with regard to large and small animals. This line seems to be a continuation of the sages’ opinion in the previous section. The same signs that validate large animals also validate small animals.", + "If a small animal stretched out its foreleg [at the end of the slaughtering] but did not withdraw it, [the slaughtering] is invalid, for this was just an indication of the expiration of its life. However, if a small animal that was already dying merely stretched out its foreleg when slaughtered, this is not a sign of having died from the slaughtering. It is possible that this is just a result of dying before.", + "When do these rules apply? To case of an animal which was believed to be dying. But if it was believed to be sound, even though it did not show any of these signs, the slaughtering is valid. All of these signs are necessary only if the animal was known to be dying before it was slaughtered. However, if it was a healthy animal, these signs are not necessary because there is no reason to assume it died of a different cause." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn our mishnah the sages debate whether an animal slaughtered on behalf of a non-Jew can be eaten by a Jew. The fear is that the animal was slaughtered as an idolatrous sacrifice and hence is prohibited.", + "If one slaughtered for a non-Jew, the slaughtering is valid. Rabbi Eliezer declares it invalid. Rabbi Eliezer said: even if one slaughtered a beast with the intention that a non-Jew should eat [only] its liver, the slaughtering is invalid, for the thoughts of a non-Jew are usually directed towards idolatry. The first opinion in the mishnah holds that an animal slaughtered for a non-Jew is valid. Rabbi Eliezer holds that even if the animal was slaughtered mostly for a Jew’s consumption and only a small part was meant for a non-Jew, the animal is still invalid because we can assume that the non-Jew intended to use it for idolatrous purposes. We see here that Rabbi Eliezer was very strict on relations between non-Jews and Jews because of the ever present fear of idolatry.", + "Rabbi Yose said: is there not a kal vehomer argument? For if in the case of consecrated animals, where a wrongful intention can render invalid, it is established that everything depends solely upon the intention of him who performs the service, how much more in the case of unconsecrated animals, where a wrongful intention cannot render invalid, is it not logical that everything should depend solely upon the intention of him who slaughters! Rabbi Yose makes a kal vehomer (a fortiori) argument that this animal should be permitted. When it comes to sacrificial animals, an invalid intention can render the animal invalid, as we learned in Zevahim, chapter two. For instance, if the priest slaughters the animal in order to eat it after the time when it may be eaten or outside of the place where it may be eaten, the sacrifice is invalid. Nevertheless, when it comes to sacrifices we only take into consideration the intention of the slaughterer, and not the owner of the sacrifice. The same therefore should be true when it comes to non-sacrificial animals, whose laws are less strict. We should only care about the intention of the slaughterer, in this case a Jew, and not the non-Jew for whom he was slaughtering the animal." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah deals with a person who slaughters an animal for idolatrous purposes.", + "If one slaughtered [an animal] as a sacrifice to mountains, hills, seas, rivers, or deserts, the slaughtering is invalid. If a person slaughtered an animal as a sacrifice to a natural phenomenon, such as a mountain, body of water or desert, the animal is invalid, even though it was slaughtered properly. Note that worship of mountains and hills was also referred to in Mishnah Avodah Zarah 3:5 and seems to be based on Deuteronomy 12:2.", + "If two persons held a knife and slaughtered [an animal], one intending it as a sacrifice to one of these things and the other for a legitimate purpose, the slaughtering is invalid. We learned in mishnah two of this chapter that if two people jointly slaughter, the slaughtering is valid. Both are participating in the slaughtering. Therefore, if one of them intends to slaughter the animal as an idolatrous sacrifice, the animal is invalid." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah deals with various prohibitions concerning where one lets the blood flow from the animal’s neck when he slaughters. The point of the mishnah is to ensure that the way that Jews slaughter their animals does not look like the way that idolaters slaughter their animals. It is interesting that with regard to this specific issue it was deemed important to distinguish between Jews and idolaters. Since slaughtering an animal is such an important moment in society, both economically and socially, it probably very frequently had religious significance. As a moment fraught with such meaning, the rabbis felt it crucial to distinguish Jewish practice from the practices of others.", + "One may not slaughter [so that the blood runs] into the sea or into rivers, or into vessels, If one slaughters and lets the blood flow into the sea or a river, it may look as if the person is using the animal’s blood to worship the sea or river. If he slaughters into a vessel it may look as if he is collecting the blood to use it in worship. Alternatively, this may look as if he is performing a Jewish sacrifice outside of the Temple. Therefore, all of these practices are prohibited.", + "But one may slaughter into a pool (or of water. The correct reading of this mishnah is probably not “pool of water” but “vessel with water.” While one cannot slaughter into a vessel, lest it look as if he is going to use the blood for a sacrifice, if there is water mixed in, it doesn’t look like he is going to use the blood, because that is not how sacrificial blood is collected.", + "And when on board a ship on to vessels. When he is on a ship, he can let the blood drain into a vessel, and even one without water. On the ship it would be clear to all witnessing the slaughter that the reason he uses a vessel is to avoid a mess. Furthermore, he wouldn’t want to use the water which has to be preserved for drinking.", + "One may not slaughter at all into a hole, but one may dig a hole in his own house for the blood to run into. In the street, however, he should not do so as not to follow the ways of the heretics. As we can see at the end of the section, it seems that the heretics, who here refer to idolaters (and not heretical Jews), used to slaughter into holes dug into the ground. Therefore, a Jew should not do so. However, in his own house he can dig a hole and slaughter so that the blood flows into the hole, but not directly into the hole. In the streets, one shouldn’t even do this." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah is, in a sense, the mirror image of mishnah eight. Whereas yesterday we learned about one who slaughtered an animal for it to be an idolatrous sacrifice, in today’s mishnah we learn about one who slaughters an animal for it to be a Jewish sacrifice, but does so outside of the Temple. While his intentions may have been good, this is still a no-no. The question is: is the slaughtering valid?", + "If one slaughtered [an unconsecrated animal outside the Temple court] for it to be an olah or a shelamim or an asham for a doubtful sin or as a Pesah or a todah, the slaughtering is invalid. But Rabbi Shimon declares it valid. An olah (whole-burnt offering), a shelamim (wellbeing offering) and a todah (thanksgiving offering) can be offered as voluntary offerings. Therefore, if one slaughters an animal with the intent of it being an olah or a shelamim but does so outside of the Temple, it looks as if he is now sanctifying the animal to be a sacrifice and slaughtering it outside of the Temple. Note that the animal is not actually invalid, because he did not sanctify it before he slaughtered it, and for an animal to be a sacrifice it must first be sanctified. However, the rabbis prohibited it lest it look like he is slaughtering and eating sanctified meat outside of the Temple. Our mishnah thinks that an asham (guilt-offering) brought for a doubtful sin (meaning one is not even sure if one sinned) can also be brought voluntarily. Therefore, it too is invalid if slaughtered for this purpose outside of the Temple. With regard to the pesah, since it can be set aside at any time during the year, someone might think that by slaughtering it now outside of the Temple, he is sanctifying it. Therefore, it is invalid. Rabbi Shimon holds that the slaughtering is valid because that is not the way that one offers a sacrifice. One doesn’t voluntarily offer a sacrifice in order to slaughter it outside of the Temple. Since his sanctifying the animal is obviously invalid, everyone will understand that he has not performed a sacrifice. Therefore, the slaughtering is invalid. For case in which Rabbi Shimon uses similar reasoning see Menahot 12:3.", + "If two persons held one knife and slaughtered [an unconsecrated animal outside the Temple court], one declaring it to be one of the above and the other intending it for a legitimate purpose, the slaughtering is invalid. As we learned in mishnah eight, when two people jointly slaughter an animal and only one of them has an intention that would render the slaughtering invalid, the one person’s intention invalidates the animal. So too here, the fact that one of them intends for the animal to be a sacrifice renders it invalid.", + "If one slaughtered [an unconsecrated animal outside the Temple court] for it to be a hatat or an asham or a first-born or the tithe [of cattle] or a substitute offering, the slaughtering is valid. The sacrifices in this section can not be voluntarily donated to the Temple. They are only brought by those who incur an obligation to bring them. Since everyone knows that the person sacrificing them was not obligated to bring such a sacrifice, they will know that he is not really sacrificing an animal outside of the Temple. Therefore, the meat is valid. We will learn more about what exactly a “substitute sacrifice” is in tractate Temurah.", + "This is the general rule: if one slaughtered an animal declaring it to be a sacrifice which can be brought either as a voluntary or a freewill-offering it is invalid, but if he declares it to be a sacrifice which cannot be brought either as a votive or a freewill-offering it is valid. This section provides the general rule that is the basis for my explanation above." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "The following [defects] render cattle terefah:
If the esophagus was pierced;
If the windpipe severed;
If the membrane of the brain was pierced;
If the heart was pierced as far as its cavity thereof;
If the spine was broken and the cord severed;
If the liver was gone and none of it remained;
If the lung was pierced,
Or if part of it was missing Rabbi Shimon says: only if it was pierced as far as the main bronchi;
If the stomach,
If the gall-bladder was pierced,
If the intestines were pierced;
If the innermost stomach was pierced,
If the greater part of the outer stomach was pierced. Rabbi Judah says: in a large animal [if it was torn] to the extent of a handbreadth, and in a small animal the greater part.
If the omasum (the third stomach of a [was pierced];
Of if the second stomach was pierced on the outside;
If the animal fell from the roof;
If most of its ribs were fractured;
Or if it was mauled by a wolf Rabbi Judah says: small animals [are terefah] if mauled by a wolf, large cattle if mauled by a lion; small fowl if mauled by a hawk, large fowl if mauled by a falcon.
This is the rule: if an animal with a similar defect could not continue to live, it is terefah.
Exodus 22:30 states, “Meat in a field that is terefah you shall not eat, cast it to the dogs.” The word “terefah” literally means “torn apart by animals.” The rabbis assume that since another verse already forbade eating “nevelah,” which they interpret to mean any animal that was improperly slaughtered, the word “terefah” must refer to something else. They therefore interpret the word “terefah” to refer to an animal that have suffered an injury, or has some sort of defect, that will cause it to die imminently. Such an animal is prohibited even if it was slaughtered properly.
The first five mishnayot of our chapter deal with which wounds or defects cause an animal to be a terefah. Our mishnah lists 18 different ways a cattle can become a terefah.
Sections 1-18: This is the list of the 18 defects that cause cattle, cows, sheep and goats, to become a terefah. Most of these are self-explanatory, more so perhaps to those of you that are biologists or veterinarians. Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Judah (in sections 8, 13 and 18) distinguish between large animals (cows) and small animals (sheep and goats). According to these two sages, the defects are not exactly the same for the two different types of animals.
Section nineteen: This section provides the general rule of when an animal becomes a terefah." + ], + [ + "And the following [defects] do not render cattle terefah:
If the windpipe was pierced, or cracked [lengthwise]. To what extent may it be deficient? Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: up to an Italian issar.
If the skull was cracked but the membrane of the brain was not pierced;
If the heart was pierced but not as far as its cavity;
If the spine was broken but the cord was not severed;
If the liver was removed but an olive's size of it remained.
If the omasum or the third stomach were pierced at their juncture;
If the spleen was removed, or the kidneys, or the lower jaw-bone or the womb.
If [the lung] was shrunken up by an act of Heaven.
If an animal was stripped of its hide: Rabbi Meir declares it valid But the rabbis declare it invalid.
Today’s mishnah lists cases in which defects do not render cattle terefah. Again, most of these are self-explanatory (as before, easier to picture for the veterinarians among us)
Section one: If the windpipe was severed, we learned yesterday that the animal is a terefah. If, however, it was only pierced or cracked, the animal is valid. When it is pierced, the hole can be up to the size of an Italian issar, a small coin.
Section two: The animal is a terefah only if the brain membrane was pierced. A cracked skull does not render an animal a terefah.
Sections 3-6: The opposite of most of these cases can be found in yesterday’s mishnah.
Sections 7: The removal of any of these organs does not render the animal a terefah, because it can continue to live.
Section eight: If an animal’s lung was shrunk up due to fear of some heavenly act, for instance the animal was frightened by thunder or lightning, then the animal is not a terefah. However, if it was frightened by an act perpetrated by a human being, then the animal is a terefah.
Section nine: I will admit that it is hard for me to comprehend how an animal that has no hide can continue to live, but evidently, Rabbi Meir believes that it can. The other rabbis say that it is a terefah." + ], + [ + "The following [defects] render birds terefah:
If the esophagus was pierced,
If the windpipe was severed;
If a weasel struck [the bird] on the head in such a place as would render it terefah.
If the gizzard was pierced
If the intestines were pierced.
If it fell into the fire and its innards were scorched: If they turned green, it is invalid, But if they remained red it is valid.
If one trod upon it or knocked it against a wall or if an animal trampled upon it, and it still jerks its limbs, and it remained alive after this for twenty-four hours, and it was thereafter slaughtered, it is valid.
Today’s mishnah lists what defects render a bird a terefah.
Sections 1-2: These are the same signs that render cattle terefot.
Section three: If a weasel (or any other animal) strikes the bird on a spot on its head in such a manner that we would need be concerned that the brain membrane was pierced, then it is a terefah.
Section six: If the innards turn green (gangrene?), that is a sign that the bird is going to die. If they remain red, the color that they were before the bird was burned, then the bird is not a terefah.
Section seven: If after having been struck in some manner the bird begins to jerk its limbs, it must live for another twenty-four hours before we can be sure that it would not have died from the blow. If it is slaughtered before 24 hours are up, then the bird is a terefah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah teaches what defects do not render birds into a terefah.", + "And the following [defects] do not render birds terefah:
If the windpipe was pierced or cracked lengthwise; This is the same defect that does not cause a beast to be a terefah (see mishnah two).", + "If a weasel struck it on the head in such a place as would not render it terefah. The opposite of the section two in yesterday’s mishnah.", + "If the crop was pierced Rabbi says: even if it was gone. Since I don’t know exactly what a “crop” is, I looked it up in Wikipedia. There the crop is defined in the following manner: “In a bird's digestive system, the crop is an expanded, muscular pouch near the gullet or throat. It is a part of the digestive tract, essentially an enlarged part of the esophagus. As with most other organisms that have a crop, the crop is used to temporarily store food. Not all birds have a crop.” According to the first opinion, if the crop is pierced, the animal is not a terefah, but if the crop is missing, it is a terefah. Rabbi rules even more leniently and holds that even if the crop is removed, it is not a terefah.", + "If the innards protruded [from the body] but were not pierced. As long as the innards were not pierced, the bird is not a terefah.", + "If its wings were broken, or its legs; or if [the wing’s] feathers were plucked. Rabbi Judah says: if its down was gone it is invalid. A broken limb and plucked feathers on the wings do not make the bird into a terefah. Rabbi Judah holds, that if the bird’s soft cover of down was removed, it is a terefah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah provides a few more criteria for determining if an animal is a terefah.", + "[If an animal] suffered from congestion of the blood, or was overcome by smoke or by a cold, or if it ate oleander or chicken dung, or if it drank noxious water, it is permitted. Although an animal who suffers from one of these problems, or ate or drank one of the things listed here may be in some danger, it is not enough in order to consider the animal a terefah. While these might cause it to die, they might not. Oleander is dangerous to an animal.", + "If it ate poison or was bitten by a snake, it is not forbidden as trefah but it is forbidden as a danger to life. Commentators understand the “poison” here to be something that is poisonous to people but not animals. If it was poisonous to animals, it would certainly render the animal a terefah. The snake bite also must also be understood as a bite not strong enough to kill the animal. Since these things will not kill the animal, the animal is not a terfah. Although the animal is not a terefah, its meat is forbidden because it is a danger to human beings. The rabbis took very seriously the prohibition of causing danger to oneself. Eating meat that might cause death or other harm is not just foolish, it is religiously forbidden." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah provides the characteristics by which it can be determined whether a bird is clean (kosher) or unclean (tref, in modern terminology).", + "The characteristics of cattle and of wild animals are stated in the Torah. Leviticus 11 teaches characteristics, split hooves and cud-chewing, that distinguish clean beasts or wild animals (such as a deer) from unclean beasts, such as the pig and camel that cannot be eaten.", + "The characteristics of birds are not stated, but the sages said: every bird that seizes its prey is unclean. The Torah does not list the characteristics of birds that are permitted or forbidden. Rather, it provides a list of names of birds that are forbidden. The rabbis had to fill in the gap and provide a general characteristic: any bird that seizes its prey, be it other birds or small animals, is unclean and not kosher. Just as the animals that we eat are peaceful animals that eat only vegetation, so too the birds that we eat do not eat other birds (although they may eat worms and insects, and not just vegetation).", + "Every bird that has an extra toe, or a crop and a gizzard that can be peeled, is clean. If the bird is not one that seizes its prey, then there are a couple of signs that can be used to determine whether it is pure. These would be necessary in case new birds are discovered and one does not know whether they can be eaten. If the bird has an extra toe on the back part of its foot, it is clean and can be eaten. If its crop (explained in mishnah four) or gizzard can be peeled from the flesh by hand, then it is also clean. Commentators debate whether the bird needs to have all of these characteristics to be kosher, or whether one is sufficient.", + "Rabbi Elazar bar Zadok says: every bird that parts its toes is unclean. Rabbi Elazar bar Zadok adds a sign to determine when a bird is impure. If when stood on a rope it splits its toes, two in front and two in back, then it is unclean. This is a sign that the bird is a predator." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nSome types of locusts are clean and can be eaten (see Leviticus 11:20-25). Our mishnah teaches the characteristics of locusts and fish that can be eaten.", + "Of locusts: all that have four legs, four wings, leaping legs, and wings covering the greater part of the body, [are clean.] Rabbi Yose says: its name must be locust. For a locust to be clean it must have four legs and wings. It must also have two legs above its other legs with which to leap (see Leviticus 11:21). And its wings must cover the greater part of its body. Rabbi Yose adds that it must be called a locust. If it has all of the signs of being kosher but it is not called a “locust” then it is not kosher. We can see here just how important a name can be to the status of the validity of the animal.", + "Of fishes: all that have fins and scales [are clean]. Rabbi Judah says: there must be [at least] two scales and one fin. The Torah states this rule explicitly, see Leviticus 11:9. Rabbi Judah adds that there must be at least two scales.", + "The scales are those which are immovable, the fins are those [wings] by which it swims. The mishnah now defines scales and fins. Scales are those that are immovable, meaning that the fish does not have control over them. Whereas the fins are like wings to a bird in that the fish swims by moving his fins." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah deals with the status of the fetus within its mother’s womb, when it may be eaten by virtue of its mother having been properly slaughtered and when it may not.", + "If an animal was having difficulty giving birth and the fetus put forth a limb and then put it back in, it may be eaten [when its mother is slaughtered]. If it put forth its head, even though it put it back in, it is considered as born. Generally, when a pregnant animal is slaughtered, the fetus may be eaten by virtue of its mother having been slaughtered. However, once the fetus has been born, it too needs to be slaughtered in order to be eaten. The mishnah determines that a fetus is considered to be “offspring” once its head has emerged, even if it puts its head back into the womb. If it puts forth a different limb, it is not considered as having been born. We should note that the same criterion exists for human beings. A fetus is halakhically considered a life once its head has emerged. The main ramification is that up until this point, it is permitted to terminate (I would have used the word sacrifice, but that might have been confusing) the fetus in order to save the life of the mother. Beyond that point, and it is not.", + "Whatever is cut off from the fetus within the womb [and left inside] may be eaten, but whatever is cut off from the spleen or kidneys [of the animal and left inside] may not be eaten. This is the rule: that which is from the body of the animal is forbidden, but that which is not from the body of the animal is permitted. If someone reaches into the mother and cuts off one of the fetus’s limbs and leaves the limb in the womb, when the mother is slaughtered, that limb may be eaten. This is not considered to be eating a limb from a living animal, which is prohibited, because this is a limb of an animal that has not yet come to life. In contrast, if he reaches in and cuts off an organ from the animal itself and leaves it in inside the animal and then slaughters the animal, that limb is prohibited because it is a limb from a living animal. Without this mishnah one might have thought that as long as the limb is inside the animal when the animal is slaughtered, it is permitted. The mishnah provides the general rule which explains this particular halakhah: if the limb is part of the animal’s body it is prohibited, but if it is not part of the animal’s body, because it is a fetus, it is permitted." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nA first born animal is holy and if it dies must be buried. In contrast, the meat of other animals can be given to dogs to eat. Our mishnah deals with an animal having trouble giving birth to her first born.", + "If an animal giving birth for the first time was having difficulty, one may cut off each limb [as it comes out] and throw it to the dogs. This halakhah accords with the general principle we learned in yesterday’s mishnah. Since the fetus is still inside the womb, it is not considered a separate life. Rather it is considered to be one of its mother’s limbs. Therefore, it can be cut out and fed to the dogs. Note that the Mishnah uses the phrase “throw it to the dogs” because this is what the Torah states may be done with a nevelah, an animal that died without having been slaughtered.", + "If the greater portion came forth it must be buried, and she is exempt from the law of the firstling. Once the majority of the fetus has emerged from its mother’s womb, it is considered as being born. From this point forth if one has to cut it up to save its mother (which is permitted) the flesh cannot be thrown to the dogs. Rather it must be buried, as is the rule for all firstlings that die. Furthermore, once the fetus is born, the next offspring born to this mother is not considered to be a firstling. Some commentators hold that this clause “she is exempt from the law of the firstling” applies to both clauses of the mishnah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to deal with ramifications of the notion that a fetus within its mother’s womb is considered to be a limb of its mother and not a separate life.", + "If a fetus died within the womb [of its mother] and the shepherd put in his hand and touched it, he is clean, whether it was a clean or unclean animal. A nevelah, an animal that died without being slaughtered, is unclean. However, the fetus in its mother’s womb is not considered to be a nevelah. This is derived from a kal vehomer (a fortiori) argument. If a clean animal is slaughtered and found to be pregnant, her fetus can be eaten based on the mother’s valid slaughtering. It is not a nevelah. All the more so, a fetus that dies within a live mother is not considered to be a nevelah, because its mother is alive. According to the first opinion, this is true of both clean and unclean animals.", + "Rabbi Yose HaGalili says: if it was an unclean animal he is unclean, and if it was a clean animal he is clean. Rabbi Yose HaGalili says that there is no “kal vehomer” argument when it comes to the unclean animal because when its mother is slaughtered, the fetus does not become fit for eating. Therefore, it has the status of nevelah even if it died within its mother’s womb.", + "If the fetus of a woman died within the womb of its mother and the midwife put in her hand and touched it, the midwife is unclean for seven days, but the mother is clean until the fetus comes out. If the human fetus dies within its mother’s womb, and the midwife touches it while it is still inside, the midwife is unclean for seven days, as is the rule for someone who comes into contact with a corpse. According to the Talmud this impurity is not “deoraita” from the Torah, but rather is a rabbinic decree. From the Torah, since the fetus is still in its mother it does not count as a separate life. However, the rabbis decreed that it should make her impure lest she touch it after its head has already emerged. The mother is considered clean from corpse impurity unless the head emerges and then the baby dies." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIf a fetus sticks a limb out when being born and someone cuts off that limb before slaughtering the mother, the limb causes impurity as would a nevelah, as do all limbs taken from living animals. Our mishnah teaches that in this case the fetus that remains in the mother does not have the status of nevelah and it is clean. The rabbis in our mishnah debate whether the same is true if they slaughtered the mother first and then cut the limb off of the fetus.", + "If an animal was having difficulty in labor and the fetus put forth its limb and a person immediately cut if off and then slaughtered the mother, the flesh [of the fetus] is clean. In this case, the fetus in its mother’s womb remains clean because it is considered to be a limb of its mother, while its mother is still alive. Even if the fetus dies it is still clean. Even if the unclean limb touches the fetus, the fetus is still clean because animals cannot become unclean while alive.", + "If he slaughtered the mother first and then cut if off, the flesh [of the fetus] is unclean like that which had touched nevelah, the words of Rabbi Meir. If after the fetus sticks out its limb, its mother is slaughtered, and then he cuts off the limb, we now have a case of a cut-off limb touching a dead fetus. Rabbi Meir holds that the fetus is rendered unclean by virtue of contact with the unclean limb. The limb has the status of nevelah and meat which has contact with nevelah is unclean.", + "But the sages say, it is like that which had touched a slaughtered terefah, The other sages do not accord the limb the status of nevelah but rather terefah, and as we shall see below in the mishnah, a slaughtered terefah does not cause impurity.", + "For just as we find that the slaughtering of a terefah animal renders it clean, so the slaughtering of the animal renders the limb clean. The rabbis say that just as slaughtering renders a terefah clean (and saves it from ever becoming an unclean nevelah) even though the meat is forbidden, so too slaughtering renders the limb clean, even though it cannot be eaten.", + "Rabbi Meir said to them: No, for when you say that the slaughtering of a terefah [animal] renders it clean you are concerned with [the animal] itself, but can you say that it will render clean the limb which is not part of [the animal] itself? Rabbi Meir rejects their argument. Slaughtering can render the terefah animal itself clean, but how can it render clean a part of the fetus, the limb, that was not attached to the fetus when its mother was slaughtered? Rather, the limb has the status of nevelah and renders the fetus unclean.", + "From where do we learn that the slaughtering of a terefah animal renders it clean? The mishnah now begins a prolonged argument trying to prove that a slaughtered terefah is clean, even though its meat cannot be eaten.", + "[For we could have argued to the contrary:] An unclean animal may not be eaten, and a terefah also may not be eaten; just as slaughtering does not render an unclean animal clean so slaughtering should not render a terefah animal clean? However, in a most rabbinic fashion, the rabbis do not begin with the proof but rather with a counter-proof, what one might have argued. Seemingly one might have compared the terefah with the unclean animal. Both an unclean animal and a terefah cannot be eaten. Therefore, one might have argued that just as shechitah (slaughtering) does not render an unclean animal clean, for its meat transmits impurity, so too the slaughtering of a terefah renders it unclean and able to transmit impurity.", + "No, if you said this of an unclean animal for at no time was it fit [for slaughtering]; can you also say this of a terefah animal which had a time when it was fit [for slaughtering]? That argument can be refuted. An unclean animal is not rendered clean by slaughtering because it never had the opportunity to be made permitted/clean through slaughtering. In contrast, if the terefah animal had been slaughtered before it became a terefah, it would have been rendered clean. Therefore, even if it is slaughtered after it becomes a terefah, it is clean (although not edible).", + "Take away with this argument that you brought forth! For where would we know this of an animal that was born terefah from the womb? The mishnah, employing graphic language found in a few other midrashim but no where in the Mishnah, says that the distinction drawn between the terefah and the unclean animal must be removed. There is a terefah which would never have been permitted by shechitah the terefah that was born as such. This is similar to the unclean animal, which also never would have been permitted by shechitah. Therefore, our original question returns: How can the inedible terefah be rendered clean by slaughter?", + "[Substitute therefore this argument]: No, if you said this of an unclean animal for none of its kind may be validly slaughtered; can you also state this of a terefah for whose kind there is valid slaughter? The mishnah now adjusts the distinction between the terefah and the unclean animal. A terefah comes from a species of animal that is edible. Other such animals can be eaten after shechitah. Therefore, it is rendered clean by shechitah, just as other animals of its kind are. This would be true even for a terefah that was born as such. In contrast, an unclean animal is by definition from a species that can never be edible. Therefore, it is not rendered clean by shechitah.", + "[Accordingly], the slaughtering of a live eight months birth does not render it clean, since there is no slaughtering of its kind. The rule that we posited in the previous section is that any animal whose “kind” can be permitted/edible by having been slaughtered, is also clean if it is slaughtered. An “eight months’ birth” refers to an animal born prematurely, one which is deformed and we know will die. The mishnah uses the term “eight months” because a human baby born at eight months is assumed not to be viable. An “eight months’ birth” is like a terefah it is an animal that is now alive, that we know will die shortly. Because of the general rule explained above, an animal born prematurely cannot be made clean by shechitah because none of its kind can be made permitted through shechitah. Such an animal that is slaughtered will have the status of nevelah. " + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah continues to deal with the status of a fetus found in its mother’s womb when she is slaughtered.", + "If one slaughtered an animal and found in it an eight months’ fetus, either living or dead, or a dead nine months fetus, he need only tear it open and take out the blood. If he found in it a living nine months’ fetus it must be slaughtered, and he would thereby [possibly] incur the penalty for “it and its young,” the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Meir distinguishes between a live fetus found inside its mother after she has been slaughtered and a dead one. A dead fetus is considered to be part of its mother’s flesh and therefore when she is slaughtered the dead fetus is permitted. An eight months’ fetus is considered to be as if it is dead (for it could not live outside of the womb) and therefore it too is permitted when its mother is slaughtered. However, a living nine months’ fetus is an independent life. When it is found in its mother’s womb it too must be slaughtered before it can be eaten. Furthermore, one who slaughters it and its mother on the same day transgresses the biblical prohibition of slaughtering a mother and her offspring on the same day (Leviticus 22:28). We should note that the implication of this halakhah is that life begins before the fetus leaves the womb. The point at which this is so would seem to be the point at which the fetus would be viable outside of the womb.", + "But the sages say: the slaughtering of its mother renders it permitted. Rabbi Shimon Shezuri says: even if it is eights years old and is plowing the field, the slaughtering of its mother renders it permitted. The other rabbis disagree. Any fetus found in its mother’s womb is permitted to be eaten without having to be slaughtered itself. All that one would need to do is drain the blood, the same rule which applies to all meat. Theoretically, as Rabbi Shimon Shezuri points out, one could even eat an eight year old animal without slaughtering it first, if it was born after its mother was slaughtered.", + "If he ripped open [the mother] and found in it a living nine months fetus, it must be slaughtered, since its mother has not been slaughtered. If he doesn’t slaughter the mother, then if the fetus is alive, it will need to be slaughtered. Since its mother was not slaughtered, there is no way to allow this animal to be eaten without proper slaughtering." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah talks about two different subjects: 1) the status as a terefah an animal whose leg has been broken off; 2) a limb hanging from an animal and whether it is considered to still be part of the animal.", + "If the hind legs of an animal were cut off below the joint, it is permitted; If above the joint, it is terefah. According to the rabbis there are three parts to an animal’s leg. The lowest part is the foot, the middle part is the calf and the upper part is the thigh. The place where the foot is attached to the calf and the place where the calf is attached to the thigh are both called “berech” which in modern Hebrew means knee. In the Talmud they debate which joint is “the joint” mentioned here. If it is the upper one, then it would mean that an animal whose leg has been severed below the knee (what we call the knee) is not a terefah. If it is the lower one, then only if it is severed below the place where the foot joins the calf is it not a terefah.", + "So too if the juncture of the tendons was gone, [it is terefah]. The “juncture of the tendons” refers to the tendons that connect the thigh to the knee. If these are missing, the animal is a terefah even if the bone is still whole.", + "If the bone was broken but the greater part of the flesh [around the fracture] remained, it is rendered clean by the slaughtering; Otherwise it is not rendered clean by the slaughtering. A limb that was separated from the animal when the animal was still alive cannot be rendered clean by slaughtering the animal. A broken bone does not mean that the limb must be considered separate. As long as most of the flesh remains, the limb is part of the animal and when the animal is slaughtered, the limb is permitted and clean. But if most of the flesh does not remain, then the limb is not considered as part of the animal and the limb is unclean even after the animal is slaughtered." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah deals with the status of the amniotic sac found in a slaughtered animal.", + "If a person slaughtered an animal and found in it an amniotic sac, he who is not fastidious may eat it. When the mother is slaughtered, her amniotic sac is permitted to be eaten by virtue of the slaughtering of the mother. However, the mishnah notes that only one who is “not fastidious” and doesn’t mind eating “yucky” parts of the animal will eat it. [I guess they didn’t have hot dogs back then.]", + "It does not contract uncleanness, either food uncleanness or the uncleanness of nevelah. Although it is edible, the amniotic sac is not considered food. Nor is it considered to be the flesh/meat of the animal. Therefore, it cannot become ritually unclean in the way that food becomes ritually unclean. Furthermore, if the animal is not slaughtered properly and therefore becomes a nevelah, it is not unclean as is a nevelah. The sac is not considered to the edible flesh of the animal, and only such flesh is unclean.", + "If he intended to eat it, it can contract food uncleanness but not the uncleanness of nevelah. If a person intends to eat it, his thoughts cause it to become “food” and it is susceptible to uncleanness. However, intention cannot cause the sac to become a “nevelah” because it is categorically not considered part of the edible flesh of the animal.", + "If part of the amniotic sac emerged [before the slaughtering of the mother], it may not be eaten; For it is a sign of birth in a woman and also a sign of birth in an animal. Once the sac begins to emerge it is considered as if the woman has begun to give birth, for the head might be inside the sac. Therefore, even if the sac goes back inside the mother’s womb, it still cannot be eaten, even if found in the mother after she was slaughtered. In this sense is treated as if it was offspring and once offspring has emerged from the womb it cannot be eaten by virtue of the mother being slaughtered. However, the main difference is that while the offspring cannot be eaten based on its mother being slaughtered, the offspring itself can be slaughtered. In contrast, when the sac cannot be eaten based on the mother being slaughtered, it can never be eaten. Once the sac begins to emerge, it is a sign of childbirth in a woman as well, again because the head might be inside the sac. From this point she has the uncleanness of a woman who gave birth (see Leviticus 12:2).", + "If an animal which was pregnant for the first time miscarried an amniotic sac, it may be thrown to dogs. But in the case of a consecrated animal it must be buried. It may not be buried at cross-roads or hung on a tree, for these are amorite practices. The amniotic sac itself does not have the halakhic status of “offspring.” Therefore, the amniotic sac of an animal’s first birth does not have the sanctity of a firstling. It can be thrown to the dogs, whereas if it was sacred it would have had to have been buried. While it is not considered offspring, the sac is still part of the animal. Therefore, if it comes from a sanctified animal, one that was dedicated to the Temple, it must be buried because it is holy. The mishnah forbids practices that are deemed idolatrous or magical. It seems that some people bestowed amniotic sacs with magical powers and either hung them in a tree or buried them at crossroads. Magical practices are deemed to be “the ways of the Amorites” and are prohibited." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nLeviticus 22:28 states, “When it comes to an ox or a sheep, it and its young you shall not slaughter on the same day.” Our chapter discusses this prohibition.", + "[The law of] “It and its young” applies both within the land of Israel and outside it, both during the existence of the Temple and after it, in respect of both unconsecrated and consecrated animals. The prohibition of slaughtering an animal and its young on the same day applies in all times and all places and to both consecrated (dedicated to the Temple) and non-consecrated (hullin) animals.", + "How so? The mishnah now explains various scenarios in which a person slaughters an animal and its young, and the various liabilities that can be occurred, depending on whether the animals were consecrated and where they were slaughtered.", + "If a person slaughtered an animal and its young, both animals being unconsecrated, [and they slaughtered them] outside [the sanctuary], they are both valid, but [he who slaughtered] the second incurs forty lashes. In this case, both animals are hullin (unconsecrated) and both are slaughtered outside of the Temple, where they should be slaughtered. Both animals are valid and can be eaten. The fact that the second one should not have been slaughtered does not render its slaughtering to be invalid. The second person, the one who slaughters the second animal (whether or not this is the parent or offspring), is liable for the forty lashes for having transgressed a biblical commandment. The first person is not liable because when he slaughtered the animal, he did nothing wrong.", + "If both animals were consecrated [and they were slaughtered] outside [the sanctuary], [he who slaughtered] the first incurs the penalty of karet, both animals are invalid, and each incurs forty lashes. In this case both animals are consecrated and should have been slaughtered only in the Temple. The person who slaughters the first animal is liable for karet for having slaughtered a consecrated animal outside the Temple. The person who slaughters the second animal is not liable for karet because that animal could not have been offered as a sacrifice on that day since its parent/child had already been slaughtered. Since it could not have been a sacrifice, the one who slaughters it outside the Temple is exempt from karet. Both animals are invalid as sacrifices because they were slaughtered outside the Temple (see Zevahim 14:2). Both slaughterers are liable for lashes but for different reasons. The first is liable for having slaughtered a consecrated animal outside of the Temple and the second for slaughtering an animal on the same day that its parent/young was slaughtered.", + "If both animals were unconsecrated [and they were slaughtered] inside [the sanctuary], both animals are invalid, and [he who slaughtered] the second incurs forty lashes. In this case both animals were unconsecrated, and yet both were slaughtered inside the Temple. This makes them invalid and it is forbidden to derive benefit from either animal (see Kiddushin 2:9). There is no biblical punishment for slaughtering an unconsecrated animal inside the Temple, therefore the first slaughterer is not punished. The second slaughterer is liable for having slaughtered an animal on the same day that its parent/young was slaughtered.", + "If both animals were consecrated [and they were slaughtered] inside [the sanctuary], the first is valid and [he who slaughtered it is] not culpable, but [he who slaughtered] the second incurs forty lashes, and it is invalid. In this case both were consecrated and both were slaughtered inside the Temple, as is required. The first animal is valid as a sacrifice and the one who slaughters it is exempt, for he has done nothing wrong. The second animal is invalid and the one who slaughters it is liable for having slaughtered an animal on the same day that its parent/young was slaughtered" + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is a direct continuation of yesterday’s mishnah.", + "If [the first animal was] unconsecrated and [the second] consecrated [and they were both slaughtered] outside [the sanctuary], the first is valid and [he who slaughtered it is] not liable, but [he who slaughtered] the second incurs forty lashes and it is invalid. The first animal was unconsecrated and the second was consecrated, and both were slaughtered outside of the Temple. The first animal is valid and the person who slaughtered it is exempt for he has done nothing wrong (way to go!). The second animal should have been slaughtered in the Temple, so the fact that it was not renders it invalid. The person who slaughtered it is lashed for having slaughtered it on the same day as the parent/offspring had already been slaughtered. He does not receive karet because the animal was not valid to be a sacrifice on that day.", + "If [the first was] consecrated and [the second] unconsecrated [and they were both slaughtered] outside [the sanctuary], [he who slaughtered] the first incurs the penalty of karet and it is invalid, and the second [animal] is valid, and each incurs forty lashes. In this case the order is opposite, first the consecrated animal is slaughtered and then the unconsecrated animal. The first person is liable for karet for having slaughtered a consecrated animal outside the Temple. The animal is invalid. Both are liable for lashes, the first for slaughtering a consecrated animal outside the Temple, and the second for violating the prohibition of “it and its young.”", + "If [the first was] unconsecrated and [the second] consecrated [and they were both slaughtered] inside [the sanctuary], they are both invalid, and [he who slaughtered] the second incurs forty lashes. Now we examine the scenarios if both are slaughtered inside the Temple. The first animal is unconsecrated and therefore it is invalid. The second is invalid because it could not be a sacrifice on that day. Only the second person is lashed because there are no lashes for slaughtering an unconsecrated animal inside the Temple.", + "If [the first was] consecrated and [the second] unconsecrated [and they were both slaughtered] inside [the sanctuary], the first animal is valid and [he who slaughtered it is] not liable, but [he who slaughtered] the second incurs forty lashes and it is invalid. Now the order is reversed. The first animal was consecrated and slaughtered inside the Temple everything good so far! The second animal is invalid because it was an unconsecrated animal slaughtered in the Temple. The person who slaughters it is liable for violating the prohibition of “it and its young.”", + "If both were unconsecrated and [the first was slaughtered] outside [the sanctuary] and [the second] inside, the first is valid and [he who slaughtered it is] not liable, but [he who slaughtered] the second incurs forty lashes and it is invalid. Now both animals are hullin, but they are slaughtered in different places. If the first is slaughtered outside the Temple, then “no problem”! If the second is slaughtered in the Temple, it is invalid for being slaughtered in the Temple and the person who slaughtered it is liable for violating the prohibition of “it and its young.”", + "If both were consecrated and [the first was slaughtered] outside [the sanctuary] and [the second] inside, [he who slaughtered] the first incurs the penalty of karet, each incurs forty lashes, and both animals are invalid. Now both are consecrated, but they are again slaughtered in different places. If the first is slaughtered outside the Temple, it is invalid and the person who slaughters it is liable for karet. The second is also invalid, because it was slaughtered outside of the Temple. Both are liable for lashes, the first for slaughtering a consecrated animal outside the Temple, and the second for violating the prohibition of “it and its young.”", + "If both were unconsecrated and [the first was slaughtered] inside [the sanctuary] and [the second] outside, the first is invalid and [he who slaughtered it is] not liable, but [he who slaughtered] the second incurs forty lashes and it is valid. This is the same as section five, but the order of where the animals are slaughtered is reversed. The first, which is slaughtered inside the Temple, is invalid, but the person who slaughtered it is exempt, because there is no punishment for slaughtering a non-consecrated animal inside the Temple. The second is valid and may be eaten, but the person who slaughtered it is liable for violating the prohibition of “it and its young.”", + "If both were consecrated and [the first was slaughtered] inside [the sanctuary] and [the second] outside, the first is valid and [he who slaughtered it is] not liable, but [he who slaughtered] the second incurs forty lashes and it is invalid. This the opposite order of section six. The first animal was consecrated and slaughtered inside the Temple good job! The second animal is invalid because it wasn’t slaughtered inside the Temple and the one who slaughters it is liable for violating the prohibition of “it and its young.” Summary of general principles that emerge from these two mishnayot: 1) The second slaughterer is always liable. However, the second animal can be eaten, if it was unconsecrated and was slaughtered outside the Temple. 2) One who slaughters a consecrated animal outside the Temple is liable for karet and lashes. 3) One who slaughters a non-consecrated animal inside the Temple is exempt. 4) An animal whose parent/offspring has already been slaughtered cannot be used as a sacrifice on that day. Therefore, if one slaughters such a consecrated animal outside the Temple he is not liable for karet. 5) No animal can be eaten if slaughtered in the wrong place." + ], + [ + "
If a person slaughtered [an animal] and it was found to be terefah, or if he slaughtered [it as an offering] to idols, or if he slaughtered the red cow, or an ox which was condemned to be stoned, or a heifer whose neck was to be broken: Rabbi Shimon exempts [him from having transgressed the law of “it and its young”]; But the sages make him liable. In all of these cases a person slaughters a parent and its offspring on the same day, but one of the animals was an animal that could not be eaten. There are five such categories: 1) A terefah, an animal that has a flaw that will cause it to eminently die. 2) An animal slaughtered for idolatry. 3) The red cow, used for purifying people with corpse impurity. 4) An ox condemned to die for either killing a person or for engaging in bestiality. It is forbidden to derive benefit from such an ox. 5) The heifer whose neck is broken to atone for an unsolved murder. Since these animals can not be eaten, even if they were slaughtered properly, Rabbi Shimon exempts the one who slaughters the second one from being liable for “it and its son.” Rabbi Shimon holds that slaughtering that would not make an animal fit for consumption even if done properly is not called “slaughtering.” The other rabbis disagree and say that he is liable, since he did indeed slaughter the second animal.", + "If a person slaughtered [an animal] and it became nevelah under his hand, or if he stabbed it, or tore away [the organs of the throat], he does not thereby transgress the law of it and its young. In this case, the animal was valid before it was slaughtered, but then was invalidated by an improper method of slaughtering. Such a person is not liable for transgressing “it and its son” because this prohibition only applies to one who “slaughters,” the verb used in the verse. This person did not successfully slaughter.", + "If two people bought a cow and its young, he who bought first can slaughter first; but if the second preceded him, he holds his advantage. If two people buy a cow and its young, they might end up arguing about who has the right to slaughter first. The mishnah says that the first person to buy has the right to slaughter first, and the second person should wait. But if the second person slaughters first, the other person will have to wait for the next day.", + "If a person slaughtered a cow and then two of its calves, he is liable for eighty lashes. If he slaughtered its two calves and then the cow, he is liable for forty lashes. If he slaughtered it and then its calf and then the calf's offspring, he is liable for eighty lashes. If he slaughtered it and then its calf's offspring and then the calf, he is liable for forty lashes. Symmachos says in the name of r. Meir: he is liable for eighty lashes. This section attempts to delineate how many transgressions a person has transgressed when he slaughters multiple animals on the same day. We will take case by case. 1) Once he slaughters the mother, he will be liable for each of its offspring that he slaughters on that day. Therefore, when he slaughters two offspring, he is liable twice. 2) However, if he slaughters two offspring and then the mother, he has violated the prohibition only once, by slaughtering the mother. In other words, we don’t count his transgressions retroactively. 3) When he slaughters the mother, it is prohibited to slaughter its young. So when he slaughters the young, he is liable for forty lashes. When he slaughters the offspring of the young, he has violated the prohibition again, and is liable for another forty lashes (ouch!) 4) If after slaughtering the mother, he first slaughters the offspring of the mother’s offspring (the third generation), and then the mother’s own offspring, according to the first opinion, he has only transgressed once. Slaughtering the third generation was not prohibited at the time that he slaughtered it. And although slaughtering the second generation violated two prohibitions, for it is the mother of the third generation and the child of the first generation, one can be liable only once for each animal. Rabbi Meir holds that he is liable twice, even though he slaughtered only one prohibited animal, since that one animal was prohibited in two different ways.", + "At four periods in the year he who sells a beast to another must inform him, “I sold today its mother to be slaughtered,” or “I sold today its young to be slaughtered,” and these are they: on the eve of the last day of the feast [of Sukkot], on the eve of the first day of Pesah, on the eve of Shavuot, and on the eve of Rosh Hashanah. According to Rabbi Yose the Galilean, also on the eve of Yom Kippur, in the Galilee. Rabbi Judah says, this is so, only when there was no time in between the sales, but if there was time, he need not inform him. Rabbi Judah agrees that if he sold the mother to the bridegroom and the young to the bride, he must inform them of it, for it is certain that they will each slaughter on the same day. When a merchant sells an animal and then sells its mother/offspring to different customers there might be a concern that the two people will slaughter the animals on the same day and thereby unwittingly the prohibition of “it and its son.” This will only be a concern if it is anticipated that a person who buys an animal will slaughter it on that very day. The mishnah informs us that this is a strong possibility four times a year, the four times when people ate the most meat. The four times are as follows: 1) Before the last day of Sukkot, which we call Shemini Atzeret. Interestingly, people seem to have eaten more meat on the last day of Sukkot then on the first day. This might be connected with Simchat Bet Hashoevah, the celebration described in the end of tractate Sukkah. 2) Before the first day of Pesah. People would have eaten meat for the Pesah meal (the seder) both before and after the destruction of the Temple. 3) Before Shavuot. 4) Before Rosh Hashanah. Rabbi Yose the Galilean notes that in the Galilee the same rule would hold the day before Yom Kippur. In the Galilee they ate large meat meals before the onset of the fast. Rabbi Judah limits the law to a case where there was not a day separating the sale of the mother and its young. If there was a day separating the sales, then the seller need not inform him. According to Rabbi Judah, two different buyers buying on two different days are not likely to slaughter on the same day. There is a case where Rabbi Judah agrees that even if the sales occur on two different days, the seller must inform the purchasers. If a bride and bridegroom buy a mother and its young, he must inform them, because it is clear that they will be slaughtered on the same day." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is a continuation of the end of yesterday’s mishnah, where we learned that there were four periods of the year when people ate more meat. This mishnah teaches us another ramification of the fact that there were four major times to eat meat during the year.", + "At these four periods a butcher can be compelled to slaughter against his will. Even if the ox was worth a thousand dinars and the purchaser has only [paid] a dinar, they can force the butcher to slaughter it. At these four times of the year (see yesterday’s mishnah for the list) a butcher can be compelled to slaughter an animal and sell the meat. This is so even if the ox to be slaughtered is worth a tremendous amount and there is only one person who wants to buy a small amount of meat. In other words, it is so important that there be meat available to celebrate these occasions, that the halakhah forces the butcher to slaughter and sell, even if he risks a loss.", + "Therefore if the animal died, the loss is upon the purchaser. At these four times, the butcher had no choice but to sell and once he agreed to sell the meat, he could not change his mind. Therefore, if the animal should die before the buyer receives his meat, the buyer loses his one denar.", + "At other times of the year it is not so, therefore if the animal died, the loss is upon the seller. At other times of the year, the law is exactly the opposite. First of all, the butcher is not compelled to sell. Second, he can retract the sale so long as the purchaser has not received the meat (this is the typical law with regard to sales). If he sees that there are not enough people interested in buying the meat, he can simply decide not to slaughter. The animal is fully his until it is given over. Therefore, if someone has already paid for the meat, but the animal dies before it is slaughtered, the butcher must return the money." + ], + [ + "The “one day” mentioned in connection with the law of “it and its young” means the day and the night preceding it.
This was how Rabbi Shimon ben Zoma expounded (: it says “one day” (Genesis 1:5) in connection with the creation and it also says “one day” (Leviticus 22:28) in connection with “it and its young” Just as the “one day” mentioned in connection with the creation means the day and the night preceding it, so too the “one day” mentioned in connection with “it and its young” means the day and the night preceding it.
This mishnah, which I shall explain here and not below, teaches that when we reckon the day on which an animal was slaughtered, the night goes with the day that follows it. Thus if he slaughtered one animal at night and then the following day he slaughtered its mother or offspring, he has violated the law of “it and its young.” But if he slaughters an animal during the day and then the following night he slaughters its mother or young, he has not violated the law.
The basis for this law are the verses from Genesis 1 that state, “and it was evening and it was morning, the first day,” and so on for each day. These verses imply, to the rabbis, that the day begins with the preceding night. And since the words “one day” are used in the context of creation and in the context of the law concerning “it and its young,” the day is reckoned in the same way for each." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nLeviticus 17:13 states, “And if any Israelite or any stranger who resides among them hunts down (or traps) an animal or a bird that may be eaten, he shall pour out its blood and cover it with earth.” From this verse we learn that when a person slaughters a wild animal such as a deer or a bird, he must pour out the blood and cover it with earth. Our chapter deals with the details concerning this mitzvah.", + "[The law of] “covering up the blood” applies both within the land of Israel and outside it, both during the existence of the Temple and after it, The law concerning covering up the blood applies in all times and in all places. It is not dependent upon the existence of the Temple or the land of Israel.", + "It applies to unconsecrated animal, but not consecrated animals. The law applies only to unconsecrated animals. Obviously this is true for game animals, because they can never be sacrificed. It is also true of birds which can be either a hatat or an olah. In such cases, there is no mitzvah to cover the blood with earth.", + "It applies [only] to wild animals and birds, whether they are at one's disposal or not. It applies only to wild animals and birds and not to domesticated beasts. However, it applies to these animals whether they are already trapped and at one’s disposal or not. One might have thought that since the verse says, “when one hunts/traps” that the rule applies only to wild animals and birds that were trapped.", + "It applies also to a koy, for it is an animal about which there is a doubt. The rabbis did not know whether to classify the koy as a wild animal or as a domesticated beast (see Bikkurim 2:8-11). Therefore, one has to deal with it stringently, and apply to it laws that govern both domesticated and wild animals. If one slaughters a koy, he must cover the blood, lest it is a hayah (a wild animal).", + "It may [therefore] not be slaughtered on a festival; and if it was slaughtered [on a festival] one may not cover up its blood. One cannot slaughter a koy on a festival because it is forbidden carry the dirt to cover up the blood, because the dirt is muktzeh (off-limits on Shabbat and Yom Tov). Note that if a koy was known to be a hayah, it could be slaughtered because the dirt would definitely be needed. However, since the koy might not be a hayah, it might not need to have its blood covered and therefore, carrying the dirt might be a violation of muktzeh. If it was slaughtered, the blood should not be covered on Yom Tov. Rather, he must wait until evening." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is very similar to 5:3, so see above for more references.", + "If a person slaughtered [a wild animal or a bird] and it was found to be terefah, or if he slaughtered [it as an offering] to idols, or if he slaughtered that which was unconsecrated inside the sanctuary or that which was consecrated outside, or if he slaughtered a wild animal or a bird that was condemned to be stoned: Rabbi Meir makes him liable to cover up the blood; But the sages make him exempt. In all of these cases, the animal was slaughtered with the proper technique, but nevertheless it could not be eaten. Most of these categories were explained above in 5:3. This mishnah adds two categories: a consecrated bird slaughtered outside the Temple or an unconsecrated bird or wild animal slaughtered inside the Temple. In both cases, the animal/bird cannot be eaten. Rabbi Meir holds that since the animal was slaughtered, the blood must be covered. In other words, the mitzvah of covering the blood is not dependent upon the edibility of the animal. The other sages hold that slaughtering causes one to be liable to cover the blood only if the animal is made edible by the slaughtering. Slaughtering that is ineffective is not considered to be slaughtering (this is like Rabbi Shimon in 5:3).", + "In these cases he didn’t even slaughter the animal, at least not properly. Therefore, he is not liable to cover the blood because covering the blood is a mitzvah only for an animal that was slaughtered." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn the beginning of the tractate we learned that if a deaf-mute, an imbecile (someone who is either crazy or perhaps retarded) or a minor slaughter an animal, the slaughtering is valid, but only if someone else watches them. If no one is watching, then we can assume that they did not slaughter in a valid fashion and the animal cannot be eaten. Our mishnah deals with the issues of covering the blood and the prohibition of “it and its young” when it comes to these three categories of people.", + "If a deaf-mute, an imbecile or a minor slaughtered while others watched them, one must cover up the blood; But if they were alone, they are exempt from covering it up. If other people watched the deaf-mute, imbecile or minor slaughter a wild animal or bird, and they saw that it was done in a valid fashion, then they are liable to cover up the blood. Since their slaughtering is valid, there would be no reason for them to be exempt from this obligation. However, if they were alone, then their slaughtering is not valid and they are exempt from covering up the blood, as we learned in yesterday’s mishnah.", + "Similarly for the matter of “it and its young”: if they slaughtered while others watched them, it is forbidden to slaughter after them [the mother/young], But if they were alone: Rabbi Meir permits to slaughter after them [the mother/young]. But the rabbis forbid it. They agree, that if a person did slaughter [after them], he has not incurred forty lashes. As is the rule with the covering of the blood, if other people see a deaf-mute, imbecile or minor slaughter an animal it is forbidden to slaughter the mother/offspring because the first animal was slaughtered in a valid fashion. If they were alone, then Rabbi Meir holds that the second animal (the mother/offspring) can be slaughtered because we can assume that the first one was not slaughtered properly. However, the other rabbis hold that one should not slaughter the second animal lest the first animal was properly slaughtered. According to the Talmud, the other rabbis disagree with the halakhah in section one as well they must cover the blood because the slaughtering might have been done in a proper fashion. In other words, when a deaf-mute, imbecile or minor slaughters an animal without witnesses, we can’t eat the animal lest it not be valid. However, we have to also take into consideration that it was slaughtered correctly and therefore the blood must be covered and it is forbidden to slaughter the mother/offspring on the same day. While the rabbis say that one should not slaughter the second animal, if one does, he is not liable for the forty lashes because it is not certain that the first animal was slaughtered properly. In order for someone to incur a punishment, it must be certain that he transgressed, and in this case there is no way to ascertain whether the first animal was slaughtered properly." + ], + [ + "If a person slaughtered a hundred wild animals in one place, one covering suffices for all. If [he slaughtered] a hundred birds in one place, one covering suffices for all. If one slaughters multiple animals of the same type, he is liable to cover up the blood only once. He need not cover up the blood for each animal individually.", + "If [he slaughtered] a wild animal and a bird in one place, one covering suffices for both. Rabbi Judah says: if he slaughtered a wild animal he should cover up its blood and then slaughter the bird [and cover it up also]. According to the first opinion, the same applies to slaughtering wild animals and birds. All of the blood from both types can be covered together. Rabbi Judah disagrees, and says that if there are two different types that require the covering of blood, birds and wild animals, then the blood of each must be covered up separately. He would agree, though, that one can cover up all of the birds’ blood at one time and all of the animals’ blood at one time.", + "If a person slaughtered and did not cover up the blood and another person saw it, the other must cover it up. The mitzvah of covering the blood of a slaughtered bird or wild animal is incumbent upon everyone, not just the person who slaughtered the animal. Therefore, if someone sees it, he must cover it up.", + "If he covered it up and it became uncovered, he need not cover it up again. Once the mitzvah has been fulfilled, if the blood becomes uncovered, it need not be fulfilled again. In other words, the mitzvah is to cover the blood and not to make sure that the blood is covered.", + "If the wind covered it up, he must cover it up again. The Talmud explains that after the wind covers the blood it becomes uncovered. Since no one actually fulfilled the mitzvah, if it becomes uncovered again, he must cover it up." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah deals with blood that comes out of a slaughtered bird or wild animal that then becomes mixed up with something else, either water, wine or blood.", + "If the blood became mixed with water and it still has the color of blood, it must be covered up. If the blood becomes so mixed up with water, that it no longer has reddish color, then it is no longer considered to be blood and it need not be covered up. But if it still has the color of blood, it must be covered, despite the fact that there is water mixed in.", + "If it became mixed with wine, [the wine] is to be regarded as though it was water. Wine has the same color, more or less, as blood, so we can’t say that if the mixture has the color of blood then it must be covered up. Therefore, if there is enough wine such that if it was water there would no longer be the color of blood, then he need not cover it up. This is what it means when the mishnah states that the wine is regarded as water.", + "If it became mixed with the blood of a beast or with the blood of a wild animal, it is to be regarded as though it was water. Rabbi Judah says: blood does not annul other blood. The blood of a domesticated beast (cow, sheep or goat) need not be covered. If the blood of a wild animal or bird is mixed up with the blood of a beast, then we apply the same test as we did with blood that was mixed with wine. If there is enough wild animal or bird blood such that if the beast’s blood was water the mixture would still look like blood, then he must cover it up. This section has some very puzzling words “or with the blood of a wild animal.” The blood of a wild animal must be covered and therefore this line makes no sense in this context. Albeck suggests that it is here by mistake, due to the similarity between this mishnah and Zevahim 8:6 where the words “the blood of a wild animal” do make sense. Rashi suggests that the blood of the wild animal came out not by slaughtering, while the Rambam suggests that the wild animal referred to here is not a kosher one. Neither suggestion is convincing. Rabbi Judah says that blood can never annul the presence of other blood. While an overwhelming amount of wine or water could exempt a small amount of blood from having to be covered, the same cannot be said about blood. In general, Rabbi Judah holds that when two like things are mixed, the problematic thing (for instance nevelah meat mixed in with kosher meat) can never be annulled." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah deals with whether all blood must be covered up or just some of it.", + "The blood which spurted out and that which is upon the knife must also be covered up. “Blood which is spurted out” refers to blood that is found at some distance from the place where the animal was slaughtered. Such blood and blood that is found on the knife must also be covered up.", + "Rabbi Judah says: when is this the case? When there is no other blood but that; but when there is other blood besides this, it need not be covered up. Rabbi Judah limits the above law to cases where this is the only blood. If this is the only blood with which to fulfill the commandment of covering the blood, then this blood must be used. But if there is other blood, at the place of slaughter, then he should use that blood and the blood on the knife or found elsewhere need not be covered. In mishnayot like this one, it is hard to tell whether there is a debate or whether Rabbi Judah is simply explaining the first clause. If there is a debate, then we might understand that there are two concepts with regard to covering the blood. According to the first opinion, all blood must be covered, regardless of where it is. The blood, the life force of the animal, cannot be left in the open. Perhaps doing so would involve some sort of danger. In contrast, Rabbi Judah says that there is a mitzvah to cover the blood, but not that all blood must be covered. The purpose of covering the blood is, perhaps, to atone for the killing of the animal, the taking of a life. In that case, someone must cover some of the blood as a symbolic act, but he need not cover all of it." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe Torah states that the blood should be covered with “earth (afar).” The rabbis expand this to include anything in which plants grow, just as they grow in earth. The blood may not be covered with something in which plants do not grow.", + "With what may one cover up [the blood] and with what may one not cover it up?
One may cover it up with fine dung, with fine sand, with lime, with white clay, or a brick or an earthenware stopper [of a cask] that have been ground into powder. All of these substances fit into the category of “earth” because plants may grow in them. Hence, they can be used to cover the blood.", + "But one may not cover it up with coarse dung or coarse sand, or with a brick or an earthenware stopper [of a cask] that have not been ground into powder. In contrast, these substances are coarser or completely solid and hence cannot be used to cover the blood. We see that the criterion for whether a substance is usable is not merely the nature of the substance itself but also the state that it is in.", + "Nor may one cover it with a vessel. Covering the blood with a vessel does not fulfill the mitzvah.", + "Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel stated a general rule: one may cover it with anything in which plants would grow; but one may not cover it with anything in which plants would not grow. This is the general rule that governs the reasoning behind the laws above." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nAt the conclusion of the story of Jacob wrestling with the angel, Genesis 32:33 states, “That is why the children of Israel to this day do not eat the thigh muscle that is on the socket of the hip, since Jacob’s hip was wrenched at the thigh muscle.” The “thigh muscle” is identified by the rabbis as the sciatic nerve. Our chapter is about this prohibition.", + "[The prohibition of] the sciatic nerve is in force both within the land and outside it, both during the existence of the Temple and after it, in respect of both unconsecrated and consecrated [animals]. It applies to cattle and to wild animals, to the right and left hip. The prohibition of the sciatic nerve is applicable in all times and at all places (as was the prohibition of “it and its young” and the mitzvah of covering the blood). It applies to all types of mammals, both wild and domesticated and to both of their hips.", + "But it does not apply to a bird because it does not have a socket [on its hip]. The prohibition does not apply to birds, because their hips do not have “sockets” as do those of mammals.", + "It applies to a fetus. Rabbi Judah says: it does not apply to a fetus. And its [forbidden] fat is permitted. According to the first opinion, the prohibition of the sciatic nerve applies to a fetus found in its mother’s womb when she was slaughtered. Rabbi Judah says it does not because this fetus is edible based on its mother’s having been slaughtered. In other words, since this fetus is treated as if it were one of its mother’s limbs, the prohibition of the sciatic nerve doesn’t apply. Rabbi Judah adds that the same holds true with regard to the forbidden fat, the helev, of a fetus. It can be eaten. Rabbi Judah, as we can see, does not accord to the fetus the status of a born-animal.", + "Butchers are not trustworthy with regard to the [removal of the] sciatic nerve, the words of Rabbi Meir. The sages say: they are trustworthy with regard to it as well as with regard to the [forbidden] fat. It is quite difficult to remove the sciatic nerve (this is why sometimes this cut of meat is not available at the kosher butcher). Therefore, Rabbi Meir holds that the butcher is not believed to have removed it. The other rabbis disagree and hold that the butcher is believed to have removed both the sciatic nerve and the forbidden fat." + ], + [ + "One may send to a non-Jew a thigh in which the sciatic nerve has not been removed, because its place is known. We are not concerned lest a Jew buy this thigh with its sciatic nerve, because he will be able to see by looking at the thigh that the entire sciatic nerve is still there.", + "When a person removes the sciatic nerve he must remove all of it. Rabbi Judah says: only so much as is necessary to fulfill the mitzvah of removing it. When he removes the sciatic nerve, he must remove it all, scraping away at anything that is left. Rabbi Judah holds that he need not remove the entire thing, rather just enough to fulfill the mitzvah. He need not do any “scraping away.”" + ], + [ + "If a person ate an olive’s bulk of the sciatic nerve, he incurs forty stripes. As with many food prohibitions, one is not liable unless he eats an amount equivalent to an olive. While eating less is certainly prohibited, one who does so is not liable for the forty lashes, the punishment for transgression of a negative commandment.", + "If he ate all of it and it was not as much as an olive's bulk, he is liable. If one eats the entire nerve, he is liable even if it is less than an olive.", + "If he ate an olive’s bulk of it from one thigh and another olive’s bulk of it from the other thigh, he incurs eighty stripes. Rabbi Judah says: he incurs only forty stripes. According to the first opinion, the nerve of each thigh is a separate prohibition. Therefore, if one eats an olive’s bulk from each thigh, he is liable for eighty lashes (ouch!). Rabbi Judah holds that only the sciatic nerve of only one of the thighs is prohibited, because, after all, Jacob was injured on only one of his legs. Most hold, according to Rabbi Judah, that it is the right thigh that is prohibited. In any case, one who eats both thighs is obligated for only forty lashes." + ], + [ + "If a thigh was cooked together with the sciatic nerve and there was enough [of the nerve] as to impart a flavor [to the thigh], it is forbidden.
How does one measure this? As if it were meat [cooked] with turnips.
This mishnah deals with whether a thigh that is cooked before the sciatic nerve has been removed is prohibited.
If one cooks a thigh without removing the sciatic nerve, this turns out to be a case of cooking something prohibited (the nerve) with something permitted (the rest of the thigh). Usually in such cases the determining factor is whether the forbidden substance imparts a taste to the permitted substance. We shall learn more about this principle in tomorrow’s mishnah.
However, in this case, there is absolutely no way that someone could taste the difference between a thigh cooked with the nerve and one cooked without the nerve. Therefore, we imagine that the thigh was a dish of turnips and the sciatic nerve was meat. How much meat would impart its taste to the turnips? If this ratio exists between the sciatic nerve and the thigh, then the entire thigh is prohibited. If not, he can still remove the nerve and eat the rest of the thigh." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with a sciatic nerve that is cooked with other permitted nerves. Afterwards, the mishnah continues to deal with the subject of prohibited foods that are cooked with permitted foods.", + "A sciatic nerve which was cooked with other [permitted] nerves: If it can still be recognized, [then all the nerves are prohibited] if [the sciatic nerve] imparts a flavor. But if it can no longer [be recognized] then they are all forbidden. And the broth [is prohibited] if it [the sciatic nerve] imparts a flavor. If the person can still tell which one of the nerves is the sciatic nerve, then the other nerves are prohibited only if we can assume that the sciatic nerve imparted its taste to the other nerves. The test for this would seem to be the turnip and meat test we learned about in yesterday’s mishnah. If he can’t recognize which one is the sciatic nerve, then all of the nerves are prohibited. Note that no amount of other nerves is sufficient, in this case, to nullify the presence of one forbidden nerve. This is unlike the usual rule that holds that forbidden substances can be nullified by a high enough percentage of permitted substances. The Talmud explains that this is because the sciatic nerve is treated like a complete entity, which can never be nullified. As far as the broth goes, here the test is simply whether or not the sciatic nerve was of a sufficient amount to impart its taste. If it is not, then the broth is permitted, even if he can’t tell which one was the nerve.", + "And so it is with a piece of nevelah, or a piece of an unclean fish that was cooked together with other pieces of flesh [or fish]: If it can still be recognized, [then all are prohibited] if it imparts a flavor. But if it can no longer [be recognized] then they are all forbidden. And the broth [is prohibited] if it [the sciatic nerve] imparts a flavor. The same rules hold true for other prohibited substances. Again we must explain why these pieces of meat or fish are not nullified by a high percentage of permitted meat or fish (in cases where he can’t recognize which was which). One would think that if there were, for instance, 200 pieces of permitted meat and only one piece of nevelah, that the permitted meat would nullify the tiny percentage of prohibited meat. The Talmud explains that pieces of meat or fish which are large enough to present to guests are significant enough that they can never be nullified." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn this interesting mishnah, the sages argue whether the prohibition of the sciatic nerve applies to non-kosher (unclean) animals.", + "It applies to clean animals but not to unclean. Rabbi Judah says, even to unclean animals. According to the first opinion, if one eats the sciatic nerve of an unclean animal, a donkey, for instance, he is liable for eating an unclean animal, but he is not liable for having eaten the sciatic nerve. Rabbi Judah disagrees and holds that he has transgressed two prohibitions: 1) eating an unclean animal; 2) eating the sciatic nerve.", + "Rabbi Judah said: was not the sciatic nerve prohibited from the time of the sons of Jacob, and at that time unclean animals were still permitted to them? They replied, this law was ordained at Sinai but was written in its proper place. Rabbi Judah’s argument is based on the unique placement of the sciatic nerve prohibition in the Torah. In the Torah, the prohibition is given in Genesis, before the rest of the laws are given at Sinai. Before the laws were given, all animals were permitted to all of humanity, including the children of Israel. Thus the sciatic nerve was prohibited at a time when unclean animals were permitted. The special nature of this prohibition stays in place, according to Rabbi Judah, even after the Torah was given on Sinai. The other rabbis argue that this law was actually given on Sinai as well. From the time of Jacob until the giving of the Torah there was no prohibition of the sciatic nerve. When the law was placed in the Torah it was put into the context of the story of Jacob, for the reason for this prohibition lies there. Thus it only applies to animal that were permitted after Sinai clean animals." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThree times the Torah states, “Do not seethe a kid in its mother’s milk.” While the Torah speaks specifically about cooking a kid in its own mother’s milk, all of the rabbis agree that the prohibition is much broader. First of all, it applies to the meat and milk of all domesticated animals (sheeps, goats and cows). Second of all, all rabbis agree that it is prohibited to eat and derive benefit from milk and meat that have been cooked together the prohibition is not just against cooking.\nHowever, beyond that, there are several issues that are not clear, and about which rabbis debate. These debates and the rules concerning milk and meat are in our chapter.", + "Every kind of flesh is forbidden to be cooked in milk, except for the flesh of fish and of locusts. There are several categories of meat: 1) Domesticated animals, sheep, goats and cows; 2) Wild animals, such as deer; 3) Fowl; 4) Fish and locusts. When it comes to the prohibition of cooking meat and milk, our mishnah draws the line before category four. Although wild animals and fowl are quite dissimilar from goats, the animal mentioned in the verse itself, it is still prohibited to cook them in milk. Indeed, fowl and milk are prohibited even though birds don’t have milk! In my opinion, the mishnah defines “meat” as anything that needs to be slaughtered. Since fish and locusts are not slaughtered, they can be cooked and eaten with milk. This rule is recognizable today because it is the rule we follow. However, we should note that not all rabbis agreed and there were some rabbis who held that it was either not prohibited by the Torah to cook and eat fowl and meat, or that it was completely permitted. This opinion was held by a few during the talmudic period, but was not accepted in later times.", + "And it is also forbidden to place it upon the table with cheese, except for the flesh of fish and of locusts. Any meat which may not be cooked with milk, may also not be placed on the same table as a dairy product, lest someone come to eat the two of them together. We can see here that the prohibition of cooking milk and meat is clearly also a prohibition of eating them together.", + "Fowl may be placed upon the table together with cheese but may not be eaten with it, the words of Bet Shammai. Bet Hillel say: it may neither be placed [upon the table together with cheese] nor eaten with it. Rabbi Yose said: this is one of the leniencies of Bet shammai and the stringencies of Bet Hillel . Bet Shammai is more lenient than Bet Hillel when it comes to fowl. It seems likely that according to Bet Shammai the prohibition of eating fowl and milk is only derabanan, of rabbinic authority. Bet Hillel might hold that it is of toraitic origin, and therefore they rule more strictly. Alternatively, they are simply stricter than Bet Shammai, but agree that fowl and cheese is only prohibited by rabbinic authority. In any case, Rabbi Yose points out that this is one of the unusual cases where Bet Hillel rules more strictly than Bet Shammai.", + "Concerning what table did they speak? Concerning the table upon which one eats; but on the table whereon the food is set out one may place the one beside the other, and not be concerned. This section refers to the table mentioned in sections two and three. When it is prohibited to place meat and milk on the same table--that is on a table which people eat off of. Meat and milk can be placed next to each other on tables that are used to prepare foods." + ], + [ + "A person may wrap up meat and cheese in one cloth, provided they do not touch one another. As long as the meat and cheese don’t touch, they may be wrapped together, without concern that someone will eat the two of them together.", + "Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: two people at an inn may eat at the same table, the one meat and the other cheese, without concern. In yesterday’s mishnah we learned that meat and cheese should not be placed on the same table. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel states that if people are eating at an inn, they may eat off the same table. The reason that this is allowed is that people at an inn do not know each other and there is no concern that one person will come to eat from the other person’s food. If the two people do know each other, the mishnah would seem to not allow them to eat off of the same table." + ], + [ + "If a drop of milk fell on a piece of meat and it imparted a flavor into that piece, it is forbidden. If milk is mixed in with meat, the mixture is prohibited if the milk imparts a taste to the meat. Thus if a drop of milk falls onto a piece of meat in a pot, the meat is prohibited only if one could taste the milk.", + "If he stirred up the pot, then it is forbidden only if [the drop of milk] imparted a flavor into [all that was in] the pot. If he stirs the pot, then the small drop of milk will spread out to the entire mixture. In such a case, the meat is prohibited only if there is enough milk to impart a taste to the entire pot. But if there is not enough milk to give its taste to the entire pot, then even the piece of meat onto which the drop of milk fell is permitted, because that drop of milk has now spread out to the entire pot.", + "The udder: he must cut it open and empty it of its milk; If he did not cut it open he has not transgressed the law on its account. The udder is a problematic part of the animal because it is flesh filled with meat. If one wishes to eat the udder, he must cut it open before cooking it and empty it of all of the milk gathered in it. Then he can cook it. If he doesn’t open it, and then he cooks it with the milk, he is not liable for cooking or eating milk and meat, since the milk that is inside the flesh is not considered to be milk until it has been expelled through the animal’s udders.", + "The heart: he must cut it open and empty it of its blood; If he did not cut it open he has not transgressed the law on its account. The same problem exists when it comes to the heart it is meat (permitted) filled with blood (forbidden). He should cut it open and empty out the blood before he eats it, but if he cooks it in its blood, and eats it, he has not transgressed the biblical prohibition of eating blood.", + "One who puts fowl onto a table with cheese has not transgressed a negative commandment. Mishnah one taught that it is forbidden to put meat and milk on the same table. Our mishnah points out that while this is forbidden, one who does put them on the same table has not transgressed a negative commandment." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nStrictly speaking, the Torah prohibits boiling only a kid (a baby goat) in its mother’s milk. As I stated in the introduction to this chapter, all rabbis agree that the prohibition is broader. In our mishnah there are two arguments: 1) whether or not the prohibition includes fowl and wild animals; 2) how the extensions to this prohibition are derived (the midrash).", + "It is forbidden to cook the meat of a clean animal in the milk of a clean animal or to derive any benefit from it. But it is permitted to cook the meat of a clean animal in the milk of an unclean animal or the meat of an unclean animal in the milk of a clean animal and to derive benefit from it. A kid and its mother are both clean (kosher) animals. The rabbis use the kid as a paradigm for all other clean animals. The prohibition of meat and milk applies only to the meat and milk of clean animals. But if one boils pig meat in milk or cow meat in camel milk, he has not transgressed any violation. He may also derive benefit from it (by selling it). Of course, he can’t eat it because pig and camel aren’t kosher. But as long as he doesn’t eat the mixture, he has not transgressed.", + "Rabbi Akiva says: wild animals and fowls are not included in the prohibition of the Torah, for it is written three times, “You shall not seethe a kid in its mother's milk;” to exclude wild animals, fowl, and unclean animals. Rabbi Akiva’s opinion is that the prohibition does not extend to wild animals or fowl, which are in a different category from the kid. Rabbi Akiva derives this midrashically from the fact that the Torah prohibits boiling a kid in its mother’s milk three times each time the Torah excludes something that is not similar to a kid. Note that Rabbi Akiva does not state that it is permitted to boil or eat chicken and milk. He only says that doing so is not forbidden by the Torah it is forbidden by the rabbis.", + "Rabbi Yose the Galilean says, it is said, “You shall not eat any nevelah” and [in the same verse] it says, “You shall not seethe a kid in its mother's milk” (Deuteronomy 14:21) anything that is prohibited because of nevelah it is forbidden to cook in milk. Fowl which is prohibited because of nevelah, it might also be forbidden to cook in milk, Scripture says, “In its mother’s milk;” this excludes fowl which has no mother's milk. Rabbi Yose the Galilean disagrees with Rabbi Akiva on two counts. First of all, he holds that the wild animal is prohibited by the Torah, since it is prohibited to eat a wild animal that was not slaughtered properly, meaning one that is a nevelah. He derives this from the juxtaposition of the prohibition of nevelah with the prohibition of meat and milk. Secondly, he seems to hold that it is permissible to eat fowl and milk, whereas Rabbi Akiva seemed to think that this was prohibited by the rabbis. Indeed, in the Talmud it states that in Rabbi Yose the Galilean’s place people used to actually eat fowl and milk. However, this is not the accepted halakhah. According to the accepted halakhah, chicken and milk is prohibited “derabanan” by the rabbis, as was stated by Rabbi Akiva." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah deals with the milk that is found inside the stomach of an animal. This sour milk contains enzymes that were used to curdle milk and make cheese. Similarly, the lining of the stomach was also used in this process.", + "The [milk in the] stomach [of an animal] of a Gentile or [in the stomach of] a nevelah is forbidden. This milk is prohibited because the animal is prohibited.", + "If a man curdled milk with the skin of the stomach of an animal that was validly slaughtered and it imparted its flavor [to the milk] it is forbidden. The skin of the stomach of an animal is considered to be meat. Therefore, if a meaty taste is imparted to the cheese then the cheese is considered to be meat mixed with milk and it is forbidden. If there is no taste of the meat, then the cheese is permitted.", + "The [milk in the] stomach of a validly slaughtered animal which had suckled from a terefah animal is forbidden. The [milk in the] stomach of a terefah animal which had suckled from a kosher animal is permitted, because the milk is collected inside. The milk in the stomach of an animal is considered to have come from the mother from whom the animal suckled. Thus if milk is found in the stomach of an animal that was validly slaughtered, but it is known that the milk came from a terefah (an animal that cannot be eaten because it will die from a defect/wound) then the milk is prohibited. In contrast, if the slaughtered animal was a terefah, but the animal from which it suckled was valid, then the milk is permitted. We should note that this mishnah has many ramifications for later halakhah, specifically with regard to the issue of making cheese. There are various opinions among medieval commentators with regard to whether the milk found in the stomach of an animal, which is called rennet, can be used to make cheese if it comes from a non-kosher animal. However, this is not the place to expand upon such an issue. For more information, you might want to look on the Rabbinical Assembly’s website for a teshuvah concerning the use of rennet in making cheese." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe last mishnah in our chapter has nothing to do with the subject of milk and meat. It deals with the prohibitions of forbidden fat (helev) and blood and compares the applicability of the two.", + "In certain respects the prohibition of the fat is stricter than the prohibition of the blood, and in certain respects the prohibition of the blood is stricter than the prohibition of the fat. This section introduces the structure of the mishnah which compares the prohibition of forbidden fat with that of blood.", + "The prohibition of the fat is stricter, in that the fat is subject to the law of sacrilege, and one is obligated over it for piggul, notar, and uncleanness which is not the case with the blood. One who eats the forbidden fat of a sacrificial animal is liable for sacrilege, meaning he has made illicit use of sacred property. The fat is supposed to be burned on the altar. Thus if one eats this fat he has transgressed twice: 1) sacrilege; 2) eating forbidden fat. He is also obligated for transgressing the other prohibitions associated with sacrificial animals. When a priest, while offering a sacrifice, intends to eat it after it may no longer be eaten, he makes it into piggul. Notar is remnant sacrificial meat that has been left over after it can no longer be eaten. One who eats forbidden fat from an animal that is piggul and notar is liable for transgressing piggul and notar and for eating forbidden fat. He is also liable if he eats the fat while he is unclean or while the meat is unclean. None of these prohibitions apply to blood. If one eats blood of a piggul or notar animal, or in a state of uncleanness he has only transgressed the prohibition of eating blood. The blood is not treated as if it were the flesh of the animal.", + "And the prohibition of the blood is stricter, for it applies to cattle, wild animals and fowl, whether clean or unclean; but the prohibition of the fat applies to clean cattle only. The prohibition of forbidden fat applies only to clean (permitted) cattle: sheep, goats and cows (see Leviticus 7:23). It does not apply to wild animals or birds. In contrast, the blood prohibition applies to all living things: cattle, wild animals and birds." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThe ninth chapter deals with two different forms of uncleanness: 1) food-uncleanness and 2) nevelah uncleanness. There are some differences between the two forms of uncleanness. Food that is unclean can cause other food to become unclean if there is the amount of an egg of food, whereas for nevelah uncleanness an olive’s worth is sufficient.\nOur mishnah teaches that some parts of the animal are considered to be food and therefore susceptible to food uncleanness even though they are not usually eaten.", + "The hide, meat juice, sediment, dried-up meat, bones, sinews, horns and hooves join together [to make up the minimum quantity in order] to convey food-uncleanness, but not to [make up the minimum quantity in order to] convey nevelah-uncleanness. These are all parts of the animal that are not generally or ever eaten. However, these parts, joing together with the generally edible parts of the animal to create a minimum volume the size of an egg to convey uncleanness to other foods if the animal was rendered unclean. The reason is that all although these parts are not eaten on their own, they are sometimes eaten with other parts of the meat. Alternatively, some of these things protect the meat of the animal, even if they themselves are not eaten. Therefore, they join with the meat in adding up to this minimum value. However, these things do not join together with the rest of the meat to cause nevelah-uncleanness, which requires the minimum volume of an olive.", + "Similarly, if a man slaughtered an unclean animal for a Gentile and it still has convulsions, it can convey food-uncleanness, but it conveys nevelah-uncleanness only after it is dead, or its head has been chopped off. This animal cannot be eaten by a Jew or by a Gentile. It can’t be eaten by a Jew because it is an unclean animal, for instance a camel. It can’t be eaten by a Gentile because it is still convulsing and is therefore prohibited under the Noahide prohibition of eating the limb of a living animal. Nevertheless, this animal is considered food because just as when a Jew slaughters a kosher (clean) animal he causes it to be able to receive impurity, so too when he slaughters a non-kosher animal, he causes it to be able to receive impurity. However, it is not considered a nevelah in order to convey nevelah uncleanness until it is truly dead or has its head cut off. If its head is cut off, it is considered dead even if it is still convulsing.", + "[Scripture] has [thus] made more cases that convey food-uncleanness than those that convey nevelah-uncleanness. The mishnah closes by noting there are more cases where something conveys food-uncleanness than nevelah uncleanness.", + "Rabbi Judah says: if an olive’s bulk of dried-up meat was gathered in one place, one would thereby become liable [for nevelah-uncleanness]. In section one, we learned that “dried-up meat” does not join together with regular meat to create the minimum measure necessary to convey nevelah-uncleanness, should the animal be a nevelah. Because the dried-up meat is not generally eaten it does not count as meat. Rabbi Judah says that if a person gathered up an olive’s bulk of such a substance in one place, then he can be liable over it for nevelah-uncleanness (provided the substance comes from a nevelah, of course). He would be liable if he touches it, thereby becoming unclean, and then eats holy food (terumah or sacrifices) or goes into the Temple." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn yesterday’s mishnah we learned that the skin is not treated as part of the flesh, as far as transmitting nevelah-uncleanness. That is to say, in order for there to be an olive’s worth of flesh to convey nevelah-uncleanness, there must be meat and not skin.\nOur mishnah teaches that there are cases where the skin is considered to be impure like the flesh.", + "In the following cases the skin is considered flesh: The skin of a person, The skin of the domesticated pig. Rabbi Yose says: even the skin of the wild pig. The skin of the hump of a young camel. The skin of the head of a young calf. The skin around the hooves. The skin of the pudenda. The skin of a fetus. The skin beneath the fat tail. The skin of the gecko, the monitor, the lizard and the skink. Rabbi Judah says: the lizard is like the weasel. In all of these cases, the skin is treated just like the flesh. The skin of a dead human being transmits impurity in the same way that the flesh does. In the remainder of the examples listed here the skin is treated like flesh because it is eaten like the flesh. These are all cases where the skin is soft and therefore edible. Thus people eat the skin of the domesticated pig, but not the skin of wild pigs. Rabbi Yose says that people eat even the skin of wild pigs. In sub-section i, the mishnah lists four of the eight “reptiles” (sheratzim) mentioned in Leviticus 11:29-30. Rabbi Judah holds that the skin of a lizard is not eaten and therefore it is like the skin of the weasel, which does not count as flesh.", + "If any of these skins was tanned or trampled upon as much as [was usual] for tanning, it becomes clean, excepting the skin of a man. Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri says: the eight reptiles have [real] skins. Generally the types of skins mentioned in section one are eaten and not tanned. That is why they convey impurity as does flesh. However, if they were tanned, or even begun to be tanned, then it is obvious that the owner does not intend to eat them. Therefore, they are pure from nevelah uncleanness. The one exception is human skin, which continues to be impure even if it is tanned (I realize that this is a disturbing image). Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri holds that the 8 reptiles listed in Leviticus 11:29-30 have real skins, ones that don’t convey nevelah-uncleanness. He disagrees with the sages above who distinguished between the different reptiles." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah discusses how long a hide that is being flayed from an animal is considered to be part of the animal. The importance of this issue is for matters of purity: if it is considered to be connected to the animal, then it conveys impurity to the remainder of the flesh and receives impurity as well. When it is disconnected it is considered a separate entity with regard to matters of purity.", + "One who was flaying cattle or wild animals, clean or unclean, small or large: The rules in this mishnah apply to all animals, whether domesticated or wild, clean (kosher) or unclean, small or large.", + "In order to use the hide for a covering, if he stripped as can be taken hold of [the hide is no longer considered as connected to the flesh.] The amount of hide necessary for it to be considered as disconnected to the flesh is going to depend on what he wants to use the hide for. If he is using it for a covering, either for a chair or table, or other such object, then once he has removed enough to grab hold of, the part that he has removed is considered to be disconnected from the flesh. If the animal is a nevelah, then the hide that has been already flayed does not make the person who touches it unclean. And if the animal was properly slaughtered but the hide became unclean, the remainder of the flesh remains clean.", + "In order to make a water-skin, until the breast has been flayed. If he was intending to use the hide as a water-skin, then the hide is considered connected until he flays the breast. When skinning an animal for this purpose, he would cut a small hole at the place of the neck and then flay the rest of the skin whole. The skin counts as being connected until he gets down to the breast, because this is the most difficult place to properly flay. Until he reaches this point, the purity status of the skin and flesh is shared.", + "If he was flaying from the feet upwards, until the whole hide [has been flayed]. If he was flaying in the opposite direction, from the feet upwards, then the skin is considered connected until it is all removed.", + "[All of these measures apply] for both conveying uncleanness and becoming unclean. As I have explained above, these rules apply in both directions: both to convey uncleanness from the animal to the hide, and from the hide to the animal.", + "As for the skin that is on the neck: Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri says: it is not connected. But the sages say it is connected until the whole hide has been flayed. The skin that surrounds the neck is easily separated from the flesh and therefore Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri considers it as disconnected from the flesh. If it becomes unclean, the flesh is not unclean and if the flesh is unclean, it remains clean. The other sages say that this hide is treated just as is the rest of the hide. One who touches it, it is as if he touched the flesh, even if part of it was removed. It is not separate until it has all been removed." + ], + [ + "A hide which had an olive’s bulk of [unclean] flesh clinging to it, one who touches a shred hanging from it, or a hair that was opposite to it, he becomes unclean. This section teaches that one who touches something that is attached to a piece of flesh is considered as having touched the flesh. If there is a piece of flesh of nevelah (carrion) the size of an olive that is hanging from a hide, one who touches the hide has become unclean through nevelah uncleanness. He is also unclean if he touches the hair attached to the hide opposite the piece of flesh, for touching the hair counts as touching the hide which conveys the uncleanness from the flesh.", + "If there were two pieces of flesh attached to it, each the size of half an olive, they convey uncleanness by carrying but not by contact, the words of Rabbi Ishmael. Rabbi Akiva says: neither by contact nor by carrying. Here, instead of there being one piece of flesh the size of an olive, the usual size necessary to convey nevelah uncleanness, there are two pieces of flesh, each the size of half of an olive. Both are attached to one piece of hide. Everyone agrees that these two pieces of flesh don’t join together to convey uncleanness by contact, since one is touching only one at a time. However, Rabbi Ishmael holds that if one carries the hide with the two olives attached to it he has become impure through carrying, because he is, after all, carrying an olive’s worth of nevelah. Rabbi Akiva says that they don’t convey impurity even when carried.", + "Rabbi Akiva agrees that if there were two pieces of flesh, each the size of half of an olive, that he stuck on a twig and he waved them, he becomes unclean. Rabbi Akiva agrees with Rabbi Ishmael that if there are two half-olive size pieces of flesh stuck on a stick, they join together to count as one full olive. Waving counts as carrying, so if he waves this stick with the two nevelah pieces on it, he is impure.", + "Why then does Rabbi Akiva declare him clean in the [case where they cling to the] hide? Because the hide renders them negligible. The mishnah now explains why Rabbi Akiva says that the two pieces of flesh attached to the hide do not join together to transmit impurity while those attached to the stick do. The two small pieces of flesh attached to the hide are negligible and nullified vis a vis the hide. However, the stick that he put them on is not considered important and therefore they are not nullified in this situation." + ], + [ + "With regard to a thigh-bone of a corpse or a thigh-bone of a consecrated animal, he who touches it, whether it be stopped up or pierced, becomes unclean. When it comes to human corpses, bones convey uncleanness just as does flesh. Thus one who touches a thigh-bone (this bone can actually be referring to any large bone) is impure no matter what state the bone is in. Consecrated animals that are disqualified by becoming either piggul (the priest had the wrong intention while offering the sacrifice) or remnant, cause hand-impurity (see Pesahim 10:9). The bones of consecrated animals also cause such impurity, again, no matter what state the bone is in.", + "With regard to a thighbone of a nevelah or of a [dead] sheretz, if it was stopped up, he who touches it remains clean, but if it was at all pierced it conveys uncleanness by contact. However, when it comes to nevelah impurity or the impurity caused by a dead sheretz (one of eight types of creepy crawly animals mentioned in the Torah), it depends on whether the bone was pierced such that the marrow could escape. The bone itself doesn’t convey impurity, whereas the marrow does. Thus, if it was not at all pierced, then the person who touches it or carries it is clean. But if it was pierced, even with a very small pierce, he is unclean.", + "From where do we know [the same rules apply] for carrying? Scripture says, “He that touches and he that carries” (Leviticus 11:39-40), anything that [can become unclean] by contact [can become unclean] by carrying. And anything that cannot [become unclean] by contact, cannot become [unclean] by carrying. The same rules that apply to touching a pierced or stopped up bone of a nevelah or sheretz apply to carrying such a bone. When one carries a pierced bone, he is impure. This is not the surprising aspect of this rule. What is surprising is that if one carries a non-pierced bone, he remains clean, even though he carried the marrow which counts as flesh of the nevelah. When it comes to nevelah, the same rules that apply to touching applying to carrying if one is pure from touching a stopped up bone, then he is also pure when he carries such a bone. This is derived from the juxtaposition of the verbs in Leviticus 11." + ], + [ + "The egg of a sheretz in which there has formed an embryo is clean. If it was pierced, however small the hole was, it is unclean. If the egg of the sheretz is not pierced, then one who touches it is pure, because there is no way of touching the sheretz that is inside. If it is pierced, then the one who touches it is unclean, no matter how small the hole is.", + "A mouse which is half flesh and half earth, if a man touched the flesh he becomes unclean, but if he touched the earth he remains clean. Rabbi Judah says: even if he touched the earth that is over against the flesh he becomes unclean. The rabbis know of, or at least discuss, a mouse that was not formed by normal ways of procreating, but rather rose out of the dust. When it had not been fully formed, it would be half dust and half earth. If one touches the earth part, he has not become impure by touching a mouse, which is a sheretz. If one touches the flesh, he is impure. Rabbi Judah holds that the earth counts as part of the mouse/sheretz, and one who touches it is impure. Saul Lieberman discusses this mishnah in his book, Hellenism in Jewish Palestine. On pages 183-184 he writes, “The existence of such a mouse was taken for granted by many ancient authors. Plinius cites it as a ‘fact’ which could confirm the credibility of other wonderful creatures…. ‘In one part of their body they are already alive, while the most recently formed part of their structure is still of earth.’ It is exactly the mouse described by the rabbis…The information about that kind of mouse the Rabbis probably got from Egyptian sources. When the alleged existence of the miraculous creature was brought to their attention they commented on its would-be Halakhic status.”" + ], + [ + "Limbs or pieces of flesh which hang loose from a [living] animal are susceptible to food uncleanness while they are in their place. In the cases in this mishnah, the flesh or limb has become severed from the animal and has no chance of becoming reattached. This limb or piece of flesh is considered pure, because it is still attached to the animal. It does, however, receive food uncleanness. Food can become impure by contact with a sheretz (and other more serious forms of impurity) and food conveys impurity to other foods.", + "And [in order to become unclean] they must be first rendered susceptible to uncleanness. In order for food to be rendered susceptible to impurity, it must come into contact with a liquid. This limb or flesh cannot become unclean until it comes into contact with one of seven liquids (water, blood, milk, dew, honey, oil or wine).", + "If the animal was slaughtered, they have by the blood [of the slaughtering] become susceptible to uncleanness, the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Shimon says: they have not become susceptible to uncleanness. If the animal is slaughtered properly, the limb or flesh that was hanging off is made susceptible to food uncleanness by virtue of the blood that leaves the animal when it is slaughtered. This is true even though the slaughtering of the animal does not permit the hanging limb or flesh to be eaten (see above 4:6). In other words, we must treat the limb or flesh as food, even though it cannot be eaten. Rabbi Shimon disagrees and holds that just as it may not be eaten, it is not susceptible to impurity by virtue of contact with this blood.", + "If the animal died, the hanging flesh must be rendered susceptible to uncleanness. If the animal died without being slaughtered, the animal becomes a nevelah but the flesh which was hanging off the animal while it was still alive is not considered nevelah. There is a rule that flesh that separates from an animal while it is still alive is not considered nevelah. Although this flesh was still attached, when it dies we consider it to have fallen off the animal. It still is susceptible to food impurity (as it did in section three), but before it can become impure it must be rendered susceptible by coming into contact with a liquid.", + "The limb is unclean as a limb severed from a living creature, but is not unclean as the limb of a nevelah (, the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Shimon declares it clean. According to Rabbi Meir, the limb, attached to the dead animal, does convey uncleanness because it is considered like a limb that was detached from a living animal, which conveys impurity as does a nevelah. However, flesh that becomes separated from a limb separated from a living animal does not convey impurity. Therefore, Rabbi Meir notes that the limb is treated like a limb separated from a living animal and not like a limb from a nevelah. Should flesh become separated from this limb, it will not become impure. Rabbi Shimon says that the limb is pure it is neither like a nevelah, nor like the limb severed from a living animal. Since the limb didn’t fall off while the animal was alive, it cannot be considered at all like a limb that falls from a living animal. And since it is separated from the rest of the body, it is not considered like nevelah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues the discussion about hanging limbs and pieces of flesh. Whereas yesterday’s mishnah discussed an animal, today’s mishnah discusses a human being.", + "A limb or a piece of flesh which hangs loose from a person are clean. As long as the limb or piece of flesh is attached to a live human being, it is clean. It is not a limb separated from a living being, because it is still attached.", + "If the man died, the flesh is clean, the limb is unclean as a limb severed from the living body but is not unclean as a limb severed from a corpse, the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Shimon declares it clean. This debate is basically the same debate as we found in yesterday’s mishnah. When the person dies, the flesh is clean because it is considered as flesh that separated from the person while he was still alive. Such flesh is pure. The limb is considered like a limb that was severed from a living animal, which is impure. It does not count as part of the corpse because we consider it to have fallen off the body while the person was still alive. This is the opinion of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Shimon considers the limb to also be clean, for the same reason that he considers the limb hanging from the dead animal’s corpse to be clean (see yesterday’s mishnah)." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nDeuteronomy 18:3 states, “This then shall be the priests’ due from the people: Everyone who offers a sacrifice, whether an ox or a sheep, must give the shoulder, the cheeks and the stomach to the priest.”\nOur chapter is concerned with these gifts given to the priest.", + "The [law of] the shoulder and the cheeks and the stomach is in force both within the Land and outside it, both during the existence of the Temple and after it, in respect of unconsecrated animals but not consecrated animals. The law that a person must give the priest the shoulder, cheeks and stomach of an animal that he slaughters is in force in all places and in all times. It applies only to unconsecrated (hullin) animals and not to those that have been consecrated to the Temple.", + "For it might have been argued thus: if unconsecrated animals, which are not subject to the law of the breast and the thigh, are subject to these dues, how much more are consecrated animals, with are subject to the law of the breast and the thigh, subject also to these dues! The mishnah now explains why one might have thought that it should apply to consecrated animals. From shelamim sacrifices, whose meat goes to the owners, the priest receives the breast and the thigh. Thus one might have argued if the priest gets the shoulder, cheeks and stomach from unconsecrated animals but not the breast and thigh, all the more so he should get the shoulder, cheeks and stomach from an animal from which he does receive the breast and thigh.", + "Scripture states, “And I have given them to Aaron the priest and his sons as a due for ever” (Leviticus 7:34) only what is mentioned in this passage shall be his. To counter this argument, the Torah hints (midrashically) that from sacrifices, Aaron and his priestly descendents receive only the breast and thigh, and not the shoulder, cheeks and stomach. Along with this midrash, it seems to me that the different priestly gifts serve to distinguish between sacrifices and non-sacrifices. The fact that the priests receive different gifts from different animals might help in distinguishing whether the gifts they are receiving must be treated as holy, or can be considered hullin (non-sacred)." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nAn animal that has a permanent physical blemish cannot be sacrificed. Our mishnah distinguishes between cases where the blemish preceded the consecration of the animal, versus cases where the consecration preceded the blemish.", + "All consecrated animals whose permanent physical blemish preceded their consecration and were then redeemed: Are subject to the law of the firstling and to the priestly gifts, And when they become like hullin [by being redeemed] they may be shorn and may be put to work. And their young and their milk are permitted after they have been redeemed. And he who slaughtered them outside the sanctuary is not liable. And they do not render what is substituted for them [holy]. And if they died they may be redeemed, except for the firstling and the tithe of cattle. If the animal had a permanent blemish before it was consecrated, then the animal itself doesn’t become holy. Instead, the consecrator has in reality dedicated the value of the animal to the Temple. Thus this animal is treated like a hullin, non-sacred, animal, except that it has to be redeemed before any use can be made of it. If it gives birth to a firstling, the firstling is holy, as is the case with a hullin animal. When one slaughters it, he must give the shoulder, cheeks and stomach to the priest. After it becomes hullin by being redeemed, it may be shorn and work may be performed with it. Similarly, its young and its milk are not prohibited. One who slaughters it outside the Temple is not liable for he has slaughtered a non-sacred animal. If one tries to exchange it for another animal, the other animal is not holy. If the animal dies, it will still need to be redeemed, so that its meat can be given to dogs. The only exception to all of these rules is if this animal that had a permanent blemish is itself a firstling or a tithed animal. The firstling is holy from the moment it is born even if it has a blemish. Similarly, even blemished animals must be tithed (see Leviticus 27:33). Thus these animals are holy regardless of whether they have blemishes and therefore they cannot be treated as the animals above were treated.", + "All [consecrated animals] whose consecration preceded their permanent, or their impermanent blemish [preceded] their consecration and subsequently they contracted a permanent blemish, and they were redeemed: Are exempt from the law of the firstling, and from priestly gifts; And they are not like unconsecrated animals to be shorn or put to work; And [even] after they have been redeemed their young and their milk are forbidden; And he who slaughtered them outside the sanctuary is liable; And they render what was substituted for them [holy], And if they died they must be buried. An animal that is first consecrated and then becomes blemished is a consecrated animal, even though it cannot be sacrificed. Similarly, if an animal has a passing blemish, and then it is consecrated, it is a consecrated animal. These animals must be redeemed, and the money used to buy a new sacrifice. However, they remain consecrated even after redemption. Therefore, their offspring is exempt from the laws of tithe and firstling, as are the offspring of all consecrated animals. One who slaughters them after their redemption need not give the shoulder, cheeks and stomach to the priest. Even after they are redeemed, it is forbidden to shear them or to perform any work with them. Their offspring and their milk remain prohibited, even after they have been redeemed. Indeed, it seems like the only thing that can be done with them is to eat them. Our version of the mishnah says that if one slaughters them outside of the Temple, he is liable. This is difficult, because what it he supposed to do with them he can’t offer them as sacrifices nor can he slaughter them outside of the Temple. There is a version which reads “exempt” instead of “liable.” However, the Talmud reads “liable” and explains that this mishnah is according to Rabbi Akiva who holds that if an animal with a blemish was put onto the altar, it is not to be removed (Zevahim 9:3). Thus, although this animal should not be sacrificed, if it is put on the altar, it can be sacrificed. If one exchanges this animal for another, the other animal also becomes holy. Consecrated animals cannot be exchanged one for the other, and if one tries to do so, the original animal remains holy and the new animal becomes holy. Finally, if they die before they are redeemed, they must be buried, because no one can derive benefit from their meat." + ], + [ + "A first-born got mixed up with a hundred other animals: If a hundred [and one] persons slaughtered them all, they are all exempt from the gifts. If one person slaughtered them all, only one animal is exempt from the gifts. As we learned in mishnah one, one is exempt from giving the priestly gifts from consecrated animals. This includes even a first-born that has a defect that allows one to slaughter the animal and eat it. The problem presented in our mishnah is that this first born was mixed up with many other non-sacred animals. If each animal was slaughtered by a different person, meaning each animal was owned by a different person, they are all exempt from giving the priestly gifts, because each person can claim that his animal was not the first-born. However, if they all belong to one person, then he must give the priestly gifts from all but one animal, for one animal is surely exempt.", + "If a man slaughtered an animal for a priest or a non-Jew, he is exempt from the gifts. An animal owned by a priest or by a non-Jew is exempt from the priestly gifts. If one slaughters an animal owned by a priest or a non-Jew for the priest or non-Jew the animal is exempt.", + "If he had a share [in the animal] with them, he must indicate this by some sign. If a person jointly owned an animal with a non-Jew or priest, the animal is still exempt from the priestly gifts. However, in order that people should know why gifts are not being given from this animal, he must make a sign on the animal that it is jointly owned by someone who is exempt.", + "If he said, “Except the gifts” he is exempt from giving the gifts. The next few sections deal with sales of animals. If a priest sells an animal to a non-priest and he says that he is selling the animal but not the gifts, (the shoulder, cheeks and stomach), then the Israelite does not need to pay the value of these parts of the animal because they were never his.", + "If he said, “Sell me the entrails of a cow” and among them were the gifts, he must give them to a priest and [the seller] does not need to reduce the price. If a person tells a butcher to sell him the entrails of an animal, and among the entrails are gifts that must be given to the priest, the purchaser must give them to the priest and the seller need not reduce the price. This is because the purchaser knew that he was not going to get to keep all of that which he bought. In other words, it was already reckoned into the price.", + "But if he bought them from him by weight, he must give them to a priest, and [the seller] must reduce the price. However, if he buys by weight, then he is anticipating that all that he buys will be his. In this case, if the seller gives the buyer priestly gifts, he must reduce the price." + ], + [ + "A convert who converted and owned a cow: If he slaughtered it before he converted, he is exempt from giving the gifts. If [he slaughtered it] after he converted, he is liable. If there was a doubt about it, he is exempt, for the burden of proof lies upon the claimant. If the convert was not yet Jewish before his cow was slaughtered, he is exempt from the gifts. If, however, he converted and then slaughtered the cow, he must give the gifts. We can see that the critical time is when the animal was slaughtered. If there is a doubt whether the conversion occurred before the animal was slaughtered, then the priest must prove that the owner was Jewish before the slaughtering in order to be able to claim his gifts. This is based on the common legal principle that the burden of the proof is on the claimant.", + "What is ‘the shoulder’? From the joint up to the shoulder-socket of the forelimb, and this is the same for the nazirite. The end of chapter ten is concerned with identifying exactly what part of the animal constitutes the shoulder and cheeks. The mishnah does not discuss the identification of the stomach, perhaps because it is clear what constitutes the stomach. The shoulder is defined as the entire front right leg, except for the foot. The joint refers to the ankle. This is the same shoulder as referred to in connection with the Nazirite in Numbers 6:19, “And the priest shall take the cooked shoulder.”", + "The corresponding part of the hind leg is called the thigh. Rabbi Judah says: the thigh extends from the joint up to the fleshy part of the leg. The same part of the hind leg is given to the priest from the shelamim offering. See above, mishnah one. Rabbi Judah says that the “thigh” referred to in the Torah is really what we would call the lower leg. It does not include from the knee and upwards.", + "What counts as ‘the cheek? From the joint of the jaw to the last protrusion of the windpipe. The “cheeks” go from the lower cheeks until the first joint of the windpipe." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nOur chapter deals with the mitzvah of giving the priest the first of the wool shorn from sheep (“the first of the fleece”). Deuteronomy 18:4 states, “You shall also give him [the priest] the first fruits of your new grain and wine and oil, and the first shearing of your sheep.” This verse follows the verse that instructed Israelites to give priests the shoulder, the cheeks and the stomach. This is the reason why this chapter is found here in Hullin.", + "The law of the first of the fleece is in force both within the Land and outside it, both during the existence of the Temple and after it, in respect of unconsecrated animals but not consecrated animals. The law of the first of the fleece is applicable in all times and places, but it applies only to unconsecrated animals. Just as consecrated animals are exempt from the shoulder, cheeks and stomach, so too they are exempt from the law of the first of the fleece.", + "The law of the shoulder and the cheeks and the stomach is of stricter application than the law of the first of the fleece; for the law of the shoulder and the cheeks and the stomach applies both to herds and flocks, whether they are many or few, whereas the law of the first of the fleece applies only to sheep, and only when there are many. The mishnah notes that in one way the giving of the shoulder, cheeks and stomach is more broadly applied than the giving of the first of the fleece. The priest receives the shoulder, cheeks and stomach from any domesticated animal, be it cow, sheep or goat. However, the priest receives the fleece only from sheep and not from goats (cows are not fleeced, so that is not relevant). Furthermore, the priest receives the fleece only when there are many sheep, and not when there are few. This shall be explained in tomorrow’s mishnah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah begins by explaining what the phrase “and only when there are many,” found at the end of yesterday’s mishnah. It then continues with other various aspects of this mitzvah.", + "How much is “many”? Bet Shammai say: [at least] two sheep, as it is said, “A man shall rear a young cow and two sheep (” (Isaiah 7:21). Bet Hillel say: five, as it is said, “Five dressed sheep (” (I Samuel 28:18). Deuteronomy 18:4 uses the word “tzon” which means flock. The question is: how many sheep are needed for there to be a flock? Clearly, one sheep is not enough. Bet Shammai use the verse from Isaiah to prove that even two sheep can be called “tzon.” Bet Hillel hold that the amount must be larger, and they use the verse from I Samuel to prove it.", + "Rabbi Dosa ben Harkinas says: five sheep, which each produce [a fleece which weighs] a maneh and a half, are subject to the law of the first of the fleece. But the sages say: five sheep, whatever their fleeces weigh. Later sages rule like Bet Hillel, but still debate whether the five sheep rule always applies. Rabbi Dosa ben Harkinas says that there must be a minimum measure of wool that each sheep produces. This amount is a maneh and a half, which is equivalent to about 600 grams of wool. The other rabbis disagree and hold that even if the first shearing produces only a minimal amount, he is still liable to give it to the priest.", + "And how much should one give him? The weight of five selas in Judah, which is equal to ten selas in Galilee. Bleached wool and not dirty wool, sufficient to make from it a small garment, for it is written, “Give him,” when there is enough to be considered a gift. If there are several priests and he wishes to divide the wool up among them he must give each not less than the weight of five Judean selas which is equivalent to ten Galilean selas. When he gives the priest the wool, it must already be bleached. He is not allowed to give the unbleached, dirty wool. The mishnah derives from the word “give” that whenever he gives the wool to the priest, there must be enough wool to make a gift, defined minimally as a small garment. The Talmud explains that a small garment is a sash.", + "If the owner did not manage to give [the fleece to the priest] until he dyed it, he is exempt. If he bleached it but did not dye it, he is still liable. If he dyed it before he had a chance to give it to the priest, he need not give the priest the wool. This is because by dyeing it, he has changed it and acquired it for himself. However, he has failed to perform the mitzvah of giving the priest the first of the fleece. But if all he did to the wool was bleach it, then he is still liable, because bleaching is not enough of a change for the owner to acquire it for himself.", + "If a man bought the fleeces of a flock belonging to a non-Jew, he is exempt from the law of the first of the fleece. Only sheep owned by Israelites are liable for the first of the fleece. So if one buys wool from a non-Jew, he need not give any of it to the priest.", + "If a man bought the fleeces of a flock belonging to his neighbor: If the seller kept some back, the seller is liable, But if he did not withhold anything, the buyer is liable. If he buys from a Jew, then it depends on whether the Jew kept any of the wool for himself. If he did, then the seller must give the first of the fleece from that which he held back. However, if he did not hold any back, then the purchaser must give the first of the fleece, because the seller did not reckon the price of the first of the fleece into the amount that he collected for the wool.", + "If he had two kinds of wool, grey and white, and he sold the grey but not the white, or [if he sold the wool] of the males but not of the females, each must give [the first of the fleece] for himself. If the seller had two kinds of wool, either of two different colors or from males and females, and he kept all of one kind to himself, then each person must give the first of the fleece from his own kind. This is because when there are two different kinds, we don’t consider it as if the seller held back some for himself. Rather he sold all of the wool of a certain kind, and therefore, the buyer must give to the priest from the kind that he bought." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nDeuteronomy 22:6-7 states: “If, along the road, you chance upon a bird’s nest, in any tree or on the ground, with fledglings or eggs and the mother sitting over the fledglings or on the eggs, do not take the mother together with her young. Let the mother go, and take only the young, in order that you may fare well and have a long life.”\nOur chapter, the final chapter in Hullin, deals with this mitzvah, called “letting the mother bird go from the nest (shiluah haken).”", + "The law of letting [the mother bird] go from the nest is in force both within the holy land and outside it, both during the existence of the Temple and after it, in respect of unconsecrated birds but not consecrated birds. The law of letting the mother bird go from the nest is applicable in all times and all places. However, it only applies to unconsecrated birds and not to consecrated ones.", + "The law of covering up the blood is of broader application than the law of letting [the mother bird] go; for the law of covering up the blood applies to wild animals as well as to birds, whether they are at one's disposal or not, whereas the law of letting [the mother bird] go from the nest applies only to birds and only to those which are not at one's disposal. The mishnah compares the law of covering up the blood (see chapter six) with the law of letting the mother bird go because both are practiced with wild animals and not domesticated ones. However, covering up the blood is of broader application because it applies to animals and birds, whereas sending the mother bird away obviously applies only to birds. Furthermore, sending the mother bird applies only to birds that are not at one’s disposal, meaning they are not “house” birds. In contrast, the covering of the blood applies to all birds and wild animals.", + "Which are they that are not at one's disposal? Such as geese and fowls that made their nests in the open field. But if they made their nests within a house or in the case of Herodian doves, one is not bound to let [the mother bird] go. If a bird makes its nest in the open field, then it is considered to not be at one’s disposal and one needs to send it away before taking its young. If the birds nest in the house, then when one comes to take them, he need not send the mother bird away. This is probably derived from the word “along the road” in Deuteronomy 22:6. The same is true for Herodian doves, which refers to the types of doves that Herod used to raise in his palace." + ], + [ + "An unclean bird one is not obligated to let it go. The obligation to let the mother bird go applies only to a clean (kosher) bird, one that can be eaten. It does not apply to birds that are not kosher.", + "If an unclean bird was sitting on the eggs of a clean bird, or a clean bird on the eggs of an unclean bird, one is not obligated to let it go. Furthermore, if either the eggs are from an unclean (not kosher) bird but the bird is clean, or vice versa, there is no obligation to let it go. The obligation applies only to a clean bird sitting on clean eggs.", + "As to a male partridge: Rabbi Eliezer obligates [one to let it go]. But the sages exempt. The Torah says “mother” because most of the time the mother bird sits on the egg. However, the male partridge does sit on the eggs, and therefore the rabbis debate whether there is an obligation to let it go. Rabbi Eliezer says that there is. Evidently, Rabbi Eliezer believes that the Torah mentioned mother, because that was the normal case. But according to his opinion, the same rule would apply to the father as well. The other rabbis are more precise in their reading of the Torah (and more hesitant about extending its logic). One must let only the mother bird go the father bird may be taken even while sitting on its young. As an aside, this reminds me of the debate concerning uncle/niece marriage. The Torah forbids a nephew from marrying his aunt, but says nothing about uncle/niece. The Jews who composed the Dead Sea Scrolls forbade both cases, thereby extending the logic of the Torah, much as Rabbi Eliezer does in this case. The rabbis, on the other hand, lauded such marriages, and read the Torah in a more narrow fashion." + ], + [ + "If the mother was hovering [over the nest]: If her wings touch the nest, one is obligated to let her go; If her wings do not touch the nest, one is not obligated to let her go. The mother is considered to be sitting upon the nest only so long as at least her wings are touching the nest. If she is just hovering over the nest, and her wings are not touching, one is not obligated to send her away.", + "If there was but one young bird or one egg [in the nest], one is still obligated to let the mother go, for it is written: “A nest,” [implying], any nest whatsoever. Although Deuteronomy 22:6 uses the plural form of eggs and fledglings, the obligation is still in place even if there is only one egg or one fledgling. This is because the Torah also uses the word “nest” which implies any nest, so long as there is at least one egg or one fledgling.", + "If there were there young birds able to fly or spoiled eggs, one is not obligated to let [the mother] go, for it is written, “And the mother sitting up on the young or upon the eggs:” Just as the young are living beings so the eggs must be such as [would produce] living beings; this excludes spoiled eggs. And just as the eggs need the care of the mother so the young must be such as need the care of the mother; this excludes those that are able to fly. The prohibition applies only to fledglings that cannot fly or to viable eggs. It does not apply to a case where the young birds can already fly or to a case where the eggs are spoiled. This is derived through a midrash which compares the fledglings with the eggs. Just as the fledglings have proven themselves to be viable birds, so too the eggs must show signs of being viable. Spoiled eggs are not covered by the prohibition. And just as the eggs still require the attention of their mother, so too the fledglings must require the attention of their mother. A fledgling which can feed itself and fly, is no longer covered by the prohibition.", + "If one let [the mother] go and she returned, even four of five times, he is still obligated [to let her go again], for it is written, “You shall surely let the mother go.” Even if the mother bird keeps returning to the nest, the person who finds her there must send her away before taking the young or the eggs. This is derived from the double appearance of the word “shalah” in the Torah, which I have translated as “surely let the mother go.” Although this is a common grammatical construct, the rabbis frequently use it as an opportunity for midrash.", + "If one said, “I will take the mother and let the young go,” he is still obligated [to let her go], for it is written, “You shall surely let the mother go.” One cannot fulfill the obligation by letting the young go, and taking the mother. Rather, the obligation is to send the mother away and then take the young.", + "If one took the young and brought them back again to the nest, and afterwards the mother returned to them, he is not obligated to let her go. If one let the mother go and took the young, he has now acquired the young birds and eggs. If he then puts them back in the nest and the mother comes and takes them, he is exempt from sending her away again. This is because the eggs are already his." + ], + [ + "If one took the mother with the young: Rabbi Judah says: he has incurred [forty] lashes and he need not now let her go. But the sages say: he must let her go, and he does not incur lashes. The Torah prohibits taking the mother bird, but then says that one should send the mother away. The question is: can one remedy the prohibition by performing the positive aspect of the commandment? Rabbi Judah says that once he has taken the mother, he has irrevocably transgressed the commandment. There are two implications: 1) he has incurred the punishment for transgressing a negative commandment (lashes); 2) he need not send the mother away, because there is no longer any commandment to do so. The other sages disagree. They hold that the transgression may be fixed by sending the mother away. Since when he transgresses there is the potential to fix the problem, one can never incur a punishment for transgressing such a type of commandment.", + "This is the general rule: [For the transgression of] any negative commandment which has of a remedy by the subsequent fulfillment of a positive commandment one does not incur lashes. This is the general rule. If there is a negative commandment that can be remedied by performing a positive commandment, then one cannot receive lashes for transgressing the negative commandment." + ], + [ + "One may not take the mother with the young even for the sake of purifying the metzora. One might have thought that if one needs a bird for the purification process of the metzora (one with skin disease) that it would be permitted to take the mother with the young. This purification process requires two birds (Leviticus 14:4). The mishnah states that this is prohibited one may not transgress one commandment in order to observe another.", + "If in respect of so light a commandment, which deals with that which is but worth an issar, the Torah said, “In order that you may fare well and have a long life”, how much more [must be the reward] for the observance of the more difficult commandments in the Torah! The mitzvah of sending away the mother bird is a relatively inexpensive mitzvah a bird is on average worth only about an issar. Thus the person who shoos the mother bird away has lost only an issar, a tiny amount of money. Nevertheless, the Torah states that he will receive a reward of having a long life. The mishnah ends with a note of encouragement, that if such a great reward is received for such an easy commandment, how much greater must be the reward for observing more difficult, and costly, commandments. Congratulations! We have finished Tractate Hullin! It is a tradition at this point to thank God for helping us finish learning the tractate and to commit ourselves to going back and relearning it, so that we may not forget it and so that its lessons will stay with us for all of our lives. Tractate Hullin was full of interesting commandments, many of which still have relevance in our lives. For those of us who eat meat (or fowl) learning Hullin is an opportunity to reflect on the meaning of taking a life in order to receive nourishment. The tractate is full of other commandments that are concerned with how we relate to killing animals in order to eat them, for instance the prohibition of killing a mother and child on the same day, or the commandment to cover the blood of a slaughtered wild animal or bird. It also dealt with the prohibition of cooking meat and milk, a practice that is to this day of great relevance in how a traditional Jew leads his/her daily life. I hope that you have enjoyed learning Hullin. In my opinion it is one of the most interesting tractates that I have learned. Tomorrow we begin learning Tractate Bechorot." + ] + ] + ] + }, + "schema": { + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה חולין", + "enTitle": "English Explanation of Mishnah Chullin", + "key": "English Explanation of Mishnah Chullin", + "nodes": [ + { + "heTitle": "הקדמה", + "enTitle": "Introduction" + }, + { + "heTitle": "", + "enTitle": "" + } + ] + } +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Kodashim/English Explanation of Mishnah Chullin/English/merged.json b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Kodashim/English Explanation of Mishnah Chullin/English/merged.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..29cd4146f53a45fb162b592a2b8d5a61e01e3356 --- /dev/null +++ b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Kodashim/English Explanation of Mishnah Chullin/English/merged.json @@ -0,0 +1,524 @@ +{ + "title": "English Explanation of Mishnah Chullin", + "language": "en", + "versionTitle": "merged", + "versionSource": "https://www.sefaria.org/English_Explanation_of_Mishnah_Chullin", + "text": { + "Introduction": [ + "Hullin means non-sanctified things. As the name of our tractate it refers to non-sacrificial meat, the topic that most of our tractate deals with. It is indeed the opposite of what Seder Kodashim is all about—holy meat. The meat in our tractate is thus called by what it is not. ", + "We should note that according to many biblical scholars, before the Temple was established, all meat that was eaten would have been sacrificial. A person who wanted to eat meat would bring an animal to the local sanctuary where it would be slaughtered. Some of the meat would be given to the priests, and the remainder could be eaten by the owners. When the Temple was established, it became prohibited to offer sacrifices anywhere but the Temple in Jerusalem and therefore people who wanted to eat meat had to eat it in a non-sacrificial manner.", + "Deuteronomy 12:20-24 teaches what one is to do should one want to eat non-sacrificial meat.", + "20 When the LORD enlarges your territory, as He has promised you, and you say, \"I shall eat some meat,\" for you have the urge to eat meat, you may eat meat whenever you wish. 21 If the place where the LORD has chosen to establish His name is too far from you, you may slaughter any of the cattle or sheep that the LORD gives you, as I have instructed you; and you may eat to your heart's content in your settlements. 22 Eat it, however, as the gazelle and the deer are eaten: the unclean may eat it together with the clean. 23 But make sure that you do not partake of the blood; for the blood is the life, and you must not consume the life with the flesh. 24 You must not partake of it; you must pour it out on the ground like water: 25 you must not partake of it, in order that it may go well with you and with your descendants to come, for you will be doing what is right in the sight of the LORD. 26 But such sacred and votive donations as you may have shall be taken by you to the site that the LORD will choose.", + "The Torah itself does not describe how meat is supposed to be slaughtered. However, by the very need to drain the blood (vs. 23) it is likely that the Torah presumes that the animal’s neck will be sliced. The other laws of “shechitah”—slaughtering, are oral laws, transmitted by Jewish tradition, but not found in the Torah. Our tractate will deal with these laws at length. ", + "In order to make the tractate a bit easier I will explain two terms here that will come up throughout: Nevelah: An animal that died without having been properly slaughtered. See Deuteronomy 14:21. Terefah: An animal that is wounded or sick and will eminently die. Such an animal is prohibited even if it is properly slaughtered. The word “treif” which colloquially is used to mean “unkosher” comes from this word.", + "There are other prohibitions concerning slaughtering and eating animals that come up throughout the tractate, but I shall introduce them as we go along.", + "As we learn the tractate we should remember that despite the fact that most of us do not slaughter our own meat, and hence these laws are not really practical for us, they are still observed today, and indeed until recently, before refrigeration was invented, all slaughtering would have been local. “Buy local” wasn’t just an environmental slogan; it was a culinary necessity. Hence, butchers would have been found in every community. Indeed, when Jews moved to a new place first and foremost they needed three things: a mikveh for women to immerse in, a mohel and a shochet. Without these three institutions, no traditional Jewish community could exist. Furthermore, we should remember that usually a person would raise his own animals and then bring them to the shochet for him to slaughter. People would have seen the slaughtering occur, and while not everyone was an expert in these laws and many people never performed them, they would have at least seen them being performed. Personally, I think that the study of Tractate Hullin is a good opportunity for us to reflect on the meaning of eating meat in our society and in our personal lives.", + "Enjoy the Tractate!" + ], + "": [ + [ + [ + "Introduction Our mishnah teaches some general rules with regard to who may slaughter and when.", + "All may slaughter, and their slaughtering is valid, except a deaf-mute, an imbecile or a minor, lest they mess up [the animal] through their slaughtering. And if any of these slaughtered while others were standing over them, their slaughtering is valid. Anyone may slaughter an animal. The only exceptions are the three categories of people who are not considered to have “da’at,” intelligence. They are not allowed to slaughter and if they do slaughter, the animal is not kosher. The problem is that one cannot tell if an animal was validly slaughtered just by looking at it afterwards. Thus there is no way to check the results if one wasn’t there watching when the animal was slaughtered. Furthermore, these three people cannot be trusted to report on what they have done, because they are not considered to have intelligence. Therefore, their slaughtering is invalid. However, if an adult is watching them while they slaughter and sees that they do it correctly, the slaughtering is valid.", + "That which is slaughtered by a non-Jew is a nevelah and defiles by carrying. A non-Jew cannot ritually slaughter for a Jew. If he does, the animal is considered a nevelah (carrion) and it imparts defilement by being carried (as do all nevelot, see Leviticus 11:40). The mishnah probably notes that this meat defiles in order to teach that this animal is “deoraita” (by the Torah) considered a nevelah, and that this rule is not just a stringency initiated by the rabbis.", + "If one slaughtered at night, and also a blind man that slaughtered, the slaughtering is valid. Obviously, it would be better not to slaughter at night, and it is problematic for a blind person to slaughter. However, an animal slaughtered at night or by a blind person is still valid, as long as it was slaughtered properly.", + "One who slaughtered on Shabbat or Yom Kippur, even though he is liable for his own life, the slaughtering is valid. Slaughtering is a prohibited labor on Shabbat and Yom Kippur and one who does so is liable for the death penalty (Shabbat) or karet (Yom Kippur). Nevertheless, the animal is still kosher. Just because the person sinned, doesn’t mean he didn’t slaughter in the correct way." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to provide general rules with regard to slaughtering including the instrument with which one slaughters. We should note that modern halakhah dictates that Jewish slaughter must be done only with an extremely sharp knife, one designed specially for such a purpose. The Mishnah still reflects a time when Jews used other instruments as well.", + "If one slaughtered with [the smooth edge of] a hand sickle, with a flint or with a reed, the slaughtering is valid. All of these instruments have smooth cutting surfaces and therefore can be used to slaughter.", + "All may slaughter; at all times one may slaughter; and with any implement one may slaughter, except a scythe, a saw, teeth or a finger nail, since these strangle. This section summarizes that which we have learned up until now. It then adds a caveat concerning instruments that can’t be used. These instruments do not sever the trachea and esophagus, as is required, but rather tear them out, thereby causing strangulation. An animal slaughtered with one of these instruments is considered a nevelah.", + "One who slaughtered with a scythe, moving it forward only: Bet Shammai declare it invalid, But Bet Hillel declare it valid. The scythe’s teeth are bent back, pointing only in a backwards direction. Therefore, if one slaughters by moving the scythe forward, the teeth won’t tear the neck and the neck will effectively be sliced. Neverthless, Bet Shammai declare it invalid lest he bring the scythe back and tear the neck. Bet Hillel declare the animal valid.", + "If the teeth of the scythe were filed away it is regarded as an ordinary knife. If the teeth are filed away, then the scythe can be treated as a normal knife and one can use it for slaughtering." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nSlaughtering must be performed on the animal’s neck below the larynx, preferably below the first hard ring of the trachea and up to the place where the bronchial tubes begin to branch. Cutting outside of this area is called “hagramah” and renders the animal invalid. Our mishnah deals with a case where a person cuts right below the first hard ring of the trachea.", + "If one slaughtered [by cutting] at the [top] ring [of the trachea] and left a hair's breadth of its entire circumference [towards the head], the slaughtering is valid. As stated in the introduction, the cut should be made below the first hard ring of the animal’s trachea. If he makes the cut at this top ring, the slaughtering is valid as long as a hair’s breadth of the trachea on the side of the head remains. According to the first opinion, the hair’s breadth of the trachea must remain on the entire circumference of the highest ring.", + "Rabbi Yose son of Rabbi Judah says: if there was only left [towards the head] a hair's breadth of the greater part of its circumference, [the slaughtering is valid]. Rabbi Yose son of Rabbi Judah says that it is sufficient for the hair’s breadth to remain on the greater part of the circumference, and not necessarily the entire circumference." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nAnimals are slaughtered and sacrificed by having their throats slit. Non-sacrificial birds are also slaughtered in this manner. However, sacrificial birds are slaughtered by a process called “nipping” which is done from the back of the neck. For more information on “nipping” see Zevahim 6:4.\nOur mishnah compares the laws of nipping with the laws of slaughtering.", + "If one cut at the side [of the neck], the slaughtering is valid. If one nipped off [the head of a bird sacrifice] from the side of the neck, the nipping is invalid. The side of neck is valid for slaughtering but not for nipping bird sacrifices. Some commentators hold that this is only ex post facto meaning one should not slaughter from the side but if one does, the slaughtering is valid. Others hold that even “lechatchila” (a priori) one can slaughter from the side. The side is considered to be part of the front.", + "If one cut at the back of the neck, the slaughtering is invalid. If one nipped off [the head] from the back of the neck, the nipping is valid. Slaughtering cannot be done from the back of the neck, whereas this is the place where nipping must occur.", + "If one cut at the front of the neck, the slaughtering is valid. If one nipped off [the head] from the front of the neck, the nipping is invalid. Slaughtering should be done at the front of the neck, whereas nipping done at the front is invalid.", + "For the whole of the back of the neck is the appropriate place for nipping, and the whole of the front of the neck is the appropriate place for slaughtering. It follows, therefore, that the place which is appropriate for slaughtering is inappropriate for nipping, and the place which is appropriate for nipping is inappropriate for slaughtering. This section explains the general rule any place that is valid for nipping is not valid for slaughtering and vice versa." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nYesterday’s mishnah concluded by noting that the place on the neck where slaughtering is performed is exactly where nipping cannot be performed and vice versa.\nThe remainder of our chapter deals with other opposite types of situations. At first these deal with sacrificial issues, but then they move on to other issues as well.", + "[The age] which qualifies turtle doves [for sacrifice] disqualifies pigeons, and [the age] which qualifies pigeons [for sacrifice] disqualifies turtle doves. Turtle doves are valid as sacrifices when they are older and pigeons when they are younger. There is no overlapping period when both are valid.", + "At the period when the neck feathers begin to turn yellow in either kind they are disqualified. However, both are invalid when the neck feathers begin to turn yellow. When the young birds hit three months their feathers begin to fall off, first from the body and then from the neck and head. Once all of their baby feathers have fallen off, they get new adult feathers. The new feathers on the head are at first yellow in appearance. Once this yellowish color has appeared, the birds are no longer considered to be young, but they are not yet considered old. Therefore, neither turtle doves nor pigeons can be used at this in-between age." + ], + [ + "[The method of killing] which renders the red cow valid renders the heifer invalid, and the method which renders the heifer valid renders the red cow invalid. The red cow used in the purificatory process is slaughtered by shechitah, having its neck sliced, the same way all sacrificial animals are slaughtered (see Numbers 19:3). The heifer is the calf killed when a corpse is found and it is unknown who murdered the person. This heifer is killed by having its neck chopped from behind (see Deuteronomy 21:4). One cannot slaughter the red cow by chopping its neck from behind or the heifer by slicing it from the front.", + "[The disability] which does not disqualify priests disqualifies Levites, and [the disability] which does not disqualify Levites disqualifies priests. Levites can serve in the Temple from the age of 20 to 50 (see Numbers 4:3). In contrast, priests can serve in the Temple from the time they reach majority age and they can continue as long as they want. In that sense, the age which disqualifies Levites does not disqualify priests. Priests who have certain physical blemishes cannot serve in the Temple (we will learn about this more in the seventh chapter of Bechorot). These blemishes do not disqualify Levites.", + "That which cannot be rendered unclean in earthenware vessels can be rendered unclean in all other vessels, and that which cannot be rendered unclean in all other vessels can be rendered unclean in earthenware vessels. When something impure enters the airspace of an earthenware vessel, it is rendered impure. However, if it touches the outside of the vessel, the vessel is pure. In contrast, other vessels are rendered impure when something impure touches them, either from inside or outside, and they are not impure when something enters their airspace without touching them.", + "That which cannot be rendered unclean in wooden things can be rendered unclean in metal things, and that which cannot be rendered unclean in metal things can be rendered unclean in wooden things. A vessel that does not have a receptacle is considered “simple” in mishnaic terms. A simple wooden vessel cannot become impure, whereas a simple metal vessel can. Unfinished metal vessels that can be used cannot become impure until they are completed. In contrast, an unfinished wood vessel can become impure as soon as it is usable.", + "When bitter almonds are subject to tithing sweet almonds are exempt, and when sweet almonds are subject to tithing bitter almonds are exempt. Bitter almonds are edible when they are small and inedible when they become larger. Therefore they are liable for tithes when they are small and not when they are big. Sweet almonds are opposite. When they are small they are inedible and therefore exempt from tithes. When they become larger and edible, they are liable for tithes." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe final mishnah of our chapter continues to describe cases where a halakhah is opposite in different situations.", + "Temed: Before it has fermented it may not be bought with second tithe money and it renders a mikveh invalid; After it has fermented it may be bought with second tithe money and it does not render a mikveh invalid. Temed is a drink made from grapes that have already been squeezed in order to make wine. Until temed has fermented the rabbis consider it to be like water. One can buy food and drink with second tithe money but not water (see Maaser Sheni 1:3, 5) and therefore not temed. Since unfermented temed is water it also has the power to render a mikveh invalid. Only drawn water can invalidate a mikveh other liquids do not. Once it has fermented it is no longer water and therefore it can be bought with second tithe money and it does not invalidate a mikveh.", + "Brothers who are partners [in their inheritance]: When they are liable to pay the kalbon, they are exempt from the cattle tithe, And when they are liable to the cattle tithe, they are exempt from the kalbon. The kalbon refers to an extra amount that people had to pay over the half shekel that every Israelite was obligated to pay to the Temple each year (see Shekalim 1:7). When sons split their fathers inheritance and then shared it in a partnership, they are treated as are all partners and they are obligated to pay the kalbon. In other words, even though at one point all of the money was jointly owned by their father, they are now regarded as regular partners. If they jointly own animals they are exempt from paying the cattle tithe, as is always the rule for partners. However, if they have not yet divided their inheritance, then we treat the inheritance as if it still belongs to their father. In such a case, they are obligated for the cattle tithe but not for the kalbon, because whenever a father pays the ½ shekel for his children, he is not liable to pay the kalbon.", + "Whenever there is [the power] to sell, there is no fine, and whenever there is a fine there is no power to sell. This section is found in Ketubbot 3:8. There are two rights discussed here: 1) the right of a father to sell his daughter as a slave and 2) his right to receive the fine paid out by one who rapes her or seduces her. The father has the right to sell her while she is still a minor (ketanah), but not when she reaches the age of a na’arah (about 12). At this age there is no fine levied on the rapist or seducer. Once she becomes a na’arah there is a fine which goes to the father. However, he no longer has the right to sell her.", + "Whenever there is the right of refusal there can be no halizah, and whenever there can be halizah there is no longer the right of refusal. The right of refusal refers to a girl’s right to annul marriage when that marriage was arranged by her mother or brother because her father had already died (see Yevamot 13:1-2). The right of refusal exists only when she is a minor. However, a minor girl cannot perform halitzah (release from levirate marriage, see Yevamot 12:4). Thus if she was married off by her father and then her husband died before she reached majority age, she cannot perform halitzah until she is of majority age.", + "When the shofar is blown there is no havdalah, and when there is habdalah the shofar is not blown. [Thus], if a festival falls on the day before Shabbat the shofar is blown but there is no havdalah; If it falls on the day following Shabbat there is havdalah but the shofar is not blown. How do they recite havdalah [on a festival that follows Shabbat]? “Who distinguishes between holy and holy.” Rabbi Dosa says: “Who distinguishes between the more holy and less holy day.” On Friday evening right before it became dark they would blow the shofar six times to let people know that Shabbat was beginning (see Sukkah 5:5). If this was a day in which they were blowing the shofar to let people know about Shabbat, then it definitely could not be time to recite the havdalah to separate a holy day from a non-holy day. However, if it was a time to recite havdalah, then there would be no shofar blasts. On a normal Saturday evening this is clear. However, it is not always so clear, as we shall see now. If the festival fell on Friday before Shabbat, then they would blow the shofar on Friday evening, as was normal. Blowing the shofar on a festival is not prohibited. However, they would not recite any havdalah at the end of the festival, since the sanctity of Shabbat is greater than that of the festival. If the festival fell immediately after Shabbat, the opposite is true. They would recite havdalah, but not blow the shofar. The final piece of the mishnah describes how the blessing was recited on Saturday night when a festival begins right after Shabbat. One could not simply recite “who distinguishes between a holy day and a profane day” because both Shabbat and the festival are holy. Therefore, according to the first opinion, one recites “who distinguishes between the holy and the holy.” Rabbi Dosa differs slightly and says that one should note that Shabbat is holier than the festival." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah returns to the subject of slaughtering. Slaughtering involves cutting the trachea and the esophagus. Our mishnah deals with a case where the slaughterer did not fully cut both organs.", + "If one cut one [of the organs of the throat] in the case of a bird, or both organs in the case of cattle, the slaughtering is valid. There is a difference between slaughtering birds and slaughtering cattle (cows, sheep and goats). In order for the cattle to be valid both organs must be cut, whereas it is sufficient for one of the organs to be cut for a bird to be valid.", + "The greater part of an organ is equivalent to [the whole of] it. Rabbi Judah says: he must cut through the veins. If he cuts through most of the organ, the animal is valid. Rabbi Judah says that he must at least cut through the veins. The Talmud states that this applies only to the bird.", + "[If one cut] half of one organ in the case of a bird, or one and a half organs in the case of cattle, the slaughtering is invalid. Cutting through half of an organ is not sufficient. Therefore, if one cuts through half of one organ of a bird or one and a half organs of an animal, the slaughtering is not valid.", + "[If one man cut] the greater part of one organ in the case of a bird, or the greater part of each organ in the case of cattle, the slaughtering is valid. However, cutting through the greater part of the organ counts as cutting through the organ. Therefore, if he cuts through the greater part of one of the bird’s organs, or the greater part of both of the animal’s organs, the slaughtering is valid" + ], + [ + "If one slaughtered two animals simultaneously, the slaughtering is valid. As long as the slaughtering is performed in a valid manner, if two animals are slaughtered together they are both valid.", + "If two persons held the knife and slaughtered, even if one cut higher up and the other cut lower down [in the neck], the slaughtering is valid. Similarly, if two people hold the knife, even if they hold different parts of the knife, the slaughtering is valid, as long as it was performed in a valid manner." + ], + [ + "If he chopped off the head with one stroke, the slaughtering is invalid. Slaughtering must be done with a to and fro motion with the knife and not by chopping. Chopping the head off, which is called \"derasah (pressing),\" invalidates the animal.", + "He was slaughtering and he cut through the neck with one stroke, if the knife was as long as the neck, the slaughtering is valid. When is this so? When the slaughterer moved the knife forward and not backward, or backward and not forward; but if he moved the knife to and fro, however small it was, even if it was a scalpel, the slaughtering is valid. In this case, while slaughtering, which means bringing the knife back and forth, he pressed the knife into the neck, and cut the organs. If the part of the knife that has already passed through the neck is as long as the neck, then the slaughtering is valid. The reason is that we can assume that he has already slaughtered properly with the part of the neck that was already passed through the neck.", + "So too, if he slaughters two animals at the same time, and he presses down on one of them. If the length of one knife has already passed through both necks, the slaughtering is valid.", + "These limitations are necessary if he had passed the knife only in one direction. But if he had already passed the knife in both directions, it doesn’t matter how large the knife is, since we can assume that he slaughtered it before he chopped it.", + "If a knife fell down and slaughtered [an animal], even though it slaughtered it in the proper way, the slaughtering is invalid, for it is said, \"And you shall slaughter and eat,\" that which you slaughter, you may eat. Slaughtering must be performed by a person slicing the neck, not by a knife that somehow falls down and slices a neck without being held by a person. While this doesn't seem to be a real possibility, perhaps what it means to say is that there must be human involvement in the slaughtering process. It can't just happen on its own, even if it happens in a valid fashion.", + "If [while slaughtering] the knife fell and he picked it up, if his clothes fell and he picked them up, if he sharpened the knife, or if he got tired and his friend came and [continued] slaughtering, if he delayed the time that it takes to slaughter, it is invalid. Rabbi Shimon says: if he delayed the time it takes to examine the slaughtering. The mishnah lists various reasons that a person might stop in the middle of slaughtering an animal. If he stops for any of these reasons, and doesn’t resume slaughtering for the amount of time it would take to slaughter an animal, then the slaughtering is invalid. In other words, the second half of the act of shechitah does not join with the first act and therefore the animal was not fully slaughtered in the correct manner. Stopping in the middle of slaughtering is called \"shehiyah,\" delaying, and it is one of the things that renders slaughtering invalid. ", + "Rabbi Shimon says that if he delays the amount of time necessary for someone to check if the slaughtering was done properly, then it is invalid. This is a longer time than it would take to actually slaughter." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn our mishnah Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yeshevav argue about whether an animal that has been improperly slaughtered is a “nevelah” or a “terefah” two terms that I explained in the introduction to Hullin. While neither animal can be eaten, the nevelah causes impurity while the terefah doesn’t. Thus there is some practical difference between the two. Today, since neither animal can be eaten, it doesn’t really matter whether an animal is a nevelah or a terefah.", + "If one first sliced the esophagus and then cut away the windpipe, or first cut away the windpipe and then sliced the esophagus; or if he sliced one of these organs and paused until the animal died; or if he thrust the knife underneath the second organ and cut it: [In all these cases] Rabbi Yeshevav says: the animal is nevelah; Rabbi Akiva says: it is terefah. “Slicing” is how I have translated “shachat” which means to validly slaughter. “Cut away” is my translation of the verb “pasak” and it is an invalid method of slaughter. So if one properly slices one of the two organs and then improperly slices the other one, or if he slices one of the organs and then doesn’t slice the other one and the animal dies, or if instead of slicing the organ he thrusts the knife under the organ and slices up (this is called haladah, burrowing), the animal cannot be eaten. The rabbis argue as to the status of the animal. According to Rabbi Yeshevav the animal is a nevelah. As we in section two, Rabbi Yeshevav says that whenever an animal cannot be eaten because it was slaughtered improperly, the animal has the status of nevelah. Rabbi Akiva says that it is a terefah.", + "Rabbi Yeshevav stated this general rule in the name of Rabbi Joshua: whenever an animal is rendered invalid by a fault in the slaughtering it is nevelah; whenever an animal has been duly slaughtered but is rendered invalid by some other defect it is terefah. And Rabbi Akiba [ultimately] agreed with him. Rabbi Yeshevav provides a general rule for determining what is a nevelah and what is a terefah. We have already explained nevelah above. A terefah is an animal that was slaughtered correctly but couldn’t be eaten because there was some other previously existing problem with it. We shall learn what causes an animal to be a terefah in chapter three. Ultimately, Rabbi Akiva agrees with Rabbi Yeshevav. My definitions of nevelah and terefah in the introduction to Hullin reflect this mishnah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn order for food to become susceptible to impurity it must come into contact with one of seven liquids (see Leviticus 11:38). When an animal is slaughtered, assumedly blood will come out and render the meat susceptible to impurity. Our mishnah discusses a situation where an animal is slaughtered and blood does not come out.", + "If one slaughtered cattle or a wild beast or a bird and no blood came out, they are valid and may be eaten by him whose hands have not been washed, for they have not been rendered susceptible to impurity by blood. Although blood did not come out of the animal (be it wild or domesticated) or the bird, the animal can still be eaten. We don’t assume that the animal was already dead when it was slaughtered and therefore no blood came out. We also don’t prohibit the animal because of the blood inside the animal, because blood that is inside an animal is not prohibited. Since the meat cannot receive impurity, one who has impure hands because he has not washed them can eat the meat without fear of causing it to be impure. This would have important ramifications if the animal was sacred and was being eaten by priests. Alternatively, it would have ramifications if the person simply desired to eat his meat in a state of purity.", + "Rabbi Shimon says: they have been rendered susceptible to impurity by the slaughtering. Rabbi Shimon says that the very act of slaughtering renders the animal susceptible to impurity. Since the slaughtering causes the animal to become permitted for eating, it also causes the animal to become susceptible to impurity." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah deals with slaughtering a dying animal. This would have been a very important issue because if the animal dies without having been slaughtered it becomes a nevelah and is inedible. Slaughtering a dying animal, therefore, would have been of utmost economic importance. However, for it to be edible it must be determined that the animal died from being slaughtered and not on its own.", + "One who slaughtered a dying animal: Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: [the slaughtering is invalid] unless it jerked its foreleg and its hind leg. Rabbi Eliezer says: it is enough if it spurted [the blood]. Rabbi Shimon said: even if one slaughtered [a dying animal] by night and the following morning he got up early and found the sides [of the throat] full of blood, the slaughtering is valid, for this proves that it spurted [the blood], as is Rabbi Eliezer's measure. The sages say: [the slaughtering is invalid] unless it jerked either its foreleg or its hind leg, or it moved its tail to and fro. There are basically two different opinions as to how to determine whether or not the animal died from the slaughtering or on its own. According to Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel if the animal doesn’t jerk its foreleg and hind leg when slaughtered, it is a sign that the animal was already dead. The sages in section four add that wagging its tail is also a sign that it died from slaughtering. Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Shimon believe that the sign is the spurting of blood from the neck at the time of slaughtering. Rabbi Shimon adds that even if he slaughtered the dying animal at night, probably because he felt that he couldn’t wait until morning, and he didn’t see blood at the time of slaughtering, but the next morning he saw blood stains around the animal’s neck, the slaughtering was valid.", + "This is the test both with regard to large and small animals. This line seems to be a continuation of the sages’ opinion in the previous section. The same signs that validate large animals also validate small animals.", + "If a small animal stretched out its foreleg [at the end of the slaughtering] but did not withdraw it, [the slaughtering] is invalid, for this was just an indication of the expiration of its life. However, if a small animal that was already dying merely stretched out its foreleg when slaughtered, this is not a sign of having died from the slaughtering. It is possible that this is just a result of dying before.", + "When do these rules apply? To case of an animal which was believed to be dying. But if it was believed to be sound, even though it did not show any of these signs, the slaughtering is valid. All of these signs are necessary only if the animal was known to be dying before it was slaughtered. However, if it was a healthy animal, these signs are not necessary because there is no reason to assume it died of a different cause." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn our mishnah the sages debate whether an animal slaughtered on behalf of a non-Jew can be eaten by a Jew. The fear is that the animal was slaughtered as an idolatrous sacrifice and hence is prohibited.", + "If one slaughtered for a non-Jew, the slaughtering is valid. Rabbi Eliezer declares it invalid. Rabbi Eliezer said: even if one slaughtered a beast with the intention that a non-Jew should eat [only] its liver, the slaughtering is invalid, for the thoughts of a non-Jew are usually directed towards idolatry. The first opinion in the mishnah holds that an animal slaughtered for a non-Jew is valid. Rabbi Eliezer holds that even if the animal was slaughtered mostly for a Jew’s consumption and only a small part was meant for a non-Jew, the animal is still invalid because we can assume that the non-Jew intended to use it for idolatrous purposes. We see here that Rabbi Eliezer was very strict on relations between non-Jews and Jews because of the ever present fear of idolatry.", + "Rabbi Yose said: is there not a kal vehomer argument? For if in the case of consecrated animals, where a wrongful intention can render invalid, it is established that everything depends solely upon the intention of him who performs the service, how much more in the case of unconsecrated animals, where a wrongful intention cannot render invalid, is it not logical that everything should depend solely upon the intention of him who slaughters! Rabbi Yose makes a kal vehomer (a fortiori) argument that this animal should be permitted. When it comes to sacrificial animals, an invalid intention can render the animal invalid, as we learned in Zevahim, chapter two. For instance, if the priest slaughters the animal in order to eat it after the time when it may be eaten or outside of the place where it may be eaten, the sacrifice is invalid. Nevertheless, when it comes to sacrifices we only take into consideration the intention of the slaughterer, and not the owner of the sacrifice. The same therefore should be true when it comes to non-sacrificial animals, whose laws are less strict. We should only care about the intention of the slaughterer, in this case a Jew, and not the non-Jew for whom he was slaughtering the animal." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah deals with a person who slaughters an animal for idolatrous purposes.", + "If one slaughtered [an animal] as a sacrifice to mountains, hills, seas, rivers, or deserts, the slaughtering is invalid. If a person slaughtered an animal as a sacrifice to a natural phenomenon, such as a mountain, body of water or desert, the animal is invalid, even though it was slaughtered properly. Note that worship of mountains and hills was also referred to in Mishnah Avodah Zarah 3:5 and seems to be based on Deuteronomy 12:2.", + "If two persons held a knife and slaughtered [an animal], one intending it as a sacrifice to one of these things and the other for a legitimate purpose, the slaughtering is invalid. We learned in mishnah two of this chapter that if two people jointly slaughter, the slaughtering is valid. Both are participating in the slaughtering. Therefore, if one of them intends to slaughter the animal as an idolatrous sacrifice, the animal is invalid." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah deals with various prohibitions concerning where one lets the blood flow from the animal’s neck when he slaughters. The point of the mishnah is to ensure that the way that Jews slaughter their animals does not look like the way that idolaters slaughter their animals. It is interesting that with regard to this specific issue it was deemed important to distinguish between Jews and idolaters. Since slaughtering an animal is such an important moment in society, both economically and socially, it probably very frequently had religious significance. As a moment fraught with such meaning, the rabbis felt it crucial to distinguish Jewish practice from the practices of others.", + "One may not slaughter [so that the blood runs] into the sea or into rivers, or into vessels, If one slaughters and lets the blood flow into the sea or a river, it may look as if the person is using the animal’s blood to worship the sea or river. If he slaughters into a vessel it may look as if he is collecting the blood to use it in worship. Alternatively, this may look as if he is performing a Jewish sacrifice outside of the Temple. Therefore, all of these practices are prohibited.", + "But one may slaughter into a pool (or of water. The correct reading of this mishnah is probably not “pool of water” but “vessel with water.” While one cannot slaughter into a vessel, lest it look as if he is going to use the blood for a sacrifice, if there is water mixed in, it doesn’t look like he is going to use the blood, because that is not how sacrificial blood is collected.", + "And when on board a ship on to vessels. When he is on a ship, he can let the blood drain into a vessel, and even one without water. On the ship it would be clear to all witnessing the slaughter that the reason he uses a vessel is to avoid a mess. Furthermore, he wouldn’t want to use the water which has to be preserved for drinking.", + "One may not slaughter at all into a hole, but one may dig a hole in his own house for the blood to run into. In the street, however, he should not do so as not to follow the ways of the heretics. As we can see at the end of the section, it seems that the heretics, who here refer to idolaters (and not heretical Jews), used to slaughter into holes dug into the ground. Therefore, a Jew should not do so. However, in his own house he can dig a hole and slaughter so that the blood flows into the hole, but not directly into the hole. In the streets, one shouldn’t even do this." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah is, in a sense, the mirror image of mishnah eight. Whereas yesterday we learned about one who slaughtered an animal for it to be an idolatrous sacrifice, in today’s mishnah we learn about one who slaughters an animal for it to be a Jewish sacrifice, but does so outside of the Temple. While his intentions may have been good, this is still a no-no. The question is: is the slaughtering valid?", + "If one slaughtered [an unconsecrated animal outside the Temple court] for it to be an olah or a shelamim or an asham for a doubtful sin or as a Pesah or a todah, the slaughtering is invalid. But Rabbi Shimon declares it valid. An olah (whole-burnt offering), a shelamim (wellbeing offering) and a todah (thanksgiving offering) can be offered as voluntary offerings. Therefore, if one slaughters an animal with the intent of it being an olah or a shelamim but does so outside of the Temple, it looks as if he is now sanctifying the animal to be a sacrifice and slaughtering it outside of the Temple. Note that the animal is not actually invalid, because he did not sanctify it before he slaughtered it, and for an animal to be a sacrifice it must first be sanctified. However, the rabbis prohibited it lest it look like he is slaughtering and eating sanctified meat outside of the Temple. Our mishnah thinks that an asham (guilt-offering) brought for a doubtful sin (meaning one is not even sure if one sinned) can also be brought voluntarily. Therefore, it too is invalid if slaughtered for this purpose outside of the Temple. With regard to the pesah, since it can be set aside at any time during the year, someone might think that by slaughtering it now outside of the Temple, he is sanctifying it. Therefore, it is invalid. Rabbi Shimon holds that the slaughtering is valid because that is not the way that one offers a sacrifice. One doesn’t voluntarily offer a sacrifice in order to slaughter it outside of the Temple. Since his sanctifying the animal is obviously invalid, everyone will understand that he has not performed a sacrifice. Therefore, the slaughtering is invalid. For case in which Rabbi Shimon uses similar reasoning see Menahot 12:3.", + "If two persons held one knife and slaughtered [an unconsecrated animal outside the Temple court], one declaring it to be one of the above and the other intending it for a legitimate purpose, the slaughtering is invalid. As we learned in mishnah eight, when two people jointly slaughter an animal and only one of them has an intention that would render the slaughtering invalid, the one person’s intention invalidates the animal. So too here, the fact that one of them intends for the animal to be a sacrifice renders it invalid.", + "If one slaughtered [an unconsecrated animal outside the Temple court] for it to be a hatat or an asham or a first-born or the tithe [of cattle] or a substitute offering, the slaughtering is valid. The sacrifices in this section can not be voluntarily donated to the Temple. They are only brought by those who incur an obligation to bring them. Since everyone knows that the person sacrificing them was not obligated to bring such a sacrifice, they will know that he is not really sacrificing an animal outside of the Temple. Therefore, the meat is valid. We will learn more about what exactly a “substitute sacrifice” is in tractate Temurah.", + "This is the general rule: if one slaughtered an animal declaring it to be a sacrifice which can be brought either as a voluntary or a freewill-offering it is invalid, but if he declares it to be a sacrifice which cannot be brought either as a votive or a freewill-offering it is valid. This section provides the general rule that is the basis for my explanation above." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "The following [defects] render cattle terefah:
If the esophagus was pierced;
If the windpipe severed;
If the membrane of the brain was pierced;
If the heart was pierced as far as its cavity thereof;
If the spine was broken and the cord severed;
If the liver was gone and none of it remained;
If the lung was pierced,
Or if part of it was missing Rabbi Shimon says: only if it was pierced as far as the main bronchi;
If the stomach,
If the gall-bladder was pierced,
If the intestines were pierced;
If the innermost stomach was pierced,
If the greater part of the outer stomach was pierced. Rabbi Judah says: in a large animal [if it was torn] to the extent of a handbreadth, and in a small animal the greater part.
If the omasum (the third stomach of a [was pierced];
Of if the second stomach was pierced on the outside;
If the animal fell from the roof;
If most of its ribs were fractured;
Or if it was mauled by a wolf Rabbi Judah says: small animals [are terefah] if mauled by a wolf, large cattle if mauled by a lion; small fowl if mauled by a hawk, large fowl if mauled by a falcon.
This is the rule: if an animal with a similar defect could not continue to live, it is terefah.
Exodus 22:30 states, “Meat in a field that is terefah you shall not eat, cast it to the dogs.” The word “terefah” literally means “torn apart by animals.” The rabbis assume that since another verse already forbade eating “nevelah,” which they interpret to mean any animal that was improperly slaughtered, the word “terefah” must refer to something else. They therefore interpret the word “terefah” to refer to an animal that have suffered an injury, or has some sort of defect, that will cause it to die imminently. Such an animal is prohibited even if it was slaughtered properly.
The first five mishnayot of our chapter deal with which wounds or defects cause an animal to be a terefah. Our mishnah lists 18 different ways a cattle can become a terefah.
Sections 1-18: This is the list of the 18 defects that cause cattle, cows, sheep and goats, to become a terefah. Most of these are self-explanatory, more so perhaps to those of you that are biologists or veterinarians. Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Judah (in sections 8, 13 and 18) distinguish between large animals (cows) and small animals (sheep and goats). According to these two sages, the defects are not exactly the same for the two different types of animals.
Section nineteen: This section provides the general rule of when an animal becomes a terefah." + ], + [ + "And the following [defects] do not render cattle terefah:
If the windpipe was pierced, or cracked [lengthwise]. To what extent may it be deficient? Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: up to an Italian issar.
If the skull was cracked but the membrane of the brain was not pierced;
If the heart was pierced but not as far as its cavity;
If the spine was broken but the cord was not severed;
If the liver was removed but an olive's size of it remained.
If the omasum or the third stomach were pierced at their juncture;
If the spleen was removed, or the kidneys, or the lower jaw-bone or the womb.
If [the lung] was shrunken up by an act of Heaven.
If an animal was stripped of its hide: Rabbi Meir declares it valid But the rabbis declare it invalid.
Today’s mishnah lists cases in which defects do not render cattle terefah. Again, most of these are self-explanatory (as before, easier to picture for the veterinarians among us)
Section one: If the windpipe was severed, we learned yesterday that the animal is a terefah. If, however, it was only pierced or cracked, the animal is valid. When it is pierced, the hole can be up to the size of an Italian issar, a small coin.
Section two: The animal is a terefah only if the brain membrane was pierced. A cracked skull does not render an animal a terefah.
Sections 3-6: The opposite of most of these cases can be found in yesterday’s mishnah.
Sections 7: The removal of any of these organs does not render the animal a terefah, because it can continue to live.
Section eight: If an animal’s lung was shrunk up due to fear of some heavenly act, for instance the animal was frightened by thunder or lightning, then the animal is not a terefah. However, if it was frightened by an act perpetrated by a human being, then the animal is a terefah.
Section nine: I will admit that it is hard for me to comprehend how an animal that has no hide can continue to live, but evidently, Rabbi Meir believes that it can. The other rabbis say that it is a terefah." + ], + [ + "The following [defects] render birds terefah:
If the esophagus was pierced,
If the windpipe was severed;
If a weasel struck [the bird] on the head in such a place as would render it terefah.
If the gizzard was pierced
If the intestines were pierced.
If it fell into the fire and its innards were scorched: If they turned green, it is invalid, But if they remained red it is valid.
If one trod upon it or knocked it against a wall or if an animal trampled upon it, and it still jerks its limbs, and it remained alive after this for twenty-four hours, and it was thereafter slaughtered, it is valid.
Today’s mishnah lists what defects render a bird a terefah.
Sections 1-2: These are the same signs that render cattle terefot.
Section three: If a weasel (or any other animal) strikes the bird on a spot on its head in such a manner that we would need be concerned that the brain membrane was pierced, then it is a terefah.
Section six: If the innards turn green (gangrene?), that is a sign that the bird is going to die. If they remain red, the color that they were before the bird was burned, then the bird is not a terefah.
Section seven: If after having been struck in some manner the bird begins to jerk its limbs, it must live for another twenty-four hours before we can be sure that it would not have died from the blow. If it is slaughtered before 24 hours are up, then the bird is a terefah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah teaches what defects do not render birds into a terefah.", + "And the following [defects] do not render birds terefah:
If the windpipe was pierced or cracked lengthwise; This is the same defect that does not cause a beast to be a terefah (see mishnah two).", + "If a weasel struck it on the head in such a place as would not render it terefah. The opposite of the section two in yesterday’s mishnah.", + "If the crop was pierced Rabbi says: even if it was gone. Since I don’t know exactly what a “crop” is, I looked it up in Wikipedia. There the crop is defined in the following manner: “In a bird's digestive system, the crop is an expanded, muscular pouch near the gullet or throat. It is a part of the digestive tract, essentially an enlarged part of the esophagus. As with most other organisms that have a crop, the crop is used to temporarily store food. Not all birds have a crop.” According to the first opinion, if the crop is pierced, the animal is not a terefah, but if the crop is missing, it is a terefah. Rabbi rules even more leniently and holds that even if the crop is removed, it is not a terefah.", + "If the innards protruded [from the body] but were not pierced. As long as the innards were not pierced, the bird is not a terefah.", + "If its wings were broken, or its legs; or if [the wing’s] feathers were plucked. Rabbi Judah says: if its down was gone it is invalid. A broken limb and plucked feathers on the wings do not make the bird into a terefah. Rabbi Judah holds, that if the bird’s soft cover of down was removed, it is a terefah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah provides a few more criteria for determining if an animal is a terefah.", + "[If an animal] suffered from congestion of the blood, or was overcome by smoke or by a cold, or if it ate oleander or chicken dung, or if it drank noxious water, it is permitted. Although an animal who suffers from one of these problems, or ate or drank one of the things listed here may be in some danger, it is not enough in order to consider the animal a terefah. While these might cause it to die, they might not. Oleander is dangerous to an animal.", + "If it ate poison or was bitten by a snake, it is not forbidden as trefah but it is forbidden as a danger to life. Commentators understand the “poison” here to be something that is poisonous to people but not animals. If it was poisonous to animals, it would certainly render the animal a terefah. The snake bite also must also be understood as a bite not strong enough to kill the animal. Since these things will not kill the animal, the animal is not a terfah. Although the animal is not a terefah, its meat is forbidden because it is a danger to human beings. The rabbis took very seriously the prohibition of causing danger to oneself. Eating meat that might cause death or other harm is not just foolish, it is religiously forbidden." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah provides the characteristics by which it can be determined whether a bird is clean (kosher) or unclean (tref, in modern terminology).", + "The characteristics of cattle and of wild animals are stated in the Torah. Leviticus 11 teaches characteristics, split hooves and cud-chewing, that distinguish clean beasts or wild animals (such as a deer) from unclean beasts, such as the pig and camel that cannot be eaten.", + "The characteristics of birds are not stated, but the sages said: every bird that seizes its prey is unclean. The Torah does not list the characteristics of birds that are permitted or forbidden. Rather, it provides a list of names of birds that are forbidden. The rabbis had to fill in the gap and provide a general characteristic: any bird that seizes its prey, be it other birds or small animals, is unclean and not kosher. Just as the animals that we eat are peaceful animals that eat only vegetation, so too the birds that we eat do not eat other birds (although they may eat worms and insects, and not just vegetation).", + "Every bird that has an extra toe, or a crop and a gizzard that can be peeled, is clean. If the bird is not one that seizes its prey, then there are a couple of signs that can be used to determine whether it is pure. These would be necessary in case new birds are discovered and one does not know whether they can be eaten. If the bird has an extra toe on the back part of its foot, it is clean and can be eaten. If its crop (explained in mishnah four) or gizzard can be peeled from the flesh by hand, then it is also clean. Commentators debate whether the bird needs to have all of these characteristics to be kosher, or whether one is sufficient.", + "Rabbi Elazar bar Zadok says: every bird that parts its toes is unclean. Rabbi Elazar bar Zadok adds a sign to determine when a bird is impure. If when stood on a rope it splits its toes, two in front and two in back, then it is unclean. This is a sign that the bird is a predator." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nSome types of locusts are clean and can be eaten (see Leviticus 11:20-25). Our mishnah teaches the characteristics of locusts and fish that can be eaten.", + "Of locusts: all that have four legs, four wings, leaping legs, and wings covering the greater part of the body, [are clean.] Rabbi Yose says: its name must be locust. For a locust to be clean it must have four legs and wings. It must also have two legs above its other legs with which to leap (see Leviticus 11:21). And its wings must cover the greater part of its body. Rabbi Yose adds that it must be called a locust. If it has all of the signs of being kosher but it is not called a “locust” then it is not kosher. We can see here just how important a name can be to the status of the validity of the animal.", + "Of fishes: all that have fins and scales [are clean]. Rabbi Judah says: there must be [at least] two scales and one fin. The Torah states this rule explicitly, see Leviticus 11:9. Rabbi Judah adds that there must be at least two scales.", + "The scales are those which are immovable, the fins are those [wings] by which it swims. The mishnah now defines scales and fins. Scales are those that are immovable, meaning that the fish does not have control over them. Whereas the fins are like wings to a bird in that the fish swims by moving his fins." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah deals with the status of the fetus within its mother’s womb, when it may be eaten by virtue of its mother having been properly slaughtered and when it may not.", + "If an animal was having difficulty giving birth and the fetus put forth a limb and then put it back in, it may be eaten [when its mother is slaughtered]. If it put forth its head, even though it put it back in, it is considered as born. Generally, when a pregnant animal is slaughtered, the fetus may be eaten by virtue of its mother having been slaughtered. However, once the fetus has been born, it too needs to be slaughtered in order to be eaten. The mishnah determines that a fetus is considered to be “offspring” once its head has emerged, even if it puts its head back into the womb. If it puts forth a different limb, it is not considered as having been born. We should note that the same criterion exists for human beings. A fetus is halakhically considered a life once its head has emerged. The main ramification is that up until this point, it is permitted to terminate (I would have used the word sacrifice, but that might have been confusing) the fetus in order to save the life of the mother. Beyond that point, and it is not.", + "Whatever is cut off from the fetus within the womb [and left inside] may be eaten, but whatever is cut off from the spleen or kidneys [of the animal and left inside] may not be eaten. This is the rule: that which is from the body of the animal is forbidden, but that which is not from the body of the animal is permitted. If someone reaches into the mother and cuts off one of the fetus’s limbs and leaves the limb in the womb, when the mother is slaughtered, that limb may be eaten. This is not considered to be eating a limb from a living animal, which is prohibited, because this is a limb of an animal that has not yet come to life. In contrast, if he reaches in and cuts off an organ from the animal itself and leaves it in inside the animal and then slaughters the animal, that limb is prohibited because it is a limb from a living animal. Without this mishnah one might have thought that as long as the limb is inside the animal when the animal is slaughtered, it is permitted. The mishnah provides the general rule which explains this particular halakhah: if the limb is part of the animal’s body it is prohibited, but if it is not part of the animal’s body, because it is a fetus, it is permitted." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nA first born animal is holy and if it dies must be buried. In contrast, the meat of other animals can be given to dogs to eat. Our mishnah deals with an animal having trouble giving birth to her first born.", + "If an animal giving birth for the first time was having difficulty, one may cut off each limb [as it comes out] and throw it to the dogs. This halakhah accords with the general principle we learned in yesterday’s mishnah. Since the fetus is still inside the womb, it is not considered a separate life. Rather it is considered to be one of its mother’s limbs. Therefore, it can be cut out and fed to the dogs. Note that the Mishnah uses the phrase “throw it to the dogs” because this is what the Torah states may be done with a nevelah, an animal that died without having been slaughtered.", + "If the greater portion came forth it must be buried, and she is exempt from the law of the firstling. Once the majority of the fetus has emerged from its mother’s womb, it is considered as being born. From this point forth if one has to cut it up to save its mother (which is permitted) the flesh cannot be thrown to the dogs. Rather it must be buried, as is the rule for all firstlings that die. Furthermore, once the fetus is born, the next offspring born to this mother is not considered to be a firstling. Some commentators hold that this clause “she is exempt from the law of the firstling” applies to both clauses of the mishnah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to deal with ramifications of the notion that a fetus within its mother’s womb is considered to be a limb of its mother and not a separate life.", + "If a fetus died within the womb [of its mother] and the shepherd put in his hand and touched it, he is clean, whether it was a clean or unclean animal. A nevelah, an animal that died without being slaughtered, is unclean. However, the fetus in its mother’s womb is not considered to be a nevelah. This is derived from a kal vehomer (a fortiori) argument. If a clean animal is slaughtered and found to be pregnant, her fetus can be eaten based on the mother’s valid slaughtering. It is not a nevelah. All the more so, a fetus that dies within a live mother is not considered to be a nevelah, because its mother is alive. According to the first opinion, this is true of both clean and unclean animals.", + "Rabbi Yose HaGalili says: if it was an unclean animal he is unclean, and if it was a clean animal he is clean. Rabbi Yose HaGalili says that there is no “kal vehomer” argument when it comes to the unclean animal because when its mother is slaughtered, the fetus does not become fit for eating. Therefore, it has the status of nevelah even if it died within its mother’s womb.", + "If the fetus of a woman died within the womb of its mother and the midwife put in her hand and touched it, the midwife is unclean for seven days, but the mother is clean until the fetus comes out. If the human fetus dies within its mother’s womb, and the midwife touches it while it is still inside, the midwife is unclean for seven days, as is the rule for someone who comes into contact with a corpse. According to the Talmud this impurity is not “deoraita” from the Torah, but rather is a rabbinic decree. From the Torah, since the fetus is still in its mother it does not count as a separate life. However, the rabbis decreed that it should make her impure lest she touch it after its head has already emerged. The mother is considered clean from corpse impurity unless the head emerges and then the baby dies." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIf a fetus sticks a limb out when being born and someone cuts off that limb before slaughtering the mother, the limb causes impurity as would a nevelah, as do all limbs taken from living animals. Our mishnah teaches that in this case the fetus that remains in the mother does not have the status of nevelah and it is clean. The rabbis in our mishnah debate whether the same is true if they slaughtered the mother first and then cut the limb off of the fetus.", + "If an animal was having difficulty in labor and the fetus put forth its limb and a person immediately cut if off and then slaughtered the mother, the flesh [of the fetus] is clean. In this case, the fetus in its mother’s womb remains clean because it is considered to be a limb of its mother, while its mother is still alive. Even if the fetus dies it is still clean. Even if the unclean limb touches the fetus, the fetus is still clean because animals cannot become unclean while alive.", + "If he slaughtered the mother first and then cut if off, the flesh [of the fetus] is unclean like that which had touched nevelah, the words of Rabbi Meir. If after the fetus sticks out its limb, its mother is slaughtered, and then he cuts off the limb, we now have a case of a cut-off limb touching a dead fetus. Rabbi Meir holds that the fetus is rendered unclean by virtue of contact with the unclean limb. The limb has the status of nevelah and meat which has contact with nevelah is unclean.", + "But the sages say, it is like that which had touched a slaughtered terefah, The other sages do not accord the limb the status of nevelah but rather terefah, and as we shall see below in the mishnah, a slaughtered terefah does not cause impurity.", + "For just as we find that the slaughtering of a terefah animal renders it clean, so the slaughtering of the animal renders the limb clean. The rabbis say that just as slaughtering renders a terefah clean (and saves it from ever becoming an unclean nevelah) even though the meat is forbidden, so too slaughtering renders the limb clean, even though it cannot be eaten.", + "Rabbi Meir said to them: No, for when you say that the slaughtering of a terefah [animal] renders it clean you are concerned with [the animal] itself, but can you say that it will render clean the limb which is not part of [the animal] itself? Rabbi Meir rejects their argument. Slaughtering can render the terefah animal itself clean, but how can it render clean a part of the fetus, the limb, that was not attached to the fetus when its mother was slaughtered? Rather, the limb has the status of nevelah and renders the fetus unclean.", + "From where do we learn that the slaughtering of a terefah animal renders it clean? The mishnah now begins a prolonged argument trying to prove that a slaughtered terefah is clean, even though its meat cannot be eaten.", + "[For we could have argued to the contrary:] An unclean animal may not be eaten, and a terefah also may not be eaten; just as slaughtering does not render an unclean animal clean so slaughtering should not render a terefah animal clean? However, in a most rabbinic fashion, the rabbis do not begin with the proof but rather with a counter-proof, what one might have argued. Seemingly one might have compared the terefah with the unclean animal. Both an unclean animal and a terefah cannot be eaten. Therefore, one might have argued that just as shechitah (slaughtering) does not render an unclean animal clean, for its meat transmits impurity, so too the slaughtering of a terefah renders it unclean and able to transmit impurity.", + "No, if you said this of an unclean animal for at no time was it fit [for slaughtering]; can you also say this of a terefah animal which had a time when it was fit [for slaughtering]? That argument can be refuted. An unclean animal is not rendered clean by slaughtering because it never had the opportunity to be made permitted/clean through slaughtering. In contrast, if the terefah animal had been slaughtered before it became a terefah, it would have been rendered clean. Therefore, even if it is slaughtered after it becomes a terefah, it is clean (although not edible).", + "Take away with this argument that you brought forth! For where would we know this of an animal that was born terefah from the womb? The mishnah, employing graphic language found in a few other midrashim but no where in the Mishnah, says that the distinction drawn between the terefah and the unclean animal must be removed. There is a terefah which would never have been permitted by shechitah the terefah that was born as such. This is similar to the unclean animal, which also never would have been permitted by shechitah. Therefore, our original question returns: How can the inedible terefah be rendered clean by slaughter?", + "[Substitute therefore this argument]: No, if you said this of an unclean animal for none of its kind may be validly slaughtered; can you also state this of a terefah for whose kind there is valid slaughter? The mishnah now adjusts the distinction between the terefah and the unclean animal. A terefah comes from a species of animal that is edible. Other such animals can be eaten after shechitah. Therefore, it is rendered clean by shechitah, just as other animals of its kind are. This would be true even for a terefah that was born as such. In contrast, an unclean animal is by definition from a species that can never be edible. Therefore, it is not rendered clean by shechitah.", + "[Accordingly], the slaughtering of a live eight months birth does not render it clean, since there is no slaughtering of its kind. The rule that we posited in the previous section is that any animal whose “kind” can be permitted/edible by having been slaughtered, is also clean if it is slaughtered. An “eight months’ birth” refers to an animal born prematurely, one which is deformed and we know will die. The mishnah uses the term “eight months” because a human baby born at eight months is assumed not to be viable. An “eight months’ birth” is like a terefah it is an animal that is now alive, that we know will die shortly. Because of the general rule explained above, an animal born prematurely cannot be made clean by shechitah because none of its kind can be made permitted through shechitah. Such an animal that is slaughtered will have the status of nevelah. " + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah continues to deal with the status of a fetus found in its mother’s womb when she is slaughtered.", + "If one slaughtered an animal and found in it an eight months’ fetus, either living or dead, or a dead nine months fetus, he need only tear it open and take out the blood. If he found in it a living nine months’ fetus it must be slaughtered, and he would thereby [possibly] incur the penalty for “it and its young,” the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Meir distinguishes between a live fetus found inside its mother after she has been slaughtered and a dead one. A dead fetus is considered to be part of its mother’s flesh and therefore when she is slaughtered the dead fetus is permitted. An eight months’ fetus is considered to be as if it is dead (for it could not live outside of the womb) and therefore it too is permitted when its mother is slaughtered. However, a living nine months’ fetus is an independent life. When it is found in its mother’s womb it too must be slaughtered before it can be eaten. Furthermore, one who slaughters it and its mother on the same day transgresses the biblical prohibition of slaughtering a mother and her offspring on the same day (Leviticus 22:28). We should note that the implication of this halakhah is that life begins before the fetus leaves the womb. The point at which this is so would seem to be the point at which the fetus would be viable outside of the womb.", + "But the sages say: the slaughtering of its mother renders it permitted. Rabbi Shimon Shezuri says: even if it is eights years old and is plowing the field, the slaughtering of its mother renders it permitted. The other rabbis disagree. Any fetus found in its mother’s womb is permitted to be eaten without having to be slaughtered itself. All that one would need to do is drain the blood, the same rule which applies to all meat. Theoretically, as Rabbi Shimon Shezuri points out, one could even eat an eight year old animal without slaughtering it first, if it was born after its mother was slaughtered.", + "If he ripped open [the mother] and found in it a living nine months fetus, it must be slaughtered, since its mother has not been slaughtered. If he doesn’t slaughter the mother, then if the fetus is alive, it will need to be slaughtered. Since its mother was not slaughtered, there is no way to allow this animal to be eaten without proper slaughtering." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah talks about two different subjects: 1) the status as a terefah an animal whose leg has been broken off; 2) a limb hanging from an animal and whether it is considered to still be part of the animal.", + "If the hind legs of an animal were cut off below the joint, it is permitted; If above the joint, it is terefah. According to the rabbis there are three parts to an animal’s leg. The lowest part is the foot, the middle part is the calf and the upper part is the thigh. The place where the foot is attached to the calf and the place where the calf is attached to the thigh are both called “berech” which in modern Hebrew means knee. In the Talmud they debate which joint is “the joint” mentioned here. If it is the upper one, then it would mean that an animal whose leg has been severed below the knee (what we call the knee) is not a terefah. If it is the lower one, then only if it is severed below the place where the foot joins the calf is it not a terefah.", + "So too if the juncture of the tendons was gone, [it is terefah]. The “juncture of the tendons” refers to the tendons that connect the thigh to the knee. If these are missing, the animal is a terefah even if the bone is still whole.", + "If the bone was broken but the greater part of the flesh [around the fracture] remained, it is rendered clean by the slaughtering; Otherwise it is not rendered clean by the slaughtering. A limb that was separated from the animal when the animal was still alive cannot be rendered clean by slaughtering the animal. A broken bone does not mean that the limb must be considered separate. As long as most of the flesh remains, the limb is part of the animal and when the animal is slaughtered, the limb is permitted and clean. But if most of the flesh does not remain, then the limb is not considered as part of the animal and the limb is unclean even after the animal is slaughtered." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah deals with the status of the amniotic sac found in a slaughtered animal.", + "If a person slaughtered an animal and found in it an amniotic sac, he who is not fastidious may eat it. When the mother is slaughtered, her amniotic sac is permitted to be eaten by virtue of the slaughtering of the mother. However, the mishnah notes that only one who is “not fastidious” and doesn’t mind eating “yucky” parts of the animal will eat it. [I guess they didn’t have hot dogs back then.]", + "It does not contract uncleanness, either food uncleanness or the uncleanness of nevelah. Although it is edible, the amniotic sac is not considered food. Nor is it considered to be the flesh/meat of the animal. Therefore, it cannot become ritually unclean in the way that food becomes ritually unclean. Furthermore, if the animal is not slaughtered properly and therefore becomes a nevelah, it is not unclean as is a nevelah. The sac is not considered to the edible flesh of the animal, and only such flesh is unclean.", + "If he intended to eat it, it can contract food uncleanness but not the uncleanness of nevelah. If a person intends to eat it, his thoughts cause it to become “food” and it is susceptible to uncleanness. However, intention cannot cause the sac to become a “nevelah” because it is categorically not considered part of the edible flesh of the animal.", + "If part of the amniotic sac emerged [before the slaughtering of the mother], it may not be eaten; For it is a sign of birth in a woman and also a sign of birth in an animal. Once the sac begins to emerge it is considered as if the woman has begun to give birth, for the head might be inside the sac. Therefore, even if the sac goes back inside the mother’s womb, it still cannot be eaten, even if found in the mother after she was slaughtered. In this sense is treated as if it was offspring and once offspring has emerged from the womb it cannot be eaten by virtue of the mother being slaughtered. However, the main difference is that while the offspring cannot be eaten based on its mother being slaughtered, the offspring itself can be slaughtered. In contrast, when the sac cannot be eaten based on the mother being slaughtered, it can never be eaten. Once the sac begins to emerge, it is a sign of childbirth in a woman as well, again because the head might be inside the sac. From this point she has the uncleanness of a woman who gave birth (see Leviticus 12:2).", + "If an animal which was pregnant for the first time miscarried an amniotic sac, it may be thrown to dogs. But in the case of a consecrated animal it must be buried. It may not be buried at cross-roads or hung on a tree, for these are amorite practices. The amniotic sac itself does not have the halakhic status of “offspring.” Therefore, the amniotic sac of an animal’s first birth does not have the sanctity of a firstling. It can be thrown to the dogs, whereas if it was sacred it would have had to have been buried. While it is not considered offspring, the sac is still part of the animal. Therefore, if it comes from a sanctified animal, one that was dedicated to the Temple, it must be buried because it is holy. The mishnah forbids practices that are deemed idolatrous or magical. It seems that some people bestowed amniotic sacs with magical powers and either hung them in a tree or buried them at crossroads. Magical practices are deemed to be “the ways of the Amorites” and are prohibited." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nLeviticus 22:28 states, “When it comes to an ox or a sheep, it and its young you shall not slaughter on the same day.” Our chapter discusses this prohibition.", + "[The law of] “It and its young” applies both within the land of Israel and outside it, both during the existence of the Temple and after it, in respect of both unconsecrated and consecrated animals. The prohibition of slaughtering an animal and its young on the same day applies in all times and all places and to both consecrated (dedicated to the Temple) and non-consecrated (hullin) animals.", + "How so? The mishnah now explains various scenarios in which a person slaughters an animal and its young, and the various liabilities that can be occurred, depending on whether the animals were consecrated and where they were slaughtered.", + "If a person slaughtered an animal and its young, both animals being unconsecrated, [and they slaughtered them] outside [the sanctuary], they are both valid, but [he who slaughtered] the second incurs forty lashes. In this case, both animals are hullin (unconsecrated) and both are slaughtered outside of the Temple, where they should be slaughtered. Both animals are valid and can be eaten. The fact that the second one should not have been slaughtered does not render its slaughtering to be invalid. The second person, the one who slaughters the second animal (whether or not this is the parent or offspring), is liable for the forty lashes for having transgressed a biblical commandment. The first person is not liable because when he slaughtered the animal, he did nothing wrong.", + "If both animals were consecrated [and they were slaughtered] outside [the sanctuary], [he who slaughtered] the first incurs the penalty of karet, both animals are invalid, and each incurs forty lashes. In this case both animals are consecrated and should have been slaughtered only in the Temple. The person who slaughters the first animal is liable for karet for having slaughtered a consecrated animal outside the Temple. The person who slaughters the second animal is not liable for karet because that animal could not have been offered as a sacrifice on that day since its parent/child had already been slaughtered. Since it could not have been a sacrifice, the one who slaughters it outside the Temple is exempt from karet. Both animals are invalid as sacrifices because they were slaughtered outside the Temple (see Zevahim 14:2). Both slaughterers are liable for lashes but for different reasons. The first is liable for having slaughtered a consecrated animal outside of the Temple and the second for slaughtering an animal on the same day that its parent/young was slaughtered.", + "If both animals were unconsecrated [and they were slaughtered] inside [the sanctuary], both animals are invalid, and [he who slaughtered] the second incurs forty lashes. In this case both animals were unconsecrated, and yet both were slaughtered inside the Temple. This makes them invalid and it is forbidden to derive benefit from either animal (see Kiddushin 2:9). There is no biblical punishment for slaughtering an unconsecrated animal inside the Temple, therefore the first slaughterer is not punished. The second slaughterer is liable for having slaughtered an animal on the same day that its parent/young was slaughtered.", + "If both animals were consecrated [and they were slaughtered] inside [the sanctuary], the first is valid and [he who slaughtered it is] not culpable, but [he who slaughtered] the second incurs forty lashes, and it is invalid. In this case both were consecrated and both were slaughtered inside the Temple, as is required. The first animal is valid as a sacrifice and the one who slaughters it is exempt, for he has done nothing wrong. The second animal is invalid and the one who slaughters it is liable for having slaughtered an animal on the same day that its parent/young was slaughtered" + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is a direct continuation of yesterday’s mishnah.", + "If [the first animal was] unconsecrated and [the second] consecrated [and they were both slaughtered] outside [the sanctuary], the first is valid and [he who slaughtered it is] not liable, but [he who slaughtered] the second incurs forty lashes and it is invalid. The first animal was unconsecrated and the second was consecrated, and both were slaughtered outside of the Temple. The first animal is valid and the person who slaughtered it is exempt for he has done nothing wrong (way to go!). The second animal should have been slaughtered in the Temple, so the fact that it was not renders it invalid. The person who slaughtered it is lashed for having slaughtered it on the same day as the parent/offspring had already been slaughtered. He does not receive karet because the animal was not valid to be a sacrifice on that day.", + "If [the first was] consecrated and [the second] unconsecrated [and they were both slaughtered] outside [the sanctuary], [he who slaughtered] the first incurs the penalty of karet and it is invalid, and the second [animal] is valid, and each incurs forty lashes. In this case the order is opposite, first the consecrated animal is slaughtered and then the unconsecrated animal. The first person is liable for karet for having slaughtered a consecrated animal outside the Temple. The animal is invalid. Both are liable for lashes, the first for slaughtering a consecrated animal outside the Temple, and the second for violating the prohibition of “it and its young.”", + "If [the first was] unconsecrated and [the second] consecrated [and they were both slaughtered] inside [the sanctuary], they are both invalid, and [he who slaughtered] the second incurs forty lashes. Now we examine the scenarios if both are slaughtered inside the Temple. The first animal is unconsecrated and therefore it is invalid. The second is invalid because it could not be a sacrifice on that day. Only the second person is lashed because there are no lashes for slaughtering an unconsecrated animal inside the Temple.", + "If [the first was] consecrated and [the second] unconsecrated [and they were both slaughtered] inside [the sanctuary], the first animal is valid and [he who slaughtered it is] not liable, but [he who slaughtered] the second incurs forty lashes and it is invalid. Now the order is reversed. The first animal was consecrated and slaughtered inside the Temple everything good so far! The second animal is invalid because it was an unconsecrated animal slaughtered in the Temple. The person who slaughters it is liable for violating the prohibition of “it and its young.”", + "If both were unconsecrated and [the first was slaughtered] outside [the sanctuary] and [the second] inside, the first is valid and [he who slaughtered it is] not liable, but [he who slaughtered] the second incurs forty lashes and it is invalid. Now both animals are hullin, but they are slaughtered in different places. If the first is slaughtered outside the Temple, then “no problem”! If the second is slaughtered in the Temple, it is invalid for being slaughtered in the Temple and the person who slaughtered it is liable for violating the prohibition of “it and its young.”", + "If both were consecrated and [the first was slaughtered] outside [the sanctuary] and [the second] inside, [he who slaughtered] the first incurs the penalty of karet, each incurs forty lashes, and both animals are invalid. Now both are consecrated, but they are again slaughtered in different places. If the first is slaughtered outside the Temple, it is invalid and the person who slaughters it is liable for karet. The second is also invalid, because it was slaughtered outside of the Temple. Both are liable for lashes, the first for slaughtering a consecrated animal outside the Temple, and the second for violating the prohibition of “it and its young.”", + "If both were unconsecrated and [the first was slaughtered] inside [the sanctuary] and [the second] outside, the first is invalid and [he who slaughtered it is] not liable, but [he who slaughtered] the second incurs forty lashes and it is valid. This is the same as section five, but the order of where the animals are slaughtered is reversed. The first, which is slaughtered inside the Temple, is invalid, but the person who slaughtered it is exempt, because there is no punishment for slaughtering a non-consecrated animal inside the Temple. The second is valid and may be eaten, but the person who slaughtered it is liable for violating the prohibition of “it and its young.”", + "If both were consecrated and [the first was slaughtered] inside [the sanctuary] and [the second] outside, the first is valid and [he who slaughtered it is] not liable, but [he who slaughtered] the second incurs forty lashes and it is invalid. This the opposite order of section six. The first animal was consecrated and slaughtered inside the Temple good job! The second animal is invalid because it wasn’t slaughtered inside the Temple and the one who slaughters it is liable for violating the prohibition of “it and its young.” Summary of general principles that emerge from these two mishnayot: 1) The second slaughterer is always liable. However, the second animal can be eaten, if it was unconsecrated and was slaughtered outside the Temple. 2) One who slaughters a consecrated animal outside the Temple is liable for karet and lashes. 3) One who slaughters a non-consecrated animal inside the Temple is exempt. 4) An animal whose parent/offspring has already been slaughtered cannot be used as a sacrifice on that day. Therefore, if one slaughters such a consecrated animal outside the Temple he is not liable for karet. 5) No animal can be eaten if slaughtered in the wrong place." + ], + [ + "
If a person slaughtered [an animal] and it was found to be terefah, or if he slaughtered [it as an offering] to idols, or if he slaughtered the red cow, or an ox which was condemned to be stoned, or a heifer whose neck was to be broken: Rabbi Shimon exempts [him from having transgressed the law of “it and its young”]; But the sages make him liable. In all of these cases a person slaughters a parent and its offspring on the same day, but one of the animals was an animal that could not be eaten. There are five such categories: 1) A terefah, an animal that has a flaw that will cause it to eminently die. 2) An animal slaughtered for idolatry. 3) The red cow, used for purifying people with corpse impurity. 4) An ox condemned to die for either killing a person or for engaging in bestiality. It is forbidden to derive benefit from such an ox. 5) The heifer whose neck is broken to atone for an unsolved murder. Since these animals can not be eaten, even if they were slaughtered properly, Rabbi Shimon exempts the one who slaughters the second one from being liable for “it and its son.” Rabbi Shimon holds that slaughtering that would not make an animal fit for consumption even if done properly is not called “slaughtering.” The other rabbis disagree and say that he is liable, since he did indeed slaughter the second animal.", + "If a person slaughtered [an animal] and it became nevelah under his hand, or if he stabbed it, or tore away [the organs of the throat], he does not thereby transgress the law of it and its young. In this case, the animal was valid before it was slaughtered, but then was invalidated by an improper method of slaughtering. Such a person is not liable for transgressing “it and its son” because this prohibition only applies to one who “slaughters,” the verb used in the verse. This person did not successfully slaughter.", + "If two people bought a cow and its young, he who bought first can slaughter first; but if the second preceded him, he holds his advantage. If two people buy a cow and its young, they might end up arguing about who has the right to slaughter first. The mishnah says that the first person to buy has the right to slaughter first, and the second person should wait. But if the second person slaughters first, the other person will have to wait for the next day.", + "If a person slaughtered a cow and then two of its calves, he is liable for eighty lashes. If he slaughtered its two calves and then the cow, he is liable for forty lashes. If he slaughtered it and then its calf and then the calf's offspring, he is liable for eighty lashes. If he slaughtered it and then its calf's offspring and then the calf, he is liable for forty lashes. Symmachos says in the name of r. Meir: he is liable for eighty lashes. This section attempts to delineate how many transgressions a person has transgressed when he slaughters multiple animals on the same day. We will take case by case. 1) Once he slaughters the mother, he will be liable for each of its offspring that he slaughters on that day. Therefore, when he slaughters two offspring, he is liable twice. 2) However, if he slaughters two offspring and then the mother, he has violated the prohibition only once, by slaughtering the mother. In other words, we don’t count his transgressions retroactively. 3) When he slaughters the mother, it is prohibited to slaughter its young. So when he slaughters the young, he is liable for forty lashes. When he slaughters the offspring of the young, he has violated the prohibition again, and is liable for another forty lashes (ouch!) 4) If after slaughtering the mother, he first slaughters the offspring of the mother’s offspring (the third generation), and then the mother’s own offspring, according to the first opinion, he has only transgressed once. Slaughtering the third generation was not prohibited at the time that he slaughtered it. And although slaughtering the second generation violated two prohibitions, for it is the mother of the third generation and the child of the first generation, one can be liable only once for each animal. Rabbi Meir holds that he is liable twice, even though he slaughtered only one prohibited animal, since that one animal was prohibited in two different ways.", + "At four periods in the year he who sells a beast to another must inform him, “I sold today its mother to be slaughtered,” or “I sold today its young to be slaughtered,” and these are they: on the eve of the last day of the feast [of Sukkot], on the eve of the first day of Pesah, on the eve of Shavuot, and on the eve of Rosh Hashanah. According to Rabbi Yose the Galilean, also on the eve of Yom Kippur, in the Galilee. Rabbi Judah says, this is so, only when there was no time in between the sales, but if there was time, he need not inform him. Rabbi Judah agrees that if he sold the mother to the bridegroom and the young to the bride, he must inform them of it, for it is certain that they will each slaughter on the same day. When a merchant sells an animal and then sells its mother/offspring to different customers there might be a concern that the two people will slaughter the animals on the same day and thereby unwittingly the prohibition of “it and its son.” This will only be a concern if it is anticipated that a person who buys an animal will slaughter it on that very day. The mishnah informs us that this is a strong possibility four times a year, the four times when people ate the most meat. The four times are as follows: 1) Before the last day of Sukkot, which we call Shemini Atzeret. Interestingly, people seem to have eaten more meat on the last day of Sukkot then on the first day. This might be connected with Simchat Bet Hashoevah, the celebration described in the end of tractate Sukkah. 2) Before the first day of Pesah. People would have eaten meat for the Pesah meal (the seder) both before and after the destruction of the Temple. 3) Before Shavuot. 4) Before Rosh Hashanah. Rabbi Yose the Galilean notes that in the Galilee the same rule would hold the day before Yom Kippur. In the Galilee they ate large meat meals before the onset of the fast. Rabbi Judah limits the law to a case where there was not a day separating the sale of the mother and its young. If there was a day separating the sales, then the seller need not inform him. According to Rabbi Judah, two different buyers buying on two different days are not likely to slaughter on the same day. There is a case where Rabbi Judah agrees that even if the sales occur on two different days, the seller must inform the purchasers. If a bride and bridegroom buy a mother and its young, he must inform them, because it is clear that they will be slaughtered on the same day." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is a continuation of the end of yesterday’s mishnah, where we learned that there were four periods of the year when people ate more meat. This mishnah teaches us another ramification of the fact that there were four major times to eat meat during the year.", + "At these four periods a butcher can be compelled to slaughter against his will. Even if the ox was worth a thousand dinars and the purchaser has only [paid] a dinar, they can force the butcher to slaughter it. At these four times of the year (see yesterday’s mishnah for the list) a butcher can be compelled to slaughter an animal and sell the meat. This is so even if the ox to be slaughtered is worth a tremendous amount and there is only one person who wants to buy a small amount of meat. In other words, it is so important that there be meat available to celebrate these occasions, that the halakhah forces the butcher to slaughter and sell, even if he risks a loss.", + "Therefore if the animal died, the loss is upon the purchaser. At these four times, the butcher had no choice but to sell and once he agreed to sell the meat, he could not change his mind. Therefore, if the animal should die before the buyer receives his meat, the buyer loses his one denar.", + "At other times of the year it is not so, therefore if the animal died, the loss is upon the seller. At other times of the year, the law is exactly the opposite. First of all, the butcher is not compelled to sell. Second, he can retract the sale so long as the purchaser has not received the meat (this is the typical law with regard to sales). If he sees that there are not enough people interested in buying the meat, he can simply decide not to slaughter. The animal is fully his until it is given over. Therefore, if someone has already paid for the meat, but the animal dies before it is slaughtered, the butcher must return the money." + ], + [ + "The “one day” mentioned in connection with the law of “it and its young” means the day and the night preceding it.
This was how Rabbi Shimon ben Zoma expounded (: it says “one day” (Genesis 1:5) in connection with the creation and it also says “one day” (Leviticus 22:28) in connection with “it and its young” Just as the “one day” mentioned in connection with the creation means the day and the night preceding it, so too the “one day” mentioned in connection with “it and its young” means the day and the night preceding it.
This mishnah, which I shall explain here and not below, teaches that when we reckon the day on which an animal was slaughtered, the night goes with the day that follows it. Thus if he slaughtered one animal at night and then the following day he slaughtered its mother or offspring, he has violated the law of “it and its young.” But if he slaughters an animal during the day and then the following night he slaughters its mother or young, he has not violated the law.
The basis for this law are the verses from Genesis 1 that state, “and it was evening and it was morning, the first day,” and so on for each day. These verses imply, to the rabbis, that the day begins with the preceding night. And since the words “one day” are used in the context of creation and in the context of the law concerning “it and its young,” the day is reckoned in the same way for each." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nLeviticus 17:13 states, “And if any Israelite or any stranger who resides among them hunts down (or traps) an animal or a bird that may be eaten, he shall pour out its blood and cover it with earth.” From this verse we learn that when a person slaughters a wild animal such as a deer or a bird, he must pour out the blood and cover it with earth. Our chapter deals with the details concerning this mitzvah.", + "[The law of] “covering up the blood” applies both within the land of Israel and outside it, both during the existence of the Temple and after it, The law concerning covering up the blood applies in all times and in all places. It is not dependent upon the existence of the Temple or the land of Israel.", + "It applies to unconsecrated animal, but not consecrated animals. The law applies only to unconsecrated animals. Obviously this is true for game animals, because they can never be sacrificed. It is also true of birds which can be either a hatat or an olah. In such cases, there is no mitzvah to cover the blood with earth.", + "It applies [only] to wild animals and birds, whether they are at one's disposal or not. It applies only to wild animals and birds and not to domesticated beasts. However, it applies to these animals whether they are already trapped and at one’s disposal or not. One might have thought that since the verse says, “when one hunts/traps” that the rule applies only to wild animals and birds that were trapped.", + "It applies also to a koy, for it is an animal about which there is a doubt. The rabbis did not know whether to classify the koy as a wild animal or as a domesticated beast (see Bikkurim 2:8-11). Therefore, one has to deal with it stringently, and apply to it laws that govern both domesticated and wild animals. If one slaughters a koy, he must cover the blood, lest it is a hayah (a wild animal).", + "It may [therefore] not be slaughtered on a festival; and if it was slaughtered [on a festival] one may not cover up its blood. One cannot slaughter a koy on a festival because it is forbidden carry the dirt to cover up the blood, because the dirt is muktzeh (off-limits on Shabbat and Yom Tov). Note that if a koy was known to be a hayah, it could be slaughtered because the dirt would definitely be needed. However, since the koy might not be a hayah, it might not need to have its blood covered and therefore, carrying the dirt might be a violation of muktzeh. If it was slaughtered, the blood should not be covered on Yom Tov. Rather, he must wait until evening." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is very similar to 5:3, so see above for more references.", + "If a person slaughtered [a wild animal or a bird] and it was found to be terefah, or if he slaughtered [it as an offering] to idols, or if he slaughtered that which was unconsecrated inside the sanctuary or that which was consecrated outside, or if he slaughtered a wild animal or a bird that was condemned to be stoned: Rabbi Meir makes him liable to cover up the blood; But the sages make him exempt. In all of these cases, the animal was slaughtered with the proper technique, but nevertheless it could not be eaten. Most of these categories were explained above in 5:3. This mishnah adds two categories: a consecrated bird slaughtered outside the Temple or an unconsecrated bird or wild animal slaughtered inside the Temple. In both cases, the animal/bird cannot be eaten. Rabbi Meir holds that since the animal was slaughtered, the blood must be covered. In other words, the mitzvah of covering the blood is not dependent upon the edibility of the animal. The other sages hold that slaughtering causes one to be liable to cover the blood only if the animal is made edible by the slaughtering. Slaughtering that is ineffective is not considered to be slaughtering (this is like Rabbi Shimon in 5:3).", + "In these cases he didn’t even slaughter the animal, at least not properly. Therefore, he is not liable to cover the blood because covering the blood is a mitzvah only for an animal that was slaughtered." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn the beginning of the tractate we learned that if a deaf-mute, an imbecile (someone who is either crazy or perhaps retarded) or a minor slaughter an animal, the slaughtering is valid, but only if someone else watches them. If no one is watching, then we can assume that they did not slaughter in a valid fashion and the animal cannot be eaten. Our mishnah deals with the issues of covering the blood and the prohibition of “it and its young” when it comes to these three categories of people.", + "If a deaf-mute, an imbecile or a minor slaughtered while others watched them, one must cover up the blood; But if they were alone, they are exempt from covering it up. If other people watched the deaf-mute, imbecile or minor slaughter a wild animal or bird, and they saw that it was done in a valid fashion, then they are liable to cover up the blood. Since their slaughtering is valid, there would be no reason for them to be exempt from this obligation. However, if they were alone, then their slaughtering is not valid and they are exempt from covering up the blood, as we learned in yesterday’s mishnah.", + "Similarly for the matter of “it and its young”: if they slaughtered while others watched them, it is forbidden to slaughter after them [the mother/young], But if they were alone: Rabbi Meir permits to slaughter after them [the mother/young]. But the rabbis forbid it. They agree, that if a person did slaughter [after them], he has not incurred forty lashes. As is the rule with the covering of the blood, if other people see a deaf-mute, imbecile or minor slaughter an animal it is forbidden to slaughter the mother/offspring because the first animal was slaughtered in a valid fashion. If they were alone, then Rabbi Meir holds that the second animal (the mother/offspring) can be slaughtered because we can assume that the first one was not slaughtered properly. However, the other rabbis hold that one should not slaughter the second animal lest the first animal was properly slaughtered. According to the Talmud, the other rabbis disagree with the halakhah in section one as well they must cover the blood because the slaughtering might have been done in a proper fashion. In other words, when a deaf-mute, imbecile or minor slaughters an animal without witnesses, we can’t eat the animal lest it not be valid. However, we have to also take into consideration that it was slaughtered correctly and therefore the blood must be covered and it is forbidden to slaughter the mother/offspring on the same day. While the rabbis say that one should not slaughter the second animal, if one does, he is not liable for the forty lashes because it is not certain that the first animal was slaughtered properly. In order for someone to incur a punishment, it must be certain that he transgressed, and in this case there is no way to ascertain whether the first animal was slaughtered properly." + ], + [ + "If a person slaughtered a hundred wild animals in one place, one covering suffices for all. If [he slaughtered] a hundred birds in one place, one covering suffices for all. If one slaughters multiple animals of the same type, he is liable to cover up the blood only once. He need not cover up the blood for each animal individually.", + "If [he slaughtered] a wild animal and a bird in one place, one covering suffices for both. Rabbi Judah says: if he slaughtered a wild animal he should cover up its blood and then slaughter the bird [and cover it up also]. According to the first opinion, the same applies to slaughtering wild animals and birds. All of the blood from both types can be covered together. Rabbi Judah disagrees, and says that if there are two different types that require the covering of blood, birds and wild animals, then the blood of each must be covered up separately. He would agree, though, that one can cover up all of the birds’ blood at one time and all of the animals’ blood at one time.", + "If a person slaughtered and did not cover up the blood and another person saw it, the other must cover it up. The mitzvah of covering the blood of a slaughtered bird or wild animal is incumbent upon everyone, not just the person who slaughtered the animal. Therefore, if someone sees it, he must cover it up.", + "If he covered it up and it became uncovered, he need not cover it up again. Once the mitzvah has been fulfilled, if the blood becomes uncovered, it need not be fulfilled again. In other words, the mitzvah is to cover the blood and not to make sure that the blood is covered.", + "If the wind covered it up, he must cover it up again. The Talmud explains that after the wind covers the blood it becomes uncovered. Since no one actually fulfilled the mitzvah, if it becomes uncovered again, he must cover it up." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah deals with blood that comes out of a slaughtered bird or wild animal that then becomes mixed up with something else, either water, wine or blood.", + "If the blood became mixed with water and it still has the color of blood, it must be covered up. If the blood becomes so mixed up with water, that it no longer has reddish color, then it is no longer considered to be blood and it need not be covered up. But if it still has the color of blood, it must be covered, despite the fact that there is water mixed in.", + "If it became mixed with wine, [the wine] is to be regarded as though it was water. Wine has the same color, more or less, as blood, so we can’t say that if the mixture has the color of blood then it must be covered up. Therefore, if there is enough wine such that if it was water there would no longer be the color of blood, then he need not cover it up. This is what it means when the mishnah states that the wine is regarded as water.", + "If it became mixed with the blood of a beast or with the blood of a wild animal, it is to be regarded as though it was water. Rabbi Judah says: blood does not annul other blood. The blood of a domesticated beast (cow, sheep or goat) need not be covered. If the blood of a wild animal or bird is mixed up with the blood of a beast, then we apply the same test as we did with blood that was mixed with wine. If there is enough wild animal or bird blood such that if the beast’s blood was water the mixture would still look like blood, then he must cover it up. This section has some very puzzling words “or with the blood of a wild animal.” The blood of a wild animal must be covered and therefore this line makes no sense in this context. Albeck suggests that it is here by mistake, due to the similarity between this mishnah and Zevahim 8:6 where the words “the blood of a wild animal” do make sense. Rashi suggests that the blood of the wild animal came out not by slaughtering, while the Rambam suggests that the wild animal referred to here is not a kosher one. Neither suggestion is convincing. Rabbi Judah says that blood can never annul the presence of other blood. While an overwhelming amount of wine or water could exempt a small amount of blood from having to be covered, the same cannot be said about blood. In general, Rabbi Judah holds that when two like things are mixed, the problematic thing (for instance nevelah meat mixed in with kosher meat) can never be annulled." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah deals with whether all blood must be covered up or just some of it.", + "The blood which spurted out and that which is upon the knife must also be covered up. “Blood which is spurted out” refers to blood that is found at some distance from the place where the animal was slaughtered. Such blood and blood that is found on the knife must also be covered up.", + "Rabbi Judah says: when is this the case? When there is no other blood but that; but when there is other blood besides this, it need not be covered up. Rabbi Judah limits the above law to cases where this is the only blood. If this is the only blood with which to fulfill the commandment of covering the blood, then this blood must be used. But if there is other blood, at the place of slaughter, then he should use that blood and the blood on the knife or found elsewhere need not be covered. In mishnayot like this one, it is hard to tell whether there is a debate or whether Rabbi Judah is simply explaining the first clause. If there is a debate, then we might understand that there are two concepts with regard to covering the blood. According to the first opinion, all blood must be covered, regardless of where it is. The blood, the life force of the animal, cannot be left in the open. Perhaps doing so would involve some sort of danger. In contrast, Rabbi Judah says that there is a mitzvah to cover the blood, but not that all blood must be covered. The purpose of covering the blood is, perhaps, to atone for the killing of the animal, the taking of a life. In that case, someone must cover some of the blood as a symbolic act, but he need not cover all of it." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe Torah states that the blood should be covered with “earth (afar).” The rabbis expand this to include anything in which plants grow, just as they grow in earth. The blood may not be covered with something in which plants do not grow.", + "With what may one cover up [the blood] and with what may one not cover it up?
One may cover it up with fine dung, with fine sand, with lime, with white clay, or a brick or an earthenware stopper [of a cask] that have been ground into powder. All of these substances fit into the category of “earth” because plants may grow in them. Hence, they can be used to cover the blood.", + "But one may not cover it up with coarse dung or coarse sand, or with a brick or an earthenware stopper [of a cask] that have not been ground into powder. In contrast, these substances are coarser or completely solid and hence cannot be used to cover the blood. We see that the criterion for whether a substance is usable is not merely the nature of the substance itself but also the state that it is in.", + "Nor may one cover it with a vessel. Covering the blood with a vessel does not fulfill the mitzvah.", + "Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel stated a general rule: one may cover it with anything in which plants would grow; but one may not cover it with anything in which plants would not grow. This is the general rule that governs the reasoning behind the laws above." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nAt the conclusion of the story of Jacob wrestling with the angel, Genesis 32:33 states, “That is why the children of Israel to this day do not eat the thigh muscle that is on the socket of the hip, since Jacob’s hip was wrenched at the thigh muscle.” The “thigh muscle” is identified by the rabbis as the sciatic nerve. Our chapter is about this prohibition.", + "[The prohibition of] the sciatic nerve is in force both within the land and outside it, both during the existence of the Temple and after it, in respect of both unconsecrated and consecrated [animals]. It applies to cattle and to wild animals, to the right and left hip. The prohibition of the sciatic nerve is applicable in all times and at all places (as was the prohibition of “it and its young” and the mitzvah of covering the blood). It applies to all types of mammals, both wild and domesticated and to both of their hips.", + "But it does not apply to a bird because it does not have a socket [on its hip]. The prohibition does not apply to birds, because their hips do not have “sockets” as do those of mammals.", + "It applies to a fetus. Rabbi Judah says: it does not apply to a fetus. And its [forbidden] fat is permitted. According to the first opinion, the prohibition of the sciatic nerve applies to a fetus found in its mother’s womb when she was slaughtered. Rabbi Judah says it does not because this fetus is edible based on its mother’s having been slaughtered. In other words, since this fetus is treated as if it were one of its mother’s limbs, the prohibition of the sciatic nerve doesn’t apply. Rabbi Judah adds that the same holds true with regard to the forbidden fat, the helev, of a fetus. It can be eaten. Rabbi Judah, as we can see, does not accord to the fetus the status of a born-animal.", + "Butchers are not trustworthy with regard to the [removal of the] sciatic nerve, the words of Rabbi Meir. The sages say: they are trustworthy with regard to it as well as with regard to the [forbidden] fat. It is quite difficult to remove the sciatic nerve (this is why sometimes this cut of meat is not available at the kosher butcher). Therefore, Rabbi Meir holds that the butcher is not believed to have removed it. The other rabbis disagree and hold that the butcher is believed to have removed both the sciatic nerve and the forbidden fat." + ], + [ + "One may send to a non-Jew a thigh in which the sciatic nerve has not been removed, because its place is known. We are not concerned lest a Jew buy this thigh with its sciatic nerve, because he will be able to see by looking at the thigh that the entire sciatic nerve is still there.", + "When a person removes the sciatic nerve he must remove all of it. Rabbi Judah says: only so much as is necessary to fulfill the mitzvah of removing it. When he removes the sciatic nerve, he must remove it all, scraping away at anything that is left. Rabbi Judah holds that he need not remove the entire thing, rather just enough to fulfill the mitzvah. He need not do any “scraping away.”" + ], + [ + "If a person ate an olive’s bulk of the sciatic nerve, he incurs forty stripes. As with many food prohibitions, one is not liable unless he eats an amount equivalent to an olive. While eating less is certainly prohibited, one who does so is not liable for the forty lashes, the punishment for transgression of a negative commandment.", + "If he ate all of it and it was not as much as an olive's bulk, he is liable. If one eats the entire nerve, he is liable even if it is less than an olive.", + "If he ate an olive’s bulk of it from one thigh and another olive’s bulk of it from the other thigh, he incurs eighty stripes. Rabbi Judah says: he incurs only forty stripes. According to the first opinion, the nerve of each thigh is a separate prohibition. Therefore, if one eats an olive’s bulk from each thigh, he is liable for eighty lashes (ouch!). Rabbi Judah holds that only the sciatic nerve of only one of the thighs is prohibited, because, after all, Jacob was injured on only one of his legs. Most hold, according to Rabbi Judah, that it is the right thigh that is prohibited. In any case, one who eats both thighs is obligated for only forty lashes." + ], + [ + "If a thigh was cooked together with the sciatic nerve and there was enough [of the nerve] as to impart a flavor [to the thigh], it is forbidden.
How does one measure this? As if it were meat [cooked] with turnips.
This mishnah deals with whether a thigh that is cooked before the sciatic nerve has been removed is prohibited.
If one cooks a thigh without removing the sciatic nerve, this turns out to be a case of cooking something prohibited (the nerve) with something permitted (the rest of the thigh). Usually in such cases the determining factor is whether the forbidden substance imparts a taste to the permitted substance. We shall learn more about this principle in tomorrow’s mishnah.
However, in this case, there is absolutely no way that someone could taste the difference between a thigh cooked with the nerve and one cooked without the nerve. Therefore, we imagine that the thigh was a dish of turnips and the sciatic nerve was meat. How much meat would impart its taste to the turnips? If this ratio exists between the sciatic nerve and the thigh, then the entire thigh is prohibited. If not, he can still remove the nerve and eat the rest of the thigh." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with a sciatic nerve that is cooked with other permitted nerves. Afterwards, the mishnah continues to deal with the subject of prohibited foods that are cooked with permitted foods.", + "A sciatic nerve which was cooked with other [permitted] nerves: If it can still be recognized, [then all the nerves are prohibited] if [the sciatic nerve] imparts a flavor. But if it can no longer [be recognized] then they are all forbidden. And the broth [is prohibited] if it [the sciatic nerve] imparts a flavor. If the person can still tell which one of the nerves is the sciatic nerve, then the other nerves are prohibited only if we can assume that the sciatic nerve imparted its taste to the other nerves. The test for this would seem to be the turnip and meat test we learned about in yesterday’s mishnah. If he can’t recognize which one is the sciatic nerve, then all of the nerves are prohibited. Note that no amount of other nerves is sufficient, in this case, to nullify the presence of one forbidden nerve. This is unlike the usual rule that holds that forbidden substances can be nullified by a high enough percentage of permitted substances. The Talmud explains that this is because the sciatic nerve is treated like a complete entity, which can never be nullified. As far as the broth goes, here the test is simply whether or not the sciatic nerve was of a sufficient amount to impart its taste. If it is not, then the broth is permitted, even if he can’t tell which one was the nerve.", + "And so it is with a piece of nevelah, or a piece of an unclean fish that was cooked together with other pieces of flesh [or fish]: If it can still be recognized, [then all are prohibited] if it imparts a flavor. But if it can no longer [be recognized] then they are all forbidden. And the broth [is prohibited] if it [the sciatic nerve] imparts a flavor. The same rules hold true for other prohibited substances. Again we must explain why these pieces of meat or fish are not nullified by a high percentage of permitted meat or fish (in cases where he can’t recognize which was which). One would think that if there were, for instance, 200 pieces of permitted meat and only one piece of nevelah, that the permitted meat would nullify the tiny percentage of prohibited meat. The Talmud explains that pieces of meat or fish which are large enough to present to guests are significant enough that they can never be nullified." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn this interesting mishnah, the sages argue whether the prohibition of the sciatic nerve applies to non-kosher (unclean) animals.", + "It applies to clean animals but not to unclean. Rabbi Judah says, even to unclean animals. According to the first opinion, if one eats the sciatic nerve of an unclean animal, a donkey, for instance, he is liable for eating an unclean animal, but he is not liable for having eaten the sciatic nerve. Rabbi Judah disagrees and holds that he has transgressed two prohibitions: 1) eating an unclean animal; 2) eating the sciatic nerve.", + "Rabbi Judah said: was not the sciatic nerve prohibited from the time of the sons of Jacob, and at that time unclean animals were still permitted to them? They replied, this law was ordained at Sinai but was written in its proper place. Rabbi Judah’s argument is based on the unique placement of the sciatic nerve prohibition in the Torah. In the Torah, the prohibition is given in Genesis, before the rest of the laws are given at Sinai. Before the laws were given, all animals were permitted to all of humanity, including the children of Israel. Thus the sciatic nerve was prohibited at a time when unclean animals were permitted. The special nature of this prohibition stays in place, according to Rabbi Judah, even after the Torah was given on Sinai. The other rabbis argue that this law was actually given on Sinai as well. From the time of Jacob until the giving of the Torah there was no prohibition of the sciatic nerve. When the law was placed in the Torah it was put into the context of the story of Jacob, for the reason for this prohibition lies there. Thus it only applies to animal that were permitted after Sinai clean animals." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThree times the Torah states, “Do not seethe a kid in its mother’s milk.” While the Torah speaks specifically about cooking a kid in its own mother’s milk, all of the rabbis agree that the prohibition is much broader. First of all, it applies to the meat and milk of all domesticated animals (sheeps, goats and cows). Second of all, all rabbis agree that it is prohibited to eat and derive benefit from milk and meat that have been cooked together the prohibition is not just against cooking.\nHowever, beyond that, there are several issues that are not clear, and about which rabbis debate. These debates and the rules concerning milk and meat are in our chapter.", + "Every kind of flesh is forbidden to be cooked in milk, except for the flesh of fish and of locusts. There are several categories of meat: 1) Domesticated animals, sheep, goats and cows; 2) Wild animals, such as deer; 3) Fowl; 4) Fish and locusts. When it comes to the prohibition of cooking meat and milk, our mishnah draws the line before category four. Although wild animals and fowl are quite dissimilar from goats, the animal mentioned in the verse itself, it is still prohibited to cook them in milk. Indeed, fowl and milk are prohibited even though birds don’t have milk! In my opinion, the mishnah defines “meat” as anything that needs to be slaughtered. Since fish and locusts are not slaughtered, they can be cooked and eaten with milk. This rule is recognizable today because it is the rule we follow. However, we should note that not all rabbis agreed and there were some rabbis who held that it was either not prohibited by the Torah to cook and eat fowl and meat, or that it was completely permitted. This opinion was held by a few during the talmudic period, but was not accepted in later times.", + "And it is also forbidden to place it upon the table with cheese, except for the flesh of fish and of locusts. Any meat which may not be cooked with milk, may also not be placed on the same table as a dairy product, lest someone come to eat the two of them together. We can see here that the prohibition of cooking milk and meat is clearly also a prohibition of eating them together.", + "Fowl may be placed upon the table together with cheese but may not be eaten with it, the words of Bet Shammai. Bet Hillel say: it may neither be placed [upon the table together with cheese] nor eaten with it. Rabbi Yose said: this is one of the leniencies of Bet shammai and the stringencies of Bet Hillel . Bet Shammai is more lenient than Bet Hillel when it comes to fowl. It seems likely that according to Bet Shammai the prohibition of eating fowl and milk is only derabanan, of rabbinic authority. Bet Hillel might hold that it is of toraitic origin, and therefore they rule more strictly. Alternatively, they are simply stricter than Bet Shammai, but agree that fowl and cheese is only prohibited by rabbinic authority. In any case, Rabbi Yose points out that this is one of the unusual cases where Bet Hillel rules more strictly than Bet Shammai.", + "Concerning what table did they speak? Concerning the table upon which one eats; but on the table whereon the food is set out one may place the one beside the other, and not be concerned. This section refers to the table mentioned in sections two and three. When it is prohibited to place meat and milk on the same table--that is on a table which people eat off of. Meat and milk can be placed next to each other on tables that are used to prepare foods." + ], + [ + "A person may wrap up meat and cheese in one cloth, provided they do not touch one another. As long as the meat and cheese don’t touch, they may be wrapped together, without concern that someone will eat the two of them together.", + "Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: two people at an inn may eat at the same table, the one meat and the other cheese, without concern. In yesterday’s mishnah we learned that meat and cheese should not be placed on the same table. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel states that if people are eating at an inn, they may eat off the same table. The reason that this is allowed is that people at an inn do not know each other and there is no concern that one person will come to eat from the other person’s food. If the two people do know each other, the mishnah would seem to not allow them to eat off of the same table." + ], + [ + "If a drop of milk fell on a piece of meat and it imparted a flavor into that piece, it is forbidden. If milk is mixed in with meat, the mixture is prohibited if the milk imparts a taste to the meat. Thus if a drop of milk falls onto a piece of meat in a pot, the meat is prohibited only if one could taste the milk.", + "If he stirred up the pot, then it is forbidden only if [the drop of milk] imparted a flavor into [all that was in] the pot. If he stirs the pot, then the small drop of milk will spread out to the entire mixture. In such a case, the meat is prohibited only if there is enough milk to impart a taste to the entire pot. But if there is not enough milk to give its taste to the entire pot, then even the piece of meat onto which the drop of milk fell is permitted, because that drop of milk has now spread out to the entire pot.", + "The udder: he must cut it open and empty it of its milk; If he did not cut it open he has not transgressed the law on its account. The udder is a problematic part of the animal because it is flesh filled with meat. If one wishes to eat the udder, he must cut it open before cooking it and empty it of all of the milk gathered in it. Then he can cook it. If he doesn’t open it, and then he cooks it with the milk, he is not liable for cooking or eating milk and meat, since the milk that is inside the flesh is not considered to be milk until it has been expelled through the animal’s udders.", + "The heart: he must cut it open and empty it of its blood; If he did not cut it open he has not transgressed the law on its account. The same problem exists when it comes to the heart it is meat (permitted) filled with blood (forbidden). He should cut it open and empty out the blood before he eats it, but if he cooks it in its blood, and eats it, he has not transgressed the biblical prohibition of eating blood.", + "One who puts fowl onto a table with cheese has not transgressed a negative commandment. Mishnah one taught that it is forbidden to put meat and milk on the same table. Our mishnah points out that while this is forbidden, one who does put them on the same table has not transgressed a negative commandment." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nStrictly speaking, the Torah prohibits boiling only a kid (a baby goat) in its mother’s milk. As I stated in the introduction to this chapter, all rabbis agree that the prohibition is broader. In our mishnah there are two arguments: 1) whether or not the prohibition includes fowl and wild animals; 2) how the extensions to this prohibition are derived (the midrash).", + "It is forbidden to cook the meat of a clean animal in the milk of a clean animal or to derive any benefit from it. But it is permitted to cook the meat of a clean animal in the milk of an unclean animal or the meat of an unclean animal in the milk of a clean animal and to derive benefit from it. A kid and its mother are both clean (kosher) animals. The rabbis use the kid as a paradigm for all other clean animals. The prohibition of meat and milk applies only to the meat and milk of clean animals. But if one boils pig meat in milk or cow meat in camel milk, he has not transgressed any violation. He may also derive benefit from it (by selling it). Of course, he can’t eat it because pig and camel aren’t kosher. But as long as he doesn’t eat the mixture, he has not transgressed.", + "Rabbi Akiva says: wild animals and fowls are not included in the prohibition of the Torah, for it is written three times, “You shall not seethe a kid in its mother's milk;” to exclude wild animals, fowl, and unclean animals. Rabbi Akiva’s opinion is that the prohibition does not extend to wild animals or fowl, which are in a different category from the kid. Rabbi Akiva derives this midrashically from the fact that the Torah prohibits boiling a kid in its mother’s milk three times each time the Torah excludes something that is not similar to a kid. Note that Rabbi Akiva does not state that it is permitted to boil or eat chicken and milk. He only says that doing so is not forbidden by the Torah it is forbidden by the rabbis.", + "Rabbi Yose the Galilean says, it is said, “You shall not eat any nevelah” and [in the same verse] it says, “You shall not seethe a kid in its mother's milk” (Deuteronomy 14:21) anything that is prohibited because of nevelah it is forbidden to cook in milk. Fowl which is prohibited because of nevelah, it might also be forbidden to cook in milk, Scripture says, “In its mother’s milk;” this excludes fowl which has no mother's milk. Rabbi Yose the Galilean disagrees with Rabbi Akiva on two counts. First of all, he holds that the wild animal is prohibited by the Torah, since it is prohibited to eat a wild animal that was not slaughtered properly, meaning one that is a nevelah. He derives this from the juxtaposition of the prohibition of nevelah with the prohibition of meat and milk. Secondly, he seems to hold that it is permissible to eat fowl and milk, whereas Rabbi Akiva seemed to think that this was prohibited by the rabbis. Indeed, in the Talmud it states that in Rabbi Yose the Galilean’s place people used to actually eat fowl and milk. However, this is not the accepted halakhah. According to the accepted halakhah, chicken and milk is prohibited “derabanan” by the rabbis, as was stated by Rabbi Akiva." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah deals with the milk that is found inside the stomach of an animal. This sour milk contains enzymes that were used to curdle milk and make cheese. Similarly, the lining of the stomach was also used in this process.", + "The [milk in the] stomach [of an animal] of a Gentile or [in the stomach of] a nevelah is forbidden. This milk is prohibited because the animal is prohibited.", + "If a man curdled milk with the skin of the stomach of an animal that was validly slaughtered and it imparted its flavor [to the milk] it is forbidden. The skin of the stomach of an animal is considered to be meat. Therefore, if a meaty taste is imparted to the cheese then the cheese is considered to be meat mixed with milk and it is forbidden. If there is no taste of the meat, then the cheese is permitted.", + "The [milk in the] stomach of a validly slaughtered animal which had suckled from a terefah animal is forbidden. The [milk in the] stomach of a terefah animal which had suckled from a kosher animal is permitted, because the milk is collected inside. The milk in the stomach of an animal is considered to have come from the mother from whom the animal suckled. Thus if milk is found in the stomach of an animal that was validly slaughtered, but it is known that the milk came from a terefah (an animal that cannot be eaten because it will die from a defect/wound) then the milk is prohibited. In contrast, if the slaughtered animal was a terefah, but the animal from which it suckled was valid, then the milk is permitted. We should note that this mishnah has many ramifications for later halakhah, specifically with regard to the issue of making cheese. There are various opinions among medieval commentators with regard to whether the milk found in the stomach of an animal, which is called rennet, can be used to make cheese if it comes from a non-kosher animal. However, this is not the place to expand upon such an issue. For more information, you might want to look on the Rabbinical Assembly’s website for a teshuvah concerning the use of rennet in making cheese." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe last mishnah in our chapter has nothing to do with the subject of milk and meat. It deals with the prohibitions of forbidden fat (helev) and blood and compares the applicability of the two.", + "In certain respects the prohibition of the fat is stricter than the prohibition of the blood, and in certain respects the prohibition of the blood is stricter than the prohibition of the fat. This section introduces the structure of the mishnah which compares the prohibition of forbidden fat with that of blood.", + "The prohibition of the fat is stricter, in that the fat is subject to the law of sacrilege, and one is obligated over it for piggul, notar, and uncleanness which is not the case with the blood. One who eats the forbidden fat of a sacrificial animal is liable for sacrilege, meaning he has made illicit use of sacred property. The fat is supposed to be burned on the altar. Thus if one eats this fat he has transgressed twice: 1) sacrilege; 2) eating forbidden fat. He is also obligated for transgressing the other prohibitions associated with sacrificial animals. When a priest, while offering a sacrifice, intends to eat it after it may no longer be eaten, he makes it into piggul. Notar is remnant sacrificial meat that has been left over after it can no longer be eaten. One who eats forbidden fat from an animal that is piggul and notar is liable for transgressing piggul and notar and for eating forbidden fat. He is also liable if he eats the fat while he is unclean or while the meat is unclean. None of these prohibitions apply to blood. If one eats blood of a piggul or notar animal, or in a state of uncleanness he has only transgressed the prohibition of eating blood. The blood is not treated as if it were the flesh of the animal.", + "And the prohibition of the blood is stricter, for it applies to cattle, wild animals and fowl, whether clean or unclean; but the prohibition of the fat applies to clean cattle only. The prohibition of forbidden fat applies only to clean (permitted) cattle: sheep, goats and cows (see Leviticus 7:23). It does not apply to wild animals or birds. In contrast, the blood prohibition applies to all living things: cattle, wild animals and birds." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThe ninth chapter deals with two different forms of uncleanness: 1) food-uncleanness and 2) nevelah uncleanness. There are some differences between the two forms of uncleanness. Food that is unclean can cause other food to become unclean if there is the amount of an egg of food, whereas for nevelah uncleanness an olive’s worth is sufficient.\nOur mishnah teaches that some parts of the animal are considered to be food and therefore susceptible to food uncleanness even though they are not usually eaten.", + "The hide, meat juice, sediment, dried-up meat, bones, sinews, horns and hooves join together [to make up the minimum quantity in order] to convey food-uncleanness, but not to [make up the minimum quantity in order to] convey nevelah-uncleanness. These are all parts of the animal that are not generally or ever eaten. However, these parts, joing together with the generally edible parts of the animal to create a minimum volume the size of an egg to convey uncleanness to other foods if the animal was rendered unclean. The reason is that all although these parts are not eaten on their own, they are sometimes eaten with other parts of the meat. Alternatively, some of these things protect the meat of the animal, even if they themselves are not eaten. Therefore, they join with the meat in adding up to this minimum value. However, these things do not join together with the rest of the meat to cause nevelah-uncleanness, which requires the minimum volume of an olive.", + "Similarly, if a man slaughtered an unclean animal for a Gentile and it still has convulsions, it can convey food-uncleanness, but it conveys nevelah-uncleanness only after it is dead, or its head has been chopped off. This animal cannot be eaten by a Jew or by a Gentile. It can’t be eaten by a Jew because it is an unclean animal, for instance a camel. It can’t be eaten by a Gentile because it is still convulsing and is therefore prohibited under the Noahide prohibition of eating the limb of a living animal. Nevertheless, this animal is considered food because just as when a Jew slaughters a kosher (clean) animal he causes it to be able to receive impurity, so too when he slaughters a non-kosher animal, he causes it to be able to receive impurity. However, it is not considered a nevelah in order to convey nevelah uncleanness until it is truly dead or has its head cut off. If its head is cut off, it is considered dead even if it is still convulsing.", + "[Scripture] has [thus] made more cases that convey food-uncleanness than those that convey nevelah-uncleanness. The mishnah closes by noting there are more cases where something conveys food-uncleanness than nevelah uncleanness.", + "Rabbi Judah says: if an olive’s bulk of dried-up meat was gathered in one place, one would thereby become liable [for nevelah-uncleanness]. In section one, we learned that “dried-up meat” does not join together with regular meat to create the minimum measure necessary to convey nevelah-uncleanness, should the animal be a nevelah. Because the dried-up meat is not generally eaten it does not count as meat. Rabbi Judah says that if a person gathered up an olive’s bulk of such a substance in one place, then he can be liable over it for nevelah-uncleanness (provided the substance comes from a nevelah, of course). He would be liable if he touches it, thereby becoming unclean, and then eats holy food (terumah or sacrifices) or goes into the Temple." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn yesterday’s mishnah we learned that the skin is not treated as part of the flesh, as far as transmitting nevelah-uncleanness. That is to say, in order for there to be an olive’s worth of flesh to convey nevelah-uncleanness, there must be meat and not skin.\nOur mishnah teaches that there are cases where the skin is considered to be impure like the flesh.", + "In the following cases the skin is considered flesh: The skin of a person, The skin of the domesticated pig. Rabbi Yose says: even the skin of the wild pig. The skin of the hump of a young camel. The skin of the head of a young calf. The skin around the hooves. The skin of the pudenda. The skin of a fetus. The skin beneath the fat tail. The skin of the gecko, the monitor, the lizard and the skink. Rabbi Judah says: the lizard is like the weasel. In all of these cases, the skin is treated just like the flesh. The skin of a dead human being transmits impurity in the same way that the flesh does. In the remainder of the examples listed here the skin is treated like flesh because it is eaten like the flesh. These are all cases where the skin is soft and therefore edible. Thus people eat the skin of the domesticated pig, but not the skin of wild pigs. Rabbi Yose says that people eat even the skin of wild pigs. In sub-section i, the mishnah lists four of the eight “reptiles” (sheratzim) mentioned in Leviticus 11:29-30. Rabbi Judah holds that the skin of a lizard is not eaten and therefore it is like the skin of the weasel, which does not count as flesh.", + "If any of these skins was tanned or trampled upon as much as [was usual] for tanning, it becomes clean, excepting the skin of a man. Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri says: the eight reptiles have [real] skins. Generally the types of skins mentioned in section one are eaten and not tanned. That is why they convey impurity as does flesh. However, if they were tanned, or even begun to be tanned, then it is obvious that the owner does not intend to eat them. Therefore, they are pure from nevelah uncleanness. The one exception is human skin, which continues to be impure even if it is tanned (I realize that this is a disturbing image). Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri holds that the 8 reptiles listed in Leviticus 11:29-30 have real skins, ones that don’t convey nevelah-uncleanness. He disagrees with the sages above who distinguished between the different reptiles." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah discusses how long a hide that is being flayed from an animal is considered to be part of the animal. The importance of this issue is for matters of purity: if it is considered to be connected to the animal, then it conveys impurity to the remainder of the flesh and receives impurity as well. When it is disconnected it is considered a separate entity with regard to matters of purity.", + "One who was flaying cattle or wild animals, clean or unclean, small or large: The rules in this mishnah apply to all animals, whether domesticated or wild, clean (kosher) or unclean, small or large.", + "In order to use the hide for a covering, if he stripped as can be taken hold of [the hide is no longer considered as connected to the flesh.] The amount of hide necessary for it to be considered as disconnected to the flesh is going to depend on what he wants to use the hide for. If he is using it for a covering, either for a chair or table, or other such object, then once he has removed enough to grab hold of, the part that he has removed is considered to be disconnected from the flesh. If the animal is a nevelah, then the hide that has been already flayed does not make the person who touches it unclean. And if the animal was properly slaughtered but the hide became unclean, the remainder of the flesh remains clean.", + "In order to make a water-skin, until the breast has been flayed. If he was intending to use the hide as a water-skin, then the hide is considered connected until he flays the breast. When skinning an animal for this purpose, he would cut a small hole at the place of the neck and then flay the rest of the skin whole. The skin counts as being connected until he gets down to the breast, because this is the most difficult place to properly flay. Until he reaches this point, the purity status of the skin and flesh is shared.", + "If he was flaying from the feet upwards, until the whole hide [has been flayed]. If he was flaying in the opposite direction, from the feet upwards, then the skin is considered connected until it is all removed.", + "[All of these measures apply] for both conveying uncleanness and becoming unclean. As I have explained above, these rules apply in both directions: both to convey uncleanness from the animal to the hide, and from the hide to the animal.", + "As for the skin that is on the neck: Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri says: it is not connected. But the sages say it is connected until the whole hide has been flayed. The skin that surrounds the neck is easily separated from the flesh and therefore Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri considers it as disconnected from the flesh. If it becomes unclean, the flesh is not unclean and if the flesh is unclean, it remains clean. The other sages say that this hide is treated just as is the rest of the hide. One who touches it, it is as if he touched the flesh, even if part of it was removed. It is not separate until it has all been removed." + ], + [ + "A hide which had an olive’s bulk of [unclean] flesh clinging to it, one who touches a shred hanging from it, or a hair that was opposite to it, he becomes unclean. This section teaches that one who touches something that is attached to a piece of flesh is considered as having touched the flesh. If there is a piece of flesh of nevelah (carrion) the size of an olive that is hanging from a hide, one who touches the hide has become unclean through nevelah uncleanness. He is also unclean if he touches the hair attached to the hide opposite the piece of flesh, for touching the hair counts as touching the hide which conveys the uncleanness from the flesh.", + "If there were two pieces of flesh attached to it, each the size of half an olive, they convey uncleanness by carrying but not by contact, the words of Rabbi Ishmael. Rabbi Akiva says: neither by contact nor by carrying. Here, instead of there being one piece of flesh the size of an olive, the usual size necessary to convey nevelah uncleanness, there are two pieces of flesh, each the size of half of an olive. Both are attached to one piece of hide. Everyone agrees that these two pieces of flesh don’t join together to convey uncleanness by contact, since one is touching only one at a time. However, Rabbi Ishmael holds that if one carries the hide with the two olives attached to it he has become impure through carrying, because he is, after all, carrying an olive’s worth of nevelah. Rabbi Akiva says that they don’t convey impurity even when carried.", + "Rabbi Akiva agrees that if there were two pieces of flesh, each the size of half of an olive, that he stuck on a twig and he waved them, he becomes unclean. Rabbi Akiva agrees with Rabbi Ishmael that if there are two half-olive size pieces of flesh stuck on a stick, they join together to count as one full olive. Waving counts as carrying, so if he waves this stick with the two nevelah pieces on it, he is impure.", + "Why then does Rabbi Akiva declare him clean in the [case where they cling to the] hide? Because the hide renders them negligible. The mishnah now explains why Rabbi Akiva says that the two pieces of flesh attached to the hide do not join together to transmit impurity while those attached to the stick do. The two small pieces of flesh attached to the hide are negligible and nullified vis a vis the hide. However, the stick that he put them on is not considered important and therefore they are not nullified in this situation." + ], + [ + "With regard to a thigh-bone of a corpse or a thigh-bone of a consecrated animal, he who touches it, whether it be stopped up or pierced, becomes unclean. When it comes to human corpses, bones convey uncleanness just as does flesh. Thus one who touches a thigh-bone (this bone can actually be referring to any large bone) is impure no matter what state the bone is in. Consecrated animals that are disqualified by becoming either piggul (the priest had the wrong intention while offering the sacrifice) or remnant, cause hand-impurity (see Pesahim 10:9). The bones of consecrated animals also cause such impurity, again, no matter what state the bone is in.", + "With regard to a thighbone of a nevelah or of a [dead] sheretz, if it was stopped up, he who touches it remains clean, but if it was at all pierced it conveys uncleanness by contact. However, when it comes to nevelah impurity or the impurity caused by a dead sheretz (one of eight types of creepy crawly animals mentioned in the Torah), it depends on whether the bone was pierced such that the marrow could escape. The bone itself doesn’t convey impurity, whereas the marrow does. Thus, if it was not at all pierced, then the person who touches it or carries it is clean. But if it was pierced, even with a very small pierce, he is unclean.", + "From where do we know [the same rules apply] for carrying? Scripture says, “He that touches and he that carries” (Leviticus 11:39-40), anything that [can become unclean] by contact [can become unclean] by carrying. And anything that cannot [become unclean] by contact, cannot become [unclean] by carrying. The same rules that apply to touching a pierced or stopped up bone of a nevelah or sheretz apply to carrying such a bone. When one carries a pierced bone, he is impure. This is not the surprising aspect of this rule. What is surprising is that if one carries a non-pierced bone, he remains clean, even though he carried the marrow which counts as flesh of the nevelah. When it comes to nevelah, the same rules that apply to touching applying to carrying if one is pure from touching a stopped up bone, then he is also pure when he carries such a bone. This is derived from the juxtaposition of the verbs in Leviticus 11." + ], + [ + "The egg of a sheretz in which there has formed an embryo is clean. If it was pierced, however small the hole was, it is unclean. If the egg of the sheretz is not pierced, then one who touches it is pure, because there is no way of touching the sheretz that is inside. If it is pierced, then the one who touches it is unclean, no matter how small the hole is.", + "A mouse which is half flesh and half earth, if a man touched the flesh he becomes unclean, but if he touched the earth he remains clean. Rabbi Judah says: even if he touched the earth that is over against the flesh he becomes unclean. The rabbis know of, or at least discuss, a mouse that was not formed by normal ways of procreating, but rather rose out of the dust. When it had not been fully formed, it would be half dust and half earth. If one touches the earth part, he has not become impure by touching a mouse, which is a sheretz. If one touches the flesh, he is impure. Rabbi Judah holds that the earth counts as part of the mouse/sheretz, and one who touches it is impure. Saul Lieberman discusses this mishnah in his book, Hellenism in Jewish Palestine. On pages 183-184 he writes, “The existence of such a mouse was taken for granted by many ancient authors. Plinius cites it as a ‘fact’ which could confirm the credibility of other wonderful creatures…. ‘In one part of their body they are already alive, while the most recently formed part of their structure is still of earth.’ It is exactly the mouse described by the rabbis…The information about that kind of mouse the Rabbis probably got from Egyptian sources. When the alleged existence of the miraculous creature was brought to their attention they commented on its would-be Halakhic status.”" + ], + [ + "Limbs or pieces of flesh which hang loose from a [living] animal are susceptible to food uncleanness while they are in their place. In the cases in this mishnah, the flesh or limb has become severed from the animal and has no chance of becoming reattached. This limb or piece of flesh is considered pure, because it is still attached to the animal. It does, however, receive food uncleanness. Food can become impure by contact with a sheretz (and other more serious forms of impurity) and food conveys impurity to other foods.", + "And [in order to become unclean] they must be first rendered susceptible to uncleanness. In order for food to be rendered susceptible to impurity, it must come into contact with a liquid. This limb or flesh cannot become unclean until it comes into contact with one of seven liquids (water, blood, milk, dew, honey, oil or wine).", + "If the animal was slaughtered, they have by the blood [of the slaughtering] become susceptible to uncleanness, the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Shimon says: they have not become susceptible to uncleanness. If the animal is slaughtered properly, the limb or flesh that was hanging off is made susceptible to food uncleanness by virtue of the blood that leaves the animal when it is slaughtered. This is true even though the slaughtering of the animal does not permit the hanging limb or flesh to be eaten (see above 4:6). In other words, we must treat the limb or flesh as food, even though it cannot be eaten. Rabbi Shimon disagrees and holds that just as it may not be eaten, it is not susceptible to impurity by virtue of contact with this blood.", + "If the animal died, the hanging flesh must be rendered susceptible to uncleanness. If the animal died without being slaughtered, the animal becomes a nevelah but the flesh which was hanging off the animal while it was still alive is not considered nevelah. There is a rule that flesh that separates from an animal while it is still alive is not considered nevelah. Although this flesh was still attached, when it dies we consider it to have fallen off the animal. It still is susceptible to food impurity (as it did in section three), but before it can become impure it must be rendered susceptible by coming into contact with a liquid.", + "The limb is unclean as a limb severed from a living creature, but is not unclean as the limb of a nevelah (, the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Shimon declares it clean. According to Rabbi Meir, the limb, attached to the dead animal, does convey uncleanness because it is considered like a limb that was detached from a living animal, which conveys impurity as does a nevelah. However, flesh that becomes separated from a limb separated from a living animal does not convey impurity. Therefore, Rabbi Meir notes that the limb is treated like a limb separated from a living animal and not like a limb from a nevelah. Should flesh become separated from this limb, it will not become impure. Rabbi Shimon says that the limb is pure it is neither like a nevelah, nor like the limb severed from a living animal. Since the limb didn’t fall off while the animal was alive, it cannot be considered at all like a limb that falls from a living animal. And since it is separated from the rest of the body, it is not considered like nevelah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues the discussion about hanging limbs and pieces of flesh. Whereas yesterday’s mishnah discussed an animal, today’s mishnah discusses a human being.", + "A limb or a piece of flesh which hangs loose from a person are clean. As long as the limb or piece of flesh is attached to a live human being, it is clean. It is not a limb separated from a living being, because it is still attached.", + "If the man died, the flesh is clean, the limb is unclean as a limb severed from the living body but is not unclean as a limb severed from a corpse, the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Shimon declares it clean. This debate is basically the same debate as we found in yesterday’s mishnah. When the person dies, the flesh is clean because it is considered as flesh that separated from the person while he was still alive. Such flesh is pure. The limb is considered like a limb that was severed from a living animal, which is impure. It does not count as part of the corpse because we consider it to have fallen off the body while the person was still alive. This is the opinion of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Shimon considers the limb to also be clean, for the same reason that he considers the limb hanging from the dead animal’s corpse to be clean (see yesterday’s mishnah)." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nDeuteronomy 18:3 states, “This then shall be the priests’ due from the people: Everyone who offers a sacrifice, whether an ox or a sheep, must give the shoulder, the cheeks and the stomach to the priest.”\nOur chapter is concerned with these gifts given to the priest.", + "The [law of] the shoulder and the cheeks and the stomach is in force both within the Land and outside it, both during the existence of the Temple and after it, in respect of unconsecrated animals but not consecrated animals. The law that a person must give the priest the shoulder, cheeks and stomach of an animal that he slaughters is in force in all places and in all times. It applies only to unconsecrated (hullin) animals and not to those that have been consecrated to the Temple.", + "For it might have been argued thus: if unconsecrated animals, which are not subject to the law of the breast and the thigh, are subject to these dues, how much more are consecrated animals, with are subject to the law of the breast and the thigh, subject also to these dues! The mishnah now explains why one might have thought that it should apply to consecrated animals. From shelamim sacrifices, whose meat goes to the owners, the priest receives the breast and the thigh. Thus one might have argued if the priest gets the shoulder, cheeks and stomach from unconsecrated animals but not the breast and thigh, all the more so he should get the shoulder, cheeks and stomach from an animal from which he does receive the breast and thigh.", + "Scripture states, “And I have given them to Aaron the priest and his sons as a due for ever” (Leviticus 7:34) only what is mentioned in this passage shall be his. To counter this argument, the Torah hints (midrashically) that from sacrifices, Aaron and his priestly descendents receive only the breast and thigh, and not the shoulder, cheeks and stomach. Along with this midrash, it seems to me that the different priestly gifts serve to distinguish between sacrifices and non-sacrifices. The fact that the priests receive different gifts from different animals might help in distinguishing whether the gifts they are receiving must be treated as holy, or can be considered hullin (non-sacred)." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nAn animal that has a permanent physical blemish cannot be sacrificed. Our mishnah distinguishes between cases where the blemish preceded the consecration of the animal, versus cases where the consecration preceded the blemish.", + "All consecrated animals whose permanent physical blemish preceded their consecration and were then redeemed: Are subject to the law of the firstling and to the priestly gifts, And when they become like hullin [by being redeemed] they may be shorn and may be put to work. And their young and their milk are permitted after they have been redeemed. And he who slaughtered them outside the sanctuary is not liable. And they do not render what is substituted for them [holy]. And if they died they may be redeemed, except for the firstling and the tithe of cattle. If the animal had a permanent blemish before it was consecrated, then the animal itself doesn’t become holy. Instead, the consecrator has in reality dedicated the value of the animal to the Temple. Thus this animal is treated like a hullin, non-sacred, animal, except that it has to be redeemed before any use can be made of it. If it gives birth to a firstling, the firstling is holy, as is the case with a hullin animal. When one slaughters it, he must give the shoulder, cheeks and stomach to the priest. After it becomes hullin by being redeemed, it may be shorn and work may be performed with it. Similarly, its young and its milk are not prohibited. One who slaughters it outside the Temple is not liable for he has slaughtered a non-sacred animal. If one tries to exchange it for another animal, the other animal is not holy. If the animal dies, it will still need to be redeemed, so that its meat can be given to dogs. The only exception to all of these rules is if this animal that had a permanent blemish is itself a firstling or a tithed animal. The firstling is holy from the moment it is born even if it has a blemish. Similarly, even blemished animals must be tithed (see Leviticus 27:33). Thus these animals are holy regardless of whether they have blemishes and therefore they cannot be treated as the animals above were treated.", + "All [consecrated animals] whose consecration preceded their permanent, or their impermanent blemish [preceded] their consecration and subsequently they contracted a permanent blemish, and they were redeemed: Are exempt from the law of the firstling, and from priestly gifts; And they are not like unconsecrated animals to be shorn or put to work; And [even] after they have been redeemed their young and their milk are forbidden; And he who slaughtered them outside the sanctuary is liable; And they render what was substituted for them [holy], And if they died they must be buried. An animal that is first consecrated and then becomes blemished is a consecrated animal, even though it cannot be sacrificed. Similarly, if an animal has a passing blemish, and then it is consecrated, it is a consecrated animal. These animals must be redeemed, and the money used to buy a new sacrifice. However, they remain consecrated even after redemption. Therefore, their offspring is exempt from the laws of tithe and firstling, as are the offspring of all consecrated animals. One who slaughters them after their redemption need not give the shoulder, cheeks and stomach to the priest. Even after they are redeemed, it is forbidden to shear them or to perform any work with them. Their offspring and their milk remain prohibited, even after they have been redeemed. Indeed, it seems like the only thing that can be done with them is to eat them. Our version of the mishnah says that if one slaughters them outside of the Temple, he is liable. This is difficult, because what it he supposed to do with them he can’t offer them as sacrifices nor can he slaughter them outside of the Temple. There is a version which reads “exempt” instead of “liable.” However, the Talmud reads “liable” and explains that this mishnah is according to Rabbi Akiva who holds that if an animal with a blemish was put onto the altar, it is not to be removed (Zevahim 9:3). Thus, although this animal should not be sacrificed, if it is put on the altar, it can be sacrificed. If one exchanges this animal for another, the other animal also becomes holy. Consecrated animals cannot be exchanged one for the other, and if one tries to do so, the original animal remains holy and the new animal becomes holy. Finally, if they die before they are redeemed, they must be buried, because no one can derive benefit from their meat." + ], + [ + "A first-born got mixed up with a hundred other animals: If a hundred [and one] persons slaughtered them all, they are all exempt from the gifts. If one person slaughtered them all, only one animal is exempt from the gifts. As we learned in mishnah one, one is exempt from giving the priestly gifts from consecrated animals. This includes even a first-born that has a defect that allows one to slaughter the animal and eat it. The problem presented in our mishnah is that this first born was mixed up with many other non-sacred animals. If each animal was slaughtered by a different person, meaning each animal was owned by a different person, they are all exempt from giving the priestly gifts, because each person can claim that his animal was not the first-born. However, if they all belong to one person, then he must give the priestly gifts from all but one animal, for one animal is surely exempt.", + "If a man slaughtered an animal for a priest or a non-Jew, he is exempt from the gifts. An animal owned by a priest or by a non-Jew is exempt from the priestly gifts. If one slaughters an animal owned by a priest or a non-Jew for the priest or non-Jew the animal is exempt.", + "If he had a share [in the animal] with them, he must indicate this by some sign. If a person jointly owned an animal with a non-Jew or priest, the animal is still exempt from the priestly gifts. However, in order that people should know why gifts are not being given from this animal, he must make a sign on the animal that it is jointly owned by someone who is exempt.", + "If he said, “Except the gifts” he is exempt from giving the gifts. The next few sections deal with sales of animals. If a priest sells an animal to a non-priest and he says that he is selling the animal but not the gifts, (the shoulder, cheeks and stomach), then the Israelite does not need to pay the value of these parts of the animal because they were never his.", + "If he said, “Sell me the entrails of a cow” and among them were the gifts, he must give them to a priest and [the seller] does not need to reduce the price. If a person tells a butcher to sell him the entrails of an animal, and among the entrails are gifts that must be given to the priest, the purchaser must give them to the priest and the seller need not reduce the price. This is because the purchaser knew that he was not going to get to keep all of that which he bought. In other words, it was already reckoned into the price.", + "But if he bought them from him by weight, he must give them to a priest, and [the seller] must reduce the price. However, if he buys by weight, then he is anticipating that all that he buys will be his. In this case, if the seller gives the buyer priestly gifts, he must reduce the price." + ], + [ + "A convert who converted and owned a cow: If he slaughtered it before he converted, he is exempt from giving the gifts. If [he slaughtered it] after he converted, he is liable. If there was a doubt about it, he is exempt, for the burden of proof lies upon the claimant. If the convert was not yet Jewish before his cow was slaughtered, he is exempt from the gifts. If, however, he converted and then slaughtered the cow, he must give the gifts. We can see that the critical time is when the animal was slaughtered. If there is a doubt whether the conversion occurred before the animal was slaughtered, then the priest must prove that the owner was Jewish before the slaughtering in order to be able to claim his gifts. This is based on the common legal principle that the burden of the proof is on the claimant.", + "What is ‘the shoulder’? From the joint up to the shoulder-socket of the forelimb, and this is the same for the nazirite. The end of chapter ten is concerned with identifying exactly what part of the animal constitutes the shoulder and cheeks. The mishnah does not discuss the identification of the stomach, perhaps because it is clear what constitutes the stomach. The shoulder is defined as the entire front right leg, except for the foot. The joint refers to the ankle. This is the same shoulder as referred to in connection with the Nazirite in Numbers 6:19, “And the priest shall take the cooked shoulder.”", + "The corresponding part of the hind leg is called the thigh. Rabbi Judah says: the thigh extends from the joint up to the fleshy part of the leg. The same part of the hind leg is given to the priest from the shelamim offering. See above, mishnah one. Rabbi Judah says that the “thigh” referred to in the Torah is really what we would call the lower leg. It does not include from the knee and upwards.", + "What counts as ‘the cheek? From the joint of the jaw to the last protrusion of the windpipe. The “cheeks” go from the lower cheeks until the first joint of the windpipe." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nOur chapter deals with the mitzvah of giving the priest the first of the wool shorn from sheep (“the first of the fleece”). Deuteronomy 18:4 states, “You shall also give him [the priest] the first fruits of your new grain and wine and oil, and the first shearing of your sheep.” This verse follows the verse that instructed Israelites to give priests the shoulder, the cheeks and the stomach. This is the reason why this chapter is found here in Hullin.", + "The law of the first of the fleece is in force both within the Land and outside it, both during the existence of the Temple and after it, in respect of unconsecrated animals but not consecrated animals. The law of the first of the fleece is applicable in all times and places, but it applies only to unconsecrated animals. Just as consecrated animals are exempt from the shoulder, cheeks and stomach, so too they are exempt from the law of the first of the fleece.", + "The law of the shoulder and the cheeks and the stomach is of stricter application than the law of the first of the fleece; for the law of the shoulder and the cheeks and the stomach applies both to herds and flocks, whether they are many or few, whereas the law of the first of the fleece applies only to sheep, and only when there are many. The mishnah notes that in one way the giving of the shoulder, cheeks and stomach is more broadly applied than the giving of the first of the fleece. The priest receives the shoulder, cheeks and stomach from any domesticated animal, be it cow, sheep or goat. However, the priest receives the fleece only from sheep and not from goats (cows are not fleeced, so that is not relevant). Furthermore, the priest receives the fleece only when there are many sheep, and not when there are few. This shall be explained in tomorrow’s mishnah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah begins by explaining what the phrase “and only when there are many,” found at the end of yesterday’s mishnah. It then continues with other various aspects of this mitzvah.", + "How much is “many”? Bet Shammai say: [at least] two sheep, as it is said, “A man shall rear a young cow and two sheep (” (Isaiah 7:21). Bet Hillel say: five, as it is said, “Five dressed sheep (” (I Samuel 28:18). Deuteronomy 18:4 uses the word “tzon” which means flock. The question is: how many sheep are needed for there to be a flock? Clearly, one sheep is not enough. Bet Shammai use the verse from Isaiah to prove that even two sheep can be called “tzon.” Bet Hillel hold that the amount must be larger, and they use the verse from I Samuel to prove it.", + "Rabbi Dosa ben Harkinas says: five sheep, which each produce [a fleece which weighs] a maneh and a half, are subject to the law of the first of the fleece. But the sages say: five sheep, whatever their fleeces weigh. Later sages rule like Bet Hillel, but still debate whether the five sheep rule always applies. Rabbi Dosa ben Harkinas says that there must be a minimum measure of wool that each sheep produces. This amount is a maneh and a half, which is equivalent to about 600 grams of wool. The other rabbis disagree and hold that even if the first shearing produces only a minimal amount, he is still liable to give it to the priest.", + "And how much should one give him? The weight of five selas in Judah, which is equal to ten selas in Galilee. Bleached wool and not dirty wool, sufficient to make from it a small garment, for it is written, “Give him,” when there is enough to be considered a gift. If there are several priests and he wishes to divide the wool up among them he must give each not less than the weight of five Judean selas which is equivalent to ten Galilean selas. When he gives the priest the wool, it must already be bleached. He is not allowed to give the unbleached, dirty wool. The mishnah derives from the word “give” that whenever he gives the wool to the priest, there must be enough wool to make a gift, defined minimally as a small garment. The Talmud explains that a small garment is a sash.", + "If the owner did not manage to give [the fleece to the priest] until he dyed it, he is exempt. If he bleached it but did not dye it, he is still liable. If he dyed it before he had a chance to give it to the priest, he need not give the priest the wool. This is because by dyeing it, he has changed it and acquired it for himself. However, he has failed to perform the mitzvah of giving the priest the first of the fleece. But if all he did to the wool was bleach it, then he is still liable, because bleaching is not enough of a change for the owner to acquire it for himself.", + "If a man bought the fleeces of a flock belonging to a non-Jew, he is exempt from the law of the first of the fleece. Only sheep owned by Israelites are liable for the first of the fleece. So if one buys wool from a non-Jew, he need not give any of it to the priest.", + "If a man bought the fleeces of a flock belonging to his neighbor: If the seller kept some back, the seller is liable, But if he did not withhold anything, the buyer is liable. If he buys from a Jew, then it depends on whether the Jew kept any of the wool for himself. If he did, then the seller must give the first of the fleece from that which he held back. However, if he did not hold any back, then the purchaser must give the first of the fleece, because the seller did not reckon the price of the first of the fleece into the amount that he collected for the wool.", + "If he had two kinds of wool, grey and white, and he sold the grey but not the white, or [if he sold the wool] of the males but not of the females, each must give [the first of the fleece] for himself. If the seller had two kinds of wool, either of two different colors or from males and females, and he kept all of one kind to himself, then each person must give the first of the fleece from his own kind. This is because when there are two different kinds, we don’t consider it as if the seller held back some for himself. Rather he sold all of the wool of a certain kind, and therefore, the buyer must give to the priest from the kind that he bought." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nDeuteronomy 22:6-7 states: “If, along the road, you chance upon a bird’s nest, in any tree or on the ground, with fledglings or eggs and the mother sitting over the fledglings or on the eggs, do not take the mother together with her young. Let the mother go, and take only the young, in order that you may fare well and have a long life.”\nOur chapter, the final chapter in Hullin, deals with this mitzvah, called “letting the mother bird go from the nest (shiluah haken).”", + "The law of letting [the mother bird] go from the nest is in force both within the holy land and outside it, both during the existence of the Temple and after it, in respect of unconsecrated birds but not consecrated birds. The law of letting the mother bird go from the nest is applicable in all times and all places. However, it only applies to unconsecrated birds and not to consecrated ones.", + "The law of covering up the blood is of broader application than the law of letting [the mother bird] go; for the law of covering up the blood applies to wild animals as well as to birds, whether they are at one's disposal or not, whereas the law of letting [the mother bird] go from the nest applies only to birds and only to those which are not at one's disposal. The mishnah compares the law of covering up the blood (see chapter six) with the law of letting the mother bird go because both are practiced with wild animals and not domesticated ones. However, covering up the blood is of broader application because it applies to animals and birds, whereas sending the mother bird away obviously applies only to birds. Furthermore, sending the mother bird applies only to birds that are not at one’s disposal, meaning they are not “house” birds. In contrast, the covering of the blood applies to all birds and wild animals.", + "Which are they that are not at one's disposal? Such as geese and fowls that made their nests in the open field. But if they made their nests within a house or in the case of Herodian doves, one is not bound to let [the mother bird] go. If a bird makes its nest in the open field, then it is considered to not be at one’s disposal and one needs to send it away before taking its young. If the birds nest in the house, then when one comes to take them, he need not send the mother bird away. This is probably derived from the word “along the road” in Deuteronomy 22:6. The same is true for Herodian doves, which refers to the types of doves that Herod used to raise in his palace." + ], + [ + "An unclean bird one is not obligated to let it go. The obligation to let the mother bird go applies only to a clean (kosher) bird, one that can be eaten. It does not apply to birds that are not kosher.", + "If an unclean bird was sitting on the eggs of a clean bird, or a clean bird on the eggs of an unclean bird, one is not obligated to let it go. Furthermore, if either the eggs are from an unclean (not kosher) bird but the bird is clean, or vice versa, there is no obligation to let it go. The obligation applies only to a clean bird sitting on clean eggs.", + "As to a male partridge: Rabbi Eliezer obligates [one to let it go]. But the sages exempt. The Torah says “mother” because most of the time the mother bird sits on the egg. However, the male partridge does sit on the eggs, and therefore the rabbis debate whether there is an obligation to let it go. Rabbi Eliezer says that there is. Evidently, Rabbi Eliezer believes that the Torah mentioned mother, because that was the normal case. But according to his opinion, the same rule would apply to the father as well. The other rabbis are more precise in their reading of the Torah (and more hesitant about extending its logic). One must let only the mother bird go the father bird may be taken even while sitting on its young. As an aside, this reminds me of the debate concerning uncle/niece marriage. The Torah forbids a nephew from marrying his aunt, but says nothing about uncle/niece. The Jews who composed the Dead Sea Scrolls forbade both cases, thereby extending the logic of the Torah, much as Rabbi Eliezer does in this case. The rabbis, on the other hand, lauded such marriages, and read the Torah in a more narrow fashion." + ], + [ + "If the mother was hovering [over the nest]: If her wings touch the nest, one is obligated to let her go; If her wings do not touch the nest, one is not obligated to let her go. The mother is considered to be sitting upon the nest only so long as at least her wings are touching the nest. If she is just hovering over the nest, and her wings are not touching, one is not obligated to send her away.", + "If there was but one young bird or one egg [in the nest], one is still obligated to let the mother go, for it is written: “A nest,” [implying], any nest whatsoever. Although Deuteronomy 22:6 uses the plural form of eggs and fledglings, the obligation is still in place even if there is only one egg or one fledgling. This is because the Torah also uses the word “nest” which implies any nest, so long as there is at least one egg or one fledgling.", + "If there were there young birds able to fly or spoiled eggs, one is not obligated to let [the mother] go, for it is written, “And the mother sitting up on the young or upon the eggs:” Just as the young are living beings so the eggs must be such as [would produce] living beings; this excludes spoiled eggs. And just as the eggs need the care of the mother so the young must be such as need the care of the mother; this excludes those that are able to fly. The prohibition applies only to fledglings that cannot fly or to viable eggs. It does not apply to a case where the young birds can already fly or to a case where the eggs are spoiled. This is derived through a midrash which compares the fledglings with the eggs. Just as the fledglings have proven themselves to be viable birds, so too the eggs must show signs of being viable. Spoiled eggs are not covered by the prohibition. And just as the eggs still require the attention of their mother, so too the fledglings must require the attention of their mother. A fledgling which can feed itself and fly, is no longer covered by the prohibition.", + "If one let [the mother] go and she returned, even four of five times, he is still obligated [to let her go again], for it is written, “You shall surely let the mother go.” Even if the mother bird keeps returning to the nest, the person who finds her there must send her away before taking the young or the eggs. This is derived from the double appearance of the word “shalah” in the Torah, which I have translated as “surely let the mother go.” Although this is a common grammatical construct, the rabbis frequently use it as an opportunity for midrash.", + "If one said, “I will take the mother and let the young go,” he is still obligated [to let her go], for it is written, “You shall surely let the mother go.” One cannot fulfill the obligation by letting the young go, and taking the mother. Rather, the obligation is to send the mother away and then take the young.", + "If one took the young and brought them back again to the nest, and afterwards the mother returned to them, he is not obligated to let her go. If one let the mother go and took the young, he has now acquired the young birds and eggs. If he then puts them back in the nest and the mother comes and takes them, he is exempt from sending her away again. This is because the eggs are already his." + ], + [ + "If one took the mother with the young: Rabbi Judah says: he has incurred [forty] lashes and he need not now let her go. But the sages say: he must let her go, and he does not incur lashes. The Torah prohibits taking the mother bird, but then says that one should send the mother away. The question is: can one remedy the prohibition by performing the positive aspect of the commandment? Rabbi Judah says that once he has taken the mother, he has irrevocably transgressed the commandment. There are two implications: 1) he has incurred the punishment for transgressing a negative commandment (lashes); 2) he need not send the mother away, because there is no longer any commandment to do so. The other sages disagree. They hold that the transgression may be fixed by sending the mother away. Since when he transgresses there is the potential to fix the problem, one can never incur a punishment for transgressing such a type of commandment.", + "This is the general rule: [For the transgression of] any negative commandment which has of a remedy by the subsequent fulfillment of a positive commandment one does not incur lashes. This is the general rule. If there is a negative commandment that can be remedied by performing a positive commandment, then one cannot receive lashes for transgressing the negative commandment." + ], + [ + "One may not take the mother with the young even for the sake of purifying the metzora. One might have thought that if one needs a bird for the purification process of the metzora (one with skin disease) that it would be permitted to take the mother with the young. This purification process requires two birds (Leviticus 14:4). The mishnah states that this is prohibited one may not transgress one commandment in order to observe another.", + "If in respect of so light a commandment, which deals with that which is but worth an issar, the Torah said, “In order that you may fare well and have a long life”, how much more [must be the reward] for the observance of the more difficult commandments in the Torah! The mitzvah of sending away the mother bird is a relatively inexpensive mitzvah a bird is on average worth only about an issar. Thus the person who shoos the mother bird away has lost only an issar, a tiny amount of money. Nevertheless, the Torah states that he will receive a reward of having a long life. The mishnah ends with a note of encouragement, that if such a great reward is received for such an easy commandment, how much greater must be the reward for observing more difficult, and costly, commandments. Congratulations! We have finished Tractate Hullin! It is a tradition at this point to thank God for helping us finish learning the tractate and to commit ourselves to going back and relearning it, so that we may not forget it and so that its lessons will stay with us for all of our lives. Tractate Hullin was full of interesting commandments, many of which still have relevance in our lives. For those of us who eat meat (or fowl) learning Hullin is an opportunity to reflect on the meaning of taking a life in order to receive nourishment. The tractate is full of other commandments that are concerned with how we relate to killing animals in order to eat them, for instance the prohibition of killing a mother and child on the same day, or the commandment to cover the blood of a slaughtered wild animal or bird. It also dealt with the prohibition of cooking meat and milk, a practice that is to this day of great relevance in how a traditional Jew leads his/her daily life. I hope that you have enjoyed learning Hullin. In my opinion it is one of the most interesting tractates that I have learned. Tomorrow we begin learning Tractate Bechorot." + ] + ] + ] + }, + "versions": [ + [ + "Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp", + "http://learn.conservativeyeshiva.org/mishnah/" + ] + ], + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה חולין", + "categories": [ + "Mishnah", + "Modern Commentary on Mishnah", + "English Explanation of Mishnah", + "Seder Kodashim" + ], + "schema": { + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה חולין", + "enTitle": "English Explanation of Mishnah Chullin", + "key": "English Explanation of Mishnah Chullin", + "nodes": [ + { + "heTitle": "הקדמה", + "enTitle": "Introduction" + }, + { + "heTitle": "", + "enTitle": "" + } + ] + } +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Kodashim/English Explanation of Mishnah Keritot/English/Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp.json b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Kodashim/English Explanation of Mishnah Keritot/English/Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e28bfc2bdb9824d16c780bf79a0d551fda76f4ba --- /dev/null +++ b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Kodashim/English Explanation of Mishnah Keritot/English/Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp.json @@ -0,0 +1,322 @@ +{ + "language": "en", + "title": "English Explanation of Mishnah Keritot", + "versionSource": "http://learn.conservativeyeshiva.org/mishnah/", + "versionTitle": "Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp", + "status": "locked", + "license": "CC-BY", + "shortVersionTitle": "Dr. Joshua Kulp", + "actualLanguage": "en", + "languageFamilyName": "english", + "isBaseText": true, + "isSource": true, + "isPrimary": true, + "direction": "ltr", + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה כריתות", + "categories": [ + "Mishnah", + "Modern Commentary on Mishnah", + "English Explanation of Mishnah", + "Seder Kodashim" + ], + "text": { + "Introduction": [ + "Keritot (sometimes pronounced Keritut) is the plural of karet, which is a punishment found quite frequently in the Torah for various transgressions (Leviticus 17:4, 9; Exodus 30:33, 38; Genesis 17:14; Numbers 15:31 and many others). Karet is variously translated as “excommunication” or “extirpation” or other similar term. The rabbis interpret this punishment to be one that is meted out by God and not by a human court. One interpretation is that the person will die an early death. Another interpretation is that the punishment is meted out on the person in world to come. ", + "Despite the fact that the title of the tractate is Keritot, the subject of most of the tractate is those who are obligated to bring a hatat (sin-offering) an asham, and especially an “asham talui.” The “asham talui” is referred to in Leviticus 5:17-19:" + ], + "": [ + [ + [ + "There are in the Torah thirty-six [transgressions which are punishable with] karet:
When one has intercourse with his mother,
His father's wife;
Or his daughter-in-law;
When a man has intercourse with a male,
Or with a beast,
Or when a woman brings a beast upon herself;
When one has intercourse with a woman and her daughter;
Or with a married woman;
Or with his sister;
Or with his father's sister;
Or his mother's sister;
Or his wife's sister;
Or his brother's wife;
Or the wife of his father's brother;
Or with a menstruating woman;
One who blasphemes [the Lord];
One who worships idols;
Or dedicates his children to Molech;
Or has a ba’al ov;
Or desecrates the Shabbat;
When an unclean person eats of sacred food;
Or when one enters the precincts of the Temple in an unclean state;
When one eats forbidden fat,
Or blood;
Notar;
Or piggul;
When one slaughters
Or offers up [a consecrated animal] outside [the Temple];
One who eats anything leavened on Pesah;
One who eats
Or works on Yom Kippur;
One who compounds the oil [of anointing];
Or compounds incense;
Or uses [unlawfully] oil of anointing;
And [when one transgresses the laws of] the pesah,
And circumcision from among positive commandments.
Keritot opens with a list of thirty-six transactions for which one is liable karet if one commits the transgression intentionally, but without prior warning.
This is not really the place to explain each of these transgressions. Rather I will give brief biblical references for each and explain anything that I feel is a bit more complicated.
I have merely duplicated each section below for ease of reference. Sorry if this is a bit long…
1) When one has intercourse with his mother; Leviticus 18:7.
2) His father's wife; ibid: 8.
3) Or his daughter-in-law; ibid: 15.
4) When a man has intercourse with a male: ibid: 22.
5) Or with a beast: ibid: 23.
6) Or when a woman brings a beast upon herself: ibid.
7) When one has intercourse with a woman and her daughter: ibid: 17.
8) Or with a married woman: ibid: 20.
9) Or with his sister; ibid: 9.
10) Or with his father's sister: ibid: 12.
11) Or his mother's sister: ibid: 13.
12) Or his wife's sister: ibid: 18.
13) Or his brother's wife: ibid: 16.
14) Or the wife of his father's brother: ibid: 14.
15) Or with a menstruating woman; ibid: 19.
16) One who blasphemes [the Lord]: Numbers 15:30.
17) One who worships idols: No shortage of references in the Tanakh.
18) Or dedicates his children to Molech; Leviticus 18:21.
19) Or has a ba’al ov; Leviticus 19:31.
20) Or desecrates the Shabbat: Many references, see for instance, Exodus 31:24.
21) When an unclean person eats of sacred food: Leviticus 7:20.
22) Or when one enters the precincts of the Temple in an unclean state:Numbers 19:13.
23) When one eats forbidden fat: Leviticus 7:25.
24) Or blood; ibid, 27.
25) Notar: Leviticus 19: 6-8.
26) Or piggul; Leviticus 7:18.
27) When one slaughters: Leviticus 17:4.
28) Or offers up [a consecrated animal] outside [the Temple]; ibid, 8-9.
29) One who eats anything leavened on Pesah; Exodus 12:19.
30) One who eats:
31) Or works on Yom Kippur; Leviticus 23:28-30 (this and the previous transgression).
32) One who compounds the oil [of anointing]; Exodus 30: 32-33.
33) Or compounds incense; Exodus 30: 37-38.
34) Or uses [unlawfully] oil of anointing; ibid, 32-33.
35) And the pesah: Deuteronomy 16: 2; Numbers 9:13.
36) And circumcision are positive commandments: Leviticus 12:3; Genesis 17:14." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah refers to the list of transgressions in yesterday’s mishnah.", + "For these [transgressions] one is liable to karet if committed intentionally, and if committed unwittingly to a hatat. One who commits any of the transgressions listed in mishnah is liable for karet if done intentionally and a hatat (a sin-offering) if done unwittingly.", + "If there is a doubt whether he had committed the transgression to an asham talui, except in the case of one who defiled the Temple or its consecrated things, for in that case one is liable in this case to a sliding-scale sacrifice, the words of Rabbi Meir. If he does not know whether he committed the transgression (see the introduction), then he brings an “asham talui” (a type of guilt-offering, see the introduction). This is true for all of the sins in mishnah one, except for defiling the Temple or its consecrated things, for in that case a person brings a sliding scale sacrifice (see Leviticus 5:2ff). For a sliding scale sacrifice a rich person brings an animal, a poor person brings a bird and a very poor person brings grain.", + "But the sages say: also the blasphemer [is an exception], as it says: “You shall have one law for one that acts in error” (Numbers 15:29), this excludes the blasphemer who performs no action. The sages hold that there is another exception to who brings a hatat and an asham talui, and that is the blasphemer. When it comes to the hatat, the Torah states, “You shall have one law for one that acts in error.” The midrashic implication is that in order to be liable for a hatat you must perform an action. Since the blasphemer doesn’t do anything, but merely speaks, he does not bring a hatat or an asham talui." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nAccording to Leviticus 12:6, after a woman gives birth and then undergoes a period of purification, she must bring two offerings. The first is a lamb, offered as an olah, and the second is a bird for a hatat. The remainder of our chapter deals with various scenarios in which a woman would bring a hatat and either eat it or not.", + "Some women [after childbirth] bring an offering which is eaten; some bring one which is not eaten, and some bring no offering at all. This is an introduction to the following four mishnayot.", + "These bring an offering which is eaten: In the cases which follow, despite the fact that the woman has not given birth to a live child, she must still bring a sacrifice and the sacrifice can be eaten. The significance of the sacrifice being edible is that it implies that she is fully obligated to bring the sacrifice. As we shall see in mishnah four, in cases of doubt concerning whether she is obligated or not, she brings the sacrifice but it is not eaten.", + "If a woman miscarries a fetus which has the shape of beast, or a wild animal or a bird, the words of Rabbi Meir; but the sages say: only if it has a human shape. According to Rabbi Meir, if the miscarried fetus has the shape of a living being, even an animal, she must bring the sacrifice and the sacrifice is eaten. The other sages hold that the fetus must have a human shape for her to eat the sacrifice. This is the same dispute that we saw in Bekhorot 8:1.", + "Or if a woman miscarries a sandal-like fetus or a placenta or a fully formed fetus, or one that comes out in pieces. A sandal like fetus is considered to be human enough for it to count as a human miscarriage, which makes the woman liable for a sacrifice that can be eaten. If a woman miscarries a placenta, the assumption is that she also miscarried a fetus and somehow it was missed. A fully formed fetus or one that is cut up in pieces also count as births.", + "Similarly, if a female slave miscarries, she brings an offering which is eaten. A female slave is liable to observe the same commandments that a Jewish woman is liable to observe. Therefore, if she gives birth, the same rules that apply to the Jewish woman apply to her." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn today’s mishnah we learn of cases in which a woman brings a sacrifice but the sacrifice is not eaten. In all of these cases there is doubt whether she is liable for a sacrifice: therefore she brings (just in case she was liable) but the sacrifice cannot be eaten (in case she was not liable).", + "The following bring an offering which is not eaten:
A woman who miscarries but does not know what the miscarriage was, If she doesn’t know whether the form of the fetus which she miscarried is something over which one must bring a childbirth sacrifice (see yesterday’s mishnah) or not, then she brings a sacrifice but it is not eaten.", + "Or if two women who have a miscarriage, one of a kind which did not render her liable [to an offering], and the other of a kind that does render her liable [to an offering]. In this case two women miscarry; one miscarries a fetus that renders her liable for a sacrifice and one miscarries something that does not render her liable. However, the women don’t know who miscarried what (I know this sounds really absurd). Both women are in the category mentioned in section one (doubtful whether they are liable), and therefore both bring a sacrifice and neither sacrifice may be eaten.", + "Rabbi Yose said: When is this so? This applies only if one went towards the east and the other towards the west, but if both remained together they bring [together] one offering which is eaten. Rabbi Yose modifies what was stated in section two. That ruling applies only to a case where two women gave their sacrifices to a priest and he is not sure which of the sacrifices came from the woman who was really liable. If they are not around to ask them who gave birth to what, then neither sacrifice can be eaten. However, if they remain together, then together the two of them can bring one sacrifice and stipulate that it is brought on behalf of the woman who is actually obligated." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah lists women who do not bring a childbirth sacrifice.", + "The following do not bring a sacrifice:
A woman who discharges a sac filled with water or with blood or with pieces of flesh; This sac is not considered to be evidence that the woman gave birth, and therefore she does not bring a sacrifice.", + "Or if the miscarriage was in the shape of fish, locust, unclean animals or reptiles; These shapes are not indicative of a human fetus and therefore she does not bring a sacrifice. We should note that there might be some ideology in effect here. In mishnah two Rabbi Meir said that a woman who gives birth to a fetus in the shape of a beast, wild animal or bird is obligated. These were all kosher animals. They are also the animals that require shekhitah (slaughtering) in order to be eaten. Today’s mishnah refers to living things that are either of a lower form (fish and locusts) or are not kosher (unclean animals and reptiles). Perhaps it is an ideological statement of Rabbi Meir that dictates that humans look like the former, kosher animals of a higher form, but not the latter.", + "Or if it was extracted by means of a caesarean section. Rabbi Shimon declares her liable [to an offering] in the case of a caesarean section. According to the rabbis, the fetus is not considered to come into existence until the fortieth day. A woman who miscarries before that point is considered to have discharged a sac full of water and she is not liable for a sacrifice.", + "According to the first opinion, a child born through caesarean section does not make his/her mother liable to bring a sacrifice because this is not really “birth.” However, Rabbi Shimon holds that she is liable." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nAccording to Leviticus 12:5-6, on the eighty-first day after giving birth to a girl a woman brings a sacrifice. Our mishnah discusses a case where on the eve of the eighty-first day the woman has a miscarriage. Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel debate whether she must bring a sacrifice.\nNote that the debate is specifically concerning this night. All agree that if she miscarried earlier she is not liable. It seems that the sacrifice brought for the previous birth will cover the subsequent miscarriage as well. And all hold that if she miscarries on the eighty-first day, she is liable for a sacrifice, because the first sacrifice cannot cover the miscarriage. The debate is only over a woman who miscarries the night before.", + "If a woman miscarries on the eve of the eighty-first day: Bet Shammai say: she is exempted from an offering. But Bet Hillel say: she is liable. These are the positions of the two houses; they will be explained below.", + "Bet Hillel said to Bet Shammai: what is the difference between the eve of the eighty-first day and the eighty-first day itself? Since these are considered equal with regard to [blood] uncleanness, why should they not be considered equal also with reference to the offerings? If a woman has a bloody discharge for the first 80 days after giving birth to a girl, the blood is pure. However, if she discharges blood on the 81st day, even at night, the blood is impure. Since the night of the 81st day is reckoned with the next day in terms of blood impurity, Bet Hillel reasons that the same must be true with regard to a sacrifice. If she miscarries on the night of the 81st day, she must bring a sacrifice, just as she would if she miscarried the next morning.", + "Bet Shammai said to them: No; if you said this in the case where she miscarries on the eighty-first day where it occurred at a time when she was fit to bring an offering, can you say this where she miscarries on the eve of the eighty-first day, where it did not occur at a time when she was fit to bring an offering? Bet Shammai responds that there is a difference between a woman who miscarries on the 81st day and one who miscarries the night before. On the morning of the 81st day she can bring a sacrifice for the previous child. Therefore, when she miscarries she must bring a new sacrifice for the miscarriage. The first sacrifice cannot cover the miscarriage. However, if she miscarries at night, she had not yet arrived at a time when she could bring the sacrifice for the first child, because sacrifices cannot be offered at night. Therefore, she does not bring a sacrifice for the miscarriage.", + "Bet Hillel said to them: the case of a woman who miscarries on the eighty-first day which fell on a Shabbat shall prove it, where it did not take place at a time when she was fit to bring an offering and yet she is liable to bring a [new] offering. Bet Hillel responds that in certain cases a woman might miscarry on the 81st day, but not be able to bring her sacrifice for the previous child. This would happen if the 81st day fell on Shabbat. Nevertheless, despite the fact that she cannot yet bring her previous sacrifice, all agree that she is liable for another sacrifice for the miscarriage. The same is true, according to Bet Hillel, if she miscarries on the night of the 81st.", + "Bet Shammai said to them: No; if you says this of the eighty-first day which fell on a Shabbat for although it is not fit for offerings of an individual, it is at least fit for communal offerings, would you maintain this concerning a woman who miscarries on the eve of the eighty-first day, seeing that the night is fit neither for offerings of the individual nor for communal offerings? Bet Shammai says that night and Shabbat are not comparable. At night, no sacrifices may be offered, whereas on Shabbat, although individual sacrifices, such as those brought by the childbearing woman, cannot be offered, communal sacrifices such as the tamid and musaf can be. This rejects Bet Hillel’s proof in section four.", + "As to [your argument of the uncleanness of] the blood, it proves nothing, for if she aborted within the period of cleanness the blood is unclean, and yet she is exempted from an offering. The sensitive reader will note that Bet Shammai has still not answered Bet Hillel’s proof found in section two: the comparison between blood impurity and the sacrifice. Bet Shammai says that the two issues are different, as can be seen by the case of a woman who aborts during the first 80 days of blood purity after having given birth to a girl. While bloody discharge that comes as a result of the first birth is pure during this period, blood that is a result of a new miscarriage during this period is impure. Nevertheless, all agree that if she miscarries during this time, she is not liable for a sacrifice. Bet Shammai argue that the same is true of a woman who miscarries on the night of the 81st at this point any blood is impure because the 80 days of purity are up, but if she miscarries she is still exempt." + ], + [ + "If a woman had five doubtful genital discharges or five doubtful births, she needs to bring only one offering, and she may eat sacrifices [immediately], and she is not liable to bring the other [offerings]. There are two situations that are described here. 1) A woman had genital discharge for three consecutive days once a month for five months and she doesn’t know if these occurred during her menstrual cycle, in which case she was not a “zavah” and does not need to bring a sacrifice, or not during her menstrual cycle and she is a zavah does need to bring a sacrifice. 2) She had five miscarriages and she doesn’t know whether what she miscarried counts as a birth and she must bring a sacrifice or doesn’t count as a birth and she does not bring a sacrifice. In both of these cases, the woman might be liable for as many as five sacrifices (each consisting of an olah and a hatat) or she might not be liable at all. The rule in this case is that she needs to bring only one sacrifice and then she can eat any sacrificial meat, as is always the case when a woman brings a sacrifice for being a zavah or for giving birth. While she can, if she wants, bring four more sacrifices, she need not do so.", + "If a woman had five certain births, or five certain genital discharges, she brings one offering and may then eat sacrifices [immediately], and she is liable to bring the other offerings. However, if she had five certain cases of genital discharge or five certain births, then she must bring all five sacrifices. After she brings the first sacrifice she can already resume eating sacrifices.", + "It once happened in Jerusalem that the price of a pair of doves rose to a golden denar. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel said: By this sanctuary, I shall not go to sleep tonight before they cost but a [silver] denar! Then he entered the court and taught: if a woman had five certain births or five certain genital discharges she needs to bring only one offering, and she may then eat sacrifices, and she is not liable to bring the other [offerings]. Thereupon the price of a pair of birds stood at a quarter of a [silver] denar each. This section contains a fascinating story. Because of the previous halakhah that demanded that a woman bring a sacrifice for every certain birth or certain genital discharge, the price of the birds used for the sacrifices went all the way up to a golden denar for a pair. A golden denar is the equivalent of 25 silver denars. Market forces were working in favor of those selling the birds and would have discouraged women from bringing the sacrifices that they so frequently had to bring. To combat this, Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel boldly changed the halakhah so that a woman would have to bring only one sacrifice, even if she had had five certain births or discharges. This new halakhah immediately brought the price down to ¼ of a denar. The actions of Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel are one of the clearest examples of a rabbi adapting the halakhah to fit the needs of the Jews of his time. The halakhah to Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel is not supposed to be something that is simply too costly to fulfill. When he saw that the cost of sacrifices was becoming prohibitive, he didn’t refrain and simply say, “What can I do? That’s what the law demands.” Rather he acted to ensure that what the law did demand was something that people could reasonably observe." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nGenerally a person who is impure and then immerses in a mikveh can begin to eat sacrifices after immersion. However, there are four categories of people who must first bring sacrifices before they can eat other sacrifices. This process is called “a ceremony of atonement.”\nOur mishnah also mentions another category, but since tomorrow’s mishnah discusses it more fully, we shall explain it tomorrow.", + "There are four persons who require a ceremony of atonement, and there are four who bring a sacrifice for willful as well as for inadvertent transgression. This section introduces today’s and tomorrow’s mishnah.", + "The following are those who require a ceremony of atonement: the zav, the zavah, the woman who gave birth and the metzora. A “zav” is a man who has an abnormal genital discharge (see Leviticus 15:15) and a “zavah” is a woman with an abnormal genital discharge (see Leviticus 15:29-30). Both must bring sacrifices before they complete their purification process. So must a woman who gave birth (as we learned in 1:3) and a person who had some type of skin disease (Leviticus 14:10ff).", + "Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob said: also a convert is regarded as a person who still requires a ceremony of atonement until the blood has been sprinkled for him; the same applies to the nazirite with reference to wine, haircutting and uncleanness. Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob adds two more to this list. A convert who has already been circumcised (if he is a man, of course) and immersed in the mikveh, must bring a sacrifice. He cannot eat sacrifices until the blood from the olah that he brings is sprinkled on the altar. Similarly, a nazirite cannot drink wine, cut his hair or become impure from contact with a dead body until he brings his sacrifices (see Numbers 6:14 and Mishnah Nazir 6:9). Both of these are also cases where a person needs to bring a sacrifice to complete the process of purification." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nUsually a person brings a sacrifice only when s/he transgresses unwittingly. For instance, if one willfully breaks Shabbat, one does not bring a sacrifice. But if one didn’t know that a certain act is forbidden on Shabbat and then he performed that act, he can bring a sacrifice to atone for the transgression. However, there are four cases in which a person must bring a sacrifice even if he intentionally transgresses.", + "The following bring a sacrifice for willful as well as for inadvertent transgressions:
One who has intercourse with a female slave, This shall be explained in mishnayot 4-5 of this chapter.", + "A nazirite who has become unclean, A nazirite is not supposed to defile himself through contact with a dead body (see Numbers 6:9-12). If he does he must bring two sacrifices a hatat and an olah. He is liable for these sacrifices even if he intentionally comes into contact with the dead.", + "For a false oath concerning testimony; If a person swears that he does not know any testimony for another person, and it turns out that he did know testimony, he must bring a sacrifice to atone for his sin. By its very nature, this false oath had to have been done intentionally, and therefore we have another case of a person who brings a sacrifice for an intentional sin. This topic was discussed in Shevuot 4:2-5.", + "And for a false oath concerning a deposit. If a person swears falsely that someone else’s property was not deposited with him, and then it turns out that he was lying, he brings a sacrifice. Again, by its very nature this is an intentional sin. This topic was discussed in Shevuot 5:1-2." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah introduces two more categories of “five people.” The first is the person who brings one sacrifice for multiple transgressions. The issue here is what can make the same act performed on repeated occasions considered to be separate transgressions? This is a topic that will prove of great interest to the rabbis and we shall discuss it for the next few chapter.\nThe mishnah also refers to five people who bring a sacrifice of higher or lesser value a rich person brings a beast and a poor person a bird. These people will be listed in mishnah four.", + "There are five persons who bring one sacrifice for multiple transgressions, and five who bring a sacrifice of higher or lesser value. The following bring one sacrifice for multiple transgressions:
One who has intercourse with a female slave several times, Having intercourse with a female slave several times is considered one transgression and therefore he brings only one sacrifice. We will discuss this issue more in mishnayot 4-5.", + "A nazirite who became unclean several times. This category was explained in yesterday’s mishnah.", + "One who warns his wife in regard to several men, This refers to the beginning of the “Sotah” process. The Sotah process begins with a man warning his wife not to be secluded with so-and-so, and (in the case mentioned here) not with so-and-so, etc. He warns her concerning several men. If she goes and is secluded with all of these men, she must bring only one sacrifice, “the minhah of jealousy” (see Numbers 5:15ff) for all of her seclusions. The reason that she brings only one minhah and not one minhah for each man with whom she was secluded is that since the warning was done collectively, we look at her acts as one transgression, not many. Had he issued separate warnings for each man, she would have brought one sacrifice for each man with whom she was secluded.", + "And a metzora who has contracted skin disease several times. If a person contracts skin disease, then is healed and then contracts it again repetitively, he brings only one sacrifice for all of the outbreaks of the disease. Since he was not purified in between each outbreak, it is considered one case of skin disease and not many.", + "If he has offered the birds and then contracted the disease again, they do not count for him until he has offered his hatat. Rabbi Judah says: until he has offered his asham. The purification process from skin disease is described in Leviticus 14. After being pronounced free of the affliction, a person brings two birds; one bird is slaughtered and its blood is sprinkled on him and the other is set free. On the eighth day he brings two lambs, one as an asham and the other as an olah. If he can’t afford two lambs, he brings one lamb as an asham and two birds, one as a hatat and one as an olah. In either case, he offers the asham first and the hatat afterwards. If he brings the birds and then contracts skin disease again, the two skin diseases are considered as one and he need bring only one set of sacrifices at the end. Even the two birds that were already brought count. When he is healed, he will bring only the lambs or lambs and birds as olah and hatat. According to Rabbi Judah, this is true until he brings the hatat at the very end. If he contracts the skin disease again after this point, then it is a new case of skin disease and he has to bring a new set of sacrifices." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is a direct continuation of yesterday’s mishnah: the five who bring one sacrifice for many instances of obligation. Today’s mishnah discusses the final such case and then moves on to explain the second topic in mishnah three the five who bring a higher or lower sacrifice.", + "A woman who has had several births. The last category of person who might bring one sacrifice for multiple cases is the woman who gave birth if she did not bring a sacrifice for one birth, she can bring one sacrifice for multiple births.", + "If she miscarried a female within eighty days of the birth of a girl, and then she again miscarried a female within eighty days of the previous [miscarriage]; or if she miscarried twins. Rabbi Judah says: she brings an offering for the first and not for the second, for the third again but not for the fourth. The mishnah now explains other types of cases where a woman might bring one sacrifice for multiple births or miscarriages. Generally, she brings her sacrifices 80 days after the birth of a female. If she miscarries within this period, she need not bring a sacrifice for both the birth and the miscarriage. If the miscarriage is female, and then she miscarries again within 80 days, she still brings only one sacrifice. Similarly, if she miscarries twins, she brings only one sacrifice for both. Rabbi Judah disagrees with the previous opinion. According to Rabbi Judah she brings a sacrifice for the first birth. For the miscarriage that occured within 80 days of the first, she does not bring, because it was within the time covered by the first. However, she does bring for the third (the second miscarriage) because it was not within the time of the first. The second (the first miscarriage) does not cover the third, because she didn’t bring a sacrifice for the second. Then she doesn’t bring for the fourth (the third miscarriage) because it was during the time of the third. In this way she ends up bringing for every other miscarriage.", + "The following persons bring an offering of higher or lesser value: One who hears the voice (see Leviticus 5:1); One who has broken the word of his lips (Leviticus 5:4); One who while unclean has entered the sanctuary or [has partaken] of holy things, A woman after childbirth And a metzora. This is the list of the five categories of people who can bring either a more or less expensive sacrifice, depending upon their wealth. A) This refers to the person who swore falsely that he didn’t know testimony. The language of the mishnah is based on Leviticus 5:1. Lev 5:5-11 discuss the various sacrifices that can be brought. B) This refers to one who made a false oath. See Leviticus 5:4. C) One who enters the Temple while impure or eats holy things while impure must bring a higher or lower sacrifice. This is also mentioned in Leviticus 5. In all three of these cases, the person who is really poor can bring just a grain offering. D) See Leviticus 12:6-8. E) See Leviticus 13.", + "What is the difference between [intercourse] with a female slave and the other forbidden sexual relations? For they are not equivalent in regard to the punishment nor the sacrifice. In the case of all other forbidden sexual relations a hatat is brought, in that of a female slave an asham; In the case of the other forbidden sexual relations a female animal is brought, in that of the female slave a male; In the case of the other forbidden sexual relations man and woman are alike with respect to lashes and the sacrifice; in that of the female slave the man is unlike the woman regarding the lashes, and the woman is unlike the man regarding the sacrifice. In the case of all other forbidden sexual relations sexual contact is punishable as well as consummation, and one is liable for each act of intercourse separately. For in this the case of the female slave is more stringent in that intentional transgression is of the same status as unwitting transgression. Leviticus 19:20-21 states, “If a man has carnal relations, having an emission, with a woman who is a slave and has been designated for another man, but has not been redeemed or given her freedom, there shall be an indemnity; they shall not, however, be put to death, since she has not been freed. But he must bring to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, as his guilt offering (asham) to the Lord, a ram of guilt offering.” Our mishnah explains what the difference is between a man who has intercourse with a slave woman such as is described here and a man who has intercourse with any other forbidden sexual relation. In the two cases, a different punishment is meted out if done intentionally, and if done unwittingly, a different sacrifice is brought. The punishment for all other sexual sins is either death or karet, whereas in this case the punishment is lashes. The mishnah now explains the differences with regard to the sacrifice. A + B) For other forbidden relations one must bring a female hatat, whereas here one brings a male asham. (Note that a hatat is always female and an asham is always male. Thus it turns out that this is only one difference between the two sins.) C) For all other sexual sins, both the man and woman are equal in matters of lashes (if done intentionally but without prior warning) and in bringing a sacrifice, if done intentionally. But in this case, the female slave is the one lashed (this is how the rabbis understand the word that is translated “indemnity”) and the man brings the sacrifice (whether done intentionally or intentionally see mishnah two). D) In all other cases the man is liable as soon as sexual contact begins, but with a slave woman, he is liable only when he emits seed, as is stated in the verse itself. E) In all other cases, if a man sleeps multiple times with a woman forbidden to him, he is liable only once, whereas here with the female slave, he is liable for each act of intercourse. The mishnah notes that this is a balancing stringency. Since there is a leniency when it comes to having intercourse with the female slave he brings a sacrifice even if done intentionally there is also an accompanying stringency he must bring a sacrifice for each act." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah defines what type of female is referred to in Leviticus 19:20-22.", + "To which type of female slave [does this refer]?
To one who is half a slave and half a free person, as it is written: “And she has been redeemed and not redeemed” (Leviticus 19:20), the words of Rabbi Akiva. According to Rabbi Akiva, the type of female slave referred to in the verse is one who is half a slave and half free (for instance she was owned by two masters and one freed her). He derives this from the strange phrasing in the Torah. The simple meaning of these words is that she has not been redeemed, but the Hebrew syntax allows Rabbi Akiva to interpret the words as if she has been partially redeemed/freed.", + "Rabbi Ishmael says: to a full female slave. Rabbi Ishmael interprets more in accordance with the simple meaning the female slave referred to is fully a slave. She has not been redeemed at all.", + "Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov says: all other forbidden sexual relations are stated explicitly, and of the remainder there is only one who can be half a slave and half a free person. All of the other prohibited relations in the Torah are fully free females (they could not be related to the man if they were slaves). There is, according to Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov, a long standing tradition that there is one prohibited woman who is half slave/half free. The only one that this can be is the female slave referred to in Leviticus 19. It is interesting that Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov agree that the slave is half free, but they disagree with regard to how we know this; Rabbi Akiva derives it through a midrashic reading of the verse whereas Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov derives it from a received tradition. These are two of the main sources of Jewish law tradition and midrash/interpretation." + ], + [ + "After having delineated several differences between the case of the female slave and other cases of forbidden sex, the mishnah notes that in other ways, most cases of forbidden sexual relations are the same.", + "In the case of all forbidden relations, if one partner was an adult and the other a minor, the minor is exempt; If one is awake and the other asleep, the one asleep is exempt; A minor or one asleep cannot be held responsible for his/her actions, therefore they are exempt.", + "If one is an inadvertent and the other intentional, the former is liable to a hatat, the latter to karet. This rule is true of most cases prohibited relations (it is not true with regard to female slaves) for inadvertent transgressions, one brings a hatat and for intentional transgressions, one is liable for karet (if done without warning)." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah talks about various types of cases where a person might or might not have eaten forbidden fat, a transgression that would cause him to bring a hatat for atonement.", + "If they said to him: you ate forbidden fat, he is liable to a hatat; This is the obvious case. If a person ate a piece of fat and doesn’t know whether it was helev (forbidden fat) or shuman (permitted fat), then he must bring a hatat.", + "If one witness says: he ate, and another says: he did not eat, or if one woman says, he ate, and another says, he did not eat, he is liable to an asham talui. In this case, there is contradictory testimony with regard to whether the fat he ate was forbidden. Furthermore, there is either only one witness who testifies that he ate forbidden fat, or that witness is a woman, whose testimony does not fully count. Since there is no proper testimony, he does not bring a hatat. However, he does bring an asham talui, a “suspended asham.” As I explained in the introduction to Keritot, this is a sacrifice brought when it is not clear if a person transgressed.", + "If one witness says: he ate, and another says: he did not eat, or if one woman says, he ate, and another says, he did not eat, he is liable to an asham talui. In this case, there is no solid testimony that he ate forbidden fat, and he himself denies having done so. These two factors combine to exempt him from having to bring a sacrifice.", + "If one witness says, he ate, and he himself says, I did not eat, he is exempt. In this case, there is proper testimony against him, but he himself denies having eaten forbidden fat. Rabbi Meir argues that just as in a case of the death penalty, where two witnesses can make him liable, so too here, when it comes to bringing a sacrifice to atone for a sin, two people can make him liable, even if he denies having transgressed. The other rabbis argue against Rabbi Meir by noting that there is a difference between testimony for a capital crime, such as murder, and testimony with regard to liability for a sacrifice. In the case of the sacrifice, if the person admits to having eaten the forbidden fat, but claims to have done so intentionally, he is not obligated for a sacrifice, because sacrifices are brought only for accidental sins. Therefore, when he says, “I didn’t eat” he is believed." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah begins discussing the topic of how to divide one act of transgressing into several transgressions, such that a person would be considered as having transgressed only one, or join separate acts into one act such that a person would be liable independently for each act. This is a topic of immense interest to the rabbis and they will continue to discuss it throughout the chapter and even in chapter four.", + "If one twice ate forbidden fat in one spell of unawareness, he is liable to but one hatat. If a person ate forbidden fat twice, but both times he was unaware of what he was doing, for instance he didn’t know that what he was eating was forbidden fat, he is liable for only one hatat. As long as he was not informed of his sin in between the acts, this counts as only one sin.", + "If one ate forbidden fat, blood, piggul and notar in one spell of unawareness, he is liable for each kind. However, if he ate different kinds of prohibited substances within one period of unawareness, meaning he was not told in between each item that what he is eating is prohibited, he is liable for a hatat for each kind of prohibited substance. This is because each is its own prohibition. “Piggul” is sacrificial meat that was offered with a disqualifying intention, and “notar” is remnant, sacrificial meat left over beyond the time when it must be eaten.", + "This is an instance where different kinds [of food] are more stringent than one kind. As the Mishnah so often does, it compares the above case with another case, noting that sometimes eating differently prohibited substances is treated more stringently, and sometimes it is treated more leniently. The above case is one in which it was treated more stringently.", + "In the following instance, however, one kind [of food] is more stringent than several kinds: if one ate half an olive-size and then again half an olive-size, both in one spell of unawareness, if of one kind he is liable, if of two kinds, he is exempted. In contrast, if a person eats half of an olive’s worth of one prohibited substance and then another half of an olive of the same substance, he is liable for a hatat, because he ate one olive’s worth, the amount necessary to be liable. If the two half-olives were of different substances, then he is exempt because he didn’t eat an olive’s worth of a single prohibited substance." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nAt the end of yesterday’s mishnah we learned that if a person eats two halves of an olive’s worth of one prohibited substance, he is liable. Our mishnah deals with the question of how close these two acts must be for them to be considered one act of eating, such that he would be liable.", + "Within what time must he eat them [for him to be liable]? [The time he would need] if he ate a similar amount of parched grains of corn, the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Meir holds that we imagine the prohibited substances as if they were parched grains of corn. If it took him longer to eat the prohibited substances than it would have to have eaten a similar amount of parched grains of corn, then he is exempt.", + "But the rabbis say: he must take from the beginning to the end [of his eating] no more time than is required for the eating of a peras (a half a loaf of [to be liable]. The other rabbis say that as long as he ate the half-olives within the amount of time it would take to eat half a loaf of a standard sized loaf of bread (four olive’s worth of bread) then he is liable. We should note that in later halakhah this became a standard as far as eating obligatory substances, such as matzah on Pesah. One must eat the matzah within this period of time for it to count as his obligatory matzah. Tiny pieces of matzah eaten throughout the meal are not sufficient to fulfill one’s obligation.", + "If one eats unclean food or drinks unclean drinks, or if he drinks a quarter [of a log] of wine and then enters the Temple [he is liable if it takes less time] than it takes to eat a peras. This section deals with a priest who does something to disqualify himself from either eating holy food (terumah and sacrifices) or from entering the Temple. If he eats or drinks impure foods he cannot eat holy foods. If he drinks wine, he cannot go into the Temple (see Leviticus 10:9). Our mishnah teaches that if he eats or drinks these things within the amount of time it would require to eat half of a loaf of bread, then he cannot eat holy food (if he ate impure food or drink) or go into the Temple (if he drank wine).", + "Rabbi Elazar says: if the drinking was interrupted or if he diluted it, he is exempt. Rabbi Elazar provides a different measure when it comes to drinking the wine. If he interrupted his drinking, or if he stopped long enough to dilute it with water, meaning he didn’t drink the whole quarter log at once, then he is allowed to go into the Temple." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn this mishnah the rabbis try to figure out how a person could eat one piece of forbidden fat and by that one act become liable to four hatats and an asham. As we have seen before, this is the kind of question the rabbis like to ask. Think of this as a rabbinic riddle, almost like asking a Scrabble or Boggle player, how many words you can make from another word. Fun!", + "It is possible that by one act of eating a person could become liable to four hatats and one asham:
If an unclean person eats forbidden fat, which was at the same time notar of an offering, and [it was on] Yom Kippur. Let’s list the hatats and asham. First the hatats: 1) For eating holy food while in an impure state. 2) For eating forbidden fat. 3) For eating notar. 4) For eating on Yom Kippur. The asham is for eating sacrificial meat in the first place. This is called “meilah” and it means illicit transgression of holy property.", + "Rabbi Meir says: if it was on Shabbat and he carried it out, he is liable [to yet another hatat]. But they said to him: this is a different name. Rabbi Meir adds a fifth hatat if it was on Shabbat and he carried it from one domain to another. The other rabbis disagree because this hatat is for carrying and not for eating. All of the other hatats and the asham were for the eating itself." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nWe’ve talked about food, now let’s talk about sex! Seriously, today’s mishnah is similar to yesterday’s in its form and style, but instead of discussing how many hatats one can be liable for eating forbidden food, now the rabbis try to figure out how many hatats one can be liable for one act of forbidden sex.", + "By one act of intercourse one may become liable for six hatats: If one had intercourse with his daughter, he can be guilty of incest with her because she is his daughter, his sister, his brother's wife, the wife of his father's brother, and [he can also be guilty] of intercourse with a married woman and a menstruant. Try to follow this one. A man has sex with his mother and they have a daughter. She is his sister and his daughter. If she marries his paternal brother (this is legal) she is now his brother’s wife. When she is divorced or widowed, she marries his father’s brother (this is also legal). When he has relations with this one woman, he has transgressed four incest prohibitions, all at the same time. In addition, if she is married at the time and she is also a menstruant, he has transgressed six times with one act. [I hope it was worth it!].", + "If one had intercourse with his daughter’s daughter he can be guilty of incest with her because she is his daughter's daughter, his daughter-in-law, his brother's wife, the wife of his father's brother, his wife's sister, a married woman, and a menstruant. If six hatats wasn’t enough for you, here’s the seventh. If his daughter’s daughter marries his son (possible if they were from different mothers), and she is his wife’s sister (if his wife is his son-in-law’s daughter from a different wife), then it turns out that his daughter’s daughter can be his daughter-in-law and his wife’s sister (three hatats). Then she marries his brother, and then his father’s brother (as in section one). If she is married and a menstruant when he has relations with her, he is liable for seven hatats.", + "Rabbi Yose said: if the grandfather transgressed and married her first, he may thereby become guilty for offending with his father's wife. In this case, his father can marry her, although this is prohibited by the rabbis. She is his great-granddaughter, and this is only a rabbinic prohibition. Note that he can only marry her in a case of yibbum, because she was married to his brother. She is not his daughter-in-law because she was married to his son’s maternal brother and not maternal brother. This would add another hatat. I know this is complicated, so if you would like to send me a chart, I’d be happy to check it for you.", + "So too, if one had intercourse with his wife's daughter or her daughter's daughter. A person can be liable for the same number of hatats if he has the same scenario but with his wife’s daughter and with his wife’s granddaughter. You might ask how his wife’s daughter can be his sister, since he can’t normally marry his sister’s mother. This could happen if his father had a daughter out of wedlock with a woman and he married this woman (this is permitted, although prohibited rabbinically). It now turns out that this child is wife’s daughter and his paternal sister." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah is a continuation of yesterday’s mishnah. There are more attempts to figure out how many transgressions a person can transgress with one act of intercourse.", + "If one had relations with his mother-in-law he may thereby become guilty for [having relations] with his mother-in-law, his daughter-in-law, his brother's wife, the wife of his father's brother, his wife's sister, a married woman, and a menstruant. I’ll use some names for this one. Let’s say Lavan has sex with Leah his daughter and they have a daughter, Dina. Yaakov marries Dina, so that Leah is his mother-in-law and his wife’s sister. Leah marries Reuven, Yaakov’s son, and now Leah is his daughter-in-law. If Reuven dies or divorces her and then she marries Yaakov’s brother, she is now his brother’s wife. Then, after death or divorce, she marries Yaakov’s father’s brother, so she is his father’s brother’s wife. If she is married and a menstruant when Yaakov has relations with her, he is liable for seven hatats.", + "And so too, if one had intercourse with the mother of his father-in-law or of his mother-in-law. One can become liable for the same hatats if the woman is the mother of his father-in-law or the mother of his mother-in-law.", + "Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri said: if one had intercourse with his mother-in-law he may thereby become guilty for [having relations] with his mother-in-law, the mother of his mother-in-law, and the mother of his father-in-law. They said to him: all these three are the same name. Eve has two daughters Rachel and Leah and one son, Lavan. If Yaakov marries Rachel and Leah’s daughter and Lavan’s daughter, then Eve is his mother-in-law (Rachel’s mother), his mother-in-law’s mother-in-law (Leah’s daughter’s mother) and his father-in-law’s mother (Lavan, his father-in-law’s, mother). If you added these prohibitions to the previous scenario, you could come up with nine hatats (don’t try this at home!). The other rabbis say that “mother-in-laws” are all one name, meaning that they are all one prohibition. This is because the prohibition of various types of mother-in-law’s is included in Leviticus 18:17: “Do not uncover the nakedness of a woman and her daughter; nor shall you marry her son’s daughter or her daughter’s daughter and uncover her nakedness: they are kindred, it is depravity.” Since they are all included in one verse if someone manages to have a woman who is all three at the same time, there is only one hatat for the “mother-in-law” prohibitions." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn our mishnah Rabbi Akiva begins to ask concerning the question of how one distinguishes between separate transgressions, for which one is liable for each individually, and one extended transgression, for which one is liable only once.", + "Rabbi Akiva said: I asked Rabban Gamaliel and Rabbi Joshua at the meat-market of Emmaus, where they went to buy meat for the wedding feast of Rabban Gamaliel's son: The mishnah begins with an interesting tidbit of historical information. Rabbi Akiva was in Emmaus (near the Latrun exit on the Tel-Aviv-Jerusalem highway, not far from my house). There he ran into Rabban Gamaliel and Rabbi Joshua buying meat for Rabban Gamaliel’s son’s wedding. Feeling himself lucky to run into some rabbis, probably not an everyday occurrence, he decides to ask them a halakhic riddle. Note that the question is not a practical one, but rather an academic one. This is an interesting window into what kinds of questions rabbis asked each other when they met.", + "What [is the law concerning] a man who had intercourse with his sister, his father's sister and his mother's sister? Is he liable for one sacrifice for all of them, or to one [separate sacrifice] for each of them? The case is one in which a man had relations with three women prohibited to him, all of whom are different types of prohibited “sisters.” All three transgressions were done in one period of unawareness. Either he didn’t know that there was such a prohibition, or he didn’t know that these women were his sister, father’s sister and mother’s sister. Thus the question is, if in one period of unawareness one commits three transgressions that are called by a similar name, is he liable for three hatats or one?", + "They replied: we have heard nothing [about this], but we have heard that if one had intercourse with five menstruants in one spell of unawareness, he is liable to a sacrifice for each [act], and it seems to us that the case [you asked about] may be derived by an a fortiori conclusion (kal. Rabban Gamaliel and Rabbi Joshua respond that they don’t have an answer to the question, at least not one that they have received from their teachers. In other words, Rabbi Akiva has thought of a new situation that was never before discussed. [Good job, Rabbi Akiva!] While they don’t have a received answer, they do have a similar received tradition concerning a man who has relations with five menstruants in one period of unawareness. Despite the fact that this is one type of transgression (prohibition of sex with a menstruant) he is liable for a hatat for each transgression. It seems that he is liable for five hatats because each one is a different woman. The distinctness of their bodies one from the other makes these five sins and not one sin of transgressing the prohibition of sex with a menstruant. From this case Rabban Gamaliel and Rabbi Joshua conclude that all the more so (kal vehomer) in the case of the three sisters, he would be liable for a hatat for each sister, because there is some difference between the status of each sister while they are all sister’s they are different types of sisters." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nRabbi Akiva asks another question to Rabban Gamaliel and Rabbi Joshua.", + "Rabbi Akiva further asked: If a limb hangs loose from the body of a living beast, what is the law? A limb removed from a living animal is considered to convey impurity like carrion. Rabbi Akiva asks concerning a case of a limb that is hanging loose from an animal. A sinew or some skin is connecting it to the animal, but the limb will not heal and become fully reattached to the animal. Does such a limb convey impurity even though it is still attached?", + "They replied: We have heard nothing about this, but we have heard about a limb hanging loose from the body of a man, that it is clean. As was the case in yesterday’s mishnah, Rabban Gamaliel and Rabbi Joshua do not have a received tradition, but they can again figure out the answer by comparing it to a case for which they do have a tradition. If a person has a limb hanging loose from his body, it does not convey impurity as if it were a dead body.", + "And thus those that were afflicted with boils used to do in Jerusalem. He would go on the eve of Pesah to the doctor, and he would cut the limb until only contact of a hairbreadth was left; he then stuck it on a thorn and then tore himself away from it. In this manner both that man and the physician could make their pesah offering. They now explain how people would use this halakhah to prevent them from becoming impure on the eve of Pesah, and thereby lose their ability to sacrifice and eat the pesah offering. People who had boils and needed to have a limb removed would go to the doctor. He could not cut off the limb because then he would become impure. To solve this problem, he would cut off most of the limb until it was only connected by a hairbreadth. At this point the limb was still pure. He would then stick the limb on a thorn stuck into the ground like a peg. The person with boils would then rip his own limb off (ouch!). In this way, the doctor would not touch the limb while it was being ripped off. Both the doctor and his patient could then offer their pesah sacrifice that evening.", + "And it seems to us that your case may be derived from this by a kal vehomer. From this case we can draw a “kal vehomer” argument. If the limb hanging from a human body which would convey the more serious impurity of a dead body is pure as long as it is still hanging from the body, all the more so the limb hanging from a live animal, which would have the lesser impurity of “carrion,” is pure if it is still hanging." + ], + [ + "Rabbi Akiba asked again: If a man slaughtered five sacrifices outside [the Temple] in one spell of unawareness, what is the law? Is he liable to a separate offering for each act or only to one for them all?
They replied: we have heard nothing about this.
Rabbi Joshua: I have heard that if one eats an offering from five different dishes in one spell of unawareness, he is guilty of sacrilege for each of them; and it seems to me that the case in question may be inferred from this by a kal vehomer.
Rabbi Shimon said: Rabbi Akiba did not ask this, but rather concerning one who ate of notar ( from five sacrifices in one spell of unawareness what is the law? Is he liable only to one [offering] for all of them, or is he liable to one for each of them?
They replied: we have heard nothing about this.
Rabbi Joshua: I have heard that if one eats an offering from five different dishes in one spell of unawareness, he is guilty of sacrilege for each of them; and it seems to me that the case in question may be inferred from this by a kal vehomer.
Rabbi Akiba replied: if this is a received tradition we accept it; but if it is only a logical deduction, there is a rebuttal.
He [Rabbi Joshua] said: rebut it.
He replied: It is not so. For if you hold the view with regard to sacrilege, for in this case one who gives food to another is as guilty as the one who eats it himself, and the person who causes others to derive a benefit from them is as guilty as the person who himself made use of them; furthermore, [small quantities are] reckoned together in the case of sacrilege even after the lapse of a long period, can you say it in connection with notar ( where not one of these laws applies.
Rabbi Akiva continues to ask questions. This mishnah returns to the subject of mishnah seven what constitutes separate transgressions?
Section one: After having heard from Rabban Gamaliel and Rabbi Joshua that if a man has relations with five different menstruants during one period of unawareness he is liable for five separate hatats, Rabbi Akiva asks a follow-up question concerning a person who slaughters five sacrifices outside the Temple, all in one period of unawareness. We might say that in the case of the menstruants there were five separate transgressions because the prohibition of relations with a menstruant applies to the women as well, and therefore, since each woman is transgressing, so too the man must be committing a separate transgression with each woman. In contrast, when it comes to the sacrifices, they can all be treated as one, because they (obviously) are incapable of committing their own transgressions.
Section two: Again, both rabbis respond that they do not have an answer to his question.
Section three: Rabbi Joshua derives a kal vehomer from a person who illegally eats one sacrifice which has been put onto five plates. Here, the fact that the meat is on different plates serves to separate these into different transgressions of sacrilege, even though it is only one sacrifice. If the separate plates make us consider one act to be several different acts, all the more so would we consider five different sacrifices to be five different acts, for which he is liable for five hatats.
Sections 4-6: Rabbi Shimon, a student of Rabbi Akiva’s, rejects the previous version of the question and answer between Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Joshua, because it made a comparison between slaughtering and eating. Rather Rabbi Akiva asked Rabbi Joshua about a person who ate “remnant” (sacrificial meat left over beyond the time in which it must be eaten) from five different sacrifices. To this question Rabbi Joshua responded with the same answer given above. If someone is guilty for five different offenses for eating one sacrifice divided into five different plates, all the more so he is guilty of five separate transgressions for eating remnant from five different sacrifices.
Section seven: Rabbi Akiva responds that if what Rabbi Joshua is saying is a received tradition, one that Rabbi Joshua learned from his teachers, then he will accept it. But if it is deduced logic, he can offer a logical rebuttal.
This answer is generally understood as showing a preference for revealed tradition over logic Rabbi Akiva would have accepted Rabbi Joshua’s answer if it was a tradition, but logic can be refuted. However, in my opinion, this is merely lip service. It is easy for Rabbi Akiva to say that he would accept Rabbi Joshua’s answer if it was a revealed tradition when he knows very well that it is not so Rabbi Joshua said it was a “kal vehomer,” a type of reasoned argument. Rather, Rabbi Akiva and the editors of the mishnah espouse a philosophy of accepting tradition over reason, but at the same time undermine that preference by pointing out that tradition does not answer many questions, and that therefore one must rely on reason to arrive at answers to new questions. Although reason is susceptible to argumentation, it is, in the end, what we must rely upon to know what to do.
Sections 8-9: Rabbi Joshua now gives Rabbi Akiva a chance to rebut his answer, and Rabbi Akiva eagerly takes up the challenge. He points out that Rabbi Joshua was dealing with a case of “sacrilege” a person eats holy things when he is not allowed to do so. Sacrilege is treated strictly in three ways: 1) a person who gives to another person to eat is just as guilty as if he ate it himself; 2) similarly, if he allowed others to benefit from holy things, he is guilty as if he himself benefited; 3) if a person ate or derived benefit today from a half a perutah’s worth of holy things, and then at a much later period derived benefit from another half of a perutah, these two half perutahs are joined together and he is liable for sacrilege. None of these stringencies apply to notar, remnant. Therefore, one cannot make an analogy from a tradition concerning sacrilege which is treated stringently, to a question concerning notar, which is treated more leniently." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn today’s mishnah, the last one of this fascinating chapter, Rabbi Akiva asks Rabbi Eliezer a question concerning Shabbat.\nAs background we should remind ourselves of a couple of general rules concerning Shabbat. There are 39 different categories of prohibited labor on Shabbat. If one performs labor from different categories, for instance he cooks and he plants, he is liable for a hatat (if done unwittingly) for each labor. However, if one performs two different acts that stem from the same category, for instance he cooks and bakes, he is liable for only one hatat. Our mishnah deals with a person who does many acts that all belong to the same category (cooking for instance) but he does them on different Shabbats. Is he liable for each transgression?", + "Rabbi Akiba said: I asked Rabbi Eliezer: if one performed many acts of forbidden work of the same category on different Shabbats but in one spell of unawareness, what is the law? Is he liable only to one [offering] for all of them, or to a separate one for each of them? Rabbi Akiva asks concerning a person who does many acts of forbidden labor, all from the same category, on many different Shabbats, all within one period of unawareness. For instance, he does not know that it is forbidden to cook on Shabbat, so he cooks, bakes, broils, boils, etc. on many different Shabbats. Does the fact that these acts were performed on different Shabbats make him liable for one hatat for each Shabbat, or do we consider this one sin of cooking, and he is liable for only one hatat?", + "He replied to me: he is liable to a separate one for each of them. And this can be derived by through a kal vehomer. If with regard to relations with a menstruant, for which there are neither many categories nor many ways of sinning, one is still liable for each act, how much more must one be liable to separate offerings in the case of Shabbat, for which there are many categories [of work] and many ways of sinning! Rabbi Eliezer responds with the same kal vehomer argument that Rabbi Joshua used in the previous mishnah. If one is liable for one hatat for every menstruant he has relations with, even though this prohibition does not have categories and many ways of sinning as does Shabbat, all the more so one is liable for one hatat for every transgression of Shabbat.", + "I said to him: No, you may hold this view in the case of the menstruant, since in that case there are two warnings: the man is warned with regard to the menstruant woman, and the menstruant woman is warned with a man; but can you hold the same in the case of the Shabbat where there is only one warning? Rabbi Akiva rebuts Rabbi Eliezer’s comparison. Relations with different menstruants are considered different transgressions because the women are also sinning, as we explained in yesterday’s mishnah. Since the women are warned against sinning just as much as the men, we must consider these different acts. In contrast when it comes to Shabbat, there is only one warning, because there is only one party.", + "He said to me: One who has relations with [menstruant] minors can prove the point, where there is but one warning, and yet one is liable for each act. Rabbi Eliezer defends his answer by slightly adjusting the question. Instead of basing his kal vehomer on relations with five menstruating women, whom he admits are liable for transgressing the prohibition, he bases the kal vehomer on a man who has relations with five menstruating minors. Because they are minors they are not liable, and nevertheless, he is liable for five separate transgressions. Therefore, the same is true with regard to Shabbat.", + "I responded to him: No, you may hold this view in the case of minors because although no prohibition now applies, it will apply later; but can you hold the same view with regard to Shabbat where neither now nor later [is there more than one warning]? Rabbi Akiva rejects this by noting that although minors are not now liable, they will be in the future. In other words, this is a transgression that still counts as having two parties, unlike Shabbat, where there is only the transgressor.", + "He said to me: Let the law concerning intercourse with an animal prove my point. Rabbi Eliezer finds another case of sexual transgression, where there is a sin but only one person sins the case of intercourse with an animal. Just as one is guilty for five hatats if he has intercourse with five different animals, so too he is guilty if he performs one forbidden labor on five different Shabbats.", + "I replied to him: the law concerning intercourse with an animal is indeed comparable to [that concerning] Shabbat. Finally, Rabbi Akiva admits that the analogy is appropriate, yet he still rejects Rabbi Eliezer’s answer. He says that his question is about the case of intercourse with animals just as it is about Shabbat. In both cases you have one sin done on multiple occasions and he wants to know if the act should be divided into different acts for which he is liable for each individual sin, or if this is considered just one sin, for which he is liable only one hatat. Final notes on Rabbi Akiva: In my opinion this debate should be looked upon as a debate between two different approaches to law: realistic versus nominal. To Rabbi Eliezer, Rabbi Joshua and Rabban Gamaliel, if one does several different acts, each of which is a transgression, one is liable for each act. This is a “realistic” approach it examines what a person has actually done. In contrast, Rabbi Akiva adopts a more “nominal” approach. The person has committed one transgression, even though he did so on separate occasions. He ate forbidden foods, he had forbidden sex or he broke the prohibition of cooking, for instance, on Shabbat. Nominally, or legally, speaking, these are all one transgression, and therefore he should be liable for only one hatat. In general, I think that there is a trend in rabbinic Judaism to go from a more “realistic” approach, which probably typified an approach to halakhah commonly found among the priests, to a more “nominal” one. The leader of this movement seems to have been Rabbi Akiva." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah returns to the subject of the “asham talui.” This is a guilt offering brought by one who is not sure if he transgressed.", + "If [a person was] in doubt whether he had eaten forbidden fat or not, or even if he had certainly eaten [of it] but [was] in doubt as to whether it had the requisite quantity or less; or [if there were] before him permitted fat as well as forbidden fat, and he ate of one of them and does not know of which of them he ate; These are various scenarios in which a person is not sure whether he ate forbidden fat (helev) and even if he did eat forbidden fat, he is not sure if he ate enough to make him liable for a hatat.", + "Or if his wife and his sister were with him in the house and he unwittingly [had sex] with one of them and does not know with which of them he unwittingly [had sex]; In this (albeit hard to imagine scenario) a man is not sure whether he had sex with his wife or sister (for whom he would be liable a hatat).", + "Or if he did forbidden labor and does not know whether it was on Shabbat or on a weekday, Here, he is not sure if he did the forbidden labor on Shabbat or on a weekday (perhaps he was traveling and lost track of the days of the week).", + "He is liable for an asham talui. In each of these cases he cannot bring a hatat, because perhaps he did not transgress. Therefore, he brings an asham talui, which will offer him atonement in case he did transgress. If later he finds out for sure that he did transgress, then he will have to bring a hatat." + ], + [ + "Just as a person who ate forbidden fat twice in one spell of unawareness is liable to only one hatat, so too, when the transgression is in doubt, he is liable to only one asham talui.
If in the meantime he became aware [of the possible sin] he is liable to a separate asham talui for each act, just as he would [in similar circumstances] be liable to a separate hatat for each act.
Just as one is liable to separate hatats if he ate, in one spell of unawareness, forbidden fat and blood and piggul and notar, so, too, when the transgression is in doubt, he is liable to an asham talui for each different act.
[If both] forbidden fat and notar lay before a person and he ate one of them but does not know which;
Or if his menstruant wife and his sister were with him in his house and he has sex unwittingly with one of them and does not know with which,
Or if Shabbat and Yom Kippur [followed each other] and he did forbidden work at twilight and does not know on which day: Rabbi Eliezer declares him liable to a hatat; But Rabbi Joshua exempts him.
Rabbi Yose said: they did not dispute about a person that did work at twilight, for he is certainly exempt, for I may assume that part of the work was done on the one day and part on the following day.
About what did they dispute? About one who did work during the day itself but he did not know whether he did it on Shabbat or on Yom Kippur, or if he did work and did not know what manner of work he did: Rabbi Eliezer declares him liable to a hatat; But Rabbi Joshua exempts him. Rabbi Judah said: Rabbi Joshua exempts him even from an asham talui.
Today’s mishnah deals with two issues. The first part deals with multiple sins performed in one spell of unawareness. The second part deals with cases where a person definitely sinned, but he is not sure which of two possible sins he committed.
Section one: If a person eats many pieces of helev (forbidden fat) during one period of unawareness, for instance, he didn’t know that what he was eating was helev, or he didn’t know that helev was prohibited, he is liable for only one hatat. This counts as one sin, since it was done in one period of unawareness. Similarly, if in one period of unawareness he is not sure if he ate helev or something else, he is liable for only one asham talui, even if he did the act multiple times.
Section two: If in between sessions of eating something that might or might not be helev he finds out that it is perhaps helev, he is liable for an asham talui for each session. For instance he sits down to dinner and eats. Then his wife tells him, “Honey, that fat you just ate might have been helev.” He is now liable for an asham talui. If the same thing happens the next night, he is liable for two asham talui’s. This is the same rule that applies to cases where he knows that what he ate was helev he is obligated for one hatat for each period of unawareness.
Section three: If one eats foods that carry different prohibitions, one is liable for a hatat for each prohibition, if he knows he transgressed, and an asham talui for each transgression, if he is not sure that he transgressed. I.e. she sits down to dinner and when she is done her husband tells her, “Dear, you might just have eaten helev, blood and notar (remnant).” She is liable for three asham talui’s. If he said, “Dear, you ate helev, blood and notar,” she is liable for three hatats.
Sections 4-6: The second half of the mishnah is patterned after mishnah one. In that case, the person might have transgressed or he might not have transgressed. In the cases mentioned here he definitely transgressed, but he doesn’t know which transgression he did what forbidden food did he eat, which forbidden woman did he have sex with or what day did he do the forbidden labor on?
Rabbi Eliezer says that since he definitely did a forbidden act, he must bring a hatat, even though he is not sure what he actually did. We can see that Rabbi Eliezer adopts a more realistic approach one who certainly sins must bring a hatat.
Rabbi Joshua says that since he doesn’t know what he actually did, he is exempt. This seems to me to be more of a “nominal” approach. Since we cannot find a legal category under which to place his sin, we cannot make him liable.
Section seven: Rabbi Yose says that even Rabbi Eliezer would agree that if one does a sin at twilight between Shabbat and Yom Kippur he is exempt, because he might not have transgressed at all. It is possible that he did half of the prohibited labor on Shabbat and half on Yom Kippur, in which case he did not perform a forbidden labor on either day.
Rather the debate was over one who simply does not know whether he did the labor on Shabbat or on Yom Kippur, or knows that he performed a forbidden labor, but doesn’t know which labor it was. In this case Rabbi Eliezer makes him liable, for her certainly transgressed, even though we can’t find a legal category under which to place his transgression.
Section eight: Finally, Rabbi Judah explains that when Rabbi Joshua exempted him, he exempted him even from the asham talui. An asham talui is brought only in a case where a person might have sinned. Since this person definitely sinned, he cannot bring an asham talui. He is left without any sacrifice to bring." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is a continuation of yesterday’s mishnah. Later sages continue to argue what Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Joshua were arguing about.", + "Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Shimon Shezuri say: They did not dispute regarding transgression of the same name, that in that case he is liable. According to these rabbis, Rabbi Joshua agrees that if he is not certain what labor he did, but he knows that it was one of two possibilities that are both “of the same name,” meaning of the same category, that he is liable. For example, if he picked some sort of fruit, but he is not sure what type of fruit he picked grapes or figs. In this case, he definitely violated the transgression of “reaping” and therefore, Rabbi Joshua agrees that he is liable.", + "About what did they dispute? About transgressions of different names: Rabbi Eliezer declares him liable to a hatat, And Rabbi Joshua declares him exempt. They disagree about a case where he transgressed one of two possible categories of transgression, for instance he ate something forbidden but he is not sure whether it was helev or notar.", + "Rabbi Judah said: even if he intended to pick figs and he picked grapes, or grapes and he picked figs, white [grapes] and he picked black ones, or black and he picked white ones Rabbi Eliezer declares him liable to a hatat. And Rabbi Joshua declares him exempt. Rabbi Judah is directly opposed to Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Shimon Shezuri. Whereas the latter say that Rabbi Joshua exempts only if he is not sure what category of labor he performed, Rabbi Joshua exempts him even if he doesn’t know what color the grapes were, and even if he didn’t fulfill his intention as to what color grapes or figs he wanted to pick.", + "Rabbi Judah said: I wonder whether Rabbi Joshua indeed declared him exempt in such a case. For then why is it written, “with which he has sinned” (Leviticus 4:23)? To exclude mindless action. Rabbi Judah then acts surprised that Rabbi Joshua would exempt him from such a case. He therefore adjusts the exact case in which Rabbi Joshua exempts. Rabbi Joshua exempts a person who didn’t intend to do a labor at all. For instance, he intended to pick up a piece of unattached grass from the ground and he accidentally plucked a piece of attached grass. This is called “mindless” action and the doer is therefore exempt. However, if he intends to perform a labor and he does perform that labor, he is liable, even if he does not do exactly what he intended to do." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThe Torah prohibits the consumption of blood. One who eats blood is liable for karet if done intentionally, and that is why this halakhah is found in tractate Keritot. If done unwittingly, he is liable for a hatat.", + "If one ate blood of a slaughtered beast, a wild animal or a bird, either clean or unclean, or blood of an animal stabbed in his throat or neck, or of the blood of an animal slaughtered by having his throat ripped, or of the blood of the arteries whereby life-force escapes, he is liable. This is a list of all of the kinds of blood for which one is liable for a hatat, as long as he eats an olive’s worth of it. The blood does not have to come from a clean (kosher) animal, nor does it have to be the blood of an animal that is slaughtered in a kosher fashion. As long as the blood is the blood whose loss causes the death of the animal, one who eats it is liable. The idea that one is liable only for this type of blood seems to come from Leviticus 17:14, which refers to blood as the life-force. The rabbis deduce from here that one is liable only for blood which is the life-force, and not for other types of blood.", + "But [if he ate] the blood of the spleen or of the heart, or blood found in eggs, or blood of fish, or of locusts, or secondary blood, he is not liable. This is a list of either internal organs, taken out of the animal after it is dead, or blood found in other things, such as eggs, fish, or locusts, or blood that comes out after the animal is dead (secondary blood). While some of these are prohibited, they are only prohibited by the rabbis and not by the Torah; one who eats them is not liable to bring a hatat. Note that Leviticus 7:26 specifically states that animal (beast) and bird blood is prohibited. Since it doesn’t list fish or locusts, the rabbis deduce that fish and locust blood is not prohibited.", + "Rabbi Judah says: he is liable for secondary blood. Rabbi Judah holds that one is liable for eating secondary blood." + ], + [ + "Introduction\n“Sacrilege” refers to one who makes illicit use of Temple property. For instance, he eats meat from an animal that was sacrificial. The penalty for doing this is that he must bring an asham, and he must pay the value of that which he benefited, and he must also add an extra fifth to the restitution. Our mishnah deals with a person who may or may not have committed sacrilege.", + "Rabbi Akiva declares one liable to an asham talui for sacrilege; But the sages declare him exempt. Rabbi Akiva says that one who might have committed sacrilege must bring an asham talui. The other rabbis disagree because they hold that one brings an asham talui only for sins for which one brings a hatat if one knows one did that he sinned (see 1:2). Since the sacrifice for sacrilege is an asham and not a hatat, there can be no asham talui for a case of uncertainty.", + "Rabbi Akiba admits that he does not bring his restitution money until he becomes aware [of his trespass], when he must bring with it a certain asham. Rabbi Akiva holds that when one might have committed sacrilege he brings the asham talui immediately. However, he need not restore the value of the benefit he illicitly derived until he is certain that he committed sacrilege. At this point he will bring the restitution money, and a certain asham.", + "Rabbi Tarfon: Why should he bring two ashams? Rather, let him set aside the principal with an added fifth, and bring an asham the value of two sela's and stipulate: “If I did commit sacrilege, here is my restitution and this my asham; and if the sacrilege was doubtful, let the money be a freewill gift and the [offering an] asham talui;” since the same type of sacrifice he brings for a case where he doesn’t know, he brings for one where he does know. Rabbi Tarfon agrees with Rabbi Akiva on principle that one who might have committed sacrilege would have to bring an asham talui. However, there is an additional problem here that there is not for the regular asham talui. In other cases, when he finds out for certain that he sinned, he brings a hatat. In our case, he would end up bringing two ashams, which strikes Rabbi Tarfon as unreasonable or unnecessary. To avoid this problem he suggests a way of bringing one asham and making a stipulation, that if he did sin, then the asham is a certain asham and the restitution is his restitution. If he never finds out whether he sinned, then the asham is an asham talui, and the money will go towards buying freewill offerings. The reason that he can do can do this is that both ashams are of the same type of animal a two year old male ram. The hatat is of a different type, and therefore one could not make such a stipulation in other cases." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first part of this mishnah is a direct continuation of yesterday’s mishnah.", + "Rabbi Akiba: Your words seem plausible in the case of a minor amount of sacrilege; but if it was a case of doubtful sacrilege of a hundred manehs, would it not be more advantageous for him to bring an asham for two sela's rather than restore out of doubt the sum of a hundred manehs? Rabbi Akiba agrees with Rabbi Tarfon in the case of a minor amount of sacrilege. Rabbi Akiva agrees with Rabbi Tarfon in a case where the sacrilege was of a small amount. In this case, the person might save money by not having to bring two asham sacrifices. However, if the sacrilege was for a very large amount, a hundred manehs, he would not be well served to pay the restitution and save himself from having to bring two ashams. Note that the debate seems to be practical if someone is not sure if he committed sacrilege, what would be the cheapest way for him to receive possible atonement. There does not seem to be a debate about whether a person could do either according to Rabbi Tarfon or Rabbi Akiva. In the end, the mishnah notes that Rabbi Akiva agrees with Rabbi Tarfon, that if the sacrilege was for a small amount, he can make a stipulation and get away with bringing only one asham.", + "If a woman brought a bird hatat for a case of a doubtful miscarriage, and prior to the pinching of its neck she learned that the birth was a certainty, she can offer it as a certain hatat, for that which she offers in the case of certainty is of the same kind as that which she offers in the case of doubt. If a woman miscarries and is not sure whether it was the type of miscarriage that would make her liable for a hatat or not (see 1:4), she brings a hatat, but since the hatat comes for a case of doubt the hatat is not eaten. If before the hatat’s head is pinched (this is how sacrificial birds were slaughtered in the Temple) she finds out that the miscarriage was one for which she is certainly liable, then she can use the same bird as a certain hatat. The reason is that the same type of bird is used for both offerings." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to deal with the issue of doubtful sacrilege.", + "[If there was] a piece of hullin meat and a piece of sacred meat, and a person ate one of them and does not know which of them he ate, he is exempt. Rabbi Akiba declares him liable for an asham talui. This is the same debate we saw in mishnah two of this chapter. According to Rabbi Akiva one must bring an asham talui for a doubtful case of sacrilege.", + "If he then ate the second [piece], he is liable to a certain asham. If he eats both pieces of meat, then we know for sure that he ate sacrificial meat, and he is obviously liable for sacrilege.", + "If he ate one [piece] and another came and ate the other, each of them is liable to an asham talui, the words of Rabbi Akiba. Rabbi Shimon says: they together bring one asham. Rabbi Yose said: Two people cannot bring one asham. In this case, one person definitely ate a piece of sacrificial meat, but one person did not. According to Rabbi Akiva, they both bring an asham talui. Rabbi Shimon agrees in principle with Rabbi Akiva, but says that in this case, there is no need for them both to bring the asham talui. They can together bring one asham, and make a stipulation, that if person A ate the sacrificial meat, it is his sacrifice, and if person B ate the sacrificial meat, it is his sacrifice. Rabbi Yose says that such a system does not work and that two people cannot bring one asham. It seems that he would hold like Rabbi Akiva that each person must bring his own asham." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah is virtually the same as yesterday’s mishnah, except that in today’s mishnah a person is not sure whether he ate permitted unconsecrated fat, or helev, for which one brings a hatat. In other words, yesterday the question was whether one had to bring an asham, today the question is whether one needs to bring a hatat.\nSince the mishnah is so similar to yesterday’s mishnah, my comments below are quite brief.", + "If there was a piece of forbidden fat and a piece of hullin [permitted fat], and a person ate one of them and does not know which, he is liable to an asham talui. Since he doesn’t know if he sinned, he brings an asham talui.", + "If he then ate the second piece, he is brings a hatat. Since he knows that he did sin, he brings a hatat, the sacrifice for accidentally eating helev, forbidden fat.", + "If he ate the one [piece] and another came and ate the other, each of them is liable to an asham talui. Rabbi Shimon says: they together bring one hatat. Rabbi Yose says: two people cannot bring one hatat. According to the first opinion, since we don’t know which of the two ate helev, they both bring an asham talui. This is not any different, at least from the perspective of the individual, from the first case. Rabbi Shimon says that the two people can bring a hatat jointly and stipulate that if the first one ate the helev, that it is his hatat, and if the second one did, it is his hatat. Rabbi Yose says that people cannot jointly bring a hatat." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn today’s mishnah, he is not sure whether he ate forbidden fat, for which he would need to bring a hatat, or consecrated, permitted fat, for which he would need to bring an asham.\nFor the parts of this mishnah that have already been explained above, I will just make reference to those mishnayot.", + "If there was a piece of forbidden fat and a piece of consecrated [permitted fat], and a person ate one of them and does not know which, he is liable to an asham talui; He brings the asham talui for the fact that he might have eaten forbidden fat. For Rabbi Akiva who holds that one brings an asham talui for a case of doubtful sacrilege, the asham talui also covers the possibility that he ate consecrated fat. In other words, one asham talui can cover two possible sins, since we know he only did one of them.", + "If he then ate the second piece, he is liable to a hatat and a certain asham. In this case we know that he ate forbidden fat and consecrated fat, so he must bring a hatat and an asham.", + "If he ate the one piece and another came and ate the other, each of them brings an asham talui. Rabbi Shimon holds: they together bring a hatat and an asham. Rabbi Yose: two people cannot together bring one hatat and one asham. See mishnayot 4-5." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn today’s mishnah, we find on the person’s plate two pieces of forbidden fat, one consecrated and one unconsecrated. The plot thickens!", + "If there was a piece of unconsecrated forbidden fat and a piece of consecrated forbidden fat, and a person ate one of them and does not know which, he is liable to a hatat. Rabbi Akiva says: also to an asham talui. We know that this person has eaten forbidden fat, so he definitely must bring a hatat. According to the first opinion, that is all that he brings. According to Rabbi Akiva he also brings an asham talui for doubtful sacrilege. This has been Rabbi Akiva’s position since mishnah two.", + "If he then ate the second piece, he is liable to two hatats and one certain asham. If he ate the second piece in a second period of unawareness, he is liable for two hatats, one for each piece of forbidden fat. He is also liable for an asham for the sacrilege.", + "If he ate one piece and another came and ate the other, each of them is liable to a hatat. Rabbi Akiva says: each of them brings [in addition] an asham talui. Rabbi Shimon holds: each of them brings a hatat and together they bring one asham. Rabbi Yose: two people cannot bring one asham. Both people are liable for a hatat for eating forbidden fat. According to Rabbi Akiva, they are both also liable for an asham talui for doubtful sacrilege. Rabbi Shimon says that they can bring one certain asham jointly whereas Rabbi Yose says that this is not possible. This is the same debate we have seen over and over since mishnah four." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe final mishnah of our chapter deals with a case where one of the pieces of meat was regular forbidden fat and the other was forbidden fat and notar (remnant).", + "If there was a piece of forbidden fat and another piece of forbidden fat [which was at the same time] notar, and a person ate one of them and does not know which, he is liable to a hatat and to an asham talui. If he eats one of the pieces, he certainly must bring one hatat for eating helev. He must also bring an asham talui lest he ate the piece that is also notar.", + "If he then ate the second piece, he is liable to three hatats. Two hatats are for the forbidden fat, assuming that they were eaten in two periods of unawareness and the third hatat is for eating notar.", + "If he ate one piece and another came and ate the other, each of them brings a hatat and an asham talui. Rabbi Shimon says: each of them brings a hatat and together they bring another hatat. Rabbi Yose says: any hatat that is brought for the expiation of sin cannot be offered by two people. They both must bring one hatat for they both certainly ate helev. According to the first opinion they both bring an asham talui, for each one of them might have also eaten helev. Rabbi Shimon holds they can jointly bring a second hatat. And Rabbi Yose again holds that two people can never jointly bring a sacrifice that comes to expiate for sin." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nAn asham talui is brought when a person is not sure if he has sinned. Our mishnah discussed what happens if after he brought it, he finds out that he did not sin (i.e. he ate the right piece of meat, or perhaps he had sex with his wife and not his sister).", + "If a person brought an asham talui and then found out that he did not sin: If it was before the animal was slaughtered, it may go out to pasture among the flock, the words of Rabbi Meir. The sages say: it goes out to pasture until it becomes blemished and it is then sold, and the money goes for freewill-offerings. Rabbi Eliezer says: it shall be offered up, for if it does not expiate this sin, it will expiate another sin. If before the animal is slaughtered he finds out that he didn’t sin, Rabbi Meir holds that the animal is not at all holy. It can go out to the flock with the rest of the hullin animals. The other sages say that it is holy and therefore it does not automatically revert to being hullin. However, it also cannot be sacrificed, because now it is not necessary. The solution is to let it go out to pasture until it becomes blemished. At this point the animal may be sold and he must use the money from the sale to buy freewill offerings. Rabbi Eliezer assumes that a person might frequently commit sins which require expiation, and he might not even know that he has done so. Therefore, he can go ahead and sacrifice this asham talui, and it will expiate for other unknown sins. Note that the rest of the mishnah does not go according to Rabbi Eliezer.", + "If he learns of it after it was slaughtered, the blood shall be spilled out and the flesh is removed to the place of burning. If he learns that he didn’t sin after the animal was already slaughtered, then the blood must be poured out into the aqueduct that runs through the Temple, and the flesh must be burned. In other words, it is a disqualified sacrifice.", + "If the blood had already been tossed [onto the altar], the flesh may be eaten. Rabbi Yose says: even if the blood is still in the vessel, it should be tossed and the flesh then eaten. Once the blood has been tossed onto the altar, the sacrifice is valid, even if it turns out that he didn’t sin. The flesh can be eaten. Rabbi Yose holds that once the blood is in the vessel, where it is put immediately after the animal is slaughtered, the sacrificial process can continue even if it turns out that the person didn’t sin." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nYesterday’s mishnah dealt with a person who set aside an asham talui and then found out that he did not sin. Today’s mishnah deals with other situations in which a person sets aside an animal and then finds out that the circumstances that caused him to set aside the animal were not as he thought they were.", + "The law is different with a certain asham: If before the animal was slaughtered, it may go out to pasture among the flock; If after it was slaughtered, it shall be buried; If after the blood was tossed, the flesh must be removed to the place of burning. The law concerning a certain asham is different from the law concerning an asham talui. If before it is slaughtered it turns out that he didn’t sin, then the animal can go out to pasture. This is simply a case of “mistaken consecration” and in such a case the consecration is not valid. This case differs from that of the asham talui which was dedicated from the outset with the possibility that the person did not sin. Therefore, it, according to the sages’ opinion in mishnah one, is holy even if it turns out he didn’t sin. Once the animal is slaughtered, it counts as “hullin that were slaughtered in the courtyard” and it therefore must be buried. It is forbidden to derive benefit from it. If the blood was already tossed, then the flesh must be burned in the place of burning, because it looks like a sacrifice that has been disqualified. Disqualified sacrifices are always disposed of by being burned in the “place of burning.”", + "The law is also different regarding an ox to be stoned: If before it was stoned, it may go out to pasture among the flock; If after it was stoned, it is permitted for use. This section deals with an ox that is to be stoned for having murdered. If before it is stoned it turns out that it didn’t actually commit the murder, the ox can simply return to the herd. If it has already been stoned, one can derive benefit from the carcass (but not eat it, of course, because it is not kosher), which would not be the case if it was stoned for a murder it had committed. In that case it is forbidden to derive benefit from the carcass.", + "The law is also different regarding the heifer whose neck is to be broken: If before its neck was broken, it may go out to pasture among the flock. If after its neck was broken, it shall be buried on the spot, for it was from the outset brought in a matter of doubt, it has atoned for the doubt, and so has served its purpose. There is also a different rule with regard to the heifer whose neck is broken for a case where a murderer has not been identified. If the murderer is found before the neck is broken, the heifer simply returns to the flock. If after its neck is broken the murderer is found, then the heifer must be buried. It is forbidden to derive benefit from its flesh, because its neck was broken to atone for a case of an unsolved murder. Since when its neck was broken the murder was indeed unsolved, it has fulfilled its role and it is treated like all other broken-neck heifers one cannot derive benefit from the carcass." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn this mishnah Rabbi Eliezer and the sages debate whether one can/should bring an asham talui “every day.”", + "Rabbi Eliezer says: one may freely offer an asham talui every day and at any time he pleases and such a sacrifice is called the asham of the pious. Rabbi Eliezer holds that one can freely offer an asham talui whenever he wants, even if he doesn’t know that he has sinned. This differs from the rules concerning a hatat. A hatat can be brought only by one who knows that he sinned, because a hatat must effect atonement. In contrast, according to Rabbi Eliezer, the asham talui does not really effect atonement, because when the person finds out that he actually sinned, he must bring a hatat. This is evidence that the asham talui is really just a freewill offering. Note that this matches his opinion in mishnah one. This asham is called “the asham of the pious (hasid)” because one brings it just in case he sins.", + "They said of Bava ben Buti that he used to freely offer an asham talui every day, except on the day after Yom Kippur. He declared: By this temple! Had they allowed me, I would have offered one even then, but they said to me, wait until you have come to a state of doubt.” The mishnah now relates the story of Bava ben Buti who would bring an asham talui every day (besides being pious, he must have been quite rich) except for the day after Yom Kippur. Since Yom Kippur atones for all sins, and certainly for ones which a person doesn’t even know if he committed, he didn’t need to bring it that one day. But, he goes on to say that he wanted to bring an asham talui that day as well. The other sages seem to have convinced him that he shouldn’t do so until there is at least a chance that he sinned. It is possible that the other sages worried that if he would bring an asham talui on the day after Yom Kippur, people would think that Yom Kippur doesn’t atone. Therefore, they opposed his doing so.", + "But the sages say one may not bring an asham talui except for a sin that [is punished by] karet [when done intentionally and for which one brings a hatat [when done unwittingly. The other sages reject Rabbi Eliezer. They hold that one can bring an asham talui only if he thinks he might have committed a sin for which he would be liable for karet if done intentionally or a hatat if done unwittingly. He cannot simply freely donate an asham talui out of piety." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nSince yesterday’s mishnah dealt with Yom Kippur, today’s mishnah deals with the effect that Yom Kippur can have on those who are liable to bring expiatory sacrifices.", + "Those that are liable to hatats or to certain ashams and Yom Kippur passes over them, are still liable to bring them after Yom Kippur. Yom Kippur does not atone for sins if he finds out before Yom Kippur that he certainly sinned. Thus if one becomes liable to bring a hatat or a certain asham before Yom Kippur, he is still liable after Yom Kippur.", + "Those that are liable to asham talui’s are exempt. However, if he has doubtfully sinned and needs to bring an asham talui, Yom Kippur atones and he need not bring the asham talui after Yom Kippur.", + "He who has committed a doubtful sin on Yom Kippur, even at twilight, is exempt, because the whole of the day effects atonement. Yom Kippur atones for doubtful sins even if they are committed (unwittingly) on Yom Kippur itself, and even at the very end of the day. It is actually hard to imagine this happening unless one simply miscalculates the date of Yom Kippur and eats meat which might or might not have been forbidden fat. For if one knows that it is Yom Kippur, he shouldn’t have been eating in the first place." + ], + [ + "If a woman is liable to a bird hatat brought in a case of doubt and Yom Kippur intervenes, she is still bound to offer it after Yom Kippur, because it renders her fit to eat sacrifices. In yesterday’s mishnah we learned that if a person was liable to bring an asham talui because he might have sinned, and Yom Kippur intervenes, he is no longer liable to bring the asham talui. In contrast, today we learn that if a woman is liable to bring a doubtful hatat because she had a miscarriage that might or might not make her liable to bring a hatat, she must bring the bird hatat even if Yom Kippur comes first. The reason she must bring the hatat is that without doing so she cannot eat sacrifices.", + "If a hatat of a bird was brought for a matter of doubt and, after the pinching of its neck it became known [that there was no need for it], it must be buried. If the woman finds out that she didn’t need to bring the hatat, but the bird’ neck has already been slaughtered by having its neck pinched, then it is treated like a non-sacred bird slaughtered in the Temple which must be buried. This is different from a bird hatat that is brought in a case of doubt which is burned (see Temurah 7:6)." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah deals with one who sets apart two selas to buy an asham, as he is supposed to do (see 5:2) but then for some reason doesn’t simply buy one ram to be used as the asham. Instead he buys two rams. The question is what to do with the extra ram. The mishnah also addresses the possibility that one of the rams was bought for non-sacred purposes, in which case he has committed sacrilege.", + "A man set apart two sela's for an asham:
If he bought with it two rams for an asham; if one was of the value of two sela's, it may be offered for his asham, and the other must be let out to pasture until it becomes blemished when it is sold and its value goes for freewill-offerings. If he buys two rams with two selas, then at the time of purchase could have been worth two selas. However, by the time he comes to sacrifice one of them, it has gone up in value and reached the requisite two selas. That ram can be offered as his asham. The other ram is holy because it was bought to be an asham. However, it cannot be offered as an asham because its owner has already received atonement through the other asham. Therefore, it must go out to pasture until it becomes blemished. Then it can be sold and the money used to buy free-will offerings.", + "If he had bought with the money two rams for hullin use, one worth two sela's and the other worth ten zuz, that which is worth two sela's should be offered for his asham and the other for his sacrilege. If he used the money to buy two hullin, non-sacred rams, he has now committed sacrilege. He bought two rams, and one is now worth two selas (again, it has gone up in value). He can offer that one as the asham sacrifice that he is liable to bring for having committed sacrilege. The other ram is worth ten zuz. A sela is worth four zuz. So ten zuz is enough to count for the two sela’s that he must restore for having committed sacrilege, and the other two zuz is the added one-fifth, which the rabbis counted as being one-fifth of the final amount and not the original amount (in this case one-fifth of ten zuz and not eight zuz). So he can take this ten zuz ram and sacrifice it as the asham that he was originally liable for, because it is worth 1/5 more than that asham needed to be. Strangely enough, it all worked out for him in the end.", + "[If he had bought with the money] one for an asham and the other for ordinary use, if that for the asham was worth two sela's it should be offered for his asham and the other for his sacrilege, and with it he shall bring a sela and its fifth. In this case he again buys two rams, this time one for the asham and the other for a hullin ram. If the one for his asham is worth two selas he can sacrifice it as an asham. If the other ram is also worth two selas, then it must be used as an asham for his sacrilege. Along with that he must bring another sela and a fifth as reparation for having committed sacrilege. This extra money will be used to buy free-will offerings." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah contains some rules governing the hatat.", + "If a man set aside his hatat and then died, his son should not offer it after him. If the owner of a hatat has died, the animal cannot be offered, not even by his son. Rather, it must be left to die (see Temurah 2:2).", + "A man may not offer [what was set apart] for one sin for another sin. Even if he had set apart [the hatat] for forbidden fat that he had eaten yesterday, he may not offer it for forbidden fat that he has eaten today, for it is said, “His offering ... for his sin” (Leviticus 4:28) the offering must be for that particular sin. If an animal was set aside to be a hatat for one sin, he cannot offer it for another sin, even if it is the same sin, such as eating helev. This is derived from a midrashic reading of Leviticus 4:28." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nMost of this mishnah deals with the “higher and lower sacrifice” which is the sacrifice that is more or less expensive depending upon the wealth of the sinner. This type of sacrifice is mentioned in Leviticus 5, where there are three levels (lamb/goat, birds, grain) and Leviticus 12-14 where there are two levels (lamb/goat and birds).", + "One may bring with [money] dedicated to buy a lamb [for a hatat] a goat, or with [what was] dedicated to buy a goat [one may bring] a lamb; Or with [what was] dedicated to buy a lamb or a goat [one may bring] turtle-doves or young pigeons; Or with [what was] dedicated to buy turtle-doves or young pigeons [one may bring] the tenth of an ephah. If one sets aside money to buy a female lamb (one year old) as a hatat he can use it to buy a female goat (two years old) because both are usable as a hatat. If he sets aside money to buy a lamb or goat and then becomes poor he can use the money to buy bird offerings, as section two explains. Similarly, if he sets aside money to buy bird offerings and then becomes even poorer, he can use the money to buy a tenth of an ephah of grain. This would only work for those who can bring such an offering, see 2:4.", + "How so? If a man set apart [money] for a lamb or a goat [for a hatat] and he became poor, he may bring a bird-offering; If he became still poorer he may bring the tenth of an ephah. This section simply explains section one.", + "If a man set apart [money] for the tenth of an ephah and he became richer, he must bring a bird-offering; If he became still richer he must bring a lamb or a goat. Just as one who grows poor can use money set aside to buy an expensive offering to buy a cheaper one, so too one who becomes rich can/must use money set aside to buy a cheap offering to buy a more expensive one.", + "If a man set apart a lamb or a goat and they became blemished, he may bring with their price a bird-offering; But if he set apart a bird-offering and it became blemished, he may not bring with its price the tenth of an ephah, since a bird-offering cannot be redeemed. If a man set apart a lamb or goat and then became poor and the animal became blemished, he may sell the animal and use the money to buy a cheaper offering. However, if he sets aside a bird offering and it loses a limb (this counts as a blemish for birds) and he becomes poor enough to offer a grain sacrifice he cannot sell it and use its price to buy grain, because there is no way to redeem bird sacrifices. The verses about redeeming a sanctified animal (see Leviticus 27:11-13) refer only to a beast (cow, sheep or goat). Bird offerings can never be redeemed." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe final mishnah of our tractate deals with the question of why some things are usually mentioned before others in the Torah.", + "Rabbi Shimon says: lambs are mentioned before goats in all places. You might think that it is because they are choicer, therefore Scripture states, “And if he brings a lamb as his offering,” (Leviticus 4:32) to teach that both are equal. In the Torah “lambs” are always mentioned before “goats,” when the two come in one verse. See for instance Exodus 12:5, or Leviticus 5:6. This is not because there is any preference to offer a lamb. The proof of this is Leviticus 4:32, which mentions the lamb, whereas in vs. 28 of the same chapter the goat is mentioned. The Torah switches the order to let us know that the two are equal.", + "Turtle-doves are mentioned before young pigeons in all places. You might think that it is because they are choicer, therefore Scripture states, “A young pigeon or a turtle-dove for a hatat,” (Leviticus 12:6) to teach that both are equal. The same is true with regard to turtle doves and pigeons see Leviticus 1:14, 5:7; 12:8; 14:22 and others. To teach that they are the same, the Torah switches the order in Leviticus 12:6.", + "The father comes before the mother in all places. You might think that it is because the honor due a father is greater than the honor due a mother, therefore Scripture states, “A man shall fear his mother and his father,” (Leviticus 19: to teach that both are equal. But the sages have said: the father comes before the mother in all places, because both a son and his mother are obligated to honor the father. Generally, a father is mentioned before the mother, for instance Exodus 20:12; 21:15, 17; Leviticus 20:9 and others. To teach that both are equal in terms of honor, the Torah switches the order once in Leviticus 19. The other rabbis, however, hold that the father does take precedence over the mother. This is because a wife is obligated to honor her husband. Personally, I will admit that this is one of those times that one could say that the Mishnah is best explained when we remember that it was written by men.", + "And so it is also with the study of Torah; if the son has been worthy [to sit] before the teacher, the teacher comes before the father in all places, because both a man and his father are obligated to honor the teacher. Finally, at the top of the ladder of respect come those who teach Torah. Both the father and son are obligated to honor the teacher of Torah. Congratulations! We have finished Tractate Keritot! It is a tradition at this point to thank God for helping us finish learning the tractate and to commit ourselves to going back and relearning it, so that we may not forget it and so that its lessons will stay with us for all of our lives. The main topic of Keritot was sacrifices brought in cases of doubt, whether the hatat or the asham talui. I think that this subject helps get us into the mindset of Temple worship. A sacrifice is not a penalty but rather an opportunity for atonement. Indeed, one who transgresses intentionally is not allowed to offer a sacrifice to achieve atonement. But one who is not sure whether he transgressed or not may actually be afraid that without the ability to bring a sacrifice, he will never be able to achieve atonement. Tractate Keritot taught us that there were two ways for one to receive atonement for an uncertain sin: the asham talui and Yom Kippur. Both of these institutions remind us that we need and can fix not just the things that we know we did wrong, but those that we might have done wrong as well. I hope you have enjoyed Keritot. Tomorrow we begin Tractate Meilah." + ] + ] + ] + }, + "schema": { + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה כריתות", + "enTitle": "English Explanation of Mishnah Keritot", + "key": "English Explanation of Mishnah Keritot", + "nodes": [ + { + "heTitle": "הקדמה", + "enTitle": "Introduction" + }, + { + "heTitle": "", + "enTitle": "" + } + ] + } +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Kodashim/English Explanation of Mishnah Keritot/English/merged.json b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Kodashim/English Explanation of Mishnah Keritot/English/merged.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..6e4b2f82db1d871bc511d931269ce9096e0f1e0f --- /dev/null +++ b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Kodashim/English Explanation of Mishnah Keritot/English/merged.json @@ -0,0 +1,319 @@ +{ + "title": "English Explanation of Mishnah Keritot", + "language": "en", + "versionTitle": "merged", + "versionSource": "https://www.sefaria.org/English_Explanation_of_Mishnah_Keritot", + "text": { + "Introduction": [ + "Keritot (sometimes pronounced Keritut) is the plural of karet, which is a punishment found quite frequently in the Torah for various transgressions (Leviticus 17:4, 9; Exodus 30:33, 38; Genesis 17:14; Numbers 15:31 and many others). Karet is variously translated as “excommunication” or “extirpation” or other similar term. The rabbis interpret this punishment to be one that is meted out by God and not by a human court. One interpretation is that the person will die an early death. Another interpretation is that the punishment is meted out on the person in world to come. ", + "Despite the fact that the title of the tractate is Keritot, the subject of most of the tractate is those who are obligated to bring a hatat (sin-offering) an asham, and especially an “asham talui.” The “asham talui” is referred to in Leviticus 5:17-19:" + ], + "": [ + [ + [ + "There are in the Torah thirty-six [transgressions which are punishable with] karet:
When one has intercourse with his mother,
His father's wife;
Or his daughter-in-law;
When a man has intercourse with a male,
Or with a beast,
Or when a woman brings a beast upon herself;
When one has intercourse with a woman and her daughter;
Or with a married woman;
Or with his sister;
Or with his father's sister;
Or his mother's sister;
Or his wife's sister;
Or his brother's wife;
Or the wife of his father's brother;
Or with a menstruating woman;
One who blasphemes [the Lord];
One who worships idols;
Or dedicates his children to Molech;
Or has a ba’al ov;
Or desecrates the Shabbat;
When an unclean person eats of sacred food;
Or when one enters the precincts of the Temple in an unclean state;
When one eats forbidden fat,
Or blood;
Notar;
Or piggul;
When one slaughters
Or offers up [a consecrated animal] outside [the Temple];
One who eats anything leavened on Pesah;
One who eats
Or works on Yom Kippur;
One who compounds the oil [of anointing];
Or compounds incense;
Or uses [unlawfully] oil of anointing;
And [when one transgresses the laws of] the pesah,
And circumcision from among positive commandments.
Keritot opens with a list of thirty-six transactions for which one is liable karet if one commits the transgression intentionally, but without prior warning.
This is not really the place to explain each of these transgressions. Rather I will give brief biblical references for each and explain anything that I feel is a bit more complicated.
I have merely duplicated each section below for ease of reference. Sorry if this is a bit long…
1) When one has intercourse with his mother; Leviticus 18:7.
2) His father's wife; ibid: 8.
3) Or his daughter-in-law; ibid: 15.
4) When a man has intercourse with a male: ibid: 22.
5) Or with a beast: ibid: 23.
6) Or when a woman brings a beast upon herself: ibid.
7) When one has intercourse with a woman and her daughter: ibid: 17.
8) Or with a married woman: ibid: 20.
9) Or with his sister; ibid: 9.
10) Or with his father's sister: ibid: 12.
11) Or his mother's sister: ibid: 13.
12) Or his wife's sister: ibid: 18.
13) Or his brother's wife: ibid: 16.
14) Or the wife of his father's brother: ibid: 14.
15) Or with a menstruating woman; ibid: 19.
16) One who blasphemes [the Lord]: Numbers 15:30.
17) One who worships idols: No shortage of references in the Tanakh.
18) Or dedicates his children to Molech; Leviticus 18:21.
19) Or has a ba’al ov; Leviticus 19:31.
20) Or desecrates the Shabbat: Many references, see for instance, Exodus 31:24.
21) When an unclean person eats of sacred food: Leviticus 7:20.
22) Or when one enters the precincts of the Temple in an unclean state:Numbers 19:13.
23) When one eats forbidden fat: Leviticus 7:25.
24) Or blood; ibid, 27.
25) Notar: Leviticus 19: 6-8.
26) Or piggul; Leviticus 7:18.
27) When one slaughters: Leviticus 17:4.
28) Or offers up [a consecrated animal] outside [the Temple]; ibid, 8-9.
29) One who eats anything leavened on Pesah; Exodus 12:19.
30) One who eats:
31) Or works on Yom Kippur; Leviticus 23:28-30 (this and the previous transgression).
32) One who compounds the oil [of anointing]; Exodus 30: 32-33.
33) Or compounds incense; Exodus 30: 37-38.
34) Or uses [unlawfully] oil of anointing; ibid, 32-33.
35) And the pesah: Deuteronomy 16: 2; Numbers 9:13.
36) And circumcision are positive commandments: Leviticus 12:3; Genesis 17:14." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah refers to the list of transgressions in yesterday’s mishnah.", + "For these [transgressions] one is liable to karet if committed intentionally, and if committed unwittingly to a hatat. One who commits any of the transgressions listed in mishnah is liable for karet if done intentionally and a hatat (a sin-offering) if done unwittingly.", + "If there is a doubt whether he had committed the transgression to an asham talui, except in the case of one who defiled the Temple or its consecrated things, for in that case one is liable in this case to a sliding-scale sacrifice, the words of Rabbi Meir. If he does not know whether he committed the transgression (see the introduction), then he brings an “asham talui” (a type of guilt-offering, see the introduction). This is true for all of the sins in mishnah one, except for defiling the Temple or its consecrated things, for in that case a person brings a sliding scale sacrifice (see Leviticus 5:2ff). For a sliding scale sacrifice a rich person brings an animal, a poor person brings a bird and a very poor person brings grain.", + "But the sages say: also the blasphemer [is an exception], as it says: “You shall have one law for one that acts in error” (Numbers 15:29), this excludes the blasphemer who performs no action. The sages hold that there is another exception to who brings a hatat and an asham talui, and that is the blasphemer. When it comes to the hatat, the Torah states, “You shall have one law for one that acts in error.” The midrashic implication is that in order to be liable for a hatat you must perform an action. Since the blasphemer doesn’t do anything, but merely speaks, he does not bring a hatat or an asham talui." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nAccording to Leviticus 12:6, after a woman gives birth and then undergoes a period of purification, she must bring two offerings. The first is a lamb, offered as an olah, and the second is a bird for a hatat. The remainder of our chapter deals with various scenarios in which a woman would bring a hatat and either eat it or not.", + "Some women [after childbirth] bring an offering which is eaten; some bring one which is not eaten, and some bring no offering at all. This is an introduction to the following four mishnayot.", + "These bring an offering which is eaten: In the cases which follow, despite the fact that the woman has not given birth to a live child, she must still bring a sacrifice and the sacrifice can be eaten. The significance of the sacrifice being edible is that it implies that she is fully obligated to bring the sacrifice. As we shall see in mishnah four, in cases of doubt concerning whether she is obligated or not, she brings the sacrifice but it is not eaten.", + "If a woman miscarries a fetus which has the shape of beast, or a wild animal or a bird, the words of Rabbi Meir; but the sages say: only if it has a human shape. According to Rabbi Meir, if the miscarried fetus has the shape of a living being, even an animal, she must bring the sacrifice and the sacrifice is eaten. The other sages hold that the fetus must have a human shape for her to eat the sacrifice. This is the same dispute that we saw in Bekhorot 8:1.", + "Or if a woman miscarries a sandal-like fetus or a placenta or a fully formed fetus, or one that comes out in pieces. A sandal like fetus is considered to be human enough for it to count as a human miscarriage, which makes the woman liable for a sacrifice that can be eaten. If a woman miscarries a placenta, the assumption is that she also miscarried a fetus and somehow it was missed. A fully formed fetus or one that is cut up in pieces also count as births.", + "Similarly, if a female slave miscarries, she brings an offering which is eaten. A female slave is liable to observe the same commandments that a Jewish woman is liable to observe. Therefore, if she gives birth, the same rules that apply to the Jewish woman apply to her." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn today’s mishnah we learn of cases in which a woman brings a sacrifice but the sacrifice is not eaten. In all of these cases there is doubt whether she is liable for a sacrifice: therefore she brings (just in case she was liable) but the sacrifice cannot be eaten (in case she was not liable).", + "The following bring an offering which is not eaten:
A woman who miscarries but does not know what the miscarriage was, If she doesn’t know whether the form of the fetus which she miscarried is something over which one must bring a childbirth sacrifice (see yesterday’s mishnah) or not, then she brings a sacrifice but it is not eaten.", + "Or if two women who have a miscarriage, one of a kind which did not render her liable [to an offering], and the other of a kind that does render her liable [to an offering]. In this case two women miscarry; one miscarries a fetus that renders her liable for a sacrifice and one miscarries something that does not render her liable. However, the women don’t know who miscarried what (I know this sounds really absurd). Both women are in the category mentioned in section one (doubtful whether they are liable), and therefore both bring a sacrifice and neither sacrifice may be eaten.", + "Rabbi Yose said: When is this so? This applies only if one went towards the east and the other towards the west, but if both remained together they bring [together] one offering which is eaten. Rabbi Yose modifies what was stated in section two. That ruling applies only to a case where two women gave their sacrifices to a priest and he is not sure which of the sacrifices came from the woman who was really liable. If they are not around to ask them who gave birth to what, then neither sacrifice can be eaten. However, if they remain together, then together the two of them can bring one sacrifice and stipulate that it is brought on behalf of the woman who is actually obligated." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah lists women who do not bring a childbirth sacrifice.", + "The following do not bring a sacrifice:
A woman who discharges a sac filled with water or with blood or with pieces of flesh; This sac is not considered to be evidence that the woman gave birth, and therefore she does not bring a sacrifice.", + "Or if the miscarriage was in the shape of fish, locust, unclean animals or reptiles; These shapes are not indicative of a human fetus and therefore she does not bring a sacrifice. We should note that there might be some ideology in effect here. In mishnah two Rabbi Meir said that a woman who gives birth to a fetus in the shape of a beast, wild animal or bird is obligated. These were all kosher animals. They are also the animals that require shekhitah (slaughtering) in order to be eaten. Today’s mishnah refers to living things that are either of a lower form (fish and locusts) or are not kosher (unclean animals and reptiles). Perhaps it is an ideological statement of Rabbi Meir that dictates that humans look like the former, kosher animals of a higher form, but not the latter.", + "Or if it was extracted by means of a caesarean section. Rabbi Shimon declares her liable [to an offering] in the case of a caesarean section. According to the rabbis, the fetus is not considered to come into existence until the fortieth day. A woman who miscarries before that point is considered to have discharged a sac full of water and she is not liable for a sacrifice.", + "According to the first opinion, a child born through caesarean section does not make his/her mother liable to bring a sacrifice because this is not really “birth.” However, Rabbi Shimon holds that she is liable." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nAccording to Leviticus 12:5-6, on the eighty-first day after giving birth to a girl a woman brings a sacrifice. Our mishnah discusses a case where on the eve of the eighty-first day the woman has a miscarriage. Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel debate whether she must bring a sacrifice.\nNote that the debate is specifically concerning this night. All agree that if she miscarried earlier she is not liable. It seems that the sacrifice brought for the previous birth will cover the subsequent miscarriage as well. And all hold that if she miscarries on the eighty-first day, she is liable for a sacrifice, because the first sacrifice cannot cover the miscarriage. The debate is only over a woman who miscarries the night before.", + "If a woman miscarries on the eve of the eighty-first day: Bet Shammai say: she is exempted from an offering. But Bet Hillel say: she is liable. These are the positions of the two houses; they will be explained below.", + "Bet Hillel said to Bet Shammai: what is the difference between the eve of the eighty-first day and the eighty-first day itself? Since these are considered equal with regard to [blood] uncleanness, why should they not be considered equal also with reference to the offerings? If a woman has a bloody discharge for the first 80 days after giving birth to a girl, the blood is pure. However, if she discharges blood on the 81st day, even at night, the blood is impure. Since the night of the 81st day is reckoned with the next day in terms of blood impurity, Bet Hillel reasons that the same must be true with regard to a sacrifice. If she miscarries on the night of the 81st day, she must bring a sacrifice, just as she would if she miscarried the next morning.", + "Bet Shammai said to them: No; if you said this in the case where she miscarries on the eighty-first day where it occurred at a time when she was fit to bring an offering, can you say this where she miscarries on the eve of the eighty-first day, where it did not occur at a time when she was fit to bring an offering? Bet Shammai responds that there is a difference between a woman who miscarries on the 81st day and one who miscarries the night before. On the morning of the 81st day she can bring a sacrifice for the previous child. Therefore, when she miscarries she must bring a new sacrifice for the miscarriage. The first sacrifice cannot cover the miscarriage. However, if she miscarries at night, she had not yet arrived at a time when she could bring the sacrifice for the first child, because sacrifices cannot be offered at night. Therefore, she does not bring a sacrifice for the miscarriage.", + "Bet Hillel said to them: the case of a woman who miscarries on the eighty-first day which fell on a Shabbat shall prove it, where it did not take place at a time when she was fit to bring an offering and yet she is liable to bring a [new] offering. Bet Hillel responds that in certain cases a woman might miscarry on the 81st day, but not be able to bring her sacrifice for the previous child. This would happen if the 81st day fell on Shabbat. Nevertheless, despite the fact that she cannot yet bring her previous sacrifice, all agree that she is liable for another sacrifice for the miscarriage. The same is true, according to Bet Hillel, if she miscarries on the night of the 81st.", + "Bet Shammai said to them: No; if you says this of the eighty-first day which fell on a Shabbat for although it is not fit for offerings of an individual, it is at least fit for communal offerings, would you maintain this concerning a woman who miscarries on the eve of the eighty-first day, seeing that the night is fit neither for offerings of the individual nor for communal offerings? Bet Shammai says that night and Shabbat are not comparable. At night, no sacrifices may be offered, whereas on Shabbat, although individual sacrifices, such as those brought by the childbearing woman, cannot be offered, communal sacrifices such as the tamid and musaf can be. This rejects Bet Hillel’s proof in section four.", + "As to [your argument of the uncleanness of] the blood, it proves nothing, for if she aborted within the period of cleanness the blood is unclean, and yet she is exempted from an offering. The sensitive reader will note that Bet Shammai has still not answered Bet Hillel’s proof found in section two: the comparison between blood impurity and the sacrifice. Bet Shammai says that the two issues are different, as can be seen by the case of a woman who aborts during the first 80 days of blood purity after having given birth to a girl. While bloody discharge that comes as a result of the first birth is pure during this period, blood that is a result of a new miscarriage during this period is impure. Nevertheless, all agree that if she miscarries during this time, she is not liable for a sacrifice. Bet Shammai argue that the same is true of a woman who miscarries on the night of the 81st at this point any blood is impure because the 80 days of purity are up, but if she miscarries she is still exempt." + ], + [ + "If a woman had five doubtful genital discharges or five doubtful births, she needs to bring only one offering, and she may eat sacrifices [immediately], and she is not liable to bring the other [offerings]. There are two situations that are described here. 1) A woman had genital discharge for three consecutive days once a month for five months and she doesn’t know if these occurred during her menstrual cycle, in which case she was not a “zavah” and does not need to bring a sacrifice, or not during her menstrual cycle and she is a zavah does need to bring a sacrifice. 2) She had five miscarriages and she doesn’t know whether what she miscarried counts as a birth and she must bring a sacrifice or doesn’t count as a birth and she does not bring a sacrifice. In both of these cases, the woman might be liable for as many as five sacrifices (each consisting of an olah and a hatat) or she might not be liable at all. The rule in this case is that she needs to bring only one sacrifice and then she can eat any sacrificial meat, as is always the case when a woman brings a sacrifice for being a zavah or for giving birth. While she can, if she wants, bring four more sacrifices, she need not do so.", + "If a woman had five certain births, or five certain genital discharges, she brings one offering and may then eat sacrifices [immediately], and she is liable to bring the other offerings. However, if she had five certain cases of genital discharge or five certain births, then she must bring all five sacrifices. After she brings the first sacrifice she can already resume eating sacrifices.", + "It once happened in Jerusalem that the price of a pair of doves rose to a golden denar. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel said: By this sanctuary, I shall not go to sleep tonight before they cost but a [silver] denar! Then he entered the court and taught: if a woman had five certain births or five certain genital discharges she needs to bring only one offering, and she may then eat sacrifices, and she is not liable to bring the other [offerings]. Thereupon the price of a pair of birds stood at a quarter of a [silver] denar each. This section contains a fascinating story. Because of the previous halakhah that demanded that a woman bring a sacrifice for every certain birth or certain genital discharge, the price of the birds used for the sacrifices went all the way up to a golden denar for a pair. A golden denar is the equivalent of 25 silver denars. Market forces were working in favor of those selling the birds and would have discouraged women from bringing the sacrifices that they so frequently had to bring. To combat this, Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel boldly changed the halakhah so that a woman would have to bring only one sacrifice, even if she had had five certain births or discharges. This new halakhah immediately brought the price down to ¼ of a denar. The actions of Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel are one of the clearest examples of a rabbi adapting the halakhah to fit the needs of the Jews of his time. The halakhah to Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel is not supposed to be something that is simply too costly to fulfill. When he saw that the cost of sacrifices was becoming prohibitive, he didn’t refrain and simply say, “What can I do? That’s what the law demands.” Rather he acted to ensure that what the law did demand was something that people could reasonably observe." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nGenerally a person who is impure and then immerses in a mikveh can begin to eat sacrifices after immersion. However, there are four categories of people who must first bring sacrifices before they can eat other sacrifices. This process is called “a ceremony of atonement.”\nOur mishnah also mentions another category, but since tomorrow’s mishnah discusses it more fully, we shall explain it tomorrow.", + "There are four persons who require a ceremony of atonement, and there are four who bring a sacrifice for willful as well as for inadvertent transgression. This section introduces today’s and tomorrow’s mishnah.", + "The following are those who require a ceremony of atonement: the zav, the zavah, the woman who gave birth and the metzora. A “zav” is a man who has an abnormal genital discharge (see Leviticus 15:15) and a “zavah” is a woman with an abnormal genital discharge (see Leviticus 15:29-30). Both must bring sacrifices before they complete their purification process. So must a woman who gave birth (as we learned in 1:3) and a person who had some type of skin disease (Leviticus 14:10ff).", + "Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob said: also a convert is regarded as a person who still requires a ceremony of atonement until the blood has been sprinkled for him; the same applies to the nazirite with reference to wine, haircutting and uncleanness. Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob adds two more to this list. A convert who has already been circumcised (if he is a man, of course) and immersed in the mikveh, must bring a sacrifice. He cannot eat sacrifices until the blood from the olah that he brings is sprinkled on the altar. Similarly, a nazirite cannot drink wine, cut his hair or become impure from contact with a dead body until he brings his sacrifices (see Numbers 6:14 and Mishnah Nazir 6:9). Both of these are also cases where a person needs to bring a sacrifice to complete the process of purification." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nUsually a person brings a sacrifice only when s/he transgresses unwittingly. For instance, if one willfully breaks Shabbat, one does not bring a sacrifice. But if one didn’t know that a certain act is forbidden on Shabbat and then he performed that act, he can bring a sacrifice to atone for the transgression. However, there are four cases in which a person must bring a sacrifice even if he intentionally transgresses.", + "The following bring a sacrifice for willful as well as for inadvertent transgressions:
One who has intercourse with a female slave, This shall be explained in mishnayot 4-5 of this chapter.", + "A nazirite who has become unclean, A nazirite is not supposed to defile himself through contact with a dead body (see Numbers 6:9-12). If he does he must bring two sacrifices a hatat and an olah. He is liable for these sacrifices even if he intentionally comes into contact with the dead.", + "For a false oath concerning testimony; If a person swears that he does not know any testimony for another person, and it turns out that he did know testimony, he must bring a sacrifice to atone for his sin. By its very nature, this false oath had to have been done intentionally, and therefore we have another case of a person who brings a sacrifice for an intentional sin. This topic was discussed in Shevuot 4:2-5.", + "And for a false oath concerning a deposit. If a person swears falsely that someone else’s property was not deposited with him, and then it turns out that he was lying, he brings a sacrifice. Again, by its very nature this is an intentional sin. This topic was discussed in Shevuot 5:1-2." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah introduces two more categories of “five people.” The first is the person who brings one sacrifice for multiple transgressions. The issue here is what can make the same act performed on repeated occasions considered to be separate transgressions? This is a topic that will prove of great interest to the rabbis and we shall discuss it for the next few chapter.\nThe mishnah also refers to five people who bring a sacrifice of higher or lesser value a rich person brings a beast and a poor person a bird. These people will be listed in mishnah four.", + "There are five persons who bring one sacrifice for multiple transgressions, and five who bring a sacrifice of higher or lesser value. The following bring one sacrifice for multiple transgressions:
One who has intercourse with a female slave several times, Having intercourse with a female slave several times is considered one transgression and therefore he brings only one sacrifice. We will discuss this issue more in mishnayot 4-5.", + "A nazirite who became unclean several times. This category was explained in yesterday’s mishnah.", + "One who warns his wife in regard to several men, This refers to the beginning of the “Sotah” process. The Sotah process begins with a man warning his wife not to be secluded with so-and-so, and (in the case mentioned here) not with so-and-so, etc. He warns her concerning several men. If she goes and is secluded with all of these men, she must bring only one sacrifice, “the minhah of jealousy” (see Numbers 5:15ff) for all of her seclusions. The reason that she brings only one minhah and not one minhah for each man with whom she was secluded is that since the warning was done collectively, we look at her acts as one transgression, not many. Had he issued separate warnings for each man, she would have brought one sacrifice for each man with whom she was secluded.", + "And a metzora who has contracted skin disease several times. If a person contracts skin disease, then is healed and then contracts it again repetitively, he brings only one sacrifice for all of the outbreaks of the disease. Since he was not purified in between each outbreak, it is considered one case of skin disease and not many.", + "If he has offered the birds and then contracted the disease again, they do not count for him until he has offered his hatat. Rabbi Judah says: until he has offered his asham. The purification process from skin disease is described in Leviticus 14. After being pronounced free of the affliction, a person brings two birds; one bird is slaughtered and its blood is sprinkled on him and the other is set free. On the eighth day he brings two lambs, one as an asham and the other as an olah. If he can’t afford two lambs, he brings one lamb as an asham and two birds, one as a hatat and one as an olah. In either case, he offers the asham first and the hatat afterwards. If he brings the birds and then contracts skin disease again, the two skin diseases are considered as one and he need bring only one set of sacrifices at the end. Even the two birds that were already brought count. When he is healed, he will bring only the lambs or lambs and birds as olah and hatat. According to Rabbi Judah, this is true until he brings the hatat at the very end. If he contracts the skin disease again after this point, then it is a new case of skin disease and he has to bring a new set of sacrifices." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is a direct continuation of yesterday’s mishnah: the five who bring one sacrifice for many instances of obligation. Today’s mishnah discusses the final such case and then moves on to explain the second topic in mishnah three the five who bring a higher or lower sacrifice.", + "A woman who has had several births. The last category of person who might bring one sacrifice for multiple cases is the woman who gave birth if she did not bring a sacrifice for one birth, she can bring one sacrifice for multiple births.", + "If she miscarried a female within eighty days of the birth of a girl, and then she again miscarried a female within eighty days of the previous [miscarriage]; or if she miscarried twins. Rabbi Judah says: she brings an offering for the first and not for the second, for the third again but not for the fourth. The mishnah now explains other types of cases where a woman might bring one sacrifice for multiple births or miscarriages. Generally, she brings her sacrifices 80 days after the birth of a female. If she miscarries within this period, she need not bring a sacrifice for both the birth and the miscarriage. If the miscarriage is female, and then she miscarries again within 80 days, she still brings only one sacrifice. Similarly, if she miscarries twins, she brings only one sacrifice for both. Rabbi Judah disagrees with the previous opinion. According to Rabbi Judah she brings a sacrifice for the first birth. For the miscarriage that occured within 80 days of the first, she does not bring, because it was within the time covered by the first. However, she does bring for the third (the second miscarriage) because it was not within the time of the first. The second (the first miscarriage) does not cover the third, because she didn’t bring a sacrifice for the second. Then she doesn’t bring for the fourth (the third miscarriage) because it was during the time of the third. In this way she ends up bringing for every other miscarriage.", + "The following persons bring an offering of higher or lesser value: One who hears the voice (see Leviticus 5:1); One who has broken the word of his lips (Leviticus 5:4); One who while unclean has entered the sanctuary or [has partaken] of holy things, A woman after childbirth And a metzora. This is the list of the five categories of people who can bring either a more or less expensive sacrifice, depending upon their wealth. A) This refers to the person who swore falsely that he didn’t know testimony. The language of the mishnah is based on Leviticus 5:1. Lev 5:5-11 discuss the various sacrifices that can be brought. B) This refers to one who made a false oath. See Leviticus 5:4. C) One who enters the Temple while impure or eats holy things while impure must bring a higher or lower sacrifice. This is also mentioned in Leviticus 5. In all three of these cases, the person who is really poor can bring just a grain offering. D) See Leviticus 12:6-8. E) See Leviticus 13.", + "What is the difference between [intercourse] with a female slave and the other forbidden sexual relations? For they are not equivalent in regard to the punishment nor the sacrifice. In the case of all other forbidden sexual relations a hatat is brought, in that of a female slave an asham; In the case of the other forbidden sexual relations a female animal is brought, in that of the female slave a male; In the case of the other forbidden sexual relations man and woman are alike with respect to lashes and the sacrifice; in that of the female slave the man is unlike the woman regarding the lashes, and the woman is unlike the man regarding the sacrifice. In the case of all other forbidden sexual relations sexual contact is punishable as well as consummation, and one is liable for each act of intercourse separately. For in this the case of the female slave is more stringent in that intentional transgression is of the same status as unwitting transgression. Leviticus 19:20-21 states, “If a man has carnal relations, having an emission, with a woman who is a slave and has been designated for another man, but has not been redeemed or given her freedom, there shall be an indemnity; they shall not, however, be put to death, since she has not been freed. But he must bring to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, as his guilt offering (asham) to the Lord, a ram of guilt offering.” Our mishnah explains what the difference is between a man who has intercourse with a slave woman such as is described here and a man who has intercourse with any other forbidden sexual relation. In the two cases, a different punishment is meted out if done intentionally, and if done unwittingly, a different sacrifice is brought. The punishment for all other sexual sins is either death or karet, whereas in this case the punishment is lashes. The mishnah now explains the differences with regard to the sacrifice. A + B) For other forbidden relations one must bring a female hatat, whereas here one brings a male asham. (Note that a hatat is always female and an asham is always male. Thus it turns out that this is only one difference between the two sins.) C) For all other sexual sins, both the man and woman are equal in matters of lashes (if done intentionally but without prior warning) and in bringing a sacrifice, if done intentionally. But in this case, the female slave is the one lashed (this is how the rabbis understand the word that is translated “indemnity”) and the man brings the sacrifice (whether done intentionally or intentionally see mishnah two). D) In all other cases the man is liable as soon as sexual contact begins, but with a slave woman, he is liable only when he emits seed, as is stated in the verse itself. E) In all other cases, if a man sleeps multiple times with a woman forbidden to him, he is liable only once, whereas here with the female slave, he is liable for each act of intercourse. The mishnah notes that this is a balancing stringency. Since there is a leniency when it comes to having intercourse with the female slave he brings a sacrifice even if done intentionally there is also an accompanying stringency he must bring a sacrifice for each act." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah defines what type of female is referred to in Leviticus 19:20-22.", + "To which type of female slave [does this refer]?
To one who is half a slave and half a free person, as it is written: “And she has been redeemed and not redeemed” (Leviticus 19:20), the words of Rabbi Akiva. According to Rabbi Akiva, the type of female slave referred to in the verse is one who is half a slave and half free (for instance she was owned by two masters and one freed her). He derives this from the strange phrasing in the Torah. The simple meaning of these words is that she has not been redeemed, but the Hebrew syntax allows Rabbi Akiva to interpret the words as if she has been partially redeemed/freed.", + "Rabbi Ishmael says: to a full female slave. Rabbi Ishmael interprets more in accordance with the simple meaning the female slave referred to is fully a slave. She has not been redeemed at all.", + "Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov says: all other forbidden sexual relations are stated explicitly, and of the remainder there is only one who can be half a slave and half a free person. All of the other prohibited relations in the Torah are fully free females (they could not be related to the man if they were slaves). There is, according to Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov, a long standing tradition that there is one prohibited woman who is half slave/half free. The only one that this can be is the female slave referred to in Leviticus 19. It is interesting that Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov agree that the slave is half free, but they disagree with regard to how we know this; Rabbi Akiva derives it through a midrashic reading of the verse whereas Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov derives it from a received tradition. These are two of the main sources of Jewish law tradition and midrash/interpretation." + ], + [ + "After having delineated several differences between the case of the female slave and other cases of forbidden sex, the mishnah notes that in other ways, most cases of forbidden sexual relations are the same.", + "In the case of all forbidden relations, if one partner was an adult and the other a minor, the minor is exempt; If one is awake and the other asleep, the one asleep is exempt; A minor or one asleep cannot be held responsible for his/her actions, therefore they are exempt.", + "If one is an inadvertent and the other intentional, the former is liable to a hatat, the latter to karet. This rule is true of most cases prohibited relations (it is not true with regard to female slaves) for inadvertent transgressions, one brings a hatat and for intentional transgressions, one is liable for karet (if done without warning)." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah talks about various types of cases where a person might or might not have eaten forbidden fat, a transgression that would cause him to bring a hatat for atonement.", + "If they said to him: you ate forbidden fat, he is liable to a hatat; This is the obvious case. If a person ate a piece of fat and doesn’t know whether it was helev (forbidden fat) or shuman (permitted fat), then he must bring a hatat.", + "If one witness says: he ate, and another says: he did not eat, or if one woman says, he ate, and another says, he did not eat, he is liable to an asham talui. In this case, there is contradictory testimony with regard to whether the fat he ate was forbidden. Furthermore, there is either only one witness who testifies that he ate forbidden fat, or that witness is a woman, whose testimony does not fully count. Since there is no proper testimony, he does not bring a hatat. However, he does bring an asham talui, a “suspended asham.” As I explained in the introduction to Keritot, this is a sacrifice brought when it is not clear if a person transgressed.", + "If one witness says: he ate, and another says: he did not eat, or if one woman says, he ate, and another says, he did not eat, he is liable to an asham talui. In this case, there is no solid testimony that he ate forbidden fat, and he himself denies having done so. These two factors combine to exempt him from having to bring a sacrifice.", + "If one witness says, he ate, and he himself says, I did not eat, he is exempt. In this case, there is proper testimony against him, but he himself denies having eaten forbidden fat. Rabbi Meir argues that just as in a case of the death penalty, where two witnesses can make him liable, so too here, when it comes to bringing a sacrifice to atone for a sin, two people can make him liable, even if he denies having transgressed. The other rabbis argue against Rabbi Meir by noting that there is a difference between testimony for a capital crime, such as murder, and testimony with regard to liability for a sacrifice. In the case of the sacrifice, if the person admits to having eaten the forbidden fat, but claims to have done so intentionally, he is not obligated for a sacrifice, because sacrifices are brought only for accidental sins. Therefore, when he says, “I didn’t eat” he is believed." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah begins discussing the topic of how to divide one act of transgressing into several transgressions, such that a person would be considered as having transgressed only one, or join separate acts into one act such that a person would be liable independently for each act. This is a topic of immense interest to the rabbis and they will continue to discuss it throughout the chapter and even in chapter four.", + "If one twice ate forbidden fat in one spell of unawareness, he is liable to but one hatat. If a person ate forbidden fat twice, but both times he was unaware of what he was doing, for instance he didn’t know that what he was eating was forbidden fat, he is liable for only one hatat. As long as he was not informed of his sin in between the acts, this counts as only one sin.", + "If one ate forbidden fat, blood, piggul and notar in one spell of unawareness, he is liable for each kind. However, if he ate different kinds of prohibited substances within one period of unawareness, meaning he was not told in between each item that what he is eating is prohibited, he is liable for a hatat for each kind of prohibited substance. This is because each is its own prohibition. “Piggul” is sacrificial meat that was offered with a disqualifying intention, and “notar” is remnant, sacrificial meat left over beyond the time when it must be eaten.", + "This is an instance where different kinds [of food] are more stringent than one kind. As the Mishnah so often does, it compares the above case with another case, noting that sometimes eating differently prohibited substances is treated more stringently, and sometimes it is treated more leniently. The above case is one in which it was treated more stringently.", + "In the following instance, however, one kind [of food] is more stringent than several kinds: if one ate half an olive-size and then again half an olive-size, both in one spell of unawareness, if of one kind he is liable, if of two kinds, he is exempted. In contrast, if a person eats half of an olive’s worth of one prohibited substance and then another half of an olive of the same substance, he is liable for a hatat, because he ate one olive’s worth, the amount necessary to be liable. If the two half-olives were of different substances, then he is exempt because he didn’t eat an olive’s worth of a single prohibited substance." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nAt the end of yesterday’s mishnah we learned that if a person eats two halves of an olive’s worth of one prohibited substance, he is liable. Our mishnah deals with the question of how close these two acts must be for them to be considered one act of eating, such that he would be liable.", + "Within what time must he eat them [for him to be liable]? [The time he would need] if he ate a similar amount of parched grains of corn, the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Meir holds that we imagine the prohibited substances as if they were parched grains of corn. If it took him longer to eat the prohibited substances than it would have to have eaten a similar amount of parched grains of corn, then he is exempt.", + "But the rabbis say: he must take from the beginning to the end [of his eating] no more time than is required for the eating of a peras (a half a loaf of [to be liable]. The other rabbis say that as long as he ate the half-olives within the amount of time it would take to eat half a loaf of a standard sized loaf of bread (four olive’s worth of bread) then he is liable. We should note that in later halakhah this became a standard as far as eating obligatory substances, such as matzah on Pesah. One must eat the matzah within this period of time for it to count as his obligatory matzah. Tiny pieces of matzah eaten throughout the meal are not sufficient to fulfill one’s obligation.", + "If one eats unclean food or drinks unclean drinks, or if he drinks a quarter [of a log] of wine and then enters the Temple [he is liable if it takes less time] than it takes to eat a peras. This section deals with a priest who does something to disqualify himself from either eating holy food (terumah and sacrifices) or from entering the Temple. If he eats or drinks impure foods he cannot eat holy foods. If he drinks wine, he cannot go into the Temple (see Leviticus 10:9). Our mishnah teaches that if he eats or drinks these things within the amount of time it would require to eat half of a loaf of bread, then he cannot eat holy food (if he ate impure food or drink) or go into the Temple (if he drank wine).", + "Rabbi Elazar says: if the drinking was interrupted or if he diluted it, he is exempt. Rabbi Elazar provides a different measure when it comes to drinking the wine. If he interrupted his drinking, or if he stopped long enough to dilute it with water, meaning he didn’t drink the whole quarter log at once, then he is allowed to go into the Temple." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn this mishnah the rabbis try to figure out how a person could eat one piece of forbidden fat and by that one act become liable to four hatats and an asham. As we have seen before, this is the kind of question the rabbis like to ask. Think of this as a rabbinic riddle, almost like asking a Scrabble or Boggle player, how many words you can make from another word. Fun!", + "It is possible that by one act of eating a person could become liable to four hatats and one asham:
If an unclean person eats forbidden fat, which was at the same time notar of an offering, and [it was on] Yom Kippur. Let’s list the hatats and asham. First the hatats: 1) For eating holy food while in an impure state. 2) For eating forbidden fat. 3) For eating notar. 4) For eating on Yom Kippur. The asham is for eating sacrificial meat in the first place. This is called “meilah” and it means illicit transgression of holy property.", + "Rabbi Meir says: if it was on Shabbat and he carried it out, he is liable [to yet another hatat]. But they said to him: this is a different name. Rabbi Meir adds a fifth hatat if it was on Shabbat and he carried it from one domain to another. The other rabbis disagree because this hatat is for carrying and not for eating. All of the other hatats and the asham were for the eating itself." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nWe’ve talked about food, now let’s talk about sex! Seriously, today’s mishnah is similar to yesterday’s in its form and style, but instead of discussing how many hatats one can be liable for eating forbidden food, now the rabbis try to figure out how many hatats one can be liable for one act of forbidden sex.", + "By one act of intercourse one may become liable for six hatats: If one had intercourse with his daughter, he can be guilty of incest with her because she is his daughter, his sister, his brother's wife, the wife of his father's brother, and [he can also be guilty] of intercourse with a married woman and a menstruant. Try to follow this one. A man has sex with his mother and they have a daughter. She is his sister and his daughter. If she marries his paternal brother (this is legal) she is now his brother’s wife. When she is divorced or widowed, she marries his father’s brother (this is also legal). When he has relations with this one woman, he has transgressed four incest prohibitions, all at the same time. In addition, if she is married at the time and she is also a menstruant, he has transgressed six times with one act. [I hope it was worth it!].", + "If one had intercourse with his daughter’s daughter he can be guilty of incest with her because she is his daughter's daughter, his daughter-in-law, his brother's wife, the wife of his father's brother, his wife's sister, a married woman, and a menstruant. If six hatats wasn’t enough for you, here’s the seventh. If his daughter’s daughter marries his son (possible if they were from different mothers), and she is his wife’s sister (if his wife is his son-in-law’s daughter from a different wife), then it turns out that his daughter’s daughter can be his daughter-in-law and his wife’s sister (three hatats). Then she marries his brother, and then his father’s brother (as in section one). If she is married and a menstruant when he has relations with her, he is liable for seven hatats.", + "Rabbi Yose said: if the grandfather transgressed and married her first, he may thereby become guilty for offending with his father's wife. In this case, his father can marry her, although this is prohibited by the rabbis. She is his great-granddaughter, and this is only a rabbinic prohibition. Note that he can only marry her in a case of yibbum, because she was married to his brother. She is not his daughter-in-law because she was married to his son’s maternal brother and not maternal brother. This would add another hatat. I know this is complicated, so if you would like to send me a chart, I’d be happy to check it for you.", + "So too, if one had intercourse with his wife's daughter or her daughter's daughter. A person can be liable for the same number of hatats if he has the same scenario but with his wife’s daughter and with his wife’s granddaughter. You might ask how his wife’s daughter can be his sister, since he can’t normally marry his sister’s mother. This could happen if his father had a daughter out of wedlock with a woman and he married this woman (this is permitted, although prohibited rabbinically). It now turns out that this child is wife’s daughter and his paternal sister." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah is a continuation of yesterday’s mishnah. There are more attempts to figure out how many transgressions a person can transgress with one act of intercourse.", + "If one had relations with his mother-in-law he may thereby become guilty for [having relations] with his mother-in-law, his daughter-in-law, his brother's wife, the wife of his father's brother, his wife's sister, a married woman, and a menstruant. I’ll use some names for this one. Let’s say Lavan has sex with Leah his daughter and they have a daughter, Dina. Yaakov marries Dina, so that Leah is his mother-in-law and his wife’s sister. Leah marries Reuven, Yaakov’s son, and now Leah is his daughter-in-law. If Reuven dies or divorces her and then she marries Yaakov’s brother, she is now his brother’s wife. Then, after death or divorce, she marries Yaakov’s father’s brother, so she is his father’s brother’s wife. If she is married and a menstruant when Yaakov has relations with her, he is liable for seven hatats.", + "And so too, if one had intercourse with the mother of his father-in-law or of his mother-in-law. One can become liable for the same hatats if the woman is the mother of his father-in-law or the mother of his mother-in-law.", + "Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri said: if one had intercourse with his mother-in-law he may thereby become guilty for [having relations] with his mother-in-law, the mother of his mother-in-law, and the mother of his father-in-law. They said to him: all these three are the same name. Eve has two daughters Rachel and Leah and one son, Lavan. If Yaakov marries Rachel and Leah’s daughter and Lavan’s daughter, then Eve is his mother-in-law (Rachel’s mother), his mother-in-law’s mother-in-law (Leah’s daughter’s mother) and his father-in-law’s mother (Lavan, his father-in-law’s, mother). If you added these prohibitions to the previous scenario, you could come up with nine hatats (don’t try this at home!). The other rabbis say that “mother-in-laws” are all one name, meaning that they are all one prohibition. This is because the prohibition of various types of mother-in-law’s is included in Leviticus 18:17: “Do not uncover the nakedness of a woman and her daughter; nor shall you marry her son’s daughter or her daughter’s daughter and uncover her nakedness: they are kindred, it is depravity.” Since they are all included in one verse if someone manages to have a woman who is all three at the same time, there is only one hatat for the “mother-in-law” prohibitions." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn our mishnah Rabbi Akiva begins to ask concerning the question of how one distinguishes between separate transgressions, for which one is liable for each individually, and one extended transgression, for which one is liable only once.", + "Rabbi Akiva said: I asked Rabban Gamaliel and Rabbi Joshua at the meat-market of Emmaus, where they went to buy meat for the wedding feast of Rabban Gamaliel's son: The mishnah begins with an interesting tidbit of historical information. Rabbi Akiva was in Emmaus (near the Latrun exit on the Tel-Aviv-Jerusalem highway, not far from my house). There he ran into Rabban Gamaliel and Rabbi Joshua buying meat for Rabban Gamaliel’s son’s wedding. Feeling himself lucky to run into some rabbis, probably not an everyday occurrence, he decides to ask them a halakhic riddle. Note that the question is not a practical one, but rather an academic one. This is an interesting window into what kinds of questions rabbis asked each other when they met.", + "What [is the law concerning] a man who had intercourse with his sister, his father's sister and his mother's sister? Is he liable for one sacrifice for all of them, or to one [separate sacrifice] for each of them? The case is one in which a man had relations with three women prohibited to him, all of whom are different types of prohibited “sisters.” All three transgressions were done in one period of unawareness. Either he didn’t know that there was such a prohibition, or he didn’t know that these women were his sister, father’s sister and mother’s sister. Thus the question is, if in one period of unawareness one commits three transgressions that are called by a similar name, is he liable for three hatats or one?", + "They replied: we have heard nothing [about this], but we have heard that if one had intercourse with five menstruants in one spell of unawareness, he is liable to a sacrifice for each [act], and it seems to us that the case [you asked about] may be derived by an a fortiori conclusion (kal. Rabban Gamaliel and Rabbi Joshua respond that they don’t have an answer to the question, at least not one that they have received from their teachers. In other words, Rabbi Akiva has thought of a new situation that was never before discussed. [Good job, Rabbi Akiva!] While they don’t have a received answer, they do have a similar received tradition concerning a man who has relations with five menstruants in one period of unawareness. Despite the fact that this is one type of transgression (prohibition of sex with a menstruant) he is liable for a hatat for each transgression. It seems that he is liable for five hatats because each one is a different woman. The distinctness of their bodies one from the other makes these five sins and not one sin of transgressing the prohibition of sex with a menstruant. From this case Rabban Gamaliel and Rabbi Joshua conclude that all the more so (kal vehomer) in the case of the three sisters, he would be liable for a hatat for each sister, because there is some difference between the status of each sister while they are all sister’s they are different types of sisters." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nRabbi Akiva asks another question to Rabban Gamaliel and Rabbi Joshua.", + "Rabbi Akiva further asked: If a limb hangs loose from the body of a living beast, what is the law? A limb removed from a living animal is considered to convey impurity like carrion. Rabbi Akiva asks concerning a case of a limb that is hanging loose from an animal. A sinew or some skin is connecting it to the animal, but the limb will not heal and become fully reattached to the animal. Does such a limb convey impurity even though it is still attached?", + "They replied: We have heard nothing about this, but we have heard about a limb hanging loose from the body of a man, that it is clean. As was the case in yesterday’s mishnah, Rabban Gamaliel and Rabbi Joshua do not have a received tradition, but they can again figure out the answer by comparing it to a case for which they do have a tradition. If a person has a limb hanging loose from his body, it does not convey impurity as if it were a dead body.", + "And thus those that were afflicted with boils used to do in Jerusalem. He would go on the eve of Pesah to the doctor, and he would cut the limb until only contact of a hairbreadth was left; he then stuck it on a thorn and then tore himself away from it. In this manner both that man and the physician could make their pesah offering. They now explain how people would use this halakhah to prevent them from becoming impure on the eve of Pesah, and thereby lose their ability to sacrifice and eat the pesah offering. People who had boils and needed to have a limb removed would go to the doctor. He could not cut off the limb because then he would become impure. To solve this problem, he would cut off most of the limb until it was only connected by a hairbreadth. At this point the limb was still pure. He would then stick the limb on a thorn stuck into the ground like a peg. The person with boils would then rip his own limb off (ouch!). In this way, the doctor would not touch the limb while it was being ripped off. Both the doctor and his patient could then offer their pesah sacrifice that evening.", + "And it seems to us that your case may be derived from this by a kal vehomer. From this case we can draw a “kal vehomer” argument. If the limb hanging from a human body which would convey the more serious impurity of a dead body is pure as long as it is still hanging from the body, all the more so the limb hanging from a live animal, which would have the lesser impurity of “carrion,” is pure if it is still hanging." + ], + [ + "Rabbi Akiba asked again: If a man slaughtered five sacrifices outside [the Temple] in one spell of unawareness, what is the law? Is he liable to a separate offering for each act or only to one for them all?
They replied: we have heard nothing about this.
Rabbi Joshua: I have heard that if one eats an offering from five different dishes in one spell of unawareness, he is guilty of sacrilege for each of them; and it seems to me that the case in question may be inferred from this by a kal vehomer.
Rabbi Shimon said: Rabbi Akiba did not ask this, but rather concerning one who ate of notar ( from five sacrifices in one spell of unawareness what is the law? Is he liable only to one [offering] for all of them, or is he liable to one for each of them?
They replied: we have heard nothing about this.
Rabbi Joshua: I have heard that if one eats an offering from five different dishes in one spell of unawareness, he is guilty of sacrilege for each of them; and it seems to me that the case in question may be inferred from this by a kal vehomer.
Rabbi Akiba replied: if this is a received tradition we accept it; but if it is only a logical deduction, there is a rebuttal.
He [Rabbi Joshua] said: rebut it.
He replied: It is not so. For if you hold the view with regard to sacrilege, for in this case one who gives food to another is as guilty as the one who eats it himself, and the person who causes others to derive a benefit from them is as guilty as the person who himself made use of them; furthermore, [small quantities are] reckoned together in the case of sacrilege even after the lapse of a long period, can you say it in connection with notar ( where not one of these laws applies.
Rabbi Akiva continues to ask questions. This mishnah returns to the subject of mishnah seven what constitutes separate transgressions?
Section one: After having heard from Rabban Gamaliel and Rabbi Joshua that if a man has relations with five different menstruants during one period of unawareness he is liable for five separate hatats, Rabbi Akiva asks a follow-up question concerning a person who slaughters five sacrifices outside the Temple, all in one period of unawareness. We might say that in the case of the menstruants there were five separate transgressions because the prohibition of relations with a menstruant applies to the women as well, and therefore, since each woman is transgressing, so too the man must be committing a separate transgression with each woman. In contrast, when it comes to the sacrifices, they can all be treated as one, because they (obviously) are incapable of committing their own transgressions.
Section two: Again, both rabbis respond that they do not have an answer to his question.
Section three: Rabbi Joshua derives a kal vehomer from a person who illegally eats one sacrifice which has been put onto five plates. Here, the fact that the meat is on different plates serves to separate these into different transgressions of sacrilege, even though it is only one sacrifice. If the separate plates make us consider one act to be several different acts, all the more so would we consider five different sacrifices to be five different acts, for which he is liable for five hatats.
Sections 4-6: Rabbi Shimon, a student of Rabbi Akiva’s, rejects the previous version of the question and answer between Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Joshua, because it made a comparison between slaughtering and eating. Rather Rabbi Akiva asked Rabbi Joshua about a person who ate “remnant” (sacrificial meat left over beyond the time in which it must be eaten) from five different sacrifices. To this question Rabbi Joshua responded with the same answer given above. If someone is guilty for five different offenses for eating one sacrifice divided into five different plates, all the more so he is guilty of five separate transgressions for eating remnant from five different sacrifices.
Section seven: Rabbi Akiva responds that if what Rabbi Joshua is saying is a received tradition, one that Rabbi Joshua learned from his teachers, then he will accept it. But if it is deduced logic, he can offer a logical rebuttal.
This answer is generally understood as showing a preference for revealed tradition over logic Rabbi Akiva would have accepted Rabbi Joshua’s answer if it was a tradition, but logic can be refuted. However, in my opinion, this is merely lip service. It is easy for Rabbi Akiva to say that he would accept Rabbi Joshua’s answer if it was a revealed tradition when he knows very well that it is not so Rabbi Joshua said it was a “kal vehomer,” a type of reasoned argument. Rather, Rabbi Akiva and the editors of the mishnah espouse a philosophy of accepting tradition over reason, but at the same time undermine that preference by pointing out that tradition does not answer many questions, and that therefore one must rely on reason to arrive at answers to new questions. Although reason is susceptible to argumentation, it is, in the end, what we must rely upon to know what to do.
Sections 8-9: Rabbi Joshua now gives Rabbi Akiva a chance to rebut his answer, and Rabbi Akiva eagerly takes up the challenge. He points out that Rabbi Joshua was dealing with a case of “sacrilege” a person eats holy things when he is not allowed to do so. Sacrilege is treated strictly in three ways: 1) a person who gives to another person to eat is just as guilty as if he ate it himself; 2) similarly, if he allowed others to benefit from holy things, he is guilty as if he himself benefited; 3) if a person ate or derived benefit today from a half a perutah’s worth of holy things, and then at a much later period derived benefit from another half of a perutah, these two half perutahs are joined together and he is liable for sacrilege. None of these stringencies apply to notar, remnant. Therefore, one cannot make an analogy from a tradition concerning sacrilege which is treated stringently, to a question concerning notar, which is treated more leniently." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn today’s mishnah, the last one of this fascinating chapter, Rabbi Akiva asks Rabbi Eliezer a question concerning Shabbat.\nAs background we should remind ourselves of a couple of general rules concerning Shabbat. There are 39 different categories of prohibited labor on Shabbat. If one performs labor from different categories, for instance he cooks and he plants, he is liable for a hatat (if done unwittingly) for each labor. However, if one performs two different acts that stem from the same category, for instance he cooks and bakes, he is liable for only one hatat. Our mishnah deals with a person who does many acts that all belong to the same category (cooking for instance) but he does them on different Shabbats. Is he liable for each transgression?", + "Rabbi Akiba said: I asked Rabbi Eliezer: if one performed many acts of forbidden work of the same category on different Shabbats but in one spell of unawareness, what is the law? Is he liable only to one [offering] for all of them, or to a separate one for each of them? Rabbi Akiva asks concerning a person who does many acts of forbidden labor, all from the same category, on many different Shabbats, all within one period of unawareness. For instance, he does not know that it is forbidden to cook on Shabbat, so he cooks, bakes, broils, boils, etc. on many different Shabbats. Does the fact that these acts were performed on different Shabbats make him liable for one hatat for each Shabbat, or do we consider this one sin of cooking, and he is liable for only one hatat?", + "He replied to me: he is liable to a separate one for each of them. And this can be derived by through a kal vehomer. If with regard to relations with a menstruant, for which there are neither many categories nor many ways of sinning, one is still liable for each act, how much more must one be liable to separate offerings in the case of Shabbat, for which there are many categories [of work] and many ways of sinning! Rabbi Eliezer responds with the same kal vehomer argument that Rabbi Joshua used in the previous mishnah. If one is liable for one hatat for every menstruant he has relations with, even though this prohibition does not have categories and many ways of sinning as does Shabbat, all the more so one is liable for one hatat for every transgression of Shabbat.", + "I said to him: No, you may hold this view in the case of the menstruant, since in that case there are two warnings: the man is warned with regard to the menstruant woman, and the menstruant woman is warned with a man; but can you hold the same in the case of the Shabbat where there is only one warning? Rabbi Akiva rebuts Rabbi Eliezer’s comparison. Relations with different menstruants are considered different transgressions because the women are also sinning, as we explained in yesterday’s mishnah. Since the women are warned against sinning just as much as the men, we must consider these different acts. In contrast when it comes to Shabbat, there is only one warning, because there is only one party.", + "He said to me: One who has relations with [menstruant] minors can prove the point, where there is but one warning, and yet one is liable for each act. Rabbi Eliezer defends his answer by slightly adjusting the question. Instead of basing his kal vehomer on relations with five menstruating women, whom he admits are liable for transgressing the prohibition, he bases the kal vehomer on a man who has relations with five menstruating minors. Because they are minors they are not liable, and nevertheless, he is liable for five separate transgressions. Therefore, the same is true with regard to Shabbat.", + "I responded to him: No, you may hold this view in the case of minors because although no prohibition now applies, it will apply later; but can you hold the same view with regard to Shabbat where neither now nor later [is there more than one warning]? Rabbi Akiva rejects this by noting that although minors are not now liable, they will be in the future. In other words, this is a transgression that still counts as having two parties, unlike Shabbat, where there is only the transgressor.", + "He said to me: Let the law concerning intercourse with an animal prove my point. Rabbi Eliezer finds another case of sexual transgression, where there is a sin but only one person sins the case of intercourse with an animal. Just as one is guilty for five hatats if he has intercourse with five different animals, so too he is guilty if he performs one forbidden labor on five different Shabbats.", + "I replied to him: the law concerning intercourse with an animal is indeed comparable to [that concerning] Shabbat. Finally, Rabbi Akiva admits that the analogy is appropriate, yet he still rejects Rabbi Eliezer’s answer. He says that his question is about the case of intercourse with animals just as it is about Shabbat. In both cases you have one sin done on multiple occasions and he wants to know if the act should be divided into different acts for which he is liable for each individual sin, or if this is considered just one sin, for which he is liable only one hatat. Final notes on Rabbi Akiva: In my opinion this debate should be looked upon as a debate between two different approaches to law: realistic versus nominal. To Rabbi Eliezer, Rabbi Joshua and Rabban Gamaliel, if one does several different acts, each of which is a transgression, one is liable for each act. This is a “realistic” approach it examines what a person has actually done. In contrast, Rabbi Akiva adopts a more “nominal” approach. The person has committed one transgression, even though he did so on separate occasions. He ate forbidden foods, he had forbidden sex or he broke the prohibition of cooking, for instance, on Shabbat. Nominally, or legally, speaking, these are all one transgression, and therefore he should be liable for only one hatat. In general, I think that there is a trend in rabbinic Judaism to go from a more “realistic” approach, which probably typified an approach to halakhah commonly found among the priests, to a more “nominal” one. The leader of this movement seems to have been Rabbi Akiva." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah returns to the subject of the “asham talui.” This is a guilt offering brought by one who is not sure if he transgressed.", + "If [a person was] in doubt whether he had eaten forbidden fat or not, or even if he had certainly eaten [of it] but [was] in doubt as to whether it had the requisite quantity or less; or [if there were] before him permitted fat as well as forbidden fat, and he ate of one of them and does not know of which of them he ate; These are various scenarios in which a person is not sure whether he ate forbidden fat (helev) and even if he did eat forbidden fat, he is not sure if he ate enough to make him liable for a hatat.", + "Or if his wife and his sister were with him in the house and he unwittingly [had sex] with one of them and does not know with which of them he unwittingly [had sex]; In this (albeit hard to imagine scenario) a man is not sure whether he had sex with his wife or sister (for whom he would be liable a hatat).", + "Or if he did forbidden labor and does not know whether it was on Shabbat or on a weekday, Here, he is not sure if he did the forbidden labor on Shabbat or on a weekday (perhaps he was traveling and lost track of the days of the week).", + "He is liable for an asham talui. In each of these cases he cannot bring a hatat, because perhaps he did not transgress. Therefore, he brings an asham talui, which will offer him atonement in case he did transgress. If later he finds out for sure that he did transgress, then he will have to bring a hatat." + ], + [ + "Just as a person who ate forbidden fat twice in one spell of unawareness is liable to only one hatat, so too, when the transgression is in doubt, he is liable to only one asham talui.
If in the meantime he became aware [of the possible sin] he is liable to a separate asham talui for each act, just as he would [in similar circumstances] be liable to a separate hatat for each act.
Just as one is liable to separate hatats if he ate, in one spell of unawareness, forbidden fat and blood and piggul and notar, so, too, when the transgression is in doubt, he is liable to an asham talui for each different act.
[If both] forbidden fat and notar lay before a person and he ate one of them but does not know which;
Or if his menstruant wife and his sister were with him in his house and he has sex unwittingly with one of them and does not know with which,
Or if Shabbat and Yom Kippur [followed each other] and he did forbidden work at twilight and does not know on which day: Rabbi Eliezer declares him liable to a hatat; But Rabbi Joshua exempts him.
Rabbi Yose said: they did not dispute about a person that did work at twilight, for he is certainly exempt, for I may assume that part of the work was done on the one day and part on the following day.
About what did they dispute? About one who did work during the day itself but he did not know whether he did it on Shabbat or on Yom Kippur, or if he did work and did not know what manner of work he did: Rabbi Eliezer declares him liable to a hatat; But Rabbi Joshua exempts him. Rabbi Judah said: Rabbi Joshua exempts him even from an asham talui.
Today’s mishnah deals with two issues. The first part deals with multiple sins performed in one spell of unawareness. The second part deals with cases where a person definitely sinned, but he is not sure which of two possible sins he committed.
Section one: If a person eats many pieces of helev (forbidden fat) during one period of unawareness, for instance, he didn’t know that what he was eating was helev, or he didn’t know that helev was prohibited, he is liable for only one hatat. This counts as one sin, since it was done in one period of unawareness. Similarly, if in one period of unawareness he is not sure if he ate helev or something else, he is liable for only one asham talui, even if he did the act multiple times.
Section two: If in between sessions of eating something that might or might not be helev he finds out that it is perhaps helev, he is liable for an asham talui for each session. For instance he sits down to dinner and eats. Then his wife tells him, “Honey, that fat you just ate might have been helev.” He is now liable for an asham talui. If the same thing happens the next night, he is liable for two asham talui’s. This is the same rule that applies to cases where he knows that what he ate was helev he is obligated for one hatat for each period of unawareness.
Section three: If one eats foods that carry different prohibitions, one is liable for a hatat for each prohibition, if he knows he transgressed, and an asham talui for each transgression, if he is not sure that he transgressed. I.e. she sits down to dinner and when she is done her husband tells her, “Dear, you might just have eaten helev, blood and notar (remnant).” She is liable for three asham talui’s. If he said, “Dear, you ate helev, blood and notar,” she is liable for three hatats.
Sections 4-6: The second half of the mishnah is patterned after mishnah one. In that case, the person might have transgressed or he might not have transgressed. In the cases mentioned here he definitely transgressed, but he doesn’t know which transgression he did what forbidden food did he eat, which forbidden woman did he have sex with or what day did he do the forbidden labor on?
Rabbi Eliezer says that since he definitely did a forbidden act, he must bring a hatat, even though he is not sure what he actually did. We can see that Rabbi Eliezer adopts a more realistic approach one who certainly sins must bring a hatat.
Rabbi Joshua says that since he doesn’t know what he actually did, he is exempt. This seems to me to be more of a “nominal” approach. Since we cannot find a legal category under which to place his sin, we cannot make him liable.
Section seven: Rabbi Yose says that even Rabbi Eliezer would agree that if one does a sin at twilight between Shabbat and Yom Kippur he is exempt, because he might not have transgressed at all. It is possible that he did half of the prohibited labor on Shabbat and half on Yom Kippur, in which case he did not perform a forbidden labor on either day.
Rather the debate was over one who simply does not know whether he did the labor on Shabbat or on Yom Kippur, or knows that he performed a forbidden labor, but doesn’t know which labor it was. In this case Rabbi Eliezer makes him liable, for her certainly transgressed, even though we can’t find a legal category under which to place his transgression.
Section eight: Finally, Rabbi Judah explains that when Rabbi Joshua exempted him, he exempted him even from the asham talui. An asham talui is brought only in a case where a person might have sinned. Since this person definitely sinned, he cannot bring an asham talui. He is left without any sacrifice to bring." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is a continuation of yesterday’s mishnah. Later sages continue to argue what Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Joshua were arguing about.", + "Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Shimon Shezuri say: They did not dispute regarding transgression of the same name, that in that case he is liable. According to these rabbis, Rabbi Joshua agrees that if he is not certain what labor he did, but he knows that it was one of two possibilities that are both “of the same name,” meaning of the same category, that he is liable. For example, if he picked some sort of fruit, but he is not sure what type of fruit he picked grapes or figs. In this case, he definitely violated the transgression of “reaping” and therefore, Rabbi Joshua agrees that he is liable.", + "About what did they dispute? About transgressions of different names: Rabbi Eliezer declares him liable to a hatat, And Rabbi Joshua declares him exempt. They disagree about a case where he transgressed one of two possible categories of transgression, for instance he ate something forbidden but he is not sure whether it was helev or notar.", + "Rabbi Judah said: even if he intended to pick figs and he picked grapes, or grapes and he picked figs, white [grapes] and he picked black ones, or black and he picked white ones Rabbi Eliezer declares him liable to a hatat. And Rabbi Joshua declares him exempt. Rabbi Judah is directly opposed to Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Shimon Shezuri. Whereas the latter say that Rabbi Joshua exempts only if he is not sure what category of labor he performed, Rabbi Joshua exempts him even if he doesn’t know what color the grapes were, and even if he didn’t fulfill his intention as to what color grapes or figs he wanted to pick.", + "Rabbi Judah said: I wonder whether Rabbi Joshua indeed declared him exempt in such a case. For then why is it written, “with which he has sinned” (Leviticus 4:23)? To exclude mindless action. Rabbi Judah then acts surprised that Rabbi Joshua would exempt him from such a case. He therefore adjusts the exact case in which Rabbi Joshua exempts. Rabbi Joshua exempts a person who didn’t intend to do a labor at all. For instance, he intended to pick up a piece of unattached grass from the ground and he accidentally plucked a piece of attached grass. This is called “mindless” action and the doer is therefore exempt. However, if he intends to perform a labor and he does perform that labor, he is liable, even if he does not do exactly what he intended to do." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThe Torah prohibits the consumption of blood. One who eats blood is liable for karet if done intentionally, and that is why this halakhah is found in tractate Keritot. If done unwittingly, he is liable for a hatat.", + "If one ate blood of a slaughtered beast, a wild animal or a bird, either clean or unclean, or blood of an animal stabbed in his throat or neck, or of the blood of an animal slaughtered by having his throat ripped, or of the blood of the arteries whereby life-force escapes, he is liable. This is a list of all of the kinds of blood for which one is liable for a hatat, as long as he eats an olive’s worth of it. The blood does not have to come from a clean (kosher) animal, nor does it have to be the blood of an animal that is slaughtered in a kosher fashion. As long as the blood is the blood whose loss causes the death of the animal, one who eats it is liable. The idea that one is liable only for this type of blood seems to come from Leviticus 17:14, which refers to blood as the life-force. The rabbis deduce from here that one is liable only for blood which is the life-force, and not for other types of blood.", + "But [if he ate] the blood of the spleen or of the heart, or blood found in eggs, or blood of fish, or of locusts, or secondary blood, he is not liable. This is a list of either internal organs, taken out of the animal after it is dead, or blood found in other things, such as eggs, fish, or locusts, or blood that comes out after the animal is dead (secondary blood). While some of these are prohibited, they are only prohibited by the rabbis and not by the Torah; one who eats them is not liable to bring a hatat. Note that Leviticus 7:26 specifically states that animal (beast) and bird blood is prohibited. Since it doesn’t list fish or locusts, the rabbis deduce that fish and locust blood is not prohibited.", + "Rabbi Judah says: he is liable for secondary blood. Rabbi Judah holds that one is liable for eating secondary blood." + ], + [ + "Introduction\n“Sacrilege” refers to one who makes illicit use of Temple property. For instance, he eats meat from an animal that was sacrificial. The penalty for doing this is that he must bring an asham, and he must pay the value of that which he benefited, and he must also add an extra fifth to the restitution. Our mishnah deals with a person who may or may not have committed sacrilege.", + "Rabbi Akiva declares one liable to an asham talui for sacrilege; But the sages declare him exempt. Rabbi Akiva says that one who might have committed sacrilege must bring an asham talui. The other rabbis disagree because they hold that one brings an asham talui only for sins for which one brings a hatat if one knows one did that he sinned (see 1:2). Since the sacrifice for sacrilege is an asham and not a hatat, there can be no asham talui for a case of uncertainty.", + "Rabbi Akiba admits that he does not bring his restitution money until he becomes aware [of his trespass], when he must bring with it a certain asham. Rabbi Akiva holds that when one might have committed sacrilege he brings the asham talui immediately. However, he need not restore the value of the benefit he illicitly derived until he is certain that he committed sacrilege. At this point he will bring the restitution money, and a certain asham.", + "Rabbi Tarfon: Why should he bring two ashams? Rather, let him set aside the principal with an added fifth, and bring an asham the value of two sela's and stipulate: “If I did commit sacrilege, here is my restitution and this my asham; and if the sacrilege was doubtful, let the money be a freewill gift and the [offering an] asham talui;” since the same type of sacrifice he brings for a case where he doesn’t know, he brings for one where he does know. Rabbi Tarfon agrees with Rabbi Akiva on principle that one who might have committed sacrilege would have to bring an asham talui. However, there is an additional problem here that there is not for the regular asham talui. In other cases, when he finds out for certain that he sinned, he brings a hatat. In our case, he would end up bringing two ashams, which strikes Rabbi Tarfon as unreasonable or unnecessary. To avoid this problem he suggests a way of bringing one asham and making a stipulation, that if he did sin, then the asham is a certain asham and the restitution is his restitution. If he never finds out whether he sinned, then the asham is an asham talui, and the money will go towards buying freewill offerings. The reason that he can do can do this is that both ashams are of the same type of animal a two year old male ram. The hatat is of a different type, and therefore one could not make such a stipulation in other cases." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first part of this mishnah is a direct continuation of yesterday’s mishnah.", + "Rabbi Akiba: Your words seem plausible in the case of a minor amount of sacrilege; but if it was a case of doubtful sacrilege of a hundred manehs, would it not be more advantageous for him to bring an asham for two sela's rather than restore out of doubt the sum of a hundred manehs? Rabbi Akiba agrees with Rabbi Tarfon in the case of a minor amount of sacrilege. Rabbi Akiva agrees with Rabbi Tarfon in a case where the sacrilege was of a small amount. In this case, the person might save money by not having to bring two asham sacrifices. However, if the sacrilege was for a very large amount, a hundred manehs, he would not be well served to pay the restitution and save himself from having to bring two ashams. Note that the debate seems to be practical if someone is not sure if he committed sacrilege, what would be the cheapest way for him to receive possible atonement. There does not seem to be a debate about whether a person could do either according to Rabbi Tarfon or Rabbi Akiva. In the end, the mishnah notes that Rabbi Akiva agrees with Rabbi Tarfon, that if the sacrilege was for a small amount, he can make a stipulation and get away with bringing only one asham.", + "If a woman brought a bird hatat for a case of a doubtful miscarriage, and prior to the pinching of its neck she learned that the birth was a certainty, she can offer it as a certain hatat, for that which she offers in the case of certainty is of the same kind as that which she offers in the case of doubt. If a woman miscarries and is not sure whether it was the type of miscarriage that would make her liable for a hatat or not (see 1:4), she brings a hatat, but since the hatat comes for a case of doubt the hatat is not eaten. If before the hatat’s head is pinched (this is how sacrificial birds were slaughtered in the Temple) she finds out that the miscarriage was one for which she is certainly liable, then she can use the same bird as a certain hatat. The reason is that the same type of bird is used for both offerings." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to deal with the issue of doubtful sacrilege.", + "[If there was] a piece of hullin meat and a piece of sacred meat, and a person ate one of them and does not know which of them he ate, he is exempt. Rabbi Akiba declares him liable for an asham talui. This is the same debate we saw in mishnah two of this chapter. According to Rabbi Akiva one must bring an asham talui for a doubtful case of sacrilege.", + "If he then ate the second [piece], he is liable to a certain asham. If he eats both pieces of meat, then we know for sure that he ate sacrificial meat, and he is obviously liable for sacrilege.", + "If he ate one [piece] and another came and ate the other, each of them is liable to an asham talui, the words of Rabbi Akiba. Rabbi Shimon says: they together bring one asham. Rabbi Yose said: Two people cannot bring one asham. In this case, one person definitely ate a piece of sacrificial meat, but one person did not. According to Rabbi Akiva, they both bring an asham talui. Rabbi Shimon agrees in principle with Rabbi Akiva, but says that in this case, there is no need for them both to bring the asham talui. They can together bring one asham, and make a stipulation, that if person A ate the sacrificial meat, it is his sacrifice, and if person B ate the sacrificial meat, it is his sacrifice. Rabbi Yose says that such a system does not work and that two people cannot bring one asham. It seems that he would hold like Rabbi Akiva that each person must bring his own asham." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah is virtually the same as yesterday’s mishnah, except that in today’s mishnah a person is not sure whether he ate permitted unconsecrated fat, or helev, for which one brings a hatat. In other words, yesterday the question was whether one had to bring an asham, today the question is whether one needs to bring a hatat.\nSince the mishnah is so similar to yesterday’s mishnah, my comments below are quite brief.", + "If there was a piece of forbidden fat and a piece of hullin [permitted fat], and a person ate one of them and does not know which, he is liable to an asham talui. Since he doesn’t know if he sinned, he brings an asham talui.", + "If he then ate the second piece, he is brings a hatat. Since he knows that he did sin, he brings a hatat, the sacrifice for accidentally eating helev, forbidden fat.", + "If he ate the one [piece] and another came and ate the other, each of them is liable to an asham talui. Rabbi Shimon says: they together bring one hatat. Rabbi Yose says: two people cannot bring one hatat. According to the first opinion, since we don’t know which of the two ate helev, they both bring an asham talui. This is not any different, at least from the perspective of the individual, from the first case. Rabbi Shimon says that the two people can bring a hatat jointly and stipulate that if the first one ate the helev, that it is his hatat, and if the second one did, it is his hatat. Rabbi Yose says that people cannot jointly bring a hatat." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn today’s mishnah, he is not sure whether he ate forbidden fat, for which he would need to bring a hatat, or consecrated, permitted fat, for which he would need to bring an asham.\nFor the parts of this mishnah that have already been explained above, I will just make reference to those mishnayot.", + "If there was a piece of forbidden fat and a piece of consecrated [permitted fat], and a person ate one of them and does not know which, he is liable to an asham talui; He brings the asham talui for the fact that he might have eaten forbidden fat. For Rabbi Akiva who holds that one brings an asham talui for a case of doubtful sacrilege, the asham talui also covers the possibility that he ate consecrated fat. In other words, one asham talui can cover two possible sins, since we know he only did one of them.", + "If he then ate the second piece, he is liable to a hatat and a certain asham. In this case we know that he ate forbidden fat and consecrated fat, so he must bring a hatat and an asham.", + "If he ate the one piece and another came and ate the other, each of them brings an asham talui. Rabbi Shimon holds: they together bring a hatat and an asham. Rabbi Yose: two people cannot together bring one hatat and one asham. See mishnayot 4-5." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn today’s mishnah, we find on the person’s plate two pieces of forbidden fat, one consecrated and one unconsecrated. The plot thickens!", + "If there was a piece of unconsecrated forbidden fat and a piece of consecrated forbidden fat, and a person ate one of them and does not know which, he is liable to a hatat. Rabbi Akiva says: also to an asham talui. We know that this person has eaten forbidden fat, so he definitely must bring a hatat. According to the first opinion, that is all that he brings. According to Rabbi Akiva he also brings an asham talui for doubtful sacrilege. This has been Rabbi Akiva’s position since mishnah two.", + "If he then ate the second piece, he is liable to two hatats and one certain asham. If he ate the second piece in a second period of unawareness, he is liable for two hatats, one for each piece of forbidden fat. He is also liable for an asham for the sacrilege.", + "If he ate one piece and another came and ate the other, each of them is liable to a hatat. Rabbi Akiva says: each of them brings [in addition] an asham talui. Rabbi Shimon holds: each of them brings a hatat and together they bring one asham. Rabbi Yose: two people cannot bring one asham. Both people are liable for a hatat for eating forbidden fat. According to Rabbi Akiva, they are both also liable for an asham talui for doubtful sacrilege. Rabbi Shimon says that they can bring one certain asham jointly whereas Rabbi Yose says that this is not possible. This is the same debate we have seen over and over since mishnah four." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe final mishnah of our chapter deals with a case where one of the pieces of meat was regular forbidden fat and the other was forbidden fat and notar (remnant).", + "If there was a piece of forbidden fat and another piece of forbidden fat [which was at the same time] notar, and a person ate one of them and does not know which, he is liable to a hatat and to an asham talui. If he eats one of the pieces, he certainly must bring one hatat for eating helev. He must also bring an asham talui lest he ate the piece that is also notar.", + "If he then ate the second piece, he is liable to three hatats. Two hatats are for the forbidden fat, assuming that they were eaten in two periods of unawareness and the third hatat is for eating notar.", + "If he ate one piece and another came and ate the other, each of them brings a hatat and an asham talui. Rabbi Shimon says: each of them brings a hatat and together they bring another hatat. Rabbi Yose says: any hatat that is brought for the expiation of sin cannot be offered by two people. They both must bring one hatat for they both certainly ate helev. According to the first opinion they both bring an asham talui, for each one of them might have also eaten helev. Rabbi Shimon holds they can jointly bring a second hatat. And Rabbi Yose again holds that two people can never jointly bring a sacrifice that comes to expiate for sin." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nAn asham talui is brought when a person is not sure if he has sinned. Our mishnah discussed what happens if after he brought it, he finds out that he did not sin (i.e. he ate the right piece of meat, or perhaps he had sex with his wife and not his sister).", + "If a person brought an asham talui and then found out that he did not sin: If it was before the animal was slaughtered, it may go out to pasture among the flock, the words of Rabbi Meir. The sages say: it goes out to pasture until it becomes blemished and it is then sold, and the money goes for freewill-offerings. Rabbi Eliezer says: it shall be offered up, for if it does not expiate this sin, it will expiate another sin. If before the animal is slaughtered he finds out that he didn’t sin, Rabbi Meir holds that the animal is not at all holy. It can go out to the flock with the rest of the hullin animals. The other sages say that it is holy and therefore it does not automatically revert to being hullin. However, it also cannot be sacrificed, because now it is not necessary. The solution is to let it go out to pasture until it becomes blemished. At this point the animal may be sold and he must use the money from the sale to buy freewill offerings. Rabbi Eliezer assumes that a person might frequently commit sins which require expiation, and he might not even know that he has done so. Therefore, he can go ahead and sacrifice this asham talui, and it will expiate for other unknown sins. Note that the rest of the mishnah does not go according to Rabbi Eliezer.", + "If he learns of it after it was slaughtered, the blood shall be spilled out and the flesh is removed to the place of burning. If he learns that he didn’t sin after the animal was already slaughtered, then the blood must be poured out into the aqueduct that runs through the Temple, and the flesh must be burned. In other words, it is a disqualified sacrifice.", + "If the blood had already been tossed [onto the altar], the flesh may be eaten. Rabbi Yose says: even if the blood is still in the vessel, it should be tossed and the flesh then eaten. Once the blood has been tossed onto the altar, the sacrifice is valid, even if it turns out that he didn’t sin. The flesh can be eaten. Rabbi Yose holds that once the blood is in the vessel, where it is put immediately after the animal is slaughtered, the sacrificial process can continue even if it turns out that the person didn’t sin." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nYesterday’s mishnah dealt with a person who set aside an asham talui and then found out that he did not sin. Today’s mishnah deals with other situations in which a person sets aside an animal and then finds out that the circumstances that caused him to set aside the animal were not as he thought they were.", + "The law is different with a certain asham: If before the animal was slaughtered, it may go out to pasture among the flock; If after it was slaughtered, it shall be buried; If after the blood was tossed, the flesh must be removed to the place of burning. The law concerning a certain asham is different from the law concerning an asham talui. If before it is slaughtered it turns out that he didn’t sin, then the animal can go out to pasture. This is simply a case of “mistaken consecration” and in such a case the consecration is not valid. This case differs from that of the asham talui which was dedicated from the outset with the possibility that the person did not sin. Therefore, it, according to the sages’ opinion in mishnah one, is holy even if it turns out he didn’t sin. Once the animal is slaughtered, it counts as “hullin that were slaughtered in the courtyard” and it therefore must be buried. It is forbidden to derive benefit from it. If the blood was already tossed, then the flesh must be burned in the place of burning, because it looks like a sacrifice that has been disqualified. Disqualified sacrifices are always disposed of by being burned in the “place of burning.”", + "The law is also different regarding an ox to be stoned: If before it was stoned, it may go out to pasture among the flock; If after it was stoned, it is permitted for use. This section deals with an ox that is to be stoned for having murdered. If before it is stoned it turns out that it didn’t actually commit the murder, the ox can simply return to the herd. If it has already been stoned, one can derive benefit from the carcass (but not eat it, of course, because it is not kosher), which would not be the case if it was stoned for a murder it had committed. In that case it is forbidden to derive benefit from the carcass.", + "The law is also different regarding the heifer whose neck is to be broken: If before its neck was broken, it may go out to pasture among the flock. If after its neck was broken, it shall be buried on the spot, for it was from the outset brought in a matter of doubt, it has atoned for the doubt, and so has served its purpose. There is also a different rule with regard to the heifer whose neck is broken for a case where a murderer has not been identified. If the murderer is found before the neck is broken, the heifer simply returns to the flock. If after its neck is broken the murderer is found, then the heifer must be buried. It is forbidden to derive benefit from its flesh, because its neck was broken to atone for a case of an unsolved murder. Since when its neck was broken the murder was indeed unsolved, it has fulfilled its role and it is treated like all other broken-neck heifers one cannot derive benefit from the carcass." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn this mishnah Rabbi Eliezer and the sages debate whether one can/should bring an asham talui “every day.”", + "Rabbi Eliezer says: one may freely offer an asham talui every day and at any time he pleases and such a sacrifice is called the asham of the pious. Rabbi Eliezer holds that one can freely offer an asham talui whenever he wants, even if he doesn’t know that he has sinned. This differs from the rules concerning a hatat. A hatat can be brought only by one who knows that he sinned, because a hatat must effect atonement. In contrast, according to Rabbi Eliezer, the asham talui does not really effect atonement, because when the person finds out that he actually sinned, he must bring a hatat. This is evidence that the asham talui is really just a freewill offering. Note that this matches his opinion in mishnah one. This asham is called “the asham of the pious (hasid)” because one brings it just in case he sins.", + "They said of Bava ben Buti that he used to freely offer an asham talui every day, except on the day after Yom Kippur. He declared: By this temple! Had they allowed me, I would have offered one even then, but they said to me, wait until you have come to a state of doubt.” The mishnah now relates the story of Bava ben Buti who would bring an asham talui every day (besides being pious, he must have been quite rich) except for the day after Yom Kippur. Since Yom Kippur atones for all sins, and certainly for ones which a person doesn’t even know if he committed, he didn’t need to bring it that one day. But, he goes on to say that he wanted to bring an asham talui that day as well. The other sages seem to have convinced him that he shouldn’t do so until there is at least a chance that he sinned. It is possible that the other sages worried that if he would bring an asham talui on the day after Yom Kippur, people would think that Yom Kippur doesn’t atone. Therefore, they opposed his doing so.", + "But the sages say one may not bring an asham talui except for a sin that [is punished by] karet [when done intentionally and for which one brings a hatat [when done unwittingly. The other sages reject Rabbi Eliezer. They hold that one can bring an asham talui only if he thinks he might have committed a sin for which he would be liable for karet if done intentionally or a hatat if done unwittingly. He cannot simply freely donate an asham talui out of piety." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nSince yesterday’s mishnah dealt with Yom Kippur, today’s mishnah deals with the effect that Yom Kippur can have on those who are liable to bring expiatory sacrifices.", + "Those that are liable to hatats or to certain ashams and Yom Kippur passes over them, are still liable to bring them after Yom Kippur. Yom Kippur does not atone for sins if he finds out before Yom Kippur that he certainly sinned. Thus if one becomes liable to bring a hatat or a certain asham before Yom Kippur, he is still liable after Yom Kippur.", + "Those that are liable to asham talui’s are exempt. However, if he has doubtfully sinned and needs to bring an asham talui, Yom Kippur atones and he need not bring the asham talui after Yom Kippur.", + "He who has committed a doubtful sin on Yom Kippur, even at twilight, is exempt, because the whole of the day effects atonement. Yom Kippur atones for doubtful sins even if they are committed (unwittingly) on Yom Kippur itself, and even at the very end of the day. It is actually hard to imagine this happening unless one simply miscalculates the date of Yom Kippur and eats meat which might or might not have been forbidden fat. For if one knows that it is Yom Kippur, he shouldn’t have been eating in the first place." + ], + [ + "If a woman is liable to a bird hatat brought in a case of doubt and Yom Kippur intervenes, she is still bound to offer it after Yom Kippur, because it renders her fit to eat sacrifices. In yesterday’s mishnah we learned that if a person was liable to bring an asham talui because he might have sinned, and Yom Kippur intervenes, he is no longer liable to bring the asham talui. In contrast, today we learn that if a woman is liable to bring a doubtful hatat because she had a miscarriage that might or might not make her liable to bring a hatat, she must bring the bird hatat even if Yom Kippur comes first. The reason she must bring the hatat is that without doing so she cannot eat sacrifices.", + "If a hatat of a bird was brought for a matter of doubt and, after the pinching of its neck it became known [that there was no need for it], it must be buried. If the woman finds out that she didn’t need to bring the hatat, but the bird’ neck has already been slaughtered by having its neck pinched, then it is treated like a non-sacred bird slaughtered in the Temple which must be buried. This is different from a bird hatat that is brought in a case of doubt which is burned (see Temurah 7:6)." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah deals with one who sets apart two selas to buy an asham, as he is supposed to do (see 5:2) but then for some reason doesn’t simply buy one ram to be used as the asham. Instead he buys two rams. The question is what to do with the extra ram. The mishnah also addresses the possibility that one of the rams was bought for non-sacred purposes, in which case he has committed sacrilege.", + "A man set apart two sela's for an asham:
If he bought with it two rams for an asham; if one was of the value of two sela's, it may be offered for his asham, and the other must be let out to pasture until it becomes blemished when it is sold and its value goes for freewill-offerings. If he buys two rams with two selas, then at the time of purchase could have been worth two selas. However, by the time he comes to sacrifice one of them, it has gone up in value and reached the requisite two selas. That ram can be offered as his asham. The other ram is holy because it was bought to be an asham. However, it cannot be offered as an asham because its owner has already received atonement through the other asham. Therefore, it must go out to pasture until it becomes blemished. Then it can be sold and the money used to buy free-will offerings.", + "If he had bought with the money two rams for hullin use, one worth two sela's and the other worth ten zuz, that which is worth two sela's should be offered for his asham and the other for his sacrilege. If he used the money to buy two hullin, non-sacred rams, he has now committed sacrilege. He bought two rams, and one is now worth two selas (again, it has gone up in value). He can offer that one as the asham sacrifice that he is liable to bring for having committed sacrilege. The other ram is worth ten zuz. A sela is worth four zuz. So ten zuz is enough to count for the two sela’s that he must restore for having committed sacrilege, and the other two zuz is the added one-fifth, which the rabbis counted as being one-fifth of the final amount and not the original amount (in this case one-fifth of ten zuz and not eight zuz). So he can take this ten zuz ram and sacrifice it as the asham that he was originally liable for, because it is worth 1/5 more than that asham needed to be. Strangely enough, it all worked out for him in the end.", + "[If he had bought with the money] one for an asham and the other for ordinary use, if that for the asham was worth two sela's it should be offered for his asham and the other for his sacrilege, and with it he shall bring a sela and its fifth. In this case he again buys two rams, this time one for the asham and the other for a hullin ram. If the one for his asham is worth two selas he can sacrifice it as an asham. If the other ram is also worth two selas, then it must be used as an asham for his sacrilege. Along with that he must bring another sela and a fifth as reparation for having committed sacrilege. This extra money will be used to buy free-will offerings." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah contains some rules governing the hatat.", + "If a man set aside his hatat and then died, his son should not offer it after him. If the owner of a hatat has died, the animal cannot be offered, not even by his son. Rather, it must be left to die (see Temurah 2:2).", + "A man may not offer [what was set apart] for one sin for another sin. Even if he had set apart [the hatat] for forbidden fat that he had eaten yesterday, he may not offer it for forbidden fat that he has eaten today, for it is said, “His offering ... for his sin” (Leviticus 4:28) the offering must be for that particular sin. If an animal was set aside to be a hatat for one sin, he cannot offer it for another sin, even if it is the same sin, such as eating helev. This is derived from a midrashic reading of Leviticus 4:28." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nMost of this mishnah deals with the “higher and lower sacrifice” which is the sacrifice that is more or less expensive depending upon the wealth of the sinner. This type of sacrifice is mentioned in Leviticus 5, where there are three levels (lamb/goat, birds, grain) and Leviticus 12-14 where there are two levels (lamb/goat and birds).", + "One may bring with [money] dedicated to buy a lamb [for a hatat] a goat, or with [what was] dedicated to buy a goat [one may bring] a lamb; Or with [what was] dedicated to buy a lamb or a goat [one may bring] turtle-doves or young pigeons; Or with [what was] dedicated to buy turtle-doves or young pigeons [one may bring] the tenth of an ephah. If one sets aside money to buy a female lamb (one year old) as a hatat he can use it to buy a female goat (two years old) because both are usable as a hatat. If he sets aside money to buy a lamb or goat and then becomes poor he can use the money to buy bird offerings, as section two explains. Similarly, if he sets aside money to buy bird offerings and then becomes even poorer, he can use the money to buy a tenth of an ephah of grain. This would only work for those who can bring such an offering, see 2:4.", + "How so? If a man set apart [money] for a lamb or a goat [for a hatat] and he became poor, he may bring a bird-offering; If he became still poorer he may bring the tenth of an ephah. This section simply explains section one.", + "If a man set apart [money] for the tenth of an ephah and he became richer, he must bring a bird-offering; If he became still richer he must bring a lamb or a goat. Just as one who grows poor can use money set aside to buy an expensive offering to buy a cheaper one, so too one who becomes rich can/must use money set aside to buy a cheap offering to buy a more expensive one.", + "If a man set apart a lamb or a goat and they became blemished, he may bring with their price a bird-offering; But if he set apart a bird-offering and it became blemished, he may not bring with its price the tenth of an ephah, since a bird-offering cannot be redeemed. If a man set apart a lamb or goat and then became poor and the animal became blemished, he may sell the animal and use the money to buy a cheaper offering. However, if he sets aside a bird offering and it loses a limb (this counts as a blemish for birds) and he becomes poor enough to offer a grain sacrifice he cannot sell it and use its price to buy grain, because there is no way to redeem bird sacrifices. The verses about redeeming a sanctified animal (see Leviticus 27:11-13) refer only to a beast (cow, sheep or goat). Bird offerings can never be redeemed." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe final mishnah of our tractate deals with the question of why some things are usually mentioned before others in the Torah.", + "Rabbi Shimon says: lambs are mentioned before goats in all places. You might think that it is because they are choicer, therefore Scripture states, “And if he brings a lamb as his offering,” (Leviticus 4:32) to teach that both are equal. In the Torah “lambs” are always mentioned before “goats,” when the two come in one verse. See for instance Exodus 12:5, or Leviticus 5:6. This is not because there is any preference to offer a lamb. The proof of this is Leviticus 4:32, which mentions the lamb, whereas in vs. 28 of the same chapter the goat is mentioned. The Torah switches the order to let us know that the two are equal.", + "Turtle-doves are mentioned before young pigeons in all places. You might think that it is because they are choicer, therefore Scripture states, “A young pigeon or a turtle-dove for a hatat,” (Leviticus 12:6) to teach that both are equal. The same is true with regard to turtle doves and pigeons see Leviticus 1:14, 5:7; 12:8; 14:22 and others. To teach that they are the same, the Torah switches the order in Leviticus 12:6.", + "The father comes before the mother in all places. You might think that it is because the honor due a father is greater than the honor due a mother, therefore Scripture states, “A man shall fear his mother and his father,” (Leviticus 19: to teach that both are equal. But the sages have said: the father comes before the mother in all places, because both a son and his mother are obligated to honor the father. Generally, a father is mentioned before the mother, for instance Exodus 20:12; 21:15, 17; Leviticus 20:9 and others. To teach that both are equal in terms of honor, the Torah switches the order once in Leviticus 19. The other rabbis, however, hold that the father does take precedence over the mother. This is because a wife is obligated to honor her husband. Personally, I will admit that this is one of those times that one could say that the Mishnah is best explained when we remember that it was written by men.", + "And so it is also with the study of Torah; if the son has been worthy [to sit] before the teacher, the teacher comes before the father in all places, because both a man and his father are obligated to honor the teacher. Finally, at the top of the ladder of respect come those who teach Torah. Both the father and son are obligated to honor the teacher of Torah. Congratulations! We have finished Tractate Keritot! It is a tradition at this point to thank God for helping us finish learning the tractate and to commit ourselves to going back and relearning it, so that we may not forget it and so that its lessons will stay with us for all of our lives. The main topic of Keritot was sacrifices brought in cases of doubt, whether the hatat or the asham talui. I think that this subject helps get us into the mindset of Temple worship. A sacrifice is not a penalty but rather an opportunity for atonement. Indeed, one who transgresses intentionally is not allowed to offer a sacrifice to achieve atonement. But one who is not sure whether he transgressed or not may actually be afraid that without the ability to bring a sacrifice, he will never be able to achieve atonement. Tractate Keritot taught us that there were two ways for one to receive atonement for an uncertain sin: the asham talui and Yom Kippur. Both of these institutions remind us that we need and can fix not just the things that we know we did wrong, but those that we might have done wrong as well. I hope you have enjoyed Keritot. Tomorrow we begin Tractate Meilah." + ] + ] + ] + }, + "versions": [ + [ + "Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp", + "http://learn.conservativeyeshiva.org/mishnah/" + ] + ], + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה כריתות", + "categories": [ + "Mishnah", + "Modern Commentary on Mishnah", + "English Explanation of Mishnah", + "Seder Kodashim" + ], + "schema": { + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה כריתות", + "enTitle": "English Explanation of Mishnah Keritot", + "key": "English Explanation of Mishnah Keritot", + "nodes": [ + { + "heTitle": "הקדמה", + "enTitle": "Introduction" + }, + { + "heTitle": "", + "enTitle": "" + } + ] + } +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Kodashim/English Explanation of Mishnah Kinnim/English/Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp.json b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Kodashim/English Explanation of Mishnah Kinnim/English/Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..7554fc4e3915d1495f3bae5ba4bfaccf774c5c39 --- /dev/null +++ b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Kodashim/English Explanation of Mishnah Kinnim/English/Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp.json @@ -0,0 +1,142 @@ +{ + "language": "en", + "title": "English Explanation of Mishnah Kinnim", + "versionSource": "http://learn.conservativeyeshiva.org/mishnah/", + "versionTitle": "Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp", + "status": "locked", + "license": "CC-BY", + "shortVersionTitle": "Dr. Joshua Kulp", + "actualLanguage": "en", + "languageFamilyName": "english", + "isBaseText": true, + "isSource": true, + "isPrimary": true, + "direction": "ltr", + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה קינים", + "categories": [ + "Mishnah", + "Modern Commentary on Mishnah", + "English Explanation of Mishnah", + "Seder Kodashim" + ], + "text": { + "Introduction": [ + "Kinim is the plural of the word \"ken\" and it refers here to a pair of birds brought as a sacrifice (in Biblical and modern Hebrew, ken is a nest). There are several cases in the Torah where a person has to bring a pair of birds, either turtledoves or pigeons, one as an olah and one as a hatat. For instance, concerning the zav (man with abnormal genital discharge), Leviticus 15:14-15 states, \"On the eighth day he shall take two turtledoves or two pigeons….The priest shall offer them, the one as a sin offering and the other as a burnt offering.\" The zavah brings the same offerings (ibid 29-30). A woman also brings these offerings after childbirth (Leviticus 12:6-8), if she is not wealthy enough to bring a ram. A nazirite who was made impure brings them on the eighth day of his purity ritual (Numbers 6:10-11). There are other such cases as well (see Leviticus 5:1-10). A person can also voluntarily bring bird sacrifices (see Leviticus 1:14-17). In this case the bird is a sacrificed as an olah (burnt offering) and not a hatat.", + "When a person brings a pair of birds as a sacrifice (a ken) the hatat must be sacrificed before the olah. Our mishnah deals with cases where birds get mixed up and it is not clear which was meant to be an olah and which was meant to be a hatat. There are several rules and definitions that will help with learning this mathematical masekhet.", + "1) When a person brings a pair of birds as a ken, he can pre-determine which is an olah and which is a hatat. This is called a \"determined ken\" (sounds like a doll who wants his Barbie!) 2) If he doesn't determine which is which, the priest offering them can decide. This is called an \"open ken.\" 3) If a person brings several open kinim together, the priest can mix them up and offer half as olot and half as hataot. 4) If she brings them each as an individual pair the priest cannot mix them all up, and in each pair he must offer one as a hatat and one as an olah.", + "It seems that there is both a practical and a theoretical interest in our tractate. On the one hand, it is likely that in the Temple, with the many, many bird sacrifices that people must have brought, these sacrifices would have become mixed up one with the other. The mishnah uses the feminine throughout because women would have had to bring these kinim upon childbirth, which seems to be the most frequent occurrence. The tractate also has great theoretical interest because rabbis seem to enjoy trying to figure out the status of mixtures, be they mixtures of milk and meat, terumah and hullin or hatat and olah birds. " + ], + "": [ + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThe first mishnah of our tractate deals with a few general rules regarding bird and other sacrifices.", + "A bird hatat is performed below [the red line], but a beast hatat is performed above [the red line]. A bird olah is performed above, but a beast olah below. If he changed this procedure with either, then the offering is disqualified. There was a red line that ran through the middle of the altar. The blood of the bird hatat was sprinkled below this line, whereas the beast hatat (cow, sheep or goat) is sprinkled above the altar, on the corners of the altar. The opposite is true of the olah the bird olah is done above and the beast olah is done below. These rules must be followed precisely and if they are not, the sacrifice is invalid.", + "The seder [ordered ritual] in the case of kinnim is as follows: In the case of obligatory offerings, one [bird] is a hatat and one an olah. In the case of vows and freewill offerings, however, all are olot. As I explained in the introduction, when one brings a ken (a pair of birds) as a mandatory sacrifice, one bird is an olah and one is a hatat. However, if one voluntarily dedicates a ken, both birds are olot.", + "What constitutes a vow? When one says: \"It is incumbent upon me to bring an olah.\" And what constitutes a freewill-offering? When one says: \"Behold, this shall be an olah.\" What is the [practical] difference between vows and freewill offerings? In the case of vows, if they die or are stolen, one is responsible for their replacement; But in the case of freewill offerings, if they die or are stolen, one is not responsible for their replacement. The mishnah now explains the difference between a vow offering (a neder) and a freewill offering (a nedavah). A neder is when one promises to bring a certain type of offering, either an olah or a shelamim (wellbeing offering). For example if he promises to bring a bird olah, he must bring two birds as an olah. If he sets aside a bird and it is lost or stolen before it can be sacrificed, he must bring a replacement. The case of the nedavah is different. In this case, one points at an animal and promises to bring that animal as a sacrifice. For instance, he points at a sheep and promises to bring it. If the sheep is lost or dies, he is not responsible for its replacement because he was only responsible to bring that sheep as long as it was alive or available. Note that this last section is not connected specifically to our tractate which deals with bird sacrifices. Rather it is a general rule with regard to voluntary sacrifices." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah begins to discuss different types of bird-offerings that get mixed up one with the other, and what can be done to best remedy the situation.", + "If a hatat becomes mixed up with an olah, or an olah with a hatat, were it even one in ten thousand, they all must be left to die. If a bird hatat and a bird olah become mixed up, they cannot be sacrificed because the blood of the hatat is sprinkled on the lower portion of the altar and the blood of the olah on the upper portion. And as we learned in yesterday's mishnah, if he spills the blood in the wrong area, the sacrifice is disqualified. If these were animal sacrifices, they could be left until they become blemished and then redeemed. However, bird sacrifices cannot be redeemed (see Menahot 12:1). Therefore, there is nothing left to do but let the birds die.", + "If a hatat becomes mixed up with [unassigned] obligatory [bird] offerings, the only ones that are valid are those that correspond to the number of hatats among the obligatory offerings. The rest of the mishnah deals with a case where either a hatat bird (offered individually for a sin) or an olah bird (offered voluntarily) becomes mixed up with kinim, that is a pair or pairs of birds, one of which must be offered as a hatat and one as an olah. The cases here refer to undetermined kinim the owner did not determine which bird from each pair will be a hatat and which will be an olah. If one hatat bird is mixed up with one ken, he can offer one bird as a hatat, because of any two birds he takes, one can be a hatat, either the \"other\" hatat or the hatat of the ken. But he can't offer two as a hatat, lest both of the birds are from the ken, and one of those birds must be an olah. And he can't offer any of the birds as an olah, lest the bird he tries to offer is the hatat. The same is true if he has two kinim he can offer two hatats, for two birds have to be hataot.", + "Similarly, if an olah becomes mixed up with [unassigned] obligatory [bird] offerings, the only ones that are valid are those that correspond to the number of olot among the obligatory offerings The same rule applies if the \"other\" bird is an olah. He can now offer as many olot as there are kinim.", + "[This rule holds true] whether the [unassigned] obligatory offerings are in the majority and the freewill-offerings in the minority, or the freewill-offerings are in the majority and those that are obligatory in the minority, or whether they are both equal in number. The \"voluntary\" bird offerings referred to here are olot because most voluntary bird offerings were olot. The mishnah reiterates that the rule taught above holds true no matter whether there are many voluntary bird offerings and just a few mandatory ones, or vice versa or the same number. One can offer only as many olot the number of olot found in the mandatory offerings." + ], + [ + "When is this so? When obligatory offerings [get mixed up] with voluntary offerings. The rules taught in mishnah two refer to cases where obligatory offerings (kinim) become mixed up with olot or hataot whose status has been determined.", + "When, however, obligatory offerings get mixed up one with another, with one [pair] belonging to one [woman] and the other pair to another [woman], or two [pairs] belonging to one and two [pairs] to another, or three [pairs] to one and three [pairs] to another, then half of these are valid and the other half disqualified. However, if obligatory offerings get mixed up and half of the total offerings belong to one person and half to another, then the priest can take half of the birds and offer half of them as hataot and the other half as olot. Let's take the simplest example, that of two kinim getting mixed up. If he offers one as a hatat and one as an olah, he is guaranteed to be correct. Because if one is from one ken and the other from one ken, then he has offered half of each ken. And if they are both from the same ken, then he has offered them properly. However, he can't offer two hataot or two olot, lest both birds belonged to the same woman and are part of the same ken. The same will hold true no matter how many kinim get mixed up, as long as the number brought by each person is the same.", + "If one [pair] belongs to one [woman] and two pairs to another, or three pairs to another, or ten pairs to another or one hundred to another, only the lesser number remains valid. If the numbers are uneven, then the priest can only offer according to the lower number. For instance, if one woman brought one ken and another woman brought two, he can only offer one hatat and one olah. For if he were to offer more than one olah or hatat, he might have offered both birds brought by the first woman as an olah (or hatat) and only one can be of each type. This same rule will hold true no matter how large the inequity. Even if one woman brings 100 pairs and one brings one, only two birds, one a hatat and one an olah, can be offered.", + "Whether they are of the same denomination or of two denominations, or whether they belong to one woman or to two. Denomination refers to the reason why the woman had to bring a sacrifice. This shall be clarified in tomorrow's mishnah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah is an explanation of the last line of yesterday's mishnah, which referred to different \"names.\"", + "What is meant by one \"name\"? For a birth and a birth, or for zivah and zivah, that is one name. And \"two names\"? For a birth, [and the other] for a zivah. There are two main reasons why a woman would bring a ken either for a childbirth or after having an abnormal genital discharge, called \"zivah.\" If she brings two kinnim, one for this birth and one for this birth, or one for this zivah and one for this zivah, then the priest can only offer one bird as an olah and one as a hatat, as we explained yesterday. The same is true even if the two kinnim she set aside were for different \"names\" one for a birth and one for zivah.", + "What is meant by \"two women\"? [When] one [woman] brings [her offering] for a birth and the other for a birth, or [when one brings] for a zivah and the other for a zivah this is \"of one name\". And a case \"of two names\"? When one brings for a birth and the other for a zivah. If multiple women set aside kinnim for either one \"name\" of for many \"names,\" they can only sacrifice as many hataot and olot as the fewest number of kinim brought by one of the women, as we explained in yesterday's mishnah.", + "Rabbi Yose says: when two women purchased their kinnim in partnership, or gave the price of their kinnim to the priest [for him to purchase them], then the priest can offer whichever one he wants as a hatat or as an olah, whether they are of one name or of two names. The above section, as well as mishnayot 2-3 dealt with cases where women gave their kinnim to the priest and the birds got mixed up. Rabbi Yose notes that they can avoid this problem by either buying their birds together or by giving the money to buy the birds to the priest. In both of these cases, the priest buys or receives all of the necessary birds. He can then determine which will be a hatat and an olah for this woman and which will be a hatat and an olah for the other woman. He can even do this if they are brought for different reasons. If done this way, even if the birds get mixed up, there will not be a problem." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nYou might call our mishnah \"the pigeon that escaped.\" It deals with a case where a single bird from an \"unassigned ken\" one in which it has not been determined which bird is a hatat and which is an olah escapes. The question is: what is the status of the bird that remains and the bird that escapes.", + "If from an unassigned pair of birds a single pigeon flew into the open air, or flew among birds that had been left to die, or if one [of the pair] died, then he must take a mate for the second one. In all of these cases, one bird leaves the unassigned ken. Since both birds were unassigned, all he has to do is take a new bird for the remaining bird and offer one as a hatat and one as an olah. However, if it had been a \"determined ken,\" one where we already knew which was which, he couldn't sacrifice the remaining one unless he knew whether it was the hatat or the olah. We should note that in all of these cases, nothing can be done with the bird that flew away, either because it is gone or dead, or because it became mixed up with other birds that must be left to die.", + "If it flew among birds that are to be offered up, it becomes invalid and it invalidates another bird as its counterpart [in the pair]; for the pigeon that flew away is invalid and invalidates another bird as its counterpart [in the pair]. In this case, the bird that flew away gets mixed up with other birds from other undetermined kinim. It itself is invalid, and we can't simply find a partner for it (a shidduch, if you will) because any bird we take might have been from one of the other birds that was to be offered up. It also invalidates one of the other birds that it joins. We shall explain this in the following mishnayot." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah explains the end of yesterday's mishnah.", + "How is this so?
Two women, this one has two pairs and this one has two pairs, and one bird flies from the [pair of] one to the other [woman's pair], then it disqualifies by its escape one [of the birds from which it flew]. Two women each have two pairs of birds. If one bird flies away from one woman's two pairs, and joins the second woman's two pairs, the woman who is left with three birds can only use two. Of the three birds remaining, she can offer one as a hatat and one as an olah, but the third cannot be offered as either an olah or a hatat, for if she were to offer the one that remains as a hatat, then the one that flew away would have to be an olah. And when it joins two kinim, only two of the five could be offered as olot (the minimum number of olot in the two pairs see 1:2). The same would be true if she were to offer the third as an olah the one that flew away would be a hatat, and the second woman can only offer two birds as hataot. But when the woman with three birds offers only two of them, the other woman can still offer two hataot and two olot. The woman with five birds also cannot take another bird and make three pair, offering one as an olah and one as a hatat from each pair, lest the fifth bird actually be one of her original birds and if she offers it as a hatat, it is possible that she will offer three hataot from her original four birds (one with the new pair, and two as the original pairs). For the same reason, she can't take another bird and offer the fifth bird as an olah, lest it turns out there are three olot from the original four birds. She has no choice but to offer only four birds. In the end, it turns out that of the original eight, the woman whose bird flew the coop offers one pair, and the woman to whom the bird flew offers two pairs. Two birds go to waste.", + "If it returned, it disqualifies yet another by its return. If one of the five birds flies back to the other three birds, it disqualifies one of the birds that it left. Of the four left with woman two, she can offer only two of them, one as an olah and one as a hatat. She can't offer more lest the bird that went back to woman one is not the same bird that joined her group, and she only has three birds left from her original two kinim.", + "If it flew away again and then returned, and again flew away and returned, no further loss is incurred, since even if they had all become mixed together, not less than two [pairs would still be valid]. This process of disqualification does not continue if birds keep flying back and forth between the kinim. For even if all four kinim get mixed up, he can always offer four birds, two as hataot and two as olot, as we learned in 1:3 that if four pairs of birds get mixed up, each woman can offer two birds, one as a hatat and one as an olah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to illustrate the principle that a bird that leaves a pair disqualifies by flying away and a bird that returns also disqualifies another pair, lest it is not the same bird that flew away. This mishnah uses large numbers, but I think that the principle should be straightforward.", + "If one [woman] had one pair, another two, another three, another four, another five, another six and another seven pairs, and one bird flew from the first to the second pair, [and then a bird flew from there] to the third, [and then a bird flew from there] to the fourth, [and from there a bird flew] to the fifth [and from there a bird flew] to the sixth, [and from there a bird flew] to the seventh, and then a bird returns [in the same order as they flew away] it disqualifies at each flight and at each return. The first and second [women] have none left, the third has one pair, the fourth two, the fifth three, the sixth four, and the seventh six pairs. This section sets out the scenario, sort of a musical chairs of sacrificial birds. Basically one bird has left each group and then one bird has returned to each group. The first woman lost her only pair when one left. The second woman lost one pair when one left and one pair when one returned from her pairs to the first woman, so she is left with nothing. The third woman has one left, the fourth woman two and the fifth woman is left with three. The seventh woman loses only one pair because for her the \"flying away\" and \"returning\" are the same. She had one bird fly away and return to a set of pairs from which it had come. So she is left with six pairs.", + "If again [one from each group] flew away and returned [in the same order as above], it disqualifies at each flight and return. The third and fourth woman have none left, the fifth has one pair, the sixth two pairs, and the seventh woman five pairs. Remarkably, the same thing repeats itself. One bird leaves the first, flies to the second, and so on up and then down the line. Again, two pairs are disqualified from the valid pairs that each woman has left, except for the last woman, who only loses one pair. Now the women who originally had three or four pairs are left with nothing, the woman with five is left with one, the woman with six is left with two, and the woman who had seven is left with five.", + "If again one [from each group] flew away and returned [in the same order as above], it disqualifies at each flight and return. The fifth and sixth women have none left, and the seventh has four pairs. But some say that the seventh woman has lost nothing. Incredibly, the same thing happens again (these birds really know what to do!). The only woman left with any valid birds is the last woman. According to one opinion, she again loses one pair. According to the other opinion, since all of the other pairs are already disqualified, the last bird to fly away from her does not disqualify any of her pairs. Therefore, she is left with five, as she was in the beginning.", + "If [a bird] from those that are left to die escaped to any of all the groups, then all must be left to die. If any birds that have to be left to die fly into any of the pairs, all of the pairs into which they may have flown are disqualified, because any of the birds may be this disqualified bird. In other words, here we do not have the problem of determining which bird is a hatat and which is an olah. Rather the problem is that any of the birds may be a bird that had been left to die and such a bird can never be sacrificed." + ], + [ + "An unassigned pair and an assigned pair: if one bird from the unassigned [pair] flew to the assigned [pair], then a pair must be taken for the second [bird]. There are two pairs in the situations described in this mishnah. In one pair the two birds have been assigned which one will be a hatat and which one will be an olah. The birds of the other pair have not been assigned. One bird from the unassigned pair flies over to the assigned pair. The three birds are now mixed up such that we can't tell which one of the assigned pair was a hatat and which was an olah. These three birds cannot be sacrificed and must be left to die. The owner can then take a second bird for the one bird left in the unassigned pair. This is the case of one bird from an unassigned pair that flies into a group of birds that must be left to die (see mishnah one). As we learned, in such a case he may take another bird for the bird left in the original pair.", + "If one bird flew back, or if in the first place a bird from the assigned pair flew [to the other pair], then all must be left to die. If one of the three birds left to die flew back to the other pair, then all of the birds must be left to die, for in neither of them do we know which is the hatat and which is the olah. The same is true if originally one of the assigned pair flew to the unassigned pair. Since we don't know which bird flew (the hatat or the olah) and which bird remained, none of the three birds in the first pair, or the remaining one bird, can be offered. All must be left to die." + ], + [ + "Hatat [birds] are on one side, and olot [birds] are on the other and an unassigned [pair] is in the middle: If from the middle pair one bird flew to this side, and one bird flew to this side, then he has not lost anything, because he [the priest] says that the bird that flew [from the middle] towards the hataot is a hatat and the bird that flew towards the olot is a burnt-offering. If one [from each side] returns to the middle, then [all] those in the middle must be left to die, but those [left on either side] can be offered up as hataot or as olot respectively. If again a bird [from the middle] returned and flew away to the sides, then all must be left to die. This section discusses a case where a person has three groups of birds. On one side are a group of birds designated to be hataot. On the other side are a group of birds designated to be olot. In between the two groups is an unassigned pair of birds, one in which it has not yet been determined which will be a hatat and which will be an olah. The mishnah describes three scenarios. A) If one of the unassigned birds flies to each of the other groups, there is no problem, because these birds can be either a hatat or an olah. B) If one of the birds from the hataot and one of the birds from the olot flies back to the middle, then they must be left to die because we don't know which one is a hatat and which is an olah. The birds left on the side remain hataot and olot. C) If the middle birds now fly back one to each side and become mixed up with the birds there, then the ones on the side must die as well because we don't know which are hataot and which are olot.", + "One cannot pair turtle-doves with pigeons or pigeons with turtle-doves. How is this so? If a woman has brought a turtle-dove as her hatat and a pigeon as her olah, she must then bring another turtle-dove as her burnt-offering; If her olah had been a turtle-dove and her hatat a pigeon, then she must bring another pigeon as her olah. Ben Azzai says: we go after the first [offering]. When a woman brings a pair of birds for sacrifices she must either bring two turtle-doves (and a partridge in a pear tree) or two pigeons. She cannot bring one of each type of bird. According to the first opinion, the hatat is the bird that determines what the other bird must be. So if the hatat is a turtle-dove, she must bring a turtle-dove as an olah, and if the hatat is a pigeon, she must bring a pigeon as an olah. The order in which the birds are brought does not matter. Ben Azzai says that the first bird that she brings determines what the second bird is. Therefore if she first brings a turtle-dove as an olah, and then tries to bring a pigeon as a hatat, she must bring a turtle-dove as an olah.", + "If a woman brought her hatat and then died, her heirs must bring her olah; [But if she first brought] her olah and then died, her heirs need not bring her hatat. If a woman sets aside birds as sacrifices and then dies, her heirs can offer the olah but they cannot offer the hatat, because a hatat whose owners have died must be left to die. This is the standard rule with regard to the hatat (see Temurah 2:2)." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThe first mishnah of chapter three relates to the halakhot found in mishnayot 1:2-3 regarding pairs of sacrificial birds that become mixed up.", + "When are these words said? When the priest asks advice. If birds get mixed up and the priest comes to ask advice as to what to do with them, he is taught the halakhot we learned in 1:2-3.", + "But in the case of a priest who does not seek advice, and one [pair] belongs to one [woman] and one to another, or two [pairs] to one and two to another, or three [pairs] to one and three to another, and he offered all of them above [the red line], then half are valid and half are invalid. [Similarly], if [he offered] all of them below, half are valid and half are invalid. If [he offered] half of them above and half of them below, then of those [offered] above, half are valid and half are invalid, and also of those [offered] below, half are valid and half are invalid. The mishnah how goes on to explain what happens if he does not seek advice and just offers all of the mixed up sacrifices. In today's mishnah the scenario is simple for the numbers of pairs belonging to each woman is equal. Tomorrow's mishnah will introduce much more complicated scenarios. If the number of pairs are even, then half will be valid and half will not be valid. Thus if he sprinkles all of the blood above the red line on the altar, as is done with the olah, then all of the olot are valid, and all of the hataot are invalid. If he offers all of the blood below the red line, as is done with the hatat, then all of the hataot are valid, and all of the olot are invalid. If he offers half above the line and half below the line, then half of each group are valid. It turns out that in all of these cases, each woman gets credit for half of the birds that she brought. As an aside, I think it is interesting that the mishnah deals with a case where the priest did not ask advice from sages before sacrificing the mixed-up birds. I think that we might read into this a bit and see that priests probably did not follow rabbinic halakhot as closely as the rabbis might have liked, and therefore the rabbis have to figure out how to proceed in such a situation." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah is a direct continuation of yesterday's mishnah. In yesterday's mishnah we discussed scenarios where the two women brought the same number of pairs of birds. Today's mishnah deals with cases where one woman has more pairs than the other.", + "If one [pair] belonged to one woman and two [pairs] to another, or [even] three [pairs] to another, or [ten] pairs to another or a hundred to another, and he offered all of them above, then half are valid and half are invalid. If for instance one woman had two pairs and the other woman had three pairs, and they were all mixed up and he offered them all above the red line on the altar, then half are valid as olot, because it is certain that of the ten birds, five were olot.", + "[Similarly], if he offered all of them below, half are valid and half are invalid. Similarly, if he offers half of them below, then half are valid as hataot, because it is clear that five of the birds are hataot.", + "[If he offered] half of them above and half below, then the [number of birds as there is in the] larger part are valid. In this case, the number of birds that are valid is equivalent to the number of pairs brought by the woman with the larger number of pairs. Let's take a case where one woman brought two pairs and another woman brought three pairs. If the priest offered five birds below the line and five birds above the line, three birds are valid. This is because even if of the five birds he offered above, four of them belonged to the woman who brought two pairs, then two are for sure valid and two are for sure invalid because they should have been hataot. The fifth bird which had to have belonged to the other woman, is also valid as an olah. And if of the five birds, all belonged to the woman with three pairs, three are certainly valid as olot. However, two are certainly invalid because they should have been hataot. The same will work no matter what numbers we plug in. If one woman brought four pairs and the other woman brought six pairs, and the priest offered ten birds above and ten below, then six of the birds offered above are valid as olot. Even if all eight birds from the first woman were offered above, four are valid and then two of the other birds which belonged to the other woman will also be valid. And if all of the birds belonged to the second woman who brought ten pairs, then six are valid. But four have to be invalid because they should have been hataot. You mathematicians out there should try it out for yourself with other numbers you'll see, it always works out.", + "This is the general principle: whenever you can divide the pairs [of birds] so that those belonging to one woman need not have part of them [offered] above and part [offered] below, then half of them are valid and half are invalid; The mishnah now provides the general rule. If it is possible that he offered all of the birds of one of the women above and all of the birds of the other woman below, then half of the birds are valid. This is the case if the women bring the same numbers of pairs. If each brings, say, five pairs, and he offers five above and five below, it is possible that all of one woman's birds were offered above and all of the other's birds were offered below. Half will be valid.", + "But whenever you cannot divide the pairs [of birds] without some of those belonging to one woman being [offered] above and some below, then [the number as there is in] the larger part are valid. However, if it is not possible that all of the birds that were offered above and below belonged to the same woman, then the number of birds valid is equal to the larger number of pairs. Thus if one woman brought six and one brought four, and he offered ten above, and ten below, it is not possible that all ten above belonged to one woman and all ten below belonged to the other woman. Therefore, six are valid, equivalent to the larger number." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nUp until now, this chapter has discussed cases where two women bring pairs of sacrificial birds; in each case one of each pair is supposed to be offered as a hatat and one as an olah.\nIn today's mishnah, one woman brings birds that will all be offered as olot, and the other woman brings birds that will all be offered as hataot. Again, the priest does not ask advice as to what to do with the birds. Rather, he just goes ahead and offers them.", + "If the hatats belonged to one and the olot to another, and the priest offered them all above, then half are valid and half disqualified. If he offered all of the birds above, obviously half are valid as olot. The other half should have been offered below, as is the rule for hataot, and therefore, they are invalid.", + "If he offered them all below, half are valid and half disqualified. The same is true if he offers half below the hataot are valid and the olot are invalid.", + "If he offered half of them above and half below, then all of them are disqualified, because I can argue that the hatats were offered above and the olot below. However, if he offered half above and half below, none of the sacrifices is valid, because it is possible that he completely mixed them up, offering the hataot above and the olot below." + ], + [ + "If a hatat, an olah, an unassigned pair of birds and an assigned pair [became mixed up], and he offered them all above, then half are valid and half are invalid. One woman has a hatat, one woman has an olah. In addition, one of these women has an unassigned pair and the other has an assigned pair, and they all get mixed up (just like us all mixed up!). If the priest offers all of the birds above (a total of six birds) half of them are valid. This is because three are certainly olot (the olah bird and one from each pair).", + "[Similarly] if he offered all of them below, half are valid and half are invalid. If he offers all below, three are valid as hataot.", + "If he offered half of them above and half below, none is valid except the unassigned pair, and that must be divided between them. However, if he offers half above and half below, then only the birds of the unassigned pair are valid, because their status as an olah or a hatat had not yet been determined. The two women will together get credit for one pair, and they can divide that pair among the two of them. They will then need to bring another pair, and offer one as an olah and one as a hatat. Each loses the hatat or olah that they had brought individually." + ], + [ + "If hataot birds were mixed up with [unassigned birds that were] obligatory offerings, only the number of hataot among the obligatory offerings are valid.
If the [unassigned] obligatory offerings are twice as many as the hataot, then half are valid and half invalid;
But if the hataot are twice as many as the [unassigned] obligatory offerings, then the number [of hataot] among the obligatory offerings are valid.
So, too, if [birds assigned as] olot were mixed up with [unassigned] obligatory offerings, only the number of olot among the obligatory offerings are valid.
If the [unassigned] obligatory offerings are twice as many as the olot, then half are valid and half invalid.
But if the olot are twice as many as the [unassigned] obligatory offerings, then the number [of olot] among the obligatory offerings are valid.
Section one: This halakhah is basically a repeat of the halakhah taught in 1:2. Obligatory bird offerings contain two birds one of which will be an olah and one a hatat. So if some birds that have already been designated as hataot get mixed up with some pairs of obligatory offerings, the valid birds are equivalent to the number of hataot in the pairs. So if ten hataot get mixed up with six pairs, of the 22 birds, any six we take can definitely be a hatat. But the seventh bird might be the seventh bird from the six pairs, in which case it should have been an olah.
Section two: If two obligatory offerings, meaning two birds one of which needs to be a hatat and one an olah, are mixed up with one hatat, then we divide the birds into two. The first bird is valid as a hatat, the second bird is definitely disqualified and the third bird is potentially half-valid, but since it can't be divided, there is nothing that can be done with it. Similarly, if three obligatory offerings get mixed up with one hatat, three birds are valid as a hatat, three are invalid and the third cannot be divided.
Section three: But if there are two hataot that get mixed up with one pair of obligatory offerings, only one bird will be valid as a hatat.
Sections four-six: The second half of this mishnah just teaches the same rule with regard to olot." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nAs we know, when a woman gives birth she will have to bring a pair of birds, one of which is offered as a hatat and one as an olah. She does not need to voluntarily take on this obligation. It is automatic. Our mishnah deals with a woman who before she gives birth, vows to bring a pair of birds if she gives birth to a male. She will now be obligated to bring two pairs of birds.\nI should warn you this mishnah is complicated. But it’s the last mishnah of the tractate and the seder (game, set and match), so we should give it careful attention. You can fall on your knees and kiss the trophy afterwards.", + "If a woman says: \"I vow a pair of birds if I give birth to a male child,\" and she does give birth to a male child, then she must offer up two pairs one for her vow and one for her obligation. This woman must offer up two pairs of birds one pair for her obligatory offerings and one for her voluntary offerings. The birds brought as voluntary offerings will be olot and of the birds brought as obligatory offerings one will be a hatat and one an olah.", + "If [before she assigned them] she gave them to the priest, and the priest who ought to offer three birds above and one below does not do so, but offers two above and two below, and does not seek guidance, she must she bring another bird and offer that above. This is so if the birds were of the same kind. If they were of two kinds, then must she bring two others. The priest should offer three as olot, meaning he should spill their blood above the red line, and one as a hatat, whose blood is spilled below the red line. Rather, the priest seems to have treated both as if they were obligatory offerings (his mistake seems quite understandable), and spilled the blood of two above the red line and the blood of the two others below the red line. He did not come to ask advice beforehand. The woman must now bring one more bird to be an olah, for one of the birds he offered below was invalid. The above halakhah is true if all of the birds that she brought were of one type either pigeons or turtle-doves. However, if she brought one pair as one type and the other pair as another type, and the priest did one pigeon above and one pigeon below and the same with the turtle-doves, she now must bring two new birds, one a turtle-dove and one a pigeon. The reason is that we don't know which of the two birds that he did below was disqualified the pigeon or turtle-dove and the replacement that she brings must be of the same type. Therefore, she brings one of each and both are offered as olot.", + "If she had expressly defined her vow, then must she bring three other birds. This is so if the birds were of the same kind. If they were of two kinds, then must she bring four others. If when the woman made the vow she set the type of bird she would bring, a pigeon or turtle-dove, and then by the time she brought them, she forgot what type of bird she had vowed, and again the priest offered two above and two below, she will now have to bring three new birds, all of which will be olot. Since she didn't know what her vow was, she should have brought a pair of birds from each type, one pair of pigeons and one pair of turtle-doves. In addition, she of course had to bring a pair for her obligatory offerings. Now that one bird was disqualified by being offered below, she must bring a replacement for that bird, and then another pair of the other type of bird that she did not bring. Again, the above is true if all of the birds that the woman brought were of the same type. If she brought two different types, then she must bring four new birds as olot. We'll go through this slowly. One of the birds done below is valid as a hatat, and the other is an invalid olah. But we don't know whether the invalid olah was supposed to a turtle-dove or a pigeon, because don't know whether she vowed to bring pigeons or turtle-doves. So both of the birds done above are also invalid. Therefore, she has to bring two new pairs; a pair of pigeons in case this is what she vowed, and a pair of turtle-doves, in case this is what she vowed.", + "If she made a definite fixture at the time of her vow, then must she bring another five birds. This is so if the birds were of the same kind. If they were of two kinds, then must she bring six others. In this case, again when the woman made the vow she set the type of bird she would bring and then forgot which type she set. Then she brings two pairs, all of one type, and in this case she determined which type would be for her voluntary offering and which type would be for her obligatory offering. Again, the priest offered one pair above and one pair below. In this case she must bring five more birds, all of which will be offered as olot. She must bring two birds of the type that she did not bring, because she should have brought two pairs in the beginning, one of pigeons and one of turtle-doves. She then must bring three of the same type that she did bring. Two of these will be for the olah, lest the priest offered one of the pair that should have been an olah as a hatat below, and both were thereby invalidated. She must bring another bird as a hatat, lest both birds that the priest offered as a hatat were meant to be olot. Again, all of this was true if she brought all of her birds from one type. If she brought two different types, then she will have to bring SIX new birds. In this case we don't know which pair she brought as a voluntary offering because we don't know which type she set as a voluntary offering. Indeed, she may have brought both as voluntary offerings, as she was supposed to do, and not brought her mandatory offering at all. Or she might have brought one as a voluntary offering and one as a mandatory offering. In this case, it is possible that all of the birds were meant to be olot, and the two done below were both disqualified. It is also possible that the obligatory offerings were done correctly, but the voluntary offerings were done incorrectly, and we don't know which was done incorrectly, the turtle-dove or pigeon. We also don't know which type of birds she vowed to bring in the first place. In short, due to all of the things we don't know, she must bring four new birds as olot, one pair of turtle-doves and one pair of pigeons. She also has to bring two birds to be her mandatory offerings.", + "If she gave them to the priest and it is not known what she gave, and the priest performed the sacrifice, but it is not known how he performed it, then she must bring four other birds for her vow, and two for her obligation and one for her hatat. Ben Azzai says: [she must bring] two hatats. Finally, it is possible to add on to the previous scenario the possibility that she doesn't even know what type of birds she brought. Furthermore, the priest offered them up but doesn't remember whether he offered them up below or above. Basically no one knows anything whatsoever. She has to bring now a total of SEVEN birds. Two pairs she brings as voluntary offerings, one pair of turtle-doves and one pair of pigeons. She also brings a hatat, lest the hatat that she previously brought was invalidated, for it is possible that both birds from the mandatory offering were done above. However, it is also possible that the priest performed the mandatory offering below, which would mean the hatat was valid. But in this case she would need to bring a replacement olah to go with that hatat, and since we don't know what type it needs to be, she must bring two more birds to go with the hatat that might have been valid. Ben Azzai says she must bring two hataot, one a turtle-dove and one a pigeon. The reason is that the olah of the mandatory offerings might have been done properly, and she needs to bring a hatat of the same type. This matches Ben Azzai's opinion in 2:5, that the second bird offered must be of the same type as the first bird. Since we don't know what type was offered, she must bring one of each.", + "Rabbi Joshua said: This is what it meant when they said: \"When [the beast] is alive it possesses one sound, but when it is dead its sound is sevenfold.\" In what way is its sound sevenfold? Its two horns [are made into] two trumpets, its two leg-bones into two flutes, its hide into a drum, its entrails for lyres and its large intestines for harp strings; and there are some who add that its wool is used for the blue [pomegranates.] Rabbi Joshua provides a colorful analogy to the above strange situation, in which a woman vowed to bring one pair of birds, and ends up bringing seven birds (or eight according to Ben Azzai). While a ram is alive it has only one voice, but its body parts can be used in making seven different instruments. Like Ben Azzai, who adds an eighth instrument, some note that from the wool of the ram, one can make the clothes of the high priests, upon which pomegranate bells are hung (see Exodus 28:33). Thus, the woman used her singular voice and became obligated to bring seven or eight birds.", + "Rabbi Shimon ben Akashiah says: ignorant old people, the older they become, the more their intellect gets befuddled, as it is said: \"He removes the speech of men of trust and takes away the sense of the elders.\" But when it comes to aged scholars, it is not so. On the contrary, the older they get, the more their mind becomes composed, as it is said: \"With aged men comes wisdom, and understanding in length of days.\" As is typical, the tractate ends with an aggadic statement a statement whose intent is moral or spiritual and less legal. It is possible that this aggadah was chosen because this mishnah concludes Seder Kodashim, and Seder Kodashim is called in the Talmud \"wisdom.\" It is interesting to note that the idea that scholars retain their mental faculties longer than those who do not engage their minds has been borne out by modern medical science (at least from what I read). Elderly people who engage in intellectual pursuits whatever they may be, or play brainy types of games, can, to a certain extent, delay the decline in their mental faculties. In other words: use it or lose it. Congratulations! We have finished Tractate Kinim and Seder Kodashim! It is a tradition at this point to thank God for helping us finish learning the tractate and to commit ourselves to going back and relearning it, so that we may not forget it and so that its lessons will stay with us for all of our lives. As I said in the intro game, set and match to all of you who stuck with Mishnah Yomit as we made our long way through Seder Kodashim. I may be wrong, but I'm certainly not far off, when I say that rare has been the occasion when this type of material has been studied for such an extended period of time by an audience such as that which participates in Mishnah Yomit. To me United Synagogue and the Conservative movement made an important statement by studying this material: the entire Torah is worthy of learning, and not just those sections that seem immediately relevant to our personal lives. We began our odyssey into Mishnah Yomit with Seder Nezikin because I thought that would be the most concrete, most down to earth of the Sedarim (pl. of seders). We moved onto Nashim and Moed, both of which were frequently relevant to modern day issues. Zeraim already began to be a little more esoteric, and Kodashim, in my opinion, is far more removed from any of our experience. Nevertheless, there were fascinating mishnayot throughout, rules, descriptions, etc. And most importantly, we all continued to learn. If you've been with us since the beginning, you've now finished 5/6 of the Mishnah. Completion (at least the first round, because Torah study is never really completed) is closer than ever! The road that lies ahead of us is not easy. Seder Toharot is next, beginning with thirty (!) chapters of Tractate Kelim. But if you've made it this far, there is no doubt in my mind that you will continue to study with us. One step-one mishnah at a time. Again, Yasher Koah on finishing Tractate Kinim and Seder Kodashim. Tomorrow we begin Tractate Kelim and Seder Toharot." + ] + ] + ] + }, + "schema": { + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה קינים", + "enTitle": "English Explanation of Mishnah Kinnim", + "key": "English Explanation of Mishnah Kinnim", + "nodes": [ + { + "heTitle": "הקדמה", + "enTitle": "Introduction" + }, + { + "heTitle": "", + "enTitle": "" + } + ] + } +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Kodashim/English Explanation of Mishnah Kinnim/English/merged.json b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Kodashim/English Explanation of Mishnah Kinnim/English/merged.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..cefb94ca2d5a83e0274179ba9901a87bbaf2024c --- /dev/null +++ b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Kodashim/English Explanation of Mishnah Kinnim/English/merged.json @@ -0,0 +1,139 @@ +{ + "title": "English Explanation of Mishnah Kinnim", + "language": "en", + "versionTitle": "merged", + "versionSource": "https://www.sefaria.org/English_Explanation_of_Mishnah_Kinnim", + "text": { + "Introduction": [ + "Kinim is the plural of the word \"ken\" and it refers here to a pair of birds brought as a sacrifice (in Biblical and modern Hebrew, ken is a nest). There are several cases in the Torah where a person has to bring a pair of birds, either turtledoves or pigeons, one as an olah and one as a hatat. For instance, concerning the zav (man with abnormal genital discharge), Leviticus 15:14-15 states, \"On the eighth day he shall take two turtledoves or two pigeons….The priest shall offer them, the one as a sin offering and the other as a burnt offering.\" The zavah brings the same offerings (ibid 29-30). A woman also brings these offerings after childbirth (Leviticus 12:6-8), if she is not wealthy enough to bring a ram. A nazirite who was made impure brings them on the eighth day of his purity ritual (Numbers 6:10-11). There are other such cases as well (see Leviticus 5:1-10). A person can also voluntarily bring bird sacrifices (see Leviticus 1:14-17). In this case the bird is a sacrificed as an olah (burnt offering) and not a hatat.", + "When a person brings a pair of birds as a sacrifice (a ken) the hatat must be sacrificed before the olah. Our mishnah deals with cases where birds get mixed up and it is not clear which was meant to be an olah and which was meant to be a hatat. There are several rules and definitions that will help with learning this mathematical masekhet.", + "1) When a person brings a pair of birds as a ken, he can pre-determine which is an olah and which is a hatat. This is called a \"determined ken\" (sounds like a doll who wants his Barbie!) 2) If he doesn't determine which is which, the priest offering them can decide. This is called an \"open ken.\" 3) If a person brings several open kinim together, the priest can mix them up and offer half as olot and half as hataot. 4) If she brings them each as an individual pair the priest cannot mix them all up, and in each pair he must offer one as a hatat and one as an olah.", + "It seems that there is both a practical and a theoretical interest in our tractate. On the one hand, it is likely that in the Temple, with the many, many bird sacrifices that people must have brought, these sacrifices would have become mixed up one with the other. The mishnah uses the feminine throughout because women would have had to bring these kinim upon childbirth, which seems to be the most frequent occurrence. The tractate also has great theoretical interest because rabbis seem to enjoy trying to figure out the status of mixtures, be they mixtures of milk and meat, terumah and hullin or hatat and olah birds. " + ], + "": [ + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThe first mishnah of our tractate deals with a few general rules regarding bird and other sacrifices.", + "A bird hatat is performed below [the red line], but a beast hatat is performed above [the red line]. A bird olah is performed above, but a beast olah below. If he changed this procedure with either, then the offering is disqualified. There was a red line that ran through the middle of the altar. The blood of the bird hatat was sprinkled below this line, whereas the beast hatat (cow, sheep or goat) is sprinkled above the altar, on the corners of the altar. The opposite is true of the olah the bird olah is done above and the beast olah is done below. These rules must be followed precisely and if they are not, the sacrifice is invalid.", + "The seder [ordered ritual] in the case of kinnim is as follows: In the case of obligatory offerings, one [bird] is a hatat and one an olah. In the case of vows and freewill offerings, however, all are olot. As I explained in the introduction, when one brings a ken (a pair of birds) as a mandatory sacrifice, one bird is an olah and one is a hatat. However, if one voluntarily dedicates a ken, both birds are olot.", + "What constitutes a vow? When one says: \"It is incumbent upon me to bring an olah.\" And what constitutes a freewill-offering? When one says: \"Behold, this shall be an olah.\" What is the [practical] difference between vows and freewill offerings? In the case of vows, if they die or are stolen, one is responsible for their replacement; But in the case of freewill offerings, if they die or are stolen, one is not responsible for their replacement. The mishnah now explains the difference between a vow offering (a neder) and a freewill offering (a nedavah). A neder is when one promises to bring a certain type of offering, either an olah or a shelamim (wellbeing offering). For example if he promises to bring a bird olah, he must bring two birds as an olah. If he sets aside a bird and it is lost or stolen before it can be sacrificed, he must bring a replacement. The case of the nedavah is different. In this case, one points at an animal and promises to bring that animal as a sacrifice. For instance, he points at a sheep and promises to bring it. If the sheep is lost or dies, he is not responsible for its replacement because he was only responsible to bring that sheep as long as it was alive or available. Note that this last section is not connected specifically to our tractate which deals with bird sacrifices. Rather it is a general rule with regard to voluntary sacrifices." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah begins to discuss different types of bird-offerings that get mixed up one with the other, and what can be done to best remedy the situation.", + "If a hatat becomes mixed up with an olah, or an olah with a hatat, were it even one in ten thousand, they all must be left to die. If a bird hatat and a bird olah become mixed up, they cannot be sacrificed because the blood of the hatat is sprinkled on the lower portion of the altar and the blood of the olah on the upper portion. And as we learned in yesterday's mishnah, if he spills the blood in the wrong area, the sacrifice is disqualified. If these were animal sacrifices, they could be left until they become blemished and then redeemed. However, bird sacrifices cannot be redeemed (see Menahot 12:1). Therefore, there is nothing left to do but let the birds die.", + "If a hatat becomes mixed up with [unassigned] obligatory [bird] offerings, the only ones that are valid are those that correspond to the number of hatats among the obligatory offerings. The rest of the mishnah deals with a case where either a hatat bird (offered individually for a sin) or an olah bird (offered voluntarily) becomes mixed up with kinim, that is a pair or pairs of birds, one of which must be offered as a hatat and one as an olah. The cases here refer to undetermined kinim the owner did not determine which bird from each pair will be a hatat and which will be an olah. If one hatat bird is mixed up with one ken, he can offer one bird as a hatat, because of any two birds he takes, one can be a hatat, either the \"other\" hatat or the hatat of the ken. But he can't offer two as a hatat, lest both of the birds are from the ken, and one of those birds must be an olah. And he can't offer any of the birds as an olah, lest the bird he tries to offer is the hatat. The same is true if he has two kinim he can offer two hatats, for two birds have to be hataot.", + "Similarly, if an olah becomes mixed up with [unassigned] obligatory [bird] offerings, the only ones that are valid are those that correspond to the number of olot among the obligatory offerings The same rule applies if the \"other\" bird is an olah. He can now offer as many olot as there are kinim.", + "[This rule holds true] whether the [unassigned] obligatory offerings are in the majority and the freewill-offerings in the minority, or the freewill-offerings are in the majority and those that are obligatory in the minority, or whether they are both equal in number. The \"voluntary\" bird offerings referred to here are olot because most voluntary bird offerings were olot. The mishnah reiterates that the rule taught above holds true no matter whether there are many voluntary bird offerings and just a few mandatory ones, or vice versa or the same number. One can offer only as many olot the number of olot found in the mandatory offerings." + ], + [ + "When is this so? When obligatory offerings [get mixed up] with voluntary offerings. The rules taught in mishnah two refer to cases where obligatory offerings (kinim) become mixed up with olot or hataot whose status has been determined.", + "When, however, obligatory offerings get mixed up one with another, with one [pair] belonging to one [woman] and the other pair to another [woman], or two [pairs] belonging to one and two [pairs] to another, or three [pairs] to one and three [pairs] to another, then half of these are valid and the other half disqualified. However, if obligatory offerings get mixed up and half of the total offerings belong to one person and half to another, then the priest can take half of the birds and offer half of them as hataot and the other half as olot. Let's take the simplest example, that of two kinim getting mixed up. If he offers one as a hatat and one as an olah, he is guaranteed to be correct. Because if one is from one ken and the other from one ken, then he has offered half of each ken. And if they are both from the same ken, then he has offered them properly. However, he can't offer two hataot or two olot, lest both birds belonged to the same woman and are part of the same ken. The same will hold true no matter how many kinim get mixed up, as long as the number brought by each person is the same.", + "If one [pair] belongs to one [woman] and two pairs to another, or three pairs to another, or ten pairs to another or one hundred to another, only the lesser number remains valid. If the numbers are uneven, then the priest can only offer according to the lower number. For instance, if one woman brought one ken and another woman brought two, he can only offer one hatat and one olah. For if he were to offer more than one olah or hatat, he might have offered both birds brought by the first woman as an olah (or hatat) and only one can be of each type. This same rule will hold true no matter how large the inequity. Even if one woman brings 100 pairs and one brings one, only two birds, one a hatat and one an olah, can be offered.", + "Whether they are of the same denomination or of two denominations, or whether they belong to one woman or to two. Denomination refers to the reason why the woman had to bring a sacrifice. This shall be clarified in tomorrow's mishnah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah is an explanation of the last line of yesterday's mishnah, which referred to different \"names.\"", + "What is meant by one \"name\"? For a birth and a birth, or for zivah and zivah, that is one name. And \"two names\"? For a birth, [and the other] for a zivah. There are two main reasons why a woman would bring a ken either for a childbirth or after having an abnormal genital discharge, called \"zivah.\" If she brings two kinnim, one for this birth and one for this birth, or one for this zivah and one for this zivah, then the priest can only offer one bird as an olah and one as a hatat, as we explained yesterday. The same is true even if the two kinnim she set aside were for different \"names\" one for a birth and one for zivah.", + "What is meant by \"two women\"? [When] one [woman] brings [her offering] for a birth and the other for a birth, or [when one brings] for a zivah and the other for a zivah this is \"of one name\". And a case \"of two names\"? When one brings for a birth and the other for a zivah. If multiple women set aside kinnim for either one \"name\" of for many \"names,\" they can only sacrifice as many hataot and olot as the fewest number of kinim brought by one of the women, as we explained in yesterday's mishnah.", + "Rabbi Yose says: when two women purchased their kinnim in partnership, or gave the price of their kinnim to the priest [for him to purchase them], then the priest can offer whichever one he wants as a hatat or as an olah, whether they are of one name or of two names. The above section, as well as mishnayot 2-3 dealt with cases where women gave their kinnim to the priest and the birds got mixed up. Rabbi Yose notes that they can avoid this problem by either buying their birds together or by giving the money to buy the birds to the priest. In both of these cases, the priest buys or receives all of the necessary birds. He can then determine which will be a hatat and an olah for this woman and which will be a hatat and an olah for the other woman. He can even do this if they are brought for different reasons. If done this way, even if the birds get mixed up, there will not be a problem." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nYou might call our mishnah \"the pigeon that escaped.\" It deals with a case where a single bird from an \"unassigned ken\" one in which it has not been determined which bird is a hatat and which is an olah escapes. The question is: what is the status of the bird that remains and the bird that escapes.", + "If from an unassigned pair of birds a single pigeon flew into the open air, or flew among birds that had been left to die, or if one [of the pair] died, then he must take a mate for the second one. In all of these cases, one bird leaves the unassigned ken. Since both birds were unassigned, all he has to do is take a new bird for the remaining bird and offer one as a hatat and one as an olah. However, if it had been a \"determined ken,\" one where we already knew which was which, he couldn't sacrifice the remaining one unless he knew whether it was the hatat or the olah. We should note that in all of these cases, nothing can be done with the bird that flew away, either because it is gone or dead, or because it became mixed up with other birds that must be left to die.", + "If it flew among birds that are to be offered up, it becomes invalid and it invalidates another bird as its counterpart [in the pair]; for the pigeon that flew away is invalid and invalidates another bird as its counterpart [in the pair]. In this case, the bird that flew away gets mixed up with other birds from other undetermined kinim. It itself is invalid, and we can't simply find a partner for it (a shidduch, if you will) because any bird we take might have been from one of the other birds that was to be offered up. It also invalidates one of the other birds that it joins. We shall explain this in the following mishnayot." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah explains the end of yesterday's mishnah.", + "How is this so?
Two women, this one has two pairs and this one has two pairs, and one bird flies from the [pair of] one to the other [woman's pair], then it disqualifies by its escape one [of the birds from which it flew]. Two women each have two pairs of birds. If one bird flies away from one woman's two pairs, and joins the second woman's two pairs, the woman who is left with three birds can only use two. Of the three birds remaining, she can offer one as a hatat and one as an olah, but the third cannot be offered as either an olah or a hatat, for if she were to offer the one that remains as a hatat, then the one that flew away would have to be an olah. And when it joins two kinim, only two of the five could be offered as olot (the minimum number of olot in the two pairs see 1:2). The same would be true if she were to offer the third as an olah the one that flew away would be a hatat, and the second woman can only offer two birds as hataot. But when the woman with three birds offers only two of them, the other woman can still offer two hataot and two olot. The woman with five birds also cannot take another bird and make three pair, offering one as an olah and one as a hatat from each pair, lest the fifth bird actually be one of her original birds and if she offers it as a hatat, it is possible that she will offer three hataot from her original four birds (one with the new pair, and two as the original pairs). For the same reason, she can't take another bird and offer the fifth bird as an olah, lest it turns out there are three olot from the original four birds. She has no choice but to offer only four birds. In the end, it turns out that of the original eight, the woman whose bird flew the coop offers one pair, and the woman to whom the bird flew offers two pairs. Two birds go to waste.", + "If it returned, it disqualifies yet another by its return. If one of the five birds flies back to the other three birds, it disqualifies one of the birds that it left. Of the four left with woman two, she can offer only two of them, one as an olah and one as a hatat. She can't offer more lest the bird that went back to woman one is not the same bird that joined her group, and she only has three birds left from her original two kinim.", + "If it flew away again and then returned, and again flew away and returned, no further loss is incurred, since even if they had all become mixed together, not less than two [pairs would still be valid]. This process of disqualification does not continue if birds keep flying back and forth between the kinim. For even if all four kinim get mixed up, he can always offer four birds, two as hataot and two as olot, as we learned in 1:3 that if four pairs of birds get mixed up, each woman can offer two birds, one as a hatat and one as an olah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to illustrate the principle that a bird that leaves a pair disqualifies by flying away and a bird that returns also disqualifies another pair, lest it is not the same bird that flew away. This mishnah uses large numbers, but I think that the principle should be straightforward.", + "If one [woman] had one pair, another two, another three, another four, another five, another six and another seven pairs, and one bird flew from the first to the second pair, [and then a bird flew from there] to the third, [and then a bird flew from there] to the fourth, [and from there a bird flew] to the fifth [and from there a bird flew] to the sixth, [and from there a bird flew] to the seventh, and then a bird returns [in the same order as they flew away] it disqualifies at each flight and at each return. The first and second [women] have none left, the third has one pair, the fourth two, the fifth three, the sixth four, and the seventh six pairs. This section sets out the scenario, sort of a musical chairs of sacrificial birds. Basically one bird has left each group and then one bird has returned to each group. The first woman lost her only pair when one left. The second woman lost one pair when one left and one pair when one returned from her pairs to the first woman, so she is left with nothing. The third woman has one left, the fourth woman two and the fifth woman is left with three. The seventh woman loses only one pair because for her the \"flying away\" and \"returning\" are the same. She had one bird fly away and return to a set of pairs from which it had come. So she is left with six pairs.", + "If again [one from each group] flew away and returned [in the same order as above], it disqualifies at each flight and return. The third and fourth woman have none left, the fifth has one pair, the sixth two pairs, and the seventh woman five pairs. Remarkably, the same thing repeats itself. One bird leaves the first, flies to the second, and so on up and then down the line. Again, two pairs are disqualified from the valid pairs that each woman has left, except for the last woman, who only loses one pair. Now the women who originally had three or four pairs are left with nothing, the woman with five is left with one, the woman with six is left with two, and the woman who had seven is left with five.", + "If again one [from each group] flew away and returned [in the same order as above], it disqualifies at each flight and return. The fifth and sixth women have none left, and the seventh has four pairs. But some say that the seventh woman has lost nothing. Incredibly, the same thing happens again (these birds really know what to do!). The only woman left with any valid birds is the last woman. According to one opinion, she again loses one pair. According to the other opinion, since all of the other pairs are already disqualified, the last bird to fly away from her does not disqualify any of her pairs. Therefore, she is left with five, as she was in the beginning.", + "If [a bird] from those that are left to die escaped to any of all the groups, then all must be left to die. If any birds that have to be left to die fly into any of the pairs, all of the pairs into which they may have flown are disqualified, because any of the birds may be this disqualified bird. In other words, here we do not have the problem of determining which bird is a hatat and which is an olah. Rather the problem is that any of the birds may be a bird that had been left to die and such a bird can never be sacrificed." + ], + [ + "An unassigned pair and an assigned pair: if one bird from the unassigned [pair] flew to the assigned [pair], then a pair must be taken for the second [bird]. There are two pairs in the situations described in this mishnah. In one pair the two birds have been assigned which one will be a hatat and which one will be an olah. The birds of the other pair have not been assigned. One bird from the unassigned pair flies over to the assigned pair. The three birds are now mixed up such that we can't tell which one of the assigned pair was a hatat and which was an olah. These three birds cannot be sacrificed and must be left to die. The owner can then take a second bird for the one bird left in the unassigned pair. This is the case of one bird from an unassigned pair that flies into a group of birds that must be left to die (see mishnah one). As we learned, in such a case he may take another bird for the bird left in the original pair.", + "If one bird flew back, or if in the first place a bird from the assigned pair flew [to the other pair], then all must be left to die. If one of the three birds left to die flew back to the other pair, then all of the birds must be left to die, for in neither of them do we know which is the hatat and which is the olah. The same is true if originally one of the assigned pair flew to the unassigned pair. Since we don't know which bird flew (the hatat or the olah) and which bird remained, none of the three birds in the first pair, or the remaining one bird, can be offered. All must be left to die." + ], + [ + "Hatat [birds] are on one side, and olot [birds] are on the other and an unassigned [pair] is in the middle: If from the middle pair one bird flew to this side, and one bird flew to this side, then he has not lost anything, because he [the priest] says that the bird that flew [from the middle] towards the hataot is a hatat and the bird that flew towards the olot is a burnt-offering. If one [from each side] returns to the middle, then [all] those in the middle must be left to die, but those [left on either side] can be offered up as hataot or as olot respectively. If again a bird [from the middle] returned and flew away to the sides, then all must be left to die. This section discusses a case where a person has three groups of birds. On one side are a group of birds designated to be hataot. On the other side are a group of birds designated to be olot. In between the two groups is an unassigned pair of birds, one in which it has not yet been determined which will be a hatat and which will be an olah. The mishnah describes three scenarios. A) If one of the unassigned birds flies to each of the other groups, there is no problem, because these birds can be either a hatat or an olah. B) If one of the birds from the hataot and one of the birds from the olot flies back to the middle, then they must be left to die because we don't know which one is a hatat and which is an olah. The birds left on the side remain hataot and olot. C) If the middle birds now fly back one to each side and become mixed up with the birds there, then the ones on the side must die as well because we don't know which are hataot and which are olot.", + "One cannot pair turtle-doves with pigeons or pigeons with turtle-doves. How is this so? If a woman has brought a turtle-dove as her hatat and a pigeon as her olah, she must then bring another turtle-dove as her burnt-offering; If her olah had been a turtle-dove and her hatat a pigeon, then she must bring another pigeon as her olah. Ben Azzai says: we go after the first [offering]. When a woman brings a pair of birds for sacrifices she must either bring two turtle-doves (and a partridge in a pear tree) or two pigeons. She cannot bring one of each type of bird. According to the first opinion, the hatat is the bird that determines what the other bird must be. So if the hatat is a turtle-dove, she must bring a turtle-dove as an olah, and if the hatat is a pigeon, she must bring a pigeon as an olah. The order in which the birds are brought does not matter. Ben Azzai says that the first bird that she brings determines what the second bird is. Therefore if she first brings a turtle-dove as an olah, and then tries to bring a pigeon as a hatat, she must bring a turtle-dove as an olah.", + "If a woman brought her hatat and then died, her heirs must bring her olah; [But if she first brought] her olah and then died, her heirs need not bring her hatat. If a woman sets aside birds as sacrifices and then dies, her heirs can offer the olah but they cannot offer the hatat, because a hatat whose owners have died must be left to die. This is the standard rule with regard to the hatat (see Temurah 2:2)." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThe first mishnah of chapter three relates to the halakhot found in mishnayot 1:2-3 regarding pairs of sacrificial birds that become mixed up.", + "When are these words said? When the priest asks advice. If birds get mixed up and the priest comes to ask advice as to what to do with them, he is taught the halakhot we learned in 1:2-3.", + "But in the case of a priest who does not seek advice, and one [pair] belongs to one [woman] and one to another, or two [pairs] to one and two to another, or three [pairs] to one and three to another, and he offered all of them above [the red line], then half are valid and half are invalid. [Similarly], if [he offered] all of them below, half are valid and half are invalid. If [he offered] half of them above and half of them below, then of those [offered] above, half are valid and half are invalid, and also of those [offered] below, half are valid and half are invalid. The mishnah how goes on to explain what happens if he does not seek advice and just offers all of the mixed up sacrifices. In today's mishnah the scenario is simple for the numbers of pairs belonging to each woman is equal. Tomorrow's mishnah will introduce much more complicated scenarios. If the number of pairs are even, then half will be valid and half will not be valid. Thus if he sprinkles all of the blood above the red line on the altar, as is done with the olah, then all of the olot are valid, and all of the hataot are invalid. If he offers all of the blood below the red line, as is done with the hatat, then all of the hataot are valid, and all of the olot are invalid. If he offers half above the line and half below the line, then half of each group are valid. It turns out that in all of these cases, each woman gets credit for half of the birds that she brought. As an aside, I think it is interesting that the mishnah deals with a case where the priest did not ask advice from sages before sacrificing the mixed-up birds. I think that we might read into this a bit and see that priests probably did not follow rabbinic halakhot as closely as the rabbis might have liked, and therefore the rabbis have to figure out how to proceed in such a situation." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah is a direct continuation of yesterday's mishnah. In yesterday's mishnah we discussed scenarios where the two women brought the same number of pairs of birds. Today's mishnah deals with cases where one woman has more pairs than the other.", + "If one [pair] belonged to one woman and two [pairs] to another, or [even] three [pairs] to another, or [ten] pairs to another or a hundred to another, and he offered all of them above, then half are valid and half are invalid. If for instance one woman had two pairs and the other woman had three pairs, and they were all mixed up and he offered them all above the red line on the altar, then half are valid as olot, because it is certain that of the ten birds, five were olot.", + "[Similarly], if he offered all of them below, half are valid and half are invalid. Similarly, if he offers half of them below, then half are valid as hataot, because it is clear that five of the birds are hataot.", + "[If he offered] half of them above and half below, then the [number of birds as there is in the] larger part are valid. In this case, the number of birds that are valid is equivalent to the number of pairs brought by the woman with the larger number of pairs. Let's take a case where one woman brought two pairs and another woman brought three pairs. If the priest offered five birds below the line and five birds above the line, three birds are valid. This is because even if of the five birds he offered above, four of them belonged to the woman who brought two pairs, then two are for sure valid and two are for sure invalid because they should have been hataot. The fifth bird which had to have belonged to the other woman, is also valid as an olah. And if of the five birds, all belonged to the woman with three pairs, three are certainly valid as olot. However, two are certainly invalid because they should have been hataot. The same will work no matter what numbers we plug in. If one woman brought four pairs and the other woman brought six pairs, and the priest offered ten birds above and ten below, then six of the birds offered above are valid as olot. Even if all eight birds from the first woman were offered above, four are valid and then two of the other birds which belonged to the other woman will also be valid. And if all of the birds belonged to the second woman who brought ten pairs, then six are valid. But four have to be invalid because they should have been hataot. You mathematicians out there should try it out for yourself with other numbers you'll see, it always works out.", + "This is the general principle: whenever you can divide the pairs [of birds] so that those belonging to one woman need not have part of them [offered] above and part [offered] below, then half of them are valid and half are invalid; The mishnah now provides the general rule. If it is possible that he offered all of the birds of one of the women above and all of the birds of the other woman below, then half of the birds are valid. This is the case if the women bring the same numbers of pairs. If each brings, say, five pairs, and he offers five above and five below, it is possible that all of one woman's birds were offered above and all of the other's birds were offered below. Half will be valid.", + "But whenever you cannot divide the pairs [of birds] without some of those belonging to one woman being [offered] above and some below, then [the number as there is in] the larger part are valid. However, if it is not possible that all of the birds that were offered above and below belonged to the same woman, then the number of birds valid is equal to the larger number of pairs. Thus if one woman brought six and one brought four, and he offered ten above, and ten below, it is not possible that all ten above belonged to one woman and all ten below belonged to the other woman. Therefore, six are valid, equivalent to the larger number." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nUp until now, this chapter has discussed cases where two women bring pairs of sacrificial birds; in each case one of each pair is supposed to be offered as a hatat and one as an olah.\nIn today's mishnah, one woman brings birds that will all be offered as olot, and the other woman brings birds that will all be offered as hataot. Again, the priest does not ask advice as to what to do with the birds. Rather, he just goes ahead and offers them.", + "If the hatats belonged to one and the olot to another, and the priest offered them all above, then half are valid and half disqualified. If he offered all of the birds above, obviously half are valid as olot. The other half should have been offered below, as is the rule for hataot, and therefore, they are invalid.", + "If he offered them all below, half are valid and half disqualified. The same is true if he offers half below the hataot are valid and the olot are invalid.", + "If he offered half of them above and half below, then all of them are disqualified, because I can argue that the hatats were offered above and the olot below. However, if he offered half above and half below, none of the sacrifices is valid, because it is possible that he completely mixed them up, offering the hataot above and the olot below." + ], + [ + "If a hatat, an olah, an unassigned pair of birds and an assigned pair [became mixed up], and he offered them all above, then half are valid and half are invalid. One woman has a hatat, one woman has an olah. In addition, one of these women has an unassigned pair and the other has an assigned pair, and they all get mixed up (just like us all mixed up!). If the priest offers all of the birds above (a total of six birds) half of them are valid. This is because three are certainly olot (the olah bird and one from each pair).", + "[Similarly] if he offered all of them below, half are valid and half are invalid. If he offers all below, three are valid as hataot.", + "If he offered half of them above and half below, none is valid except the unassigned pair, and that must be divided between them. However, if he offers half above and half below, then only the birds of the unassigned pair are valid, because their status as an olah or a hatat had not yet been determined. The two women will together get credit for one pair, and they can divide that pair among the two of them. They will then need to bring another pair, and offer one as an olah and one as a hatat. Each loses the hatat or olah that they had brought individually." + ], + [ + "If hataot birds were mixed up with [unassigned birds that were] obligatory offerings, only the number of hataot among the obligatory offerings are valid.
If the [unassigned] obligatory offerings are twice as many as the hataot, then half are valid and half invalid;
But if the hataot are twice as many as the [unassigned] obligatory offerings, then the number [of hataot] among the obligatory offerings are valid.
So, too, if [birds assigned as] olot were mixed up with [unassigned] obligatory offerings, only the number of olot among the obligatory offerings are valid.
If the [unassigned] obligatory offerings are twice as many as the olot, then half are valid and half invalid.
But if the olot are twice as many as the [unassigned] obligatory offerings, then the number [of olot] among the obligatory offerings are valid.
Section one: This halakhah is basically a repeat of the halakhah taught in 1:2. Obligatory bird offerings contain two birds one of which will be an olah and one a hatat. So if some birds that have already been designated as hataot get mixed up with some pairs of obligatory offerings, the valid birds are equivalent to the number of hataot in the pairs. So if ten hataot get mixed up with six pairs, of the 22 birds, any six we take can definitely be a hatat. But the seventh bird might be the seventh bird from the six pairs, in which case it should have been an olah.
Section two: If two obligatory offerings, meaning two birds one of which needs to be a hatat and one an olah, are mixed up with one hatat, then we divide the birds into two. The first bird is valid as a hatat, the second bird is definitely disqualified and the third bird is potentially half-valid, but since it can't be divided, there is nothing that can be done with it. Similarly, if three obligatory offerings get mixed up with one hatat, three birds are valid as a hatat, three are invalid and the third cannot be divided.
Section three: But if there are two hataot that get mixed up with one pair of obligatory offerings, only one bird will be valid as a hatat.
Sections four-six: The second half of this mishnah just teaches the same rule with regard to olot." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nAs we know, when a woman gives birth she will have to bring a pair of birds, one of which is offered as a hatat and one as an olah. She does not need to voluntarily take on this obligation. It is automatic. Our mishnah deals with a woman who before she gives birth, vows to bring a pair of birds if she gives birth to a male. She will now be obligated to bring two pairs of birds.\nI should warn you this mishnah is complicated. But it’s the last mishnah of the tractate and the seder (game, set and match), so we should give it careful attention. You can fall on your knees and kiss the trophy afterwards.", + "If a woman says: \"I vow a pair of birds if I give birth to a male child,\" and she does give birth to a male child, then she must offer up two pairs one for her vow and one for her obligation. This woman must offer up two pairs of birds one pair for her obligatory offerings and one for her voluntary offerings. The birds brought as voluntary offerings will be olot and of the birds brought as obligatory offerings one will be a hatat and one an olah.", + "If [before she assigned them] she gave them to the priest, and the priest who ought to offer three birds above and one below does not do so, but offers two above and two below, and does not seek guidance, she must she bring another bird and offer that above. This is so if the birds were of the same kind. If they were of two kinds, then must she bring two others. The priest should offer three as olot, meaning he should spill their blood above the red line, and one as a hatat, whose blood is spilled below the red line. Rather, the priest seems to have treated both as if they were obligatory offerings (his mistake seems quite understandable), and spilled the blood of two above the red line and the blood of the two others below the red line. He did not come to ask advice beforehand. The woman must now bring one more bird to be an olah, for one of the birds he offered below was invalid. The above halakhah is true if all of the birds that she brought were of one type either pigeons or turtle-doves. However, if she brought one pair as one type and the other pair as another type, and the priest did one pigeon above and one pigeon below and the same with the turtle-doves, she now must bring two new birds, one a turtle-dove and one a pigeon. The reason is that we don't know which of the two birds that he did below was disqualified the pigeon or turtle-dove and the replacement that she brings must be of the same type. Therefore, she brings one of each and both are offered as olot.", + "If she had expressly defined her vow, then must she bring three other birds. This is so if the birds were of the same kind. If they were of two kinds, then must she bring four others. If when the woman made the vow she set the type of bird she would bring, a pigeon or turtle-dove, and then by the time she brought them, she forgot what type of bird she had vowed, and again the priest offered two above and two below, she will now have to bring three new birds, all of which will be olot. Since she didn't know what her vow was, she should have brought a pair of birds from each type, one pair of pigeons and one pair of turtle-doves. In addition, she of course had to bring a pair for her obligatory offerings. Now that one bird was disqualified by being offered below, she must bring a replacement for that bird, and then another pair of the other type of bird that she did not bring. Again, the above is true if all of the birds that the woman brought were of the same type. If she brought two different types, then she must bring four new birds as olot. We'll go through this slowly. One of the birds done below is valid as a hatat, and the other is an invalid olah. But we don't know whether the invalid olah was supposed to a turtle-dove or a pigeon, because don't know whether she vowed to bring pigeons or turtle-doves. So both of the birds done above are also invalid. Therefore, she has to bring two new pairs; a pair of pigeons in case this is what she vowed, and a pair of turtle-doves, in case this is what she vowed.", + "If she made a definite fixture at the time of her vow, then must she bring another five birds. This is so if the birds were of the same kind. If they were of two kinds, then must she bring six others. In this case, again when the woman made the vow she set the type of bird she would bring and then forgot which type she set. Then she brings two pairs, all of one type, and in this case she determined which type would be for her voluntary offering and which type would be for her obligatory offering. Again, the priest offered one pair above and one pair below. In this case she must bring five more birds, all of which will be offered as olot. She must bring two birds of the type that she did not bring, because she should have brought two pairs in the beginning, one of pigeons and one of turtle-doves. She then must bring three of the same type that she did bring. Two of these will be for the olah, lest the priest offered one of the pair that should have been an olah as a hatat below, and both were thereby invalidated. She must bring another bird as a hatat, lest both birds that the priest offered as a hatat were meant to be olot. Again, all of this was true if she brought all of her birds from one type. If she brought two different types, then she will have to bring SIX new birds. In this case we don't know which pair she brought as a voluntary offering because we don't know which type she set as a voluntary offering. Indeed, she may have brought both as voluntary offerings, as she was supposed to do, and not brought her mandatory offering at all. Or she might have brought one as a voluntary offering and one as a mandatory offering. In this case, it is possible that all of the birds were meant to be olot, and the two done below were both disqualified. It is also possible that the obligatory offerings were done correctly, but the voluntary offerings were done incorrectly, and we don't know which was done incorrectly, the turtle-dove or pigeon. We also don't know which type of birds she vowed to bring in the first place. In short, due to all of the things we don't know, she must bring four new birds as olot, one pair of turtle-doves and one pair of pigeons. She also has to bring two birds to be her mandatory offerings.", + "If she gave them to the priest and it is not known what she gave, and the priest performed the sacrifice, but it is not known how he performed it, then she must bring four other birds for her vow, and two for her obligation and one for her hatat. Ben Azzai says: [she must bring] two hatats. Finally, it is possible to add on to the previous scenario the possibility that she doesn't even know what type of birds she brought. Furthermore, the priest offered them up but doesn't remember whether he offered them up below or above. Basically no one knows anything whatsoever. She has to bring now a total of SEVEN birds. Two pairs she brings as voluntary offerings, one pair of turtle-doves and one pair of pigeons. She also brings a hatat, lest the hatat that she previously brought was invalidated, for it is possible that both birds from the mandatory offering were done above. However, it is also possible that the priest performed the mandatory offering below, which would mean the hatat was valid. But in this case she would need to bring a replacement olah to go with that hatat, and since we don't know what type it needs to be, she must bring two more birds to go with the hatat that might have been valid. Ben Azzai says she must bring two hataot, one a turtle-dove and one a pigeon. The reason is that the olah of the mandatory offerings might have been done properly, and she needs to bring a hatat of the same type. This matches Ben Azzai's opinion in 2:5, that the second bird offered must be of the same type as the first bird. Since we don't know what type was offered, she must bring one of each.", + "Rabbi Joshua said: This is what it meant when they said: \"When [the beast] is alive it possesses one sound, but when it is dead its sound is sevenfold.\" In what way is its sound sevenfold? Its two horns [are made into] two trumpets, its two leg-bones into two flutes, its hide into a drum, its entrails for lyres and its large intestines for harp strings; and there are some who add that its wool is used for the blue [pomegranates.] Rabbi Joshua provides a colorful analogy to the above strange situation, in which a woman vowed to bring one pair of birds, and ends up bringing seven birds (or eight according to Ben Azzai). While a ram is alive it has only one voice, but its body parts can be used in making seven different instruments. Like Ben Azzai, who adds an eighth instrument, some note that from the wool of the ram, one can make the clothes of the high priests, upon which pomegranate bells are hung (see Exodus 28:33). Thus, the woman used her singular voice and became obligated to bring seven or eight birds.", + "Rabbi Shimon ben Akashiah says: ignorant old people, the older they become, the more their intellect gets befuddled, as it is said: \"He removes the speech of men of trust and takes away the sense of the elders.\" But when it comes to aged scholars, it is not so. On the contrary, the older they get, the more their mind becomes composed, as it is said: \"With aged men comes wisdom, and understanding in length of days.\" As is typical, the tractate ends with an aggadic statement a statement whose intent is moral or spiritual and less legal. It is possible that this aggadah was chosen because this mishnah concludes Seder Kodashim, and Seder Kodashim is called in the Talmud \"wisdom.\" It is interesting to note that the idea that scholars retain their mental faculties longer than those who do not engage their minds has been borne out by modern medical science (at least from what I read). Elderly people who engage in intellectual pursuits whatever they may be, or play brainy types of games, can, to a certain extent, delay the decline in their mental faculties. In other words: use it or lose it. Congratulations! We have finished Tractate Kinim and Seder Kodashim! It is a tradition at this point to thank God for helping us finish learning the tractate and to commit ourselves to going back and relearning it, so that we may not forget it and so that its lessons will stay with us for all of our lives. As I said in the intro game, set and match to all of you who stuck with Mishnah Yomit as we made our long way through Seder Kodashim. I may be wrong, but I'm certainly not far off, when I say that rare has been the occasion when this type of material has been studied for such an extended period of time by an audience such as that which participates in Mishnah Yomit. To me United Synagogue and the Conservative movement made an important statement by studying this material: the entire Torah is worthy of learning, and not just those sections that seem immediately relevant to our personal lives. We began our odyssey into Mishnah Yomit with Seder Nezikin because I thought that would be the most concrete, most down to earth of the Sedarim (pl. of seders). We moved onto Nashim and Moed, both of which were frequently relevant to modern day issues. Zeraim already began to be a little more esoteric, and Kodashim, in my opinion, is far more removed from any of our experience. Nevertheless, there were fascinating mishnayot throughout, rules, descriptions, etc. And most importantly, we all continued to learn. If you've been with us since the beginning, you've now finished 5/6 of the Mishnah. Completion (at least the first round, because Torah study is never really completed) is closer than ever! The road that lies ahead of us is not easy. Seder Toharot is next, beginning with thirty (!) chapters of Tractate Kelim. But if you've made it this far, there is no doubt in my mind that you will continue to study with us. One step-one mishnah at a time. Again, Yasher Koah on finishing Tractate Kinim and Seder Kodashim. Tomorrow we begin Tractate Kelim and Seder Toharot." + ] + ] + ] + }, + "versions": [ + [ + "Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp", + "http://learn.conservativeyeshiva.org/mishnah/" + ] + ], + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה קינים", + "categories": [ + "Mishnah", + "Modern Commentary on Mishnah", + "English Explanation of Mishnah", + "Seder Kodashim" + ], + "schema": { + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה קינים", + "enTitle": "English Explanation of Mishnah Kinnim", + "key": "English Explanation of Mishnah Kinnim", + "nodes": [ + { + "heTitle": "הקדמה", + "enTitle": "Introduction" + }, + { + "heTitle": "", + "enTitle": "" + } + ] + } +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Kodashim/English Explanation of Mishnah Meilah/English/Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp.json b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Kodashim/English Explanation of Mishnah Meilah/English/Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..3823881f4d3897190796d5145ee751432c55d2ba --- /dev/null +++ b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Kodashim/English Explanation of Mishnah Meilah/English/Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp.json @@ -0,0 +1,261 @@ +{ + "language": "en", + "title": "English Explanation of Mishnah Meilah", + "versionSource": "http://learn.conservativeyeshiva.org/mishnah/", + "versionTitle": "Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp", + "status": "locked", + "license": "CC-BY", + "shortVersionTitle": "Dr. Joshua Kulp", + "actualLanguage": "en", + "languageFamilyName": "english", + "isBaseText": true, + "isSource": true, + "isPrimary": true, + "direction": "ltr", + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה מעילה", + "categories": [ + "Mishnah", + "Modern Commentary on Mishnah", + "English Explanation of Mishnah", + "Seder Kodashim" + ], + "text": { + "Introduction": [ + "Meilah is translated either as “sacrilege” or “trespass.” It refers to one who unwittingly makes prohibited use of property that belongs to the Temple. The subject is dealt with in Leviticus 5:15-16:", + "When a person commits trespass, being unwittingly remiss about any of the Lord’s sacred things, he shall bring as his penalty to the Lord a ram without blemish from the flock, convertible into payment in silver by the sanctuary weight, as an asham (guilt offering). He make restitution for that wherein he was remiss about the sacred things, and he shall add a fifth part to it and give it to the priest. The priest shall make expiation on his behalf with the ram of the guilt offering, and he shall be forgiven.", + "As we can see from these verses when a person commits sacrilege he must do three things: 1) bring an asham; 2) make restitution for the amount he benefited; 3) add an extra fifth. The restitution and the added fifth are given to the Temple in place of that which he benefited. \tOne who intentionally trespasses pays back only the principle. He does not pay back an extra fifth nor does he bring a sacrifice. There is a debate about his punishment: according to Rabbi he gets “death by the hands of heaven” whereas the other rabbis hold that he receives lashes. \tWith that brief introduction, we are on our merry way. Good luck! " + ], + "": [ + [ + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah discusses cases where the laws of sacrilege apply to animals despite the fact that the sacrifice was disqualified.", + "Most holy sacrifices which were slaughtered on the south side [of the altar], the law of sacrilege [still] applies to them. Most holy sacrifices must be sacrificed on the north side of the altar (Zevahim 5:1-5). If they are sacrificed on the south side, they are disqualified. Nevertheless, if a person derives benefit from them he has committed sacrilege and must bring a sacrifice, make restitution and bring the added fifth. Despite the fact that these are disqualified sacrifices, they still retain their holiness.", + "If they were slaughtered on the south side and their blood received on the north or [slaughtered] on the north side and their blood received on the south, or if they were slaughtered by day and [their blood] sprinkled during the night or [slaughtered] during the night and [their blood] sprinkled by day, or if they were slaughtered [with the intention of eating the flesh] beyond its proper time or outside its proper place, the law of sacrilege still applies to them. This section contains a list of other actions that disqualify a sacrifice. A most holy sacrifice must be slaughtered and have its blood received on the north side. It must be slaughtered and have its blood received during the day. The intention of the one performing the sacrifice must be to eat it in its proper time and place. However, if the sacrifice is disqualified, it is still subject to the laws of sacrilege.", + "Rabbi Joshua stated a general rule: whatever has at some time been permitted to the priests is not subject to the law of sacrilege, and whatever has at no time been permitted to the priests is subject to the law of sacrilege. Which is that which has at some time been permitted to the priests? [Sacrifices] which remained overnight or became defiled or were taken out [of the Temple Court]. Which is that which has at no time been permitted to the priests? [Sacrifices] that were slaughtered [with the intention of eating its flesh] beyond its proper time or outside its proper place, or [the blood of which] was received by the unfit and they sprinkled it. Rabbi Joshua has a different rule as to when the laws of sacrilege apply to a disqualified sacrifice. If the sacrifice was at one time edible by priests, then these laws do not apply. This is the case if the blood was spilled on the altar in the correct fashion, but then the sacrifice was disqualified by becoming remnant, impure or by being taken out of the Temple. In these cases the meat was permitted and then became forbidden. However, if the meat was never permitted, such as the cases in section one, or a case where someone unfit either received the blood in a vessel or poured the blood onto the altar, in all of these cases the laws of sacrilege do apply, as we taught in sections one and two." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn this mishnah Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva argue about whether meat from most holy sacrifices that was taken out of the Temple before its blood was sprinkled on the altar is subject to the laws of sacrilege.", + "If the flesh of most holy sacrifices was taken out [of the Temple court] before the blood was sprinkled: Rabbi Eliezer says: it is still subject to the laws of sacrilege and one does not become guilty of [transgressing with it the laws of] notar, piggul and defilement. Rabbi Akiba says: it is not subject to the laws of sacrilege and one can become guilty of [transgressing with it the laws of] notar, piggul and defilement. There are two background halakhot necessary to understand this debate: 1) The flesh of most holy sacrifices cannot be taken out of the Temple courtyard. 2) Once the blood of a sacrifice has been sprinkled on the altar, the sacrifice can be eaten by the priests. In this mishnah the flesh was taken out before the blood was sprinkled, such that the flesh was never edible. In yesterday’s mishnah we learned that if the flesh of a sacrifice was never at a point where it could be eaten by the priests, then it is subject to the laws of sacrilege. In our case, since the flesh was never at a point where it could be eaten by the priests, because it was disqualified before its blood was spilled, it is subject to the laws of sacrilege. However, it is not subject to the laws of piggul (improper intention when offering the sacrifice), remnant or the prohibition of eating leftover sacrifices, because it never became edible. These prohibitions refer only to edible meat. To summarize the essential issue: according to Rabbi Eliezer, since the blood was sprinkled only after the flesh was disqualified, this meat is never considered edible.", + "Rabbi Akiba said: if one set aside his hatat and it was lost and he set aside another in its place and afterwards the first was found, and both of them are in front of us, [do you not agree] that just as [the sprinkling of] the blood [of the one] exempts its own flesh [from the laws of sacrilege] so it exempts the flesh of the other one? According to Rabbi Akiva, even though the sprinkling of the blood took place only after the flesh had left the courtyard and it does not therefore allow the flesh to be eaten, it does remove the flesh from the category of being subject to sacrilege. In other words, it counts as edible, even though it can’t be eaten for some other reason. Since it is treated as if it is edible meat (even though it can’t be eaten) it is liable for the laws of piggul, notar or defilement.", + "Now, if the sprinkling of its blood can exempt the flesh of the other from the laws of sacrilege, how much more must it exempt its own flesh. Rabbi Akiva now argues by analogy. If one sets aside a hatat and then it is lost, he must set aside another in its place. If the first animal is found, the second one cannot be sacrificed (see Temurah 4:3). However, if he slaughters the first and sprinkles its blood, the sprinkling removes both that hatat and the second, unusable hatat from being subject to sacrilege. In other words, here you have a case where the sprinkling of blood can exempt an animal for being subject to sacrilege, even if the sprinkling does not make the animal’s flesh edible permitted to eat. Rabbi Akiva now takes the argument one step further. If sprinkling of one animal’s blood can exempt another animal’s disqualified flesh from being subject to sacrilege, shouldn’t it be able to exempt its own flesh from being subject to sacrilege. Thus, in our case, although the flesh was disqualified by being taken out of the Temple court, once its blood has been sprinkled, it is no longer subject to the laws of sacrilege." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah deals with the innards of sacrifices of a lower degree of holiness. These innards are burned on the altar after the blood has been spilled. As in yesterday’s mishnah, today we discuss a case where these innards left the Temple courtyard. This disqualifies them from being able to be placed on the altar.\nAs in yesterday’s mishnah, Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi disagree about whether the laws of sacrilege apply. Their opinions are consistent with those found in yesterday’s mishnah.", + "If the innards of sacrifices of that have a lower degree of holiness were taken out [of the Temple court] before the blood was sprinkled:
Rabbi Eliezer says: they are not subject to the laws of sacrilege and one cannot become guilty of [transgressing with them the laws of] notar, piggul and defilement. Rabbi Eliezer holds that when it comes to the rules of sacrilege, the same rules that applied in yesterday’s mishnah to the flesh of most holy sacrifices, apply to the innards of less holy sacrifices. Once they were taken out of the Temple, they became disqualified from being subsequently placed on the altar. The laws of sacrilege therefore do apply, even after the blood was spilled. The other laws do not apply because this flesh was never able to have been placed on the altar.", + "Rabbi Akiva says: they are subject to the laws of sacrilege and one can become guilty of [transgressing with them the laws of] notar, piggul and defilement. Rabbi Akiva holds that even though the innards were removed from the Temple before the blood was sprinkled, the sprinkling does make them subject to the laws of sacrilege, the same as it did for the flesh in yesterday’s mishnah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah compares the effect that the sprinkling of the blood on the altar has on sacrifices of both higher and lower degrees of holiness.", + "The act of [sprinkling the] blood of most holy sacrifices may have either a lenient or a stringent effect, but with sacrifices of a lesser degree of holiness it has only a stringent effect. This is an introductory note delineating the structure of the remainder of the mishnah.", + "How so? With most holy sacrifices, before the sprinkling, the law of sacrilege applies both to the innards and to the flesh; after the sprinkling it applies to the innards but not to the flesh; In respect of both one is guilty of [transgressing the laws of] notar, iggul and defilement. It is thus found that with most holy sacrifices the act of sprinkling has a lenient as well as a stringent effect. Before the sprinkling of the blood the flesh of most holy sacrifices cannot be eaten by the priests, and its innards cannot be placed on the altar. At this point all parts are subject to the laws of sacrilege. Once the blood is sprinkled, the laws of sacrilege do not apply to the flesh, because it can be eaten by the priests. This is a lenient effect. The innards are still subject to sacrilege, because they can never be eaten. After the sprinkling of the blood, the flesh becomes subject to the laws of piggul, notar and defilement, three laws which apply only to edible flesh. This is the stringent effect.", + "With sacrifices of a lesser degree of holiness it has only a stringent effect. How so? With sacrifices of a lesser degree of holiness, before the sprinkling the law of sacrilege does not apply to the innards or to the flesh; after the sprinkling it applies to the innards but not to the flesh; In respect of both one is guilty of transgressing the laws of notar, piggul and defilement. It is thus found that with sacrifices of a lesser degree of holiness it has only a stringent effect. When it comes to less holy sacrifices, the sprinkling only has a stringent effect. Before the sprinkling, the laws of sacrilege do not apply at all, because they are not yet considered holy. We should note that the laws of meilah (sacrilege) never apply to the flesh of sacrifices of lesser holiness, because they can be eaten by anyone, and not just priests. Sacrilege applies only to food that can be eaten only by priests. Nevertheless, once the blood is sprinkled, the laws of sacrilege do apply to the innards. This is a stringent effect. The sprinkling also serves to make all parts subject to the laws of piggul, notar and defilement, which again is a stringent effect. It turns out that here the sprinkling of blood only has a stringent effect." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis entire chapter discusses various states of preparation of every type of sacrifice, and when the sacrifice becomes liable for various prohibitions. As we shall see, the pattern of this mishnah is repeated throughout this highly stylized chapter. There are some halakhot that I will explain here and then refer to throughout the mishnah, so save the commentary for future reference.\nThe first topic is the bird hatat.", + "The law of sacrilege applies to the hatat of a bird from the moment of its dedication. As soon as a bird hatat is dedicated, it is subject to the laws of sacrilege, even when it is still alive. Since it is still not edible to the priests, the laws of sacrilege apply (see 1:1).", + "With the pinching of its neck it becomes susceptible to be disqualified through contact with a tevul yom or one who still requires atonement, or by remaining overnight. Once its neck is pinched, which is how bird sacrifices are slaughtered, it is now subject to disqualification by contact with a “tevul yom.” A “tevul yom” is a person who has immersed in the mikveh but is not fully pure until the sun sets that evening (see Leviticus 22:7). It can also be disqualified by contact with a person who has gone through his purification process but must still bring the requisite sacrifices the next day (see Keritot 2:1). If the blood remains overnight without being sprinkled on the altar, the sacrifice is disqualified.", + "Once its blood has been sprinkled it is subject to [the laws of] piggul, notar and defilement, but the law of sacrilege no longer applies to it. Once the blood has been sprinkled, its flesh is edible and is therefore liable to the laws of piggul, notar and defilement. Piggul is a disqualification that occurs if the priest sacrifices it with the intention of eating it after it can no longer be eaten. Notar is remnat, and defilement refers to the prohibition of eating a sacrifice that has been ritually defiled. Since the bird hatat can now be eaten by the priests, it is no longer subject to the laws of sacrilege." + ], + [ + "The law of sacrilege applies to the olah of a bird from the moment of its dedication.
With the pinching of its neck it becomes susceptible to be disqualified through contact with a tevul yom or one who still requires atonement, or by remaining overnight.
Once its blood has been squeezed out [onto the walls of the altar] it is subject to [the laws of] piggul, notar and defilement;
And the law of sacrilege applies to it until [the ashes have been] removed [from the altar] to the place of the ashes.
Today’s mishnah deals with the bird olah, a whole burnt offering. Most of its laws are the same as those found in yesterday’s mishnah.
Sections one-three: These laws are the same as those found in yesterday’s mishnah. See there for an explanation.
Section four: Since an olah never becomes edible, the laws of sacrilege apply longer than they do to the hatat, which can be eaten by the priests. The flesh is still subject to sacrilege until it is burned and the ashes are removed from the altar and brought out to the “places of ashes” which was outside of the Temple/Tabernacle (see Leviticus 6:4). At this point its mitzvah has been completed and it is therefore no longer subject to the law of sacrilege." + ], + [ + "The law of sacrilege applies to the bullocks which are to be burned and the goats which are to be burned from the moment of their dedication.
Once slaughtered they become susceptible to be disqualified through contact with a tevul yom or one who still requires atonement, or by remaining overnight.
Once their blood has been sprinkled they are subject to [the laws of] piggul, notar and defilement.
And the law of sacrilege applies to them even while they are at the place of the ashes so long as the flesh has not been charred.
This mishnah is very similar to the first two mishnayot of this chapter, except it deals with the bullocks and goats that are burned. There are three types of bullocks that are burned: 1) The bullock offered on Yom Kippur; 2) the bullock offered by a high priest for issuing a mistaken instruction; 3) the bullock offered by the court that makes a mistaken instruction. There are two types of goats that are burned: 1) The goat offered on Yom Kippur; 2) The goat offered by a court for making a mistaken instruction concerning a law related to idol worship.
Sections 1-3: See mishnayot one and two above for an explanation.
Section four: The law of sacrilege continues to apply to the burned bullocks and goats even after they are brought out to the place of burning. It applies until their flesh has been charred and its appearance has changed. This is when their burning is technically complete (see Zevahim 12:6) and at that point the law of sacrilege no longer applies." + ], + [ + "The law of sacrilege applies to an olah from the moment of its dedication.
When it is slaughtered it becomes susceptible to be disqualified through contact with a tevul yom or one who still requires atonement, or by remaining overnight.
Once its blood has been sprinkled it is subject to [the laws of] piggul, notar and defilement;
And the law of sacrilege does not apply to its hide, but it does apply to it flesh until [the ashes have been] removed [from the altar] to the place of the ashes.
Today’s mishnah deals with the animal olah.
Sections one-three: See mishnah two.
Section four: Immediately after it is slaughtered, the hide belongs to the priest. Therefore, the law of sacrilege stops applying to the hide. However, the law of sacrilege continues to apply to its flesh, which is not eaten by the priest. It only stops when the flesh is removed from the altar and brought to the place of ashes." + ], + [ + "The law of sacrilege applies to the hatat, and asham and to shelamim sacrifices of the congregation from the moment of their dedication.
Once slaughtered they become susceptible to be disqualified through contact with a tevul yom or one who still requires atonement, or by remaining overnight.
Once their blood has been sprinkled they are subject to [the laws of] piggul, notar and defilement.
The law of sacrilege then no longer applies to the flesh, but applies to the innards until the ashes are removed to the place of the ashes.
This mishnah refers to other most holy sacrifices, namely the hatat, the asham and the public shelamim sacrifices. These are the two lambs sacrificed on Shavuot. They are considered most holy sacrifices, although other shelamim sacrifices are sacrifices of a lesser degree of holiness.
Sections one-three: See the previous mishnayot.
Section four: Once the animal has been slaughtered, the flesh may be eaten by the priests, and therefore the law of sacrilege no longer applies. However it continues to apply to the innards until they are burned and then brought out to the place of ashes." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOn Shavuot two loaves of bread are brought with the sacrifices. Our mishnah is concerned with when the law of sacrilege applies to these loaves.", + "The law of sacrilege applies to the two loaves of bread from the moment of their dedication. Same as mishnayot above.", + "Once they have formed a crust in the oven they become susceptible to be disqualified through contact with a tevul yom or one who still requires atonement, and the [festival] offerings can then be slaughtered. Once they have formed a crust, they are considered food and they are liable to become disqualified in all of these ways (see above mishnayot). Note that “remaining overnight” is not found in this mishnah because the two loaves are cooked the night before the festival. They always remain overnight. Once they have formed a crust, they are considered bread and at this point the priests can slaughter the festival sacrifices (see Leviticus 23:20).", + "Once the blood of the lambs has been sprinkled they [the loaves] are subject to [the laws of] piggul, notar and defilement, and the law of sacrilege no longer applies to them. Once the blood of the lambs has been sprinkled, one who eats them can be liable if they have been disqualified. And since the priests can now eat the loaves, they are no longer subject to the laws of sacrilege." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah deals with the showbread that is placed on the table in the Sanctuary every Shabbat.", + "The law of sacrilege applies to the showbread from the moment of its dedication. See above mishnayot.", + "Once it has formed a crust in the oven it becomes susceptible to be disqualified through contact with a tevul yom or one who still requires atonement, and it may be arranged upon the table [of the Sanctuary]. As with the two loaves in yesterday’s mishnah, the showbread can become disqualified once it has become crusted. It is also at this point that it can be taken out of the oven and arranged on the table.", + "Once the dishes of incense have been offered it is subject to [the laws of] piggul, notar and defilement, and the law of sacrilege no longer applies to it. Two dishes of incense were placed over the showbread. If the bread was “piggul” while he was burning the incense he had the intent of eating the bread on the next day he would be liable for eating it. Similarly, if he waited until it was remnant (notar) or ate it after it was defiled he would be liable. As is always the case, once the bread has become defiled, it is no longer subject to the law of sacrilege." + ], + [ + "Our mishnah discusses how the law of sacrilege relates to menahot.
The law of sacrilege applies to menahot (grain from the moment of their dedication. See every other mishnah in this chapter.", + "Once they have become sacred by being put in the vessel [of service] they become susceptible for unfitness through contact with a tevul yom or one who still requires atonement, or by remaining overnight. Once the minhah is placed in a vessel it can be disqualified. The rest of the categories are the same as those in every other mishnah in this chapter.", + "Once the handful has been offered they are subject to [the law of] piggul, notar and defilement, and the law of sacrilege no longer applies to the remnants, but it applies to the handful until its ashes have been removed to the place of the ashes. Once the handful has been removed and placed on the altar, the minhah can be eaten by the priests, and therefore the law of sacrilege no longer applies. However, one who eats it in a disqualified state is now liable for the three prohibitions mentioned in all of the mishnayot above." + ], + [ + "The law of sacrilege applies to the handful [of a minhah], the frankincense, the incense, the minhah of a priest, the minhah of the anointed high priest and the minhah that is accompanied by a libation, from the moment of their dedication. All of these menahot or other items (incense) are completely burned on the altar. No parts thereof are given to the priest. Therefore, the law of sacrilege will always apply to them.", + "Once they have become sacred by being put in the vessel, they become susceptible for unfitness through contact with a tevul yom or one who still requires atonement, or by remaining overnight, and they are subject to [the laws of] notar and defilement, but [the law of] piggul does not apply to them. Most of this section is the same as that in yesterday’s mishnah except that the laws of piggul do not apply to any of these items. The mishnah will now explain why the laws of piggul do not apply.", + "This is the general rule: whatever has something else which renders it permissible [for the altar or for the use of the priests] is not subject to [the laws of] piggul, nothar and defilement until that act has been performed. And whatever does not have something else which renders it permissible becomes subject [to the laws of] notar and defilement as soon as it has become sacred by being put in the vessel, but piggul does not apply to it. Any sacrificial item that has something else that allows it to be burned or eaten is subject to all of these laws, but only after that other thing has been done. For instance, the flesh of an animal is subject to these laws after the blood has been sprinkled on the altar (see mishnayot 1-5). The innards can be put on the altar once the blood has been sprinkled. The minhah can be eaten once the handful has been removed. The two loaves can be eaten once the blood of the lambs has been thrown on the altar, and the showbread can be eaten once the incense has been burned. All of these have other things that permit them. In contrast, the list in our mishnah “permits itself.” In other words, these things can be sacrificed immediately (none of them are eaten) without waiting for something else to be done. Therefore, they are subject immediately to the laws of notar and defilement. Piggul never applies to such items. For further discussion see Zevahim 4:3." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is found word for word in Temurah 4:1. It is brought here because it also deals with sacrilege. I have mostly replicated my commentary from there.\nIn Temurah 2:2 we learned that there are five types of hataot (pl. of hatat) that are left to die because they can’t be sacrificed and neither can they be eaten. Our mishnah deals with these five hataot.", + "The offspring of a hatat, the substitute of a hatat, and a hatat whose owner has died, are left to die. These are the first three categories of hataot that are left to die. Basically, once the owner has been atoned for, the hatat cannot be sacrificed. The first two cannot be sacrificed because the owner received atonement from the original animal. If the owner died, then he no longer needs atonement so his hatat too cannot be sacrificed.", + "A hatat whose year has passed or which was lost and found blemished: If the owners obtained atonement [afterwards, through another animal], is left to die, and it does not make a substitute; it is forbidden to derive benefit from it, but the law of sacrilege does not apply. If the owners have not yet obtained atonement, it must go to pasture until it becomes unfit for sacrifice. It is then sold and another is bought with the money. It makes a substitute, and the law of sacrilege does apply. When it comes to the fourth and fifth types of hatat that must be left to die, it depends on whether the owners have already received atonement through another animal. If the owners have already been atoned for by bringing another animal as a hatat, then the original hatat (the one whose year had passed or which had been lost and then was found) must be left to die. If the owner tries to substitute for it, it no longer can make a substitute. It is forbidden to derive any benefit from it, as it is always forbidden to derive benefit from dedicated animals; however, if one does derive benefit from it, it is not considered sacrilege because the animal is not really sanctified any more. If, however, the original hatat is found (and is blemished) or passed a year before the owners had been atoned for, then the animal need not be left to die. The hatat whose year had passed is let out to pasture until it is blemished and then it can be sold. The hatat that was found blemished can be sold immediately. With the proceeds he buys a new hatat, and that hatat has all of the sanctity of regular hatat. It can make a substitute and if one derives benefit from it, he has committed sacrilege and will have to make restitution." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nWhen a nazirite finishes his term he must bring three offerings: a hatat (sin-offering), an olah (whole-burnt offering), and a shelamim (well-being offering). Our mishnah deals with how the law of sacrilege and various other laws apply to these three offerings in a case where a person set aside money to buy the sacrifices but had not yet bought them.", + "If one has set aside money for his nazirite offerings, it may not be used, but the law of sacrilege does not apply to it, as it may all be used for the shelamim. If he set aside money, he is not allowed to use the money, but the laws of sacrilege don’t apply. This is because all of the money might end up going for shelamim (offerings of well-being), and since shelamim are sacrifices of lower sanctity, the laws of sacrilege do not apply to them (see 1:4).", + "If he died and left money [for his nazirite offerings] If unspecified it shall go to the fund for voluntary offerings; If specified: The money designated for the hatats shall be taken to the Dead Sea; it may not be used, though the law of sacrilege does not apply to it. With the money designated for an olah they shall bring a olah; the law of sacrilege applies to it. With the money designated for the shelamim they shall bring a shelamim, and it has to be consumed within a day, but requires no bread offering. If he died and left money, but had not specified how much was to go for each type of sacrifice, then all of the money goes to the general fund in the Temple used to buy voluntary offerings.", + "The mishnah now deals with a case where he did specify which coins go for which sacrifices. The money set aside for a hatat must be destroyed. As we learned in yesterday’s mishnah, a hatat whose owners have died can’t be sacrificed. While it is forbidden to derive any benefit from this money, if he does it is not sacrilege, because the money was not going to be used to buy a sacrifice. The money for the olah should be used to buy an olah. The law of sacrilege will apply to the olah, as it always does. The money set aside for the shelamim is used for a shelamim. It must be eaten by the next day, as is the law for the shelamim of a nazirite (Zevahim 5:6), but it does not need to be accompanied by a bread-offering, because the nazirite is dead and the bread offering is supposed to be put in his hands (see Numbers 6:19)." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah discusses the law of sacrilege as it relates to blood and the wine libations.", + "Rabbi Ishmael says: [the law relating to] blood is lenient at the beginning [before it is offered] and stringent at the end; [the law relating to] libations is stringent at the beginning and lenient at the end. This section introduces the rest of the mishnah. As we have seen on many occasions, the rabbis frequently compare the laws as they apply in one case with their application in other cases.", + "Blood at the beginning is not subject to the law of sacrilege, but is subject to it after it has flowed away to the Wadi Kidron. Before the blood is put on the altar, it is not subject to the law of sacrilege. This is derived in the Talmud from a midrash. After being spilled or cast against the altar, the blood would flow out of the Temple down into Wadi Kidron. Blood found in the soil surrounding the Wadi was subject to sacrilege. This would mean that anyone using this soil, which was used for fertilizer, would have to pay for its use to the Temple.", + "Libations at the beginning are subject to the law of sacrilege, but are exempted from it after they flowed down into the shitin. Before the wine libations are put on the altar, they are subject to the law of sacrilege. This is because it is prohibited to derive benefit from them. However, after they flow out through the hole on the altar down to the “shittin” the foundations of the altar, the law of sacrilege no longer applies. The general rule is that anything which has had its mitzvah performed is not subject to the law of sacrilege." + ], + [ + "The ashes of the inner altar and [of the wicks of] the menorah may not be used but they are not subject to the law of sacrilege. The incense was burned on the inner altar, inside the Sanctuary. It is forbidden to use the ashes from this altar, and to use the wicks of the menorah. However, since their mitzvoth had already been performed, they are not subject to the law of sacrilege, as we learned in yesterday’s mishnah.", + "If one dedicates ashes they are subject to the law of sacrilege. If after the ashes were removed from the Temple, someone picked them up and dedicated them to the Temple, they would then become subject to sacrilege. In other words, they would remain forbidden but one who did use them would be liable to compensate the Temple.", + "Turtle-doves which have not reached the right age and pigeons which have exceeded the right age may not be used but they are not subject to the law of sacrilege. Turtle-doves can be used as sacrifices when they are mature. Pigeons can only be used when they are young. If one dedicates them before they have reached the right age, or after they have passed their age they may not be used, but they are not subject to the law of sacrilege, because they are not fit to be put on the altar.", + "Rabbi Shimon said: turtle-doves which have not yet reached the right age are subject to the law of sacrilege, while pigeons which have exceeded the right age are not allowed for use, but are exempt from the law of sacrilege. Before turtle-doves reach the right age, they are subject to the law of sacrilege, because they will eventually become fit for the altar. However, he agrees with the previous opinion that once pigeons have passed the age at which they can be sacrificed, they are no longer subject to sacrilege." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah deals with sacrilege and the products that come from animals milk and eggs.", + "The milk of consecrated animals and the eggs of [consecrated] turtle-doves may not be used, but are not subject to the law of sacrilege. The sanctity of a consecrated female animal or turtle-dove applies to the animal itself, but not to the products that come from the animal, such as milk and eggs. While one may not derive any benefit from these items, they are not holy and therefore, they are not subject to the law of sacrilege.", + "When is this so? For things dedicated for the altar, but as for things dedicated for Temple upkeep, if one consecrated a chicken both it and its eggs are subject to the law of sacrilege, or [if one dedicated] a she-donkey, both it and its milk are subject to the law of sacrilege. The above exemption from the law of sacrilege applies only if the animal was dedicated for the altar. But if an animal which could not be sacrificed was dedicated, such as a chicken or a donkey, then the animal is considered to have been dedicated for Temple upkeep. This means that the animal will be sold and the profits used to maintain the Temple. In such a case, even those things which the animal produces are holy and are subject to the law of sacrilege. We shall deal more with this subject in tomorrow’s mishnah." + ], + [ + "Whatever is fit for the altar and not for Temple repair, for Temple repair and not for the altar, neither for the altar nor for Temple repair is subject to the law of sacrilege. A person can be liable for sacrilege for things that are either fit for use on the altar, or fit for use for Temple repair, or not fit for either use. In all cases, it is possible that the law of sacrilege will apply, as the mishnah will now explain.", + "How so? If one consecrated a cistern full of water, a dump full of manure, a dove-cote full of pigeons, a tree laden with fruit, a field covered with herbs, the law of sacrilege applies to them and to their contents. But if one consecrated a cistern and it was later filled with water, a dump and it was later filled with manure, a dove-cote and it was later filled with pigeons, a tree and it afterwards bore fruit or a field and it afterwards produced herbs, the law of sacrilege applies to the consecrated objects themselves but not to their contents, the words of Rabbi Judah. Water is fit for Temple repair but not for the altar. It can be used to make bricks, or for other uses. But this water cannot be put on the altar, because the one water libation done during the year, on Sukkot, was done with water from the Shiloah. The manure is fit for neither use. It would have to be sold and its profits used for Temple upkeep. The pigeons can be put on the altar. Some fruit, such as grapes and olives, can be put on the altar. Other fruit cannot be used on the altar, or for Temple upkeep. They would be sold and the profits used for Temple upkeep. Similarly, herbs cannot be used on the altar, or for Temple upkeep. In all of these cases, the law of sacrilege applies both to the container, and to that which was in it or on it. However, if one dedicates one of these things before it contains the water, manure, etc. only the container/tree/field is subject to the law of sacrilege. The general rule is that which is produced by something dedicated is not subject to the law of sacrilege. This is the opinion of Rabbi Judah.", + "Rabbi Shimon says: if one consecrated a field or a tree, the law of sacrilege applies to it and to its produce for it is the growth of consecrated property. Rabbi Shimon partially disagrees with Rabbi Judah. He holds that if something grows from a consecrated thing, such as fruit from a tree or herbs from a plant, that which grows is subject to the law of sacrilege.", + "The young of [cattle set aside as] tithe may not nurse from cattle set aside for tithe, but others consecrate for such use. The young of consecrated cattle may not nurse from consecrated cattle, but others consecrate for such use. Tithed animals are sacred as are their offspring. Therefore, even their own offspring cannot nurse from them. Other people dedicate milk so that the offspring of tithed or holy animals can have milk to nurse.", + "Workers may not eat dry figs dedicated to the Temple, nor may a cow eat of the vetch belonging to the Temple. Workers who are working on behalf of the Temple, or a cow performing some type of labor needed for the Temple, cannot directly eat produce dedicated to the Temple. Although the Temple must feed the workers or the cow, they still can’t eat holy property. They get their pay from the Temple treasurer. They can then use these funds to buy their own food." + ], + [ + "If the roots of a privately owned tree spread onto dedicated ground, or those of a tree in dedicated ground spread onto private ground, they may not be used, but the law of sacrilege does not apply to them.
The water of a spring which comes out of a dedicated field may not be used, but the law of sacrilege does not apply to it When it has left the field it may be used.
The water in the golden jar may not be used, but the law of sacrilege does not apply to it.
When it has been poured into the flask, it is subject to the law of sacrilege.
The willow branch may not be used, but is not subject to the law of sacrilege. Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Zadok says: the elders used to put it with their palm tree branches.
Section one: In this case, either the tree grows on privately owned, non-sacred ground but its roots spread out onto dedicated ground, or the opposite. Since part of the tree is on sacred ground, it is forbidden to benefit from any of the tree. However, since the entire tree is not on sacred ground, it is not subject to the law of sacrilege.
Section two: This refers to a case where a person dedicated his field to the Temple, but he did not dedicate the spring. While the spring is on the field, the water may not be used because it is on dedicated ground. However, since he didn’t dedicate the spring itself, the water is not subject to the law of sacrilege. Once the water has left the field, it can be used. This is different from the case of the tree because all parts of a tree are interconnected. When its roots leave the sacred ground they are not disconnected from that ground, unlike water which is.
Section three: This section refers to the water used for the water libation on Sukkot (see Sukkah 4:9-10). The day before Shabbat, they would fill a golden jar with water drawn from the Shiloah spring in Jerusalem, so that the next day they could pour it onto the altar without having to carry from the Shiloah to the Temple. When in this jar, the water cannot be used for other purposes, but it has not yet been sanctified so it is not subject to the law of sacrilege. The golden flask was used on most days to directly draw water from the Shiloah, and on Shabbat they would pour from the golden jar into the golden flask. The flask serves to sanctify the water and therefore once in this flask it is subject to the law of sacrilege.
Section four: On Sukkot there was a custom to place willows on the side of the altar (see Sukkah 4:5). That willow cannot be used for other purposes, but it is not subject to the law of sacrilege, because it is not sanctified. Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Zadok notes that before putting it next to the altar, the elders used to put it with their palm branches (the lulav). This is not considered illicit use, because when one performs a mitzvah with an object, it is not considered that he has “derived benefit” from the object." + ], + [ + "A nest which is built on the top of a dedicated tree, one may not derive benefit from it, but the law of sacrilege does not apply to it. The nest at the top of the dedicated tree is forbidden for use, but since it is not the tree itself, it is not subject to the law of sacrilege.", + "That which is on the top of an asherah, one flicks [it] off with a reed. An asherah is a tree used in idol worship (see Avodah Zarah 3:7). It is forbidden to use the tree. The nest, however, is not prohibited. If a person wants to take the nest, he can flick it off with a reed. Note that the law is stricter when it comes to Temple property there is no way to use the nest.", + "If one dedicated a forest to the temple, the law of sacrilege applies to the whole of it. If a person dedicates an entire forest to the Temple, every part of the tree is sacred and subject to the law of sacrilege, including the leaves.", + "However, if the Temple buys a forest in order to use the trees, only the parts of the tree that they intend to use, namely the lumber is subject to the law of sacrilege. The chips and the fallen leaves are not subject to sacrilege because the when the treasurers bought them, they knew that they had no use for them." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis chapter deals with when things join together to create the minimum amount necessary for a violation to have been committed or an obligation to be fulfilled. We begin with the issue of sacrilege, but the following mishnayot proceed to other subjects.", + "Things dedicated for the altar combine with one another with regard to the law of sacrilege, and to render one liable over them [for the laws of] piggul, notar and defilement. To be liable for sacrilege one must derive a perutah’s worth of benefit from sacred property. If one derives benefit from several different things dedicated to the altar, and separately each is not worth a perutah, but together they are, he is liable for sacrilege. They also join together to cause one to be liable for piggul (sacrifices offered with improper intent), notar (remnant) and the prohibition against eating defiled holy things.", + "Things dedicated for Temple repair combine with one another. Things dedicated for Temple repair join together only for sacrilege, but not for the other prohibitions, because these prohibitions do not apply to things dedicated for Temple repair (see Temurah 7:1).", + "Things dedicated for the altar combine with things dedicated for Temple repair with regard to the law of sacrilege. If one has a mixture of things dedicated for the Temple and things dedicated for Temple repair, they can join together to make one liable for sacrilege, because the law of sacrilege applies to them all. However, they do not join together for the other prohibitions, because these prohibitions don’t apply to things dedicated for Temple repair." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah deals with which parts of a sacrifice combine to make one liable for either sacrilege, or piggul, notar or defilement. If a person eats a little of this part and a little of that part, when does he become liable.", + "Five things in an olah combine with one another: the flesh, the fat, the fine flour, the wine and the oil. The fine flour, the wine and the oil all accompany the olah, the whole-burnt offering. If one eats less than a perutah’s worth of meat, for instance, and less than a perutah’s worth of oil, but together they are worth a perutah, he has committed sacrilege. If he eats them and together they constitute an olive’s worth, and they were piggul, notar or defiled, he has transgressed the prohibition.", + "And six in a todah: the flesh, the fat, the fine flour, the wine, the oil and the bread. There is one more element when it comes to the todah that doesn’t exist for the olah the loaves that accompany it. These also join with the other parts of the sacrifice. We should note that since the todah (thanksgiving offering) is a sacrifice of lesser holiness, it is not subject to the laws of sacrilege. The six things join together to make one liable for piggul, notar or defilement.", + "Terumah, terumah of the tithe, terumah of the tithe separated from demai, hallah and first-fruits combine with one another to make up the size required to render other things forbidden and to be liable for the payment of a fifth. The items listed here, which I will explain shortly, join together to render other things forbidden, if enough of them fall into non-sacred things. For instance, if a small amount of terumah oil and a small amount of hallah dough are mixed together and together they constitute a seah then fall into less than 100 seahs of hullin (non-sacred) dough, all of the dough is forbidden to non-priests (see Orlah 2:1). They also join together to make one who eats them unwittingly liable to pay back the principle and an added fifth. One is liable for the added fifth only if he eats an olive’s worth of holy things (see Bava Metzia 4:8). I shall now briefly explain what each is. Terumah: taken from produce and given to the priest. Terumah of tithe: the Levite gives one tenth of his tithe to the priest as terumah. Demai is the tithe separated from produce bought from someone who might not have already tithed it. Terumah is then taken from this demai. Hallah: separated from dough and given to the priest. Bikkurim: first-fruits, also considered to be holy." + ], + [ + "All kinds of piggul can combine with one another and all kinds of notar can combine with one another. To remind ourselves, piggul is a sacrifice that was offered with the intent of eating it outside of the time in which it must be eaten. If one eats different types of piggul, for instance part that came from a most holy sacrifice such as a hatat, and part that comes from a less holy sacrifice such as shelamim, he is liable for having eaten piggul, if together they add up to the minimum measure of an olive. Notar is sacrifice that is left over after the time in which it must be eaten. The same thing here if the notar comes from different types of sacrifices, it still joins together to create the minimum measure.", + "All kinds of carrion can combine with one another. An olive’s worth of carrion causes impurity. All types of carrion join together to convey this impurity, even if half of the measure is from a pure animal and half is from an impure animal.", + "All kinds of sheratzim can combine with one another. There are eight forbidden sheratzim (creepy crawly things) listed in Leviticus 11:29-30 that convey impurity at the minimum measure of a lentil’s worth. They all join together to create the minimal measure.", + "The blood of a sheretz and its flesh can combine with one another. Just as different sheretzim join together, so too does the blood of the sheretz join with its flesh to add up to the minimum measure.", + "A general rule was stated by Rabbi Joshua: all things that are alike both in respect of [duration of] uncleanness and in respect of their minimum measure can combine with one another. Things that are alike in respect [of duration] of uncleanness but not in respect of minimum measure, in respect of minimum measure but not in respect [of duration] of uncleanness, or [if they are alike] neither in respect [of duration] of uncleanness nor in respect of measure, cannot combine with one another. Rabbi Joshua now provides a general rule as to when different things join together. There are two criteria. First of all, the minimum measure needs to be the same. Second, the rules regarding their impurity need to be the same. So a part of a sheretz and a piece of carrion do not join together because carrion has a minimum measure of an olive, whereas the minimum measure for a sheretz is a lentil. A piece of dead body and a piece of carrion share the same measure (an olive’s worth) but the piece of a dead body cause seven-day impurity, whereas the carrioin causes one day impurity, so they don’t join. All the more so a piece of a dead body won’t join with a piece of sheretz because both their impurity and their measures are different." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn today’s mishnah we learn that different types of prohibited substances do not join together to add up to a sufficient amount for a transgression to have occurred.", + "Piggul and remnant do not combine with one another because they are of two different names. In yesterday’s mishnah we learned that different types of piggul can combine together, and different types of sheratzim can combine together, etc. Today we learn that differently named substances do not combine together. So if one eats half of an olive’s worth of piggul and half of an olive’s worth of notar (remnant) he is not liable, because he has not eaten enough prohibited food of one prohibition.", + "Sheretz and carrion, as well as carrion and the flesh of a corpse do not combine with one another to effect impurity, not even in respect of the more lenient of the two [grades] of defilement. Similarly, sheretz (a creepy crawly thing that transmits impurity see yesterday’s mishnah) and carrion, and carrion and flesh from a human corpse do not join together to create the minimum amount needed to effect impurity. This is true even with regard to the lower quantity or level of defilement. For instance, less than a lentil’s worth of a sheretz does not join together with less than an olive’s worth of carrion. Similarly, less than an olive’s worth of a human corpse does not join with less than an olive’s worth of animal carrion to transmit the type of impurity that makes on impure for only one day.", + "Food contaminated through contact with a primary defilement can combine with that contaminated by a secondary defilement to affect uncleanness according to the lower degree of defilement of the two. Food that has been contaminated by contact with a source of primary defilement (such as a dead body) now has first degree defilement. Food that has been contaminated with something that has secondary defilement now has second degree defilement. These different foods can combine to form the minimum amount of an egg’s worth to contaminate other foods according to the lower degree of the two. If the joined substance comes into contact with terumah, it would cause it to have third degree defilement, which is a very low level of defilement. We shall learn more about this when we learn tractate Toharot." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah teaches that different types of food and different types of drink can join together with regard to various matters.", + "All kinds of food can combine with one another:
To make up the quantity of half a peras in order to render the body unfit One who eats half of a peras (the equivalent of two eggs) of unclean food, cannot eat terumah until the evening. The food “renders his body unfit” to eat holy food. Different types of unclean food can join to create this minimum amount.", + "[To make up the food] for two meals to form an eruv; One who wants to walk more than two thousand cubits out of his city on Shabbat puts an “eruv,” a meal, at the two thousand cubit mark and then he can walk an additional two thousand cubits. The meal must consist of a certain amount of food (see Eruvin 8:2) and different types of food can join together to create the minimum amount.", + "To make up the volume of an egg to contaminate food; Impure food conveys impurity only if there is the volume of an egg. Different impure foods can join together to create this volume.", + "To make up the volume of a dry fig with regard to carrying on Shabbat; One who carries food from one domain to another on Shabbat is liable only if the food is at least the volume of a dried fig (see Shabbat 7:4).", + "And the volume of a date with regard to Yom Kippur. All kinds of drinks can combine with one another: One who eats a date’s worth of food on Yom Kippur is liable. Again, all different foods join together to create this minimum amount.", + "To make up a quarter [of a log] in order to render the body unfit; One who drinks a quarter of a log of impure drink is rendered unfit to eat terumah until the evening.", + "To make up a mouthful with regard to Yom Kippur. On Yom Kippur, one who drinks a mouthful is liable. In both of these matters, different foods join together." + ], + [ + "Orlah and kilayim of the vineyard can combine with one another. Rabbi Shimon says: they do not combine. According to the first opinion, orlah (fruit during its first three years) and kilayim (seeds) that grow in a vineyard combine with one another. The result is that if half of a seah of orlah and half of a seah of kilayim fall into less than two hundred seahs of regular produce, the regular produce is all prohibited. Rabbi Shimon holds that since these two prohibitions have different names, they don’t combine together. It seems that the first opinion holds that since they are so similar, they do combine.", + "Cloth, sack-cloth, sack-cloth and leather, leather and matting combine with one another. The different materials in this section have different minimum measures for being susceptible to different kinds of uncleanness. Cloth that is three handbreadths square is susceptible to the sitting impurity conveyed by a zav (one with an unusual genital discharge), and for other matters of impurity it is susceptible if it is three fingers square. Sack-cloth must be four by four handbreadths. Leather must be five square handbreadths. And matting must be six square handbreadths. These different materials can join together to create the minimum measure for the most lenient of them. For instance, one handbreadth of cloth will join with three handbreadths of sack-cloth, and one of sack-cloth will join four of leather and one of leather will join five of matting. However, two handbreadths of cloth will not join one handbreadth of sack-cloth, because the cloth is stricter. To put it another way cloth can count as sack-cloth, but sack-cloth cannot count as cloth.", + "Rabbi Shimon: What is the reason? Because these are all susceptible to the uncleanness caused by sitting. In mishnah three we learned that different substances that do not have the same measure do not join together. Seemingly, today’s mishnah deviates from that rule. Rabbi Shimon explains that it does not actually contradict that rule because when it comes to the impurity conveyed by the sitting of a zav, they all potentially have the same measure. If a person cuts off a small piece of any of these materials, the size of one handbreadth square, and he intends to sit on that material, it is susceptible to sitting impurity when a zav sits on it. Since there is one aspect in which they are all the same, they can join together to create the minimum measure be susceptible to impurity." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah discusses the basic laws of sacrilege when is a person considered to have derived benefit from a sacred thing such that he is guilty of sacrilege?", + "If one derived a perutah's worth of benefit from a sacred thing, he is guilty of sacrilege even though he did not lessen its value, the words of Rabbi Akiva. According to Rabbi Akiva, one is liable for sacrilege by virtue of his having derived benefit from the object that was dedicated to the Temple. It is irrelevant whether the benefit that he derived diminished the value of the dedicated object. He is guilty because he should not have made such use of a holy item.", + "But the sages say: Anything that can deteriorate [through use], the law of sacrilege applies to it only after it has suffered deterioration. And anything that does not deteriorate [through use], the law of sacrilege applies to it as soon as he made use of it. The other rabbis offer a more nuanced approach to this issue. If the object is one whose value can be diminished by use, then he is not liable for sacrilege unless he actually does cause it to be diminished. However, if the item is not generally diminished by normal use, then one who uses it is liable for sacrilege as long as he derived a perutah’s worth of benefit.", + "How is this so? If [a woman] puts a necklace round her neck or a ring on her finger, or if she drank from a golden cup, she is liable to the law of sacrilege as soon as she made use of it [to the value of a perutah]. But if one puts on a shirt or covers oneself with a cloak, or if one chopped [wood] with an axe, he is subject to the law of sacrilege only if [those objects] have suffered deterioration. The mishnah now illustrates which items are diminished by use and which items are not. The items in the first list are not diminished by use for they are made of metal. Therefore, as soon as the woman using them derives benefit from them, she has committed sacrilege. The items in the second list are diminished, even minimally by use. Therefore, one who uses them is not liable for sacrilege unless he has diminished them by the value of a perutah. It is easiest to think of the rule this way: when an item is diminished by use, we define benefit by its deterioration. For instance, one derives benefit from food, when he has eaten a perutah’s worth of food. But if the item does not deteriorate, we must evaluate it the benefit some other way. The way to do this would be to estimate how much one would pay to use the cup, necklace etc. for such a use. If it is more than a perutah, then she has committed sacrilege.", + "If one sheared a hatat while it was alive, he is not liable for sacrilege sacrilege unless he has diminished its value. If when dead, he is liable as soon as he made use of it. If he shears the hatat animal while it is alive, he has diminished its value. Therefore, he is liable only if the amount he sheared is worth a perutah. In contrast, it is forbidden to derive any benefit from a hatat animal that died (it was not slaughtered as part of the sacrificial process). Its wool has no real value because it must be buried. Therefore, we can’t say that by using the wool he has diminished the animal’s value-the animal has no value. He will be liable for having derived benefit, even without diminishing the animal’s value." + ], + [ + "If one derived half a perutah's worth of benefit and impaired [the value of the used article] by another half a perutah, or if one derived a perutah's worth of benefit from one thing and diminished another thing by the value of a perutah, he had not committed sacrilege, until he benefits a perutah's worth and diminishes the value of a perutah of the same thing. In order to be liable for sacrilege one has to derive a perutah’s worth of benefit and cause the value of the object used to be diminished by the value of a perutah. If both of these elements do not exist, sacrilege has not been committed (assuming that the item is one that does deteriorate with use). Let’s use the case of an ax. If one benefits a perutah’s worth, meaning a person would pay at least a perutah to use the ax for as long as he did, and he at the same time he caused the ax to deteriorate in value by at least a perutah, then he is liable for sacrilege. However, if he derives only half a perutah’s worth of benefit and causes the value to deteriorate by only half of a perutah, he has not committed sacrilege. We don’t add the benefit to the deterioration to arrive at the requisite perutah. If he uses the ax and derives a perutah’s worth of benefit but doesn’t cause it to deteriorate by a perutah, and at the same time he causes some other holy item to deteriorate, for instance he breaks a jar that has been dedicated to the Temple causing the loss of at least a perutah, he is still not liable for sacrilege. Here the benefit came with one object (the ax) and the deterioration with another (the jar). In order for sacrilege to have been committed, the benefit and loss must be with the same object." + ], + [ + "One does not commit sacrilege after sacrilege has already been committed by another person, except with domesticated animals and vessels of ministry. Once a person has made non-holy use of an item dedicated to the Temple, the item becomes non-sacred and therefore the next person to use it has not committed sacrilege. This is true, however, only of items that become non-sacred (hullin) after secular use has been made of them. Animals that can be used as sacrifices and the vessels of ministry used in the Temple can never become hullin. Therefore, even after sacrilege has already been committed with them, they are still subject to the laws of sacrilege.", + "How so? If one rode on a beast and then another came and rode on it and yet another came and rode on it; Or if one drank from a golden cup, then another came and drank and yet another came and drank; Or if one plucked [of the wool] of a hatat, then another came and plucked and yet another came and plucked, all of them are guilty of sacrilege. The mishnah now cites three examples of sacrilege done either with a sacrificial animal or with a vessel of ministry. In all three of these cases, those who use the animal or vessel after the first sacrilege has already been performed are still liable for sacrilege.", + "Rabbi said: anything that cannot be redeemed is subject to the law of sacrilege even after sacrilege has been already committed with it. Rabbi [Judah Hanasi] adds that anything that cannot be redeemed is subject to multiple acts of sacrilege, because it too, like the vessels, cannot become hullin. This would include birds set aside to be sacrifices, wood and incense (see Menahot 12:1)." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah discusses when exactly a person who takes something from Temple property is considered to have committed sacrilege.", + "If he removed a stone or a beam belonging to Temple property, he is not guilty of sacrilege. But if he gave it to his friend he is guilty of sacrilege, but his fellow is not guilty. Simply removing a stone or a beam from Temple property is not considered sacrilege, because he has not yet benefited from it. However, all he has to do is give it to his friend and he has committed sacrilege because his friend will think highly of him for having given him a present. This is considered enough benefit for him to be considered as having committed sacrilege. His friend who receives the stone or beam cannot be guilty of sacrilege because as we learned in mishnah three, once sacrilege has been committed with an item it becomes hullin and the next person to use it has not committed sacrilege.", + "If he built it into his house he is not guilty of sacrilege until he lives beneath it and benefits the equivalent of a perutah. Using the stone or beam to build his house does not constitute sacrilege until he actually lives in the house with the holy stone or beam.", + "If he took a perutah from Temple property he is not guilty of sacrilege. But if he gave it to his friend he is guilty of sacrilege, but his fellow is not guilty. The same rule that we stated above with regard to the stone or beam is stated here with regard to a simple coin.", + "If he gave it to the bathhouse keeper, he is guilty of sacrilege even though he has not bathed, for he can say to him, “Behold the bath is ready for you, go in and bathe.” If he gives it to the bathhouse keeper, he is liable for sacrilege even before he takes a bath. Once he has paid for his bath, he has a right to take his bath whenever he so wishes. This right is considered to be benefit, and therefore he has committed sacrilege." + ], + [ + "The portion which a person has eaten himself and that which he has given his friend to eat, or the portion which he has made use of himself and that which he has given to his friend to make use of, or the portion which he has eaten himself and that which he has given his friend to make use of, or the portion which he has made use of himself and that which he has given his friend to eat can combine with one another even after the lapse of a lot of time. If a person eats half of a perutah’s worth of dedicated food (something subject to the laws of sacrilege), and gives his friend half of a perutah’s worth of dedicated food to eat, the two half-perutah’s join together to cause him to be liable for sacrilege. The same is true if he derives half of a perutah’s worth of benefit and he gives his friend half of a perutah’s worth of the dedicated thing. The mishnah now goes through all of the various permutations of this law. To put it briefly, benefit and eating can join together, whether they were directly done by the person, or they were given by one person to another. This is true even if a lot of time lapsed in between the two events. As long as they both occurred in one period of lack of knowledge that the food was dedicated, they can join to make one liable for sacrilege." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah deals with the question of one who sends another person to commit an act of sacrilege: who is guilty of the sacrilege, the sender or his agent?", + "If an agent has fulfilled his agency, the sender is guilty of sacrilege, but if he has not carried out his agency, he himself is guilty of sacrilege. The general rule is straightforward if the agent fulfills the sender’s instructions and neither knew that the item (food or otherwise) he was being sent to bring had been dedicated, the sender has committed sacrilege. But if the agent does not fulfill his agency, then we can’t hold the sender responsible and the agent has committed sacrilege. The mishnah now illustrates this.", + "How so? If he [the employer] said to him: “Give meat to the guests” and he offered them liver, “[Give] liver” and he offered them meat, he himself is guilty of sacrilege. “Meat” and “liver” are two different things, according to the lingo of the mishnah. If the sender sent his servant instructing him to give “meat” to the guests, and the servant gave liver (which I would have politely declined), then the agent has committed sacrilege because he did not fulfill his boss’s instructions. The same is true in the opposite case.", + "If the employer said to him: “Give them one piece each,” and he said to them: “Take two pieces each,” and the guests took three pieces each, all of them are guilty of sacrilege. In this case, the servant fulfilled the agency when he gave the guests permission to take one piece. Therefore, the host has committed sacrilege. When the servant gave the second piece, which the host did not instruct him to do, the servant committed sacrilege. And finally, when the guests took a third piece (greedy guests), they committed sacrilege as well. Note that if they had not taken thirds, they would not have been guilty. I hope it teaches them a lesson.", + "If he [the employer] said to him, “Bring me [something] from the window or from the chest,” and he brought it to him [from one of these places] even though the employer says, “I meant only from that place” and he brought it from the other place, the employer is guilty of sacrilege. But if he said to him, “Bring it to me from the window,” and he brought it from the chest, or “from the chest” and he brought it to him from the window, the agent is guilty of sacrilege. In this case, the employer sent his employee to fetch something that turned out to be holy from one of either of two places. When the employee brings him the object and the employer uses it, the employer has committed sacrilege. Since he mentioned both places, he can’t say that he really meant for the object that was in the opposite place to have been brought. However, if he specifies precisely where the object is, and the employee brings an object from somewhere else, then the employee has not fulfilled his instructions and the employee is the one that is guilty of sacrilege." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with a person who unknowingly sends money that has been dedicated to the Temple with an agent to a storekeeper to buy something.", + "One who has sent a deaf-mute, an imbecile or a minor: If they carried out their agency the employer is guilty, If they did not carry out their appointed errand, the shopkeeper is guilty. A deaf-mute, imbecile and minor cannot be held legally responsible for their actions. However, if they fulfill their agency, then the one who sent them is liable for sacrilege, just as he is in all cases. If they do not fulfill the agency, then when the shopkeeper spends the money that they gave him, he will be guilty of sacrilege. The money has remained holy until this point, because the deaf-mute, imbecile and minor are not capable of being liable for sacrilege. Had the agent been a person of sound senses, he would have been liable for sacrilege when he didn’t fulfill the employer’s instructions. In such a case, when the storekeeper spends the money he will not be liable.", + "If one sent one of sound senses and remembers [that the money belongs to Temple property] before it has come into the possession of the shopkeeper, the shopkeeper will be guilty when he spends it. Here the employer remembers that the money he gave to his agent is holy, but he remembers too late. The employee is already on his way. At this point the sender cannot be liable for sacrilege, or at least not to bring a sacrifice to atone for sacrilege, because a sacrifice is not brought by one who intentionally commits sacrilege. Although he sent it without knowing it was holy, since he knows before it is used, he is considered as one who intentionally commits sacrilege.", + "What should he do? He should take a perutah or a vessel and say “The perutah that is Temple property, wherever it may be, is redeemed with this;” for consecrated things can be redeemed both with money and with money's worth. Don’t worry! There is a remedy to prevent the poor innocent storekeeper from committing sacrilege. The sender can redeem the coins even when they are not in his presence. All he has to do is take a perutah or a vessel that is worth at least a perutah and declare that the holiness of the coins that he already sent is transferred to the coin or vessel in his hand. The mishnah concludes by noting that Temple property can be redeemed both by coin and by things that are worth money." + ], + [ + "If he gave him a perutah and said to him: “Bring me for half a perutah lamps and for the other half wicks,” and he went and brought for the whole perutah wicks or for the whole perutah lamps; Or if he said to him, “Bring me for the whole lamps or for the whole wicks,” and he went and brought for half [a perutah] lamps and for the other half wicks, neither is guilty of sacrilege. In this case the employer has not committed sacrilege because the agent changed his instructions. The agent also has not committed sacrilege for he only changed the instructions by half of a perutah (by spending the whole perutah on one thing and not half on each item). In order for the agent to be liable, he has to change the instructions for the entire perutah.", + "But if he said to him, “Bring for half a perutah lamps from one place and for half a perutah wicks from another,” and he went and brought the lamps from the place where the wicks [were to be bought] and the wicks from the place where the lamps [were to be bought], the agent is guilty of sacrilege. In this case the agent changed the instructions completely and didn’t precisely fulfill any of the instructions that he was sent to fulfill. Therefore, he has committed sacrilege." + ], + [ + "If he gave him two perutahs and said, “Bring me for them an etrog,” and he brought for one perutah an etrog and for the other a pomegranate, both are guilty of sacrilege. Rabbi Judah says: the employer is not guilty of sacrilege for he could say, “I wanted a large etrog and you brought me a small and bad one.” According to the first opinion, the employer is guilty of sacrilege with one of the perutahs, because the agent did perform the instructions to buy an etrog. The agent is guilty of sacrilege with the other perutah because he changed the instructions and bought a pomegranate with the other perutah. Rabbi Judah argues that the employer is not guilty at all, because he can claim that he wanted a two-perutah etrog, not a one-perutah etrog. Therefore, we don’t consider the agent as having fulfilled half of his instructions; rather he has not fulfilled the instructions at all and he alone is guilty of sacrilege.", + "If he gave him a golden denar and said to him, “Bring me a shirt,” and he brought him for three [silver selas] a shirt and for the other three a cloak, both are guilty of sacrilege. Rabbi Judah says: the employer is not guilty of sacrilege, for he can argue, “I wanted a large shirt and you brought me a small and bad one.” The employer sends him with a golden denar to buy a shirt. A golden denar is worth 25 silver denars, or 6.5 silver selas. The agent uses half of the money to buy the cloak, and the other half to buy a shirt. As in the previous section, the first opinion considers them both to have committed sacrilege. The employer committed sacrilege with the first half of the money, and the agent by changing the instructions with the second half. Again, Rabbi Judah argues that only the agent committed sacrilege. The employer sent him to buy a golden denar shirt (Gucci?) and not a cheaper one (Target?), so the agent didn’t fulfill any of his instructions." + ], + [ + "One who deposited money with a moneychanger: if it was tied up, he may not use it; and therefore if he did spend it he is guilty of sacrilege. If it was loose he may use it and therefore if he spent it he is not guilty of sacrilege. If one deposits dedicated money with a moneychanger and the money is tied up, the moneychanger should not use the coins. If he does use the coins, then he is guilty of sacrilege. Having tied them up, it is as if the owner told him not to use them. However, if they are loose, the owner should expect that the moneychanger might use the coins, and replace them with other coins later on when he returns them. Therefore, if the moneychanger uses them, he has not committed sacrilege. The Talmud explains that in such a case the depositor has committed sacrilege because it is as if he gave the coins to the moneychanger with the explicit permission to use them.", + "If [the money was deposited] with a private person, he may not use it in neither case, and therefore if he did spent it he is guilty of sacrilege. A private person is not supposed to use money deposited with him. Therefore, if he does so and the money is dedicated, he is guilty of sacrilege, whether the money was tied up or given to him loosely.", + "A shopkeeper has the status of a private person, the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Judah says: he is like a money-changer. According to Rabbi Meir a shopkeeper is like a private person. If someone gives him coins, he may not use them, whether they are tied up or loose. Therefore, in both cases, if he uses the coins he has committed sacrilege. Rabbi Judah holds that a shopkeeper is like a money-changer. Therefore, if the coins were given to him loosely he may use them and in such a case the depositor is the one who will have committed sacrilege." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses a situation where one dedicated coin is in a bag full of non-sacred coins, but we don’t know which coin it is. If he uses the coins in the bag, at what point is he considered to have committed sacrilege?", + "If a perutah belonging to the Temple fell into his bag or if he said, “One perutah in this bag shall be dedicated,” as soon as he spends the first perutah he is guilty of sacrilege, the words of Rabbi Akiva. But the sages say: not until he has spent all the money that was in the bag. According to Rabbi Akiva, as soon as he spends a perutah from this bag of coins, he is liable for sacrilege, lest that perutah was the holy one. As a penalty he will bring an asham talui (a suspended asham) for every perutah that he spends. This matches Rabbi Akiva’s position in Keritot 5:2 one who has committed a doubtful act of sacrilege must bring an asham talui. If he spends all of the coins in the bag, he will have to bring a certain asham because at that point we know that he has committed sacrilege. The sages hold that he is not liable for sacrilege until it is certain that he has used the dedicated coin. This is consistent with their opinion in Keritot 5:2 one does not bring an asham talui for sacrilege. He is liable for sacrilege only when he spends all of the coins.", + "Rabbi Akiva agrees if he says, “A perutah out of this bag shall be dedicated,” he is permitted to keep on spending [and is liable only] when he has spent all that was in the bag. “A perutah out of this bag shall be dedicated” is interpreted to mean that the owner will give a perutah from the coins in this bag to the Temple. In other words, none of the coins are holy now, but one will be holy later on. In this case, Rabbi Akiva agrees with the sages that the he is not liable for sacrilege unless he uses all of the coins in the bag. Congratulations! We have finished Tractate Meilah! It is a tradition at this point to thank God for helping us finish learning the tractate and to commit ourselves to going back and relearning it, so that we may not forget it and so that its lessons will stay with us for all of our lives. By dedicating an entire chapter to the topic of sacrilege, we learn just how serious a crime it is to use funds in an inappropriate manner. In modern Hebrew “meilah” is the word for embezzlement, a crime that unfortunately many of our leaders cannot seem to avoid. Meilah teaches us boundaries holy property, dedicated for the spiritual use of the community cannot be used for non-sacred purposes. Furthermore, when one does so, it is not enough just to pay back the embezzled funds. One must add an additional one-fifth and bring a sacrifice to atone for the crime. Although, as always, the technical aspects of this crime overwhelm the rabbinic discussion, there is a moral lesson that lies behind them as well. I hope you have enjoyed Meilah. Tomorrow we begin Tractate Tamid." + ] + ] + ] + }, + "schema": { + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה מעילה", + "enTitle": "English Explanation of Mishnah Meilah", + "key": "English Explanation of Mishnah Meilah", + "nodes": [ + { + "heTitle": "הקדמה", + "enTitle": "Introduction" + }, + { + "heTitle": "", + "enTitle": "" + } + ] + } +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Kodashim/English Explanation of Mishnah Meilah/English/merged.json b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Kodashim/English Explanation of Mishnah Meilah/English/merged.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..38607272a3c182b216d2b25f9e5259f6986f7716 --- /dev/null +++ b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Kodashim/English Explanation of Mishnah Meilah/English/merged.json @@ -0,0 +1,258 @@ +{ + "title": "English Explanation of Mishnah Meilah", + "language": "en", + "versionTitle": "merged", + "versionSource": "https://www.sefaria.org/English_Explanation_of_Mishnah_Meilah", + "text": { + "Introduction": [ + "Meilah is translated either as “sacrilege” or “trespass.” It refers to one who unwittingly makes prohibited use of property that belongs to the Temple. The subject is dealt with in Leviticus 5:15-16:", + "When a person commits trespass, being unwittingly remiss about any of the Lord’s sacred things, he shall bring as his penalty to the Lord a ram without blemish from the flock, convertible into payment in silver by the sanctuary weight, as an asham (guilt offering). He make restitution for that wherein he was remiss about the sacred things, and he shall add a fifth part to it and give it to the priest. The priest shall make expiation on his behalf with the ram of the guilt offering, and he shall be forgiven.", + "As we can see from these verses when a person commits sacrilege he must do three things: 1) bring an asham; 2) make restitution for the amount he benefited; 3) add an extra fifth. The restitution and the added fifth are given to the Temple in place of that which he benefited. \tOne who intentionally trespasses pays back only the principle. He does not pay back an extra fifth nor does he bring a sacrifice. There is a debate about his punishment: according to Rabbi he gets “death by the hands of heaven” whereas the other rabbis hold that he receives lashes. \tWith that brief introduction, we are on our merry way. Good luck! " + ], + "": [ + [ + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah discusses cases where the laws of sacrilege apply to animals despite the fact that the sacrifice was disqualified.", + "Most holy sacrifices which were slaughtered on the south side [of the altar], the law of sacrilege [still] applies to them. Most holy sacrifices must be sacrificed on the north side of the altar (Zevahim 5:1-5). If they are sacrificed on the south side, they are disqualified. Nevertheless, if a person derives benefit from them he has committed sacrilege and must bring a sacrifice, make restitution and bring the added fifth. Despite the fact that these are disqualified sacrifices, they still retain their holiness.", + "If they were slaughtered on the south side and their blood received on the north or [slaughtered] on the north side and their blood received on the south, or if they were slaughtered by day and [their blood] sprinkled during the night or [slaughtered] during the night and [their blood] sprinkled by day, or if they were slaughtered [with the intention of eating the flesh] beyond its proper time or outside its proper place, the law of sacrilege still applies to them. This section contains a list of other actions that disqualify a sacrifice. A most holy sacrifice must be slaughtered and have its blood received on the north side. It must be slaughtered and have its blood received during the day. The intention of the one performing the sacrifice must be to eat it in its proper time and place. However, if the sacrifice is disqualified, it is still subject to the laws of sacrilege.", + "Rabbi Joshua stated a general rule: whatever has at some time been permitted to the priests is not subject to the law of sacrilege, and whatever has at no time been permitted to the priests is subject to the law of sacrilege. Which is that which has at some time been permitted to the priests? [Sacrifices] which remained overnight or became defiled or were taken out [of the Temple Court]. Which is that which has at no time been permitted to the priests? [Sacrifices] that were slaughtered [with the intention of eating its flesh] beyond its proper time or outside its proper place, or [the blood of which] was received by the unfit and they sprinkled it. Rabbi Joshua has a different rule as to when the laws of sacrilege apply to a disqualified sacrifice. If the sacrifice was at one time edible by priests, then these laws do not apply. This is the case if the blood was spilled on the altar in the correct fashion, but then the sacrifice was disqualified by becoming remnant, impure or by being taken out of the Temple. In these cases the meat was permitted and then became forbidden. However, if the meat was never permitted, such as the cases in section one, or a case where someone unfit either received the blood in a vessel or poured the blood onto the altar, in all of these cases the laws of sacrilege do apply, as we taught in sections one and two." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn this mishnah Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva argue about whether meat from most holy sacrifices that was taken out of the Temple before its blood was sprinkled on the altar is subject to the laws of sacrilege.", + "If the flesh of most holy sacrifices was taken out [of the Temple court] before the blood was sprinkled: Rabbi Eliezer says: it is still subject to the laws of sacrilege and one does not become guilty of [transgressing with it the laws of] notar, piggul and defilement. Rabbi Akiba says: it is not subject to the laws of sacrilege and one can become guilty of [transgressing with it the laws of] notar, piggul and defilement. There are two background halakhot necessary to understand this debate: 1) The flesh of most holy sacrifices cannot be taken out of the Temple courtyard. 2) Once the blood of a sacrifice has been sprinkled on the altar, the sacrifice can be eaten by the priests. In this mishnah the flesh was taken out before the blood was sprinkled, such that the flesh was never edible. In yesterday’s mishnah we learned that if the flesh of a sacrifice was never at a point where it could be eaten by the priests, then it is subject to the laws of sacrilege. In our case, since the flesh was never at a point where it could be eaten by the priests, because it was disqualified before its blood was spilled, it is subject to the laws of sacrilege. However, it is not subject to the laws of piggul (improper intention when offering the sacrifice), remnant or the prohibition of eating leftover sacrifices, because it never became edible. These prohibitions refer only to edible meat. To summarize the essential issue: according to Rabbi Eliezer, since the blood was sprinkled only after the flesh was disqualified, this meat is never considered edible.", + "Rabbi Akiba said: if one set aside his hatat and it was lost and he set aside another in its place and afterwards the first was found, and both of them are in front of us, [do you not agree] that just as [the sprinkling of] the blood [of the one] exempts its own flesh [from the laws of sacrilege] so it exempts the flesh of the other one? According to Rabbi Akiva, even though the sprinkling of the blood took place only after the flesh had left the courtyard and it does not therefore allow the flesh to be eaten, it does remove the flesh from the category of being subject to sacrilege. In other words, it counts as edible, even though it can’t be eaten for some other reason. Since it is treated as if it is edible meat (even though it can’t be eaten) it is liable for the laws of piggul, notar or defilement.", + "Now, if the sprinkling of its blood can exempt the flesh of the other from the laws of sacrilege, how much more must it exempt its own flesh. Rabbi Akiva now argues by analogy. If one sets aside a hatat and then it is lost, he must set aside another in its place. If the first animal is found, the second one cannot be sacrificed (see Temurah 4:3). However, if he slaughters the first and sprinkles its blood, the sprinkling removes both that hatat and the second, unusable hatat from being subject to sacrilege. In other words, here you have a case where the sprinkling of blood can exempt an animal for being subject to sacrilege, even if the sprinkling does not make the animal’s flesh edible permitted to eat. Rabbi Akiva now takes the argument one step further. If sprinkling of one animal’s blood can exempt another animal’s disqualified flesh from being subject to sacrilege, shouldn’t it be able to exempt its own flesh from being subject to sacrilege. Thus, in our case, although the flesh was disqualified by being taken out of the Temple court, once its blood has been sprinkled, it is no longer subject to the laws of sacrilege." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah deals with the innards of sacrifices of a lower degree of holiness. These innards are burned on the altar after the blood has been spilled. As in yesterday’s mishnah, today we discuss a case where these innards left the Temple courtyard. This disqualifies them from being able to be placed on the altar.\nAs in yesterday’s mishnah, Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi disagree about whether the laws of sacrilege apply. Their opinions are consistent with those found in yesterday’s mishnah.", + "If the innards of sacrifices of that have a lower degree of holiness were taken out [of the Temple court] before the blood was sprinkled:
Rabbi Eliezer says: they are not subject to the laws of sacrilege and one cannot become guilty of [transgressing with them the laws of] notar, piggul and defilement. Rabbi Eliezer holds that when it comes to the rules of sacrilege, the same rules that applied in yesterday’s mishnah to the flesh of most holy sacrifices, apply to the innards of less holy sacrifices. Once they were taken out of the Temple, they became disqualified from being subsequently placed on the altar. The laws of sacrilege therefore do apply, even after the blood was spilled. The other laws do not apply because this flesh was never able to have been placed on the altar.", + "Rabbi Akiva says: they are subject to the laws of sacrilege and one can become guilty of [transgressing with them the laws of] notar, piggul and defilement. Rabbi Akiva holds that even though the innards were removed from the Temple before the blood was sprinkled, the sprinkling does make them subject to the laws of sacrilege, the same as it did for the flesh in yesterday’s mishnah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah compares the effect that the sprinkling of the blood on the altar has on sacrifices of both higher and lower degrees of holiness.", + "The act of [sprinkling the] blood of most holy sacrifices may have either a lenient or a stringent effect, but with sacrifices of a lesser degree of holiness it has only a stringent effect. This is an introductory note delineating the structure of the remainder of the mishnah.", + "How so? With most holy sacrifices, before the sprinkling, the law of sacrilege applies both to the innards and to the flesh; after the sprinkling it applies to the innards but not to the flesh; In respect of both one is guilty of [transgressing the laws of] notar, iggul and defilement. It is thus found that with most holy sacrifices the act of sprinkling has a lenient as well as a stringent effect. Before the sprinkling of the blood the flesh of most holy sacrifices cannot be eaten by the priests, and its innards cannot be placed on the altar. At this point all parts are subject to the laws of sacrilege. Once the blood is sprinkled, the laws of sacrilege do not apply to the flesh, because it can be eaten by the priests. This is a lenient effect. The innards are still subject to sacrilege, because they can never be eaten. After the sprinkling of the blood, the flesh becomes subject to the laws of piggul, notar and defilement, three laws which apply only to edible flesh. This is the stringent effect.", + "With sacrifices of a lesser degree of holiness it has only a stringent effect. How so? With sacrifices of a lesser degree of holiness, before the sprinkling the law of sacrilege does not apply to the innards or to the flesh; after the sprinkling it applies to the innards but not to the flesh; In respect of both one is guilty of transgressing the laws of notar, piggul and defilement. It is thus found that with sacrifices of a lesser degree of holiness it has only a stringent effect. When it comes to less holy sacrifices, the sprinkling only has a stringent effect. Before the sprinkling, the laws of sacrilege do not apply at all, because they are not yet considered holy. We should note that the laws of meilah (sacrilege) never apply to the flesh of sacrifices of lesser holiness, because they can be eaten by anyone, and not just priests. Sacrilege applies only to food that can be eaten only by priests. Nevertheless, once the blood is sprinkled, the laws of sacrilege do apply to the innards. This is a stringent effect. The sprinkling also serves to make all parts subject to the laws of piggul, notar and defilement, which again is a stringent effect. It turns out that here the sprinkling of blood only has a stringent effect." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis entire chapter discusses various states of preparation of every type of sacrifice, and when the sacrifice becomes liable for various prohibitions. As we shall see, the pattern of this mishnah is repeated throughout this highly stylized chapter. There are some halakhot that I will explain here and then refer to throughout the mishnah, so save the commentary for future reference.\nThe first topic is the bird hatat.", + "The law of sacrilege applies to the hatat of a bird from the moment of its dedication. As soon as a bird hatat is dedicated, it is subject to the laws of sacrilege, even when it is still alive. Since it is still not edible to the priests, the laws of sacrilege apply (see 1:1).", + "With the pinching of its neck it becomes susceptible to be disqualified through contact with a tevul yom or one who still requires atonement, or by remaining overnight. Once its neck is pinched, which is how bird sacrifices are slaughtered, it is now subject to disqualification by contact with a “tevul yom.” A “tevul yom” is a person who has immersed in the mikveh but is not fully pure until the sun sets that evening (see Leviticus 22:7). It can also be disqualified by contact with a person who has gone through his purification process but must still bring the requisite sacrifices the next day (see Keritot 2:1). If the blood remains overnight without being sprinkled on the altar, the sacrifice is disqualified.", + "Once its blood has been sprinkled it is subject to [the laws of] piggul, notar and defilement, but the law of sacrilege no longer applies to it. Once the blood has been sprinkled, its flesh is edible and is therefore liable to the laws of piggul, notar and defilement. Piggul is a disqualification that occurs if the priest sacrifices it with the intention of eating it after it can no longer be eaten. Notar is remnat, and defilement refers to the prohibition of eating a sacrifice that has been ritually defiled. Since the bird hatat can now be eaten by the priests, it is no longer subject to the laws of sacrilege." + ], + [ + "The law of sacrilege applies to the olah of a bird from the moment of its dedication.
With the pinching of its neck it becomes susceptible to be disqualified through contact with a tevul yom or one who still requires atonement, or by remaining overnight.
Once its blood has been squeezed out [onto the walls of the altar] it is subject to [the laws of] piggul, notar and defilement;
And the law of sacrilege applies to it until [the ashes have been] removed [from the altar] to the place of the ashes.
Today’s mishnah deals with the bird olah, a whole burnt offering. Most of its laws are the same as those found in yesterday’s mishnah.
Sections one-three: These laws are the same as those found in yesterday’s mishnah. See there for an explanation.
Section four: Since an olah never becomes edible, the laws of sacrilege apply longer than they do to the hatat, which can be eaten by the priests. The flesh is still subject to sacrilege until it is burned and the ashes are removed from the altar and brought out to the “places of ashes” which was outside of the Temple/Tabernacle (see Leviticus 6:4). At this point its mitzvah has been completed and it is therefore no longer subject to the law of sacrilege." + ], + [ + "The law of sacrilege applies to the bullocks which are to be burned and the goats which are to be burned from the moment of their dedication.
Once slaughtered they become susceptible to be disqualified through contact with a tevul yom or one who still requires atonement, or by remaining overnight.
Once their blood has been sprinkled they are subject to [the laws of] piggul, notar and defilement.
And the law of sacrilege applies to them even while they are at the place of the ashes so long as the flesh has not been charred.
This mishnah is very similar to the first two mishnayot of this chapter, except it deals with the bullocks and goats that are burned. There are three types of bullocks that are burned: 1) The bullock offered on Yom Kippur; 2) the bullock offered by a high priest for issuing a mistaken instruction; 3) the bullock offered by the court that makes a mistaken instruction. There are two types of goats that are burned: 1) The goat offered on Yom Kippur; 2) The goat offered by a court for making a mistaken instruction concerning a law related to idol worship.
Sections 1-3: See mishnayot one and two above for an explanation.
Section four: The law of sacrilege continues to apply to the burned bullocks and goats even after they are brought out to the place of burning. It applies until their flesh has been charred and its appearance has changed. This is when their burning is technically complete (see Zevahim 12:6) and at that point the law of sacrilege no longer applies." + ], + [ + "The law of sacrilege applies to an olah from the moment of its dedication.
When it is slaughtered it becomes susceptible to be disqualified through contact with a tevul yom or one who still requires atonement, or by remaining overnight.
Once its blood has been sprinkled it is subject to [the laws of] piggul, notar and defilement;
And the law of sacrilege does not apply to its hide, but it does apply to it flesh until [the ashes have been] removed [from the altar] to the place of the ashes.
Today’s mishnah deals with the animal olah.
Sections one-three: See mishnah two.
Section four: Immediately after it is slaughtered, the hide belongs to the priest. Therefore, the law of sacrilege stops applying to the hide. However, the law of sacrilege continues to apply to its flesh, which is not eaten by the priest. It only stops when the flesh is removed from the altar and brought to the place of ashes." + ], + [ + "The law of sacrilege applies to the hatat, and asham and to shelamim sacrifices of the congregation from the moment of their dedication.
Once slaughtered they become susceptible to be disqualified through contact with a tevul yom or one who still requires atonement, or by remaining overnight.
Once their blood has been sprinkled they are subject to [the laws of] piggul, notar and defilement.
The law of sacrilege then no longer applies to the flesh, but applies to the innards until the ashes are removed to the place of the ashes.
This mishnah refers to other most holy sacrifices, namely the hatat, the asham and the public shelamim sacrifices. These are the two lambs sacrificed on Shavuot. They are considered most holy sacrifices, although other shelamim sacrifices are sacrifices of a lesser degree of holiness.
Sections one-three: See the previous mishnayot.
Section four: Once the animal has been slaughtered, the flesh may be eaten by the priests, and therefore the law of sacrilege no longer applies. However it continues to apply to the innards until they are burned and then brought out to the place of ashes." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOn Shavuot two loaves of bread are brought with the sacrifices. Our mishnah is concerned with when the law of sacrilege applies to these loaves.", + "The law of sacrilege applies to the two loaves of bread from the moment of their dedication. Same as mishnayot above.", + "Once they have formed a crust in the oven they become susceptible to be disqualified through contact with a tevul yom or one who still requires atonement, and the [festival] offerings can then be slaughtered. Once they have formed a crust, they are considered food and they are liable to become disqualified in all of these ways (see above mishnayot). Note that “remaining overnight” is not found in this mishnah because the two loaves are cooked the night before the festival. They always remain overnight. Once they have formed a crust, they are considered bread and at this point the priests can slaughter the festival sacrifices (see Leviticus 23:20).", + "Once the blood of the lambs has been sprinkled they [the loaves] are subject to [the laws of] piggul, notar and defilement, and the law of sacrilege no longer applies to them. Once the blood of the lambs has been sprinkled, one who eats them can be liable if they have been disqualified. And since the priests can now eat the loaves, they are no longer subject to the laws of sacrilege." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah deals with the showbread that is placed on the table in the Sanctuary every Shabbat.", + "The law of sacrilege applies to the showbread from the moment of its dedication. See above mishnayot.", + "Once it has formed a crust in the oven it becomes susceptible to be disqualified through contact with a tevul yom or one who still requires atonement, and it may be arranged upon the table [of the Sanctuary]. As with the two loaves in yesterday’s mishnah, the showbread can become disqualified once it has become crusted. It is also at this point that it can be taken out of the oven and arranged on the table.", + "Once the dishes of incense have been offered it is subject to [the laws of] piggul, notar and defilement, and the law of sacrilege no longer applies to it. Two dishes of incense were placed over the showbread. If the bread was “piggul” while he was burning the incense he had the intent of eating the bread on the next day he would be liable for eating it. Similarly, if he waited until it was remnant (notar) or ate it after it was defiled he would be liable. As is always the case, once the bread has become defiled, it is no longer subject to the law of sacrilege." + ], + [ + "Our mishnah discusses how the law of sacrilege relates to menahot.
The law of sacrilege applies to menahot (grain from the moment of their dedication. See every other mishnah in this chapter.", + "Once they have become sacred by being put in the vessel [of service] they become susceptible for unfitness through contact with a tevul yom or one who still requires atonement, or by remaining overnight. Once the minhah is placed in a vessel it can be disqualified. The rest of the categories are the same as those in every other mishnah in this chapter.", + "Once the handful has been offered they are subject to [the law of] piggul, notar and defilement, and the law of sacrilege no longer applies to the remnants, but it applies to the handful until its ashes have been removed to the place of the ashes. Once the handful has been removed and placed on the altar, the minhah can be eaten by the priests, and therefore the law of sacrilege no longer applies. However, one who eats it in a disqualified state is now liable for the three prohibitions mentioned in all of the mishnayot above." + ], + [ + "The law of sacrilege applies to the handful [of a minhah], the frankincense, the incense, the minhah of a priest, the minhah of the anointed high priest and the minhah that is accompanied by a libation, from the moment of their dedication. All of these menahot or other items (incense) are completely burned on the altar. No parts thereof are given to the priest. Therefore, the law of sacrilege will always apply to them.", + "Once they have become sacred by being put in the vessel, they become susceptible for unfitness through contact with a tevul yom or one who still requires atonement, or by remaining overnight, and they are subject to [the laws of] notar and defilement, but [the law of] piggul does not apply to them. Most of this section is the same as that in yesterday’s mishnah except that the laws of piggul do not apply to any of these items. The mishnah will now explain why the laws of piggul do not apply.", + "This is the general rule: whatever has something else which renders it permissible [for the altar or for the use of the priests] is not subject to [the laws of] piggul, nothar and defilement until that act has been performed. And whatever does not have something else which renders it permissible becomes subject [to the laws of] notar and defilement as soon as it has become sacred by being put in the vessel, but piggul does not apply to it. Any sacrificial item that has something else that allows it to be burned or eaten is subject to all of these laws, but only after that other thing has been done. For instance, the flesh of an animal is subject to these laws after the blood has been sprinkled on the altar (see mishnayot 1-5). The innards can be put on the altar once the blood has been sprinkled. The minhah can be eaten once the handful has been removed. The two loaves can be eaten once the blood of the lambs has been thrown on the altar, and the showbread can be eaten once the incense has been burned. All of these have other things that permit them. In contrast, the list in our mishnah “permits itself.” In other words, these things can be sacrificed immediately (none of them are eaten) without waiting for something else to be done. Therefore, they are subject immediately to the laws of notar and defilement. Piggul never applies to such items. For further discussion see Zevahim 4:3." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is found word for word in Temurah 4:1. It is brought here because it also deals with sacrilege. I have mostly replicated my commentary from there.\nIn Temurah 2:2 we learned that there are five types of hataot (pl. of hatat) that are left to die because they can’t be sacrificed and neither can they be eaten. Our mishnah deals with these five hataot.", + "The offspring of a hatat, the substitute of a hatat, and a hatat whose owner has died, are left to die. These are the first three categories of hataot that are left to die. Basically, once the owner has been atoned for, the hatat cannot be sacrificed. The first two cannot be sacrificed because the owner received atonement from the original animal. If the owner died, then he no longer needs atonement so his hatat too cannot be sacrificed.", + "A hatat whose year has passed or which was lost and found blemished: If the owners obtained atonement [afterwards, through another animal], is left to die, and it does not make a substitute; it is forbidden to derive benefit from it, but the law of sacrilege does not apply. If the owners have not yet obtained atonement, it must go to pasture until it becomes unfit for sacrifice. It is then sold and another is bought with the money. It makes a substitute, and the law of sacrilege does apply. When it comes to the fourth and fifth types of hatat that must be left to die, it depends on whether the owners have already received atonement through another animal. If the owners have already been atoned for by bringing another animal as a hatat, then the original hatat (the one whose year had passed or which had been lost and then was found) must be left to die. If the owner tries to substitute for it, it no longer can make a substitute. It is forbidden to derive any benefit from it, as it is always forbidden to derive benefit from dedicated animals; however, if one does derive benefit from it, it is not considered sacrilege because the animal is not really sanctified any more. If, however, the original hatat is found (and is blemished) or passed a year before the owners had been atoned for, then the animal need not be left to die. The hatat whose year had passed is let out to pasture until it is blemished and then it can be sold. The hatat that was found blemished can be sold immediately. With the proceeds he buys a new hatat, and that hatat has all of the sanctity of regular hatat. It can make a substitute and if one derives benefit from it, he has committed sacrilege and will have to make restitution." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nWhen a nazirite finishes his term he must bring three offerings: a hatat (sin-offering), an olah (whole-burnt offering), and a shelamim (well-being offering). Our mishnah deals with how the law of sacrilege and various other laws apply to these three offerings in a case where a person set aside money to buy the sacrifices but had not yet bought them.", + "If one has set aside money for his nazirite offerings, it may not be used, but the law of sacrilege does not apply to it, as it may all be used for the shelamim. If he set aside money, he is not allowed to use the money, but the laws of sacrilege don’t apply. This is because all of the money might end up going for shelamim (offerings of well-being), and since shelamim are sacrifices of lower sanctity, the laws of sacrilege do not apply to them (see 1:4).", + "If he died and left money [for his nazirite offerings] If unspecified it shall go to the fund for voluntary offerings; If specified: The money designated for the hatats shall be taken to the Dead Sea; it may not be used, though the law of sacrilege does not apply to it. With the money designated for an olah they shall bring a olah; the law of sacrilege applies to it. With the money designated for the shelamim they shall bring a shelamim, and it has to be consumed within a day, but requires no bread offering. If he died and left money, but had not specified how much was to go for each type of sacrifice, then all of the money goes to the general fund in the Temple used to buy voluntary offerings.", + "The mishnah now deals with a case where he did specify which coins go for which sacrifices. The money set aside for a hatat must be destroyed. As we learned in yesterday’s mishnah, a hatat whose owners have died can’t be sacrificed. While it is forbidden to derive any benefit from this money, if he does it is not sacrilege, because the money was not going to be used to buy a sacrifice. The money for the olah should be used to buy an olah. The law of sacrilege will apply to the olah, as it always does. The money set aside for the shelamim is used for a shelamim. It must be eaten by the next day, as is the law for the shelamim of a nazirite (Zevahim 5:6), but it does not need to be accompanied by a bread-offering, because the nazirite is dead and the bread offering is supposed to be put in his hands (see Numbers 6:19)." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah discusses the law of sacrilege as it relates to blood and the wine libations.", + "Rabbi Ishmael says: [the law relating to] blood is lenient at the beginning [before it is offered] and stringent at the end; [the law relating to] libations is stringent at the beginning and lenient at the end. This section introduces the rest of the mishnah. As we have seen on many occasions, the rabbis frequently compare the laws as they apply in one case with their application in other cases.", + "Blood at the beginning is not subject to the law of sacrilege, but is subject to it after it has flowed away to the Wadi Kidron. Before the blood is put on the altar, it is not subject to the law of sacrilege. This is derived in the Talmud from a midrash. After being spilled or cast against the altar, the blood would flow out of the Temple down into Wadi Kidron. Blood found in the soil surrounding the Wadi was subject to sacrilege. This would mean that anyone using this soil, which was used for fertilizer, would have to pay for its use to the Temple.", + "Libations at the beginning are subject to the law of sacrilege, but are exempted from it after they flowed down into the shitin. Before the wine libations are put on the altar, they are subject to the law of sacrilege. This is because it is prohibited to derive benefit from them. However, after they flow out through the hole on the altar down to the “shittin” the foundations of the altar, the law of sacrilege no longer applies. The general rule is that anything which has had its mitzvah performed is not subject to the law of sacrilege." + ], + [ + "The ashes of the inner altar and [of the wicks of] the menorah may not be used but they are not subject to the law of sacrilege. The incense was burned on the inner altar, inside the Sanctuary. It is forbidden to use the ashes from this altar, and to use the wicks of the menorah. However, since their mitzvoth had already been performed, they are not subject to the law of sacrilege, as we learned in yesterday’s mishnah.", + "If one dedicates ashes they are subject to the law of sacrilege. If after the ashes were removed from the Temple, someone picked them up and dedicated them to the Temple, they would then become subject to sacrilege. In other words, they would remain forbidden but one who did use them would be liable to compensate the Temple.", + "Turtle-doves which have not reached the right age and pigeons which have exceeded the right age may not be used but they are not subject to the law of sacrilege. Turtle-doves can be used as sacrifices when they are mature. Pigeons can only be used when they are young. If one dedicates them before they have reached the right age, or after they have passed their age they may not be used, but they are not subject to the law of sacrilege, because they are not fit to be put on the altar.", + "Rabbi Shimon said: turtle-doves which have not yet reached the right age are subject to the law of sacrilege, while pigeons which have exceeded the right age are not allowed for use, but are exempt from the law of sacrilege. Before turtle-doves reach the right age, they are subject to the law of sacrilege, because they will eventually become fit for the altar. However, he agrees with the previous opinion that once pigeons have passed the age at which they can be sacrificed, they are no longer subject to sacrilege." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah deals with sacrilege and the products that come from animals milk and eggs.", + "The milk of consecrated animals and the eggs of [consecrated] turtle-doves may not be used, but are not subject to the law of sacrilege. The sanctity of a consecrated female animal or turtle-dove applies to the animal itself, but not to the products that come from the animal, such as milk and eggs. While one may not derive any benefit from these items, they are not holy and therefore, they are not subject to the law of sacrilege.", + "When is this so? For things dedicated for the altar, but as for things dedicated for Temple upkeep, if one consecrated a chicken both it and its eggs are subject to the law of sacrilege, or [if one dedicated] a she-donkey, both it and its milk are subject to the law of sacrilege. The above exemption from the law of sacrilege applies only if the animal was dedicated for the altar. But if an animal which could not be sacrificed was dedicated, such as a chicken or a donkey, then the animal is considered to have been dedicated for Temple upkeep. This means that the animal will be sold and the profits used to maintain the Temple. In such a case, even those things which the animal produces are holy and are subject to the law of sacrilege. We shall deal more with this subject in tomorrow’s mishnah." + ], + [ + "Whatever is fit for the altar and not for Temple repair, for Temple repair and not for the altar, neither for the altar nor for Temple repair is subject to the law of sacrilege. A person can be liable for sacrilege for things that are either fit for use on the altar, or fit for use for Temple repair, or not fit for either use. In all cases, it is possible that the law of sacrilege will apply, as the mishnah will now explain.", + "How so? If one consecrated a cistern full of water, a dump full of manure, a dove-cote full of pigeons, a tree laden with fruit, a field covered with herbs, the law of sacrilege applies to them and to their contents. But if one consecrated a cistern and it was later filled with water, a dump and it was later filled with manure, a dove-cote and it was later filled with pigeons, a tree and it afterwards bore fruit or a field and it afterwards produced herbs, the law of sacrilege applies to the consecrated objects themselves but not to their contents, the words of Rabbi Judah. Water is fit for Temple repair but not for the altar. It can be used to make bricks, or for other uses. But this water cannot be put on the altar, because the one water libation done during the year, on Sukkot, was done with water from the Shiloah. The manure is fit for neither use. It would have to be sold and its profits used for Temple upkeep. The pigeons can be put on the altar. Some fruit, such as grapes and olives, can be put on the altar. Other fruit cannot be used on the altar, or for Temple upkeep. They would be sold and the profits used for Temple upkeep. Similarly, herbs cannot be used on the altar, or for Temple upkeep. In all of these cases, the law of sacrilege applies both to the container, and to that which was in it or on it. However, if one dedicates one of these things before it contains the water, manure, etc. only the container/tree/field is subject to the law of sacrilege. The general rule is that which is produced by something dedicated is not subject to the law of sacrilege. This is the opinion of Rabbi Judah.", + "Rabbi Shimon says: if one consecrated a field or a tree, the law of sacrilege applies to it and to its produce for it is the growth of consecrated property. Rabbi Shimon partially disagrees with Rabbi Judah. He holds that if something grows from a consecrated thing, such as fruit from a tree or herbs from a plant, that which grows is subject to the law of sacrilege.", + "The young of [cattle set aside as] tithe may not nurse from cattle set aside for tithe, but others consecrate for such use. The young of consecrated cattle may not nurse from consecrated cattle, but others consecrate for such use. Tithed animals are sacred as are their offspring. Therefore, even their own offspring cannot nurse from them. Other people dedicate milk so that the offspring of tithed or holy animals can have milk to nurse.", + "Workers may not eat dry figs dedicated to the Temple, nor may a cow eat of the vetch belonging to the Temple. Workers who are working on behalf of the Temple, or a cow performing some type of labor needed for the Temple, cannot directly eat produce dedicated to the Temple. Although the Temple must feed the workers or the cow, they still can’t eat holy property. They get their pay from the Temple treasurer. They can then use these funds to buy their own food." + ], + [ + "If the roots of a privately owned tree spread onto dedicated ground, or those of a tree in dedicated ground spread onto private ground, they may not be used, but the law of sacrilege does not apply to them.
The water of a spring which comes out of a dedicated field may not be used, but the law of sacrilege does not apply to it When it has left the field it may be used.
The water in the golden jar may not be used, but the law of sacrilege does not apply to it.
When it has been poured into the flask, it is subject to the law of sacrilege.
The willow branch may not be used, but is not subject to the law of sacrilege. Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Zadok says: the elders used to put it with their palm tree branches.
Section one: In this case, either the tree grows on privately owned, non-sacred ground but its roots spread out onto dedicated ground, or the opposite. Since part of the tree is on sacred ground, it is forbidden to benefit from any of the tree. However, since the entire tree is not on sacred ground, it is not subject to the law of sacrilege.
Section two: This refers to a case where a person dedicated his field to the Temple, but he did not dedicate the spring. While the spring is on the field, the water may not be used because it is on dedicated ground. However, since he didn’t dedicate the spring itself, the water is not subject to the law of sacrilege. Once the water has left the field, it can be used. This is different from the case of the tree because all parts of a tree are interconnected. When its roots leave the sacred ground they are not disconnected from that ground, unlike water which is.
Section three: This section refers to the water used for the water libation on Sukkot (see Sukkah 4:9-10). The day before Shabbat, they would fill a golden jar with water drawn from the Shiloah spring in Jerusalem, so that the next day they could pour it onto the altar without having to carry from the Shiloah to the Temple. When in this jar, the water cannot be used for other purposes, but it has not yet been sanctified so it is not subject to the law of sacrilege. The golden flask was used on most days to directly draw water from the Shiloah, and on Shabbat they would pour from the golden jar into the golden flask. The flask serves to sanctify the water and therefore once in this flask it is subject to the law of sacrilege.
Section four: On Sukkot there was a custom to place willows on the side of the altar (see Sukkah 4:5). That willow cannot be used for other purposes, but it is not subject to the law of sacrilege, because it is not sanctified. Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Zadok notes that before putting it next to the altar, the elders used to put it with their palm branches (the lulav). This is not considered illicit use, because when one performs a mitzvah with an object, it is not considered that he has “derived benefit” from the object." + ], + [ + "A nest which is built on the top of a dedicated tree, one may not derive benefit from it, but the law of sacrilege does not apply to it. The nest at the top of the dedicated tree is forbidden for use, but since it is not the tree itself, it is not subject to the law of sacrilege.", + "That which is on the top of an asherah, one flicks [it] off with a reed. An asherah is a tree used in idol worship (see Avodah Zarah 3:7). It is forbidden to use the tree. The nest, however, is not prohibited. If a person wants to take the nest, he can flick it off with a reed. Note that the law is stricter when it comes to Temple property there is no way to use the nest.", + "If one dedicated a forest to the temple, the law of sacrilege applies to the whole of it. If a person dedicates an entire forest to the Temple, every part of the tree is sacred and subject to the law of sacrilege, including the leaves.", + "However, if the Temple buys a forest in order to use the trees, only the parts of the tree that they intend to use, namely the lumber is subject to the law of sacrilege. The chips and the fallen leaves are not subject to sacrilege because the when the treasurers bought them, they knew that they had no use for them." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis chapter deals with when things join together to create the minimum amount necessary for a violation to have been committed or an obligation to be fulfilled. We begin with the issue of sacrilege, but the following mishnayot proceed to other subjects.", + "Things dedicated for the altar combine with one another with regard to the law of sacrilege, and to render one liable over them [for the laws of] piggul, notar and defilement. To be liable for sacrilege one must derive a perutah’s worth of benefit from sacred property. If one derives benefit from several different things dedicated to the altar, and separately each is not worth a perutah, but together they are, he is liable for sacrilege. They also join together to cause one to be liable for piggul (sacrifices offered with improper intent), notar (remnant) and the prohibition against eating defiled holy things.", + "Things dedicated for Temple repair combine with one another. Things dedicated for Temple repair join together only for sacrilege, but not for the other prohibitions, because these prohibitions do not apply to things dedicated for Temple repair (see Temurah 7:1).", + "Things dedicated for the altar combine with things dedicated for Temple repair with regard to the law of sacrilege. If one has a mixture of things dedicated for the Temple and things dedicated for Temple repair, they can join together to make one liable for sacrilege, because the law of sacrilege applies to them all. However, they do not join together for the other prohibitions, because these prohibitions don’t apply to things dedicated for Temple repair." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah deals with which parts of a sacrifice combine to make one liable for either sacrilege, or piggul, notar or defilement. If a person eats a little of this part and a little of that part, when does he become liable.", + "Five things in an olah combine with one another: the flesh, the fat, the fine flour, the wine and the oil. The fine flour, the wine and the oil all accompany the olah, the whole-burnt offering. If one eats less than a perutah’s worth of meat, for instance, and less than a perutah’s worth of oil, but together they are worth a perutah, he has committed sacrilege. If he eats them and together they constitute an olive’s worth, and they were piggul, notar or defiled, he has transgressed the prohibition.", + "And six in a todah: the flesh, the fat, the fine flour, the wine, the oil and the bread. There is one more element when it comes to the todah that doesn’t exist for the olah the loaves that accompany it. These also join with the other parts of the sacrifice. We should note that since the todah (thanksgiving offering) is a sacrifice of lesser holiness, it is not subject to the laws of sacrilege. The six things join together to make one liable for piggul, notar or defilement.", + "Terumah, terumah of the tithe, terumah of the tithe separated from demai, hallah and first-fruits combine with one another to make up the size required to render other things forbidden and to be liable for the payment of a fifth. The items listed here, which I will explain shortly, join together to render other things forbidden, if enough of them fall into non-sacred things. For instance, if a small amount of terumah oil and a small amount of hallah dough are mixed together and together they constitute a seah then fall into less than 100 seahs of hullin (non-sacred) dough, all of the dough is forbidden to non-priests (see Orlah 2:1). They also join together to make one who eats them unwittingly liable to pay back the principle and an added fifth. One is liable for the added fifth only if he eats an olive’s worth of holy things (see Bava Metzia 4:8). I shall now briefly explain what each is. Terumah: taken from produce and given to the priest. Terumah of tithe: the Levite gives one tenth of his tithe to the priest as terumah. Demai is the tithe separated from produce bought from someone who might not have already tithed it. Terumah is then taken from this demai. Hallah: separated from dough and given to the priest. Bikkurim: first-fruits, also considered to be holy." + ], + [ + "All kinds of piggul can combine with one another and all kinds of notar can combine with one another. To remind ourselves, piggul is a sacrifice that was offered with the intent of eating it outside of the time in which it must be eaten. If one eats different types of piggul, for instance part that came from a most holy sacrifice such as a hatat, and part that comes from a less holy sacrifice such as shelamim, he is liable for having eaten piggul, if together they add up to the minimum measure of an olive. Notar is sacrifice that is left over after the time in which it must be eaten. The same thing here if the notar comes from different types of sacrifices, it still joins together to create the minimum measure.", + "All kinds of carrion can combine with one another. An olive’s worth of carrion causes impurity. All types of carrion join together to convey this impurity, even if half of the measure is from a pure animal and half is from an impure animal.", + "All kinds of sheratzim can combine with one another. There are eight forbidden sheratzim (creepy crawly things) listed in Leviticus 11:29-30 that convey impurity at the minimum measure of a lentil’s worth. They all join together to create the minimal measure.", + "The blood of a sheretz and its flesh can combine with one another. Just as different sheretzim join together, so too does the blood of the sheretz join with its flesh to add up to the minimum measure.", + "A general rule was stated by Rabbi Joshua: all things that are alike both in respect of [duration of] uncleanness and in respect of their minimum measure can combine with one another. Things that are alike in respect [of duration] of uncleanness but not in respect of minimum measure, in respect of minimum measure but not in respect [of duration] of uncleanness, or [if they are alike] neither in respect [of duration] of uncleanness nor in respect of measure, cannot combine with one another. Rabbi Joshua now provides a general rule as to when different things join together. There are two criteria. First of all, the minimum measure needs to be the same. Second, the rules regarding their impurity need to be the same. So a part of a sheretz and a piece of carrion do not join together because carrion has a minimum measure of an olive, whereas the minimum measure for a sheretz is a lentil. A piece of dead body and a piece of carrion share the same measure (an olive’s worth) but the piece of a dead body cause seven-day impurity, whereas the carrioin causes one day impurity, so they don’t join. All the more so a piece of a dead body won’t join with a piece of sheretz because both their impurity and their measures are different." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn today’s mishnah we learn that different types of prohibited substances do not join together to add up to a sufficient amount for a transgression to have occurred.", + "Piggul and remnant do not combine with one another because they are of two different names. In yesterday’s mishnah we learned that different types of piggul can combine together, and different types of sheratzim can combine together, etc. Today we learn that differently named substances do not combine together. So if one eats half of an olive’s worth of piggul and half of an olive’s worth of notar (remnant) he is not liable, because he has not eaten enough prohibited food of one prohibition.", + "Sheretz and carrion, as well as carrion and the flesh of a corpse do not combine with one another to effect impurity, not even in respect of the more lenient of the two [grades] of defilement. Similarly, sheretz (a creepy crawly thing that transmits impurity see yesterday’s mishnah) and carrion, and carrion and flesh from a human corpse do not join together to create the minimum amount needed to effect impurity. This is true even with regard to the lower quantity or level of defilement. For instance, less than a lentil’s worth of a sheretz does not join together with less than an olive’s worth of carrion. Similarly, less than an olive’s worth of a human corpse does not join with less than an olive’s worth of animal carrion to transmit the type of impurity that makes on impure for only one day.", + "Food contaminated through contact with a primary defilement can combine with that contaminated by a secondary defilement to affect uncleanness according to the lower degree of defilement of the two. Food that has been contaminated by contact with a source of primary defilement (such as a dead body) now has first degree defilement. Food that has been contaminated with something that has secondary defilement now has second degree defilement. These different foods can combine to form the minimum amount of an egg’s worth to contaminate other foods according to the lower degree of the two. If the joined substance comes into contact with terumah, it would cause it to have third degree defilement, which is a very low level of defilement. We shall learn more about this when we learn tractate Toharot." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah teaches that different types of food and different types of drink can join together with regard to various matters.", + "All kinds of food can combine with one another:
To make up the quantity of half a peras in order to render the body unfit One who eats half of a peras (the equivalent of two eggs) of unclean food, cannot eat terumah until the evening. The food “renders his body unfit” to eat holy food. Different types of unclean food can join to create this minimum amount.", + "[To make up the food] for two meals to form an eruv; One who wants to walk more than two thousand cubits out of his city on Shabbat puts an “eruv,” a meal, at the two thousand cubit mark and then he can walk an additional two thousand cubits. The meal must consist of a certain amount of food (see Eruvin 8:2) and different types of food can join together to create the minimum amount.", + "To make up the volume of an egg to contaminate food; Impure food conveys impurity only if there is the volume of an egg. Different impure foods can join together to create this volume.", + "To make up the volume of a dry fig with regard to carrying on Shabbat; One who carries food from one domain to another on Shabbat is liable only if the food is at least the volume of a dried fig (see Shabbat 7:4).", + "And the volume of a date with regard to Yom Kippur. All kinds of drinks can combine with one another: One who eats a date’s worth of food on Yom Kippur is liable. Again, all different foods join together to create this minimum amount.", + "To make up a quarter [of a log] in order to render the body unfit; One who drinks a quarter of a log of impure drink is rendered unfit to eat terumah until the evening.", + "To make up a mouthful with regard to Yom Kippur. On Yom Kippur, one who drinks a mouthful is liable. In both of these matters, different foods join together." + ], + [ + "Orlah and kilayim of the vineyard can combine with one another. Rabbi Shimon says: they do not combine. According to the first opinion, orlah (fruit during its first three years) and kilayim (seeds) that grow in a vineyard combine with one another. The result is that if half of a seah of orlah and half of a seah of kilayim fall into less than two hundred seahs of regular produce, the regular produce is all prohibited. Rabbi Shimon holds that since these two prohibitions have different names, they don’t combine together. It seems that the first opinion holds that since they are so similar, they do combine.", + "Cloth, sack-cloth, sack-cloth and leather, leather and matting combine with one another. The different materials in this section have different minimum measures for being susceptible to different kinds of uncleanness. Cloth that is three handbreadths square is susceptible to the sitting impurity conveyed by a zav (one with an unusual genital discharge), and for other matters of impurity it is susceptible if it is three fingers square. Sack-cloth must be four by four handbreadths. Leather must be five square handbreadths. And matting must be six square handbreadths. These different materials can join together to create the minimum measure for the most lenient of them. For instance, one handbreadth of cloth will join with three handbreadths of sack-cloth, and one of sack-cloth will join four of leather and one of leather will join five of matting. However, two handbreadths of cloth will not join one handbreadth of sack-cloth, because the cloth is stricter. To put it another way cloth can count as sack-cloth, but sack-cloth cannot count as cloth.", + "Rabbi Shimon: What is the reason? Because these are all susceptible to the uncleanness caused by sitting. In mishnah three we learned that different substances that do not have the same measure do not join together. Seemingly, today’s mishnah deviates from that rule. Rabbi Shimon explains that it does not actually contradict that rule because when it comes to the impurity conveyed by the sitting of a zav, they all potentially have the same measure. If a person cuts off a small piece of any of these materials, the size of one handbreadth square, and he intends to sit on that material, it is susceptible to sitting impurity when a zav sits on it. Since there is one aspect in which they are all the same, they can join together to create the minimum measure be susceptible to impurity." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah discusses the basic laws of sacrilege when is a person considered to have derived benefit from a sacred thing such that he is guilty of sacrilege?", + "If one derived a perutah's worth of benefit from a sacred thing, he is guilty of sacrilege even though he did not lessen its value, the words of Rabbi Akiva. According to Rabbi Akiva, one is liable for sacrilege by virtue of his having derived benefit from the object that was dedicated to the Temple. It is irrelevant whether the benefit that he derived diminished the value of the dedicated object. He is guilty because he should not have made such use of a holy item.", + "But the sages say: Anything that can deteriorate [through use], the law of sacrilege applies to it only after it has suffered deterioration. And anything that does not deteriorate [through use], the law of sacrilege applies to it as soon as he made use of it. The other rabbis offer a more nuanced approach to this issue. If the object is one whose value can be diminished by use, then he is not liable for sacrilege unless he actually does cause it to be diminished. However, if the item is not generally diminished by normal use, then one who uses it is liable for sacrilege as long as he derived a perutah’s worth of benefit.", + "How is this so? If [a woman] puts a necklace round her neck or a ring on her finger, or if she drank from a golden cup, she is liable to the law of sacrilege as soon as she made use of it [to the value of a perutah]. But if one puts on a shirt or covers oneself with a cloak, or if one chopped [wood] with an axe, he is subject to the law of sacrilege only if [those objects] have suffered deterioration. The mishnah now illustrates which items are diminished by use and which items are not. The items in the first list are not diminished by use for they are made of metal. Therefore, as soon as the woman using them derives benefit from them, she has committed sacrilege. The items in the second list are diminished, even minimally by use. Therefore, one who uses them is not liable for sacrilege unless he has diminished them by the value of a perutah. It is easiest to think of the rule this way: when an item is diminished by use, we define benefit by its deterioration. For instance, one derives benefit from food, when he has eaten a perutah’s worth of food. But if the item does not deteriorate, we must evaluate it the benefit some other way. The way to do this would be to estimate how much one would pay to use the cup, necklace etc. for such a use. If it is more than a perutah, then she has committed sacrilege.", + "If one sheared a hatat while it was alive, he is not liable for sacrilege sacrilege unless he has diminished its value. If when dead, he is liable as soon as he made use of it. If he shears the hatat animal while it is alive, he has diminished its value. Therefore, he is liable only if the amount he sheared is worth a perutah. In contrast, it is forbidden to derive any benefit from a hatat animal that died (it was not slaughtered as part of the sacrificial process). Its wool has no real value because it must be buried. Therefore, we can’t say that by using the wool he has diminished the animal’s value-the animal has no value. He will be liable for having derived benefit, even without diminishing the animal’s value." + ], + [ + "If one derived half a perutah's worth of benefit and impaired [the value of the used article] by another half a perutah, or if one derived a perutah's worth of benefit from one thing and diminished another thing by the value of a perutah, he had not committed sacrilege, until he benefits a perutah's worth and diminishes the value of a perutah of the same thing. In order to be liable for sacrilege one has to derive a perutah’s worth of benefit and cause the value of the object used to be diminished by the value of a perutah. If both of these elements do not exist, sacrilege has not been committed (assuming that the item is one that does deteriorate with use). Let’s use the case of an ax. If one benefits a perutah’s worth, meaning a person would pay at least a perutah to use the ax for as long as he did, and he at the same time he caused the ax to deteriorate in value by at least a perutah, then he is liable for sacrilege. However, if he derives only half a perutah’s worth of benefit and causes the value to deteriorate by only half of a perutah, he has not committed sacrilege. We don’t add the benefit to the deterioration to arrive at the requisite perutah. If he uses the ax and derives a perutah’s worth of benefit but doesn’t cause it to deteriorate by a perutah, and at the same time he causes some other holy item to deteriorate, for instance he breaks a jar that has been dedicated to the Temple causing the loss of at least a perutah, he is still not liable for sacrilege. Here the benefit came with one object (the ax) and the deterioration with another (the jar). In order for sacrilege to have been committed, the benefit and loss must be with the same object." + ], + [ + "One does not commit sacrilege after sacrilege has already been committed by another person, except with domesticated animals and vessels of ministry. Once a person has made non-holy use of an item dedicated to the Temple, the item becomes non-sacred and therefore the next person to use it has not committed sacrilege. This is true, however, only of items that become non-sacred (hullin) after secular use has been made of them. Animals that can be used as sacrifices and the vessels of ministry used in the Temple can never become hullin. Therefore, even after sacrilege has already been committed with them, they are still subject to the laws of sacrilege.", + "How so? If one rode on a beast and then another came and rode on it and yet another came and rode on it; Or if one drank from a golden cup, then another came and drank and yet another came and drank; Or if one plucked [of the wool] of a hatat, then another came and plucked and yet another came and plucked, all of them are guilty of sacrilege. The mishnah now cites three examples of sacrilege done either with a sacrificial animal or with a vessel of ministry. In all three of these cases, those who use the animal or vessel after the first sacrilege has already been performed are still liable for sacrilege.", + "Rabbi said: anything that cannot be redeemed is subject to the law of sacrilege even after sacrilege has been already committed with it. Rabbi [Judah Hanasi] adds that anything that cannot be redeemed is subject to multiple acts of sacrilege, because it too, like the vessels, cannot become hullin. This would include birds set aside to be sacrifices, wood and incense (see Menahot 12:1)." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah discusses when exactly a person who takes something from Temple property is considered to have committed sacrilege.", + "If he removed a stone or a beam belonging to Temple property, he is not guilty of sacrilege. But if he gave it to his friend he is guilty of sacrilege, but his fellow is not guilty. Simply removing a stone or a beam from Temple property is not considered sacrilege, because he has not yet benefited from it. However, all he has to do is give it to his friend and he has committed sacrilege because his friend will think highly of him for having given him a present. This is considered enough benefit for him to be considered as having committed sacrilege. His friend who receives the stone or beam cannot be guilty of sacrilege because as we learned in mishnah three, once sacrilege has been committed with an item it becomes hullin and the next person to use it has not committed sacrilege.", + "If he built it into his house he is not guilty of sacrilege until he lives beneath it and benefits the equivalent of a perutah. Using the stone or beam to build his house does not constitute sacrilege until he actually lives in the house with the holy stone or beam.", + "If he took a perutah from Temple property he is not guilty of sacrilege. But if he gave it to his friend he is guilty of sacrilege, but his fellow is not guilty. The same rule that we stated above with regard to the stone or beam is stated here with regard to a simple coin.", + "If he gave it to the bathhouse keeper, he is guilty of sacrilege even though he has not bathed, for he can say to him, “Behold the bath is ready for you, go in and bathe.” If he gives it to the bathhouse keeper, he is liable for sacrilege even before he takes a bath. Once he has paid for his bath, he has a right to take his bath whenever he so wishes. This right is considered to be benefit, and therefore he has committed sacrilege." + ], + [ + "The portion which a person has eaten himself and that which he has given his friend to eat, or the portion which he has made use of himself and that which he has given to his friend to make use of, or the portion which he has eaten himself and that which he has given his friend to make use of, or the portion which he has made use of himself and that which he has given his friend to eat can combine with one another even after the lapse of a lot of time. If a person eats half of a perutah’s worth of dedicated food (something subject to the laws of sacrilege), and gives his friend half of a perutah’s worth of dedicated food to eat, the two half-perutah’s join together to cause him to be liable for sacrilege. The same is true if he derives half of a perutah’s worth of benefit and he gives his friend half of a perutah’s worth of the dedicated thing. The mishnah now goes through all of the various permutations of this law. To put it briefly, benefit and eating can join together, whether they were directly done by the person, or they were given by one person to another. This is true even if a lot of time lapsed in between the two events. As long as they both occurred in one period of lack of knowledge that the food was dedicated, they can join to make one liable for sacrilege." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah deals with the question of one who sends another person to commit an act of sacrilege: who is guilty of the sacrilege, the sender or his agent?", + "If an agent has fulfilled his agency, the sender is guilty of sacrilege, but if he has not carried out his agency, he himself is guilty of sacrilege. The general rule is straightforward if the agent fulfills the sender’s instructions and neither knew that the item (food or otherwise) he was being sent to bring had been dedicated, the sender has committed sacrilege. But if the agent does not fulfill his agency, then we can’t hold the sender responsible and the agent has committed sacrilege. The mishnah now illustrates this.", + "How so? If he [the employer] said to him: “Give meat to the guests” and he offered them liver, “[Give] liver” and he offered them meat, he himself is guilty of sacrilege. “Meat” and “liver” are two different things, according to the lingo of the mishnah. If the sender sent his servant instructing him to give “meat” to the guests, and the servant gave liver (which I would have politely declined), then the agent has committed sacrilege because he did not fulfill his boss’s instructions. The same is true in the opposite case.", + "If the employer said to him: “Give them one piece each,” and he said to them: “Take two pieces each,” and the guests took three pieces each, all of them are guilty of sacrilege. In this case, the servant fulfilled the agency when he gave the guests permission to take one piece. Therefore, the host has committed sacrilege. When the servant gave the second piece, which the host did not instruct him to do, the servant committed sacrilege. And finally, when the guests took a third piece (greedy guests), they committed sacrilege as well. Note that if they had not taken thirds, they would not have been guilty. I hope it teaches them a lesson.", + "If he [the employer] said to him, “Bring me [something] from the window or from the chest,” and he brought it to him [from one of these places] even though the employer says, “I meant only from that place” and he brought it from the other place, the employer is guilty of sacrilege. But if he said to him, “Bring it to me from the window,” and he brought it from the chest, or “from the chest” and he brought it to him from the window, the agent is guilty of sacrilege. In this case, the employer sent his employee to fetch something that turned out to be holy from one of either of two places. When the employee brings him the object and the employer uses it, the employer has committed sacrilege. Since he mentioned both places, he can’t say that he really meant for the object that was in the opposite place to have been brought. However, if he specifies precisely where the object is, and the employee brings an object from somewhere else, then the employee has not fulfilled his instructions and the employee is the one that is guilty of sacrilege." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with a person who unknowingly sends money that has been dedicated to the Temple with an agent to a storekeeper to buy something.", + "One who has sent a deaf-mute, an imbecile or a minor: If they carried out their agency the employer is guilty, If they did not carry out their appointed errand, the shopkeeper is guilty. A deaf-mute, imbecile and minor cannot be held legally responsible for their actions. However, if they fulfill their agency, then the one who sent them is liable for sacrilege, just as he is in all cases. If they do not fulfill the agency, then when the shopkeeper spends the money that they gave him, he will be guilty of sacrilege. The money has remained holy until this point, because the deaf-mute, imbecile and minor are not capable of being liable for sacrilege. Had the agent been a person of sound senses, he would have been liable for sacrilege when he didn’t fulfill the employer’s instructions. In such a case, when the storekeeper spends the money he will not be liable.", + "If one sent one of sound senses and remembers [that the money belongs to Temple property] before it has come into the possession of the shopkeeper, the shopkeeper will be guilty when he spends it. Here the employer remembers that the money he gave to his agent is holy, but he remembers too late. The employee is already on his way. At this point the sender cannot be liable for sacrilege, or at least not to bring a sacrifice to atone for sacrilege, because a sacrifice is not brought by one who intentionally commits sacrilege. Although he sent it without knowing it was holy, since he knows before it is used, he is considered as one who intentionally commits sacrilege.", + "What should he do? He should take a perutah or a vessel and say “The perutah that is Temple property, wherever it may be, is redeemed with this;” for consecrated things can be redeemed both with money and with money's worth. Don’t worry! There is a remedy to prevent the poor innocent storekeeper from committing sacrilege. The sender can redeem the coins even when they are not in his presence. All he has to do is take a perutah or a vessel that is worth at least a perutah and declare that the holiness of the coins that he already sent is transferred to the coin or vessel in his hand. The mishnah concludes by noting that Temple property can be redeemed both by coin and by things that are worth money." + ], + [ + "If he gave him a perutah and said to him: “Bring me for half a perutah lamps and for the other half wicks,” and he went and brought for the whole perutah wicks or for the whole perutah lamps; Or if he said to him, “Bring me for the whole lamps or for the whole wicks,” and he went and brought for half [a perutah] lamps and for the other half wicks, neither is guilty of sacrilege. In this case the employer has not committed sacrilege because the agent changed his instructions. The agent also has not committed sacrilege for he only changed the instructions by half of a perutah (by spending the whole perutah on one thing and not half on each item). In order for the agent to be liable, he has to change the instructions for the entire perutah.", + "But if he said to him, “Bring for half a perutah lamps from one place and for half a perutah wicks from another,” and he went and brought the lamps from the place where the wicks [were to be bought] and the wicks from the place where the lamps [were to be bought], the agent is guilty of sacrilege. In this case the agent changed the instructions completely and didn’t precisely fulfill any of the instructions that he was sent to fulfill. Therefore, he has committed sacrilege." + ], + [ + "If he gave him two perutahs and said, “Bring me for them an etrog,” and he brought for one perutah an etrog and for the other a pomegranate, both are guilty of sacrilege. Rabbi Judah says: the employer is not guilty of sacrilege for he could say, “I wanted a large etrog and you brought me a small and bad one.” According to the first opinion, the employer is guilty of sacrilege with one of the perutahs, because the agent did perform the instructions to buy an etrog. The agent is guilty of sacrilege with the other perutah because he changed the instructions and bought a pomegranate with the other perutah. Rabbi Judah argues that the employer is not guilty at all, because he can claim that he wanted a two-perutah etrog, not a one-perutah etrog. Therefore, we don’t consider the agent as having fulfilled half of his instructions; rather he has not fulfilled the instructions at all and he alone is guilty of sacrilege.", + "If he gave him a golden denar and said to him, “Bring me a shirt,” and he brought him for three [silver selas] a shirt and for the other three a cloak, both are guilty of sacrilege. Rabbi Judah says: the employer is not guilty of sacrilege, for he can argue, “I wanted a large shirt and you brought me a small and bad one.” The employer sends him with a golden denar to buy a shirt. A golden denar is worth 25 silver denars, or 6.5 silver selas. The agent uses half of the money to buy the cloak, and the other half to buy a shirt. As in the previous section, the first opinion considers them both to have committed sacrilege. The employer committed sacrilege with the first half of the money, and the agent by changing the instructions with the second half. Again, Rabbi Judah argues that only the agent committed sacrilege. The employer sent him to buy a golden denar shirt (Gucci?) and not a cheaper one (Target?), so the agent didn’t fulfill any of his instructions." + ], + [ + "One who deposited money with a moneychanger: if it was tied up, he may not use it; and therefore if he did spend it he is guilty of sacrilege. If it was loose he may use it and therefore if he spent it he is not guilty of sacrilege. If one deposits dedicated money with a moneychanger and the money is tied up, the moneychanger should not use the coins. If he does use the coins, then he is guilty of sacrilege. Having tied them up, it is as if the owner told him not to use them. However, if they are loose, the owner should expect that the moneychanger might use the coins, and replace them with other coins later on when he returns them. Therefore, if the moneychanger uses them, he has not committed sacrilege. The Talmud explains that in such a case the depositor has committed sacrilege because it is as if he gave the coins to the moneychanger with the explicit permission to use them.", + "If [the money was deposited] with a private person, he may not use it in neither case, and therefore if he did spent it he is guilty of sacrilege. A private person is not supposed to use money deposited with him. Therefore, if he does so and the money is dedicated, he is guilty of sacrilege, whether the money was tied up or given to him loosely.", + "A shopkeeper has the status of a private person, the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Judah says: he is like a money-changer. According to Rabbi Meir a shopkeeper is like a private person. If someone gives him coins, he may not use them, whether they are tied up or loose. Therefore, in both cases, if he uses the coins he has committed sacrilege. Rabbi Judah holds that a shopkeeper is like a money-changer. Therefore, if the coins were given to him loosely he may use them and in such a case the depositor is the one who will have committed sacrilege." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses a situation where one dedicated coin is in a bag full of non-sacred coins, but we don’t know which coin it is. If he uses the coins in the bag, at what point is he considered to have committed sacrilege?", + "If a perutah belonging to the Temple fell into his bag or if he said, “One perutah in this bag shall be dedicated,” as soon as he spends the first perutah he is guilty of sacrilege, the words of Rabbi Akiva. But the sages say: not until he has spent all the money that was in the bag. According to Rabbi Akiva, as soon as he spends a perutah from this bag of coins, he is liable for sacrilege, lest that perutah was the holy one. As a penalty he will bring an asham talui (a suspended asham) for every perutah that he spends. This matches Rabbi Akiva’s position in Keritot 5:2 one who has committed a doubtful act of sacrilege must bring an asham talui. If he spends all of the coins in the bag, he will have to bring a certain asham because at that point we know that he has committed sacrilege. The sages hold that he is not liable for sacrilege until it is certain that he has used the dedicated coin. This is consistent with their opinion in Keritot 5:2 one does not bring an asham talui for sacrilege. He is liable for sacrilege only when he spends all of the coins.", + "Rabbi Akiva agrees if he says, “A perutah out of this bag shall be dedicated,” he is permitted to keep on spending [and is liable only] when he has spent all that was in the bag. “A perutah out of this bag shall be dedicated” is interpreted to mean that the owner will give a perutah from the coins in this bag to the Temple. In other words, none of the coins are holy now, but one will be holy later on. In this case, Rabbi Akiva agrees with the sages that the he is not liable for sacrilege unless he uses all of the coins in the bag. Congratulations! We have finished Tractate Meilah! It is a tradition at this point to thank God for helping us finish learning the tractate and to commit ourselves to going back and relearning it, so that we may not forget it and so that its lessons will stay with us for all of our lives. By dedicating an entire chapter to the topic of sacrilege, we learn just how serious a crime it is to use funds in an inappropriate manner. In modern Hebrew “meilah” is the word for embezzlement, a crime that unfortunately many of our leaders cannot seem to avoid. Meilah teaches us boundaries holy property, dedicated for the spiritual use of the community cannot be used for non-sacred purposes. Furthermore, when one does so, it is not enough just to pay back the embezzled funds. One must add an additional one-fifth and bring a sacrifice to atone for the crime. Although, as always, the technical aspects of this crime overwhelm the rabbinic discussion, there is a moral lesson that lies behind them as well. I hope you have enjoyed Meilah. Tomorrow we begin Tractate Tamid." + ] + ] + ] + }, + "versions": [ + [ + "Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp", + "http://learn.conservativeyeshiva.org/mishnah/" + ] + ], + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה מעילה", + "categories": [ + "Mishnah", + "Modern Commentary on Mishnah", + "English Explanation of Mishnah", + "Seder Kodashim" + ], + "schema": { + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה מעילה", + "enTitle": "English Explanation of Mishnah Meilah", + "key": "English Explanation of Mishnah Meilah", + "nodes": [ + { + "heTitle": "הקדמה", + "enTitle": "Introduction" + }, + { + "heTitle": "", + "enTitle": "" + } + ] + } +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Kodashim/English Explanation of Mishnah Menachot/English/Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp.json b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Kodashim/English Explanation of Mishnah Menachot/English/Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ff611376e29a4bdd95668eeed32458025bbc9ce8 --- /dev/null +++ b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Kodashim/English Explanation of Mishnah Menachot/English/Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp.json @@ -0,0 +1,646 @@ +{ + "language": "en", + "title": "English Explanation of Mishnah Menachot", + "versionSource": "http://learn.conservativeyeshiva.org/mishnah/", + "versionTitle": "Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp", + "status": "locked", + "license": "CC-BY", + "shortVersionTitle": "Dr. Joshua Kulp", + "actualLanguage": "en", + "languageFamilyName": "english", + "isBaseText": true, + "isSource": true, + "isPrimary": true, + "direction": "ltr", + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה מנחות", + "categories": [ + "Mishnah", + "Modern Commentary on Mishnah", + "English Explanation of Mishnah", + "Seder Kodashim" + ], + "text": { + "Introduction": [ + "Tractate Menahot deals with the minhah, or meal-offering. The main passage that deals with this offering is in Leviticus 2, but I have included here several other passages in Leviticus that mention how the minhah was offered.", + "Leviticus 2 1When a person presents an offering of meal to the LORD, his offering shall be of choice flour; he shall pour oil upon it, lay frankincense on it, 2 and present it to Aaron's sons, the priests. The priest shall scoop out of it a handful of its choice flour and oil, as well as all of its frankincense; and this token portion he shall turn into smoke on the altar, as an offering by fire, of pleasing odor to the LORD. 3 And the remainder of the meal offering shall be for Aaron and his sons, a most holy portion from the LORD's offerings by fire. 4 When you present an offering of meal baked in the oven, it shall be of choice flour: unleavened cakes with oil mixed in, or unleavened wafers spread with oil. 5 If your offering is a meal offering on a griddle, it shall be of choice flour with oil mixed in, unleavened. 6 Break it into bits and pour oil on it; it is a meal offering. 7 If your offering is a meal offering in a pan, it shall be made of choice flour in oil. 8 When you present to the LORD a meal offering that is made in any of these ways, it shall be brought to the priest who shall take it up to the altar. 9 The priest shall remove the token portion from the meal offering and turn it into smoke on the altar as an offering by fire, of pleasing odor to the LORD. 10 And the remainder of the meal offering shall be for Aaron and his sons, a most holy portion from the LORD's offerings by fire. 11 No meal offering that you offer to the LORD shall be made with leaven, for no leaven or honey may be turned into smoke as an offering by fire to the LORD. 12 You may bring them to the LORD as an offering of choice products; but they shall not be offered up on the altar for a pleasing odor. 13 You shall season your every offering of meal with salt; you shall not omit from your meal offering the salt of your covenant with God; with all your offerings you must offer salt.", + "Leviticus 6 7 And this is the ritual of the meal offering: Aaron's sons shall present it before the LORD, in front of the altar. 8 A handful of the choice flour and oil of the meal offering shall be taken from it, with all the frankincense that is on the meal offering, and this token portion shall be turned into smoke on the altar as a pleasing odor to the LORD. 9 What is left of it shall be eaten by Aaron and his sons; it shall be eaten as unleavened cakes, in the sacred precinct; they shall eat it in the enclosure of the Tent of Meeting. 10 It shall not be baked with leaven; I have given it as their portion from My offerings by fire; it is most holy, like the sin offering and the guilt offering. 11 Only the males among Aaron's descendants may eat of it, as their due for all time throughout the ages from the LORD's offerings by fire. Anything that touches these shall become holy.", + "Leviticus 7 9 Further, any meal offering that is baked in an oven, and any that is prepared in a pan or on a griddle, shall belong to the priest who offers it. 10 But every other meal offering, with oil mixed in or dry, shall go to the sons of Aaron all alike.", + "Leviticus 2 lists minhahs that are brought as voluntary offerings. There are five such minhahs: 1) A minhah of choice flour (verses 1-3) 2 + 3) A minhah baked in the oven (verse 4). There are two kinds of such minhahs: loaves, and wafers. 4) A minhah cooked on a griddle (verses 5-6) 5) A minhah cooked in a pan (verse 7).", + "In addition there are several cases where the Torah mandates that a person bring a minhah: 1) As a sin-offering for a poor person (Leviticus 5: 11-13). 2) The minhah of a Sotah (Numbers 5:15). 3) The minhah of the anointed priest (Leviticus 6:13-16). 4) A minhah that accompanies one of the following: a) a voluntary olah or shelamim (Numbers 15:2-16); b) the Tamid and Musaf offerings (Numbers 28:5); c) the olah bullock (Numbers 15:24); d) the Nazirite’s sacrifices (Numbers 6:15); e) with the omer sacrifices or two loaves of bread (Leviticus 23:13, 18); f) the metzora’s (one afflicted with skin-disease) sacrifice (Leviticus 14:10); g) the minhah of the omer (Leviticus 2:14-16; 23:10-11); h) the two loaves of bread (Leviticus 23: 16-17); i) the showbread (Leviticus 24:5-9).", + "Tractate Menahot deals with the laws governing the various types of minhahs as well as other bread-type offerings, such as the loaves of thanksgiving.", + "For those of you who learned Zevahim, many of the laws here should be familiar. The thoughts and actions that invalidate animal and bird sacrifices also invalidate minhahs. This means that if the priest intends to eat the minhah at the wrong time it is “piggul,” and one who eats it is liable for karet, and if he intends to eat it in the wrong place it is disqualified. When it came to animal sacrifices there were four actions that had to be performed with the right intent: slaughtering, receiving the blood, carrying the blood to the altar and sprinkling it on the altar. With the minhah there are also four critical actions, but they are different: 1) Removing the handful. 2) Putting the handful in a vessel. 3) Carrying it to the altar. 4) Turning it into smoke on the altar. ", + "We can see here that the two lists create a clear parallel between the fistful of the minhah that is put on the altar and the blood. Each is the critical part of the offering and it is what effects atonement (in an expiatory sacrifice). Good luck learning Menahot!" + ], + "": [ + [ + [ + "All minhahs from which the handful was taken not in their own name are valid, except that they do not count in fulfilling their owners’ obligation, with the exception of the sinner's minhah and the minhah of jealousy.
A sinner’s minhah and the minhah of jealousy from which he removed the handful not in their own name, or he put into the vessel, or brought [to the altar], or burned not in their own name, or for their own name and not for their own name, or not for their own name and for their own name, they are invalid.
How can they be “for their own name and not for their own name”? [If offered it] as a sinner's minhah and as a voluntary minhah.
And how can they be “not for their own name and for their own name”? [If offered it] as a voluntary minhah and as a sinner's minhah.
Today’s mishnah discusses minhahs that are offered by the priest with the intent of their being a different type of minhah from that which the person bringing them intended them to be. For instance a voluntary minhah is offered with the intent of its being a sinner’s minhah. There are two issues at stake: 1) Does the owner get credit for having brought the sacrifice? 2) Can the sacrifice be eaten?
The discerning reader will note that this mishnah is nearly identical to the mishnah that began Zevahim, and also to Zevahim 1:4. So consider this a great opportunity for some review!
Section one: If the priest removes the handful from the minhah in order to burn it on the altar, but he thinks that the minhah is a different type than what it really was supposed to be, for instance it was supposed to be a voluntary minhah and he thought it was a sinner’s minhah, the minhah is valid. This means that the fistful can be put on the altar and the remainder of the minhah can be eaten. However, it does not discharge the owner of his obligation and the owner will have to bring another in its stead.
There are two exceptions to this rule: the sinner’s minhah (Leviticus 5:11) and the minhah of jealousy, which is the minhah brought by the Sotah, a woman suspected of adultery (Numbers 5:15). In both of these cases if the priest offering the minhah thinks that the minhah is something else, the minhah is disqualified and cannot be offered on the altar, and the remainder cannot be eaten.
Section two: When it comes to the sinner’s minhah or the minhah of jealousy if any of the four critical actions, or even a part thereof, are done with the intent of the minhah being a different sacrifice, the minhah is invalid.
Sections three and four: If while performing one of the four actions the priest had the correct intent and then when performing a subsequent action he thought that the minhah was something else, it is disqualified. The same holds true in the reverse: if he makes a mistake during one of the first actions but then subsequently corrects himself and offers it with the correct intent, it is still disqualified." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to teach cases in which the minhah is invalid.", + "As for both a sinner’s minhah and any other minhah if [one of the following] removed the handful: a non-priest; or [a priest] that was an onen; or one who immersed himself during the day; or was not wearing the priestly vestments, or whose atonement was lacking; or who had not washed his hands and feet; or that was uncircumcised; or unclean; or was sitting, or standing upon vessels or upon a beast or upon another's feet, it is invalid. This section contains a list of cases in which a priest who removes the handful from the minhah renders it invalid. The same list appears in Zevahim 2:1, so I am basically replicating my commentary here: Non-priest: only priests can perform these activities. An onen: Someone who had one of their close relatives die is considered an onen on the day of the death. A tebul yom: This is the word for an impure person who has immersed in a mikveh but before the end of the day (before the sun sets after he was made pure). See Leviticus 22:7. One lacking [priestly] vestments: A regular priest must wear four garments and the high priest must wear eight garments (see Yoma 7:5). Without the proper attire, the minhah is invalid. One lacking sacrificial atonement: In certain cases, when one’s period of impurity is over he must bring a sacrifice. If the priest has not brought the required sacrifice, he cannot take part in the sacrificial worship. One who had not washed his hands and feet: See Exodus 30:19. An uncircumcised [priest]: See Ezekiel 44:9. An unclean [priest]: one must be ritually pure to offer sacrifices. One who was sitting, one who was standing on utensils or on an animal or on another’s feet, are disqualified: the sacrificial procedure must be performed while standing on the floor of the Temple’s courtyard, not sitting or standing on something else.", + "If [a priest] removed the handful with his left hand it is invalid. Ben Batera says: he may put [the handful] back and take it out again with the right hand. The handful should be removed with the right hand. According to the first opinion, if he removes it with his left hand the minhah is invalid, whereas Ben Batera holds that he may put the handful back into the remainder and take it out again with his right hand.", + "If on taking the handful there came into his hand a small stone or a grain of salt or a drop of frankincense it is invalid, for they have said: if the handful was too much or too little it is invalid. If when taking the handful the priest removes the correct amount, but then finds that something else was in the handful, a stone, salt or frankincense, it is invalid, because as we shall see, it turns out that he didn’t take enough.", + "What is meant by “too much? If he took an overflowing handful. The mishnah now explains the meaning of the statement, “if the handful was too much or too little it is invalid.” If he took a heaping handful and it was overflowing, then it is too much and the fistful is invalid.", + "And ‘too little’? If he took the handful with the tips of his fingers only. If he took it just with his fingertips, without using his palm, then it is similarly invalid, because it is not enough.", + "How should he do it? He should stretch out his fingers on to the palm of his hand. The proper way of taking out the fistful is for the priest to use his whole hand, with outstretched fingertips. This way he uses his palm and fingers." + ], + [ + "If he put in too much of its oil or too little of its oil or too little of its frankincense, it is invalid.
One who takes a fistful from the minhah [intending]: To eat the remainder outside [the Temple] or an olive’s worth outside; To burn the fistful or an olive’s worth of the fistful outside; To burn its frankincense outside, It is invalid, but it does not involve karet.
[One who takes a fistful from the minhah intending]: To eat the remainder the next day or an olive’s worth the next day; To burn the fistful the next day or an olive’s worth of the fistful the next day; To burn its frankincense the next day, It is piggul, and involves kareth.
This is the general rule: anyone who removes the fistful, or puts it into a vessel, or carries it to the altar, or burns it, [intending] to eat as much as an olive of that which is normally eaten or to burn [on the altar] as much as an olive of that which is normally burned outside its prescribed place, [the minhah] is invalid, but it does not involve karet; [Intending to eat or burn] after its designated time, it is piggul and it involves karet. Provided that the mattir is offered in accordance with the law.
How is the mattir offered in accordance with the law? If one took out the fistful in silence, and put it in a vessel, or carried it, or burned it, [intending to eat it] after its designated time; Or if one took out the fistful [intending to eat the minhah] after its designated time, and put it in a vessel, and carried it and burned it in silence, or if one took out the fistful, or put it in a vessel, or carried it, or burned it [intending to eat the minhah] after its designated time. That is offering the mattir in accordance with the law.
This mishnah is nearly similar to Zevahim 2:2-5. It deals with various ways in which the minhah offering is disqualified.
Section one: The amount of oil put into a minhah offering is one log for every tenth of an ephah of flour. If he puts in too much or too little oil the minhah is invalid. The amount of frankincense is two karots. If he puts in too little frankincense, the minhah is invalid, but it is not invalidated if he puts in too much.
Sections two-five: These sections are taught nearly word for word in Zevahim 2:2-4, so I have not rewritten my entire commentary here. The one difference is that here the mishnah discusses the four actions relevant to the minhah: taking out the fistful, putting it in a vessel, bringing it to the altar and burning it there. These are parallel to the four main activities with animal and bird sacrifices. Also, the fistful and the frankincense are parallel to the blood and the innards of the animal, such that the remainder of the minhah is parallel to the flesh of the animal.
Everything else in this mishnah is already explained in Zevahim 2:2-4." + ], + [ + "How is the mattir not offered in accordance with the law? If one took out the fistful [intending to eat it] outside the designated place, [and] put it in a vessel, carried it to the altar, and burned [with the intention of eating it] after its designated time; Or if one took out the fistful [intending to eat it] after its designated time, [and] received, carried it to the altar, and burned it [intending to eat it] outside its designated place, or if one took out the fistful, received, carried it to the altar, and burned [intending to eat it] outside its designated time.
If one took out the fistful of a sinner’s minhah or the minhah of jealousy for the sake of something else, and received, carried it to the altar, and burned [intending to eat them] after their designated time; Or if one took out the fistful [from them, intending to eat] after their designated time, [and] received, carried it to the altar, and burned for the sake of something else, or if one took out the fistful, received, carried it to the altar, and burned for the sake of something else;
Rabbi Judah said: this is the general rule: where the [improper] intention of time precedes the [improper] intention of place, [the sacrifice] is piggul, and involves karet; but if the [improper] intention of place precedes the [improper] intention of time, it is invalid and does not involve kareth.
In these cases the mattir was not offered in accordance with the law
But the sages say: in both cases [the sacrifice] is invalid and does not involve karet.
[If one intended] to eat as much as an olive outside its designated place [and] as much as an olive on the next day, [or] as much as an olive on the next day [and] as much as an olive outside its designated place; Half as much as an olive outside its designated place [and] half as much as an olive on the next day; Half as much as an olive on the next day [and] half as much as an olive outside its designated place, [The sacrifice] is unfit, and does not involve karet.
[If one intends] to eat half as much as an olive [after its intended time or outside its intended place] [and] to burn half as much as an olive [similarly] it is valid, for eating and burning do not combine.
This mishnah is nearly identical to Zevahim 2:4-5, with the exception that the actions here are relevant to a minhah whereas Zevahim discussed animal sacrifices. For commentary, see there." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nIn this mishnah, Rabbi Yose and the sages disagree concerning a case where a priest offered a minhah and had a disqualifying intention with regard to the accompanying frankincense.", + "If he took out the handful [intending] to eat the remainder or to burn the handful the next day, in this case Rabbi Yose agrees that the offering is piggul and he is obligated for karet. This is the same case that was mentioned in mishnah three of the previous chapter. Since he had a disqualifying intention with regard to either eating the remainder of the minhah or burning the handful that he removes in order to burn on the altar, everyone agrees that the offering is piggul (forbidden) and the penalty for eating it is karet (extirpation). This section is mentioned here to note that in this case Rabbi Yose agrees, but he will disagree below about a similar case.", + "[If he intended] to burn its frankincense the next day: Rabbi Yose says: it is invalid but he is not liable for karet. But the sages say: it is piggul and he is liable for karet. The debate concerns a case where the priest’s disqualifying intention was in connection with burning the frankincense that accompanies the minhah. Rabbi Yose holds that the minhah is merely invalid it is not piggul and therefore one who eats it is not liable for karet. The sages disagree and hold that this minhah is piggul and one who eats it is liable for karet, just as he would be if the disqualifying intention was with regard to eating the remainder or burning the fistful (section one).", + "They said to him: how does this differ from an animal-offering? He said to them: with the animal-offering the blood, the flesh and the sacrificial portions are all one; but the frankincense is not part of the minhah. In this section the rabbis argue out their position. As we have seen, the fistful of the minhah is parallel to the blood of an animal offering and the frankincense is parallel to the innards of the animal that are burned on the altar (the emurim). If one sacrifices the animal with the intention of burning the innards on the following day, the sacrifice is piggul and one who eats it is liable for karet. So too, one who sacrifices the minhah with the intention of burning the innards on the following day, the minhah is piggul and one who eats it is liable for karet. Rabbi Yose responds by pointing out the difference between the parts of the animal sacrifice and the components of the minhah. The three parts of the animal, the flesh, the blood and the innards, are all from the same source. When it comes to the minhah, the fistful and the remains are from the same source, but the frankincense is not. Therefore, with regard to disqualifying intentions, the minhah is treated differently from the frankincense." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn this mishnah Rabbi Yose and the sages continue to debate cases where a priest has a disqualifying intention concerning one of the components of a sacrifice. The question is: does this cause the entire sacrifice to become piggul or just the part over which he had a disqualifying intention.", + "If he slaughtered the two lambs [intending] to eat one of the [two] loaves the next day, or if he burned the two dishes [of the frankincense intending] to eat one of the [two] rows of the showbread the next day: Rabbi Yose says: that loaf or that row about which he expressed the intention is piggul and he is liable for karet for it, while the other is invalid but he is not liable for karet for it. But the sages say, both are piggul and he is liable for karet for both of them. On Shavuot there are two lambs offered on behalf of the community, and with them are brought two loaves of bread. When the lambs are sacrificed the loaves become sanctified (see Leviticus 23:17, 19-20). In the case here, when sacrificing the lamb the priest has the intention to eat one of the two loaves after the proper time. On top of the showbread the priest puts two dishes of frankincense. When he burns this frankincense on Shabbat, the showbread can be eaten that day and the following night. In the case here, the priest intends to eat one of the two rows of the showbread the following day, after its time has expired. The debate concerning these two circumstances is similar to the debate in yesterday’s mishnah. According to Rabbi Yose, a disqualifying intention with regard to one of the component parts does not cause the entire sacrifice to become piggul. Thus the loaf which he intended to eat the next day is piggul and one who eats it is liable for karet. The other loaf is invalid, but it is not piggul. The same is true with regard to the two rows of bread; only the one which he intended to eat the next day is piggul. The rabbis are consistent with their position in the previous mishnah. If the priest intends to eat one part of the sacrifice after its time has expired, then the whole sacrifice is piggul and one who eats any part of it is liable for karet.", + "If one of the [two] loaves or one of the [two] rows [of the showbread] became unclean: Rabbi Judah says: both must be taken out to the place of burning, for the offering of the congregation may not be divided. But the sages say, the unclean [is treated] as unclean, but the clean may be eaten. Since the previous section dealt with the two loaves and the two rows of showbread, the mishnah relates another law concerning these sacrifices. If one of the two things (either loaves or rows) becomes impure and thus cannot be eaten, Rabbi Judah says they both must be burned. A sacrifice of the congregation cannot be divided in two, and therefore neither can be eaten. The rabbis say that only the part that was actually impure cannot be eaten. The other part is still permitted." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to deal with cases where a priest has a disqualifying intention with regard to one part of a multi-part sacrifice and whether this renders the entire sacrifice piggul and the one who eats it liable for karet.", + "The todah can render the bread piggul but the bread does not render the todah piggul. How so? If he slaughtered the todah intending to eat part of it on the next day, both it and the bread are piggul; if he intended to eat part of the bread the next day, the bread is piggul but the todah is not piggul. When one brings a todah (thanksgiving) offering, he brings with it unleavened cakes of bread (see Leviticus 7:12). If the priest intends to eat the todah after its time has expired, the bread is also rendered piggul. This is because the todah is the main part and the loaves are ancillary to it. However, if he intends to eat the loaves after their time has expired, then the loaves alone are piggul and the todah is not. The rule is that the main part can render that which is ancillary to it piggul, but the ancillary part cannot render the main part of the sacrifice piggul.", + "The lambs can render the bread piggul but the bread cannot render the lambs piggul. How so? If he slaughtered the lambs intending to eat part of them the next day, both they and the bread are piggul; if he intended to eat part of the bread the next day, the bread is piggul but the lambs are not. This is the same rule as above but applied to the lambs that are sacrificed on Shavuot and the loaves that accompany them (see yesterday’s mishnah). The lambs are the main part and the bread is ancillary." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah contains another example of the same rule found in yesterday’s mishnah.", + "The animal-offering can render the libations piggul after they have been sanctified in the vessel, the words of Rabbi Meir. When one offers an animal sacrifice, he must bring with it libations. This includes a minhah and a wine-libation (see Numbers 15). Rabbi Meir holds that if the priest has a disqualifying intention with regard to the animal offering, the libations become piggul as well, as long as they have already been sanctified by being put into a ministering vessel. The sages’ opinion with regard to this issue is not found in this mishnah. In Zevahim 4:3 we learn that the sages hold that the libations that accompany an animal offering cannot ever become piggul. Therefore, even if the priest has a disqualifying intention with regard to the animal, the libations can still be eaten.", + "But the libations cannot render the animal-offering piggul. Thus, if he slaughtered an animal-offering intending to eat part of it on the next day, both it and the libations are piggul; if he intended to offer the libations the next day, the libations are piggul but the animal-offering is not. Since the libations are ancillary to the animal-offering, even if the priest has a disqualifying intention with regard to them, the animal-offering is not piggul." + ], + [ + "If he had an intention which makes piggul [with regard to the remainder of the minhah] during the [burning of the] handful and not during the [burning of the] frankincense, or during the [burning of the] frankincense and not during the [burning of the] incense: Rabbi Meir says: it is piggul and he is liable for karet for it; But the sages say: there is no karet unless he had an intention that makes piggul during the service of the whole of the mattir. As we have explained on several occasions, there are two elements that allow the remainder of the minhah offering to be eaten: the removal of the fistful and its burning on the altar and the burning of the frankincense. These are the two “mattirs” for the remainder. According to Rabbi Meir, if while burning either the handful or the frankincense he has the intention of eating the remainder after its time has expired, the remainder is piggul and one who eats it is liable for karet. The other sages disagree and say that in order for something to be piggul and for one to be liable for karet for eating it, he has to have a disqualifying intention while all of the mattirs are being burned, in this case both the handful and the frankincense.", + "The sages agree with Rabbi Meir with regard to a sinner’s minhah or a minhah of jealousy, that if he had an intention which makes piggul during the [burning of the] handful, [the remainder] is piggul and he is liable for karet for it, since the handful is the entire mattir. There is no frankincense offered with the sinner’s minhah or the minhah of jealousy (that brought by the Sotah). Therefore, the sages agree that if he has a disqualifying intention when burning the handful, the remainder is piggul, because the handful is the only mattir.", + "If he slaughtered one of the lambs intending to eat the two loaves the next day, or if he burned one of the dishes of frankincense intending to eat the two rows [of the showbread] on the next day: Rabbi Meir says: it is piggul and he is liable for karet for it; But the sages say: it is not piggul, unless he had an intention that makes piggul during the service of the whole of the mattir. Again the mishnah makes reference to the two lambs slaughtered on Shavuot and the two bowls of frankincense which allow the showbread to be eaten. The lambs are the “mattir” for the bread that is brought with them on Shavuot and the frankincense is the “mattir” for the showbread. Rabbi Meir holds that if the priest intends to eat the Shavuot bread after its time while sacrificing even one of the two lambs or intends to eat the showbread after its time while burning even one of the two bowls of frankincense, the bread is piggul and one who eats it is liable for karet. The other sages disagree because the bread can’t be piggul unless all of the mattirs (both lambs or both bowls) are offered with a disqualifying intention.", + "If he slaughtered one of the lambs intending to eat part of it the next day, that [lamb] is piggul but the other [lamb] is valid. Having a disqualifying intention with regard to one of the lambs brought on Shavuot does not affect the status of the other lamb. One lamb is not a “mattir” for the other.", + "If he intended to eat the other [lamb] the next day, both are valid. If while slaughtering one of the lambs one has a disqualifying intention with regard to the other lamb, neither lamb is affected. He did not have the wrong intention with regard to the lamb he was actually sacrificing, so it is not affected. And while he did have a wrong intention with regard to the other lamb, he wasn’t actually slaughtering the other lamb when he had that intention." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with various cases where the disqualifying intention does not cause the sacrifice to be invalid. The same mishnah concerning animal sacrifices appeared in Zevahim 3:3.", + "If he took the handful from the minhah intending to eat [outside its proper place or after its proper time] a thing that it is not usual to eat or to burn [outside its proper place or after its proper time] a thing that it is not usual to burn, the offering is valid. But Rabbi Eliezer says it is invalid. Normally, having an intention to eat or burn something outside of the place or time it should be eaten or burned will invalidate the minhah. However, here he intends to burn or eat something that is not normally burned or eaten. Therefore, this improper intention does not render the sacrifice invalid. Rabbi Eliezer disagrees and holds that an improper intention even concerning that which is not normally eaten or burned will still render the sacrifice invalid.", + "If he intended to eat less than an olive's worth of a thing that it is usual to eat, or to burn less than an olive's worth of a thing that it is usual to burn, the offering is valid. Here his improper intention was to do the action with less than an olive’s worth of the minhah, and therefore the minhah is still valid.", + "If he intended to eat a half of an olive's worth and to burn a half of an olive’s worth, the offering is valid, for eating and burning cannot be reckoned together. As we learned in 1:4, improper intentions with regard to eating a minhah and burning the fistful taken out of it do not join together to add up to the requisite olive’s worth. Therefore, the minhah is still valid." + ], + [ + "If he did not pour in [the oil], or if he did not mix it, or if he did not break up [the minhah] into pieces, or if he did not salt it, or wave it, or if he did not draw it near, or if he broke it up into large pieces, or if he did not anoint it [with oil], it is valid. This section deals with a case where the priest preparing the minhah did not prepare it in the precisely correct way. With regard to each case I will first explain the correct way to prepare the minhah and then note what he did wrong. He brings a tenth [of an ephah] of flour and a log (a measure) of oil. He puts a little bit of the oil into a vessel and then he puts the flour on top of it and then he pours the rest of the oil on top and mixes it together. If he didn’t pour the oil on afterwards, but rather poured it all into the vessel before he put the flour in, the minhah is still valid. Similarly, if he didn’t mix it up, it is still valid. After having been mixed up, certain minhahs are kneaded in water and then baked in either a shallow or a deep pan. He would then make ten loaves. After the loaves have been baked, he breaks the loaves up into pieces, each about the size of an olive. If he doesn’t break the loaves up or he breaks them up into large pieces, the minhah is still valid. Before a minhah is burned on the altar, the priest salts it. If he doesn’t salt the minhah and only salts the handful, it is still valid (this is how some commentators understand the mishnah, because if the handful is not salted, it is invalid). Some minhah offerings, such as the minhah of jealousy, are waved before they are burned. If they are not waved, they are still valid. The minhah is brought to the altar before it is eaten. If it is not brought there, it is still valid (we will learn more about this in 5:5-6). Certain minhahs, specifically those made into wafers, are not mixed with oil before they are cooked, but rather afterwards. If he doesn’t anoint these minhah “wafers” they are still valid.", + "If the handful of one minhah was mixed with the handful of another, or with a priest’s minhah, or with the minhah of the anointed [high] priest, or with the minhah offered with the libations, it is valid. Rabbi Judah says: if [it was mixed] with the minhah of the anointed [high] priest or with the minhah offered with libations, it is invalid, for since the consistency of the one is thick and the consistency of the other is thin, each absorbs from the other. This section deals with various minhah offerings whose handfuls are mixed up with one another. According to the first opinion, it doesn’t matter which handful is mixed up with which handful, they all remain valid and they can all be put on the altar. Rabbi Judah says that if the handful from a regular Israelite minhah gets mixed up with the handful from either the minhah of the high priest or the minhah of libations then the mixture cannot be offered because the consistency of these minhahs is different. The minhah of the high priest and the minhah of libations have three logs of oil per tenth of an ephah of flour, whereas the regular Israelite minhah has only one log per tenth of flour. If they are mixed together the Israelite minhah will absorb from the other minhahs and its mixture will become thinner, and the mixture of the high priest’s minhah or minhah of libations will become thicker. In other words, they will become of uniform viscosity, and neither of them will stay as they are required to be." + ], + [ + "Two minhahs from which the handfuls had not yet been taken out were mixed together: If it is still possible to take the handful from each separately, they are valid; If not, they are invalid.
If the handful [of a minhah] was mixed with a minhah from which the handful had not yet been taken, he must not burn it. If he did burn it, then the minhah from which the handful had been taken fulfills the owner's obligation while the other from which the handful had not been taken does not fulfill the owner's obligation.
If the handful was mixed with the remainder of the minhah or with the remainder of another minhah, it must not be burned; If he did burn it does fulfill the owner's obligation.
If the handful had become unclean and yet he offered it, the head plate renders it acceptable,
But if it went out [of the Temple Court] and was afterwards he offered it, the headplate does not render it acceptable.
For the headplate renders acceptable only an offering which was unclean but not that which was taken out.
Section one: In order for the minhah to be validated, the handful must be removed. So if two minhahs are mixed in together and neither has their handful removed, each minhah will be permitted only if he can definitely remove a handful from each minhah, and he can tell that this handful comes from only one minhah. If it is impossible to tell which minhah is which, then neither is valid because he can’t tell whether he has removed a handful from each.
Section two: Here a handful from one minhah is mixed in with another minhah from which the handful has not been removed. He should not burn this entire mixture because only the handful is supposed to be burned, not the remainder of the minhah offering. He also cannot remove two handfuls because in each handful there may be flour from the other minhah.
However, if he does burn the entire mixture the minhah which had the handful removed counts as fulfilling the obligation of its owners because its handful was properly burned. The other minhah does not fulfill the owner’s obligation because it was completely burned and only the handful should have been burned." + ], + [ + "If the remainder of the minhah became unclean or was burnt or lost: According to the rule of Rabbi Eliezer it is valid [to burn the fistful], But according to the rule of Rabbi Joshua it is invalid. According to Rabbi Eliezer, if the remainder became unclean, was burnt or lost, the handful can still be burned on the altar. However, Rabbi Joshua holds that if the remainder is no longer there or is no longer pure, then the fistful cannot be burned.", + "If [he did] not [put the fistful] into a ministering vessel it is invalid; But Rabbi Shimon declares it valid. The fistful must be put into a ministering vessel before it is burned. If it is not, it is invalid. Rabbi Shimon disagrees.", + "If he burnt the handful twice, it is valid. If he divided the fistful into two and burned each half separately, it is still valid." + ], + [ + "Regarding the handful: the [absence of the] smallest part invalidates the whole.
Regarding the tenth [of flour for the minhah] the [absence of the] smallest part invalidates the whole.
Regarding the wine [libation which accompanies the minhah] the [absence of the] smallest part invalidates the whole.
Regarding the oil [which is mixed in with the minhah] the [absence of the] smallest part invalidates the whole.
Regarding the flour and the oil, the [absence of] one invalidates the other.
Regarding the handful and the frankincense, the [absence of] one invalidates the other.
This mishnah begins a series of mishnayot that continues through the fourth mishnah of the next chapter. In this series we learn that the absence of certain things prevents the fulfillment of a mitzvah.
In the first four sections of today’s mishnah we learn that if any of the following components of the minhah are missing even the smallest amount, then the whole is invalid: the handful removed from the minhah, the tenth of flour that constitutes the minhah, and the wine and oil libations that accompany the minhah.
In section five we learn that without the oil one cannot fulfill the mitzvah of offering the flour and vice versa. And in section six we learn that one cannot fulfill the mitzvah of burning the handful without also burning the frankincense and vice versa.
The words of the mishnah themselves are straightforward, so you won’t find any additional commentary below." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to provide cases where the absence of one element of a mitzvah prevents the entire mitzvah from being fulfilled.", + "Regarding the two goats of Yom Hakippurim, the [absence of] one invalidates the other. On Yom Kippur two male goats are brought, one is sacrificed and one is sent to Azazel. The absence of one goat prevents the fulfillment of any mitzvah with the other goat.", + "Regarding the two lambs of Shavuot, the [absence of] one invalidates the other. Regarding the two loaves [that accompany the lambs] the [absence of] one invalidates the other. On Shavuot two lambs are brought, accompanied by two loaves of bread. If one of the lambs is missing, it prevents one from fulfilling any mitzvah with the other lamb. Similarly, with regard to the loaves.", + "Regarding the two rows [of the showbread] the [absence of] one invalidates the other. Regarding the two dishes [of frankincense] the [absence of] one invalidates the other. Regarding the rows and the dishes the [absence of] one invalidates the other. The showbread consisted of two rows of six loaves. On each row was placed a dish of frankincense. The absence of one of the rows or one of the dishes prevents the fulfillment of the other. And, the absence of the rows prevents one from being able to fulfill the mitzvah of the frankincense, and vice versa, the absence of the dishes prevents the fulfillment of the mitzvah of the showbread.", + "Regarding the: two kinds [of cakes] used in the offering of the nazirite, the three kinds used for the red cow, the four kinds [of cakes] used in the todah, the four kinds [of species] used for the lulav, and the four kinds used for the [purification of the] leper, the [absence of] one invalidates the others. The mishnah now lists a series of mitzvoth that have multiple components, the absence of which prevents the fulfillment of the others. I shall give biblical references for each: Two kinds [of cakes] used in the offering of the nazirite: loaves of matzah and wafers of matzah, see Numbers 6:15. The three kinds used for the red cow: cedar wood, hyssop and crimson thread, see Numbers 19:6. The four kinds [of cakes] used in the todah: loaves of matzah, wafers of matzah, boiled flour, and hametz, see Leviticus 7:12. The four kinds [of species] used for the lulav: palm, myrtle, willow and etrog, see Leviticus 23:40. And the four kinds used for the [purification of the] leper: two birds, cedar wood, hyssop and crimson thread, see Leviticus 14:4.", + "Regarding the seven sprinklings [of the blood] of the red cow the [absence of] one invalidates the others. During the red cow purification ceremony, they sprinkle its blood seven times (see Numbers 19:4). If one of these sprinklings is not done, the entire ceremony is invalid.", + "Regarding the seven sprinklings between the staves of the ark, and of those towards the veil and upon the golden altar, the [absence of] one invalidates the others. On Yom Kippur the blood is sprinkled seven times between the staves of the ark, seven times on the curtain and seven times on the golden altar (see Leviticus 16:14-15). If even one of these is not done, they are all invalid." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe mishnah continues to list mitzvoth in which the absence of one element disqualifies the fulfillment of the entire mitzvah. The mishnah is quite simple to understand. Below I have mostly provided biblical references.", + "Regarding the seven branches of the menorah, the [absence of] one invalidates the others. Exodus 25:31-32.", + "Regarding the seven lamps on it, the [absence of] one invalidates the others. The “lamps” refers to the cups that held the oil and the wicks.", + "Regarding the two portions of Scripture in the mezuzah, the [absence of] one invalidates the other; indeed even one letter can invalidate the whole. The two portions are Deuteronomy 6:4-9, the Shema, and Deuteronomy 11:13-21, Vehaya im Shamoa. If even one letter is missing or not written correctly, the mezuzah is invalid.", + "Regarding the four portions of Scripture in the tefillin, the [absence of] one invalidates the others; indeed even one letter can invalidate the whole. The four portions are: the two portions that are in the mezuzah and Exodus 13:1-10 and Exodus 13:11-16.", + "Regarding the four fringes, the [absence of] one invalidates the others, since the four together form one mitzvah. Rabbi Ishmael says: the four are four separate mitzvot. Numbers 15:38 and Deuteronomy 22:12. According to the first opinion, if one corner of the garment does not have tzitzit, then the mitzvah has not been fulfilled. Rabbi Ishmael holds that each corner is its own mitzvah and therefore if one is missing he has fulfilled his mitzvah." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nIn this mishnah we learn of cases where the absence of a part of a certain mitzvah does not prevent the fulfillment of the whole mitzvah.", + "The [absence of the] blue [in the tzitzit] does not invalidate the white, neither does the [absence of the] white invalidate the blue. Tzitzit consist of white and blue strands (Numbers 15:38). If one makes tzitzit with only white or only blue strands, he has fulfilled the mitzvah. Today most people wear tzitzit with only white threads because for many years rabbis did not know how to make the blue threads. However, recently people re-discovered how the blue threads were made. Nowadays, it is becoming increasingly more common to see people with tzitzit made of blue and white.", + "The [absence of the] hand-tefillin does not invalidate the head-tefillin, neither does the [absence of the] head-tefillin invalidate the hand-tefillin. Tefillin are worn on the head and arm. These are two separate mitzvoth, so if a person wears one and not the other, he has fulfilled the mitzvah of wearing that particular piece of tefillin.", + "The [absence of the] fine flour and the oil does not invalidate the wine, neither does the [absence of the] wine invalidate them. A minhah that is accompanied by libations comes with three elements: flour, oil and wine. If one offers one or two of these elements, but not the others, he has fulfilled the mitzvah of that which he offered.", + "The [omission of one of the] sprinklings [of the blood] on the outer altar does not invalidate the rest. Some sacrifices require the blood of the animal to be sprinkled on the outer altar, either four times or twice (see Zevahim 5:3-7). If he omits one of the sprinklings he has still fulfilled the mitzvah (see Zevahim 4:1)." + ], + [ + "The [absence of either the] bullocks or the rams or the lambs does not invalidate the others. On Rosh Hodesh and festivals, bullocks, rams and lambs are offered, together with “drink-offerings” consisting of wine, flour and oil (see Numbers 28:11ff and Leviticus 23:18). If the community does not bring all of these, they can still fulfill the mitzvah of the offerings that they do bring.", + "Rabbi Shimon says: if they had [money enough to buy] many bullocks but not [enough for] the drink-offerings, they should bring one bullock and its drink-offerings and should not offer them all without drink-offerings. Rabbi Shimon points out that it is preferable to bring one bullock with its drink-offerings than to bring more animals without drink-offerings. It seems that the drink-offerings, according to Rabbi Shimon, complete the sacrifice and therefore it is better to bring one completed sacrifice than multiple partial sacrifices." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with the sacrifices offered on Shavuot, and the absence of which sacrifices prevent the fulfillment of the other sacrifices.\nI have brought here the relevant verses, Leviticus 23:17-20, for ease of reference:\n17 You shall bring from your settlements two loaves of bread as an elevation offering; each shall be made of two-tenths of a measure of choice flour, baked after leavening, as first fruits to the LORD.\n8 With the bread you shall present, as burnt offerings to the LORD, seven yearling lambs without blemish, one bull of the herd, and two rams, with their meal offerings and libations, an offering by fire of pleasing odor to the LORD.\n19 You shall also offer one he-goat as a sin offering and two yearling lambs as a sacrifice of well-being.\n20 The priest shall elevate these -- the two lambs -- together with the bread of first fruits as an elevation offering before the LORD; they shall be holy to the LORD, for the priest.", + "The [absence of the] bull, or the rams, or the lambs or the goat does not invalidate the bread, neither does the [absence of the] bread invalidate them. The absence of one of the sacrifices mentioned in verse 18, does not invalidate the bread mentioned in verses 17 and 20, neither does the absence of the bread invalidate them. They are separate sacrifices, each their own mitzvah.", + "The [absence of the] bread invalidates the lambs, but the [absence of the] lambs does not invalidate the bread, the words of Rabbi Akiva. The two lambs mentioned in verses 19 and 20 are elevated (lifted up) with the bread. The bread and these lambs seem to go together. Rabbi Akiva holds that without the bread, the lambs are invalidated. However, since the bread is mentioned alone in verse 17, it is its own offering, and therefore, even if he doesn’t offer the lambs, the bread is still valid.", + "Rabbi Shimon b. Nanas said: it is not so, but rather the [absence of the] lambs invalidates the bread, while the [absence of the] bread does not invalidate the lambs; for so we find that when the Israelites were in the wilderness for forty years they offered the lambs without the bread, therefore now too they may offer the lambs without the bread. Rabbi Shimon ben Nanas holds an opposite opinion. Without the lambs, the bread cannot be offered, but without the bread, the lambs can still be offered. The reason is that when the Israelites were in the desert, they could not offer the bread, because the bread offering must come from grain grown in the land of Israel, as it says in verse 17, “from your settlements.” Since there is a precedent for offering lambs without bread, even after the Temple was built, the lambs could be offered without the bread.", + "Rabbi Shimon said: the halakhah is according to the words of Ben Nanas but not for the reason he stated; for every offering stated in the Book of Numbers was offered in the wilderness, but not every offering stated in the book of Leviticus was offered in the wilderness; however, when they came into the land of Israel they offered both kinds. Rabbi Shimon says that the halakhah is in accordance with Rabbi Shimon ben Nanas, that without the lambs the bread cannot be offered but the lambs can be offered without the bread. However, Rabbi Shimon disagrees with Ben Nanas’s reason. Rabbi Shimon holds that all offerings mentioned in Leviticus were not offered at all in the desert. So there is no precedent for offering the lambs without the bread. Only the offerings mentioned in Numbers 28:27ff. were offered in the desert.", + "Why then do I say that the lambs may be offered without the bread? Because the lambs render themselves permissible without the bread, whereas bread without lambs, there is nothing that renders it permissible. Now Rabbi Shimon must explain why he agrees with the halakhah stated by Ben Nanas. The lambs can be offered without the bread, because burning the lambs’ innards allows the lambs to be eaten by the priests. In other words, we have a ritual that renders the lambs themselves permissible. In contrast, there is nothing that permits the bread to be eaten, except the sacrifice of the lambs. Therefore, without the lambs, the bread cannot be offered." + ], + [ + "The [absence of the] daily offerings ( does not invalidate the additional offerings (, neither does [the absence of] the additional offerings invalidate the daily offerings, neither does the absence of [one of the] additional offerings invalidate the other additional offerings. Every day there are two daily offerings, called the “tamidin” one in the morning and one towards evening. On holidays and Shabbat there are additional offerings, called “musafin” (this is where the word musaf of the musaf service comes from). These sacrifices do not affect one another, so if one of them is not offered for whatever reason, the others can still be offered validly.", + "Even though they did not offer the [tamid] lamb in the morning they must offer [the lamb] towards evening. The mishnah now deals with the two tamid offerings, and whether the absence of the first of them invalidates the other. According to the first opinion, it does not, and therefore if they don’t offer the lamb of the tamid in the morning, they can still offer the lamb towards evening.", + "Rabbi Shimon said: When is this so? Only when they had acted under constraint or in error, but if they acted deliberately and did not offer the lamb in the morning they may not offer [the lamb] towards evening. Rabbi Shimon qualifies the previous opinion. If they didn’t offer the tamid in the morning because they could not, or due to some error, then they can offer the tamid in the evening. However, if they intentionally don’t offer it in the morning, then they are penalized and they can’t offer the other lamb in the evening.", + "If they did not burn the incense in the morning they burn it towards evening. Incense was burned on the golden altar twice a day, once in the morning and once in the evening (see Exodus 30:7-8). If they did not burn it in the morning, they may still offer burn the evening incense. This opinion is a continuation of the opinion found in section two above.", + "Rabbi Shimon said: all of it was burned towards evening. Rabbi Shimon says that if they didn’t burn the incense in the morning, in the evening they should burn all of the incense, both the evening incense and the incense that should have been burned in the morning.", + "For the golden altar was dedicated only by the incense of spices. And the altar for the olah by the daily offering of the morning, And the table only by the showbread on Shabbat, And the menorah only by [the kindling of] seven lamps towards evening. This section is actually the explanation for the opinion of the sages found in section four. The reason that the evening incense must be offered even if the morning incense was not offered is that the dedication of the altar was done by burning the evening incense. When it comes to the altar for the olah, meaning the altar that stood in the courtyard, it was dedicated by the morning tamid offering. Thus, if the altar had not yet been dedicated, and the morning tamid was not offered on it, they could not offer on it the evening tamid. The mishnah also notes that the dedication of the table that stood in the courtyard was done by placing on it the Sabbath showbread. The menorah was dedicated when it was lit in the evening." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with the minhah offering that the high priest offers every day (Leviticus 6:13-15). This offering had to consist of a tenth of an ephah of fine flour, half of which was offered in the morning and half in the evening. It was fried in oil on a pan, and hence they are called griddle-cakes.", + "The high priest’s griddle-cakes cannot be brought in [two separate] halves. Rather he must bring a whole tenth and then divide it, offering a half in the morning and a half towards evening. The high priest is not allowed to bring the griddle-cakes in two halves, half of a tenth in the morning and half in the evening. Rather, he must bring the entire tenth in the morning and then divide it in half, offering a half in the morning and the other half in the evening.", + "If a [high] priest offered half in the morning and then died and they appointed another priest in his place, [the successor] may not bring a half-tenth from his house, neither [may he use] the remaining half-tenth of the first [high priest]. Rather he must bring a whole tenth and divide it, and offer one half and leaving the other half goes to waste. It turns out that two halves are offered and two halves go to waste. If the high priest offers half in the morning and then dies, and the court appoints a new high priest, the new high priest must bring an entire tenth of flour, and only offer half of it. The second half of the previous high priest’s offering goes to waste, as does half of the new high priest’s offering. We should note that this is just the kind of scenario that the rabbis love to discuss.", + "If they did not appoint another priest in his place, at whose expense was it offered? Rabbi Shimon says, at the expense of the community; But Rabbi Judah says: at the expense of his heirs, And a whole [tenth] was offered. If the court didn’t appoint a new high priest, there is a debate as to who is responsible to offer the minhah. According to Rabbi Shimon, the community had to pay for the offering, whereas Rabbi Judah holds that the high priest’s heirs must offer it. Furthermore, in such a situation, in both the morning and evening a full tenth would be offered." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis chapter teaches general rules with regard to the minhah offering.", + "All minhahs must be offered unleavened, with the exception of the leavened cakes of the todah and the two loaves [of Shavuot] which are offered leavened. There are only two minhah offerings that are offered as leavened bread and not unleavened matzot the leavened cakes that accompany the todah (Leviticus 7:13; these will be explained below in mishnah 7:1) and the two loaves of bread brought on Shavuot (Leviticus 23:17).", + "Rabbi Meir says: the leaven must be taken from [the minhahs] themselves and with this they are leavened. The rabbis now debate where the leaven (sour dough) that leavens these loaves comes from. According to Rabbi Meir, the leaven is taken out of the minhah of the todah. In other words, he uses some of the flour to make leavened dough, and then he uses this to leaven the entire dough for the minhah. In this way, he can ensure that he doesn’t use more flour than is called for.", + "Rabbi Judah says: that is not the best way, rather [first of all] he brings leaven and puts into the measuring vessel and then he fills the measuring vessel up [with flour]. Rabbi Judah says that the problem is that it won’t be enough leaven to cause the dough to rise properly. Rather, he first brings some leaven and puts it into the measuring vessel. Then he fills up the rest with flour until he gets to a tenth. This is what he uses for dough.", + "But they said to him: even so [it is not satisfactory], for it would be sometimes too little and sometimes too much. The other sages (or Rabbi Meir) respond that this way of leavening the bread is also problematic. For if the leaven was good leaven, then because it was soft and swollen up, there would actually be too low of a measure, for if the space that the leaven occupied was taken up by flour, there wouldn’t have been enough flour. The opposite is true if the leaven was low quality. If it was thick and dried up, it would take up too little space, and if there was flour in its place, there would be more flour than a tenth. Therefore, this method of leavening is also problematic." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah deals with the prohibition of allowing a minhah to become hametz, for as we learned in yesterday’s mishnah, nearly all minhahs must be brought as matzot.", + "All minhahs must be kneaded with lukewarm water and must be watched lest they become leavened. In order to delay the leavening process, the minhah was kneaded with lukewarm water, and it was carefully watched so that it would not become leaven.", + "If one allowed the remainder to become leavened he has transgressed a negative commandment, for it is written, “No minhah which you shall bring to the Lord shall be made leavened” (Leviticus 2:11). Even the remainders of the minhah, the part of the minhah eaten by the priests, were not allowed to become leaven. If one did allow any part of the minhah to become leaven, he transgressed the negative commandment found in Leviticus 2:11.", + "One is liable for the kneading, and for rolling and for baking. If a minhah becomes leaven and one performs any one of these acts, kneading, rolling the dough or baking it, he is liable." + ], + [ + "Some [minhahs] require oil and frankincense, some require oil but not frankincense, some frankincense but not oil, and some neither oil nor frankincense.
These require oil and frankincense: the minhah of fine flour, that prepared on a griddle, that prepared in a pan, the cakes and the wafers, the minhah of the priests, the minhah of the anointed high priest, the minhah of a gentile, the minhah of women, and the minhah of the omer.
The minhah offered with the drink-offerings requires oil but not frankincense.
The showbread requires frankincense but not oil.
The two loaves, the sinner's minhah and the minhah of jealousy require neither oil nor frankincense.
This mishnah teaches which minhah requires oil and frankincense, which requires one of the two, and which require neither.
Section one: As the mishnah typically loves to note, all of the possible combinations can actually occur. I shall give references for each of these types of minhahs.
Section two:
The minhah of fine flour; that prepared on a griddle; that prepared in a pan: Leviticus 2:1.
The cakes and the wafers: Leviticus 2:4.
The minhah of the priests: A priest who volunteers to bring one of these minhahs.
The minhah of the anointed high priest: See above 4:5.
The minhah of a gentile; the minhah of women: who volunteered to bring one of these minhahs.
And the minhah of the omer: Leviticus 2:14-15.
Section three: Numbers 15:4ff.
Section four: Leviticus 24:7.
Section five: The two loaves are those brought on Shavuot. The sinner’s minhah is referred to in Leviticus 5:11 and the minhah of jealousy is that brought by the suspected adultress (the Sotah (Numbers 5:15). In both cases the Torah specifically states not to put frankincense or oil on them." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with the consequences of adding oil or frankincense to a minhah that did not require it.", + "One is liable for the oil on its own and for the frankincense on its own. If one adds oil and frankincense to a sinner’s minhah or to a minhah of jealousy, neither of which require either oil or frankincense, he has transgressed two negative commandments, for with regard to both of these the Torah specifically says not to place either oil or frankincense. Each is its own separate prohibition.", + "If he put in oil, he has rendered it invalid, but if frankincense, he can remove it. If he put oil into a minhah that does not require oil, the minhah is invalid, and there is nothing he can do to remedy it. However, if he puts frankincense in, he can simply pick out the frankincense and the minhah will remain valid.", + "If he put oil on the remainder, he has not transgressed a negative commandment. If he put oil on the part of the minhah eaten by the priests, the “remainder”, then he has not transgressed the prohibition and the part offered on the altar remains valid.", + "If he put one vessel above the other vessel, he has not rendered it invalid. If he put a vessel that has in it oil or frankincense on top of a vessel that has in it the minhah, he has not transgressed or rendered the minhah invalid because the vessels separate the substances." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah begins to note which minhahs must be brought to the altar (see Leviticus 2:8, 6:7), which have to be waved, which require one and not the other, and which require both. “Bringing near” refers to bringing the minhah close to the southwestern corner of the altar before the handful is removed. Note that the structure of this mishnah is nearly identical to the structure of mishnah three.", + "Some [minhahs] require bringing near but not waving, some require bringing near and also waving, some require waving but not bringing near, and some require neither bringing near nor waving. As was the format in mishnah three, the mishnah begins by noting that all of the combinations with regard to requiring bringing near and waving are possible.", + "These require bringing near but not waving: the minhah of fine flour, that prepared on a griddle, that prepared in a pan, the cakes and the wafers, the minhah of the priests, the minhah of the anointed high priest, the minhah of a gentile, the minhah of women, and the minhah of the omer. These minhahs are brought near to the altar, but they are not waved. The list is the same as that in section one of mishnah three.", + "Rabbi Shimon says: the minhah of the priests and the minhah of the anointed high priest do not require bringing near, since no handful is taken out of them, and where no handful is taken out bringing near is not necessary. Rabbi Shimon says that since the minhahs of the priests and of the anointed high priest are not eaten at all, but rather are entirely burned, they need not be brought near to the altar. Rather they are just put on the altar and burned." + ], + [ + "These require waving but not bringing near: The log of oil of the leper and his guilt-offering, The first fruits, according to Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov, The innards of an individual’s shelamim and its breast and thigh, whether they are the offerings of men or of women, by Israelites but not by others; The two loaves and the two lambs of Shavuot. The mishnah now lists the minhahs that require waving but not bringing near. I will give references to these and brief explanations. The log of oil of the leper and his guilt-offering: Leviticus 14:12 states, “The priest shall take one of the male lambs and offer it with the log of oil as an asham, and he shall wave them as a wave offering before the Lord. The first fruits, according to Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov: see Bikkurim 3:6. The innards of an individual’s shelamim and its breast and thigh, whether they are the offerings of men or of women, by Israelites but not by others: The innards of the shelamim are burned on the altar and the breast and thigh are given to a priest. That they need to be waved is stated in Leviticus 7:30 and 10:15. These parts are waved whether the shelamim is brought by a man or a woman, but only if the man or woman is Jewish. A Gentile can bring a shelamim but it is not waved. The two loaves and the two lambs of Shavuot: see Leviticus 23:20.", + "How does he perform [the waving]? He places the two loaves upon the two lambs and puts his two hands beneath them and waves them forward and backward and upward and downward, for it is written, “which is waved and which is lifted up” (Exodus 29:27). In describing how an offering is waved, the Torah states that it was waved and lifted up” which seems to be repetitive. The rabbis interpret “waving” as moving it forward and backward and “lifting up” to mean moving it upward and downward.", + "The waving was performed on the east side [of the altar] and the bringing near on the west side. The two ceremonies described in these sections were performed on opposite sides of the altar.", + "The ceremony of waving comes before that of bringing near. If the minhah is one that requires both waving and bringing near (these minhahs are listed in the next section) then first the minhah is waved and then it is brought near. This order is implied in Numbers 5:25, concerning the minhah of jealousy (brought by the suspected adulteress), “The priest shall take from the woman’s hand the minhah of jealousy, and wave the minhah before the Lord, and then bring it to the altar.”", + "The minhah of the omer and the minhah of jealousy require bringing near and waving. The two minhahs that require both waving and bringing near are the minhah of jealousy (see above) and the minhah of the omer, which is brought on the 16th of Nisan.", + "The showbread and the minhah with the libations require neither bringing near nor waving. The showbread and the minhah brought with libations do not require either waving or bringing near." + ], + [ + "Rabbi Shimon says, there are three kinds [of sacrifices] which require three commandments; two [of the three] apply to each kind, but none of them require a third.
And these are they: the shelamim of the individual, the shelamim of the community and the asham of the leper.
The shelamim of the individual requires the laying on of hands for the living animal and waving after it is slaughtered, but it does not require waving while alive.
The shelamim of the community requires waving while alive and also after it is slaughtered, but it does not require the laying on of hands.
The asham of the leper requires the laying on of hands and also waving while alive, but it does not require waving after it is slaughtered.
In this mishnah Rabbi Shimon compares three sacrifices and three requirements, with each sacrifice requiring two of the three requirements. We should note that Rabbi Shimon seems more interested in the curious fact that three sacrifices can be compared in this manner than in the actual rules that apply to these sacrifices. Perhaps the mishnah is somewhat of a mnemonic, a means by which to remember certain rules. Alternatively it is just a neat fact that Rabbi Shimon enjoyed relating.
Instead of explaining the mishnah line by line, I will be explaining it all at once below.
The three sacrifices under discussion in this mishnah are 1) the shelamim brought by an individual (Leviticus 7:11ff); 2) the shelamim brought by the community on Shavuot (Leviticus 23:20); 3) and the asham brought by the leper (Leviticus 14:14). The three commandments are: 1) waving while the animal is alive; 2) waving after slaughtering; 3) laying on of the hands (see Leviticus 3:2). All three sacrifices require two of the three commandments, but none of the sacrifices require all three actions." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nLeviticus 7:9 mentions minhahs “prepared in a pan or on a griddle.” Our mishnah teaches the difference in how these two minhahs are prepared.", + "One who says, “I take upon myself [to offer a minhah] prepared on a griddle,” he must not bring one prepared in a pan; If [he says, I take upon myself to offer a minhah prepared] in a pan,” he must not bring one prepared on a griddle. The first thing the mishnah asserts is that a minhah prepared in a pan is indeed different from one prepared on a griddle. Therefore, one who vows to bring one type of minhah cannot bring the other.", + "What is the difference between a griddle [mahabat] and a pan [marheshet]? The pan has a lid to it, but the griddle has no lid, the words of Rabbi Yose the Galilean. Rabbi Hanina ben Gamaliel says: a pan is deep and what is prepared is spongy; a griddle is flat and what is prepared on it is hard. There are two opinions as to what the difference was between a griddle and a pan. According to Rabbi Yose the Galilean, the pan had a lid but the griddle did not. Rabbi Hanina ben Gamaliel says that the pan was deep and since there was more oil, the cake prepared was softer than that prepared on the flat griddle. What is interesting to me is that these rabbis, living only one hundred years after the destruction of the Temple, already dispute how minhahs were prepared in the Temple. Clearly, they have no historical record to turn to, and therefore must decipher how things were done by reasoning out various verses in the Torah. This is probably quite common in Seder Kodashim and demonstrates well that much of the material in this Seder is not a record of what went on in the Temple but rather an interpretation of what the Torah says should have gone on in the Temple." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to teach the differences between how different menahot (pl. of minhah) are prepared.", + "[If a man said,] “I take upon myself [to offer a minhah baked] in an oven,” he must not bring what is baked in a stove or on tiles or in the cauldrons of the Arabs. Rabbi Judah says: he may bring what is baked in a stove. Leviticus 2:4 refers to a minhah baked in an oven. According to the first opinion, this means that the minhah must actually be baked inside an oven. This used to be done by placing the loaf on the sides of the hot oven where it would be baked, similar to the way in which pita is still made. He is not allowed to cook it on a stove or on tiles, or in the type of cauldrons that Arabs at the time of the Mishnah used to prepare their bread. These were holes dug in the ground, lined with plaster and then heated up to bake bread. Rabbi Judah says that when the Torah specifies a “minhah baked in an oven” it includes a minhah baked on a stove.", + "[If he said,] “I take upon myself [to offer] a baked minhah,” he may not bring half in loaves and half in wafers. Rabbi Shimon permits it for it is one kind. Leviticus 2:4 refers to loaves of matzah and matzah wafers. The mishnah interprets this to mean that the minhah can be brought either as loaves of matzah or matzah wafers. One cannot bring half as loaves and half as wafers. Rabbi Shimon says that since both the loaves and wafers are both “one kind” meaning they are essentially the same, one can bring half of his minhah as loaves and half as wafers." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis chapter continues to teach general rules with regard to menahot. Today’s mishnah and tomorrow’s teaches which minhah has a handful removed and the rest eaten by the priests.", + "From the following menahot the handful must be taken and the remainder is for the priests: The minhah of fine flour, that prepared on a griddle, that prepared in a pan, the loaves and the wafers, the minhah of a Gentile, the minhah of women, the minhah of the omer, the sinners’ minhah, and the minhah of jealousy. All of these menahot have been explained already in mishnah three and five of the previous chapter. For all of them, a handful is removed and burned on the altar. The remainder is eaten by the priests.", + "Rabbi Shimon says: a sinners’ minhah brought by priests the handful is taken, and the handful is offered by itself and so also the remainder is offered by itself. Generally a minhah brought by priests is not also eaten by the priests. Rather it is all burned, as is stated explicitly in Leviticus 6:16. Therefore, it would seem that there is no reason to remove a handful, as is normally done with a sinners’ minhah. Nevertheless, Rabbi Shimon holds that first a handful is removed and burned by itself, and then the remainder is also burned by itself. In this way, the normal procedure is preserved." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah lists menahot that are either completely burned, or completely eaten.", + "The minhah of the priests, The minhah of the anointed high priest, And the minhah that is offered with the libations are [wholly] for the altar and the priests have no share in them; with these the altar is more privileged than the priests. These three menahot are burned and no part of them is eaten. This is always the case with menahot that are brought by priests. In addition, it is also true of the minhah brought with the libations (Numbers 15:4ff).", + "The two loaves and the showbread are eaten by the priests and the altar has no share in them; with these the priests are more privileged than the altar. The two loaves brought on Shavuot (Leviticus 23:20) and the showbread (Leviticus 24:9) are completely eaten by priests and no part is burned on the altar." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah teaches how the oil was put into the minhah.", + "All menahot that are prepared in a vessel require three applications of oil: pouring, mixing and putting oil in the vessel, before they are completed. The menahot that are prepared in a vessel are those prepared in a pan or a griddle. These menahot had oil put in them on three occasions. First some oil was poured into the vessel, and then he would pour the flour into the vessel. Then he would pour more oil onto the flour and mix it all together. Then he would add in lukewarm water, knead the flour into dough and bake ten loaves. After they were baked he would break them into pieces and pour more oil onto the pieces. Note that the mishnah is in backwards order first they would put oil in the vessel, then they would mix it in with the flour, and the pouring only came at the very end.", + "The [baked] cakes were mixed [with oil], the words of Rabbi [Judah Ha-Nasi]. But the sages say: the fine flour [was mixed with oil]. Rabbi Judah Hanasi disagrees with the rabbis as to when the mixing occurs. According to the Rabbi, the mixing occurs after the cakes have been baked. He then breaks them into pieces and mixes them up with oil. The other sages say that the mixing occurs when the minhah is still flour, before it has been kneaded and baked, as we explained above.", + "The loaves were mixed and the wafers anointed. How did he anoint them? In the form of a “chi.” As explained above, the oil was mixed into the loaves, according to the sages when they were still flour, and according to Rabbi when they were already baked. If the minhah came in the form of wafers, the procedure was slightly different. Here they would anoint the wafers after they were baked by making an X over them. The letter “chi” in Greek is written as an X. [The Greeks would probably prefer that we say that the letter “ex” in English is written as a chi.]", + "And the rest of the oil was eaten by the priests. Whatever was left over from the oil could be eaten by the priests." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah teaches how menahot were broken into pieces once they were baked. This process is referred to in Leviticus 2:6, “Break it into bits and pour oil on it; it is a meal offereing.” Although this verse is stated specifically in reference to a minhah prepared on a griddle, the rabbis extend it to other menahot as well.", + "All menahot prepared in a vessel must be broken into pieces. As stated in the introduction, the rabbis derive from Leviticus 2:6 that all menahot that are prepared in a vessel must be broken into pieces. The remainder of the mishnah describes how this is done.", + "The minhah of an Israelite was folded into two and the two were folded into four, and it was severed [at each bend]. First he takes the flat loaf and folds it into two and then into four. He then severs the loaf at all of the folds. He would take a handful from these pieces (there would be forty of them, since there are ten loaves) and he would throw the handful onto the fires of the altar.", + "The minhah of priests was folded into two and the two were folded into four, but it was not severed. According to the first opinion in the mishnah, a minhah brought by a priest was folded, but it was not severed into pieces. Since the entire minhah was burned, it wasn’t necessary to take out a handful and put it on the altar. It seems that the folding was sufficient to count as having broken it into pieces.", + "The minhah of the anointed high priest was not folded. The Torah does not say that the minhah brought by the high priest has to be broken into pieces, although it is called a “minhah of pieces” (Leviticus 6:14). According to the mishnah, this minhah is not even folded, for it too is totally burned.", + "Rabbi Shimon says: neither the minhah of the priests nor the minhah of the anointed high priest was broken in pieces, since the handful was not taken from them, and whenever the handful is not taken [from a minhah] it is not to be broken in pieces. Rabbi Shimon holds that there is no process of breaking into pieces for any minhah brought by a priest since these menahot are completely burned. There is no need to break them into pieces because the purpose of doing so was to throw some of them pieces onto the altar.", + "The pieces were the size of an olive. When they break the minhah into pieces, each piece should be no smaller than an olive’s worth. Commentators on the mishnah debate whether this is the opinion of Rabbi Shimon or whether everyone agrees." + ], + [ + "All menahot must be rubbed three hundred times and beaten five hundred times. The grains of wheat that will be used for the minhah offering must be rubbed three hundred times and then beaten five hundred times. This process is done in order to remove the husks before the grain is ground into flour.", + "The rubbing and the beating apply is performed with the grains of wheat. Rabbi Yose says: also to the dough. The first opinion holds that the rubbing and beating is performed with the grain, as explained above. Rabbi Yose holds that the same is done with the dough. This is to further refine and perfect the quality of the minhah. According to a different version of the mishnah, Rabbi Yose says that it only applies to the dough and not to the grain.", + "All menahot consist of ten cakes each, except the showbread and the griddle-cakes of the high priest, which consist of twelve cakes each, the words of Rabbi Judah. Whether the menahot consist of loaves or wafers, they make ten cakes. According to Rabbi Judah all menahot are compared with the minhah that accompanies the todah - just as it has ten loaves, so too do all menahot. There are two exceptions, the showbread (see Leviticus 24:5) and the daily minhah of griddle-cakes offered by the high priest (Leviticus 6:13-15). With regard to the latter, the verse does not state that 12 cakes are offered. Rather, the rabbis derive this number midrashically by comparing it with the showbread.", + "But Rabbi Meir says: they all consist of twelve cakes each, except the loaves of the todah and of the nazirite-offering, which consist of ten cakes each. Rabbi Meir says that all menahot consist of twelve-cakes, for they derive the number of cakes from the showbread. The two exceptions are the todah (thanks-giving offering) and the minhah that accompanies the nazirite offering. We shall learn more about these two menahot in chapter seven." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah teaches how much flour was found in various types of menahot.", + "The omer consisted of one tenth [of an ephah of flour] taken from three se'ahs. The minhah of the omer, brought on the sixteenth of Nissan (at the end of the first day of Pesah), consisted of a tenth of an ephah of flour (we shall learn more about the omer in chapter ten). An ephah was equivalent to about 4 liters and in mishnaic measurement, an ephah was equivalent to three seahs. This one-tenth of an ephah was sifted out of three whole seahs of barley. This refined it until it was quite pure. It was necessary to refine the omer so thoroughly because barley grain has a high quantity of waste material.", + "The two loaves consisted of two tenths taken from three se'ahs. The two loaves brought on Shavuot each consisted of two-tenths of an ephah, as is stated in Leviticus 23:17. These two-tenths were sifted out of three ephahs. The reason that less sifting was needed is that these loaves came from wheat and not barley.", + "And the showbread consisted of twenty-four tenths taken from twenty-four se'ahs. Each of the twelve loaves of the showbread consisted of two-tenths of an ephah of flour, as is stated in Leviticus 24:5, for a total of twenty-four tenths. Each tenth would have been sifted from one seah. The reason that less sifting is needed is that unlike the omer and the two loaves which must come from newly harvested barley or wheat, the showbread can come from the older harvest, which has less waste material than the new harvest." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with how well the flour must be sifted for certain minhah offerings.", + "The omer was sifted through thirteen sieves, the two loaves through twelve, and the showbread through eleven. The omer was sifted thirteen times, each time making the flour a bit finer. The two loaves for Shavuot were sifted a bit less and showbread was sifted only (!) eleven times. This accords with what we learned in yesterday’s mishnah the greatest amount of grain was needed for the omer, a little bit less for the two loaves and the least for the showbread.", + "Rabbi Shimon says: there was no prescribed number for them, rather they brought fine flour and sifted it as much as was necessary, as it is said, “You shall take fine flour and bake it” (Leviticus 24:5) [you should not bake it] until it is sifted as much as is necessary. Rabbi Shimon holds that there was no prescribed amount for how much the showbread had to be sifted or how much grain had to be used (yesterday’s mishnah). Rather, whatever was needed was used. He proves this from a verse which states that the flour must be fine, but does not give a prescribed amount." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis chapter deals with the rules regarding the loaves that accompany the thanksgiving offering, the “todah” (see Leviticus 7:12).", + "The todah required five Jerusalem seahs [of flour], which are six wilderness seahs; The amount of flour required for these loaves was five seahs measured with the Jerusalem measure of the seah, which is equivalent to six seahs as they were measured in the wilderness. What this means is that in Jerusalem the measures were 1/6 larger than they were in the wilderness.", + "This is the equivalent to two ephahs, for an ephah is three seahs, or to twenty tenths [of an ephah], ten for the leavened cakes and ten for the matzot. Six wilderness seahs are equivalent to two ephahs, which can be divided up into twenty tenths of an ephah. This comes out to twenty loaves each 1/10 of an ephah. Ten of these were leavened (chametz, see Leviticus 7:13) and ten were matzot (Leviticus 7:12).", + "“Ten for the leavened cakes” one tenth for each cake; Each leavened cake was 1/10 of an ephah (aren’t you grateful for simple math?).", + "“And ten for the matzot” –there were three kinds of matzot: loaves, wafers, and soaked cakes, thus there were three and a third tenths of flour for each kind, three cakes to every tenth. Leviticus 7:12 lists three kinds of matzot: “unleavened cakes with oil mixed in, unleavened flours with oil, and cakes of choice flour with oil mixed in.” So if there were ten of each kind, each would have been 1/3 of a tenth of an ephah.", + "By Jerusalem measure they were thirty kavs, fifteen for the leavened cakes and fifteen for the matzot. The mishnah now provides the amounts according to the Jerusalem measure. In Jerusalem they didn’t count according to ephah and tenths of an ephah but rather according to kavs. A seah is six kav so five seahs are 30 kav.", + "“Fifteen for the leavened cakes”, one kav and a half for each cake. According to this account, there were fifteen kav for the leavened cakes, 1 ½ kav per cake.", + "“And fifteen for the matzot” there were three kinds of matzot: loaves, wafers, and soaked cakes, thus there were five kavs for each kind, two cakes to every kav. When you do the account for the matzot, each kind gets five kav, divided by ten cakes, adds up to ½ a kav per cake." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah deals with two other types of minhah offerings that are similar in amount to the todah: the “basket of matzot” brought on the day that the priests were first consecrated to serve in the Tabernacle (Leviticus 8:26) and the “basket of matzot” brought by the Nazirite (Numbers 6:15).", + "The consecration [minhah] consisted of matzah like the todah: cakes, wafers, and soaked cakes. The minhah offered at the consecration of the priests was the same as the matzot of the todah (see yesterday’s mishnah).", + "The nazirite minhah consisted of two thirds of the matzah of the todah: cakes and wafers, but not soaked cakes. The minhah of the nazirite’s offering consisted of only cakes and wafers. Unlike the todah and the consecration minhah, there were no soaked cakes.", + "Thus there were ten kavs by Jerusalem measure, which are six tenths and something over. Since for the nazirite offering there are only two kinds of matzot and not three, there are only ten kavs needed and not the fifteen for the todah (as we saw in yesterday’s mishnah). Each type of matzah is three and 1/3 tenths of an ephah, so the two types of matzah are 6 and 2/3 tenths of an ephah.", + "From each kind [the priest] took one tenth part as terumah, as it is said, “Out of this he shall offer one of each kind as a gift to the Lord” (Leviticus 7:1: From each type of matzah in the todah and nazirite minhah, the priest takes one tenth as his terumah, his part. This is explicit in Leviticus 7:14 which states that the priest gets one part of each kind, meaning one of the ten cakes, one of the ten wafers and for the todah, one of the ten soaked cakes.", + "“One:” that he may not take what is broken. The mishnah now contains a brief midrash of this verse. The word “one” means that the matzah that he removes should be whole and not broken.", + "“Out of each offering:” that each kind of offering shall be equal, [and] that he must not take [the terumah] from the one kind of offering on behalf of another. “Out of each offering” means that the amount of matzot of each type must be equal ten of each. Furthermore, the priest should not take two of one type and none of another rather he must take one of each type.", + "“It shall go to the priest who dashes the blood of the shelamim:” and the rest was consumed by the owner. Besides the one matzah taken by the priest, the rest of the matzot go to the owner who brings the todah or the nazirite." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with situations in which the loaves that accompany the todah sacrifice are for various reasons not sanctified, meaning that they don’t attain the status of a sacrifice. If one were to make non-holy use of one of the loaves that had not been sanctified, he would not be guilty of making illicit use of Temple property.", + "One who slaughtered the todah within [the Temple court] while its bread was outside the wall, the bread has not been sanctified. If they slaughtered the todah while the bread was still outside of the Temple walls, the bread is not sanctified. Some commentators interpret the walls here to be the walls of Jerusalem.", + "If he slaughtered it before [the loaves] had become crusted in the oven, even if all except one had become crusted, the bread is not sanctified. The todah should be slaughtered only once the bread has been baked. “Dough” turns into “bread” when it is crusted over in the oven. Thus if the loaves were not yet crusted over when the todah is sacrificed, then the loaves are not sanctified.", + "If he slaughtered the todah [intending to eat it] outside its proper time or outside its proper place, the bread is sanctified. If he sacrifices the todah with an improper intent, then the bread is sanctified. However, it becomes “piggul” or “disqualified” just like the todah. In other words, in this case, the bread became sanctified and then disqualified. In the cases in the first two sections, the bread was simply never sanctified.", + "If he slaughtered it and it was found to be terefah, the bread is not sanctified. If the animal is found to be a terefah (an animal that has a defect that would have caused it to die), then the animal was never really a valid sacrifice. Therefore, the bread is not sanctified.", + "If he slaughtered it and it was found to have a blemish: Rabbi Eliezer says: the bread is sanctified. But the sages say: it is not sanctified. In Zevahim 9:3 we learned that Rabbi Akiva said that an animal with a blemish that was put up on the altar is not taken down. In other words, since the animal was slaughtered to be a sacrifice, it remains sanctified. Rabbi Eliezer agrees with this and therefore holds that the bread is also sanctified. The other rabbis disagree and seem to hold like the other opinion in Zevahim, that if an animal with a blemish is slaughtered and put on the altar, it must be taken down. It was never sacred, and neither is the bread.", + "If he slaughtered it under another name, and so, too, if the ram of the consecration-offering or the two lambs offered at Shavuot were slaughtered under another name, the bread is not sanctified. If he slaughtered the todah, or the other sacrifices that are accompanied by bread (the ram of consecration was explained above in mishnah two, and the two lambs offered at Shavuot were mentioned in 2:2), under the wrong name, meaning intending for them to be another sacrifice, then the bread that accompanies them is not sanctified because the sacrifice does not count." + ], + [ + "If a [minhah that is accompanied by] the libations had already been sanctified in a vessel when the animal-offering was found to be invalid: If there is another animal-offering, they may be offered with it; But if not, they are left to become invalid by remaining overnight. The first section deals with the libations and the minhah that accompany an animal sacrifice (see Numbers 15:2ff and see also above 2:4). If the minhah was already sanctified by having been put in a vessel, and then the animal sacrifice was found to be invalid, there are two possible outcomes. If there is another animal-offering that the minhah and the libations can accompany, then they can be offered with it. If not, then the minhah and the libation should be left over night in the Temple. Anything left out over night is invalid and must be burned. This is the way of disposing of the minhah and the libations. Note that they can’t just get rid of them, because they have already attained a holy status by being put in a vessel.", + "The offspring of a todah, its substitute, and the animal which was set apart in the place of the todah which was set apart and was lost, do not require the [accompanying] bread, as it says, “And he shall offer [them] with the sacrifice of thanksgiving (” (Leviticus 7:1; the todah requires the accompanying bread, but its young, what is brought in its place, and its substitute, do not require the accompanying bread. There are three different types of animals related to here. The first is the offspring of a todah, meaning an animal born from an animal that had already been set aside as a todah. The second is a substitute, which refers to an animal that someone tried to substitute for a todah (there is an entire tractate devoted to this subject, so we will learn more there). The third is a replacement todah, one that was meant to take the place of a lost todah, but then the original todah was found. In all of these cases, the animal is holy and must be sacrificed. However, since it is not actually itself a todah, it need not be accompanied by the bread. This is derived from the verse which is read as emphasizing that only the todah requires bread, not other sacrifices that are in various ways derived from the todah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah and the next deal with various laws governing one who vows to bring a todah sacrifice.", + "One who says: “Behold I take upon myself [to bring] a todah”, he must bring both it and its bread from hullin. If he vows to bring a todah, he must bring both it and its bread from hullin, non-sacred, sources. He cannot use second tithe money to purchase it or its bread. We will learn why in tomorrow’s mishnah.", + "[If he said:] “A todah from hullin and its bread from tithe,” he must bring the bread from hullin. If he specifies that he will purchase the todah with hullin money, but that he wants to use second tithe money for the bread, he must still use hullin money to purchase both. When he said that he would bring a “todah from hullin” the word “todah” included the bread, so it too must be brought from hullin. His words “and its bread from tithe” don’t make any difference.", + "[If he said:] “A todah from tithe and bread from hullin,” he may bring. If he says that he wants to bring the todah from tithe, then he may do so. He can also bring the bread from hullin.", + "[If he said:] “A todah, it and its bread from tithe,” he may bring. If he vows to bring both from tithe, he may do so.", + "But he must not bring from grain of second tithe, rather from second tithe money. In the previous case, the animal that he brings for a todah will be purchased with second tithe money. Therefore, the bread should also be purchased with money used to redeem second tithe, and not with grain that was itself set aside to be second tithe. This way both the todah and the accompanying bread come from the exact same source." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah explains why one who says “I take upon myself to bring a todah” must buy the todah with hullin (non-sacred) money and cannot use maaser sheni money. This was the halakhah that we learned in yesterday’s mishnah.", + "From where [is it derived] that if one says, “I take upon myself to bring a todah,” he can bring it only from hullin? This section asks why the mishnah rules that one who vows to bring a todah must purchase it with hullin money.", + "As it is said, “And you shall sacrifice the pesah to the Lord your God, from the flock or the herd” (Deuteronomy 16:. But is not the pesah sacrifice brought only from the lambs and from the goats? Why then is it written, “from the flock or the herd”? The answer is derived from a problematic verse that deals with the pesah sacrifice. The pesah sacrifice, according to Exodus, must be brought only from flock animals, meaning sheep or goats. However, Deuteronomy 16:2 states that it can come from herd animals, such as cows. This is a clear example of biblical verses which contradict each other.", + "It is to compare whatever is brought from the flock and the herd with the pesah: just as the pesah is obligatory and offered only from what is hullin, so everything that is obligatory may be offered only from what is hullin. The mishnah answers that Deuteronomy states “from the flock and the herd” not because the pesah can come from the herd (it cannot) but to compare other sacrifices that come from the flock and the herd with the pesah. The comparison is that whatever sacrifice is obligatory, as is the pesah, must be brought only from hullin sources and not from maaser sheni money. We should note that this makes sense from a practical perspective. If the Torah mandates that I bring a certain sacrifice and it mandates that I bring maaser sheni money and use it to buy food in Jerusalem, combining these two obligations would be cheating the system. Rather, maaser sheni money should be used to buy voluntary sacrifices, sacrifices that I would not otherwise had to have brought.", + "Therefore if a man says, “I take upon myself to bring a todah,” or “I take upon myself [to offer] a shelamim,” since [in these cases] these are obligatory they may be offered only from what is hullin. A todah is usually a voluntary sacrifice. However, in this case once he makes a vow to bring a todah, it is no longer voluntary but rather obligatory. Since he has made it into an obligatory sacrifice, he can no longer purchase the animal with maaser sheni money. In sum, a normal todah can be purchased with maaser sheni money because it is a voluntary sacrifice but a todah brought because of a vow is a mandatory sacrifice and must be purchased with hullin money.", + "The libations in every case may be offered only from what is hullin. The libations that accompany a todah or a shelamim sacrifice must always be purchased with hullin money, even if he explicitly vows to bring the todah from maaser sheni. The reason is that these libations are not eaten, but rather fully sacrificed on the altar. Maaser sheni money must be used to purchase food that will be eaten by people and not sacrifices that go completely to the altar." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah deals with where they would bring flour from for the minhah offerings.", + "All the sacrifices communal or individual may be offered from [produce grown] in the Land [of Israel] or outside the Land, from new [produce] or from the old, except for the omer and the two loaves, which must be offered only from new produce and from [produce grown] in the land. All sacrifices can come from animals raised either in or outside of Israel and similarly all menahot can come from grain grown anywhere. It can also come from new produce or aged produce. There are two exceptions: the omer barley offering brought on the second day of Pesah and the two loaves brought on Shavuot. With regard to the omer it is stated in Leviticus 23:10, “When you come into the land…you shall bring the omer, the first of your harvest.” With regard to the two loaves it states there in verses 16-17, “And you shall offer a new minhah to the Lord, from your dwelling places you shall bring it.” Both of these verses teach that the omer and the two loaves must come from the new harvest and from grain grown in the land of Israel.", + "All [offerings] must be offered from the choicest produce. All offerings must come from choice produce. The mishnah explains where the best grain is grown.", + "And which is the choicest? That from Michmas and Zanoha are “alpha” for the quality of their fine flour; second to them is Hafaraim in the valley. The best grain is grown in two places. Michmas, which is in the territory of Benjamin (I Samuel 13:2) and Zanoha, which is in Judah (see Joshua 15:34). These places are “alpha” the first letter in the Greek alphabet, which means that they are numero uno when it comes to grain. Next best is grain that comes from Hafaraim which is in the territory of Issachar (see Joshua 19:19).", + "The [produce of the] whole land was valid, but they used to bring it from these places. There is a preference to bring grain from these regions, and it was the custom to indeed do so. But if they brought grain from other regions within the land of Israel, it was still valid." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses what kinds of fields are used to grow the grain to make flour for menahot.", + "One may not bring [grain for menahot] from the produce of a manured field or from an irrigated field or from a field stocked with trees. The grain used for the minhah must come from a field that is irrigated by rainwater. It cannot come from a field that requires manure to fertilize it or from a field that is artificially irrigated. It also cannot come from a field that also grows trees because the trees weaken the quality of the field.", + "But if one did bring it [from these] it was valid. While the grain should not be brought from such a field, if it is, the minhah is still valid.", + "How was it prepared? In the first year it was plowed and in the second year it was sown seventy days before Pesah, thus it would produce fine flour in abundance. This section describes how the special field set aside to grow grain for the minhah was prepared. The reason that it was sown before Pesah is that this is the time of the year for sowing fields in Israel.", + "How was it tested? The temple-treasurer used to thrust his hand into it; if some dust came up in [his hand] it was invalid, until it was sifted [more]. This is how the flour was tested to see if it had been sifted well enough to be used for the minhah.", + "If it had become magotty it is invalid. Maggoty (or wormy) flour is obviously not fit to be used in the preparation of the sacred minhah (and it’s a bit gross as well, although I suppose it was hard to avoid in the ancient world)." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses from where and from what they brought the olive oil used in the minhah offering.", + "Tekoa is “alpha” first its oil. Tekoa, which is in the Negev and is mentioned in II Samuel 14:2 has the best oil.", + "Abba Saul says: Second to it is Regev, on the other side of the Jordan. Second to it is Regev, which lies on the other side of the Jordan.", + "The [oil of the] whole land was valid, but they used to bring it only from these places. As with the grain, any oil from olives grown in the land of Israel is valid, but these two places were customary and preferable. Note that Regev is considered to be part of the land of Israel, even though it lies on the other side of the Jordan.", + "One may not bring it from a manured field or from an irrigated field or from olive-trees planted in a field sown with seeds, but if one did bring it [from these] it was valid. These are basically the same rules as we saw in yesterday’s mishnah with regard to the grain. Olive-trees which grown in grain fields are weaker and hence their olives will not be as good.", + "One may not bring anpakinon, and if one did bring it, it is invalid. Anpakinon is a Greek word for olive oil from olives that were not fully ripened. Since this olive oil is of far inferior quality, it cannot be used.", + "One may not bring it from olive-berries which had been soaked in water or preserved or stewed; and if one did bring it, it is invalid. Olive-berries are the small unripe olives. Sometimes they would soak these in water, or preserve them or stew them in order to get oil out of them. Such oil cannot be used for the minhah offering because it too is vastly inferior." + ], + [ + "There are three [periods of gathering in the] olives and each crop gives three kinds of oil. There are three different ways of picking the olives off of the trees, and each way provides three different qualities of oil. The mishnah now lists each way and the quality of oil that is produced in each way.", + "The first crop of olives is when the olives are picked from the top of the tree; they are pounded and put into the basket. Rabbi Judah says: around the basket. This gives the first oil. They are then pressed with the beam Rabbi Judah says: with stones. This gives the second oil. They are then ground and pressed again. This gives the third oil. The first [oil] is fit for the candlestick and the others for menahot. The first picking is done from the olives on the tops of the trees. First they are picked, then crushed and put into baskets. The oil flows from the baskets into a vessel underneath. Rabbi Judah says that the crushed olives are placed around the basket and that the oil will then enter the basket through the holes in the basket. This is the first oil, which I believe we call the extra virgin oil. The second oil comes from what is pressed out of the baskets. The first opinion holds that this pressing is done with a wooden beam, whereas Rabbi Judah (who must have had his own olive press!) says it is done with stones. This is the virgin olive oil, second best. After the first pressing, they would again grind the olives and press them again. This would be the regular olive oil. The first type of oil is good enough to be used for lighting the menorah. The second and third types could be used for menahot.", + "The second crop is when the olives at roof-level are picked from the tree; they are pounded and put into the basket. Rabbi Judah says: around the basket. This gives the first oil. They are then pressed with the beam Rabbi Judah says: with stones. This gives the second oil. They are then ground and pressed again. This gives the third oil. The first [oil] is fit for the candlestick and the others for menahot. The second crop was done with the olives was done with the olives that were at the height of the rooftops. The processing of these olives is the same as that with the first crop.", + "The third crop is when the last olives of the tree are packed inside the house until they become overripe; they are then taken up and dried on the roof they are pounded and put into the basket. Rabbi Judah says: around the basket. This gives the first oil. They are then pressed with the beam Rabbi Judah says: with stones. This gives the second oil. They are then ground and pressed again. This gives the third oil. The first [oil] is fit for the candlestick and the others for menahot. The third crop was done with the olives on the lowest part of the tree. These olives will not ripen on their own on the tree and therefore they are packed inside the house until they become overripe and the oil begins to seep out. Henceforth, their processing is the same as the olives that ripen on the tree." + ], + [ + "The first oil of the first crop, there is none better than it.
The second oil of the first crop and the first oil of the second crop are equal.
The third oil of the first crop, the second oil of the second crop and the first oil of the third crop are equal.
The third oil of the second crop and the second oil of the third crop are equal.
As to the third oil of the third crop, there is none worse than it.
It would have been logical by the following argument that menahot should also require the purest olive oil: if the candlestick, whose [oil] is not for eating, requires pure olive oil, how much more should menahot, whose oil is for eating, require pure olive oil! But the text states, “Pure olive oil of beaten olives for lighting” (Exodus 27:20), but not “pure olive oil of beaten olives for menahot.”
Today’s mishnah is a continuation of yesterday’s. It explains the relative quality of the various pressings we learned about yesterday.
Basically, the first crop yields better oil than the next two, and the first pressings of each crop are better than the others. If two types of oil are equal, then the person can use whichever he wishes, but if better oil is available, that is what he should use.
Section six: The mishnah concludes by noting that it would have been logical for the menahot to require the highest quality of oil and not just the oil used for lighting the menorah. This is logical because the oil used in menahot is “eaten” by the altar, whereas the menorah is not conceived of as “eating” the oil, just burning it. This is an interesting, but not altogether unusual, personification of the altar.
The reason that the halakhah requires the best olive oil for lighting the menorah and not for menahot is that the Torah specifies that the lighting oil must be “pure olive oil” whereas no such specification is made with regard to the oil used for menahot." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nHaving already discussed grain and oil, our mishnah turns its attention to the next element of the minhah, the wine.", + "From where did they bring the wine? Keruhim and Attulim rank are alpha their wine. Second to them are Bet Rimmah and Bet Lavan on the mountain and Kefar Signa in the valley. [Wine of the] whole land was valid but they used to bring it only from these places. The best wine was from two places in the region of Judah, one called Keruhim and the other Attulim. The second best wine came from three other places, Bet Rimmah and Bet Lavan in the mountains of Judah and Kefar Signa which was in the valley of the Judah region. As was the case with the grain and the oil, wine brought from other regions is valid, even though they used to bring from those places.", + "One may not bring it from a manured field or from an irrigated field or from vines planted in a field sown with seeds; but if one did bring it [from these] it was valid. These are the exact same rules we saw in mishnah two with regard to the grain and in mishnah three with regard to the oil.", + "One may not bring wine from sun-dried grapes, but if one did bring it, it was valid. This wine was inferior, but still valid for libations.", + "One may not bring old wine, the words of Rabbi. But the sages permit it. Although old wine is better, it does lose some of its redness, according to Rabbi [Judah Ha-Nasi] and therefore it should not be used for libations.", + "One may not bring sweet wine or smoked wine or cooked wine, and if one did bring it, it was invalid. These types of wine are all invalid for libations, for they are not pure, regular wine.", + "One may not bring wine from grapes suspended [on reeds], but only from the vines growing close to the ground and from well-cultivated vineyards. The grapes used to produce libation wine must be grown on vines close to the ground, and not on reeds used to suspend them in the air, as many vines are grown today. The vines must be well-cultivated and tended to, so as to produce the best grapes possible." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to deal with the quality of the wine used in the libations.", + "They did not put [the wine] in large casks but in small barrels. Larger caskets would distort the taste of the wine, and therefore they were not used.", + "And one did not fill the barrels to the brim so that its scent might spread. If the jug is filled all the way to the brim, the scent escapes and dissipates. Therefore, so that the scent would spread directly from the barrel, they would not fill it to the brim.", + "One may not take the wine at the mouth of the barrel because of the scum, nor that at the bottom because of the lees; but one should take it only from the third or the middle of the barrel. The wine at the top of the jug had frothy scum and the wine at the bottom of the jug had the sediments. The best wine was that found in the middle of the jug, or at least between the top third and the bottom third.", + "How was it tested? The temple-treasurer used to sit nearby with his stick in his hand; when the froth burst forth he would knock with his stick. This is how the temple-treasurer would make sure that the wine they were taking from the jug was not from the top or the bottom of the jug. While they were drawing out the wine, he would sit near by with his stick. When froth started to come out from the jug, he would strike it with his stick, as a sign that they should not take any more wine from that jug.", + "Rabbi Yose bar Judah says: wine on which there is a scum is invalid, for it is written, “They shall be for you without blemish, and their minhah,” and “They shall be for you without blemish, and their libations” (Numbers 28:19-20, 31). Rabbi Yose bar Judah gives the scriptural basis for why wine with scum cannot be used for sacrificial purposes. This is derived by the juxtaposition of the word “without blemish” which in its simple sense refers to the animals, with the beginnings of the next lines which refer to menahot and libations. Through this midrash the rabbis learn that just as the animals must be without blemish, so too the menahot cannot be wormy (see mishnah two) and the wine cannot be smoky (mishnah six) or frothy (our mishnah)." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThe first five mishnayot of our chapter deal with the size of the measuring vessels used in the Temple.", + "There were two dry-measures in the Temple: the tenth and the half-tenth. Rabbi Meir says: a tenth, [another] tenth, and a half-tenth. When it came to measuring dry things, i.e. grain, there were two measuring vessels in the Temple, one that contained a tenth of an ephah, and one that contained half of a tenth. The remainder of the mishnah will explain what they were used for. According to Rabbi Meir, there were three dry-measures. One held a tenth when it was heaped over, and one held precisely a tenth when it was measured out evenly. The heaped over one would be used for all menahot, and the smoothed out one would be used for the griddlecakes of the high priest, which had to be divided into two halves. This was preferable for if they used the heaped over measure to split into two, some of the grain might spill out.", + "For what purpose did the tenth measure serve? By it they used to measure all the menahot. The one-tenth measuring vessel was used for all menahot.", + "One did not measure with a three-tenths measure [the minhah] for a bull or with a two-tenths measure [the minhah] for a ram, rather, one measured them by all by tenths. Some menahot require more than one tenth, but there were not special measuring vessels that held three or two tenths. Rather they would just fill the one-tenth measuring vessel two or three times.", + "For what purpose did the half-tenth measure serve? By it one used to measure the griddlecakes of the high priest [which was offered] half in the morning and the half towards evening. The half-tenth measure was used for the griddle-cakes of the high priest (see Menahot 4:4), half of which was offered in the morning and half in the evening." + ], + [ + "There were seven liquid measuring vessels in the Temple: the hin, the half-hin, the third-hin, the quarter-hin, the log, the half-log, and the quarter-log. The mishnah now begins to list the liquid measurements. The hin contains 12 logs. Each log is about ½ a liter, so a hin is about 6 liters.", + "Rabbi Eliezer bar Zadok says: there were markings in the hin measure [indicating] thus far for a bull, thus far for a ram, and thus far for a lamb. Rabbi Elazar bar Zadok says that they didn’t need to have separate vessels for the parts of the hin. Rather there were markings on the hin measuring vessel that would indicate a half of a hin for a bull, a third of a hin for a ram and a quarter of a hin for a lamb (see Numbers 15). So according to Rabbi Elazar bar Zadok, there would have been only four measuring vessels in the Temple, the hin and the three log measuring vessels.", + "Rabbi Shimon says: there was no hin measure at all, for what purpose could the hin serve? According to Rabbi Shimon, there was no hin measuring vessel, because none of the sacrifices require a wine or oil libation of a hin, so why have one in the first place?", + "But there was an additional measure of one and a half logs by which one used to measure [the oil] for the minhah of the high priest, a log and a half in the morning and a log and a half towards evening. Rabbi Shimon, after having stated that there was no hin measuring vessel, adds in another vessel so that there will be seven, as stated in the beginning of the mishnah. This seems to have been some tradition, which he is unwilling to dispute. The extra vessel was one and a half logs, and it was used for the oil for the high priest’s griddle cakes minhah which was three logs, half used in the morning and half in the evening. This is similar to the half of a tenth measuring vessel used for the grain of his minhah offering, as we saw in yesterday’s mishnah." + ], + [ + "For what purpose did the quarter-log serve? [To measure] a quarter-log of water for the one with skin disease and a quarter-log of oil for the Nazirite. The quarter-log was used to measure the water used in the purification of the person with skin disease (the metzora, see Leviticus 14:5) and the quarter-log of oil used in preparing the cakes and wafers for the nazirite (see above mishnah 7:2).", + "For what purpose did the half-log serve? [To measure] a half-log of water for the sotah and a half-log of oil for the todah. The half-log was used to measure the water for the Sotah, which she will later drink (see Numbers 5:17). It was also the measure used to prepare the cakes that accompany the todah offering (see above mishnah 7:1).", + "With the log one measured [the oil] for all the menahot. Even a minhah of sixty tenths required sixty logs [of oil]. Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov says: even a minhah of sixty tenths required only one log [of oil], for it is written, “For a minhah, and for a log of oil” (Leviticus 14:21). The log was used to measure the oil for all of the menahot, which used a log of oil to accompany each tenth of grain. According to the first opinion, if a minhah has sixty-tenths of grain, it will require sixty logs of oil, one log for each tenth. Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov says that even if a minhah contains sixty-tenths of grain, it only requires one log of oil. He derives this midrashically from a verse concerning the minhah of a person with skin disease.", + "Six [logs] were required for a bull, four for a ram, and three for a lamb; Six logs are ½ of a hin, which we learned in yesterday’s mishnah are the amount of oil for a bull, four are a 1/3 of a hin and three are ¼ of a hin, as we leaned in yesterday’s mishnah.", + "Three logs and a half for the menorah, a half-log for each lamp. The menorah required a total of 3.5 logs, half of a log for each lamp. (I might suggest that if you enjoyed this mishnah, you could make a song out of it for Pesah. Who knows a quarter-log? I know a quarter-log!)." + ], + [ + "One may mix the drink-offerings of bulls with the drink-offerings of rams, or the drink-offerings of lambs with the drink-offerings of other lambs, or those of an individual offering with those of a communal offering, or those of [an offering offered] today with those of [an offering offered] yesterday; The principle here is that the ratio of grain to oil in the minhah offered with bulls is the same as that of the lambs. When it comes to bulls there are six logs of oil for three-tenths of grain, two logs per tenth. With rams it is four logs of oil for two-tenths, so the ratio is the same. Therefore if they are mixed up together, the drink-offerings (grain and oil) are still valid. So too with all of the other offerings listed in this section, as long as the ratio is the same, they are all valid.", + "But one may not mix the drink-offerings of lambs with the drink-offerings of bulls or of rams. The ratio of the grain and oil for a lamb is three logs for a tenth, so these drink-offerings cannot be mixed together with those of bulls or rams.", + "If they mixed these on their own, and they mixed these on their own, and then they were mixed, they are valid. But if before each was mixed by itself [they were mixed together], they are invalid. However, if one first mixes the oil and grain for each offering on its own, and then they become mixed up, they are still valid, and one can offer them on the altar. If the different drink-offerings were first mixed up together before the oil and grain of each offering was mixed up on its own, then they are invalid.", + "Although the minhah of the lamb that was offered with the omer was doubled, its drink-offerings were not doubled. The grain for the minhah that accompanies the lamb that is sacrificed with the omer is double the normal amount (Leviticus 23:13). Normally, there is one-tenth for a lamb, but this lamb is accompanied by two-tenths of grain. Nevertheless, the drink-offerings, meaning the wine and oil, were the same, three logs of oil and three logs of wine, the same as they always are for a lamb." + ], + [ + "All the measures in the Temple were heaped except [that used for] the high priest's [minhah] which included in itself the heaped amount. The measuring vessels used in the Temple were filled up until they were overflowing. The one exception was the measuring vessel used for the high priest’s griddle cakes, which was large enough to contain without overflowing the amount that it would have contained had it actually been overflowing. We should note that this matches Rabbi Meir’s opinion in mishnah one there were three dry-measuring vessels in the Temple, one that contained a tenth and one that contained a tenth and its overflow.", + "The overflow of the liquid-measures was holy, but the overflow of the dry-measures was not holy. Rabbi Akiva says: the liquid-measuring vessels were holy, therefore their overflow was holy too; the dry-measuring vessels were not holy, therefore their overflow was not holy. Rabbi Yose says: it is not for that reason, but because liquids are stirred up and dry-stuffs are not. When vessels are overflowing, the obvious question then becomes, what do we do with the overflow? The mishnah states that the overflow of liquid, meaning wine and oil, is holy and must be treated as such, whereas the overflow of the dry-measures, the grain, is not holy. Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yose disagree as to why the liquid is holy and the grain is not. Rabbi Akiva says that the liquid-measuring vessels were anointed with anointing oil, and thereby became holy. This made anything that was inside them holy as well. The dry-measuring vessels were not anointed, and therefore their overflow was not holy. Rabbi Yose agrees with the halakhah but disagrees with Rabbi Akiva’s reasoning. The liquid overflow is holy because the liquid that overflows was actually at one point in the vessel. There are various different versions of the Hebrew word that I have translated as “stirred up” but they all imply the same thing since the oil or wine was actually in the vessel, it is sanctified. In contrast, the dry overflow was never in the vessel, just on top of it. Therefore it is not holy." + ], + [ + "All the offerings of the congregation and of the individual require libations except the first-born animal, the cattle tithe of cattle, the pesah, the hatat and the asham; But the hatat and the asham of the one with skin disease do require libations.
This mishnah teaches that most sacrifices must be accompanied by the libations of wine, grain and oil that are mentioned in Numbers 15.
Numbers 15 states, “When you enter the land that I am giving you to settle in and would present an offering by fire to the Lord from the herd or the flock, be it burnt offering or sacrifice, in fulfillment of a vow explicitly uttered, or as a freewill offering or at your fixed occasions…” The chapter then goes on to list how much wine, oil and grain must accompany each sacrifice.
From here the rabbis derive that freewill offerings such as the olah, the shelamim and the todah require libations. So too do the communal offerings offered on the festivals. However, mandated offerings, such as the first-born, the tithe, the pesah, the hatat (sin-offering) and the asham (guilt-offering) do not need to be accompanied by oil, wine and grain.
The two exceptions are the hatat and the asham offerings brought by a person with skin disease. Leviticus 14:10 explicitly states, “On the eighth day he shall take two male lambs without blemish, one ewe lamb in its first year without blemish, three-tenths of a measure of choice flour with oil mixed in for a meal offering, and one log of oil.” One of these lambs is a guilt offering and one is a sin-offering." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nFor some sacrifices the person offering the sacrifice must lay his hands on the sacrifice before it is slaughtered. Our mishnah teaches which sacrifices require the laying on of the hands and which do not.", + "None of the communal offerings require the laying on of hands except the bull that is offered for [the transgression by the congregation] of any of the commandments, and the scapegoat. Almost all public sacrifices do not require the laying on of the hands. There are two exceptions to this rule. The first is the bull that is offered if the entire congregation of Israel sins. This is stated explicitly in Leviticus 4:15, “And the elders of the congregation shall lay their hands upon the head of the bull.” The other exception is the scapegoat sent to Azazel on Yom Kippur. Leviticus 16:21 states, “And Aaron shall lay his hands upon the head of the goat.”", + "Rabbi Shimon says: also the he-goat offered for [the sin] of idol worship. Rabbi Shimon adds that also the he-goat offered for idol worship requires the laying on of the hands. This he-goat is mentioned along with the bull in Numbers 15:24. Since the bull requires the laying on of hands, so too does the goat.", + "All the offerings of an individual require the laying on of hands except the first-born, the cattle tithe, and the pesah. Offerings brought by an individual, be they mandatory sacrifices such as the hatat and asham or voluntary ones such as the shelamim or todah, do require the laying on of the hands. The three exceptions are the first-born, the tithe and the pesah, three sacrifices that are often considered exceptional.", + "And an heir may lay his hands [on his father’s offering], and he may bring the libations for it, and can substitute [another animal for it]. If someone’s father dies before his sacrifice can be offered, the heir can lay his hands on the sacrifice in place of the father. He may also bring the libations (wine, grain and oil) if his father had not yet brought them. He also has the ability to substitute another animal for his father’s sacrifice, although as we will learn, the effect of this is to make both animals sacred. There is an entire tractate on this later in Seder Kodashim." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah continues to teach laws regarding the laying of the hands on the sacrifice.", + "All lay hands on the offering except a deaf-mute, an imbecile, a minor, a blind man, a gentile, a slave, an agent, or a woman. Everyone who brings a sacrifice is required to lay his hands on the animal with the following exceptions. 1) The deaf-mute, imbecile and minor. These three categories of people are all assumed not to have “da’at”, awareness of the consequences or meaning of their actions. 2) A blind man. Perhaps he was excluded because he couldn’t see what he was doing. 3) A gentile. This is derived from Leviticus 1:2 which begins, “Speak to the children of Israel.” From here the rabbis derive that the laws in this chapter (and elsewhere) refer to Israelites and not Gentiles. 4) A slave is in the same category, for this matter, as a Gentile. 5) An agent the owner himself, or his heir, must lay his hands on the animal. One cannot appoint another to do so in his stead. 5) A woman this is also derived from the verse “the children of Israel” which can be translated “the sons of Israel.” A woman can bring a sacrifice and will often be obligated to do so, but she does not have to lay her hands on it.", + "The laying on of hands is outside the commandment. The laying on of the hands is not part of the commandment, such that if one doesn’t lay on his hands, the sacrifice is invalid.", + "[One must lay] the hands: On the head of the animal, Both hands In the place where one lays on the hands there the animal must be slaughtered; And the slaughtering must immediately follow the laying on of hands. This section provides various instructions as to how the laying on of the hands must be performed. Both hands are placed on the animal’s head (see Leviticus 16:21). The laying on of the hands is done in the Temple court, the same place where the animal is slaughtered. And it is performed right before the animal is slaughtered." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah compares the rules regarding the laying on of the hands with the rules regarding waving certain sacrifices. It is set up in typical mishnaic fashion, noting that sometimes the rules regarding one action are more stringent than the others, while at other times, the reverse is true.", + "Laying on of hands is [in certain respects] more stringent than waving and waving is [in other respects] more stringent than laying on of hands. This section introduces the rest of the mishnah.", + "For one may perform the waving on behalf of all the others, but one may not perform the laying on of hands on behalf of all the others. This section explains how the rules regarding laying on of hands are more stringent than those governing the waving of the offering. If several people jointly bring a voluntary offering, then one can wave the offering on behalf of the whole group. In contrast, when it comes to the laying on of the hands, each person who shares in ownership of the offering must lay on his hands. We might conceive of this as the difference between something that must be done to the sacrifice (waving) and therefore one can perform it on behalf of all, versus an action that the owner must perform, and therefore, each individual owner must perform it.", + "Waving is more stringent, for waving takes place for offerings of the individual and for offerings of the community, for living animals and for slaughtered animals, and for things that have life and for things that do not have life; but it is not so with laying on of the hands. There are several aspects of waving that are more stringent, or put another way, more broadly applied, than they are for laying on of the hands. Waving is more stringent than laying on of the hands because waving is done with both individual and communal sacrifices (see above 5:6-7) whereas laying on of hands is performed almost exclusively with individual sacrifices (see yesterday’s mishnah). The waving is done on both living and already slaughtered animals and sometimes it is done with grain offerings, such as the omer minhah or the sotah’s minhah. Laying on of the hands is performed only on live animals and not on grain offerings." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThe tenth chapter deals with the Omer.\nIn order to understand this chapter we should explain what was one of the biggest debates between the Pharisees and Sadducees the date of Shavuot. The Torah states that one begins to count the omer “from the day after the Sabbath.” This was interpreted by the Sadducees to mean that the omer was offered on the day after the Sabbath during Pesah. Thus Shavuot, which fell seven weeks later, was always on Sunday. The Sadducees never had to address how to harvest the omer barley on the Sabbath, because in their calendar it was always harvested on the day following the Sabbath. The Pharisees held that “from the day after the Sabbath” refers to the second day of Pesah. This could be on the Sabbath and thus Shavuot could potentially fall on any day of the week.\nWhile there are many possible reasons why this debate was so prominent in the polemics between these two groups, it is possible that Sabbath observance was one of the main issues. We know that the Dead Sea Sect was extremely scrupulous in Sabbath observance and seems to have done anything to avoid any possible desecration of the Sabbath. In their calendar, holidays never fell on the Sabbath. The Dead Sea Sect’s halakhic system is often similar to that of the Sadducees. It is therefore possible that the Sadducees shaped their calendar to avoid having to face the prospect of reaping the omer barley on Shabbat. At the least, we can be certain that to the Sadducees there was never a problem of harvesting the omer barley on Shabbat. In contrast, the Pharisees and later the rabbis were not bothered by this.\nIn our mishnah we may seem some echo of this ancient debate.", + "Rabbi Ishmael says: On Shabbat the omer was taken out of three seahs [of barley] and on a weekday out of five. But the sages say: whether on Shabbat or on a weekday it was taken out of three seahs. In this section, there is a debate concerning how much flour they sifted in order to get the tenth of sifted flour needed for the omer. When the 16th of Nissan fell on Shabbat, they would use three seahs of flour. There is a debate over how much barley was used during the week. According to Rabbi Ishmael, they would use five seahs, so that the barley would be more finely refined. The other rabbis disagree and claim that the procedure on Shabbat was the same as that on the weekday three seahs. In other words, according to Rabbi Ishmael on Shabbat they would use less barley so that less sifting would have to be done, since sifting is prohibited on Shabbat. In contrast, the other sages say that the same amount was used regardless of whether it was Shabbat or not.", + "Rabbi Hanina the vice-high priest says: on Shabbat it was reaped by one man with one sickle into one basket, and on a weekday it was reaped by three men into three baskets and with three sickles. But the sages say: whether on Shabbat or on a weekday it was reaped by three men into three baskets and with three sickles. In this section, there is a debate concerning the reaping procedure. When the omer was reaped on a weekday, all agree that it was reaped by three people, using three sickles, into three baskets. They debate with regard to how it was reaped on Shabbat. According to Rabbi Hanina, who was vice-high priest (not the high priest of vice ☺) on Shabbat, fewer people did the reaping in order to minimize Shabbat desecration. The sages again disagree, insisting that the procedure on the Shabbat is the same as that performed during the week. In my opinion, behind these two debates is a remnant of the old Sadducean/Pharisaic debate. While Rabbi Ishmael and Rabbi Hananya admit that the 16th of Nissan can fall on Shabbat, meaning they use a Pharisaic calendar, they still want to minimize the conflict between harvesting the omer and the Sabbath. The other rabbis insist that this is no conflict at all, and that on Shabbat the omer is harvested in the exact same way as it is every other day." + ], + [ + "The mitzvah of the omer is that it should be brought from [what grows] near by. It was a mitzvah, meaning it was preferable, for the omer to be brought from barley grown close to Jerusalem.", + "If [the crop] near Jerusalem was not yet ripe, it could be brought from any place. However, if this barley was too ripe to be harvested, it could be brought from elsewhere with the land of Israel.", + "It once happened that the omer was brought from Gagot Zerifin and the two loaves from the plain of En Soker. The mishnah records a time when the barley for the omer had to be brought all the way from Gagot Zerifin, which Albeck identifies as being near Lod (near the Ben-Gurion airport). According to another version of this mishnah, the words are “ganot Zerifin” which means the fields near Zerifin. The grain used for the two loaves once came from as far away as En Soker, which is near Shechem (in the northern part of Samaria, or the West Bank)." + ], + [ + "How would they do it [reap the omer]?
The agents of the court used to go out on the day before the festival and tie the unreaped grain in bunches to make it the easier to reap.
All the inhabitants of the towns near by assembled there, so that it might be reaped with a great demonstration.
As soon as it became dark he says to them: “Has the sun set?” And they answer, “Yes.” “Has the sun set?” And they answer, “Yes.” “With this sickle?” And they answer, “Yes.” “With this sickle?” And they answer, “Yes.” “Into this basket?” And they answer, “Yes.” “Into this basket?” And they answer, “Yes.”
On the Sabbath he says to them, “On this Sabbath?” And they answer, “Yes.” “On this Sabbath?” And they answer, “Yes.” “Shall I reap?” And they answer, “Reap.” “Shall I reap?” And they answer, “Reap.”
He repeated every matter three times, and they answer, “yes, yes, yes.”
And why all of this? Because of the Boethusians who held that the reaping of the omer was not to take place at the conclusion of the [first day of the] festival.
This mishnah describes the procedure that preceded the harvesting of the omer.
The end of this mishnah explains why they would make such a spectacle out of what is quite a simple act. The Boethusians were a group of Jews either similar to or identical with the Sadducees. As I stated in my introduction to yesterday’s mishnah, the Sadducees held that the omer was harvested on the Sabbath that followed the first day of the festival, and not on the evening after the first day of the festival.
According to our mishnah, they would make an exaggerated demonstration of reaping the omer in order to let people know that the halakhah was according to the Pharisees and not the Sadducees. These acts were polemical acts against a rival group of Jews. We should note that we don’t know if this was how the omer was actually harvested in Temple times. All we know is that this is how the rabbis envisioned it happening.
The mishnah itself is easily understood and therefore I have not commented below." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah completes the description of how the omer was offered.", + "They reaped it, put it into the baskets, and brought it to the Temple courtyard; After harvesting the barley, they would put it into baskets and bring it to the Temple courtyard.", + "Then they would parch it with fire in order to fulfill the mitzvah that it should be parched [with fire], the words of Rabbi Meir. According to Rabbi Meir, they would first parch the grain, while it was still attached to the stalks. Parching a minhah offering is mentioned in Leviticus 2:14, “If you bring a minhah of first fruits to the Lord, you shall bring new ears parched with fire.” The rabbis interpret this verse as referring to the minhah of the omer.", + "But the sages say: they beat it with reeds or stems of plants that the grains should not be crushed, and then they put it into a pipe that was perforated so that the fire might take hold of all of it. The other sages say that first they would beat the grain from the stalks, as is normally done with grain. However, they would use soft sticks since the omer came from freshly-harvested barley. Normally, when the grain is more aged, they could use harder sticks. After the grain was separated from the stalks, they would parch it by putting it into a metal pipe which was perforated so that the fire would get in. The rabbis disagree with Rabbi Meir in that the former holds that the stalks were put directly into contact with fire, whereas the sages hold that the parching is done with grains and by using a vessel.", + "They spread it out in the Temple courtyard so that the wind might blow over it. They would then spread it out to cool it off.", + "Then they put it into a gristmill and took out of it a tenth [of an ephah of flour] which was sifted through thirteen sieves. After the grain was cooled, it was ground and then sifted thirteen times, as we learned in mishnah 6:7.", + "What was left over was redeemed and might be eaten by any one; It was liable for hallah but exempt from tithes. Rabbi Akiba made it liable both to hallah and to tithes. The leftover grain not used for the omer could be eaten by anyone, even non-priests. According to the first opinion in the mishnah, the grain was liable for tithes but not for hallah. This is the rule for holy things that have been redeemed they are liable for hallah, but not for tithes. Rabbi Akiva says that it is liable for tithes as well, because he doesn’t consider this grain to have ever been holy. When it was sanctified at the outset, the only part that was really sanctified was the grain that was going to be used for the flour necessary to make the one-tenth. All of the extra grain was never holy, and therefore it is liable for all normal agricultural gifts (tithes and terumah).", + "He then came to the tenth, put in its oil and its frankincense, poured in the oil, mixed it, waved it, brought it near [to the altar], took from it the handful and burnt it; and the remainder was eaten by the priests. He would then complete the process of offering the omer by adding in the oil and frankincense, mixing it up, waving it and bringing it close to the altar, and then taking a handful and burning it on the altar. The remainder of the 1/10 of an ephah that wasn’t burned is holy and can be eaten only by the priests." + ], + [ + "After the omer was offered they used to go out and find the market of Jerusalem already full of flour and parched grain [of the new produce]; This was without the approval of the rabbis, the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Judah says: it was with the approval of the rabbis.
After the omer was offered the new grain was permitted immediately, but for those that lived far off it was permitted only after midday.
After the Temple was destroyed Rabbi Yohanan ben Zakkai decreed that it should be forbidden throughout the day of the waving.
Rabbi Judah said: is it not so forbidden by the law of the Torah, for it is said, “Until this very day?”
Why was it permitted for those that lived far away from midday? Because they know that the court would not be negligent with it.
Leviticus 23:14 states, “Until that very day, until you have brought the offering for your God, you shall eat no bread or parched grain or fresh ears [of the new crop].” Our mishnah discusses when people can begin to eat of the new crop of grain.
Section one: The mishnah describes the markets of Jerusalem as being full of grain from the new crop, immediately after the omer was offered. It is easy to imagine the merchants waiting and waiting until finally they could begin selling this new grain.
The debate between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Judah was over whether the rabbis approved of this. Rabbi Meir says they disapproved of the practice because if the merchants were already selling the new grain so quickly, it is clear that they had harvested it and ground it before the omer was offered. The fear was that they might also end up eating it before the omer. Therefore, the rabbis disapproved of this practice, although they did not successfully stop it. Rabbi Judah says that they were not concerned lest people eat it before it was permitted.
Section two: As stated above, after the omer was offered, it was permitted for people to eat the new grain. People who lived far away from the Temple could not know when the omer was offered, so they must wait until half the day had passed to begin to eat of the new harvest. Below, in section five, the mishnah explains that they do not have to wait until they have actually heard that the court offered the omer because they can assume that the court would make sure that the omer was offered by this time.
Section three: After the Temple was destroyed, Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai forbade eating the new harvest for the entire day of the 16th of Nissan. This day is called “the day of waving” because that is when the omer was waved. It seems that Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai reasoned that when no omer could be offered, it would be legal to eat the new harvest immediately when the day began. However, if we allowed such a practice people might forget that at one point it had been forbidden to eat until the omer was offered. Therefore, he was overly stringent and forbade people to eat for the whole day.
Rabbi Judah says that there was no need for such a “takkanah” a rabbinic ordinance. The Torah itself says that the new harvest is forbidden until “that very day.” To Rabbi Judah this clause refers to a time when there is no Temple. When there is a Temple, the new harvest is forbidden until “you have brought the offering,” the second clause of the verse. Since the Torah already encompasses instructions as to how to act in the absence of the Temple, there was no need for rabbinic legislation." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah continues to deal with when new grain can be eaten and used in a sacrifice.", + "The omer permits [the new grain] throughout the land, and the two loaves permit it in the Temple. As we learned in yesterday’s mishnah, once the omer is offered, it permits the eating of new grain throughout the land. However, this does not permit using new grain for a sacrifice. New grain could be used in the Temple only once the two loaves offered on Shavuot (see Leviticus 23:16) had been offered. In practice, this means that new grain would be permitted outside of the Temple about seven weeks before it was permitted in the Temple.", + "One may not offer minhahs, first-fruits, or minhahs that accompany animal offerings, before the omer. And if one did so, it is invalid. Before the omer is offered, no sacrifices can be brought from the new grain, because they cannot be eaten by anyone. This includes all types of minhahs, the first-fruits (bikkurim) as well as any minhah that would accompany an animal offering. And if one did offer a minhah from new grain before the omer was offered, the minhah is invalid.", + "Nor may one offer these before the two loaves. But if one did so it was valid. While one should wait to bring sacrifices from the new grain until Shavuot, when the two loaves are offered, if one does bring an offering of new grain between the beginning of the omer and Shavuot the offering is valid, since people can eat the new grain." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThere are five species of grain: wheat, barley, spelt, oats and rye. All other species, such as rice, do not count as grain, and laws that apply to grain do not apply to them. Our mishnah teaches a few general halakhot that are applicable to these five species.", + "Wheat, barley, spelt, oats and rye are subject to hallah. These five species of grain are subject to the laws of hallah (when one kneads a certain amount of them, he must separate hallah and give it to the kohen, if the hallah is pure).", + "And they are reckoned together. These five species are reckoned together for all prohibitions and obligations. Thus if one kneaded together dough made from wheat and dough from barley and when reckoned together there was enough dough to require one to separate hallah, he would be obligated to take out hallah (see Hallah 1:1). The same would be true for prohibitions such as hametz on Pesah and other obligations, such as eating matzah on Pesah.", + "They are forbidden [to be eaten] as new grain before the omer. Before the omer is offered on the 16th of Nissan, these five species are prohibited from the new crop.", + "And they may not be harvested before Pesah. Before Pesah, one is not supposed to even harvest any of the new grain. The Torah states that the omer should be “the first of your harvest” (Leviticus 23:10), implying that this grain should be the first to be harvested.", + "If they had taken root before the omer, the omer permits them; And if not, they are forbidden until the next year's omer. This section determines when grain is considered is to be part of the new crop. If it took root before the omer was offered, then it is part of the pre-omer crop and can be harvested once the omer was harvested. However, if it had just been planted before the omer and had not yet taken root, then one would have to wait for the following year’s omer before it can be harvested." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah brings in exceptions concerning the prohibition of harvesting grain before the omer.", + "[Before the omer] one may reap [grain] in irrigated fields in the valley, but one may not stack it. One doesn’t bring omer grain from grain grown in irrigated fields in the valley because this is poor quality grain. However, the sages did not permit people to stack this grain. The only reason that they did permit harvesting this grain is that there was a fear it would be lost if it was not harvested. Therefore they were lenient when it came to grain that would not have been brought as the omer barley in any case. But there was no reason to be lenient with regard to stacking because it would not cause a loss to wait until the omer to stack the grain.", + "The people of Jericho used to reap [before the omer] with the approval of the sages, and used to stack it without the approval of the sages, but the sages did not protest. Jericho’s fields are in the valley and therefore the rabbis allowed them to reap the grain before the omer was offered. However, the people of Jericho went further and stacked their grain as well. This was a no-no in the eyes of the sages, but despite this, they did not protest.", + "One may reap the unripe grain for cattle feed. Rabbi Judah said: When is this so? If one had begun to reap it before it had reached a third of its growth. Rabbi Shimon says: one may reap it and feed [his cattle with it] even after it has reached a third of its growth. Unripe grain can be harvested before the omer, if it is to be used for cattle feed. Rabbi Judah says that the grain can be harvested as long as it has not yet reached one third of its growth. Rabbi Shimon is more lenient and allows the grain to be harvested even if it has not yet reached one third of its growth." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe final mishnah of chapter ten concludes with a few more rules governing the prohibition of harvesting grain before the 16th of Nissan and a few last rules with regard to the omer.", + "One may reap on account of the saplings or in order to make a house for mourners or in order not to interrupt the bet hamidrash. Generally, it is prohibited to harvest grain before the harvesting of the omer on the 16th of Nissan. This section provides a few exceptions to this rule, cases where the person is harvesting the grain not in order to use the grain but in order to clear the area. If he needs to make room in the field for the saplings to grow, he may clear the grain. He need not suffer the loss of the saplings, due to the prohibition of harvesting before the omer. He may also clear the grain in order to make room for either a place for mourners to gather or for sages to gather in order to study in a bet midrash. It is interesting to note that according to this source, study seems to have taken place in open fields. It is unclear whether a structure would have been built in the fields or not.", + "One may not bind them in bundles but one may leave them in small heaps. When a person is allowed to harvest grain before the omer, he may not bind the stalks into bundles as is normally done. This would make it seem like he was harvesting them for food, which is prohibited. Rather, he may leave them in small heaps on the ground and collect them later when the omer has already been harvested.", + "The mitzvah of the omer is that it should be brought from the standing grain. If this cannot be found he may bring it from the sheaves. It is a mitzvah, meaning it is preferable to bring the omer from freshly harvested grain. It is preferable that on the 16th at night they should go out and harvest grain in order to bring it as the omer sacrifice. If this is impossible because there is no grain to harvest, it can be brought from already harvested grain, that has already been put into bundles.", + "The mitvah is that it should be brought from moist ( grain. If this cannot be found he may bring it from dry grain. It is best that if one bring bundles, they still be fresh (moist). However, if there are no moist bundles, he can bring the omer offering even from already dry grain.", + "The mitzvah is that it should be reaped at night. If it was reaped at day it is valid. The omer should be offered at night on the 16th of Nissan (see mishnah three), but if they wait until the day, it is still valid.", + "And it overrides the Shabbat. This polemical chapter ends by reminding us what we learned in the beginning of the chapter harvesting the omer overrides the Sabbath. As a reminder, non-Pharisaic sects during the Second Temple period seem to have shaped their calendar so as to avoid, as much as possible, conflicts between holidays and Shabbat. The Pharisees and later the rabbis took an opposite route and demonstratively declared that if there is such a conflict, the holiday sacrifices nearly always override the Sabbath. The editors of the Mishnah end this chapter by emphasizing exactly this point one can harvest the omer even on Friday night." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with the baking of the two loaves used on Shavuot (see above 10:6) and the showbread (see above 6:5-7).", + "The two loaves [of Shavuot] were kneaded each on its own and baked each on its own. The [cakes of the] showbread were kneaded each on its own and baked two at a time. The two loaves used on Shavuot (Leviticus 23:17) must be kneaded on their own and baked on their own. However, the cakes used for the showbread (Leviticus 24:5-9) must also be kneaded on their own, but they are baked two at a time. These rules are derived through midrashic readings of various verses.", + "They were prepared in a mould, and when they were taken out from the oven they were again put in a mould lest they become damaged. The cakes of the showbread were baked in a mould to give them a specific shape. After they were taken out of the oven, they were put into another mould so that they would not break." + ], + [ + "Both the two loaves and the showbread their kneading and their shaping were performed outside [the Temple Court], and their baking was inside. According to the first opinion, the two loaves and the showbread are to be prepared outside of the Temple and then baked in the Temple.", + "And they do not override the Shabbat. Baking these loaves does not override the Shabbat, because they can be done before Shabbat. As we shall see in tomorrow’s mishnah, things override the Shabbat only if they can only be done on Shabbat. If they can be done on another day, then they don’t override the Shabbat.", + "Rabbi Judah says: all of these were performed inside [the Temple Court]. Rabbi Judah disagrees with the first opinion, and holds that the kneading and shaping were also performed inside the Temple Court.", + "Rabbi Shimon says: One should always accustom himself to say, “The two loaves and the showbread were valid whether made in the Temple Court or in Bet Pagi.” Rabbi Shimon says that it doesn’t matter whether they were baked in the Temple or outside in a place called Bet Pagi, a place where many priests lived. Rabbi Shimon’s words “one should always accustom himself to say” are quite unusual and I have not found them elsewhere in the Mishnah. They seem to mean that Rabbi Shimon finds this halakhah to be quite important and worthy of memorization, more than other halakhot in the Mishnah. It is unclear why this halakhah is singled out." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses the “griddle cakes” offered daily by the High Priest (Leviticus 6:13-15).", + "The high priest’s griddle cakes: their kneading, their shaping, and their baking were performed within [the Temple Court], When it comes to the high priest’s griddle cakes, all agree that they must be prepared and baked in the Temple. The reason is that these griddle cakes are anointed with oil in the Temple. This makes them holy and they cannot subsequently be taken out to be kneaded, shaped or baked outside the Temple.", + "And they override the Shabbat. These cakes were offered every day. Therefore, these three actions, which are performed on the same day that they are offered, can be performed on the Shabbat. As Rabbi Akiva says in section four, any action that cannot be performed the day before, overrides the Shabbat.", + "The grinding [of the grain for it] and the sifting did not override the Shabbat. However, grinding grain to make these cakes and sifting the grain to make the flour are not essential parts of the minhah offering. Rather they are preparatory acts, and therefore they can be performed on Friday. As Rabbi Akiva states, anything that can be done before Shabbat, does not override Shabbat.", + "Rabbi Akiva said a general rule: any work that can be done on the eve of Shabbat does not override Shabbat, but that which cannot be done on the eve of Shabbat does override Shabbat. This is the general rule that governs when something overrides the Shabbat." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nMost of this mishnah deals with how the two loaves for Shavuot and how the showbread were made.", + "All menahot require a vessel [for works that are performed] within, but do not require a vessel [for those works that are performed] outside. This section provides a general rule regarding which works in preparation of a minhah are performed with a ministering (holy) vessel and which are not. Any work performed within the Temple, such as kneading, arranging and baking, needs to be done in a ministering vessel. However, any work performed outside of the Temple does not need to be done in a ministering vessel.", + "How so? The two loaves were seven handbreadths long and four wide and their horns were four fingerbreadths. Usually the words “how so” mean that this section is an explanation of that which comes before it. However, in this case section two does not explain section one. Either the words shouldn’t be here, and they are missing in some manuscripts, or they simply mean that this section explains how one makes the two loaves and the showbread. The “horns” of the two loaves and showbread can be explained in two ways. Some explain that they would take a piece of dough and stick it on the ends of the bread to make it look like horns. Others explain that this “seven fingerbreadths” actually refers to the height of the loaves.", + "The [cakes of the] showbread were ten handbreadths long and five wide and their horns were seven fingerbreadths. The showbread cakes were slightly larger than the two loaves for Shavuot.", + "Rabbi Judah says: lest you err [remember but the words] “zadad yahaz.” Rabbi Judah provides a mnemonic device to remember the size of each type of loaf. For the two loaves the mnemonic is “zayin” (7), “daled” (4), “daled” (4). For the showbread the mnemonic is “yod” (10), “heh” (5) and “zayin” (7).", + "Ben Zoma says: “And you shall set upon the table showbread (lehem before me continually:” panim signifies that it should have faces. Rabbi Shimon makes a midrash on why it is called “lehem panim.” “Panim” can mean face, so Rabbi Shimon interprets the word to mean that the cakes each have a face, meaning a side. This seems to mean that the cakes were not flat." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah describes how the showbread was placed on the table.", + "The table was ten handbreadths long and five wide; the showbread was ten handbreadths long and five wide. Each cake was placed lengthwise across the breadth of the table, and two and a half handbreadths were turned up at either side so that its length filled the entire breadth of the table, the words of Rabbi Judah. Exodus 25:23 says that the table was two cubits in length and one cubit in width. According to Rabbi Judah, in the Temple each cubit was five handbreadths, so the table was ten by five handbreadths. Each cake was ten handbreadths long and five wide. When they would make the cakes, they would fold them up two and half handbreadths on either side, so that each cake would be five handbreadths long and five wide. They would then stack them on the table, six on each pile, thereby filling up the table.", + "Rabbi Meir says: the table was twelve handbreadths long and six wide; the showbread was ten handbreadths long and five wide. Each cake was placed lengthwise across the breadth of the table, and two handbreadths were turned up at either side; and there was a space of two handbreadths between [the two sets] so that the wind could blow between them. According to Rabbi Meir, in the Temple each cubit was six handbreadths. This means that the table was 12 x 6 handbreadths. They would fold up the cakes two handbreadths and in between the piles there was an empty space of two handbreadths (since the table was twelve and the width of each pile only five). This space allowed the wind to blow in between the loaves to cool them off.", + "Abba Shaul says: there they used to put the two dishes of frankincense for the showbread. They said to him: Has it not already been said, “And you shall put pure frankincense upon [al] each row” (Leviticus 24:7)? He replied, But has it not also been said, “And next unto [al] him shall be the tribe of Manasseh” (Numbers 2:20)? Abba Shaul says that in between the two piles of loaves they would put the two dishes of frankincense (see Leviticus 24:7). The other sages disagree with Abba Shaul because the verse says “on each row” which means that the frankincense should be placed on top of the cakes and not in between them. However, Abba Shaul replies that the Hebrew words “al” can also mean “next to” as it does in Numbers 2:20. Therefore, he can interpret the verse to mean “next to the rows.”" + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to deal with the table upon which was placed the showbread.", + "There were there four golden props [at the corners of] the table, each split at the top, which supported the cakes, two for the one row and two for the other row. On the table were four props, one at each corner, whose heads were split into two. Each row had two split props to support it on each side.", + "And there were twenty-eight rods, each [shaped] like the half of a hollow reed, fourteen for the one row and fourteen for the other row. The bottom hallah was placed directly on the table. The next four hallot were each placed on three rods and the top hallah was placed on two rods. It needed less support because it was on top.", + "Neither the placing of the rods nor their removal overrode the Shabbat, but [a priest] used to enter on the day before Shabbat, pull out the rods, and place them parallel with the length of the table. Setting up the rods and removing them from the old bread does not override the Shabbat. Rather, a priest would pull out the old rods on the day before the Shabbat and place them on the table. On Shabbat, when the new loaves were put out, they were placed directly on the table. They were only put onto the rods when Shabbat was over.", + "Every article that stood in the Temple was placed with its length parallel with the length of the House. Everything in the Temple had its length go from east to west, as was the length of the Temple. This line was brought here in this mishnah to teach that the length of the table was also east-west." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with the ceremony of the showbread, bringing in the new loaves and taking out the old. This would occur once a week on Shabbat. The old bread would lie there for the entire week until new loaves were brought and the old ones were distributed to the priests.", + "There were two tables inside the sanctuary, at the entrance of the Temple, the one of marble and the other of gold. On the table of marble they laid the showbread when it was brought in, and on the table of gold they laid the showbread when it was brought out, since we raise [the status] of what is holy and we don’t lower it down. And within [the sanctuary] there was a table of gold on which the showbread lay continually. There were three tables, two outside of the sanctuary and one within. The showbread was baked on Friday and then placed on a marble table for it to cool down. When the bread that had been within the sanctuary was brought out, it was placed on a gold table to be distributed to the priests. This table had to be of gold, because the bread had been on the gold table all week, inside the sanctuary. Once the bread had been on a golden table, it could no longer be put on a table made of material lesser than gold. The third table was where the showbread lay all week, inside the sanctuary.", + "Four priests entered: two bearing the two rows [of the showbread] in their hands and two bearing the two dishes [of frankincense] in their hands; And four went in before them, two to take away the two rows [of the showbread] and two to take away the two dishes [of frankincense]. Those who brought them in stood at the north side facing the south, and those who took them away stood at the south side facing the north. These withdrew [the old] and the others laid down [the new], the handbreadth of the one being by the side of the handbreadth of the other, as it is said, “Before me continually” (Exodus 25:30). Rabbi Yose says: even if these [first] took away [the old] and the others laid down [the new later on], this too fulfills the requirement of continually. The mishnah now describes the process through which the old showbread was removed and the new showbread was laid on the table. The important issue here is that the golden table within the sanctuary should never be without the bread upon it. Thus, while two priests slide the showbread off of one side, the other two priests place the new showbread on the other side. We can see that this ceremony was done with much pomp and circumstance and probably made a great impression upon those priests who saw it performed. Rabbi Yose holds that “continually” does not mean that the table cannot go for even a moment without the showbread. Rather, “continually” means that the table should not be empty overnight (this is explained in the Talmud).", + "They went out and laid [the old bread] on the table of gold that was in the sanctuary [at its entrance]. They then burned the dishes [of frankincense] and the loaves were distributed among the priests. Upon bringing the showbread and frankincense out of the sanctuary, they would distribute the bread to the priests and burn the frankincense.", + "If Yom Kippur fell on a Shabbat the cakes were distributed in the evening. If Yom Kippur fell on Shabbat, and it was impossible to eat the showbread because of the fast, they would distribute the loaves at night.", + "If it fell on a Friday the he-goat of Yom Kippur was eaten in the evening. The Babylonian [priests] used to eat it raw for they were not fastidious. If Yom Kippur fell on Friday, the he-goat (see Numbers 29:11) had to be eaten by the priests that night. The Babylonian priests, meaning the priests who returned to the Land of Israel after the Babylonian exile had strong stomachs and could eat the goat raw. The reason that they had to do this is that it was impossible to cook it on Friday because of Yom Kippur or on Shabbat. Since it had to be eaten that night, there was no other option but to eat it raw (wouldn’t that make an interesting break-fast, a lot more exciting than bagels and danish!). As an interesting aside, the Rambam proves from our Mishnah that in talmudic times, Yom Kippur could fall on Friday. Today, since we have a set calendar, Yom Kippur can no longer fall on Friday or on Sunday, although it can fall on Shabbat." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe showbread and frankincense are supposed to be arranged on the table on Shabbat and removed the following Shabbat, when the frankincense is burned. The showbread can be eaten that day and the following night.\nOur mishnah discusses cases in which this precise order was not followed, and the consequences.", + "If he arranged the showbread on Shabbat and the dishes [of frankincense] on the day after Shabbat, and burned the dishes [of frankincense] on the [next] Shabbat, it is not valid, and one is not liable over it for piggul, remnant, or uncleanness. The dishes of frankincense must be left on the showbread for the entire week that the showbread is on the table. So if the priest set up the showbread on Shabbat, as he was supposed to do, but didn’t put the dishes of frankincense on the table on Shabbat, but rather the next day, then the bread and the dishes are invalid. If he later burned the frankincense with the intent of eating the showbread the day after Shabbat, then the loaves are not piggul (see 2:2 concerning piggul of the showbread. Piggul is the status of a sacrifice that was offered with the intent of eating after it should no longer be eaten), since the frankincense was already disqualified by not having been placed on the table at the correct time. Similarly, if he eats the showbread after Shabbat, he is not liable for the transgression of “remnant.” Finally, if he eats the bread while impure or while it is impure, he is not liable for eating the bread in impurity, because he is only liable for eating valid showbread. In other words, since the showbread was never valid, he is not liable for any of the potential transgressions.", + "If he arranged the bread and the dishes [of frankincense] on Shabbat and burned the dishes of frankincense on the day after Shabbat, it is not valid, and one is not liable over it for piggul, remnant, or uncleanness. In this case, he arranged the bread and dishes of frankincense at the correct time, but he didn’t burn the frankincense on the following Shabbat, as he was supposed to do. Rather he burned them the day after. This disqualifies the frankincense and the bread, and again he is not liable in this case for any possible transgression of piggul, remnant or eating while impure or while the bread is impure.", + "If he arranged the bread and the dishes [of frankincense] on the day after Shabbat and burned the dishes [of frankincense] on the [next] Shabbat, it is not valid. What should he do? He should leave it until the following Shabbat, for even if it remains many days on the table there is nothing to this. If he arranged the bread and frankincense after Shabbat and then burned the frankincense on the following Shabbat, there is a remedy. What he can do is just leave the bread on the table until the next Shabbat when it will count as that week’s showbread. Leaving it on the table longer than it was supposed to be there (in this case 6 days, and then an entire week) does not disqualify the bread. I should note that the word “invalid” is missing in some versions of this section. Indeed it shouldn’t be here because this showbread is not necessarily invalid, as we learn in the remainder of the mishnah." + ], + [ + "The two loaves were eaten never earlier than on the second day and never later than on the third day. How so? [Normally] they were baked on the day before the festival and eaten on the festival, that is, on the second day. If the festival fell on the day after Shabbat, they would be eaten on the third day.
The showbread was eaten never earlier than on the ninth day and never later than on the eleventh day. How so? [Normally] it was baked on the day before Shabbat and eaten on Shabbat [of the following week], that is on the ninth day. If a festival fell on the day before Shabbat, it would be eaten on the tenth day. If the two days of Rosh Hashanah [fell before Shabbat], it would then be eaten on the eleventh day.
[Baking] overrides neither Shabbat nor the festival.
Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says in the name of Rabbi Shimon, son of the deputy [high priest]: it overrides the festival but not the fast day (Yom.
This mishnah deals with when the two loaves for Shavuot and the showbread were baked and when they were eaten.
Section one: The two loaves for Shavuot were always baked the day before Shavuot, unless Shavuot fell on a Sunday, in which case they were baked on Friday. Therefore, the two loaves were always eaten either on the second day, or at the latest on the third day.
Section two: Normally, the showbread would have been baked the day before Shabbat, and eaten the following Shabbat, on the ninth day. If a festival came before Shabbat, then it would have been baked on Thursday and eaten on Shabbat, the tenth day, and if Rosh Hashanah, which was always two days, came before Shabbat, it would have been baked on Wednesday and eaten on Shabbat, the eleventh day.
Section three: The mishnah explains that the baking of these loaves never overrides Shabbat or the festival. Thus sometimes they will have to be baked earlier.
Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel disagrees and holds that baking the bread could override the festival, but not Yom Kippur. For instance, if the first day of Sukkot falls on Friday, the showbread could be baked on Friday, but if Yom Kippur fell on Friday, the showbread would have to be baked on Thursday." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with “redeeming” holy items. Redeeming is done by transferring the holiness of an item to money. The money then becomes holy and must be used to buy sacrifices or other items for the Temple. The item itself can now be used for secular purposes.", + "If menahot and libation-offerings became unclean before they were sanctified in a vessel, they may be redeemed. If [they became unclean] after they were sanctified in a vessel, they may not be redeemed. Once a minhah or a libation offering (the wine or oil that accompanies a sacrifice) is put into a ministering vessel, it may no longer be redeemed. If it becomes impure at this point, it would have to be destroyed. However, if it becomes unclean before it is put into a ministering vessel, it can be redeemed and used for non-holy purposes.", + "Bird-offerings, the wood, the frankincense, and the ministering vessels, may not be redeemed, for the rule of redemption applies only to [offerings of] beasts. Leviticus 27:11-13 states that if one dedicates an unclean animal to the Temple, the priest evaluates the animal and takes money in place of the animal. This verse, however, was stated only with regard to “beasts” which would include sheep, goats, cows and other mammals. It is not stated in regard to bird-offerings, wood or vessels. Once these are dedicated to the Temple, they may no longer be redeemed." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn this mishnah and in the following one, a person vows to bring a minhah offering, but then does not bring exactly what he vowed to bring. Our mishnah deals with the consequences of acting in such a way.", + "If one said, “I take upon myself [to bring a minhah prepared] on a griddle”, and he brought one prepared in a pan, or “a minhah prepared in a pan”, and he brought one prepared on a griddle, what he has brought he has brought, but he has not fulfilled his obligation. [But if he said, “I take upon myself] to bring this [flour] as a minhah prepared on a griddle”, and he brought it prepared in a pan; or as “a minhah prepared in a pan”, and he brought it prepared on a griddle, it is invalid. A minhah can be prepared either on a pan or on a griddle. Both are valid. Therefore, if a person makes a vow to bring one type of minhah and he brings the other, his minhah is valid and can be offered. It is considered a voluntary offering, and not one in fulfillment of the vow. Since, he has not fulfilled his vow because he vowed to bring a specific type of minhah, he also must bring another minhah in its stead. However, if he has some flour and he vows to use it to make a certain type of minhah, either in a pan or on a griddle, and then he changes it to the other type, the minhah is not valid at all and cannot be offered, because it was supposed to be prepared in the manner he stated.", + "If one said, “I take upon myself to bring two tenths in one vessel”, and he brought them in two vessels, or [he said] “in two vessels,” and he brought them in one vessel, what he has brought he has brought, but he has not fulfilled his obligation. But [if he said, “I take upon myself to bring] these [two tenths] in one vessel”, and he brought them in two vessels, or “in two vessels”, and he brought them in one vessel, they are invalid. Similarly in this case, where he vowed to bring two tenths in either one or two vessels and then he brought in the opposite number of vessels, the minhah is valid but he has not fulfilled his vow because he performed the mitzvah differently from the way he said he would. Again, if he specifies that these specific two tenths of flour will be brought in either one or two vessels, and then he brings them in the wrong number of vessels, they are invalid and cannot be offered.", + "If he said, “I take upon myself to bring two tenths in one vessel” and he brought them in two vessels, and when they said to him, “You vowed to bring them in one vessel”, if he brought them in one vessel, they are valid, but if he still offered them in two vessels, they are invalid. In these cases, the priests tell him that he is offering the minhah in the wrong number of vessels. If he changes the minhah back to the correct number of vessels, it is valid and he has fulfilled his obligation. However, if he nevertheless offers the minhah in the wrong number of vessels, it is invalid. In this case, it cannot be considered a voluntary offering, since he didn’t respond, “I will then bring this as a voluntary offering.” Rather, it is clear that he thinks he is bringing the minhah in fulfillment of his vow, in which case it is invalid because he vowed differently.", + "If he said “I take upon myself to bring two tenths in two vessels”, and he brought them in one vessel, and when they said to him, “You vowed to bring them in two vessels”, if he offered them in two vessels they are valid; but if he still kept them in one vessel, they are considered as two menahot which have been mixed. Here he vows to bring two tenths in two vessels, and instead brings them in one vessel. If, after having been told that he should have brought them in two vessels, he puts them in two vessels, they are still valid. However, if he keeps them in one vessel, they are treated as two menahot which have been mixed up. This was a situation dealt with in 3:3. If one can take a handful out of each minhah and put it on the altar, then they are valid, but if not they are invalid. The same would be true in section two. If he had said “I take upon myself to bring two tenths in two vessels” and he brought them in one vessel, if they can still be somewhat separated, they would be valid." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nA minhah must consist of a tenth of an ephah of fine wheat flour. It must be accompanied by oil and frankincense. Our mishnah discusses what happens if one vows to bring a minhah that does not fulfill all of these requirements.", + "[If one said,] “I take upon myself to bring a minhah of barley,” he must bring one of wheat. A minhah must come from wheat, not barley. If he vows to bring a barley minhah, he must bring one of wheat.", + "“Of coarse flour,” he must bring it of fine flour. Similarly, if he vows to bring it from coarse flour, he must bring it from fine flour.", + "“Without oil and without frankincense,” he must bring it with oil and frankincense. He must bring the minhah in its normal fashion, with oil and frankincense.", + "“Half a tenth,” he must bring a whole tenth. If he tries to bring less than the prescribed amount, he must bring the prescribed amount.", + "“A tenth and a half,” he must bring two. If he tries to bring 1 ½ tenths, what he has really done is vowed to bring one minhah and a half of a minhah. Since one can’t bring half of a minhah he must bring two full menahot.", + "Rabbi Shimon declares him exempt, because he did not make his offering in the manner in which people usually make their offerings. Rabbi Shimon says that the person is not liable to bring a minhah at all. His vow to bring a minhah does not count, since he didn’t promise to make the offering in the way it is normally made." + ], + [ + "A man may offer a minhah consisting of sixty tenths and bring them in one vessel. As we shall see in the argument below between Rabbi Shimon and the other sages, all agree that a person can voluntary bring a minhah of up to sixty tenths and put it all into one vessel. The rabbis will argue below as to why this is permissible.", + "If one said, “I take upon myself to offer sixty-one tenths,” he must bring sixty in one vessel and the one in another vessel, since the congregation brings on the first day of the festival [of Sukkot] when it falls on Shabbat sixty-one tenths [as a minhah], it is enough for an individual that [his minhah] should be one tenth less than that of the congregation. However, if he offers to bring a minhah of sixty-one tenths, he must put sixty in one vessel and one in another vessel. The number sixty-one is the number of tenths that would have been brought when the first day of Sukkot falls on Shabbat. Fifty-seven would cover the bullocks (13 x 3 tenths), rams (2 x 2 tenths) and lambs (14 x 1 tenth) that the musaf (additional offering), required. Two more tenths are for the tamid (daily) offering and two more tenths are for the musaf of Shabbat. This brings the total to sixty-one. According to the first opinion, if an individual wishes to bring sixty-one tenths, he can only bring up to sixty in one vessel, such that he will have one less than the congregation brings.", + "Rabbi Shimon said: but some of these [sixty-one tenths] are for the bullocks and some for the lambs, and they may not be mixed one with the other! Rather sixty tenths mingles [in one vessel]. Rabbi Shimon points out that these sixty-one tenths are not mixed in together on Sukkot, since they are for different animals. The reason that one can bring sixty tenths in one vessel has nothing to do with the amount brought on Sukkot. Rather sixty tenths of flour can mix with one log of oil, but sixty-one cannot.", + "They said to him: can sixty be mingled [in one vessel] and not sixty-one? The other rabbis question Rabbi Shimon. If sixty-tenths can mix in with one log of oil, then surely sixty-one tenths can also be mixed. Is one extra tenth really going to make that much of a difference!", + "He answered, so it is with all the measures prescribed by the sages: a man may immerse himself in forty seahs of water, but he may not immerse himself in forty seahs less one kortob. Rabbi Shimon responds by simply noting that this is the way that halakhah works. When the rabbis set an arbitrary number, that arbitrary number is mandatory and even the smallest deviation is not accepted. For instance, a mikveh is valid if it has 40 seahs of water. If even the smallest amount, a kortov, is missing, the mikveh is invalid, even though such a small absence would not be at all noticeable. Thus, the rabbis have established that sixty seahs can be mixed in one vessel with one log of oil, but sixty-one cannot.", + "One may not offer one [log], two, or five [logs], but one may offer three, four, six, or anything above six. This section begins a new topic. One can voluntary offer three, four, six or more logs of wine, but not one, two or five, for these numbers are never found in the libation offerings mentioned in the Numbers 14:5-10. Three logs are for a lamb, four for a ram and six for a bullock (see also Menahot 9:3). Any number above six is a possible combination of 3, 4 and 6. For instance, 7 would be a lamb and a ram. Eight would be two rams, nine, three lambs and so on. Thus one can make a voluntary offering of wine consisting of any number higher than six logs." + ], + [ + "One may offer wine but not oil, the words of Rabbi Akiva. But Rabbi Tarfon says: one may also offer oil. According to Rabbi Akiva, while one can make a voluntary offering of wine, one cannot make a voluntary offering of just oil, without an accompanying minhah. Rabbi Tarfon holds that just as one can voluntarily offer wine on its own, so too one can voluntarily offer oil on its own.", + "Rabbi Tarfon said: just as we find that wine is offered as an obligation may be offered as a freewill-offering, so oil which is offered as an obligation may be offered as a freewill-offering. Both Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva agree that one can voluntarily offer wine on its own. And of course, there are situations where one is obligated to bring wine and oil to accompany sacrifices. From here Rabbi Tarfon concludes that just as wine can be brought on its own voluntarily, so too oil can be brought on its own voluntarily.", + "Rabbi Akiva said to him: No, if you say so of wine it is because it is offered by itself even when offered as an obligation, can you say the same of oil which is not offered by itself when offered as an obligation? Rabbi Akiva responds by pointing out a hole in his argument. Wine is brought on its own as an obligation, when it accompanies a sacrifice. Oil, on the other hand, is always mixed in with the minhah offering. Since it is never brought on its own to fulfill an obligation, it cannot be brought on its own voluntarily.", + "Two [men] may not jointly offer one tenth [of flour for a minhah]; but they may jointly offer an olah or a shelamim, and bird sacrifices even a single bird. This section is independent of the previous debate. Two people cannot jointly bring one tenth of flour for a minhah offering. However, they can jointly bring an animal sacrifice, and even jointly bring a bird. The difference between a minhah and an animal offering is derived midrashically." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThe entire thirteenth and final chapter of Menahot is concerned with a person who obligates himself to bring something to the Temple. The issue at hand is how to interpret his words in order to ensure that he fulfills his pledge.", + "[One who says], “I take upon myself to bring a tenth,” he must bring one [tenth]. This is the general and a bit obvious introduction to the rest of the Mishnah. If someone pledges to bring a tenth of flour as a minhah to the Temple, then he must bring one tenth.", + "“Tenths,” he must bring two [tenths]. If he uses the plural, “tenths,” then he must bring at least two tenths, because the minimum number of “tenths” is two.", + "[If he said,] “I specified [a certain number of tenths] but I do not know what number I specified,” he must bring sixty tenths In this case, he remembers having specified a certain number of tenths, but he doesn’t remember how many tenths he specified. We must be concerned that he pledged to bring the maximum number of tenths possible. Therefore, he must bring sixty tenths, which as we learned in 12:4, is the largest number of tenths that a person can bring in one vessel.", + "[If he said,] “I take upon myself to bring a minhah,” he may bring whichever kind he chooses. Rabbi Judah says: he must bring a minhah of fine flour, for that is the distinctive [one] among the menahot. In this case a person pledges to bring a minhah, but doesn’t specify what kind of minhah he intends to bring. As explained in the introduction, and as we shall see in tomorrow’s mishnah, there are five different kinds of menahot. According to the first opinion, the person can bring any minhah because we assume that he didn’t have any specific minhah in mind. In other words, he must have meant to just bring any minhah and therefore that is exactly what he can do. Rabbi Judah says that he must bring a minhah of fine flour, for the Torah calls the minhah of fine flour “a minhah” without any accompanying name (see Leviticus 2:1). When it comes to other types of menahot, they all have an accompanying name, for instance “a minhah baked in an oven” (Leviticus 2:4). We can assume that had he wanted to bring such a minhah, he would have been more specific." + ], + [ + "[If he said] “A minhah” or “a kind of minhah,” he may bring one [of any kind]. Again, this is a general introduction to the rest of the mishnah. If he pledges to bring a minhah or “kind of from the various types of menahot” he must bring one minhah.", + "[If he said] “Menahot” or “A kind from menahot,” he must bring two [of any one kind]. If he uses the plural, he must bring two, because the minimum of a plurality is two.", + "[If he said,] “I specified [a certain kind], but I do not know what kind I specified,” he must bring the five kinds. There are five different kinds of menahot mentioned in Leviticus 2: 1) A minhah of choice flour. 2 + 3) A minhah baked in the oven. There are two kinds of such minhahs: loaves, and wafers. 4) A minhah cooked on a griddle. 5) A minhah cooked in a pan. If he remembers that he specified that he wished to bring a certain type of minhah, but he doesn’t remember what type he specified, he must bring one of each type, lest that is the type that he pledged.", + "Here he remembers what type of minhah he specified, but he does not remember how many tenths he pledged to put in the minhah. As we have seen, a minhah can have anywhere from 1-60 tenths of flour. According to the first opinion, he must bring one minhah of sixty tenths, because that is the maximum amount of tenths that a minhah can consist of. Rabbi works the math out differently. The problem with bringing one minhah of sixty tenths is that the one who made the pledge might have said a minhah with a lower amount, in which case the minhah with sixty tenths would not fulfill his pledge. What he must do is bring a minhah for every number from one to sixty. This way he can be covered for every possibility. I won’t do that math here, but suffice it to say that this forgotten pledge is going to cost him a bundle!" + ], + [ + "[If one said,] “I take upon myself to bring [pieces of] wood,” he must bring not less than two logs. If one volunteers to bring wood to use on the altar, he must bring two logs. This is the amount of wood they put on the altar at one time.", + "“Frankincense,” he must bring not less than a handful. If one volunteers to bring frankincense he must bring at least a handful of frankincense.", + "There are five cases of [not less than] a handful: One who says, “I take upon myself to bring frankincense,” he must bring not less than a handful. One who voluntarily offered a minhah must bring a handful of frankincense with it. One who offered up the handful outside [the Temp] is liable. The two dishes [of frankincense] require two handfuls. The mishnah now lists five cases where the minimum amount is a handful. The first is the case we just encountered in section two. The second case is one who volunteers to offer a minhah. He must bring with the minhah a handful of frankincense, the amount that always accompanies the minhah. The third case is who offers up a handful of incense outside of the Temple. Since a handful is an amount of significance within the Temple, one who offers up this amount outside of the Tempe is liable. The fourth and fifth handfuls are those that accompany the showbread (see above 11:5). Each row of the showbread had a dish of frankincense into which was put a handful of frankincense." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah deals with a person who volunteers to bring an unspecified amount of money as a donation to the Temple.", + "“I take upon myself to offer gold,” he must bring not less than a golden denar. Since the smallest gold coin is a golden denar, the person who pledges to bring gold must bring at least a golden denar.", + "“Silver,” he must bring not less than a silver denar. The same rule applies when it comes to silver.", + "“Copper,” he must bring not less than [the value of] a silver maah. If someone pledges to bring copper, he must bring copper that is equivalent in value to one silver maah. A maah is 1/24 of a sela, and a sela is equivalent to 4 denars, so a maah is 1/6 of a denar.", + "[If he said] “I specified [how much I would bring] but I do not know what I specified,” he must bring until he says, “I certainly did not intend to give so much!” In this case, the person doesn’t remember how much he pledged. He must therefore bring the maximum amount he might have possibly pledged. In other words, we might say to him, “Might you have pledged 10 denars?” If he says yes, then we would say, “Might you have pledged 100 denars?” If he says yes, then the number keeps going up until he hits a number that he knows he definitely didn’t pledge. We should note that in all of these cases we are dealing with a person who honestly wants to fulfill his vow. There is no concern that the person might lie and say “I could not have possibly pledged to bring such a large amount” when he really might have, because if we were concerned about him lying, he could have just lied and said that he remembered having pledged a lower amount. Rather, in all of these mishnayot we are dealing with a person who honestly wants to figure out how much money he owes to the Temple. " + ], + [ + "[If one said,] “I take upon myself to bring wine,” he must bring not less than three logs.
“Oil,” he must bring not less than one log;
Rabbi says: not less than three logs.
[If one said,] “I specified [how much I would offer] but I do not know how much I specified,” he must bring that quantity which is the most that is brought on any one day.
Today’s mishnah deals with one who has volunteered to bring wine or oil.
Section one: If he volunteered to bring wine, he must bring at least three logs of wine, which is the minimum amount of any of the libation offerings that accompany animal sacrifices (see above 12:4).
Section two: There is a debate about one who volunteers to bring oil. According to the first opinion, he must bring at least one log because an unspecified minhah is one tenth of fine flour (see 12:3), which requires one log of oil (see 9:3).
However, Rabbi [Judah Hanasi] says that he must bring three logs of oil, for that is the minimum amount of oil used in any of the libation offerings that accompany animal sacrifices (see 12:4). In other words, the first opinion holds that he might have referred to the oil that accompanies a minhah which is only a log, whereas Rabbi holds that we must be concerned lest he was volunteering the amount of oil that accompanies an animal sacrifice, which is three logs." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah deals with a person who pledges to bring an olah, a wholly burnt offering, but does not clarify what type of animal he wishes to bring. The laws of the olah are found in Leviticus 1.", + "[If one said,] “I take upon myself to offer an olah,” he must bring a lamb. Rabbi Elazar ben Azaryah say: [he may bring] a turtle-dove or a young pigeon. According to the first opinion in this section, if a person offers to bring an olah he must bring at minimum a lamb, which is the lowest level of olah that comes from a beast (a behemah). This opinion assumes that when he stated that he wished to bring an olah, he must have had a behemah in mind. Rabbi Elazar ben Azaryah believes that it is also possible that he had a bird olah in mind (see Leviticus 1:14ff). Therefore, he can bring a bird, either a turtle-dove (and a partridge in a pear tree, I can’t help it!) or a young pigeon, both of which are valid for bird olahs.", + "[If he said,] “I specified a beast of the herd but I do not know what it was I specified,” he must bring a bull and a calf. In this case he knows that he specified a herd animal (and not a flock animal) but he is not sure which animal specified. Therefore he must bring both a bull (an adult of two or three years) and a calf (one year old). He can’t just bring one lest he volunteered to bring the other and he wouldn’t fulfill his obligation by bringing the other one. Note that he need not bring female animals because only male animals may be offered as an olah.", + "[If he said, “I specified] a beast of the cattle but I do not know what it was I specified,” he must bring a bull, a bull calf, a ram, a he-goat, a he-kid, and a he-lamb. “Cattle” means in Hebrew domesticated animals. This is a broader category than “herd” because it includes flock animals. Therefore, it is possible that he pledged an animal either from the herd (bull or bull calf) or from the flock. These include the ram (two years old), the he-goat (two years old), a he-kid (one year old) or a he-lamb (one year old).", + "[If he said,] “I specified [some kind] but I do not know what it was I specified,” he must add to these a turtle-dove and a young pigeon. If he has no idea what he pledged, then he must also bring bird offerings, both a turtle-dove and a pigeon. This poor shlepper is going to have to bring 8 animals! Let this be a warning if you pledge to bring an olah, try to remember what animal you pledged." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn this case he pledged to bring a todah (thanksgiving offering) or a shelamim (well-being offering). The difference between these and the olah that we learned about in yesterday’s mishnah is that these sacrifices can also be female. Therefore, in certain circumstances he may have to bring a lot more animals.", + "[If one said,] “I take upon myself to offer a todah or a shelamim,” he must bring a lamb. This is the same rule as found in section one of yesterday’s mishnah.", + "[If he said,] “I specified a beast of the herd but I do not know what it was I specified,” he must bring a bull and a cow, a bull calf and a heifer. This is also the same as yesterday’s mishnah, except here he must be concerned lest he pledged to bring a female animal. Thus he must bring a bull and a cow (female) and he must bring a bull calf and a heifer (a young female).", + "[If he said, “I specified] a beast of the cattle but I do not know what it was I specified,” he must bring a bull and a cow, a bull calf and a heifer, a ram and a ewe, a he-goat and a she-goat, a he-kid and a she-kid, a he-lamb and a ewe-lamb. So too here, where he might have pledged a flock or herd animal, he must bring female animals as well. This will be very expensive as he will have to bring 12 animals, any of which might have been his pledge." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah establishes the minimum value of the animals that one has to bring when one has pledged to bring a specific animal.", + "[If he said,] “I take upon myself to offer an ox,” he must bring one with its drink-offerings to the value of a maneh. “A calf,” he must bring one with its drink-offerings to the value of five selas. “A ram,” he must bring one with its drink-offerings to the value of two selas. “A lamb,” he must bring one with its drink-offerings to the value of one sela. This section sets standard values for animals that one might pledge to bring as a sacrifice. If he pledges to bring an animal without specifying an amount, then the mandatory value of the animal includes the value of the drink-offerings (wine, oil and grain) that must accompany the animal. Thus the ox and its drink-offerings must be worth a maneh, which is 100 denar. The calf and its drink-offerings must be worth only five selas which is equivalent to twenty denar. The ram must be worth ten denars, and the lamb must be worth only five denars.", + "If he said “An ox valued at one maneh,” he must bring one worth a maneh apart from its drink-offerings. “A calf valued at five selas,” he must bring one worth five selas apart from its drink-offerings. “A ram valued at two selas,” he must bring one worth two selas apart from its drink-offerings. “A lamb valued at one sela,” he must bring one worth one sela apart from its drink-offerings. If he specifies the value of the animal, then he must bring an animal worth that amount and on top of that, the requisite drink-offerings.", + "[If he said, “I take upon myself to offer] an ox valued at a maneh,” and he brought two together worth a maneh, he has not fulfilled his obligation, even if one was worth a maneh less one denar and the other also was worth a maneh less one denar. If he pledges to bring an ox worth a maneh, he cannot bring two oxen that together add up to one maneh. Even if each ox is worth 99 denar, he has not fulfilled his obligation because he stated that he would bring one ox worth one maneh (100 denar).", + "[If he said] “A black one” and he brought a white one, or “a white one” and he brought a black one, or “a large one” and he brought a small one, he has not fulfilled his obligation. If he specified the color of the animal that he was going to bring, he cannot bring one of a different color. Similarly, if he pledges to bring a large animal, he cannot bring a smaller one.", + "[If he said] “a small one” and he brought a large one, he has fulfilled his obligation; Rabbi says: he has not fulfilled his obligation. However, if he pledges to bring a small one and he brings a larger one, there is a debate over whether he has fulfilled his obligation. According to the first opinion, he has fulfilled his obligation because the smaller ox is encompassed in the larger ox. This is akin to a situation in which he pledges to bring a small amount of money and he brings a larger amount of money. Rabbi [Judah Hanasi] disagrees and holds that even in this situation he has not fulfilled his obligation. A small animal is qualitatively different from a large animal and therefore if he pledges to bring a small one, he must bring that type. This might be akin to promising to give a friend a small dog. The receiver might not be happier to get a larger one. Small things are perhaps not necessarily less than large ones [I wonder what would Rabbi Judah Hanasi have said about our SuperSize Me culture?]" + ], + [ + "[If one said,] “This ox shall be an olah,” and it becomes blemished, he may, if he so desires, bring two with its price.
[If he said,] “These two oxen are for an olah,” and they become blemished, he may, if he so desires, bring one ox with their price. But Rabbi forbids it.
[If he said,] “This ram shall be an olah,” and it becomes blemished, he may, if he so desires, bring a lamb with its price.
[If he said,] “This lamb shall be an olah,” and it becomes blemished, he may, if he so desires, bring a ram with its price thereof. But Rabbi forbids it.
One who says, “One of my lambs shall be holy,” or “one of my oxen shall be holy,” and he had only two, the larger one is holy.
If he had three, the middle one is holy.
[If he said,] “I specified one but I do not know which it was I specified,” or [if he said,] “My father told me [that he had specified one] but I do not know which it is,” the largest one among them must be holy.
Section one: An animal that has become blemished cannot be sacrificed. If someone sets aside a specific animal to be a sacrifice and it becomes blemished, he is not liable to bring another animal in its stead. The animal is redeemed for money and the money is holy and it can be used for any holy purpose. Therefore, he can bring two smaller oxen in place of the original one.
Section two: So too, if he originally dedicated two oxen to be sacrifices and both became blemished, he can redeem them both and use the money to buy one, more expensive oxen.
Rabbi forbids in both cases. It seems that Rabbi holds that once a person has dedicated a certain number of animals to the Temple he must bring that specific number of animals. As in yesterday’s mishnah, Rabbi rules more strictly than the other sages.
Sections three and four: These sections teach basically the same rule, expect instead of one or two oxen the examples are a ram (two years old) or a lamb (one year old).
Section five: Since he didn’t specify that the smaller one of his lambs should be holy we can assume that he meant for the larger one to be holy and that is the one that he must bring.
Section six: In this case, where he doesn’t specify which lamb he wishes to dedicate, we assume that he didn’t want to be miserly and give the smallest one or be overly generous and give the largest one, but that he wanted to give the middle sized lamb.
Section seven: If he says that he did specify which lamb would be holy, but he doesn’t remember, then we must be concerned that he did dedicate the largest lamb. Similarly, if his father told him that he dedicated a lamb but he doesn’t remember which lamb his father told him, he must bring his largest lamb." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah deals with a fascinating historical topic, the “Temple of Onias.” The Temple of Onias was a Jewish Temple built in Egypt, in Heliopolis, around 230 years before the destruction of the Temple, some time during the second century B.C.E. The Temple is mentioned by Josephus who relates that it was destroyed in 73 C.E., three years after the destruction of the Temple in Jerusalem.\nThe rabbis did not look with favor upon the Temple of Onias, but neither did they completely reject it. It seems that the rabbis believed that such a Temple was not a valid form of worship, but that it was not an idolatrous shrine and that it was created with good, albeit mistaken, intent.", + "[If one said,] “I take upon myself to offer an olah,” he must offer it in the Temple. And if he offered it in the Temple of Onias, he has not fulfilled his obligation. [If one said,] “I take upon myself to offer an olah but I will offer it in the Temple of Onias,” he must offer it in the Temple, yet if he offered it in the Temple of Onias he has fulfilled his obligation. Rabbi Shimon says: this is not an olah. If one offers to bring an olah, he must bring it to the Temple in Jerusalem. If he brings it to the Temple of Onias in Egypt, he has not fulfilled his obligation. If he specifically states that he is going to bring it to the Temple of Onias, he should still bring it to the Temple in Jerusalem because for it to truly be an olah, it must be offered in Jerusalem. However, if he offers it in the Temple, he has fulfilled his vow. Rabbi Shimon takes a stronger stance against the Temple of Onias. Vowing to bring an olah at the Temple of Onias does not make the animal an olah. Therefore, there is no validity to his vow and he need not bring a sacrifice at all.", + "[If one said,] “I will be a nazirite,” he must bring his offerings and shave his hair in the Temple. And if he brought them and shaved his hair in the Temple of Onias he has not fulfilled his obligation. [If he said,] “I will be a nazirite but I will bring my offerings and shave my hair in the Temple of Onias,” he must bring them in the Temple, yet if he brought them and shaved his hair in the Temple of Onias he has fulfilled his obligation. Rabbi Shimon says: such a one is not a nazirite. The same rules hold true for a nazirite with regard to completing his naziriteship which is performed in the Temple by shaving and bringing sacrifices.", + "The priests who served in the Temple of Onias may not serve in the Temple in Jerusalem; and needless to say [this is so of priests who served] something else; for it is said, “The priests of the shrines, however, did not ascend the altar of the Lord in Jerusalem. But they did eat unleavened bread along with their kinsmen” (II Kings 23:9). Thus they are like those that had a blemish: they are entitled to share and eat [of the holy things] but they are not permitted to offer sacrifices. Priests who serve in the Temple of Onias are penalized by not being allowed to subsequently serve in the Temple of Jerusalem. However, they still can receive their share of holy things, such as terumah and sacrificial meat. The mishnah compares them with priests with blemishes. In other words, priests remain priests no matter what they do. Their genealogy provides them with the right to eat priestly food. But to serve in the Temple one must be unblemished, both physically and spiritually. Serving in the Temple of Onias and all the more so serving in an idolatrous temple, called by the Mishnah “something else,” disqualifies one from serving in the Temple in Jerusalem." + ], + [ + "It is said of the olah of cattle, “An offering made by fire of pleasing odor” (Leviticus 1:9); and of the olah of birds, “An offering made by fire of pleasing odor (vs. 17); and of the minhah, “An offering made by fire of pleasing odor” (Leviticus 2:2): to teach you that it is the same whether one offers much or little, so long as one directs one’s heart to heaven. Congratulations! We have finished Tractate Menahot! It is a tradition at this point to thank God for helping us finish learning the tractate and to commit ourselves to going back and relearning it, so that we may not forget it and so that its lessons will stay with us for all of our lives. It is no accident that the last mishnah of the tractate finishes with the message that we learned today. After having learned 14 chapters of Zevahim and 13 chapters of Menahot, there is a grave danger that one could learn that all God cares about, and all that is important in Judaism, is bringing the proper sacrifice in the proper manner. Our mishnah teaches that the important issue is the proper intent, that one’s intent in sacrifice should be to worship God. This is not to deny that that the minutiae of rules are extremely important, both in the eyes of the rabbis and surely in the eyes of the priests who served in the Temple while it still stood. Rather, what today’s mishnah seems to say is that the rules are an outer manifestation of the inner kavannah, intent, of the worshipper. Without following the rules, there is no way to bring that intent into the world. But without the intent, the rules are just empty exercises devoid of meaning. I believe that this is a message that is as true of Judaism today as it was in Temple times. Mishnah Menahot has probably been a great challenge for many of you; I know it was for me. So please accept an extra congratulations on completing it. Tomorrow we begin Hullin, the one tractate in all of Seder Kodashim that does not deal with sacrifices or the Temple.
The final mishnah of Menahot contains what is perhaps one of the most important religious messages found in the entire Mishnah. Its final phrase is quoted quite frequently by Jewish thinkers, who employ it in many different contexts. I shall explain it here in the introduction.
The Torah uses the phrase “An offering made by fire of pleasing odor” in reference to three different sacrifices: 1) the olah from cattle (herd or flock animals), which would cost a lot; 2) the olah of birds, which cost far less; 3) and the minhah, which would cost even less than birds. All three of these are pleasing to God, even though some cost far more than do the other. This teaches that God doesn’t care how much the sacrifice costs. What God cares about is that the person “directs his heart to heaven” meaning offers the sacrifice with the correct intention. If an expensive sacrifice helps one direct one’s heart to heaven, then it would be pleasing. But if it is offered for the wrong reason, then the mishnah seems to say that it is not actually pleasing to God." + ] + ] + ] + }, + "schema": { + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה מנחות", + "enTitle": "English Explanation of Mishnah Menachot", + "key": "English Explanation of Mishnah Menachot", + "nodes": [ + { + "heTitle": "הקדמה", + "enTitle": "Introduction" + }, + { + "heTitle": "", + "enTitle": "" + } + ] + } +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Kodashim/English Explanation of Mishnah Menachot/English/merged.json b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Kodashim/English Explanation of Mishnah Menachot/English/merged.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..d876c46fb37e6af8cc78ef1bf9bde2379c2c9b36 --- /dev/null +++ b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Kodashim/English Explanation of Mishnah Menachot/English/merged.json @@ -0,0 +1,643 @@ +{ + "title": "English Explanation of Mishnah Menachot", + "language": "en", + "versionTitle": "merged", + "versionSource": "https://www.sefaria.org/English_Explanation_of_Mishnah_Menachot", + "text": { + "Introduction": [ + "Tractate Menahot deals with the minhah, or meal-offering. The main passage that deals with this offering is in Leviticus 2, but I have included here several other passages in Leviticus that mention how the minhah was offered.", + "Leviticus 2 1When a person presents an offering of meal to the LORD, his offering shall be of choice flour; he shall pour oil upon it, lay frankincense on it, 2 and present it to Aaron's sons, the priests. The priest shall scoop out of it a handful of its choice flour and oil, as well as all of its frankincense; and this token portion he shall turn into smoke on the altar, as an offering by fire, of pleasing odor to the LORD. 3 And the remainder of the meal offering shall be for Aaron and his sons, a most holy portion from the LORD's offerings by fire. 4 When you present an offering of meal baked in the oven, it shall be of choice flour: unleavened cakes with oil mixed in, or unleavened wafers spread with oil. 5 If your offering is a meal offering on a griddle, it shall be of choice flour with oil mixed in, unleavened. 6 Break it into bits and pour oil on it; it is a meal offering. 7 If your offering is a meal offering in a pan, it shall be made of choice flour in oil. 8 When you present to the LORD a meal offering that is made in any of these ways, it shall be brought to the priest who shall take it up to the altar. 9 The priest shall remove the token portion from the meal offering and turn it into smoke on the altar as an offering by fire, of pleasing odor to the LORD. 10 And the remainder of the meal offering shall be for Aaron and his sons, a most holy portion from the LORD's offerings by fire. 11 No meal offering that you offer to the LORD shall be made with leaven, for no leaven or honey may be turned into smoke as an offering by fire to the LORD. 12 You may bring them to the LORD as an offering of choice products; but they shall not be offered up on the altar for a pleasing odor. 13 You shall season your every offering of meal with salt; you shall not omit from your meal offering the salt of your covenant with God; with all your offerings you must offer salt.", + "Leviticus 6 7 And this is the ritual of the meal offering: Aaron's sons shall present it before the LORD, in front of the altar. 8 A handful of the choice flour and oil of the meal offering shall be taken from it, with all the frankincense that is on the meal offering, and this token portion shall be turned into smoke on the altar as a pleasing odor to the LORD. 9 What is left of it shall be eaten by Aaron and his sons; it shall be eaten as unleavened cakes, in the sacred precinct; they shall eat it in the enclosure of the Tent of Meeting. 10 It shall not be baked with leaven; I have given it as their portion from My offerings by fire; it is most holy, like the sin offering and the guilt offering. 11 Only the males among Aaron's descendants may eat of it, as their due for all time throughout the ages from the LORD's offerings by fire. Anything that touches these shall become holy.", + "Leviticus 7 9 Further, any meal offering that is baked in an oven, and any that is prepared in a pan or on a griddle, shall belong to the priest who offers it. 10 But every other meal offering, with oil mixed in or dry, shall go to the sons of Aaron all alike.", + "Leviticus 2 lists minhahs that are brought as voluntary offerings. There are five such minhahs: 1) A minhah of choice flour (verses 1-3) 2 + 3) A minhah baked in the oven (verse 4). There are two kinds of such minhahs: loaves, and wafers. 4) A minhah cooked on a griddle (verses 5-6) 5) A minhah cooked in a pan (verse 7).", + "In addition there are several cases where the Torah mandates that a person bring a minhah: 1) As a sin-offering for a poor person (Leviticus 5: 11-13). 2) The minhah of a Sotah (Numbers 5:15). 3) The minhah of the anointed priest (Leviticus 6:13-16). 4) A minhah that accompanies one of the following: a) a voluntary olah or shelamim (Numbers 15:2-16); b) the Tamid and Musaf offerings (Numbers 28:5); c) the olah bullock (Numbers 15:24); d) the Nazirite’s sacrifices (Numbers 6:15); e) with the omer sacrifices or two loaves of bread (Leviticus 23:13, 18); f) the metzora’s (one afflicted with skin-disease) sacrifice (Leviticus 14:10); g) the minhah of the omer (Leviticus 2:14-16; 23:10-11); h) the two loaves of bread (Leviticus 23: 16-17); i) the showbread (Leviticus 24:5-9).", + "Tractate Menahot deals with the laws governing the various types of minhahs as well as other bread-type offerings, such as the loaves of thanksgiving.", + "For those of you who learned Zevahim, many of the laws here should be familiar. The thoughts and actions that invalidate animal and bird sacrifices also invalidate minhahs. This means that if the priest intends to eat the minhah at the wrong time it is “piggul,” and one who eats it is liable for karet, and if he intends to eat it in the wrong place it is disqualified. When it came to animal sacrifices there were four actions that had to be performed with the right intent: slaughtering, receiving the blood, carrying the blood to the altar and sprinkling it on the altar. With the minhah there are also four critical actions, but they are different: 1) Removing the handful. 2) Putting the handful in a vessel. 3) Carrying it to the altar. 4) Turning it into smoke on the altar. ", + "We can see here that the two lists create a clear parallel between the fistful of the minhah that is put on the altar and the blood. Each is the critical part of the offering and it is what effects atonement (in an expiatory sacrifice). Good luck learning Menahot!" + ], + "": [ + [ + [ + "All minhahs from which the handful was taken not in their own name are valid, except that they do not count in fulfilling their owners’ obligation, with the exception of the sinner's minhah and the minhah of jealousy.
A sinner’s minhah and the minhah of jealousy from which he removed the handful not in their own name, or he put into the vessel, or brought [to the altar], or burned not in their own name, or for their own name and not for their own name, or not for their own name and for their own name, they are invalid.
How can they be “for their own name and not for their own name”? [If offered it] as a sinner's minhah and as a voluntary minhah.
And how can they be “not for their own name and for their own name”? [If offered it] as a voluntary minhah and as a sinner's minhah.
Today’s mishnah discusses minhahs that are offered by the priest with the intent of their being a different type of minhah from that which the person bringing them intended them to be. For instance a voluntary minhah is offered with the intent of its being a sinner’s minhah. There are two issues at stake: 1) Does the owner get credit for having brought the sacrifice? 2) Can the sacrifice be eaten?
The discerning reader will note that this mishnah is nearly identical to the mishnah that began Zevahim, and also to Zevahim 1:4. So consider this a great opportunity for some review!
Section one: If the priest removes the handful from the minhah in order to burn it on the altar, but he thinks that the minhah is a different type than what it really was supposed to be, for instance it was supposed to be a voluntary minhah and he thought it was a sinner’s minhah, the minhah is valid. This means that the fistful can be put on the altar and the remainder of the minhah can be eaten. However, it does not discharge the owner of his obligation and the owner will have to bring another in its stead.
There are two exceptions to this rule: the sinner’s minhah (Leviticus 5:11) and the minhah of jealousy, which is the minhah brought by the Sotah, a woman suspected of adultery (Numbers 5:15). In both of these cases if the priest offering the minhah thinks that the minhah is something else, the minhah is disqualified and cannot be offered on the altar, and the remainder cannot be eaten.
Section two: When it comes to the sinner’s minhah or the minhah of jealousy if any of the four critical actions, or even a part thereof, are done with the intent of the minhah being a different sacrifice, the minhah is invalid.
Sections three and four: If while performing one of the four actions the priest had the correct intent and then when performing a subsequent action he thought that the minhah was something else, it is disqualified. The same holds true in the reverse: if he makes a mistake during one of the first actions but then subsequently corrects himself and offers it with the correct intent, it is still disqualified." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to teach cases in which the minhah is invalid.", + "As for both a sinner’s minhah and any other minhah if [one of the following] removed the handful: a non-priest; or [a priest] that was an onen; or one who immersed himself during the day; or was not wearing the priestly vestments, or whose atonement was lacking; or who had not washed his hands and feet; or that was uncircumcised; or unclean; or was sitting, or standing upon vessels or upon a beast or upon another's feet, it is invalid. This section contains a list of cases in which a priest who removes the handful from the minhah renders it invalid. The same list appears in Zevahim 2:1, so I am basically replicating my commentary here: Non-priest: only priests can perform these activities. An onen: Someone who had one of their close relatives die is considered an onen on the day of the death. A tebul yom: This is the word for an impure person who has immersed in a mikveh but before the end of the day (before the sun sets after he was made pure). See Leviticus 22:7. One lacking [priestly] vestments: A regular priest must wear four garments and the high priest must wear eight garments (see Yoma 7:5). Without the proper attire, the minhah is invalid. One lacking sacrificial atonement: In certain cases, when one’s period of impurity is over he must bring a sacrifice. If the priest has not brought the required sacrifice, he cannot take part in the sacrificial worship. One who had not washed his hands and feet: See Exodus 30:19. An uncircumcised [priest]: See Ezekiel 44:9. An unclean [priest]: one must be ritually pure to offer sacrifices. One who was sitting, one who was standing on utensils or on an animal or on another’s feet, are disqualified: the sacrificial procedure must be performed while standing on the floor of the Temple’s courtyard, not sitting or standing on something else.", + "If [a priest] removed the handful with his left hand it is invalid. Ben Batera says: he may put [the handful] back and take it out again with the right hand. The handful should be removed with the right hand. According to the first opinion, if he removes it with his left hand the minhah is invalid, whereas Ben Batera holds that he may put the handful back into the remainder and take it out again with his right hand.", + "If on taking the handful there came into his hand a small stone or a grain of salt or a drop of frankincense it is invalid, for they have said: if the handful was too much or too little it is invalid. If when taking the handful the priest removes the correct amount, but then finds that something else was in the handful, a stone, salt or frankincense, it is invalid, because as we shall see, it turns out that he didn’t take enough.", + "What is meant by “too much? If he took an overflowing handful. The mishnah now explains the meaning of the statement, “if the handful was too much or too little it is invalid.” If he took a heaping handful and it was overflowing, then it is too much and the fistful is invalid.", + "And ‘too little’? If he took the handful with the tips of his fingers only. If he took it just with his fingertips, without using his palm, then it is similarly invalid, because it is not enough.", + "How should he do it? He should stretch out his fingers on to the palm of his hand. The proper way of taking out the fistful is for the priest to use his whole hand, with outstretched fingertips. This way he uses his palm and fingers." + ], + [ + "If he put in too much of its oil or too little of its oil or too little of its frankincense, it is invalid.
One who takes a fistful from the minhah [intending]: To eat the remainder outside [the Temple] or an olive’s worth outside; To burn the fistful or an olive’s worth of the fistful outside; To burn its frankincense outside, It is invalid, but it does not involve karet.
[One who takes a fistful from the minhah intending]: To eat the remainder the next day or an olive’s worth the next day; To burn the fistful the next day or an olive’s worth of the fistful the next day; To burn its frankincense the next day, It is piggul, and involves kareth.
This is the general rule: anyone who removes the fistful, or puts it into a vessel, or carries it to the altar, or burns it, [intending] to eat as much as an olive of that which is normally eaten or to burn [on the altar] as much as an olive of that which is normally burned outside its prescribed place, [the minhah] is invalid, but it does not involve karet; [Intending to eat or burn] after its designated time, it is piggul and it involves karet. Provided that the mattir is offered in accordance with the law.
How is the mattir offered in accordance with the law? If one took out the fistful in silence, and put it in a vessel, or carried it, or burned it, [intending to eat it] after its designated time; Or if one took out the fistful [intending to eat the minhah] after its designated time, and put it in a vessel, and carried it and burned it in silence, or if one took out the fistful, or put it in a vessel, or carried it, or burned it [intending to eat the minhah] after its designated time. That is offering the mattir in accordance with the law.
This mishnah is nearly similar to Zevahim 2:2-5. It deals with various ways in which the minhah offering is disqualified.
Section one: The amount of oil put into a minhah offering is one log for every tenth of an ephah of flour. If he puts in too much or too little oil the minhah is invalid. The amount of frankincense is two karots. If he puts in too little frankincense, the minhah is invalid, but it is not invalidated if he puts in too much.
Sections two-five: These sections are taught nearly word for word in Zevahim 2:2-4, so I have not rewritten my entire commentary here. The one difference is that here the mishnah discusses the four actions relevant to the minhah: taking out the fistful, putting it in a vessel, bringing it to the altar and burning it there. These are parallel to the four main activities with animal and bird sacrifices. Also, the fistful and the frankincense are parallel to the blood and the innards of the animal, such that the remainder of the minhah is parallel to the flesh of the animal.
Everything else in this mishnah is already explained in Zevahim 2:2-4." + ], + [ + "How is the mattir not offered in accordance with the law? If one took out the fistful [intending to eat it] outside the designated place, [and] put it in a vessel, carried it to the altar, and burned [with the intention of eating it] after its designated time; Or if one took out the fistful [intending to eat it] after its designated time, [and] received, carried it to the altar, and burned it [intending to eat it] outside its designated place, or if one took out the fistful, received, carried it to the altar, and burned [intending to eat it] outside its designated time.
If one took out the fistful of a sinner’s minhah or the minhah of jealousy for the sake of something else, and received, carried it to the altar, and burned [intending to eat them] after their designated time; Or if one took out the fistful [from them, intending to eat] after their designated time, [and] received, carried it to the altar, and burned for the sake of something else, or if one took out the fistful, received, carried it to the altar, and burned for the sake of something else;
Rabbi Judah said: this is the general rule: where the [improper] intention of time precedes the [improper] intention of place, [the sacrifice] is piggul, and involves karet; but if the [improper] intention of place precedes the [improper] intention of time, it is invalid and does not involve kareth.
In these cases the mattir was not offered in accordance with the law
But the sages say: in both cases [the sacrifice] is invalid and does not involve karet.
[If one intended] to eat as much as an olive outside its designated place [and] as much as an olive on the next day, [or] as much as an olive on the next day [and] as much as an olive outside its designated place; Half as much as an olive outside its designated place [and] half as much as an olive on the next day; Half as much as an olive on the next day [and] half as much as an olive outside its designated place, [The sacrifice] is unfit, and does not involve karet.
[If one intends] to eat half as much as an olive [after its intended time or outside its intended place] [and] to burn half as much as an olive [similarly] it is valid, for eating and burning do not combine.
This mishnah is nearly identical to Zevahim 2:4-5, with the exception that the actions here are relevant to a minhah whereas Zevahim discussed animal sacrifices. For commentary, see there." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nIn this mishnah, Rabbi Yose and the sages disagree concerning a case where a priest offered a minhah and had a disqualifying intention with regard to the accompanying frankincense.", + "If he took out the handful [intending] to eat the remainder or to burn the handful the next day, in this case Rabbi Yose agrees that the offering is piggul and he is obligated for karet. This is the same case that was mentioned in mishnah three of the previous chapter. Since he had a disqualifying intention with regard to either eating the remainder of the minhah or burning the handful that he removes in order to burn on the altar, everyone agrees that the offering is piggul (forbidden) and the penalty for eating it is karet (extirpation). This section is mentioned here to note that in this case Rabbi Yose agrees, but he will disagree below about a similar case.", + "[If he intended] to burn its frankincense the next day: Rabbi Yose says: it is invalid but he is not liable for karet. But the sages say: it is piggul and he is liable for karet. The debate concerns a case where the priest’s disqualifying intention was in connection with burning the frankincense that accompanies the minhah. Rabbi Yose holds that the minhah is merely invalid it is not piggul and therefore one who eats it is not liable for karet. The sages disagree and hold that this minhah is piggul and one who eats it is liable for karet, just as he would be if the disqualifying intention was with regard to eating the remainder or burning the fistful (section one).", + "They said to him: how does this differ from an animal-offering? He said to them: with the animal-offering the blood, the flesh and the sacrificial portions are all one; but the frankincense is not part of the minhah. In this section the rabbis argue out their position. As we have seen, the fistful of the minhah is parallel to the blood of an animal offering and the frankincense is parallel to the innards of the animal that are burned on the altar (the emurim). If one sacrifices the animal with the intention of burning the innards on the following day, the sacrifice is piggul and one who eats it is liable for karet. So too, one who sacrifices the minhah with the intention of burning the innards on the following day, the minhah is piggul and one who eats it is liable for karet. Rabbi Yose responds by pointing out the difference between the parts of the animal sacrifice and the components of the minhah. The three parts of the animal, the flesh, the blood and the innards, are all from the same source. When it comes to the minhah, the fistful and the remains are from the same source, but the frankincense is not. Therefore, with regard to disqualifying intentions, the minhah is treated differently from the frankincense." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn this mishnah Rabbi Yose and the sages continue to debate cases where a priest has a disqualifying intention concerning one of the components of a sacrifice. The question is: does this cause the entire sacrifice to become piggul or just the part over which he had a disqualifying intention.", + "If he slaughtered the two lambs [intending] to eat one of the [two] loaves the next day, or if he burned the two dishes [of the frankincense intending] to eat one of the [two] rows of the showbread the next day: Rabbi Yose says: that loaf or that row about which he expressed the intention is piggul and he is liable for karet for it, while the other is invalid but he is not liable for karet for it. But the sages say, both are piggul and he is liable for karet for both of them. On Shavuot there are two lambs offered on behalf of the community, and with them are brought two loaves of bread. When the lambs are sacrificed the loaves become sanctified (see Leviticus 23:17, 19-20). In the case here, when sacrificing the lamb the priest has the intention to eat one of the two loaves after the proper time. On top of the showbread the priest puts two dishes of frankincense. When he burns this frankincense on Shabbat, the showbread can be eaten that day and the following night. In the case here, the priest intends to eat one of the two rows of the showbread the following day, after its time has expired. The debate concerning these two circumstances is similar to the debate in yesterday’s mishnah. According to Rabbi Yose, a disqualifying intention with regard to one of the component parts does not cause the entire sacrifice to become piggul. Thus the loaf which he intended to eat the next day is piggul and one who eats it is liable for karet. The other loaf is invalid, but it is not piggul. The same is true with regard to the two rows of bread; only the one which he intended to eat the next day is piggul. The rabbis are consistent with their position in the previous mishnah. If the priest intends to eat one part of the sacrifice after its time has expired, then the whole sacrifice is piggul and one who eats any part of it is liable for karet.", + "If one of the [two] loaves or one of the [two] rows [of the showbread] became unclean: Rabbi Judah says: both must be taken out to the place of burning, for the offering of the congregation may not be divided. But the sages say, the unclean [is treated] as unclean, but the clean may be eaten. Since the previous section dealt with the two loaves and the two rows of showbread, the mishnah relates another law concerning these sacrifices. If one of the two things (either loaves or rows) becomes impure and thus cannot be eaten, Rabbi Judah says they both must be burned. A sacrifice of the congregation cannot be divided in two, and therefore neither can be eaten. The rabbis say that only the part that was actually impure cannot be eaten. The other part is still permitted." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to deal with cases where a priest has a disqualifying intention with regard to one part of a multi-part sacrifice and whether this renders the entire sacrifice piggul and the one who eats it liable for karet.", + "The todah can render the bread piggul but the bread does not render the todah piggul. How so? If he slaughtered the todah intending to eat part of it on the next day, both it and the bread are piggul; if he intended to eat part of the bread the next day, the bread is piggul but the todah is not piggul. When one brings a todah (thanksgiving) offering, he brings with it unleavened cakes of bread (see Leviticus 7:12). If the priest intends to eat the todah after its time has expired, the bread is also rendered piggul. This is because the todah is the main part and the loaves are ancillary to it. However, if he intends to eat the loaves after their time has expired, then the loaves alone are piggul and the todah is not. The rule is that the main part can render that which is ancillary to it piggul, but the ancillary part cannot render the main part of the sacrifice piggul.", + "The lambs can render the bread piggul but the bread cannot render the lambs piggul. How so? If he slaughtered the lambs intending to eat part of them the next day, both they and the bread are piggul; if he intended to eat part of the bread the next day, the bread is piggul but the lambs are not. This is the same rule as above but applied to the lambs that are sacrificed on Shavuot and the loaves that accompany them (see yesterday’s mishnah). The lambs are the main part and the bread is ancillary." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah contains another example of the same rule found in yesterday’s mishnah.", + "The animal-offering can render the libations piggul after they have been sanctified in the vessel, the words of Rabbi Meir. When one offers an animal sacrifice, he must bring with it libations. This includes a minhah and a wine-libation (see Numbers 15). Rabbi Meir holds that if the priest has a disqualifying intention with regard to the animal offering, the libations become piggul as well, as long as they have already been sanctified by being put into a ministering vessel. The sages’ opinion with regard to this issue is not found in this mishnah. In Zevahim 4:3 we learn that the sages hold that the libations that accompany an animal offering cannot ever become piggul. Therefore, even if the priest has a disqualifying intention with regard to the animal, the libations can still be eaten.", + "But the libations cannot render the animal-offering piggul. Thus, if he slaughtered an animal-offering intending to eat part of it on the next day, both it and the libations are piggul; if he intended to offer the libations the next day, the libations are piggul but the animal-offering is not. Since the libations are ancillary to the animal-offering, even if the priest has a disqualifying intention with regard to them, the animal-offering is not piggul." + ], + [ + "If he had an intention which makes piggul [with regard to the remainder of the minhah] during the [burning of the] handful and not during the [burning of the] frankincense, or during the [burning of the] frankincense and not during the [burning of the] incense: Rabbi Meir says: it is piggul and he is liable for karet for it; But the sages say: there is no karet unless he had an intention that makes piggul during the service of the whole of the mattir. As we have explained on several occasions, there are two elements that allow the remainder of the minhah offering to be eaten: the removal of the fistful and its burning on the altar and the burning of the frankincense. These are the two “mattirs” for the remainder. According to Rabbi Meir, if while burning either the handful or the frankincense he has the intention of eating the remainder after its time has expired, the remainder is piggul and one who eats it is liable for karet. The other sages disagree and say that in order for something to be piggul and for one to be liable for karet for eating it, he has to have a disqualifying intention while all of the mattirs are being burned, in this case both the handful and the frankincense.", + "The sages agree with Rabbi Meir with regard to a sinner’s minhah or a minhah of jealousy, that if he had an intention which makes piggul during the [burning of the] handful, [the remainder] is piggul and he is liable for karet for it, since the handful is the entire mattir. There is no frankincense offered with the sinner’s minhah or the minhah of jealousy (that brought by the Sotah). Therefore, the sages agree that if he has a disqualifying intention when burning the handful, the remainder is piggul, because the handful is the only mattir.", + "If he slaughtered one of the lambs intending to eat the two loaves the next day, or if he burned one of the dishes of frankincense intending to eat the two rows [of the showbread] on the next day: Rabbi Meir says: it is piggul and he is liable for karet for it; But the sages say: it is not piggul, unless he had an intention that makes piggul during the service of the whole of the mattir. Again the mishnah makes reference to the two lambs slaughtered on Shavuot and the two bowls of frankincense which allow the showbread to be eaten. The lambs are the “mattir” for the bread that is brought with them on Shavuot and the frankincense is the “mattir” for the showbread. Rabbi Meir holds that if the priest intends to eat the Shavuot bread after its time while sacrificing even one of the two lambs or intends to eat the showbread after its time while burning even one of the two bowls of frankincense, the bread is piggul and one who eats it is liable for karet. The other sages disagree because the bread can’t be piggul unless all of the mattirs (both lambs or both bowls) are offered with a disqualifying intention.", + "If he slaughtered one of the lambs intending to eat part of it the next day, that [lamb] is piggul but the other [lamb] is valid. Having a disqualifying intention with regard to one of the lambs brought on Shavuot does not affect the status of the other lamb. One lamb is not a “mattir” for the other.", + "If he intended to eat the other [lamb] the next day, both are valid. If while slaughtering one of the lambs one has a disqualifying intention with regard to the other lamb, neither lamb is affected. He did not have the wrong intention with regard to the lamb he was actually sacrificing, so it is not affected. And while he did have a wrong intention with regard to the other lamb, he wasn’t actually slaughtering the other lamb when he had that intention." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with various cases where the disqualifying intention does not cause the sacrifice to be invalid. The same mishnah concerning animal sacrifices appeared in Zevahim 3:3.", + "If he took the handful from the minhah intending to eat [outside its proper place or after its proper time] a thing that it is not usual to eat or to burn [outside its proper place or after its proper time] a thing that it is not usual to burn, the offering is valid. But Rabbi Eliezer says it is invalid. Normally, having an intention to eat or burn something outside of the place or time it should be eaten or burned will invalidate the minhah. However, here he intends to burn or eat something that is not normally burned or eaten. Therefore, this improper intention does not render the sacrifice invalid. Rabbi Eliezer disagrees and holds that an improper intention even concerning that which is not normally eaten or burned will still render the sacrifice invalid.", + "If he intended to eat less than an olive's worth of a thing that it is usual to eat, or to burn less than an olive's worth of a thing that it is usual to burn, the offering is valid. Here his improper intention was to do the action with less than an olive’s worth of the minhah, and therefore the minhah is still valid.", + "If he intended to eat a half of an olive's worth and to burn a half of an olive’s worth, the offering is valid, for eating and burning cannot be reckoned together. As we learned in 1:4, improper intentions with regard to eating a minhah and burning the fistful taken out of it do not join together to add up to the requisite olive’s worth. Therefore, the minhah is still valid." + ], + [ + "If he did not pour in [the oil], or if he did not mix it, or if he did not break up [the minhah] into pieces, or if he did not salt it, or wave it, or if he did not draw it near, or if he broke it up into large pieces, or if he did not anoint it [with oil], it is valid. This section deals with a case where the priest preparing the minhah did not prepare it in the precisely correct way. With regard to each case I will first explain the correct way to prepare the minhah and then note what he did wrong. He brings a tenth [of an ephah] of flour and a log (a measure) of oil. He puts a little bit of the oil into a vessel and then he puts the flour on top of it and then he pours the rest of the oil on top and mixes it together. If he didn’t pour the oil on afterwards, but rather poured it all into the vessel before he put the flour in, the minhah is still valid. Similarly, if he didn’t mix it up, it is still valid. After having been mixed up, certain minhahs are kneaded in water and then baked in either a shallow or a deep pan. He would then make ten loaves. After the loaves have been baked, he breaks the loaves up into pieces, each about the size of an olive. If he doesn’t break the loaves up or he breaks them up into large pieces, the minhah is still valid. Before a minhah is burned on the altar, the priest salts it. If he doesn’t salt the minhah and only salts the handful, it is still valid (this is how some commentators understand the mishnah, because if the handful is not salted, it is invalid). Some minhah offerings, such as the minhah of jealousy, are waved before they are burned. If they are not waved, they are still valid. The minhah is brought to the altar before it is eaten. If it is not brought there, it is still valid (we will learn more about this in 5:5-6). Certain minhahs, specifically those made into wafers, are not mixed with oil before they are cooked, but rather afterwards. If he doesn’t anoint these minhah “wafers” they are still valid.", + "If the handful of one minhah was mixed with the handful of another, or with a priest’s minhah, or with the minhah of the anointed [high] priest, or with the minhah offered with the libations, it is valid. Rabbi Judah says: if [it was mixed] with the minhah of the anointed [high] priest or with the minhah offered with libations, it is invalid, for since the consistency of the one is thick and the consistency of the other is thin, each absorbs from the other. This section deals with various minhah offerings whose handfuls are mixed up with one another. According to the first opinion, it doesn’t matter which handful is mixed up with which handful, they all remain valid and they can all be put on the altar. Rabbi Judah says that if the handful from a regular Israelite minhah gets mixed up with the handful from either the minhah of the high priest or the minhah of libations then the mixture cannot be offered because the consistency of these minhahs is different. The minhah of the high priest and the minhah of libations have three logs of oil per tenth of an ephah of flour, whereas the regular Israelite minhah has only one log per tenth of flour. If they are mixed together the Israelite minhah will absorb from the other minhahs and its mixture will become thinner, and the mixture of the high priest’s minhah or minhah of libations will become thicker. In other words, they will become of uniform viscosity, and neither of them will stay as they are required to be." + ], + [ + "Two minhahs from which the handfuls had not yet been taken out were mixed together: If it is still possible to take the handful from each separately, they are valid; If not, they are invalid.
If the handful [of a minhah] was mixed with a minhah from which the handful had not yet been taken, he must not burn it. If he did burn it, then the minhah from which the handful had been taken fulfills the owner's obligation while the other from which the handful had not been taken does not fulfill the owner's obligation.
If the handful was mixed with the remainder of the minhah or with the remainder of another minhah, it must not be burned; If he did burn it does fulfill the owner's obligation.
If the handful had become unclean and yet he offered it, the head plate renders it acceptable,
But if it went out [of the Temple Court] and was afterwards he offered it, the headplate does not render it acceptable.
For the headplate renders acceptable only an offering which was unclean but not that which was taken out.
Section one: In order for the minhah to be validated, the handful must be removed. So if two minhahs are mixed in together and neither has their handful removed, each minhah will be permitted only if he can definitely remove a handful from each minhah, and he can tell that this handful comes from only one minhah. If it is impossible to tell which minhah is which, then neither is valid because he can’t tell whether he has removed a handful from each.
Section two: Here a handful from one minhah is mixed in with another minhah from which the handful has not been removed. He should not burn this entire mixture because only the handful is supposed to be burned, not the remainder of the minhah offering. He also cannot remove two handfuls because in each handful there may be flour from the other minhah.
However, if he does burn the entire mixture the minhah which had the handful removed counts as fulfilling the obligation of its owners because its handful was properly burned. The other minhah does not fulfill the owner’s obligation because it was completely burned and only the handful should have been burned." + ], + [ + "If the remainder of the minhah became unclean or was burnt or lost: According to the rule of Rabbi Eliezer it is valid [to burn the fistful], But according to the rule of Rabbi Joshua it is invalid. According to Rabbi Eliezer, if the remainder became unclean, was burnt or lost, the handful can still be burned on the altar. However, Rabbi Joshua holds that if the remainder is no longer there or is no longer pure, then the fistful cannot be burned.", + "If [he did] not [put the fistful] into a ministering vessel it is invalid; But Rabbi Shimon declares it valid. The fistful must be put into a ministering vessel before it is burned. If it is not, it is invalid. Rabbi Shimon disagrees.", + "If he burnt the handful twice, it is valid. If he divided the fistful into two and burned each half separately, it is still valid." + ], + [ + "Regarding the handful: the [absence of the] smallest part invalidates the whole.
Regarding the tenth [of flour for the minhah] the [absence of the] smallest part invalidates the whole.
Regarding the wine [libation which accompanies the minhah] the [absence of the] smallest part invalidates the whole.
Regarding the oil [which is mixed in with the minhah] the [absence of the] smallest part invalidates the whole.
Regarding the flour and the oil, the [absence of] one invalidates the other.
Regarding the handful and the frankincense, the [absence of] one invalidates the other.
This mishnah begins a series of mishnayot that continues through the fourth mishnah of the next chapter. In this series we learn that the absence of certain things prevents the fulfillment of a mitzvah.
In the first four sections of today’s mishnah we learn that if any of the following components of the minhah are missing even the smallest amount, then the whole is invalid: the handful removed from the minhah, the tenth of flour that constitutes the minhah, and the wine and oil libations that accompany the minhah.
In section five we learn that without the oil one cannot fulfill the mitzvah of offering the flour and vice versa. And in section six we learn that one cannot fulfill the mitzvah of burning the handful without also burning the frankincense and vice versa.
The words of the mishnah themselves are straightforward, so you won’t find any additional commentary below." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to provide cases where the absence of one element of a mitzvah prevents the entire mitzvah from being fulfilled.", + "Regarding the two goats of Yom Hakippurim, the [absence of] one invalidates the other. On Yom Kippur two male goats are brought, one is sacrificed and one is sent to Azazel. The absence of one goat prevents the fulfillment of any mitzvah with the other goat.", + "Regarding the two lambs of Shavuot, the [absence of] one invalidates the other. Regarding the two loaves [that accompany the lambs] the [absence of] one invalidates the other. On Shavuot two lambs are brought, accompanied by two loaves of bread. If one of the lambs is missing, it prevents one from fulfilling any mitzvah with the other lamb. Similarly, with regard to the loaves.", + "Regarding the two rows [of the showbread] the [absence of] one invalidates the other. Regarding the two dishes [of frankincense] the [absence of] one invalidates the other. Regarding the rows and the dishes the [absence of] one invalidates the other. The showbread consisted of two rows of six loaves. On each row was placed a dish of frankincense. The absence of one of the rows or one of the dishes prevents the fulfillment of the other. And, the absence of the rows prevents one from being able to fulfill the mitzvah of the frankincense, and vice versa, the absence of the dishes prevents the fulfillment of the mitzvah of the showbread.", + "Regarding the: two kinds [of cakes] used in the offering of the nazirite, the three kinds used for the red cow, the four kinds [of cakes] used in the todah, the four kinds [of species] used for the lulav, and the four kinds used for the [purification of the] leper, the [absence of] one invalidates the others. The mishnah now lists a series of mitzvoth that have multiple components, the absence of which prevents the fulfillment of the others. I shall give biblical references for each: Two kinds [of cakes] used in the offering of the nazirite: loaves of matzah and wafers of matzah, see Numbers 6:15. The three kinds used for the red cow: cedar wood, hyssop and crimson thread, see Numbers 19:6. The four kinds [of cakes] used in the todah: loaves of matzah, wafers of matzah, boiled flour, and hametz, see Leviticus 7:12. The four kinds [of species] used for the lulav: palm, myrtle, willow and etrog, see Leviticus 23:40. And the four kinds used for the [purification of the] leper: two birds, cedar wood, hyssop and crimson thread, see Leviticus 14:4.", + "Regarding the seven sprinklings [of the blood] of the red cow the [absence of] one invalidates the others. During the red cow purification ceremony, they sprinkle its blood seven times (see Numbers 19:4). If one of these sprinklings is not done, the entire ceremony is invalid.", + "Regarding the seven sprinklings between the staves of the ark, and of those towards the veil and upon the golden altar, the [absence of] one invalidates the others. On Yom Kippur the blood is sprinkled seven times between the staves of the ark, seven times on the curtain and seven times on the golden altar (see Leviticus 16:14-15). If even one of these is not done, they are all invalid." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe mishnah continues to list mitzvoth in which the absence of one element disqualifies the fulfillment of the entire mitzvah. The mishnah is quite simple to understand. Below I have mostly provided biblical references.", + "Regarding the seven branches of the menorah, the [absence of] one invalidates the others. Exodus 25:31-32.", + "Regarding the seven lamps on it, the [absence of] one invalidates the others. The “lamps” refers to the cups that held the oil and the wicks.", + "Regarding the two portions of Scripture in the mezuzah, the [absence of] one invalidates the other; indeed even one letter can invalidate the whole. The two portions are Deuteronomy 6:4-9, the Shema, and Deuteronomy 11:13-21, Vehaya im Shamoa. If even one letter is missing or not written correctly, the mezuzah is invalid.", + "Regarding the four portions of Scripture in the tefillin, the [absence of] one invalidates the others; indeed even one letter can invalidate the whole. The four portions are: the two portions that are in the mezuzah and Exodus 13:1-10 and Exodus 13:11-16.", + "Regarding the four fringes, the [absence of] one invalidates the others, since the four together form one mitzvah. Rabbi Ishmael says: the four are four separate mitzvot. Numbers 15:38 and Deuteronomy 22:12. According to the first opinion, if one corner of the garment does not have tzitzit, then the mitzvah has not been fulfilled. Rabbi Ishmael holds that each corner is its own mitzvah and therefore if one is missing he has fulfilled his mitzvah." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nIn this mishnah we learn of cases where the absence of a part of a certain mitzvah does not prevent the fulfillment of the whole mitzvah.", + "The [absence of the] blue [in the tzitzit] does not invalidate the white, neither does the [absence of the] white invalidate the blue. Tzitzit consist of white and blue strands (Numbers 15:38). If one makes tzitzit with only white or only blue strands, he has fulfilled the mitzvah. Today most people wear tzitzit with only white threads because for many years rabbis did not know how to make the blue threads. However, recently people re-discovered how the blue threads were made. Nowadays, it is becoming increasingly more common to see people with tzitzit made of blue and white.", + "The [absence of the] hand-tefillin does not invalidate the head-tefillin, neither does the [absence of the] head-tefillin invalidate the hand-tefillin. Tefillin are worn on the head and arm. These are two separate mitzvoth, so if a person wears one and not the other, he has fulfilled the mitzvah of wearing that particular piece of tefillin.", + "The [absence of the] fine flour and the oil does not invalidate the wine, neither does the [absence of the] wine invalidate them. A minhah that is accompanied by libations comes with three elements: flour, oil and wine. If one offers one or two of these elements, but not the others, he has fulfilled the mitzvah of that which he offered.", + "The [omission of one of the] sprinklings [of the blood] on the outer altar does not invalidate the rest. Some sacrifices require the blood of the animal to be sprinkled on the outer altar, either four times or twice (see Zevahim 5:3-7). If he omits one of the sprinklings he has still fulfilled the mitzvah (see Zevahim 4:1)." + ], + [ + "The [absence of either the] bullocks or the rams or the lambs does not invalidate the others. On Rosh Hodesh and festivals, bullocks, rams and lambs are offered, together with “drink-offerings” consisting of wine, flour and oil (see Numbers 28:11ff and Leviticus 23:18). If the community does not bring all of these, they can still fulfill the mitzvah of the offerings that they do bring.", + "Rabbi Shimon says: if they had [money enough to buy] many bullocks but not [enough for] the drink-offerings, they should bring one bullock and its drink-offerings and should not offer them all without drink-offerings. Rabbi Shimon points out that it is preferable to bring one bullock with its drink-offerings than to bring more animals without drink-offerings. It seems that the drink-offerings, according to Rabbi Shimon, complete the sacrifice and therefore it is better to bring one completed sacrifice than multiple partial sacrifices." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with the sacrifices offered on Shavuot, and the absence of which sacrifices prevent the fulfillment of the other sacrifices.\nI have brought here the relevant verses, Leviticus 23:17-20, for ease of reference:\n17 You shall bring from your settlements two loaves of bread as an elevation offering; each shall be made of two-tenths of a measure of choice flour, baked after leavening, as first fruits to the LORD.\n8 With the bread you shall present, as burnt offerings to the LORD, seven yearling lambs without blemish, one bull of the herd, and two rams, with their meal offerings and libations, an offering by fire of pleasing odor to the LORD.\n19 You shall also offer one he-goat as a sin offering and two yearling lambs as a sacrifice of well-being.\n20 The priest shall elevate these -- the two lambs -- together with the bread of first fruits as an elevation offering before the LORD; they shall be holy to the LORD, for the priest.", + "The [absence of the] bull, or the rams, or the lambs or the goat does not invalidate the bread, neither does the [absence of the] bread invalidate them. The absence of one of the sacrifices mentioned in verse 18, does not invalidate the bread mentioned in verses 17 and 20, neither does the absence of the bread invalidate them. They are separate sacrifices, each their own mitzvah.", + "The [absence of the] bread invalidates the lambs, but the [absence of the] lambs does not invalidate the bread, the words of Rabbi Akiva. The two lambs mentioned in verses 19 and 20 are elevated (lifted up) with the bread. The bread and these lambs seem to go together. Rabbi Akiva holds that without the bread, the lambs are invalidated. However, since the bread is mentioned alone in verse 17, it is its own offering, and therefore, even if he doesn’t offer the lambs, the bread is still valid.", + "Rabbi Shimon b. Nanas said: it is not so, but rather the [absence of the] lambs invalidates the bread, while the [absence of the] bread does not invalidate the lambs; for so we find that when the Israelites were in the wilderness for forty years they offered the lambs without the bread, therefore now too they may offer the lambs without the bread. Rabbi Shimon ben Nanas holds an opposite opinion. Without the lambs, the bread cannot be offered, but without the bread, the lambs can still be offered. The reason is that when the Israelites were in the desert, they could not offer the bread, because the bread offering must come from grain grown in the land of Israel, as it says in verse 17, “from your settlements.” Since there is a precedent for offering lambs without bread, even after the Temple was built, the lambs could be offered without the bread.", + "Rabbi Shimon said: the halakhah is according to the words of Ben Nanas but not for the reason he stated; for every offering stated in the Book of Numbers was offered in the wilderness, but not every offering stated in the book of Leviticus was offered in the wilderness; however, when they came into the land of Israel they offered both kinds. Rabbi Shimon says that the halakhah is in accordance with Rabbi Shimon ben Nanas, that without the lambs the bread cannot be offered but the lambs can be offered without the bread. However, Rabbi Shimon disagrees with Ben Nanas’s reason. Rabbi Shimon holds that all offerings mentioned in Leviticus were not offered at all in the desert. So there is no precedent for offering the lambs without the bread. Only the offerings mentioned in Numbers 28:27ff. were offered in the desert.", + "Why then do I say that the lambs may be offered without the bread? Because the lambs render themselves permissible without the bread, whereas bread without lambs, there is nothing that renders it permissible. Now Rabbi Shimon must explain why he agrees with the halakhah stated by Ben Nanas. The lambs can be offered without the bread, because burning the lambs’ innards allows the lambs to be eaten by the priests. In other words, we have a ritual that renders the lambs themselves permissible. In contrast, there is nothing that permits the bread to be eaten, except the sacrifice of the lambs. Therefore, without the lambs, the bread cannot be offered." + ], + [ + "The [absence of the] daily offerings ( does not invalidate the additional offerings (, neither does [the absence of] the additional offerings invalidate the daily offerings, neither does the absence of [one of the] additional offerings invalidate the other additional offerings. Every day there are two daily offerings, called the “tamidin” one in the morning and one towards evening. On holidays and Shabbat there are additional offerings, called “musafin” (this is where the word musaf of the musaf service comes from). These sacrifices do not affect one another, so if one of them is not offered for whatever reason, the others can still be offered validly.", + "Even though they did not offer the [tamid] lamb in the morning they must offer [the lamb] towards evening. The mishnah now deals with the two tamid offerings, and whether the absence of the first of them invalidates the other. According to the first opinion, it does not, and therefore if they don’t offer the lamb of the tamid in the morning, they can still offer the lamb towards evening.", + "Rabbi Shimon said: When is this so? Only when they had acted under constraint or in error, but if they acted deliberately and did not offer the lamb in the morning they may not offer [the lamb] towards evening. Rabbi Shimon qualifies the previous opinion. If they didn’t offer the tamid in the morning because they could not, or due to some error, then they can offer the tamid in the evening. However, if they intentionally don’t offer it in the morning, then they are penalized and they can’t offer the other lamb in the evening.", + "If they did not burn the incense in the morning they burn it towards evening. Incense was burned on the golden altar twice a day, once in the morning and once in the evening (see Exodus 30:7-8). If they did not burn it in the morning, they may still offer burn the evening incense. This opinion is a continuation of the opinion found in section two above.", + "Rabbi Shimon said: all of it was burned towards evening. Rabbi Shimon says that if they didn’t burn the incense in the morning, in the evening they should burn all of the incense, both the evening incense and the incense that should have been burned in the morning.", + "For the golden altar was dedicated only by the incense of spices. And the altar for the olah by the daily offering of the morning, And the table only by the showbread on Shabbat, And the menorah only by [the kindling of] seven lamps towards evening. This section is actually the explanation for the opinion of the sages found in section four. The reason that the evening incense must be offered even if the morning incense was not offered is that the dedication of the altar was done by burning the evening incense. When it comes to the altar for the olah, meaning the altar that stood in the courtyard, it was dedicated by the morning tamid offering. Thus, if the altar had not yet been dedicated, and the morning tamid was not offered on it, they could not offer on it the evening tamid. The mishnah also notes that the dedication of the table that stood in the courtyard was done by placing on it the Sabbath showbread. The menorah was dedicated when it was lit in the evening." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with the minhah offering that the high priest offers every day (Leviticus 6:13-15). This offering had to consist of a tenth of an ephah of fine flour, half of which was offered in the morning and half in the evening. It was fried in oil on a pan, and hence they are called griddle-cakes.", + "The high priest’s griddle-cakes cannot be brought in [two separate] halves. Rather he must bring a whole tenth and then divide it, offering a half in the morning and a half towards evening. The high priest is not allowed to bring the griddle-cakes in two halves, half of a tenth in the morning and half in the evening. Rather, he must bring the entire tenth in the morning and then divide it in half, offering a half in the morning and the other half in the evening.", + "If a [high] priest offered half in the morning and then died and they appointed another priest in his place, [the successor] may not bring a half-tenth from his house, neither [may he use] the remaining half-tenth of the first [high priest]. Rather he must bring a whole tenth and divide it, and offer one half and leaving the other half goes to waste. It turns out that two halves are offered and two halves go to waste. If the high priest offers half in the morning and then dies, and the court appoints a new high priest, the new high priest must bring an entire tenth of flour, and only offer half of it. The second half of the previous high priest’s offering goes to waste, as does half of the new high priest’s offering. We should note that this is just the kind of scenario that the rabbis love to discuss.", + "If they did not appoint another priest in his place, at whose expense was it offered? Rabbi Shimon says, at the expense of the community; But Rabbi Judah says: at the expense of his heirs, And a whole [tenth] was offered. If the court didn’t appoint a new high priest, there is a debate as to who is responsible to offer the minhah. According to Rabbi Shimon, the community had to pay for the offering, whereas Rabbi Judah holds that the high priest’s heirs must offer it. Furthermore, in such a situation, in both the morning and evening a full tenth would be offered." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis chapter teaches general rules with regard to the minhah offering.", + "All minhahs must be offered unleavened, with the exception of the leavened cakes of the todah and the two loaves [of Shavuot] which are offered leavened. There are only two minhah offerings that are offered as leavened bread and not unleavened matzot the leavened cakes that accompany the todah (Leviticus 7:13; these will be explained below in mishnah 7:1) and the two loaves of bread brought on Shavuot (Leviticus 23:17).", + "Rabbi Meir says: the leaven must be taken from [the minhahs] themselves and with this they are leavened. The rabbis now debate where the leaven (sour dough) that leavens these loaves comes from. According to Rabbi Meir, the leaven is taken out of the minhah of the todah. In other words, he uses some of the flour to make leavened dough, and then he uses this to leaven the entire dough for the minhah. In this way, he can ensure that he doesn’t use more flour than is called for.", + "Rabbi Judah says: that is not the best way, rather [first of all] he brings leaven and puts into the measuring vessel and then he fills the measuring vessel up [with flour]. Rabbi Judah says that the problem is that it won’t be enough leaven to cause the dough to rise properly. Rather, he first brings some leaven and puts it into the measuring vessel. Then he fills up the rest with flour until he gets to a tenth. This is what he uses for dough.", + "But they said to him: even so [it is not satisfactory], for it would be sometimes too little and sometimes too much. The other sages (or Rabbi Meir) respond that this way of leavening the bread is also problematic. For if the leaven was good leaven, then because it was soft and swollen up, there would actually be too low of a measure, for if the space that the leaven occupied was taken up by flour, there wouldn’t have been enough flour. The opposite is true if the leaven was low quality. If it was thick and dried up, it would take up too little space, and if there was flour in its place, there would be more flour than a tenth. Therefore, this method of leavening is also problematic." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah deals with the prohibition of allowing a minhah to become hametz, for as we learned in yesterday’s mishnah, nearly all minhahs must be brought as matzot.", + "All minhahs must be kneaded with lukewarm water and must be watched lest they become leavened. In order to delay the leavening process, the minhah was kneaded with lukewarm water, and it was carefully watched so that it would not become leaven.", + "If one allowed the remainder to become leavened he has transgressed a negative commandment, for it is written, “No minhah which you shall bring to the Lord shall be made leavened” (Leviticus 2:11). Even the remainders of the minhah, the part of the minhah eaten by the priests, were not allowed to become leaven. If one did allow any part of the minhah to become leaven, he transgressed the negative commandment found in Leviticus 2:11.", + "One is liable for the kneading, and for rolling and for baking. If a minhah becomes leaven and one performs any one of these acts, kneading, rolling the dough or baking it, he is liable." + ], + [ + "Some [minhahs] require oil and frankincense, some require oil but not frankincense, some frankincense but not oil, and some neither oil nor frankincense.
These require oil and frankincense: the minhah of fine flour, that prepared on a griddle, that prepared in a pan, the cakes and the wafers, the minhah of the priests, the minhah of the anointed high priest, the minhah of a gentile, the minhah of women, and the minhah of the omer.
The minhah offered with the drink-offerings requires oil but not frankincense.
The showbread requires frankincense but not oil.
The two loaves, the sinner's minhah and the minhah of jealousy require neither oil nor frankincense.
This mishnah teaches which minhah requires oil and frankincense, which requires one of the two, and which require neither.
Section one: As the mishnah typically loves to note, all of the possible combinations can actually occur. I shall give references for each of these types of minhahs.
Section two:
The minhah of fine flour; that prepared on a griddle; that prepared in a pan: Leviticus 2:1.
The cakes and the wafers: Leviticus 2:4.
The minhah of the priests: A priest who volunteers to bring one of these minhahs.
The minhah of the anointed high priest: See above 4:5.
The minhah of a gentile; the minhah of women: who volunteered to bring one of these minhahs.
And the minhah of the omer: Leviticus 2:14-15.
Section three: Numbers 15:4ff.
Section four: Leviticus 24:7.
Section five: The two loaves are those brought on Shavuot. The sinner’s minhah is referred to in Leviticus 5:11 and the minhah of jealousy is that brought by the suspected adultress (the Sotah (Numbers 5:15). In both cases the Torah specifically states not to put frankincense or oil on them." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with the consequences of adding oil or frankincense to a minhah that did not require it.", + "One is liable for the oil on its own and for the frankincense on its own. If one adds oil and frankincense to a sinner’s minhah or to a minhah of jealousy, neither of which require either oil or frankincense, he has transgressed two negative commandments, for with regard to both of these the Torah specifically says not to place either oil or frankincense. Each is its own separate prohibition.", + "If he put in oil, he has rendered it invalid, but if frankincense, he can remove it. If he put oil into a minhah that does not require oil, the minhah is invalid, and there is nothing he can do to remedy it. However, if he puts frankincense in, he can simply pick out the frankincense and the minhah will remain valid.", + "If he put oil on the remainder, he has not transgressed a negative commandment. If he put oil on the part of the minhah eaten by the priests, the “remainder”, then he has not transgressed the prohibition and the part offered on the altar remains valid.", + "If he put one vessel above the other vessel, he has not rendered it invalid. If he put a vessel that has in it oil or frankincense on top of a vessel that has in it the minhah, he has not transgressed or rendered the minhah invalid because the vessels separate the substances." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah begins to note which minhahs must be brought to the altar (see Leviticus 2:8, 6:7), which have to be waved, which require one and not the other, and which require both. “Bringing near” refers to bringing the minhah close to the southwestern corner of the altar before the handful is removed. Note that the structure of this mishnah is nearly identical to the structure of mishnah three.", + "Some [minhahs] require bringing near but not waving, some require bringing near and also waving, some require waving but not bringing near, and some require neither bringing near nor waving. As was the format in mishnah three, the mishnah begins by noting that all of the combinations with regard to requiring bringing near and waving are possible.", + "These require bringing near but not waving: the minhah of fine flour, that prepared on a griddle, that prepared in a pan, the cakes and the wafers, the minhah of the priests, the minhah of the anointed high priest, the minhah of a gentile, the minhah of women, and the minhah of the omer. These minhahs are brought near to the altar, but they are not waved. The list is the same as that in section one of mishnah three.", + "Rabbi Shimon says: the minhah of the priests and the minhah of the anointed high priest do not require bringing near, since no handful is taken out of them, and where no handful is taken out bringing near is not necessary. Rabbi Shimon says that since the minhahs of the priests and of the anointed high priest are not eaten at all, but rather are entirely burned, they need not be brought near to the altar. Rather they are just put on the altar and burned." + ], + [ + "These require waving but not bringing near: The log of oil of the leper and his guilt-offering, The first fruits, according to Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov, The innards of an individual’s shelamim and its breast and thigh, whether they are the offerings of men or of women, by Israelites but not by others; The two loaves and the two lambs of Shavuot. The mishnah now lists the minhahs that require waving but not bringing near. I will give references to these and brief explanations. The log of oil of the leper and his guilt-offering: Leviticus 14:12 states, “The priest shall take one of the male lambs and offer it with the log of oil as an asham, and he shall wave them as a wave offering before the Lord. The first fruits, according to Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov: see Bikkurim 3:6. The innards of an individual’s shelamim and its breast and thigh, whether they are the offerings of men or of women, by Israelites but not by others: The innards of the shelamim are burned on the altar and the breast and thigh are given to a priest. That they need to be waved is stated in Leviticus 7:30 and 10:15. These parts are waved whether the shelamim is brought by a man or a woman, but only if the man or woman is Jewish. A Gentile can bring a shelamim but it is not waved. The two loaves and the two lambs of Shavuot: see Leviticus 23:20.", + "How does he perform [the waving]? He places the two loaves upon the two lambs and puts his two hands beneath them and waves them forward and backward and upward and downward, for it is written, “which is waved and which is lifted up” (Exodus 29:27). In describing how an offering is waved, the Torah states that it was waved and lifted up” which seems to be repetitive. The rabbis interpret “waving” as moving it forward and backward and “lifting up” to mean moving it upward and downward.", + "The waving was performed on the east side [of the altar] and the bringing near on the west side. The two ceremonies described in these sections were performed on opposite sides of the altar.", + "The ceremony of waving comes before that of bringing near. If the minhah is one that requires both waving and bringing near (these minhahs are listed in the next section) then first the minhah is waved and then it is brought near. This order is implied in Numbers 5:25, concerning the minhah of jealousy (brought by the suspected adulteress), “The priest shall take from the woman’s hand the minhah of jealousy, and wave the minhah before the Lord, and then bring it to the altar.”", + "The minhah of the omer and the minhah of jealousy require bringing near and waving. The two minhahs that require both waving and bringing near are the minhah of jealousy (see above) and the minhah of the omer, which is brought on the 16th of Nisan.", + "The showbread and the minhah with the libations require neither bringing near nor waving. The showbread and the minhah brought with libations do not require either waving or bringing near." + ], + [ + "Rabbi Shimon says, there are three kinds [of sacrifices] which require three commandments; two [of the three] apply to each kind, but none of them require a third.
And these are they: the shelamim of the individual, the shelamim of the community and the asham of the leper.
The shelamim of the individual requires the laying on of hands for the living animal and waving after it is slaughtered, but it does not require waving while alive.
The shelamim of the community requires waving while alive and also after it is slaughtered, but it does not require the laying on of hands.
The asham of the leper requires the laying on of hands and also waving while alive, but it does not require waving after it is slaughtered.
In this mishnah Rabbi Shimon compares three sacrifices and three requirements, with each sacrifice requiring two of the three requirements. We should note that Rabbi Shimon seems more interested in the curious fact that three sacrifices can be compared in this manner than in the actual rules that apply to these sacrifices. Perhaps the mishnah is somewhat of a mnemonic, a means by which to remember certain rules. Alternatively it is just a neat fact that Rabbi Shimon enjoyed relating.
Instead of explaining the mishnah line by line, I will be explaining it all at once below.
The three sacrifices under discussion in this mishnah are 1) the shelamim brought by an individual (Leviticus 7:11ff); 2) the shelamim brought by the community on Shavuot (Leviticus 23:20); 3) and the asham brought by the leper (Leviticus 14:14). The three commandments are: 1) waving while the animal is alive; 2) waving after slaughtering; 3) laying on of the hands (see Leviticus 3:2). All three sacrifices require two of the three commandments, but none of the sacrifices require all three actions." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nLeviticus 7:9 mentions minhahs “prepared in a pan or on a griddle.” Our mishnah teaches the difference in how these two minhahs are prepared.", + "One who says, “I take upon myself [to offer a minhah] prepared on a griddle,” he must not bring one prepared in a pan; If [he says, I take upon myself to offer a minhah prepared] in a pan,” he must not bring one prepared on a griddle. The first thing the mishnah asserts is that a minhah prepared in a pan is indeed different from one prepared on a griddle. Therefore, one who vows to bring one type of minhah cannot bring the other.", + "What is the difference between a griddle [mahabat] and a pan [marheshet]? The pan has a lid to it, but the griddle has no lid, the words of Rabbi Yose the Galilean. Rabbi Hanina ben Gamaliel says: a pan is deep and what is prepared is spongy; a griddle is flat and what is prepared on it is hard. There are two opinions as to what the difference was between a griddle and a pan. According to Rabbi Yose the Galilean, the pan had a lid but the griddle did not. Rabbi Hanina ben Gamaliel says that the pan was deep and since there was more oil, the cake prepared was softer than that prepared on the flat griddle. What is interesting to me is that these rabbis, living only one hundred years after the destruction of the Temple, already dispute how minhahs were prepared in the Temple. Clearly, they have no historical record to turn to, and therefore must decipher how things were done by reasoning out various verses in the Torah. This is probably quite common in Seder Kodashim and demonstrates well that much of the material in this Seder is not a record of what went on in the Temple but rather an interpretation of what the Torah says should have gone on in the Temple." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to teach the differences between how different menahot (pl. of minhah) are prepared.", + "[If a man said,] “I take upon myself [to offer a minhah baked] in an oven,” he must not bring what is baked in a stove or on tiles or in the cauldrons of the Arabs. Rabbi Judah says: he may bring what is baked in a stove. Leviticus 2:4 refers to a minhah baked in an oven. According to the first opinion, this means that the minhah must actually be baked inside an oven. This used to be done by placing the loaf on the sides of the hot oven where it would be baked, similar to the way in which pita is still made. He is not allowed to cook it on a stove or on tiles, or in the type of cauldrons that Arabs at the time of the Mishnah used to prepare their bread. These were holes dug in the ground, lined with plaster and then heated up to bake bread. Rabbi Judah says that when the Torah specifies a “minhah baked in an oven” it includes a minhah baked on a stove.", + "[If he said,] “I take upon myself [to offer] a baked minhah,” he may not bring half in loaves and half in wafers. Rabbi Shimon permits it for it is one kind. Leviticus 2:4 refers to loaves of matzah and matzah wafers. The mishnah interprets this to mean that the minhah can be brought either as loaves of matzah or matzah wafers. One cannot bring half as loaves and half as wafers. Rabbi Shimon says that since both the loaves and wafers are both “one kind” meaning they are essentially the same, one can bring half of his minhah as loaves and half as wafers." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis chapter continues to teach general rules with regard to menahot. Today’s mishnah and tomorrow’s teaches which minhah has a handful removed and the rest eaten by the priests.", + "From the following menahot the handful must be taken and the remainder is for the priests: The minhah of fine flour, that prepared on a griddle, that prepared in a pan, the loaves and the wafers, the minhah of a Gentile, the minhah of women, the minhah of the omer, the sinners’ minhah, and the minhah of jealousy. All of these menahot have been explained already in mishnah three and five of the previous chapter. For all of them, a handful is removed and burned on the altar. The remainder is eaten by the priests.", + "Rabbi Shimon says: a sinners’ minhah brought by priests the handful is taken, and the handful is offered by itself and so also the remainder is offered by itself. Generally a minhah brought by priests is not also eaten by the priests. Rather it is all burned, as is stated explicitly in Leviticus 6:16. Therefore, it would seem that there is no reason to remove a handful, as is normally done with a sinners’ minhah. Nevertheless, Rabbi Shimon holds that first a handful is removed and burned by itself, and then the remainder is also burned by itself. In this way, the normal procedure is preserved." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah lists menahot that are either completely burned, or completely eaten.", + "The minhah of the priests, The minhah of the anointed high priest, And the minhah that is offered with the libations are [wholly] for the altar and the priests have no share in them; with these the altar is more privileged than the priests. These three menahot are burned and no part of them is eaten. This is always the case with menahot that are brought by priests. In addition, it is also true of the minhah brought with the libations (Numbers 15:4ff).", + "The two loaves and the showbread are eaten by the priests and the altar has no share in them; with these the priests are more privileged than the altar. The two loaves brought on Shavuot (Leviticus 23:20) and the showbread (Leviticus 24:9) are completely eaten by priests and no part is burned on the altar." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah teaches how the oil was put into the minhah.", + "All menahot that are prepared in a vessel require three applications of oil: pouring, mixing and putting oil in the vessel, before they are completed. The menahot that are prepared in a vessel are those prepared in a pan or a griddle. These menahot had oil put in them on three occasions. First some oil was poured into the vessel, and then he would pour the flour into the vessel. Then he would pour more oil onto the flour and mix it all together. Then he would add in lukewarm water, knead the flour into dough and bake ten loaves. After they were baked he would break them into pieces and pour more oil onto the pieces. Note that the mishnah is in backwards order first they would put oil in the vessel, then they would mix it in with the flour, and the pouring only came at the very end.", + "The [baked] cakes were mixed [with oil], the words of Rabbi [Judah Ha-Nasi]. But the sages say: the fine flour [was mixed with oil]. Rabbi Judah Hanasi disagrees with the rabbis as to when the mixing occurs. According to the Rabbi, the mixing occurs after the cakes have been baked. He then breaks them into pieces and mixes them up with oil. The other sages say that the mixing occurs when the minhah is still flour, before it has been kneaded and baked, as we explained above.", + "The loaves were mixed and the wafers anointed. How did he anoint them? In the form of a “chi.” As explained above, the oil was mixed into the loaves, according to the sages when they were still flour, and according to Rabbi when they were already baked. If the minhah came in the form of wafers, the procedure was slightly different. Here they would anoint the wafers after they were baked by making an X over them. The letter “chi” in Greek is written as an X. [The Greeks would probably prefer that we say that the letter “ex” in English is written as a chi.]", + "And the rest of the oil was eaten by the priests. Whatever was left over from the oil could be eaten by the priests." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah teaches how menahot were broken into pieces once they were baked. This process is referred to in Leviticus 2:6, “Break it into bits and pour oil on it; it is a meal offereing.” Although this verse is stated specifically in reference to a minhah prepared on a griddle, the rabbis extend it to other menahot as well.", + "All menahot prepared in a vessel must be broken into pieces. As stated in the introduction, the rabbis derive from Leviticus 2:6 that all menahot that are prepared in a vessel must be broken into pieces. The remainder of the mishnah describes how this is done.", + "The minhah of an Israelite was folded into two and the two were folded into four, and it was severed [at each bend]. First he takes the flat loaf and folds it into two and then into four. He then severs the loaf at all of the folds. He would take a handful from these pieces (there would be forty of them, since there are ten loaves) and he would throw the handful onto the fires of the altar.", + "The minhah of priests was folded into two and the two were folded into four, but it was not severed. According to the first opinion in the mishnah, a minhah brought by a priest was folded, but it was not severed into pieces. Since the entire minhah was burned, it wasn’t necessary to take out a handful and put it on the altar. It seems that the folding was sufficient to count as having broken it into pieces.", + "The minhah of the anointed high priest was not folded. The Torah does not say that the minhah brought by the high priest has to be broken into pieces, although it is called a “minhah of pieces” (Leviticus 6:14). According to the mishnah, this minhah is not even folded, for it too is totally burned.", + "Rabbi Shimon says: neither the minhah of the priests nor the minhah of the anointed high priest was broken in pieces, since the handful was not taken from them, and whenever the handful is not taken [from a minhah] it is not to be broken in pieces. Rabbi Shimon holds that there is no process of breaking into pieces for any minhah brought by a priest since these menahot are completely burned. There is no need to break them into pieces because the purpose of doing so was to throw some of them pieces onto the altar.", + "The pieces were the size of an olive. When they break the minhah into pieces, each piece should be no smaller than an olive’s worth. Commentators on the mishnah debate whether this is the opinion of Rabbi Shimon or whether everyone agrees." + ], + [ + "All menahot must be rubbed three hundred times and beaten five hundred times. The grains of wheat that will be used for the minhah offering must be rubbed three hundred times and then beaten five hundred times. This process is done in order to remove the husks before the grain is ground into flour.", + "The rubbing and the beating apply is performed with the grains of wheat. Rabbi Yose says: also to the dough. The first opinion holds that the rubbing and beating is performed with the grain, as explained above. Rabbi Yose holds that the same is done with the dough. This is to further refine and perfect the quality of the minhah. According to a different version of the mishnah, Rabbi Yose says that it only applies to the dough and not to the grain.", + "All menahot consist of ten cakes each, except the showbread and the griddle-cakes of the high priest, which consist of twelve cakes each, the words of Rabbi Judah. Whether the menahot consist of loaves or wafers, they make ten cakes. According to Rabbi Judah all menahot are compared with the minhah that accompanies the todah - just as it has ten loaves, so too do all menahot. There are two exceptions, the showbread (see Leviticus 24:5) and the daily minhah of griddle-cakes offered by the high priest (Leviticus 6:13-15). With regard to the latter, the verse does not state that 12 cakes are offered. Rather, the rabbis derive this number midrashically by comparing it with the showbread.", + "But Rabbi Meir says: they all consist of twelve cakes each, except the loaves of the todah and of the nazirite-offering, which consist of ten cakes each. Rabbi Meir says that all menahot consist of twelve-cakes, for they derive the number of cakes from the showbread. The two exceptions are the todah (thanks-giving offering) and the minhah that accompanies the nazirite offering. We shall learn more about these two menahot in chapter seven." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah teaches how much flour was found in various types of menahot.", + "The omer consisted of one tenth [of an ephah of flour] taken from three se'ahs. The minhah of the omer, brought on the sixteenth of Nissan (at the end of the first day of Pesah), consisted of a tenth of an ephah of flour (we shall learn more about the omer in chapter ten). An ephah was equivalent to about 4 liters and in mishnaic measurement, an ephah was equivalent to three seahs. This one-tenth of an ephah was sifted out of three whole seahs of barley. This refined it until it was quite pure. It was necessary to refine the omer so thoroughly because barley grain has a high quantity of waste material.", + "The two loaves consisted of two tenths taken from three se'ahs. The two loaves brought on Shavuot each consisted of two-tenths of an ephah, as is stated in Leviticus 23:17. These two-tenths were sifted out of three ephahs. The reason that less sifting was needed is that these loaves came from wheat and not barley.", + "And the showbread consisted of twenty-four tenths taken from twenty-four se'ahs. Each of the twelve loaves of the showbread consisted of two-tenths of an ephah of flour, as is stated in Leviticus 24:5, for a total of twenty-four tenths. Each tenth would have been sifted from one seah. The reason that less sifting is needed is that unlike the omer and the two loaves which must come from newly harvested barley or wheat, the showbread can come from the older harvest, which has less waste material than the new harvest." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with how well the flour must be sifted for certain minhah offerings.", + "The omer was sifted through thirteen sieves, the two loaves through twelve, and the showbread through eleven. The omer was sifted thirteen times, each time making the flour a bit finer. The two loaves for Shavuot were sifted a bit less and showbread was sifted only (!) eleven times. This accords with what we learned in yesterday’s mishnah the greatest amount of grain was needed for the omer, a little bit less for the two loaves and the least for the showbread.", + "Rabbi Shimon says: there was no prescribed number for them, rather they brought fine flour and sifted it as much as was necessary, as it is said, “You shall take fine flour and bake it” (Leviticus 24:5) [you should not bake it] until it is sifted as much as is necessary. Rabbi Shimon holds that there was no prescribed amount for how much the showbread had to be sifted or how much grain had to be used (yesterday’s mishnah). Rather, whatever was needed was used. He proves this from a verse which states that the flour must be fine, but does not give a prescribed amount." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis chapter deals with the rules regarding the loaves that accompany the thanksgiving offering, the “todah” (see Leviticus 7:12).", + "The todah required five Jerusalem seahs [of flour], which are six wilderness seahs; The amount of flour required for these loaves was five seahs measured with the Jerusalem measure of the seah, which is equivalent to six seahs as they were measured in the wilderness. What this means is that in Jerusalem the measures were 1/6 larger than they were in the wilderness.", + "This is the equivalent to two ephahs, for an ephah is three seahs, or to twenty tenths [of an ephah], ten for the leavened cakes and ten for the matzot. Six wilderness seahs are equivalent to two ephahs, which can be divided up into twenty tenths of an ephah. This comes out to twenty loaves each 1/10 of an ephah. Ten of these were leavened (chametz, see Leviticus 7:13) and ten were matzot (Leviticus 7:12).", + "“Ten for the leavened cakes” one tenth for each cake; Each leavened cake was 1/10 of an ephah (aren’t you grateful for simple math?).", + "“And ten for the matzot” –there were three kinds of matzot: loaves, wafers, and soaked cakes, thus there were three and a third tenths of flour for each kind, three cakes to every tenth. Leviticus 7:12 lists three kinds of matzot: “unleavened cakes with oil mixed in, unleavened flours with oil, and cakes of choice flour with oil mixed in.” So if there were ten of each kind, each would have been 1/3 of a tenth of an ephah.", + "By Jerusalem measure they were thirty kavs, fifteen for the leavened cakes and fifteen for the matzot. The mishnah now provides the amounts according to the Jerusalem measure. In Jerusalem they didn’t count according to ephah and tenths of an ephah but rather according to kavs. A seah is six kav so five seahs are 30 kav.", + "“Fifteen for the leavened cakes”, one kav and a half for each cake. According to this account, there were fifteen kav for the leavened cakes, 1 ½ kav per cake.", + "“And fifteen for the matzot” there were three kinds of matzot: loaves, wafers, and soaked cakes, thus there were five kavs for each kind, two cakes to every kav. When you do the account for the matzot, each kind gets five kav, divided by ten cakes, adds up to ½ a kav per cake." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah deals with two other types of minhah offerings that are similar in amount to the todah: the “basket of matzot” brought on the day that the priests were first consecrated to serve in the Tabernacle (Leviticus 8:26) and the “basket of matzot” brought by the Nazirite (Numbers 6:15).", + "The consecration [minhah] consisted of matzah like the todah: cakes, wafers, and soaked cakes. The minhah offered at the consecration of the priests was the same as the matzot of the todah (see yesterday’s mishnah).", + "The nazirite minhah consisted of two thirds of the matzah of the todah: cakes and wafers, but not soaked cakes. The minhah of the nazirite’s offering consisted of only cakes and wafers. Unlike the todah and the consecration minhah, there were no soaked cakes.", + "Thus there were ten kavs by Jerusalem measure, which are six tenths and something over. Since for the nazirite offering there are only two kinds of matzot and not three, there are only ten kavs needed and not the fifteen for the todah (as we saw in yesterday’s mishnah). Each type of matzah is three and 1/3 tenths of an ephah, so the two types of matzah are 6 and 2/3 tenths of an ephah.", + "From each kind [the priest] took one tenth part as terumah, as it is said, “Out of this he shall offer one of each kind as a gift to the Lord” (Leviticus 7:1: From each type of matzah in the todah and nazirite minhah, the priest takes one tenth as his terumah, his part. This is explicit in Leviticus 7:14 which states that the priest gets one part of each kind, meaning one of the ten cakes, one of the ten wafers and for the todah, one of the ten soaked cakes.", + "“One:” that he may not take what is broken. The mishnah now contains a brief midrash of this verse. The word “one” means that the matzah that he removes should be whole and not broken.", + "“Out of each offering:” that each kind of offering shall be equal, [and] that he must not take [the terumah] from the one kind of offering on behalf of another. “Out of each offering” means that the amount of matzot of each type must be equal ten of each. Furthermore, the priest should not take two of one type and none of another rather he must take one of each type.", + "“It shall go to the priest who dashes the blood of the shelamim:” and the rest was consumed by the owner. Besides the one matzah taken by the priest, the rest of the matzot go to the owner who brings the todah or the nazirite." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with situations in which the loaves that accompany the todah sacrifice are for various reasons not sanctified, meaning that they don’t attain the status of a sacrifice. If one were to make non-holy use of one of the loaves that had not been sanctified, he would not be guilty of making illicit use of Temple property.", + "One who slaughtered the todah within [the Temple court] while its bread was outside the wall, the bread has not been sanctified. If they slaughtered the todah while the bread was still outside of the Temple walls, the bread is not sanctified. Some commentators interpret the walls here to be the walls of Jerusalem.", + "If he slaughtered it before [the loaves] had become crusted in the oven, even if all except one had become crusted, the bread is not sanctified. The todah should be slaughtered only once the bread has been baked. “Dough” turns into “bread” when it is crusted over in the oven. Thus if the loaves were not yet crusted over when the todah is sacrificed, then the loaves are not sanctified.", + "If he slaughtered the todah [intending to eat it] outside its proper time or outside its proper place, the bread is sanctified. If he sacrifices the todah with an improper intent, then the bread is sanctified. However, it becomes “piggul” or “disqualified” just like the todah. In other words, in this case, the bread became sanctified and then disqualified. In the cases in the first two sections, the bread was simply never sanctified.", + "If he slaughtered it and it was found to be terefah, the bread is not sanctified. If the animal is found to be a terefah (an animal that has a defect that would have caused it to die), then the animal was never really a valid sacrifice. Therefore, the bread is not sanctified.", + "If he slaughtered it and it was found to have a blemish: Rabbi Eliezer says: the bread is sanctified. But the sages say: it is not sanctified. In Zevahim 9:3 we learned that Rabbi Akiva said that an animal with a blemish that was put up on the altar is not taken down. In other words, since the animal was slaughtered to be a sacrifice, it remains sanctified. Rabbi Eliezer agrees with this and therefore holds that the bread is also sanctified. The other rabbis disagree and seem to hold like the other opinion in Zevahim, that if an animal with a blemish is slaughtered and put on the altar, it must be taken down. It was never sacred, and neither is the bread.", + "If he slaughtered it under another name, and so, too, if the ram of the consecration-offering or the two lambs offered at Shavuot were slaughtered under another name, the bread is not sanctified. If he slaughtered the todah, or the other sacrifices that are accompanied by bread (the ram of consecration was explained above in mishnah two, and the two lambs offered at Shavuot were mentioned in 2:2), under the wrong name, meaning intending for them to be another sacrifice, then the bread that accompanies them is not sanctified because the sacrifice does not count." + ], + [ + "If a [minhah that is accompanied by] the libations had already been sanctified in a vessel when the animal-offering was found to be invalid: If there is another animal-offering, they may be offered with it; But if not, they are left to become invalid by remaining overnight. The first section deals with the libations and the minhah that accompany an animal sacrifice (see Numbers 15:2ff and see also above 2:4). If the minhah was already sanctified by having been put in a vessel, and then the animal sacrifice was found to be invalid, there are two possible outcomes. If there is another animal-offering that the minhah and the libations can accompany, then they can be offered with it. If not, then the minhah and the libation should be left over night in the Temple. Anything left out over night is invalid and must be burned. This is the way of disposing of the minhah and the libations. Note that they can’t just get rid of them, because they have already attained a holy status by being put in a vessel.", + "The offspring of a todah, its substitute, and the animal which was set apart in the place of the todah which was set apart and was lost, do not require the [accompanying] bread, as it says, “And he shall offer [them] with the sacrifice of thanksgiving (” (Leviticus 7:1; the todah requires the accompanying bread, but its young, what is brought in its place, and its substitute, do not require the accompanying bread. There are three different types of animals related to here. The first is the offspring of a todah, meaning an animal born from an animal that had already been set aside as a todah. The second is a substitute, which refers to an animal that someone tried to substitute for a todah (there is an entire tractate devoted to this subject, so we will learn more there). The third is a replacement todah, one that was meant to take the place of a lost todah, but then the original todah was found. In all of these cases, the animal is holy and must be sacrificed. However, since it is not actually itself a todah, it need not be accompanied by the bread. This is derived from the verse which is read as emphasizing that only the todah requires bread, not other sacrifices that are in various ways derived from the todah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah and the next deal with various laws governing one who vows to bring a todah sacrifice.", + "One who says: “Behold I take upon myself [to bring] a todah”, he must bring both it and its bread from hullin. If he vows to bring a todah, he must bring both it and its bread from hullin, non-sacred, sources. He cannot use second tithe money to purchase it or its bread. We will learn why in tomorrow’s mishnah.", + "[If he said:] “A todah from hullin and its bread from tithe,” he must bring the bread from hullin. If he specifies that he will purchase the todah with hullin money, but that he wants to use second tithe money for the bread, he must still use hullin money to purchase both. When he said that he would bring a “todah from hullin” the word “todah” included the bread, so it too must be brought from hullin. His words “and its bread from tithe” don’t make any difference.", + "[If he said:] “A todah from tithe and bread from hullin,” he may bring. If he says that he wants to bring the todah from tithe, then he may do so. He can also bring the bread from hullin.", + "[If he said:] “A todah, it and its bread from tithe,” he may bring. If he vows to bring both from tithe, he may do so.", + "But he must not bring from grain of second tithe, rather from second tithe money. In the previous case, the animal that he brings for a todah will be purchased with second tithe money. Therefore, the bread should also be purchased with money used to redeem second tithe, and not with grain that was itself set aside to be second tithe. This way both the todah and the accompanying bread come from the exact same source." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah explains why one who says “I take upon myself to bring a todah” must buy the todah with hullin (non-sacred) money and cannot use maaser sheni money. This was the halakhah that we learned in yesterday’s mishnah.", + "From where [is it derived] that if one says, “I take upon myself to bring a todah,” he can bring it only from hullin? This section asks why the mishnah rules that one who vows to bring a todah must purchase it with hullin money.", + "As it is said, “And you shall sacrifice the pesah to the Lord your God, from the flock or the herd” (Deuteronomy 16:. But is not the pesah sacrifice brought only from the lambs and from the goats? Why then is it written, “from the flock or the herd”? The answer is derived from a problematic verse that deals with the pesah sacrifice. The pesah sacrifice, according to Exodus, must be brought only from flock animals, meaning sheep or goats. However, Deuteronomy 16:2 states that it can come from herd animals, such as cows. This is a clear example of biblical verses which contradict each other.", + "It is to compare whatever is brought from the flock and the herd with the pesah: just as the pesah is obligatory and offered only from what is hullin, so everything that is obligatory may be offered only from what is hullin. The mishnah answers that Deuteronomy states “from the flock and the herd” not because the pesah can come from the herd (it cannot) but to compare other sacrifices that come from the flock and the herd with the pesah. The comparison is that whatever sacrifice is obligatory, as is the pesah, must be brought only from hullin sources and not from maaser sheni money. We should note that this makes sense from a practical perspective. If the Torah mandates that I bring a certain sacrifice and it mandates that I bring maaser sheni money and use it to buy food in Jerusalem, combining these two obligations would be cheating the system. Rather, maaser sheni money should be used to buy voluntary sacrifices, sacrifices that I would not otherwise had to have brought.", + "Therefore if a man says, “I take upon myself to bring a todah,” or “I take upon myself [to offer] a shelamim,” since [in these cases] these are obligatory they may be offered only from what is hullin. A todah is usually a voluntary sacrifice. However, in this case once he makes a vow to bring a todah, it is no longer voluntary but rather obligatory. Since he has made it into an obligatory sacrifice, he can no longer purchase the animal with maaser sheni money. In sum, a normal todah can be purchased with maaser sheni money because it is a voluntary sacrifice but a todah brought because of a vow is a mandatory sacrifice and must be purchased with hullin money.", + "The libations in every case may be offered only from what is hullin. The libations that accompany a todah or a shelamim sacrifice must always be purchased with hullin money, even if he explicitly vows to bring the todah from maaser sheni. The reason is that these libations are not eaten, but rather fully sacrificed on the altar. Maaser sheni money must be used to purchase food that will be eaten by people and not sacrifices that go completely to the altar." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah deals with where they would bring flour from for the minhah offerings.", + "All the sacrifices communal or individual may be offered from [produce grown] in the Land [of Israel] or outside the Land, from new [produce] or from the old, except for the omer and the two loaves, which must be offered only from new produce and from [produce grown] in the land. All sacrifices can come from animals raised either in or outside of Israel and similarly all menahot can come from grain grown anywhere. It can also come from new produce or aged produce. There are two exceptions: the omer barley offering brought on the second day of Pesah and the two loaves brought on Shavuot. With regard to the omer it is stated in Leviticus 23:10, “When you come into the land…you shall bring the omer, the first of your harvest.” With regard to the two loaves it states there in verses 16-17, “And you shall offer a new minhah to the Lord, from your dwelling places you shall bring it.” Both of these verses teach that the omer and the two loaves must come from the new harvest and from grain grown in the land of Israel.", + "All [offerings] must be offered from the choicest produce. All offerings must come from choice produce. The mishnah explains where the best grain is grown.", + "And which is the choicest? That from Michmas and Zanoha are “alpha” for the quality of their fine flour; second to them is Hafaraim in the valley. The best grain is grown in two places. Michmas, which is in the territory of Benjamin (I Samuel 13:2) and Zanoha, which is in Judah (see Joshua 15:34). These places are “alpha” the first letter in the Greek alphabet, which means that they are numero uno when it comes to grain. Next best is grain that comes from Hafaraim which is in the territory of Issachar (see Joshua 19:19).", + "The [produce of the] whole land was valid, but they used to bring it from these places. There is a preference to bring grain from these regions, and it was the custom to indeed do so. But if they brought grain from other regions within the land of Israel, it was still valid." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses what kinds of fields are used to grow the grain to make flour for menahot.", + "One may not bring [grain for menahot] from the produce of a manured field or from an irrigated field or from a field stocked with trees. The grain used for the minhah must come from a field that is irrigated by rainwater. It cannot come from a field that requires manure to fertilize it or from a field that is artificially irrigated. It also cannot come from a field that also grows trees because the trees weaken the quality of the field.", + "But if one did bring it [from these] it was valid. While the grain should not be brought from such a field, if it is, the minhah is still valid.", + "How was it prepared? In the first year it was plowed and in the second year it was sown seventy days before Pesah, thus it would produce fine flour in abundance. This section describes how the special field set aside to grow grain for the minhah was prepared. The reason that it was sown before Pesah is that this is the time of the year for sowing fields in Israel.", + "How was it tested? The temple-treasurer used to thrust his hand into it; if some dust came up in [his hand] it was invalid, until it was sifted [more]. This is how the flour was tested to see if it had been sifted well enough to be used for the minhah.", + "If it had become magotty it is invalid. Maggoty (or wormy) flour is obviously not fit to be used in the preparation of the sacred minhah (and it’s a bit gross as well, although I suppose it was hard to avoid in the ancient world)." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses from where and from what they brought the olive oil used in the minhah offering.", + "Tekoa is “alpha” first its oil. Tekoa, which is in the Negev and is mentioned in II Samuel 14:2 has the best oil.", + "Abba Saul says: Second to it is Regev, on the other side of the Jordan. Second to it is Regev, which lies on the other side of the Jordan.", + "The [oil of the] whole land was valid, but they used to bring it only from these places. As with the grain, any oil from olives grown in the land of Israel is valid, but these two places were customary and preferable. Note that Regev is considered to be part of the land of Israel, even though it lies on the other side of the Jordan.", + "One may not bring it from a manured field or from an irrigated field or from olive-trees planted in a field sown with seeds, but if one did bring it [from these] it was valid. These are basically the same rules as we saw in yesterday’s mishnah with regard to the grain. Olive-trees which grown in grain fields are weaker and hence their olives will not be as good.", + "One may not bring anpakinon, and if one did bring it, it is invalid. Anpakinon is a Greek word for olive oil from olives that were not fully ripened. Since this olive oil is of far inferior quality, it cannot be used.", + "One may not bring it from olive-berries which had been soaked in water or preserved or stewed; and if one did bring it, it is invalid. Olive-berries are the small unripe olives. Sometimes they would soak these in water, or preserve them or stew them in order to get oil out of them. Such oil cannot be used for the minhah offering because it too is vastly inferior." + ], + [ + "There are three [periods of gathering in the] olives and each crop gives three kinds of oil. There are three different ways of picking the olives off of the trees, and each way provides three different qualities of oil. The mishnah now lists each way and the quality of oil that is produced in each way.", + "The first crop of olives is when the olives are picked from the top of the tree; they are pounded and put into the basket. Rabbi Judah says: around the basket. This gives the first oil. They are then pressed with the beam Rabbi Judah says: with stones. This gives the second oil. They are then ground and pressed again. This gives the third oil. The first [oil] is fit for the candlestick and the others for menahot. The first picking is done from the olives on the tops of the trees. First they are picked, then crushed and put into baskets. The oil flows from the baskets into a vessel underneath. Rabbi Judah says that the crushed olives are placed around the basket and that the oil will then enter the basket through the holes in the basket. This is the first oil, which I believe we call the extra virgin oil. The second oil comes from what is pressed out of the baskets. The first opinion holds that this pressing is done with a wooden beam, whereas Rabbi Judah (who must have had his own olive press!) says it is done with stones. This is the virgin olive oil, second best. After the first pressing, they would again grind the olives and press them again. This would be the regular olive oil. The first type of oil is good enough to be used for lighting the menorah. The second and third types could be used for menahot.", + "The second crop is when the olives at roof-level are picked from the tree; they are pounded and put into the basket. Rabbi Judah says: around the basket. This gives the first oil. They are then pressed with the beam Rabbi Judah says: with stones. This gives the second oil. They are then ground and pressed again. This gives the third oil. The first [oil] is fit for the candlestick and the others for menahot. The second crop was done with the olives was done with the olives that were at the height of the rooftops. The processing of these olives is the same as that with the first crop.", + "The third crop is when the last olives of the tree are packed inside the house until they become overripe; they are then taken up and dried on the roof they are pounded and put into the basket. Rabbi Judah says: around the basket. This gives the first oil. They are then pressed with the beam Rabbi Judah says: with stones. This gives the second oil. They are then ground and pressed again. This gives the third oil. The first [oil] is fit for the candlestick and the others for menahot. The third crop was done with the olives on the lowest part of the tree. These olives will not ripen on their own on the tree and therefore they are packed inside the house until they become overripe and the oil begins to seep out. Henceforth, their processing is the same as the olives that ripen on the tree." + ], + [ + "The first oil of the first crop, there is none better than it.
The second oil of the first crop and the first oil of the second crop are equal.
The third oil of the first crop, the second oil of the second crop and the first oil of the third crop are equal.
The third oil of the second crop and the second oil of the third crop are equal.
As to the third oil of the third crop, there is none worse than it.
It would have been logical by the following argument that menahot should also require the purest olive oil: if the candlestick, whose [oil] is not for eating, requires pure olive oil, how much more should menahot, whose oil is for eating, require pure olive oil! But the text states, “Pure olive oil of beaten olives for lighting” (Exodus 27:20), but not “pure olive oil of beaten olives for menahot.”
Today’s mishnah is a continuation of yesterday’s. It explains the relative quality of the various pressings we learned about yesterday.
Basically, the first crop yields better oil than the next two, and the first pressings of each crop are better than the others. If two types of oil are equal, then the person can use whichever he wishes, but if better oil is available, that is what he should use.
Section six: The mishnah concludes by noting that it would have been logical for the menahot to require the highest quality of oil and not just the oil used for lighting the menorah. This is logical because the oil used in menahot is “eaten” by the altar, whereas the menorah is not conceived of as “eating” the oil, just burning it. This is an interesting, but not altogether unusual, personification of the altar.
The reason that the halakhah requires the best olive oil for lighting the menorah and not for menahot is that the Torah specifies that the lighting oil must be “pure olive oil” whereas no such specification is made with regard to the oil used for menahot." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nHaving already discussed grain and oil, our mishnah turns its attention to the next element of the minhah, the wine.", + "From where did they bring the wine? Keruhim and Attulim rank are alpha their wine. Second to them are Bet Rimmah and Bet Lavan on the mountain and Kefar Signa in the valley. [Wine of the] whole land was valid but they used to bring it only from these places. The best wine was from two places in the region of Judah, one called Keruhim and the other Attulim. The second best wine came from three other places, Bet Rimmah and Bet Lavan in the mountains of Judah and Kefar Signa which was in the valley of the Judah region. As was the case with the grain and the oil, wine brought from other regions is valid, even though they used to bring from those places.", + "One may not bring it from a manured field or from an irrigated field or from vines planted in a field sown with seeds; but if one did bring it [from these] it was valid. These are the exact same rules we saw in mishnah two with regard to the grain and in mishnah three with regard to the oil.", + "One may not bring wine from sun-dried grapes, but if one did bring it, it was valid. This wine was inferior, but still valid for libations.", + "One may not bring old wine, the words of Rabbi. But the sages permit it. Although old wine is better, it does lose some of its redness, according to Rabbi [Judah Ha-Nasi] and therefore it should not be used for libations.", + "One may not bring sweet wine or smoked wine or cooked wine, and if one did bring it, it was invalid. These types of wine are all invalid for libations, for they are not pure, regular wine.", + "One may not bring wine from grapes suspended [on reeds], but only from the vines growing close to the ground and from well-cultivated vineyards. The grapes used to produce libation wine must be grown on vines close to the ground, and not on reeds used to suspend them in the air, as many vines are grown today. The vines must be well-cultivated and tended to, so as to produce the best grapes possible." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to deal with the quality of the wine used in the libations.", + "They did not put [the wine] in large casks but in small barrels. Larger caskets would distort the taste of the wine, and therefore they were not used.", + "And one did not fill the barrels to the brim so that its scent might spread. If the jug is filled all the way to the brim, the scent escapes and dissipates. Therefore, so that the scent would spread directly from the barrel, they would not fill it to the brim.", + "One may not take the wine at the mouth of the barrel because of the scum, nor that at the bottom because of the lees; but one should take it only from the third or the middle of the barrel. The wine at the top of the jug had frothy scum and the wine at the bottom of the jug had the sediments. The best wine was that found in the middle of the jug, or at least between the top third and the bottom third.", + "How was it tested? The temple-treasurer used to sit nearby with his stick in his hand; when the froth burst forth he would knock with his stick. This is how the temple-treasurer would make sure that the wine they were taking from the jug was not from the top or the bottom of the jug. While they were drawing out the wine, he would sit near by with his stick. When froth started to come out from the jug, he would strike it with his stick, as a sign that they should not take any more wine from that jug.", + "Rabbi Yose bar Judah says: wine on which there is a scum is invalid, for it is written, “They shall be for you without blemish, and their minhah,” and “They shall be for you without blemish, and their libations” (Numbers 28:19-20, 31). Rabbi Yose bar Judah gives the scriptural basis for why wine with scum cannot be used for sacrificial purposes. This is derived by the juxtaposition of the word “without blemish” which in its simple sense refers to the animals, with the beginnings of the next lines which refer to menahot and libations. Through this midrash the rabbis learn that just as the animals must be without blemish, so too the menahot cannot be wormy (see mishnah two) and the wine cannot be smoky (mishnah six) or frothy (our mishnah)." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThe first five mishnayot of our chapter deal with the size of the measuring vessels used in the Temple.", + "There were two dry-measures in the Temple: the tenth and the half-tenth. Rabbi Meir says: a tenth, [another] tenth, and a half-tenth. When it came to measuring dry things, i.e. grain, there were two measuring vessels in the Temple, one that contained a tenth of an ephah, and one that contained half of a tenth. The remainder of the mishnah will explain what they were used for. According to Rabbi Meir, there were three dry-measures. One held a tenth when it was heaped over, and one held precisely a tenth when it was measured out evenly. The heaped over one would be used for all menahot, and the smoothed out one would be used for the griddlecakes of the high priest, which had to be divided into two halves. This was preferable for if they used the heaped over measure to split into two, some of the grain might spill out.", + "For what purpose did the tenth measure serve? By it they used to measure all the menahot. The one-tenth measuring vessel was used for all menahot.", + "One did not measure with a three-tenths measure [the minhah] for a bull or with a two-tenths measure [the minhah] for a ram, rather, one measured them by all by tenths. Some menahot require more than one tenth, but there were not special measuring vessels that held three or two tenths. Rather they would just fill the one-tenth measuring vessel two or three times.", + "For what purpose did the half-tenth measure serve? By it one used to measure the griddlecakes of the high priest [which was offered] half in the morning and the half towards evening. The half-tenth measure was used for the griddle-cakes of the high priest (see Menahot 4:4), half of which was offered in the morning and half in the evening." + ], + [ + "There were seven liquid measuring vessels in the Temple: the hin, the half-hin, the third-hin, the quarter-hin, the log, the half-log, and the quarter-log. The mishnah now begins to list the liquid measurements. The hin contains 12 logs. Each log is about ½ a liter, so a hin is about 6 liters.", + "Rabbi Eliezer bar Zadok says: there were markings in the hin measure [indicating] thus far for a bull, thus far for a ram, and thus far for a lamb. Rabbi Elazar bar Zadok says that they didn’t need to have separate vessels for the parts of the hin. Rather there were markings on the hin measuring vessel that would indicate a half of a hin for a bull, a third of a hin for a ram and a quarter of a hin for a lamb (see Numbers 15). So according to Rabbi Elazar bar Zadok, there would have been only four measuring vessels in the Temple, the hin and the three log measuring vessels.", + "Rabbi Shimon says: there was no hin measure at all, for what purpose could the hin serve? According to Rabbi Shimon, there was no hin measuring vessel, because none of the sacrifices require a wine or oil libation of a hin, so why have one in the first place?", + "But there was an additional measure of one and a half logs by which one used to measure [the oil] for the minhah of the high priest, a log and a half in the morning and a log and a half towards evening. Rabbi Shimon, after having stated that there was no hin measuring vessel, adds in another vessel so that there will be seven, as stated in the beginning of the mishnah. This seems to have been some tradition, which he is unwilling to dispute. The extra vessel was one and a half logs, and it was used for the oil for the high priest’s griddle cakes minhah which was three logs, half used in the morning and half in the evening. This is similar to the half of a tenth measuring vessel used for the grain of his minhah offering, as we saw in yesterday’s mishnah." + ], + [ + "For what purpose did the quarter-log serve? [To measure] a quarter-log of water for the one with skin disease and a quarter-log of oil for the Nazirite. The quarter-log was used to measure the water used in the purification of the person with skin disease (the metzora, see Leviticus 14:5) and the quarter-log of oil used in preparing the cakes and wafers for the nazirite (see above mishnah 7:2).", + "For what purpose did the half-log serve? [To measure] a half-log of water for the sotah and a half-log of oil for the todah. The half-log was used to measure the water for the Sotah, which she will later drink (see Numbers 5:17). It was also the measure used to prepare the cakes that accompany the todah offering (see above mishnah 7:1).", + "With the log one measured [the oil] for all the menahot. Even a minhah of sixty tenths required sixty logs [of oil]. Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov says: even a minhah of sixty tenths required only one log [of oil], for it is written, “For a minhah, and for a log of oil” (Leviticus 14:21). The log was used to measure the oil for all of the menahot, which used a log of oil to accompany each tenth of grain. According to the first opinion, if a minhah has sixty-tenths of grain, it will require sixty logs of oil, one log for each tenth. Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov says that even if a minhah contains sixty-tenths of grain, it only requires one log of oil. He derives this midrashically from a verse concerning the minhah of a person with skin disease.", + "Six [logs] were required for a bull, four for a ram, and three for a lamb; Six logs are ½ of a hin, which we learned in yesterday’s mishnah are the amount of oil for a bull, four are a 1/3 of a hin and three are ¼ of a hin, as we leaned in yesterday’s mishnah.", + "Three logs and a half for the menorah, a half-log for each lamp. The menorah required a total of 3.5 logs, half of a log for each lamp. (I might suggest that if you enjoyed this mishnah, you could make a song out of it for Pesah. Who knows a quarter-log? I know a quarter-log!)." + ], + [ + "One may mix the drink-offerings of bulls with the drink-offerings of rams, or the drink-offerings of lambs with the drink-offerings of other lambs, or those of an individual offering with those of a communal offering, or those of [an offering offered] today with those of [an offering offered] yesterday; The principle here is that the ratio of grain to oil in the minhah offered with bulls is the same as that of the lambs. When it comes to bulls there are six logs of oil for three-tenths of grain, two logs per tenth. With rams it is four logs of oil for two-tenths, so the ratio is the same. Therefore if they are mixed up together, the drink-offerings (grain and oil) are still valid. So too with all of the other offerings listed in this section, as long as the ratio is the same, they are all valid.", + "But one may not mix the drink-offerings of lambs with the drink-offerings of bulls or of rams. The ratio of the grain and oil for a lamb is three logs for a tenth, so these drink-offerings cannot be mixed together with those of bulls or rams.", + "If they mixed these on their own, and they mixed these on their own, and then they were mixed, they are valid. But if before each was mixed by itself [they were mixed together], they are invalid. However, if one first mixes the oil and grain for each offering on its own, and then they become mixed up, they are still valid, and one can offer them on the altar. If the different drink-offerings were first mixed up together before the oil and grain of each offering was mixed up on its own, then they are invalid.", + "Although the minhah of the lamb that was offered with the omer was doubled, its drink-offerings were not doubled. The grain for the minhah that accompanies the lamb that is sacrificed with the omer is double the normal amount (Leviticus 23:13). Normally, there is one-tenth for a lamb, but this lamb is accompanied by two-tenths of grain. Nevertheless, the drink-offerings, meaning the wine and oil, were the same, three logs of oil and three logs of wine, the same as they always are for a lamb." + ], + [ + "All the measures in the Temple were heaped except [that used for] the high priest's [minhah] which included in itself the heaped amount. The measuring vessels used in the Temple were filled up until they were overflowing. The one exception was the measuring vessel used for the high priest’s griddle cakes, which was large enough to contain without overflowing the amount that it would have contained had it actually been overflowing. We should note that this matches Rabbi Meir’s opinion in mishnah one there were three dry-measuring vessels in the Temple, one that contained a tenth and one that contained a tenth and its overflow.", + "The overflow of the liquid-measures was holy, but the overflow of the dry-measures was not holy. Rabbi Akiva says: the liquid-measuring vessels were holy, therefore their overflow was holy too; the dry-measuring vessels were not holy, therefore their overflow was not holy. Rabbi Yose says: it is not for that reason, but because liquids are stirred up and dry-stuffs are not. When vessels are overflowing, the obvious question then becomes, what do we do with the overflow? The mishnah states that the overflow of liquid, meaning wine and oil, is holy and must be treated as such, whereas the overflow of the dry-measures, the grain, is not holy. Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yose disagree as to why the liquid is holy and the grain is not. Rabbi Akiva says that the liquid-measuring vessels were anointed with anointing oil, and thereby became holy. This made anything that was inside them holy as well. The dry-measuring vessels were not anointed, and therefore their overflow was not holy. Rabbi Yose agrees with the halakhah but disagrees with Rabbi Akiva’s reasoning. The liquid overflow is holy because the liquid that overflows was actually at one point in the vessel. There are various different versions of the Hebrew word that I have translated as “stirred up” but they all imply the same thing since the oil or wine was actually in the vessel, it is sanctified. In contrast, the dry overflow was never in the vessel, just on top of it. Therefore it is not holy." + ], + [ + "All the offerings of the congregation and of the individual require libations except the first-born animal, the cattle tithe of cattle, the pesah, the hatat and the asham; But the hatat and the asham of the one with skin disease do require libations.
This mishnah teaches that most sacrifices must be accompanied by the libations of wine, grain and oil that are mentioned in Numbers 15.
Numbers 15 states, “When you enter the land that I am giving you to settle in and would present an offering by fire to the Lord from the herd or the flock, be it burnt offering or sacrifice, in fulfillment of a vow explicitly uttered, or as a freewill offering or at your fixed occasions…” The chapter then goes on to list how much wine, oil and grain must accompany each sacrifice.
From here the rabbis derive that freewill offerings such as the olah, the shelamim and the todah require libations. So too do the communal offerings offered on the festivals. However, mandated offerings, such as the first-born, the tithe, the pesah, the hatat (sin-offering) and the asham (guilt-offering) do not need to be accompanied by oil, wine and grain.
The two exceptions are the hatat and the asham offerings brought by a person with skin disease. Leviticus 14:10 explicitly states, “On the eighth day he shall take two male lambs without blemish, one ewe lamb in its first year without blemish, three-tenths of a measure of choice flour with oil mixed in for a meal offering, and one log of oil.” One of these lambs is a guilt offering and one is a sin-offering." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nFor some sacrifices the person offering the sacrifice must lay his hands on the sacrifice before it is slaughtered. Our mishnah teaches which sacrifices require the laying on of the hands and which do not.", + "None of the communal offerings require the laying on of hands except the bull that is offered for [the transgression by the congregation] of any of the commandments, and the scapegoat. Almost all public sacrifices do not require the laying on of the hands. There are two exceptions to this rule. The first is the bull that is offered if the entire congregation of Israel sins. This is stated explicitly in Leviticus 4:15, “And the elders of the congregation shall lay their hands upon the head of the bull.” The other exception is the scapegoat sent to Azazel on Yom Kippur. Leviticus 16:21 states, “And Aaron shall lay his hands upon the head of the goat.”", + "Rabbi Shimon says: also the he-goat offered for [the sin] of idol worship. Rabbi Shimon adds that also the he-goat offered for idol worship requires the laying on of the hands. This he-goat is mentioned along with the bull in Numbers 15:24. Since the bull requires the laying on of hands, so too does the goat.", + "All the offerings of an individual require the laying on of hands except the first-born, the cattle tithe, and the pesah. Offerings brought by an individual, be they mandatory sacrifices such as the hatat and asham or voluntary ones such as the shelamim or todah, do require the laying on of the hands. The three exceptions are the first-born, the tithe and the pesah, three sacrifices that are often considered exceptional.", + "And an heir may lay his hands [on his father’s offering], and he may bring the libations for it, and can substitute [another animal for it]. If someone’s father dies before his sacrifice can be offered, the heir can lay his hands on the sacrifice in place of the father. He may also bring the libations (wine, grain and oil) if his father had not yet brought them. He also has the ability to substitute another animal for his father’s sacrifice, although as we will learn, the effect of this is to make both animals sacred. There is an entire tractate on this later in Seder Kodashim." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah continues to teach laws regarding the laying of the hands on the sacrifice.", + "All lay hands on the offering except a deaf-mute, an imbecile, a minor, a blind man, a gentile, a slave, an agent, or a woman. Everyone who brings a sacrifice is required to lay his hands on the animal with the following exceptions. 1) The deaf-mute, imbecile and minor. These three categories of people are all assumed not to have “da’at”, awareness of the consequences or meaning of their actions. 2) A blind man. Perhaps he was excluded because he couldn’t see what he was doing. 3) A gentile. This is derived from Leviticus 1:2 which begins, “Speak to the children of Israel.” From here the rabbis derive that the laws in this chapter (and elsewhere) refer to Israelites and not Gentiles. 4) A slave is in the same category, for this matter, as a Gentile. 5) An agent the owner himself, or his heir, must lay his hands on the animal. One cannot appoint another to do so in his stead. 5) A woman this is also derived from the verse “the children of Israel” which can be translated “the sons of Israel.” A woman can bring a sacrifice and will often be obligated to do so, but she does not have to lay her hands on it.", + "The laying on of hands is outside the commandment. The laying on of the hands is not part of the commandment, such that if one doesn’t lay on his hands, the sacrifice is invalid.", + "[One must lay] the hands: On the head of the animal, Both hands In the place where one lays on the hands there the animal must be slaughtered; And the slaughtering must immediately follow the laying on of hands. This section provides various instructions as to how the laying on of the hands must be performed. Both hands are placed on the animal’s head (see Leviticus 16:21). The laying on of the hands is done in the Temple court, the same place where the animal is slaughtered. And it is performed right before the animal is slaughtered." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah compares the rules regarding the laying on of the hands with the rules regarding waving certain sacrifices. It is set up in typical mishnaic fashion, noting that sometimes the rules regarding one action are more stringent than the others, while at other times, the reverse is true.", + "Laying on of hands is [in certain respects] more stringent than waving and waving is [in other respects] more stringent than laying on of hands. This section introduces the rest of the mishnah.", + "For one may perform the waving on behalf of all the others, but one may not perform the laying on of hands on behalf of all the others. This section explains how the rules regarding laying on of hands are more stringent than those governing the waving of the offering. If several people jointly bring a voluntary offering, then one can wave the offering on behalf of the whole group. In contrast, when it comes to the laying on of the hands, each person who shares in ownership of the offering must lay on his hands. We might conceive of this as the difference between something that must be done to the sacrifice (waving) and therefore one can perform it on behalf of all, versus an action that the owner must perform, and therefore, each individual owner must perform it.", + "Waving is more stringent, for waving takes place for offerings of the individual and for offerings of the community, for living animals and for slaughtered animals, and for things that have life and for things that do not have life; but it is not so with laying on of the hands. There are several aspects of waving that are more stringent, or put another way, more broadly applied, than they are for laying on of the hands. Waving is more stringent than laying on of the hands because waving is done with both individual and communal sacrifices (see above 5:6-7) whereas laying on of hands is performed almost exclusively with individual sacrifices (see yesterday’s mishnah). The waving is done on both living and already slaughtered animals and sometimes it is done with grain offerings, such as the omer minhah or the sotah’s minhah. Laying on of the hands is performed only on live animals and not on grain offerings." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThe tenth chapter deals with the Omer.\nIn order to understand this chapter we should explain what was one of the biggest debates between the Pharisees and Sadducees the date of Shavuot. The Torah states that one begins to count the omer “from the day after the Sabbath.” This was interpreted by the Sadducees to mean that the omer was offered on the day after the Sabbath during Pesah. Thus Shavuot, which fell seven weeks later, was always on Sunday. The Sadducees never had to address how to harvest the omer barley on the Sabbath, because in their calendar it was always harvested on the day following the Sabbath. The Pharisees held that “from the day after the Sabbath” refers to the second day of Pesah. This could be on the Sabbath and thus Shavuot could potentially fall on any day of the week.\nWhile there are many possible reasons why this debate was so prominent in the polemics between these two groups, it is possible that Sabbath observance was one of the main issues. We know that the Dead Sea Sect was extremely scrupulous in Sabbath observance and seems to have done anything to avoid any possible desecration of the Sabbath. In their calendar, holidays never fell on the Sabbath. The Dead Sea Sect’s halakhic system is often similar to that of the Sadducees. It is therefore possible that the Sadducees shaped their calendar to avoid having to face the prospect of reaping the omer barley on Shabbat. At the least, we can be certain that to the Sadducees there was never a problem of harvesting the omer barley on Shabbat. In contrast, the Pharisees and later the rabbis were not bothered by this.\nIn our mishnah we may seem some echo of this ancient debate.", + "Rabbi Ishmael says: On Shabbat the omer was taken out of three seahs [of barley] and on a weekday out of five. But the sages say: whether on Shabbat or on a weekday it was taken out of three seahs. In this section, there is a debate concerning how much flour they sifted in order to get the tenth of sifted flour needed for the omer. When the 16th of Nissan fell on Shabbat, they would use three seahs of flour. There is a debate over how much barley was used during the week. According to Rabbi Ishmael, they would use five seahs, so that the barley would be more finely refined. The other rabbis disagree and claim that the procedure on Shabbat was the same as that on the weekday three seahs. In other words, according to Rabbi Ishmael on Shabbat they would use less barley so that less sifting would have to be done, since sifting is prohibited on Shabbat. In contrast, the other sages say that the same amount was used regardless of whether it was Shabbat or not.", + "Rabbi Hanina the vice-high priest says: on Shabbat it was reaped by one man with one sickle into one basket, and on a weekday it was reaped by three men into three baskets and with three sickles. But the sages say: whether on Shabbat or on a weekday it was reaped by three men into three baskets and with three sickles. In this section, there is a debate concerning the reaping procedure. When the omer was reaped on a weekday, all agree that it was reaped by three people, using three sickles, into three baskets. They debate with regard to how it was reaped on Shabbat. According to Rabbi Hanina, who was vice-high priest (not the high priest of vice ☺) on Shabbat, fewer people did the reaping in order to minimize Shabbat desecration. The sages again disagree, insisting that the procedure on the Shabbat is the same as that performed during the week. In my opinion, behind these two debates is a remnant of the old Sadducean/Pharisaic debate. While Rabbi Ishmael and Rabbi Hananya admit that the 16th of Nissan can fall on Shabbat, meaning they use a Pharisaic calendar, they still want to minimize the conflict between harvesting the omer and the Sabbath. The other rabbis insist that this is no conflict at all, and that on Shabbat the omer is harvested in the exact same way as it is every other day." + ], + [ + "The mitzvah of the omer is that it should be brought from [what grows] near by. It was a mitzvah, meaning it was preferable, for the omer to be brought from barley grown close to Jerusalem.", + "If [the crop] near Jerusalem was not yet ripe, it could be brought from any place. However, if this barley was too ripe to be harvested, it could be brought from elsewhere with the land of Israel.", + "It once happened that the omer was brought from Gagot Zerifin and the two loaves from the plain of En Soker. The mishnah records a time when the barley for the omer had to be brought all the way from Gagot Zerifin, which Albeck identifies as being near Lod (near the Ben-Gurion airport). According to another version of this mishnah, the words are “ganot Zerifin” which means the fields near Zerifin. The grain used for the two loaves once came from as far away as En Soker, which is near Shechem (in the northern part of Samaria, or the West Bank)." + ], + [ + "How would they do it [reap the omer]?
The agents of the court used to go out on the day before the festival and tie the unreaped grain in bunches to make it the easier to reap.
All the inhabitants of the towns near by assembled there, so that it might be reaped with a great demonstration.
As soon as it became dark he says to them: “Has the sun set?” And they answer, “Yes.” “Has the sun set?” And they answer, “Yes.” “With this sickle?” And they answer, “Yes.” “With this sickle?” And they answer, “Yes.” “Into this basket?” And they answer, “Yes.” “Into this basket?” And they answer, “Yes.”
On the Sabbath he says to them, “On this Sabbath?” And they answer, “Yes.” “On this Sabbath?” And they answer, “Yes.” “Shall I reap?” And they answer, “Reap.” “Shall I reap?” And they answer, “Reap.”
He repeated every matter three times, and they answer, “yes, yes, yes.”
And why all of this? Because of the Boethusians who held that the reaping of the omer was not to take place at the conclusion of the [first day of the] festival.
This mishnah describes the procedure that preceded the harvesting of the omer.
The end of this mishnah explains why they would make such a spectacle out of what is quite a simple act. The Boethusians were a group of Jews either similar to or identical with the Sadducees. As I stated in my introduction to yesterday’s mishnah, the Sadducees held that the omer was harvested on the Sabbath that followed the first day of the festival, and not on the evening after the first day of the festival.
According to our mishnah, they would make an exaggerated demonstration of reaping the omer in order to let people know that the halakhah was according to the Pharisees and not the Sadducees. These acts were polemical acts against a rival group of Jews. We should note that we don’t know if this was how the omer was actually harvested in Temple times. All we know is that this is how the rabbis envisioned it happening.
The mishnah itself is easily understood and therefore I have not commented below." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah completes the description of how the omer was offered.", + "They reaped it, put it into the baskets, and brought it to the Temple courtyard; After harvesting the barley, they would put it into baskets and bring it to the Temple courtyard.", + "Then they would parch it with fire in order to fulfill the mitzvah that it should be parched [with fire], the words of Rabbi Meir. According to Rabbi Meir, they would first parch the grain, while it was still attached to the stalks. Parching a minhah offering is mentioned in Leviticus 2:14, “If you bring a minhah of first fruits to the Lord, you shall bring new ears parched with fire.” The rabbis interpret this verse as referring to the minhah of the omer.", + "But the sages say: they beat it with reeds or stems of plants that the grains should not be crushed, and then they put it into a pipe that was perforated so that the fire might take hold of all of it. The other sages say that first they would beat the grain from the stalks, as is normally done with grain. However, they would use soft sticks since the omer came from freshly-harvested barley. Normally, when the grain is more aged, they could use harder sticks. After the grain was separated from the stalks, they would parch it by putting it into a metal pipe which was perforated so that the fire would get in. The rabbis disagree with Rabbi Meir in that the former holds that the stalks were put directly into contact with fire, whereas the sages hold that the parching is done with grains and by using a vessel.", + "They spread it out in the Temple courtyard so that the wind might blow over it. They would then spread it out to cool it off.", + "Then they put it into a gristmill and took out of it a tenth [of an ephah of flour] which was sifted through thirteen sieves. After the grain was cooled, it was ground and then sifted thirteen times, as we learned in mishnah 6:7.", + "What was left over was redeemed and might be eaten by any one; It was liable for hallah but exempt from tithes. Rabbi Akiba made it liable both to hallah and to tithes. The leftover grain not used for the omer could be eaten by anyone, even non-priests. According to the first opinion in the mishnah, the grain was liable for tithes but not for hallah. This is the rule for holy things that have been redeemed they are liable for hallah, but not for tithes. Rabbi Akiva says that it is liable for tithes as well, because he doesn’t consider this grain to have ever been holy. When it was sanctified at the outset, the only part that was really sanctified was the grain that was going to be used for the flour necessary to make the one-tenth. All of the extra grain was never holy, and therefore it is liable for all normal agricultural gifts (tithes and terumah).", + "He then came to the tenth, put in its oil and its frankincense, poured in the oil, mixed it, waved it, brought it near [to the altar], took from it the handful and burnt it; and the remainder was eaten by the priests. He would then complete the process of offering the omer by adding in the oil and frankincense, mixing it up, waving it and bringing it close to the altar, and then taking a handful and burning it on the altar. The remainder of the 1/10 of an ephah that wasn’t burned is holy and can be eaten only by the priests." + ], + [ + "After the omer was offered they used to go out and find the market of Jerusalem already full of flour and parched grain [of the new produce]; This was without the approval of the rabbis, the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Judah says: it was with the approval of the rabbis.
After the omer was offered the new grain was permitted immediately, but for those that lived far off it was permitted only after midday.
After the Temple was destroyed Rabbi Yohanan ben Zakkai decreed that it should be forbidden throughout the day of the waving.
Rabbi Judah said: is it not so forbidden by the law of the Torah, for it is said, “Until this very day?”
Why was it permitted for those that lived far away from midday? Because they know that the court would not be negligent with it.
Leviticus 23:14 states, “Until that very day, until you have brought the offering for your God, you shall eat no bread or parched grain or fresh ears [of the new crop].” Our mishnah discusses when people can begin to eat of the new crop of grain.
Section one: The mishnah describes the markets of Jerusalem as being full of grain from the new crop, immediately after the omer was offered. It is easy to imagine the merchants waiting and waiting until finally they could begin selling this new grain.
The debate between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Judah was over whether the rabbis approved of this. Rabbi Meir says they disapproved of the practice because if the merchants were already selling the new grain so quickly, it is clear that they had harvested it and ground it before the omer was offered. The fear was that they might also end up eating it before the omer. Therefore, the rabbis disapproved of this practice, although they did not successfully stop it. Rabbi Judah says that they were not concerned lest people eat it before it was permitted.
Section two: As stated above, after the omer was offered, it was permitted for people to eat the new grain. People who lived far away from the Temple could not know when the omer was offered, so they must wait until half the day had passed to begin to eat of the new harvest. Below, in section five, the mishnah explains that they do not have to wait until they have actually heard that the court offered the omer because they can assume that the court would make sure that the omer was offered by this time.
Section three: After the Temple was destroyed, Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai forbade eating the new harvest for the entire day of the 16th of Nissan. This day is called “the day of waving” because that is when the omer was waved. It seems that Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai reasoned that when no omer could be offered, it would be legal to eat the new harvest immediately when the day began. However, if we allowed such a practice people might forget that at one point it had been forbidden to eat until the omer was offered. Therefore, he was overly stringent and forbade people to eat for the whole day.
Rabbi Judah says that there was no need for such a “takkanah” a rabbinic ordinance. The Torah itself says that the new harvest is forbidden until “that very day.” To Rabbi Judah this clause refers to a time when there is no Temple. When there is a Temple, the new harvest is forbidden until “you have brought the offering,” the second clause of the verse. Since the Torah already encompasses instructions as to how to act in the absence of the Temple, there was no need for rabbinic legislation." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah continues to deal with when new grain can be eaten and used in a sacrifice.", + "The omer permits [the new grain] throughout the land, and the two loaves permit it in the Temple. As we learned in yesterday’s mishnah, once the omer is offered, it permits the eating of new grain throughout the land. However, this does not permit using new grain for a sacrifice. New grain could be used in the Temple only once the two loaves offered on Shavuot (see Leviticus 23:16) had been offered. In practice, this means that new grain would be permitted outside of the Temple about seven weeks before it was permitted in the Temple.", + "One may not offer minhahs, first-fruits, or minhahs that accompany animal offerings, before the omer. And if one did so, it is invalid. Before the omer is offered, no sacrifices can be brought from the new grain, because they cannot be eaten by anyone. This includes all types of minhahs, the first-fruits (bikkurim) as well as any minhah that would accompany an animal offering. And if one did offer a minhah from new grain before the omer was offered, the minhah is invalid.", + "Nor may one offer these before the two loaves. But if one did so it was valid. While one should wait to bring sacrifices from the new grain until Shavuot, when the two loaves are offered, if one does bring an offering of new grain between the beginning of the omer and Shavuot the offering is valid, since people can eat the new grain." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThere are five species of grain: wheat, barley, spelt, oats and rye. All other species, such as rice, do not count as grain, and laws that apply to grain do not apply to them. Our mishnah teaches a few general halakhot that are applicable to these five species.", + "Wheat, barley, spelt, oats and rye are subject to hallah. These five species of grain are subject to the laws of hallah (when one kneads a certain amount of them, he must separate hallah and give it to the kohen, if the hallah is pure).", + "And they are reckoned together. These five species are reckoned together for all prohibitions and obligations. Thus if one kneaded together dough made from wheat and dough from barley and when reckoned together there was enough dough to require one to separate hallah, he would be obligated to take out hallah (see Hallah 1:1). The same would be true for prohibitions such as hametz on Pesah and other obligations, such as eating matzah on Pesah.", + "They are forbidden [to be eaten] as new grain before the omer. Before the omer is offered on the 16th of Nissan, these five species are prohibited from the new crop.", + "And they may not be harvested before Pesah. Before Pesah, one is not supposed to even harvest any of the new grain. The Torah states that the omer should be “the first of your harvest” (Leviticus 23:10), implying that this grain should be the first to be harvested.", + "If they had taken root before the omer, the omer permits them; And if not, they are forbidden until the next year's omer. This section determines when grain is considered is to be part of the new crop. If it took root before the omer was offered, then it is part of the pre-omer crop and can be harvested once the omer was harvested. However, if it had just been planted before the omer and had not yet taken root, then one would have to wait for the following year’s omer before it can be harvested." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah brings in exceptions concerning the prohibition of harvesting grain before the omer.", + "[Before the omer] one may reap [grain] in irrigated fields in the valley, but one may not stack it. One doesn’t bring omer grain from grain grown in irrigated fields in the valley because this is poor quality grain. However, the sages did not permit people to stack this grain. The only reason that they did permit harvesting this grain is that there was a fear it would be lost if it was not harvested. Therefore they were lenient when it came to grain that would not have been brought as the omer barley in any case. But there was no reason to be lenient with regard to stacking because it would not cause a loss to wait until the omer to stack the grain.", + "The people of Jericho used to reap [before the omer] with the approval of the sages, and used to stack it without the approval of the sages, but the sages did not protest. Jericho’s fields are in the valley and therefore the rabbis allowed them to reap the grain before the omer was offered. However, the people of Jericho went further and stacked their grain as well. This was a no-no in the eyes of the sages, but despite this, they did not protest.", + "One may reap the unripe grain for cattle feed. Rabbi Judah said: When is this so? If one had begun to reap it before it had reached a third of its growth. Rabbi Shimon says: one may reap it and feed [his cattle with it] even after it has reached a third of its growth. Unripe grain can be harvested before the omer, if it is to be used for cattle feed. Rabbi Judah says that the grain can be harvested as long as it has not yet reached one third of its growth. Rabbi Shimon is more lenient and allows the grain to be harvested even if it has not yet reached one third of its growth." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe final mishnah of chapter ten concludes with a few more rules governing the prohibition of harvesting grain before the 16th of Nissan and a few last rules with regard to the omer.", + "One may reap on account of the saplings or in order to make a house for mourners or in order not to interrupt the bet hamidrash. Generally, it is prohibited to harvest grain before the harvesting of the omer on the 16th of Nissan. This section provides a few exceptions to this rule, cases where the person is harvesting the grain not in order to use the grain but in order to clear the area. If he needs to make room in the field for the saplings to grow, he may clear the grain. He need not suffer the loss of the saplings, due to the prohibition of harvesting before the omer. He may also clear the grain in order to make room for either a place for mourners to gather or for sages to gather in order to study in a bet midrash. It is interesting to note that according to this source, study seems to have taken place in open fields. It is unclear whether a structure would have been built in the fields or not.", + "One may not bind them in bundles but one may leave them in small heaps. When a person is allowed to harvest grain before the omer, he may not bind the stalks into bundles as is normally done. This would make it seem like he was harvesting them for food, which is prohibited. Rather, he may leave them in small heaps on the ground and collect them later when the omer has already been harvested.", + "The mitzvah of the omer is that it should be brought from the standing grain. If this cannot be found he may bring it from the sheaves. It is a mitzvah, meaning it is preferable to bring the omer from freshly harvested grain. It is preferable that on the 16th at night they should go out and harvest grain in order to bring it as the omer sacrifice. If this is impossible because there is no grain to harvest, it can be brought from already harvested grain, that has already been put into bundles.", + "The mitvah is that it should be brought from moist ( grain. If this cannot be found he may bring it from dry grain. It is best that if one bring bundles, they still be fresh (moist). However, if there are no moist bundles, he can bring the omer offering even from already dry grain.", + "The mitzvah is that it should be reaped at night. If it was reaped at day it is valid. The omer should be offered at night on the 16th of Nissan (see mishnah three), but if they wait until the day, it is still valid.", + "And it overrides the Shabbat. This polemical chapter ends by reminding us what we learned in the beginning of the chapter harvesting the omer overrides the Sabbath. As a reminder, non-Pharisaic sects during the Second Temple period seem to have shaped their calendar so as to avoid, as much as possible, conflicts between holidays and Shabbat. The Pharisees and later the rabbis took an opposite route and demonstratively declared that if there is such a conflict, the holiday sacrifices nearly always override the Sabbath. The editors of the Mishnah end this chapter by emphasizing exactly this point one can harvest the omer even on Friday night." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with the baking of the two loaves used on Shavuot (see above 10:6) and the showbread (see above 6:5-7).", + "The two loaves [of Shavuot] were kneaded each on its own and baked each on its own. The [cakes of the] showbread were kneaded each on its own and baked two at a time. The two loaves used on Shavuot (Leviticus 23:17) must be kneaded on their own and baked on their own. However, the cakes used for the showbread (Leviticus 24:5-9) must also be kneaded on their own, but they are baked two at a time. These rules are derived through midrashic readings of various verses.", + "They were prepared in a mould, and when they were taken out from the oven they were again put in a mould lest they become damaged. The cakes of the showbread were baked in a mould to give them a specific shape. After they were taken out of the oven, they were put into another mould so that they would not break." + ], + [ + "Both the two loaves and the showbread their kneading and their shaping were performed outside [the Temple Court], and their baking was inside. According to the first opinion, the two loaves and the showbread are to be prepared outside of the Temple and then baked in the Temple.", + "And they do not override the Shabbat. Baking these loaves does not override the Shabbat, because they can be done before Shabbat. As we shall see in tomorrow’s mishnah, things override the Shabbat only if they can only be done on Shabbat. If they can be done on another day, then they don’t override the Shabbat.", + "Rabbi Judah says: all of these were performed inside [the Temple Court]. Rabbi Judah disagrees with the first opinion, and holds that the kneading and shaping were also performed inside the Temple Court.", + "Rabbi Shimon says: One should always accustom himself to say, “The two loaves and the showbread were valid whether made in the Temple Court or in Bet Pagi.” Rabbi Shimon says that it doesn’t matter whether they were baked in the Temple or outside in a place called Bet Pagi, a place where many priests lived. Rabbi Shimon’s words “one should always accustom himself to say” are quite unusual and I have not found them elsewhere in the Mishnah. They seem to mean that Rabbi Shimon finds this halakhah to be quite important and worthy of memorization, more than other halakhot in the Mishnah. It is unclear why this halakhah is singled out." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses the “griddle cakes” offered daily by the High Priest (Leviticus 6:13-15).", + "The high priest’s griddle cakes: their kneading, their shaping, and their baking were performed within [the Temple Court], When it comes to the high priest’s griddle cakes, all agree that they must be prepared and baked in the Temple. The reason is that these griddle cakes are anointed with oil in the Temple. This makes them holy and they cannot subsequently be taken out to be kneaded, shaped or baked outside the Temple.", + "And they override the Shabbat. These cakes were offered every day. Therefore, these three actions, which are performed on the same day that they are offered, can be performed on the Shabbat. As Rabbi Akiva says in section four, any action that cannot be performed the day before, overrides the Shabbat.", + "The grinding [of the grain for it] and the sifting did not override the Shabbat. However, grinding grain to make these cakes and sifting the grain to make the flour are not essential parts of the minhah offering. Rather they are preparatory acts, and therefore they can be performed on Friday. As Rabbi Akiva states, anything that can be done before Shabbat, does not override Shabbat.", + "Rabbi Akiva said a general rule: any work that can be done on the eve of Shabbat does not override Shabbat, but that which cannot be done on the eve of Shabbat does override Shabbat. This is the general rule that governs when something overrides the Shabbat." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nMost of this mishnah deals with how the two loaves for Shavuot and how the showbread were made.", + "All menahot require a vessel [for works that are performed] within, but do not require a vessel [for those works that are performed] outside. This section provides a general rule regarding which works in preparation of a minhah are performed with a ministering (holy) vessel and which are not. Any work performed within the Temple, such as kneading, arranging and baking, needs to be done in a ministering vessel. However, any work performed outside of the Temple does not need to be done in a ministering vessel.", + "How so? The two loaves were seven handbreadths long and four wide and their horns were four fingerbreadths. Usually the words “how so” mean that this section is an explanation of that which comes before it. However, in this case section two does not explain section one. Either the words shouldn’t be here, and they are missing in some manuscripts, or they simply mean that this section explains how one makes the two loaves and the showbread. The “horns” of the two loaves and showbread can be explained in two ways. Some explain that they would take a piece of dough and stick it on the ends of the bread to make it look like horns. Others explain that this “seven fingerbreadths” actually refers to the height of the loaves.", + "The [cakes of the] showbread were ten handbreadths long and five wide and their horns were seven fingerbreadths. The showbread cakes were slightly larger than the two loaves for Shavuot.", + "Rabbi Judah says: lest you err [remember but the words] “zadad yahaz.” Rabbi Judah provides a mnemonic device to remember the size of each type of loaf. For the two loaves the mnemonic is “zayin” (7), “daled” (4), “daled” (4). For the showbread the mnemonic is “yod” (10), “heh” (5) and “zayin” (7).", + "Ben Zoma says: “And you shall set upon the table showbread (lehem before me continually:” panim signifies that it should have faces. Rabbi Shimon makes a midrash on why it is called “lehem panim.” “Panim” can mean face, so Rabbi Shimon interprets the word to mean that the cakes each have a face, meaning a side. This seems to mean that the cakes were not flat." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah describes how the showbread was placed on the table.", + "The table was ten handbreadths long and five wide; the showbread was ten handbreadths long and five wide. Each cake was placed lengthwise across the breadth of the table, and two and a half handbreadths were turned up at either side so that its length filled the entire breadth of the table, the words of Rabbi Judah. Exodus 25:23 says that the table was two cubits in length and one cubit in width. According to Rabbi Judah, in the Temple each cubit was five handbreadths, so the table was ten by five handbreadths. Each cake was ten handbreadths long and five wide. When they would make the cakes, they would fold them up two and half handbreadths on either side, so that each cake would be five handbreadths long and five wide. They would then stack them on the table, six on each pile, thereby filling up the table.", + "Rabbi Meir says: the table was twelve handbreadths long and six wide; the showbread was ten handbreadths long and five wide. Each cake was placed lengthwise across the breadth of the table, and two handbreadths were turned up at either side; and there was a space of two handbreadths between [the two sets] so that the wind could blow between them. According to Rabbi Meir, in the Temple each cubit was six handbreadths. This means that the table was 12 x 6 handbreadths. They would fold up the cakes two handbreadths and in between the piles there was an empty space of two handbreadths (since the table was twelve and the width of each pile only five). This space allowed the wind to blow in between the loaves to cool them off.", + "Abba Shaul says: there they used to put the two dishes of frankincense for the showbread. They said to him: Has it not already been said, “And you shall put pure frankincense upon [al] each row” (Leviticus 24:7)? He replied, But has it not also been said, “And next unto [al] him shall be the tribe of Manasseh” (Numbers 2:20)? Abba Shaul says that in between the two piles of loaves they would put the two dishes of frankincense (see Leviticus 24:7). The other sages disagree with Abba Shaul because the verse says “on each row” which means that the frankincense should be placed on top of the cakes and not in between them. However, Abba Shaul replies that the Hebrew words “al” can also mean “next to” as it does in Numbers 2:20. Therefore, he can interpret the verse to mean “next to the rows.”" + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to deal with the table upon which was placed the showbread.", + "There were there four golden props [at the corners of] the table, each split at the top, which supported the cakes, two for the one row and two for the other row. On the table were four props, one at each corner, whose heads were split into two. Each row had two split props to support it on each side.", + "And there were twenty-eight rods, each [shaped] like the half of a hollow reed, fourteen for the one row and fourteen for the other row. The bottom hallah was placed directly on the table. The next four hallot were each placed on three rods and the top hallah was placed on two rods. It needed less support because it was on top.", + "Neither the placing of the rods nor their removal overrode the Shabbat, but [a priest] used to enter on the day before Shabbat, pull out the rods, and place them parallel with the length of the table. Setting up the rods and removing them from the old bread does not override the Shabbat. Rather, a priest would pull out the old rods on the day before the Shabbat and place them on the table. On Shabbat, when the new loaves were put out, they were placed directly on the table. They were only put onto the rods when Shabbat was over.", + "Every article that stood in the Temple was placed with its length parallel with the length of the House. Everything in the Temple had its length go from east to west, as was the length of the Temple. This line was brought here in this mishnah to teach that the length of the table was also east-west." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with the ceremony of the showbread, bringing in the new loaves and taking out the old. This would occur once a week on Shabbat. The old bread would lie there for the entire week until new loaves were brought and the old ones were distributed to the priests.", + "There were two tables inside the sanctuary, at the entrance of the Temple, the one of marble and the other of gold. On the table of marble they laid the showbread when it was brought in, and on the table of gold they laid the showbread when it was brought out, since we raise [the status] of what is holy and we don’t lower it down. And within [the sanctuary] there was a table of gold on which the showbread lay continually. There were three tables, two outside of the sanctuary and one within. The showbread was baked on Friday and then placed on a marble table for it to cool down. When the bread that had been within the sanctuary was brought out, it was placed on a gold table to be distributed to the priests. This table had to be of gold, because the bread had been on the gold table all week, inside the sanctuary. Once the bread had been on a golden table, it could no longer be put on a table made of material lesser than gold. The third table was where the showbread lay all week, inside the sanctuary.", + "Four priests entered: two bearing the two rows [of the showbread] in their hands and two bearing the two dishes [of frankincense] in their hands; And four went in before them, two to take away the two rows [of the showbread] and two to take away the two dishes [of frankincense]. Those who brought them in stood at the north side facing the south, and those who took them away stood at the south side facing the north. These withdrew [the old] and the others laid down [the new], the handbreadth of the one being by the side of the handbreadth of the other, as it is said, “Before me continually” (Exodus 25:30). Rabbi Yose says: even if these [first] took away [the old] and the others laid down [the new later on], this too fulfills the requirement of continually. The mishnah now describes the process through which the old showbread was removed and the new showbread was laid on the table. The important issue here is that the golden table within the sanctuary should never be without the bread upon it. Thus, while two priests slide the showbread off of one side, the other two priests place the new showbread on the other side. We can see that this ceremony was done with much pomp and circumstance and probably made a great impression upon those priests who saw it performed. Rabbi Yose holds that “continually” does not mean that the table cannot go for even a moment without the showbread. Rather, “continually” means that the table should not be empty overnight (this is explained in the Talmud).", + "They went out and laid [the old bread] on the table of gold that was in the sanctuary [at its entrance]. They then burned the dishes [of frankincense] and the loaves were distributed among the priests. Upon bringing the showbread and frankincense out of the sanctuary, they would distribute the bread to the priests and burn the frankincense.", + "If Yom Kippur fell on a Shabbat the cakes were distributed in the evening. If Yom Kippur fell on Shabbat, and it was impossible to eat the showbread because of the fast, they would distribute the loaves at night.", + "If it fell on a Friday the he-goat of Yom Kippur was eaten in the evening. The Babylonian [priests] used to eat it raw for they were not fastidious. If Yom Kippur fell on Friday, the he-goat (see Numbers 29:11) had to be eaten by the priests that night. The Babylonian priests, meaning the priests who returned to the Land of Israel after the Babylonian exile had strong stomachs and could eat the goat raw. The reason that they had to do this is that it was impossible to cook it on Friday because of Yom Kippur or on Shabbat. Since it had to be eaten that night, there was no other option but to eat it raw (wouldn’t that make an interesting break-fast, a lot more exciting than bagels and danish!). As an interesting aside, the Rambam proves from our Mishnah that in talmudic times, Yom Kippur could fall on Friday. Today, since we have a set calendar, Yom Kippur can no longer fall on Friday or on Sunday, although it can fall on Shabbat." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe showbread and frankincense are supposed to be arranged on the table on Shabbat and removed the following Shabbat, when the frankincense is burned. The showbread can be eaten that day and the following night.\nOur mishnah discusses cases in which this precise order was not followed, and the consequences.", + "If he arranged the showbread on Shabbat and the dishes [of frankincense] on the day after Shabbat, and burned the dishes [of frankincense] on the [next] Shabbat, it is not valid, and one is not liable over it for piggul, remnant, or uncleanness. The dishes of frankincense must be left on the showbread for the entire week that the showbread is on the table. So if the priest set up the showbread on Shabbat, as he was supposed to do, but didn’t put the dishes of frankincense on the table on Shabbat, but rather the next day, then the bread and the dishes are invalid. If he later burned the frankincense with the intent of eating the showbread the day after Shabbat, then the loaves are not piggul (see 2:2 concerning piggul of the showbread. Piggul is the status of a sacrifice that was offered with the intent of eating after it should no longer be eaten), since the frankincense was already disqualified by not having been placed on the table at the correct time. Similarly, if he eats the showbread after Shabbat, he is not liable for the transgression of “remnant.” Finally, if he eats the bread while impure or while it is impure, he is not liable for eating the bread in impurity, because he is only liable for eating valid showbread. In other words, since the showbread was never valid, he is not liable for any of the potential transgressions.", + "If he arranged the bread and the dishes [of frankincense] on Shabbat and burned the dishes of frankincense on the day after Shabbat, it is not valid, and one is not liable over it for piggul, remnant, or uncleanness. In this case, he arranged the bread and dishes of frankincense at the correct time, but he didn’t burn the frankincense on the following Shabbat, as he was supposed to do. Rather he burned them the day after. This disqualifies the frankincense and the bread, and again he is not liable in this case for any possible transgression of piggul, remnant or eating while impure or while the bread is impure.", + "If he arranged the bread and the dishes [of frankincense] on the day after Shabbat and burned the dishes [of frankincense] on the [next] Shabbat, it is not valid. What should he do? He should leave it until the following Shabbat, for even if it remains many days on the table there is nothing to this. If he arranged the bread and frankincense after Shabbat and then burned the frankincense on the following Shabbat, there is a remedy. What he can do is just leave the bread on the table until the next Shabbat when it will count as that week’s showbread. Leaving it on the table longer than it was supposed to be there (in this case 6 days, and then an entire week) does not disqualify the bread. I should note that the word “invalid” is missing in some versions of this section. Indeed it shouldn’t be here because this showbread is not necessarily invalid, as we learn in the remainder of the mishnah." + ], + [ + "The two loaves were eaten never earlier than on the second day and never later than on the third day. How so? [Normally] they were baked on the day before the festival and eaten on the festival, that is, on the second day. If the festival fell on the day after Shabbat, they would be eaten on the third day.
The showbread was eaten never earlier than on the ninth day and never later than on the eleventh day. How so? [Normally] it was baked on the day before Shabbat and eaten on Shabbat [of the following week], that is on the ninth day. If a festival fell on the day before Shabbat, it would be eaten on the tenth day. If the two days of Rosh Hashanah [fell before Shabbat], it would then be eaten on the eleventh day.
[Baking] overrides neither Shabbat nor the festival.
Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says in the name of Rabbi Shimon, son of the deputy [high priest]: it overrides the festival but not the fast day (Yom.
This mishnah deals with when the two loaves for Shavuot and the showbread were baked and when they were eaten.
Section one: The two loaves for Shavuot were always baked the day before Shavuot, unless Shavuot fell on a Sunday, in which case they were baked on Friday. Therefore, the two loaves were always eaten either on the second day, or at the latest on the third day.
Section two: Normally, the showbread would have been baked the day before Shabbat, and eaten the following Shabbat, on the ninth day. If a festival came before Shabbat, then it would have been baked on Thursday and eaten on Shabbat, the tenth day, and if Rosh Hashanah, which was always two days, came before Shabbat, it would have been baked on Wednesday and eaten on Shabbat, the eleventh day.
Section three: The mishnah explains that the baking of these loaves never overrides Shabbat or the festival. Thus sometimes they will have to be baked earlier.
Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel disagrees and holds that baking the bread could override the festival, but not Yom Kippur. For instance, if the first day of Sukkot falls on Friday, the showbread could be baked on Friday, but if Yom Kippur fell on Friday, the showbread would have to be baked on Thursday." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with “redeeming” holy items. Redeeming is done by transferring the holiness of an item to money. The money then becomes holy and must be used to buy sacrifices or other items for the Temple. The item itself can now be used for secular purposes.", + "If menahot and libation-offerings became unclean before they were sanctified in a vessel, they may be redeemed. If [they became unclean] after they were sanctified in a vessel, they may not be redeemed. Once a minhah or a libation offering (the wine or oil that accompanies a sacrifice) is put into a ministering vessel, it may no longer be redeemed. If it becomes impure at this point, it would have to be destroyed. However, if it becomes unclean before it is put into a ministering vessel, it can be redeemed and used for non-holy purposes.", + "Bird-offerings, the wood, the frankincense, and the ministering vessels, may not be redeemed, for the rule of redemption applies only to [offerings of] beasts. Leviticus 27:11-13 states that if one dedicates an unclean animal to the Temple, the priest evaluates the animal and takes money in place of the animal. This verse, however, was stated only with regard to “beasts” which would include sheep, goats, cows and other mammals. It is not stated in regard to bird-offerings, wood or vessels. Once these are dedicated to the Temple, they may no longer be redeemed." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn this mishnah and in the following one, a person vows to bring a minhah offering, but then does not bring exactly what he vowed to bring. Our mishnah deals with the consequences of acting in such a way.", + "If one said, “I take upon myself [to bring a minhah prepared] on a griddle”, and he brought one prepared in a pan, or “a minhah prepared in a pan”, and he brought one prepared on a griddle, what he has brought he has brought, but he has not fulfilled his obligation. [But if he said, “I take upon myself] to bring this [flour] as a minhah prepared on a griddle”, and he brought it prepared in a pan; or as “a minhah prepared in a pan”, and he brought it prepared on a griddle, it is invalid. A minhah can be prepared either on a pan or on a griddle. Both are valid. Therefore, if a person makes a vow to bring one type of minhah and he brings the other, his minhah is valid and can be offered. It is considered a voluntary offering, and not one in fulfillment of the vow. Since, he has not fulfilled his vow because he vowed to bring a specific type of minhah, he also must bring another minhah in its stead. However, if he has some flour and he vows to use it to make a certain type of minhah, either in a pan or on a griddle, and then he changes it to the other type, the minhah is not valid at all and cannot be offered, because it was supposed to be prepared in the manner he stated.", + "If one said, “I take upon myself to bring two tenths in one vessel”, and he brought them in two vessels, or [he said] “in two vessels,” and he brought them in one vessel, what he has brought he has brought, but he has not fulfilled his obligation. But [if he said, “I take upon myself to bring] these [two tenths] in one vessel”, and he brought them in two vessels, or “in two vessels”, and he brought them in one vessel, they are invalid. Similarly in this case, where he vowed to bring two tenths in either one or two vessels and then he brought in the opposite number of vessels, the minhah is valid but he has not fulfilled his vow because he performed the mitzvah differently from the way he said he would. Again, if he specifies that these specific two tenths of flour will be brought in either one or two vessels, and then he brings them in the wrong number of vessels, they are invalid and cannot be offered.", + "If he said, “I take upon myself to bring two tenths in one vessel” and he brought them in two vessels, and when they said to him, “You vowed to bring them in one vessel”, if he brought them in one vessel, they are valid, but if he still offered them in two vessels, they are invalid. In these cases, the priests tell him that he is offering the minhah in the wrong number of vessels. If he changes the minhah back to the correct number of vessels, it is valid and he has fulfilled his obligation. However, if he nevertheless offers the minhah in the wrong number of vessels, it is invalid. In this case, it cannot be considered a voluntary offering, since he didn’t respond, “I will then bring this as a voluntary offering.” Rather, it is clear that he thinks he is bringing the minhah in fulfillment of his vow, in which case it is invalid because he vowed differently.", + "If he said “I take upon myself to bring two tenths in two vessels”, and he brought them in one vessel, and when they said to him, “You vowed to bring them in two vessels”, if he offered them in two vessels they are valid; but if he still kept them in one vessel, they are considered as two menahot which have been mixed. Here he vows to bring two tenths in two vessels, and instead brings them in one vessel. If, after having been told that he should have brought them in two vessels, he puts them in two vessels, they are still valid. However, if he keeps them in one vessel, they are treated as two menahot which have been mixed up. This was a situation dealt with in 3:3. If one can take a handful out of each minhah and put it on the altar, then they are valid, but if not they are invalid. The same would be true in section two. If he had said “I take upon myself to bring two tenths in two vessels” and he brought them in one vessel, if they can still be somewhat separated, they would be valid." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nA minhah must consist of a tenth of an ephah of fine wheat flour. It must be accompanied by oil and frankincense. Our mishnah discusses what happens if one vows to bring a minhah that does not fulfill all of these requirements.", + "[If one said,] “I take upon myself to bring a minhah of barley,” he must bring one of wheat. A minhah must come from wheat, not barley. If he vows to bring a barley minhah, he must bring one of wheat.", + "“Of coarse flour,” he must bring it of fine flour. Similarly, if he vows to bring it from coarse flour, he must bring it from fine flour.", + "“Without oil and without frankincense,” he must bring it with oil and frankincense. He must bring the minhah in its normal fashion, with oil and frankincense.", + "“Half a tenth,” he must bring a whole tenth. If he tries to bring less than the prescribed amount, he must bring the prescribed amount.", + "“A tenth and a half,” he must bring two. If he tries to bring 1 ½ tenths, what he has really done is vowed to bring one minhah and a half of a minhah. Since one can’t bring half of a minhah he must bring two full menahot.", + "Rabbi Shimon declares him exempt, because he did not make his offering in the manner in which people usually make their offerings. Rabbi Shimon says that the person is not liable to bring a minhah at all. His vow to bring a minhah does not count, since he didn’t promise to make the offering in the way it is normally made." + ], + [ + "A man may offer a minhah consisting of sixty tenths and bring them in one vessel. As we shall see in the argument below between Rabbi Shimon and the other sages, all agree that a person can voluntary bring a minhah of up to sixty tenths and put it all into one vessel. The rabbis will argue below as to why this is permissible.", + "If one said, “I take upon myself to offer sixty-one tenths,” he must bring sixty in one vessel and the one in another vessel, since the congregation brings on the first day of the festival [of Sukkot] when it falls on Shabbat sixty-one tenths [as a minhah], it is enough for an individual that [his minhah] should be one tenth less than that of the congregation. However, if he offers to bring a minhah of sixty-one tenths, he must put sixty in one vessel and one in another vessel. The number sixty-one is the number of tenths that would have been brought when the first day of Sukkot falls on Shabbat. Fifty-seven would cover the bullocks (13 x 3 tenths), rams (2 x 2 tenths) and lambs (14 x 1 tenth) that the musaf (additional offering), required. Two more tenths are for the tamid (daily) offering and two more tenths are for the musaf of Shabbat. This brings the total to sixty-one. According to the first opinion, if an individual wishes to bring sixty-one tenths, he can only bring up to sixty in one vessel, such that he will have one less than the congregation brings.", + "Rabbi Shimon said: but some of these [sixty-one tenths] are for the bullocks and some for the lambs, and they may not be mixed one with the other! Rather sixty tenths mingles [in one vessel]. Rabbi Shimon points out that these sixty-one tenths are not mixed in together on Sukkot, since they are for different animals. The reason that one can bring sixty tenths in one vessel has nothing to do with the amount brought on Sukkot. Rather sixty tenths of flour can mix with one log of oil, but sixty-one cannot.", + "They said to him: can sixty be mingled [in one vessel] and not sixty-one? The other rabbis question Rabbi Shimon. If sixty-tenths can mix in with one log of oil, then surely sixty-one tenths can also be mixed. Is one extra tenth really going to make that much of a difference!", + "He answered, so it is with all the measures prescribed by the sages: a man may immerse himself in forty seahs of water, but he may not immerse himself in forty seahs less one kortob. Rabbi Shimon responds by simply noting that this is the way that halakhah works. When the rabbis set an arbitrary number, that arbitrary number is mandatory and even the smallest deviation is not accepted. For instance, a mikveh is valid if it has 40 seahs of water. If even the smallest amount, a kortov, is missing, the mikveh is invalid, even though such a small absence would not be at all noticeable. Thus, the rabbis have established that sixty seahs can be mixed in one vessel with one log of oil, but sixty-one cannot.", + "One may not offer one [log], two, or five [logs], but one may offer three, four, six, or anything above six. This section begins a new topic. One can voluntary offer three, four, six or more logs of wine, but not one, two or five, for these numbers are never found in the libation offerings mentioned in the Numbers 14:5-10. Three logs are for a lamb, four for a ram and six for a bullock (see also Menahot 9:3). Any number above six is a possible combination of 3, 4 and 6. For instance, 7 would be a lamb and a ram. Eight would be two rams, nine, three lambs and so on. Thus one can make a voluntary offering of wine consisting of any number higher than six logs." + ], + [ + "One may offer wine but not oil, the words of Rabbi Akiva. But Rabbi Tarfon says: one may also offer oil. According to Rabbi Akiva, while one can make a voluntary offering of wine, one cannot make a voluntary offering of just oil, without an accompanying minhah. Rabbi Tarfon holds that just as one can voluntarily offer wine on its own, so too one can voluntarily offer oil on its own.", + "Rabbi Tarfon said: just as we find that wine is offered as an obligation may be offered as a freewill-offering, so oil which is offered as an obligation may be offered as a freewill-offering. Both Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva agree that one can voluntarily offer wine on its own. And of course, there are situations where one is obligated to bring wine and oil to accompany sacrifices. From here Rabbi Tarfon concludes that just as wine can be brought on its own voluntarily, so too oil can be brought on its own voluntarily.", + "Rabbi Akiva said to him: No, if you say so of wine it is because it is offered by itself even when offered as an obligation, can you say the same of oil which is not offered by itself when offered as an obligation? Rabbi Akiva responds by pointing out a hole in his argument. Wine is brought on its own as an obligation, when it accompanies a sacrifice. Oil, on the other hand, is always mixed in with the minhah offering. Since it is never brought on its own to fulfill an obligation, it cannot be brought on its own voluntarily.", + "Two [men] may not jointly offer one tenth [of flour for a minhah]; but they may jointly offer an olah or a shelamim, and bird sacrifices even a single bird. This section is independent of the previous debate. Two people cannot jointly bring one tenth of flour for a minhah offering. However, they can jointly bring an animal sacrifice, and even jointly bring a bird. The difference between a minhah and an animal offering is derived midrashically." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThe entire thirteenth and final chapter of Menahot is concerned with a person who obligates himself to bring something to the Temple. The issue at hand is how to interpret his words in order to ensure that he fulfills his pledge.", + "[One who says], “I take upon myself to bring a tenth,” he must bring one [tenth]. This is the general and a bit obvious introduction to the rest of the Mishnah. If someone pledges to bring a tenth of flour as a minhah to the Temple, then he must bring one tenth.", + "“Tenths,” he must bring two [tenths]. If he uses the plural, “tenths,” then he must bring at least two tenths, because the minimum number of “tenths” is two.", + "[If he said,] “I specified [a certain number of tenths] but I do not know what number I specified,” he must bring sixty tenths In this case, he remembers having specified a certain number of tenths, but he doesn’t remember how many tenths he specified. We must be concerned that he pledged to bring the maximum number of tenths possible. Therefore, he must bring sixty tenths, which as we learned in 12:4, is the largest number of tenths that a person can bring in one vessel.", + "[If he said,] “I take upon myself to bring a minhah,” he may bring whichever kind he chooses. Rabbi Judah says: he must bring a minhah of fine flour, for that is the distinctive [one] among the menahot. In this case a person pledges to bring a minhah, but doesn’t specify what kind of minhah he intends to bring. As explained in the introduction, and as we shall see in tomorrow’s mishnah, there are five different kinds of menahot. According to the first opinion, the person can bring any minhah because we assume that he didn’t have any specific minhah in mind. In other words, he must have meant to just bring any minhah and therefore that is exactly what he can do. Rabbi Judah says that he must bring a minhah of fine flour, for the Torah calls the minhah of fine flour “a minhah” without any accompanying name (see Leviticus 2:1). When it comes to other types of menahot, they all have an accompanying name, for instance “a minhah baked in an oven” (Leviticus 2:4). We can assume that had he wanted to bring such a minhah, he would have been more specific." + ], + [ + "[If he said] “A minhah” or “a kind of minhah,” he may bring one [of any kind]. Again, this is a general introduction to the rest of the mishnah. If he pledges to bring a minhah or “kind of from the various types of menahot” he must bring one minhah.", + "[If he said] “Menahot” or “A kind from menahot,” he must bring two [of any one kind]. If he uses the plural, he must bring two, because the minimum of a plurality is two.", + "[If he said,] “I specified [a certain kind], but I do not know what kind I specified,” he must bring the five kinds. There are five different kinds of menahot mentioned in Leviticus 2: 1) A minhah of choice flour. 2 + 3) A minhah baked in the oven. There are two kinds of such minhahs: loaves, and wafers. 4) A minhah cooked on a griddle. 5) A minhah cooked in a pan. If he remembers that he specified that he wished to bring a certain type of minhah, but he doesn’t remember what type he specified, he must bring one of each type, lest that is the type that he pledged.", + "Here he remembers what type of minhah he specified, but he does not remember how many tenths he pledged to put in the minhah. As we have seen, a minhah can have anywhere from 1-60 tenths of flour. According to the first opinion, he must bring one minhah of sixty tenths, because that is the maximum amount of tenths that a minhah can consist of. Rabbi works the math out differently. The problem with bringing one minhah of sixty tenths is that the one who made the pledge might have said a minhah with a lower amount, in which case the minhah with sixty tenths would not fulfill his pledge. What he must do is bring a minhah for every number from one to sixty. This way he can be covered for every possibility. I won’t do that math here, but suffice it to say that this forgotten pledge is going to cost him a bundle!" + ], + [ + "[If one said,] “I take upon myself to bring [pieces of] wood,” he must bring not less than two logs. If one volunteers to bring wood to use on the altar, he must bring two logs. This is the amount of wood they put on the altar at one time.", + "“Frankincense,” he must bring not less than a handful. If one volunteers to bring frankincense he must bring at least a handful of frankincense.", + "There are five cases of [not less than] a handful: One who says, “I take upon myself to bring frankincense,” he must bring not less than a handful. One who voluntarily offered a minhah must bring a handful of frankincense with it. One who offered up the handful outside [the Temp] is liable. The two dishes [of frankincense] require two handfuls. The mishnah now lists five cases where the minimum amount is a handful. The first is the case we just encountered in section two. The second case is one who volunteers to offer a minhah. He must bring with the minhah a handful of frankincense, the amount that always accompanies the minhah. The third case is who offers up a handful of incense outside of the Temple. Since a handful is an amount of significance within the Temple, one who offers up this amount outside of the Tempe is liable. The fourth and fifth handfuls are those that accompany the showbread (see above 11:5). Each row of the showbread had a dish of frankincense into which was put a handful of frankincense." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah deals with a person who volunteers to bring an unspecified amount of money as a donation to the Temple.", + "“I take upon myself to offer gold,” he must bring not less than a golden denar. Since the smallest gold coin is a golden denar, the person who pledges to bring gold must bring at least a golden denar.", + "“Silver,” he must bring not less than a silver denar. The same rule applies when it comes to silver.", + "“Copper,” he must bring not less than [the value of] a silver maah. If someone pledges to bring copper, he must bring copper that is equivalent in value to one silver maah. A maah is 1/24 of a sela, and a sela is equivalent to 4 denars, so a maah is 1/6 of a denar.", + "[If he said] “I specified [how much I would bring] but I do not know what I specified,” he must bring until he says, “I certainly did not intend to give so much!” In this case, the person doesn’t remember how much he pledged. He must therefore bring the maximum amount he might have possibly pledged. In other words, we might say to him, “Might you have pledged 10 denars?” If he says yes, then we would say, “Might you have pledged 100 denars?” If he says yes, then the number keeps going up until he hits a number that he knows he definitely didn’t pledge. We should note that in all of these cases we are dealing with a person who honestly wants to fulfill his vow. There is no concern that the person might lie and say “I could not have possibly pledged to bring such a large amount” when he really might have, because if we were concerned about him lying, he could have just lied and said that he remembered having pledged a lower amount. Rather, in all of these mishnayot we are dealing with a person who honestly wants to figure out how much money he owes to the Temple. " + ], + [ + "[If one said,] “I take upon myself to bring wine,” he must bring not less than three logs.
“Oil,” he must bring not less than one log;
Rabbi says: not less than three logs.
[If one said,] “I specified [how much I would offer] but I do not know how much I specified,” he must bring that quantity which is the most that is brought on any one day.
Today’s mishnah deals with one who has volunteered to bring wine or oil.
Section one: If he volunteered to bring wine, he must bring at least three logs of wine, which is the minimum amount of any of the libation offerings that accompany animal sacrifices (see above 12:4).
Section two: There is a debate about one who volunteers to bring oil. According to the first opinion, he must bring at least one log because an unspecified minhah is one tenth of fine flour (see 12:3), which requires one log of oil (see 9:3).
However, Rabbi [Judah Hanasi] says that he must bring three logs of oil, for that is the minimum amount of oil used in any of the libation offerings that accompany animal sacrifices (see 12:4). In other words, the first opinion holds that he might have referred to the oil that accompanies a minhah which is only a log, whereas Rabbi holds that we must be concerned lest he was volunteering the amount of oil that accompanies an animal sacrifice, which is three logs." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah deals with a person who pledges to bring an olah, a wholly burnt offering, but does not clarify what type of animal he wishes to bring. The laws of the olah are found in Leviticus 1.", + "[If one said,] “I take upon myself to offer an olah,” he must bring a lamb. Rabbi Elazar ben Azaryah say: [he may bring] a turtle-dove or a young pigeon. According to the first opinion in this section, if a person offers to bring an olah he must bring at minimum a lamb, which is the lowest level of olah that comes from a beast (a behemah). This opinion assumes that when he stated that he wished to bring an olah, he must have had a behemah in mind. Rabbi Elazar ben Azaryah believes that it is also possible that he had a bird olah in mind (see Leviticus 1:14ff). Therefore, he can bring a bird, either a turtle-dove (and a partridge in a pear tree, I can’t help it!) or a young pigeon, both of which are valid for bird olahs.", + "[If he said,] “I specified a beast of the herd but I do not know what it was I specified,” he must bring a bull and a calf. In this case he knows that he specified a herd animal (and not a flock animal) but he is not sure which animal specified. Therefore he must bring both a bull (an adult of two or three years) and a calf (one year old). He can’t just bring one lest he volunteered to bring the other and he wouldn’t fulfill his obligation by bringing the other one. Note that he need not bring female animals because only male animals may be offered as an olah.", + "[If he said, “I specified] a beast of the cattle but I do not know what it was I specified,” he must bring a bull, a bull calf, a ram, a he-goat, a he-kid, and a he-lamb. “Cattle” means in Hebrew domesticated animals. This is a broader category than “herd” because it includes flock animals. Therefore, it is possible that he pledged an animal either from the herd (bull or bull calf) or from the flock. These include the ram (two years old), the he-goat (two years old), a he-kid (one year old) or a he-lamb (one year old).", + "[If he said,] “I specified [some kind] but I do not know what it was I specified,” he must add to these a turtle-dove and a young pigeon. If he has no idea what he pledged, then he must also bring bird offerings, both a turtle-dove and a pigeon. This poor shlepper is going to have to bring 8 animals! Let this be a warning if you pledge to bring an olah, try to remember what animal you pledged." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn this case he pledged to bring a todah (thanksgiving offering) or a shelamim (well-being offering). The difference between these and the olah that we learned about in yesterday’s mishnah is that these sacrifices can also be female. Therefore, in certain circumstances he may have to bring a lot more animals.", + "[If one said,] “I take upon myself to offer a todah or a shelamim,” he must bring a lamb. This is the same rule as found in section one of yesterday’s mishnah.", + "[If he said,] “I specified a beast of the herd but I do not know what it was I specified,” he must bring a bull and a cow, a bull calf and a heifer. This is also the same as yesterday’s mishnah, except here he must be concerned lest he pledged to bring a female animal. Thus he must bring a bull and a cow (female) and he must bring a bull calf and a heifer (a young female).", + "[If he said, “I specified] a beast of the cattle but I do not know what it was I specified,” he must bring a bull and a cow, a bull calf and a heifer, a ram and a ewe, a he-goat and a she-goat, a he-kid and a she-kid, a he-lamb and a ewe-lamb. So too here, where he might have pledged a flock or herd animal, he must bring female animals as well. This will be very expensive as he will have to bring 12 animals, any of which might have been his pledge." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah establishes the minimum value of the animals that one has to bring when one has pledged to bring a specific animal.", + "[If he said,] “I take upon myself to offer an ox,” he must bring one with its drink-offerings to the value of a maneh. “A calf,” he must bring one with its drink-offerings to the value of five selas. “A ram,” he must bring one with its drink-offerings to the value of two selas. “A lamb,” he must bring one with its drink-offerings to the value of one sela. This section sets standard values for animals that one might pledge to bring as a sacrifice. If he pledges to bring an animal without specifying an amount, then the mandatory value of the animal includes the value of the drink-offerings (wine, oil and grain) that must accompany the animal. Thus the ox and its drink-offerings must be worth a maneh, which is 100 denar. The calf and its drink-offerings must be worth only five selas which is equivalent to twenty denar. The ram must be worth ten denars, and the lamb must be worth only five denars.", + "If he said “An ox valued at one maneh,” he must bring one worth a maneh apart from its drink-offerings. “A calf valued at five selas,” he must bring one worth five selas apart from its drink-offerings. “A ram valued at two selas,” he must bring one worth two selas apart from its drink-offerings. “A lamb valued at one sela,” he must bring one worth one sela apart from its drink-offerings. If he specifies the value of the animal, then he must bring an animal worth that amount and on top of that, the requisite drink-offerings.", + "[If he said, “I take upon myself to offer] an ox valued at a maneh,” and he brought two together worth a maneh, he has not fulfilled his obligation, even if one was worth a maneh less one denar and the other also was worth a maneh less one denar. If he pledges to bring an ox worth a maneh, he cannot bring two oxen that together add up to one maneh. Even if each ox is worth 99 denar, he has not fulfilled his obligation because he stated that he would bring one ox worth one maneh (100 denar).", + "[If he said] “A black one” and he brought a white one, or “a white one” and he brought a black one, or “a large one” and he brought a small one, he has not fulfilled his obligation. If he specified the color of the animal that he was going to bring, he cannot bring one of a different color. Similarly, if he pledges to bring a large animal, he cannot bring a smaller one.", + "[If he said] “a small one” and he brought a large one, he has fulfilled his obligation; Rabbi says: he has not fulfilled his obligation. However, if he pledges to bring a small one and he brings a larger one, there is a debate over whether he has fulfilled his obligation. According to the first opinion, he has fulfilled his obligation because the smaller ox is encompassed in the larger ox. This is akin to a situation in which he pledges to bring a small amount of money and he brings a larger amount of money. Rabbi [Judah Hanasi] disagrees and holds that even in this situation he has not fulfilled his obligation. A small animal is qualitatively different from a large animal and therefore if he pledges to bring a small one, he must bring that type. This might be akin to promising to give a friend a small dog. The receiver might not be happier to get a larger one. Small things are perhaps not necessarily less than large ones [I wonder what would Rabbi Judah Hanasi have said about our SuperSize Me culture?]" + ], + [ + "[If one said,] “This ox shall be an olah,” and it becomes blemished, he may, if he so desires, bring two with its price.
[If he said,] “These two oxen are for an olah,” and they become blemished, he may, if he so desires, bring one ox with their price. But Rabbi forbids it.
[If he said,] “This ram shall be an olah,” and it becomes blemished, he may, if he so desires, bring a lamb with its price.
[If he said,] “This lamb shall be an olah,” and it becomes blemished, he may, if he so desires, bring a ram with its price thereof. But Rabbi forbids it.
One who says, “One of my lambs shall be holy,” or “one of my oxen shall be holy,” and he had only two, the larger one is holy.
If he had three, the middle one is holy.
[If he said,] “I specified one but I do not know which it was I specified,” or [if he said,] “My father told me [that he had specified one] but I do not know which it is,” the largest one among them must be holy.
Section one: An animal that has become blemished cannot be sacrificed. If someone sets aside a specific animal to be a sacrifice and it becomes blemished, he is not liable to bring another animal in its stead. The animal is redeemed for money and the money is holy and it can be used for any holy purpose. Therefore, he can bring two smaller oxen in place of the original one.
Section two: So too, if he originally dedicated two oxen to be sacrifices and both became blemished, he can redeem them both and use the money to buy one, more expensive oxen.
Rabbi forbids in both cases. It seems that Rabbi holds that once a person has dedicated a certain number of animals to the Temple he must bring that specific number of animals. As in yesterday’s mishnah, Rabbi rules more strictly than the other sages.
Sections three and four: These sections teach basically the same rule, expect instead of one or two oxen the examples are a ram (two years old) or a lamb (one year old).
Section five: Since he didn’t specify that the smaller one of his lambs should be holy we can assume that he meant for the larger one to be holy and that is the one that he must bring.
Section six: In this case, where he doesn’t specify which lamb he wishes to dedicate, we assume that he didn’t want to be miserly and give the smallest one or be overly generous and give the largest one, but that he wanted to give the middle sized lamb.
Section seven: If he says that he did specify which lamb would be holy, but he doesn’t remember, then we must be concerned that he did dedicate the largest lamb. Similarly, if his father told him that he dedicated a lamb but he doesn’t remember which lamb his father told him, he must bring his largest lamb." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah deals with a fascinating historical topic, the “Temple of Onias.” The Temple of Onias was a Jewish Temple built in Egypt, in Heliopolis, around 230 years before the destruction of the Temple, some time during the second century B.C.E. The Temple is mentioned by Josephus who relates that it was destroyed in 73 C.E., three years after the destruction of the Temple in Jerusalem.\nThe rabbis did not look with favor upon the Temple of Onias, but neither did they completely reject it. It seems that the rabbis believed that such a Temple was not a valid form of worship, but that it was not an idolatrous shrine and that it was created with good, albeit mistaken, intent.", + "[If one said,] “I take upon myself to offer an olah,” he must offer it in the Temple. And if he offered it in the Temple of Onias, he has not fulfilled his obligation. [If one said,] “I take upon myself to offer an olah but I will offer it in the Temple of Onias,” he must offer it in the Temple, yet if he offered it in the Temple of Onias he has fulfilled his obligation. Rabbi Shimon says: this is not an olah. If one offers to bring an olah, he must bring it to the Temple in Jerusalem. If he brings it to the Temple of Onias in Egypt, he has not fulfilled his obligation. If he specifically states that he is going to bring it to the Temple of Onias, he should still bring it to the Temple in Jerusalem because for it to truly be an olah, it must be offered in Jerusalem. However, if he offers it in the Temple, he has fulfilled his vow. Rabbi Shimon takes a stronger stance against the Temple of Onias. Vowing to bring an olah at the Temple of Onias does not make the animal an olah. Therefore, there is no validity to his vow and he need not bring a sacrifice at all.", + "[If one said,] “I will be a nazirite,” he must bring his offerings and shave his hair in the Temple. And if he brought them and shaved his hair in the Temple of Onias he has not fulfilled his obligation. [If he said,] “I will be a nazirite but I will bring my offerings and shave my hair in the Temple of Onias,” he must bring them in the Temple, yet if he brought them and shaved his hair in the Temple of Onias he has fulfilled his obligation. Rabbi Shimon says: such a one is not a nazirite. The same rules hold true for a nazirite with regard to completing his naziriteship which is performed in the Temple by shaving and bringing sacrifices.", + "The priests who served in the Temple of Onias may not serve in the Temple in Jerusalem; and needless to say [this is so of priests who served] something else; for it is said, “The priests of the shrines, however, did not ascend the altar of the Lord in Jerusalem. But they did eat unleavened bread along with their kinsmen” (II Kings 23:9). Thus they are like those that had a blemish: they are entitled to share and eat [of the holy things] but they are not permitted to offer sacrifices. Priests who serve in the Temple of Onias are penalized by not being allowed to subsequently serve in the Temple of Jerusalem. However, they still can receive their share of holy things, such as terumah and sacrificial meat. The mishnah compares them with priests with blemishes. In other words, priests remain priests no matter what they do. Their genealogy provides them with the right to eat priestly food. But to serve in the Temple one must be unblemished, both physically and spiritually. Serving in the Temple of Onias and all the more so serving in an idolatrous temple, called by the Mishnah “something else,” disqualifies one from serving in the Temple in Jerusalem." + ], + [ + "It is said of the olah of cattle, “An offering made by fire of pleasing odor” (Leviticus 1:9); and of the olah of birds, “An offering made by fire of pleasing odor (vs. 17); and of the minhah, “An offering made by fire of pleasing odor” (Leviticus 2:2): to teach you that it is the same whether one offers much or little, so long as one directs one’s heart to heaven. Congratulations! We have finished Tractate Menahot! It is a tradition at this point to thank God for helping us finish learning the tractate and to commit ourselves to going back and relearning it, so that we may not forget it and so that its lessons will stay with us for all of our lives. It is no accident that the last mishnah of the tractate finishes with the message that we learned today. After having learned 14 chapters of Zevahim and 13 chapters of Menahot, there is a grave danger that one could learn that all God cares about, and all that is important in Judaism, is bringing the proper sacrifice in the proper manner. Our mishnah teaches that the important issue is the proper intent, that one’s intent in sacrifice should be to worship God. This is not to deny that that the minutiae of rules are extremely important, both in the eyes of the rabbis and surely in the eyes of the priests who served in the Temple while it still stood. Rather, what today’s mishnah seems to say is that the rules are an outer manifestation of the inner kavannah, intent, of the worshipper. Without following the rules, there is no way to bring that intent into the world. But without the intent, the rules are just empty exercises devoid of meaning. I believe that this is a message that is as true of Judaism today as it was in Temple times. Mishnah Menahot has probably been a great challenge for many of you; I know it was for me. So please accept an extra congratulations on completing it. Tomorrow we begin Hullin, the one tractate in all of Seder Kodashim that does not deal with sacrifices or the Temple.
The final mishnah of Menahot contains what is perhaps one of the most important religious messages found in the entire Mishnah. Its final phrase is quoted quite frequently by Jewish thinkers, who employ it in many different contexts. I shall explain it here in the introduction.
The Torah uses the phrase “An offering made by fire of pleasing odor” in reference to three different sacrifices: 1) the olah from cattle (herd or flock animals), which would cost a lot; 2) the olah of birds, which cost far less; 3) and the minhah, which would cost even less than birds. All three of these are pleasing to God, even though some cost far more than do the other. This teaches that God doesn’t care how much the sacrifice costs. What God cares about is that the person “directs his heart to heaven” meaning offers the sacrifice with the correct intention. If an expensive sacrifice helps one direct one’s heart to heaven, then it would be pleasing. But if it is offered for the wrong reason, then the mishnah seems to say that it is not actually pleasing to God." + ] + ] + ] + }, + "versions": [ + [ + "Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp", + "http://learn.conservativeyeshiva.org/mishnah/" + ] + ], + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה מנחות", + "categories": [ + "Mishnah", + "Modern Commentary on Mishnah", + "English Explanation of Mishnah", + "Seder Kodashim" + ], + "schema": { + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה מנחות", + "enTitle": "English Explanation of Mishnah Menachot", + "key": "English Explanation of Mishnah Menachot", + "nodes": [ + { + "heTitle": "הקדמה", + "enTitle": "Introduction" + }, + { + "heTitle": "", + "enTitle": "" + } + ] + } +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Kodashim/English Explanation of Mishnah Middot/English/Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp.json b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Kodashim/English Explanation of Mishnah Middot/English/Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..566280f16bfd7d26332d24766934715396526942 --- /dev/null +++ b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Kodashim/English Explanation of Mishnah Middot/English/Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp.json @@ -0,0 +1,232 @@ +{ + "language": "en", + "title": "English Explanation of Mishnah Middot", + "versionSource": "http://learn.conservativeyeshiva.org/mishnah/", + "versionTitle": "Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp", + "status": "locked", + "license": "CC-BY", + "shortVersionTitle": "Dr. Joshua Kulp", + "actualLanguage": "en", + "languageFamilyName": "english", + "isBaseText": true, + "isSource": true, + "isPrimary": true, + "direction": "ltr", + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה מדות", + "categories": [ + "Mishnah", + "Modern Commentary on Mishnah", + "English Explanation of Mishnah", + "Seder Kodashim" + ], + "text": { + "Introduction": [ + "Tractate Middot is a detailed description of the Second Temple as built by Herod during the end of the first century B.C.E. The word “Middot” means “measurements” and it refers to the measurements of the Temple. ", + "We should note that the sources of this description can be varied. Some of the sources are from the sages own memories or transmitted oral tradition. However, the memory of the Temple sometimes contains discrepancies and is sometimes brought in piecework. There are even occasional debates as to what exactly the Temple looked like. Occasionally, the rabbis use Ezekiel’s visions of the Temple in their own description, even though they were aware that the actual Temple did not look exactly as Ezekiel described it. On other occasions they even use descriptions of Solomon’s Temple, under the assumption that the First Temple served as guideline for the building of the Second Temple. ", + "Josephus also offers up a detailed description of the Temple, and his description does not always accord with the rabbis’ description. We should also note that their reasons for describing the Temple were different. The rabbis described the Temple so that subsequent generations would rebuild it, speedily and in their time. Josephus described the Temple so that he could impress the Greeks. However, both the rabbis and Josephus agree that it was a most impressive building.", + "Middot has many similarities with Tamid, so we will make frequent reference to it as we learn these mishnayot. Both tractates are descriptive and differ distinctly from most of the other tractates we have learned.", + "Good luck in learning Middot!\n" + ], + "": [ + [ + [ + "Introduction\nTractate Middot opens with the same exact line as did Tamid a list of where the priests kept watch all night. However, the interest of the two tractates is a bit different. Middot is interested in the watch itself, whereas Tamid was more interested in locating the priests before their daily work began.\nThe beginning of Numbers 18 states that the priests and Levites are to stand guard at the Tabernacle, an idea that was later applied to the Temple as well. It seems that this guarding could serve two functions: practical and ceremonial. The Temple is akin to a palace and a palace needs guard both for protection and protocol (think about the guards in front of Buckingham Palace). The idea that there were a total of twenty-four places in the Temple where either priests or Levites would stand guard is mentioned also in I Chronicles 26:17-18.", + "In three places the priests keep watch in the Temple: in the chamber of Avtinas, in the chamber of the spark, and in the fire chamber. There were three places in the Temple where the priests would keep watch at night: The chamber of Avtinas, where they would prepare the incense. The chamber of the spark, where they kept the fire to light the fires on the altars. The fire chamber where they kept a large fire to keep the priests warm at night.", + "And the Levites in twenty-one places: Five at the five gates of the Temple Mount; Four at its four corners on the inside; Five at five of the gates of the courtyard; Four at its four corners on the outside; One at the offering chamber; One at the chamber of the curtain, And one behind the place of the kapporet. There were twenty-one places where the Levites kept watch: A: The five gates to enter the Temple Mount. B: The four inside corners of the walls surrounding the Temple Mount. Sort of like prison guards. C: There were seven gates to the courtyard (see mishnah four) but the Levites guarded only five of them. D: At the four corners inside the walls surrounding the Temple. E: The “offering chamber” was in the burning place. We will learn more about this place in mishnah six. F: Where the curtain was kept. G: This refers to behind the Holy of Holies." + ], + [ + "The officer of the Temple Mount used to go round to every watch, with lighted torches before him, and if any watcher did not rise [at his approach] and say to him, “Shalom to you, officer of the Temple Mount, it was obvious that he was asleep. Then he used to beat him with his rod.
And he had permission to burn his clothes. And the others would say: What is the noise in the courtyard? It is the cry of a Levite who is being beaten and whose clothes are being burned, because he was asleep at his watch. Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob said: once they found my mother's brother asleep, and they burnt his clothes.
Today’s mishnah describes the officer in charge of security on the Temple Mount who would go around and check to make sure no one was asleep on his watch. If he found anyone asleep he would beat them, and perhaps even burn their clothes. Don’t ask me what they would do without any clothes!
The mishnah is straightforward (although a bit harsh) and therefore doesn’t really need explanation." + ], + [ + "The Temple Mount had five gates, which the mishnah now lists.", + "There were five gates to the Temple Mount: Huldah was a prophetess mentioned in II Kings 22:14, but there is she found in Jerusalem, not necessarily at these gates. Perhaps these were the gates where she sat, albeit in the First Temple. We should note that one can still see these southern gates at the southern walls of the Temple. This seems to be the most common entrance and exit.", + "The two Huldah gates on the south were used both for entrance and exit; We don’t really know who Kiponus was. It is possible that he was the man who donated the gate.", + "The Kiponus gate on the west was used both for entrance and exit. The Taddi gate on the north was rarely used. One exception will be brought at the end of this chapter. Again, Taddi seems possibly to have been the man who donated the gate.", + "The Taddi gate on the north was not used at all. Over the eastern gate was a drawing of Shushan, Persia. This was in commemoration of the place where the Jews were during the exile. It might have also served as a tribute to Cyrus who let the Jews leave Persia to return to Israel. To the east of the Temple lies the Mount of Olives, where the red heifer was burned. The high priest and the other priests involved in this ceremony would go through this gate on their way to the Mount of Olives to burn the red heifer." + ], + [ + "There were seven gates in the courtyard: three in the north and three in the south and one in the east.
In the south: the Gate of Kindling, and next to it the Gate of the First-borns, and then the Water Gate.
In the east: the Gate of Nicanor. It had two chambers, one on its right and one on its left. One was the chamber of Pinchas the dresser and one the other the chamber of the griddle cake makers.
Today’s mishnah lists the seven gates in the Temple courtyard.
Section two: The Gate of Kindling was used to bring in the wood for the altar.
Through the Gate of the First-borns they would bring in first-born animals on their way to being slaughtered. The Water Gate was used to bring in the water used on Sukkot for the water libation (it’s the most famous gate in history, but for other reasons).
Section three: Mishnah Yoma 3:10, mentions Nicanor and the doors for his gate, which according to legend were brought miraculously from Egypt. This gate was on the eastern side of the courtyard. Within the gate itself there were two chambers. In one sat Pinchas who made the priestly clothing (see Shekalim 5:1) and in the other sat the priests who made the griddle cakes that the high priest would offer every day (see Tamid 1:3)." + ], + [ + "On the north was the Gate of the Sparks which was shaped like a portico. On the north there was the Gate of the Sparks. There were pillars on both sides, which made it look like a portico.", + "It had an upper chamber built on it, and the priests used to keep watch above and the Levites below, and it had a door opening into the Hel. The Gate of the Sparks, unlike most gates, also had an upper chamber. The priests would stand on top and stand guard, as we learned in mishnah one. The Levites would stand below and guard (see also mishnah one). The Gate had a door that opened onto the Hel. The Hel was an area ten amot wide that went between the Soreg (a light fence) and the walls of the Courtyard. We will explain more about this later in 2:3.", + "Next to it was the Gate of the Sacrifice and next to that the fire chamber. To the east of the Gate of the Sparks was the Gate of the Sacrifice. Next to it was the fire chamber, mentioned above in mishnah one." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah describes the fire chamber. This chamber is also described in Tamid 3:3. In the first mishnah of Middot (and Tamid) we learned that the fire chamber was called as such because it had a large fire which kept the priests warm at night. Today we learn that there were different rooms within the fire chamber, each of them serving a different purpose.", + "There were four chambers inside the fire chamber, like sleeping chambers opening into a hall, two in sacred ground and two in non-holy, and there was a row of mosaic stones separating the holy from the non-holy. For what were they used? The chambers of the fire chamber were small rooms that opened into a larger hall. Two of them were inside the Temple on holy ground and two were outside the Temple. The ones on the outside of the Temple were in the Hel [in Hebrew Hel and hol (non-holy) are almost the same]. There was a fence made of mosaic stones that would separate the chambers inside the Temple from those outside.", + "The one on the southwest was the chamber of sacrificial lambs, The chamber on the southwest was used to store lambs. This chamber was mentioned in Arakhin 2:5, “there were never less than six inspected lambs in the chamber of lambs.”", + "The one on the southeast was the chamber of the showbread. In the chamber on the southeast they would knead and bake the showbread.", + "In the one to the northeast the Hasmoneans deposited the stones of the altar which the kings of Greece had defiled. The northeastern chamber was used to store the stones from the altar that the Greeks had defiled by offering foreign sacrifices on it. According to I Maccabees 1:54 (a non-canonical book) when the Maccabees tore down the altar that had been defiled by the Greeks, they deposited the stones until a prophet would come along and tell them what to do with them (see 4: 43-46). In Tamid 3:3 this chamber is called “the chamber of seals.”", + "Through the one on the northwest they used to go down to the bathing place. In the floor of the northwestern chamber there was an opening through which the priests would go down to bathe. In Tamid this is called “the fire chamber” for it was in this chamber that they would keep the fire." + ], + [ + "The fire chamber had two gates, one opening on to the Hel and one on to the courtyard. Rabbi Judah says: the one that opened on to the courtyard had a small opening through which they went in to search the courtyard. On the northern side of the fire chamber there was a gate opening to the Hel, the corridor that ran outside the courtyard. On the southern side there was a gate opening into the courtyard.", + "Every morning they would check the courtyard to make sure everything was in its proper place. This procedure was described in Tamid 1:3. The gate to the courtyard had a small opening through which they would enter the courtyard." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah appears word for word in Tamid 1:1. My explanation here is the same as there.", + "The fire chamber was vaulted and it was a large room surrounded with stone projections, and the elders of the clan [serving in the Temple] used to sleep there, with the keys of the Temple courtyard in their hands. The fire chamber was vaulted, and surrounded by rows of stones. On these rows of stones the priests serving in the Temple at the time (the Temple guard was split into 24 houses) would sleep, while holding the keys to the Temple courtyard.", + "The young priests did not get to sleep on the rows of stones. They had to put their bedding down on the ground and sleep on the floor." + ], + [ + "There was a place there [in the fire chamber] one cubit square on which was a slab of marble.
In this was fixed a ring and a chain on which the keys were hung.
When closing time came, the priest would raise the slab by the ring and take the keys from the chain.
Then the priest would lock up within while the Levite was sleeping outside.
When he had finished locking up, he would replace the keys on the chain and the slab in its place and put his garment on it and sleep there.
If one of them had a seminal emission, he would go out by the winding stair which went under the Birah, and which was lighted with lamps on both sides, until he reached the bathing place.
Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob says: he descended by the winding stair which went under the Hel and he went out by the Taddi gate.
Our mishnah deals with the locking of the Temple gates at night.
Section four: There are two explanations for “the Levite was sleeping outside.” Either it means that the Levites sat outside the courtyard and guarded from the outside. Or this refers to the locking of the fire chamber. In the fire chamber the priests were inside and the Levites outside.
Section six: Tamid 1:1 also discusses what would happen if a priest had an emission in the middle of the night and needed to purify himself. According to Deuteronomy 23:11 such a person must leave the “camp”, which the rabbis interpret to be parallel to the Temple. The priest would exit the Temple by using a set of underground stairs. It was forbidden for him to walk through the courtyard, or even on the Temple mount because he was impure. These stairs were lit so that he could see his way. He would then come to the ritual bath.
Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob says that when he was coming out of the ritual bath, he would not go back to the fire chamber. Rather he would go under the Hel and end up on the Temple Mount near the Taddi gate. Note that Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob does not disagree with the halakhah in our mishnah but rather with the halakhah in Tamid 1:1, according to which the priest the priest would return to the fire chamber." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nChapter two deals with the dimensions of the Temple Mount and its courtyards.", + "The Temple Mount was five hundred cubits by five hundred cubits. This accords with the dimensions stated in Ezekiel 42:20.", + "The greater part of it was on the south; next to that on the east; next to that on the north; and the smallest part on the west. The Temple was not centered in the middle of the Temple Mount. Rather it was to the northwestern side. Most of the empty ground was on the south. The second greatest empty area was on the east, then the north. The western side, or more accurately, the northwestern side, is where the Temple was located. As an aside, this is why the Western Wall is the closest of the walls to the actual Temple. Today if you go into the tunnels to the north of the western wall, you get as close as is possible to the Temple, without going onto the Temple Mount.", + "The part which was most extensive was the part most used. For non-priests, the most extensive use was in the south, where the largest empty area was located." + ], + [ + "All who entered the Temple Mount entered by the right and went round [to the right] and went out by the left, save for one to whom something had happened, who entered and went round to the left. Most people would enter the Temple Mount on the right side of the Southern Gates, and they would turn right and eventually come out on the left. The exception was one who was either a mourner or had been excommunicated. They would enter the same way, but they would go around to the left. This seems to have served as a means by which others could tell that something had happened to them and could offer them comfort.", + "[He was asked]: “Why do you go round to the left?” [If he answered] “Because I am a mourner,” [they said to him], “May He who dwells in this house comfort you.” When people would see others walking around to the left, they would know to ask them what had happened. If the person answered that he was a mourner, they would offer him comfort.", + "[If he answered] “Because I am excommunicated” [they said]: “May He who dwells in this house inspire them to draw you near again,” the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yose to him: you make it seem as if they treated him unjustly. Rather [they should say]: “May He who dwells in this house inspire you to listen to the words of your colleagues so that they may draw you near again.” Rabbi Yose and Rabbi Meir debate what words they would say to a mourner. According to Rabbi Meir they would offer hope that God would inspire the people who had excommunicated him to restore him to his status. Rabbi Yose complains that such a formulation gives the impression that those who had excommunicated him had done so unjustly. Instead, Rabbi Yose formulates words of consolation that place the blame on the excommunicated party, that he should mend his ways in order to be restored to his prior place." + ], + [ + "Within it was the Soreg, ten handbreadths high.
There were thirteen breaches in it, which had been originally made by the kings of Greece, and when they repaired them they enacted that thirteen prostrations should be made facing them.
Within this was the Hel, which was ten cubits [broad].
There were twelve steps there. The height of each step was half a cubit and its tread was half a cubit.
All the steps in the Temple were half a cubit high with a tread of half a cubit, except those of the Porch.
All the doorways in the Temple were twenty cubits high and ten cubits broad except those of the Porch.
All the doorways there had doors in them except those of the Porch.
All the gates there had lintels except that of Taddi which had two stones inclined to one another.
All the original gates were changed for gates of gold except the gates of Nicanor, because a miracle happened with them. Some say: because their copper gleamed like gold.
Section one: Around the Temple there was a small partition called the Soreg. This set the Temple off from the rest of the Temple Mount.
Section two: The Greeks made thirteen breaches in the Soreg in order to demonstrate that Gentiles could enter the Hel, which was inside the Soreg. This tradition is also reflected in I Maccabees 9:54: “In the year one hundred and fifty-three, in the second month, Alcimus ordered the wall of the inner court of the porch to be torn down, thus destroying the work of the prophets.”
When the Hasmoneans expelled the Greeks, they repaired the breaches and enacted that anytime a person would pass one of them, he would bow down and thank God for their victory over the Greeks.
Section three: Within the Soreg was an area called the Hel. This was an empty area ten cubits (about five meters) wide.
Section four: Leading up from the Hel to the Temple courtyard were twelve steps. Each step was half a cubit high and half a cubit long.
Section five: The only steps in the Temple that did not have this dimension were those that led up from the courtyard of the priests to the Porch, whose length varied as we shall see in 3:6.
Section six: The mishnah now proceeds to note several differences between the dimensions of the Porch and the dimensions found elsewhere in the Temple. The gates of the Porch were forty amot high and twenty amot wide.
Section seven: The entrance to the Porch was set off with a curtain and not a door.
Section nine: Originally the gates were made of copper. When the Jews had more money, they refurnished the Temple and covered them with gold. The only exception was the Nicanor gates, which were not changed. There are two possibilities for why they stayed the same. First of all, there was a miracle performed with them. This is explained in the Bavli (Yoma 38a) in the following way: “What miracles happened to his doors? They say that when Nicanor had gone to bring doors from Alexandria of Egypt, on his return a storm arose in the sea to drown him. They took one of his doors and cast it into the sea and yet the sea would not stop its rage. They wanted to cast the other into the sea. He rose and clung to it, saying: ‘Cast me in with it!’ The sea immediately stopped its raging. He was deeply grieved about the other [door]. When he arrived at the harbor of Acco, it broke through and came up from under the sides of the boat. Others say: A monster of the sea swallowed it and spat it out on the dry land.”
The other explanation is that there was no need to replace the gates of Nicanor because their copper shined liked gold." + ], + [ + "All the walls that were there [in the Temple] were high except the eastern wall, for the priest who burned the red heifer would stand on the top of the Mount of Olives and direct his gaze carefully see the opening of the Sanctuary at the time of the sprinkling of the blood. The red heifer was burned on the Mount of Olives, towards the east of the Temple Mount. The priest who burned it had to see the Sanctuary when he sprinkled the blood. This is how the rabbis interpret Numbers 19:4, “the priest shall take some of its blood with his finger and sprinkle it seven times toward the front of the Tent of Meeting.” Note that the priest would not have been able to see the Sanctuary through the Eastern gate because the floor of the Sanctuary was 22 amot higher than the floor of the Temple Mount, and the Eastern Gate was only 20 amot high. Thus the floor of the Sanctuary was higher than the gate, and therefore, the priest had to see over the wall. That is why they designed this wall to be shorter than the other walls." + ], + [ + "The courtyard of the women was a hundred and thirty-five cubits long by a hundred and thirty-five wide.
It had four chambers in its four corners, each of which was forty cubits.
They were not roofed, and so they will be in the time to come, as it says, “Then he brought me forth into the outer court, and caused me to pass by the four corners of the court, and behold in every corner of the court there was a court. In the four corners of the court there were keturot courts” (Ezekiel 46:21-22) and keturot means that they were not roofed. For what were they used?
The southeastern one was the chamber of the Nazirites where the Nazirites used to boil their shelamim and shave their hair and throw it under the pot.
The northeastern one was the wood chamber where priests with physical defects used to pick out the wood which had worms, every piece with a worm in it being unfit for use on the altar.
The northwestern one was the chamber of those with skin disease.
The southwestern one: Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob said: I forget what it was used for. Abba Shaul says: they used to store there wine and oil, and it was called the chamber of oil.
It [the courtyard of the women] had originally been smooth [without protrusions in the walls] but subsequently they surrounded it with a balcony so that the women could look on from above while the men were below, and they should not mix together.
Fifteen steps led up from it to the courtyard of Israel, corresponding to the fifteen [songs of] ascents mentioned in the Book of Psalms, and upon which the Levites used to sing. They were not rectangular but circular like the half of a threshing floor.
Today’s mishnah is about the courtyard of the women. This was the first courtyard which one would enter upon entering the Temple.
I am not going to explain every section, just those that I feel are not self-explanatory.
Section three: The rabbis read Ezekiel as a description of the future Temple that will be built in Messianic times. Nevertheless, the current Temple is to a certain extent patterned, at least in the rabbinic mind, after Ezekiel’s description. The word “keturot” in Ezekiel is unclear, but the rabbis interpret it to mean “unroofed.” Albeck notes that this is based on the Syriac phrased “Beta Ketira” which means “unroofed house.” Syriac is a Semitic language very close to Aramaic.
Section four: The Nazirites would boil their shelamim, peace offering, and throw their shaven hair into the fire under the pot (see Numbers 6:18; Nazir 6:8).
Section five: Priests with defects could not serve at the altar. Instead, they would sit in the chamber of wood and sort out which wood had worms, because wormed wood was not welcome on the altar.
Section six: Those with skin disease would immerse themselves in the special chamber for those with skin disease.
Section seven: The rabbis aren’t exactly sure what the southwestern chamber was even used for, at least not Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob. Abba Shaul claims that it was used to store wine and oil and it was called “the oil chamber.”
Section eight: Originally the walls of the women’s courtyard were smooth, without any protrusions to uphold a balcony. However, when they saw that there was a problem with men and women mixing during the Simhat Bet Hashoevah, a raucous festival that occurred during Sukkot (see Sukkah 5:2), they made a balcony for women to be above. We should note that during the rest of the year men and women mingled together in the women’s courtyard. Only during the risky time of great celebration did they separate the genders. This balcony is an eventual, much later source for women sitting in the balcony at synagogues, but in the Temple it was only used on one special occasion.
Section nine: Leading up from the courtyard of the women there were fifteen steps, going through the Nicanor gates and into the courtyard of the Israelites. These fifteen steps corresponded to the fifteen “songs of ascent” in Psalms 120-134. Upon them the Levites would sing during the Simhet Bet Hashoevah. The steps were shaped in semi-circles, and not rectangles as were other steps found in the Temple." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah is mostly about the Court of Israel, which was a smaller court leading from the Court of Women to the Court of the Priests.", + "There were chambers underneath the Court of Israel which opened into the Court of Women, where the Levites used to keep lyres and lutes and cymbals and all kinds of musical instruments. Underneath the Court of Israel there were chambers where the Levites would deposit their instruments.", + "The Court of Israel was a hundred and thirty-five cubits in length by eleven in breadth. Similarly the Court of the Priests was a hundred and thirty-five cubits in length by eleven in breadth. Both of these courtyards were the same breadth as the Court of Women, but they were much shorter, extending only eleven cubits. In a sense they were just strips.", + "And a row of mosaic stones separated the Court of Israel from the Court of the Priests. There was a partition separating the Court of Israel from the Court of Priests, for Israelites would not typically go into the Court of Priests. They would enter only when they were going to either slaughter a sacrifice or lay their hands upon it, or wave it.", + "Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob says: there was a step a cubit high on which a platform was placed, and it had three steps each of half a cubit in height. In this way the Court of the Priests was made two and a half cubits higher than that of Israel. According to Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob, there was a step with a platform on it between the two courts. On this platform the Levites would stand and sing when the tamid sacrifice was being offered (see Tamid 7:3). The Court of Priests was thus slightly higher than the Court of Israel.", + "The whole of the Court was a hundred and eighty-seven cubits in length by a hundred and thirty-five in breadth. The entire Courtyard in which the Temple was located was 187 cubits long. This included the entire area of the Court of Priests, and then the area of the Temple, all the way past the Holy of Holies and to the western side of the Temple.", + "And thirteen prostrations were made there. There were thirteen places to prostrate, as we learned in mishnah three. According to this opinion, the thirteen places of prostration were at the places where the Soreg had been broken through by the Greeks.", + "Abba Yose ben Hanan says: they were made facing the thirteen gates. On the south beginning from the west there were the upper gate (1), the gate of burning (2), the gate of the firstborn (3), and the water gate (4). And why was it called the water gate? Because they brought in through it the pitcher of water for libation on the festival. Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob says: in it the water welled up, and in the time to come from there it will come out from under the threshold of the Temple. Corresponding to them in the north beginning in the west were the gate of Yehoniah (5), the gate of the offering (6), the women's gate (7), the gate of song (8). Why was it called the gate of Yehoniah? Because Yehoniah went forth into captivity through it. On the east was the gate of Nicanor (9); it had two doors, one on its right and one on its left (10 + 11). There were further two gates in the west which had no special name (12 + 13). Abba Yose ben Hanan disagrees with the anonymous mishnah found in 1:4-5, who held that there were seven gates around the Temple Court. Abba Yose ben Hanan says that there were thirteen, and at each they would prostrate. He now lists these gates. Some of them are repeats of those listed above. The upper gate: Was called “upper” because it was at the highest point on the Temple Mount. The gate of the first-borns: Through which they would bring the first-born animals to be slaughtered, for they can be slaughtered on the south. The water gate: The mishnah gives two reasons why it was called the water gate. The first is practical through this gate the water was brought in for the water libation on Sukkot. The second is more messianic: Ezekiel 47:1-2 prophesies that in the time of redemption water will burst forth from the Temple. This water will come forth from this gate. Yehoniah’s gate: Yehoniah, as will be explained later in the mishnah, is the king who was exiled to Babylonia in II Kings 24:15. He went out, according to legend, through this gate. Commentators say that this is the same gate that is called “the gate of kindling” in 1:4. The gate of the offering: Through here they would bring in any sacrifice that needed to be slaughtered on the north side. The gate of women: Women who needed/wanted to lay their hands on their sacrifices could go in through this gate. The gate of song: Through which the Levites would bring in their musical instruments. Commentators identify this gate with the gate of the sparks in 1:5. Nicanor’s gate: As we have already learned, this gate was named after Nicanor who brought the gates from Egypt. On each side of the gate was a small door, and these doors were included in the overall count. Thus Nicanor’s gate gets credit for being three gates. The no-name gates: These gates were behind the Temple and were rarely used and therefore had no names." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nChapter three begins with several mishnayot describing the outer altar, upon which the sacrifices were burned.", + "The altar was thirty-two cubits by thirty-two. The mishnah begins to describe the altar from the very bottom. This area was 32 by 32 cubits.", + "It rose a cubit and went in a cubit, and this formed the foundation, leaving thirty cubits by thirty. The foundation of the altar was an amah in length and ran the entire length on the north and west but not the south and the east. On the southwestern corner and northeastern corner it took up one amah, but did not run the whole length (this will be explained in section nine). The remaining square of the altar was 30 x 30 amot.", + "It then rose five cubits and went in one cubit, and this formed the surround, leaving twenty-eight cubits by twenty-eight. On top of the foundation lies the surround (sovev). The sovev was five amot above the altar, and it was an amah in breadth. This left the altar with 28 x 28 amot.", + "The horns extended a cubit in each direction, thus leaving twenty-six by twenty-six. The four corners/horns (same word in Hebrew) of the altar each took up an amah in each direction, leaving the altar with 26 x 26 amot.", + "A cubit on every side was allowed for the priests to go round, thus leaving twenty-four by twenty-four as the place for the wood pile [for the altar fire]. Along the sides there was an amah walkway left empty so that the priests could walk around the altar. This walkway was inside the area devoted to the horns. Thus, the final measurement of the altar is 24 x 24. It was on this space that they would set the wood for the fire.", + "Rabbi Yose said: Originally, the complete area [occupied by the altar] was only twenty-eight cubits by twenty-eight, and it rose with the dimensions mentioned until the space left for the altar pile was only twenty by twenty. When, however, the children of the exile returned, they added four cubits on the north, and four on the west like a gamma, since it is said: “Now the hearth shall be twelve cubits long by twelve broad, square” (Ezekiel 43:16). Is it possible that it was only twelve cubits by twelve? When it says, “With four equal sides” (, this shows that he was measuring from the middle, twelve cubits in every direction. According to Rabbi Yose, the bottom square of the original altar was 28 x 28, leaving 20 x 20 for burning the wood, after room was left for the foundation, sovev, horns and walkway. This accords with the size of the altar built by Solomon according to II Chronicles 4:1. However, when the Israelites returned from the Babylonian exile, they built the altar larger than it was before. They added four amot to two sides of the altar, forming the shape of the Greek letter Gamma, which made the usable space of the altar 24 x 24. This number is derived from an interpretation of Ezekiel 43:16, according to which the altar was 12 x 12 amot. This number strikes Rabbi Yose as being impossibly small, probably because that would make it smaller than the altar of Solomon. Therefore, he posits that the measurements were taken from the center of the altar, and that 12 amot extended in each direction, leaving a space of 24 x 24.", + "A line of red paint ran round it in the middle to divide between the upper and the lower blood. Some sacrifices had their blood spilt on the upper side of the altar, above the red paint (the animal hatat and bird olot) while the rest had their blood spilt on the lower side of the altar.", + "The foundation ran the whole length of the north and of the west sides, and it took up one cubit on the south and one on the east. This was explained above in section two." + ], + [ + "At the southwestern corner [of the foundation] there were two openings like two small nostrils through which the blood which was poured on the western side of the foundation and on the southern side flowed down till the two streams became mingled in the channel, through which they made their way out to the Kidron wadi. The blood of all sacrifices was either drained on the western side of the foundation (see Zevahim 5:1-2) or on the southern side (Zevahim 5:3). The blood would drain out through two holes shaped like nostrils, and then flow down to the channel that flowed through the Temple Courtyard. From there the blood would be flushed out to the Kidron wadi that flows below the Temple Mount." + ], + [ + "On the floor beneath at that corner there was a place a cubit square on which was a marble slab with a ring fixed in it, and through this they used to go down to the pit to clean it out. The blood and refuse would flow down to the pit (called in Hebrew the “shit” wonder if that’s coincidental?). There was a trap door that would lead down to the pit and the priests would periodically clean it out of congealed blood so that it wouldn’t get clogged. That might not have been a job that they had to fight to get.", + "There was an ascent on the south side of the altar, thirty-two cubits [long] by sixteen broad. The ascent was the ramp that the priests used to go up to the altar. It was long and quite broad.", + "It had a square window in its western side where disqualified sin-offerings of birds were placed. Sin-offerings of birds had to be left somewhere until they would begin to rot. Then they could be burned outside the Temple. To this end the birds were left in a small window/cavity cut out of the ascent." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah deals with the stones used for the altar. Deuteronomy 27:5-6 states: “You should build an altar to the Lord your God, an altar of stones. Do not wield an iron tool over them; you must build the altar of the Lord your God of unhewn stones.” These two verses and their fulfillment are the main topic of this mishnah.", + "The stones both of the ascent and of the altar were taken from the valley of Bet Kerem. Bet Kerem is close to Jerusalem (today it is a neighborhood in Jerusalem).", + "They dug into virgin soil and brought from there whole stones on which no iron had been lifted, since iron disqualifies by mere touch, though a flaw made by anything could disqualify. If one of them received a flaw, it was disqualified, but the rest were not. The quarrying would begin in soil that had not been used. They would extract whole stones without using any iron tools. Any stone which had been touched by an iron tool is disqualified. If it was flawed by a different type of tool it is also disqualified, but other types of metal do not disqualify by mere touch. If one of the stones that were already in use received a flaw, it is disqualified but the other stones are still valid. They will have to replace the flawed stone.", + "They were whitewashed twice a year, once at Pesah and once at Hag, and the Sanctuary was whitewashed once a year, at Pesah. Rabbi says: they were whitewashed every Friday with a cloth on account of the blood stains. The stones of the altar were whitewashed with plaster twice a year, once on Pesah (their Pesah cleaning) and once on Sukkot. The mishnah seems to say that they whitewashed the Sanctuary with plaster once a year. However, this cannot be the intention of the mishnah because the Sanctuary and the Holy of Holies were both covered with gold. Therefore, Albeck explains that this refers to the porch (the Ulam) that comes before the Sanctuary. Another explanation is that the word “Sanctuary” here actually refers to the whole Temple, including the courtyards. Rabbi [Judah Hanasi] holds that they would clean the altar once a week because of the blood stains. But they would only do so with a simple cloth.", + "The plaster was not laid on with an iron trowel, for fear that it might touch and disqualify. When they put on the plaster, they did not use an iron trowel for fear that would disqualify the stones.", + "Since iron was created to shorten man's days and the altar was created to prolong man's days, and it is not right therefore that that which shortens should be lifted against that which prolongs. This section explains why iron disqualifies the stones of the altar. It is a nice midrash the material that is used to destroy life should be kept away from the altar, whose ultimate purpose is to provide and lengthen life." + ], + [ + "There were rings to the north of the altar, six rows of four each. And some say, four rows of six each. Upon them they used to slaughter the sacrificial animals.
The slaughter house was to the north of the altar, and on it were eight small pillars on top of which were blocks of cedar wood, in which were fixed hooks of iron, three rows in each, upon which they would hang [the sacrifice] and they would strip its hide on tables of marble that stood between the pillars. Section one: There were twenty-four rings on the north side of the altar, either in six rows of four, or four rows of six. They would put the animal’s head in the ring to slaughter it. Section two: The mishnah describes the slaughterhouse, especially the hooks on which they would hang the meat after the sacrifice was slaughtered. It is also describes the tables upon which the meat would be washed.
This mishnah describes the set-up used to slaughter the sacrifices. Some of this mishnah was also found in Tamid 3:5 (coincidental, I think, that the number of the mishnah is the same)." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe Mishnah continues to move in its description from the less holy places to the direction of the Sanctuary and the holiest places. Today we move from the outer altar to the Sanctuary.", + "The laver was between the porch and the altar, a little to the south. The laver where the priests would wash their hands and feet was found between the porch and the altar (to the west of the altar), and a little bit south.", + "Between the porch and the altar there were twenty-two cubits. Between the altar and the porch there were twenty-two cubits, which were taken up by steps. Each step was half a cubit above the previous step. The breadth of each step was a cubit, but some steps had some extra floor space in between them.", + "There were twelve steps there, each step being half a cubit high and a cubit broad. There was a cubit, a cubit and a level space of three cubits, then a cubit, a cubit and a level space of three cubits, then at the top a cubit, a cubit and a level space of four cubits. The first two steps were a cubit broad, and then there was a level space of three cubits before the next step began. This set-up occurred three times for a total of nine steps, and fifteen cubits. The final set had a level space of four cubits, bringing the total to twenty-one cubits. In addition there was another cubit between the altar and the first step, for a total of 22 cubits between the altar and the Sanctuary.", + "Rabbi Judah says that at the top there was a cubit, a cubit and a level space of five cubits. Rabbi Judah holds that the extra cubit was in the level space after the last step. There was no space of a cubit between the altar and the first step." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah deals with the doorway that opened onto the Porch (Oolam in Hebrew).", + "The doorway of the porch was forty cubits high and its breadth was twenty cubits. As we noted above in 2:3, the doorway to the Porch was larger than all of the other doorways in the Temple. It was forty cubits high, whereas all other doorways were twenty cubits high.", + "Over it were five main beams of ash [wood]. The lowest projected a cubit on each side beyond the doorway. The one above projected beyond this one a cubit on each side. Thus the topmost one was thirty cubits long. The lowest beam that went over the doorway would have been 22 cubits in breadth. The next was 24, the third was 26, the fourth was 28 and the fifth was thirty cubits long.", + "There was a layer of stones between each one and the next. Between each beam there was a layer of stones." + ], + [ + "There were poles of cedar wood stretching from the wall of the Sanctuary to the wall of the Porch to prevent it from bulging. There were chains of gold fixed in the roof beams of the Porch by which the priestly initiates used to ascend and see the crowns, as it says, “And the crowns shall be to Helem and to Toviyah and to Yedaya and to Hen the son of Zephaniah as a memorial in the Temple of the Lord” (Zechariah 6:14). A golden vine stood at the door of the Sanctuary trained on poles, and anyone who offered a leaf or a grape or a bunch used to bring it and hang it there. Rabbi Eliezer bar Zadok said: on one occasion three hundred priests were commissioned [to clear it].
" + ] + ], + [ + [ + "The doorway of the Hekhal was twenty cubits high and ten broad.
It had four doors, two on the inner side, and two on the outer, as it says, “And the Hekhal and the Sanctuary had two doors” (Ezekiel 41:23).
The outer ones opened into the interior of the doorway so as to cover the thickness of the wall, while the inner ones opened into the Temple so as to cover the space behind the doors, because the whole of the Temple was overlaid with gold except the space behind the doors.
Rabbi Judah says: they stood within the doorway, and they resembled folding doors. These were two cubits and a half [of the wall] and these were two cubits and a half, leaving half a cubit as a doorpost at the one end and half a cubit as a doorpost at the other end, as it says, “And the doors had two leaves apiece, two turning leaves, two leaves for the one door and two leaves for the other” (Ezekiel 41:2.
Chapter four deals with the Sanctuary or Hekhal in Hebrew. I will call it the Hekhal henceforth in order to encourage the use of Hebrew. The Hekhal was the main structure of the Temple and it stood between the Porch and the Holy of Holies.
Section two: The Hekhal had four doors. Two doors were in the thickness of the wall of the Hekhal, which ran the length of the opening, facing the Hekhal, one on the left and one on the right. Two others were on the other side, facing the Porch.
Section three: The wall of the Hekhal was six cubits in breadth. The doors were each five cubits long, so that when they opened they would cover five of the six cubits of the thickness of the wall. The extra cubit was taken up by the door post. The inner ones opened into the Hekhal, and when opened they would cover the part of the inside of the Hekhal that was not overlaid with gold. The doors were also covered with gold, so that when they were open only gold would be seen.
Section four: Rabbi Judah envisions a different set-up for the doors. Each door was like a folding door and they stood within the doorway and all of them were used to cover the thickness of the wall, each covering 2 ½ cubits of the wall. In other words, the doors did not open into the Hekhal. Rabbi Judah seems to interpret “two turning leaves” as proof that each door was a type of folding door. It is interesting to note that there may be a bit of tension here between the first opinion and Rabbi Judah as to how we know what occurred in the Temple. The first opinion may be based more on tradition or even recollections whereas Rabbi Judah’s opinion is based on more on the text found in Ezekiel." + ], + [ + "The great gate had two small doors, one to the north and one to the south. By the one to the south no one ever went in, and concerning it was stated explicitly be Ezekiel, as it says, “And the Lord said to me: this gate shall be shut, it shall not be opened, neither shall any man enter in by it, for the Lord God of Israel has entered in by it; therefore it shall be shut” (Ezekiel 44:2). The great gate of the Hekhal had two small doors, one to the north (to the right when facing the Hekhal) and one to the south. However, the southern door was never used, due to a direct order by God.", + "He [the priest] took the key and opened the [northern] door and went in to the cell, and from the cell he went into the Hekhal. When the priest wanted to open the great gate, he would take the keys to the gates, go into the cell, which was a chamber next to the gate, and then go into the Hekhal and open from the inside.", + "Rabbi Judah says: he used to walk along in the thickness of the wall until he came to the space between the two gates. He would open the outer doors from within and the inner doors from without. Rabbi Judah says that the priest would not enter the cell but would rather walk along inside the wall which was six cubits thick. He would then open the outer doors from within, turn around and open the inner doors from without." + ], + [ + "There were thirty-eight cells there, fifteen on the north, fifteen on the south, and eight on the west. Around the walls of the Hekhal and the Holy of Holies there were 38 cells or small chambers.", + "On the north and on the south there were five over five and five again over these; On the west there were three over three and two over these. These chambers were built in three stories. On the northern and southern sides there were five on each story, and on the west there were three on the first two stories and two on the top story.", + "Each had three openings, one to the cell on the right and one to the cell on the left and one to the cell above. Each cell had three openings, one which would open to the cell on the right, one which would open to the cell on the left, and one which would open to the cell above. However, the top row of cells had only two openings.", + "In the [one at the] northeastern corner there were five openings, one to the cell on the right, one to the cell above, one to the mesibbah, one to the door, and one to the Hekhal. The cell at the northeastern corner had five openings. One to the cell on the right and one above (there was no cell to its left, because there were no cells on the east). One to the mesibbah, which was a ramp that would go up from the west to the east to the roofs of the cells and the upper level of the Sanctuary. We will learn more about the mesibbah in mishnah five. The fourth opening led to the door on the northern side of the great gate at the entrance to the Hekhal. The fifth door led straight to the Hekhal. This accords with what we learned in yesterday's mishnah, according to the opinion of the sages (and not Rabbi Judah)." + ], + [ + "The [chamber] of the lowest [story] was five cubits wide and at the ceiling six cubits. The mishnah's explanation of the size of the cells is based on I Kings 6:6. The bottom story's cells were each five cubits in breadth. In the walls of the Hekhal they would reduce the thickness of the wall by a cubit at this point so that the ceiling of the cell could rest on the point where the wall was brought in. This is also referred to in the continuation of the above verse from I Kings. This would mean that at the point of the ceiling the cell was one cubit broader.", + "The [chamber] of the middle [story] was six cubits wide and at the ceiling of seven. The second story was one cubit broader, matching the breadth of the ceiling of the first story. Again, the wall was brought in to accommodate the planks for the ceiling of the cell. This would make it seven cubits at the point of the ceiling.", + "The [chamber] of the top [story] was seven cubits wide, as it says, \"The lowest story was five cubits wide, the middle one 6 cubits wide and the third 7 cubits wide\" (I Kings 6:6). Similarly, the third story was the breadth of the ceiling of the second story. As stated above, this matches the verse in I Kings that describes Solomon's Temple. We should emphasize that this is another example where either the Second Temple was patterned after the First Temple, or the rabbis at least imagined that it was." + ], + [ + "The mesibbah (a winding went up from the north-east corner to the north-west corner by which they used to go up to the roofs of the cells.
One would ascend the messibah facing the west, traversing the whole of the northern side till he reached the west.
When he reached the west he turned to face south and then traversed whole of the west side till he reached the south.
When he reached the south he turned to face eastwards and then traversed the south side till he reached the door of the upper chamber, since the door of the upper chamber opened to the south.
In the doorway of the upper chamber were two columns of cedar by which they used to climb up to the roof of the upper chamber, and at the top of them was a row of stones showing the division in the upper chamber between the holy part and the Holy of Holies.
There were trap doors in the upper chamber opening into the Holy of Holies by which the workmen were let down in baskets so that they should not feast their eyes on the Holy of Holies.
Sections 1-4: The mesibbah was the walkway that they would use to get to the top of the Hekhal. The mishnah explains how the priest would walk on the mesibbah which began on the northeastern side (as we learned in mishnah three) and went to the northwestern side. He would then turn south (left) and walk to the end, then he would walk all the way to the southeastern cornet to get to the upper chamber that was built on top of the Hekhal and the Holy of Holies. The door of this chamber was open on the southern wall.
Section five: There were poles in the upper chamber which they could use to climb up to the roof. On the roof there was a division made by a wall of stones to distinguish between the Hekhal (the holy) and the Holy of Holies.
Section six: There were trap doors in the roof of the Holy of Holies through which they would let workmen down in baskets to fix the walls of the Hekhal and Holy of Holies when necessary. The workmen were let down in baskets that were covered on three sides so that all they could see was the wall that they were repairing. This would prevent them from unabashedly gazing at the Holy of Holies which would be considered an inappropriate means of deriving benefit from the holiest point of the Temple." + ], + [ + "The Hekhal was a hundred cubits by a hundred with a height of a hundred. The Hekhal as referred to in this mishnah includes the dimensions of the Porch, the Hekhal and the Holy of Holies put together. It was a 100 cubit cube.", + "The foundation was six cubits, then it rose forty, then a cubit for the ornamentation, two cubits for the guttering, a cubit for the ceiling and a cubit for the plastering. The mishnah now explains the elements that lead to a height of 100 cubits (note: this is a very tall structure). The closed foundation of the entire structure was 6 cubits high. We can also see this by the need for 12 stairs to lead up from the courtyard to the floor of the Porch. Each stair was 1/2 cubit high, making a total of 6 cubits. The empty space inside the Hekhal was 40 cubits high. Before the ceiling there was a cubit of ornamentation on the walls. Then there were two cubits of guttering to catch water that might leak in from the roof. The ceiling (the boards) and the plastering were each a cubit. This would bring us to a total of 51 cubits.", + "The height of the upper chamber was forty cubits, there was a cubit for its ornamentation, two cubits for the guttering, a cubit for the ceiling, a cubit for the plastering, three cubits for the parapet and a cubit for the spikes. The upper chamber was also forty cubits high, then another cubit for ornamentation, two for guttering, and one each for the ceiling and its plastering. This brings us to 96 total cubits. There was a parapet (a railing) on top of the upper chamber and there were one cubit spikes coming out of the parapet. This would chase away birds which would have nested on the tops of the walls. [Funny, but we too put spikes on top of our walls to keep away the bird].", + "Rabbi Judah says the spikes were not included in the measurement, but the parapet was four cubits. Rabbi Judah disagrees with two minor details of the above description. He claims that the spikes were not counted in the total, and that the number 100 was reached by the parapet being four not three cubits high." + ], + [ + "From east to west was a hundred cubits: The wall of the porch five cubits, the porch itself eleven, the wall of the Hekhal six cubits and its interior forty, a cubit for the space between, and twenty cubits for the Holy of Holies, the wall of the Hekhal six cubits, the cell six cubits and the wall of the cell five. The mishnah now proceeds to delineate the structures, walls, etc. that took up the length and breadth of the Hekhal. The Hekhal was one hundred cubits from its eastern side to its western side. The thickness of the front wall of the Porch was five cubits. The area of the Porch was eleven cubits, and the wall separating the Porch from the Hekhal was six more. This brings us to 22. The interior of the Hekhal was 40 (total = 62). There was a one cubit space between the Hekhal and the Holy of Holies. In the First Temple there was an actual wall in this space, but in the Second Temple there were two curtains a cubit apart from one another. The interior of the Holy of Holies was 20 cubits (total = 83). The western wall of the Hekhal was six more cubits. The width of the middle cells on the western side was six cubits, and the western wall of the cell was another five, bringing us to the grand total of 100 cubits.", + "From north to south was seventy cubits: The wall of the mesibbah five cubits, the mesibbah itself three, the wall of the cell five and the cell itself six, the wall of the Hekhal six cubits and its interior twenty, then the wall of the Hekhal again six and the cell six and its wall five, then the place of the water descent three cubits and its wall five cubits. From north to south the entire expanse was seventy cubits. The thickness of the walls of the mesibbah was 5 cubits (concerning the mesibbah see mishnah five). The width of the mesibbah itself was three cubits. Inside the mesibbah was the cell, whose wall was five. The middle level cell itself was six cubits wide (total = 19). The wall separating the cell from the Hekhal was another six, and the width of the Hekhal was twenty (total=45). The opposite wall was also six and the cell on the south side was another six, and its wall was another five (total = 62). There was a space of three cubits between the wall of the cell and the outer wall in order to let water flow down from the roof. This was another three cubits and then another five cubits of wall, bringing us to a total of 70 cubits. It might be interesting to note that of the seventy cubits, 32 of them were taken up by wall. The walls were plentiful and very thick.", + "The Porch extended beyond this fifteen cubits on the north and fifteen cubits on the south, and this space was called the House of the slaughter-knives where they used to store the knives. The Porch, the structure that lay in front of the Hekhal, was fifteen cubits longer from north to south then the Hekhal on each side. This would mean that the back wall to the Porch, which serves as the front wall of the Hekhal, would have been 100 cubits, whereas the rest of the Hekhal was seventy cubits from north to south. This extra space was where the slaughterer's knives were stored. Perhaps we could surmise that they stored the knives here in order to keep them from being parallel to the altar or Holy of Holies, such that an instrument of violence, while necessary for the daily operation of the Temple, was at least not stored in a space parallel to the life-giving altar.", + "The Hekhal was narrow behind and broad in front, resembling a lion, as it says, \"Ah, Ariel, Ariel, the city where David encamped\" (Isaiah 29:1): Just as a lion is narrow behind and broad in front, so the Hekhal was narrow behind and broad in front. The final section of the mishnah and our chapter likens the entire structure of the Porch, Hekhal and Holy of Holies to a lion. It was broad in front (100 cubits) and a bit narrower in the back (70 cubits). The imagery is based on the verse which refers to Jerusalem as \"Ariel\" which means \"lion of God.\"" + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nChapter five backs away from the Hekhal and describes the courtyard that lay to the east of the Temple.\nIf we think about Tractate Middot as a whole we can see that the first two chapters brought us on to the Temple Mount and into the outer courtyards, the fourth chapter discussed the Hekhal and the fifth chapter went back to the courtyard. At the heart of the tractate, in chapter three, is the description of the outer altar, certainly the most important piece of the Temple on an everyday basis. In my opinion, the literary structure of this tractate is clearly intentional.", + "The whole of the courtyard was a hundred and eighty-seven cubits long by a hundred and thirty-five broad. The 187 cubits is measured from the Israelite's courtyard (the Nicanor Gate) to the outer walls of the Temple. It does not include the Women's courtyard.", + "From east to west it was a hundred and eighty-seven. The space in which the Israelites could go was eleven cubits. The space in which the priests could go was eleven cubits. The altar took up thirty-two. Between the Porch and the altar was twenty-two cubits. The Hekhal took up a hundred cubits, and there were eleven cubits behind the kapporet. The Israelites' courtyard was eleven cubits wide, as was the priests' courtyard. Immediately after the priests' courtyard began the outer altar, which was thirty-two cubits broad (see 3:1). There were twenty-two cubits between the outer altar and the beginning of the Porch (see 3:6). This brings us to a total of 76 cubits. The Hekhal was 100 cubits from east to west (see 4:7). On the other side of the Holy of Holies, which held the kapporet, from the western wall of the Hekhal to the western wall of the Temple, there were another 11 cubits, bringing us to a grand total of 187 cubits." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah explains the structures that took up the space going from north to south in the courtyard.", + "From north to south was a hundred and thirty-five cubits.
The ascent and the altar took up sixty-two; Although the ascent was 32 cubits long and the altar was also thirty-two cubits long, together they took up only 62 cubits of floor space. There are some complicated equations to work this out, which I do not want to get into here. Suffice it to say, that Albeck concludes that the ascent did not reach the altar itself, but stopped about a cubit away and that the top of the ascent did not go all the way up to the altar.", + "From the altar to the rings was eight cubits. The rings were described in 3:5. They were eight cubits north of the altar (total 70).", + "The rings took up twenty-four cubits. The rings took up twenty-four cubits (total: 94).", + "From the rings to the tables was four cubits, See also 3:5. These were four cubits away.", + "From the tables to the dwarf pillars four, See also 3:5. These pillars were used to hang the sacrifices and strip their hides. The mishnah does not tell us how much space the tables took up. The Rambam writes that the tables took up eight cubits. Based on this, other commentators claim that the tables took up the space between the rings and the dwarf pillars.", + "And from the dwarf pillars to the wall of the courtyard eight cubits, From the dwarf pillars to the outer wall was another 8 cubits, bringing the total to 110.", + "And the remainder was between the ascent and the wall and the space occupied by the dwarf pillars. The remaining 25 cubits was taken up by the space on the southern side between the ascent and the southern wall and the space of the dwarf pillars themselves. According to the Rambam, each took up 12 1/2 cubits." + ], + [ + "There were six chambers in the courtyard, three on the north and three on the south.
On the north were the salt chamber, the parvah chamber and the washer's chamber.
In the salt chamber they used to keep the salt for the offerings.
In the parvah chamber they used to salt the skins of the animal-offerings.
On its roof was the bath used by the high priest on Yom Kippur.
In the washers’ chamber they used to wash the entrails of the sacrificial animals, and from it a winding way went up to the roof of the parvah chamber.
Our mishnah that were in the Israelites' courtyard or within. Most of the mishnah is self-explanatory, but I have made a few comments below.
Section two: These three chambers were close to one another, on the northeastern corner of the Israelites' courtyard. There are two explanations as to why it was called the \"parvah chamber.\" The first is that the person who dedicated it was named \"Parvah\" either as a first or last name. The second is that the word \"parvah\" is after the \"parot\" or cows, whose hides were treated their. In modern Hebrew the word \"parvah\" means fur, but cows, sheep and goats don't really have fur.
Section five: The high priest would immerse five times on Yom Kippur, all within the Temple confines. See Yoma 3:3. Here we learn that these immersions were done on the roof of the parvah chamber.
Section six: In this chamber they would wash out the animal's stomach. The intestines were washed on the tables near the dwarf pillars, as we learned in Tamid 4:3." + ], + [ + "On the south were the wood chamber, the chamber of the exile and the chamber of hewn stones.
The wood chamber: Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob says: I forget what it was used for. Abba Shaul says: It was the chamber of the high priest, and it was behind the two of them, and one roof covered all three.
In the chamber of the exile there was a fixed cistern, with a wheel over it, and from there water was provided for all of the courtyard.
In the chamber of hewn stone the great Sanhedrin of Israel used to sit and judge the priesthood.
A priest in whom was found a disqualification used to put on black garments and wrap himself in black and go away. One in whom no disqualification was found used to put on white garments and wrap himself in white and go in and serve along with his brother priests.
They used to make a feast because no blemish had been found in the seed of Aaron the priest, and they used to say: Blessed is the Omnipresent, blessed is He, for no blemish has been found in the seed of Aaron. Blessed is He who chose Aaron and his sons to stand to minister before the Lord in the Holy of Holies.
The final mishnah of our tractate describes the three chambers that were found on the southern side of the courtyard.
Section two: We should note that this is the second time in our tractate that Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob did not know what a chamber was used for and Abba Shaul did. See also 2:5. According to the Abba Shaul, the chamber of wood was the chamber of the high priest, which the Talmud identifies with the chamber mentioned in the beginning of Yoma. There it is called \"the chamber of parhedrin\" and in it the high priest would dwell for the seven days before Yom Kippur.
Section three: This cistern was also mentioned in Eruvin 10:14. Some commentators explain that it was called the \"chamber of the exile\" because it was built by Jews who had returned from the exile. Others explain that the word \"golah\" which I have translated to be \"exile\" should be read \"gulah\" which refers to a large container attached to the wheel which was used to draw water.
Section four: In the chamber of hewn stone, the great Sanhedrin of 70 judges would sit and one of their responsibilities was to decide which priests were fit to serve in the Temple [see also Sanhedrin, chapter one]. [We should note that there is something to be said about rabbis claiming that they determined which priests were fit to serve in the Temple. One wonders whether the priests would have agreed that this was the way things were done].
Section five: A priest who was disqualified from serving in the Temple, either due to a physical blemish or perhaps a genealogical flaw, would dress in black and leave.
One who was found valid to serve, would don his white priestly clothing and head off to join his fellow priests.
Section five: On a day that no priests were invalidated, the priests would make a celebration and offer up a special blessing. The impression one gets is that this was not the norm most of time at least one priest was found to be disqualified.
Congratulations! We have finished Tractate Middot!
It is a tradition at this point to thank God for helping us finish learning the tractate and to commit ourselves to going back and relearning it, so that we may not forget it and so that its lessons will stay with us for all of our lives.
Middot was an unusual tractate, much as was Tamid. Instead of the usual argumentation, we get a long physical description of the Temple. We should appreciate that although the rabbis were primarily attached to the words of the Torah, both the written and the oral Torah, they were drawn to the physical stones of the Temple, although they could no longer worship there. Perhaps we could even look at Middot as a way of bringing those stones into their own world of words.
This is not the place to discuss rabbinic thought on the complicated subject of animal sacrifice, but we should note that on at least one occasion in the tractate the rabbis did reveal their understanding of this subject. The altar gives life, both to Israel and perhaps to the entire world. By bringing us closer to God and maintaining our relationship with the eternal forces that rule the universe, the altar and the Temple which surround it, seem to tap into such a primal power and bring life to the worshipper's fragile human existence.
I hope you have enjoyed Arakhin. Tomorrow we begin Tractate Kinim." + ] + ] + ] + }, + "schema": { + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה מדות", + "enTitle": "English Explanation of Mishnah Middot", + "key": "English Explanation of Mishnah Middot", + "nodes": [ + { + "heTitle": "הקדמה", + "enTitle": "Introduction" + }, + { + "heTitle": "", + "enTitle": "" + } + ] + } +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Kodashim/English Explanation of Mishnah Middot/English/merged.json b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Kodashim/English Explanation of Mishnah Middot/English/merged.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..1e7010f1f69ff6bd406d69db967fb3d70f199353 --- /dev/null +++ b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Kodashim/English Explanation of Mishnah Middot/English/merged.json @@ -0,0 +1,229 @@ +{ + "title": "English Explanation of Mishnah Middot", + "language": "en", + "versionTitle": "merged", + "versionSource": "https://www.sefaria.org/English_Explanation_of_Mishnah_Middot", + "text": { + "Introduction": [ + "Tractate Middot is a detailed description of the Second Temple as built by Herod during the end of the first century B.C.E. The word “Middot” means “measurements” and it refers to the measurements of the Temple. ", + "We should note that the sources of this description can be varied. Some of the sources are from the sages own memories or transmitted oral tradition. However, the memory of the Temple sometimes contains discrepancies and is sometimes brought in piecework. There are even occasional debates as to what exactly the Temple looked like. Occasionally, the rabbis use Ezekiel’s visions of the Temple in their own description, even though they were aware that the actual Temple did not look exactly as Ezekiel described it. On other occasions they even use descriptions of Solomon’s Temple, under the assumption that the First Temple served as guideline for the building of the Second Temple. ", + "Josephus also offers up a detailed description of the Temple, and his description does not always accord with the rabbis’ description. We should also note that their reasons for describing the Temple were different. The rabbis described the Temple so that subsequent generations would rebuild it, speedily and in their time. Josephus described the Temple so that he could impress the Greeks. However, both the rabbis and Josephus agree that it was a most impressive building.", + "Middot has many similarities with Tamid, so we will make frequent reference to it as we learn these mishnayot. Both tractates are descriptive and differ distinctly from most of the other tractates we have learned.", + "Good luck in learning Middot!\n" + ], + "": [ + [ + [ + "Introduction\nTractate Middot opens with the same exact line as did Tamid a list of where the priests kept watch all night. However, the interest of the two tractates is a bit different. Middot is interested in the watch itself, whereas Tamid was more interested in locating the priests before their daily work began.\nThe beginning of Numbers 18 states that the priests and Levites are to stand guard at the Tabernacle, an idea that was later applied to the Temple as well. It seems that this guarding could serve two functions: practical and ceremonial. The Temple is akin to a palace and a palace needs guard both for protection and protocol (think about the guards in front of Buckingham Palace). The idea that there were a total of twenty-four places in the Temple where either priests or Levites would stand guard is mentioned also in I Chronicles 26:17-18.", + "In three places the priests keep watch in the Temple: in the chamber of Avtinas, in the chamber of the spark, and in the fire chamber. There were three places in the Temple where the priests would keep watch at night: The chamber of Avtinas, where they would prepare the incense. The chamber of the spark, where they kept the fire to light the fires on the altars. The fire chamber where they kept a large fire to keep the priests warm at night.", + "And the Levites in twenty-one places: Five at the five gates of the Temple Mount; Four at its four corners on the inside; Five at five of the gates of the courtyard; Four at its four corners on the outside; One at the offering chamber; One at the chamber of the curtain, And one behind the place of the kapporet. There were twenty-one places where the Levites kept watch: A: The five gates to enter the Temple Mount. B: The four inside corners of the walls surrounding the Temple Mount. Sort of like prison guards. C: There were seven gates to the courtyard (see mishnah four) but the Levites guarded only five of them. D: At the four corners inside the walls surrounding the Temple. E: The “offering chamber” was in the burning place. We will learn more about this place in mishnah six. F: Where the curtain was kept. G: This refers to behind the Holy of Holies." + ], + [ + "The officer of the Temple Mount used to go round to every watch, with lighted torches before him, and if any watcher did not rise [at his approach] and say to him, “Shalom to you, officer of the Temple Mount, it was obvious that he was asleep. Then he used to beat him with his rod.
And he had permission to burn his clothes. And the others would say: What is the noise in the courtyard? It is the cry of a Levite who is being beaten and whose clothes are being burned, because he was asleep at his watch. Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob said: once they found my mother's brother asleep, and they burnt his clothes.
Today’s mishnah describes the officer in charge of security on the Temple Mount who would go around and check to make sure no one was asleep on his watch. If he found anyone asleep he would beat them, and perhaps even burn their clothes. Don’t ask me what they would do without any clothes!
The mishnah is straightforward (although a bit harsh) and therefore doesn’t really need explanation." + ], + [ + "The Temple Mount had five gates, which the mishnah now lists.", + "There were five gates to the Temple Mount: Huldah was a prophetess mentioned in II Kings 22:14, but there is she found in Jerusalem, not necessarily at these gates. Perhaps these were the gates where she sat, albeit in the First Temple. We should note that one can still see these southern gates at the southern walls of the Temple. This seems to be the most common entrance and exit.", + "The two Huldah gates on the south were used both for entrance and exit; We don’t really know who Kiponus was. It is possible that he was the man who donated the gate.", + "The Kiponus gate on the west was used both for entrance and exit. The Taddi gate on the north was rarely used. One exception will be brought at the end of this chapter. Again, Taddi seems possibly to have been the man who donated the gate.", + "The Taddi gate on the north was not used at all. Over the eastern gate was a drawing of Shushan, Persia. This was in commemoration of the place where the Jews were during the exile. It might have also served as a tribute to Cyrus who let the Jews leave Persia to return to Israel. To the east of the Temple lies the Mount of Olives, where the red heifer was burned. The high priest and the other priests involved in this ceremony would go through this gate on their way to the Mount of Olives to burn the red heifer." + ], + [ + "There were seven gates in the courtyard: three in the north and three in the south and one in the east.
In the south: the Gate of Kindling, and next to it the Gate of the First-borns, and then the Water Gate.
In the east: the Gate of Nicanor. It had two chambers, one on its right and one on its left. One was the chamber of Pinchas the dresser and one the other the chamber of the griddle cake makers.
Today’s mishnah lists the seven gates in the Temple courtyard.
Section two: The Gate of Kindling was used to bring in the wood for the altar.
Through the Gate of the First-borns they would bring in first-born animals on their way to being slaughtered. The Water Gate was used to bring in the water used on Sukkot for the water libation (it’s the most famous gate in history, but for other reasons).
Section three: Mishnah Yoma 3:10, mentions Nicanor and the doors for his gate, which according to legend were brought miraculously from Egypt. This gate was on the eastern side of the courtyard. Within the gate itself there were two chambers. In one sat Pinchas who made the priestly clothing (see Shekalim 5:1) and in the other sat the priests who made the griddle cakes that the high priest would offer every day (see Tamid 1:3)." + ], + [ + "On the north was the Gate of the Sparks which was shaped like a portico. On the north there was the Gate of the Sparks. There were pillars on both sides, which made it look like a portico.", + "It had an upper chamber built on it, and the priests used to keep watch above and the Levites below, and it had a door opening into the Hel. The Gate of the Sparks, unlike most gates, also had an upper chamber. The priests would stand on top and stand guard, as we learned in mishnah one. The Levites would stand below and guard (see also mishnah one). The Gate had a door that opened onto the Hel. The Hel was an area ten amot wide that went between the Soreg (a light fence) and the walls of the Courtyard. We will explain more about this later in 2:3.", + "Next to it was the Gate of the Sacrifice and next to that the fire chamber. To the east of the Gate of the Sparks was the Gate of the Sacrifice. Next to it was the fire chamber, mentioned above in mishnah one." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah describes the fire chamber. This chamber is also described in Tamid 3:3. In the first mishnah of Middot (and Tamid) we learned that the fire chamber was called as such because it had a large fire which kept the priests warm at night. Today we learn that there were different rooms within the fire chamber, each of them serving a different purpose.", + "There were four chambers inside the fire chamber, like sleeping chambers opening into a hall, two in sacred ground and two in non-holy, and there was a row of mosaic stones separating the holy from the non-holy. For what were they used? The chambers of the fire chamber were small rooms that opened into a larger hall. Two of them were inside the Temple on holy ground and two were outside the Temple. The ones on the outside of the Temple were in the Hel [in Hebrew Hel and hol (non-holy) are almost the same]. There was a fence made of mosaic stones that would separate the chambers inside the Temple from those outside.", + "The one on the southwest was the chamber of sacrificial lambs, The chamber on the southwest was used to store lambs. This chamber was mentioned in Arakhin 2:5, “there were never less than six inspected lambs in the chamber of lambs.”", + "The one on the southeast was the chamber of the showbread. In the chamber on the southeast they would knead and bake the showbread.", + "In the one to the northeast the Hasmoneans deposited the stones of the altar which the kings of Greece had defiled. The northeastern chamber was used to store the stones from the altar that the Greeks had defiled by offering foreign sacrifices on it. According to I Maccabees 1:54 (a non-canonical book) when the Maccabees tore down the altar that had been defiled by the Greeks, they deposited the stones until a prophet would come along and tell them what to do with them (see 4: 43-46). In Tamid 3:3 this chamber is called “the chamber of seals.”", + "Through the one on the northwest they used to go down to the bathing place. In the floor of the northwestern chamber there was an opening through which the priests would go down to bathe. In Tamid this is called “the fire chamber” for it was in this chamber that they would keep the fire." + ], + [ + "The fire chamber had two gates, one opening on to the Hel and one on to the courtyard. Rabbi Judah says: the one that opened on to the courtyard had a small opening through which they went in to search the courtyard. On the northern side of the fire chamber there was a gate opening to the Hel, the corridor that ran outside the courtyard. On the southern side there was a gate opening into the courtyard.", + "Every morning they would check the courtyard to make sure everything was in its proper place. This procedure was described in Tamid 1:3. The gate to the courtyard had a small opening through which they would enter the courtyard." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah appears word for word in Tamid 1:1. My explanation here is the same as there.", + "The fire chamber was vaulted and it was a large room surrounded with stone projections, and the elders of the clan [serving in the Temple] used to sleep there, with the keys of the Temple courtyard in their hands. The fire chamber was vaulted, and surrounded by rows of stones. On these rows of stones the priests serving in the Temple at the time (the Temple guard was split into 24 houses) would sleep, while holding the keys to the Temple courtyard.", + "The young priests did not get to sleep on the rows of stones. They had to put their bedding down on the ground and sleep on the floor." + ], + [ + "There was a place there [in the fire chamber] one cubit square on which was a slab of marble.
In this was fixed a ring and a chain on which the keys were hung.
When closing time came, the priest would raise the slab by the ring and take the keys from the chain.
Then the priest would lock up within while the Levite was sleeping outside.
When he had finished locking up, he would replace the keys on the chain and the slab in its place and put his garment on it and sleep there.
If one of them had a seminal emission, he would go out by the winding stair which went under the Birah, and which was lighted with lamps on both sides, until he reached the bathing place.
Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob says: he descended by the winding stair which went under the Hel and he went out by the Taddi gate.
Our mishnah deals with the locking of the Temple gates at night.
Section four: There are two explanations for “the Levite was sleeping outside.” Either it means that the Levites sat outside the courtyard and guarded from the outside. Or this refers to the locking of the fire chamber. In the fire chamber the priests were inside and the Levites outside.
Section six: Tamid 1:1 also discusses what would happen if a priest had an emission in the middle of the night and needed to purify himself. According to Deuteronomy 23:11 such a person must leave the “camp”, which the rabbis interpret to be parallel to the Temple. The priest would exit the Temple by using a set of underground stairs. It was forbidden for him to walk through the courtyard, or even on the Temple mount because he was impure. These stairs were lit so that he could see his way. He would then come to the ritual bath.
Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob says that when he was coming out of the ritual bath, he would not go back to the fire chamber. Rather he would go under the Hel and end up on the Temple Mount near the Taddi gate. Note that Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob does not disagree with the halakhah in our mishnah but rather with the halakhah in Tamid 1:1, according to which the priest the priest would return to the fire chamber." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nChapter two deals with the dimensions of the Temple Mount and its courtyards.", + "The Temple Mount was five hundred cubits by five hundred cubits. This accords with the dimensions stated in Ezekiel 42:20.", + "The greater part of it was on the south; next to that on the east; next to that on the north; and the smallest part on the west. The Temple was not centered in the middle of the Temple Mount. Rather it was to the northwestern side. Most of the empty ground was on the south. The second greatest empty area was on the east, then the north. The western side, or more accurately, the northwestern side, is where the Temple was located. As an aside, this is why the Western Wall is the closest of the walls to the actual Temple. Today if you go into the tunnels to the north of the western wall, you get as close as is possible to the Temple, without going onto the Temple Mount.", + "The part which was most extensive was the part most used. For non-priests, the most extensive use was in the south, where the largest empty area was located." + ], + [ + "All who entered the Temple Mount entered by the right and went round [to the right] and went out by the left, save for one to whom something had happened, who entered and went round to the left. Most people would enter the Temple Mount on the right side of the Southern Gates, and they would turn right and eventually come out on the left. The exception was one who was either a mourner or had been excommunicated. They would enter the same way, but they would go around to the left. This seems to have served as a means by which others could tell that something had happened to them and could offer them comfort.", + "[He was asked]: “Why do you go round to the left?” [If he answered] “Because I am a mourner,” [they said to him], “May He who dwells in this house comfort you.” When people would see others walking around to the left, they would know to ask them what had happened. If the person answered that he was a mourner, they would offer him comfort.", + "[If he answered] “Because I am excommunicated” [they said]: “May He who dwells in this house inspire them to draw you near again,” the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yose to him: you make it seem as if they treated him unjustly. Rather [they should say]: “May He who dwells in this house inspire you to listen to the words of your colleagues so that they may draw you near again.” Rabbi Yose and Rabbi Meir debate what words they would say to a mourner. According to Rabbi Meir they would offer hope that God would inspire the people who had excommunicated him to restore him to his status. Rabbi Yose complains that such a formulation gives the impression that those who had excommunicated him had done so unjustly. Instead, Rabbi Yose formulates words of consolation that place the blame on the excommunicated party, that he should mend his ways in order to be restored to his prior place." + ], + [ + "Within it was the Soreg, ten handbreadths high.
There were thirteen breaches in it, which had been originally made by the kings of Greece, and when they repaired them they enacted that thirteen prostrations should be made facing them.
Within this was the Hel, which was ten cubits [broad].
There were twelve steps there. The height of each step was half a cubit and its tread was half a cubit.
All the steps in the Temple were half a cubit high with a tread of half a cubit, except those of the Porch.
All the doorways in the Temple were twenty cubits high and ten cubits broad except those of the Porch.
All the doorways there had doors in them except those of the Porch.
All the gates there had lintels except that of Taddi which had two stones inclined to one another.
All the original gates were changed for gates of gold except the gates of Nicanor, because a miracle happened with them. Some say: because their copper gleamed like gold.
Section one: Around the Temple there was a small partition called the Soreg. This set the Temple off from the rest of the Temple Mount.
Section two: The Greeks made thirteen breaches in the Soreg in order to demonstrate that Gentiles could enter the Hel, which was inside the Soreg. This tradition is also reflected in I Maccabees 9:54: “In the year one hundred and fifty-three, in the second month, Alcimus ordered the wall of the inner court of the porch to be torn down, thus destroying the work of the prophets.”
When the Hasmoneans expelled the Greeks, they repaired the breaches and enacted that anytime a person would pass one of them, he would bow down and thank God for their victory over the Greeks.
Section three: Within the Soreg was an area called the Hel. This was an empty area ten cubits (about five meters) wide.
Section four: Leading up from the Hel to the Temple courtyard were twelve steps. Each step was half a cubit high and half a cubit long.
Section five: The only steps in the Temple that did not have this dimension were those that led up from the courtyard of the priests to the Porch, whose length varied as we shall see in 3:6.
Section six: The mishnah now proceeds to note several differences between the dimensions of the Porch and the dimensions found elsewhere in the Temple. The gates of the Porch were forty amot high and twenty amot wide.
Section seven: The entrance to the Porch was set off with a curtain and not a door.
Section nine: Originally the gates were made of copper. When the Jews had more money, they refurnished the Temple and covered them with gold. The only exception was the Nicanor gates, which were not changed. There are two possibilities for why they stayed the same. First of all, there was a miracle performed with them. This is explained in the Bavli (Yoma 38a) in the following way: “What miracles happened to his doors? They say that when Nicanor had gone to bring doors from Alexandria of Egypt, on his return a storm arose in the sea to drown him. They took one of his doors and cast it into the sea and yet the sea would not stop its rage. They wanted to cast the other into the sea. He rose and clung to it, saying: ‘Cast me in with it!’ The sea immediately stopped its raging. He was deeply grieved about the other [door]. When he arrived at the harbor of Acco, it broke through and came up from under the sides of the boat. Others say: A monster of the sea swallowed it and spat it out on the dry land.”
The other explanation is that there was no need to replace the gates of Nicanor because their copper shined liked gold." + ], + [ + "All the walls that were there [in the Temple] were high except the eastern wall, for the priest who burned the red heifer would stand on the top of the Mount of Olives and direct his gaze carefully see the opening of the Sanctuary at the time of the sprinkling of the blood. The red heifer was burned on the Mount of Olives, towards the east of the Temple Mount. The priest who burned it had to see the Sanctuary when he sprinkled the blood. This is how the rabbis interpret Numbers 19:4, “the priest shall take some of its blood with his finger and sprinkle it seven times toward the front of the Tent of Meeting.” Note that the priest would not have been able to see the Sanctuary through the Eastern gate because the floor of the Sanctuary was 22 amot higher than the floor of the Temple Mount, and the Eastern Gate was only 20 amot high. Thus the floor of the Sanctuary was higher than the gate, and therefore, the priest had to see over the wall. That is why they designed this wall to be shorter than the other walls." + ], + [ + "The courtyard of the women was a hundred and thirty-five cubits long by a hundred and thirty-five wide.
It had four chambers in its four corners, each of which was forty cubits.
They were not roofed, and so they will be in the time to come, as it says, “Then he brought me forth into the outer court, and caused me to pass by the four corners of the court, and behold in every corner of the court there was a court. In the four corners of the court there were keturot courts” (Ezekiel 46:21-22) and keturot means that they were not roofed. For what were they used?
The southeastern one was the chamber of the Nazirites where the Nazirites used to boil their shelamim and shave their hair and throw it under the pot.
The northeastern one was the wood chamber where priests with physical defects used to pick out the wood which had worms, every piece with a worm in it being unfit for use on the altar.
The northwestern one was the chamber of those with skin disease.
The southwestern one: Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob said: I forget what it was used for. Abba Shaul says: they used to store there wine and oil, and it was called the chamber of oil.
It [the courtyard of the women] had originally been smooth [without protrusions in the walls] but subsequently they surrounded it with a balcony so that the women could look on from above while the men were below, and they should not mix together.
Fifteen steps led up from it to the courtyard of Israel, corresponding to the fifteen [songs of] ascents mentioned in the Book of Psalms, and upon which the Levites used to sing. They were not rectangular but circular like the half of a threshing floor.
Today’s mishnah is about the courtyard of the women. This was the first courtyard which one would enter upon entering the Temple.
I am not going to explain every section, just those that I feel are not self-explanatory.
Section three: The rabbis read Ezekiel as a description of the future Temple that will be built in Messianic times. Nevertheless, the current Temple is to a certain extent patterned, at least in the rabbinic mind, after Ezekiel’s description. The word “keturot” in Ezekiel is unclear, but the rabbis interpret it to mean “unroofed.” Albeck notes that this is based on the Syriac phrased “Beta Ketira” which means “unroofed house.” Syriac is a Semitic language very close to Aramaic.
Section four: The Nazirites would boil their shelamim, peace offering, and throw their shaven hair into the fire under the pot (see Numbers 6:18; Nazir 6:8).
Section five: Priests with defects could not serve at the altar. Instead, they would sit in the chamber of wood and sort out which wood had worms, because wormed wood was not welcome on the altar.
Section six: Those with skin disease would immerse themselves in the special chamber for those with skin disease.
Section seven: The rabbis aren’t exactly sure what the southwestern chamber was even used for, at least not Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob. Abba Shaul claims that it was used to store wine and oil and it was called “the oil chamber.”
Section eight: Originally the walls of the women’s courtyard were smooth, without any protrusions to uphold a balcony. However, when they saw that there was a problem with men and women mixing during the Simhat Bet Hashoevah, a raucous festival that occurred during Sukkot (see Sukkah 5:2), they made a balcony for women to be above. We should note that during the rest of the year men and women mingled together in the women’s courtyard. Only during the risky time of great celebration did they separate the genders. This balcony is an eventual, much later source for women sitting in the balcony at synagogues, but in the Temple it was only used on one special occasion.
Section nine: Leading up from the courtyard of the women there were fifteen steps, going through the Nicanor gates and into the courtyard of the Israelites. These fifteen steps corresponded to the fifteen “songs of ascent” in Psalms 120-134. Upon them the Levites would sing during the Simhet Bet Hashoevah. The steps were shaped in semi-circles, and not rectangles as were other steps found in the Temple." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah is mostly about the Court of Israel, which was a smaller court leading from the Court of Women to the Court of the Priests.", + "There were chambers underneath the Court of Israel which opened into the Court of Women, where the Levites used to keep lyres and lutes and cymbals and all kinds of musical instruments. Underneath the Court of Israel there were chambers where the Levites would deposit their instruments.", + "The Court of Israel was a hundred and thirty-five cubits in length by eleven in breadth. Similarly the Court of the Priests was a hundred and thirty-five cubits in length by eleven in breadth. Both of these courtyards were the same breadth as the Court of Women, but they were much shorter, extending only eleven cubits. In a sense they were just strips.", + "And a row of mosaic stones separated the Court of Israel from the Court of the Priests. There was a partition separating the Court of Israel from the Court of Priests, for Israelites would not typically go into the Court of Priests. They would enter only when they were going to either slaughter a sacrifice or lay their hands upon it, or wave it.", + "Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob says: there was a step a cubit high on which a platform was placed, and it had three steps each of half a cubit in height. In this way the Court of the Priests was made two and a half cubits higher than that of Israel. According to Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob, there was a step with a platform on it between the two courts. On this platform the Levites would stand and sing when the tamid sacrifice was being offered (see Tamid 7:3). The Court of Priests was thus slightly higher than the Court of Israel.", + "The whole of the Court was a hundred and eighty-seven cubits in length by a hundred and thirty-five in breadth. The entire Courtyard in which the Temple was located was 187 cubits long. This included the entire area of the Court of Priests, and then the area of the Temple, all the way past the Holy of Holies and to the western side of the Temple.", + "And thirteen prostrations were made there. There were thirteen places to prostrate, as we learned in mishnah three. According to this opinion, the thirteen places of prostration were at the places where the Soreg had been broken through by the Greeks.", + "Abba Yose ben Hanan says: they were made facing the thirteen gates. On the south beginning from the west there were the upper gate (1), the gate of burning (2), the gate of the firstborn (3), and the water gate (4). And why was it called the water gate? Because they brought in through it the pitcher of water for libation on the festival. Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob says: in it the water welled up, and in the time to come from there it will come out from under the threshold of the Temple. Corresponding to them in the north beginning in the west were the gate of Yehoniah (5), the gate of the offering (6), the women's gate (7), the gate of song (8). Why was it called the gate of Yehoniah? Because Yehoniah went forth into captivity through it. On the east was the gate of Nicanor (9); it had two doors, one on its right and one on its left (10 + 11). There were further two gates in the west which had no special name (12 + 13). Abba Yose ben Hanan disagrees with the anonymous mishnah found in 1:4-5, who held that there were seven gates around the Temple Court. Abba Yose ben Hanan says that there were thirteen, and at each they would prostrate. He now lists these gates. Some of them are repeats of those listed above. The upper gate: Was called “upper” because it was at the highest point on the Temple Mount. The gate of the first-borns: Through which they would bring the first-born animals to be slaughtered, for they can be slaughtered on the south. The water gate: The mishnah gives two reasons why it was called the water gate. The first is practical through this gate the water was brought in for the water libation on Sukkot. The second is more messianic: Ezekiel 47:1-2 prophesies that in the time of redemption water will burst forth from the Temple. This water will come forth from this gate. Yehoniah’s gate: Yehoniah, as will be explained later in the mishnah, is the king who was exiled to Babylonia in II Kings 24:15. He went out, according to legend, through this gate. Commentators say that this is the same gate that is called “the gate of kindling” in 1:4. The gate of the offering: Through here they would bring in any sacrifice that needed to be slaughtered on the north side. The gate of women: Women who needed/wanted to lay their hands on their sacrifices could go in through this gate. The gate of song: Through which the Levites would bring in their musical instruments. Commentators identify this gate with the gate of the sparks in 1:5. Nicanor’s gate: As we have already learned, this gate was named after Nicanor who brought the gates from Egypt. On each side of the gate was a small door, and these doors were included in the overall count. Thus Nicanor’s gate gets credit for being three gates. The no-name gates: These gates were behind the Temple and were rarely used and therefore had no names." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nChapter three begins with several mishnayot describing the outer altar, upon which the sacrifices were burned.", + "The altar was thirty-two cubits by thirty-two. The mishnah begins to describe the altar from the very bottom. This area was 32 by 32 cubits.", + "It rose a cubit and went in a cubit, and this formed the foundation, leaving thirty cubits by thirty. The foundation of the altar was an amah in length and ran the entire length on the north and west but not the south and the east. On the southwestern corner and northeastern corner it took up one amah, but did not run the whole length (this will be explained in section nine). The remaining square of the altar was 30 x 30 amot.", + "It then rose five cubits and went in one cubit, and this formed the surround, leaving twenty-eight cubits by twenty-eight. On top of the foundation lies the surround (sovev). The sovev was five amot above the altar, and it was an amah in breadth. This left the altar with 28 x 28 amot.", + "The horns extended a cubit in each direction, thus leaving twenty-six by twenty-six. The four corners/horns (same word in Hebrew) of the altar each took up an amah in each direction, leaving the altar with 26 x 26 amot.", + "A cubit on every side was allowed for the priests to go round, thus leaving twenty-four by twenty-four as the place for the wood pile [for the altar fire]. Along the sides there was an amah walkway left empty so that the priests could walk around the altar. This walkway was inside the area devoted to the horns. Thus, the final measurement of the altar is 24 x 24. It was on this space that they would set the wood for the fire.", + "Rabbi Yose said: Originally, the complete area [occupied by the altar] was only twenty-eight cubits by twenty-eight, and it rose with the dimensions mentioned until the space left for the altar pile was only twenty by twenty. When, however, the children of the exile returned, they added four cubits on the north, and four on the west like a gamma, since it is said: “Now the hearth shall be twelve cubits long by twelve broad, square” (Ezekiel 43:16). Is it possible that it was only twelve cubits by twelve? When it says, “With four equal sides” (, this shows that he was measuring from the middle, twelve cubits in every direction. According to Rabbi Yose, the bottom square of the original altar was 28 x 28, leaving 20 x 20 for burning the wood, after room was left for the foundation, sovev, horns and walkway. This accords with the size of the altar built by Solomon according to II Chronicles 4:1. However, when the Israelites returned from the Babylonian exile, they built the altar larger than it was before. They added four amot to two sides of the altar, forming the shape of the Greek letter Gamma, which made the usable space of the altar 24 x 24. This number is derived from an interpretation of Ezekiel 43:16, according to which the altar was 12 x 12 amot. This number strikes Rabbi Yose as being impossibly small, probably because that would make it smaller than the altar of Solomon. Therefore, he posits that the measurements were taken from the center of the altar, and that 12 amot extended in each direction, leaving a space of 24 x 24.", + "A line of red paint ran round it in the middle to divide between the upper and the lower blood. Some sacrifices had their blood spilt on the upper side of the altar, above the red paint (the animal hatat and bird olot) while the rest had their blood spilt on the lower side of the altar.", + "The foundation ran the whole length of the north and of the west sides, and it took up one cubit on the south and one on the east. This was explained above in section two." + ], + [ + "At the southwestern corner [of the foundation] there were two openings like two small nostrils through which the blood which was poured on the western side of the foundation and on the southern side flowed down till the two streams became mingled in the channel, through which they made their way out to the Kidron wadi. The blood of all sacrifices was either drained on the western side of the foundation (see Zevahim 5:1-2) or on the southern side (Zevahim 5:3). The blood would drain out through two holes shaped like nostrils, and then flow down to the channel that flowed through the Temple Courtyard. From there the blood would be flushed out to the Kidron wadi that flows below the Temple Mount." + ], + [ + "On the floor beneath at that corner there was a place a cubit square on which was a marble slab with a ring fixed in it, and through this they used to go down to the pit to clean it out. The blood and refuse would flow down to the pit (called in Hebrew the “shit” wonder if that’s coincidental?). There was a trap door that would lead down to the pit and the priests would periodically clean it out of congealed blood so that it wouldn’t get clogged. That might not have been a job that they had to fight to get.", + "There was an ascent on the south side of the altar, thirty-two cubits [long] by sixteen broad. The ascent was the ramp that the priests used to go up to the altar. It was long and quite broad.", + "It had a square window in its western side where disqualified sin-offerings of birds were placed. Sin-offerings of birds had to be left somewhere until they would begin to rot. Then they could be burned outside the Temple. To this end the birds were left in a small window/cavity cut out of the ascent." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah deals with the stones used for the altar. Deuteronomy 27:5-6 states: “You should build an altar to the Lord your God, an altar of stones. Do not wield an iron tool over them; you must build the altar of the Lord your God of unhewn stones.” These two verses and their fulfillment are the main topic of this mishnah.", + "The stones both of the ascent and of the altar were taken from the valley of Bet Kerem. Bet Kerem is close to Jerusalem (today it is a neighborhood in Jerusalem).", + "They dug into virgin soil and brought from there whole stones on which no iron had been lifted, since iron disqualifies by mere touch, though a flaw made by anything could disqualify. If one of them received a flaw, it was disqualified, but the rest were not. The quarrying would begin in soil that had not been used. They would extract whole stones without using any iron tools. Any stone which had been touched by an iron tool is disqualified. If it was flawed by a different type of tool it is also disqualified, but other types of metal do not disqualify by mere touch. If one of the stones that were already in use received a flaw, it is disqualified but the other stones are still valid. They will have to replace the flawed stone.", + "They were whitewashed twice a year, once at Pesah and once at Hag, and the Sanctuary was whitewashed once a year, at Pesah. Rabbi says: they were whitewashed every Friday with a cloth on account of the blood stains. The stones of the altar were whitewashed with plaster twice a year, once on Pesah (their Pesah cleaning) and once on Sukkot. The mishnah seems to say that they whitewashed the Sanctuary with plaster once a year. However, this cannot be the intention of the mishnah because the Sanctuary and the Holy of Holies were both covered with gold. Therefore, Albeck explains that this refers to the porch (the Ulam) that comes before the Sanctuary. Another explanation is that the word “Sanctuary” here actually refers to the whole Temple, including the courtyards. Rabbi [Judah Hanasi] holds that they would clean the altar once a week because of the blood stains. But they would only do so with a simple cloth.", + "The plaster was not laid on with an iron trowel, for fear that it might touch and disqualify. When they put on the plaster, they did not use an iron trowel for fear that would disqualify the stones.", + "Since iron was created to shorten man's days and the altar was created to prolong man's days, and it is not right therefore that that which shortens should be lifted against that which prolongs. This section explains why iron disqualifies the stones of the altar. It is a nice midrash the material that is used to destroy life should be kept away from the altar, whose ultimate purpose is to provide and lengthen life." + ], + [ + "There were rings to the north of the altar, six rows of four each. And some say, four rows of six each. Upon them they used to slaughter the sacrificial animals.
The slaughter house was to the north of the altar, and on it were eight small pillars on top of which were blocks of cedar wood, in which were fixed hooks of iron, three rows in each, upon which they would hang [the sacrifice] and they would strip its hide on tables of marble that stood between the pillars. Section one: There were twenty-four rings on the north side of the altar, either in six rows of four, or four rows of six. They would put the animal’s head in the ring to slaughter it. Section two: The mishnah describes the slaughterhouse, especially the hooks on which they would hang the meat after the sacrifice was slaughtered. It is also describes the tables upon which the meat would be washed.
This mishnah describes the set-up used to slaughter the sacrifices. Some of this mishnah was also found in Tamid 3:5 (coincidental, I think, that the number of the mishnah is the same)." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe Mishnah continues to move in its description from the less holy places to the direction of the Sanctuary and the holiest places. Today we move from the outer altar to the Sanctuary.", + "The laver was between the porch and the altar, a little to the south. The laver where the priests would wash their hands and feet was found between the porch and the altar (to the west of the altar), and a little bit south.", + "Between the porch and the altar there were twenty-two cubits. Between the altar and the porch there were twenty-two cubits, which were taken up by steps. Each step was half a cubit above the previous step. The breadth of each step was a cubit, but some steps had some extra floor space in between them.", + "There were twelve steps there, each step being half a cubit high and a cubit broad. There was a cubit, a cubit and a level space of three cubits, then a cubit, a cubit and a level space of three cubits, then at the top a cubit, a cubit and a level space of four cubits. The first two steps were a cubit broad, and then there was a level space of three cubits before the next step began. This set-up occurred three times for a total of nine steps, and fifteen cubits. The final set had a level space of four cubits, bringing the total to twenty-one cubits. In addition there was another cubit between the altar and the first step, for a total of 22 cubits between the altar and the Sanctuary.", + "Rabbi Judah says that at the top there was a cubit, a cubit and a level space of five cubits. Rabbi Judah holds that the extra cubit was in the level space after the last step. There was no space of a cubit between the altar and the first step." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah deals with the doorway that opened onto the Porch (Oolam in Hebrew).", + "The doorway of the porch was forty cubits high and its breadth was twenty cubits. As we noted above in 2:3, the doorway to the Porch was larger than all of the other doorways in the Temple. It was forty cubits high, whereas all other doorways were twenty cubits high.", + "Over it were five main beams of ash [wood]. The lowest projected a cubit on each side beyond the doorway. The one above projected beyond this one a cubit on each side. Thus the topmost one was thirty cubits long. The lowest beam that went over the doorway would have been 22 cubits in breadth. The next was 24, the third was 26, the fourth was 28 and the fifth was thirty cubits long.", + "There was a layer of stones between each one and the next. Between each beam there was a layer of stones." + ], + [ + "There were poles of cedar wood stretching from the wall of the Sanctuary to the wall of the Porch to prevent it from bulging. There were chains of gold fixed in the roof beams of the Porch by which the priestly initiates used to ascend and see the crowns, as it says, “And the crowns shall be to Helem and to Toviyah and to Yedaya and to Hen the son of Zephaniah as a memorial in the Temple of the Lord” (Zechariah 6:14). A golden vine stood at the door of the Sanctuary trained on poles, and anyone who offered a leaf or a grape or a bunch used to bring it and hang it there. Rabbi Eliezer bar Zadok said: on one occasion three hundred priests were commissioned [to clear it].
" + ] + ], + [ + [ + "The doorway of the Hekhal was twenty cubits high and ten broad.
It had four doors, two on the inner side, and two on the outer, as it says, “And the Hekhal and the Sanctuary had two doors” (Ezekiel 41:23).
The outer ones opened into the interior of the doorway so as to cover the thickness of the wall, while the inner ones opened into the Temple so as to cover the space behind the doors, because the whole of the Temple was overlaid with gold except the space behind the doors.
Rabbi Judah says: they stood within the doorway, and they resembled folding doors. These were two cubits and a half [of the wall] and these were two cubits and a half, leaving half a cubit as a doorpost at the one end and half a cubit as a doorpost at the other end, as it says, “And the doors had two leaves apiece, two turning leaves, two leaves for the one door and two leaves for the other” (Ezekiel 41:2.
Chapter four deals with the Sanctuary or Hekhal in Hebrew. I will call it the Hekhal henceforth in order to encourage the use of Hebrew. The Hekhal was the main structure of the Temple and it stood between the Porch and the Holy of Holies.
Section two: The Hekhal had four doors. Two doors were in the thickness of the wall of the Hekhal, which ran the length of the opening, facing the Hekhal, one on the left and one on the right. Two others were on the other side, facing the Porch.
Section three: The wall of the Hekhal was six cubits in breadth. The doors were each five cubits long, so that when they opened they would cover five of the six cubits of the thickness of the wall. The extra cubit was taken up by the door post. The inner ones opened into the Hekhal, and when opened they would cover the part of the inside of the Hekhal that was not overlaid with gold. The doors were also covered with gold, so that when they were open only gold would be seen.
Section four: Rabbi Judah envisions a different set-up for the doors. Each door was like a folding door and they stood within the doorway and all of them were used to cover the thickness of the wall, each covering 2 ½ cubits of the wall. In other words, the doors did not open into the Hekhal. Rabbi Judah seems to interpret “two turning leaves” as proof that each door was a type of folding door. It is interesting to note that there may be a bit of tension here between the first opinion and Rabbi Judah as to how we know what occurred in the Temple. The first opinion may be based more on tradition or even recollections whereas Rabbi Judah’s opinion is based on more on the text found in Ezekiel." + ], + [ + "The great gate had two small doors, one to the north and one to the south. By the one to the south no one ever went in, and concerning it was stated explicitly be Ezekiel, as it says, “And the Lord said to me: this gate shall be shut, it shall not be opened, neither shall any man enter in by it, for the Lord God of Israel has entered in by it; therefore it shall be shut” (Ezekiel 44:2). The great gate of the Hekhal had two small doors, one to the north (to the right when facing the Hekhal) and one to the south. However, the southern door was never used, due to a direct order by God.", + "He [the priest] took the key and opened the [northern] door and went in to the cell, and from the cell he went into the Hekhal. When the priest wanted to open the great gate, he would take the keys to the gates, go into the cell, which was a chamber next to the gate, and then go into the Hekhal and open from the inside.", + "Rabbi Judah says: he used to walk along in the thickness of the wall until he came to the space between the two gates. He would open the outer doors from within and the inner doors from without. Rabbi Judah says that the priest would not enter the cell but would rather walk along inside the wall which was six cubits thick. He would then open the outer doors from within, turn around and open the inner doors from without." + ], + [ + "There were thirty-eight cells there, fifteen on the north, fifteen on the south, and eight on the west. Around the walls of the Hekhal and the Holy of Holies there were 38 cells or small chambers.", + "On the north and on the south there were five over five and five again over these; On the west there were three over three and two over these. These chambers were built in three stories. On the northern and southern sides there were five on each story, and on the west there were three on the first two stories and two on the top story.", + "Each had three openings, one to the cell on the right and one to the cell on the left and one to the cell above. Each cell had three openings, one which would open to the cell on the right, one which would open to the cell on the left, and one which would open to the cell above. However, the top row of cells had only two openings.", + "In the [one at the] northeastern corner there were five openings, one to the cell on the right, one to the cell above, one to the mesibbah, one to the door, and one to the Hekhal. The cell at the northeastern corner had five openings. One to the cell on the right and one above (there was no cell to its left, because there were no cells on the east). One to the mesibbah, which was a ramp that would go up from the west to the east to the roofs of the cells and the upper level of the Sanctuary. We will learn more about the mesibbah in mishnah five. The fourth opening led to the door on the northern side of the great gate at the entrance to the Hekhal. The fifth door led straight to the Hekhal. This accords with what we learned in yesterday's mishnah, according to the opinion of the sages (and not Rabbi Judah)." + ], + [ + "The [chamber] of the lowest [story] was five cubits wide and at the ceiling six cubits. The mishnah's explanation of the size of the cells is based on I Kings 6:6. The bottom story's cells were each five cubits in breadth. In the walls of the Hekhal they would reduce the thickness of the wall by a cubit at this point so that the ceiling of the cell could rest on the point where the wall was brought in. This is also referred to in the continuation of the above verse from I Kings. This would mean that at the point of the ceiling the cell was one cubit broader.", + "The [chamber] of the middle [story] was six cubits wide and at the ceiling of seven. The second story was one cubit broader, matching the breadth of the ceiling of the first story. Again, the wall was brought in to accommodate the planks for the ceiling of the cell. This would make it seven cubits at the point of the ceiling.", + "The [chamber] of the top [story] was seven cubits wide, as it says, \"The lowest story was five cubits wide, the middle one 6 cubits wide and the third 7 cubits wide\" (I Kings 6:6). Similarly, the third story was the breadth of the ceiling of the second story. As stated above, this matches the verse in I Kings that describes Solomon's Temple. We should emphasize that this is another example where either the Second Temple was patterned after the First Temple, or the rabbis at least imagined that it was." + ], + [ + "The mesibbah (a winding went up from the north-east corner to the north-west corner by which they used to go up to the roofs of the cells.
One would ascend the messibah facing the west, traversing the whole of the northern side till he reached the west.
When he reached the west he turned to face south and then traversed whole of the west side till he reached the south.
When he reached the south he turned to face eastwards and then traversed the south side till he reached the door of the upper chamber, since the door of the upper chamber opened to the south.
In the doorway of the upper chamber were two columns of cedar by which they used to climb up to the roof of the upper chamber, and at the top of them was a row of stones showing the division in the upper chamber between the holy part and the Holy of Holies.
There were trap doors in the upper chamber opening into the Holy of Holies by which the workmen were let down in baskets so that they should not feast their eyes on the Holy of Holies.
Sections 1-4: The mesibbah was the walkway that they would use to get to the top of the Hekhal. The mishnah explains how the priest would walk on the mesibbah which began on the northeastern side (as we learned in mishnah three) and went to the northwestern side. He would then turn south (left) and walk to the end, then he would walk all the way to the southeastern cornet to get to the upper chamber that was built on top of the Hekhal and the Holy of Holies. The door of this chamber was open on the southern wall.
Section five: There were poles in the upper chamber which they could use to climb up to the roof. On the roof there was a division made by a wall of stones to distinguish between the Hekhal (the holy) and the Holy of Holies.
Section six: There were trap doors in the roof of the Holy of Holies through which they would let workmen down in baskets to fix the walls of the Hekhal and Holy of Holies when necessary. The workmen were let down in baskets that were covered on three sides so that all they could see was the wall that they were repairing. This would prevent them from unabashedly gazing at the Holy of Holies which would be considered an inappropriate means of deriving benefit from the holiest point of the Temple." + ], + [ + "The Hekhal was a hundred cubits by a hundred with a height of a hundred. The Hekhal as referred to in this mishnah includes the dimensions of the Porch, the Hekhal and the Holy of Holies put together. It was a 100 cubit cube.", + "The foundation was six cubits, then it rose forty, then a cubit for the ornamentation, two cubits for the guttering, a cubit for the ceiling and a cubit for the plastering. The mishnah now explains the elements that lead to a height of 100 cubits (note: this is a very tall structure). The closed foundation of the entire structure was 6 cubits high. We can also see this by the need for 12 stairs to lead up from the courtyard to the floor of the Porch. Each stair was 1/2 cubit high, making a total of 6 cubits. The empty space inside the Hekhal was 40 cubits high. Before the ceiling there was a cubit of ornamentation on the walls. Then there were two cubits of guttering to catch water that might leak in from the roof. The ceiling (the boards) and the plastering were each a cubit. This would bring us to a total of 51 cubits.", + "The height of the upper chamber was forty cubits, there was a cubit for its ornamentation, two cubits for the guttering, a cubit for the ceiling, a cubit for the plastering, three cubits for the parapet and a cubit for the spikes. The upper chamber was also forty cubits high, then another cubit for ornamentation, two for guttering, and one each for the ceiling and its plastering. This brings us to 96 total cubits. There was a parapet (a railing) on top of the upper chamber and there were one cubit spikes coming out of the parapet. This would chase away birds which would have nested on the tops of the walls. [Funny, but we too put spikes on top of our walls to keep away the bird].", + "Rabbi Judah says the spikes were not included in the measurement, but the parapet was four cubits. Rabbi Judah disagrees with two minor details of the above description. He claims that the spikes were not counted in the total, and that the number 100 was reached by the parapet being four not three cubits high." + ], + [ + "From east to west was a hundred cubits: The wall of the porch five cubits, the porch itself eleven, the wall of the Hekhal six cubits and its interior forty, a cubit for the space between, and twenty cubits for the Holy of Holies, the wall of the Hekhal six cubits, the cell six cubits and the wall of the cell five. The mishnah now proceeds to delineate the structures, walls, etc. that took up the length and breadth of the Hekhal. The Hekhal was one hundred cubits from its eastern side to its western side. The thickness of the front wall of the Porch was five cubits. The area of the Porch was eleven cubits, and the wall separating the Porch from the Hekhal was six more. This brings us to 22. The interior of the Hekhal was 40 (total = 62). There was a one cubit space between the Hekhal and the Holy of Holies. In the First Temple there was an actual wall in this space, but in the Second Temple there were two curtains a cubit apart from one another. The interior of the Holy of Holies was 20 cubits (total = 83). The western wall of the Hekhal was six more cubits. The width of the middle cells on the western side was six cubits, and the western wall of the cell was another five, bringing us to the grand total of 100 cubits.", + "From north to south was seventy cubits: The wall of the mesibbah five cubits, the mesibbah itself three, the wall of the cell five and the cell itself six, the wall of the Hekhal six cubits and its interior twenty, then the wall of the Hekhal again six and the cell six and its wall five, then the place of the water descent three cubits and its wall five cubits. From north to south the entire expanse was seventy cubits. The thickness of the walls of the mesibbah was 5 cubits (concerning the mesibbah see mishnah five). The width of the mesibbah itself was three cubits. Inside the mesibbah was the cell, whose wall was five. The middle level cell itself was six cubits wide (total = 19). The wall separating the cell from the Hekhal was another six, and the width of the Hekhal was twenty (total=45). The opposite wall was also six and the cell on the south side was another six, and its wall was another five (total = 62). There was a space of three cubits between the wall of the cell and the outer wall in order to let water flow down from the roof. This was another three cubits and then another five cubits of wall, bringing us to a total of 70 cubits. It might be interesting to note that of the seventy cubits, 32 of them were taken up by wall. The walls were plentiful and very thick.", + "The Porch extended beyond this fifteen cubits on the north and fifteen cubits on the south, and this space was called the House of the slaughter-knives where they used to store the knives. The Porch, the structure that lay in front of the Hekhal, was fifteen cubits longer from north to south then the Hekhal on each side. This would mean that the back wall to the Porch, which serves as the front wall of the Hekhal, would have been 100 cubits, whereas the rest of the Hekhal was seventy cubits from north to south. This extra space was where the slaughterer's knives were stored. Perhaps we could surmise that they stored the knives here in order to keep them from being parallel to the altar or Holy of Holies, such that an instrument of violence, while necessary for the daily operation of the Temple, was at least not stored in a space parallel to the life-giving altar.", + "The Hekhal was narrow behind and broad in front, resembling a lion, as it says, \"Ah, Ariel, Ariel, the city where David encamped\" (Isaiah 29:1): Just as a lion is narrow behind and broad in front, so the Hekhal was narrow behind and broad in front. The final section of the mishnah and our chapter likens the entire structure of the Porch, Hekhal and Holy of Holies to a lion. It was broad in front (100 cubits) and a bit narrower in the back (70 cubits). The imagery is based on the verse which refers to Jerusalem as \"Ariel\" which means \"lion of God.\"" + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nChapter five backs away from the Hekhal and describes the courtyard that lay to the east of the Temple.\nIf we think about Tractate Middot as a whole we can see that the first two chapters brought us on to the Temple Mount and into the outer courtyards, the fourth chapter discussed the Hekhal and the fifth chapter went back to the courtyard. At the heart of the tractate, in chapter three, is the description of the outer altar, certainly the most important piece of the Temple on an everyday basis. In my opinion, the literary structure of this tractate is clearly intentional.", + "The whole of the courtyard was a hundred and eighty-seven cubits long by a hundred and thirty-five broad. The 187 cubits is measured from the Israelite's courtyard (the Nicanor Gate) to the outer walls of the Temple. It does not include the Women's courtyard.", + "From east to west it was a hundred and eighty-seven. The space in which the Israelites could go was eleven cubits. The space in which the priests could go was eleven cubits. The altar took up thirty-two. Between the Porch and the altar was twenty-two cubits. The Hekhal took up a hundred cubits, and there were eleven cubits behind the kapporet. The Israelites' courtyard was eleven cubits wide, as was the priests' courtyard. Immediately after the priests' courtyard began the outer altar, which was thirty-two cubits broad (see 3:1). There were twenty-two cubits between the outer altar and the beginning of the Porch (see 3:6). This brings us to a total of 76 cubits. The Hekhal was 100 cubits from east to west (see 4:7). On the other side of the Holy of Holies, which held the kapporet, from the western wall of the Hekhal to the western wall of the Temple, there were another 11 cubits, bringing us to a grand total of 187 cubits." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah explains the structures that took up the space going from north to south in the courtyard.", + "From north to south was a hundred and thirty-five cubits.
The ascent and the altar took up sixty-two; Although the ascent was 32 cubits long and the altar was also thirty-two cubits long, together they took up only 62 cubits of floor space. There are some complicated equations to work this out, which I do not want to get into here. Suffice it to say, that Albeck concludes that the ascent did not reach the altar itself, but stopped about a cubit away and that the top of the ascent did not go all the way up to the altar.", + "From the altar to the rings was eight cubits. The rings were described in 3:5. They were eight cubits north of the altar (total 70).", + "The rings took up twenty-four cubits. The rings took up twenty-four cubits (total: 94).", + "From the rings to the tables was four cubits, See also 3:5. These were four cubits away.", + "From the tables to the dwarf pillars four, See also 3:5. These pillars were used to hang the sacrifices and strip their hides. The mishnah does not tell us how much space the tables took up. The Rambam writes that the tables took up eight cubits. Based on this, other commentators claim that the tables took up the space between the rings and the dwarf pillars.", + "And from the dwarf pillars to the wall of the courtyard eight cubits, From the dwarf pillars to the outer wall was another 8 cubits, bringing the total to 110.", + "And the remainder was between the ascent and the wall and the space occupied by the dwarf pillars. The remaining 25 cubits was taken up by the space on the southern side between the ascent and the southern wall and the space of the dwarf pillars themselves. According to the Rambam, each took up 12 1/2 cubits." + ], + [ + "There were six chambers in the courtyard, three on the north and three on the south.
On the north were the salt chamber, the parvah chamber and the washer's chamber.
In the salt chamber they used to keep the salt for the offerings.
In the parvah chamber they used to salt the skins of the animal-offerings.
On its roof was the bath used by the high priest on Yom Kippur.
In the washers’ chamber they used to wash the entrails of the sacrificial animals, and from it a winding way went up to the roof of the parvah chamber.
Our mishnah that were in the Israelites' courtyard or within. Most of the mishnah is self-explanatory, but I have made a few comments below.
Section two: These three chambers were close to one another, on the northeastern corner of the Israelites' courtyard. There are two explanations as to why it was called the \"parvah chamber.\" The first is that the person who dedicated it was named \"Parvah\" either as a first or last name. The second is that the word \"parvah\" is after the \"parot\" or cows, whose hides were treated their. In modern Hebrew the word \"parvah\" means fur, but cows, sheep and goats don't really have fur.
Section five: The high priest would immerse five times on Yom Kippur, all within the Temple confines. See Yoma 3:3. Here we learn that these immersions were done on the roof of the parvah chamber.
Section six: In this chamber they would wash out the animal's stomach. The intestines were washed on the tables near the dwarf pillars, as we learned in Tamid 4:3." + ], + [ + "On the south were the wood chamber, the chamber of the exile and the chamber of hewn stones.
The wood chamber: Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob says: I forget what it was used for. Abba Shaul says: It was the chamber of the high priest, and it was behind the two of them, and one roof covered all three.
In the chamber of the exile there was a fixed cistern, with a wheel over it, and from there water was provided for all of the courtyard.
In the chamber of hewn stone the great Sanhedrin of Israel used to sit and judge the priesthood.
A priest in whom was found a disqualification used to put on black garments and wrap himself in black and go away. One in whom no disqualification was found used to put on white garments and wrap himself in white and go in and serve along with his brother priests.
They used to make a feast because no blemish had been found in the seed of Aaron the priest, and they used to say: Blessed is the Omnipresent, blessed is He, for no blemish has been found in the seed of Aaron. Blessed is He who chose Aaron and his sons to stand to minister before the Lord in the Holy of Holies.
The final mishnah of our tractate describes the three chambers that were found on the southern side of the courtyard.
Section two: We should note that this is the second time in our tractate that Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob did not know what a chamber was used for and Abba Shaul did. See also 2:5. According to the Abba Shaul, the chamber of wood was the chamber of the high priest, which the Talmud identifies with the chamber mentioned in the beginning of Yoma. There it is called \"the chamber of parhedrin\" and in it the high priest would dwell for the seven days before Yom Kippur.
Section three: This cistern was also mentioned in Eruvin 10:14. Some commentators explain that it was called the \"chamber of the exile\" because it was built by Jews who had returned from the exile. Others explain that the word \"golah\" which I have translated to be \"exile\" should be read \"gulah\" which refers to a large container attached to the wheel which was used to draw water.
Section four: In the chamber of hewn stone, the great Sanhedrin of 70 judges would sit and one of their responsibilities was to decide which priests were fit to serve in the Temple [see also Sanhedrin, chapter one]. [We should note that there is something to be said about rabbis claiming that they determined which priests were fit to serve in the Temple. One wonders whether the priests would have agreed that this was the way things were done].
Section five: A priest who was disqualified from serving in the Temple, either due to a physical blemish or perhaps a genealogical flaw, would dress in black and leave.
One who was found valid to serve, would don his white priestly clothing and head off to join his fellow priests.
Section five: On a day that no priests were invalidated, the priests would make a celebration and offer up a special blessing. The impression one gets is that this was not the norm most of time at least one priest was found to be disqualified.
Congratulations! We have finished Tractate Middot!
It is a tradition at this point to thank God for helping us finish learning the tractate and to commit ourselves to going back and relearning it, so that we may not forget it and so that its lessons will stay with us for all of our lives.
Middot was an unusual tractate, much as was Tamid. Instead of the usual argumentation, we get a long physical description of the Temple. We should appreciate that although the rabbis were primarily attached to the words of the Torah, both the written and the oral Torah, they were drawn to the physical stones of the Temple, although they could no longer worship there. Perhaps we could even look at Middot as a way of bringing those stones into their own world of words.
This is not the place to discuss rabbinic thought on the complicated subject of animal sacrifice, but we should note that on at least one occasion in the tractate the rabbis did reveal their understanding of this subject. The altar gives life, both to Israel and perhaps to the entire world. By bringing us closer to God and maintaining our relationship with the eternal forces that rule the universe, the altar and the Temple which surround it, seem to tap into such a primal power and bring life to the worshipper's fragile human existence.
I hope you have enjoyed Arakhin. Tomorrow we begin Tractate Kinim." + ] + ] + ] + }, + "versions": [ + [ + "Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp", + "http://learn.conservativeyeshiva.org/mishnah/" + ] + ], + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה מדות", + "categories": [ + "Mishnah", + "Modern Commentary on Mishnah", + "English Explanation of Mishnah", + "Seder Kodashim" + ], + "schema": { + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה מדות", + "enTitle": "English Explanation of Mishnah Middot", + "key": "English Explanation of Mishnah Middot", + "nodes": [ + { + "heTitle": "הקדמה", + "enTitle": "Introduction" + }, + { + "heTitle": "", + "enTitle": "" + } + ] + } +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Kodashim/English Explanation of Mishnah Tamid/English/Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp.json b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Kodashim/English Explanation of Mishnah Tamid/English/Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..aaef3abc03c71aafc6636a942d2b30bd975ded18 --- /dev/null +++ b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Kodashim/English Explanation of Mishnah Tamid/English/Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp.json @@ -0,0 +1,250 @@ +{ + "language": "en", + "title": "English Explanation of Mishnah Tamid", + "versionSource": "http://learn.conservativeyeshiva.org/mishnah/", + "versionTitle": "Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp", + "status": "locked", + "license": "CC-BY", + "shortVersionTitle": "Dr. Joshua Kulp", + "actualLanguage": "en", + "languageFamilyName": "english", + "isBaseText": true, + "isSource": true, + "isPrimary": true, + "direction": "ltr", + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה תמיד", + "categories": [ + "Mishnah", + "Modern Commentary on Mishnah", + "English Explanation of Mishnah", + "Seder Kodashim" + ], + "text": { + "Introduction": [ + "Tractate Tamid describes how the sacrificial service was performed in the Temple in the morning, up until the sacrifice of the morning Tamid (daily offering). There are almost no disputes in the entire tractate, the only dispute being found in 5:2. The Tamid offering is described in Numbers 28:3-8:", + "1 The Lord spoke to Moses, saying: 2 Command the Israelite people and say to them: Be punctilious in presenting to Me at stated times the offerings of food due Me, as offerings by fire of pleasing odor to Me. 3 Say to them: These are the offerings by fire that you are to present to the Lord: As a regular burnt offering every day, two yearling lambs without blemish. 4 You shall offer one lamb in the morning, and the other lamb you shall offer at twilight. 5 And as a meal offering, there shall be a tenth of an ephah of choice flour with a quarter of a hin of beaten oil mixed in 6 —the regular burnt offering instituted at Mount Sinai—an offering by fire of pleasing odor to the Lord. 7 The libation with it shall be a quarter of a hin for each lamb, to be poured in the sacred precinct as an offering of fermented drink to the Lord. 8 The other lamb you shall offer at twilight, preparing the same meal offering and libation as in the morning—an offering by fire of pleasing odor to the Lord.", + "There is also a daily incense offering. This is described in Exodus 30:7-8:", + "7 On it Aaron shall burn aromatic incense: he shall burn it every morning when he tends the lamps, 8 and Aaron shall burn it at twilight when he lights the lamps — a regular incense offering before the Lord throughout the ages. ", + "Many scholars believe that Tamid is one of the earliest tractates of the Mishnah. They believe that it was composed shortly after the destruction of the Temple. While there is some Babylonian Talmud on the tractate, there is not much. This may be, in my opinion, a result of the fact that there are virtually no disputes in the tractate, which also may be a result of the tractate having been composed at a very early period. In other words, the tractate was composed early, later sages did not discuss it very much, so we don’t find them debating about it, and this lack of interest by early sages in the subject, also caused later sages to not engage much in learning this tractate. Despite all of this, it is certainly one of the tractates of the Mishnah, so we will certainly learn it! Good luck and I hope you all enjoy tractate Tamid." + ], + "": [ + [ + [ + "Introduction\nMishnah Tamid begins with a description of the priests sleeping in the Temple, before their daily work began.", + "In three places the priests keep watch in the Temple: in the chamber of Avtinas, in the chamber of the spark, and in the fire chamber. There were three places in the Temple where the priests would keep watch at night. When we learn Tractate Midot we will see a list of 21 places where the Levites kept watch. The three places here are also mentioned there. These three places are: The chamber of Avtinas, where they would prepare the incense. The chamber of the spark, where they kept the fire to light the fires on the altars. The fire chamber where they kept a large fire to keep the priests warm at night.", + "In the chamber of Avtinas and in the chamber of the spark there were upper chambers where the youths kept watch. Two of the chambers had upper chambers so that the younger priests who could not yet serve in the Temple could keep watch.", + "The fire chamber was vaulted and it was a large room surrounded with stone projections, and the elders of the clan [serving in the Temple] used to sleep there, with the keys of the Temple courtyard in their hands. The fire chamber did not have an upper chamber. Rather it was vaulted, and surrounded by rows of stones. On these rows of stones the priests serving in the Temple at the time (the Temple guard was split into 24 houses) would sleep, while holding the keys to the Temple courtyard.", + "The priestly initiates used to place their bedding on the ground. The young priests did not get to sleep on the rows of stones. They had to put their bedding down on the ground and sleep on the floor.", + "They did not sleep in their sacred garments, but they used to take them off [and fold them] and place them under their heads and cover themselves with their own ordinary clothes. None of the priests slept in the clothes that they would wear while performing the Temple service. Based on the continuation of the Mishnah it seems that they feared lest they would have an emission at night and thereby contaminate their clothes. Therefore, they slept in their regular, non-sanctified clothing.", + "If one of them had a seminal emission, he used to go out and make his way down the winding stairs which went under the Birah, and which was lit by lights on each side until he reached the bathing place. There was a fire close by and an honorable seat [i.e. toilet]: and this was its honor: if he found it locked, he knew there was someone there; if it was open, he knew there was no one there. He would go down and bathe and then come up and dry himself and warm himself in front of the fire. He would then go and take his seat next to his fellow priests until the gates were opened, when he would take his departure. This section describes what would happen if one of the priests had a seminal emission while sleeping in the Temple. According to Deuteronomy 23:11 such a person must leave the “camp”, which the rabbis interpret to be parallel to the Temple. The priest would exit the Temple by using a set of underground stairs. It was forbidden for him to walk through the courtyard, or even on the Temple mount because he was impure. These stairs were lit so that he could see his way. He would then come to the ritual bath and a private toilet. The mishnah notes that a private toilet was unique generally toilets were used by a number of people at the same time. So unique was this toilet that it was even called “The Seat of Honor.” After taking care of his needs, he would bathe and then warm up next to the fire kept there for his comfort (sounds like a spa!). He would then go back to the other priests until the gates of the Temple were opened, when he would exit. He could not go serve in the Temple because he was not fully pure until the following evening. However, since he had been to the mikveh, he was no longer impure, so he could exit through the normal gates." + ], + [ + "Anyone who desired to remove the ashes from the altar used to rise early and bathe before the superintendent came. The first work done in the morning was clearing the ashes from the altar. This could be done by anyone who wished to do so (see Leviticus 1:2). Before removing the ashes, the priest would have to bathe, because it is always forbidden to enter the Temple courtyard before bathing (see Yoma 3:3).", + "At what time did the superintendent come? He did not always come at the same time; sometimes he came just at cock-crow, sometimes a little before or a little after. The superintendent was in charge of the lottery used to determine who would get to perform what ritual in the Temple. The lottery is described in Yoma 2:1-2. The superintendent would arrive around the time when the cock crows (see Yoma 1:8).", + "The superintendent would come and knock and they would open for him, and he would say to them, let all who have bathed come and draw lots. So they drew lots, and whoever was successful. The superintendent would knock on the door and let the priests know that whoever had prepared by taking a ritual bath, could come and participate in the lottery. But if you didn’t bathe you’re out of luck. The early priest gets the meat, as they say." + ], + [ + "He took the key and opened the small door, and went from the fire chamber into the Temple courtyard, and the priests went in after him carrying two lighted torches. After waking them up, the superintendent would take the key and open the small door in the fire chamber that was connected to the courtyard. The regular gates to the courtyard did not open until it began to be light outside. The priests then entered the courtyard each carrying two torches.", + "They divided into two groups, one of which went along the portico to the east, while the other went along it to the west. They then divided into two groups to check the Temple to make sure that everything was still in its proper place.", + "They went along inspecting until they came to the place where the griddle-cakes were made. There the two groups met and said, Is all well (? All is well (! They then appointed they that made the griddle-cakes to make griddle-cakes. Each day the high priest would offer a tenth of an ephah of griddle cakes, half in the morning and half in the evening (see Leviticus 6:13-14; Menahot 4:5). They would end their examination at the place where these cakes were made and each group would ask the other if everything was okay. They would then formally appoint those who made the griddle-cakes to make the griddle-cakes." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah deals with clearing the ashes from the altar.", + "The one who had merited to clear the ashes, would get ready to clear the ashes. After getting the griddle-cakes on their way, its now time to clear the ashes from the altar, the first ritual performed each morning. Mishnah two noted that the priest who performed this ritual was not chosen by lottery, but rather by his being the first to get out of bed and immerse.", + "They said to him: “Be careful not to touch any vessel until you have washed your hands and feet from the laver. See, the fire-pan is in the corner between the ascent and the altar on the west of the ascent.” Despite the fact that he had immersed, he still can’t touch holy vessels until he washes his feet and hands from the water in the laver. This would include the fire-pan. Therefore, before he begins the process, the other priests would remind him not to touch the fire-pan until he first washes his hands and feet. They would also remind him where the fire-pan was kept. This was helpful because it was dark in the courtyard.", + "No one entered with him, nor did he carry any light. Rather, he walked by the light of the altar fire. He would not carry a flame in with him rather he would walk along using only the dim light from the remaining fire on the altar.", + "No-one saw him or heard a sound from him until they heard the noise of the wooden wheel which Ben Katin made for hauling up the laver, when they said, “The time has come.” The other priests couldn’t see him or hear him until he began to draw water using the water wheel invented by Ben Katin. This water wheel is described in Yoma 3:10. The following is my commentary on that mishnah: Ben Katin is also credited with another improvement in the Temple, this one also connected to issue of water. He made a wheel that went into the water cistern which would cause the water in the laver to be connected to the water in the cistern. The reason for this is that any water left out overnight in a vessel in the Temple is rendered unfit. Without this wheel, the water left over in the laver would need to be emptied out every morning. Once they heard the wheel, they would say, “The time has come” meaning the time to wash his hands and feet.", + "He washed his hands and feet from the laver, then took the silver fire-pan and went up to the top of the altar and cleared away the cinders on either side and scooped up the ashes in the centre. The priest would then wash his hands and then clear the ashes and the cinders from the Temple.", + "He then descended and when he reached the floor he turned his face to the north and went along the east side of the ascent for about ten cubits, and he then made a heap of the cinders on the pavement three handbreadths away from the ascent, in the place where they used to put the crop of the birds and the ashes from the inner altar and the ash from the menorah. He would then descend from the altar, and deposit the ashes in the place where they would also dump out other waste-products, including the crop from the heads of bird offerings, and the ashes from the inner altar and the menorah." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "When his fellow priests saw that he had descended, they came running and hastened to wash their hands and feet in the laver. When the other priests see that the person who cleared the ashes had descended from the altar, they knew it was their turn to wash their hands and feet.", + "They then took the shovels and the forks and went up to the top of the altar. The limbs and pieces of fat that had not been consumed since the evening they pushed to the sides of the altar. If there was not room on the sides they arranged them on the surround or on the ascent. Their task was to take the pieces of the sacrifices that had not been consumed the day before and to clear them to the sides of the altar to make room for the wood they were now going to burn for the new day’s sacrifices. These limbs and pieces of fat would still burn; they would just do so on the sides of the altar. If there wasn’t enough room on the sides of the altar, they would even take some pieces off of the altar and put them on the ledge surrounding the altar or on the ascent. As we will learn in mishnah five, these pieces were later put back on so that they could be consumed." + ], + [ + "They then began to throw the ashes on to the heap (. This heap was in the middle of the altar, and sometimes there was as much as three hundred kor on it. After having cleared the limbs and pieces of fat, the other priests would take the ashes still on the altar and heap them onto the middle of the altar, onto a place called the “tapuah.” The pile of ashes on the tapuah could get quite high, as the mishnah testifies. However, when the tapuah began to overflow with ash, they would remove all of it and take it out of the city.", + "On festivals they did not use to clear away the ash because it was reckoned an ornament to the altar. On festivals they let the ash heap grow even higher because by seeing the massive amounts of ashes, people could tell how many sacrifices had been offered. The large ash-heap was considered to be ornamental to the altar.", + "It never happened that the priest was neglectful in taking out the ashes. This section relates to the previous one. One might have thought that they neglected to clear away the ashes during the festival, perhaps because they were so busy with other matters. To dash this thought, the mishnah notes that the priests never neglected the duty of taking the ashes off of the altar. They left the ashes on the altar during the festival out of intention and not neglect." + ], + [ + "They then began to take up the logs to place onto the fire. After having cleared the altar of the ashes or at least pushing them into the middle of the altar, the priests can now begin to bring up new wood to use to burn the day’s sacrifices.", + "Were all kinds of wood valid for the fire? All kinds of wood were valid for the fire except vine and olive wood. But what they mostly used were boughs of fig trees and of nut trees and of oil trees. Any wood could be used on the altar except for olive wood and vines. These were not used for kindling because these are the primary fruit bearing trees in Israel. It would be completely wasteful to use them as firewood. The most common trees were figs, nuts and oil trees. Note that these trees also bear fruit, but they were used for fire because their fruit was less significant than the wine and oil that come from the vine and olive trees. Alternatively, some commentators claim that these types of trees can only be used if the figs, nuts or oil that they produce are of low quality." + ], + [ + "He then arranged a large pile on the east side of the altar, with its open side on the east, while the inner ends of the [selected] logs touched the ash heap. They now begin to arrange the logs on the altar. They begin with a large pile of logs on the eastern side of the altar. In tomorrow’s mishnah we shall see that there was a smaller pile on the other side for burning the incense. The open side of the large pile faced east. The logs were arranged in straight rows from east to west, with the ends of the logs on the eastern side.", + "Spaces were left between the logs in which they kindled the brushwood. They left spaces in between the logs into which they put brushwood for kindling. Anyone who has ever made a good campfire should be familiar with this practice." + ], + [ + "They picked out from there some good fig-tree branches to make a second fire for the incense near the south-western corner some four cubits to the north of it, using as much wood as he judged sufficient to form five seahs of coals, and on the Shabbat as much as he thought would make eight seahs of coals, because from there they used to take fire for the two dishes of frankincense for the showbread. This section describes setting up the fire from which coals would be drawn to burn the incense on the inner altar, which stood inside the sanctuary (unlike the main altar which was outside). The wood used to make these coals was set up on the south-western corner of the altar, a little bit removed to the north. They would put enough wood to make five seahs of coals. On Shabbat they needed more coals because they would use them for the two dishes of frankincense burned on Shabbat with the showbread. Evidently, these two dishes needed an extra three seahs of coals.", + "The limbs and the pieces of fat which had not been consumed over night were put back on the wood. The chapter concludes by returning to those limbs and pieces of fat that were moved to the side in mishnah one of the chapter. These could now be moved back to the middle so that they could keep on burning.", + "They then kindled the two fires and descended and went to the chamber of hewn stone. After all this hoopla, the fires can finally be lit. After having lit the fires, they would go down to the chamber of hewn stone to raise a toast (just kidding!). In the chamber of hewn stone they will cast lots to see who gets to offer which sacrifice. But stay tuned the action continues in the next chapter." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "The superintendent then said to them: come and cast lots, to see who is to slaughter, and who is to sprinkle the blood, and who is to clear the ashes from the inner altar, and who is to clear the ash from the candlestick, and who is to lift the limbs on to the ascent: the head, the right leg, the two forelegs, the tailbone, the left leg, the breast and the neck and the two flanks, the entrails, the fine flour, the griddle cakes and the wine.
They cast lots and whoever won, won.
The altar is heating up and ready to go. It’s now time to start figuring out who is going to do what in the Temple that day.
The mishnah simply lists what were the parts of the sacrificial process that were up for grabs during this lottery. Many of these actions will be further explained below, so I will not explain them now." + ], + [ + "He then said to them: Go out and see if it is yet time for the slaughter. If the time had come, the one who saw would say, “There are flashes.”
Matya ben Samuel says: [He used to say] Has the whole of the east [of the sky] lit up. as far as Hebron?
And he [the observer] would answer yes.
Before the sacrifices were offered, they had to make sure that it was light outside.
Section one: The morning sacrifice could only be sacrificed after it was light. From the chamber of hewn stone they would send someone out to see if it was light outside.
Note that this process is not simply the practical issue of sending someone out to see if it was yet light outside. The process is highly ritualized the mishnah tells the priests what to say (“There are flashes!”) or provides them with ritualized questions to ask.
Section two: Matya ben Samuel was himself the “superintendent” so his testimony here is not just about what was said at this point, but rather what he himself used to say." + ], + [ + "He said to them: Go out and bring a lamb from the chamber of lambs. After having cast the lots, the first thing done was to fetch a lamb to use for the morning tamid.", + "Now the lamb’s chamber was in the north-western corner. And there were four chambers there the chamber of lambs, the chamber of the seals, the chamber of the fire-room and the chamber where the showbread was prepared. There were four chambers in the north-western corner of the Temple. My personal favorite is the chamber of the seals. Here the priests would teach the seals all sorts of tricks, like how to bounce a ball on your nose, how to clap your fins and most importantly, how to wave at the crowd when the show is over. I wonder where they kept the chamber of the little fish ☺. [Seriously, the seals were used to stamp the libation offerings so that the priests would easily know which libation goes with which offering. See Shekalim 5:3]" + ], + [ + "They went into the chamber of the vessels and they took out ninety-three vessels of silver and gold. They then went into the chamber of vessels to take out all 93 (!) vessels that would be used during the day’s worship.", + "They gave the animal for the daily sacrifice a drink from a cup of gold. While it might be tempting to think that they gave the animal a drink out of kindness. In reality the drink was so that its hide would be easier to strip after it was slaughtered.", + "Although it had been examined on the previous evening it was now examined again by torchlight. They would then reexamine the animal to make sure that it did not have a blemish that would disqualify it from being used as a sacrifice." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe mishnah now describes the bringing of the tamid to the slaughter house, and provides a description of the slaughter house.", + "The priest who had won the right to slaughter the tamid takes it along with him to the slaughter house, and those who had won the right to bring the limbs up followed after him. The priest who won the right to slaughter and the priests who will bring the various parts of the sacrifice onto the ramp leading up to the altar all go to the slaughter house.", + "The slaughter house was to the north of the altar, and on it were eight small pillars on top of which were blocks of cedar wood, in which were fixed hooks of iron, three rows in each, upon which they would hang [the tamid] and they would strip its hide on tables of marble that stood between the pillars. The mishnah describes the slaughterhouse, especially the hooks on which they would hang the meat after the tamid was slaughtered. It is also describes the tables upon which the meat would be washed. These processes will be described later in the mishnah." + ], + [ + "Those who had won the right to clear the ashes from the inner altar and from the candlestick would go first with four vessels in their hands the teni, the kuz and two keys. Before the people described in yesterday’s mishnah would go to bring the animal to the slaughterhouse, the priests who had won the right to clear the ashes would first go in to do their work. The mishnah describes the four objects that they would carry with them. [This mishnah does seem to be out of order. Indeed, in the Talmud it comes before the previous mishnah].", + "The teni resembled a large tarkav of gold and held two and a half kavs. The kuz resembled a large gold pitcher. The first two objects were used to carry out the ashes. One was called the teni, and it was the size of a basket that could hold two and a half kavs (about five liters). The kuz resembled a gold pitcher. The mishnah does not state how large the kuz was.", + "And two keys: One of the two keys would reach down to the “amah of the armpit” and the other opens immediately. They also held two keys to open the two locks on the first door. With one key they would open a lock below called the “amah of the armpit.” There are two reasons given for why it has this name. First of all, the priest unlocking the lock might have had to bend down a cubit (an amah) until he opened it. Alternatively, he had to stick his hand into the door until it was up until his armpit. Once the bottom lock was opened, he could open the top lock with the other key immediately." + ], + [ + "He then came to the small opening on the north.
The great gate had two small openings, one on the north and one on the south.
No one ever went in by the openings on the south, about which it is stated explicitly in Ezekiel, “And the Lord said to me, ‘This gate shall be closed, it shall not be opened, and no man shall enter by it, for the Lord God of Israel has entered by it” (Ezekiel 44:2).
He took the key and opened the small opening and went in to the cell and from the cell to the Sanctuary, until he reached the great gate.
When he reached the great gate he drew back the bolt and the latches and opened it. The slaughterer did not slaughter till he heard the sound of the great gate being opened.
Section one: The priest who was to open the gates of the Sanctuary would first come to the northern opening on the outside of the great gate.
Section two: The great gate had two openings, but because of the verse in Ezekiel, the southern opening was never used.
Section three: The priest would open the northern opening (this was described at the end of yesterday’s mishnah) and then he would go in to the cell. This was a chamber which would open up into the great gate of the Sanctuary. It seems to have been within the thickness of the walls of the great gate.
Section four: The priest would then open the gate of the sanctuary, which was the sign to the priest who was to slaughter the tamid that he could proceed with the slaughtering." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah describes some of the noises and sounds made in the Temple. In an exaggerated fashion, the rabbis claim that these noises could be heard in Jericho. Due to the fact that Jericho is probably 30-40 km’s from the Temple, these claims are clearly hyperbole.\nI shall explain what each of these sounds and smells were.", + "From Jericho they could hear the sound of the great gate being opened. Explained in yesterday’s mishnah.", + "From Jericho they could hear the sound of the magrephah. The “magrephah” which means “shovel” was a musical instrument that was shaped like a shovel.", + "From Jericho they could hear the noise of the wooden pulley which Ben Katin made for the laver. This was described in 1:4.", + "From Jericho they could hear the voice of Gevini the herald. He would summon the priests and Levites to their places. See Shekalim 5:1.", + "From Jericho they could hear the sound of the pipes. See: Arakhin 2:3.", + "From Jericho they could hear the sound of the cymbals. The cymbals would be clashed by Ben Arza. See Tamid 7:3.", + "From Jericho they could hear the sound of the singing [of the Levites]. This refers to singing done without instruments.", + "From Jericho they could hear the sound of the shofar. Refers to the daily shofar blasts. See Arakhin 2:3.", + "Some say also of the high priest when he pronounced the divine name on Yom Kippur. See Yoma 6:2.", + "From Jericho they could smell the odor of the compounding of incense. That is some powerful incense. I had a roommate in college who seems to have had a mixture with similar potency ☺.", + "Rabbi Elazar ben Diglai said: my father had some goats in Har Michvar, and they would sneeze from the smell of the incense. Har Michvar is on the other side of the Jordan river. Super-sensitive goats!" + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah discusses removing the ashes from the inner altar and the menorah, both of which were inside the Sanctuary.", + "The one who had been chosen for clearing the ashes from the inner altar went in carrying the teni which he set down in front of it, and he scooped up the ash in his fists and put it into it, and in the end he swept up what was left into it, and then he left it there and went out. The teni is the basket mentioned in mishnah six. The priest would first scoop up whatever ashes he could with his hands, and then would sweep out the remainder. The teni would be left in the Sanctuary for the time being. It will be removed in mishnah 6:1.", + "The one who had been chosen to clear the ashes from the menorah went in. If he found the two eastern lights burning, he cleared the ash from the rest and left these two burning. If he found that these two had gone out, he cleared away their ash and kindled them from those which were still lit and then he cleared the ash from the rest. There was a stone in front of the candlestick with three steps on which the priest stood in order to trim the lights. He left the kuz on the second step and went out. The menorah stood on the southern side of the Sanctuary, aligned from east to west. The eastern lights were on the left side (when facing south). If these two lights were still lit, he would first clear the ashes and waste of the other five and put it into the kuz (see mishnah six). If these two lights were already out, then he would clear their ashes as well, and if necessary add oil and relight them from candles which were still lit. If all of the candles had gone out, then he would light the first two from the fire on the outer altar (as we shall learn in 6:1). He would then remove the ashes from these two candles after the sprinkling of the blood of the tamid, and after the limbs of the tamid had been put onto the ramp. After either relighting, or clearing the ashes from the first two, he would clear the ashes from remainder. He would leave the kuz in the Sanctuary until he had completed clearing the ashes from the other two candles, as we shall see in 6:1." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThe mishnah now describes the slaughtering of the morning tamid.", + "They would not tie up the lamb but rather they would string its legs together. The lamb was not tied to something else to keep it from running away. Rather it was strung up, with one forefoot tied to one of the hind feet. Note that the word for “strung its legs together” in Hebrew is “akedah” which is the same word used for the binding of Isaac.", + "Those who merited [to bring up] the limbs took hold of it. Thus it was strung up: its head was to the south while its face was turned to the west. The slaughterer stood to the east of it, facing the west. The animal was held still by those priests who had won the right to bring the limbs up to the ramp. It was slaughtered on the northern side of the Temple courtyard, with its head toward the south, the location of the altar. Its head was turned west, so that it faced the Sanctuary and the slaughterer stood on the opposite side, also facing the Sanctuary.", + "The morning tamid was killed by the north-western corner of the altar at the second ring. The evening tamid was killed by the north-eastern corner at the second ring. The morning and evening tamid were sacrificed by different corners of the altar. The “rings” referred to here are rings that were set in the floor of the courtyard, on the northern side of the altar.", + "While one slaughtered another received the blood. He then proceeded to the north-eastern corner and cast the blood on the eastern and northern sides; he then proceeded to the southwestern corner and cast the blood on the western and southern sides. The remnant of the blood he poured out at the southern base of the altar. Once the tamid was slaughtered another priest received the blood in a vessel. By casting the blood on two corners of the altar, he could cast it against both sides. In this way, with two shpritzes he could hit all four sides of the altar. He would pour out the remainder of the blood on the southern base of the altar." + ], + [ + "He did not use to break the leg, but he made a hole in it at the [knee-] joint and suspended it from there.
He then began to flay it until he came to the breast.
When he came to the breast he cut off the head and gave it to the one who merited [bringing it onto the ramp].
He then cut off the legs [up to the knees] and gave them to the one who merited [bringing them onto the ramp].
He then finished the flaying.
He tore out the heart and squeezed out the blood in it.
He then cut off the forelegs and gave them to the one who merited [bringing them onto the ramp].
He then went back to the right leg and cut it off and gave it to the one who merited [to bring it onto the ramp], and the two testicles with it.
He then tore it [the remaining carcass] open so that it was all exposed before him.
He took the fat and put it on top of the place where the head had been severed.
He took the innards and gave them to the one to who had merited washing them.
The stomach was washed very thoroughly in the washing chamber, while the entrails were washed at least three times on marble tables which stood between the pillars.
The mishnah now describes in detail how the tamid was flayed. I think that most of this mishnah is self-explanatory, especially after it has been translated. The flaying is described in great detail, because it was an important part of the sacrificial process. Today, when most of us are greatly-distanced from the sources of the meat that we eat (or don’t eat), we might forget that cows don’t magically turn into steaks and hamburgers. The mishnah is a good reminder that inside a cow, or sheep or any animal, are internal organs that need to be removed, and for sacrifice, cleaned, before they can be put on the altar." + ], + [ + "He then took a knife and separated the lung from the liver and the finger of the liver from the liver, but he did not remove it from its place.
He cut out the breast and gave it to the one to the one who had merited [bringing it onto the ramp].
He came to the right flank and cut into it as far as the spine, without touching the spine, until he came to the place between two small ribs.
He cut it off and gave it to the one who had merited [bringing it onto the ramp], with the liver attached to it.
He then came to the neck, and he left two ribs on each side of it, cut it off and gave it to the one to the one who had merited [bringing it onto the ramp], with the windpipe and the heart and the lung attached to it.
He then came to the left flank in which he left the two thin ribs above and two thin ribs below; and he had done similarly with the other flank.
Thus he left two on each side above and two on each side below.
He cut it off and gave it to the one to the one who had merited [bringing it onto the ramp], and the spine with it and the spleen attached to it.
This was really the largest piece, but the right flank was called the largest, because the liver was attached to it.
He then came to the tail bone, which he cut off and gave it to the one who had merited [bringing it onto the ramp], along with the tail, the finger of the liver and the two kidneys.
He then took the left leg and cut it off and gave it to the one who had merited [bringing it onto the ramp].
Thus they were all standing in a row with the limbs in their hands
The first had the head and the [right] hind leg. The head was in his right hand with its nose towards his arm, its horns between his fingers, and the place where it was severed turned upwards with the fat covering it. The right leg was in his left hand with the place where the flaying began turned away from him.
The second had the two fore legs, the right leg in his right hand and the left leg in his left hand, the place where the flaying began turned away from him.
The third had the tail bone and the other hind leg, the tail bone in his right hand with the tail hanging between his fingers and the finger of the liver and the two kidneys with it, and the left hind leg in his left hand with the place where the flaying began turned away from him.
The fourth had the breast and the neck, the breast in his right hand and the neck in his left hand, its ribs being between two of his fingers.
The fifth had the two flanks, the right one in his right hand, and the left one in his left hand, with the place where the flaying began turned away from him.
The sixth had the innards on a platter with the knees on top of them.
The seventh had the fine flour.
The eighth had the griddle cakes.
The ninth had the wine.
They went and placed them on the lower half of the ramp on its western side, and salted them (see Leviticus 2:13).
They then came down and went to the Chamber of Hewn Stone to recite the Shema.
Today’s mishnah gives an intricate description of the butchering of the tamid offering. Most of the mishnah is self-explanatory (although unless you’re a butcher or a scientist who has dissected a sheep, you might have trouble picturing the parts).
By the end of the mishnah, each of the parts that is put onto the altar is in the hands of the priest who won the lottery to bring that piece onto the ramp. They then go back to the Chamber of Hewn Stone to recite the Shema. We shall talk about this when we learn the next chapter." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah discusses the blessings and verses that the priests would recite in the Chamber of Hewn Stone before the tamid sacrifice was placed on the altar.\nHistorically, this mishnah is of great importance. Scholars have often asked if Jewish prayer as we know it today existed during the time of the Temple. Today’s mishnah mentions prayers that later became part of the Amidah and Shacharit service. The Mishnah was not composed until about 200 C.E., so it is debatable as to how accurately it describes history. Nevertheless, the fact that the prayers mentioned here are not exactly the same as those that exist in a later period, lends credence to the possibility that this mishnah provides some of the earliest evidence as to the existence of Jewish prayer.", + "The superintendent said to them: Bless one blessing! And they blessed. The superintendent is the priest who had run the lottery (see 3:1-3). He first instructs them to recite one blessing. The mishnah seems to assume that one learning the mishnah would know what blessing was referred to. The Talmud explains the blessing to be “Ahavah Rabbah” the blessing that we recite before reading the Shema in the morning. Today we recite two blessings before Shema (“yotzer hameorot” is the other). It seems that during Temple times, only one was recited.", + "They then read the Ten Commandments, the Shema, the “And it will be if you hearken” (the second paragraph of and Vayomer (the third paragraph of, and they blessed the people with three blessings: Emet veYatziv, and Avodah, and the priestly benediction. The next recitation was the Ten Commandments. According to the Yerushalmi, this is part of the “Shema”. These did not become part of the liturgy outside of the Temple because of the “murmurings of the sectarians.” According to the Talmud, the rabbis feared that Jews would say that only the Ten Commandments were given by God, and that the rest came from Moses and is not divine or binding. In order to prevent this impression, this section was removed from the prayer service. The Shema is the same three paragraphs that are still recited today. The three blessings are still recited today, although they are placed differently within the service. Today, the Emet VeYatziv is the first blessing recited after the Shema, so its place has not changed since Temple times. It ends with “who redeems Israel.” The “avodah”, which means “worship,” is now recited towards the end of the Amidah. It begins with the word “Retzeh”. The “priestly benediction,” “May God bless you and protect you….” is recited today as part of the last paragraph of the Amidah. All three of these prayers contain words of blessing for Israel, which seems to be appropriate for this point of the service.", + "On Shabbat they added a blessing to be said by the watch which was leaving. On Shabbat, the new priestly watch would take over for the outgoing watch after the musaf (additional) sacrifice was offered. To celebrate this occasion, they would offer a prayer for the outgoing watch (meaning for themselves!)." + ], + [ + "He said to them: those who are new to the incense come and draw lots, and who ever won, won.
He then said: new and old, come and draw lots to see who shall take up the limbs from the ascent to the altar.
Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob says: the one who brought the limbs on to the ascent also takes them up to the altar.
Section one: The burning of the incense was such a desirable piece of the Temple service that priests were not supposed to perform it more than once in their lives. Thus they would not draw lots to see who would offer the incense. Rather, the superintendent would call the priests who had never done so to come up and take his turn.
Section two: The limbs of the cut up sacrifice are currently sitting on the ramp/ascent up to the altar. They still need to be placed on the altar. According to the first opinion, there is another lottery to see who merits bringing each piece up. This lottery is open to priests who had performed this act before, as well as new priests. Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob says that there is no new lottery. Rather, whoever brought the piece up to the ascent, he also gets to bring it up to the altar." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe lotteries are now over, the winners have won and the losers, well, they have not won. Our mishnah discusses what those who did not win any lottery do.", + "He then handed them over to the attendants, who stripped them of their garments, and they would leave on them only the pants. The superintendent would now turn over to the Temple attendants the priests who had not won any lottery. The attendants would strip the priests of the special clothes that they wore to work in the Temple, leaving on only their pants, so that they wouldn’t be standing there naked. After they would put on their regular clothing, they could remove the priestly pants and put on regular pants as well.", + "There were windows there on which was inscribed the name of the garment to which each was assigned. There were windows in the Temple into which the priests could put their clothes. Each piece of clothing would have its own slot. This would save sorting the laundry later on, a job that I too find most cumbersome." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah describes the ladle and spoon that held the incense.", + "The one who had been selected to offer the incense took up the ladle, which was in shape like a big tarkav of gold, and it held three kavs, The ladle which cradled the incense spoon was shaped like a big tarkav (a basket see 3:6) and it could hold up to three kavs.", + "And the [small] dish was in the middle of it, heaped up with incense. The small dish was placed in the middle of the tarkav, heaped up with incense. It was placed inside the larger basket so that the incense wouldn’t spill over and get lost.", + "This had a covering, over which was spread a piece of cloth. The dish was covered, and there was a small piece of cloth over the cover. All of this was done to keep the precious incense from getting lost." + ], + [ + "The priest who had won the firepan, would take the silver pan and ascend to the top of the altar and clear away the live coals to this side and that, and he would rake [the coals]. He then went down and poured them into a gold [firepan]. The priest who had won the right to bring the firepan into the incense altar found inside the Sanctuary would take a silver pan and go to the top of the outer altar (see 2:5). He would clear the live coals to this side and that and rake the coals into the pan and then he would pour them into a gold firepan.", + "About a kav of the coals was spilt, and these he swept into the channel. The silver pan could hold four kavs and the gold pan could hold three kavs. So a kav of coals would spill onto the floor. During the week these could just be swept into the channel.", + "On Shabbat he used to put an overturned pot on them. On Shabbat it was forbidden to put out the coals, or to even move them. Therefore, in order to prevent them from causing damage, he would put a large vessel over them.", + "This pot was a large vessel which could hold a letekh. The pot was large enough to hold a letekh, which is about 90 kav. So it was plenty big to cover the coals.", + "It had two chains; with one he used to draw it down, and with the other he used to hold it above so that it should not roll over. This pot had two chains. The first was used to lower it down from the altar with the ashes (see next section). One priest would pull on a chain and the vessel would be lowered. The other chain was used to hold it steady. Another priest would stand up top and hold on to this chain so that it would stay steady.", + "It was used for three purposes for placing over live coals, and over a [dead] creeping thing on Shabbat, and for drawing down the ashes from the top of the altar. There were three uses for this vessel, two of which have already been described here (to cover the spilled coals on Shabbat and to lower the ashes from the altar). The third use would be to cover a dead sheretz (a creepy crawly thing) so that it wouldn’t cause impurity on Shabbat in the Temple. The sheretz is “muktzeh” so it can’t be moved or even touched on Shabbat. Therefore, they would cover it with the vessel until Shabbat was over. For more on how they dealt with the sheretz in the Temple see Eruvin 10:15." + ], + [ + "When they came between the Sanctuary and the altar, one took the magrefah and threw it between the Sanctuary and the altar. The two priests, one who had won the right to offer the incense and the other who had won the right to the firepan, now came between the Sanctuary and the altar. They would take the magrefah, which was a musical instrument shaped like a shovel (see 3:8) and throw it. This loud noise served as a warning to the other priests, as the mishnah explains.", + "People could not hear one another speak in Jerusalem from the noise of the magrefah. The noise of the throwing of the magrefah was so great that all over Jerusalem people could not hear one another speak. I’m assuming this is a bit of an exaggeration.", + "It served three purposes: When a priest heard the sound of it he knew that his fellow priests were going in to bow down, and he would run to join them. When a Levite heard the noise he knew that his fellow Levites were going in to sing, and he would run to join them. And the head of the Ma’amad used to make the unclean stand in the east gate. The mishnah now lists the three functions that this loud noise would serve. First of all, it would warn the priests that it was time to enter the Sanctuary to bow down. We shall learn more of this in tomorrow’s mishnah. Second, it would warn the Levites that it was time to sing. We shall see more of this in 7:3. Third, the priests and Levites were split into twenty-four watches or Ma’amad’s, each serving for a week in the Temple (see Taanit 4:2). The priest who stood at the head of each Ma’amad would make the unclean priests and Levites stand at the east gate so that they could go through their purification rituals, which might allow them to serve later during the week in the Temple." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThe priests now make their way into the Sanctuary.", + "They began to ascend the steps of the Sanctuary. The two priests, one who had won the right to offer the incense and the other who had won the right to bring the coals from the outer altar to the inner altar, begin to make their way up the twelve steps that lie in front of the Sanctuary.", + "Those who had won the right to clear the ashes from the inner altar and from the candlestick went in front. The two priests, one who had won the right to clear the ashes off the inner altar and the other who had won the right to clear the candlestick, went before them. We should note that the Mishnah described these two jobs in 3:9. Our mishnah takes place after they have already done the work referred to there.", + "The one who won the right to clear the inner altar went in and took the teni and bowed down and went out again. The teni is the basket that the priest left inside the Sanctuary after clearing the altar. He now goes in takes the teni, bows down and then goes out again.", + "The one who had been chosen to clear the candlestick went in, and if he found the two eastern lights still burning he cleared out the eastern one and left the western one burning, since from it he lit the candlestick for the evening. This section is largely a repeat of mishnah 3:9. The two eastern lights are the first that he encounters when he enters. If both are still burning, then he cleans out the first one, which is called “the eastern one” but he leaves the “western one,” the second of these two lights, still lit. This is the light that he will use to light the other branches in the night.", + "If he found that this one had gone out, he cleared the ash away and lit it from the altar of burnt-offering. If he finds that both are out, then he lights the menorah with fire taken from the outer altar.", + "He then took the kuz from the second step and bowed down and went out. He then takes the kuz (another vessel) from the second step where he left it (3:9), bows down and then goes out. These two priests will now put the ashes from the inner altar and the menorah near the ramp, as we learned at the very end of 1:4." + ], + [ + "The one who had won the right to bring in the firepan made a heap of the coals on the top of the altar and then spread them about with the end of the firepan and bowed down and went out. This mishnah describes what the priest who took the firepan into the Sanctuary would do. First he would make a heap of the coals on top of the altar. Then he would spread them out over the altar so that the incense could be easily placed on top. Then he bowed and went out." + ], + [ + "The one who had won the right to the incense took the dish from the middle of the spoon and gave it to his friend or his relative. The chapter concludes with the burning of the incense. The priest who held the incense takes the incense dish out of the large spoon and gives the spoon to a fellow priest or a related priest who had entered with him.", + "If some of it spilled into the spoon, he would put it into his hands. Any incense that had spilled into the large spoon, he would gather up into his hands.", + "They used to instruct him: Be careful not to begin immediately in front of you or else you may burn yourself. He was warned not to scatter the incense first on the side immediately in front of him, because he would burn himself as he tried to scatter the incense on the other side of the altar. Very interesting to note how concerned the rabbis were with fire safety!", + "He then began to scatter the incense and [after finishing] went out. Rather, he would scatter the incense first on the side opposite from him, and then on the close side. When he was done, he would go out.", + "The one who burned the incense did not do so until the superintendent said to him: burn the incense. If it was the high priest who burned: he would say to him: Sir, high priest, burn the incense. The priest who would scatter the incense did not begin to do so, until told by the superintendent that he could begin. If he was speaking to the high priest, he would address him with some extra respect.", + "Everyone left and he burned the incense and bowed down and went out. All of the priests would leave the area between the altar and the Sanctuary while the incense was being offered, because it is forbidden for anyone to be there at this time (see Leviticus 16:17)." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "When the high priest went in to bow down, three priests supported him, one by his right and one by his left and one by the precious stones. The high priest would then go in to the Sanctuary. He would have three priests supporting him, one on each side and one who would hold on to the precious stones embedded either in his vest or in the breastplate.", + "When the superintendent heard the sound of the footsteps of the high priest as he was about to go out [from the Sanctuary], he raised the curtain for him. It’s good to be the high priest he even gets the superintendent to lift up the curtain before he comes out! [By the way, does anyone else picture the superintendent with a giant ring of keys, low hanging pants, without a belt and a cigarette hanging out of the side of his mouth?].", + "He went in, bowed down and went out, and then his fellow priests went in and bowed down and went out. After the high priest has come out, the superintendent goes in, bows, and then goes out. Finally, all of the other priests take their turn and go in, bow down and go out." + ], + [ + "They went and stood on the steps of the Sanctuary. The priests now gather back at the steps going down from the Sanctuary to the courtyard.", + "The first ones stood at the south side of their fellow priests with five vessels in their hands: one held the teni, the second the kuz, the third the firepan, the fourth the dish, and the fifth the spoon and its covering. The “first ones” are those mentioned at the end of the last chapter: the one who cleared the inner altar, the one who cleared the menorah, the one with the firepan, the one who offered the incense, and his friend/relative. They are each holding their respective vessel in their hands. They stood on the south side. The other priests stood to their north, meaning to their left.", + "They blessed the people with a single blessing, except in the country they recited it as three blessings, in the Temple as one. The priests now recite the priestly blessing found in Numbers 6:24-26. In the Temple they would recite this as one blessing, meaning they would not say “amen” after each verse. In the “country,” meaning outside of the Temple, when the blessing was recited in the synagogue, they would recite it as three blessings. This is how it is done, at least in Israel, to this day.", + "In the Temple they pronounced the divine name as it is written, but in the country by its substitute. The mishnah now explains other differences as to how the priestly blessing was done in the Temple versus how it was done outside. In the Temple, they would pronounce the name of God as it is written. We should note that we no longer really know how the name is to be pronounced. Outside the Temple, and to this day, it is pronounced by its “nickname” Adonai.", + "In the country the priests raised their hands as high as their shoulders, but in the Temple above their heads, except the high priest, who did not raise his hands above the diadem. Rabbi Judah says: the high priest also raised his hands above the diadem, since it says, “And Aaron lifted up his hands toward the people and blessed them” (Leviticus 9:22). Outside of the Temple, the priests would lift their hands to the height of their shoulders (as they do today), whereas in the Temple, they would lift them over their heads. The one exception is the high priest who was not to lift his hands above the diadem (tzitz) on his head. This seems to be because of the holiness of the diadem. Rabbi Judah disagrees and holds that the high priest also would lift his hands above his head." + ], + [ + "Introduction With this mishnah, the sacrifice of the tamid comes to its thunderous conclusion.", + "If the high priest wished to burn the offerings [himself], he would go up the ascent with the deputy high priest at his right. The high priest always had the right to put the pieces of the tamid onto the altar himself. If he didn't want to, he could have the others do so (see section seven).", + "The first [of the other priests] then handed to him the head and the foot and he laid his hands on them and threw them [onto the altar]. The second then handed to the first the two fore legs. And he handed them to the high priest who laid his hands on them and threw them [onto the altar]. The second then went away. In the same way all the other limbs were handed to him and he laid his hands on them and threw them [on to the altar fire]. Each of the priests would hand the part to the high priest, and he would lay his hands upon them. The second priest would hand up to the first, and then go. Similarly the third priest would hand to the first, etc. Thus all nine priests (see 4:3) would hand the pieces of the sacrifice which they held up to the high priest.", + "He then went around the altar. From where did he begin? From the southeastern corner; from there he went to the northeastern, then to the northwestern and then to the southwestern. The high priest would then make his way all the way around the altar to offer the wine libation. If this was done by a regular priest, he would simply go from the southeastern corner to the southwestern corner.", + "They there handed him the wine for libation. The deputy high priest stood on the corner/horn of the altar with the flags in his hand, and two priests on the table of the fats with two trumpets in their hands. They blew a teki’ah, a teru’ah and a teki’ah. They then went and stood by Ben Arza, one on his right hand and one on his left. When he bent down to make the libation the deputy high priest waved the flags and Ben Arza struck the cymbals and the Levites sang the psalm. When they came to a pause they blew a teki’ah, and the public bowed down. At every pause there was a teki’ah and at every teki’ah a bowing down. This was the order of the regular daily sacrifice for the service of our Lord. May it be His will that it be rebuilt speedily in our days, Amen. These sections refer to the wine libation, done after the tamid was on the altar. The “table of fats” is the marble table that stood on the western side of the ramp. They would place the limbs on this table. See Shekalim 6:4.", + "Ben Arza is the nickname of the priest in charge of the cymbals (see Shekalim 5:1).", + "After each set of trumpet blasts, the public standing in the Temple would bow down.", + "The mishnah concludes with a prayer for the Temple to be speedily rebuilt." + ], + [ + "The following are the psalms that were chanted in the Temple.
On the first day they used to say, “The earth is the Lord's and the fullness thereof, the world and they that dwell therein” (Psalms 24).
On the second day they used to say: “Great is the Lord and highly to be praised, in the city of our God. His holy mountain” (Psalms 48).
On the third day they used to say: “God stands in the congregation of God, in the midst of the judges he judges” (Psalms 82).
On the fourth day they used to say: “O Lord, God to whom vengeance belongs. God to whom vengeance belongs, shine forth” (Psalms 9.
On the fifth day they used to say: “Sing aloud unto God our strength, shout unto the God of Jacob” (Psalms 91).
On the sixth day they used to say: “The lord reigns, he is clothed in majesty, the Lord is clothed, He has girded himself with strength” (Psalms 93).
On Shabbat they used to say: “A psalm, a song for the Sabbath day” (Psalms 92). A psalm, a song for the time to come, for the day that will be all Shabbat and rest for everlasting life.
Congratulations! We have finished Tractate Tamid! It is a tradition at this point to thank God for helping us finish learning the tractate and to commit ourselves to going back and relearning it, so that we may not forget it and so that its lessons will stay with us for all of our lives. Tamid may have been one of the more unusual tractates that we have ever learned. Instead of disputes between sages, heaps of logic and laws, we get an intricate description of the Temple service. Indeed, although the language is clearly rabbinic Hebrew, its descriptive style is more characteristic of the Bible than of rabbinic literature. It is likely that these descriptions, or at least parts thereof, come from Temple times. They were preserved because the rabbis fervently hoped that the Temple would be rebuilt during their own lifetimes. While we may or may not share in this wish, I think we can all appreciate the respect in which they held this ceremony. Despite the fact that it was performed each and every day, twice every day, they don’t seem to have lost their sense of wonder at the intimate connection that they received with God through the sacrificial process. I hope you have enjoyed Tamid. Tomorrow we begin Tractate Middot (the last tractate in Seder Kodashim!).
Today’s mishnah lists the psalms that were chanted by the Levites each day in the Temple. Today we still recite these Psalms in the synagogue, and before we say them we say, “This is the Psalm that they used to say in the Temple.”
The mishnah concludes with a sort of prayer/midrash on the last Psalm." + ] + ] + ] + }, + "schema": { + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה תמיד", + "enTitle": "English Explanation of Mishnah Tamid", + "key": "English Explanation of Mishnah Tamid", + "nodes": [ + { + "heTitle": "הקדמה", + "enTitle": "Introduction" + }, + { + "heTitle": "", + "enTitle": "" + } + ] + } +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Kodashim/English Explanation of Mishnah Tamid/English/merged.json b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Kodashim/English Explanation of Mishnah Tamid/English/merged.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..363d1cc7d257fbffb05d6a423e1e3642ac122994 --- /dev/null +++ b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Kodashim/English Explanation of Mishnah Tamid/English/merged.json @@ -0,0 +1,247 @@ +{ + "title": "English Explanation of Mishnah Tamid", + "language": "en", + "versionTitle": "merged", + "versionSource": "https://www.sefaria.org/English_Explanation_of_Mishnah_Tamid", + "text": { + "Introduction": [ + "Tractate Tamid describes how the sacrificial service was performed in the Temple in the morning, up until the sacrifice of the morning Tamid (daily offering). There are almost no disputes in the entire tractate, the only dispute being found in 5:2. The Tamid offering is described in Numbers 28:3-8:", + "1 The Lord spoke to Moses, saying: 2 Command the Israelite people and say to them: Be punctilious in presenting to Me at stated times the offerings of food due Me, as offerings by fire of pleasing odor to Me. 3 Say to them: These are the offerings by fire that you are to present to the Lord: As a regular burnt offering every day, two yearling lambs without blemish. 4 You shall offer one lamb in the morning, and the other lamb you shall offer at twilight. 5 And as a meal offering, there shall be a tenth of an ephah of choice flour with a quarter of a hin of beaten oil mixed in 6 —the regular burnt offering instituted at Mount Sinai—an offering by fire of pleasing odor to the Lord. 7 The libation with it shall be a quarter of a hin for each lamb, to be poured in the sacred precinct as an offering of fermented drink to the Lord. 8 The other lamb you shall offer at twilight, preparing the same meal offering and libation as in the morning—an offering by fire of pleasing odor to the Lord.", + "There is also a daily incense offering. This is described in Exodus 30:7-8:", + "7 On it Aaron shall burn aromatic incense: he shall burn it every morning when he tends the lamps, 8 and Aaron shall burn it at twilight when he lights the lamps — a regular incense offering before the Lord throughout the ages. ", + "Many scholars believe that Tamid is one of the earliest tractates of the Mishnah. They believe that it was composed shortly after the destruction of the Temple. While there is some Babylonian Talmud on the tractate, there is not much. This may be, in my opinion, a result of the fact that there are virtually no disputes in the tractate, which also may be a result of the tractate having been composed at a very early period. In other words, the tractate was composed early, later sages did not discuss it very much, so we don’t find them debating about it, and this lack of interest by early sages in the subject, also caused later sages to not engage much in learning this tractate. Despite all of this, it is certainly one of the tractates of the Mishnah, so we will certainly learn it! Good luck and I hope you all enjoy tractate Tamid." + ], + "": [ + [ + [ + "Introduction\nMishnah Tamid begins with a description of the priests sleeping in the Temple, before their daily work began.", + "In three places the priests keep watch in the Temple: in the chamber of Avtinas, in the chamber of the spark, and in the fire chamber. There were three places in the Temple where the priests would keep watch at night. When we learn Tractate Midot we will see a list of 21 places where the Levites kept watch. The three places here are also mentioned there. These three places are: The chamber of Avtinas, where they would prepare the incense. The chamber of the spark, where they kept the fire to light the fires on the altars. The fire chamber where they kept a large fire to keep the priests warm at night.", + "In the chamber of Avtinas and in the chamber of the spark there were upper chambers where the youths kept watch. Two of the chambers had upper chambers so that the younger priests who could not yet serve in the Temple could keep watch.", + "The fire chamber was vaulted and it was a large room surrounded with stone projections, and the elders of the clan [serving in the Temple] used to sleep there, with the keys of the Temple courtyard in their hands. The fire chamber did not have an upper chamber. Rather it was vaulted, and surrounded by rows of stones. On these rows of stones the priests serving in the Temple at the time (the Temple guard was split into 24 houses) would sleep, while holding the keys to the Temple courtyard.", + "The priestly initiates used to place their bedding on the ground. The young priests did not get to sleep on the rows of stones. They had to put their bedding down on the ground and sleep on the floor.", + "They did not sleep in their sacred garments, but they used to take them off [and fold them] and place them under their heads and cover themselves with their own ordinary clothes. None of the priests slept in the clothes that they would wear while performing the Temple service. Based on the continuation of the Mishnah it seems that they feared lest they would have an emission at night and thereby contaminate their clothes. Therefore, they slept in their regular, non-sanctified clothing.", + "If one of them had a seminal emission, he used to go out and make his way down the winding stairs which went under the Birah, and which was lit by lights on each side until he reached the bathing place. There was a fire close by and an honorable seat [i.e. toilet]: and this was its honor: if he found it locked, he knew there was someone there; if it was open, he knew there was no one there. He would go down and bathe and then come up and dry himself and warm himself in front of the fire. He would then go and take his seat next to his fellow priests until the gates were opened, when he would take his departure. This section describes what would happen if one of the priests had a seminal emission while sleeping in the Temple. According to Deuteronomy 23:11 such a person must leave the “camp”, which the rabbis interpret to be parallel to the Temple. The priest would exit the Temple by using a set of underground stairs. It was forbidden for him to walk through the courtyard, or even on the Temple mount because he was impure. These stairs were lit so that he could see his way. He would then come to the ritual bath and a private toilet. The mishnah notes that a private toilet was unique generally toilets were used by a number of people at the same time. So unique was this toilet that it was even called “The Seat of Honor.” After taking care of his needs, he would bathe and then warm up next to the fire kept there for his comfort (sounds like a spa!). He would then go back to the other priests until the gates of the Temple were opened, when he would exit. He could not go serve in the Temple because he was not fully pure until the following evening. However, since he had been to the mikveh, he was no longer impure, so he could exit through the normal gates." + ], + [ + "Anyone who desired to remove the ashes from the altar used to rise early and bathe before the superintendent came. The first work done in the morning was clearing the ashes from the altar. This could be done by anyone who wished to do so (see Leviticus 1:2). Before removing the ashes, the priest would have to bathe, because it is always forbidden to enter the Temple courtyard before bathing (see Yoma 3:3).", + "At what time did the superintendent come? He did not always come at the same time; sometimes he came just at cock-crow, sometimes a little before or a little after. The superintendent was in charge of the lottery used to determine who would get to perform what ritual in the Temple. The lottery is described in Yoma 2:1-2. The superintendent would arrive around the time when the cock crows (see Yoma 1:8).", + "The superintendent would come and knock and they would open for him, and he would say to them, let all who have bathed come and draw lots. So they drew lots, and whoever was successful. The superintendent would knock on the door and let the priests know that whoever had prepared by taking a ritual bath, could come and participate in the lottery. But if you didn’t bathe you’re out of luck. The early priest gets the meat, as they say." + ], + [ + "He took the key and opened the small door, and went from the fire chamber into the Temple courtyard, and the priests went in after him carrying two lighted torches. After waking them up, the superintendent would take the key and open the small door in the fire chamber that was connected to the courtyard. The regular gates to the courtyard did not open until it began to be light outside. The priests then entered the courtyard each carrying two torches.", + "They divided into two groups, one of which went along the portico to the east, while the other went along it to the west. They then divided into two groups to check the Temple to make sure that everything was still in its proper place.", + "They went along inspecting until they came to the place where the griddle-cakes were made. There the two groups met and said, Is all well (? All is well (! They then appointed they that made the griddle-cakes to make griddle-cakes. Each day the high priest would offer a tenth of an ephah of griddle cakes, half in the morning and half in the evening (see Leviticus 6:13-14; Menahot 4:5). They would end their examination at the place where these cakes were made and each group would ask the other if everything was okay. They would then formally appoint those who made the griddle-cakes to make the griddle-cakes." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah deals with clearing the ashes from the altar.", + "The one who had merited to clear the ashes, would get ready to clear the ashes. After getting the griddle-cakes on their way, its now time to clear the ashes from the altar, the first ritual performed each morning. Mishnah two noted that the priest who performed this ritual was not chosen by lottery, but rather by his being the first to get out of bed and immerse.", + "They said to him: “Be careful not to touch any vessel until you have washed your hands and feet from the laver. See, the fire-pan is in the corner between the ascent and the altar on the west of the ascent.” Despite the fact that he had immersed, he still can’t touch holy vessels until he washes his feet and hands from the water in the laver. This would include the fire-pan. Therefore, before he begins the process, the other priests would remind him not to touch the fire-pan until he first washes his hands and feet. They would also remind him where the fire-pan was kept. This was helpful because it was dark in the courtyard.", + "No one entered with him, nor did he carry any light. Rather, he walked by the light of the altar fire. He would not carry a flame in with him rather he would walk along using only the dim light from the remaining fire on the altar.", + "No-one saw him or heard a sound from him until they heard the noise of the wooden wheel which Ben Katin made for hauling up the laver, when they said, “The time has come.” The other priests couldn’t see him or hear him until he began to draw water using the water wheel invented by Ben Katin. This water wheel is described in Yoma 3:10. The following is my commentary on that mishnah: Ben Katin is also credited with another improvement in the Temple, this one also connected to issue of water. He made a wheel that went into the water cistern which would cause the water in the laver to be connected to the water in the cistern. The reason for this is that any water left out overnight in a vessel in the Temple is rendered unfit. Without this wheel, the water left over in the laver would need to be emptied out every morning. Once they heard the wheel, they would say, “The time has come” meaning the time to wash his hands and feet.", + "He washed his hands and feet from the laver, then took the silver fire-pan and went up to the top of the altar and cleared away the cinders on either side and scooped up the ashes in the centre. The priest would then wash his hands and then clear the ashes and the cinders from the Temple.", + "He then descended and when he reached the floor he turned his face to the north and went along the east side of the ascent for about ten cubits, and he then made a heap of the cinders on the pavement three handbreadths away from the ascent, in the place where they used to put the crop of the birds and the ashes from the inner altar and the ash from the menorah. He would then descend from the altar, and deposit the ashes in the place where they would also dump out other waste-products, including the crop from the heads of bird offerings, and the ashes from the inner altar and the menorah." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "When his fellow priests saw that he had descended, they came running and hastened to wash their hands and feet in the laver. When the other priests see that the person who cleared the ashes had descended from the altar, they knew it was their turn to wash their hands and feet.", + "They then took the shovels and the forks and went up to the top of the altar. The limbs and pieces of fat that had not been consumed since the evening they pushed to the sides of the altar. If there was not room on the sides they arranged them on the surround or on the ascent. Their task was to take the pieces of the sacrifices that had not been consumed the day before and to clear them to the sides of the altar to make room for the wood they were now going to burn for the new day’s sacrifices. These limbs and pieces of fat would still burn; they would just do so on the sides of the altar. If there wasn’t enough room on the sides of the altar, they would even take some pieces off of the altar and put them on the ledge surrounding the altar or on the ascent. As we will learn in mishnah five, these pieces were later put back on so that they could be consumed." + ], + [ + "They then began to throw the ashes on to the heap (. This heap was in the middle of the altar, and sometimes there was as much as three hundred kor on it. After having cleared the limbs and pieces of fat, the other priests would take the ashes still on the altar and heap them onto the middle of the altar, onto a place called the “tapuah.” The pile of ashes on the tapuah could get quite high, as the mishnah testifies. However, when the tapuah began to overflow with ash, they would remove all of it and take it out of the city.", + "On festivals they did not use to clear away the ash because it was reckoned an ornament to the altar. On festivals they let the ash heap grow even higher because by seeing the massive amounts of ashes, people could tell how many sacrifices had been offered. The large ash-heap was considered to be ornamental to the altar.", + "It never happened that the priest was neglectful in taking out the ashes. This section relates to the previous one. One might have thought that they neglected to clear away the ashes during the festival, perhaps because they were so busy with other matters. To dash this thought, the mishnah notes that the priests never neglected the duty of taking the ashes off of the altar. They left the ashes on the altar during the festival out of intention and not neglect." + ], + [ + "They then began to take up the logs to place onto the fire. After having cleared the altar of the ashes or at least pushing them into the middle of the altar, the priests can now begin to bring up new wood to use to burn the day’s sacrifices.", + "Were all kinds of wood valid for the fire? All kinds of wood were valid for the fire except vine and olive wood. But what they mostly used were boughs of fig trees and of nut trees and of oil trees. Any wood could be used on the altar except for olive wood and vines. These were not used for kindling because these are the primary fruit bearing trees in Israel. It would be completely wasteful to use them as firewood. The most common trees were figs, nuts and oil trees. Note that these trees also bear fruit, but they were used for fire because their fruit was less significant than the wine and oil that come from the vine and olive trees. Alternatively, some commentators claim that these types of trees can only be used if the figs, nuts or oil that they produce are of low quality." + ], + [ + "He then arranged a large pile on the east side of the altar, with its open side on the east, while the inner ends of the [selected] logs touched the ash heap. They now begin to arrange the logs on the altar. They begin with a large pile of logs on the eastern side of the altar. In tomorrow’s mishnah we shall see that there was a smaller pile on the other side for burning the incense. The open side of the large pile faced east. The logs were arranged in straight rows from east to west, with the ends of the logs on the eastern side.", + "Spaces were left between the logs in which they kindled the brushwood. They left spaces in between the logs into which they put brushwood for kindling. Anyone who has ever made a good campfire should be familiar with this practice." + ], + [ + "They picked out from there some good fig-tree branches to make a second fire for the incense near the south-western corner some four cubits to the north of it, using as much wood as he judged sufficient to form five seahs of coals, and on the Shabbat as much as he thought would make eight seahs of coals, because from there they used to take fire for the two dishes of frankincense for the showbread. This section describes setting up the fire from which coals would be drawn to burn the incense on the inner altar, which stood inside the sanctuary (unlike the main altar which was outside). The wood used to make these coals was set up on the south-western corner of the altar, a little bit removed to the north. They would put enough wood to make five seahs of coals. On Shabbat they needed more coals because they would use them for the two dishes of frankincense burned on Shabbat with the showbread. Evidently, these two dishes needed an extra three seahs of coals.", + "The limbs and the pieces of fat which had not been consumed over night were put back on the wood. The chapter concludes by returning to those limbs and pieces of fat that were moved to the side in mishnah one of the chapter. These could now be moved back to the middle so that they could keep on burning.", + "They then kindled the two fires and descended and went to the chamber of hewn stone. After all this hoopla, the fires can finally be lit. After having lit the fires, they would go down to the chamber of hewn stone to raise a toast (just kidding!). In the chamber of hewn stone they will cast lots to see who gets to offer which sacrifice. But stay tuned the action continues in the next chapter." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "The superintendent then said to them: come and cast lots, to see who is to slaughter, and who is to sprinkle the blood, and who is to clear the ashes from the inner altar, and who is to clear the ash from the candlestick, and who is to lift the limbs on to the ascent: the head, the right leg, the two forelegs, the tailbone, the left leg, the breast and the neck and the two flanks, the entrails, the fine flour, the griddle cakes and the wine.
They cast lots and whoever won, won.
The altar is heating up and ready to go. It’s now time to start figuring out who is going to do what in the Temple that day.
The mishnah simply lists what were the parts of the sacrificial process that were up for grabs during this lottery. Many of these actions will be further explained below, so I will not explain them now." + ], + [ + "He then said to them: Go out and see if it is yet time for the slaughter. If the time had come, the one who saw would say, “There are flashes.”
Matya ben Samuel says: [He used to say] Has the whole of the east [of the sky] lit up. as far as Hebron?
And he [the observer] would answer yes.
Before the sacrifices were offered, they had to make sure that it was light outside.
Section one: The morning sacrifice could only be sacrificed after it was light. From the chamber of hewn stone they would send someone out to see if it was light outside.
Note that this process is not simply the practical issue of sending someone out to see if it was yet light outside. The process is highly ritualized the mishnah tells the priests what to say (“There are flashes!”) or provides them with ritualized questions to ask.
Section two: Matya ben Samuel was himself the “superintendent” so his testimony here is not just about what was said at this point, but rather what he himself used to say." + ], + [ + "He said to them: Go out and bring a lamb from the chamber of lambs. After having cast the lots, the first thing done was to fetch a lamb to use for the morning tamid.", + "Now the lamb’s chamber was in the north-western corner. And there were four chambers there the chamber of lambs, the chamber of the seals, the chamber of the fire-room and the chamber where the showbread was prepared. There were four chambers in the north-western corner of the Temple. My personal favorite is the chamber of the seals. Here the priests would teach the seals all sorts of tricks, like how to bounce a ball on your nose, how to clap your fins and most importantly, how to wave at the crowd when the show is over. I wonder where they kept the chamber of the little fish ☺. [Seriously, the seals were used to stamp the libation offerings so that the priests would easily know which libation goes with which offering. See Shekalim 5:3]" + ], + [ + "They went into the chamber of the vessels and they took out ninety-three vessels of silver and gold. They then went into the chamber of vessels to take out all 93 (!) vessels that would be used during the day’s worship.", + "They gave the animal for the daily sacrifice a drink from a cup of gold. While it might be tempting to think that they gave the animal a drink out of kindness. In reality the drink was so that its hide would be easier to strip after it was slaughtered.", + "Although it had been examined on the previous evening it was now examined again by torchlight. They would then reexamine the animal to make sure that it did not have a blemish that would disqualify it from being used as a sacrifice." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe mishnah now describes the bringing of the tamid to the slaughter house, and provides a description of the slaughter house.", + "The priest who had won the right to slaughter the tamid takes it along with him to the slaughter house, and those who had won the right to bring the limbs up followed after him. The priest who won the right to slaughter and the priests who will bring the various parts of the sacrifice onto the ramp leading up to the altar all go to the slaughter house.", + "The slaughter house was to the north of the altar, and on it were eight small pillars on top of which were blocks of cedar wood, in which were fixed hooks of iron, three rows in each, upon which they would hang [the tamid] and they would strip its hide on tables of marble that stood between the pillars. The mishnah describes the slaughterhouse, especially the hooks on which they would hang the meat after the tamid was slaughtered. It is also describes the tables upon which the meat would be washed. These processes will be described later in the mishnah." + ], + [ + "Those who had won the right to clear the ashes from the inner altar and from the candlestick would go first with four vessels in their hands the teni, the kuz and two keys. Before the people described in yesterday’s mishnah would go to bring the animal to the slaughterhouse, the priests who had won the right to clear the ashes would first go in to do their work. The mishnah describes the four objects that they would carry with them. [This mishnah does seem to be out of order. Indeed, in the Talmud it comes before the previous mishnah].", + "The teni resembled a large tarkav of gold and held two and a half kavs. The kuz resembled a large gold pitcher. The first two objects were used to carry out the ashes. One was called the teni, and it was the size of a basket that could hold two and a half kavs (about five liters). The kuz resembled a gold pitcher. The mishnah does not state how large the kuz was.", + "And two keys: One of the two keys would reach down to the “amah of the armpit” and the other opens immediately. They also held two keys to open the two locks on the first door. With one key they would open a lock below called the “amah of the armpit.” There are two reasons given for why it has this name. First of all, the priest unlocking the lock might have had to bend down a cubit (an amah) until he opened it. Alternatively, he had to stick his hand into the door until it was up until his armpit. Once the bottom lock was opened, he could open the top lock with the other key immediately." + ], + [ + "He then came to the small opening on the north.
The great gate had two small openings, one on the north and one on the south.
No one ever went in by the openings on the south, about which it is stated explicitly in Ezekiel, “And the Lord said to me, ‘This gate shall be closed, it shall not be opened, and no man shall enter by it, for the Lord God of Israel has entered by it” (Ezekiel 44:2).
He took the key and opened the small opening and went in to the cell and from the cell to the Sanctuary, until he reached the great gate.
When he reached the great gate he drew back the bolt and the latches and opened it. The slaughterer did not slaughter till he heard the sound of the great gate being opened.
Section one: The priest who was to open the gates of the Sanctuary would first come to the northern opening on the outside of the great gate.
Section two: The great gate had two openings, but because of the verse in Ezekiel, the southern opening was never used.
Section three: The priest would open the northern opening (this was described at the end of yesterday’s mishnah) and then he would go in to the cell. This was a chamber which would open up into the great gate of the Sanctuary. It seems to have been within the thickness of the walls of the great gate.
Section four: The priest would then open the gate of the sanctuary, which was the sign to the priest who was to slaughter the tamid that he could proceed with the slaughtering." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah describes some of the noises and sounds made in the Temple. In an exaggerated fashion, the rabbis claim that these noises could be heard in Jericho. Due to the fact that Jericho is probably 30-40 km’s from the Temple, these claims are clearly hyperbole.\nI shall explain what each of these sounds and smells were.", + "From Jericho they could hear the sound of the great gate being opened. Explained in yesterday’s mishnah.", + "From Jericho they could hear the sound of the magrephah. The “magrephah” which means “shovel” was a musical instrument that was shaped like a shovel.", + "From Jericho they could hear the noise of the wooden pulley which Ben Katin made for the laver. This was described in 1:4.", + "From Jericho they could hear the voice of Gevini the herald. He would summon the priests and Levites to their places. See Shekalim 5:1.", + "From Jericho they could hear the sound of the pipes. See: Arakhin 2:3.", + "From Jericho they could hear the sound of the cymbals. The cymbals would be clashed by Ben Arza. See Tamid 7:3.", + "From Jericho they could hear the sound of the singing [of the Levites]. This refers to singing done without instruments.", + "From Jericho they could hear the sound of the shofar. Refers to the daily shofar blasts. See Arakhin 2:3.", + "Some say also of the high priest when he pronounced the divine name on Yom Kippur. See Yoma 6:2.", + "From Jericho they could smell the odor of the compounding of incense. That is some powerful incense. I had a roommate in college who seems to have had a mixture with similar potency ☺.", + "Rabbi Elazar ben Diglai said: my father had some goats in Har Michvar, and they would sneeze from the smell of the incense. Har Michvar is on the other side of the Jordan river. Super-sensitive goats!" + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah discusses removing the ashes from the inner altar and the menorah, both of which were inside the Sanctuary.", + "The one who had been chosen for clearing the ashes from the inner altar went in carrying the teni which he set down in front of it, and he scooped up the ash in his fists and put it into it, and in the end he swept up what was left into it, and then he left it there and went out. The teni is the basket mentioned in mishnah six. The priest would first scoop up whatever ashes he could with his hands, and then would sweep out the remainder. The teni would be left in the Sanctuary for the time being. It will be removed in mishnah 6:1.", + "The one who had been chosen to clear the ashes from the menorah went in. If he found the two eastern lights burning, he cleared the ash from the rest and left these two burning. If he found that these two had gone out, he cleared away their ash and kindled them from those which were still lit and then he cleared the ash from the rest. There was a stone in front of the candlestick with three steps on which the priest stood in order to trim the lights. He left the kuz on the second step and went out. The menorah stood on the southern side of the Sanctuary, aligned from east to west. The eastern lights were on the left side (when facing south). If these two lights were still lit, he would first clear the ashes and waste of the other five and put it into the kuz (see mishnah six). If these two lights were already out, then he would clear their ashes as well, and if necessary add oil and relight them from candles which were still lit. If all of the candles had gone out, then he would light the first two from the fire on the outer altar (as we shall learn in 6:1). He would then remove the ashes from these two candles after the sprinkling of the blood of the tamid, and after the limbs of the tamid had been put onto the ramp. After either relighting, or clearing the ashes from the first two, he would clear the ashes from remainder. He would leave the kuz in the Sanctuary until he had completed clearing the ashes from the other two candles, as we shall see in 6:1." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThe mishnah now describes the slaughtering of the morning tamid.", + "They would not tie up the lamb but rather they would string its legs together. The lamb was not tied to something else to keep it from running away. Rather it was strung up, with one forefoot tied to one of the hind feet. Note that the word for “strung its legs together” in Hebrew is “akedah” which is the same word used for the binding of Isaac.", + "Those who merited [to bring up] the limbs took hold of it. Thus it was strung up: its head was to the south while its face was turned to the west. The slaughterer stood to the east of it, facing the west. The animal was held still by those priests who had won the right to bring the limbs up to the ramp. It was slaughtered on the northern side of the Temple courtyard, with its head toward the south, the location of the altar. Its head was turned west, so that it faced the Sanctuary and the slaughterer stood on the opposite side, also facing the Sanctuary.", + "The morning tamid was killed by the north-western corner of the altar at the second ring. The evening tamid was killed by the north-eastern corner at the second ring. The morning and evening tamid were sacrificed by different corners of the altar. The “rings” referred to here are rings that were set in the floor of the courtyard, on the northern side of the altar.", + "While one slaughtered another received the blood. He then proceeded to the north-eastern corner and cast the blood on the eastern and northern sides; he then proceeded to the southwestern corner and cast the blood on the western and southern sides. The remnant of the blood he poured out at the southern base of the altar. Once the tamid was slaughtered another priest received the blood in a vessel. By casting the blood on two corners of the altar, he could cast it against both sides. In this way, with two shpritzes he could hit all four sides of the altar. He would pour out the remainder of the blood on the southern base of the altar." + ], + [ + "He did not use to break the leg, but he made a hole in it at the [knee-] joint and suspended it from there.
He then began to flay it until he came to the breast.
When he came to the breast he cut off the head and gave it to the one who merited [bringing it onto the ramp].
He then cut off the legs [up to the knees] and gave them to the one who merited [bringing them onto the ramp].
He then finished the flaying.
He tore out the heart and squeezed out the blood in it.
He then cut off the forelegs and gave them to the one who merited [bringing them onto the ramp].
He then went back to the right leg and cut it off and gave it to the one who merited [to bring it onto the ramp], and the two testicles with it.
He then tore it [the remaining carcass] open so that it was all exposed before him.
He took the fat and put it on top of the place where the head had been severed.
He took the innards and gave them to the one to who had merited washing them.
The stomach was washed very thoroughly in the washing chamber, while the entrails were washed at least three times on marble tables which stood between the pillars.
The mishnah now describes in detail how the tamid was flayed. I think that most of this mishnah is self-explanatory, especially after it has been translated. The flaying is described in great detail, because it was an important part of the sacrificial process. Today, when most of us are greatly-distanced from the sources of the meat that we eat (or don’t eat), we might forget that cows don’t magically turn into steaks and hamburgers. The mishnah is a good reminder that inside a cow, or sheep or any animal, are internal organs that need to be removed, and for sacrifice, cleaned, before they can be put on the altar." + ], + [ + "He then took a knife and separated the lung from the liver and the finger of the liver from the liver, but he did not remove it from its place.
He cut out the breast and gave it to the one to the one who had merited [bringing it onto the ramp].
He came to the right flank and cut into it as far as the spine, without touching the spine, until he came to the place between two small ribs.
He cut it off and gave it to the one who had merited [bringing it onto the ramp], with the liver attached to it.
He then came to the neck, and he left two ribs on each side of it, cut it off and gave it to the one to the one who had merited [bringing it onto the ramp], with the windpipe and the heart and the lung attached to it.
He then came to the left flank in which he left the two thin ribs above and two thin ribs below; and he had done similarly with the other flank.
Thus he left two on each side above and two on each side below.
He cut it off and gave it to the one to the one who had merited [bringing it onto the ramp], and the spine with it and the spleen attached to it.
This was really the largest piece, but the right flank was called the largest, because the liver was attached to it.
He then came to the tail bone, which he cut off and gave it to the one who had merited [bringing it onto the ramp], along with the tail, the finger of the liver and the two kidneys.
He then took the left leg and cut it off and gave it to the one who had merited [bringing it onto the ramp].
Thus they were all standing in a row with the limbs in their hands
The first had the head and the [right] hind leg. The head was in his right hand with its nose towards his arm, its horns between his fingers, and the place where it was severed turned upwards with the fat covering it. The right leg was in his left hand with the place where the flaying began turned away from him.
The second had the two fore legs, the right leg in his right hand and the left leg in his left hand, the place where the flaying began turned away from him.
The third had the tail bone and the other hind leg, the tail bone in his right hand with the tail hanging between his fingers and the finger of the liver and the two kidneys with it, and the left hind leg in his left hand with the place where the flaying began turned away from him.
The fourth had the breast and the neck, the breast in his right hand and the neck in his left hand, its ribs being between two of his fingers.
The fifth had the two flanks, the right one in his right hand, and the left one in his left hand, with the place where the flaying began turned away from him.
The sixth had the innards on a platter with the knees on top of them.
The seventh had the fine flour.
The eighth had the griddle cakes.
The ninth had the wine.
They went and placed them on the lower half of the ramp on its western side, and salted them (see Leviticus 2:13).
They then came down and went to the Chamber of Hewn Stone to recite the Shema.
Today’s mishnah gives an intricate description of the butchering of the tamid offering. Most of the mishnah is self-explanatory (although unless you’re a butcher or a scientist who has dissected a sheep, you might have trouble picturing the parts).
By the end of the mishnah, each of the parts that is put onto the altar is in the hands of the priest who won the lottery to bring that piece onto the ramp. They then go back to the Chamber of Hewn Stone to recite the Shema. We shall talk about this when we learn the next chapter." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah discusses the blessings and verses that the priests would recite in the Chamber of Hewn Stone before the tamid sacrifice was placed on the altar.\nHistorically, this mishnah is of great importance. Scholars have often asked if Jewish prayer as we know it today existed during the time of the Temple. Today’s mishnah mentions prayers that later became part of the Amidah and Shacharit service. The Mishnah was not composed until about 200 C.E., so it is debatable as to how accurately it describes history. Nevertheless, the fact that the prayers mentioned here are not exactly the same as those that exist in a later period, lends credence to the possibility that this mishnah provides some of the earliest evidence as to the existence of Jewish prayer.", + "The superintendent said to them: Bless one blessing! And they blessed. The superintendent is the priest who had run the lottery (see 3:1-3). He first instructs them to recite one blessing. The mishnah seems to assume that one learning the mishnah would know what blessing was referred to. The Talmud explains the blessing to be “Ahavah Rabbah” the blessing that we recite before reading the Shema in the morning. Today we recite two blessings before Shema (“yotzer hameorot” is the other). It seems that during Temple times, only one was recited.", + "They then read the Ten Commandments, the Shema, the “And it will be if you hearken” (the second paragraph of and Vayomer (the third paragraph of, and they blessed the people with three blessings: Emet veYatziv, and Avodah, and the priestly benediction. The next recitation was the Ten Commandments. According to the Yerushalmi, this is part of the “Shema”. These did not become part of the liturgy outside of the Temple because of the “murmurings of the sectarians.” According to the Talmud, the rabbis feared that Jews would say that only the Ten Commandments were given by God, and that the rest came from Moses and is not divine or binding. In order to prevent this impression, this section was removed from the prayer service. The Shema is the same three paragraphs that are still recited today. The three blessings are still recited today, although they are placed differently within the service. Today, the Emet VeYatziv is the first blessing recited after the Shema, so its place has not changed since Temple times. It ends with “who redeems Israel.” The “avodah”, which means “worship,” is now recited towards the end of the Amidah. It begins with the word “Retzeh”. The “priestly benediction,” “May God bless you and protect you….” is recited today as part of the last paragraph of the Amidah. All three of these prayers contain words of blessing for Israel, which seems to be appropriate for this point of the service.", + "On Shabbat they added a blessing to be said by the watch which was leaving. On Shabbat, the new priestly watch would take over for the outgoing watch after the musaf (additional) sacrifice was offered. To celebrate this occasion, they would offer a prayer for the outgoing watch (meaning for themselves!)." + ], + [ + "He said to them: those who are new to the incense come and draw lots, and who ever won, won.
He then said: new and old, come and draw lots to see who shall take up the limbs from the ascent to the altar.
Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob says: the one who brought the limbs on to the ascent also takes them up to the altar.
Section one: The burning of the incense was such a desirable piece of the Temple service that priests were not supposed to perform it more than once in their lives. Thus they would not draw lots to see who would offer the incense. Rather, the superintendent would call the priests who had never done so to come up and take his turn.
Section two: The limbs of the cut up sacrifice are currently sitting on the ramp/ascent up to the altar. They still need to be placed on the altar. According to the first opinion, there is another lottery to see who merits bringing each piece up. This lottery is open to priests who had performed this act before, as well as new priests. Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob says that there is no new lottery. Rather, whoever brought the piece up to the ascent, he also gets to bring it up to the altar." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe lotteries are now over, the winners have won and the losers, well, they have not won. Our mishnah discusses what those who did not win any lottery do.", + "He then handed them over to the attendants, who stripped them of their garments, and they would leave on them only the pants. The superintendent would now turn over to the Temple attendants the priests who had not won any lottery. The attendants would strip the priests of the special clothes that they wore to work in the Temple, leaving on only their pants, so that they wouldn’t be standing there naked. After they would put on their regular clothing, they could remove the priestly pants and put on regular pants as well.", + "There were windows there on which was inscribed the name of the garment to which each was assigned. There were windows in the Temple into which the priests could put their clothes. Each piece of clothing would have its own slot. This would save sorting the laundry later on, a job that I too find most cumbersome." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah describes the ladle and spoon that held the incense.", + "The one who had been selected to offer the incense took up the ladle, which was in shape like a big tarkav of gold, and it held three kavs, The ladle which cradled the incense spoon was shaped like a big tarkav (a basket see 3:6) and it could hold up to three kavs.", + "And the [small] dish was in the middle of it, heaped up with incense. The small dish was placed in the middle of the tarkav, heaped up with incense. It was placed inside the larger basket so that the incense wouldn’t spill over and get lost.", + "This had a covering, over which was spread a piece of cloth. The dish was covered, and there was a small piece of cloth over the cover. All of this was done to keep the precious incense from getting lost." + ], + [ + "The priest who had won the firepan, would take the silver pan and ascend to the top of the altar and clear away the live coals to this side and that, and he would rake [the coals]. He then went down and poured them into a gold [firepan]. The priest who had won the right to bring the firepan into the incense altar found inside the Sanctuary would take a silver pan and go to the top of the outer altar (see 2:5). He would clear the live coals to this side and that and rake the coals into the pan and then he would pour them into a gold firepan.", + "About a kav of the coals was spilt, and these he swept into the channel. The silver pan could hold four kavs and the gold pan could hold three kavs. So a kav of coals would spill onto the floor. During the week these could just be swept into the channel.", + "On Shabbat he used to put an overturned pot on them. On Shabbat it was forbidden to put out the coals, or to even move them. Therefore, in order to prevent them from causing damage, he would put a large vessel over them.", + "This pot was a large vessel which could hold a letekh. The pot was large enough to hold a letekh, which is about 90 kav. So it was plenty big to cover the coals.", + "It had two chains; with one he used to draw it down, and with the other he used to hold it above so that it should not roll over. This pot had two chains. The first was used to lower it down from the altar with the ashes (see next section). One priest would pull on a chain and the vessel would be lowered. The other chain was used to hold it steady. Another priest would stand up top and hold on to this chain so that it would stay steady.", + "It was used for three purposes for placing over live coals, and over a [dead] creeping thing on Shabbat, and for drawing down the ashes from the top of the altar. There were three uses for this vessel, two of which have already been described here (to cover the spilled coals on Shabbat and to lower the ashes from the altar). The third use would be to cover a dead sheretz (a creepy crawly thing) so that it wouldn’t cause impurity on Shabbat in the Temple. The sheretz is “muktzeh” so it can’t be moved or even touched on Shabbat. Therefore, they would cover it with the vessel until Shabbat was over. For more on how they dealt with the sheretz in the Temple see Eruvin 10:15." + ], + [ + "When they came between the Sanctuary and the altar, one took the magrefah and threw it between the Sanctuary and the altar. The two priests, one who had won the right to offer the incense and the other who had won the right to the firepan, now came between the Sanctuary and the altar. They would take the magrefah, which was a musical instrument shaped like a shovel (see 3:8) and throw it. This loud noise served as a warning to the other priests, as the mishnah explains.", + "People could not hear one another speak in Jerusalem from the noise of the magrefah. The noise of the throwing of the magrefah was so great that all over Jerusalem people could not hear one another speak. I’m assuming this is a bit of an exaggeration.", + "It served three purposes: When a priest heard the sound of it he knew that his fellow priests were going in to bow down, and he would run to join them. When a Levite heard the noise he knew that his fellow Levites were going in to sing, and he would run to join them. And the head of the Ma’amad used to make the unclean stand in the east gate. The mishnah now lists the three functions that this loud noise would serve. First of all, it would warn the priests that it was time to enter the Sanctuary to bow down. We shall learn more of this in tomorrow’s mishnah. Second, it would warn the Levites that it was time to sing. We shall see more of this in 7:3. Third, the priests and Levites were split into twenty-four watches or Ma’amad’s, each serving for a week in the Temple (see Taanit 4:2). The priest who stood at the head of each Ma’amad would make the unclean priests and Levites stand at the east gate so that they could go through their purification rituals, which might allow them to serve later during the week in the Temple." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThe priests now make their way into the Sanctuary.", + "They began to ascend the steps of the Sanctuary. The two priests, one who had won the right to offer the incense and the other who had won the right to bring the coals from the outer altar to the inner altar, begin to make their way up the twelve steps that lie in front of the Sanctuary.", + "Those who had won the right to clear the ashes from the inner altar and from the candlestick went in front. The two priests, one who had won the right to clear the ashes off the inner altar and the other who had won the right to clear the candlestick, went before them. We should note that the Mishnah described these two jobs in 3:9. Our mishnah takes place after they have already done the work referred to there.", + "The one who won the right to clear the inner altar went in and took the teni and bowed down and went out again. The teni is the basket that the priest left inside the Sanctuary after clearing the altar. He now goes in takes the teni, bows down and then goes out again.", + "The one who had been chosen to clear the candlestick went in, and if he found the two eastern lights still burning he cleared out the eastern one and left the western one burning, since from it he lit the candlestick for the evening. This section is largely a repeat of mishnah 3:9. The two eastern lights are the first that he encounters when he enters. If both are still burning, then he cleans out the first one, which is called “the eastern one” but he leaves the “western one,” the second of these two lights, still lit. This is the light that he will use to light the other branches in the night.", + "If he found that this one had gone out, he cleared the ash away and lit it from the altar of burnt-offering. If he finds that both are out, then he lights the menorah with fire taken from the outer altar.", + "He then took the kuz from the second step and bowed down and went out. He then takes the kuz (another vessel) from the second step where he left it (3:9), bows down and then goes out. These two priests will now put the ashes from the inner altar and the menorah near the ramp, as we learned at the very end of 1:4." + ], + [ + "The one who had won the right to bring in the firepan made a heap of the coals on the top of the altar and then spread them about with the end of the firepan and bowed down and went out. This mishnah describes what the priest who took the firepan into the Sanctuary would do. First he would make a heap of the coals on top of the altar. Then he would spread them out over the altar so that the incense could be easily placed on top. Then he bowed and went out." + ], + [ + "The one who had won the right to the incense took the dish from the middle of the spoon and gave it to his friend or his relative. The chapter concludes with the burning of the incense. The priest who held the incense takes the incense dish out of the large spoon and gives the spoon to a fellow priest or a related priest who had entered with him.", + "If some of it spilled into the spoon, he would put it into his hands. Any incense that had spilled into the large spoon, he would gather up into his hands.", + "They used to instruct him: Be careful not to begin immediately in front of you or else you may burn yourself. He was warned not to scatter the incense first on the side immediately in front of him, because he would burn himself as he tried to scatter the incense on the other side of the altar. Very interesting to note how concerned the rabbis were with fire safety!", + "He then began to scatter the incense and [after finishing] went out. Rather, he would scatter the incense first on the side opposite from him, and then on the close side. When he was done, he would go out.", + "The one who burned the incense did not do so until the superintendent said to him: burn the incense. If it was the high priest who burned: he would say to him: Sir, high priest, burn the incense. The priest who would scatter the incense did not begin to do so, until told by the superintendent that he could begin. If he was speaking to the high priest, he would address him with some extra respect.", + "Everyone left and he burned the incense and bowed down and went out. All of the priests would leave the area between the altar and the Sanctuary while the incense was being offered, because it is forbidden for anyone to be there at this time (see Leviticus 16:17)." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "When the high priest went in to bow down, three priests supported him, one by his right and one by his left and one by the precious stones. The high priest would then go in to the Sanctuary. He would have three priests supporting him, one on each side and one who would hold on to the precious stones embedded either in his vest or in the breastplate.", + "When the superintendent heard the sound of the footsteps of the high priest as he was about to go out [from the Sanctuary], he raised the curtain for him. It’s good to be the high priest he even gets the superintendent to lift up the curtain before he comes out! [By the way, does anyone else picture the superintendent with a giant ring of keys, low hanging pants, without a belt and a cigarette hanging out of the side of his mouth?].", + "He went in, bowed down and went out, and then his fellow priests went in and bowed down and went out. After the high priest has come out, the superintendent goes in, bows, and then goes out. Finally, all of the other priests take their turn and go in, bow down and go out." + ], + [ + "They went and stood on the steps of the Sanctuary. The priests now gather back at the steps going down from the Sanctuary to the courtyard.", + "The first ones stood at the south side of their fellow priests with five vessels in their hands: one held the teni, the second the kuz, the third the firepan, the fourth the dish, and the fifth the spoon and its covering. The “first ones” are those mentioned at the end of the last chapter: the one who cleared the inner altar, the one who cleared the menorah, the one with the firepan, the one who offered the incense, and his friend/relative. They are each holding their respective vessel in their hands. They stood on the south side. The other priests stood to their north, meaning to their left.", + "They blessed the people with a single blessing, except in the country they recited it as three blessings, in the Temple as one. The priests now recite the priestly blessing found in Numbers 6:24-26. In the Temple they would recite this as one blessing, meaning they would not say “amen” after each verse. In the “country,” meaning outside of the Temple, when the blessing was recited in the synagogue, they would recite it as three blessings. This is how it is done, at least in Israel, to this day.", + "In the Temple they pronounced the divine name as it is written, but in the country by its substitute. The mishnah now explains other differences as to how the priestly blessing was done in the Temple versus how it was done outside. In the Temple, they would pronounce the name of God as it is written. We should note that we no longer really know how the name is to be pronounced. Outside the Temple, and to this day, it is pronounced by its “nickname” Adonai.", + "In the country the priests raised their hands as high as their shoulders, but in the Temple above their heads, except the high priest, who did not raise his hands above the diadem. Rabbi Judah says: the high priest also raised his hands above the diadem, since it says, “And Aaron lifted up his hands toward the people and blessed them” (Leviticus 9:22). Outside of the Temple, the priests would lift their hands to the height of their shoulders (as they do today), whereas in the Temple, they would lift them over their heads. The one exception is the high priest who was not to lift his hands above the diadem (tzitz) on his head. This seems to be because of the holiness of the diadem. Rabbi Judah disagrees and holds that the high priest also would lift his hands above his head." + ], + [ + "Introduction With this mishnah, the sacrifice of the tamid comes to its thunderous conclusion.", + "If the high priest wished to burn the offerings [himself], he would go up the ascent with the deputy high priest at his right. The high priest always had the right to put the pieces of the tamid onto the altar himself. If he didn't want to, he could have the others do so (see section seven).", + "The first [of the other priests] then handed to him the head and the foot and he laid his hands on them and threw them [onto the altar]. The second then handed to the first the two fore legs. And he handed them to the high priest who laid his hands on them and threw them [onto the altar]. The second then went away. In the same way all the other limbs were handed to him and he laid his hands on them and threw them [on to the altar fire]. Each of the priests would hand the part to the high priest, and he would lay his hands upon them. The second priest would hand up to the first, and then go. Similarly the third priest would hand to the first, etc. Thus all nine priests (see 4:3) would hand the pieces of the sacrifice which they held up to the high priest.", + "He then went around the altar. From where did he begin? From the southeastern corner; from there he went to the northeastern, then to the northwestern and then to the southwestern. The high priest would then make his way all the way around the altar to offer the wine libation. If this was done by a regular priest, he would simply go from the southeastern corner to the southwestern corner.", + "They there handed him the wine for libation. The deputy high priest stood on the corner/horn of the altar with the flags in his hand, and two priests on the table of the fats with two trumpets in their hands. They blew a teki’ah, a teru’ah and a teki’ah. They then went and stood by Ben Arza, one on his right hand and one on his left. When he bent down to make the libation the deputy high priest waved the flags and Ben Arza struck the cymbals and the Levites sang the psalm. When they came to a pause they blew a teki’ah, and the public bowed down. At every pause there was a teki’ah and at every teki’ah a bowing down. This was the order of the regular daily sacrifice for the service of our Lord. May it be His will that it be rebuilt speedily in our days, Amen. These sections refer to the wine libation, done after the tamid was on the altar. The “table of fats” is the marble table that stood on the western side of the ramp. They would place the limbs on this table. See Shekalim 6:4.", + "Ben Arza is the nickname of the priest in charge of the cymbals (see Shekalim 5:1).", + "After each set of trumpet blasts, the public standing in the Temple would bow down.", + "The mishnah concludes with a prayer for the Temple to be speedily rebuilt." + ], + [ + "The following are the psalms that were chanted in the Temple.
On the first day they used to say, “The earth is the Lord's and the fullness thereof, the world and they that dwell therein” (Psalms 24).
On the second day they used to say: “Great is the Lord and highly to be praised, in the city of our God. His holy mountain” (Psalms 48).
On the third day they used to say: “God stands in the congregation of God, in the midst of the judges he judges” (Psalms 82).
On the fourth day they used to say: “O Lord, God to whom vengeance belongs. God to whom vengeance belongs, shine forth” (Psalms 9.
On the fifth day they used to say: “Sing aloud unto God our strength, shout unto the God of Jacob” (Psalms 91).
On the sixth day they used to say: “The lord reigns, he is clothed in majesty, the Lord is clothed, He has girded himself with strength” (Psalms 93).
On Shabbat they used to say: “A psalm, a song for the Sabbath day” (Psalms 92). A psalm, a song for the time to come, for the day that will be all Shabbat and rest for everlasting life.
Congratulations! We have finished Tractate Tamid! It is a tradition at this point to thank God for helping us finish learning the tractate and to commit ourselves to going back and relearning it, so that we may not forget it and so that its lessons will stay with us for all of our lives. Tamid may have been one of the more unusual tractates that we have ever learned. Instead of disputes between sages, heaps of logic and laws, we get an intricate description of the Temple service. Indeed, although the language is clearly rabbinic Hebrew, its descriptive style is more characteristic of the Bible than of rabbinic literature. It is likely that these descriptions, or at least parts thereof, come from Temple times. They were preserved because the rabbis fervently hoped that the Temple would be rebuilt during their own lifetimes. While we may or may not share in this wish, I think we can all appreciate the respect in which they held this ceremony. Despite the fact that it was performed each and every day, twice every day, they don’t seem to have lost their sense of wonder at the intimate connection that they received with God through the sacrificial process. I hope you have enjoyed Tamid. Tomorrow we begin Tractate Middot (the last tractate in Seder Kodashim!).
Today’s mishnah lists the psalms that were chanted by the Levites each day in the Temple. Today we still recite these Psalms in the synagogue, and before we say them we say, “This is the Psalm that they used to say in the Temple.”
The mishnah concludes with a sort of prayer/midrash on the last Psalm." + ] + ] + ] + }, + "versions": [ + [ + "Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp", + "http://learn.conservativeyeshiva.org/mishnah/" + ] + ], + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה תמיד", + "categories": [ + "Mishnah", + "Modern Commentary on Mishnah", + "English Explanation of Mishnah", + "Seder Kodashim" + ], + "schema": { + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה תמיד", + "enTitle": "English Explanation of Mishnah Tamid", + "key": "English Explanation of Mishnah Tamid", + "nodes": [ + { + "heTitle": "הקדמה", + "enTitle": "Introduction" + }, + { + "heTitle": "", + "enTitle": "" + } + ] + } +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Kodashim/English Explanation of Mishnah Temurah/English/Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp.json b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Kodashim/English Explanation of Mishnah Temurah/English/Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..23117202129c806e22f4bee49d5c7fbcd6fd4db7 --- /dev/null +++ b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Kodashim/English Explanation of Mishnah Temurah/English/Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp.json @@ -0,0 +1,263 @@ +{ + "language": "en", + "title": "English Explanation of Mishnah Temurah", + "versionSource": "http://learn.conservativeyeshiva.org/mishnah/", + "versionTitle": "Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp", + "status": "locked", + "license": "CC-BY", + "shortVersionTitle": "Dr. Joshua Kulp", + "actualLanguage": "en", + "languageFamilyName": "english", + "isBaseText": true, + "isSource": true, + "isPrimary": true, + "direction": "ltr", + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה תמורה", + "categories": [ + "Mishnah", + "Modern Commentary on Mishnah", + "English Explanation of Mishnah", + "Seder Kodashim" + ], + "text": { + "Introduction": [ + "“Temurah” means “substitute” and Tractate Temurah deals with cases where a person tries to substitute a non-sacred animal for another animal that has already been dedicated to be a sacrifice. This subject is dealt with in two parts of Leviticus 27, which I have quoted below:", + "Leviticus 27: 9-10 9 If [the vow concerns] any animal that may be brought as an offering to the Lord, any such that may be given to the Lord shall be holy. 10 One may not exchange or substitute another for it, either good for bad, or bad for good; if one does substitute one animal for another, the thing vowed and its substitute shall both be holy.", + "Leviticus 27:32-33 32 All tithes of the herd or flock — of all that passes under the shepherd's staff, every tenth one — shall be holy to the Lord. 33 He must not look out for good as against bad, or make substitution for it. If he does make substitution for it, then it and its substitute shall both be holy: it cannot be redeemed.", + "Since there are not that many laws that are connected to substituting non-sacred animals for sacrifices, our tractate also deals with the status of the offspring of dedicated animals. The commonality between these two subjects is that the sanctity of one animal (the substitute or the offspring) comes as a result of the sanctity of the other animal (the original sacrifice or the parent)." + ], + "": [ + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThe first mishnah of Temurah explains who has the ability to substitute a non-sacred animal for an already dedicated one. Remember: when one does this, both animals become sacred. The substitution in essence fails to remove the holiness from the original animal but succeeds in making the substituted animal holy. So throughout this tractate whenever the mishnah says “can substitute” what it means is that the substituted animal is sacred. It does not mean that the original animal becomes non-sacred.", + "All persons can substitute, both men and women. Not that one is permitted to substitute, but that if one did so, the substitute is sacred, and he receives forty lashes. The owner of a sacrifice has the ability to substitute one animal for another. The mishnah immediately notes that what this means is that when one tries to make such a substitution the substituted animal becomes holy. It is not permitted to try to make such a substitution, and one who does try to do so is punished, for transgressing the negative commandment of “do not make a substitute” (Leviticus 27:10).", + "Priests have the power to substitute their own [animal] and Israelites also have the power to substitute their own [animal]. People can substitute only sacrifices that they actually own. Israelites can substitute sacrifices that they bring and priests can substitute sacrifices that they bring on their own behalf, but not sacrifices that other people bring to them to offer.", + "Priests do not have the power to substitute a hatat, an asham or a first-born: Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri: what is the reason [priests] do not have the power to substitute a first-born? Rabbi Akiva said: a hatat and an asham are priestly gifts and a first-born is also a priestly gift. Just as in the case of a hatat and an asham [priests] have no power to substitute them, so in the case of a first-born [priests] have no power to substitute it. Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri said to him: So what that priests should have no power to substitute a hatat and an asham, for there they have do not have a claim on these [offerings] while they are alive. How can you say that the same applies to a first-born upon which [the priests] do have a claim when it is alive? Rabbi Akiva replied to him: Has not Scripture already said: “Then it and its substitute shall be holy?” (Leviticus 27:10). Now where does the holiness [of the original animal] occur? In the house of the owners; so too the substitution occurs in the house of the owners. When it comes to an asham (guilt offering) or a hatat (sin offering) brought to a priest by an Israelite all agree that priests cannot affect substitutes for them. Even though the priest does get to eat the meat of the asham and hatat, they are still not his when they are alive, and therefore he cannot substitute for them. The argument is over the first-born. Rabbi Akiva says that the first-born is like the asham and the hatat and the priest cannot substitute for them. Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri responds that there is a difference. The priest receives the meat of the asham and hatat only once the animals have been sacrificed. He has no share in them when they are alive, and therefore he cannot substitute for them, because substitution must be done with a live animal. But when it comes to a first-born, the animal is given to the priests when it is alive, and therefore, if a priest substitutes for it, the substitution is effective. Rabbi Akiva responds with a midrash. The Torah compares the sanctity of the substitute with the sanctity of the original animal. Since the sanctity of the original animal has to occur with the original owners, so too the sanctity of the substitute must occur with the original owners." + ], + [ + "One can substitute Herd animals for flock animals and flock animals for herd animals; Sheep for goats and goats for sheep; Males for females and females for males; Unblemished animals for blemished animals and blemished animals for unblemished animals, since Scripture says: “One may not exchange or substitute another for it, either good for bad, or bad for good” (Leviticus 27:10). What is meant by “good for bad”? (1) Blemished animals whose dedication was prior to their blemish. One can substitute any type of animal for any other type of animal. The reason this works is that the substitution is not effective, so it doesn’t really matter if there is a match between the original and the substitute. One can even substitute a blemished (bad) animal for an unblemished (good) sacrifice. The mishnah clarifies that if the original sacrifice was blemished, the blemish must have occurred after it was sanctified. When one sanctifies a blemished animal, he is really sanctifying its value because the animal itself cannot be sacrificed, and when one sanctifies the value of an animal, it cannot be substituted for.", + "One can substitute one [hullin animal] for two [consecrated animals], and two [hullin animals] for one [consecrated animal]; One [hullin animal] for a hundred [consecrated animals] and a hundred [hullin animals] for one [consecrated animal]; Rabbi Shimon says: one can only substitute one for one, as it says, “Then it and its substitute” (, just as “it” [the consecrated animal] is only one, so [its substitute] must also be only one. According to the first opinion, it doesn’t matter how many animals are substituted or substituted for. Since the substitution is ineffective, all of the original animals remain holy, and all of the substitute animals become holy. Rabbi Shimon derives from the verse that one can only do a one for one substitute. The Torah uses singular language to designate that both the original animal and the substitute animal must be singular. So if one tries to substitute many hullin animals for a sacred animal, the hullin animals do not become sacred." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with a person who tries to substitute either parts of an animal or embryos for a whole dedicated animal, or vice versa.", + "One cannot substitute limbs [of hullin] for [dedicated] embryos; Or embryos [of hullin] for [dedicated] limbs; Or embryos and limbs [of hullin] for whole [dedicated animals]; Or whole [animals of hullin] for them. According to the first opinion, one can substitute only whole animals for other whole animals. One cannot substitute parts or embryos for whole animals, or whole animals for parts or embryos that have been dedicated to the Temple.", + "Rabbi Yose says: limbs [of hullin] can be substituted for whole [dedicated animals], but whole [animals of hullin] cannot be substitute for them. According to Rabbi Yose if a person says, “This limb is in place of this dedicated animal,” the limb does become holy as a substitute. Once the limb is holy its holiness “spreads” over the entire animal and the entire animal is holy.", + "Rabbi Yose said: When it comes to dedicating animals, is it not true that if one says: “This foot shall be an olah (a burnt,” the whole [animal] becomes an olah? Similarly, if one says, “This foot shall be in place of this [whole dedicated animal],” the whole [animal] should become a substitute in its place! Rabbi Yose explains his opinion by analogizing it to a case where a person dedicates the limb of an animal. In such a case the entire animal becomes an olah (assuming that is what he said it would be). So too, when one tries to substitute a limb for an entire animal, the entire substitute animal becomes holy." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah has nothing to do with temurah. It is here because it is similar to tomorrow’s mishnah, which does have some connection to our tractate.", + "[Anything which has become subject to the law of terumah through] a mixture can affect a [second] mixture only in proportion. If terumah and hullin (non-sacred things) become mixed up with, for instance, terumah wine and hullin wine, and there are 100 parts hullin for every part terumah, one can simply remove one part terumah, and the remainder becomes hullin. However, if there is less than a 100 to 1 ratio, the mixture, called “meduma” has to be treated with the stringency of terumah. It can only be eaten or drunk by priests. If this “meduma” mixture becomes mixed in with other hullin, it only affects the hullin according to the amount of terumah that is in the meduma. As long as there are 100 parts hullin for every part terumah in the “meduma” mixture, the entire mixture can be treated as hullin. We should note that it is forbidden to intentionally mix meduma with more hullin in order to nullify the presence of the terumah. Our mishnah refers to a case where this occurs accidentally.", + "[Dough] leavened [through terumah] can affect [other dough] only in proportion. If hullin dough is leavened by terumah sour dough, the hullin dough must be treated as terumah. However, if some of this dough falls into more hullin dough, it causes the new dough take on the status of terumah only if there was enough terumah in it to leaven the new dough. This is basically the same principle we saw in section one, just in reference to dough.", + "Drawn water can disqualify a mikweh only in proportion. If a mikveh has less than 40 seahs of water, and three logs of drawn water fall into it, the mikveh is disqualified. If, however, these three logs of drawn water became mixed in with water that was not drawn, water that can be used for a mikveh, then they disqualify the mikveh only according to amount of drawn water that is in the mixture. To summarize: in all of these cases, there is a mixture of problematic substances (terumah or drawn water) and non-problematic substances. If this mixture is mixed in with something else that is not problematic (hullin or a mikveh) we only consider the problematic parts of the mixture when determining the status of what it fell into." + ], + [ + "Hatat water does not become hatat water except with the putting of ashes [in the water]. “Hatat water” is the water mixed in the ashes of the red heifer that is used in the purification ritual. The water does not become hatat water until the ashes are put into them. This also can mean that if there is some water that already has the ashes mixed in, and then more water falls in, they must again put more ashes in so that the new water can become “hatat water.”", + "A doubtful graveyard cannot make another doubtful graveyard. A field in which there was a grave and then was plowed becomes a “doubtful graveyard.” This status extends for 100 cubits from where the grave was. However, if the “doubtful graveyard” is then plowed again, it does not make another doubtful graveyard.", + "Nor can terumah be made after terumah. If one separates terumah from his produce, and then separates terumah a second time, the second batch of terumah is not terumah.", + "A substitute cannot make another substitute. If one has an animal that is holy because he attempted to substitute it for another animal, and then he tries to substitute another animal for the substitute, the second substitute is not holy. That is what the mishnah means when it says, “A substitute [that has already been made holy] does not make another substitute.", + "The offspring of a dedicated animal cannot make a substitute. Rabbi Judah says: the offspring of a dedicated animal can make a substitute. They said to him: a dedicated animal can make a substitute, but neither the offspring of a dedicated animal nor a substitute can make a substitute. The sages debate whether when one substitutes an animal for the offspring of a dedicated animal, the substitute is holy. The sages say that it is not, for they hold that only the originally dedicated animal can make another animal into a substitute. Rabbi Judah expands the laws of substitutes and holds that even the offspring can make a substitute." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah provides some limits to the applicability of the law of substitutes.", + "Birds and menahot do not make a substitute, since it only says “a beast” (Leviticus 27:10). The laws of substitutes apply only to beasts, cows, goats and sheep. They do not apply to bird offerings or meal offering (menahot).", + "A congregation or partners cannot make a substitute, since it says: “He shall not substitute for it” an individual can make a substitute but a congregation or partners cannot make substitute. The laws of substitutes apply only to sacrifices brought by individuals and not to those brought by the congregation or to those brought by partners. This is derived from the singular language used by the Torah.", + "One cannot make a substitute with [objects] dedicated for Temple repairs. Rabbi Shimon said: Now is not tithe included [in the laws of substitutes]? Then why was it specially mentioned? In order to make a comparison with it: tithe is a private offering, it thus excludes congregational offerings. And tithe is a dedication for the altar, it thus excludes offerings dedicated for Temple repairs. If someone has an animal that is dedicated not to be a sacrifice but to be sold for profit for Temple repairs, that animal cannot make a substitute. Rabi Shimon derives this midrashically from the comparison of the two sets of verses that deal with substitutes in Leviticus 27. The first set deals with regular animals and the second set (vs. 32-33) deals with tithes. Why would the Torah mention tithes, asks Rabbi Shimon, if not to teach us some extra information that we could not have learned from the first group of verses? Rabbi Shimon answers that these verses are there to compare animal tithes with other sacrifices that can make a substitute. Just as tithes are brought in order to offer them as sacrifices, and not to go to Temple repairs, so too only animals brought to be offered can make a substitute. Similarly, just as tithes are brought by individuals, so too only sacrifices brought by individuals can make substitutes, and not those brought by the congregation." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah compares the laws of sacrifices brought by an individual with the laws of sacrifices brought by the congregation.", + "There are [laws relating] to the sacrifices of an individual which do not apply to congregational sacrifices and [laws relating] to congregational sacrifices which do not apply to the sacrifices of individuals. For sacrifices of an individual can make a substitute whereas congregational sacrifices cannot make a substitute; Sacrifices of an individual can be either males or females, whereas congregational sacrifices can be only males. For sacrifices of an individual the owner is responsible for them and their libations, whereas for congregational sacrifices they are not liable for them or for their libations, although they are liable for their libations once the sacrifice has been offered. There are three ways in which sacrifices brought by an individual differ from the public sacrifices brought by the congregation. First of all, as we learned in yesterday’s mishnah, sacrifices brought by an individual can make substitutes whereas those brought by the congregation do not. Second, sacrifices brought by the congregation must always be brought from male animals. Third, if an individual is obligated to bring a sacrifice within a certain time, and the time passes, he must still bring the sacrifice and all of its libations (wine and oil). In contrast, if a congregational sacrifice, such as a tamid (daily) or musaf (additional) offering is not brought at its correct time, the congregation need not bring it later, nor need they bring its libations at a later time. The one caveat is that if the offering was sacrificed at the correct time and the congregation for some reason did not bring its libations, they must do so at a later date.", + "There are [laws relating] to congregational sacrifices which do not apply to the sacrifices of individuals: For congregational sacrifices override Shabbat and [the laws] of ritual impurity, whereas sacrifices of individuals do not override the Shabbat or [the laws] of ritual impurity. Rabbi Meir said: but do not the griddle cakes of a high priest and the bull for Yom Hakippurim which are sacrifices of individuals and yet override the Shabbat and [the laws] of ritual impurity? The matter therefore depends on [whether] the time [for the offering up] is fixed. Congregational sacrifices can be brought on Shabbat and if there are no ritually clean priests, even impure priests can bring them. However, individual sacrifices are never offered on Shabbat and if there are no pure priests to offer them, they simply must wait until a priest is purified. While the first opinion seems to hold that the reason for this difference between congregational and individual sacrifices is that the former is brought by the many and the latter is not, Rabbi Meir points out that there are two individual sacrifices that do not conform to these rules. The griddle cakes that the priest offers on a daily basis (see Menahot 4:5) and the bull he offers on Yom Kippur (Leviticus 16:7) are both individual sacrifices and yet they both override the Shabbat and the laws of impurity. Rabbi Meir explains that the reason a sacrifice overrides Shabbat and the impurity laws is that its time is fixed. Congregational sacrifices and a couple of individual sacrifices have fixed times, whereas other individual sacrifices do not. That is why they do not override the Shabbat or impurity laws." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah continues to explain the differences between sacrifices of an individual and those of the congregation.\nTo understand our mishnah we must discuss the category of a hatat (a sin-offering) that is left to die. There are five types of hatats that must be left to die: 1) the offspring of a hatat; 2) the substitute of a hatat; 3) a hatat whose owners have died; 4) a hatat whose owners were atoned for by a different hatat; 5) a hatat whose year has passed.\nThe sages in our mishnah argue whether these laws apply to all hatats, or just to those brought by an individual. The argument is really only over the last two categories, because the first three are not relevant to a congregational hatat. The hatat brought by the congregation is always male (so no offspring, at least not that we can be certain about) and it cannot make a substitute (as we learned in yesterday’s mishnah). Furthermore, it is impossible to conceive of a hatat brought by the congregation whose owners have all died. Therefore, the argument is only about the last two categories, and whether they apply to the congregational hatat.", + "A hatat of an individual whose owners have been atoned for is left to die, whereas that of a congregation is not left to die. Rabbi Judah says: it is left to die. If a person sets aside an animal to be a hatat, a sin-offering, and then loses the offering, and then sets aside and brings a different animal to be a hatat, the first animal, if found, must be left to die. According to the Bavli, it is put into a pen and is starved to death. Our mishnah limits this to the hatat of an individual. According to the first opinion, the hatat of a congregation is not left to die. Rather, it goes out to pasture until it becomes blemished at which point it can be sold and the proceeds used to buy another sacrifice. Rabbi Judah disagrees and holds that the same rules apply to the hatat of the congregation.", + "Rabbi Shimon said: Just as we have found with regard to the offspring of a hatat, the substitute of a hatat and a hatat whose owners died, that these rules apply only to an individual but not to a congregation, so too [the rules concerning] the hatat whose owners have been atoned for and [a hatat] whose year has passed apply only to an individual but not a congregation. Rabbi Shimon defends the first opinion. Just as the first three types of hatat are left to die only if they belong to an individual and not to the congregation, so too when it comes to the other two types of hatat, the rules of being left to die apply only to that brought by the individual and not to that brought by the congregation. In other words, although it is possible for there to be a hatat whose congregation has already been atoned for or a hatat brought by a congregation, but whose year has already passed, nevertheless, these hatats are not left to die." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah compares the laws that relate to dedicating something to the Temple with the laws that relate to an animal that has been substituted. As the rabbis love to do, they note that sometimes the laws governing dedications are more stringent, whereas at other times, the laws governing substitutes are more stringent.", + "In some ways [the laws relating to] dedications are more stringent than [that those relating to] a substitute, and in some ways [those relating to] a substitute are more stringent than [those relating to] dedications. This section introduces the rest of the mishnah.", + "In some ways [the laws relating to] dedications are more stringent than [those relating to] a substitute, For dedicated animals can make a substitute whereas a substitute cannot make another substitute. A congregation or partners can dedicate but cannot make a substitute. One can dedicate embryos and limbs, but one cannot make a substitute with them. There are three ways in which dedications are treated more stringently than substitutes, all of which we have learned before. In 1:5-6 we learned that a dedicated animal can make a substitute but that a substitute cannot make another substitute. In 2:1 we learned that only individuals can make substitutes. In 1:3 we learned that one can dedicate embryos and limbs but that one cannot make them a substitute for a dedicated animal.", + "[The laws relating to] a substitute are more stringent than [those relating to] dedications, since a substitute applies to a permanently blemished animal and it does not become hullin to be sheared or worked. One can substitute a permanently blemished animal for an unblemished animal, as we learned in 1:2. When the person comes to redeem the blemished animal from its holiness, which he must do because it cannot be sacrificed, the substituted animal does not become completely hullin, non-sacred. It still retains its holiness in that it cannot be sheared or worked. All that one can do with it is slaughter it for food. In contrast, if one dedicates an animal that already has a permanent blemish, it can be redeemed and when it is redeemed it can be sheared and put to work (see Hullin 10:2). In this way we can see that the laws governing the substitute are more stringent.", + "Rabbi Yose son of Rabbi Judah says: they made an error to be the same as intent when it comes to a substitute, but they did not make an error to be the same as intent when it comes to dedication. If one substitutes an animal for another animal in error, the substitution works and the animal becomes holy, despite the fact that he didn’t know what he was doing. This is not so when it comes to dedications.", + "Rabbi Elazar says: kilayim, terefah, a fetus extracted by means of a cesarean section, a tumtum and a hermaphrodite, cannot become sacred nor can they make sacred. “Kilayim” is an animal born of two different species, for instance a goat and sheep. A “tumtum” is an animal whose sex cannot be easily determined and a hermaphrodite (“androgynous”) is one who has signs of being both male and female. These animals cannot be dedicated, and if one tries to dedicate them, they are not holy. Furthermore, they cannot cause other animals to become holy. For instance, if they are already holy due to the fact that their parents were dedicated animals, they cannot make a substitute. One who tries to substitute another animal for them, the substituted animal is not holy. This is true even for Rabbi Judah who in mishnah five said that offspring of dedicated animals can make a substitute." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThe third chapter discusses the status of the offspring and the substitutes of sacrifices, and whether or not they have the same exact status as the original/mother animal.\nIn our mishnah the sages debate the status of the offspring of a shelamim, an offering of well-being.", + "The following are sacrifices whose offspring and substitutes are the same as them:
The offspring of shelamim and their substitutes, their offspring and the offspring of their offspring, till the end of time, are regarded as shelamim, and they require the laying on of hands, libations and the waving of the breast and shoulder. According to the first opinion, animals whose sanctity is derived from the original shelamim offering are treated exactly like shelamim. This means they require laying on of the hands (semikhah) before they are sacrificed, they require libations (grain, wine and oil) and the breast and shoulder must be waved, as is done with the shelamim itself. This would include the offspring of the original shelamim, the substitute and its offspring, and even any offspring of other offspring of the original or its substitute.", + "Rabbi Eliezer says: the offspring of a shelamim must not be offered as a shelamim. The sages say: it is offered. Rabbi Eliezer disagrees and holds that the offspring of a shelamim is not offered as a shelamim. Rather it must be left to die of starvation, as was the case in mishnah 2:2. The other sages again reiterate their opinion from section one.", + "Rabbi Shimon said: there is no dispute between them as regards the offspring of the offspring of a shelamim or the offspring of the offspring of a substitute that they are not offered. What did they dispute? The offspring [of a shelamim]: Rabbi Eliezer says: it is not offered, But the sages say: it is offered. According to Rabbi Shimon everyone holds that the offspring of the offspring or the offspring of the offspring of the substitute may not be offered as a shelamim. The reason for this prohibition is that if we let such animals be offered as shelamim, people would see that owners delaying bringing their offerings to the Temple and rather holding them long enough for a third generation to be born. The only reason to do so is that the person wants to grow flocks of shelamim, since he can eat most of the meat. This is a problem for two reasons. First of all, the Torah says that one should not delay in bringing one’s vows to the Temple. Second, it is prohibited to shear or work these animals and if he keeps them around for a long time, the chances that he will transgress this commandment go up. To prevent people from holding on to their shelamim offerings, Rabbi Shimon says that we rule that their third generation can no longer be eaten. The sages and Rabbi Eliezer debate only with regard to the original offspring. It is, after all, possible that the shelamim (or its substitute) will have offspring without having a long delay between its sanctification and its being brought to the Temple. Therefore, the sages say that this offspring can be offered.", + "Rabbi Shimon said: there is no dispute between them as regards the offspring of the offspring of a shelamim or the offspring of the offspring of a substitute that they are not offered. What did they dispute? The offspring [of a shelamim]: Rabbi Eliezer says: it is not offered, But the sages say: it is offered. Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Papias testify that they have a tradition that supports the sages in their dispute with Rabbi Eliezer. Furthermore, Rabbi Papias testifies that they did eat the offspring of a shelamim. This testimony is found also in tractate Eduyot (testimonies) 7:6. There the testimony is explicitly brought as a refutation of Rabbi Eliezer." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah deals with the offspring and substitutes of a todah (thanksgiving offering) or of an olah (whole burnt offering).", + "The offspring of a todah and its substitute, their offspring and the offspring of their offspring, until the end of all time, are considered as a todah, only they do not require the accompaniment of loaves of bread. Basically, the animals whose holiness comes about as a result of a todah (offspring, and their offspring) have the status of a todah. The one difference is that the original todah is brought with a bread offering, whereas the offspring is brought without a bread offering. This law was derived midrashically in Menahot 7:4.", + "The substitute of an olah, the offspring of its substitute, its offspring and the offspring of its offspring, until the end of time, are regarded as an olah: they require flaying, cutting into pieces and to be altogether burned. The substitute of an olah is a case where a person substituted a male animal for an olah. If one substitutes a female for the male olah, then the female is holy, and its offspring is sacrificed as an olah. But the olah itself does not have halakhic offspring, because the olah is a male. All of the offspring in this section, therefore, refer to a case where a female was substituted for a male. These offspring must all be flayed, cut into pieces and then burned on the altar. These laws are outlined in the first chapter of Leviticus." + ], + [ + "If one set aside a female animal for an olah and it gave birth to a male, it goes out to pasture until it becomes unfit for sacrifice. It is then sold and with its money he brings an olah. Rabbi Elazar says: the [male] animal itself is offered as an olah. An olah must be a male animal. If one sets aside a female animal to be an olah, he has sanctified it, but it cannot be offered up in the manner he wished. To solve this problem, we let the animal go out to pasture until it is blemished. Once it is blemished it can be sold, because it can no longer be sacrificed. Our mishnah points out that if the female animal has male offspring, the same process is undergone by that animal. We can’t sacrifice it because its sanctity came from its mother and its mother was improperly dedicated to be an olah. In both cases the profits from the sale go towards buying another olah. Rabbi Elazar disagrees and holds that the male offspring can be offered as an olah, even though its mother could not.", + "If one sets aside a female [animal] for an asham, it goes out to pasture until it becomes unfit for sacrifice. It is then sold and with its money he brings an asham. If he has already offered an asham [in its place], its money goes for freewill-offerings. Rabbi Shimon says: it is sold without [waiting for] a blemish. The asham (a guilt-offering) must also be male. The same solution is employed as was used above. There is an additional issue with the asham. If before he buys the new asham he brings another animal through which he atones for his guilt, then he can’t use the proceeds from the blemished asham to buy a new asham, because one can’t bring two ashamot for one sin. In this case, the proceeds go to a fund that is used to buy freewill offerings. Rabbi Shimon says that they can sell the original asham without even waiting for it to be blemished. In his opinion, the fact that it can’t be sacrificed as an asham already is a blemish, and we need not wait for another one.", + "The substitute of an asham, the young of its substitute, their young and the young of their young until the end of time, go out to pasture until unfit for sacrifice. They are then sold and their money goes for a freewill-offering. Rabbi Eliezer says: they are left to die. Rabbi Elazar says: he brings olot [burnt sacrifices] with their money. As stated above, one can’t bring two ashamot for one sin. So while an asham can make a substitute, the substitute cannot be offered as an asham. Neither can the offspring or any subsequent offspring of the substitute or the asham. According to the first opinion, all of these animals must go out to pasture, become blemished and then sold for money to be used for freewill offerings. Rabbi Eliezer says that these animals must be left to die, just as they are in the case of a hatat (see 2:2; we will learn more about the hatat in the next mishnah). Rabbi Elazar says that he can bring olot (burnt offerings) with the proceeds. His opinion will be explained in tomorrow’s mishnah.", + "An asham whose owner died or whose owner obtained atonement [through another animal] goes out to pasture until unfit for sacrifice. It is then sold and its money goes for freewill-offerings. Rabbi Eliezer says: they are left to die. Rabbi Elazar says: he brings olot [burnt sacrifices] with their money. If the asham itself cannot be sacrificed because either its owner died or he already achieved atonement through another animal, then the same debate about what to do with the proceeds of its sale occurs as we saw in section three above." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah is a direct continuation of yesterday’s mishnah.", + "But cannot a nedavah [freewill-offering] also be an olah? What then is the difference between the opinion of Rabbi Elazar and that of the sages? In the last two sections of yesterday’s mishnah Rabbi Elazar and the sages argued what to do with the proceeds from the sale of an asham that couldn’t have been sacrificed. Rabbi Elazar said they would buy an olah, and the sages said that the money would go into the treasury of funds used to buy freewill offerings. The problem is that the money from this fund would be used to buy olot, which can be brought as freewill offerings. So what is the difference between Rabbi Elazar’s opinion and that of the sages?", + "Only in that when the offering comes as an obligation, he lays his hands on it and he brings libations and the libations must be from him; and if he is a priest, the privilege of officiating and its hide belong to him. The difference is that when an individual brings the olah, as Rabbi Elazar stated, he must lay his hands upon the sacrifice, he is responsible for the libations (wine, grain and oil) and if he is a priest, he gets to sacrifice it, and he keeps its hide, as the officiating priest always does with an olah.", + "Whereas when he brings it as a freewill-offering, he does not lay his hands [on it], he does not bring libations with it, the libations are provided by the congregation, and although he is a priest, the privilege of officiating and its hide belong to the men of the division [officiating that particular week]. However, if it is brought from the funds for freewill offerings, then it is a communal sacrifice. He does not lay his hands on it, the libations come from communal funds and even if he is a priest, he does not get to sacrifice it himself. Rather the duty falls to whatever division of priests is serving in the Temple that week, and they receive the hide." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah, the final of our chapter, deals with the first-born and a tithed animal.", + "The substitute of a first-born and an animal tithed, their young and the young of their young until the end of time, they are all treated like a first-born and an animal tithed, and are eaten by the owners when blemished. The substitute and offspring of a first-born and an animal tithed, and all of their subsequent substitutes and offspring, all are treated just like a first-born or a tithe. They can be eaten by their owners once they have become blemished [the priest who receives the first-born is considered its owner once he receives it]. However, the substitute of a first-born is not sacrificed, as is the first-born.", + "What is the difference between a first-born and an animal tithed [on the one hand] and other dedications [on the other]? All [blemished] dedications are sold in the market, killed in the market, and weighed by the pound, but not a first-born and an animal tithed. They [other dedications] and their substitutes are redeemed, but not a first-born and an animal tithed. They [other dedications] come from outside the land [to the land], but not a first-born and an animal tithed. [If] they however came from [outside the holy land] unblemished, they are offered, if blemished they are eaten by their owners with their blemishes. Rabbi Shimon: what is the reason? Because a first-born and an animal tithed have a remedy wherever they are, whereas all other dedications, although a blemish has occurred in them, remain holy. The mishnah now lists ways in which the first-born and tithe differ from all other animals dedicated to be sacrifices. If a blemish occurs to any other dedicated animal, it must be redeemed for money, and only then it can be eaten. Once it is redeemed, the animal can be sold and slaughtered in the marketplace, and its meat can be weighed out, because the animal is no longer holy. In contrast, the first-born and tithe are not redeemed, so they remain holy. Therefore, when they are eaten, they must not be treated in the normal way that meat is treated, for this is considered to be disgraceful. [As an aside, it is interesting to note that the sages believed that the way in which meat is treated is considered as either disgraceful or respectful to the animal]. Other animals are sometimes dedicated outside the land of Israel and then brought to Israel to be sacrifices. In contrast, while a first-born and tithe outside the land is holy, they are not generally brought to the land of Israel. However, if they are brought to the land of Israel, the same rules apply when they are blemished they can be eaten, and if they are not, they are sacrificed. Rabbi Shimon explains that the difference between the first-born and tithe on the one hand and the other dedications is that the former have a “remedy” when they are outside of Israel. There, they can go out to pasture and then when they become blemished, they can be eaten by their owners. There is no real reason to bring them to the land of Israel. In contrast, while other dedicated animals can be let out to pasture and become blemished, even once they are blemished they must be redeemed and a sacrifice must be brought with the proceeds. In which case, it is just as easy to bring them directly to Israel to be sacrificed themselves." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nChapter four is about the hatat, the sin-offering. As we have learned in 2:2, there are five types of hataot (pl. of hatat) that are left to die because they can’t be sacrificed and neither can they be eaten. Our mishnah deals with these five hataot.", + "The offspring of a hatat, the substitute of a hatat, and a hatat whose owner has died, are left to die. These are the first three categories of hataot that are left to die. Basically, once the owner has been atoned for, the hatat cannot be sacrificed. The first two cannot be sacrificed because the owner received atonement from the original animal. If the owner died, then he no longer needs atonement so his hatat too cannot be sacrificed.", + "A hatat whose year has passed or which was lost and found blemished: If the owners obtained atonement [afterwards, through another animal], is left to die, and it does not make a substitute; it is forbidden to derive benefit from it, but the laws of sacrilege do not apply. If the owners have not yet obtained atonement, it must go to pasture until it becomes unfit for sacrifice. It is then sold and another is bought with the money. It makes a substitute, and the laws of sacrilege do apply. When it comes to the fourth and fifth types of hatat that must be left to die, it depends on whether the owners have already received atonement through another animal. If the owners have already been atoned for by bringing another animal as a hatat, then the original hatat (the one whose year had passed or which had been lost and then was found) must be left to die. If the owner tries to substitute for it, it no longer can make a substitute. It is forbidden to derive any benefit from it, as it is always forbidden to derive benefit from dedicated animals; however, if one does derive benefit from it, it is not considered sacrilege because the animal is not really sanctified any more. If, however, the original hatat is found (and is blemished) or passed a year before the owners had been atoned for, then the animal need not be left to die. The hatat whose year had passed is let out to pasture until it is blemished and then it can be sold. The hatat that was found blemished can be sold immediately. With the proceeds he buys a new hatat, and that hatat has all of the sanctity of regular hatat. It can make a substitute and if one derives benefit from it, he has committed sacrilege and will have to make restitution." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with the case of someone who set aside an animal to be a hatat, and then it was lost.", + "If one set aside a hatat and it was lost and he sacrificed another in its place, if then the first [animal] is found, it is left to die. As we explained in yesterday’s mishnah, once the owners received atonement from another animal, the original animal cannot be used as a hatat and rather must be left to die.", + "If one set aside money for his hatat and they were lost and he offered a hatat instead of it, if then the money was found, it goes to the Dead Sea. Similarly, one cannot use money set aside to purchase a hatat if he already received atonement from another hatat. Rather the money must be thrown into the Dead Sea, which is another way of saying that it must be put somewhere where he cannot derive any benefit from it." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah deals with various scenarios where one sets aside a hatat or money for a hatat and it or the money is lost, and then he sets aside another hatat or more money to buy another hatat and he then finds the first one before he offers the second one.", + "If one set aside money for his hatat, and it was lost and he set aside other money in its place, if he did not have the opportunity to buy a hatat with it until the [first] money was found, he brings a hatat from both [sums], and the rest of the money is used for a freewill-offering. This case, and all of the cases in this mishnah, differ from those in yesterday’s mishnah because in these cases the original money or hatat is found before a replacement hatat is offered. In this first section, both sets of money must be used to buy a hatat. They are mixed in together to buy one hatat through which the owner receives atonement and any extra money goes to a fund for freewill offerings.", + "If one set aside money for his hatat and it was lost and he set aside a hatat in its place, if he did not have the opportunity to offer it until the money was found, and the hatat was blemished, it is sold and he brings a hatat from both [sums], and the rest is used as a freewill-offering. In this case, the second hatat is blemished so it can be sold. If it had been unblemished, it could have been sacrificed (as we shall see in section five). Here, since it is blemished it is sold and again, both sums are used to buy one hatat and the extra goes for freewill offerings.", + "If one set aside a hatat and it was lost and he set aside money in its place, if he did not have the opportunity to buy a hatat until his hatat was found and it was blemished, it is sold and he brings a hatat from both [sums], and the rest is used for a freewill-offering. This is similar to the situation in section two, except here he originally set aside a hatat and then set aside money. Again, since the hatat is blemished, it can be sold and both sums are used to buy one hatat.", + "If one set aside a hatat and it was lost and he set aside another hatat in its place, if he did not have the opportunity to offer it until the first hatat was found and both were blemished, they are to be sold and he brings a hatat from both [sums] and the rest is used for a freewill-offering. Again, a very similar scenario, except this time both animals were set aside (and not just money for animals). Since both are blemished, the same procedure as above is followed.", + "If one set aside a hatat and it was lost and he set aside another in its place, if he did not have the opportunity of offering it until the first hatat was found and both animals were unblemished, one of them is offered as a hatat and the second must be left to die, the words of Rabbi. The sages say: the only hatat which is left to die is a case where it is found after the owners obtained atonement, and the money does not go to the Dead Sea except where found after the owners have obtained atonement. Ah! Finally a debate! In this case both the original hatat and the replacement hatat are unblemished. According, to Rabbi [Judah HaNasi] one of the two hataot has to be left to die, and the other one can be sacrificed. The rabbis disagree. Since the first hatat wasn’t yet sacrificed, neither of them needs to be left to die. The only type of hatat that is lost that needs to be left to die is one where the replacement hatat was sacrificed. Here, since the replacement wasn’t yet sacrificed, both can go out to pasture until they are blemished. The rabbis also add in that the only case where the money must be thrown into the Dead Sea is the case that we discussed in yesterday’s mishnah the replacement hatat was sacrificed. If the replacement hatat was not sacrificed then the hatat is left to become blemished and then both sums are used to buy a new hatat." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe final mishnah of our chapter has another case of a hatat that must be left to die.", + "If one set aside a hatat and it is blemished, he sells it and brings another with its money. In this case he can’t sacrifice the first hatat because it is blemished. Therefore, he sells it and brings another with the proceeds.", + "Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Shimon says: if the second animal was offered before the first was killed, it is left to die, since the owners have [already] obtained atonement. Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Shimon thinks that this too can become a case of a hatat left to die. Even though the original hatat was sold and now belongs to another person, if it is still alive when the second animal is offered, it still counts as a hatat whose owners had received atonement from another hatat and it too must be left to die. In other words, even though the first hatat wasn’t a “lost hatat” it still must be left to die if it is alive when the owners receive atonement." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThe first three mishnayot of our chapter deal with what is called “acting deceptively with regard to the first born.” The first-born animal has to be offered as a sacrifice, unless it is blemished. The idea with acting deceptively is that the owner of the animal giving birth wants to use the offspring as another sacrifice that he is obligated to bring. For instance, he vowed to bring an olah, and now he wants to bring the first-born and have it count as the olah. This is sort of like “double-dipping” when it comes to sacrifices, but we can easily understand why this was helpful to someone who might not be able to afford to give away both the first-born and another animal that he owes as a sacrifice.", + "How can we act deceptively with regard to the first-born?
He says in respect of a pregnant animal which was giving birth for the first time: if what is in the inside of this [animal] is a male, let it be an olah. If it then gave birth to a male, it is offered as an olah. One can dedicate an animal while it is still in its mother’s womb. Since this animal was dedicated before it was born and become a “first-born” it has the status of an olah and he can use it as such.", + "[If he said:] if it is a female, let it be a shelamim, then if it gave birth to a female, it is offered as a shelamim. He can make the animal into a shelamim (an offering of wellbeing) by stipulating that it will be a shelamim if it is female. Note that this has nothing to do with the acting deceptively with a first-born because a female animal does not have the status of a first-born. It is only taught here because of the clauses that follow.", + "[If he said:] if it is a female, let it be a shelamim, then if it gave birth to a female, it is offered as a shelamim. The person can make a double stipulation and then if both are born, the male is an olah and the female is a shelamim." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is a direct continuation of yesterday’s mishnah. The situation discussed is when a person says about a pregnant animal, “If it gives birth to a male, then it shall be an olah, and if it gives birth to a female, it shall be a shelamim.”", + "If it gave birth to two males, one of them shall be offered as an olah and the second shall be sold to persons obligated to bring an olah and its money becomes hullin. If it gives birth to two males he does not need to bring both as olot (pl. of olah) because he vowed to bring only one olah. However, the sanctity of an olah does apply to the animal because it is unclear which of them he vowed to be his olah. So what he can do is sell the animal as an olah to another person to be used as an olah and that money he can keep as his own, as hullin (non-sacred money).", + "If it gave birth to two females, one of them is offered as a shelamim and the second is sold to persons obligated to bring shelamim and the money becomes hullin. The same is true when it comes to the shelamim, because only a female animal can be a shelamim.", + "If [the animal] gave birth to a tumtum or a hermaphrodite, Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: no holiness attaches to them. A tumtum (an animal with neither sexual signs) and a hermaphrodite (one with signs of being both male and female) do not count full as either male or female. Since neither of them fulfills the conditions of his vow, neither of them is holy." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah deals with someone who wants to make a pregnant animal one type of sacrifice but dedicate its offspring to be a different type.", + "If one says: “The offspring of this [pregnant animal] shall be an olah and it [the animal itself] shall be a shelamim,” his words stand. If he first dedicates the offspring and then the mother, there is no problem. The mother will be a shelamim and the offspring an olah (if it is male). Note that it is probably intentional that the mother is a shelamim and the offspring an olah, because the owner doesn’t get any parts of the olah, whereas he does get to eat a majority of the shelamim. Naturally, he would be more interested in making the larger animal into the sacrifice that he can eat.", + "But if he says [first]: “It [the animal] shall be a shelamim” [and then], “and its offspring shall be an olah,” [its offspring] is regarded as the offspring of an shelamim, the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yose says: if he intended [to say] this at first, since it is impossible to mention both kinds [of sacrifices] simultaneously, his words stand; but if after he already said [intentionally]: this shall be a shelamim, and then he changed his mind and says: its offspring shall be an olah, [its offspring] is regarded as the offspring of a shelamim. The problem here is that he first makes the mother into a shelamim and then tries to make the offspring into an olah. According to Rabbi Meir, once the mother is a shelamim, its offspring will automatically have the same status. He cannot change that by trying to make it into an olah. Rabbi Yose disagrees. If from the outset he intended to make the mother a shelamim and the offspring an olah, but he just happened to dedicate the mother first, then his words do stand. The fact that he dedicated the mother right before the offspring does not matter. However, if he intended at first to make the mother into a shelamim, and then later changed his mind, then both the mother and the offspring are shelamim." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah contains a debate between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yose that is very similar to the debate found in yesterday’s mishnah.", + "[If one says:] “Behold, this animal shall be the substitute of an olah and the substitute of a shelamim,” it is the substitute of an olah, the words of Rabbi Meir. Again in this situation a person said two things that are contradictory. One animal cannot be a substitute for both an olah and a shelamim. According to Rabbi Meir, we take into consideration only his first words, and the animal is the substitute of an olah, and not the substitute of a shelamim.", + "Rabbi Yose says: if he originally intended this, since it is impossible to mention both names [of sacrifices] simultaneously, his words stand. But if after he had already said: “This shall be the substitute of an olah,” he changed his mind and then said: “The substitute of a shelamim,” it is the substitute of an olah. Rabbi Yose says that if he intended to make the animal both the substitute of a shelamim and the substitute of an olah, his words count. Such an animal is half a substitute for an olah and half for a shelamim. Obviously it cannot be sacrificed; rather it must be let out to pasture until it is blemished, then sold and with half of the proceeds he brings an olah and with the other half he brings a shelamim. If, however, he said one thing and then changed his mind, his first words count. Once one has dedicated an animal or made it into a substitute, he cannot subsequently change his mind." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah teaches what actual words are capable of making one animal a substitute for another. We should again remember that the laws of “temurah” refer to one who tries to make one animal holy in place of another animal that is already dedicated. The substitution works in making the new animal holy, but it does not work in making the original animal into hullin (non-sacred). In other words, he was trying to redeem one animal for another, but since he used the language of substituting, his redemption fails.", + "[If one says:] “Behold this [animal] is tahat [instead of] this,” [or] “Behold this is temurat [a substitute] this,” [or] “Behold this is halufat [in place of] this,” [each of these] is a substitute. There are three different words that can cause a substitute to be made: “tahat” “temurat” and “halufat.” If any of these three phrases are used the new animal is holy and the original animal is still holy.", + "[If however one says:] “This shall be redeemed for this,” it is not the case of a [valid] substitute. And if the dedicated animal was blemished, it becomes hullin and he is required to make up [the hullin] to the value [of the dedicated animal]. However, if one uses the word for redeem, then he has not made a substitute. If the original dedicated animal is not blemished then it cannot be redeemed and his words do not have any effect. If the dedicated animal was blemished then his redemption is successful and the original animal is now hullin and the substitute animal is holy. However, he must make sure that the value of the hullin animal he used to redeem is at least equal to the value of the dedicated animal that was being redeemed, as is always the case when redeeming blemished sacrifices." + ], + [ + "Introduction The final mishnah of chapter five discusses the precise language that must be used for a substitute to be valid.", + "[If one says:] “Behold this animal shall be instead of a hatat,” [or] “instead of an olah,” he has said nothing. [But if he says:] “Instead of this hatat” [or] “Instead of this olah,” [or] “Instead of the hatat or the olah which I have in the house,” and he had it in the house, his words stand. In order for the substitute to be valid he must specify the animal that is being substituted for. If he does not specify an animal that he owns, then his words have no validity.", + "If he says concerning an unclean animal or a blemished animal: “Behold these shall be an olah,” he has said nothing. [But if he says:] “Behold they shall be for an olah,” they are sold and he brings with their money an olah. One cannot make an unclean animal (such as a pig or camel) into an olah, or any sacrifice for that matter. If one takes such an animal and declares it to be an olah, he has said nothing. However, if he says that the animal will “be for an olah” we interpret him as meaning that the animal will be used to bring another animal for an olah. Therefore the unclean or blemished animal can be sold and with its proceeds an olah is brought." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nChapter six contains information concerning animals that cannot be put onto the altar for various reasons.", + "All [animals] forbidden for the altar render [others] unfit however few there are. If an animal is one of the kinds of animals that cannot be put onto the altar, then if it becomes mixed up with other animals, all of the animals are forbidden, even if there were many permitted animals and only one forbidden one. In other words, there is no measure in which the forbidden animals are nullified, as there are in other forbidden mixtures.", + "[These are the animals forbidden for the altar]: An animal which had sexual relations with [a woman] or [an animal] that had sexual relations [with a man], an animal set aside ( [for idolatry], or that had been worshipped (ne’ [as an idol]; or that was the fee of a whore, or [a dog's] exchange; or that was kilayim; or terefah; or an animal born through a caesarean section,
What is meant by muktzeh? That which has been set aside for idolatrous use. It [the animal itself] is forbidden, but what is upon it, is permitted. This is the list of animals that cannot be put on the altar. We have explained these in Zevahim 8:1 and our mishnah and the following ones will deal below with categories b-c. Kilayim is an animal born from two different species of parents, such as a goat and a sheep. A terefah is an animal with a wound/disease that will cause it to die imminently.", + "And what is meant by ne'evad? That which has been used for idolatry. Both it [the animal itself] and that which is upon it, are forbidden. In both cases the animal may be eaten. “Muktzeh” means “set aside” and here it refers to an animal that has been set aside to be used in an idolatrous ritual, but that has not yet been used. It itself cannot be offered as a Jewish sacrifice, but anything on it, jewels, a saddle, etc. is not yet forbidden.", + "“Ne’evad” means that the animal has already been used in idolatry. Here the prohibition is broader and includes even the things that decorate the animal. However, both animals can be eaten as non-sacrificial meat as long as they were not already slaughtered for the sake of idolatry." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nAccording to Deuteronomy 23:19 one may not bring “a prostitute’s fee or the pay of a dog into the house of the Lord.” The rabbis understand these two things to be an animal used to pay a prostitute or an ox used as payment for a dog. Neither of them can be used as a sacrifice.\nThe next three mishnayot explain what constitutes the “a prostitute’s fee” or “the pay of a dog.”", + "What is meant by “a prostitute’s fee”?
If one says to a prostitute, “Take this lamb as your fee,” even if there are a hundred lambs, they are all forbidden [for the altar]. According to Albeck, this means that a man gives even 100 lambs to a prostitute as her fee, none of the lambs can be used as a sacrifice. The Talmud adds that even if her stated fee was only one lamb and he gave her another 99 lambs as a bonus, they are all prohibited.", + "If one says to his fellow: Here is a lamb and have your female slave sleep with my servant, Rabbi Meir says: it [the lamb] is not regarded as a prostitute’s fee. But the sages say: it is regarded as a prostitute’s fee. A slave owner has a right to give his female Canaanite(non-Jewish) slave to his male Hebrew slave. Rabbi Meir says that if someone tries to pay another slave owner for him to have his female slave sleep with his male slave, it is not prostitution and the fee is not a prostitute’s fee. According to Rabbi Meir the reason is that a Hebrew slave cannot marry a female Canaanite slave, therefore the master has a right to designate her to have relations with someone not for the sake of marriage. The other sages hold that he could marry her and therefore when she is paid to have relations with him it is a prostitute’s fee." + ], + [ + "What is meant by the “price of a dog”?
If one says to his fellow, here is this lamb instead of [this] dog. The price of a dog means an animal used to pay for a dog. Such an animal cannot be used as a sacrifice. Assumedly, the dog was considered a lowly animal in the biblical world and therefore something used to buy a dog itself had a lowly status and could not be used a sacrifice.", + "And similarly if two partners divided [an estate] and one took ten lambs and the other nine and a dog, all those taken in place of the dog are forbidden [for the altar], but those taken with a dog are valid [for the altar]. The lamb taken by one partner in exchange for the dog taken by the other partner is considered to be the “price of a dog.”", + "An animal that is the fee of a dog and the price of a prostitute are permitted [for the altar], since it says: “[For] both [of these]” (Deuteronomy 23:19): both’ but not four. The mishnah here reverses the biblical “prostitute’s fee and price of a dog” and comes up with “the fee of a dog and price of a prostitute.” The “fee of a dog” is when someone gives a lamb to his fellow in return for a dog to be used for sexual relations (I know, a bit sick, but that’s what it says). The “price of a prostitute” refers to a case where one exchanges a prostitute for a lamb. These lambs are not prohibited because the Torah prohibits only two things the prostitute’s fee and the price of a dog. Any other combo, no matter how morally troubling, does not cause the lamb to become prohibited.", + "Their offspring are permitted [for the altar since it says]: “[Both of these]” implying they but not their offspring. Only the animal itself is prohibited, not their offspring." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah is the last mishnah to deal with the topic of “the price of a dog” and the “fee of a prostitute.”", + "If he gave her [a prostitute] money, it is permitted [for use for the altar.] [But if he gave her] wine, oil, flour and anything similar which is offered on the altar, it is forbidden for the altar. If one pays a prostitute with money (I think today that this is preferred over giving her a lamb), the money can later be used to buy a sacrifice. The only thing that becomes prohibited is something can be sacrifice, such as wine, oil and flour.", + "If he gave her dedicated [animals] they are permitted [for the altar]. If he gives her an animal already dedicated to the Temple, it does not become prohibited. This is because an animal that is already dedicated is not his money any more, and one cannot prohibit something that does not belong to him.", + "If he gave her birds [of hullin] they are disqualified. The mishnah includes birds as being prohibited if given to a prostitute for her fee.", + "For one might have reasoned [as follows]: if in the case of dedicated animals, where a blemish disqualifies them, [the law] of [the prostitute’s] fee and price [of a dog] does not apply to them, in the case of birds, where a blemish does not disqualify, is it not all the more reason that the law of [the prostitute’s] fee and the price [of a dog] should not apply? Scripture says, “For any vow,” (Deuteronomy 23:19) this includes a bird. The mishnah now explains why one might have even thought that these laws don’t apply to a bird. We have already learned in section two that the laws of the fee of a prostitute and the price of a dog don’t apply to dedicated animals. The laws concerning blemishes (that a blemished animal cannot be sacrificed) do, however, apply to dedicated animals. This makes the laws governing dedicated animals more stringent than the laws governing birds, which are not disqualified by defects. Therefore, if the laws of the fee of a prostitute and the price of a dog don’t apply to the more stringent case of dedicated animals, all the more so they should not apply to the more lenient case of the bird. Therefore, the Torah teaches “for any vow” to let us know that birds are included in the prohibition." + ], + [ + "With regard to any animals that are disqualified for the altar, their offspring are permitted for the altar. If an animal cannot be offered for the altar, for instance an animal given as prostitute’s fee or the price of a dog (see mishnah three), its offspring can still be offered.", + "The offspring of a terefah: Rabbi Elazar says it may not be offered on the altar. Rabbi Elazar says that when it comes to a terefah, an animal with a physical defect that will eventually cause it to die, the offspring cannot be offered. Evidently, according to Rabbi Elazar, such a defect is inherited.", + "Rabbi Hanina ben Antigonus says: a ritually clean animal which nursed from a terefah is disqualified from the altar. The milk in this animal’s stomach is prohibited because it comes from a terefah. Therefore, according to Rabbi Hanina ben Antigonus, it is prohibited from the altar.", + "Any dedicated animal which became terefah one may not dedicate them, since we may not redeem dedicated [animals] in order to give them to dogs to eat. One cannot dedicate a living terefah to be a sacrifice because there would be nothing to do with that animal. It cannot be offered on the altar because it is a terefah. It cannot be redeemed, because the only thing one could do with it after it is redeemed is feed it to the dogs, and this is considered disgraceful to a formerly holy thing. Therefore, one should not dedicate it in the first place." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThe first three mishnayot of our chapter deal with the differences between the laws that apply to things that are dedicated to the altar to be sacrifices and things that are dedicated to the Temple for their proceeds to be used for Temple repairs.\nOur mishnah deals with the first half of this equation laws that apply to dedications to the altar that don’t apply to dedications made for Temple repair.", + "There are [laws] which apply to dedications for the altar which do not apply to dedications for repairs of the Temple, and there are [laws] which apply to dedications for the repairs of the Temple which do not apply to dedications for the altar.
Dedications for the altar effect a substitute; If one tries to make a substitute for an animal that has been dedicated to be a sacrifice, then the substitute is holy and the original animal retains its holiness. This is not so when it comes to an animal dedicated for Temple repairs (see 1:6).", + "They are subject to the laws of piggul, remnant and ritual uncleanness; If while offering an animal to be a sacrifice one has the intention to eat it or offer its innards on the altar after its prescribed time has expired, the animal is piggul and anyone who eats it is liable for karet (see Zevahim 2:2-3). Remnant (notar) is the meat of a sacrifice that has been left over after its time has expired. Ritual uncleanness refers to either the person eating the sacrifice, or the meat of the sacrifice. These laws refer only to the animals dedicated to be sacrifices, but not to animals dedicated for Temple repairs.", + "Their offspring and milk are forbidden [even] after their redemption; The offspring and milk of animals dedicated for the altar are always forbidden, even if the animals should become blemished and are then redeemed. Their holiness remains after redemption, and therefore things that come from them are also holy. See Hullin 10:2.", + "If one kills them outside [the Temple] he is guilty; Slaughtering such an animal outside the Temple is forbidden and will make one liable for karet (see Zevahim 14:1-2).", + "And wages are not paid from them to artisans, Which is not the case with dedications for temple repairs. Artisans who work in the Temple, building or repairing or other such work, their wages are not paid from animals dedicated for the altar. However, their wages can come from animals dedicated for Temple repairs." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is the second half of yesterday’s mishnah. Here we learn that there are laws that apply to dedications made for the repair of the Temple that don’t apply to animals dedicated to be sacrifices.", + "There are [laws] which apply to dedications for the repairs of the Temple which don’t apply to dedications to the altar.
Unspecified dedications go to the repairs of the Temple. If one dedicates something to the Temple, even an animal that can be a sacrifice, it automatically goes towards Temple repair. If he wishes it to be a sacrifice, he must specify that the animal is to be a sacrifice.", + "Dedication for the repairs of the temple can have an effect on all things, Anything can be dedicated to be used for repairs for the Temple, even an animal that cannot be sacrificed, such as a pig or camel. The animal is sold and the proceeds go to the Temple. In contrast, only an unblemished kosher animal, bird or other sacrificable object can be dedicated to be put on the altar.", + "The law of sacrilege applies to things that grow from them. If one makes use of something that comes from an animal dedicated for Temple repair, such as milk from an animal or eggs from a bird, he has committed sacrilege (illicit use of holy property). The same is not true if he makes use of the same object that comes from an animal that has been dedicated to be a sacrifice. We will learn more about the laws of sacrilege in tractate Meilah.", + "And there is no benefit to be derived from them for the priest. Priests do not derive any personal benefit from animals or any other product dedicated for Temple repair. In contrast, they receive part of all animals dedicated to be sacrifices, either part of the meat or the hide." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn today’s mishnah we learn ways in which dedications for the repairs of the Temple are treated the same as dedications for the altar.", + "Both dedications for the altar and dedications for the repairs of the Temple may not be changed from one holiness to another. Once someone has dedicated an animal for a certain purpose he cannot change that purpose. For instance, if one dedicated an animal to be an olah, he can’t later change his mind and make it into a shelamim. Similarly, if one dedicated an animal to be sold and used for Temple repairs, he can’t change his mind and dedicate it for the altar.", + "One may dedicate them with a value-dedication, and one may conscribe them. A person can use either type of dedicated thing to make a vow of value. This is a subject we just learned in Arakhin 8:7. A person can dedicate to the Temple the benefit that he gets from bringing an already dedicated ox (or other animal) to the Temple. In other words, how much would you pay to bring this ox as a sacrifice? If someone makes such a vow, he owes that much money to the Temple. Similarly one can conscribe an already dedicated thing. Again this means that he owes the monetary amount of benefit he is receiving by having the merit to bring this sacrifice.", + "If they die, they are buried. Rabbi Shimon says: dedications for the repairs of the temple, if they died, they are redeemed. If either type of dedicated animal dies, it cannot be redeemed because it cannot be stood up for a formal process of evaluation. Since there is no way to “remove” the holiness, the animal must be buried. Rabbi Shimon holds that animals dedicated for Temple repair can be redeemed without a formal process of evaluation. Therefore, they can be redeemed even after death." + ], + [ + "And the following are things which must be buried:
A dedicated animal which had a miscarriage, [the miscarriage] must be buried.
A dedicated animal which expelled a placenta, [the placenta] must be buried.
An ox which was condemned to be stoned.
The heifer whose neck was broken.
The birds [brought in connection with the purification] of one with skin disease (.
The hair of a nazirite.
The first-born of a donkey.
[A mixture of] meat [cooked] in milk.
And hullin which were slaughtered in the Temple court. Shimon says: hullin which were slaughtered in the Temple court must be burned. And similarly a wild animal killed in the Temple court [is also burned].
At the end of yesterday’s mishnah we learned that animals dedicated, either for the altar or for Temple repair, that then die, must be buried because they cannot be redeemed. Our mishnah lists other things that must be buried.
Section one: The aborted fetus carries the holiness of its mother, but it can’t be redeemed. Therefore it must be buried. The same is true with regard to the placenta mentioned in the next section. The placenta here refers to an early miscarriage which might have a fetus in it, and therefore it too must be buried.
Section three: An ox which committed a crime (murder or sex with a human being) must be stoned. Once it is stoned, it is forbidden to derive benefit from it (see Exodus 21:28). The same is true with regard to the heifer whose neck is broken as part of the ritual that atones for an unknown murder. See Deuteronomy 21; Mishnah Kiddushin 2:9 and Avodah Zarah 5:9.
Section five: There are two birds used in the purification of the leper (see Leviticus 14). One bird is slaughtered and the other bird is set free. It is forbidden to use these birds for any other purpose. The slaughtered bird must be buried, and if it should die before being released, the other bird must be buried as well. However, once the other bird is released, it is permitted.
Section six: It is forbidden to derive any benefit from the hair that the nazirite shaves during the ritual which observed if he became impure (see Numbers 6:9). However, the hair that he shaves at the end of his term of naziriteship is burned (see vs. 18).
Section seven: The first born of a donkey must be redeemed with a sheep. It is prohibited to derive any benefit from the sheep after it has been used to redeem the donkey.
Section eight: It is prohibited to derive benefit from milk and meat cooked together. If one does cook them together they must be buried, which basically means that the mixture must be thrown away.
Section nine: According to the first opinion, if a non-sacred animal is slaughtered in the Temple court, it must be buried. Rabbi Shimon says that it must be burned, which is the same rule that applies to sanctified animals that become disqualified in the Temple court (see mishnah six below). He holds that all animals that are improperly slaughtered in the Temple court must be burned this is to prevent confusion. Indeed, Rabbi Shimon holds that even though wild animals cannot be sacrificed they too must be burned." + ], + [ + "And the following are to be burned:
Chametz on Pesah is burned;
Unclean terumah;
Orlah;
Kilayim (mixed in the vineyard--that which it is customary to burn is to be burned and that which it is customary to bury is to be buried.
We may kindle with the bread and oil of [unclean] terumah.
In yesterday’s mishnah we learned which forbidden items must be buried. Today we learn that other forbidden things must be burned.
Section one: If one finds chametz (leavened bread) on Pesah, he must burn it.
Sections two-four: Unclean terumah, orlah (fruit in its first three years of growth) and seeds sewn in a vineyard must be burned. If these come in a form that is impossible to burn, such as juice made of orlah fruit, then it should be buried. But if it can be burned, than it should be burned.
Section five: When burning unclean terumah, one may use the light and heat to derive benefit. This is not the case when it comes to burning chametz on Pesah, orlah, or kilayim. It is forbidden to derive any benefit from these substances, even from the fire in which they are being burned." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe final mishnah in Temurah deals with prohibited things that must be burned.", + "All dedicated animals which were slaughtered [with the intention of being eaten] after their set time or outside of their set place must be burned. An animal dedicated to be a sacrifice which was slaughtered with a disqualifying intention to eat it or burn it at the wrong time or place is fully disqualified and must be burned. The same is true with regard to a sacrifice that is in another way disqualified, such as remnant or a meat that has been made impure (see Leviticus 7:17, 19; see also Leviticus 6:23).", + "An asham offered by one in doubt [as to whether he has transgressed] is to be burned. Rabbi Judah says: it is to be buried. An “asham offered by one in doubt” is brought by someone who is not sure if he committed a sin that if he knew for certain he had committed he would have had to bring a hatat. If he brings this type of asham and then before its blood is sprinkled on the altar he finds out that he did not sin, the asham is disqualified. According to the first opinion it is to be burned, whereas Rabbi Judah holds that it is buried.", + "A hatat of a bird that is brought for a doubt is burned. Rabbi Judah says: it is cast into the sewer. This section could refer to a case where a woman is not sure if she gave birth (for instance she had a very early miscarriage and is unsure whether it was just some blood or was a miscarriage). After child birth a woman brings a hatat, but in this case her hatat is of doubtful status. It cannot be eaten. According to the first opinion, it is burned. Rabbi Judah says that it can be cast into the sewer that flows through the Temple courtyard, which is, according to the Tosefta, equivalent to burial. Rabbi Judah holds that both this and the doubtful hatat are looked at like non-sacred animals that were slaughtered in the Temple court, which means they are to be buried.", + "All things which must be buried must not be burned, and all things which must be burned must not be buried. Rabbi Judah says: if one wishes to be stringent with himself, to burn things which are buried, he is permitted to do so. They said to him: he is not allowed to change. According to the sages, if one is obligated to burn or bury a specific item, he must do so in the specified manner. He cannot change from one means of disposal to the other. Rabbi Judah is more flexible and allows one to burn things that can be buried. He does not allow one to bury things that need to be burned. Congratulations! We have finished Tractate Temurah! It is a tradition at this point to thank God for helping us finish learning the tractate and to commit ourselves to going back and relearning it, so that we may not forget it and so that its lessons will stay with us for all of our lives. Temurah contained many quite technical details concerning sacrificial law (a topic you should be used to by now) but perhaps you will allow me a little “derashah” at this point. The verses in Leviticus 27 concerning substituting teach us that it is basically impossible to substitute one sanctified animal for another. Once an animal has become sacred, and dedicated to be a sacrifice, it must fulfill its destiny and become a sacrifice. Perhaps in a broader sense this teaches us that sometimes once something has attained a certain status, there just is no substitute for it. Once it has become “holy” in our lives, even if we try to put something else in its place, the holiness of the original object can never be removed. There are many things that play such a role in our lives, and I don’t wish to limit the imagination by specifying. Substitutions, sometimes, simply don’t work, and perhaps, in a very symbolic fashion, that is what these sacrificial laws are trying to teach us. I hope you have enjoyed Temurah. Tomorrow we begin Tractate Keritot." + ] + ] + ] + }, + "schema": { + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה תמורה", + "enTitle": "English Explanation of Mishnah Temurah", + "key": "English Explanation of Mishnah Temurah", + "nodes": [ + { + "heTitle": "הקדמה", + "enTitle": "Introduction" + }, + { + "heTitle": "", + "enTitle": "" + } + ] + } +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Kodashim/English Explanation of Mishnah Temurah/English/merged.json b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Kodashim/English Explanation of Mishnah Temurah/English/merged.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..31d845941f2b795fe1b17af5757fb6367ee55e49 --- /dev/null +++ b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Kodashim/English Explanation of Mishnah Temurah/English/merged.json @@ -0,0 +1,260 @@ +{ + "title": "English Explanation of Mishnah Temurah", + "language": "en", + "versionTitle": "merged", + "versionSource": "https://www.sefaria.org/English_Explanation_of_Mishnah_Temurah", + "text": { + "Introduction": [ + "“Temurah” means “substitute” and Tractate Temurah deals with cases where a person tries to substitute a non-sacred animal for another animal that has already been dedicated to be a sacrifice. This subject is dealt with in two parts of Leviticus 27, which I have quoted below:", + "Leviticus 27: 9-10 9 If [the vow concerns] any animal that may be brought as an offering to the Lord, any such that may be given to the Lord shall be holy. 10 One may not exchange or substitute another for it, either good for bad, or bad for good; if one does substitute one animal for another, the thing vowed and its substitute shall both be holy.", + "Leviticus 27:32-33 32 All tithes of the herd or flock — of all that passes under the shepherd's staff, every tenth one — shall be holy to the Lord. 33 He must not look out for good as against bad, or make substitution for it. If he does make substitution for it, then it and its substitute shall both be holy: it cannot be redeemed.", + "Since there are not that many laws that are connected to substituting non-sacred animals for sacrifices, our tractate also deals with the status of the offspring of dedicated animals. The commonality between these two subjects is that the sanctity of one animal (the substitute or the offspring) comes as a result of the sanctity of the other animal (the original sacrifice or the parent)." + ], + "": [ + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThe first mishnah of Temurah explains who has the ability to substitute a non-sacred animal for an already dedicated one. Remember: when one does this, both animals become sacred. The substitution in essence fails to remove the holiness from the original animal but succeeds in making the substituted animal holy. So throughout this tractate whenever the mishnah says “can substitute” what it means is that the substituted animal is sacred. It does not mean that the original animal becomes non-sacred.", + "All persons can substitute, both men and women. Not that one is permitted to substitute, but that if one did so, the substitute is sacred, and he receives forty lashes. The owner of a sacrifice has the ability to substitute one animal for another. The mishnah immediately notes that what this means is that when one tries to make such a substitution the substituted animal becomes holy. It is not permitted to try to make such a substitution, and one who does try to do so is punished, for transgressing the negative commandment of “do not make a substitute” (Leviticus 27:10).", + "Priests have the power to substitute their own [animal] and Israelites also have the power to substitute their own [animal]. People can substitute only sacrifices that they actually own. Israelites can substitute sacrifices that they bring and priests can substitute sacrifices that they bring on their own behalf, but not sacrifices that other people bring to them to offer.", + "Priests do not have the power to substitute a hatat, an asham or a first-born: Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri: what is the reason [priests] do not have the power to substitute a first-born? Rabbi Akiva said: a hatat and an asham are priestly gifts and a first-born is also a priestly gift. Just as in the case of a hatat and an asham [priests] have no power to substitute them, so in the case of a first-born [priests] have no power to substitute it. Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri said to him: So what that priests should have no power to substitute a hatat and an asham, for there they have do not have a claim on these [offerings] while they are alive. How can you say that the same applies to a first-born upon which [the priests] do have a claim when it is alive? Rabbi Akiva replied to him: Has not Scripture already said: “Then it and its substitute shall be holy?” (Leviticus 27:10). Now where does the holiness [of the original animal] occur? In the house of the owners; so too the substitution occurs in the house of the owners. When it comes to an asham (guilt offering) or a hatat (sin offering) brought to a priest by an Israelite all agree that priests cannot affect substitutes for them. Even though the priest does get to eat the meat of the asham and hatat, they are still not his when they are alive, and therefore he cannot substitute for them. The argument is over the first-born. Rabbi Akiva says that the first-born is like the asham and the hatat and the priest cannot substitute for them. Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri responds that there is a difference. The priest receives the meat of the asham and hatat only once the animals have been sacrificed. He has no share in them when they are alive, and therefore he cannot substitute for them, because substitution must be done with a live animal. But when it comes to a first-born, the animal is given to the priests when it is alive, and therefore, if a priest substitutes for it, the substitution is effective. Rabbi Akiva responds with a midrash. The Torah compares the sanctity of the substitute with the sanctity of the original animal. Since the sanctity of the original animal has to occur with the original owners, so too the sanctity of the substitute must occur with the original owners." + ], + [ + "One can substitute Herd animals for flock animals and flock animals for herd animals; Sheep for goats and goats for sheep; Males for females and females for males; Unblemished animals for blemished animals and blemished animals for unblemished animals, since Scripture says: “One may not exchange or substitute another for it, either good for bad, or bad for good” (Leviticus 27:10). What is meant by “good for bad”? (1) Blemished animals whose dedication was prior to their blemish. One can substitute any type of animal for any other type of animal. The reason this works is that the substitution is not effective, so it doesn’t really matter if there is a match between the original and the substitute. One can even substitute a blemished (bad) animal for an unblemished (good) sacrifice. The mishnah clarifies that if the original sacrifice was blemished, the blemish must have occurred after it was sanctified. When one sanctifies a blemished animal, he is really sanctifying its value because the animal itself cannot be sacrificed, and when one sanctifies the value of an animal, it cannot be substituted for.", + "One can substitute one [hullin animal] for two [consecrated animals], and two [hullin animals] for one [consecrated animal]; One [hullin animal] for a hundred [consecrated animals] and a hundred [hullin animals] for one [consecrated animal]; Rabbi Shimon says: one can only substitute one for one, as it says, “Then it and its substitute” (, just as “it” [the consecrated animal] is only one, so [its substitute] must also be only one. According to the first opinion, it doesn’t matter how many animals are substituted or substituted for. Since the substitution is ineffective, all of the original animals remain holy, and all of the substitute animals become holy. Rabbi Shimon derives from the verse that one can only do a one for one substitute. The Torah uses singular language to designate that both the original animal and the substitute animal must be singular. So if one tries to substitute many hullin animals for a sacred animal, the hullin animals do not become sacred." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with a person who tries to substitute either parts of an animal or embryos for a whole dedicated animal, or vice versa.", + "One cannot substitute limbs [of hullin] for [dedicated] embryos; Or embryos [of hullin] for [dedicated] limbs; Or embryos and limbs [of hullin] for whole [dedicated animals]; Or whole [animals of hullin] for them. According to the first opinion, one can substitute only whole animals for other whole animals. One cannot substitute parts or embryos for whole animals, or whole animals for parts or embryos that have been dedicated to the Temple.", + "Rabbi Yose says: limbs [of hullin] can be substituted for whole [dedicated animals], but whole [animals of hullin] cannot be substitute for them. According to Rabbi Yose if a person says, “This limb is in place of this dedicated animal,” the limb does become holy as a substitute. Once the limb is holy its holiness “spreads” over the entire animal and the entire animal is holy.", + "Rabbi Yose said: When it comes to dedicating animals, is it not true that if one says: “This foot shall be an olah (a burnt,” the whole [animal] becomes an olah? Similarly, if one says, “This foot shall be in place of this [whole dedicated animal],” the whole [animal] should become a substitute in its place! Rabbi Yose explains his opinion by analogizing it to a case where a person dedicates the limb of an animal. In such a case the entire animal becomes an olah (assuming that is what he said it would be). So too, when one tries to substitute a limb for an entire animal, the entire substitute animal becomes holy." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah has nothing to do with temurah. It is here because it is similar to tomorrow’s mishnah, which does have some connection to our tractate.", + "[Anything which has become subject to the law of terumah through] a mixture can affect a [second] mixture only in proportion. If terumah and hullin (non-sacred things) become mixed up with, for instance, terumah wine and hullin wine, and there are 100 parts hullin for every part terumah, one can simply remove one part terumah, and the remainder becomes hullin. However, if there is less than a 100 to 1 ratio, the mixture, called “meduma” has to be treated with the stringency of terumah. It can only be eaten or drunk by priests. If this “meduma” mixture becomes mixed in with other hullin, it only affects the hullin according to the amount of terumah that is in the meduma. As long as there are 100 parts hullin for every part terumah in the “meduma” mixture, the entire mixture can be treated as hullin. We should note that it is forbidden to intentionally mix meduma with more hullin in order to nullify the presence of the terumah. Our mishnah refers to a case where this occurs accidentally.", + "[Dough] leavened [through terumah] can affect [other dough] only in proportion. If hullin dough is leavened by terumah sour dough, the hullin dough must be treated as terumah. However, if some of this dough falls into more hullin dough, it causes the new dough take on the status of terumah only if there was enough terumah in it to leaven the new dough. This is basically the same principle we saw in section one, just in reference to dough.", + "Drawn water can disqualify a mikweh only in proportion. If a mikveh has less than 40 seahs of water, and three logs of drawn water fall into it, the mikveh is disqualified. If, however, these three logs of drawn water became mixed in with water that was not drawn, water that can be used for a mikveh, then they disqualify the mikveh only according to amount of drawn water that is in the mixture. To summarize: in all of these cases, there is a mixture of problematic substances (terumah or drawn water) and non-problematic substances. If this mixture is mixed in with something else that is not problematic (hullin or a mikveh) we only consider the problematic parts of the mixture when determining the status of what it fell into." + ], + [ + "Hatat water does not become hatat water except with the putting of ashes [in the water]. “Hatat water” is the water mixed in the ashes of the red heifer that is used in the purification ritual. The water does not become hatat water until the ashes are put into them. This also can mean that if there is some water that already has the ashes mixed in, and then more water falls in, they must again put more ashes in so that the new water can become “hatat water.”", + "A doubtful graveyard cannot make another doubtful graveyard. A field in which there was a grave and then was plowed becomes a “doubtful graveyard.” This status extends for 100 cubits from where the grave was. However, if the “doubtful graveyard” is then plowed again, it does not make another doubtful graveyard.", + "Nor can terumah be made after terumah. If one separates terumah from his produce, and then separates terumah a second time, the second batch of terumah is not terumah.", + "A substitute cannot make another substitute. If one has an animal that is holy because he attempted to substitute it for another animal, and then he tries to substitute another animal for the substitute, the second substitute is not holy. That is what the mishnah means when it says, “A substitute [that has already been made holy] does not make another substitute.", + "The offspring of a dedicated animal cannot make a substitute. Rabbi Judah says: the offspring of a dedicated animal can make a substitute. They said to him: a dedicated animal can make a substitute, but neither the offspring of a dedicated animal nor a substitute can make a substitute. The sages debate whether when one substitutes an animal for the offspring of a dedicated animal, the substitute is holy. The sages say that it is not, for they hold that only the originally dedicated animal can make another animal into a substitute. Rabbi Judah expands the laws of substitutes and holds that even the offspring can make a substitute." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah provides some limits to the applicability of the law of substitutes.", + "Birds and menahot do not make a substitute, since it only says “a beast” (Leviticus 27:10). The laws of substitutes apply only to beasts, cows, goats and sheep. They do not apply to bird offerings or meal offering (menahot).", + "A congregation or partners cannot make a substitute, since it says: “He shall not substitute for it” an individual can make a substitute but a congregation or partners cannot make substitute. The laws of substitutes apply only to sacrifices brought by individuals and not to those brought by the congregation or to those brought by partners. This is derived from the singular language used by the Torah.", + "One cannot make a substitute with [objects] dedicated for Temple repairs. Rabbi Shimon said: Now is not tithe included [in the laws of substitutes]? Then why was it specially mentioned? In order to make a comparison with it: tithe is a private offering, it thus excludes congregational offerings. And tithe is a dedication for the altar, it thus excludes offerings dedicated for Temple repairs. If someone has an animal that is dedicated not to be a sacrifice but to be sold for profit for Temple repairs, that animal cannot make a substitute. Rabi Shimon derives this midrashically from the comparison of the two sets of verses that deal with substitutes in Leviticus 27. The first set deals with regular animals and the second set (vs. 32-33) deals with tithes. Why would the Torah mention tithes, asks Rabbi Shimon, if not to teach us some extra information that we could not have learned from the first group of verses? Rabbi Shimon answers that these verses are there to compare animal tithes with other sacrifices that can make a substitute. Just as tithes are brought in order to offer them as sacrifices, and not to go to Temple repairs, so too only animals brought to be offered can make a substitute. Similarly, just as tithes are brought by individuals, so too only sacrifices brought by individuals can make substitutes, and not those brought by the congregation." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah compares the laws of sacrifices brought by an individual with the laws of sacrifices brought by the congregation.", + "There are [laws relating] to the sacrifices of an individual which do not apply to congregational sacrifices and [laws relating] to congregational sacrifices which do not apply to the sacrifices of individuals. For sacrifices of an individual can make a substitute whereas congregational sacrifices cannot make a substitute; Sacrifices of an individual can be either males or females, whereas congregational sacrifices can be only males. For sacrifices of an individual the owner is responsible for them and their libations, whereas for congregational sacrifices they are not liable for them or for their libations, although they are liable for their libations once the sacrifice has been offered. There are three ways in which sacrifices brought by an individual differ from the public sacrifices brought by the congregation. First of all, as we learned in yesterday’s mishnah, sacrifices brought by an individual can make substitutes whereas those brought by the congregation do not. Second, sacrifices brought by the congregation must always be brought from male animals. Third, if an individual is obligated to bring a sacrifice within a certain time, and the time passes, he must still bring the sacrifice and all of its libations (wine and oil). In contrast, if a congregational sacrifice, such as a tamid (daily) or musaf (additional) offering is not brought at its correct time, the congregation need not bring it later, nor need they bring its libations at a later time. The one caveat is that if the offering was sacrificed at the correct time and the congregation for some reason did not bring its libations, they must do so at a later date.", + "There are [laws relating] to congregational sacrifices which do not apply to the sacrifices of individuals: For congregational sacrifices override Shabbat and [the laws] of ritual impurity, whereas sacrifices of individuals do not override the Shabbat or [the laws] of ritual impurity. Rabbi Meir said: but do not the griddle cakes of a high priest and the bull for Yom Hakippurim which are sacrifices of individuals and yet override the Shabbat and [the laws] of ritual impurity? The matter therefore depends on [whether] the time [for the offering up] is fixed. Congregational sacrifices can be brought on Shabbat and if there are no ritually clean priests, even impure priests can bring them. However, individual sacrifices are never offered on Shabbat and if there are no pure priests to offer them, they simply must wait until a priest is purified. While the first opinion seems to hold that the reason for this difference between congregational and individual sacrifices is that the former is brought by the many and the latter is not, Rabbi Meir points out that there are two individual sacrifices that do not conform to these rules. The griddle cakes that the priest offers on a daily basis (see Menahot 4:5) and the bull he offers on Yom Kippur (Leviticus 16:7) are both individual sacrifices and yet they both override the Shabbat and the laws of impurity. Rabbi Meir explains that the reason a sacrifice overrides Shabbat and the impurity laws is that its time is fixed. Congregational sacrifices and a couple of individual sacrifices have fixed times, whereas other individual sacrifices do not. That is why they do not override the Shabbat or impurity laws." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah continues to explain the differences between sacrifices of an individual and those of the congregation.\nTo understand our mishnah we must discuss the category of a hatat (a sin-offering) that is left to die. There are five types of hatats that must be left to die: 1) the offspring of a hatat; 2) the substitute of a hatat; 3) a hatat whose owners have died; 4) a hatat whose owners were atoned for by a different hatat; 5) a hatat whose year has passed.\nThe sages in our mishnah argue whether these laws apply to all hatats, or just to those brought by an individual. The argument is really only over the last two categories, because the first three are not relevant to a congregational hatat. The hatat brought by the congregation is always male (so no offspring, at least not that we can be certain about) and it cannot make a substitute (as we learned in yesterday’s mishnah). Furthermore, it is impossible to conceive of a hatat brought by the congregation whose owners have all died. Therefore, the argument is only about the last two categories, and whether they apply to the congregational hatat.", + "A hatat of an individual whose owners have been atoned for is left to die, whereas that of a congregation is not left to die. Rabbi Judah says: it is left to die. If a person sets aside an animal to be a hatat, a sin-offering, and then loses the offering, and then sets aside and brings a different animal to be a hatat, the first animal, if found, must be left to die. According to the Bavli, it is put into a pen and is starved to death. Our mishnah limits this to the hatat of an individual. According to the first opinion, the hatat of a congregation is not left to die. Rather, it goes out to pasture until it becomes blemished at which point it can be sold and the proceeds used to buy another sacrifice. Rabbi Judah disagrees and holds that the same rules apply to the hatat of the congregation.", + "Rabbi Shimon said: Just as we have found with regard to the offspring of a hatat, the substitute of a hatat and a hatat whose owners died, that these rules apply only to an individual but not to a congregation, so too [the rules concerning] the hatat whose owners have been atoned for and [a hatat] whose year has passed apply only to an individual but not a congregation. Rabbi Shimon defends the first opinion. Just as the first three types of hatat are left to die only if they belong to an individual and not to the congregation, so too when it comes to the other two types of hatat, the rules of being left to die apply only to that brought by the individual and not to that brought by the congregation. In other words, although it is possible for there to be a hatat whose congregation has already been atoned for or a hatat brought by a congregation, but whose year has already passed, nevertheless, these hatats are not left to die." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah compares the laws that relate to dedicating something to the Temple with the laws that relate to an animal that has been substituted. As the rabbis love to do, they note that sometimes the laws governing dedications are more stringent, whereas at other times, the laws governing substitutes are more stringent.", + "In some ways [the laws relating to] dedications are more stringent than [that those relating to] a substitute, and in some ways [those relating to] a substitute are more stringent than [those relating to] dedications. This section introduces the rest of the mishnah.", + "In some ways [the laws relating to] dedications are more stringent than [those relating to] a substitute, For dedicated animals can make a substitute whereas a substitute cannot make another substitute. A congregation or partners can dedicate but cannot make a substitute. One can dedicate embryos and limbs, but one cannot make a substitute with them. There are three ways in which dedications are treated more stringently than substitutes, all of which we have learned before. In 1:5-6 we learned that a dedicated animal can make a substitute but that a substitute cannot make another substitute. In 2:1 we learned that only individuals can make substitutes. In 1:3 we learned that one can dedicate embryos and limbs but that one cannot make them a substitute for a dedicated animal.", + "[The laws relating to] a substitute are more stringent than [those relating to] dedications, since a substitute applies to a permanently blemished animal and it does not become hullin to be sheared or worked. One can substitute a permanently blemished animal for an unblemished animal, as we learned in 1:2. When the person comes to redeem the blemished animal from its holiness, which he must do because it cannot be sacrificed, the substituted animal does not become completely hullin, non-sacred. It still retains its holiness in that it cannot be sheared or worked. All that one can do with it is slaughter it for food. In contrast, if one dedicates an animal that already has a permanent blemish, it can be redeemed and when it is redeemed it can be sheared and put to work (see Hullin 10:2). In this way we can see that the laws governing the substitute are more stringent.", + "Rabbi Yose son of Rabbi Judah says: they made an error to be the same as intent when it comes to a substitute, but they did not make an error to be the same as intent when it comes to dedication. If one substitutes an animal for another animal in error, the substitution works and the animal becomes holy, despite the fact that he didn’t know what he was doing. This is not so when it comes to dedications.", + "Rabbi Elazar says: kilayim, terefah, a fetus extracted by means of a cesarean section, a tumtum and a hermaphrodite, cannot become sacred nor can they make sacred. “Kilayim” is an animal born of two different species, for instance a goat and sheep. A “tumtum” is an animal whose sex cannot be easily determined and a hermaphrodite (“androgynous”) is one who has signs of being both male and female. These animals cannot be dedicated, and if one tries to dedicate them, they are not holy. Furthermore, they cannot cause other animals to become holy. For instance, if they are already holy due to the fact that their parents were dedicated animals, they cannot make a substitute. One who tries to substitute another animal for them, the substituted animal is not holy. This is true even for Rabbi Judah who in mishnah five said that offspring of dedicated animals can make a substitute." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThe third chapter discusses the status of the offspring and the substitutes of sacrifices, and whether or not they have the same exact status as the original/mother animal.\nIn our mishnah the sages debate the status of the offspring of a shelamim, an offering of well-being.", + "The following are sacrifices whose offspring and substitutes are the same as them:
The offspring of shelamim and their substitutes, their offspring and the offspring of their offspring, till the end of time, are regarded as shelamim, and they require the laying on of hands, libations and the waving of the breast and shoulder. According to the first opinion, animals whose sanctity is derived from the original shelamim offering are treated exactly like shelamim. This means they require laying on of the hands (semikhah) before they are sacrificed, they require libations (grain, wine and oil) and the breast and shoulder must be waved, as is done with the shelamim itself. This would include the offspring of the original shelamim, the substitute and its offspring, and even any offspring of other offspring of the original or its substitute.", + "Rabbi Eliezer says: the offspring of a shelamim must not be offered as a shelamim. The sages say: it is offered. Rabbi Eliezer disagrees and holds that the offspring of a shelamim is not offered as a shelamim. Rather it must be left to die of starvation, as was the case in mishnah 2:2. The other sages again reiterate their opinion from section one.", + "Rabbi Shimon said: there is no dispute between them as regards the offspring of the offspring of a shelamim or the offspring of the offspring of a substitute that they are not offered. What did they dispute? The offspring [of a shelamim]: Rabbi Eliezer says: it is not offered, But the sages say: it is offered. According to Rabbi Shimon everyone holds that the offspring of the offspring or the offspring of the offspring of the substitute may not be offered as a shelamim. The reason for this prohibition is that if we let such animals be offered as shelamim, people would see that owners delaying bringing their offerings to the Temple and rather holding them long enough for a third generation to be born. The only reason to do so is that the person wants to grow flocks of shelamim, since he can eat most of the meat. This is a problem for two reasons. First of all, the Torah says that one should not delay in bringing one’s vows to the Temple. Second, it is prohibited to shear or work these animals and if he keeps them around for a long time, the chances that he will transgress this commandment go up. To prevent people from holding on to their shelamim offerings, Rabbi Shimon says that we rule that their third generation can no longer be eaten. The sages and Rabbi Eliezer debate only with regard to the original offspring. It is, after all, possible that the shelamim (or its substitute) will have offspring without having a long delay between its sanctification and its being brought to the Temple. Therefore, the sages say that this offspring can be offered.", + "Rabbi Shimon said: there is no dispute between them as regards the offspring of the offspring of a shelamim or the offspring of the offspring of a substitute that they are not offered. What did they dispute? The offspring [of a shelamim]: Rabbi Eliezer says: it is not offered, But the sages say: it is offered. Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Papias testify that they have a tradition that supports the sages in their dispute with Rabbi Eliezer. Furthermore, Rabbi Papias testifies that they did eat the offspring of a shelamim. This testimony is found also in tractate Eduyot (testimonies) 7:6. There the testimony is explicitly brought as a refutation of Rabbi Eliezer." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah deals with the offspring and substitutes of a todah (thanksgiving offering) or of an olah (whole burnt offering).", + "The offspring of a todah and its substitute, their offspring and the offspring of their offspring, until the end of all time, are considered as a todah, only they do not require the accompaniment of loaves of bread. Basically, the animals whose holiness comes about as a result of a todah (offspring, and their offspring) have the status of a todah. The one difference is that the original todah is brought with a bread offering, whereas the offspring is brought without a bread offering. This law was derived midrashically in Menahot 7:4.", + "The substitute of an olah, the offspring of its substitute, its offspring and the offspring of its offspring, until the end of time, are regarded as an olah: they require flaying, cutting into pieces and to be altogether burned. The substitute of an olah is a case where a person substituted a male animal for an olah. If one substitutes a female for the male olah, then the female is holy, and its offspring is sacrificed as an olah. But the olah itself does not have halakhic offspring, because the olah is a male. All of the offspring in this section, therefore, refer to a case where a female was substituted for a male. These offspring must all be flayed, cut into pieces and then burned on the altar. These laws are outlined in the first chapter of Leviticus." + ], + [ + "If one set aside a female animal for an olah and it gave birth to a male, it goes out to pasture until it becomes unfit for sacrifice. It is then sold and with its money he brings an olah. Rabbi Elazar says: the [male] animal itself is offered as an olah. An olah must be a male animal. If one sets aside a female animal to be an olah, he has sanctified it, but it cannot be offered up in the manner he wished. To solve this problem, we let the animal go out to pasture until it is blemished. Once it is blemished it can be sold, because it can no longer be sacrificed. Our mishnah points out that if the female animal has male offspring, the same process is undergone by that animal. We can’t sacrifice it because its sanctity came from its mother and its mother was improperly dedicated to be an olah. In both cases the profits from the sale go towards buying another olah. Rabbi Elazar disagrees and holds that the male offspring can be offered as an olah, even though its mother could not.", + "If one sets aside a female [animal] for an asham, it goes out to pasture until it becomes unfit for sacrifice. It is then sold and with its money he brings an asham. If he has already offered an asham [in its place], its money goes for freewill-offerings. Rabbi Shimon says: it is sold without [waiting for] a blemish. The asham (a guilt-offering) must also be male. The same solution is employed as was used above. There is an additional issue with the asham. If before he buys the new asham he brings another animal through which he atones for his guilt, then he can’t use the proceeds from the blemished asham to buy a new asham, because one can’t bring two ashamot for one sin. In this case, the proceeds go to a fund that is used to buy freewill offerings. Rabbi Shimon says that they can sell the original asham without even waiting for it to be blemished. In his opinion, the fact that it can’t be sacrificed as an asham already is a blemish, and we need not wait for another one.", + "The substitute of an asham, the young of its substitute, their young and the young of their young until the end of time, go out to pasture until unfit for sacrifice. They are then sold and their money goes for a freewill-offering. Rabbi Eliezer says: they are left to die. Rabbi Elazar says: he brings olot [burnt sacrifices] with their money. As stated above, one can’t bring two ashamot for one sin. So while an asham can make a substitute, the substitute cannot be offered as an asham. Neither can the offspring or any subsequent offspring of the substitute or the asham. According to the first opinion, all of these animals must go out to pasture, become blemished and then sold for money to be used for freewill offerings. Rabbi Eliezer says that these animals must be left to die, just as they are in the case of a hatat (see 2:2; we will learn more about the hatat in the next mishnah). Rabbi Elazar says that he can bring olot (burnt offerings) with the proceeds. His opinion will be explained in tomorrow’s mishnah.", + "An asham whose owner died or whose owner obtained atonement [through another animal] goes out to pasture until unfit for sacrifice. It is then sold and its money goes for freewill-offerings. Rabbi Eliezer says: they are left to die. Rabbi Elazar says: he brings olot [burnt sacrifices] with their money. If the asham itself cannot be sacrificed because either its owner died or he already achieved atonement through another animal, then the same debate about what to do with the proceeds of its sale occurs as we saw in section three above." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah is a direct continuation of yesterday’s mishnah.", + "But cannot a nedavah [freewill-offering] also be an olah? What then is the difference between the opinion of Rabbi Elazar and that of the sages? In the last two sections of yesterday’s mishnah Rabbi Elazar and the sages argued what to do with the proceeds from the sale of an asham that couldn’t have been sacrificed. Rabbi Elazar said they would buy an olah, and the sages said that the money would go into the treasury of funds used to buy freewill offerings. The problem is that the money from this fund would be used to buy olot, which can be brought as freewill offerings. So what is the difference between Rabbi Elazar’s opinion and that of the sages?", + "Only in that when the offering comes as an obligation, he lays his hands on it and he brings libations and the libations must be from him; and if he is a priest, the privilege of officiating and its hide belong to him. The difference is that when an individual brings the olah, as Rabbi Elazar stated, he must lay his hands upon the sacrifice, he is responsible for the libations (wine, grain and oil) and if he is a priest, he gets to sacrifice it, and he keeps its hide, as the officiating priest always does with an olah.", + "Whereas when he brings it as a freewill-offering, he does not lay his hands [on it], he does not bring libations with it, the libations are provided by the congregation, and although he is a priest, the privilege of officiating and its hide belong to the men of the division [officiating that particular week]. However, if it is brought from the funds for freewill offerings, then it is a communal sacrifice. He does not lay his hands on it, the libations come from communal funds and even if he is a priest, he does not get to sacrifice it himself. Rather the duty falls to whatever division of priests is serving in the Temple that week, and they receive the hide." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah, the final of our chapter, deals with the first-born and a tithed animal.", + "The substitute of a first-born and an animal tithed, their young and the young of their young until the end of time, they are all treated like a first-born and an animal tithed, and are eaten by the owners when blemished. The substitute and offspring of a first-born and an animal tithed, and all of their subsequent substitutes and offspring, all are treated just like a first-born or a tithe. They can be eaten by their owners once they have become blemished [the priest who receives the first-born is considered its owner once he receives it]. However, the substitute of a first-born is not sacrificed, as is the first-born.", + "What is the difference between a first-born and an animal tithed [on the one hand] and other dedications [on the other]? All [blemished] dedications are sold in the market, killed in the market, and weighed by the pound, but not a first-born and an animal tithed. They [other dedications] and their substitutes are redeemed, but not a first-born and an animal tithed. They [other dedications] come from outside the land [to the land], but not a first-born and an animal tithed. [If] they however came from [outside the holy land] unblemished, they are offered, if blemished they are eaten by their owners with their blemishes. Rabbi Shimon: what is the reason? Because a first-born and an animal tithed have a remedy wherever they are, whereas all other dedications, although a blemish has occurred in them, remain holy. The mishnah now lists ways in which the first-born and tithe differ from all other animals dedicated to be sacrifices. If a blemish occurs to any other dedicated animal, it must be redeemed for money, and only then it can be eaten. Once it is redeemed, the animal can be sold and slaughtered in the marketplace, and its meat can be weighed out, because the animal is no longer holy. In contrast, the first-born and tithe are not redeemed, so they remain holy. Therefore, when they are eaten, they must not be treated in the normal way that meat is treated, for this is considered to be disgraceful. [As an aside, it is interesting to note that the sages believed that the way in which meat is treated is considered as either disgraceful or respectful to the animal]. Other animals are sometimes dedicated outside the land of Israel and then brought to Israel to be sacrifices. In contrast, while a first-born and tithe outside the land is holy, they are not generally brought to the land of Israel. However, if they are brought to the land of Israel, the same rules apply when they are blemished they can be eaten, and if they are not, they are sacrificed. Rabbi Shimon explains that the difference between the first-born and tithe on the one hand and the other dedications is that the former have a “remedy” when they are outside of Israel. There, they can go out to pasture and then when they become blemished, they can be eaten by their owners. There is no real reason to bring them to the land of Israel. In contrast, while other dedicated animals can be let out to pasture and become blemished, even once they are blemished they must be redeemed and a sacrifice must be brought with the proceeds. In which case, it is just as easy to bring them directly to Israel to be sacrificed themselves." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nChapter four is about the hatat, the sin-offering. As we have learned in 2:2, there are five types of hataot (pl. of hatat) that are left to die because they can’t be sacrificed and neither can they be eaten. Our mishnah deals with these five hataot.", + "The offspring of a hatat, the substitute of a hatat, and a hatat whose owner has died, are left to die. These are the first three categories of hataot that are left to die. Basically, once the owner has been atoned for, the hatat cannot be sacrificed. The first two cannot be sacrificed because the owner received atonement from the original animal. If the owner died, then he no longer needs atonement so his hatat too cannot be sacrificed.", + "A hatat whose year has passed or which was lost and found blemished: If the owners obtained atonement [afterwards, through another animal], is left to die, and it does not make a substitute; it is forbidden to derive benefit from it, but the laws of sacrilege do not apply. If the owners have not yet obtained atonement, it must go to pasture until it becomes unfit for sacrifice. It is then sold and another is bought with the money. It makes a substitute, and the laws of sacrilege do apply. When it comes to the fourth and fifth types of hatat that must be left to die, it depends on whether the owners have already received atonement through another animal. If the owners have already been atoned for by bringing another animal as a hatat, then the original hatat (the one whose year had passed or which had been lost and then was found) must be left to die. If the owner tries to substitute for it, it no longer can make a substitute. It is forbidden to derive any benefit from it, as it is always forbidden to derive benefit from dedicated animals; however, if one does derive benefit from it, it is not considered sacrilege because the animal is not really sanctified any more. If, however, the original hatat is found (and is blemished) or passed a year before the owners had been atoned for, then the animal need not be left to die. The hatat whose year had passed is let out to pasture until it is blemished and then it can be sold. The hatat that was found blemished can be sold immediately. With the proceeds he buys a new hatat, and that hatat has all of the sanctity of regular hatat. It can make a substitute and if one derives benefit from it, he has committed sacrilege and will have to make restitution." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with the case of someone who set aside an animal to be a hatat, and then it was lost.", + "If one set aside a hatat and it was lost and he sacrificed another in its place, if then the first [animal] is found, it is left to die. As we explained in yesterday’s mishnah, once the owners received atonement from another animal, the original animal cannot be used as a hatat and rather must be left to die.", + "If one set aside money for his hatat and they were lost and he offered a hatat instead of it, if then the money was found, it goes to the Dead Sea. Similarly, one cannot use money set aside to purchase a hatat if he already received atonement from another hatat. Rather the money must be thrown into the Dead Sea, which is another way of saying that it must be put somewhere where he cannot derive any benefit from it." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah deals with various scenarios where one sets aside a hatat or money for a hatat and it or the money is lost, and then he sets aside another hatat or more money to buy another hatat and he then finds the first one before he offers the second one.", + "If one set aside money for his hatat, and it was lost and he set aside other money in its place, if he did not have the opportunity to buy a hatat with it until the [first] money was found, he brings a hatat from both [sums], and the rest of the money is used for a freewill-offering. This case, and all of the cases in this mishnah, differ from those in yesterday’s mishnah because in these cases the original money or hatat is found before a replacement hatat is offered. In this first section, both sets of money must be used to buy a hatat. They are mixed in together to buy one hatat through which the owner receives atonement and any extra money goes to a fund for freewill offerings.", + "If one set aside money for his hatat and it was lost and he set aside a hatat in its place, if he did not have the opportunity to offer it until the money was found, and the hatat was blemished, it is sold and he brings a hatat from both [sums], and the rest is used as a freewill-offering. In this case, the second hatat is blemished so it can be sold. If it had been unblemished, it could have been sacrificed (as we shall see in section five). Here, since it is blemished it is sold and again, both sums are used to buy one hatat and the extra goes for freewill offerings.", + "If one set aside a hatat and it was lost and he set aside money in its place, if he did not have the opportunity to buy a hatat until his hatat was found and it was blemished, it is sold and he brings a hatat from both [sums], and the rest is used for a freewill-offering. This is similar to the situation in section two, except here he originally set aside a hatat and then set aside money. Again, since the hatat is blemished, it can be sold and both sums are used to buy one hatat.", + "If one set aside a hatat and it was lost and he set aside another hatat in its place, if he did not have the opportunity to offer it until the first hatat was found and both were blemished, they are to be sold and he brings a hatat from both [sums] and the rest is used for a freewill-offering. Again, a very similar scenario, except this time both animals were set aside (and not just money for animals). Since both are blemished, the same procedure as above is followed.", + "If one set aside a hatat and it was lost and he set aside another in its place, if he did not have the opportunity of offering it until the first hatat was found and both animals were unblemished, one of them is offered as a hatat and the second must be left to die, the words of Rabbi. The sages say: the only hatat which is left to die is a case where it is found after the owners obtained atonement, and the money does not go to the Dead Sea except where found after the owners have obtained atonement. Ah! Finally a debate! In this case both the original hatat and the replacement hatat are unblemished. According, to Rabbi [Judah HaNasi] one of the two hataot has to be left to die, and the other one can be sacrificed. The rabbis disagree. Since the first hatat wasn’t yet sacrificed, neither of them needs to be left to die. The only type of hatat that is lost that needs to be left to die is one where the replacement hatat was sacrificed. Here, since the replacement wasn’t yet sacrificed, both can go out to pasture until they are blemished. The rabbis also add in that the only case where the money must be thrown into the Dead Sea is the case that we discussed in yesterday’s mishnah the replacement hatat was sacrificed. If the replacement hatat was not sacrificed then the hatat is left to become blemished and then both sums are used to buy a new hatat." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe final mishnah of our chapter has another case of a hatat that must be left to die.", + "If one set aside a hatat and it is blemished, he sells it and brings another with its money. In this case he can’t sacrifice the first hatat because it is blemished. Therefore, he sells it and brings another with the proceeds.", + "Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Shimon says: if the second animal was offered before the first was killed, it is left to die, since the owners have [already] obtained atonement. Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Shimon thinks that this too can become a case of a hatat left to die. Even though the original hatat was sold and now belongs to another person, if it is still alive when the second animal is offered, it still counts as a hatat whose owners had received atonement from another hatat and it too must be left to die. In other words, even though the first hatat wasn’t a “lost hatat” it still must be left to die if it is alive when the owners receive atonement." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThe first three mishnayot of our chapter deal with what is called “acting deceptively with regard to the first born.” The first-born animal has to be offered as a sacrifice, unless it is blemished. The idea with acting deceptively is that the owner of the animal giving birth wants to use the offspring as another sacrifice that he is obligated to bring. For instance, he vowed to bring an olah, and now he wants to bring the first-born and have it count as the olah. This is sort of like “double-dipping” when it comes to sacrifices, but we can easily understand why this was helpful to someone who might not be able to afford to give away both the first-born and another animal that he owes as a sacrifice.", + "How can we act deceptively with regard to the first-born?
He says in respect of a pregnant animal which was giving birth for the first time: if what is in the inside of this [animal] is a male, let it be an olah. If it then gave birth to a male, it is offered as an olah. One can dedicate an animal while it is still in its mother’s womb. Since this animal was dedicated before it was born and become a “first-born” it has the status of an olah and he can use it as such.", + "[If he said:] if it is a female, let it be a shelamim, then if it gave birth to a female, it is offered as a shelamim. He can make the animal into a shelamim (an offering of wellbeing) by stipulating that it will be a shelamim if it is female. Note that this has nothing to do with the acting deceptively with a first-born because a female animal does not have the status of a first-born. It is only taught here because of the clauses that follow.", + "[If he said:] if it is a female, let it be a shelamim, then if it gave birth to a female, it is offered as a shelamim. The person can make a double stipulation and then if both are born, the male is an olah and the female is a shelamim." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is a direct continuation of yesterday’s mishnah. The situation discussed is when a person says about a pregnant animal, “If it gives birth to a male, then it shall be an olah, and if it gives birth to a female, it shall be a shelamim.”", + "If it gave birth to two males, one of them shall be offered as an olah and the second shall be sold to persons obligated to bring an olah and its money becomes hullin. If it gives birth to two males he does not need to bring both as olot (pl. of olah) because he vowed to bring only one olah. However, the sanctity of an olah does apply to the animal because it is unclear which of them he vowed to be his olah. So what he can do is sell the animal as an olah to another person to be used as an olah and that money he can keep as his own, as hullin (non-sacred money).", + "If it gave birth to two females, one of them is offered as a shelamim and the second is sold to persons obligated to bring shelamim and the money becomes hullin. The same is true when it comes to the shelamim, because only a female animal can be a shelamim.", + "If [the animal] gave birth to a tumtum or a hermaphrodite, Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: no holiness attaches to them. A tumtum (an animal with neither sexual signs) and a hermaphrodite (one with signs of being both male and female) do not count full as either male or female. Since neither of them fulfills the conditions of his vow, neither of them is holy." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah deals with someone who wants to make a pregnant animal one type of sacrifice but dedicate its offspring to be a different type.", + "If one says: “The offspring of this [pregnant animal] shall be an olah and it [the animal itself] shall be a shelamim,” his words stand. If he first dedicates the offspring and then the mother, there is no problem. The mother will be a shelamim and the offspring an olah (if it is male). Note that it is probably intentional that the mother is a shelamim and the offspring an olah, because the owner doesn’t get any parts of the olah, whereas he does get to eat a majority of the shelamim. Naturally, he would be more interested in making the larger animal into the sacrifice that he can eat.", + "But if he says [first]: “It [the animal] shall be a shelamim” [and then], “and its offspring shall be an olah,” [its offspring] is regarded as the offspring of an shelamim, the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yose says: if he intended [to say] this at first, since it is impossible to mention both kinds [of sacrifices] simultaneously, his words stand; but if after he already said [intentionally]: this shall be a shelamim, and then he changed his mind and says: its offspring shall be an olah, [its offspring] is regarded as the offspring of a shelamim. The problem here is that he first makes the mother into a shelamim and then tries to make the offspring into an olah. According to Rabbi Meir, once the mother is a shelamim, its offspring will automatically have the same status. He cannot change that by trying to make it into an olah. Rabbi Yose disagrees. If from the outset he intended to make the mother a shelamim and the offspring an olah, but he just happened to dedicate the mother first, then his words do stand. The fact that he dedicated the mother right before the offspring does not matter. However, if he intended at first to make the mother into a shelamim, and then later changed his mind, then both the mother and the offspring are shelamim." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah contains a debate between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yose that is very similar to the debate found in yesterday’s mishnah.", + "[If one says:] “Behold, this animal shall be the substitute of an olah and the substitute of a shelamim,” it is the substitute of an olah, the words of Rabbi Meir. Again in this situation a person said two things that are contradictory. One animal cannot be a substitute for both an olah and a shelamim. According to Rabbi Meir, we take into consideration only his first words, and the animal is the substitute of an olah, and not the substitute of a shelamim.", + "Rabbi Yose says: if he originally intended this, since it is impossible to mention both names [of sacrifices] simultaneously, his words stand. But if after he had already said: “This shall be the substitute of an olah,” he changed his mind and then said: “The substitute of a shelamim,” it is the substitute of an olah. Rabbi Yose says that if he intended to make the animal both the substitute of a shelamim and the substitute of an olah, his words count. Such an animal is half a substitute for an olah and half for a shelamim. Obviously it cannot be sacrificed; rather it must be let out to pasture until it is blemished, then sold and with half of the proceeds he brings an olah and with the other half he brings a shelamim. If, however, he said one thing and then changed his mind, his first words count. Once one has dedicated an animal or made it into a substitute, he cannot subsequently change his mind." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah teaches what actual words are capable of making one animal a substitute for another. We should again remember that the laws of “temurah” refer to one who tries to make one animal holy in place of another animal that is already dedicated. The substitution works in making the new animal holy, but it does not work in making the original animal into hullin (non-sacred). In other words, he was trying to redeem one animal for another, but since he used the language of substituting, his redemption fails.", + "[If one says:] “Behold this [animal] is tahat [instead of] this,” [or] “Behold this is temurat [a substitute] this,” [or] “Behold this is halufat [in place of] this,” [each of these] is a substitute. There are three different words that can cause a substitute to be made: “tahat” “temurat” and “halufat.” If any of these three phrases are used the new animal is holy and the original animal is still holy.", + "[If however one says:] “This shall be redeemed for this,” it is not the case of a [valid] substitute. And if the dedicated animal was blemished, it becomes hullin and he is required to make up [the hullin] to the value [of the dedicated animal]. However, if one uses the word for redeem, then he has not made a substitute. If the original dedicated animal is not blemished then it cannot be redeemed and his words do not have any effect. If the dedicated animal was blemished then his redemption is successful and the original animal is now hullin and the substitute animal is holy. However, he must make sure that the value of the hullin animal he used to redeem is at least equal to the value of the dedicated animal that was being redeemed, as is always the case when redeeming blemished sacrifices." + ], + [ + "Introduction The final mishnah of chapter five discusses the precise language that must be used for a substitute to be valid.", + "[If one says:] “Behold this animal shall be instead of a hatat,” [or] “instead of an olah,” he has said nothing. [But if he says:] “Instead of this hatat” [or] “Instead of this olah,” [or] “Instead of the hatat or the olah which I have in the house,” and he had it in the house, his words stand. In order for the substitute to be valid he must specify the animal that is being substituted for. If he does not specify an animal that he owns, then his words have no validity.", + "If he says concerning an unclean animal or a blemished animal: “Behold these shall be an olah,” he has said nothing. [But if he says:] “Behold they shall be for an olah,” they are sold and he brings with their money an olah. One cannot make an unclean animal (such as a pig or camel) into an olah, or any sacrifice for that matter. If one takes such an animal and declares it to be an olah, he has said nothing. However, if he says that the animal will “be for an olah” we interpret him as meaning that the animal will be used to bring another animal for an olah. Therefore the unclean or blemished animal can be sold and with its proceeds an olah is brought." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nChapter six contains information concerning animals that cannot be put onto the altar for various reasons.", + "All [animals] forbidden for the altar render [others] unfit however few there are. If an animal is one of the kinds of animals that cannot be put onto the altar, then if it becomes mixed up with other animals, all of the animals are forbidden, even if there were many permitted animals and only one forbidden one. In other words, there is no measure in which the forbidden animals are nullified, as there are in other forbidden mixtures.", + "[These are the animals forbidden for the altar]: An animal which had sexual relations with [a woman] or [an animal] that had sexual relations [with a man], an animal set aside ( [for idolatry], or that had been worshipped (ne’ [as an idol]; or that was the fee of a whore, or [a dog's] exchange; or that was kilayim; or terefah; or an animal born through a caesarean section,
What is meant by muktzeh? That which has been set aside for idolatrous use. It [the animal itself] is forbidden, but what is upon it, is permitted. This is the list of animals that cannot be put on the altar. We have explained these in Zevahim 8:1 and our mishnah and the following ones will deal below with categories b-c. Kilayim is an animal born from two different species of parents, such as a goat and a sheep. A terefah is an animal with a wound/disease that will cause it to die imminently.", + "And what is meant by ne'evad? That which has been used for idolatry. Both it [the animal itself] and that which is upon it, are forbidden. In both cases the animal may be eaten. “Muktzeh” means “set aside” and here it refers to an animal that has been set aside to be used in an idolatrous ritual, but that has not yet been used. It itself cannot be offered as a Jewish sacrifice, but anything on it, jewels, a saddle, etc. is not yet forbidden.", + "“Ne’evad” means that the animal has already been used in idolatry. Here the prohibition is broader and includes even the things that decorate the animal. However, both animals can be eaten as non-sacrificial meat as long as they were not already slaughtered for the sake of idolatry." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nAccording to Deuteronomy 23:19 one may not bring “a prostitute’s fee or the pay of a dog into the house of the Lord.” The rabbis understand these two things to be an animal used to pay a prostitute or an ox used as payment for a dog. Neither of them can be used as a sacrifice.\nThe next three mishnayot explain what constitutes the “a prostitute’s fee” or “the pay of a dog.”", + "What is meant by “a prostitute’s fee”?
If one says to a prostitute, “Take this lamb as your fee,” even if there are a hundred lambs, they are all forbidden [for the altar]. According to Albeck, this means that a man gives even 100 lambs to a prostitute as her fee, none of the lambs can be used as a sacrifice. The Talmud adds that even if her stated fee was only one lamb and he gave her another 99 lambs as a bonus, they are all prohibited.", + "If one says to his fellow: Here is a lamb and have your female slave sleep with my servant, Rabbi Meir says: it [the lamb] is not regarded as a prostitute’s fee. But the sages say: it is regarded as a prostitute’s fee. A slave owner has a right to give his female Canaanite(non-Jewish) slave to his male Hebrew slave. Rabbi Meir says that if someone tries to pay another slave owner for him to have his female slave sleep with his male slave, it is not prostitution and the fee is not a prostitute’s fee. According to Rabbi Meir the reason is that a Hebrew slave cannot marry a female Canaanite slave, therefore the master has a right to designate her to have relations with someone not for the sake of marriage. The other sages hold that he could marry her and therefore when she is paid to have relations with him it is a prostitute’s fee." + ], + [ + "What is meant by the “price of a dog”?
If one says to his fellow, here is this lamb instead of [this] dog. The price of a dog means an animal used to pay for a dog. Such an animal cannot be used as a sacrifice. Assumedly, the dog was considered a lowly animal in the biblical world and therefore something used to buy a dog itself had a lowly status and could not be used a sacrifice.", + "And similarly if two partners divided [an estate] and one took ten lambs and the other nine and a dog, all those taken in place of the dog are forbidden [for the altar], but those taken with a dog are valid [for the altar]. The lamb taken by one partner in exchange for the dog taken by the other partner is considered to be the “price of a dog.”", + "An animal that is the fee of a dog and the price of a prostitute are permitted [for the altar], since it says: “[For] both [of these]” (Deuteronomy 23:19): both’ but not four. The mishnah here reverses the biblical “prostitute’s fee and price of a dog” and comes up with “the fee of a dog and price of a prostitute.” The “fee of a dog” is when someone gives a lamb to his fellow in return for a dog to be used for sexual relations (I know, a bit sick, but that’s what it says). The “price of a prostitute” refers to a case where one exchanges a prostitute for a lamb. These lambs are not prohibited because the Torah prohibits only two things the prostitute’s fee and the price of a dog. Any other combo, no matter how morally troubling, does not cause the lamb to become prohibited.", + "Their offspring are permitted [for the altar since it says]: “[Both of these]” implying they but not their offspring. Only the animal itself is prohibited, not their offspring." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah is the last mishnah to deal with the topic of “the price of a dog” and the “fee of a prostitute.”", + "If he gave her [a prostitute] money, it is permitted [for use for the altar.] [But if he gave her] wine, oil, flour and anything similar which is offered on the altar, it is forbidden for the altar. If one pays a prostitute with money (I think today that this is preferred over giving her a lamb), the money can later be used to buy a sacrifice. The only thing that becomes prohibited is something can be sacrifice, such as wine, oil and flour.", + "If he gave her dedicated [animals] they are permitted [for the altar]. If he gives her an animal already dedicated to the Temple, it does not become prohibited. This is because an animal that is already dedicated is not his money any more, and one cannot prohibit something that does not belong to him.", + "If he gave her birds [of hullin] they are disqualified. The mishnah includes birds as being prohibited if given to a prostitute for her fee.", + "For one might have reasoned [as follows]: if in the case of dedicated animals, where a blemish disqualifies them, [the law] of [the prostitute’s] fee and price [of a dog] does not apply to them, in the case of birds, where a blemish does not disqualify, is it not all the more reason that the law of [the prostitute’s] fee and the price [of a dog] should not apply? Scripture says, “For any vow,” (Deuteronomy 23:19) this includes a bird. The mishnah now explains why one might have even thought that these laws don’t apply to a bird. We have already learned in section two that the laws of the fee of a prostitute and the price of a dog don’t apply to dedicated animals. The laws concerning blemishes (that a blemished animal cannot be sacrificed) do, however, apply to dedicated animals. This makes the laws governing dedicated animals more stringent than the laws governing birds, which are not disqualified by defects. Therefore, if the laws of the fee of a prostitute and the price of a dog don’t apply to the more stringent case of dedicated animals, all the more so they should not apply to the more lenient case of the bird. Therefore, the Torah teaches “for any vow” to let us know that birds are included in the prohibition." + ], + [ + "With regard to any animals that are disqualified for the altar, their offspring are permitted for the altar. If an animal cannot be offered for the altar, for instance an animal given as prostitute’s fee or the price of a dog (see mishnah three), its offspring can still be offered.", + "The offspring of a terefah: Rabbi Elazar says it may not be offered on the altar. Rabbi Elazar says that when it comes to a terefah, an animal with a physical defect that will eventually cause it to die, the offspring cannot be offered. Evidently, according to Rabbi Elazar, such a defect is inherited.", + "Rabbi Hanina ben Antigonus says: a ritually clean animal which nursed from a terefah is disqualified from the altar. The milk in this animal’s stomach is prohibited because it comes from a terefah. Therefore, according to Rabbi Hanina ben Antigonus, it is prohibited from the altar.", + "Any dedicated animal which became terefah one may not dedicate them, since we may not redeem dedicated [animals] in order to give them to dogs to eat. One cannot dedicate a living terefah to be a sacrifice because there would be nothing to do with that animal. It cannot be offered on the altar because it is a terefah. It cannot be redeemed, because the only thing one could do with it after it is redeemed is feed it to the dogs, and this is considered disgraceful to a formerly holy thing. Therefore, one should not dedicate it in the first place." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThe first three mishnayot of our chapter deal with the differences between the laws that apply to things that are dedicated to the altar to be sacrifices and things that are dedicated to the Temple for their proceeds to be used for Temple repairs.\nOur mishnah deals with the first half of this equation laws that apply to dedications to the altar that don’t apply to dedications made for Temple repair.", + "There are [laws] which apply to dedications for the altar which do not apply to dedications for repairs of the Temple, and there are [laws] which apply to dedications for the repairs of the Temple which do not apply to dedications for the altar.
Dedications for the altar effect a substitute; If one tries to make a substitute for an animal that has been dedicated to be a sacrifice, then the substitute is holy and the original animal retains its holiness. This is not so when it comes to an animal dedicated for Temple repairs (see 1:6).", + "They are subject to the laws of piggul, remnant and ritual uncleanness; If while offering an animal to be a sacrifice one has the intention to eat it or offer its innards on the altar after its prescribed time has expired, the animal is piggul and anyone who eats it is liable for karet (see Zevahim 2:2-3). Remnant (notar) is the meat of a sacrifice that has been left over after its time has expired. Ritual uncleanness refers to either the person eating the sacrifice, or the meat of the sacrifice. These laws refer only to the animals dedicated to be sacrifices, but not to animals dedicated for Temple repairs.", + "Their offspring and milk are forbidden [even] after their redemption; The offspring and milk of animals dedicated for the altar are always forbidden, even if the animals should become blemished and are then redeemed. Their holiness remains after redemption, and therefore things that come from them are also holy. See Hullin 10:2.", + "If one kills them outside [the Temple] he is guilty; Slaughtering such an animal outside the Temple is forbidden and will make one liable for karet (see Zevahim 14:1-2).", + "And wages are not paid from them to artisans, Which is not the case with dedications for temple repairs. Artisans who work in the Temple, building or repairing or other such work, their wages are not paid from animals dedicated for the altar. However, their wages can come from animals dedicated for Temple repairs." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is the second half of yesterday’s mishnah. Here we learn that there are laws that apply to dedications made for the repair of the Temple that don’t apply to animals dedicated to be sacrifices.", + "There are [laws] which apply to dedications for the repairs of the Temple which don’t apply to dedications to the altar.
Unspecified dedications go to the repairs of the Temple. If one dedicates something to the Temple, even an animal that can be a sacrifice, it automatically goes towards Temple repair. If he wishes it to be a sacrifice, he must specify that the animal is to be a sacrifice.", + "Dedication for the repairs of the temple can have an effect on all things, Anything can be dedicated to be used for repairs for the Temple, even an animal that cannot be sacrificed, such as a pig or camel. The animal is sold and the proceeds go to the Temple. In contrast, only an unblemished kosher animal, bird or other sacrificable object can be dedicated to be put on the altar.", + "The law of sacrilege applies to things that grow from them. If one makes use of something that comes from an animal dedicated for Temple repair, such as milk from an animal or eggs from a bird, he has committed sacrilege (illicit use of holy property). The same is not true if he makes use of the same object that comes from an animal that has been dedicated to be a sacrifice. We will learn more about the laws of sacrilege in tractate Meilah.", + "And there is no benefit to be derived from them for the priest. Priests do not derive any personal benefit from animals or any other product dedicated for Temple repair. In contrast, they receive part of all animals dedicated to be sacrifices, either part of the meat or the hide." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn today’s mishnah we learn ways in which dedications for the repairs of the Temple are treated the same as dedications for the altar.", + "Both dedications for the altar and dedications for the repairs of the Temple may not be changed from one holiness to another. Once someone has dedicated an animal for a certain purpose he cannot change that purpose. For instance, if one dedicated an animal to be an olah, he can’t later change his mind and make it into a shelamim. Similarly, if one dedicated an animal to be sold and used for Temple repairs, he can’t change his mind and dedicate it for the altar.", + "One may dedicate them with a value-dedication, and one may conscribe them. A person can use either type of dedicated thing to make a vow of value. This is a subject we just learned in Arakhin 8:7. A person can dedicate to the Temple the benefit that he gets from bringing an already dedicated ox (or other animal) to the Temple. In other words, how much would you pay to bring this ox as a sacrifice? If someone makes such a vow, he owes that much money to the Temple. Similarly one can conscribe an already dedicated thing. Again this means that he owes the monetary amount of benefit he is receiving by having the merit to bring this sacrifice.", + "If they die, they are buried. Rabbi Shimon says: dedications for the repairs of the temple, if they died, they are redeemed. If either type of dedicated animal dies, it cannot be redeemed because it cannot be stood up for a formal process of evaluation. Since there is no way to “remove” the holiness, the animal must be buried. Rabbi Shimon holds that animals dedicated for Temple repair can be redeemed without a formal process of evaluation. Therefore, they can be redeemed even after death." + ], + [ + "And the following are things which must be buried:
A dedicated animal which had a miscarriage, [the miscarriage] must be buried.
A dedicated animal which expelled a placenta, [the placenta] must be buried.
An ox which was condemned to be stoned.
The heifer whose neck was broken.
The birds [brought in connection with the purification] of one with skin disease (.
The hair of a nazirite.
The first-born of a donkey.
[A mixture of] meat [cooked] in milk.
And hullin which were slaughtered in the Temple court. Shimon says: hullin which were slaughtered in the Temple court must be burned. And similarly a wild animal killed in the Temple court [is also burned].
At the end of yesterday’s mishnah we learned that animals dedicated, either for the altar or for Temple repair, that then die, must be buried because they cannot be redeemed. Our mishnah lists other things that must be buried.
Section one: The aborted fetus carries the holiness of its mother, but it can’t be redeemed. Therefore it must be buried. The same is true with regard to the placenta mentioned in the next section. The placenta here refers to an early miscarriage which might have a fetus in it, and therefore it too must be buried.
Section three: An ox which committed a crime (murder or sex with a human being) must be stoned. Once it is stoned, it is forbidden to derive benefit from it (see Exodus 21:28). The same is true with regard to the heifer whose neck is broken as part of the ritual that atones for an unknown murder. See Deuteronomy 21; Mishnah Kiddushin 2:9 and Avodah Zarah 5:9.
Section five: There are two birds used in the purification of the leper (see Leviticus 14). One bird is slaughtered and the other bird is set free. It is forbidden to use these birds for any other purpose. The slaughtered bird must be buried, and if it should die before being released, the other bird must be buried as well. However, once the other bird is released, it is permitted.
Section six: It is forbidden to derive any benefit from the hair that the nazirite shaves during the ritual which observed if he became impure (see Numbers 6:9). However, the hair that he shaves at the end of his term of naziriteship is burned (see vs. 18).
Section seven: The first born of a donkey must be redeemed with a sheep. It is prohibited to derive any benefit from the sheep after it has been used to redeem the donkey.
Section eight: It is prohibited to derive benefit from milk and meat cooked together. If one does cook them together they must be buried, which basically means that the mixture must be thrown away.
Section nine: According to the first opinion, if a non-sacred animal is slaughtered in the Temple court, it must be buried. Rabbi Shimon says that it must be burned, which is the same rule that applies to sanctified animals that become disqualified in the Temple court (see mishnah six below). He holds that all animals that are improperly slaughtered in the Temple court must be burned this is to prevent confusion. Indeed, Rabbi Shimon holds that even though wild animals cannot be sacrificed they too must be burned." + ], + [ + "And the following are to be burned:
Chametz on Pesah is burned;
Unclean terumah;
Orlah;
Kilayim (mixed in the vineyard--that which it is customary to burn is to be burned and that which it is customary to bury is to be buried.
We may kindle with the bread and oil of [unclean] terumah.
In yesterday’s mishnah we learned which forbidden items must be buried. Today we learn that other forbidden things must be burned.
Section one: If one finds chametz (leavened bread) on Pesah, he must burn it.
Sections two-four: Unclean terumah, orlah (fruit in its first three years of growth) and seeds sewn in a vineyard must be burned. If these come in a form that is impossible to burn, such as juice made of orlah fruit, then it should be buried. But if it can be burned, than it should be burned.
Section five: When burning unclean terumah, one may use the light and heat to derive benefit. This is not the case when it comes to burning chametz on Pesah, orlah, or kilayim. It is forbidden to derive any benefit from these substances, even from the fire in which they are being burned." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe final mishnah in Temurah deals with prohibited things that must be burned.", + "All dedicated animals which were slaughtered [with the intention of being eaten] after their set time or outside of their set place must be burned. An animal dedicated to be a sacrifice which was slaughtered with a disqualifying intention to eat it or burn it at the wrong time or place is fully disqualified and must be burned. The same is true with regard to a sacrifice that is in another way disqualified, such as remnant or a meat that has been made impure (see Leviticus 7:17, 19; see also Leviticus 6:23).", + "An asham offered by one in doubt [as to whether he has transgressed] is to be burned. Rabbi Judah says: it is to be buried. An “asham offered by one in doubt” is brought by someone who is not sure if he committed a sin that if he knew for certain he had committed he would have had to bring a hatat. If he brings this type of asham and then before its blood is sprinkled on the altar he finds out that he did not sin, the asham is disqualified. According to the first opinion it is to be burned, whereas Rabbi Judah holds that it is buried.", + "A hatat of a bird that is brought for a doubt is burned. Rabbi Judah says: it is cast into the sewer. This section could refer to a case where a woman is not sure if she gave birth (for instance she had a very early miscarriage and is unsure whether it was just some blood or was a miscarriage). After child birth a woman brings a hatat, but in this case her hatat is of doubtful status. It cannot be eaten. According to the first opinion, it is burned. Rabbi Judah says that it can be cast into the sewer that flows through the Temple courtyard, which is, according to the Tosefta, equivalent to burial. Rabbi Judah holds that both this and the doubtful hatat are looked at like non-sacred animals that were slaughtered in the Temple court, which means they are to be buried.", + "All things which must be buried must not be burned, and all things which must be burned must not be buried. Rabbi Judah says: if one wishes to be stringent with himself, to burn things which are buried, he is permitted to do so. They said to him: he is not allowed to change. According to the sages, if one is obligated to burn or bury a specific item, he must do so in the specified manner. He cannot change from one means of disposal to the other. Rabbi Judah is more flexible and allows one to burn things that can be buried. He does not allow one to bury things that need to be burned. Congratulations! We have finished Tractate Temurah! It is a tradition at this point to thank God for helping us finish learning the tractate and to commit ourselves to going back and relearning it, so that we may not forget it and so that its lessons will stay with us for all of our lives. Temurah contained many quite technical details concerning sacrificial law (a topic you should be used to by now) but perhaps you will allow me a little “derashah” at this point. The verses in Leviticus 27 concerning substituting teach us that it is basically impossible to substitute one sanctified animal for another. Once an animal has become sacred, and dedicated to be a sacrifice, it must fulfill its destiny and become a sacrifice. Perhaps in a broader sense this teaches us that sometimes once something has attained a certain status, there just is no substitute for it. Once it has become “holy” in our lives, even if we try to put something else in its place, the holiness of the original object can never be removed. There are many things that play such a role in our lives, and I don’t wish to limit the imagination by specifying. Substitutions, sometimes, simply don’t work, and perhaps, in a very symbolic fashion, that is what these sacrificial laws are trying to teach us. I hope you have enjoyed Temurah. Tomorrow we begin Tractate Keritot." + ] + ] + ] + }, + "versions": [ + [ + "Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp", + "http://learn.conservativeyeshiva.org/mishnah/" + ] + ], + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה תמורה", + "categories": [ + "Mishnah", + "Modern Commentary on Mishnah", + "English Explanation of Mishnah", + "Seder Kodashim" + ], + "schema": { + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה תמורה", + "enTitle": "English Explanation of Mishnah Temurah", + "key": "English Explanation of Mishnah Temurah", + "nodes": [ + { + "heTitle": "הקדמה", + "enTitle": "Introduction" + }, + { + "heTitle": "", + "enTitle": "" + } + ] + } +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Kodashim/English Explanation of Mishnah Zevachim/English/Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp.json b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Kodashim/English Explanation of Mishnah Zevachim/English/Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ec17ab541e59c7c5ebc5d25a71079adcbc2d2db8 --- /dev/null +++ b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Kodashim/English Explanation of Mishnah Zevachim/English/Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp.json @@ -0,0 +1,655 @@ +{ + "language": "en", + "title": "English Explanation of Mishnah Zevachim", + "versionSource": "http://learn.conservativeyeshiva.org/mishnah/", + "versionTitle": "Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp", + "status": "locked", + "license": "CC-BY", + "shortVersionTitle": "Dr. Joshua Kulp", + "actualLanguage": "en", + "languageFamilyName": "english", + "isBaseText": true, + "isSource": true, + "isPrimary": true, + "direction": "ltr", + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה זבחים", + "categories": [ + "Mishnah", + "Modern Commentary on Mishnah", + "English Explanation of Mishnah", + "Seder Kodashim" + ], + "text": { + "Introduction": [ + "Tractate Zevahim is the first tractate in Seder Kodashim, most of which deals with sacrificial laws and other various laws governing the Temple. Zevahim deals with animal and bird sacrifices, with what disqualifies them and what happens when they are sacrificed outside of the Temple. There are seven types of sacrifices which I shall list here. Some offerings are mandatory and some are voluntary, some are communal and some are individual, and both of these distinctions are critical. Below I will list them by their Hebrew name and by an attempt at translating that name into English. However, throughout my translation and commentary I will refer to them mostly by their Hebrew name, in order to encourage the reader to learn them in a version closer to the original. 1. Olah, the wholly burnt offering. This is also sometimes called a “holocaust” but for obvious reasons, I won’t be using that translation. The olah can either be a mandatory offering, such as the tamid, the daily sacrifices (Numbers 28:1-8) or the musaf, additional offering (Numbers 28: 9ff) or a voluntary offering (Leviticus 1). There are many other mandatory types of the olah. The olah is sometimes a beast and sometimes a bird. 2. Hatat, the sin offering, also sometimes translated as a cleansing offering. The main type of hatat is one that is brought to atone for an unintentional sin (Leviticus 4:1-5). There are also hataot (the plural of hatat) brought on the festivals (Numbers 28: 15ff). There are several other types of hataot as well. The hatat is sometimes a beast and sometimes a bird. 3. Asham, guilt offering. This is brought by robbers, people who made illicit use of Temple property, and by several others (Leviticus 5:14-26; 19:20-22). The asham, the hatat and the olah are all considered “holy of holies” which means that they are eaten entirely by priests within the Temple confines. 4. Shelamim, well-being or peace offering. This is generally an individual offering, either voluntary or mandated, with the exception of the two lambs brought on Shavuot (Leviticus 23:19) which are a communal offering. The todah, or thanksgiving offering, is considered a type of shelamim (Leviticus 7:11ff). 5. Bechor, the first-born animal. There is an entire tractate devoted to the bechor, so we will deal with it there. 6. Maaser behemah, the animal tithe (Leviticus 27:32). This subject is also covered in Tractate Bechorot. 7. Pesah, the passover lamb. This sacrifice is covered in Tractate Pesahim.", + "There are four steps that are essential and are covered extensively concerning in the sacrifice of a beast: 1) the slaughter (shechitah); 2) collecting the blood from the animal’s neck in a vessel; 3) bringing the blood to the altar; 4) spilling the blood on the altar. When it comes to the slaughter of the bird sacrifices that are two main steps: 1) the plucking off of its head (melikah); 2) the squeezing out of its blood. " + ], + "": [ + [ + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah discusses sacrifices that are offered by the priest with the intent of their being a different type of sacrifice from that which the person bringing them intended them to be. For instance a shelamim (peace offering) is offered with the intent of its being an olah (burnt offering). There are two issues at stake: 1) Does the owner get the credit for having brought the sacrifice? 2) Can the sacrifice even be eaten?", + "All sacrifices slaughtered not in their own name are valid, except that they do not count in fulfilling their owners’ obligation, with the exception of the pesah and the hatat (sin-. For most sacrifices, if the priest offering them thinks that he is offering a different sacrifice than he is really supposed to be offering, the sacrifice is still valid. This means that its blood can be spilled on the altar and the sacrifice can be eaten by those who would have been able to eat it had it been offered properly. However, the sacrifice does not count as far as fulfilling the obligation of its owner. Thus if the owner was obligated to bring an olah, for instance, and it was sacrificed with the intent of it being another sacrifice, the owner must bring another olah in its place. The exception to this is the pesah and the hatat. If either of these two sacrifices is offered with the intent of its being a different type of sacrifices, not only does it not count for the owner who brought it, it is completely disqualified. Its blood cannot be spilled on the altar, nor can it be eaten.", + "[This is true for] a pesah in its proper time and a hatat at all times. The pesah is only disqualified if it is slaughtered with the wrong intent at the time that it is supposed to be slaughtered, on second half of the day on the fourteenth of Nissan. If it is slaughtered on the wrong day, for the wrong purpose, then paradoxically, it is valid, although it would obviously not count for its owner. Its as if the mishnah is saying that in this case, two negatives can make a positive. When it comes to the hatat, there is no specific time in which it must be offered. Therefore, no matter when it is offered, if the intention is for the wrong sacrifice, it is disqualified.", + "Rabbi Eliezer says: also the asham (guilt-. [This is true for] a pesah in its proper time and a hatat and an asham at all times. Rabbi Eliezer said: the hatat comes on account of sin, and the asham comes on account of sin: just as a hatat [slaughtered] not in its own name is invalid, so the asham is invalid if [slaughtered] not in its own name. Rabbi Eliezer argues that the same rule that applies to the hatat applies to the asham, also a sacrifice brought to atone for sin. If it is slaughtered for the sake of it being a different sacrifice, it is disqualified." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah continues to deal with sacrifices offered “not for their own name”, meaning in order for them to be different from what they were supposed to be.", + "Yose ben Honi says: [Sacrifices] slaughtered in the name of a pesah or a hatat are invalid. Yose ben Honi points out the mirror image rule to that which we learned in yesterday’s mishnah. There we learned that if a pesah or a hatat were offered with the wrong intent, they are disqualified. Here we learn that if a different sacrifice is offered with the intent of its being a pesah or a hatat it is disqualified. Concerning the pesah, this must be on the fourteenth of Nissan, the only day that the pesah can be offered. The hatat rule is true any time.", + "Shimon the brother of Azariah says: if one slaughtered them under a higher designation than their own they are valid; under a lower designation than their own, they are invalid. How so? If one slaughtered most sacred sacrifices under the designation of lesser sacrifices, they are invalid; [but] if one slaughtered lesser sacrifices under the designation of most sacred sacrifices, they are valid. Shimon the brother of Azariah (an unusual way of referring to someone) has a different rule. The sacrifices are divided into two main groups most sacred sacrifices (hatat, asham and olah) and lesser sacrifices (shelamim, pesah, bekhor and tithe). If the sacrifice is a lesser sacrifice and it is offered with the intent of its being a higher sacrifice then it is valid. However, if it is a most sacred sacrifice and it is offered with the intent of it being a lesser sacrifice, then it is invalid because he has reduced its sanctity.", + "If one slaughtered a bekhor or a tithe in the name of a shelamim, it is valid, but if one slaughtered a shelamim in the name of a bekhor or tithe, it is invalid. Technically, the bekhor (firstling), the tithe and shelamim are all lesser sacrifices. However, we see here that the sanctity of the bekhor and the tithe is actually lower than that of the shelamim. Thus if a priest offers a bekhor or tithe (lesser sanctity) in order for it to be a shelamim, then the sacrifice is valid (and can be eaten) because he has raised its sanctity. But if he offers a shelamim with the thought that it is a tithe or bekhor, then it is invalid." + ], + [ + "A pesah that was slaughtered on the morning of the fourteenth [of Nisan] under a different designation: Rabbi Joshua declares it valid, just as if it had been slaughtered on the thirteenth. Ben Batera declares it invalid, as if it had been slaughtered in the afternoon. The pesah must be offered on the fourteenth of Nisan, during the second half of the day. It cannot be offered in the morning, at least not according to most opinions. Therefore, according to Rabbi Joshua, a pesah that was offered before it should have been offered, and was slaughtered for it to be a different sacrifice, can be eaten because we learned in mishnah one that a pesah that is slaughtered under a different name is only disqualified if it is slaughtered at the time when a pesah can be slaughtered. Ben Batera holds that the pesah can be slaughtered any time of the day on the fourteenth. Therefore, if one slaughters a pesah in the morning of the fourteenth under the name of a different sacrifice, then it is disqualified because it has been slaughtered when it could have counted as a pesah.", + "Said Shimon ben Azzai: I have a tradition from seventy-two elder[s] on the day that Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah] was placed in the academy, that all sacrifices which are eaten, though slaughtered under a different designation are valid, except that their owners have not fulfilled their obligation, except the pesah and the hatat. And ben Azzai added only the olah, but the sages did not agree with him. Shimon ben Azzai relates here a tradition that is very close to the tradition found in the beginning of mishnah one. There we learned that the two exceptional sacrifices that are disqualified if offered with the wrong intent are the pesah and the hatat. According to mishnah one, all other sacrifices are valid if slaughtered with the intent of their being different sacrifices. Shimon ben Azzai quotes this tradition as being true only for sacrifices that are eaten. This would not include the olah, which is wholly burnt. According to ben Azzai’s tradition, the olah is disqualified if it is slaughtered with the intent of it being a different sacrifice. The final line of the mishnah notes that ben Azzai added the olah to the pesah and hatat, but that the sages (whose opinion is found in mishnah one) did not agree with this tradition. Ben Azzai states that he received this tradition on the day that Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah was appointed a member of the yeshiva (academy). This seems to be a famous day in rabbinic recollection and there is a significant amount of aggadah concerning the background to this appointment. The most expansive version of this aggadah is found in Bavli Berakhot 27b, where Rabbi Elazar ben Azaryah is appointed head of the academy after Rabban Gamaliel is deposed. The historical accuracy of that legendary account is a bit suspect, but here in the Mishnah we can see that although we might not know exactly what happened that day, it was a memorable day, one which later rabbis used as a reference point." + ], + [ + "A pesah and a hatat which were slaughtered not in their own name, or he received [the blood], and carried it [to the altar] and sprinkled [it] not in their own name,
Or in their own name and not in their own name, or not in their own name and in their own name, they are disqualified.
What is the case of ‘in their own name and not in their own name’? In the name of it being a pesah [first] and [then] in the name of it being a shelamim.
‘Not in their own name and in their own name:’ in the name of a shelamim [first] and [then] in the name of a pesah.
For a sacrifice can be disqualified in [any one of] the four elements: slaughtering, receiving, carrying and sprinkling.
Rabbi Shimon declares it valid if carried [with the wrong intent], for Rabbi Shimon said: it is impossible [to have a valid sacrifice] without slaughtering, without receiving and without sprinkling, but it is possible without carrying. [How so]? One slaughters it at the side of the altar and sprinkles.
Rabbi Elazar says: if one goes where he needs to go, an [illegitimate] intention disqualifies [it]; where he doesn’t need to go, an [illegitimate] intention does not disqualify [it].
Section one: This section expands upon the halakhah that we learned in mishnah one, that a pesah or a hatat that were offered with the intent of their being a different sacrifice are disqualified. Here we learn two new halakhot. First of all, if any of the other essential parts of the sacrifice are done with the intent of the sacrifice being something else other than a pesah or a hatat, the sacrifice is invalid. The four essential elements of sacrifices are: slaughtering, receiving the blood, carrying it to the altar and sprinkling it on the altar.
Sections 2-4: The second new law we learn is that if one of these actions is done with the proper intent, but another of the actions is done with the improper intent, the sacrifice is invalid. The mishnah now illustrates this. If the sacrifice is supposed to be a pesah and it is first done in the name of it being a pesah and then later on the priest is confused and performs one of the later actions with the intent of it being a shelamim, the sacrifice is invalid. The same is true if at first he has the wrong intention and then when performing one of the later actions he has the correct intention. In either case the sacrifice is disqualified.
Section five: This supports what was stated above in section one any of the four essential aspects of the sacrifice can also serve as potential disqualifiers, if the intention is incorrect.
Section six: Rabbi Shimon disagrees with the statement in section five and holds that if the sacrifice’s blood is carried to the altar with the wrong intent, it is not disqualified because carrying is not essential to all sacrifices. Theoretically, one could slaughter a sacrifice right next to the altar and then sprinkle the blood without having to carry the blood from the point of slaughter to the altar.
Section seven: If the person is carrying the blood from the point at which he slaughtered it to the altar and while doing so he has the intention that it should be a different sacrifice, then the sacrifice is disqualified. However, if he slaughtered it next to the altar and received the blood in a vessel right there and then brought the blood elsewhere, an action that he did not need to do, and while carrying it he intended to offer it as another sacrifice, then the sacrifice is not disqualified, at least according to Rabbi Elazar. This carrying of the blood was unnecessary and therefore his intents at that moment do not factor into determining the validity of the sacrifice." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "All sacrifices whose blood was caught by a: non-priest, an onen, a tebul yom, one lacking [priestly] vestments, one lacking sacrificial atonement, one who had not washed his hands and feet, an uncircumcised [priest]; an unclean [priest]; one who was sitting, one who was standing on utensils or on an animal or on another’s feet, are disqualified.
If [the priest] caught [the blood] with his left hand, it is disqualified. Rabbi Shimon declares it valid.
If the blood was poured out on to the pavement and [the priest] collected it, it is disqualified.
If [the priest] put it [the blood] on the ramp [to the altar], [or on the altar, but] not against its base; if he applied [the blood] which should be applied below [the scarlet line] above [it] or that which should be applied above, below, or that which should be applied within [he applied] without, or that which should be applied without [he applied] within, it is invalid, but does not involve karet.
Section one: This is a list of people who cannot receive the blood of a sacrifice in a vessel, or carry it to the altar, or sprinkle it on the altar. Note that the mishnah does not say that these people cannot slaughter the animal. The laws regarding slaughtering the sacrifice are less strict. I shall explain each category one at a time:
Non-priest: only priests can perform these activities.
An onen: Someone who had one of their close relatives die is considered an onen on the day of the death.
A tebul yom: This is the word for an impure person who has immersed in a mikveh but before the end of the day (before the sun sets after he was made pure). See Leviticus 22:7. Believe it or not, there is an entire tractate in Seder Toharot devoted to this subject.
One lacking [priestly] vestments: A regular priest must wear four garments and the high priest must wear eight garments (see Yoma 7:5). Without the proper attire, the sacrifice is invalid.
One lacking sacrificial atonement: In certain cases, when one’s period of impurity is over he must bring a sacrifice. If the priest has not brought the required sacrifice, he cannot take part in the sacrificial worship.
One who had not washed his hands and feet: See Exodus 30:19.
An uncircumcised [priest]: See Ezekiel 44:9.
An unclean [priest]: one must be ritually pure to offer sacrifices.
One who was sitting, one who was standing on utensils or on an animal or on another’s feet, are disqualified: the sacrificial procedure must be performed while standing on the floor of the Temple’s courtyard, not sitting or standing on something else.
Section two: According to the first opinion, the blood must be caught in one’s right hand. Rabbi Shimon says it can be caught in the left hand.
Section three: The blood has a very specific place upon which it must be poured. It cannot be poured on the floor of the Temple, or on the ramp leading up to the Temple. It must be applied to the base of the altar. Sometimes the blood must be poured on the lower part of the base, which was separated by a crimson line from the upper part, and sometimes it must be poured on the upper part. The important thing is that the blood is poured on the part appropriate to that sacrifice. If it is not, the sacrifice is invalid. Similarly, sometimes the blood must be poured on the altar inside the Sanctuary (the Hekhal) or even within the Holy of Holies, and at other times it must be poured on the outer altar. What again is essential is that the blood of each sacrificed is poured on the altar upon which it is supposed to be poured. If it is not, the sacrifice is invalid.
Although this sacrifice is invalid, one who eats of its flesh is not liable for karet (a biblical penalty of great severity) unlike one who eats of one of the sacrifices disqualified in mishnah two or three. In those cases, when the animal was sacrificed with the wrong intent, eating its flesh was punished by the serious penalty of karet." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah begins to deal with the subject of a priest who slaughters a sacrifice with the intent of doing a subsequent activity at the wrong time or wrong place. The wrong intention disqualifies the sacrifice, but in different ways and with different consequences.", + "One who slaughters a sacrifice [intending]: To sprinkle its blood outside [the Temple] or part of its blood outside; To burn its innards or part of its innards outside; To eat its flesh or as much as an olive of its flesh outside, Or to eat as much as an olive of the skin of the fat-tail outside, It is invalid, but it does not involve karet. In all of the cases in this section, the priest sacrifices the animal with the intent of doing one of the activities outside of the Temple. I’m not sure why he would do this, but the message is clear the priest must realize that all of the following are done in the Temple. A) All of the blood that needs to be sprinkled must be sprinkled within the Temple. B) The innards that are burned on the altar must be entirely burned within the Temple. C) The flesh of certain sacrifices must be eaten within the Temple. D) If the priest has the intention of doing any of these steps outside of the Temple, the sacrifice is disqualified. However, the transgression is not punished by karet. The reason probably is that this specific problem, sacrificing it with the intent of doing something with it outside of the Temple, is not directly addressed by the Torah. As we shall see, this is contrasted with “piggul” found in the next section, which is punished by karet.", + "[One he slaughters a sacrifice intending]: To sprinkle its blood or part of its blood the next day, To burn its innards or part of its innards on the next day; To eat its flesh or as much as an olive of its flesh on the next day; Or to eat as much as an olive of the skin of its fat-tail on the next day, It is piggul, and involves kareth. In all of the cases here, the priest sacrifices the animal with the intent of doing something else with it after the time in which the animal must be eaten has expired. For some animals this is one day (until the next morning) and for some it is two days (until the morning after tomorrow). We shall discuss this issue more fully in chapter five. Here we learn that if the priest does any of the activities explained above with the intent of doing them after this time has expired, the animal is considered “piggul”, a word found in Leviticus 7:18. One who eats such a sacrifice is liable for karet, even if he eats it during the time when the sacrifice must be eaten. Note that this is a category different from “notar (remnant)” which is what the sacrifice is called if it is actually left over past the time when it must be eaten. This sacrifice is not actually “notar” rather it was sacrificed with the intent of making it notar. That is sufficient for it to be biblically prohibited." + ], + [ + "This is the general rule: anyone who slaughters or receives [the blood], or carries [it] or sprinkles [it] [intending] to eat as much as an olive of that which is normally eaten or to burn [on the altar] as much as an olive of that which is normally burned outside its prescribed place, [the sacrifice] is invalid, but it does not involve karet; [Intending to eat or burn] after its designated time, it is piggul and it involves karet. This is the general rule that explains the details in mishnah two. If while performing one of the four essential activities he had the intent to eat or burn part of the sacrifice outside of the place where it must be eaten or burned, the sacrifice is invalid, but one who eats it is not punished by karet. This is not the “piggul” referred to in the Torah. In contrast, if the priest has the intent of eating or burning its innards on the altar after the time in which it must be eaten or burned, the sacrifice is “piggul” and one who eats of it is liable for karet, as we explained in yesterday’s mishnah.", + "Provided that the mattir is offered in accordance with the law. The sprinkling of the blood onto the altar is what permits the sacrifice to be eaten. The word for “permit” in Hebrew is “mattir” so the blood is called the “mattir.” This section teaches that for the previous halakhot to hold true, the blood must have been properly sprinkled on the altar. This will be explained more fully in tomorrow’s mishnah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah explains the last line of yesterday’s mishnah.", + "How is the mattir offered in accordance with the law? If one slaughtered in silence, and received, or carried, or sprinkled, [intending to eat the sacrifice] after its designated time; Or if one slaughtered [intending to eat] after its designated time, and received, and carried and sprinkled in silence, or if one slaughtered, or received, or carried, or sprinkled [intending to eat] after its designated time. That is offering the mattir in accordance with the law. The case of a mattir offered in accordance with the law is a case in which one of the four activities was done with intent of eating it or burning it after it needs to be eaten or burned, and the rest of the activities were done correctly, meaning in silence. “Silence” means that the sacrifice was done without the improper intent. When one (or more of the activities were done with the intent of eating it after its designated time, and all of the other activities were done properly, then the sacrifice is piggul. The only improper element was the intent to eat it or burn its innards after its designated time.", + "How is the mattir not offered in accordance with the law? If one slaughtered [intending to eat] outside the designated place, [and] received, carried, and sprinkled [with the intention of eating] after its designated time; Or if one slaughtered [intending to eat] after its designated time, [and] received, carried, and sprinkled [intending to eat] outside its designated place, or if one slaughtered, received, carried, and sprinkled [intending to eat] outside its designated time. However, if while doing one of the activities he has the intention of eating or burning it outside its proper place and while doing another one he has the intention of eating it or burning it outside of its designated time, then the sacrifice is doubly invalid and one who eats it is not liable for karet. In other words, in order for it to be piggul it must be purely an error of improper time when improper place is mixed in, the sacrifice is still invalid, but one who eats it is not liable for karet.", + "If one slaughtered the pesah or the hatat for the sake of something else, and received, carried, and sprinkled [intending to eat them] after their designated time; Or if one slaughtered [them, intending to eat them] after their designated time, [and] received, carried, and sprinkled for the sake of something else, or if one slaughtered, received, carried, and sprinkled for the sake of something else; The pesah and hatat must be sacrificed with the intent of their being a pesah or hatat (see 1:1). If while performing one of these actions one has the intent of it being a different sacrifice (and thereby invalidates it) and then has the intent of eating or burning it after the proper time, the sacrifice does not become piggul because there was another improper intent mixed in with the intent of eating it at the wrong time.", + "If one slaughtered the pesah or the hatat for the sake of something else, and received, carried, and sprinkled [intending to eat them] after their designated time; Or if one slaughtered [them, intending to eat them] after their designated time, [and] received, carried, and sprinkled for the sake of something else, or if one slaughtered, received, carried, and sprinkled for the sake of something else; This summarizes the general rule for something to become piggul, the improper intent is only to eat or burn it at the wrong time. If there is some other improper intent, the sacrifice is not piggul." + ], + [ + "[If one intended] to eat as much as an olive on the next day [and] as much as an olive on the outside its intended place, [or] as much as an olive outside its designated place [and] as much as an olive on the next day; Half as much as an olive on the next day [and] half as much as an olive outside its designated place; Half as much as an olive on the next day [and] half as much as an olive outside its designated place, [The sacrifice] is unfit, and does not involve karet. The priest performs the sacrifice with the intention of first eating part of it on the wrong day, and then he has the intention of eating part of it outside its designated place, or vice versa. Alternatively, he has one type of improper intention with half of an olive’s worth of the sacrifice and then another type of improper intention with the other half. Note in all of these cases he has mixed between the two types of improper intention wrong time and wrong place. The sacrifice is invalid, because the two half-olives combine since they were both offered with the wrong intention. However, in none of the cases is there karet for eating the sacrifice because the penalty of karet is only for piggul, and for something to be piggul, the problematic intent must be solely that of eating it after its designated time. Having the intent of eating it in the wrong place takes it out of the category of karet.", + "Rabbi Judah said: this is the general rule: where the [improper] intention of time precedes the [improper] intention of place, [the sacrifice] is piggul, and involves karet; but if the [improper] intention of place precedes the [improper] intention of time, it is invalid and does not involve kareth. Rabbi Judah says that the order of the wrong intentions is critical. If the improper intention of time precedes the improper intention of place, then the sacrifice is piggul because the second improper intention does not affect the first improper intention. However, if the first improper intention is place and then he has an improper intention of time, the sacrifice is not piggul.", + "But the sages say: in both cases [the sacrifice] is invalid and does not involve karet. The sages, whose opinion is found in section one, say that the order doesn’t matter. For something to be piggul, the improper intention must have been only that of time.", + "[If one intends] to eat half as much as an olive [after its intended time or outside its intended place] [and] to burn half as much as an olive [similarly] it is valid, for eating and burning do not combine. In section one we learned that if one has one type of improper intention with one half of an olive’s worth of meat and the other type of improper intention with the other half, then the two half-olives’ worth of meat join together to prohibit the sacrifice. Here we learn that if the priest intends to eat one half of an olive’s worth at either the wrong time or place and burn another half of an olive’s worth at either the wrong time or place, the two half-olives do not join together to create a prohibition. While two types of wrong intention can join together, improper intentions to do different things, burn and eat, do not join together." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn chapter two mishnah one we learned that only a fit priest can receive the blood, carry it to the altar and sprinkle it on the altar. Today we learn that anyone can slaughter the animal.", + "All unfit persons who slaughtered, their slaughtering is valid, for slaughtering is valid [even when performed] by non-priests, and by women, and by slaves, and by the unclean, even in the case of most-holy sacrifices, provided that unclean [persons] do not touch the flesh. The first action in the process of sacrificing an animal can be performed by anyone, and not necessarily just a male priest. This is true for all sacrifices, even most holy sacrifices. There is one caveat if an unclean person slaughters the animal, they must not touch the flesh. The animal is not susceptible to uncleanness but once it has been slaughtered, its flesh is.", + "Therefore they invalidate [the sacrifice] by an [illegitimate] intention. Since anyone can slaughter the animal, if such a person has an illegitimate intention he/she invalidates the sacrifice. In other words, since they can perform these actions, the same rules apply to them as apply to priests when performing the other three actions.", + "And in all of these cases, if they received the blood [in order to eat the sacrifice] after the prescribed time, or outside of the prescribed place, if there remains [in the animal] life-blood, a fit person should go back and receive the blood. Those people listed in section one cannot receive the blood of the sacrificed animal. Therefore, if they do receive the blood and while doing so have an illegitimate intention, it does not automatically render the sacrifice invalid. If there is still blood flowing from the animal’s neck, the life-blood, then a valid priest can come and receive the blood and bring it to the altar and thereby preserve the validity of the sacrifice." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nIn chapter two, mishnah one we learned that only a fit priest can receive the blood, carry it to the altar and sprinkle it on the altar. Today we learn that anyone can slaughter the animal.", + "All unfit persons who slaughtered, their slaughtering is valid, for slaughtering is valid [even when performed] by non-priests, and by women, and by slaves, and by the unclean, even in the case of most-holy sacrifices, provided that unclean [persons] do not touch the flesh. The first action in the process of sacrificing an animal can be performed by anyone, and not just a fit priest. This is true for all sacrifices, even most-holy sacrifices such as the hatat and the asham. There is one caveat if an unclean person slaughters the animal, they must not touch the flesh. The animal is not susceptible to uncleanness but once it has been slaughtered, its flesh is.", + "Therefore they invalidate [the sacrifice] by an [illegitimate] intention. Since anyone can slaughter the animal, even people who are unfit to perform the other three actions, if such a person has an illegitimate intention while slaughtering, he/she invalidates the sacrifice. In other words, since they can perform these actions, the same rules apply to them as apply to fit priests when performing the other three actions.", + "And in all of these cases, if they received the blood [in order to eat the sacrifice] after the prescribed time, or outside of the prescribed place, if there remains [in the animal] life-blood, a fit person should go back and receive the blood. Those people listed in section one cannot receive the blood of the sacrificed animal. Therefore, if they do receive the blood and while doing so have an illegitimate intention, it does not automatically render the sacrifice invalid. If there is still blood flowing from the animal’s neck, the life-blood, then a valid priest can still receive the blood and bring it to the altar and thereby preserve the validity of the sacrifice." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn this mishnah we learn that at certain times a priest may perform one of the sacrificial actions in an invalid manner and yet may afterwards remedy the situation and thereby preserve the validity of the sacrifice.", + "If a fit person received [the blood] and gave [it] to an unfit person, he must return it to the fit one. A fit priest must receive the blood. Were an unfit person to receive it, the sacrifice would be rendered invalid. But if the fit priest receives the blood and then gives the vessel to an unfit person, the unfit person can give the vessel back to the fit priest and the sacrificial procedure can continue. The mere fact that an unfit person handled the vessel does not automatically render the sacrifice invalid.", + "If he received [the blood] in his right hand and transferred [it] to his left, he must return it to his right. As we learned in 2:1, all of the sacrificial actions must be performed with one’s right hand. If one received the blood with his right hand, but then transferred the vessel to his left, he can then transfer the vessel back to his right. This too has not rendered the entire procedure invalid.", + "If he received [it] in a sacred vessel and poured it into a secular [non-sacred] vessel, he must return it to the sacred vessel. The same structure works here. He must receive the blood with a sanctified vessel, but if he first receives it with a sanctified vessel and then pours it into a non-sacred vessel, all he has to do is pour the blood back into the sacred vessel and .", + "If he spilled it from the vessel on to the pavement and then collected it, it is fit. In 2:1 we learned that if the blood pours directly from the neck of the animal onto the floor and he doesn’t receive it in a vessel, the blood cannot be put back into the vessel. Here we learn that if the blood is first put into a sacred vessel, and then it spills onto the floor of the Temple, he can scoop it up and then use it to sprinkle on the altar.", + "If [the priest] applied it on the ascent [or on the altar], [but] not against [the altar’s] base; [or] if he applied what should be applied below [the scarlet line] above [it], or what should be applied above, below; or what should be applied within [he applied] without, or what should be applied without, within1 and life-blood is [still] available, a fit [priest] must receive [blood] anew. In all of these cases (these are the same cases mentioned in 2:1) the priest sprinkles the blood on the altar on a place where it should not be sprinkled. If he has no more life-blood then the sacrifice is not valid. But if he has other life-blood, he can go back, get the other life-blood and sprinkle that blood in the appropriate place." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah lists cases in which a person has an improper intention while sacrificing the animal but this improper intention does not render the sacrifice invalid.", + "If one slaughters the sacrifice [intending] to eat what is not normally eaten, or to burn [on the altar] what is not normally burned [outside of the time or place the sacrifice must be eaten or burned], it is valid; But Rabbi Eliezer invalidates [the sacrifice]. Normally, having an intention to eat or burn something outside of the place or time it should be eaten or burned will invalidate a sacrifice. However, here he intends to burn or eat something that is not normally burned or eaten. Therefore, this improper intention does not render the sacrifice invalid. Rabbi Eliezer disagrees and holds that an improper intention even concerning that which is not normally eaten or burned will still render the sacrifice invalid.", + "[If he slaughters it intending] to eat what is normally eaten and to burn what is normally burned [outside of the time or place the sacrifice must be eaten or burned], [but] less than the size of an olive, it is valid. Here his improper intention was to do the action with less than an olive’s worth of the sacrifice, and therefore the sacrifice is still valid.", + "To eat half as much as an olive and to burn half as much as an olive [outside of the time or place the sacrifice must be eaten or burned], it is valid, because [intentions concerning] eating and burning do not combine. As we learned in 2:5, improper intentions with regard to eating a sacrifice and burning a sacrifice do not join together to add up to the requisite olive’s worth. Therefore, the sacrifice is still valid." + ], + [ + "One who slaughters the sacrifice [intending] to eat as much as an olive of the skin, or of the juice, or of the jelly, or of the hardened meat, or of the bones, or of the tendons, or of the horns, or of the hoofs, either after time or out of bounds, it is valid, and one is not liable on their account in respect of piggul, remnant, or uncleanness. This mishnah teaches that if one has an improper intention to eat a part of the sacrifice that is not normally eaten, then that does not render the sacrifice invalid. In addition, one who eats any of these things from a sacrifice that was offered with an improper intention has not transgressed the prohibition of “piggul.” If the sacrifice was “remnant,” meaning it was left over beyond the time in which it must be eaten, then one who eats these parts has not transgressed the prohibition of eating remnant. Finally, if these parts become impure or he is impure and he eats them, he has not transgressed the prohibition of eating impure sacrifices, or eating pure sacrifice while impure (see Leviticus 7:19-20). In short, when it comes to sacrificial eating laws, these parts of the animal do not count as “meat.”" + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with offspring, eggs and milk and their status vis a vis the sacrifice as a whole.", + "If one slaughters sacred animals [intending] to eat the fetus or the afterbirth outside [of the place or time where the animal must be eaten], he does not render it piggul. The fetus and the afterbirth are not considered integral parts of the sacrificial animal. Therefore, if one slaughters an animal with an improper intention concerning eating its fetus or afterbirth the sacrifice is not rendered invalid.", + "If one plucks off [the necks of] doves, [intending] to eat their eggs outside [of the place or time where the animal must be eaten], he does not render [them] piggul. Birds are slaughtered by having their heads plucked off. We will learn about this more later. Our mishnah teaches that if one has an improper intention concerning eating the eggs, this does not render the sacrifice invalid. The eggs are not part of the bird.", + "The milk of sacred animals or the eggs of doves one is not liable for eating them in respect of piggul, remnant, or uncleanness. The milk of a mammal and the eggs of a bird are not considered part of the animal in respect of sacrificial laws. Therefore, the laws of piggul, remnant and uncleanness do not apply to them see yesterday’s mishnah for a discussion of these three laws." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn this mishnah we learn that usually only two types of illegitimate intentions can invalidate a sacrifice the intention of eating it outside the prescribed place of after the prescribed time. Other illegitimate intentions do not render the sacrifice invalid.", + "If he slaughtered it with the intention of leaving its blood or its innards for the next day, or of carrying them outside of their place: Rabbi Judah disqualifies [it], But the sages declare it valid. The person sacrificing had the intention of leaving the blood or the innards that must be burned on the altar for the next day, but he was not thinking that he would sprinkle the blood on the next day or burn the innards on the next day. Alternatively, he had the intention of taking the blood or innards to a place outside of where they must be spilled or burned, but not of offering them up there. According to Rabbi Judah this is sufficient to disqualify the sacrifice. Just as leaving them over for the next day or taking them out of their prescribed place disqualifies them, so too does thinking about doing such a thing. The rabbis however disagree. Since he did not have the intention of burning or eating after the prescribed time or outside the prescribed place, the sacrifice is not invalid.", + "[If he slaughtered it] with the intention of sprinkling [the blood] on the ascent, [or on the altar] but not against its base; or of applying below [the scarlet line] what should be applied above, or above what should be applied below, or without what should be applied within, or within what should be applied without; The mishnah now brings a long list of cases where a person has the intention of doing an action that will render the sacrifice invalid, but his intention is not to burn or eat the sacrifice after the prescribed time or outside the prescribed place. Section seven will state that in only of these cases the sacrifice is valid. The first list is the same as that found in 2:1 spilling the blood in the wrong place.", + "[Or with the intention] that unclean [persons] should eat it, [or] that unclean [priests] should offer it; The second wrong intention is giving it to an impure person, who cannot eat sacrificial meat.", + "[Or] that uncircumcised [persons] should eat it, [or] that uncircumcised persons should offer it; Uncircumcised men cannot eat sacrifices.", + "[Or with the intention] of breaking the bones of the pesah, or eating of it before it is roasted; The bones of the pesah cannot be broken and it must be eaten wholly roasted. See Exodus 12:9, 46.", + "Or of mingling its blood with the blood of invalid [sacrifices]; If the blood of a valid sacrifice is mixed with the blood of an invalid sacrifice, the sacrifice cannot be eaten.", + "[In all of these cases] it is valid, because an [illegitimate] intention does not disqualify [a sacrifice] except when it refers to after its time or outside its prescribed place, and [in the case of] a pesah and a hatat, [the intention to slaughter them] for the sake of their being a different sacrifice. In all of these cases the sacrifice is valid because his improper intention was not connected with eating or burning it outside the prescribed place or after the prescribed time, the improper intention that does render a sacrifice invalid. The only other improper intention that can render a sacrifice invalid is if the sacrifice is a pesah or a hatat and the person offering it sacrifices it thinking that they are other sacrifices (see 1:4)." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Bet Shammai says: any [blood] which is to be sprinkled on the outer altar, if [the priest] applied [it] with one sprinkling, he has made atonement, [and in the case of a hatat two applications, but Bet Hillel says: also the case of the hatat if the priest applied it with one sprinkling it atones When it comes to sacrifices offered on the outer altar, some require four sprinklings of blood, some two and some one (we will learn more about this in chapter five). Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel agree that for most of these sacrifices if he sprinkled the blood only one time atonement has been effected. They disagree with regard to the hatat. To Bet Shammai the hatat doesn’t atone without two applications of the blood, whereas Bet Hillel holds that one application is sufficient.", + "Therefore if he made the first application in the proper manner and the second [with the intention to eat the flesh] after the prescribed time, it atones. The previous section was all just an introduction. The consequence of this rule (that one application of blood is sufficient to atone, and for Bet Shammai two in the case of the hatat) is that if he made the first application of blood in a proper manner and the second with an improper intention, the sacrifice effects atonement and is valid. The second application was put on the altar after atonement had already been effected by the first application, and therefore it does not render the sacrifice invalid.", + "If he made the first application [with the intention to eat the flesh] after the prescribed time and the second outside the prescribed place, it is piggul and involves [the punishment of] karet. Again, we see here that the second application does not affect the status of the sacrifice. Thus if the first application was done with the intent of eating the sacrifice after the prescribed time, the sacrifice is piggul, and the fact that while sprinkling the blood for a second time he had a different improper intention does not matter. Concerning which improper intention causes the sacrifice to be piggul and is punished by karet, see 2:4-5." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to discuss the effect of improper intentions had when sprinkling the blood.", + "With regard to any [blood] which is sprinkled on the inner altar, if [the priest] omitted one of the applications, he has not atoned; therefore if he applied all in the proper manner but one in an improper manner, it [the sacrifice] is invalid, but does not involve karet. When it comes to sacrifices whose blood must be spilled on the altar inside the sanctuary (the golden altar), all of the sprinklings must be applied and if any one is skipped atonement is not effected. This differs from those sacrifices whose blood is spilled on the outer altar (see yesterday’s mishnah). Since all of the applications of the blood are mandatory, if any one of them is done with the wrong intention, the sacrifice is invalid. However, the sacrifice is not piggul and one who eats it is not obligated for karet unless all of the applications were done with the improper intent. If any one of the mandatory applications was done with the correct intent, the sacrifice is not piggul, although it cannot be eaten." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nAs we have learned, piggul is something that was sacrificed with the intent of eating or burning it outside of its appropriate time. In today’s mishnah we learn that certain items are not liable for piggul, meaning that if one eats or burns these items he cannot be liable for having eaten piggul (although they may nevertheless be prohibited for other reasons).\nThe general rule concerning when one is liable for piggul and when one is exempt is found at the end of the mishnah. Piggul is only applicable to an item if something else permits that item to be eaten or burned. For instance, the flesh of a sacrifice can be eaten once its blood has been sprinkled on the altar. Therefore, if one eats the flesh after the sacrifice was offered with improper intent, he has transgressed the violation of piggul. Some items “permit themselves” and to these items, piggul does not apply.", + "These are the things for which one is not liable on account of piggul:
The fistful, The “fistful” is the fistful of flour that the priest puts on the altar from the minhah, or meal-offering. If he grabs this fistful with the intent of eating it outside the proper time, or of burning it outside of its time, the minhah offering is piggul. However, one who eats the fistful taken from the minhah offering has not transgressed piggul for the fistful permits the minhah to be eaten, but the fistful permits itself, and one who eats something that permits itself has not violated piggul.", + "The incense, The incense that is put on the altar with the “fistful” (see Leviticus 2:2). The same rules that apply to the fistful apply to it as well.", + "The frankincense, The frankincense offering referred to in Exodus 30:7-8. The case here is one in which a person, while bringing the frankincense to the altar to turn it into smoke thought that he would burn it on the next day. One who then eats such frankincense, has not transgressed piggul.", + "The priests’ meal-offering, The priests’ entire minhnah offering is burned on the altar (Leviticus 6:16). There is no fistful taken from it that permits it to be eaten or burned. Therefore, it “permits itself” and the laws of piggul do not apply.", + "The anointed priest's meal-offering, The high priest would bring a minhah offering everyday (Leviticus 6:15). It too is entirely burned.", + "The minhah with libation This refers to a minhah offering that a person volunteers to bring (Numbers 15:2ff).", + "The blood, The blood permits the sacrifice to be eaten, but nothing permits it. One who eats this blood is liable for eating blood, but not for the violation of piggul.", + "The libations that are brought separately, the words of Rabbi Meir. The sages say: also those that are brought with an animal [sacrifice]. This refers to a minhah brought with a libation but not with an accompanying animal sacrifice, for the sacrifice was offered on the previous day. According to Rabbi Meir, this minhah permits itself and does not permit the sacrifice (the blood permits the sacrifice). Therefore, in such a case, the minhah is not piggul, even if the animal was. However, according to Rabbi Meir, if the minhah was brought with the animal sacrifice, and the animal becomes piggul (offered with improper intent), then the minhah also becomes piggul. The other rabbis disagree and hold that the minhah offering cannot become piggul even when it accompanies an animal sacrifice. The minhah offering is independent from the animal offering and even if the animal becomes piggul, the minhah does not.", + "The log of oil brought by the metzora: Rabbi Shimon says: one is not liable on account of piggul; But Rabbi Meir says: one is liable on account of piggul, See Leviticus 14:10. This log (a measure) of oil is offered by the metzora (one who had some type of skin disease) upon becoming pure. It accompanies an asham sacrifice. According to Rabbi Shimon, if the asham becomes piggul, the oil does not because the sacrifice does not “permit” the oil, rather the oil permits itself. Rabbi Meir holds that the asham does permit the oil to be put on the ear and thumb/big toe of the metzora and therefore it is something that other things permit and it can become piggul. If the sacrifice is offered with the wrong intent, then the oil becomes piggul and one who eats it would be liable.", + "because the blood of the asham makes it permitted and whatever has something else that makes it permitted, whether for man or for the altar, one is liable on its account for piggul. This is the general rule that underlies the entire mishnah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses what permits the parts of various sacrifices to be burned or eaten. The importance of this is that if one has an improper intent while performing an action with the blood that permits this sacrifice to be eaten or burned, then the sacrifice is piggul and one who eats it is liable for karet (if the improper intent was to eat or burn it after the time in which it must be eaten or burned).", + "[The sprinkling of] the blood of the olah permits its flesh for [burning on] the altar, and its skin to the priests. Once the blood of the olah sacrifice has been sprinkled on the altar, its flesh can be burned on the altar and the skin goes to the priests. Thus, if one has an improper intent while sprinkling the blood, the olah is piggul.", + "[The sprinkling of] the blood of the olah of a bird permits its flesh to the altar. The same holds true for the bird olah, except that in this case the skin is also burned (what would the priests do with the skin of a dove?).", + "[The sprinkling of] the blood of the hatat of a bird permits its flesh to the priests. A hatat bird can be eaten by the priests, once its blood has been sprinkled.", + "[The sprinkling of] the blood of the bullocks that are burned and the goats that are burned permits their innards to be offered [on the altar]. Rabbi Shimon said: whatever is not [sprinkled] on the outer altar, as in the case of shelamim, one is not liable for it on account of piggul. There are three types of bullocks referred to here: 1) The bullock offered on Yom Kippur; 2) the bullock offered by a high priest for issuing a mistaken instruction; 3) the bullock offered by the court that makes a mistaken instruction. There are two types of goats that are referred to here: 1) The goat offered on Yom Kippur; 2) The goat offered by a court for making a mistaken instruction concerning a law related to idol worship. In all of these cases the blood is sprinkled on the inner altar, their flesh is burned and their innards are burned on the altar. Therefore, if one has an improper intent while sprinkling the blood, the flesh is piggul. Rabbi Shimon disagrees and holds that in these cases, since the blood is not sprinkled on the outer altar, as is the case in shelamim concerning which the laws concerning piggul were written (Leviticus 7:18), the laws of piggul don’t apply. So in this case, even if he has an improper thought, the flesh is not piggul." + ], + [ + "The sacrifices of non-Jews: one is not liable on their account for piggul, remnant, or defilement, and if [a priest] slaughters them outside [the Temple], he is not liable, the words of Rabbi Meir. But Rabbi Yose declares him liable.
The things for which one is not liable on account of piggul, one is liable on account of remnant and defilement except blood.
Rabbi Shimon declares one liable for anything which is normally eaten, but for wood, frankincense and incense, one is not liable for [transgressions involving] defilement.
Section one: Non-Jews may bring sacrifices to the Temple, and this probably was not altogether an uncommon occurrence in the Second Temple period. Rabbi Meir says that the laws concerning piggul, remnant, defilement and the prohibition of slaughtering a sacrifice outside of the Temple do not apply to these sacrifices. What this means is that if someone has an improper intent while offering this sacrifice, and then someone eats the meat, the one who ate the meat is not liable for karet, as he would be had the sacrifice been brought by a Jew. The same holds true if the sacrifice is left over, or if someone eats it while impure. While doing so is prohibited, one who does so is not liable for karet, according to Rabbi Meir.
Rabbi Yose says that the same laws that govern sacrifices brought by Jews also govern sacrifices brought by non-Jews and that one who eats from such a sacrifice would be liable for karet.
Section two: This section refers to the list found in mishnah three above. For all of those things, while the laws of piggul don’t apply, the laws of remnant and defilement do apply. Thus if one eats one of them after the time has elapsed, he is liable for transgressing the laws of remnant, and if one eats one of them while impure, he has violated the prohibition of eating holy things while impure. The one exception is blood one who eats blood has violated the prohibition of eating blood, but he has not violated other prohibitions.
Rabbi Shimon disagrees and holds that for anything that is normally eaten, one can violate the prohibitions of eating it while defiled. This would apply to the fistful of the minhah offering, the priests’ minhah offering and other edible things found in the list in mishnah three. However, if one eats or burns inedible things, such as wood or incense, while impure, he is not liable. The sages disagree and hold that he is liable for violating the prohibition of impurity in such cases as well." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nWhen a priest offers a sacrifice, he must have six things in mind while doing so. Our mishnah teaches what these six things are.", + "The sacrifice is slaughtered for the sake of six things:
For the sake of the sacrifice, The priest must have in mind what type of sacrifice is being offered, for instance an olah must be offered with the intent that it be an olah, and not a shelamim.", + "For the sake of the sacrificer, The priest must have in mind the person who is bringing the sacrifice. In other words, he must intend that the sacrifice should “count” for that person.", + "For the sake of the [Divine] Name, The priest must have in mind that the sacrifice is for God (our God, of course) and not for some other god, or any other entity one could think of.", + "For the sake of fire-offerings, When sacrificing the priest has to have in mind that it will be burned on the altar, and not that it will merely be burned.", + "For the sake of fragrance, The sacrifice must be offered with the intent to produce a fragrance for God, as it says in Leviticus 1:9, “an olah, a fire-offering of pleasing fragrance.”", + "For the sake of pleasing; The final word (in Hebrew) of the above-verse is “pleasing.” The priest must have in mind that the sacrifice be pleasing to God.", + "And a hatat and an asham for the sake of sin. A hatat and an asham come to atone for sins. They must be offered with the sake that they atone for the sin that they are intended to atone for.", + "Rabbi Yose said: even if one did not have any of these purposes in his heart, it is valid, because it is a regulation of the court. According to Rabbi Yose, even if the priest did not have any of these intentions, the sacrifice is still valid. This is because the court stipulates that any sacrifice done without one of these intentions (but not with an improper intention) is valid.", + "Since the intention is determined only by the worshipper. This line explains the entire mishnah. The intent of the worshipper, meaning the priest, is what is determinative of the sacrifice, and not the intent of the owner of the sacrifice. If the worshipper had these six things in mind when offering the sacrifice, the sacrifice is valid even if the owner had an intent that would disqualify the sacrifice." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThe fifth chapter of Zevahim is a well-known chapter of Mishnah, at least in traditional circles, because it is recited every morning before Shacharit, the morning prayer service. The chapter describes how the sacrifices were offered, where in the Temple, how many times the blood was sprinkled on the altar, and other various issues. The reason why this chapter was recited every morning was that its recitation was meant to take the place of the sacrifices which could no longer be offered after the Temple was destroyed.", + "Which is the place [for the offering] of the sacrifices?
Most holy sacrifices are slaughtered on the north [side of the altar]. This is a general clause that will be further expanded henceforth through mishnah five. The three most holy sacrifices are the hatat, the asham and the olah.", + "The bullock and the goat of Yom Kippur are [done] at the north, and the receiving of their blood is [performed] with ministering vessels at the north, and their blood requires sprinkling between the poles [of the ark], on the curtain, and on the golden altar. These sacrifices are mentioned in Leviticus 16, the chapter that is read in the synagogue on Yom Kippur. The section gives basic instructions as to where these two sacrifices are offered and where their blood must be sprinkled. When sprinkling the blood the high priest would stand between the poles of the ark and sprinkle the blood on the poles, on the veil in the sanctuary and on the golden altar which also stood in the sanctuary. For more detailed information, see Yoma 5:3-6.", + "[The omission of] a single application of [the blood] invalidates [them]. Every application of the blood must be executed and the omission of a single one of them invalidates these two sacrifices.", + "He [the priest] would pour out the remainders of the blood on the western base of the outer altar, but if he did not pour it out, he did not invalidate [the sacrifice]. The mishnah instructs the priest to pour the blood out on the base of the altar. If he doesn’t do so, or doesn’t do so in a proper manner, the sacrifice is still valid." + ], + [ + "As for the bullocks which were burnt and the goats which were burnt, their slaughtering is [done] at the north, and the reception of their blood is [done] at the north, and their blood requires sprinkling on the veil, and on the golden altar;
[The omission of] a single one of these applications invalidates [the sacrifice].
He [the priest] pours the remainder of the blood on the western base of the altar; but if he did not pour it out, he did not invalidate [the sacrifice].
Both of these were burnt at the ash pit.
This mishnah deals with two sacrifices: the bullocks and the goats that were wholly-burned. These sacrifices were explained above in chapter four, mishnah four.
As far as how they were sacrificed, these sacrifices, both of which are an olah, are treated basically the same as the two sacrifices discussed in yesterday’s mishnah.
Sections one-three: For an explanation, see yesterday’s mishnah. The one difference between these two sacrifices and the Yom Kippur sacrifices in yesterday’s mishnah are that those mentioned in today’s mishnah do not require sprinkling the blood on the altar.
Section four: All of the sacrifices mentioned in this mishnah and in yesterday’s are burned at the ash pit, outside of the camp of Israel, a place mentioned in Leviticus 6:4." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah provides instruction concerning the sacrifice of the hatat.", + "[Concerning] public and private hatats: (These are the public hatats: the goats of new moons and The mishnah notes that the discussion here is concerning both the public and the private hatat. In a parenthetical remark, the mishnah lists the public hatats, meaning those offered on behalf of the entire people of Israel. These include the goats offered on Rosh Hodesh (the new moons) and festivals. These are listed in Numbers 28: 15ff.", + "They are slaughtered in the north, and their blood is received in ministering vessels in the north, and their blood requires four applications on the four corners [of the altar]. The hatat, like all most holy sacrifices, is slaughtered on the north side of the altar. Its blood is then received in ministering vessels. The blood of the hatat is spilled on all four corners (or horns, the word is the same in Hebrew) of the altar that stands outside in the Temple courtyard.", + "How was it done? He went up the ascent, turned to the surrounding walkway, and came to the south-east corner, then the north-east, then the north-west, and then the south-west. The priest would ascend the altar on the ascent, and arrive at a walkway that surrounds the altar, known as the “sovev” in Hebrew. The ascent begins on the southern side of the altar, and the priest would first arrive at the southeastern corner. He would then walk north to the northeastern corner, then west to the northwestern corner, and finish at the southwestern corner.", + "He would pour the residue of the blood out at the southern base. The residues of the blood would be poured out on the southern base to the altar.", + "They were eaten within the hangings [of the Tabernacle], by male priests, prepared in any fashion, the same day and night, until midnight. The hatat must be eaten within the Temple confines. The mishnah expresses this by referring to the Tabernacle, and the hangings that enclosed it. When it comes to the Temple, the hatat must be eaten within the walls of the Temple courtyard. Any priest can eat the hatat. The priests can prepare the hatat in any manner they like. This distinguishes it from the pesah sacrifice, which must be roasted. The hatat must be eaten on the day that it is sacrificed and the remainder of the night, up until midnight. The next morning it will become remnant, and anyone who eats it will be liable for karet. See Leviticus 7:15, and Mishnah Berakhot 1:1." + ], + [ + "The olah is a most holy sacrifice.
It is slaughtered in the north, and its blood is received in a ministering vessel in the north; and its blood requires two applications, which are four.
It had to be flayed, dismembered, and completely consumed by the fire.
Today’s mishnah discusses the olah, the second of the three “most holy sacrifices.”
Section two: The olah, like the hatat and the asham, the other two most holy sacrifices, must be slaughtered on the north side of the altar. Its blood must be received in a ministering vessel. The priest then takes the blood and while standing on the floor of the Temple (and not on the walkway) he applies two blood applications. Both are on the lower part of the altar, the first on the northeastern corner and the other on the southwestern corner, thus causing the blood to spread in all four directions (see Leviticus 1:5). This is how two applications of blood can be considered four.
Section three: After the blood has been applied to the altar, the animal is flayed, dismembered and then all of its parts are burnt completely on the altar (see Leviticus 1:6-9). In English this is called the “wholly burned sacrifice.”" + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah teaches details concerning the asham and the public shelamim sacrifices.", + "The shelamim of the public and the ashams: This mishnah will deal mostly with different types of ashams, but it also deals with the shelamim offering of the public, which consists of two sheep offered on behalf of the entire congregation of Israel on Shavuot. See Leviticus 23:19. Other types of shelamim have different rules and we shall deal with them below in mishnah seven.", + "These are the[different types of] ashams: The asham for robbery; The asham or illegal use of holy property; The asham for a betrothed maidservant; A nazirite's asham; A leper's asham; And the suspended asham. There are six different types of ashams. I shall briefly explain each one and provide biblical reference: The asham for robbery: This is brought by one who swore that he had not stolen something, and then confessed to his crime. See Leviticus 5:25 and Mishnah Shevuot 5:1. The asham for illegal use of holy property: Someone who makes personal use of holy property, such as something that was dedicated to the Temple, must bring an asham to atone for his sin. See Leviticus 5:15. For a betrothed maidservant: This is brought by a man who sleeps with a maidservant betrothed to another man. See Leviticus 19:20-21. We will deal more extensively with this passage when we get to tractate Keritot 2:5. A nazirite's asham: Brought by a nazirite who had come into contact with a dead body. See Numbers 6:12. A leper's asham: Brought by the leper (one with some sort of skin affliction) when he has recovered from his disease. See Leviticus 14:12. And the suspended asham: This is brought by a person who is not sure if he transgressed a prohibition for which a hatat is usually brought. He would bring this asham and then if he found out later that he had sinned, he would have to bring a hatat. In that sense this asham “suspends” for the punishment is suspended until it is determined whether a transgression has been committed. See Leviticus 5:17-18.", + "These are slaughtered in the north, and their blood is received in a service vessel in the north, and their blood requires two sprinklings, which constitute four. The rules here are the same as those concerning the sprinkling of the blood of the olah above in mishnah four.", + "And they are eaten within the curtains [of the Tabernacle], by male priests, prepared in any manner, the same day and night, until midnight. These sacrifices can be eaten. The same rules that applied to the hatat (see mishnah three) apply to the asham and to the public shelamim." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with the todah, or thanksgiving offering (Leviticus 7:11 ff.) and the ram brought by the nazirite upon the completion of his naziriteship.", + "The todah and the nazirite's ram are sacrifices of lesser sanctity. Both of these sacrifices are of lesser sanctity, and this will be expressed in some of the halakhot which we will see below. These halakhot are more lenient than those governing the most holy sacrifices which we dealt with above.", + "They are slaughtered anywhere in the Temple Court, and their blood requires two sprinklings, which constitute four; Unlike sacrifices of most holy sanctity, which must be slaughtered north of the altar, these sacrifices can be slaughtered anywhere in the Temple courtyard. The blood is sprinkled on the altar in the same way as was done for the olah (see mishnah four).", + "And they are eaten in any part of the city, by any person, prepared in any manner, the same day and the night following, until midnight. Most holy sacrifices must be eaten within the walls of the Temple (or the curtains of the Tabernacle when the Israelites were in the desert). Lesser holy sacrifices can be eaten anywhere within the walls of the city of Jerusalem. Anyone can eat them, not just priests. These two sacrifices can be prepared in any manner and must be eaten by midnight of the night following their offering (like the hatat in mishnah three).", + "The parts of them which are raised are governed by the same law, save that these are eaten [only] by the priests, their wives, their children and their slaves. The breast and the thigh are raised from these sacrifices and given to the priests (see Leviticus 7:34). All of the rules that apply to the rest of the sacrifice apply to these two parts, except that these can only be eaten by priests and their households (wives, children and slaves). They can be eaten anywhere in Jerusalem, prepared in any manner and until midnight." + ], + [ + "The shelamim is a sacrifice of lesser sanctity.
It may be slaughtered in any part of the Temple court, and its blood requires two sprinklings, which constitute four.
And they are eaten in any part of the city, by any person, prepared in any way, during two days and one night.
The parts of them which are raised are governed by the same law, save that these are eaten [only] by the priests, their wives, their children and their slaves.
Section two: The same rules that governed the slaughtering of the todah in yesterday’s mishnah.
Section three: The difference between the shelamim and the todah is that the shelamim can be eaten for longer. They can be eaten on the day that they are sacrificed, on the entire following night and on the following day. See Leviticus 7:16-17.
Section four: The same rule as we saw in yesterday’s mishnah regarding the todah." + ], + [ + "The first-born animal, tithe and the pesah are sacrifices of lesser sanctity.
They are slaughtered in any part of the Temple court, and their blood requires one sprinkling, provided that he applies it against the base [of the altar].
They differ in the [rules governing] their eating:
The first-born animal is eaten by priests [only], the tithe is eaten by anyone and they can be eaten in any part of the city, prepared in any manner, during two days and one night.
The pesah can be eaten only at night, only until midnight, and it can be eaten only by those registered for it, and it can be eaten only when roasted.
The last mishnah of our chapter is concerned with the three remaining sacrifices of lower sanctity the first-born animal, the tithe and the pesah.
Section two: These sacrifices require only one sprinkling of blood. This is derived from the fact that Numbers 18:17 says concerning the first-born animal, “and the blood you shall sprinkle on the altar” and it doesn’t say “around the altar” as it says regarding other sacrifices. This one sprinkling must be applied a section of the altar that has a base. There was no base (Hebrew: yesod) to the altar on the east or south sides, so this blood sprinkling had to be done on the north or west sides.
Section three: The rules concerning eating these three sacrifices differ, and therefore each must be discussed individually.
Section four: The first-born is given to the priests and can be eaten only by them (and also their households). These are the same rules that govern the breast and thigh of other sacrifices. See Numbers 18:18. In contrast, the tithe can be eaten by anyone.
Both of these sacrifices can be eaten anywhere in Jerusalem. They can be prepared in any manner and they can be eaten with the same time limitations as the shelamim, meaning the day they are slaughtered, the night that follows and the entire following day.
Section five: The pesah is different in many ways. First of all, it can be eaten only on the night following the day on which it was slaughtered (see Exodus 12:8). This is the night on which we now observe the seder. That night it can only be eaten until midnight. We should note that there was some debate among the rabbis concerning this see Pesahim 10:9. Some rabbis held that it could be eaten until the following morning, but that one should try to eat it before midnight. In order for a person to eat a pesah he had to be registered for it. What this means is that before it is slaughtered the people who intend to eat it must inform the slaughterer of their intention. A person could not register for two pesah sacrifices. Finally, the pesah must be fully roasted it can’t be boiled or cooked using any water." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Most holy sacrifices which were slaughtered on the top of the altar: Rabbi Yose says: it is as though they were slaughtered in the north. Rabbi Yose son of Rabb Judah says: from the middle of the altar southward is as south, from the middle of the altar northward is as the north. We already learned in the previous chapter that most-holy sacrifices (the olah, hatat and asham) are slaughtered north of the altar. Our mishnah discusses what happens if the priest slaughters one of these sacrifices on top of the altar. According to Rabbi Yose this is sufficient to validate the sacrifice, since the top of the altar counts as the north of the altar. Rabbi Yose the son of Rabbi Judah divides the altar in half if the sacrifice was slaughtered on the northern half, then it is valid, but if on the southern half it is not valid.", + "The fistfuls of meal-offerings were taken in any part of the Temple court, and they [the minhah-offerings] were eaten within the curtains, by male priests, prepared in any manner, on the same day and night, until midnight. The mishnah has now completed the topic of animal sacrifices and is moving on to other things that are offered in the Temple. Out of minhah offerings (grain) are removed fistfuls of flour and they are burned on the altar (see Leviticus 2:1-3). The removal of the fistful from the minhah can be done anywhere in the Temple court, and not just on the northern side of the altar. The minhah itself (not the fistful) is eaten by male priests (and not their households) within the Temple confines. It can be cooked in any manner, but it must be eaten by midnight of the day it was brought." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah begins to deal with bird offerings. There are two types of bird offerings: the hatat and the olah.", + "The hatat of a bird was sacrificed by the southwest horn [of the altar]. The sacrifice of a bird consists of plucking off its head and then sprinkling its blood on the altar. These were both done on the southwest horn (or corner) of the altar.", + "It is valid [if done] in any place, but this was its [particular] place. The mishnah notes that this is where the bird hatat was supposed to be done, but it didn’t have to be done there. If it was done elsewhere it is still valid.", + "That horn served for three things below, and three things above: Below: for the hatat of the bird, For the presenting [of meal-offerings]. And for the residue of the blood. There were six sacrificial actions performed on this corner of the altar, three of which were performed above the crimson line in the middle of the altar and three below. The bird hatat, the main topic of our mishnah, was performed below the line. The minhah (meal) offerings were presented, meaning drawn near, to the altar, at this corner, below the line. Also, the residue of the blood from animal sacrifices was poured out on the southern base (yesod) at this corner (see above 5:3).", + "Above: for the pouring out of wine and water, and for the olah of a bird when there was too much on the east. There were three actions above the line at this corner. The first two are the libations, liquids poured out onto the altar. There are two such libations. The water libation which occurs only on Sukkot (see Sukkah 4:9) and the wine libation, which was done frequently as an accompaniment to animal sacrifices. In addition, usually the bird olah was done on the southeastern corner of the altar. But if there were too many bird olahs and the southeastern corner became busy, they would offer the extra on the southwestern corner." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to deal with the three offerings mentioned at the end of yesterday’s mishnah the water and wine libations and the extra bird olahs.", + "All who ascended the altar, ascended by the right, then they went round [the altar] and descended by the left, except for these three, who ascended and descended by retracing their steps. The ramp was on the southern side of the altar. Usually a priest would ascend the southern side of the altar and then walk around to the right of the altar, its eastern side, and then turn towards the left, or western side of the altar and make his way back down. In other words, he would arrive at the southeastern corner first and the southwestern corner last. For things done on the southwestern corner, the priest did not have to circle the entire altar. Rather, he could just go up the left side, immediately arrive at the southwestern corner, and when done come right back. Perhaps this was a traffic-saving device, meant to prevent too many priests from having to circle the entire altar. The problem would be that priests would be walking in opposite directions, but I guess they somehow managed that problem." + ], + [ + "How was the hatat of a bird sacrificed?
He pinches off its head behind its neck, but he did not sever it.
And he would sprinkle its blood on the wall of the altar.
The residue of the blood was drained out on the base.
Only the blood belonged to the altar, while the rest of it belonged to the priests.
Our mishnah continues to provide instructions as to how the bird hatat was sacrificed.
Section one: Birds are not slaughtered to be sacrifices in the same way that birds are slaughtered to be eaten. To make a bird kosher, the shochet slices its neck, the same way that he does for an animal. But for sacrificing, the priest pinches off its head off with his thumbnail from the back of the bird’s neck. See Leviticus 5:8-9. He does not sever the head entirely from the body, just separates it by pinching it off.
Sections two-three: After pinching off its head, he sprinkles the blood out of the bird onto the wall of the altar. Note that its blood is not received in a ministering vessel. The residue of the blood is squeezed out of the bird onto the base of the altar.
Section four: The rest of the bird was eaten by priests only the blood was put on the altar." + ], + [ + "How was the olah of a bird sacrificed?
He [the priest] ascended the ramp, and turned to the surrounding walkway, and made his way to the southeast horn.
There he pinched its head at the back of the neck, and severed it, and drained out its blood on the wall of the altar.
He took the head, turned the part where it was nipped to the altar, saturated it with salt, and threw it on to the fires [of the altar].
Then he came to the body, and removed the crop, the feathers, and the entrails that came out of it, and threw them on to the burning place. He tore [the body], but did not sever it in half, but if he did sever it, it is still valid. Then he saturated it [the body] with salt, and threw it on to the fires of the altar.
This mishnah provides instructions as to how the bird olah was sacrificed. Some of this mishnah does not need explanation, so I have commented only upon the sections that I felt require it.
Section three: After having slaughtered the bird by pinching its head off at the back of the neck, the priest severs the head off of the body (see Leviticus 1:15-17).
Section four: The first thing he takes care of is the head. He drains its blood by turning the point at which it was pinched toward the altar. Then he salts it very well until it is saturated (see Leviticus 2:13). After it has been salted, he can throw the head onto the altar so it can be burned.
Section five: Now he must take care of the body. He removes the parts that are not to be offered on the altar (Leviticus 1:16), the crop, the feathers and the entrails and then he throws them on the “Bet Hamoked”, the burning place where parts of animals that are not burned on the altar are burned. This was on the southern side of the altar.
He then tears the body at its wings, but he tries not to sever it in half (Leviticus 1:17). Finally, he salts the body and burns it on the altar." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah teaches that if the priest deviates from some of the above instructions regarding the bird sacrifices, the sacrifice might still be valid. But if he deviates from others, they invalidate the sacrifice.", + "If he did not remove the crop or the feathers or the entrails which came out of it, or did not dry it with salt, or made any other deviation after he had drained the blood out, it is still valid. The general rule here is quite clear if he makes any changes from the prescribed way of acting after he has drained out the blood, then the sacrifice is still valid.", + "If he severed the [head of the] hatat or did not sever the olah, it is unfit. However, if he makes some changes before the blood is drained, such as severing the head of the hatar, or not severing the head of the olah, the sacrifice is invalid. It seems that the sacrifice is validated by the blood being drained out, and therefore deviations that occur before that moment can invalidate the sacrifice whereas those that occur after cannot.", + "If he drained out the blood of the head, but not the blood of the body, it is unfit; The blood of the body, but not the blood of the head, it is fit. As far as the blood is concerned, the rule is that he must drain the blood out of the body, for that is where most of the blood is. If he does not do so, the sacrifice is invalid. He should also drain the blood out of the head, but if he does not, the sacrifice is still valid." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah introduces the problem of a sacrifice not sacrificed with the correct intent in connection with bird sacrifices. Many of these same rules can be found in the first four chapters of the tractate in connection with the animal sacrifices.", + "If he nipped a hatat of a bird for the sake of something else; if he drained out its blood for the sake of something else, or for its own sake and for the sake of something else, or for the sake of something else and for its own sake, it is unfit. An olah of a bird is fit [in such circumstances] except that it does not count for its owner’s obligation. In all of these cases the priest offering the bird hatat performed one of the actions with the intention that the offering be something other than a hatat. Such an intention invalidates the sacrifice, but only in the case of the hatat. In the case of the bird olah, the animal can still be burned on the altar. Nevertheless, it doesn’t count for its owners, so they will have to bring a replacement bird olah. This is the same rule we saw with regard to animal olahs (see 1:3).", + "A hatat of a bird or an olah of a bird which he nipped, or drained out the blood [with the intention] to eat what was normally eaten or to burn what was normally burned outside of the appropriate place, is invalid, but it does not involve karet; After the appropriate time, it is piggul and involves karet, Provided that the mattir was offered in accordance with the regulations. If the priest nips off the head of either bird sacrifice or drains the blood with the intention of either eating something or burning something outside of the proper place (meaning outside of the Temple) then the sacrifice is invalid (see mishnayot 2:3-5). However, an intention concerning the wrong place does not make the sacrifice piggul, and the person who eats it is not liable for the punishment of karet. If he nips off the head or drains the blood with the intention of eating or burning it after the appropriate time, then the sacrifice is piggul and one who eats it liable for karet. The one caveat is that in order for the sacrifice to be piggul and for the one who eats it to be liable for karet the “mattir” has to be offered correctly. What this means, as we shall see, is that if both problematic intentions are involved with the sacrifice, then the sacrifice is not piggul, although it is still invalid. It is piggul only if the only type of wrong intention involved in the sacrifice was eating it after the appropriate time.", + "How does he offer the mattir according to regulations? If he nipped it in silence and drained the blood [with an intention of] after the appropriate time; or if he nipped it [with an intention of] after the appropriate time and drained the blood in silence; or if he nipped it and drained the blood [with an intention of] after the appropriate time: in these cases he offered the mattir according to regulation. The mishnah now illustrates what the previous line means. One of the actions was done in silence, meaning with correct intention, and the other of the actions was done with the intent of eating it after its appropriate time, or if both actions were done with the intent of eating at the wrong time, then the sacrifice is piggul, because the only wrong intention was with regard to time.", + "How does he not offer the mattir according to regulation? If he nipped it [with an intention of] outside the appropriate place and drained the blood [with an intention of] outside the appropriate time; or if he nipped it [with an intention of] after the appropriate time and drained the blood [with an intention of] outside the appropriate place; or if he nipped it and drained the blood [with an intention of] outside the appropriate place; or if he nipped a hatat of a bird for the sake of a different sacrifice and drained the blood [with an intention of] after the appropriate time; or if he nipped it [with an intention of] after the appropriate time and drained the blood for the sake of a different sacrifice; or if he nipped it and drained the blood for the sake of a different sacrifice: in these cases he did not offer the mattir according to regulation. If, however, one of the actions done with the intention of eating it or burning it in the wrong place, and the other action was done with the intention of eating it or burning it after the appropriate time, then it is not piggul. It is also not piggul if both actions were done with the intention of eating it in the wrong place, as we learned in section two above.", + "[If he intended] to eat as much as an olive outside the appropriate place [and] as much as an olive the next day, [or] as much as an olive the next day [and] as much as an olive outside the appropriate place; Or half as much as an olive outside the appropriate place [and] half as much as an olive the next day; Or half as much as an olive the next day [and] half as much as an olive outside the appropriate place, [the sacrifice] is unfit, and does not involve karet. In this section he performs one action (nipping the head or draining the blood) with the intention of eating at least one olive’s worth in the wrong place and one olive’s worth at the wrong time, or in the opposite order, or half an olive’s worth in the wrong place and half an olive’s worth at the wrong time, or in the opposite order. In these cases the sacrifice is invalid, but one who eats it is not liable for karet for two wrong intentions were involved in this sacrifice. The order of the wrong intentions, according to this opinion, doesn’t matter. As long as the two different improper intentions were mixed up in one sacrifice, the sacrifice is not piggul and the one who eats it is not liable for karet.", + "Rabbi Judah said: this is the general rule: if the [wrongful] intention of time precedes that of place, [the sacrifice] is piggul, and involves karet; but if the [wrongful] intention of place precedes that of time, it is unfit and does not involve karet. But the sages say: in both cases [the sacrifice is] unfit and does not involve karet. According to Rabbi Judah, the order of the wrong intentions is significant. If the wrong intention of time comes first, then the sacrifice is piggul. It is determinative of the ultimate status of the sacrifice, because it came first. If, however, the wrong intention concerning place came first, then it is determinative, and as we learned in section two, the sacrifice is not piggul and one who eats it is not liable for karet. The sages, whose opinion was found in section five, restate their opinion that in neither case is the sacrifice piggul, and one who eats it would not be liable for karet.", + "[If he intended] to eat half as much as an olive [outside the appropriate place or after the appropriate time] [and] to burn half as much as an olive [similarly] it is fit, for eating and burning do not combine. The situation described here is actually impossible when it comes to the bird hatat, none of it is burned on the altar and it when it comes to the bird olah, none of it is eaten. So with one sacrifice, one could never have a wrong intention to eat half an olive and a wrong intention to burn half an olive. The section is taught because this was possible with animal sacrifices. There and here we learn that wrong intents with regard to eating and burning half an olive’s worth do not join together to fill the requirement for their to be the wrong to intent with regard to an olive’s worth of the flesh." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nIn chapter six, mishnayot five and six we learned how the bird hatat and bird olah were offered. There were a few differences between them. The first two mishnayot of this chapter discuss what happens if one mixes up between the two of them.", + "If a hatat of a bird is offered below [the red line] with the rites of a hatat [and] for the sake of a hatat, it is fit. The blood of the hatat is supposed to be offered below the red line. In this case the bird hatat is offered in the correct manner, and is therefore fit. This line is only here in the mishnah to serve as a contrast with the following four sections.", + "[If it is offered] with the rites of a hatat, [but] in the name of a olah; If the rites followed are those for a hatat, but his intention was for it to be an olah, the sacrifice is unfit.", + "[Or] with the rites of an olah [and] in the name of a hatat; If the intent of the priest is for it to be a hatat, but he sacrifices it using the rites for an olah, then it is unfit.", + "Or with the rites of an olah [and] in the name of an olah, it is unfit. If the sacrifice is supposed to be a hatat, but the priest thinks and acts as if it is an olah, it is similarly unfit. Basically for the hatat to be fit, it must be offered for the sake of a hatat and with the rites of a hatat.", + "If he offers it above [the red line] [even] with the rites of any of these, it is unfit. If he sprinkles the blood above the red line, then it is invalid even if he offers it for the sake of a hatat, using the rites of a hatat. Sprinkling the blood below the red line is mandatory and without it the hatat is invalid." + ], + [ + "If an olah of a bird is offered above [the red line], with the rites of an olah [and] in the name of a olah, it is fit.
With the rites of an olah [but] in the name of a hatat, it is fit, but does not count for its owner’s obligation.
[If he offers it] with the rites of a hatat [and] in the name of a olah;
[Or] with the rites of a hatat [and] in the name of a hatat, it is unfit.
If he offers it below, [even] with the rites of any of these, it is unfit.
This mishnah is similar to yesterday’s mishnah, but the topic here is the olah.
Section one: This olah is offered in the manner in which it is supposed to be offered and therefore it is valid.
Section two: If an olah is offered with the rites of an olah but for the sake of it being a hatat, it is still fit and can be burned on the altar. However, it doesn’t count for discharging the owner of his obligation, as we explained in chapter six, mishnah seven. The owners will need to bring another hatat.
Sections three and four: However, if he uses the rites of a hatat, it is invalid.
Section five: As with the hatat, if he sprinkles the blood in the wrong place, it is invalid, even if he uses the rites of the olah and does it for the sake of an olah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah refers to the cases in the previous two mishnayot of bird hatats and olahs that were not offered correctly.", + "And all of these do not defile in the gullet One who eats a bird that was not slaughtered properly becomes impure when the piece of meat he is swallowing reaches his gullet. However, these birds were slaughtered properly (the problem was in the sacrificial ritual) and therefore they do not cause impurity as do carrion birds.", + "And they involve trespass, except the hatat of a bird which was offered below [the red line] with the rites of a hatat [and] in the name of a hatat. Trespass refers to illegal use of Temple property. One who uses a bird hatat or olah that was sacrificed improperly has still trespassed and must bring an asham to atone for his sin. The exception is a bird hatat that was offered correctly. At this point a priest can eat from it, and once priests can eat it, non-priests can derive benefit from it, they have not trespassed Temple property. Note that an olah is not eaten by the priests and therefore no one is ever allowed to derive benefit from it." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn this mishnah we find an extended argument between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Joshua concerning whether or not one who derives benefit from a bird olah that was sacrificed as a hatat has “trespassed”. As we learned in yesterday’s mishnah, trespassing means making illegal use of Temple property. This topic is interesting (at least to the sages) because an olah does involve trespass, but a hatat does not.\nThis mishnah is a bit complicated but I hope that you will appreciate the glimpse we get here of the types of logical arguments employed by the sages.", + "If one offered an olah of a bird below [the red line] with the rites of a hatat [and] in the name of a hatat: Rabbi Eliezer says: it involves trespass. But Rabbi Joshua says: it does not involve trespass. This section lays out the two opinions. Rabbi Eliezer says that this olah, sacrificed in the name of a hatat with the rites of a hatat still involves trespass, as does every olah. Rabbi Joshua says that just as a bird hatat doesn’t involve trespass (because it is entirely edible for priests) so too this olah that was sacrificed as a hatat does not involve trespass.", + "Rabbi Eliezer said: if a hatat which does not involve trespass when he offers it for its own name, nevertheless when he changes the name [for which it is offered] it does involve trespass, is it not logical that an olah which does involve trespass when he offers it for its own name, would involve trespass when he changes its name? Rabbi Eliezer now begins to prove his opinion by comparing the wrongly sacrificed olah with a wrongly sacrificed hatat. When someone sacrifices a hatat in the right way, it does not involve trespass, because it can be eaten by priests. However, when he offers it as an olah it does involve trespass. All the more so, Rabbi Eliezer argues, with an olah. If it involves trespass when it is offered for its own sake, all the more so it should involve trespass when it is offered for the sake of something else.", + "Rabbi Joshua said to him: No, when you speak of a hatat whose name he changed to that of an olah, [it involves trespass] because he changed its name to something that involves trespass; will you say [the same] of an olah whose name he changed to that of a hatat, seeing that he changed its name to something which does not involve trespass? Rabbi Joshua responds that a hatat that he offered for the sake of an olah involves trespass because he changed it to a sacrifice that involves trespass (the olah). However, in the case of our mishnah, when he offered the olah for the sake of a hatat, he changed it to something that doesn’t involve trespass (the hatat). Therefore, this olah offered as a hatat does not involve trespass. Digging a bit deeper into the meaning of this debate, we might say that Rabbi Joshua accords greater power to the intention of the sacrificer when he changes something into a hatat it is a hatat and the rules regarding an olah no longer apply. In contrast, according to Rabbi Eliezer, if it was supposed to be an olah it stays an olah, no matter what his intention.", + "Rabbi Eliezer said to him: Behold, most holy sacrifices which he slaughtered in the south and which he slaughtered in the name of lesser sacrifices will prove the matter, for he changed their name to something which does not involve trespass, and yet they involve trespass, so too, do not be surprised that in the case of the olah, although he changed its name to something that does not involve trespass, it still involves trespass. Rabbi Eliezer responds by noting that there is a case where a person changes something from a type of sacrifice that does involve trespass to a type that does not involve trespass and yet the sacrifice still involves trespass. If one sacrifices a most holy sacrifice as if it were a less holy sacrifice which does not involve trespass, the sacrifice still involves trespass. This simply proves that what Rabbi Joshua said in section two was incorrect.", + "Rabbi Joshua said: No, when you speak of most holy sacrifices which are slaughtered in the south and in the name of lesser sacrifices, [they involve trespass] because he changed their name to something which is partly forbidden and partly permitted; will you say the same of an olah, where he changed its name to something that is altogether permitted? Rabbi Joshua responds that in the case of most holy sacrifices which were offered as if they were less holy sacrifices, he has changed it into something that has both prohibited and permitted parts. When it comes to less holy sacrifices, some parts can be eaten, whereas some of the inner parts of the animal cannot be eaten and do involve trespass. Therefore, in this case the sacrifice still involves trespass because he changed it into something that at least partially involves trespass. However, in the case of the bird olah sacrificed as a bird hatat, he changed the sacrifice into something that doesn’t involve trespass at all. This defends Rabbi Joshua’s opinion that a bird olah offered as a bird hatat doesn’t involve trespass." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with the subject of when a sacrificial bird that was nipped (this is how sacrificial birds are slaughtered) causes impurity if its flesh is swallowed. We began to discuss this subject in mishnah three.", + "If he nipped [the bird sacrifice] with his left [hand] or at night; if he slaughtered hullin within [the Temple courtyard] or a sacrifice outside [the Temple courtyard] they do not defile in the gullet. As I stated in the commentary to mishnah three, one who eats a pure bird that was not slaughtered properly becomes impure when the flesh of the bird reaches his gullet. Our mishnah lists cases where an action was done improperly with the slaughtering of a bird sacrifice. A bird sacrifice must be nipped with the right hand, during the day, so if he nips it with the left hand or at night, it is invalid. If one brings a non-sacred bird into the Temple and slaughters it (not nips but slaughters by cutting its neck), it may not be eaten, and a sacrifice that was slaughtered (not nipped) outside of the Temple is invalid. In all of these cases, the slaughtering or nipping was done properly, but it was done at the wrong time, with the wrong hand, or in the wrong place. Since the slaughtering/nipping itself was done correctly, the flesh of the bird doesn’t cause impurity.", + "If he nipped with a knife; or if he nipped hullin within [or] sacrifices without; or [if he sacrificed] turtle-doves before their time or pigeons after their time; [or a bird] whose wing was withered, [or] blind in the eye [or] whose foot was cut off, [all these] defile in the gullet. In contrast, in some these cases the slaughtering itself was performed incorrectly. Nipping must be done with one’s fingernail and not with a knife. If the bird was hullin (non-sacred), then nipping it is an improper means to slaughter it (it must have its neck sliced). If he nips a bird sacrifice outside of the Temple it is invalid. In all of these cases, the bird is considered carrion and it does cause impurity if swallowed. The mishnah now lists other problems that will cause the bird to defile when its flesh is swallowed. When it comes to turtle-doves, they are valid as sacrifices only when they are older (about three months) whereas pigeons are valid as sacrifices when they are younger (before three months). So if he sacrificed a bird either before or after it reached majority, it causes impurity. Furthermore, if the bird was missing a limb it cannot be used as a sacrifice. So if he nipped a bird that couldn’t be used as a sacrifice, it is completely invalid and does cause impurity.", + "This is the general rule: all whose unfitness [arose] in sanctity do not defile in the gullet; if their unfitness did not arise in sanctity, they defile in the gullet. The mishnah now provides the general rule. If a bird was valid as a sacrifice and it was nipped in the Temple, using the correct method for nipping, but then became disqualified for some reason, the bird does not cause impurity when its flesh is swallowed. However, if the bird was disqualified before it arrived at the Temple courtyard, or was disqualified because its nipping was not performed correctly, the bird is considered carrion and one who eats it becomes impure when its flesh is swallowed.", + "And anyone who is unfit who nips, their nipping is invalid, and they [the birds] do not defile in the gullet. If someone performs the nipping who is not allowed to do so (see mishnah 2:1), for instance a non-priest, or an impure priest, the nipping is invalid and the bird cannot be used as a sacrifice. However, it does not place the bird into the category of carrion because this is a case of unfitness that arose in sanctity." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah deals with a case where a priest did melikah (nipping the bird) and the bird turned out to be a terefah, an animal with some flaw which would have caused it to die. Such a bird cannot be sacrificed the question in our mishnah is does it defile in the gullet, like the nevelah (improperly slaughtered) bird.", + "If one performed melikah, and he found it [the bird] to be a terefah: Rabbi Meir said: it does not defile in the gullet; Rabbi Judah said: it does defile in the gullet. Rabbi Meir says that if a bird sacrifice has its head nipped (melikah) and it is found to be a terefah, it does not defile when swallowed. According to Rabbi Meir melikah purifies a terefah sacrificial bird from defiling as does a nevelah (carrion), just as slaughtering (shechitah) purifies a terefah beast from imparting carrion impurity. Rabbi Judah says that when a bird is slaughtered or nipped and it is found to be a terefah it still defiles in the gullet, as does a nevelah.", + "Rabbi Meir said: if with regard to a beast, when it is carrion (a it defiles through contact or carrying, yet slaughtering it purifies its terefah from defiling, when it comes to carrion ( of a bird which does not defile through contact or carriage, is it not logical that slaughtering would cleanse its terefah? Now, just as we have found that slaughtering, which makes it [a bird of hullin] fit for eating, cleanses its terefah from its uncleanness; so melikah (, which makes it [a bird sacrifice] fit for eating, cleanses its terefah. Rabbi Meir now proceeds to argue out his position. When it comes to a beast, its nevelah (carrion it died without having been slaughtered properly) defiles when it is touched or even when it is carried. Nevertheless, if one slaughters it and it turns out to be a terefah (an animal with some defect that would have caused it to die) it now does not defile through contact and carrying. The nevelah of a bird is less stringent for it never defiles through contact or carriage. Therefore, Rabbi Meir argues, it is logical that if one slaughters a hullin (non-sacred) bird and it turns out to be a terefah, it is purified from defiling in the way it would have had it been a nevelah (in the gullet). Rabbi Meir now proceeds with his argument. Slaughtering a hullin bird is parallel to nipping (melikah) a sacrificial bird. Both make the birds fit (for eating or sacrifice) and both cleanse the terefah from defiling in the gullet.", + "Rabbi Yose says: it is sufficient for it to be like the nevelah of a beast, which is cleansed by slaughtering, but not by melikah (. Rabbi Yose says that the laws concerning carrion of a bird do not need to be any more lenient than the laws concerning the carrion of a beast. Just as slaughtering and not melikah (nipping) purifies a beast’s terefah from carrion impurity (because there is no such thing as melikah with a beast) so too when it comes to birds slaughtering purifies them from carrion impurity but not melikah. So if the bird was hullin (non-sacred) and one slaughtered it and it turned out to be a terefah it would not impart carrion impurity. But if it was a sacrificial bird and one nipped it and it turned out to be a terefah it would still impart carrion impurity. Again, the argumentation in this mishnah was classic mishnaic type of argumentation. While the mishnah was certainly not easy, if you want to see what type of logic the sages employed, this is a great example." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah deals with sacrifices that become mixed up with other animals. There are three possibilities in the mishnah for the type of animal the sacrifice is mixed up with:\n1) Animals that cannot be eaten or sacrificed.\n2) Animals that can be eaten but not sacrificed.\n3) Animals that can be sacrificed or eaten.", + "All sacrifices which became mixed up with hatats that must be left to die, or with an ox that is to be stoned, even one in ten thousand, all must be left to die. To understand this clause we need to explain what a hatat is that must be left to die. There are five categories of this type of problematic hatat, cases where for some reason the hatat cannot be sacrificed and all that can be done with it is let it die. We shall learn more about this when we learn Tractate Temurah. If a valid sacrifice becomes mixed up with a hatat that must be left to die, then all of the animals that are mixed up must be left to die. The same is true if it is mixed up with an ox that has been condemned to be stoned for either killing a person or for having sexual relations with a person. In both of these cases, none of the animals mixed up can be sacrificed, even if one forbidden hatat becomes mixed up with 10,000 valid ones.", + "If they were mixed up with: an ox with which a transgression had been committed [for instance]: one that had killed a man on the testimony of one witness or of its owner; or [an ox] that had sexual relations with a woman or one with whom a man had sexual relations; or an animal set aside [for idolatry], or that had been worshipped [as an idol]; or that was the fee of a whore, or [a dog's] exchange; or that was kilayim; or terefah; or an animal born through the caesarean section, [In all of these cases] they must graze until they become defected, then they are sold, and one brings [a sacrifice] of the same kind at the price of the better of them. If the sacrifice is mixed up with another animal that cannot be sacrificed, then the animals should graze until they become defected [and thereby unfit for sacrifice], then they can all be sold and the proceeds from the better of them (or the best if there were more than two) must be used to buy a sacrifice of the same kind that was originally mixed in. The mishnah now lists possible ways for a sacrifice to become invalid. The first is that it transgresses or a transgression is committed with it. An animal that kills a human being must be executed and its meat is forbidden, but only if there are two witnesses to the killing. If there is one witness the animal cannot be sacrificed but it can be slaughtered and then eaten. Similarly, an animal that has sexual relations with a human being must be executed but only if there are two witnesses. If there is only one witness it is forbidden to sacrifice the animal but not for people to eat it. The next two categories are animals that were involved in idolatry. If there is only one witness, the animals are only prohibited as sacrifices. According to Deuteronomy 23:19 one may not bring “the fee of a whore or the pay of a dog into the house of the Lord.” The rabbis understand these two things to be an animal used to pay a prostitute or an ox used as payment for a dog. Neither of them can be used as a sacrifice. An animal born from mixed parentage, such as a ram and a ewe, cannot be sacrificed, although it can be eaten. The mishnah here lists a terefah, an animal who after having been slaughtered is found to have a defect that would have caused it to die. A terefah cannot be eaten, so commentators explain that this refers to the offspring of a terefah, which according to some opinions, cannot be sacrificed. An animal born through cesarean section also cannot be sacrificed, although it can be eaten. In all of these cases the animal cannot be used as a sacrifice but it can be eaten. Therefore, if one of these is mixed up with a sacrificial animal, they do not have to let the animals die, as was the case in the previous clause.", + "If they were mixed up with unblemished [animals] of hullin, the hullin must be sold to those who need that kind [for a sacrifice]. If the sacrifice was mixed up with unblemished non-sacred animals, then all of the animals can be sold to people who need such animals as sacrifices and then they will all eventually be used as sacrifices." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn yesterday’s mishnah we dealt with sacrifices that were mixed up with animals that either were already disqualified from being sacrifices, or were not sacrifices. Today’s mishnah discusses sacrifices that were mixed up with other sacrifices.", + "A sacrifice [which was mixed up] with another sacrifice, both being of the same kind: this one is offered in the name of whoever is its owner, and the other is offered in the name of whoever is its owner. If both sacrificial animals are the same kind, for instance both are hatats, then both can be offered as hatats. When they are offered, instead of mentioning the name of the owner, the priest should use a general formula, “in the name of whoever is its owner.” In this way both owners can get credit.", + "A sacrifice [which was mixed up] with a sacrifice, both being of different kinds: they must graze until they become unfit, and then he purchases at the price of the better of them [an animal] of each kind, and he pays the loss of the excess out of his own pocket. In this case the two sacrifices are different kinds. For instance a hatat becomes mixed up with an olah. It is impossible to sacrifice either because their sacrificial rituals are different. Therefore, he let both graze until they become unfit by having a defect which disqualifies them from being sacrifices. Then the animals themselves can be redeemed and the money used to buy new sacrifices. However, he must pay for each new sacrifice at the higher price at which the animals were sold. For instance, if one animal was sold for two selas, and the other for one sela, then he must buy two new sacrifices, each for two selas. The extra sela he must make up from his own pocket. In this way, he can ensure that no sacrifice has lost out by being worth less than the original animal.", + "If they were mixed up with a firstling or tithe, they must graze until they become unfit, and then they are eaten as firstling or tithe. If a sacrifice is mixed up with a tithe or firstling, then they must let all the animals graze until they become unfit for sacrifice. The tithe and the firstling cannot be redeemed for money until they have a defect, so he has to wait with all of the animals. At this point he can eat all of the animals as if they were all firstling or tithe. What this means is that they can’t be sold at a butcher’s shop, nor can their flesh be weighed out on scales. In addition, he must redeem the animal that was set aside as a sacrifice at the value of the most expensive of the animals and with that money he has to buy a new sacrifice to make up for the one that was lost.", + "All [sacrifices] can be mixed up, except the hatat and the asham. All sacrifices can possibly be mixed up together, except for an asham and a hatat because a hatat almost always has to be brought from a female animal, (the exception is the male goat brought by the chieftain (Leviticus 4:23)]. The asham is always a male ram or sheep and never a goat. Thus there is no possibility that these two sacrifices could ever be confused." + ], + [ + "An asham which was mixed up with a shelamim: They graze until they become unfit. Rabbi Shimon says: they are slaughtered at the north [side of the altar] and eaten in accordance with [the laws of] the more stringent of them. They said to him: one must not bring sacrifices to a place of unfitness. According to the first opinion in the mishnah, if an asham and a shelamim get mixed up, then the same thing must be done with them as is done with all sacrifices that are mixed up they graze until they become unfit, and then he must bring two new sacrifices, both at the cost of the higher of them (see yesterday’s mishnah). According to Rabbi Shimon, there is another solution in this case. Both sacrifices can be offered and slaughtered in the north of the Temple courtyard, as is the rule for the asham. They are eaten in accordance with the stricter laws, which are those for the asham. They must be eaten within the Temple walls, by male priests only, for one day and the following night. With regard to the blood applications, the laws are the same. The rabbis respond that this might cause the loss of a sacrifice. One of these sacrifices is a shelamim, which can be eaten for two days and the night in between. If we treat both as ashams, and they are left over after the first night, we will treat them as remnant and burn the leftover. This might cause a valid sacrifice to be destroyed. Since unnecessarily burning sacrifices should be avoided so as not to disgrace the sacrifice, it is better that neither are offered and both are left to graze until they become unfit, as was described above.", + "If pieces [of sacrificial flesh] were mixed up with pieces [of other sacrificial flesh], most sacred sacrifices with lesser sacrifices, [pieces] that are eaten one day with [those] that are eaten two days and one night, they must be eaten in accordance with [the laws of] the more stringent of them. If pieces of sacrificial meat get mixed up, for instance hatat meat with shelamim meat, then the rabbis agree with Rabbi Shimon that the only thing we can do is treat all of the meat with the laws governing the stricter of the sacrifices. In this case, all of the meat will be eaten by priests, for one day and one night, within the Temple confines, as are the rules for the hatat. Any meat left over will have to be burned, because there is no other solution in this case." + ], + [ + "Limbs of a hatat which were mixed up with limbs from an olah: Rabbi Eliezer says: he must place [them all] on the top [of the altar], and regard the flesh of the hatat on top as though it were wood. But the sages say: they must become disfigured, and then go out to the place of burning. In this mishnah a hatat and an olah have been slaughtered and cut up and then the limbs of the two animals get mixed up. As a reminder, a hatat can be eaten by male priests while an olah is completely burned on the altar. The problem is that the limbs cannot be eaten, because of the olah. The debate is over whether the hatat can be burned with the olah meat. Rabbi Eliezer says that he can burn the hatat flesh as long as his intent is not to “turn it into smoke” as is done with sacrifices, but rather to burn it as if it was wood. The other rabbis say that this is not possible. Rather they must leave all the meat until the following morning, when it becomes “disfigured” by being left over. At this point it becomes remnant and it must be burned as is always the rule with remnant sacrifices." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn this mishnah, limbs of unblemished olahs which can be burned on the altar become mixed up with limbs of blemished olahs which cannot be burned on the altar. As in yesterday’s mishnah, Rabbi Eliezer and the other rabbis debate.", + "Limbs of [unblemished olahs which were mixed up] with the limbs of blemished [olahs]: Rabbi Eliezer says: if [the priest] offered the head of one of them, all the heads are to be offered; the legs of one of them, all the legs are to be offered. But the sages say: even if they had offered all except one of them, it goes forth to the place of burning. All of the sages agree that what he should do is take all of the flesh out to the place of burning, where disqualified sacrifices are disposed (this is not the altar). The debate is over what to do if some of the limbs have already been burned on the altar. Rabbi Eliezer says that if he already burned a head on the altar and then realized the situation, then we can suppose that that head was from the blemished animal and all of the rest of the heads can be offered on the altar, with the assumption that they were from the unblemished animals. The same is true for the other limbs once one has been burned on the altar all of the rest of the same type of limb can be burned. The other sages disagree and say that we can never assume that the already burned limbs were from the blemished animal. We must always be concerned that the flesh that has not yet been burned is from the blemished animal. Therefore, all remaining flesh must be taken out to the burning place and burned there." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah deals with blood from a sacrificial animal that becomes mixed up with some other liquid. The question is: can it still be sprinkled on the altar?", + "If blood was mixed with water, if it retains the appearance of blood, it is fit [to be sprinkled on the altar]. If the blood is mixed with water, it can still be sprinkled on the altar, as long as it is not so watered down that it loses the appearance of blood.", + "If it was mixed with wine, we regard it as though it were water. If the blood is mixed with red wine, then it will have the appearance of blood even if there is mostly red wine. So what we do is we look at the wine as if it were water, and if there is enough wine such that if it were water there would no longer be an appearance of blood, it cannot be used.", + "If it was mixed with the blood of a beast or wild animal, we regard it as though it were water. The same is true if the blood is mixed in with the blood of a non-sacrificial beast or a wild animal (that can never be used as a sacrifice). Since this mixture will always have the appearance of blood, we look at the blood of the non-sacrificial animal as if it were water, and if there is enough of this blood such that if it were water there would no longer be an appearance of blood, it cannot be used.", + "Rabbi Judah said: blood cannot nullify blood. According to Rabbi Judah like things do not nullify each other. Thus no matter how much blood there was from the non-sacrificial animal, the mixture can still be sprinkled on the altar." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to deal with blood from a valid sacrificial animal that is mixed up with other blood.", + "If it was mixed with the blood of unfit [animals], it must be poured out into the duct. In this case the blood of the fit animal is mixed up with blood from an animal that either cannot be sacrificed or was sacrificed and became unfit at some point during the sacrificial procedure. It is forbidden to sprinkle blood from such an animal on the altar. Therefore, all of this blood must be poured into the aqueduct that flows through the Temple courtyard. This aqueduct was used to clean out the Temple, so putting blood there is akin to throwing it in the garbage.", + "[If it was mixed] with the blood that came out after death, it must be poured out into the duct. Rabbi Eliezer declares it fit. The blood that is sprinkled on the altar is the blood that spurts out of the animal as the animal is dying. This is the “life-blood” for it is the blood that carries the animal’s life force. Blood that seeps out after the animal has already died is not sprinkled on the altar. So according to the first opinion, if the life-blood that was supposed to be used is mixed in with this post-mortem blood, it all must be poured into the duct. Rabbi Eliezer allows this blood to be used, at least in this case when it was accidentally mixed in with the valid life-blood.", + "If he [the priest] did not ask but sprinkled it, it is valid. If the priest didn’t ask what to do in any of these cases, and just went ahead and sprinkled a mixture of valid and invalid on the altar, then his sprinkling is valid. According to the Tosefta, it is valid only if the invalid blood is not of sufficient quantity such that if it were water it would cause the mixture to lose the appearance of blood (see yesterday’s mishnah)." + ], + [ + "[If] blood of unblemished animals [was mixed] with blood of blemished animals, it must be poured out into the duct. Blood of blemished animals cannot be spilled on the altar, therefore this mixture must be dumped out into the duct.", + "[If] a goblet [of valid blood was mixed up] with other goblets [of invalid blood]: Rabbi Eliezer said: if he [the priest] offered [sprinkled] one goblet, all the goblets can be offered; But the sages say: even if they offered all of them save one, it must be poured out into the duct. Here, instead of the blood being mixed up, goblets of blood are mixed up. Some of these goblets have the valid blood from unblemished animals and one has the invalid blood of a blemished animal. All of the sages seem to agree that all of the goblets should be spilled out into the duct. They debate what should be done if one of the goblets had already had its blood sprinkled. According to Rabbi Eliezer, we can treat this like the situation with the mixed up limbs in mishnah five. If one of the goblets’ contents has been sprinkled, we can assume that the rest of the goblets are those containing valid blood and their blood can be sprinkled. The sages disagree, as they did above in mishnah five, and say that in all circumstances all of the blood must be poured out into the duct." + ], + [ + "If [blood] that is to be sprinkled below [the red line on the altar] was mixed with blood that is sprinkled above: As we have seen in earlier chapters, some sacrificial blood is sprinkled on the altar above the red line that runs through its middle, and some is sprinkled below. In the case in our mishnah, blood from a sacrifice that is sprinkled above, namely a hatat whose blood is sprinkled on the four corners of the altar, is mixed in with blood that is sprinkled below from either an olah, an asham or a shelamim.", + "Rabbi Eliezer says: he must sprinkle [it] above, and I regard the lower [blood which was sprinkled] above as though it were water, and then he sprinkles again below. Rabbi Eliezer says that the first thing he should do is sprinkle the blood on the four corners of the altar, as is the rule for the hatat. Then Rabbi Eliezer employs a legal fiction similar to that which we saw him use in earlier mishnayot. The priest can look at the blood that was sprinkled above as if it were water, even though it may have in fact been from the blood that was supposed to be sprinkled below, and what is left in the mixture is blood that is supposed to be sprinkled below. Sprinkling the blood below will also count towards the requirement to pour out the remainder of that hatat blood below (see 5:3).", + "But the sages say: he must pour it out into the duct. As in all of the previous cases, the rabbis say that this should not be done. All of the mixture should be poured into the duct for disposal.", + "If he [the priest] did not ask but sprinkled it, it is valid. This is the same line that appeared at the end of mishnah seven. If the priest did apply the blood above the line, then the application is “ex post facto” valid." + ], + [ + "[If blood] which requires one application [was mixed] with blood [also] requiring one application, it [the mixture] should be presented with one application.
[If blood] which requires four applications [was mixed] with blood requiring four applications, they should be presented with four applications.
[If blood] which requires four applications [was mixed] with blood which requires one application: Rabbi Eliezer says: it [the mixture] should be presented with four applications. Rabbi Joshua says: it should be presented with one application.
Rabbi Eliezer said to him: Behold, he transgresses the [injunction] not to diminish [from God’s commandment]! Rabbi Joshua said to him: Behold, he transgresses the injunction not to add [to God’s commandments].
Rabbi Eliezer said to him: The injunction not to add applies only where it is by itself. Rabbi Joshua said to him: The injunction not to diminish applies only where it is by itself.
Moreover, Rabbi Joshua said: when you make [four] applications you transgress the injunction not to add, and perform an action with your own hands; whereas when you do not make [four] applications you transgress the injunction not to diminish, but do not perform an action with your own hands.
The first-born animal, the tithe and the pesah require only one blood application on the outer altar. Some other sacrifices require two applications that are actually four because they are applied on two corners. The hatat requires four distinct blood applications. Our mishnah deals with a case where blood from animals requiring different numbers of blood applications are mixed up with each other.
Note that unlike the previous cases where the mixture had invalid blood in it, in this case the mixture consists of only valid blood. The problem is not in the blood itself, but what exactly to do with it.
Sections one and two: If blood from animals requiring the same number of applications is mixed up then they can simply make that number of applications with the blood. These two sections are quite obvious and probably serve as an introduction to the more interesting case which arises in the next section.
Section three: Here blood requiring two different numbers of applications is mixed up. Rabbi Eliezer holds that in such a situation, they should apply the maximum number of applications, in this case four, whereas Rabbi Joshua holds that they should apply the minimum number of applications, one.
Section four: Let the battle begin! Rabbi Eliezer says that if they make only one application, they will be transgressing the biblical prohibition against diminishing from God’s commandments. Rabbi Joshua quickly responds that Rabbi Eliezer’s suggestion is also problematic, for by making four blood applications, he will be adding to God’s commandments, and this is also prohibited (see Deuteronomy 4:2).
Section five: Rabbi Eliezer explains that the prohibition against adding to God’s commandments only applies when the blood is alone, meaning it is not mixed in with blood that requires four applications. If someone were to take blood that requires one application and apply it four times, that would be a transgression. But in our case since some of the blood does require four applications, there is no transgression.
Of course, Rabbi Joshua responds accordingly that the same can be said with regard to the prohibition against diminishing from God’s commandments it would only apply if there was only blood requiring four applications and he applied it only once. Since some of the blood requires one application, there is no transgression.
This argument seems to be going nowhere!
Section six: So now we’re all tied up in the bottom of the ninth. Rabbi Eliezer had his arguments and Rabbi Joshua responded to each of them. The winning blow (to mix my metaphor) is delivered by Rabbi Joshua who says that in this situation it is preferable to transgress by omission rather than commission. It is preferable to make only one blood application and thereby omit the other three, than to make four applications, thereby adding on three to the blood which only required one.
Interesting, this becomes a halakhic rule in other situations. Generally, if there is a conflict of mitzvoth or a situation of such nature, it is better to not perform anything, than to potentially actively transgress a commandment. As I stated in my introduction, many rules that originally appear in Seder Kodashim, are adopted to other areas of halakhah. Temple law, while not in practice by the time of the Mishnah, remained a rich source of halakhah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nWhile the blood of most sacrifices is sprinkled on the outer altar, the altar that was in the courtyard, some sacrifices have their blood sprinkled inside, on the golden altar that was in the Sanctuary (the Hekhal). These sacrifices were described in 5:2. Our mishnah deals with a situation where blood that was supposed to be sprinkled inside was mixed up with blood that was supposed to be sprinkled outside.", + "If [blood] which is to be sprinkled inside [the Sanctuary] was mixed with [blood] that is to be sprinkled outside, it must be poured out into the duct. If inside and outside blood are mixed up together, then the mixture should be poured into the duct.", + "If [the priest] sprinkled outside and then sprinkled inside, it is valid. If, however, the priest did not ask and went ahead and sprinkled the blood, if he first sprinkled it outside and then inside, it is valid.", + "[If he sprinkled] inside and then went back and sprinkled outside: Rabbi Akiva declares it unfit, But the sages declare it fit. For Rabbi Akiva says: all blood which entered the Sanctuary to make atonement is unfit; But the sages say: the hatat alone [is unfit]. R. Eliezer said: the asham too, for it says, “As is the hatat, so is the asham” (Leviticus 7:7). The thornier problem is if he first brought the blood inside and sprinkled it on the inner altar and then brought it back outside and sprinkled it on the outer altar. According to Rabbi Akiva, the blood sprinkled on the outer altar is invalid. According to Rabbi Akiva, once blood that is supposed to be sprinkled on the outer altar is brought into the Sanctuary, it is disqualified. The other sages say that both blood applications are valid. The rule that once blood enters the Sanctuary it is invalid to spill it outside was stated only with regard to the hatat, as it says in Leviticus 6:23, “But no sin offering (hatat) whose blood has been brought into the Tent of Meeting for expiation in the sanctuary may be eaten; it shall be burned in the fire.” Rabbi Eliezer expands this to include the asham because Leviticus 7:7 says that the rules that govern the hatat also govern the asham." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with blood from a hatat, which should be sprinkled on the outer altar (found in the Temple courtyard).", + "If the blood of a hatat was received in two goblets and one of them went outside [the Temple courtyard], the inside one is fit. In this case the outside one is rendered invalid but the inside one, which never left the Temple courtyard, remains fit.", + "If one of them entered within [the Sanctuary]: Rabbi Yose the Galilean declares the outer one fit. The sages disqualify it. When one of the two goblets goes into the Sanctuary, it becomes unfit, as we learned in yesterday’s mishnah. The debate is over whether the goblet of blood that remained outside of the Sanctuary, in the Temple courtyard (where it belongs) is also unfit. Rabbi Yose the Galilean argues that the outer one remains fit, but the sages say that in this case, since part of the blood which came from the animal became unfit by going inside the Sanctuary, it all becomes unfit.", + "Rabbi Yose the Galilean: if the place where an intention [directed to it] disqualifies, i.e. without, you do not treat what is left [inside] as what went out; then the place where an intention [directed to it] does not disqualify, i.e. within, is it not logical that we do not treat what is left [outside] as what entered within? Rabbi Yose now argues his position. Had the priest thought to bring the blood of the hatat outside of the Temple, it is already invalid. Nevertheless, if one of the goblets is brought out of the Temple, the other goblet remains valid, as we learned in section one. In contrast, had he thought to bring the blood into the Sanctuary he has not rendered the sacrifice unfit. Therefore, Rabbi Yose argues, all the more so if he actually brings one of the goblets into the Sanctuary, the other one remains fit. It is interesting that the other rabbis do not respond to this argument. It seems likely that they just don’t believe that this argument works here rather, once part of the blood goes into the Sanctuary, all of the blood is rendered unfit no matter where it is.", + "If it entered within to make atonement, even if he [the priest] did not make atonement, it is unfit, the words of Rabbi Eliezer. Rabbi Shimon said: [it is not unfit] unless he makes atonement. Rabbi Judah said: if he took it in unwittingly, it is fit. In this section, there is a debate over whether blood that enters the sanctuary is always rendered unfit, or only under certain circumstances. According to Rabbi Eliezer, if he brought the blood into the Sanctuary in order to sprinkle it on the golden altar, then it is unfit, even if he did not end up sprinkling it. Rabbi Shimon says that it is not rendered unfit until he actually sprinkles it on the altar. Rabbi Judah is even more lenient. If he brings the blood in accidentally, it is not rendered unfit, even if he sprinkles it on the altar. It is unfit only if he intentionally brings it in and sprinkles it on the altar.", + "For all unfit blood which was put on the altar, the head plate [of the high priest] does not propitiate, save for the unclean, for the headplate propitiates for that which is unclean, but does not propitiate for what goes out. According to Exodus 28:38, the head plate worn by the high priest “bears the iniquity of any holy things (sacrifices).” The mishnah explains that the head plate propitiates, meaning cleanses, in a case where a sacrifice becomes impure. In such a case the sacrifice will count, even though it should not have been offered. However, it does not propitiate for a sacrifice whose blood has gone out of the Temple courtyard. If they offer such a sacrifice, it is invalid." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nExodus 29:37 states, “Whatever touches the altar shall become sanctified.” From this verse the rabbis learn that once certain things have been put on the altar they may not be taken back down, even if they were invalidated from being fit sacrifices. In today’s mishnah there is a debate over how far this rule extends: i.e. what things can be taken off the altar once they have been put on, and what things may not.", + "The altar sanctifies whatever is eligible for it. The altar sanctifies anything that is “eligible” for it, even if that thing became unfit. Thus if an animal that was fit (such as a sheep) became unfit and the animal is put up onto the altar, it cannot subsequently be removed.", + "Rabbi Joshua says: whatever is eligible for the altar fire does not descend once it has ascended, as it is said, “The olah itself shall remain where it is burned upon the altar [all night until morning, while the fire of the altar is kept going on it]” (Leviticus 6:: just as the olah, which is eligible for the altar fire, does not descend once it has ascended, so whatever is eligible for the altar fire does not descend once it ascended. Rabbi Joshua limits this rule to that which is eligible for the altar’s fire, meaning things that are burned. As we shall see below in section four, this does not include blood and libations, which are not burned on the altar and therefore can be taken down once they have been put onto the altar. Rabbi Joshua understands the words “eligible for it” in section one to refer to that which is eligible for the fires of the altar, and not just eligible to be put up onto the altar.", + "Rabbi Gamaliel said: whatever is eligible for the altar does not descend once it ascended, as it is said: “The olah itself shall remain where it is burned upon the altar [all night until morning, while the fire of the altar is kept going on it]” (Leviticus 6:2): just as the olah, which is eligible for the altar, does not descend once it ascended, so whatever is eligible for the altar does not descend once it ascended. Rabban Gamaliel expands the rule to include anything that can be put on the altar, including libations and blood. Once one of these has been put on the altar, it cannot be taken back down.", + "The only difference between Rabban Gamaliel and Rabbi Joshua is in respect of the blood and libations, for Rabban Gamaliel says that they cannot descend, while Rabbi Joshua says that they can descend. As explained above, the difference between Rabbi Joshua and Rabban Gamaliel is with regard to blood and libations which are not burned. All other matter that is eligible for the altar is burned and therefore all agree that it is not taken down.", + "Rabbi Shimon says: if the sacrifice is fit while the libations [which accompanied it] are unfit; or if the libations are fit while the sacrifice is unfit; or even if both are unfit, the sacrifice does not descend, while the libations do descend. Rabbi Shimon distinguishes between libations that accompany a sacrifice (see 4:3) and libations that are put on the altar without a sacrifice. If the libations accompany a sacrifice, then in all cases, regardless of whether the sacrifice is valid and the libations are invalid, vice versa or even both are invalid, the sacrifice stays on the altar and the libations can be taken down. This is like Rabbi Joshua. In contrast, in a case where the libations are put alone on the altar, they remain there even if they become unfit." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn yesterday’s mishnah we learned that when a sacrifice is placed on the altar, it is not taken off, even if it turned out to be unfit. Today’s mishnah discusses what types of disqualifications require that the sacrifice be left on the altar.", + "The following do not descend once they have ascended: [Sacrificial flesh] that was kept overnight, Or that which becomes unclean Or that that which goes out [of its permitted boundaries], Or which was slaughtered [with the intention of consuming it] after the appropriate time or outside the appropriate place; Or if unfit [persons] received and sprinkled its blood. If one of the following disqualifications occurs to a sacrifice and then it is put on the altar, the flesh is not removed from the altar. A) This refers to parts of the sacrifice that are burned on the altar that were outside the Temple overnight. This disqualifies them from being sacrificed. B) Sacrificial flesh is subject to uncleanness. C) Sacrificial flesh cannot be taken out of the Temple courtyard. D) The person offering it had a disqualifying intention (see 2:2). E) Unfit persons can receive and sprinkle the blood of a sacrifice (2:1).", + "Rabbi Judah says: that which was slaughtered at night or whose blood was spilt or whose blood went outside the curtains, if it ascended, it must descend. Rabbi Judah lists a few other cases in which, in his opinion, the sacrifice is taken off of the altar even if it was already put up there. There are three such cases: 1) It was slaughtered at night sacrifices must be slaughtered during the day. 2) If the blood spilled and therefore they could not sprinkle it on the altar, as is done with all sacrifices. 3) If the blood was taken out of the curtains, which is another way of saying that the blood was taken out of the Temple courtyard.", + "Rabbi Shimon says: it does not descend, because Rabbi Shimon says: anything whose disqualification arose in sanctity, the sacred [altar] receives it; if its disqualification did not arise in sanctity, the sacred [altar] does not receive it. Rabbi Shimon disagrees with Rabbi Judah concerning the last category the blood taken out of the courtyard. He holds that only if the disqualification occured “in sanctity” meaning within the Temple courtyard does the sacrifice not descend from the altar. If the disqualification occurred outside of the sacred Temple courtyard, then the sacred altar does not receive it, and it must be taken down. Tomorrow’s mishnah will explain what disqualifications occur outside the Temple’s courtyard." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is a continuation of Rabbi Shimon’s rule at the end of yesterday’s mishnah, that if a disqualification occurred outside the Temple courtyard, then if the sacrifice is put up on the altar, it should be taken off. The sacrifices that stay on the altar despite their disqualification are ones which became disqualified only some time after they came into the Temple.", + "Which are the ones whose disqualification did not arise in sanctity: An animal which had sexual relations with a woman or with a man, or that was the fee of a whore, or [a dog's] exchange; or that was kilayim; or terefah; or an animal born through the caesarean section, and blemished animals. All of these animals were disqualified even before they entered the Temple courtyard. Hence, if they are put up on the altar, they must be taken down. The list is explained in 8:1.", + "Rabbi Akiva declared blemished animals fit [to remain on the altar if they had already been put up]. Rabbi Hananya, chief of the priests, said: my father used to push blemished animals off the altar. Rabbi Akiva allows blemished animals to remain on the altar, even though they may have been blemished before they entered the courtyard. Rabbi Hananya, who himself seems to have served in the Temple, says that his father would push blemished animals off the altar. Interestingly, this is another case where the Mishnah does not seem to provide any more authority in Temple matters to priests than it does to non-priests. Rabbi Akiva does not seem to have changed his opinion, despite Rabbi Hananya’s testimony." + ], + [ + "Just as they do not descend once they have ascended, so they do not ascend if they have descended. Once one of the disqualified sacrifices listed in mishnah two is taken off the altar, it cannot be put back on.", + "And all of these, if they ascended alive to the top of the altar, they must descend. In contrast, if a live animal is put on the altar it may be taken off. The altar only sanctifies sacrifices that have already been slaughtered.", + "An olah which ascended live to the top of the altar, it must descend. If an olah is put alive on the altar, it still should be taken off. It should not be slaughtered there, even though all of it will eventually be burned on the altar.", + "If one slaughtered it on the top of the altar, he must skin it and dismember it where it lies. If, however, one did slaughter the olah on top of the altar, it has now become sanctified and cannot be taken down. It should be skinned and dismembered there on the altar. Then the skin can be removed for burning elsewhere and the pieces can be burned right there on the altar." + ], + [ + "The following if they ascended are taken down:
The flesh of most sacred sacrifices
The flesh of lesser sacrifices;
The remnants of the omer;
The two loaves;
The showbread;
The remnants of meal-offerings;
And the incense.
The wool on the heads of lambs, the hair of he-goats’ beards, the bones, tendons, horns and hoofs if they are attached, go up, because it is said, “And the priest shall turn it all into smoke on the altar” (Leviticus 1:9).
If they were severed [from the animal], they do not go up, for it is said, “And You shall offer your olah, the flesh and the blood, [upon the altar of the Lord your God]” (Deuteronomy 12:27).
Our mishnah lists things that are not meant to be on the altar at all, meaning not in any state. Unlike the things listed in mishnah two, which were once valid and then became invalid, these things were never supposed to be put on the altar. Therefore, even if they were put on the altar, the altar doesn’t sanctify them and they may be taken down.
Sections one and two: The flesh of sacrifices, both most holy sacrifices and lesser sacrifices, is meant to be eaten and not burned on the altar.
Section three: The volume of the omer, offered on the sixteenth of the month of Nissan, was a tenth of an ephah. A handful was burned on the altar and the rest was eaten by the priests. If the remnants were put on the altar, they may be taken down.
Section four: The two loaves that are brought on Shavuot are not meant to be put on the altar.
Section five: The showbread (Leviticus 24:5-19) sat on the golden table in the Sanctuary from week to week. It was eaten not sacrificed.
Section six: Part of the meal offering was put on the altar, but the remnant was eaten by the priests.
Section seven: The incense was put on the inner altar, the one in the Sanctuary. If it was mistakenly put on the outer altar, it can be taken down.
Sections eight and nine: This section seems to be based on a contradiction between the two quoted verses. The verse from Leviticus seems to say that the entire olah is burned on the altar, whereas the verse from Deuteronomy says that only the flesh and blood are burned. The first verse implies that non-flesh and blood parts of the animal, the hair, the bones, sinews etc. are burned, whereas the second implies that they are not. The mishnah resolves this contradiction by stating that when the non-flesh and blood parts are detached from the flesh and blood, then they are not burned on the altar and if they are put up there, they should be taken down. If they are put up there while still attached to the animal, then they have been sanctified and cannot be taken down." + ], + [ + "And if any of these sprang off from the altar they are not replaced. If any item that is not supposed to be taken down from the altar, whether it was one of the list of disqualified sacrifices found in mishnah two, or the hair, bones, sinews etc. referred to in yesterday’s mishnah, is flung off the altar by the power of the fires of the altar, it is not put back on. In other words, if a person used his own power to take them off, then they must be put back on. But if they come off the altar due to some other power, they need not be put back on.", + "Similarly, if a coal sprang off from the altar, it is not replaced. The same is true for a coal found on the altar if it comes off on its own, it need not be put back.", + "Limbs that sprang off from the altar: if before midnight, must be replaced, and they involve trespass; after midnight, they are not replaced and do not involve trespass. Up until midnight, the mitzvah to burn the limbs of the sacrifice has not been fulfilled (see Berachot 1:1). Up until this point, the limbs “belong” to the altar, if you will. Therefore, if they come off on their own, they must be put back. Up until this point, one who unintentionally derives benefit from them has trespassed Temple property. After midnight, their mitzvah has been completed and therefore one who derives benefit from them has not trespassed (although he should not do so). If one of the limbs does fall off the altar after midnight, it need not be replaced." + ], + [ + "Just as the altar sanctifies whatever is eligible for it, so does the ascent sanctify whatever is eligible for it;
And just as the altar and the ascent sanctify whatever is eligible for them, so do vessels sanctify.
Vessels for liquids sanctify liquids,
And the measures sanctify dry material.
A liquid vessel does not sanctify dry matter, nor does a dry [measure] sanctify a liquid.
If holy vessels were perforated and they can be used for the same purpose as when whole, they sanctify [what is placed in them]; if not, they do not sanctify.
And all these sanctify only in the holy place.
The final mishnah of our chapter teaches that the altar is not the only item that sanctifies that which is fit for it other items in the Temple do so as well.
Section one: The ascent is the ramp that leads up to the altar. If something that is fit for the altar is brought onto the ascent, it is sanctified and cannot be taken down. The same rules that apply to things that ascend onto the altar will apply to the ascent.
Section two: The ministering vessels, listed in Exodus 30:28-29, also sanctify things that are put in them, as long as they are fit.
Sections three-five: There are vessels meant to hold liquids, such as wine libations, and there are vessels meant to hold dry measures, such as the minhah (grain) offerings. Each type of vessel only sanctifies the type of material it is meant to hold.
Section six: If there is a hole in one of the vessels but it can still be used for its original purpose, then it still sanctifies that which is put in it. But if it can no longer be used, then it has lost its status as a holy vessel and it does not sanctify that which is put in it.
Section seven: The sanctifying effect of the vessels is dependent upon their being in the Temple courtyard. If the vessel is taken out of the courtyard, it will no longer sanctify." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Whatever is more frequent than another, takes precedence over the other.
The daily offerings precede the additional offerings;
The additional offerings of Shabbat precede the additional offerings of Rosh Hodesh;
The additional offerings of Rosh Hodesh precede the additional offerings of Rosh Hashanah.
As it is said, “You shall present these in addition to the morning portion of the regular burnt offering” (Numbers 28:23).
The first five mishnayot of this chapter deal with the order in which different sacrifices are offered. There are two general rules, one which we will see in this mishnah and one in the next mishnah.
Section one: This is a general principle that is today often invoked when determining which prayer, or which blessing is recited first (for instance over the matzah on Pesah). As is frequently the case, a principle that plays a large role in later halakhah, has its origins in sacrificial law.
Sections two-four: Here, the principle is invoked in connection to the daily offerings and the additional offerings (musaf). A more frequent sacrifice is offered first.
Section five: This is the proof text that the daily tamid, the morning offering, is offered before the other additional offerings for holidays. The verse implies that the morning offering has already been offered before the other sacrifices are offered. Hence, whatever is more frequent comes first." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe principle that whatever is more frequent takes precedence is determinative only when there is a set frequency to a given sacrifice. Most sacrifices are offered whenever a person needs to bring one without a determined frequency. Therefore, there is a different principle as to which takes precedence.", + "Whatever is more sacred than another precedes the other. The principle invoked here is that whatever is more sacred is offered first. As we shall see below, there are different ways of determining what is more sacred.", + "The blood of a hatat precedes the blood of a olah, because it propitiates. If a priest has to sprinkle blood from a hatat and blood from an olah, he first sprinkles the blood from the hatat because the hatat propitiates (atones) for sin, whereas an olah does not have that function. Here we see that sanctity is determined by what a sacrifice does the greater effect it has, the greater its sanctity.", + "The limbs of a olah precede the innards of a hatat, because it [the former] is entirely for the fires [of the altar]. An olah is completely burned, whereas parts of the hatat are eaten. This means, to the mishnah, that an olah is more sacred. Therefore, the parts of the olah that are burned take precedence over the parts of the hatat that have to be burned.", + "A hatat precedes an asham, because its blood is sprinkled on the four horns and on the base. A hatat is holier than an asham because it requires four full blood applications, whereas the asham requires only two that are four (they are applied on the corners. See above 5:3 and 5:5.", + "An asham precedes a today and a nazirite’s ram, because it is a most holy sacrifice. An asham is a most holy sacrifice and therefore it is offered before sacrifices of lesser sanctity such as the todah and the nazirite’s ram, brought at the end of the term of his naziriteship.", + "A todah and a nazirite's ram precede a shelamim, because they are eaten one day [only] and require [the accompaniment of] loaves. The shelamim is also a sacrifice of lesser sanctity. But the todah and nazirite’s ram can only be eaten for one day and night, whereas the shelamim can be eaten the next day and night. And when a todah or nazirite’s ram are brought, loaves accompany them. Here we see that more restrictions and more mitzvoth (loaves) implies greater sanctity.", + "A shelamim precedes a firstling, because it requires four [blood] applications and laying [of hands], libations, and the waving of the breast and the thigh. The first-born animal is also considered a lesser sacrifice. The shelamim is offered before it because the shelamim requires four blood applications. It requires the bringer to lay his hands on the animal. It is accompanied by wine libations and when it is offered, the breast and thigh are waved. The only one of these elements found in a firstling is laying of the hands." + ], + [ + "A first-born precedes tithe, because its sanctity is from the womb, and it is eaten by priests. If a priest has a first-born and a tithe to sacrifice, he first sacrifices the first-born because it has greater sanctity than the tithe for two reasons: 1) it is sacred as soon as it is conceived, whereas the tithe has to wait until it is counted as a tenth animal to become sacred; 2) The first-born is eaten only by priests, whereas the tithe can be eaten by anyone.", + "Tithe precedes bird [-offerings] because it is a slaughtered sacrifice, and part of it is most sacred: its blood and innards. Tithe is sacrificed before either of the bird-offerings (olah and hatat) for two reasons: 1) It is a slaughtered whereas bird-offerings are nipped. Also, there are various sacrifices for which there is a sliding-scale: a rich person brings a bullock, a person of medium wealth brings a sheep or goat and a poor person brings a bird. Hence, a bird is a lesser sacrifice. 2) Part of the tithe is burned on the altar namely its blood and innards (emurim), the same way that parts of a most holy sacrifice are burned on the altar. In contrast, although the bird hatat and olah are most holy sacrifices, only the innards of the bird hatat are put on the altar. The entire bird olah is burned on the altar, and therefore one would think that the bird olah should take precedence over the tithe. But because the bird olah takes precedence over the bird hatat (as we shall see in tomorrow’s mishnah) the tithe, which definitely precedes the bird hatat, must also precede the bird olah." + ], + [ + "Birds precede meal-offerings (, because they are blood sacrifices. Meal-offerings are offered by the very, very poor, those who can’t even offer a bird (see Leviticus 5:11). Hence, a bird-offering precedes them. Also, the blood of a bird-offering is sprinkled on the altar, and there is obviously no blood to the meal-offering.", + "A sinner’s meal-offering precedes a voluntary meal-offering, because it comes on account of sin. The sinner’s meal offering (Leviticus 5:11) is brought to atone for certain sins, either various false oaths or bringing defilement into the Temple. It precedes the voluntary meal-offering because it atones, whereas the voluntary meal-offering does not atone for any sin.", + "A hatat of a bird precedes an olah of a bird. The rabbis derive from Leviticus 5:8 that the hatat takes precedence over the olah. Note that in 10:2 the mishnah stated that parts of the olah take place to parts of the hatat. That was in reference to parts of animal sacrifices. When it comes to the whole sacrifice, the hatat takes precedence.", + "And it is likewise when he dedicates them. When a person brings a bird offering as a hatat, he also brings one bird as on olah (Leviticus 5:7). When he separates them and declares which is the hatat and which is the olah, he must first designate the hatat and then the olah." + ], + [ + "All hatats in the Torah precede ashams, except the asham of a metzora (one with a skin, because it comes to make [a person] fit. As we learned in mishnah two of this chapter, the hatat takes precedence over the asham because its blood is sprinkled on all four corners of the altar, whereas the blood of the asham is sprinkled on only two corners. There is one exception to this rule and that is the asham of the metzora (Leviticus 14:14). The blood of this asham is placed on the ear, thumb and large toe of the metzora and it purifies him from his skin affliction. This makes him fit to participate in rituals which require purity. The metzora also brings a hatat and this sacrifice is also required in order for him to be purified from his affliction. However, since it is the blood from the asham and not the blood of the hatat that is placed on his body, it takes precedence.", + "All ashams of the Torah must be two-year olds and [two] silver shekels in value, except a nazirite’s asham and the asham of a metzorah, for they are a year old, and need not be [two] silver shekels in value. The mishnah now begins to discuss some general principles with regard to the asham. The Torah describes most ashams as being “rams.” In order to be a ram the animal must be at least two years old. The asham must also be worth at least two silver shekels. In describing the asham brought for illegal trespass of Temple property Leviticus 5:15 states that it must be worth “shekalim” which is the plural of “shekel.” The minimum number of a plural is two, and therefore the asham ram must be worth at least two shekels. There are two exceptions to this rule: the asham brought by the nazirite and the asham brought by the metzora. When it comes to the nazirite’s asham, Numbers 6:12 says that he must “bring a lamb (keves) in its first year as an asham.” The same word “keves” is used in Leviticus 14:12 with regard to the metzora’s asham, and hence we can learn that it too is one year old, and not two. If a two-year old ram is worth two shekels, then a one year old lamb is not worth two shekels (at least not usually). Therefore, the rabbis waive the requirement that these ashams, which are lambs and not rams, must be worth two silver shekels." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah returns to the discussion of what sacrifices take precedence over other sacrifices.", + "Just as they take precedence in being offered, so they take precedence in being eaten. Until now our chapter of mishnah has been discussing precedence with regard to sacrificing an animal (or meal-offering). Now the mishnah adds that if someone has two or more sacrifices to eat, the rules of precedence continue to apply. The hatat precedes the asham, the asham precedes the todah, etc.", + "Yesterday’s shelamim and today’s shelamim, yesterday’s takes precedence. A shelamim can be eaten the day it is sacrificed, the following night and the following day. Since yesterday’s shelamim must be eaten before the day is over, it takes precedence over today’s shelamim, which has longer in which to be eaten.", + "Yesterday’s shelamim and today’s hatat and asham, yesterday's shelamim takes precedence, the words of Rabbi Meir. But the sages say: the hatat takes precedence, because it is a most sacred sacrifice. Yesterday’s shelamim must be eaten by the end of the day, whereas the hatat and the asham that were offered today can be eaten today and tonight. To Rabbi Meir, the fact that the shelamim must be eaten earlier than the hatat or asham means that it takes precedence, despite the general rule that the asham and hatat take precedence over the shelamim. The sages rule that today’s hatat takes precedence over yesterday’s shelamim, and the same would hold true for today’s asham. Since they are most holy sacrifices their innate holiness overrides any consideration of how much longer the sacrifice can be eaten." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses how the sacrifices that priests eat are to be prepared. It is brought here because the debate between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Shimon is tangentially related to the debate between the sages and Rabbi Shimon in yesterday’s mishnah.", + "And in all of these, the priests may deviate in how they eat, and eat them roasted, stewed or boiled. The priest(s) eating the sacrifice may choose to prepare the meat in any way they wish. There are no restrictions as to how the meat can be eaten.", + "And one may season them with hullin spices or terumah spices, the words of Rabbi Shimon. According to Rabbi Shimon, the priest may spice his sacrificial meat with either sacred (terumah) or non-sacred (hullin) spices.", + "Rabbi Meir says: one should not season them with terumah spices, so as not to bring terumah to unfitness. Rabbi Meir points out that by spicing his sacrificial meat with terumah spices, the priest might cause the terumah to become unfit for eating. This is because there is a time limit as to how long any sacrifice can be eaten, be it the day it is slaughtered and the following night, or the following night and day. If he spices the meat with terumah, then the spices will absorb some of the taste of the meat. Since they have the taste of the meat, they will be restricted with regard to how long they can be eaten, just as the meat was restricted. Once past this time, they will need to be burned, the same rule that applies to the meat. Thus, by spicing his sacrifice with terumah he may cause terumah to have to be burned, and this is prohibited. Rabbi Meir rules, therefore, that the priest should not use terumah to season his sacrificial meal." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn this mishnah Rabbi Shimon points out how one could identify what type of oil is being divided up by the priests in the Temple courtyard and what type of oil is being burned in order to remove it.", + "Rabbi Shimon said: if you see oil being divided in the Temple courtyard, you don’t need to ask what it is for, for it is the remnant of oil of the wafers of the Israelite’s meal-offerings, or of the metzora’s log of oil. The extra oil used to anoint the meal offering brought by an Israelite goes to the priests. The “wafers of the Israelite’s meal-offerings” refers to a type of meal offering that is either brought as loaves soaked with oil or as wafers that have been dabbed with oil (see Leviticus 2:4: we will learn a lot more about the meal-offering, the minhah, in tractate Menahot). The remnant of the oil brought by the metzora (a person afflicted with scale disease, see Leviticus 14:15) also belongs to the priest. This oil is brought in a vessel and used among other things to anoint the metzora. What is leftover, the priest gets to keep.", + "If you see oil being poured on to the fires, you don’t need not ask what it is for, for it is the remnant of the oil of the wafers of priests’ meal-offerings, or of the anointed priest's meal-offering; for one cannot voluntarily offer offer oil [alone]. Rabbi Shimon now explains what oil doesn’t go to the priest and instead is poured out onto the altar. If the priest is bringing the minhah (meal) offering, then neither he nor any other priest gets to keep the oil. All of this meal offering, and all of the oil, is burned. The high priest (the anointed priest) offers a minhah offering every day. The remnant of this oil does not go to the priests, but rather is burned.. A person cannot voluntarily offer just oil. Therefore, any oil that one sees in the Temple being either divided up among the priests or burned on the altar cannot come from a voluntary offering. This line comes to explain how one knows that the oil being divided up among the priests or burned on the altar is not from a voluntary offering oil simply cannot be brought alone as a voluntary offering.", + "Rabbi Tarfon say: oil can be voluntarily offered [alone]. Rabbi Tarfon disagrees and holds that oil can be brought as an individual offering. Therefore, if one sees oil being divided or burned it might also come from such an offering." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nIn connection with a hatat, Leviticus 6:20 states, “Anything that touches its flesh shall become holy; and if any of its blood is spattered upon a garment, you shall wash the bespattered part in the holy place.”\nThis chapter deals with various details that stem from this verse. Our mishnah deals with the second half of the verse.", + "If the blood of a hatat spurted on to a garment, it must be washed. As the second half of verse 20 states, if blood from a hatat splatters onto a piece of clothing, the piece of clothing must be washed.", + "Though scripture speaks only of [hatats] which are eaten, for it is said, “In the holy place shall it be eaten,” (Leviticus 6:19), yet both those which may be eaten and the inner [sacrifices] necessitate washing, for it is said, “[This is] the law of the hatat” (Leviticus 6:18), there is one law for all hatats. The mishnah clarifies that verse 20 speaks about all hatats, both those that are eaten by the priests and those that are offered inside the Sanctuary on the golden altar and are not eaten (see 5:1-2). Although verse 19 seems to refer only to hatats that are eaten, since verse 18 refers to all hatats, the rules that are in verse 20 are understood as referring to all hatats as well." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah teaches that when Leviticus 6:20 states, “And if any of its [the hatat] blood is spattered upon a garment, you shall wash the bespattered part in the holy place,” it is only referring to a valid hatat, and not to a disqualified one.", + "The blood of a disqualified hatat does not necessitate washing, whether it had a period of fitness or did not have a period of fitness. If the blood came from a disqualified hatat, then the garment does not require ritual cleansing (I might advise one to wash it before wearing it again, but that’s not the type of washing referred to here). This applies whether or not the hatat was once valid and then became disqualified (“had a period of fitness”) or whether it was disqualified from the minute it was sacrificed (“did not have a period of fitness”). The mishnah now explains these two categories.", + "Which had a period of fitness? One [whose blood] was kept overnight, or was defiled, or was taken out [of the Temple courtyard]. There are three cases where the hatat “had a period of fitness”. First it was sacrificed properly and then: 1) its blood was kept overnight in the Temple courtyard; 2) It was defiled for instance its flesh was defiled before the blood was sprinkled; 3) The blood was taken out of the Temple courtyard before it was sprinkled on the altar. For more information on these categories see 9:2.", + "Which did not have a period of fitness? One which was slaughtered [with the intention of eating it] after the appropriate time or outside the appropriate bounds; or whose blood was received by unfit persons, and sprinkled by them. If the hatat was slaughtered improperly, for instance with the wrong intention, or its blood was received and/or sprinkled by a person not qualified to do so (see 2:1), then the blood never had a period of fitness." + ], + [ + "If [blood] spurted [direct] from the [animal's] throat onto a garment, it does not require washing.
From the horn or from the base [of the altar], it does not require washing.
If it spilled out on to the floor [of the Temple] and [the priest] collected it, [and then it splattered onto a garment] it does not require washing.
Only blood which was received in a vessel and is fit for sprinkling requires washing.
If [the blood] spurted on to the hide, before it was flayed, it does not require washing.
[If it spurted] after it was flayed, it requires washing, the words of Rabbi Judah. Rabbi Elazar says: even [if it spurted on the skin] after it was flayed [it does not require washing].
Only the place of the blood requires washing.
And whatever is eligible to contract uncleanness,
And whatever is fit for washing.
Sections one-four: In section four the general rule that explains the first three sections of the mishnah is stated. The blood which if spilled on a garment requires the garment to be washed is only blood that was in a vessel and was fit for being sprinkled on the altar. In other words, totally valid blood, ready to be spilled onto the altar, contaminates the garment, because that’s not where the blood is supposed to be. But if the blood was not valid blood in a vessel, the garment need not be ritually washed.
The mishnah lists three such possibilities.
1) Blood which splatters directly from the neck of the animal onto the garment. Since it is not in a vessel, the blood doesn’t contaminate the garment.
2) If the blood was already spilled on the horn or the base of the altar, and then it gets on the garment, the blood doesn’t contaminate. This blood has already fulfilled its purpose and therefore it no longer contaminates.
3) If it had spilled onto the floor of the Temple, it can no longer be sprinkled onto the altar. Since it is no longer eligible for the altar, it doesn’t contaminate.
Section five: Before the hide is flayed from the animal, it is not a “garment” and not even in a state from which it can become a garment. Therefore, if blood spills on it, it is not contaminated.
Section six: According to Rabbi Judah, once it has been flayed, the hide is close enough to a garment, that it can become contaminated by the hatat blood. Even though a hide usually cannot become impure until it has been processed, if one should decide to use it as a garment in its current state, it would become susceptible to impurity. [We will learn more about this when we learn Seder Toharot]. Therefore, Rabbi Judah says it does require washing.
Rabbi Elazar says that since it is not at this moment susceptible to impurity, it does not require washing.
Section seven: The entire garment does not require washing, just the point that came into contact with blood.
Section eight: Only a garment that is susceptible to impurity must be washed. This would seem to exclude a piece of cloth so small that it can no longer become impure.
Section nine: Finally, if the garment cannot be washed, for instance a garment made of wood (I know, sounds weird), then it doesn’t require washing. The Torah only requires that washables be washed." + ], + [ + "Whether a garment, a sack, or a hide, it requires washing in a holy place. No matter the material of the garment, whether it be normal cloth, probably made of wool or linen, or coarse sack-cloth or a hide, it must be washed in the holy place, which means in the Temple courtyard. This is stated explicitly in Leviticus 6:20.", + "The breaking of an earthen vessel must be in a holy place. Leviticus 6:21 states, “An earthen vessel in which it [the hatat] was boiled shall be broken.” The mishnah teaches that just as the washing of the garment must be in the Temple courtyard, so too the breaking of the copper vessel must be done there. In both cases the hatat contaminates, and therefore the contamination must be cleansed.", + "And the scouring and rinsing of a copper vessel must be in a holy place. The continuation of the verse states, “If it was boiled in a copper vessel, [the vessel] shall be scoured and rinsed with water.” This too must be done in the Temple courtyard.", + "In this the hatat is more stringent than [other] sacrifices of higher sanctity. In this regard, the laws concerning the hatat are more stringent than the laws concerning other sacrifices, even most holy ones. In cases involving other sacrifices, the garment can be washed, the earthen vessel can be broken and the copper vessel can be rinsed and scoured in places other than the Temple courtyard." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to deal with washing a garment or breaking an earthen vessel in the holy place in order to cleanse it from contamination from the hatat.", + "If a garment was carried outside the curtains [of the Tabernacle], it must re-enter, and is washed it in the holy place. If the garment which was splattered with the hatat blood is brought out of Temple confines (the Mishnah always uses the term “curtains” which refers to the Tabernacle, even though it clearly means the walls of the Temple), it must be brought back into the Temple and washed there.", + "If it was defiled outside the curtains, one must tear it, then it re-enters, and is washed in the holy place. If it is defiled outside the Temple, it cannot be brought back into the Temple because it is prohibited to bring defilement into the Temple. Therefore, he should tear it, and thereby make it no longer susceptible to impurity. Once garments are torn and thereby no longer are “garments” they are pure. Then he can bring it back into the Temple and wash it there.", + "If an earthen vessel was carried outside the hangings, it re-enters and is broken in a holy place. Similarly, with regard to the earthen vessel. If it is brought out of the Temple, he should bring it back in and break it inside the Temple.", + "If it was defiled outside the curtains, a hole is made in it, then it re-enters and is broken in a holy place. And if it becomes impure outside the Temple, he puts a hole in it. This makes it pure because a vessel with a hole in it is no longer usable as a vessel and it thereby becomes pure. Then he can bring it back in and break it inside the Temple." + ], + [ + "If a copper vessel was carried outside the hangings, it re-enters and is scoured and rinsed in a holy place.
If it was defiled outside the hangings, it must be broken through, then it re-enters and is scoured and rinsed in a holy place.
This mishnah teaches the exact same law as was found in yesterday’s mishnah, except that today’s mishnah refers to a copper vessel. Since the law is the same, I refer the reader to yesterday’s mishnah for more commentary.
Section two: In order to purify the copper vessel, he must make a large hole in it, for metal vessels become pure only if large holes are put into them." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe earthen vessel is broken and the copper vessel scoured and rinsed if sacrifices were cooked in them. Our mishnah continues to deal with this law.\nWe should note that again a mishnah concerning sacrificial law later becomes halakhically significant by being applied to other areas. The laws concerning cleansing the vessel in which a sacrifice is cooked are eventually used as a source for laws for how vessels are “kashered.”", + "Whether one boiled in it or poured boiling [sacrificial flesh] into it, whether most sacred sacrifices or lesser sacrifices, [the pot] requires scouring and rinsing. Rabbi Shimon says: lesser sacrifices do not require scouring and rinsing. The earthen vessel must be broken and the copper vessel scoured and rinsed whether they were used to boil a sacrifice or whether a boiled sacrifice was poured into them. The important thing is that since the sacrifice was hot when it was in the vessel, the vessel absorbed some of the taste of the sacrifice and it must subsequently be cleansed. This remains a normative law in kashrut – vessels absorb the taste of that which is cooked in them only if the food is hot. The verses from Leviticus 6 refer only to the hatat. Nevertheless, the rabbis extend these laws to other sacrifices. Just as the taste of the hatat needs to be removed from the vessels, so too does the taste of other sacrifices. The first opinion holds that this is true for most holy sacrifices, like the hatat and the asham, and for less holy sacrifices like the shelamim and todah. Rabbi Shimon says that if the vessel was used to cook a less holy sacrifice, it need not be scoured and rinsed.", + "Rabbi Tarfon says: if one boiled [sacrifices in a pot] at the beginning of a festival, he can boil in it during the whole festival. But the sages say: until the time of eating, scouring and rinsing. Rabbi Tarfon says that if a vessel was used to cook a sacrifice at the beginning of a seven day festival (Sukkot or Pesah), one can continue to use that vessel throughout the entire festival without scouring and rinsing it. Since the vessel will be in continuous use due to the large number of sacrifices offered during the festival, each time it is used the vessel will discharge the taste of the previous sacrifice cooked in it, and thereby the taste of that sacrifice will never become “remnant,” sacrifice left over past the time when it must be eaten. The other rabbis hold that the vessel must be scoured and rinsed before the time in which any sacrifice that was in it had to be eaten. For instance, if a hatat is put into the vessel, then the vessel must be scoured and rinsed by midnight, for that is when the hatat becomes remnant. This is true even if another sacrifice, for instance a shelamim, is cooked in there before this time. The rabbis disagree that the taste of the sacrifice will be completely discharged through cooking another sacrifice. Since the taste will remain, it must be scoured and rinsed within the time that any sacrifices are cooked in it.", + "Scouring is done as the scouring of a goblet; and rinsing is as the rinsing of a goblet, Scouring and rinsing are done to the copper vessels as is done with a goblet, which means that they are thoroughly cleansed.", + "Scouring [in hot water] and rinsing in cold [water]. There are two different versions of this line. According to one version, not found in manuscripts but accepted by the Rambam, scouring is done with hot water. Since the taste came in to the vessel through hot water, it can only be removed through hot water. According to the other version, the scouring need only be done through cold water. According to both versions, rinsing is done through cold water.", + "The spit and the grill are cleansed with hot water. A spit or grill upon which a sacrifice was roasted, must be cleansed by being put into boiling water. Since these were directly on the fire, the requirements for cleansing are greater." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah introduces several principles as to when taste is transferred from one thing to another. Again, while the principles here relate directly to sacrificial law that is no longer practiced today (and wasn’t practiced at the time of the Mishnah either), these principles are also applicable to the laws of kashrut and thus historically were and remain significant practical halakhah.", + "If one boiled sacrifices and hullin in it [the copper pot], or most holy sacrifices and lesser sacrifices, if they were sufficient to impart their flavor, the less stringent must be eaten as the more stringent of them; In both cases mentioned here, a person boils two different things in one pot, one of greater stringency (sacrifices, or most holy sacrifices) and one of lesser stringency (hullin, or less holy sacrifices). If there is enough of the sacrifices to impart a taste to the hullin, or enough most holy sacrifices to impart taste to the less holy sacrifices, then the rules of the stringent will apply to everything in the pot. Thus the hullin would have to be treated like sacrificial meat and the less holy sacrifices like most holy sacrifices. But if there is not enough to impart taste, then the more lenient rules remain in place.", + "But they do not necessitate scouring and rinsing; This line seems to say that even if the sacrifices impart their flavor, the pot still need not be scoured and rinsed. However, the Talmud emends the line to read “they do necessitate scouring and rinsing and they do disqualify by touch; if there is not enough to impart taste, then the less stringent need not be eaten as the more stringent ….” In other words, the Talmud emends the line to read the opposite of what it actually says. As long as the more stringent stuff does not impart taste, the less stringent rules apply.", + "And they do not disqualify by touch. Leviticus 6:20 states that anything that touches the flesh of the hatat shall become holy. The rabbis rule that any food that absorbs the taste of sacrifices becomes holy like the sacrifice. If the sacrifice is unfit then it too is unfit. If he cooks a mixture of sacrifices and hullin in a pot, and there is not enough sacrifice to impart a taste to the mixture, then the mixture does not disqualify other food which absorbs its taste. (This is according to the talmudic reading of this line, which I mentioned above in my commentary to section two).", + "If [an unfit] wafer touched a [fit] wafer, or an [unfit] piece of meat touched a [fit] piece of meat, not the whole wafer or the whole piece of meat is forbidden; only the part that absorbed [of the unfit] is forbidden. When a permitted thing and a forbidden thing touch and the permitted thing absorbs some of the taste of the forbidden thing, only the part that absorbed the taste would become prohibited. The mishnah illustrates this with regard to the wafer (brought as an accompaniment to a sacrifice) or a piece of sacrificial flesh." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nOur chapter discusses what parts of the sacrifices the priests receive. Our mishnah begins by pointing out which priests do not receive a share.", + "A tebul yom and one who lacks atonement do not share in sacrifices for consumption in the evening. A tebul yom is a priest who immersed in a mikveh in order to cleanse himself of his impurity but the sun has not yet set upon him. He cannot eat sacrifices, although he is clean once he has been in the mikveh. “One who lacks atonement” is an impure priest, for instance one who had been a zav, who had to bring a sacrifice the day after he immerses in a mikveh. He cannot eat sacrificial meat until after he brings the sacrifices, even though he is clean after having gone in the mikveh. Both of these types of priest do not receive their share of sacrificial meat today, in order to eat it tomorrow, or tonight. Since they cannot currently eat sacrifices, they lose out on their share.", + "An onen may handle [sacrifices], but he may not offer them, and he does not receive a share for consumption in the evening. An onen is a person (in this case a priest) whose close relative has died. The priest remains an onen on the day of the death according to Torah law, but the rabbis add that he remains an onen throughout the following night as well. An onen is not allowed to eat sacrifices, but he can touch them, for he is not impure. He does not receive a share in order to eat that night, since this is rabbinically forbidden.", + "Priests with blemishes, whether permanent or passing, receive a share and may eat [of the sacrifices] but they may not offer them. A priest with a blemish cannot offer sacrifices, but he can eat them and therefore he receives his share with the other priests. See Leviticus 21:21-23.", + "Whoever is not eligible for service does not share in the flesh. A priest who is not eligible to take part in the service, for instance a priest who is impure, does not receive part of the sacrificial flesh. The exception is those with blemishes, as stated in section three.", + "And he who does not share in the flesh does not share in the hides. Someone who doesn’t get his part of the flesh, also loses out on his part of the hides of the sacrifices.", + "Even if one was unclean when the blood was sprinkled but clean when the fats were burned [on the altar], he does not share in the flesh, for it is said: “he among the sons of Aaron, that offers the blood of the shelamim, and the fat, shall have the right thigh for a portion” (Leviticus 7:33). Even if the person was impure during the day when the blood was sprinkled on the altar, and then pure in the evening when the fats were burned, he still doesn’t get a share of the flesh or hides, until he is pure at the point when the blood is sprinkled. This is derived from the verse which says that one who offers both the blood and the fat gets a portion of the flesh – but if he can’t offer the blood, he loses his portion. In other words, no blood, no flesh!" + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah teaches that the priests have the right to the hide of a sacrifice only if the flesh of the sacrifice was burned on the altar.", + "Whenever the altar does not acquire its flesh, the priests do not acquire the hide, for it is said, “[And the priest that offers] any man’s olah [the priest shall have … the hide]” (Leviticus 7:8), [this means,] an olah which went up on the altar on behalf a man. If for some reason the flesh of the sacrifice cannot be burned on the altar, for instance it was sacrificed with a disqualifying intention, then the priests also don’t acquire the hides. This is learned from a midrash on Leviticus 7:8 which implies that when the priest successfully sacrifices a person’s olah, then he gets to keep the hide. Only if the olah is actually put on the altar, does the priest receive the hide.", + "If an olah was slaughtered under a different designation, although it does not count for its owner, its hide belongs to the priests. If the olah was slaughtered with the intent of it being a different sacrifice, it can be put on the altar, even though it does not discharge the owner of his obligation (see 1:1). Since it can be put on the altar, the priest does receive the hide.", + "Whether [it be] a man’s olah or a woman's olah, the hide belong to the priests. Even the Torah says, “man”, the priest receives the hide of the sacrifice whether it was brought by a man or a woman. The word “man” in this context was not meant to exclude a woman." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses who receives the hides of different types of sacrifices.", + "The hides of less holy sacrifices belong to their owners. The Torah states that the hide of an olah goes to the priests. Since the olah is a most holy sacrifice (as is the hatat and the asham), the rabbis extrapolate that the hides of all most holy sacrifices go to the priests, as we shall see below. But when it comes to the hides of less holy sacrifices, such as the shelamim, the todah, the tithe and the first-born, they go to those who bring these sacrifices.", + "The hides of most holy sacrifices belong to the priest. This is a kal vehomer: if with an olah, even though they do not acquire its flesh they do acquire its hide, is it not logical that they acquire the hides of most holy sacrifices, when they do acquire their flesh? While the Torah states that the hides of the olah go to the priest, the rabbis expand this to include all most holy sacrifices. The argument is a kal vehomer argument, which roughly translates as an “all the more so” type of argument. If the priests receive the hide even when they don’t receive the flesh, as is the case with the olah, all the more so they receive the hide when they do receive the flesh, as is the case with the asham and hatat.", + "The altar does not refute [this argument], for it does not acquire the hide in any instance. In order to refute a kal vehomer argument, what one must do is show that the relationship between the two things being discussed is not stable. In our case, the mishnah tried to claim that the relationship between hide and flesh is stable whenever one receives the flesh, he receives the hide. However, the altar could seemingly prove the opposite the altar receives the flesh and doesn’t receive the hide. Therefore, we could say that the priests receive the flesh of most holy sacrifices but they don’t receive the hide. The mishnah rejects this argument because the altar never receives the hide, unlike the priests who do receive the hide of the olah. In other words, we reason the kal vehomer argument from the fact that the priests do receive the hide of the olah and therefore they also receive the hide of other most holy sacrifices, and not from some general argument that any time someone receives the flesh, he also receives the hide." + ], + [ + "All sacrifices which became disqualified, before they were flayed, their hides do not belong to the priests. After they were flayed, their hides belong to the priests. When sacrifices are disqualified, they cannot be eaten. The question in our mishnah is what to do with the hides when the priests do not get the flesh. If the sacrifice was disqualified before the animal was flayed, then the hide does not belong to the priest. In this case the disqualification renders the hide disqualified as well. If the disqualification takes place after the hide has already been removed, then it does not affect the status of the hide, which goes to the priest.", + "Rabbi Hanina vice-chief of the priests said: Never in my life have I seen a hide go out to the place of burning. Rabbi Hanina was the vice-chief of the priests, and hence his testimony of what occurred in the Temple is first-hand. Rabbi Hanina claims that he never saw a hide go out to be burned in the place of burning, which is what would have to be done to a hide if it was disqualified from going to either the priest or the owner. Rather, the always went to the priests (or to the owners in the case of less holy sacrifices). This line is an interesting interpolation of actual Temple practice into abstract rabbinic law concerning what is supposed to happen in the Temple. As I have stated many times, the rabbis’ laws are not simply recordings of what actually happened in the Temple. Rather, they are based mostly on rabbinic interpretation of the Torah and rabbinic application of legal principles. These interpretations and principles are occasionally mixed in with traditions about what actually happened in the Temple. Very rarely do we have a priest actually tell us what he saw in the Temple. And here, when a priest of priestly and rabbinic authority does testify, it seems to contradict what was stated above, for according to the previous halakhah, if the disqualification occurred before the animal was flayed, the hide must be burned.", + "Rabbi Akiva said: we learn from his words that if one flays a firstling and it is found to be terefah, the priests have a right to its hide. Rabbi Akiva attempts to derive a halakhah from Rabbi Hanina’s testimony. If a firstling was slaughtered, whether in the Temple as a sacrifice when it does not have a blemish, or outside the Temple when it is blemished, and it is found to be a terefah, an animal with an internal flaw such that it cannot be eaten, the priests receive the hide. Were it not for Rabbi Hanina’s testimony, we would have thought that the hide should have been burned.", + "But the sages say: “I have never seen” is not proof: rather, it [the hide] must go forth to the place of burning. The other rabbis discount Rabbi Hanina’s testimony as being valueless. The fact that he didn’t see something occur does not mean that it did not actually occur. Perhaps there was a hide burned at the burning place and not given to the priests but that this did not occur while Rabbi Hanina was serving in the Temple. Hence, the law cannot be based on his testimony, rather if the disqualification occurs before the animal is flayed, the priests do not receive the hide, as was stated in section one." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn chapter five mishnayot 1-2 we learned that in certain cases, namely that of certain bullocks and goats, the sacrificial rites are performed on the inner altar. Their blood is spilled on the inner altar. Our mishnah deals with where these sacrifices are burned.", + "Bullocks which are burned and goats which are burned: when they are burned in fulfillment of their prescribed commandment, they are burned in the ash depository (bet, and they defile garments. If the bullocks or goats had not been disqualified, then the flesh is burned in the “ash depository” or “bet hadeshen” which was outside of Jerusalem. In addition, one who burns these sacrifices must wash his clothes and any clothes that he touches, see Leviticus 16:28 and Yoma 6:7.", + "But when they are not burned in fulfillment of their commandment, they are burned in the bet habirah and they do not defile garments. However, if they were disqualified in some way, then they are burned in a place called “bet habirah.” According to some commentators there are two places that are called “bet habirah” one in the Temple courtyard, and one on the Temple Mount, outside the Temple. If they were disqualified before they left the courtyard, then they would be burned inside the Temple, and if they were disqualified after they left the courtyard, then they would be burned outside the Temple but on the Temple Mount. These bullocks and goats do not defile garments only valid ones are defiling." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to deal with the bullocks and goats whose blood was offered inside the sanctuary, in the inner altar. Specifically, the question is when do these carcasses defile the clothes of those who deal with them and cause him to defile any clothes that he touches.", + "They would carry them on staves [out of the Temple courtyard]. After the rites were performed inside the Sanctuary, they would carry the carcasses outside using staves.", + "If those in front had passed outside the wall of the Temple courtyard, but those in the back had not [yet] gone out, those in front defile their garments, while those in the back do not defile their garments, until they go out. When they both go out, both defile their garments. Rabbi Shimon says: neither defile [their garments] until the fire is burning in the greater part of them. The Torah (Leviticus 16:28) states that the one who burns these sacrifices shall wash his clothes. The debate in this section is when does someone become “one who burns.” According to the first opinion, the one who deals with these sacrifices defiles clothes once they have left the walls of the Temple courtyard. If some of those carrying the carcasses have left and some have not, then only those who have left the walls defile clothes. Once they have all left, they all defile. According to this interpretation “one who burns” is one who has left the Temple in order to burn one of these sacrifices. Rabbi Shimon holds that only once the fire has begun to consume a majority of the carcass of the bullock or goat does the one who burned it defile clothing. He interprets “one who burns” in a much more limiting fashion to defile one must actually begin the burning process.", + "When the flesh is dissolved, he who burns [it] does not defile his garments. Burning is over once the flesh has been dissolved. One who deals with the burning after this point does not defile clothes." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nChapter thirteen deals with the prohibition of slaughtering and offering sacrifices outside of the Temple. This prohibition is found in Leviticus 17 which reads:\nLeviticus 17:2-9 2 Speak to Aaron and his sons and to all the Israelite people and say to them: This is what the LORD has commanded: 3 if anyone of the house of Israel slaughters an ox or sheep or goat in the camp, or does so outside the camp, 4 and does not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting to present it as an offering to the LORD, before the LORD's Tabernacle, bloodguilt shall be imputed to that man: he has shed blood; that man shall be cut off from among his people... 8 Say to them further: If anyone of the house of Israel or of the strangers who reside among them offers a burnt offering or a sacrifice, 9 and does not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting to offer it to the LORD, that person shall be cut off from his people.\nNote that the verses prohibit slaughtering (verse 3) and offering (verse 9). The punishment for intentionally transgressing either of these prohibitions is karet, which is translated here as “cut off from his people.” According to the rabbis, any sin which is punished with karet when done intentionally, is atoned for with a sin-offering, a hatat, when done unwittingly. Our mishnah deals with how many hatats a person would be liable for if he unwittingly slaughters and offers a sacrifice outside of the Temple.", + "He who slaughters and offers up outside [the Temple courtyard] is liable in respect of slaughtering and in respect of offering. If one unwittingly slaughters and then offers a sacrifice outside of the Temple courtyard he is liable to bring two hatats one for slaughtering and one for offering it up.", + "Rabbi Yose the Galilean says: if he slaughtered inside and offered up outside, [he is liable]; if he slaughtered outside and offered up outside, he is not liable [for offering up], because he offered up only that which was unfit. Rabbi Yose the Galilean says that one is liable for offering outside the Temple only if he slaughtered it inside. If he slaughtered the animal outside and then offered it up outside he would be liable for only one hatat, since by the time he offered it up, it was already unfit by having been slaughtered outside. Rabbi Yose would read verse 3 as prohibiting slaughtering outside the Temple and verse 9 as saying that even if he slaughtered inside, where one is allowed to slaughter, he is punished for offering outside. Verse 9’s punishment for offering up does not apply if verse 3’s prohibition of slaughtering outside was already transgressed.", + "They said to him: even when one slaughters inside and offers up outside, since he carries it out, he renders it unfit. The rabbis reject his argument, claiming that even if he slaughters it inside and then carries it outside, he is still offering up something that is unfit. In other words, there is no way to offer up a fit sacrifice outside the Temple because as soon as it leaves the Temple it is unfit. Nevertheless, verse 9 punishes one who offers a sacrifice outside the Temple. The only conclusion is that this verse is applicable even if the sacrifice was already disqualified. Thus he must bring two hatats one for slaughtering and one for offering." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah contains a debate between the sages and Rabbi Yose the Galilean similar in structure to the debate in yesterday’s mishnah. Here the topic is an unclean person who eats sacrifices. This is prohibited in Leviticus 7:20.", + "An unclean [person] who eats [of sacrifices], whether unclean sacrifices or clean sacrifices, is liable. Leviticus 7:20 says that an unclean person who intentionally eats a sacrifice is punished with karet. According to the first opinion in the mishnah, this prohibition applies whether the sacrifice was clean and therefore permitted, or unclean and was prohibited.", + "Rabbi Yose the Galilean says: an unclean person who eats clean [sacrifices] is liable, but an unclean person who eats unclean [sacrifices] is not liable because he ate only that which is unclean. Rabbi Yose the Galilean says that an unclean person is liable for eating a sacrifice that he would otherwise have been allowed to eat, i.e a clean sacrifice. If he ate an unclean sacrifice he is not liable because he couldn’t have eaten it even if he was clean. This is similar to Rabbi Yose’s reasoning in yesterday’s mishnah, where he stated that one is liable for offering up a sacrifice outside of the Temple only if the sacrifice was slaughtered in the Temple.", + "They said to him: even when an unclean person eats clean [sacrifices], when he touches it, he defiles it. As in yesterday’s mishnah, the sages respond to Rabbi Yose the Galilean by saying that an unclean person cannot eat a clean sacrifice, because as soon as he touches it, he renders it unclean. Therefore, when the Torah states that it is a transgression for an unclean person to eat a sacrifice, it doesn’t make a difference whether the sacrifice was clean (before he began to eat it) or unclean in both cases he is liable.", + "A clean person who eats unclean [sacrifices] is not liable, because one is liable only on account of bodily uncleanness. The mishnah now limits the punishment in Leviticus 7:20 to a case of an unclean person who eats a clean sacrifice. While it is forbidden for a clean person to eat an unclean sacrifice, he is not liable for karet or a hatat if he does so." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with various differences between the laws governing the prohibition of slaughtering a sacrifice outside of the Temple and those prohibiting offering a sacrifice outside of the Temple.", + "Slaughtering [outside the Temple] is more stringent than offering up [outside], and offering up [is more stringent] than slaughtering. This is a classic style of introduction in the Mishnah. The rabbis seem to have been fascinated by these types of situations, sometimes the laws of x (here slaughtering) are stricter than those of the related prohibition y (here offering) whereas sometimes the situation is opposite and the laws governing y are more stringent than x.", + "Slaughtering is more stringent, for he who slaughters [a sacrifice] to a man is liable, whereas he who offers up to a man is not liable. The laws governing slaughtering are more stringent, for he who slaughters an animal to a man, in worship of that man, is liable. However, one who offers up a sacrifice in worship of a man is not liable. This distinction is derived midrashically from the verses in Leviticus 7.", + "Offering up is more stringent: two who hold a knife and slaughter are not liable, [whereas] if two take hold of a limb and offer it up, they are liable. If two people together hold a knife and slaughter an animal then neither is liable. This is because each could have done the act on his own, and often when an act that could be done by one person is performed jointly by two, both are exempt. However, we would not say about offering that it is an act that could be performed by one person. It could be performed by as many people who wish to do so. Therefore, each person who offers up a limb of the animal outside of the Temple is liable for karet or a hatat.", + "If one offered up, then offered up again, then offered up again, he is liable in respect of each [act of] offering up, the words of Rabbi Shimon. Rabbi Yose says: he is liable for only one. According to Rabbi Shimon, if one offers up the limb of an animal multiple times, he is liable for each and every act. Rabbi Shimon looks at each act as being separate and therefore each carries its own culpability. Rabbi Yose says that one cannot really offer up the same animal (or piece thereof) twice. Thus he is liable for only one hatat, even though he offered it up multiple times.", + "He is liable only when he offers up on the top of an altar. Rabbi Shimon says: he is liable even if he offers up on the top of a rock or a stone. According to the first opinion he is liable only if he offers up the sacrifice on an altar which he built outside the Temple. Without an altar, something is not really a sacrifice. Rabbi Shimon disagrees and holds that even if he offers it on a rock or a stone, which are not properly built altars, he is still liable for offering a sacrifice outside of the Temple." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to deal with the prohibition of offering a sacrifice outside of the Temple.", + "In regard to both valid sacrifices or invalid sacrifices which had become unfit within [the Temple]: if one offers them outside, he is liable. One is liable for offering up outside of the Temple either a valid sacrifice or an invalid sacrifice that had been invalidated while it was in the Temple. The rule with regard to such sacrifices is that if they are put on the altar they do not come down (see 9:2). However, if one offers up a sacrifice that had been disqualified outside of the Temple, one that if put up on the altar would have to be taken down, he is not liable.", + "If one offers up outside [the Temple] as much as an olive’s worth of an olah and its innards [combined], he is liable. In order to be liable for offering up a sacrifice outside the Temple, one must offer up at least an olive’s worth of flesh. The mishnah rules that when offering an olah, a sacrifice that is wholly burned, the flesh and the innards, which are always burned for every sacrifice, add up together. Assumedly, in a sacrifice that is partially eaten, the parts that are eaten would not be combined with the parts that are normally burned, in order to add up to the requisite olive’s worth.", + "As for the fistful [of flour], the frankincense, the incense, the priests’ meal-offering, the anointed priest’s meal-offering, and the meal offering of libations, if [one] offered up as much as an olive of one of these outside, he is liable. But Rabbi Elazar exempts him unless he offers up the whole of them. All of the types of sacrifices listed in this section were explained in 4:3. They are all completely burned on the altar, without any of their parts being eaten by priests or non-priests. According to the first opinion, even though they are completely burned, if one offers up even a part of them outside of the Temple, he is liable. Rabbi Elazar disagrees and holds that just as they must be completely burned on the altar if done properly, so too in order for one to be liable for offering them outside the Temple, they must be completely offered.", + "In all of these cases, if they offered them within, and left over an olive’s worth and one offered it outside, he is liable. Rabbi Elazar, however, agrees that if most of one of the above-mentioned things is offered on the altar, and then an olive’s worth is left over and offered outside the Temple, that one is liable. Since this olive’s worth completes the offering of the sacrifice, one is liable for offering it up outside.", + "In all of these cases, if they became lacking something, and one offered them outside, he is not liable. The sacrifices in section three must be completely offered for them to be valid. Therefore, if even the smallest part of them is missing and one offers it up outside the Temple, he is not liable. In other words, since this would not have been valid had it been offered on the altar, it doesn’t make one liable if offered outside." + ], + [ + "One who offers sacrifices together with the innards outside the Temple, is liable. In this case one offers parts of sacrifices that are eaten, together with the innards that are burned on the altar. Had he offered up just the edible parts outside the Temple, he would not be liable, because these parts did not need to be put on the altar. He is liable for offering the innards, because one is liable for offering up outside the Temple anything that should have been burned on the altar. This is true even if the sacrifices that are to be eaten were directly on the fire and the innards were on top, and not directly upon the fire. The edible parts of the sacrifices don’t cause a separation between the fire and the innards because they are of the same type, and things that are of the same type don’t cause separation.", + "If a minhah had not had its fistful removed and one offered it outside, he is exempt. When a minhah, a meal-offering, is sacrificed, a fistful is removed and burned on the altar and then the remainder of the minhah can be eaten. Since part of the minhah is burned and part is eaten one is liable for offering up only the part that is supposed to be burned, as we saw in section one. If one offered up a minhah outside of the Temple before its fistful has been removed he is exempt because it has not yet been determined what part of the minhah was supposed to have been burned.", + "If one took out the fistful, and then the fistful went back into the minhah, and he offered it outside, he is liable. However, if the fistful is removed and thereby determined, and then it falls back into the remainder of the minhah, and he offers up the whole minhah outside the Temple, in this case he is liable because the fistful was determined, even though we now cannot tell what part was the fistful and what part was the remainder." + ], + [ + "As for the fistful and the frankincense, if one offered one of them [without the other] outside [the Temple], he is liable. Rabbi Elazar says: he is exempt unless he offers the second too. [If one offered] one inside and the other outside, he is liable. In order for the non-sacrificed parts of the minhah (meal) offering to be eaten, the fistful of the minhah and the frankincense must both be burned on the altar (see Leviticus 2:2-3). If one offers one of these outside of the Temple, he is still liable, according to the first opinion, even though he didn’t offer the other one. Rabbi Elazar says that he is exempt until he offers both the fistful and the frankincense, because one is not effective without the other. This matches his opinion in mishnah four. Rabbi Elazar agrees with the sages that if he offers one of them inside and then the other outside, he is liable. This is similar to the case in mishnah four where he offered most of a certain type of sacrifice inside the Temple, but left over an olive’s worth which he offered outside the Temple. Since this completes the offering, all agree that he is liable.", + "As for the two dishes of frankincense, if one offered one of them outside, he is liable. Rabbi Elazar says: he is exempt unless he offers the second too. [If one offered] one inside and the other outside, he is liable. Burning the two dishes of frankincense allows the priests to eat the showbread. Both dishes must be burned. Again, the first opinion holds that if he offers one of them outside the Temple he is liable, whereas Rabbi Elazar holds that he is not liable unless he offers both. As above, if he offers one inside the Temple and the other outside, Rabbi Elazar agrees that he is liable.", + "If one sprinkles part of the blood outside, he is liable. Every sprinkling of the blood is considered its own separate entity. Therefore, if one offers even one sprinkling of blood outside the Temple, he is liable, even if he didn’t perform the requisite two or four sprinklings. In this case Rabbi Elazar would agree.", + "Rabbi Elazar says: also one who makes a libation of the water of the Festival [of Sukkot] on the festival, outside is liable. On Sukkot there is a water libation. If one performs this water libation outside the Temple he is liable.", + "Rabbi Nehemiah says: if one offered the residue of the blood outside, he is liable. The remainder of the blood after some of it has been sprinkled is poured onto the base of the altar. If one offers this blood outside the Temple, he is liable." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with a person who “nips,” or slaughters a bird inside or outside the Temple and offers it up outside. As a reminder “nipping,” plucking off the head from the back of the neck, was the way that bird sacrifices were slaughtered inside the Temple, whereas slaughtering, slicing the neck with a knife, was how they were slaughtered outside the Temple, to be eaten not as a sacrifice.", + "If one nips a bird [offering] inside and offers it up outside, he is liable; Inside the Temple a bird is slaughtered by nipping. Therefore, if he nips it inside the Temple he has slaughtered it correctly. When he then brings it outside the Temple and offers it up there, he is liable because he has offered a valid sacrifice outside of the Temple.", + "If one nips it outside and offers it up outside, he is exempt. However, if he nips it outside, he has disqualified it from being a valid sacrifice and when he offers it up outside he is not liable.", + "If one slaughters a bird inside and offers it up outside, he is exempt. Slaughtering it inside the Temple also disqualifies it from being a sacrifice and thus when he offers it up outside he is exempt.", + "If one slaughters [it] outside and offers [it] up outside, he is liable. Slaughtering is the proper way to kill the bird outside the Temple. So if he slaughters it and then offers it outside the Temple he is liable.", + "Thus its prescribed rite inside exempts him [if he does it] outside, while its prescribed rite outside exempts him [if he does it] inside. We now get a summary, which may also serve as a type of mnemonic device. If one kills the bird outside the Temple with the rite prescribed for inside, that is nipping, he is exempt. Similarly, if one kills the bird inside the Temple with the rite prescribed for outside, that is slaughtering with the knife, he is exempt.", + "Rabbi Shimon says: whatever he is liable for outside, he is liable in similar circumstances inside when one [subsequently] offers it up outside; except when one slaughters [a bird] inside and offers [it] up outside. Rabbi Shimon holds that one who nips outside the Temple and then offers it up outside the Temple is liable. He then adds a rule that any time one is liable for an act when done outside the Temple, he is also liable if done inside and then offered up outside the Temple. The one exception is one who slaughters an animal inside and then offers it up outside. One who does this is exempt even though if he slaughtered it outside and offered it up there he would be liable. Rabbi Shimon disagrees with Rabbi Yose the Galilean in mishnah one of our chapter, who holds that one who slaughters outside the Temple and offers it up outside the Temple is exempt, whereas one who slaughters inside the Temple and offers it up outside is liable. Rabbi Shimon holds that since he is exempt when done outside, he is also exempt when done inside. I should note that Rabbi Shimon’s words are exceedingly difficult. I have explained them according to Albeck’s commentary." + ], + [ + "As for a hatat whose blood was received in one goblet: If one [first] sprinkled [the blood] outside and then sprinkled [it] inside; [Or] inside and then outside, he is liable, because the whole of it was eligible inside. The first scenario is one in which the priest received the blood of the hatat in one goblet. All of this blood should be poured out on the altar inside the Temple. Therefore, it doesn’t matter if he first pours some blood inside the Temple and then some outside, or some outside and then some inside, he is always liable. This matches Rabbi Nehemiah’s opinion in mishnah six, who held that even if one offers up the remainder of the blood outside the Temple he is liable. Once he pours out the blood inside the Temple, he still is liable for pouring the remainder outside.", + "If the blood was received in two goblets: If he sprinkled both inside, he is exempt; Both outside, he is liable. One inside and one outside, he is exempt; One outside and one inside, he is liable on account of the one outside, while the one inside makes atonement. The situation is now more complex. The priest receives the blood in two goblets. A) If he sprinkled both inside he is obviously exempt, since he has not offered anything outside the Temple. The mishnah did not need to state this; it only did so in order to exhaust all of the possibilities. B) If he sprinkled both outside, he is liable. Again, this seems obvious. C) Once he sprinkles one inside the other cannot be sprinkled on the altar and is to be poured out into the aqueduct which cleans out the Temple. Therefore, if he offers up this one outside the Temple he is exempt. D) If he first offers up one of the goblets of blood outside, he is liable, for this one should have been offered up inside. If he then offers the other goblet inside, it is valid and it effects atonement, as the sprinkling of the blood always does. The fact that the other goblet was spilled outside does not render invalid the goblet to be spilled inside.", + "To what may this be compared? To one who set aside [an animal for] a hatat, then it was lost, and he set aside another in its place; then the first was found, and [so] both are present. If he slaughtered both of them inside, he is exempt; Both of them outside, he is liable. [If he slaughtered] one inside and one outside, he is exempt; One outside and one inside, he is liable on account of the one outside, while the one inside makes atonement. The mishnah compares this situation to a person who set aside an animal to be a hatat, lost the animal, then set aside another animal and then found the first one. The two animals are now both hatats, but only one can effect atonement. The mishnah now runs through all of the possible scenarios, as it did above. A) Obviously, if he slaughters both inside he is exempt. B) Similarly, if he slaughters both outside, he is liable. C) If he first slaughters one inside and then the second one outside he is exempt, because the first animal already effected atonement. In this case the rule with the second one is that it cannot be a valid sacrifice and therefore he is not liable for offering it outside the Temple. D) When he slaughters the first one outside the Temple he is liable for slaughtering outside the Temple. However, the second one can still effect atonement when it is slaughtered inside because the first one does not affect its status.", + "Just as the blood exempts its own flesh, so does it exempt the flesh of its companion [the other animal]. The mishnah now makes a final note with regard to the situation of the two hatats. This section is not really connected to the issue of slaughtering outside the Temple. In this situation if one was to slaughter both hatats inside the Temple and then pour the blood of one of them on the altar, the pouring of the blood exempts one who benefits from the flesh of that animal from being punished for illicit benefit from Temple property. The flesh is exempt from this prohibition because after the blood is spilled the animal can be eaten by the priest. The mishnah teaches that just as the pouring of the blood exempts the flesh of the animal whose blood was poured, so too it exempts one who benefits from the other animal. The second animal cannot be a sacrifice and it is forbidden to derive benefit from it. However, since it is no longer in the category of sacrifice, the laws of illegal use of Temple property no longer apply to it." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThe first three mishnayot of our chapter continue to deal with the prohibition of slaughtering an animal outside the Temple.", + "If one slaughtered the hatat cow [the red heifer] outside its appointed place, and likewise if one offered the scapegoat [of Yom Kippur] outside, he is not liable, because it says, “And has not brought it unto the door of the Tent of Meeting,” (Leviticus 17:4): whatever is not eligible to come to the door of the Tent of Meeting, one is not liable on its account. The hatat cow (see Numbers 19:9) is burned and its ashes are placed into water which is then used to purify people from corpse impurity. None of this is performed inside the Temple. The scapegoat of Yom Kippur is brought to Azazel, a place in the wilderness, and there it is thrown off a cliff. Neither of these animals is sacrificed in the Temple. One who slaughters the heifer in the wrong place, or offers up the scapegoat outside the Temple is not liable. This is derived from the wording of the verse: one is liable for offering outside the Temple only animals that were supposed to be brought into the Temple (Tent of Meeting while in the desert)." + ], + [ + "[As for an ox] that had sexual relations with a woman or one with whom a man had sexual relations; or an animal set aside [for idolatry], or that had been worshipped [as an idol]; or that was the fee of a whore, or [a dog's] exchange; or that was kilayim; or a terefah; or an animal born through caesarean section, if one offered any of these outside, he is not liable, because it says, “Before the Tabernacle of the Lord” (Leviticus 17:4): whatever is not eligible to come before the Tabernacle of the Lord, one is not liable on its account. All of the animals on this list were explained in 8:1, so for a more detailed explanation, look there. None of these animals can be sacrificed and they all became unfit to be put onto the altar outside the Temple. Since none of these can be sacrificed, one who offers one of them up outside the Temple is not liable.", + "[As for] blemished animals, whether with permanent blemishes or with passing blemishes, if one offers them outside, he is exempt. Rabbi Shimon says: [if one offers] animals with permanent blemishes, he is exempt; [if one offers] animals with passing blemishes, he violates a negative commandment. Blemished animals cannot be offered as sacrifices. Animals that have permanent blemishes will never be able to be used as sacrifices whereas animals that have passing blemishes are only temporarily disqualified. According to the sages (the first opinion in the mishnah), since the animal cannot now be sacrificed in the Temple, one is not liable if one offers it outside the Temple. Rabbi Shimon says that if one offers up outside the Temple an animal that is only temporarily disqualified from being used as a sacrifice on the Temple’s altar, he has transgressed the negative commandment found in Deuteronomy 12:13, “Take care not to sacrifice your burnt offerings in any place” but he has not transgressed the commandment found in Leviticus 17:8-9, which is punished with karet. This seems to be Rabbi Shimon’s way of answering why the Torah repeats the same prohibition, once in Leviticus 17 and once in Deuteronomy 12. The case in Deuteronomy refers to a person who sacrifices outside the Temple an animal that is only temporarily disqualified from being put on the altar inside the Temple.", + "[As for] turtledoves before their time and young pigeons after their time, if one offered them outside, he is exempt. Rabbi Shimon says: [if one offers] young pigeons after their time, he is exempt; turtledoves before their time, he violates a negative commandment. Turtledoves are valid as sacrifices only when they are older (about three months) whereas pigeons are valid as sacrifices when they are younger (before three months). According to the sages, if one sacrifices either of these outside the Temple at a time when it cannot be sacrificed in the Temple, he is not liable. Rabbi Shimon holds that since a turtledove that is not yet three months will eventually become fit for the altar, if one sacrifices it outside the Temple, he is liable for transgressing a negative commandment although he is exempt from karet.", + "[One who offers] an animal together with its young [on the same day], and [one who offers] an animal before its time, is not liable. Rabbi Shimon says: he violates a negative commandment. Leviticus 22:28 prohibits one from slaughtering a mother animal and her offspring on the same day. If one already slaughtered one of these animals, he can’t then slaughter the other and the other animal would not be fit on that day to be a sacrifice. Thus, according to the sages, if one offers up the other animal outside the Temple he is liable. Rabbi Shimon says that since the animal can be offered on the next day, if he offers it on the day its mother/offspring was already slaughtered, he has transgressed a negative commandment. It is also forbidden to sacrifice an animal before it is eight days old (Leviticus 22:27). The same rules apply here: the sages hold that he is exempt if he sacrifices it outside the Temple whereas Rabbi Shimon holds that he has transgressed a negative commandment, since the animal can be sacrificed after it is eight days old.", + "For Rabbi Shimon would say: whatever is eligible to come [onto the altar] later entails a negative commandment, but does not entail karet. But the sages say: whatever does not entail karet also does not entail a negative commandment. In this section we see the debate that serves as the basis for the particular debates in sections 2-4. Rabbi Shimon holds that Deuteronomy 12:13 applies to one who sacrifices an animal outside the Temple that cannot currently be sacrificed on the altar, but that will be fit later on. The other sages disagree and hold that if karet (Leviticus 17) doesn’t apply, then he doesn’t transgress the negative commandment found in Deuteronomy either." + ], + [ + "“Before time” applies both to [the animal] itself and to its owner. What is “before time” as applied to its owner? If a zav or a zavah, a woman after childbirth, or a metzora, offered their hatat or their asham outside [before the time in which they were obligated], they are exempt;
[If they offered] their olah or their shelamims outside [before their time], they are liable.
One who offers up flesh of a hatat, or flesh of an asham, or flesh of most holy sacrifices, or flesh of less holy sacrifices; or the remainder of the omer, or the two loaves, or the showbread, or the remainder of meal-offerings;
Or if he pours [the oil on to the meal-offering], or mingles [it with flour], or breaks up [the meal-offering cakes], or salts [the meal-offering], or waves it, or presents it; or sets the table [with the showbread], or trims the lamps, or takes out the fistful, or receives the blood; [If he does any of these] outside, he is exempt.
One is also not liable for any of these acts on account of not being a priest, or uncleanness, or lack of [priestly] vestments, or the non-washing of hands and feet.
This is the final mishnah that deals with the prohibition of sacrificing an animal outside the Temple (take a deep breath, we’re almost there).
Section one: At the end of yesterday’s mishnah, we learned that if someone sacrifices an animal outside the Temple before that animal is eight days old he is not liable because that animal could not be sacrificed on the altar. This section explains that “before time” refers not only to animal but also to a person who is not yet obligated to bring an animal to the Temple. There are several such categories of people: the zav or zavah, a man or woman with unusual genital discharge, bring expiatory sacrifices after having been pure for eight days (Leviticus 15:14, 29). A woman after childbirth brings a sacrifice after a set amount of time, depending upon whether the child is male or female (Leviticus 12:6). A metzora, a person suffering some sort of skin affliction, brings his sacrifices after eight days of purity (Lev 14:10). In all of these cases, if a person offered up the hatat or the asham outside the Temple that he/she would have to bring at the end of that period, they are exempt because they had not yet become liable to bring those sacrifices to the Temple.
However, if someone who is liable to bring a shelamim or an olah offers it up outside the Temple before the prescribed time has arrived, for instance if a nazirite offers up his shelamim before his naziriteship is complete, or if a zav or a zavah brings his/her olah before the eight days are over, he is liable. This is because a person can always voluntarily bring an olah or a shelamim, even without being liable for one. Since this olah or shelamim could be brought inside the Temple and put on the altar, one who brings it outside the Temple is liable. In contrast, a hatat and an asham can only be brought by someone obligated to bring such a sacrifice, and therefore if someone is not obligated and he offers one outside the Temple he is exempt.
Section three: Sections three and four teach that liability is incurred for offering up a sacrifice outside the Temple only if it was an animal, or a part thereof, that could have been put on the altar. Section three contains a list of parts of animals or other parts of sacrifices that are eaten by priests or non-priests. Since these are eaten and not sacrificed, one who offers them up outside of the Temple is not liable.
Section four: One is liable for offering up a sacrifice outside the Temple but not for performing other parts of the worship service. The first set of these are directly taken from Leviticus 2 which discusses preparing the minhah (meal-offering). Then the mishnah proceeds to note other types of work done in the Temple, such as arranging the showbread on the table, trimming the wicks of the menorah, taking a fistful of the minhah offering, and receiving blood from an animal’s neck.
The general rule is that one is liable only for an act of the sacrificial service which is the completion of that sacrifice, such as burning the animal on an altar. Since all of these acts are merely preparatory, one is not liable for performing them outside the Temple.
Section five: The mishnah now adds that just as one is not liable for performing one of these acts outside the Temple, so too several other prohibitions are not transgressed. If a non-priest does one of these acts, he is not liable for death (by the hands of heaven), as he would be had he actually offered a sacrifice (see Numbers 18:7). An impure priest is also not liable, nor is a priest who is not wearing the prescribed clothing or has not washed his hands and feet. In all of these cases, the act done by the priest (or non-priest) is invalid, but nevertheless he is not liable for having done so." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nSince the past chapter and a half have dealt with the prohibition of offering a sacrifice outside the Temple, the mishnah now notes that in the past, before the Temple was built, there were periods where it was permissible to offer a sacrifice anywhere one wished. These local altars are called “bamot,” which is close to the Hebrew word for the pulpit, “bimah.", + "Before the Tabernacle was set up bamot (local were permitted and the service was performed by the firstborn. Before the Israelites set up the Tabernacle in the desert it was permitted to offer a sacrifice anywhere. This was the way that sacrifices were performed from the time of Adam until the Tabernacle was set up in the desert. In addition, the Temple service was performed by the firstborns. This is hinted at in several places. First of all, Numbers 3:12 states, “I hereby take the Levites from among the Israelites in place of all the first-born.” This seems to state that at some earlier point in Israelite history, the firstborns performed the worship that the Levites (which here includes priests) used to perform. Second, in Exodus 24:5 Moses designates “some young men among the Israelites” to offer sacrifices. The rabbis understand these “young men” to be firstborns.", + "After the Tabernacle was set up bamot were forbidden and the service was performed by priests. After the Tabernacle was set up, it became forbidden to offer sacrifices elsewhere, as it says in Leviticus 17:5, “This is in order that the Israelites may bring the sacrifices which they have been making in the open…to the priest at the entrance of the Tent of Meeting.” At this point, the worship was performed at the Tabernacle and by priests.", + "Most holy sacrifices were [then] eaten within the curtains, and lesser sacrifices [were eaten] anywhere in the camp of the Israelites. When in the desert, most holy sacrifices, the asham and hatat, had to be eaten within the curtain of the Tabernacle. Lesser sacrifices, such as the shelamim and todah, had to be eaten within the camp of Israel." + ], + [ + "When they came to Gilgal, bamot (local were [again] permitted. When the Israelites crossed the Jordan they came first to Gilgal and they set up the Tabernacle there. However, they didn’t set up camp around the Tabernacle, as they did in the desert. The Tabernacle contained an altar, but the ark was not inside it. At this point it became permitted to offer sacrifices elsewhere. Communal sacrifices and mandatory individual sacrifices (such as the hatat and the asham) were offered in the Tabernacle whereas voluntary individual offerings could be sacrificed at local altars.", + "Most holy sacrifices were eaten within the curtains, and less holy sacrifices [were eaten] anywhere. The most holy sacrifices continued to be eaten within the Tabernacle’s curtains. Lesser sacrifices could now be eaten anywhere, since there was no official encampment." + ], + [ + "When they came to Shiloh, bamot were forbidden. When they came to Shiloh (see Joshua 18:1) the ark was put back into the Tabernacle (see I Samuel 3:3). At this point bamot were again forbidden because at Shiloh the Tabernacle was considered to be at “rest”, a reference to Deuteronomy 12:9, “Because you have not yet come to the resting place, to the inheritance, that the Lord your God is giving you.” “Resting place” is understood to be Shiloh because the Israelites came to Shiloh after fourteen years spent conquering the land of Israel. Once the Tabernacle came to rest in Shiloh, local altars, bamot, were prohibited.", + "[The Tabernacle] there had no roof, but [consisted of] a base of stones with a ceiling of curtains, and that was the “resting place” [referred to in the Torah]. In the desert, the Tabernacle was made of wood. In Shiloh the Tabernacle was made of a base of stones and a roof of curtains.", + "Most holy sacrifices were eaten within the curtains, and less holy sacrifices and second tithe [were eaten] wherever [Shiloh] could be seen. As always, most holy sacrifices were eaten within the curtains of the Tabernacle. Less holy sacrifices and second tithe could now be eaten in any place that could see Shiloh. According to the Talmud’s account, the ark was in Shiloh for 369 years." + ], + [ + "When they came to Nov and to Givon, bamot were [again] permitted. When Shiloh was destroyed and the ark was taken by the Philistines (I Samuel 4) the Tabernacle was set up in Nov (I Samuel 21). And after Nov was destroyed during Saul’s reign (I Samuel 21-22), they brought the Tabernacle to Givon (I Kings 3:4). While the Tabernacle was in Nov and Givon local altars were again permitted. It seems that these were not important central places, as were Shiloh and subsequently Jerusalem. Thus sacrifices could be offered outside of the Tabernacle.", + "Most holy sacrifices were eaten within the curtains, and less holy sacrifices in all of the cities of Israel. As was the situation before Shiloh, once Shiloh was destroyed most holy sacrifices must be eaten within the Tabernacle, whereas less holy sacrifices, specifically voluntary offerings, could be eaten anywhere within the cities of Israel. Note that when the Tabernacle was in Gilgal (mishnah five) they could eat anywhere. Once the cities were built they offered sacrifices there." + ], + [ + "When they came to Jerusalem, bamot were forbidden and were never again permitted, and that was the ‘inheritance’. Deuteronomy 12:9 reads, “Because you have not yet come to the resting place, to the inheritance, that the Lord your God is giving you.” As we saw in mishnah six “resting place” refers to Shiloh. “Inheritance” refers to Jerusalem. Once Solomon built the Temple in Jerusalem, local altars were forever thereafter prohibited, even after the destruction of the altar. We should note that this mishnah represents an ideology and not an historic fact. There were definitely Jews who offered sacrifices in places other than the Temple, both while the Temple stood and when it was destroyed. The rabbis, at least those speaking in this mishnah, were opposed to this.", + "Most holy sacrifices were eaten within the curtains, and less holy sacrifices and second tithe within the walls [of Jerusalem]. As before, most holy sacrifices must be eaten inside the Temple, whereas less holy sacrifices could be eaten anywhere within the walls of Jerusalem (see also 5:3, 5)." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nWhen it comes to sacrificing outside the Temple, according to rabbinic reckoning one can transgress three commandments: 1) A negative commandment “Take care not to sacrifice your burnt offerings in any place you like” (Deuteronomy 12:13); 2) A positive commandment “But only in the place that the Lord will choose in one of your tribal territories” (ibid 14); 3) A commandment punished by karet “If anyone of the house of Israel or of strangers who reside among them offers a burnt offering or a sacrifice and does not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting to offer it to the Lord, that person shall be cut off from his people” (Leviticus 17:8-9).\nOur mishnah deals with various situations in which one might transgress one of these commandments, but not all of them.", + "All sacrifices consecrated while bamot were forbidden and offered outside while bamot were forbidden involve the transgression of a positive and a negative commandment, and one is liable for karet on their account. The simplest situation is one in which a person consecrated the animal to be a sacrifice while bamot were forbidden and then offered it up outside Shiloh/Jerusalem also while bamot were forbidden. Such a person has transgressed both the positive and negative commandment and is liable for karet.", + "If one consecrated them while bamot were permitted, but offered them without when bamot were forbidden, they involve the transgression of a positive and a negative commandment, but one is not liable for karet on their account. If he consecrated the animal when it was permitted to offer sacrifices at bamot, for instance when the Tabernacle stood in Gilgal, and when the Tabernacle came to Shiloh he didn’t offer it there but rather at a local altar, he is not liable for karet. However, he has transgressed both a positive and negative commandment.", + "If one consecrated them when bamot were forbidden, and offered them when bamot were permitted, they involve the transgression of a positive commandment, but they do not involve the transgression of a negative commandment. If he consecrated the animal when bamot were forbidden, for instance when the Tabernacle stood in Shiloh, and then offered it once Shiloh was destroyed and bamot were again permitted, he has transgressed the positive commandment of not bringing the animal to Shiloh while the Tabernacle was still there. However, he has not transgressed the negative commandment, nor is he liable for karet." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nWhen the Tabernacle stood in Gilgal, Nov and Givon, it was permitted to offer sacrifices at local altars. Still there were certain sacrifices that were offered only at the Tabernacle, as we explained in connection to some of the earlier mishnayot of this chapter. Our mishnah discusses the difference between the “bamah of the congregation” that was in the Tabernacle and the “bamah of the individual,” the local altars that were found elsewhere.", + "The following sacrifices were offered in the Tabernacle sacrifices consecrated for the Tabernacle: Public sacrifices were offered in the Tabernacle, and private sacrifices were offered at a bamah. The general rule is that public sacrifices had to be performed at the Tabernacle, and that any private sacrifices could be offered at the local altar, the bamah of the congregation.", + "If private sacrifices were consecrated for the Tabernacle, they must be offered in the Tabernacle; yet if one offered them at a bamah, he is not liable. If an individual specifically stated that he was consecrating an animal in order to offer it at the Tabernacle, then it must be offered at the Tabernacle. If he nevertheless goes ahead and offers it at a bamah, he is not liable for offering a sacrifice outside the Temple.", + "What is the difference between the bamah of an individual and the bamah of the congregation? Laying [of hands], slaughtering in the north, sprinkling around [the altar], waving and presenting, (Rabbi Judah says: there were no meal-offerings at the; priesthood, sacrificial vestments, ministering vessels, a sweet fragrance, a line of demarcation for [the sprinkling of] the blood, and the washing of hands and feet. This list consists of actions that were to be performed at the Tabernacle, but not at a local bamah. I shall explain each separately: a) Laying [of hands]: Laying one’s hands on the sacrifice before it is slaughtered. b) Slaughtering in the north: side of the altar, obligatory for most holy sacrifices. c) Sprinkling around [the altar]: sprinkling the blood on various corners of the altar. d) Waving and presenting: the minhah (meal) offering. i) (Rabbi Judah says: there were no meal-offerings at the bamah): Rabbi Judah disagrees and holds that minhah offerings were only offered at the Tabernacle. e) Priesthood: sacrifices could be offered by non-priests at the local bamot. f) Sacrificial vestments: neither did the person offering have to wear the priestly clothing. g) Ministering vessels: He also did not need to use sanctified vessels. h) A sweet fragrance: Inside the Tabernacle (and subsequently the Temple) it was prohibited to put onto the altar limbs of a sacrifice that have already been roasted elsewhere. Such limbs will not give off the sweet fragrance of roasting meat (think bbq!). This was not prohibited at local altars, where one could first roast the limb and then put it onto the altar. i) A line of demarcation for [the sprinkling of] the blood: On the altar in the Tabernacle there was a crimson line separating the upper and lower parts. Blood of some sacrifices was sprinkled below and of others it was sprinkled above. There was no such line on the local altar. j) And the washing of hands and feet: In the Tabernacle and Temple priests had to wash their hands and feet before performing any of the worship service. There was no such requirement for local altars.", + "But [the prohibitions of] time, remnant and defilement were the same in both. When it comes to these three prohibitions, they apply to local altars just as they do to the public altar. If one offering the sacrifice intends to eat it after the prescribed time, he has rendered it invalid. The laws governing when a sacrifice must be eaten, and when it becomes “remnant,” which is prohibited, apply in all places. And the prohibition of offering or eating a sacrifice when impure, applies to individual bamot as well. Congratulations! We have finished Tractate Zevahim! It is a tradition at this point to thank God for helping us finish learning the tractate and to commit ourselves to going back and relearning it, so that we may not forget it and so that its lessons will stay with us for all of our lives. Tractate Zevahim introduced us to a world which probably seems quite strange. To imagine a version of Judaism centered on animal sacrifice is probably quite difficult for modern Jews, myself included. For two thousand years, Jews have not offered sacrifices, and it is hard to imagine returning to such a form of Judaism. However, that is not the point of learning Zevahim. In my opinion, there are at least three solid reasons to study Zevahim in particular and Seder Kodashim in general. The first is that it is always interesting and helpful to remind ourselves of where our religion comes from and what it would have been like in ancient times. I also hope that learning Zevahim will make Leviticus more interesting, when you hear it in the synagogue. Second, and more importantly, in Zevahim we can see a system created by the rabbis based on their interpretation of Torah, and not just a simple record of how things were done in the Temple. This allows us to get into the mindset of the rabbis and understand better who they were and how they created their laws. Third, many later principles of halakhah, especially those connected with prayer, have their origins in sacrificial law. So while most of these laws are no longer observed, their principles often still manifest themselves. In any case, I hope you enjoyed Zevahim. I know that I especially enjoyed writing my commentary on it, for I always learn the most when I have to try to explain something to others. Tomorrow we start Tractate Menahot." + ] + ] + ] + }, + "schema": { + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה זבחים", + "enTitle": "English Explanation of Mishnah Zevachim", + "key": "English Explanation of Mishnah Zevachim", + "nodes": [ + { + "heTitle": "הקדמה", + "enTitle": "Introduction" + }, + { + "heTitle": "", + "enTitle": "" + } + ] + } +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Kodashim/English Explanation of Mishnah Zevachim/English/merged.json b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Kodashim/English Explanation of Mishnah Zevachim/English/merged.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..7a72a54d09bd0ea6d1a13f82afbb75c3008f976f --- /dev/null +++ b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Kodashim/English Explanation of Mishnah Zevachim/English/merged.json @@ -0,0 +1,652 @@ +{ + "title": "English Explanation of Mishnah Zevachim", + "language": "en", + "versionTitle": "merged", + "versionSource": "https://www.sefaria.org/English_Explanation_of_Mishnah_Zevachim", + "text": { + "Introduction": [ + "Tractate Zevahim is the first tractate in Seder Kodashim, most of which deals with sacrificial laws and other various laws governing the Temple. Zevahim deals with animal and bird sacrifices, with what disqualifies them and what happens when they are sacrificed outside of the Temple. There are seven types of sacrifices which I shall list here. Some offerings are mandatory and some are voluntary, some are communal and some are individual, and both of these distinctions are critical. Below I will list them by their Hebrew name and by an attempt at translating that name into English. However, throughout my translation and commentary I will refer to them mostly by their Hebrew name, in order to encourage the reader to learn them in a version closer to the original. 1. Olah, the wholly burnt offering. This is also sometimes called a “holocaust” but for obvious reasons, I won’t be using that translation. The olah can either be a mandatory offering, such as the tamid, the daily sacrifices (Numbers 28:1-8) or the musaf, additional offering (Numbers 28: 9ff) or a voluntary offering (Leviticus 1). There are many other mandatory types of the olah. The olah is sometimes a beast and sometimes a bird. 2. Hatat, the sin offering, also sometimes translated as a cleansing offering. The main type of hatat is one that is brought to atone for an unintentional sin (Leviticus 4:1-5). There are also hataot (the plural of hatat) brought on the festivals (Numbers 28: 15ff). There are several other types of hataot as well. The hatat is sometimes a beast and sometimes a bird. 3. Asham, guilt offering. This is brought by robbers, people who made illicit use of Temple property, and by several others (Leviticus 5:14-26; 19:20-22). The asham, the hatat and the olah are all considered “holy of holies” which means that they are eaten entirely by priests within the Temple confines. 4. Shelamim, well-being or peace offering. This is generally an individual offering, either voluntary or mandated, with the exception of the two lambs brought on Shavuot (Leviticus 23:19) which are a communal offering. The todah, or thanksgiving offering, is considered a type of shelamim (Leviticus 7:11ff). 5. Bechor, the first-born animal. There is an entire tractate devoted to the bechor, so we will deal with it there. 6. Maaser behemah, the animal tithe (Leviticus 27:32). This subject is also covered in Tractate Bechorot. 7. Pesah, the passover lamb. This sacrifice is covered in Tractate Pesahim.", + "There are four steps that are essential and are covered extensively concerning in the sacrifice of a beast: 1) the slaughter (shechitah); 2) collecting the blood from the animal’s neck in a vessel; 3) bringing the blood to the altar; 4) spilling the blood on the altar. When it comes to the slaughter of the bird sacrifices that are two main steps: 1) the plucking off of its head (melikah); 2) the squeezing out of its blood. " + ], + "": [ + [ + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah discusses sacrifices that are offered by the priest with the intent of their being a different type of sacrifice from that which the person bringing them intended them to be. For instance a shelamim (peace offering) is offered with the intent of its being an olah (burnt offering). There are two issues at stake: 1) Does the owner get the credit for having brought the sacrifice? 2) Can the sacrifice even be eaten?", + "All sacrifices slaughtered not in their own name are valid, except that they do not count in fulfilling their owners’ obligation, with the exception of the pesah and the hatat (sin-. For most sacrifices, if the priest offering them thinks that he is offering a different sacrifice than he is really supposed to be offering, the sacrifice is still valid. This means that its blood can be spilled on the altar and the sacrifice can be eaten by those who would have been able to eat it had it been offered properly. However, the sacrifice does not count as far as fulfilling the obligation of its owner. Thus if the owner was obligated to bring an olah, for instance, and it was sacrificed with the intent of it being another sacrifice, the owner must bring another olah in its place. The exception to this is the pesah and the hatat. If either of these two sacrifices is offered with the intent of its being a different type of sacrifices, not only does it not count for the owner who brought it, it is completely disqualified. Its blood cannot be spilled on the altar, nor can it be eaten.", + "[This is true for] a pesah in its proper time and a hatat at all times. The pesah is only disqualified if it is slaughtered with the wrong intent at the time that it is supposed to be slaughtered, on second half of the day on the fourteenth of Nissan. If it is slaughtered on the wrong day, for the wrong purpose, then paradoxically, it is valid, although it would obviously not count for its owner. Its as if the mishnah is saying that in this case, two negatives can make a positive. When it comes to the hatat, there is no specific time in which it must be offered. Therefore, no matter when it is offered, if the intention is for the wrong sacrifice, it is disqualified.", + "Rabbi Eliezer says: also the asham (guilt-. [This is true for] a pesah in its proper time and a hatat and an asham at all times. Rabbi Eliezer said: the hatat comes on account of sin, and the asham comes on account of sin: just as a hatat [slaughtered] not in its own name is invalid, so the asham is invalid if [slaughtered] not in its own name. Rabbi Eliezer argues that the same rule that applies to the hatat applies to the asham, also a sacrifice brought to atone for sin. If it is slaughtered for the sake of it being a different sacrifice, it is disqualified." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah continues to deal with sacrifices offered “not for their own name”, meaning in order for them to be different from what they were supposed to be.", + "Yose ben Honi says: [Sacrifices] slaughtered in the name of a pesah or a hatat are invalid. Yose ben Honi points out the mirror image rule to that which we learned in yesterday’s mishnah. There we learned that if a pesah or a hatat were offered with the wrong intent, they are disqualified. Here we learn that if a different sacrifice is offered with the intent of its being a pesah or a hatat it is disqualified. Concerning the pesah, this must be on the fourteenth of Nissan, the only day that the pesah can be offered. The hatat rule is true any time.", + "Shimon the brother of Azariah says: if one slaughtered them under a higher designation than their own they are valid; under a lower designation than their own, they are invalid. How so? If one slaughtered most sacred sacrifices under the designation of lesser sacrifices, they are invalid; [but] if one slaughtered lesser sacrifices under the designation of most sacred sacrifices, they are valid. Shimon the brother of Azariah (an unusual way of referring to someone) has a different rule. The sacrifices are divided into two main groups most sacred sacrifices (hatat, asham and olah) and lesser sacrifices (shelamim, pesah, bekhor and tithe). If the sacrifice is a lesser sacrifice and it is offered with the intent of its being a higher sacrifice then it is valid. However, if it is a most sacred sacrifice and it is offered with the intent of it being a lesser sacrifice, then it is invalid because he has reduced its sanctity.", + "If one slaughtered a bekhor or a tithe in the name of a shelamim, it is valid, but if one slaughtered a shelamim in the name of a bekhor or tithe, it is invalid. Technically, the bekhor (firstling), the tithe and shelamim are all lesser sacrifices. However, we see here that the sanctity of the bekhor and the tithe is actually lower than that of the shelamim. Thus if a priest offers a bekhor or tithe (lesser sanctity) in order for it to be a shelamim, then the sacrifice is valid (and can be eaten) because he has raised its sanctity. But if he offers a shelamim with the thought that it is a tithe or bekhor, then it is invalid." + ], + [ + "A pesah that was slaughtered on the morning of the fourteenth [of Nisan] under a different designation: Rabbi Joshua declares it valid, just as if it had been slaughtered on the thirteenth. Ben Batera declares it invalid, as if it had been slaughtered in the afternoon. The pesah must be offered on the fourteenth of Nisan, during the second half of the day. It cannot be offered in the morning, at least not according to most opinions. Therefore, according to Rabbi Joshua, a pesah that was offered before it should have been offered, and was slaughtered for it to be a different sacrifice, can be eaten because we learned in mishnah one that a pesah that is slaughtered under a different name is only disqualified if it is slaughtered at the time when a pesah can be slaughtered. Ben Batera holds that the pesah can be slaughtered any time of the day on the fourteenth. Therefore, if one slaughters a pesah in the morning of the fourteenth under the name of a different sacrifice, then it is disqualified because it has been slaughtered when it could have counted as a pesah.", + "Said Shimon ben Azzai: I have a tradition from seventy-two elder[s] on the day that Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah] was placed in the academy, that all sacrifices which are eaten, though slaughtered under a different designation are valid, except that their owners have not fulfilled their obligation, except the pesah and the hatat. And ben Azzai added only the olah, but the sages did not agree with him. Shimon ben Azzai relates here a tradition that is very close to the tradition found in the beginning of mishnah one. There we learned that the two exceptional sacrifices that are disqualified if offered with the wrong intent are the pesah and the hatat. According to mishnah one, all other sacrifices are valid if slaughtered with the intent of their being different sacrifices. Shimon ben Azzai quotes this tradition as being true only for sacrifices that are eaten. This would not include the olah, which is wholly burnt. According to ben Azzai’s tradition, the olah is disqualified if it is slaughtered with the intent of it being a different sacrifice. The final line of the mishnah notes that ben Azzai added the olah to the pesah and hatat, but that the sages (whose opinion is found in mishnah one) did not agree with this tradition. Ben Azzai states that he received this tradition on the day that Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah was appointed a member of the yeshiva (academy). This seems to be a famous day in rabbinic recollection and there is a significant amount of aggadah concerning the background to this appointment. The most expansive version of this aggadah is found in Bavli Berakhot 27b, where Rabbi Elazar ben Azaryah is appointed head of the academy after Rabban Gamaliel is deposed. The historical accuracy of that legendary account is a bit suspect, but here in the Mishnah we can see that although we might not know exactly what happened that day, it was a memorable day, one which later rabbis used as a reference point." + ], + [ + "A pesah and a hatat which were slaughtered not in their own name, or he received [the blood], and carried it [to the altar] and sprinkled [it] not in their own name,
Or in their own name and not in their own name, or not in their own name and in their own name, they are disqualified.
What is the case of ‘in their own name and not in their own name’? In the name of it being a pesah [first] and [then] in the name of it being a shelamim.
‘Not in their own name and in their own name:’ in the name of a shelamim [first] and [then] in the name of a pesah.
For a sacrifice can be disqualified in [any one of] the four elements: slaughtering, receiving, carrying and sprinkling.
Rabbi Shimon declares it valid if carried [with the wrong intent], for Rabbi Shimon said: it is impossible [to have a valid sacrifice] without slaughtering, without receiving and without sprinkling, but it is possible without carrying. [How so]? One slaughters it at the side of the altar and sprinkles.
Rabbi Elazar says: if one goes where he needs to go, an [illegitimate] intention disqualifies [it]; where he doesn’t need to go, an [illegitimate] intention does not disqualify [it].
Section one: This section expands upon the halakhah that we learned in mishnah one, that a pesah or a hatat that were offered with the intent of their being a different sacrifice are disqualified. Here we learn two new halakhot. First of all, if any of the other essential parts of the sacrifice are done with the intent of the sacrifice being something else other than a pesah or a hatat, the sacrifice is invalid. The four essential elements of sacrifices are: slaughtering, receiving the blood, carrying it to the altar and sprinkling it on the altar.
Sections 2-4: The second new law we learn is that if one of these actions is done with the proper intent, but another of the actions is done with the improper intent, the sacrifice is invalid. The mishnah now illustrates this. If the sacrifice is supposed to be a pesah and it is first done in the name of it being a pesah and then later on the priest is confused and performs one of the later actions with the intent of it being a shelamim, the sacrifice is invalid. The same is true if at first he has the wrong intention and then when performing one of the later actions he has the correct intention. In either case the sacrifice is disqualified.
Section five: This supports what was stated above in section one any of the four essential aspects of the sacrifice can also serve as potential disqualifiers, if the intention is incorrect.
Section six: Rabbi Shimon disagrees with the statement in section five and holds that if the sacrifice’s blood is carried to the altar with the wrong intent, it is not disqualified because carrying is not essential to all sacrifices. Theoretically, one could slaughter a sacrifice right next to the altar and then sprinkle the blood without having to carry the blood from the point of slaughter to the altar.
Section seven: If the person is carrying the blood from the point at which he slaughtered it to the altar and while doing so he has the intention that it should be a different sacrifice, then the sacrifice is disqualified. However, if he slaughtered it next to the altar and received the blood in a vessel right there and then brought the blood elsewhere, an action that he did not need to do, and while carrying it he intended to offer it as another sacrifice, then the sacrifice is not disqualified, at least according to Rabbi Elazar. This carrying of the blood was unnecessary and therefore his intents at that moment do not factor into determining the validity of the sacrifice." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "All sacrifices whose blood was caught by a: non-priest, an onen, a tebul yom, one lacking [priestly] vestments, one lacking sacrificial atonement, one who had not washed his hands and feet, an uncircumcised [priest]; an unclean [priest]; one who was sitting, one who was standing on utensils or on an animal or on another’s feet, are disqualified.
If [the priest] caught [the blood] with his left hand, it is disqualified. Rabbi Shimon declares it valid.
If the blood was poured out on to the pavement and [the priest] collected it, it is disqualified.
If [the priest] put it [the blood] on the ramp [to the altar], [or on the altar, but] not against its base; if he applied [the blood] which should be applied below [the scarlet line] above [it] or that which should be applied above, below, or that which should be applied within [he applied] without, or that which should be applied without [he applied] within, it is invalid, but does not involve karet.
Section one: This is a list of people who cannot receive the blood of a sacrifice in a vessel, or carry it to the altar, or sprinkle it on the altar. Note that the mishnah does not say that these people cannot slaughter the animal. The laws regarding slaughtering the sacrifice are less strict. I shall explain each category one at a time:
Non-priest: only priests can perform these activities.
An onen: Someone who had one of their close relatives die is considered an onen on the day of the death.
A tebul yom: This is the word for an impure person who has immersed in a mikveh but before the end of the day (before the sun sets after he was made pure). See Leviticus 22:7. Believe it or not, there is an entire tractate in Seder Toharot devoted to this subject.
One lacking [priestly] vestments: A regular priest must wear four garments and the high priest must wear eight garments (see Yoma 7:5). Without the proper attire, the sacrifice is invalid.
One lacking sacrificial atonement: In certain cases, when one’s period of impurity is over he must bring a sacrifice. If the priest has not brought the required sacrifice, he cannot take part in the sacrificial worship.
One who had not washed his hands and feet: See Exodus 30:19.
An uncircumcised [priest]: See Ezekiel 44:9.
An unclean [priest]: one must be ritually pure to offer sacrifices.
One who was sitting, one who was standing on utensils or on an animal or on another’s feet, are disqualified: the sacrificial procedure must be performed while standing on the floor of the Temple’s courtyard, not sitting or standing on something else.
Section two: According to the first opinion, the blood must be caught in one’s right hand. Rabbi Shimon says it can be caught in the left hand.
Section three: The blood has a very specific place upon which it must be poured. It cannot be poured on the floor of the Temple, or on the ramp leading up to the Temple. It must be applied to the base of the altar. Sometimes the blood must be poured on the lower part of the base, which was separated by a crimson line from the upper part, and sometimes it must be poured on the upper part. The important thing is that the blood is poured on the part appropriate to that sacrifice. If it is not, the sacrifice is invalid. Similarly, sometimes the blood must be poured on the altar inside the Sanctuary (the Hekhal) or even within the Holy of Holies, and at other times it must be poured on the outer altar. What again is essential is that the blood of each sacrificed is poured on the altar upon which it is supposed to be poured. If it is not, the sacrifice is invalid.
Although this sacrifice is invalid, one who eats of its flesh is not liable for karet (a biblical penalty of great severity) unlike one who eats of one of the sacrifices disqualified in mishnah two or three. In those cases, when the animal was sacrificed with the wrong intent, eating its flesh was punished by the serious penalty of karet." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah begins to deal with the subject of a priest who slaughters a sacrifice with the intent of doing a subsequent activity at the wrong time or wrong place. The wrong intention disqualifies the sacrifice, but in different ways and with different consequences.", + "One who slaughters a sacrifice [intending]: To sprinkle its blood outside [the Temple] or part of its blood outside; To burn its innards or part of its innards outside; To eat its flesh or as much as an olive of its flesh outside, Or to eat as much as an olive of the skin of the fat-tail outside, It is invalid, but it does not involve karet. In all of the cases in this section, the priest sacrifices the animal with the intent of doing one of the activities outside of the Temple. I’m not sure why he would do this, but the message is clear the priest must realize that all of the following are done in the Temple. A) All of the blood that needs to be sprinkled must be sprinkled within the Temple. B) The innards that are burned on the altar must be entirely burned within the Temple. C) The flesh of certain sacrifices must be eaten within the Temple. D) If the priest has the intention of doing any of these steps outside of the Temple, the sacrifice is disqualified. However, the transgression is not punished by karet. The reason probably is that this specific problem, sacrificing it with the intent of doing something with it outside of the Temple, is not directly addressed by the Torah. As we shall see, this is contrasted with “piggul” found in the next section, which is punished by karet.", + "[One he slaughters a sacrifice intending]: To sprinkle its blood or part of its blood the next day, To burn its innards or part of its innards on the next day; To eat its flesh or as much as an olive of its flesh on the next day; Or to eat as much as an olive of the skin of its fat-tail on the next day, It is piggul, and involves kareth. In all of the cases here, the priest sacrifices the animal with the intent of doing something else with it after the time in which the animal must be eaten has expired. For some animals this is one day (until the next morning) and for some it is two days (until the morning after tomorrow). We shall discuss this issue more fully in chapter five. Here we learn that if the priest does any of the activities explained above with the intent of doing them after this time has expired, the animal is considered “piggul”, a word found in Leviticus 7:18. One who eats such a sacrifice is liable for karet, even if he eats it during the time when the sacrifice must be eaten. Note that this is a category different from “notar (remnant)” which is what the sacrifice is called if it is actually left over past the time when it must be eaten. This sacrifice is not actually “notar” rather it was sacrificed with the intent of making it notar. That is sufficient for it to be biblically prohibited." + ], + [ + "This is the general rule: anyone who slaughters or receives [the blood], or carries [it] or sprinkles [it] [intending] to eat as much as an olive of that which is normally eaten or to burn [on the altar] as much as an olive of that which is normally burned outside its prescribed place, [the sacrifice] is invalid, but it does not involve karet; [Intending to eat or burn] after its designated time, it is piggul and it involves karet. This is the general rule that explains the details in mishnah two. If while performing one of the four essential activities he had the intent to eat or burn part of the sacrifice outside of the place where it must be eaten or burned, the sacrifice is invalid, but one who eats it is not punished by karet. This is not the “piggul” referred to in the Torah. In contrast, if the priest has the intent of eating or burning its innards on the altar after the time in which it must be eaten or burned, the sacrifice is “piggul” and one who eats of it is liable for karet, as we explained in yesterday’s mishnah.", + "Provided that the mattir is offered in accordance with the law. The sprinkling of the blood onto the altar is what permits the sacrifice to be eaten. The word for “permit” in Hebrew is “mattir” so the blood is called the “mattir.” This section teaches that for the previous halakhot to hold true, the blood must have been properly sprinkled on the altar. This will be explained more fully in tomorrow’s mishnah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah explains the last line of yesterday’s mishnah.", + "How is the mattir offered in accordance with the law? If one slaughtered in silence, and received, or carried, or sprinkled, [intending to eat the sacrifice] after its designated time; Or if one slaughtered [intending to eat] after its designated time, and received, and carried and sprinkled in silence, or if one slaughtered, or received, or carried, or sprinkled [intending to eat] after its designated time. That is offering the mattir in accordance with the law. The case of a mattir offered in accordance with the law is a case in which one of the four activities was done with intent of eating it or burning it after it needs to be eaten or burned, and the rest of the activities were done correctly, meaning in silence. “Silence” means that the sacrifice was done without the improper intent. When one (or more of the activities were done with the intent of eating it after its designated time, and all of the other activities were done properly, then the sacrifice is piggul. The only improper element was the intent to eat it or burn its innards after its designated time.", + "How is the mattir not offered in accordance with the law? If one slaughtered [intending to eat] outside the designated place, [and] received, carried, and sprinkled [with the intention of eating] after its designated time; Or if one slaughtered [intending to eat] after its designated time, [and] received, carried, and sprinkled [intending to eat] outside its designated place, or if one slaughtered, received, carried, and sprinkled [intending to eat] outside its designated time. However, if while doing one of the activities he has the intention of eating or burning it outside its proper place and while doing another one he has the intention of eating it or burning it outside of its designated time, then the sacrifice is doubly invalid and one who eats it is not liable for karet. In other words, in order for it to be piggul it must be purely an error of improper time when improper place is mixed in, the sacrifice is still invalid, but one who eats it is not liable for karet.", + "If one slaughtered the pesah or the hatat for the sake of something else, and received, carried, and sprinkled [intending to eat them] after their designated time; Or if one slaughtered [them, intending to eat them] after their designated time, [and] received, carried, and sprinkled for the sake of something else, or if one slaughtered, received, carried, and sprinkled for the sake of something else; The pesah and hatat must be sacrificed with the intent of their being a pesah or hatat (see 1:1). If while performing one of these actions one has the intent of it being a different sacrifice (and thereby invalidates it) and then has the intent of eating or burning it after the proper time, the sacrifice does not become piggul because there was another improper intent mixed in with the intent of eating it at the wrong time.", + "If one slaughtered the pesah or the hatat for the sake of something else, and received, carried, and sprinkled [intending to eat them] after their designated time; Or if one slaughtered [them, intending to eat them] after their designated time, [and] received, carried, and sprinkled for the sake of something else, or if one slaughtered, received, carried, and sprinkled for the sake of something else; This summarizes the general rule for something to become piggul, the improper intent is only to eat or burn it at the wrong time. If there is some other improper intent, the sacrifice is not piggul." + ], + [ + "[If one intended] to eat as much as an olive on the next day [and] as much as an olive on the outside its intended place, [or] as much as an olive outside its designated place [and] as much as an olive on the next day; Half as much as an olive on the next day [and] half as much as an olive outside its designated place; Half as much as an olive on the next day [and] half as much as an olive outside its designated place, [The sacrifice] is unfit, and does not involve karet. The priest performs the sacrifice with the intention of first eating part of it on the wrong day, and then he has the intention of eating part of it outside its designated place, or vice versa. Alternatively, he has one type of improper intention with half of an olive’s worth of the sacrifice and then another type of improper intention with the other half. Note in all of these cases he has mixed between the two types of improper intention wrong time and wrong place. The sacrifice is invalid, because the two half-olives combine since they were both offered with the wrong intention. However, in none of the cases is there karet for eating the sacrifice because the penalty of karet is only for piggul, and for something to be piggul, the problematic intent must be solely that of eating it after its designated time. Having the intent of eating it in the wrong place takes it out of the category of karet.", + "Rabbi Judah said: this is the general rule: where the [improper] intention of time precedes the [improper] intention of place, [the sacrifice] is piggul, and involves karet; but if the [improper] intention of place precedes the [improper] intention of time, it is invalid and does not involve kareth. Rabbi Judah says that the order of the wrong intentions is critical. If the improper intention of time precedes the improper intention of place, then the sacrifice is piggul because the second improper intention does not affect the first improper intention. However, if the first improper intention is place and then he has an improper intention of time, the sacrifice is not piggul.", + "But the sages say: in both cases [the sacrifice] is invalid and does not involve karet. The sages, whose opinion is found in section one, say that the order doesn’t matter. For something to be piggul, the improper intention must have been only that of time.", + "[If one intends] to eat half as much as an olive [after its intended time or outside its intended place] [and] to burn half as much as an olive [similarly] it is valid, for eating and burning do not combine. In section one we learned that if one has one type of improper intention with one half of an olive’s worth of meat and the other type of improper intention with the other half, then the two half-olives’ worth of meat join together to prohibit the sacrifice. Here we learn that if the priest intends to eat one half of an olive’s worth at either the wrong time or place and burn another half of an olive’s worth at either the wrong time or place, the two half-olives do not join together to create a prohibition. While two types of wrong intention can join together, improper intentions to do different things, burn and eat, do not join together." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn chapter two mishnah one we learned that only a fit priest can receive the blood, carry it to the altar and sprinkle it on the altar. Today we learn that anyone can slaughter the animal.", + "All unfit persons who slaughtered, their slaughtering is valid, for slaughtering is valid [even when performed] by non-priests, and by women, and by slaves, and by the unclean, even in the case of most-holy sacrifices, provided that unclean [persons] do not touch the flesh. The first action in the process of sacrificing an animal can be performed by anyone, and not necessarily just a male priest. This is true for all sacrifices, even most holy sacrifices. There is one caveat if an unclean person slaughters the animal, they must not touch the flesh. The animal is not susceptible to uncleanness but once it has been slaughtered, its flesh is.", + "Therefore they invalidate [the sacrifice] by an [illegitimate] intention. Since anyone can slaughter the animal, if such a person has an illegitimate intention he/she invalidates the sacrifice. In other words, since they can perform these actions, the same rules apply to them as apply to priests when performing the other three actions.", + "And in all of these cases, if they received the blood [in order to eat the sacrifice] after the prescribed time, or outside of the prescribed place, if there remains [in the animal] life-blood, a fit person should go back and receive the blood. Those people listed in section one cannot receive the blood of the sacrificed animal. Therefore, if they do receive the blood and while doing so have an illegitimate intention, it does not automatically render the sacrifice invalid. If there is still blood flowing from the animal’s neck, the life-blood, then a valid priest can come and receive the blood and bring it to the altar and thereby preserve the validity of the sacrifice." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nIn chapter two, mishnah one we learned that only a fit priest can receive the blood, carry it to the altar and sprinkle it on the altar. Today we learn that anyone can slaughter the animal.", + "All unfit persons who slaughtered, their slaughtering is valid, for slaughtering is valid [even when performed] by non-priests, and by women, and by slaves, and by the unclean, even in the case of most-holy sacrifices, provided that unclean [persons] do not touch the flesh. The first action in the process of sacrificing an animal can be performed by anyone, and not just a fit priest. This is true for all sacrifices, even most-holy sacrifices such as the hatat and the asham. There is one caveat if an unclean person slaughters the animal, they must not touch the flesh. The animal is not susceptible to uncleanness but once it has been slaughtered, its flesh is.", + "Therefore they invalidate [the sacrifice] by an [illegitimate] intention. Since anyone can slaughter the animal, even people who are unfit to perform the other three actions, if such a person has an illegitimate intention while slaughtering, he/she invalidates the sacrifice. In other words, since they can perform these actions, the same rules apply to them as apply to fit priests when performing the other three actions.", + "And in all of these cases, if they received the blood [in order to eat the sacrifice] after the prescribed time, or outside of the prescribed place, if there remains [in the animal] life-blood, a fit person should go back and receive the blood. Those people listed in section one cannot receive the blood of the sacrificed animal. Therefore, if they do receive the blood and while doing so have an illegitimate intention, it does not automatically render the sacrifice invalid. If there is still blood flowing from the animal’s neck, the life-blood, then a valid priest can still receive the blood and bring it to the altar and thereby preserve the validity of the sacrifice." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn this mishnah we learn that at certain times a priest may perform one of the sacrificial actions in an invalid manner and yet may afterwards remedy the situation and thereby preserve the validity of the sacrifice.", + "If a fit person received [the blood] and gave [it] to an unfit person, he must return it to the fit one. A fit priest must receive the blood. Were an unfit person to receive it, the sacrifice would be rendered invalid. But if the fit priest receives the blood and then gives the vessel to an unfit person, the unfit person can give the vessel back to the fit priest and the sacrificial procedure can continue. The mere fact that an unfit person handled the vessel does not automatically render the sacrifice invalid.", + "If he received [the blood] in his right hand and transferred [it] to his left, he must return it to his right. As we learned in 2:1, all of the sacrificial actions must be performed with one’s right hand. If one received the blood with his right hand, but then transferred the vessel to his left, he can then transfer the vessel back to his right. This too has not rendered the entire procedure invalid.", + "If he received [it] in a sacred vessel and poured it into a secular [non-sacred] vessel, he must return it to the sacred vessel. The same structure works here. He must receive the blood with a sanctified vessel, but if he first receives it with a sanctified vessel and then pours it into a non-sacred vessel, all he has to do is pour the blood back into the sacred vessel and .", + "If he spilled it from the vessel on to the pavement and then collected it, it is fit. In 2:1 we learned that if the blood pours directly from the neck of the animal onto the floor and he doesn’t receive it in a vessel, the blood cannot be put back into the vessel. Here we learn that if the blood is first put into a sacred vessel, and then it spills onto the floor of the Temple, he can scoop it up and then use it to sprinkle on the altar.", + "If [the priest] applied it on the ascent [or on the altar], [but] not against [the altar’s] base; [or] if he applied what should be applied below [the scarlet line] above [it], or what should be applied above, below; or what should be applied within [he applied] without, or what should be applied without, within1 and life-blood is [still] available, a fit [priest] must receive [blood] anew. In all of these cases (these are the same cases mentioned in 2:1) the priest sprinkles the blood on the altar on a place where it should not be sprinkled. If he has no more life-blood then the sacrifice is not valid. But if he has other life-blood, he can go back, get the other life-blood and sprinkle that blood in the appropriate place." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah lists cases in which a person has an improper intention while sacrificing the animal but this improper intention does not render the sacrifice invalid.", + "If one slaughters the sacrifice [intending] to eat what is not normally eaten, or to burn [on the altar] what is not normally burned [outside of the time or place the sacrifice must be eaten or burned], it is valid; But Rabbi Eliezer invalidates [the sacrifice]. Normally, having an intention to eat or burn something outside of the place or time it should be eaten or burned will invalidate a sacrifice. However, here he intends to burn or eat something that is not normally burned or eaten. Therefore, this improper intention does not render the sacrifice invalid. Rabbi Eliezer disagrees and holds that an improper intention even concerning that which is not normally eaten or burned will still render the sacrifice invalid.", + "[If he slaughters it intending] to eat what is normally eaten and to burn what is normally burned [outside of the time or place the sacrifice must be eaten or burned], [but] less than the size of an olive, it is valid. Here his improper intention was to do the action with less than an olive’s worth of the sacrifice, and therefore the sacrifice is still valid.", + "To eat half as much as an olive and to burn half as much as an olive [outside of the time or place the sacrifice must be eaten or burned], it is valid, because [intentions concerning] eating and burning do not combine. As we learned in 2:5, improper intentions with regard to eating a sacrifice and burning a sacrifice do not join together to add up to the requisite olive’s worth. Therefore, the sacrifice is still valid." + ], + [ + "One who slaughters the sacrifice [intending] to eat as much as an olive of the skin, or of the juice, or of the jelly, or of the hardened meat, or of the bones, or of the tendons, or of the horns, or of the hoofs, either after time or out of bounds, it is valid, and one is not liable on their account in respect of piggul, remnant, or uncleanness. This mishnah teaches that if one has an improper intention to eat a part of the sacrifice that is not normally eaten, then that does not render the sacrifice invalid. In addition, one who eats any of these things from a sacrifice that was offered with an improper intention has not transgressed the prohibition of “piggul.” If the sacrifice was “remnant,” meaning it was left over beyond the time in which it must be eaten, then one who eats these parts has not transgressed the prohibition of eating remnant. Finally, if these parts become impure or he is impure and he eats them, he has not transgressed the prohibition of eating impure sacrifices, or eating pure sacrifice while impure (see Leviticus 7:19-20). In short, when it comes to sacrificial eating laws, these parts of the animal do not count as “meat.”" + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with offspring, eggs and milk and their status vis a vis the sacrifice as a whole.", + "If one slaughters sacred animals [intending] to eat the fetus or the afterbirth outside [of the place or time where the animal must be eaten], he does not render it piggul. The fetus and the afterbirth are not considered integral parts of the sacrificial animal. Therefore, if one slaughters an animal with an improper intention concerning eating its fetus or afterbirth the sacrifice is not rendered invalid.", + "If one plucks off [the necks of] doves, [intending] to eat their eggs outside [of the place or time where the animal must be eaten], he does not render [them] piggul. Birds are slaughtered by having their heads plucked off. We will learn about this more later. Our mishnah teaches that if one has an improper intention concerning eating the eggs, this does not render the sacrifice invalid. The eggs are not part of the bird.", + "The milk of sacred animals or the eggs of doves one is not liable for eating them in respect of piggul, remnant, or uncleanness. The milk of a mammal and the eggs of a bird are not considered part of the animal in respect of sacrificial laws. Therefore, the laws of piggul, remnant and uncleanness do not apply to them see yesterday’s mishnah for a discussion of these three laws." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn this mishnah we learn that usually only two types of illegitimate intentions can invalidate a sacrifice the intention of eating it outside the prescribed place of after the prescribed time. Other illegitimate intentions do not render the sacrifice invalid.", + "If he slaughtered it with the intention of leaving its blood or its innards for the next day, or of carrying them outside of their place: Rabbi Judah disqualifies [it], But the sages declare it valid. The person sacrificing had the intention of leaving the blood or the innards that must be burned on the altar for the next day, but he was not thinking that he would sprinkle the blood on the next day or burn the innards on the next day. Alternatively, he had the intention of taking the blood or innards to a place outside of where they must be spilled or burned, but not of offering them up there. According to Rabbi Judah this is sufficient to disqualify the sacrifice. Just as leaving them over for the next day or taking them out of their prescribed place disqualifies them, so too does thinking about doing such a thing. The rabbis however disagree. Since he did not have the intention of burning or eating after the prescribed time or outside the prescribed place, the sacrifice is not invalid.", + "[If he slaughtered it] with the intention of sprinkling [the blood] on the ascent, [or on the altar] but not against its base; or of applying below [the scarlet line] what should be applied above, or above what should be applied below, or without what should be applied within, or within what should be applied without; The mishnah now brings a long list of cases where a person has the intention of doing an action that will render the sacrifice invalid, but his intention is not to burn or eat the sacrifice after the prescribed time or outside the prescribed place. Section seven will state that in only of these cases the sacrifice is valid. The first list is the same as that found in 2:1 spilling the blood in the wrong place.", + "[Or with the intention] that unclean [persons] should eat it, [or] that unclean [priests] should offer it; The second wrong intention is giving it to an impure person, who cannot eat sacrificial meat.", + "[Or] that uncircumcised [persons] should eat it, [or] that uncircumcised persons should offer it; Uncircumcised men cannot eat sacrifices.", + "[Or with the intention] of breaking the bones of the pesah, or eating of it before it is roasted; The bones of the pesah cannot be broken and it must be eaten wholly roasted. See Exodus 12:9, 46.", + "Or of mingling its blood with the blood of invalid [sacrifices]; If the blood of a valid sacrifice is mixed with the blood of an invalid sacrifice, the sacrifice cannot be eaten.", + "[In all of these cases] it is valid, because an [illegitimate] intention does not disqualify [a sacrifice] except when it refers to after its time or outside its prescribed place, and [in the case of] a pesah and a hatat, [the intention to slaughter them] for the sake of their being a different sacrifice. In all of these cases the sacrifice is valid because his improper intention was not connected with eating or burning it outside the prescribed place or after the prescribed time, the improper intention that does render a sacrifice invalid. The only other improper intention that can render a sacrifice invalid is if the sacrifice is a pesah or a hatat and the person offering it sacrifices it thinking that they are other sacrifices (see 1:4)." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Bet Shammai says: any [blood] which is to be sprinkled on the outer altar, if [the priest] applied [it] with one sprinkling, he has made atonement, [and in the case of a hatat two applications, but Bet Hillel says: also the case of the hatat if the priest applied it with one sprinkling it atones When it comes to sacrifices offered on the outer altar, some require four sprinklings of blood, some two and some one (we will learn more about this in chapter five). Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel agree that for most of these sacrifices if he sprinkled the blood only one time atonement has been effected. They disagree with regard to the hatat. To Bet Shammai the hatat doesn’t atone without two applications of the blood, whereas Bet Hillel holds that one application is sufficient.", + "Therefore if he made the first application in the proper manner and the second [with the intention to eat the flesh] after the prescribed time, it atones. The previous section was all just an introduction. The consequence of this rule (that one application of blood is sufficient to atone, and for Bet Shammai two in the case of the hatat) is that if he made the first application of blood in a proper manner and the second with an improper intention, the sacrifice effects atonement and is valid. The second application was put on the altar after atonement had already been effected by the first application, and therefore it does not render the sacrifice invalid.", + "If he made the first application [with the intention to eat the flesh] after the prescribed time and the second outside the prescribed place, it is piggul and involves [the punishment of] karet. Again, we see here that the second application does not affect the status of the sacrifice. Thus if the first application was done with the intent of eating the sacrifice after the prescribed time, the sacrifice is piggul, and the fact that while sprinkling the blood for a second time he had a different improper intention does not matter. Concerning which improper intention causes the sacrifice to be piggul and is punished by karet, see 2:4-5." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to discuss the effect of improper intentions had when sprinkling the blood.", + "With regard to any [blood] which is sprinkled on the inner altar, if [the priest] omitted one of the applications, he has not atoned; therefore if he applied all in the proper manner but one in an improper manner, it [the sacrifice] is invalid, but does not involve karet. When it comes to sacrifices whose blood must be spilled on the altar inside the sanctuary (the golden altar), all of the sprinklings must be applied and if any one is skipped atonement is not effected. This differs from those sacrifices whose blood is spilled on the outer altar (see yesterday’s mishnah). Since all of the applications of the blood are mandatory, if any one of them is done with the wrong intention, the sacrifice is invalid. However, the sacrifice is not piggul and one who eats it is not obligated for karet unless all of the applications were done with the improper intent. If any one of the mandatory applications was done with the correct intent, the sacrifice is not piggul, although it cannot be eaten." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nAs we have learned, piggul is something that was sacrificed with the intent of eating or burning it outside of its appropriate time. In today’s mishnah we learn that certain items are not liable for piggul, meaning that if one eats or burns these items he cannot be liable for having eaten piggul (although they may nevertheless be prohibited for other reasons).\nThe general rule concerning when one is liable for piggul and when one is exempt is found at the end of the mishnah. Piggul is only applicable to an item if something else permits that item to be eaten or burned. For instance, the flesh of a sacrifice can be eaten once its blood has been sprinkled on the altar. Therefore, if one eats the flesh after the sacrifice was offered with improper intent, he has transgressed the violation of piggul. Some items “permit themselves” and to these items, piggul does not apply.", + "These are the things for which one is not liable on account of piggul:
The fistful, The “fistful” is the fistful of flour that the priest puts on the altar from the minhah, or meal-offering. If he grabs this fistful with the intent of eating it outside the proper time, or of burning it outside of its time, the minhah offering is piggul. However, one who eats the fistful taken from the minhah offering has not transgressed piggul for the fistful permits the minhah to be eaten, but the fistful permits itself, and one who eats something that permits itself has not violated piggul.", + "The incense, The incense that is put on the altar with the “fistful” (see Leviticus 2:2). The same rules that apply to the fistful apply to it as well.", + "The frankincense, The frankincense offering referred to in Exodus 30:7-8. The case here is one in which a person, while bringing the frankincense to the altar to turn it into smoke thought that he would burn it on the next day. One who then eats such frankincense, has not transgressed piggul.", + "The priests’ meal-offering, The priests’ entire minhnah offering is burned on the altar (Leviticus 6:16). There is no fistful taken from it that permits it to be eaten or burned. Therefore, it “permits itself” and the laws of piggul do not apply.", + "The anointed priest's meal-offering, The high priest would bring a minhah offering everyday (Leviticus 6:15). It too is entirely burned.", + "The minhah with libation This refers to a minhah offering that a person volunteers to bring (Numbers 15:2ff).", + "The blood, The blood permits the sacrifice to be eaten, but nothing permits it. One who eats this blood is liable for eating blood, but not for the violation of piggul.", + "The libations that are brought separately, the words of Rabbi Meir. The sages say: also those that are brought with an animal [sacrifice]. This refers to a minhah brought with a libation but not with an accompanying animal sacrifice, for the sacrifice was offered on the previous day. According to Rabbi Meir, this minhah permits itself and does not permit the sacrifice (the blood permits the sacrifice). Therefore, in such a case, the minhah is not piggul, even if the animal was. However, according to Rabbi Meir, if the minhah was brought with the animal sacrifice, and the animal becomes piggul (offered with improper intent), then the minhah also becomes piggul. The other rabbis disagree and hold that the minhah offering cannot become piggul even when it accompanies an animal sacrifice. The minhah offering is independent from the animal offering and even if the animal becomes piggul, the minhah does not.", + "The log of oil brought by the metzora: Rabbi Shimon says: one is not liable on account of piggul; But Rabbi Meir says: one is liable on account of piggul, See Leviticus 14:10. This log (a measure) of oil is offered by the metzora (one who had some type of skin disease) upon becoming pure. It accompanies an asham sacrifice. According to Rabbi Shimon, if the asham becomes piggul, the oil does not because the sacrifice does not “permit” the oil, rather the oil permits itself. Rabbi Meir holds that the asham does permit the oil to be put on the ear and thumb/big toe of the metzora and therefore it is something that other things permit and it can become piggul. If the sacrifice is offered with the wrong intent, then the oil becomes piggul and one who eats it would be liable.", + "because the blood of the asham makes it permitted and whatever has something else that makes it permitted, whether for man or for the altar, one is liable on its account for piggul. This is the general rule that underlies the entire mishnah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses what permits the parts of various sacrifices to be burned or eaten. The importance of this is that if one has an improper intent while performing an action with the blood that permits this sacrifice to be eaten or burned, then the sacrifice is piggul and one who eats it is liable for karet (if the improper intent was to eat or burn it after the time in which it must be eaten or burned).", + "[The sprinkling of] the blood of the olah permits its flesh for [burning on] the altar, and its skin to the priests. Once the blood of the olah sacrifice has been sprinkled on the altar, its flesh can be burned on the altar and the skin goes to the priests. Thus, if one has an improper intent while sprinkling the blood, the olah is piggul.", + "[The sprinkling of] the blood of the olah of a bird permits its flesh to the altar. The same holds true for the bird olah, except that in this case the skin is also burned (what would the priests do with the skin of a dove?).", + "[The sprinkling of] the blood of the hatat of a bird permits its flesh to the priests. A hatat bird can be eaten by the priests, once its blood has been sprinkled.", + "[The sprinkling of] the blood of the bullocks that are burned and the goats that are burned permits their innards to be offered [on the altar]. Rabbi Shimon said: whatever is not [sprinkled] on the outer altar, as in the case of shelamim, one is not liable for it on account of piggul. There are three types of bullocks referred to here: 1) The bullock offered on Yom Kippur; 2) the bullock offered by a high priest for issuing a mistaken instruction; 3) the bullock offered by the court that makes a mistaken instruction. There are two types of goats that are referred to here: 1) The goat offered on Yom Kippur; 2) The goat offered by a court for making a mistaken instruction concerning a law related to idol worship. In all of these cases the blood is sprinkled on the inner altar, their flesh is burned and their innards are burned on the altar. Therefore, if one has an improper intent while sprinkling the blood, the flesh is piggul. Rabbi Shimon disagrees and holds that in these cases, since the blood is not sprinkled on the outer altar, as is the case in shelamim concerning which the laws concerning piggul were written (Leviticus 7:18), the laws of piggul don’t apply. So in this case, even if he has an improper thought, the flesh is not piggul." + ], + [ + "The sacrifices of non-Jews: one is not liable on their account for piggul, remnant, or defilement, and if [a priest] slaughters them outside [the Temple], he is not liable, the words of Rabbi Meir. But Rabbi Yose declares him liable.
The things for which one is not liable on account of piggul, one is liable on account of remnant and defilement except blood.
Rabbi Shimon declares one liable for anything which is normally eaten, but for wood, frankincense and incense, one is not liable for [transgressions involving] defilement.
Section one: Non-Jews may bring sacrifices to the Temple, and this probably was not altogether an uncommon occurrence in the Second Temple period. Rabbi Meir says that the laws concerning piggul, remnant, defilement and the prohibition of slaughtering a sacrifice outside of the Temple do not apply to these sacrifices. What this means is that if someone has an improper intent while offering this sacrifice, and then someone eats the meat, the one who ate the meat is not liable for karet, as he would be had the sacrifice been brought by a Jew. The same holds true if the sacrifice is left over, or if someone eats it while impure. While doing so is prohibited, one who does so is not liable for karet, according to Rabbi Meir.
Rabbi Yose says that the same laws that govern sacrifices brought by Jews also govern sacrifices brought by non-Jews and that one who eats from such a sacrifice would be liable for karet.
Section two: This section refers to the list found in mishnah three above. For all of those things, while the laws of piggul don’t apply, the laws of remnant and defilement do apply. Thus if one eats one of them after the time has elapsed, he is liable for transgressing the laws of remnant, and if one eats one of them while impure, he has violated the prohibition of eating holy things while impure. The one exception is blood one who eats blood has violated the prohibition of eating blood, but he has not violated other prohibitions.
Rabbi Shimon disagrees and holds that for anything that is normally eaten, one can violate the prohibitions of eating it while defiled. This would apply to the fistful of the minhah offering, the priests’ minhah offering and other edible things found in the list in mishnah three. However, if one eats or burns inedible things, such as wood or incense, while impure, he is not liable. The sages disagree and hold that he is liable for violating the prohibition of impurity in such cases as well." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nWhen a priest offers a sacrifice, he must have six things in mind while doing so. Our mishnah teaches what these six things are.", + "The sacrifice is slaughtered for the sake of six things:
For the sake of the sacrifice, The priest must have in mind what type of sacrifice is being offered, for instance an olah must be offered with the intent that it be an olah, and not a shelamim.", + "For the sake of the sacrificer, The priest must have in mind the person who is bringing the sacrifice. In other words, he must intend that the sacrifice should “count” for that person.", + "For the sake of the [Divine] Name, The priest must have in mind that the sacrifice is for God (our God, of course) and not for some other god, or any other entity one could think of.", + "For the sake of fire-offerings, When sacrificing the priest has to have in mind that it will be burned on the altar, and not that it will merely be burned.", + "For the sake of fragrance, The sacrifice must be offered with the intent to produce a fragrance for God, as it says in Leviticus 1:9, “an olah, a fire-offering of pleasing fragrance.”", + "For the sake of pleasing; The final word (in Hebrew) of the above-verse is “pleasing.” The priest must have in mind that the sacrifice be pleasing to God.", + "And a hatat and an asham for the sake of sin. A hatat and an asham come to atone for sins. They must be offered with the sake that they atone for the sin that they are intended to atone for.", + "Rabbi Yose said: even if one did not have any of these purposes in his heart, it is valid, because it is a regulation of the court. According to Rabbi Yose, even if the priest did not have any of these intentions, the sacrifice is still valid. This is because the court stipulates that any sacrifice done without one of these intentions (but not with an improper intention) is valid.", + "Since the intention is determined only by the worshipper. This line explains the entire mishnah. The intent of the worshipper, meaning the priest, is what is determinative of the sacrifice, and not the intent of the owner of the sacrifice. If the worshipper had these six things in mind when offering the sacrifice, the sacrifice is valid even if the owner had an intent that would disqualify the sacrifice." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThe fifth chapter of Zevahim is a well-known chapter of Mishnah, at least in traditional circles, because it is recited every morning before Shacharit, the morning prayer service. The chapter describes how the sacrifices were offered, where in the Temple, how many times the blood was sprinkled on the altar, and other various issues. The reason why this chapter was recited every morning was that its recitation was meant to take the place of the sacrifices which could no longer be offered after the Temple was destroyed.", + "Which is the place [for the offering] of the sacrifices?
Most holy sacrifices are slaughtered on the north [side of the altar]. This is a general clause that will be further expanded henceforth through mishnah five. The three most holy sacrifices are the hatat, the asham and the olah.", + "The bullock and the goat of Yom Kippur are [done] at the north, and the receiving of their blood is [performed] with ministering vessels at the north, and their blood requires sprinkling between the poles [of the ark], on the curtain, and on the golden altar. These sacrifices are mentioned in Leviticus 16, the chapter that is read in the synagogue on Yom Kippur. The section gives basic instructions as to where these two sacrifices are offered and where their blood must be sprinkled. When sprinkling the blood the high priest would stand between the poles of the ark and sprinkle the blood on the poles, on the veil in the sanctuary and on the golden altar which also stood in the sanctuary. For more detailed information, see Yoma 5:3-6.", + "[The omission of] a single application of [the blood] invalidates [them]. Every application of the blood must be executed and the omission of a single one of them invalidates these two sacrifices.", + "He [the priest] would pour out the remainders of the blood on the western base of the outer altar, but if he did not pour it out, he did not invalidate [the sacrifice]. The mishnah instructs the priest to pour the blood out on the base of the altar. If he doesn’t do so, or doesn’t do so in a proper manner, the sacrifice is still valid." + ], + [ + "As for the bullocks which were burnt and the goats which were burnt, their slaughtering is [done] at the north, and the reception of their blood is [done] at the north, and their blood requires sprinkling on the veil, and on the golden altar;
[The omission of] a single one of these applications invalidates [the sacrifice].
He [the priest] pours the remainder of the blood on the western base of the altar; but if he did not pour it out, he did not invalidate [the sacrifice].
Both of these were burnt at the ash pit.
This mishnah deals with two sacrifices: the bullocks and the goats that were wholly-burned. These sacrifices were explained above in chapter four, mishnah four.
As far as how they were sacrificed, these sacrifices, both of which are an olah, are treated basically the same as the two sacrifices discussed in yesterday’s mishnah.
Sections one-three: For an explanation, see yesterday’s mishnah. The one difference between these two sacrifices and the Yom Kippur sacrifices in yesterday’s mishnah are that those mentioned in today’s mishnah do not require sprinkling the blood on the altar.
Section four: All of the sacrifices mentioned in this mishnah and in yesterday’s are burned at the ash pit, outside of the camp of Israel, a place mentioned in Leviticus 6:4." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah provides instruction concerning the sacrifice of the hatat.", + "[Concerning] public and private hatats: (These are the public hatats: the goats of new moons and The mishnah notes that the discussion here is concerning both the public and the private hatat. In a parenthetical remark, the mishnah lists the public hatats, meaning those offered on behalf of the entire people of Israel. These include the goats offered on Rosh Hodesh (the new moons) and festivals. These are listed in Numbers 28: 15ff.", + "They are slaughtered in the north, and their blood is received in ministering vessels in the north, and their blood requires four applications on the four corners [of the altar]. The hatat, like all most holy sacrifices, is slaughtered on the north side of the altar. Its blood is then received in ministering vessels. The blood of the hatat is spilled on all four corners (or horns, the word is the same in Hebrew) of the altar that stands outside in the Temple courtyard.", + "How was it done? He went up the ascent, turned to the surrounding walkway, and came to the south-east corner, then the north-east, then the north-west, and then the south-west. The priest would ascend the altar on the ascent, and arrive at a walkway that surrounds the altar, known as the “sovev” in Hebrew. The ascent begins on the southern side of the altar, and the priest would first arrive at the southeastern corner. He would then walk north to the northeastern corner, then west to the northwestern corner, and finish at the southwestern corner.", + "He would pour the residue of the blood out at the southern base. The residues of the blood would be poured out on the southern base to the altar.", + "They were eaten within the hangings [of the Tabernacle], by male priests, prepared in any fashion, the same day and night, until midnight. The hatat must be eaten within the Temple confines. The mishnah expresses this by referring to the Tabernacle, and the hangings that enclosed it. When it comes to the Temple, the hatat must be eaten within the walls of the Temple courtyard. Any priest can eat the hatat. The priests can prepare the hatat in any manner they like. This distinguishes it from the pesah sacrifice, which must be roasted. The hatat must be eaten on the day that it is sacrificed and the remainder of the night, up until midnight. The next morning it will become remnant, and anyone who eats it will be liable for karet. See Leviticus 7:15, and Mishnah Berakhot 1:1." + ], + [ + "The olah is a most holy sacrifice.
It is slaughtered in the north, and its blood is received in a ministering vessel in the north; and its blood requires two applications, which are four.
It had to be flayed, dismembered, and completely consumed by the fire.
Today’s mishnah discusses the olah, the second of the three “most holy sacrifices.”
Section two: The olah, like the hatat and the asham, the other two most holy sacrifices, must be slaughtered on the north side of the altar. Its blood must be received in a ministering vessel. The priest then takes the blood and while standing on the floor of the Temple (and not on the walkway) he applies two blood applications. Both are on the lower part of the altar, the first on the northeastern corner and the other on the southwestern corner, thus causing the blood to spread in all four directions (see Leviticus 1:5). This is how two applications of blood can be considered four.
Section three: After the blood has been applied to the altar, the animal is flayed, dismembered and then all of its parts are burnt completely on the altar (see Leviticus 1:6-9). In English this is called the “wholly burned sacrifice.”" + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah teaches details concerning the asham and the public shelamim sacrifices.", + "The shelamim of the public and the ashams: This mishnah will deal mostly with different types of ashams, but it also deals with the shelamim offering of the public, which consists of two sheep offered on behalf of the entire congregation of Israel on Shavuot. See Leviticus 23:19. Other types of shelamim have different rules and we shall deal with them below in mishnah seven.", + "These are the[different types of] ashams: The asham for robbery; The asham or illegal use of holy property; The asham for a betrothed maidservant; A nazirite's asham; A leper's asham; And the suspended asham. There are six different types of ashams. I shall briefly explain each one and provide biblical reference: The asham for robbery: This is brought by one who swore that he had not stolen something, and then confessed to his crime. See Leviticus 5:25 and Mishnah Shevuot 5:1. The asham for illegal use of holy property: Someone who makes personal use of holy property, such as something that was dedicated to the Temple, must bring an asham to atone for his sin. See Leviticus 5:15. For a betrothed maidservant: This is brought by a man who sleeps with a maidservant betrothed to another man. See Leviticus 19:20-21. We will deal more extensively with this passage when we get to tractate Keritot 2:5. A nazirite's asham: Brought by a nazirite who had come into contact with a dead body. See Numbers 6:12. A leper's asham: Brought by the leper (one with some sort of skin affliction) when he has recovered from his disease. See Leviticus 14:12. And the suspended asham: This is brought by a person who is not sure if he transgressed a prohibition for which a hatat is usually brought. He would bring this asham and then if he found out later that he had sinned, he would have to bring a hatat. In that sense this asham “suspends” for the punishment is suspended until it is determined whether a transgression has been committed. See Leviticus 5:17-18.", + "These are slaughtered in the north, and their blood is received in a service vessel in the north, and their blood requires two sprinklings, which constitute four. The rules here are the same as those concerning the sprinkling of the blood of the olah above in mishnah four.", + "And they are eaten within the curtains [of the Tabernacle], by male priests, prepared in any manner, the same day and night, until midnight. These sacrifices can be eaten. The same rules that applied to the hatat (see mishnah three) apply to the asham and to the public shelamim." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with the todah, or thanksgiving offering (Leviticus 7:11 ff.) and the ram brought by the nazirite upon the completion of his naziriteship.", + "The todah and the nazirite's ram are sacrifices of lesser sanctity. Both of these sacrifices are of lesser sanctity, and this will be expressed in some of the halakhot which we will see below. These halakhot are more lenient than those governing the most holy sacrifices which we dealt with above.", + "They are slaughtered anywhere in the Temple Court, and their blood requires two sprinklings, which constitute four; Unlike sacrifices of most holy sanctity, which must be slaughtered north of the altar, these sacrifices can be slaughtered anywhere in the Temple courtyard. The blood is sprinkled on the altar in the same way as was done for the olah (see mishnah four).", + "And they are eaten in any part of the city, by any person, prepared in any manner, the same day and the night following, until midnight. Most holy sacrifices must be eaten within the walls of the Temple (or the curtains of the Tabernacle when the Israelites were in the desert). Lesser holy sacrifices can be eaten anywhere within the walls of the city of Jerusalem. Anyone can eat them, not just priests. These two sacrifices can be prepared in any manner and must be eaten by midnight of the night following their offering (like the hatat in mishnah three).", + "The parts of them which are raised are governed by the same law, save that these are eaten [only] by the priests, their wives, their children and their slaves. The breast and the thigh are raised from these sacrifices and given to the priests (see Leviticus 7:34). All of the rules that apply to the rest of the sacrifice apply to these two parts, except that these can only be eaten by priests and their households (wives, children and slaves). They can be eaten anywhere in Jerusalem, prepared in any manner and until midnight." + ], + [ + "The shelamim is a sacrifice of lesser sanctity.
It may be slaughtered in any part of the Temple court, and its blood requires two sprinklings, which constitute four.
And they are eaten in any part of the city, by any person, prepared in any way, during two days and one night.
The parts of them which are raised are governed by the same law, save that these are eaten [only] by the priests, their wives, their children and their slaves.
Section two: The same rules that governed the slaughtering of the todah in yesterday’s mishnah.
Section three: The difference between the shelamim and the todah is that the shelamim can be eaten for longer. They can be eaten on the day that they are sacrificed, on the entire following night and on the following day. See Leviticus 7:16-17.
Section four: The same rule as we saw in yesterday’s mishnah regarding the todah." + ], + [ + "The first-born animal, tithe and the pesah are sacrifices of lesser sanctity.
They are slaughtered in any part of the Temple court, and their blood requires one sprinkling, provided that he applies it against the base [of the altar].
They differ in the [rules governing] their eating:
The first-born animal is eaten by priests [only], the tithe is eaten by anyone and they can be eaten in any part of the city, prepared in any manner, during two days and one night.
The pesah can be eaten only at night, only until midnight, and it can be eaten only by those registered for it, and it can be eaten only when roasted.
The last mishnah of our chapter is concerned with the three remaining sacrifices of lower sanctity the first-born animal, the tithe and the pesah.
Section two: These sacrifices require only one sprinkling of blood. This is derived from the fact that Numbers 18:17 says concerning the first-born animal, “and the blood you shall sprinkle on the altar” and it doesn’t say “around the altar” as it says regarding other sacrifices. This one sprinkling must be applied a section of the altar that has a base. There was no base (Hebrew: yesod) to the altar on the east or south sides, so this blood sprinkling had to be done on the north or west sides.
Section three: The rules concerning eating these three sacrifices differ, and therefore each must be discussed individually.
Section four: The first-born is given to the priests and can be eaten only by them (and also their households). These are the same rules that govern the breast and thigh of other sacrifices. See Numbers 18:18. In contrast, the tithe can be eaten by anyone.
Both of these sacrifices can be eaten anywhere in Jerusalem. They can be prepared in any manner and they can be eaten with the same time limitations as the shelamim, meaning the day they are slaughtered, the night that follows and the entire following day.
Section five: The pesah is different in many ways. First of all, it can be eaten only on the night following the day on which it was slaughtered (see Exodus 12:8). This is the night on which we now observe the seder. That night it can only be eaten until midnight. We should note that there was some debate among the rabbis concerning this see Pesahim 10:9. Some rabbis held that it could be eaten until the following morning, but that one should try to eat it before midnight. In order for a person to eat a pesah he had to be registered for it. What this means is that before it is slaughtered the people who intend to eat it must inform the slaughterer of their intention. A person could not register for two pesah sacrifices. Finally, the pesah must be fully roasted it can’t be boiled or cooked using any water." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Most holy sacrifices which were slaughtered on the top of the altar: Rabbi Yose says: it is as though they were slaughtered in the north. Rabbi Yose son of Rabb Judah says: from the middle of the altar southward is as south, from the middle of the altar northward is as the north. We already learned in the previous chapter that most-holy sacrifices (the olah, hatat and asham) are slaughtered north of the altar. Our mishnah discusses what happens if the priest slaughters one of these sacrifices on top of the altar. According to Rabbi Yose this is sufficient to validate the sacrifice, since the top of the altar counts as the north of the altar. Rabbi Yose the son of Rabbi Judah divides the altar in half if the sacrifice was slaughtered on the northern half, then it is valid, but if on the southern half it is not valid.", + "The fistfuls of meal-offerings were taken in any part of the Temple court, and they [the minhah-offerings] were eaten within the curtains, by male priests, prepared in any manner, on the same day and night, until midnight. The mishnah has now completed the topic of animal sacrifices and is moving on to other things that are offered in the Temple. Out of minhah offerings (grain) are removed fistfuls of flour and they are burned on the altar (see Leviticus 2:1-3). The removal of the fistful from the minhah can be done anywhere in the Temple court, and not just on the northern side of the altar. The minhah itself (not the fistful) is eaten by male priests (and not their households) within the Temple confines. It can be cooked in any manner, but it must be eaten by midnight of the day it was brought." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah begins to deal with bird offerings. There are two types of bird offerings: the hatat and the olah.", + "The hatat of a bird was sacrificed by the southwest horn [of the altar]. The sacrifice of a bird consists of plucking off its head and then sprinkling its blood on the altar. These were both done on the southwest horn (or corner) of the altar.", + "It is valid [if done] in any place, but this was its [particular] place. The mishnah notes that this is where the bird hatat was supposed to be done, but it didn’t have to be done there. If it was done elsewhere it is still valid.", + "That horn served for three things below, and three things above: Below: for the hatat of the bird, For the presenting [of meal-offerings]. And for the residue of the blood. There were six sacrificial actions performed on this corner of the altar, three of which were performed above the crimson line in the middle of the altar and three below. The bird hatat, the main topic of our mishnah, was performed below the line. The minhah (meal) offerings were presented, meaning drawn near, to the altar, at this corner, below the line. Also, the residue of the blood from animal sacrifices was poured out on the southern base (yesod) at this corner (see above 5:3).", + "Above: for the pouring out of wine and water, and for the olah of a bird when there was too much on the east. There were three actions above the line at this corner. The first two are the libations, liquids poured out onto the altar. There are two such libations. The water libation which occurs only on Sukkot (see Sukkah 4:9) and the wine libation, which was done frequently as an accompaniment to animal sacrifices. In addition, usually the bird olah was done on the southeastern corner of the altar. But if there were too many bird olahs and the southeastern corner became busy, they would offer the extra on the southwestern corner." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to deal with the three offerings mentioned at the end of yesterday’s mishnah the water and wine libations and the extra bird olahs.", + "All who ascended the altar, ascended by the right, then they went round [the altar] and descended by the left, except for these three, who ascended and descended by retracing their steps. The ramp was on the southern side of the altar. Usually a priest would ascend the southern side of the altar and then walk around to the right of the altar, its eastern side, and then turn towards the left, or western side of the altar and make his way back down. In other words, he would arrive at the southeastern corner first and the southwestern corner last. For things done on the southwestern corner, the priest did not have to circle the entire altar. Rather, he could just go up the left side, immediately arrive at the southwestern corner, and when done come right back. Perhaps this was a traffic-saving device, meant to prevent too many priests from having to circle the entire altar. The problem would be that priests would be walking in opposite directions, but I guess they somehow managed that problem." + ], + [ + "How was the hatat of a bird sacrificed?
He pinches off its head behind its neck, but he did not sever it.
And he would sprinkle its blood on the wall of the altar.
The residue of the blood was drained out on the base.
Only the blood belonged to the altar, while the rest of it belonged to the priests.
Our mishnah continues to provide instructions as to how the bird hatat was sacrificed.
Section one: Birds are not slaughtered to be sacrifices in the same way that birds are slaughtered to be eaten. To make a bird kosher, the shochet slices its neck, the same way that he does for an animal. But for sacrificing, the priest pinches off its head off with his thumbnail from the back of the bird’s neck. See Leviticus 5:8-9. He does not sever the head entirely from the body, just separates it by pinching it off.
Sections two-three: After pinching off its head, he sprinkles the blood out of the bird onto the wall of the altar. Note that its blood is not received in a ministering vessel. The residue of the blood is squeezed out of the bird onto the base of the altar.
Section four: The rest of the bird was eaten by priests only the blood was put on the altar." + ], + [ + "How was the olah of a bird sacrificed?
He [the priest] ascended the ramp, and turned to the surrounding walkway, and made his way to the southeast horn.
There he pinched its head at the back of the neck, and severed it, and drained out its blood on the wall of the altar.
He took the head, turned the part where it was nipped to the altar, saturated it with salt, and threw it on to the fires [of the altar].
Then he came to the body, and removed the crop, the feathers, and the entrails that came out of it, and threw them on to the burning place. He tore [the body], but did not sever it in half, but if he did sever it, it is still valid. Then he saturated it [the body] with salt, and threw it on to the fires of the altar.
This mishnah provides instructions as to how the bird olah was sacrificed. Some of this mishnah does not need explanation, so I have commented only upon the sections that I felt require it.
Section three: After having slaughtered the bird by pinching its head off at the back of the neck, the priest severs the head off of the body (see Leviticus 1:15-17).
Section four: The first thing he takes care of is the head. He drains its blood by turning the point at which it was pinched toward the altar. Then he salts it very well until it is saturated (see Leviticus 2:13). After it has been salted, he can throw the head onto the altar so it can be burned.
Section five: Now he must take care of the body. He removes the parts that are not to be offered on the altar (Leviticus 1:16), the crop, the feathers and the entrails and then he throws them on the “Bet Hamoked”, the burning place where parts of animals that are not burned on the altar are burned. This was on the southern side of the altar.
He then tears the body at its wings, but he tries not to sever it in half (Leviticus 1:17). Finally, he salts the body and burns it on the altar." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah teaches that if the priest deviates from some of the above instructions regarding the bird sacrifices, the sacrifice might still be valid. But if he deviates from others, they invalidate the sacrifice.", + "If he did not remove the crop or the feathers or the entrails which came out of it, or did not dry it with salt, or made any other deviation after he had drained the blood out, it is still valid. The general rule here is quite clear if he makes any changes from the prescribed way of acting after he has drained out the blood, then the sacrifice is still valid.", + "If he severed the [head of the] hatat or did not sever the olah, it is unfit. However, if he makes some changes before the blood is drained, such as severing the head of the hatar, or not severing the head of the olah, the sacrifice is invalid. It seems that the sacrifice is validated by the blood being drained out, and therefore deviations that occur before that moment can invalidate the sacrifice whereas those that occur after cannot.", + "If he drained out the blood of the head, but not the blood of the body, it is unfit; The blood of the body, but not the blood of the head, it is fit. As far as the blood is concerned, the rule is that he must drain the blood out of the body, for that is where most of the blood is. If he does not do so, the sacrifice is invalid. He should also drain the blood out of the head, but if he does not, the sacrifice is still valid." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah introduces the problem of a sacrifice not sacrificed with the correct intent in connection with bird sacrifices. Many of these same rules can be found in the first four chapters of the tractate in connection with the animal sacrifices.", + "If he nipped a hatat of a bird for the sake of something else; if he drained out its blood for the sake of something else, or for its own sake and for the sake of something else, or for the sake of something else and for its own sake, it is unfit. An olah of a bird is fit [in such circumstances] except that it does not count for its owner’s obligation. In all of these cases the priest offering the bird hatat performed one of the actions with the intention that the offering be something other than a hatat. Such an intention invalidates the sacrifice, but only in the case of the hatat. In the case of the bird olah, the animal can still be burned on the altar. Nevertheless, it doesn’t count for its owners, so they will have to bring a replacement bird olah. This is the same rule we saw with regard to animal olahs (see 1:3).", + "A hatat of a bird or an olah of a bird which he nipped, or drained out the blood [with the intention] to eat what was normally eaten or to burn what was normally burned outside of the appropriate place, is invalid, but it does not involve karet; After the appropriate time, it is piggul and involves karet, Provided that the mattir was offered in accordance with the regulations. If the priest nips off the head of either bird sacrifice or drains the blood with the intention of either eating something or burning something outside of the proper place (meaning outside of the Temple) then the sacrifice is invalid (see mishnayot 2:3-5). However, an intention concerning the wrong place does not make the sacrifice piggul, and the person who eats it is not liable for the punishment of karet. If he nips off the head or drains the blood with the intention of eating or burning it after the appropriate time, then the sacrifice is piggul and one who eats it liable for karet. The one caveat is that in order for the sacrifice to be piggul and for the one who eats it to be liable for karet the “mattir” has to be offered correctly. What this means, as we shall see, is that if both problematic intentions are involved with the sacrifice, then the sacrifice is not piggul, although it is still invalid. It is piggul only if the only type of wrong intention involved in the sacrifice was eating it after the appropriate time.", + "How does he offer the mattir according to regulations? If he nipped it in silence and drained the blood [with an intention of] after the appropriate time; or if he nipped it [with an intention of] after the appropriate time and drained the blood in silence; or if he nipped it and drained the blood [with an intention of] after the appropriate time: in these cases he offered the mattir according to regulation. The mishnah now illustrates what the previous line means. One of the actions was done in silence, meaning with correct intention, and the other of the actions was done with the intent of eating it after its appropriate time, or if both actions were done with the intent of eating at the wrong time, then the sacrifice is piggul, because the only wrong intention was with regard to time.", + "How does he not offer the mattir according to regulation? If he nipped it [with an intention of] outside the appropriate place and drained the blood [with an intention of] outside the appropriate time; or if he nipped it [with an intention of] after the appropriate time and drained the blood [with an intention of] outside the appropriate place; or if he nipped it and drained the blood [with an intention of] outside the appropriate place; or if he nipped a hatat of a bird for the sake of a different sacrifice and drained the blood [with an intention of] after the appropriate time; or if he nipped it [with an intention of] after the appropriate time and drained the blood for the sake of a different sacrifice; or if he nipped it and drained the blood for the sake of a different sacrifice: in these cases he did not offer the mattir according to regulation. If, however, one of the actions done with the intention of eating it or burning it in the wrong place, and the other action was done with the intention of eating it or burning it after the appropriate time, then it is not piggul. It is also not piggul if both actions were done with the intention of eating it in the wrong place, as we learned in section two above.", + "[If he intended] to eat as much as an olive outside the appropriate place [and] as much as an olive the next day, [or] as much as an olive the next day [and] as much as an olive outside the appropriate place; Or half as much as an olive outside the appropriate place [and] half as much as an olive the next day; Or half as much as an olive the next day [and] half as much as an olive outside the appropriate place, [the sacrifice] is unfit, and does not involve karet. In this section he performs one action (nipping the head or draining the blood) with the intention of eating at least one olive’s worth in the wrong place and one olive’s worth at the wrong time, or in the opposite order, or half an olive’s worth in the wrong place and half an olive’s worth at the wrong time, or in the opposite order. In these cases the sacrifice is invalid, but one who eats it is not liable for karet for two wrong intentions were involved in this sacrifice. The order of the wrong intentions, according to this opinion, doesn’t matter. As long as the two different improper intentions were mixed up in one sacrifice, the sacrifice is not piggul and the one who eats it is not liable for karet.", + "Rabbi Judah said: this is the general rule: if the [wrongful] intention of time precedes that of place, [the sacrifice] is piggul, and involves karet; but if the [wrongful] intention of place precedes that of time, it is unfit and does not involve karet. But the sages say: in both cases [the sacrifice is] unfit and does not involve karet. According to Rabbi Judah, the order of the wrong intentions is significant. If the wrong intention of time comes first, then the sacrifice is piggul. It is determinative of the ultimate status of the sacrifice, because it came first. If, however, the wrong intention concerning place came first, then it is determinative, and as we learned in section two, the sacrifice is not piggul and one who eats it is not liable for karet. The sages, whose opinion was found in section five, restate their opinion that in neither case is the sacrifice piggul, and one who eats it would not be liable for karet.", + "[If he intended] to eat half as much as an olive [outside the appropriate place or after the appropriate time] [and] to burn half as much as an olive [similarly] it is fit, for eating and burning do not combine. The situation described here is actually impossible when it comes to the bird hatat, none of it is burned on the altar and it when it comes to the bird olah, none of it is eaten. So with one sacrifice, one could never have a wrong intention to eat half an olive and a wrong intention to burn half an olive. The section is taught because this was possible with animal sacrifices. There and here we learn that wrong intents with regard to eating and burning half an olive’s worth do not join together to fill the requirement for their to be the wrong to intent with regard to an olive’s worth of the flesh." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nIn chapter six, mishnayot five and six we learned how the bird hatat and bird olah were offered. There were a few differences between them. The first two mishnayot of this chapter discuss what happens if one mixes up between the two of them.", + "If a hatat of a bird is offered below [the red line] with the rites of a hatat [and] for the sake of a hatat, it is fit. The blood of the hatat is supposed to be offered below the red line. In this case the bird hatat is offered in the correct manner, and is therefore fit. This line is only here in the mishnah to serve as a contrast with the following four sections.", + "[If it is offered] with the rites of a hatat, [but] in the name of a olah; If the rites followed are those for a hatat, but his intention was for it to be an olah, the sacrifice is unfit.", + "[Or] with the rites of an olah [and] in the name of a hatat; If the intent of the priest is for it to be a hatat, but he sacrifices it using the rites for an olah, then it is unfit.", + "Or with the rites of an olah [and] in the name of an olah, it is unfit. If the sacrifice is supposed to be a hatat, but the priest thinks and acts as if it is an olah, it is similarly unfit. Basically for the hatat to be fit, it must be offered for the sake of a hatat and with the rites of a hatat.", + "If he offers it above [the red line] [even] with the rites of any of these, it is unfit. If he sprinkles the blood above the red line, then it is invalid even if he offers it for the sake of a hatat, using the rites of a hatat. Sprinkling the blood below the red line is mandatory and without it the hatat is invalid." + ], + [ + "If an olah of a bird is offered above [the red line], with the rites of an olah [and] in the name of a olah, it is fit.
With the rites of an olah [but] in the name of a hatat, it is fit, but does not count for its owner’s obligation.
[If he offers it] with the rites of a hatat [and] in the name of a olah;
[Or] with the rites of a hatat [and] in the name of a hatat, it is unfit.
If he offers it below, [even] with the rites of any of these, it is unfit.
This mishnah is similar to yesterday’s mishnah, but the topic here is the olah.
Section one: This olah is offered in the manner in which it is supposed to be offered and therefore it is valid.
Section two: If an olah is offered with the rites of an olah but for the sake of it being a hatat, it is still fit and can be burned on the altar. However, it doesn’t count for discharging the owner of his obligation, as we explained in chapter six, mishnah seven. The owners will need to bring another hatat.
Sections three and four: However, if he uses the rites of a hatat, it is invalid.
Section five: As with the hatat, if he sprinkles the blood in the wrong place, it is invalid, even if he uses the rites of the olah and does it for the sake of an olah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah refers to the cases in the previous two mishnayot of bird hatats and olahs that were not offered correctly.", + "And all of these do not defile in the gullet One who eats a bird that was not slaughtered properly becomes impure when the piece of meat he is swallowing reaches his gullet. However, these birds were slaughtered properly (the problem was in the sacrificial ritual) and therefore they do not cause impurity as do carrion birds.", + "And they involve trespass, except the hatat of a bird which was offered below [the red line] with the rites of a hatat [and] in the name of a hatat. Trespass refers to illegal use of Temple property. One who uses a bird hatat or olah that was sacrificed improperly has still trespassed and must bring an asham to atone for his sin. The exception is a bird hatat that was offered correctly. At this point a priest can eat from it, and once priests can eat it, non-priests can derive benefit from it, they have not trespassed Temple property. Note that an olah is not eaten by the priests and therefore no one is ever allowed to derive benefit from it." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn this mishnah we find an extended argument between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Joshua concerning whether or not one who derives benefit from a bird olah that was sacrificed as a hatat has “trespassed”. As we learned in yesterday’s mishnah, trespassing means making illegal use of Temple property. This topic is interesting (at least to the sages) because an olah does involve trespass, but a hatat does not.\nThis mishnah is a bit complicated but I hope that you will appreciate the glimpse we get here of the types of logical arguments employed by the sages.", + "If one offered an olah of a bird below [the red line] with the rites of a hatat [and] in the name of a hatat: Rabbi Eliezer says: it involves trespass. But Rabbi Joshua says: it does not involve trespass. This section lays out the two opinions. Rabbi Eliezer says that this olah, sacrificed in the name of a hatat with the rites of a hatat still involves trespass, as does every olah. Rabbi Joshua says that just as a bird hatat doesn’t involve trespass (because it is entirely edible for priests) so too this olah that was sacrificed as a hatat does not involve trespass.", + "Rabbi Eliezer said: if a hatat which does not involve trespass when he offers it for its own name, nevertheless when he changes the name [for which it is offered] it does involve trespass, is it not logical that an olah which does involve trespass when he offers it for its own name, would involve trespass when he changes its name? Rabbi Eliezer now begins to prove his opinion by comparing the wrongly sacrificed olah with a wrongly sacrificed hatat. When someone sacrifices a hatat in the right way, it does not involve trespass, because it can be eaten by priests. However, when he offers it as an olah it does involve trespass. All the more so, Rabbi Eliezer argues, with an olah. If it involves trespass when it is offered for its own sake, all the more so it should involve trespass when it is offered for the sake of something else.", + "Rabbi Joshua said to him: No, when you speak of a hatat whose name he changed to that of an olah, [it involves trespass] because he changed its name to something that involves trespass; will you say [the same] of an olah whose name he changed to that of a hatat, seeing that he changed its name to something which does not involve trespass? Rabbi Joshua responds that a hatat that he offered for the sake of an olah involves trespass because he changed it to a sacrifice that involves trespass (the olah). However, in the case of our mishnah, when he offered the olah for the sake of a hatat, he changed it to something that doesn’t involve trespass (the hatat). Therefore, this olah offered as a hatat does not involve trespass. Digging a bit deeper into the meaning of this debate, we might say that Rabbi Joshua accords greater power to the intention of the sacrificer when he changes something into a hatat it is a hatat and the rules regarding an olah no longer apply. In contrast, according to Rabbi Eliezer, if it was supposed to be an olah it stays an olah, no matter what his intention.", + "Rabbi Eliezer said to him: Behold, most holy sacrifices which he slaughtered in the south and which he slaughtered in the name of lesser sacrifices will prove the matter, for he changed their name to something which does not involve trespass, and yet they involve trespass, so too, do not be surprised that in the case of the olah, although he changed its name to something that does not involve trespass, it still involves trespass. Rabbi Eliezer responds by noting that there is a case where a person changes something from a type of sacrifice that does involve trespass to a type that does not involve trespass and yet the sacrifice still involves trespass. If one sacrifices a most holy sacrifice as if it were a less holy sacrifice which does not involve trespass, the sacrifice still involves trespass. This simply proves that what Rabbi Joshua said in section two was incorrect.", + "Rabbi Joshua said: No, when you speak of most holy sacrifices which are slaughtered in the south and in the name of lesser sacrifices, [they involve trespass] because he changed their name to something which is partly forbidden and partly permitted; will you say the same of an olah, where he changed its name to something that is altogether permitted? Rabbi Joshua responds that in the case of most holy sacrifices which were offered as if they were less holy sacrifices, he has changed it into something that has both prohibited and permitted parts. When it comes to less holy sacrifices, some parts can be eaten, whereas some of the inner parts of the animal cannot be eaten and do involve trespass. Therefore, in this case the sacrifice still involves trespass because he changed it into something that at least partially involves trespass. However, in the case of the bird olah sacrificed as a bird hatat, he changed the sacrifice into something that doesn’t involve trespass at all. This defends Rabbi Joshua’s opinion that a bird olah offered as a bird hatat doesn’t involve trespass." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with the subject of when a sacrificial bird that was nipped (this is how sacrificial birds are slaughtered) causes impurity if its flesh is swallowed. We began to discuss this subject in mishnah three.", + "If he nipped [the bird sacrifice] with his left [hand] or at night; if he slaughtered hullin within [the Temple courtyard] or a sacrifice outside [the Temple courtyard] they do not defile in the gullet. As I stated in the commentary to mishnah three, one who eats a pure bird that was not slaughtered properly becomes impure when the flesh of the bird reaches his gullet. Our mishnah lists cases where an action was done improperly with the slaughtering of a bird sacrifice. A bird sacrifice must be nipped with the right hand, during the day, so if he nips it with the left hand or at night, it is invalid. If one brings a non-sacred bird into the Temple and slaughters it (not nips but slaughters by cutting its neck), it may not be eaten, and a sacrifice that was slaughtered (not nipped) outside of the Temple is invalid. In all of these cases, the slaughtering or nipping was done properly, but it was done at the wrong time, with the wrong hand, or in the wrong place. Since the slaughtering/nipping itself was done correctly, the flesh of the bird doesn’t cause impurity.", + "If he nipped with a knife; or if he nipped hullin within [or] sacrifices without; or [if he sacrificed] turtle-doves before their time or pigeons after their time; [or a bird] whose wing was withered, [or] blind in the eye [or] whose foot was cut off, [all these] defile in the gullet. In contrast, in some these cases the slaughtering itself was performed incorrectly. Nipping must be done with one’s fingernail and not with a knife. If the bird was hullin (non-sacred), then nipping it is an improper means to slaughter it (it must have its neck sliced). If he nips a bird sacrifice outside of the Temple it is invalid. In all of these cases, the bird is considered carrion and it does cause impurity if swallowed. The mishnah now lists other problems that will cause the bird to defile when its flesh is swallowed. When it comes to turtle-doves, they are valid as sacrifices only when they are older (about three months) whereas pigeons are valid as sacrifices when they are younger (before three months). So if he sacrificed a bird either before or after it reached majority, it causes impurity. Furthermore, if the bird was missing a limb it cannot be used as a sacrifice. So if he nipped a bird that couldn’t be used as a sacrifice, it is completely invalid and does cause impurity.", + "This is the general rule: all whose unfitness [arose] in sanctity do not defile in the gullet; if their unfitness did not arise in sanctity, they defile in the gullet. The mishnah now provides the general rule. If a bird was valid as a sacrifice and it was nipped in the Temple, using the correct method for nipping, but then became disqualified for some reason, the bird does not cause impurity when its flesh is swallowed. However, if the bird was disqualified before it arrived at the Temple courtyard, or was disqualified because its nipping was not performed correctly, the bird is considered carrion and one who eats it becomes impure when its flesh is swallowed.", + "And anyone who is unfit who nips, their nipping is invalid, and they [the birds] do not defile in the gullet. If someone performs the nipping who is not allowed to do so (see mishnah 2:1), for instance a non-priest, or an impure priest, the nipping is invalid and the bird cannot be used as a sacrifice. However, it does not place the bird into the category of carrion because this is a case of unfitness that arose in sanctity." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah deals with a case where a priest did melikah (nipping the bird) and the bird turned out to be a terefah, an animal with some flaw which would have caused it to die. Such a bird cannot be sacrificed the question in our mishnah is does it defile in the gullet, like the nevelah (improperly slaughtered) bird.", + "If one performed melikah, and he found it [the bird] to be a terefah: Rabbi Meir said: it does not defile in the gullet; Rabbi Judah said: it does defile in the gullet. Rabbi Meir says that if a bird sacrifice has its head nipped (melikah) and it is found to be a terefah, it does not defile when swallowed. According to Rabbi Meir melikah purifies a terefah sacrificial bird from defiling as does a nevelah (carrion), just as slaughtering (shechitah) purifies a terefah beast from imparting carrion impurity. Rabbi Judah says that when a bird is slaughtered or nipped and it is found to be a terefah it still defiles in the gullet, as does a nevelah.", + "Rabbi Meir said: if with regard to a beast, when it is carrion (a it defiles through contact or carrying, yet slaughtering it purifies its terefah from defiling, when it comes to carrion ( of a bird which does not defile through contact or carriage, is it not logical that slaughtering would cleanse its terefah? Now, just as we have found that slaughtering, which makes it [a bird of hullin] fit for eating, cleanses its terefah from its uncleanness; so melikah (, which makes it [a bird sacrifice] fit for eating, cleanses its terefah. Rabbi Meir now proceeds to argue out his position. When it comes to a beast, its nevelah (carrion it died without having been slaughtered properly) defiles when it is touched or even when it is carried. Nevertheless, if one slaughters it and it turns out to be a terefah (an animal with some defect that would have caused it to die) it now does not defile through contact and carrying. The nevelah of a bird is less stringent for it never defiles through contact or carriage. Therefore, Rabbi Meir argues, it is logical that if one slaughters a hullin (non-sacred) bird and it turns out to be a terefah, it is purified from defiling in the way it would have had it been a nevelah (in the gullet). Rabbi Meir now proceeds with his argument. Slaughtering a hullin bird is parallel to nipping (melikah) a sacrificial bird. Both make the birds fit (for eating or sacrifice) and both cleanse the terefah from defiling in the gullet.", + "Rabbi Yose says: it is sufficient for it to be like the nevelah of a beast, which is cleansed by slaughtering, but not by melikah (. Rabbi Yose says that the laws concerning carrion of a bird do not need to be any more lenient than the laws concerning the carrion of a beast. Just as slaughtering and not melikah (nipping) purifies a beast’s terefah from carrion impurity (because there is no such thing as melikah with a beast) so too when it comes to birds slaughtering purifies them from carrion impurity but not melikah. So if the bird was hullin (non-sacred) and one slaughtered it and it turned out to be a terefah it would not impart carrion impurity. But if it was a sacrificial bird and one nipped it and it turned out to be a terefah it would still impart carrion impurity. Again, the argumentation in this mishnah was classic mishnaic type of argumentation. While the mishnah was certainly not easy, if you want to see what type of logic the sages employed, this is a great example." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah deals with sacrifices that become mixed up with other animals. There are three possibilities in the mishnah for the type of animal the sacrifice is mixed up with:\n1) Animals that cannot be eaten or sacrificed.\n2) Animals that can be eaten but not sacrificed.\n3) Animals that can be sacrificed or eaten.", + "All sacrifices which became mixed up with hatats that must be left to die, or with an ox that is to be stoned, even one in ten thousand, all must be left to die. To understand this clause we need to explain what a hatat is that must be left to die. There are five categories of this type of problematic hatat, cases where for some reason the hatat cannot be sacrificed and all that can be done with it is let it die. We shall learn more about this when we learn Tractate Temurah. If a valid sacrifice becomes mixed up with a hatat that must be left to die, then all of the animals that are mixed up must be left to die. The same is true if it is mixed up with an ox that has been condemned to be stoned for either killing a person or for having sexual relations with a person. In both of these cases, none of the animals mixed up can be sacrificed, even if one forbidden hatat becomes mixed up with 10,000 valid ones.", + "If they were mixed up with: an ox with which a transgression had been committed [for instance]: one that had killed a man on the testimony of one witness or of its owner; or [an ox] that had sexual relations with a woman or one with whom a man had sexual relations; or an animal set aside [for idolatry], or that had been worshipped [as an idol]; or that was the fee of a whore, or [a dog's] exchange; or that was kilayim; or terefah; or an animal born through the caesarean section, [In all of these cases] they must graze until they become defected, then they are sold, and one brings [a sacrifice] of the same kind at the price of the better of them. If the sacrifice is mixed up with another animal that cannot be sacrificed, then the animals should graze until they become defected [and thereby unfit for sacrifice], then they can all be sold and the proceeds from the better of them (or the best if there were more than two) must be used to buy a sacrifice of the same kind that was originally mixed in. The mishnah now lists possible ways for a sacrifice to become invalid. The first is that it transgresses or a transgression is committed with it. An animal that kills a human being must be executed and its meat is forbidden, but only if there are two witnesses to the killing. If there is one witness the animal cannot be sacrificed but it can be slaughtered and then eaten. Similarly, an animal that has sexual relations with a human being must be executed but only if there are two witnesses. If there is only one witness it is forbidden to sacrifice the animal but not for people to eat it. The next two categories are animals that were involved in idolatry. If there is only one witness, the animals are only prohibited as sacrifices. According to Deuteronomy 23:19 one may not bring “the fee of a whore or the pay of a dog into the house of the Lord.” The rabbis understand these two things to be an animal used to pay a prostitute or an ox used as payment for a dog. Neither of them can be used as a sacrifice. An animal born from mixed parentage, such as a ram and a ewe, cannot be sacrificed, although it can be eaten. The mishnah here lists a terefah, an animal who after having been slaughtered is found to have a defect that would have caused it to die. A terefah cannot be eaten, so commentators explain that this refers to the offspring of a terefah, which according to some opinions, cannot be sacrificed. An animal born through cesarean section also cannot be sacrificed, although it can be eaten. In all of these cases the animal cannot be used as a sacrifice but it can be eaten. Therefore, if one of these is mixed up with a sacrificial animal, they do not have to let the animals die, as was the case in the previous clause.", + "If they were mixed up with unblemished [animals] of hullin, the hullin must be sold to those who need that kind [for a sacrifice]. If the sacrifice was mixed up with unblemished non-sacred animals, then all of the animals can be sold to people who need such animals as sacrifices and then they will all eventually be used as sacrifices." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn yesterday’s mishnah we dealt with sacrifices that were mixed up with animals that either were already disqualified from being sacrifices, or were not sacrifices. Today’s mishnah discusses sacrifices that were mixed up with other sacrifices.", + "A sacrifice [which was mixed up] with another sacrifice, both being of the same kind: this one is offered in the name of whoever is its owner, and the other is offered in the name of whoever is its owner. If both sacrificial animals are the same kind, for instance both are hatats, then both can be offered as hatats. When they are offered, instead of mentioning the name of the owner, the priest should use a general formula, “in the name of whoever is its owner.” In this way both owners can get credit.", + "A sacrifice [which was mixed up] with a sacrifice, both being of different kinds: they must graze until they become unfit, and then he purchases at the price of the better of them [an animal] of each kind, and he pays the loss of the excess out of his own pocket. In this case the two sacrifices are different kinds. For instance a hatat becomes mixed up with an olah. It is impossible to sacrifice either because their sacrificial rituals are different. Therefore, he let both graze until they become unfit by having a defect which disqualifies them from being sacrifices. Then the animals themselves can be redeemed and the money used to buy new sacrifices. However, he must pay for each new sacrifice at the higher price at which the animals were sold. For instance, if one animal was sold for two selas, and the other for one sela, then he must buy two new sacrifices, each for two selas. The extra sela he must make up from his own pocket. In this way, he can ensure that no sacrifice has lost out by being worth less than the original animal.", + "If they were mixed up with a firstling or tithe, they must graze until they become unfit, and then they are eaten as firstling or tithe. If a sacrifice is mixed up with a tithe or firstling, then they must let all the animals graze until they become unfit for sacrifice. The tithe and the firstling cannot be redeemed for money until they have a defect, so he has to wait with all of the animals. At this point he can eat all of the animals as if they were all firstling or tithe. What this means is that they can’t be sold at a butcher’s shop, nor can their flesh be weighed out on scales. In addition, he must redeem the animal that was set aside as a sacrifice at the value of the most expensive of the animals and with that money he has to buy a new sacrifice to make up for the one that was lost.", + "All [sacrifices] can be mixed up, except the hatat and the asham. All sacrifices can possibly be mixed up together, except for an asham and a hatat because a hatat almost always has to be brought from a female animal, (the exception is the male goat brought by the chieftain (Leviticus 4:23)]. The asham is always a male ram or sheep and never a goat. Thus there is no possibility that these two sacrifices could ever be confused." + ], + [ + "An asham which was mixed up with a shelamim: They graze until they become unfit. Rabbi Shimon says: they are slaughtered at the north [side of the altar] and eaten in accordance with [the laws of] the more stringent of them. They said to him: one must not bring sacrifices to a place of unfitness. According to the first opinion in the mishnah, if an asham and a shelamim get mixed up, then the same thing must be done with them as is done with all sacrifices that are mixed up they graze until they become unfit, and then he must bring two new sacrifices, both at the cost of the higher of them (see yesterday’s mishnah). According to Rabbi Shimon, there is another solution in this case. Both sacrifices can be offered and slaughtered in the north of the Temple courtyard, as is the rule for the asham. They are eaten in accordance with the stricter laws, which are those for the asham. They must be eaten within the Temple walls, by male priests only, for one day and the following night. With regard to the blood applications, the laws are the same. The rabbis respond that this might cause the loss of a sacrifice. One of these sacrifices is a shelamim, which can be eaten for two days and the night in between. If we treat both as ashams, and they are left over after the first night, we will treat them as remnant and burn the leftover. This might cause a valid sacrifice to be destroyed. Since unnecessarily burning sacrifices should be avoided so as not to disgrace the sacrifice, it is better that neither are offered and both are left to graze until they become unfit, as was described above.", + "If pieces [of sacrificial flesh] were mixed up with pieces [of other sacrificial flesh], most sacred sacrifices with lesser sacrifices, [pieces] that are eaten one day with [those] that are eaten two days and one night, they must be eaten in accordance with [the laws of] the more stringent of them. If pieces of sacrificial meat get mixed up, for instance hatat meat with shelamim meat, then the rabbis agree with Rabbi Shimon that the only thing we can do is treat all of the meat with the laws governing the stricter of the sacrifices. In this case, all of the meat will be eaten by priests, for one day and one night, within the Temple confines, as are the rules for the hatat. Any meat left over will have to be burned, because there is no other solution in this case." + ], + [ + "Limbs of a hatat which were mixed up with limbs from an olah: Rabbi Eliezer says: he must place [them all] on the top [of the altar], and regard the flesh of the hatat on top as though it were wood. But the sages say: they must become disfigured, and then go out to the place of burning. In this mishnah a hatat and an olah have been slaughtered and cut up and then the limbs of the two animals get mixed up. As a reminder, a hatat can be eaten by male priests while an olah is completely burned on the altar. The problem is that the limbs cannot be eaten, because of the olah. The debate is over whether the hatat can be burned with the olah meat. Rabbi Eliezer says that he can burn the hatat flesh as long as his intent is not to “turn it into smoke” as is done with sacrifices, but rather to burn it as if it was wood. The other rabbis say that this is not possible. Rather they must leave all the meat until the following morning, when it becomes “disfigured” by being left over. At this point it becomes remnant and it must be burned as is always the rule with remnant sacrifices." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn this mishnah, limbs of unblemished olahs which can be burned on the altar become mixed up with limbs of blemished olahs which cannot be burned on the altar. As in yesterday’s mishnah, Rabbi Eliezer and the other rabbis debate.", + "Limbs of [unblemished olahs which were mixed up] with the limbs of blemished [olahs]: Rabbi Eliezer says: if [the priest] offered the head of one of them, all the heads are to be offered; the legs of one of them, all the legs are to be offered. But the sages say: even if they had offered all except one of them, it goes forth to the place of burning. All of the sages agree that what he should do is take all of the flesh out to the place of burning, where disqualified sacrifices are disposed (this is not the altar). The debate is over what to do if some of the limbs have already been burned on the altar. Rabbi Eliezer says that if he already burned a head on the altar and then realized the situation, then we can suppose that that head was from the blemished animal and all of the rest of the heads can be offered on the altar, with the assumption that they were from the unblemished animals. The same is true for the other limbs once one has been burned on the altar all of the rest of the same type of limb can be burned. The other sages disagree and say that we can never assume that the already burned limbs were from the blemished animal. We must always be concerned that the flesh that has not yet been burned is from the blemished animal. Therefore, all remaining flesh must be taken out to the burning place and burned there." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah deals with blood from a sacrificial animal that becomes mixed up with some other liquid. The question is: can it still be sprinkled on the altar?", + "If blood was mixed with water, if it retains the appearance of blood, it is fit [to be sprinkled on the altar]. If the blood is mixed with water, it can still be sprinkled on the altar, as long as it is not so watered down that it loses the appearance of blood.", + "If it was mixed with wine, we regard it as though it were water. If the blood is mixed with red wine, then it will have the appearance of blood even if there is mostly red wine. So what we do is we look at the wine as if it were water, and if there is enough wine such that if it were water there would no longer be an appearance of blood, it cannot be used.", + "If it was mixed with the blood of a beast or wild animal, we regard it as though it were water. The same is true if the blood is mixed in with the blood of a non-sacrificial beast or a wild animal (that can never be used as a sacrifice). Since this mixture will always have the appearance of blood, we look at the blood of the non-sacrificial animal as if it were water, and if there is enough of this blood such that if it were water there would no longer be an appearance of blood, it cannot be used.", + "Rabbi Judah said: blood cannot nullify blood. According to Rabbi Judah like things do not nullify each other. Thus no matter how much blood there was from the non-sacrificial animal, the mixture can still be sprinkled on the altar." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to deal with blood from a valid sacrificial animal that is mixed up with other blood.", + "If it was mixed with the blood of unfit [animals], it must be poured out into the duct. In this case the blood of the fit animal is mixed up with blood from an animal that either cannot be sacrificed or was sacrificed and became unfit at some point during the sacrificial procedure. It is forbidden to sprinkle blood from such an animal on the altar. Therefore, all of this blood must be poured into the aqueduct that flows through the Temple courtyard. This aqueduct was used to clean out the Temple, so putting blood there is akin to throwing it in the garbage.", + "[If it was mixed] with the blood that came out after death, it must be poured out into the duct. Rabbi Eliezer declares it fit. The blood that is sprinkled on the altar is the blood that spurts out of the animal as the animal is dying. This is the “life-blood” for it is the blood that carries the animal’s life force. Blood that seeps out after the animal has already died is not sprinkled on the altar. So according to the first opinion, if the life-blood that was supposed to be used is mixed in with this post-mortem blood, it all must be poured into the duct. Rabbi Eliezer allows this blood to be used, at least in this case when it was accidentally mixed in with the valid life-blood.", + "If he [the priest] did not ask but sprinkled it, it is valid. If the priest didn’t ask what to do in any of these cases, and just went ahead and sprinkled a mixture of valid and invalid on the altar, then his sprinkling is valid. According to the Tosefta, it is valid only if the invalid blood is not of sufficient quantity such that if it were water it would cause the mixture to lose the appearance of blood (see yesterday’s mishnah)." + ], + [ + "[If] blood of unblemished animals [was mixed] with blood of blemished animals, it must be poured out into the duct. Blood of blemished animals cannot be spilled on the altar, therefore this mixture must be dumped out into the duct.", + "[If] a goblet [of valid blood was mixed up] with other goblets [of invalid blood]: Rabbi Eliezer said: if he [the priest] offered [sprinkled] one goblet, all the goblets can be offered; But the sages say: even if they offered all of them save one, it must be poured out into the duct. Here, instead of the blood being mixed up, goblets of blood are mixed up. Some of these goblets have the valid blood from unblemished animals and one has the invalid blood of a blemished animal. All of the sages seem to agree that all of the goblets should be spilled out into the duct. They debate what should be done if one of the goblets had already had its blood sprinkled. According to Rabbi Eliezer, we can treat this like the situation with the mixed up limbs in mishnah five. If one of the goblets’ contents has been sprinkled, we can assume that the rest of the goblets are those containing valid blood and their blood can be sprinkled. The sages disagree, as they did above in mishnah five, and say that in all circumstances all of the blood must be poured out into the duct." + ], + [ + "If [blood] that is to be sprinkled below [the red line on the altar] was mixed with blood that is sprinkled above: As we have seen in earlier chapters, some sacrificial blood is sprinkled on the altar above the red line that runs through its middle, and some is sprinkled below. In the case in our mishnah, blood from a sacrifice that is sprinkled above, namely a hatat whose blood is sprinkled on the four corners of the altar, is mixed in with blood that is sprinkled below from either an olah, an asham or a shelamim.", + "Rabbi Eliezer says: he must sprinkle [it] above, and I regard the lower [blood which was sprinkled] above as though it were water, and then he sprinkles again below. Rabbi Eliezer says that the first thing he should do is sprinkle the blood on the four corners of the altar, as is the rule for the hatat. Then Rabbi Eliezer employs a legal fiction similar to that which we saw him use in earlier mishnayot. The priest can look at the blood that was sprinkled above as if it were water, even though it may have in fact been from the blood that was supposed to be sprinkled below, and what is left in the mixture is blood that is supposed to be sprinkled below. Sprinkling the blood below will also count towards the requirement to pour out the remainder of that hatat blood below (see 5:3).", + "But the sages say: he must pour it out into the duct. As in all of the previous cases, the rabbis say that this should not be done. All of the mixture should be poured into the duct for disposal.", + "If he [the priest] did not ask but sprinkled it, it is valid. This is the same line that appeared at the end of mishnah seven. If the priest did apply the blood above the line, then the application is “ex post facto” valid." + ], + [ + "[If blood] which requires one application [was mixed] with blood [also] requiring one application, it [the mixture] should be presented with one application.
[If blood] which requires four applications [was mixed] with blood requiring four applications, they should be presented with four applications.
[If blood] which requires four applications [was mixed] with blood which requires one application: Rabbi Eliezer says: it [the mixture] should be presented with four applications. Rabbi Joshua says: it should be presented with one application.
Rabbi Eliezer said to him: Behold, he transgresses the [injunction] not to diminish [from God’s commandment]! Rabbi Joshua said to him: Behold, he transgresses the injunction not to add [to God’s commandments].
Rabbi Eliezer said to him: The injunction not to add applies only where it is by itself. Rabbi Joshua said to him: The injunction not to diminish applies only where it is by itself.
Moreover, Rabbi Joshua said: when you make [four] applications you transgress the injunction not to add, and perform an action with your own hands; whereas when you do not make [four] applications you transgress the injunction not to diminish, but do not perform an action with your own hands.
The first-born animal, the tithe and the pesah require only one blood application on the outer altar. Some other sacrifices require two applications that are actually four because they are applied on two corners. The hatat requires four distinct blood applications. Our mishnah deals with a case where blood from animals requiring different numbers of blood applications are mixed up with each other.
Note that unlike the previous cases where the mixture had invalid blood in it, in this case the mixture consists of only valid blood. The problem is not in the blood itself, but what exactly to do with it.
Sections one and two: If blood from animals requiring the same number of applications is mixed up then they can simply make that number of applications with the blood. These two sections are quite obvious and probably serve as an introduction to the more interesting case which arises in the next section.
Section three: Here blood requiring two different numbers of applications is mixed up. Rabbi Eliezer holds that in such a situation, they should apply the maximum number of applications, in this case four, whereas Rabbi Joshua holds that they should apply the minimum number of applications, one.
Section four: Let the battle begin! Rabbi Eliezer says that if they make only one application, they will be transgressing the biblical prohibition against diminishing from God’s commandments. Rabbi Joshua quickly responds that Rabbi Eliezer’s suggestion is also problematic, for by making four blood applications, he will be adding to God’s commandments, and this is also prohibited (see Deuteronomy 4:2).
Section five: Rabbi Eliezer explains that the prohibition against adding to God’s commandments only applies when the blood is alone, meaning it is not mixed in with blood that requires four applications. If someone were to take blood that requires one application and apply it four times, that would be a transgression. But in our case since some of the blood does require four applications, there is no transgression.
Of course, Rabbi Joshua responds accordingly that the same can be said with regard to the prohibition against diminishing from God’s commandments it would only apply if there was only blood requiring four applications and he applied it only once. Since some of the blood requires one application, there is no transgression.
This argument seems to be going nowhere!
Section six: So now we’re all tied up in the bottom of the ninth. Rabbi Eliezer had his arguments and Rabbi Joshua responded to each of them. The winning blow (to mix my metaphor) is delivered by Rabbi Joshua who says that in this situation it is preferable to transgress by omission rather than commission. It is preferable to make only one blood application and thereby omit the other three, than to make four applications, thereby adding on three to the blood which only required one.
Interesting, this becomes a halakhic rule in other situations. Generally, if there is a conflict of mitzvoth or a situation of such nature, it is better to not perform anything, than to potentially actively transgress a commandment. As I stated in my introduction, many rules that originally appear in Seder Kodashim, are adopted to other areas of halakhah. Temple law, while not in practice by the time of the Mishnah, remained a rich source of halakhah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nWhile the blood of most sacrifices is sprinkled on the outer altar, the altar that was in the courtyard, some sacrifices have their blood sprinkled inside, on the golden altar that was in the Sanctuary (the Hekhal). These sacrifices were described in 5:2. Our mishnah deals with a situation where blood that was supposed to be sprinkled inside was mixed up with blood that was supposed to be sprinkled outside.", + "If [blood] which is to be sprinkled inside [the Sanctuary] was mixed with [blood] that is to be sprinkled outside, it must be poured out into the duct. If inside and outside blood are mixed up together, then the mixture should be poured into the duct.", + "If [the priest] sprinkled outside and then sprinkled inside, it is valid. If, however, the priest did not ask and went ahead and sprinkled the blood, if he first sprinkled it outside and then inside, it is valid.", + "[If he sprinkled] inside and then went back and sprinkled outside: Rabbi Akiva declares it unfit, But the sages declare it fit. For Rabbi Akiva says: all blood which entered the Sanctuary to make atonement is unfit; But the sages say: the hatat alone [is unfit]. R. Eliezer said: the asham too, for it says, “As is the hatat, so is the asham” (Leviticus 7:7). The thornier problem is if he first brought the blood inside and sprinkled it on the inner altar and then brought it back outside and sprinkled it on the outer altar. According to Rabbi Akiva, the blood sprinkled on the outer altar is invalid. According to Rabbi Akiva, once blood that is supposed to be sprinkled on the outer altar is brought into the Sanctuary, it is disqualified. The other sages say that both blood applications are valid. The rule that once blood enters the Sanctuary it is invalid to spill it outside was stated only with regard to the hatat, as it says in Leviticus 6:23, “But no sin offering (hatat) whose blood has been brought into the Tent of Meeting for expiation in the sanctuary may be eaten; it shall be burned in the fire.” Rabbi Eliezer expands this to include the asham because Leviticus 7:7 says that the rules that govern the hatat also govern the asham." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with blood from a hatat, which should be sprinkled on the outer altar (found in the Temple courtyard).", + "If the blood of a hatat was received in two goblets and one of them went outside [the Temple courtyard], the inside one is fit. In this case the outside one is rendered invalid but the inside one, which never left the Temple courtyard, remains fit.", + "If one of them entered within [the Sanctuary]: Rabbi Yose the Galilean declares the outer one fit. The sages disqualify it. When one of the two goblets goes into the Sanctuary, it becomes unfit, as we learned in yesterday’s mishnah. The debate is over whether the goblet of blood that remained outside of the Sanctuary, in the Temple courtyard (where it belongs) is also unfit. Rabbi Yose the Galilean argues that the outer one remains fit, but the sages say that in this case, since part of the blood which came from the animal became unfit by going inside the Sanctuary, it all becomes unfit.", + "Rabbi Yose the Galilean: if the place where an intention [directed to it] disqualifies, i.e. without, you do not treat what is left [inside] as what went out; then the place where an intention [directed to it] does not disqualify, i.e. within, is it not logical that we do not treat what is left [outside] as what entered within? Rabbi Yose now argues his position. Had the priest thought to bring the blood of the hatat outside of the Temple, it is already invalid. Nevertheless, if one of the goblets is brought out of the Temple, the other goblet remains valid, as we learned in section one. In contrast, had he thought to bring the blood into the Sanctuary he has not rendered the sacrifice unfit. Therefore, Rabbi Yose argues, all the more so if he actually brings one of the goblets into the Sanctuary, the other one remains fit. It is interesting that the other rabbis do not respond to this argument. It seems likely that they just don’t believe that this argument works here rather, once part of the blood goes into the Sanctuary, all of the blood is rendered unfit no matter where it is.", + "If it entered within to make atonement, even if he [the priest] did not make atonement, it is unfit, the words of Rabbi Eliezer. Rabbi Shimon said: [it is not unfit] unless he makes atonement. Rabbi Judah said: if he took it in unwittingly, it is fit. In this section, there is a debate over whether blood that enters the sanctuary is always rendered unfit, or only under certain circumstances. According to Rabbi Eliezer, if he brought the blood into the Sanctuary in order to sprinkle it on the golden altar, then it is unfit, even if he did not end up sprinkling it. Rabbi Shimon says that it is not rendered unfit until he actually sprinkles it on the altar. Rabbi Judah is even more lenient. If he brings the blood in accidentally, it is not rendered unfit, even if he sprinkles it on the altar. It is unfit only if he intentionally brings it in and sprinkles it on the altar.", + "For all unfit blood which was put on the altar, the head plate [of the high priest] does not propitiate, save for the unclean, for the headplate propitiates for that which is unclean, but does not propitiate for what goes out. According to Exodus 28:38, the head plate worn by the high priest “bears the iniquity of any holy things (sacrifices).” The mishnah explains that the head plate propitiates, meaning cleanses, in a case where a sacrifice becomes impure. In such a case the sacrifice will count, even though it should not have been offered. However, it does not propitiate for a sacrifice whose blood has gone out of the Temple courtyard. If they offer such a sacrifice, it is invalid." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nExodus 29:37 states, “Whatever touches the altar shall become sanctified.” From this verse the rabbis learn that once certain things have been put on the altar they may not be taken back down, even if they were invalidated from being fit sacrifices. In today’s mishnah there is a debate over how far this rule extends: i.e. what things can be taken off the altar once they have been put on, and what things may not.", + "The altar sanctifies whatever is eligible for it. The altar sanctifies anything that is “eligible” for it, even if that thing became unfit. Thus if an animal that was fit (such as a sheep) became unfit and the animal is put up onto the altar, it cannot subsequently be removed.", + "Rabbi Joshua says: whatever is eligible for the altar fire does not descend once it has ascended, as it is said, “The olah itself shall remain where it is burned upon the altar [all night until morning, while the fire of the altar is kept going on it]” (Leviticus 6:: just as the olah, which is eligible for the altar fire, does not descend once it has ascended, so whatever is eligible for the altar fire does not descend once it ascended. Rabbi Joshua limits this rule to that which is eligible for the altar’s fire, meaning things that are burned. As we shall see below in section four, this does not include blood and libations, which are not burned on the altar and therefore can be taken down once they have been put onto the altar. Rabbi Joshua understands the words “eligible for it” in section one to refer to that which is eligible for the fires of the altar, and not just eligible to be put up onto the altar.", + "Rabbi Gamaliel said: whatever is eligible for the altar does not descend once it ascended, as it is said: “The olah itself shall remain where it is burned upon the altar [all night until morning, while the fire of the altar is kept going on it]” (Leviticus 6:2): just as the olah, which is eligible for the altar, does not descend once it ascended, so whatever is eligible for the altar does not descend once it ascended. Rabban Gamaliel expands the rule to include anything that can be put on the altar, including libations and blood. Once one of these has been put on the altar, it cannot be taken back down.", + "The only difference between Rabban Gamaliel and Rabbi Joshua is in respect of the blood and libations, for Rabban Gamaliel says that they cannot descend, while Rabbi Joshua says that they can descend. As explained above, the difference between Rabbi Joshua and Rabban Gamaliel is with regard to blood and libations which are not burned. All other matter that is eligible for the altar is burned and therefore all agree that it is not taken down.", + "Rabbi Shimon says: if the sacrifice is fit while the libations [which accompanied it] are unfit; or if the libations are fit while the sacrifice is unfit; or even if both are unfit, the sacrifice does not descend, while the libations do descend. Rabbi Shimon distinguishes between libations that accompany a sacrifice (see 4:3) and libations that are put on the altar without a sacrifice. If the libations accompany a sacrifice, then in all cases, regardless of whether the sacrifice is valid and the libations are invalid, vice versa or even both are invalid, the sacrifice stays on the altar and the libations can be taken down. This is like Rabbi Joshua. In contrast, in a case where the libations are put alone on the altar, they remain there even if they become unfit." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn yesterday’s mishnah we learned that when a sacrifice is placed on the altar, it is not taken off, even if it turned out to be unfit. Today’s mishnah discusses what types of disqualifications require that the sacrifice be left on the altar.", + "The following do not descend once they have ascended: [Sacrificial flesh] that was kept overnight, Or that which becomes unclean Or that that which goes out [of its permitted boundaries], Or which was slaughtered [with the intention of consuming it] after the appropriate time or outside the appropriate place; Or if unfit [persons] received and sprinkled its blood. If one of the following disqualifications occurs to a sacrifice and then it is put on the altar, the flesh is not removed from the altar. A) This refers to parts of the sacrifice that are burned on the altar that were outside the Temple overnight. This disqualifies them from being sacrificed. B) Sacrificial flesh is subject to uncleanness. C) Sacrificial flesh cannot be taken out of the Temple courtyard. D) The person offering it had a disqualifying intention (see 2:2). E) Unfit persons can receive and sprinkle the blood of a sacrifice (2:1).", + "Rabbi Judah says: that which was slaughtered at night or whose blood was spilt or whose blood went outside the curtains, if it ascended, it must descend. Rabbi Judah lists a few other cases in which, in his opinion, the sacrifice is taken off of the altar even if it was already put up there. There are three such cases: 1) It was slaughtered at night sacrifices must be slaughtered during the day. 2) If the blood spilled and therefore they could not sprinkle it on the altar, as is done with all sacrifices. 3) If the blood was taken out of the curtains, which is another way of saying that the blood was taken out of the Temple courtyard.", + "Rabbi Shimon says: it does not descend, because Rabbi Shimon says: anything whose disqualification arose in sanctity, the sacred [altar] receives it; if its disqualification did not arise in sanctity, the sacred [altar] does not receive it. Rabbi Shimon disagrees with Rabbi Judah concerning the last category the blood taken out of the courtyard. He holds that only if the disqualification occured “in sanctity” meaning within the Temple courtyard does the sacrifice not descend from the altar. If the disqualification occurred outside of the sacred Temple courtyard, then the sacred altar does not receive it, and it must be taken down. Tomorrow’s mishnah will explain what disqualifications occur outside the Temple’s courtyard." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is a continuation of Rabbi Shimon’s rule at the end of yesterday’s mishnah, that if a disqualification occurred outside the Temple courtyard, then if the sacrifice is put up on the altar, it should be taken off. The sacrifices that stay on the altar despite their disqualification are ones which became disqualified only some time after they came into the Temple.", + "Which are the ones whose disqualification did not arise in sanctity: An animal which had sexual relations with a woman or with a man, or that was the fee of a whore, or [a dog's] exchange; or that was kilayim; or terefah; or an animal born through the caesarean section, and blemished animals. All of these animals were disqualified even before they entered the Temple courtyard. Hence, if they are put up on the altar, they must be taken down. The list is explained in 8:1.", + "Rabbi Akiva declared blemished animals fit [to remain on the altar if they had already been put up]. Rabbi Hananya, chief of the priests, said: my father used to push blemished animals off the altar. Rabbi Akiva allows blemished animals to remain on the altar, even though they may have been blemished before they entered the courtyard. Rabbi Hananya, who himself seems to have served in the Temple, says that his father would push blemished animals off the altar. Interestingly, this is another case where the Mishnah does not seem to provide any more authority in Temple matters to priests than it does to non-priests. Rabbi Akiva does not seem to have changed his opinion, despite Rabbi Hananya’s testimony." + ], + [ + "Just as they do not descend once they have ascended, so they do not ascend if they have descended. Once one of the disqualified sacrifices listed in mishnah two is taken off the altar, it cannot be put back on.", + "And all of these, if they ascended alive to the top of the altar, they must descend. In contrast, if a live animal is put on the altar it may be taken off. The altar only sanctifies sacrifices that have already been slaughtered.", + "An olah which ascended live to the top of the altar, it must descend. If an olah is put alive on the altar, it still should be taken off. It should not be slaughtered there, even though all of it will eventually be burned on the altar.", + "If one slaughtered it on the top of the altar, he must skin it and dismember it where it lies. If, however, one did slaughter the olah on top of the altar, it has now become sanctified and cannot be taken down. It should be skinned and dismembered there on the altar. Then the skin can be removed for burning elsewhere and the pieces can be burned right there on the altar." + ], + [ + "The following if they ascended are taken down:
The flesh of most sacred sacrifices
The flesh of lesser sacrifices;
The remnants of the omer;
The two loaves;
The showbread;
The remnants of meal-offerings;
And the incense.
The wool on the heads of lambs, the hair of he-goats’ beards, the bones, tendons, horns and hoofs if they are attached, go up, because it is said, “And the priest shall turn it all into smoke on the altar” (Leviticus 1:9).
If they were severed [from the animal], they do not go up, for it is said, “And You shall offer your olah, the flesh and the blood, [upon the altar of the Lord your God]” (Deuteronomy 12:27).
Our mishnah lists things that are not meant to be on the altar at all, meaning not in any state. Unlike the things listed in mishnah two, which were once valid and then became invalid, these things were never supposed to be put on the altar. Therefore, even if they were put on the altar, the altar doesn’t sanctify them and they may be taken down.
Sections one and two: The flesh of sacrifices, both most holy sacrifices and lesser sacrifices, is meant to be eaten and not burned on the altar.
Section three: The volume of the omer, offered on the sixteenth of the month of Nissan, was a tenth of an ephah. A handful was burned on the altar and the rest was eaten by the priests. If the remnants were put on the altar, they may be taken down.
Section four: The two loaves that are brought on Shavuot are not meant to be put on the altar.
Section five: The showbread (Leviticus 24:5-19) sat on the golden table in the Sanctuary from week to week. It was eaten not sacrificed.
Section six: Part of the meal offering was put on the altar, but the remnant was eaten by the priests.
Section seven: The incense was put on the inner altar, the one in the Sanctuary. If it was mistakenly put on the outer altar, it can be taken down.
Sections eight and nine: This section seems to be based on a contradiction between the two quoted verses. The verse from Leviticus seems to say that the entire olah is burned on the altar, whereas the verse from Deuteronomy says that only the flesh and blood are burned. The first verse implies that non-flesh and blood parts of the animal, the hair, the bones, sinews etc. are burned, whereas the second implies that they are not. The mishnah resolves this contradiction by stating that when the non-flesh and blood parts are detached from the flesh and blood, then they are not burned on the altar and if they are put up there, they should be taken down. If they are put up there while still attached to the animal, then they have been sanctified and cannot be taken down." + ], + [ + "And if any of these sprang off from the altar they are not replaced. If any item that is not supposed to be taken down from the altar, whether it was one of the list of disqualified sacrifices found in mishnah two, or the hair, bones, sinews etc. referred to in yesterday’s mishnah, is flung off the altar by the power of the fires of the altar, it is not put back on. In other words, if a person used his own power to take them off, then they must be put back on. But if they come off the altar due to some other power, they need not be put back on.", + "Similarly, if a coal sprang off from the altar, it is not replaced. The same is true for a coal found on the altar if it comes off on its own, it need not be put back.", + "Limbs that sprang off from the altar: if before midnight, must be replaced, and they involve trespass; after midnight, they are not replaced and do not involve trespass. Up until midnight, the mitzvah to burn the limbs of the sacrifice has not been fulfilled (see Berachot 1:1). Up until this point, the limbs “belong” to the altar, if you will. Therefore, if they come off on their own, they must be put back. Up until this point, one who unintentionally derives benefit from them has trespassed Temple property. After midnight, their mitzvah has been completed and therefore one who derives benefit from them has not trespassed (although he should not do so). If one of the limbs does fall off the altar after midnight, it need not be replaced." + ], + [ + "Just as the altar sanctifies whatever is eligible for it, so does the ascent sanctify whatever is eligible for it;
And just as the altar and the ascent sanctify whatever is eligible for them, so do vessels sanctify.
Vessels for liquids sanctify liquids,
And the measures sanctify dry material.
A liquid vessel does not sanctify dry matter, nor does a dry [measure] sanctify a liquid.
If holy vessels were perforated and they can be used for the same purpose as when whole, they sanctify [what is placed in them]; if not, they do not sanctify.
And all these sanctify only in the holy place.
The final mishnah of our chapter teaches that the altar is not the only item that sanctifies that which is fit for it other items in the Temple do so as well.
Section one: The ascent is the ramp that leads up to the altar. If something that is fit for the altar is brought onto the ascent, it is sanctified and cannot be taken down. The same rules that apply to things that ascend onto the altar will apply to the ascent.
Section two: The ministering vessels, listed in Exodus 30:28-29, also sanctify things that are put in them, as long as they are fit.
Sections three-five: There are vessels meant to hold liquids, such as wine libations, and there are vessels meant to hold dry measures, such as the minhah (grain) offerings. Each type of vessel only sanctifies the type of material it is meant to hold.
Section six: If there is a hole in one of the vessels but it can still be used for its original purpose, then it still sanctifies that which is put in it. But if it can no longer be used, then it has lost its status as a holy vessel and it does not sanctify that which is put in it.
Section seven: The sanctifying effect of the vessels is dependent upon their being in the Temple courtyard. If the vessel is taken out of the courtyard, it will no longer sanctify." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Whatever is more frequent than another, takes precedence over the other.
The daily offerings precede the additional offerings;
The additional offerings of Shabbat precede the additional offerings of Rosh Hodesh;
The additional offerings of Rosh Hodesh precede the additional offerings of Rosh Hashanah.
As it is said, “You shall present these in addition to the morning portion of the regular burnt offering” (Numbers 28:23).
The first five mishnayot of this chapter deal with the order in which different sacrifices are offered. There are two general rules, one which we will see in this mishnah and one in the next mishnah.
Section one: This is a general principle that is today often invoked when determining which prayer, or which blessing is recited first (for instance over the matzah on Pesah). As is frequently the case, a principle that plays a large role in later halakhah, has its origins in sacrificial law.
Sections two-four: Here, the principle is invoked in connection to the daily offerings and the additional offerings (musaf). A more frequent sacrifice is offered first.
Section five: This is the proof text that the daily tamid, the morning offering, is offered before the other additional offerings for holidays. The verse implies that the morning offering has already been offered before the other sacrifices are offered. Hence, whatever is more frequent comes first." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe principle that whatever is more frequent takes precedence is determinative only when there is a set frequency to a given sacrifice. Most sacrifices are offered whenever a person needs to bring one without a determined frequency. Therefore, there is a different principle as to which takes precedence.", + "Whatever is more sacred than another precedes the other. The principle invoked here is that whatever is more sacred is offered first. As we shall see below, there are different ways of determining what is more sacred.", + "The blood of a hatat precedes the blood of a olah, because it propitiates. If a priest has to sprinkle blood from a hatat and blood from an olah, he first sprinkles the blood from the hatat because the hatat propitiates (atones) for sin, whereas an olah does not have that function. Here we see that sanctity is determined by what a sacrifice does the greater effect it has, the greater its sanctity.", + "The limbs of a olah precede the innards of a hatat, because it [the former] is entirely for the fires [of the altar]. An olah is completely burned, whereas parts of the hatat are eaten. This means, to the mishnah, that an olah is more sacred. Therefore, the parts of the olah that are burned take precedence over the parts of the hatat that have to be burned.", + "A hatat precedes an asham, because its blood is sprinkled on the four horns and on the base. A hatat is holier than an asham because it requires four full blood applications, whereas the asham requires only two that are four (they are applied on the corners. See above 5:3 and 5:5.", + "An asham precedes a today and a nazirite’s ram, because it is a most holy sacrifice. An asham is a most holy sacrifice and therefore it is offered before sacrifices of lesser sanctity such as the todah and the nazirite’s ram, brought at the end of the term of his naziriteship.", + "A todah and a nazirite's ram precede a shelamim, because they are eaten one day [only] and require [the accompaniment of] loaves. The shelamim is also a sacrifice of lesser sanctity. But the todah and nazirite’s ram can only be eaten for one day and night, whereas the shelamim can be eaten the next day and night. And when a todah or nazirite’s ram are brought, loaves accompany them. Here we see that more restrictions and more mitzvoth (loaves) implies greater sanctity.", + "A shelamim precedes a firstling, because it requires four [blood] applications and laying [of hands], libations, and the waving of the breast and the thigh. The first-born animal is also considered a lesser sacrifice. The shelamim is offered before it because the shelamim requires four blood applications. It requires the bringer to lay his hands on the animal. It is accompanied by wine libations and when it is offered, the breast and thigh are waved. The only one of these elements found in a firstling is laying of the hands." + ], + [ + "A first-born precedes tithe, because its sanctity is from the womb, and it is eaten by priests. If a priest has a first-born and a tithe to sacrifice, he first sacrifices the first-born because it has greater sanctity than the tithe for two reasons: 1) it is sacred as soon as it is conceived, whereas the tithe has to wait until it is counted as a tenth animal to become sacred; 2) The first-born is eaten only by priests, whereas the tithe can be eaten by anyone.", + "Tithe precedes bird [-offerings] because it is a slaughtered sacrifice, and part of it is most sacred: its blood and innards. Tithe is sacrificed before either of the bird-offerings (olah and hatat) for two reasons: 1) It is a slaughtered whereas bird-offerings are nipped. Also, there are various sacrifices for which there is a sliding-scale: a rich person brings a bullock, a person of medium wealth brings a sheep or goat and a poor person brings a bird. Hence, a bird is a lesser sacrifice. 2) Part of the tithe is burned on the altar namely its blood and innards (emurim), the same way that parts of a most holy sacrifice are burned on the altar. In contrast, although the bird hatat and olah are most holy sacrifices, only the innards of the bird hatat are put on the altar. The entire bird olah is burned on the altar, and therefore one would think that the bird olah should take precedence over the tithe. But because the bird olah takes precedence over the bird hatat (as we shall see in tomorrow’s mishnah) the tithe, which definitely precedes the bird hatat, must also precede the bird olah." + ], + [ + "Birds precede meal-offerings (, because they are blood sacrifices. Meal-offerings are offered by the very, very poor, those who can’t even offer a bird (see Leviticus 5:11). Hence, a bird-offering precedes them. Also, the blood of a bird-offering is sprinkled on the altar, and there is obviously no blood to the meal-offering.", + "A sinner’s meal-offering precedes a voluntary meal-offering, because it comes on account of sin. The sinner’s meal offering (Leviticus 5:11) is brought to atone for certain sins, either various false oaths or bringing defilement into the Temple. It precedes the voluntary meal-offering because it atones, whereas the voluntary meal-offering does not atone for any sin.", + "A hatat of a bird precedes an olah of a bird. The rabbis derive from Leviticus 5:8 that the hatat takes precedence over the olah. Note that in 10:2 the mishnah stated that parts of the olah take place to parts of the hatat. That was in reference to parts of animal sacrifices. When it comes to the whole sacrifice, the hatat takes precedence.", + "And it is likewise when he dedicates them. When a person brings a bird offering as a hatat, he also brings one bird as on olah (Leviticus 5:7). When he separates them and declares which is the hatat and which is the olah, he must first designate the hatat and then the olah." + ], + [ + "All hatats in the Torah precede ashams, except the asham of a metzora (one with a skin, because it comes to make [a person] fit. As we learned in mishnah two of this chapter, the hatat takes precedence over the asham because its blood is sprinkled on all four corners of the altar, whereas the blood of the asham is sprinkled on only two corners. There is one exception to this rule and that is the asham of the metzora (Leviticus 14:14). The blood of this asham is placed on the ear, thumb and large toe of the metzora and it purifies him from his skin affliction. This makes him fit to participate in rituals which require purity. The metzora also brings a hatat and this sacrifice is also required in order for him to be purified from his affliction. However, since it is the blood from the asham and not the blood of the hatat that is placed on his body, it takes precedence.", + "All ashams of the Torah must be two-year olds and [two] silver shekels in value, except a nazirite’s asham and the asham of a metzorah, for they are a year old, and need not be [two] silver shekels in value. The mishnah now begins to discuss some general principles with regard to the asham. The Torah describes most ashams as being “rams.” In order to be a ram the animal must be at least two years old. The asham must also be worth at least two silver shekels. In describing the asham brought for illegal trespass of Temple property Leviticus 5:15 states that it must be worth “shekalim” which is the plural of “shekel.” The minimum number of a plural is two, and therefore the asham ram must be worth at least two shekels. There are two exceptions to this rule: the asham brought by the nazirite and the asham brought by the metzora. When it comes to the nazirite’s asham, Numbers 6:12 says that he must “bring a lamb (keves) in its first year as an asham.” The same word “keves” is used in Leviticus 14:12 with regard to the metzora’s asham, and hence we can learn that it too is one year old, and not two. If a two-year old ram is worth two shekels, then a one year old lamb is not worth two shekels (at least not usually). Therefore, the rabbis waive the requirement that these ashams, which are lambs and not rams, must be worth two silver shekels." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah returns to the discussion of what sacrifices take precedence over other sacrifices.", + "Just as they take precedence in being offered, so they take precedence in being eaten. Until now our chapter of mishnah has been discussing precedence with regard to sacrificing an animal (or meal-offering). Now the mishnah adds that if someone has two or more sacrifices to eat, the rules of precedence continue to apply. The hatat precedes the asham, the asham precedes the todah, etc.", + "Yesterday’s shelamim and today’s shelamim, yesterday’s takes precedence. A shelamim can be eaten the day it is sacrificed, the following night and the following day. Since yesterday’s shelamim must be eaten before the day is over, it takes precedence over today’s shelamim, which has longer in which to be eaten.", + "Yesterday’s shelamim and today’s hatat and asham, yesterday's shelamim takes precedence, the words of Rabbi Meir. But the sages say: the hatat takes precedence, because it is a most sacred sacrifice. Yesterday’s shelamim must be eaten by the end of the day, whereas the hatat and the asham that were offered today can be eaten today and tonight. To Rabbi Meir, the fact that the shelamim must be eaten earlier than the hatat or asham means that it takes precedence, despite the general rule that the asham and hatat take precedence over the shelamim. The sages rule that today’s hatat takes precedence over yesterday’s shelamim, and the same would hold true for today’s asham. Since they are most holy sacrifices their innate holiness overrides any consideration of how much longer the sacrifice can be eaten." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses how the sacrifices that priests eat are to be prepared. It is brought here because the debate between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Shimon is tangentially related to the debate between the sages and Rabbi Shimon in yesterday’s mishnah.", + "And in all of these, the priests may deviate in how they eat, and eat them roasted, stewed or boiled. The priest(s) eating the sacrifice may choose to prepare the meat in any way they wish. There are no restrictions as to how the meat can be eaten.", + "And one may season them with hullin spices or terumah spices, the words of Rabbi Shimon. According to Rabbi Shimon, the priest may spice his sacrificial meat with either sacred (terumah) or non-sacred (hullin) spices.", + "Rabbi Meir says: one should not season them with terumah spices, so as not to bring terumah to unfitness. Rabbi Meir points out that by spicing his sacrificial meat with terumah spices, the priest might cause the terumah to become unfit for eating. This is because there is a time limit as to how long any sacrifice can be eaten, be it the day it is slaughtered and the following night, or the following night and day. If he spices the meat with terumah, then the spices will absorb some of the taste of the meat. Since they have the taste of the meat, they will be restricted with regard to how long they can be eaten, just as the meat was restricted. Once past this time, they will need to be burned, the same rule that applies to the meat. Thus, by spicing his sacrifice with terumah he may cause terumah to have to be burned, and this is prohibited. Rabbi Meir rules, therefore, that the priest should not use terumah to season his sacrificial meal." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn this mishnah Rabbi Shimon points out how one could identify what type of oil is being divided up by the priests in the Temple courtyard and what type of oil is being burned in order to remove it.", + "Rabbi Shimon said: if you see oil being divided in the Temple courtyard, you don’t need to ask what it is for, for it is the remnant of oil of the wafers of the Israelite’s meal-offerings, or of the metzora’s log of oil. The extra oil used to anoint the meal offering brought by an Israelite goes to the priests. The “wafers of the Israelite’s meal-offerings” refers to a type of meal offering that is either brought as loaves soaked with oil or as wafers that have been dabbed with oil (see Leviticus 2:4: we will learn a lot more about the meal-offering, the minhah, in tractate Menahot). The remnant of the oil brought by the metzora (a person afflicted with scale disease, see Leviticus 14:15) also belongs to the priest. This oil is brought in a vessel and used among other things to anoint the metzora. What is leftover, the priest gets to keep.", + "If you see oil being poured on to the fires, you don’t need not ask what it is for, for it is the remnant of the oil of the wafers of priests’ meal-offerings, or of the anointed priest's meal-offering; for one cannot voluntarily offer offer oil [alone]. Rabbi Shimon now explains what oil doesn’t go to the priest and instead is poured out onto the altar. If the priest is bringing the minhah (meal) offering, then neither he nor any other priest gets to keep the oil. All of this meal offering, and all of the oil, is burned. The high priest (the anointed priest) offers a minhah offering every day. The remnant of this oil does not go to the priests, but rather is burned.. A person cannot voluntarily offer just oil. Therefore, any oil that one sees in the Temple being either divided up among the priests or burned on the altar cannot come from a voluntary offering. This line comes to explain how one knows that the oil being divided up among the priests or burned on the altar is not from a voluntary offering oil simply cannot be brought alone as a voluntary offering.", + "Rabbi Tarfon say: oil can be voluntarily offered [alone]. Rabbi Tarfon disagrees and holds that oil can be brought as an individual offering. Therefore, if one sees oil being divided or burned it might also come from such an offering." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nIn connection with a hatat, Leviticus 6:20 states, “Anything that touches its flesh shall become holy; and if any of its blood is spattered upon a garment, you shall wash the bespattered part in the holy place.”\nThis chapter deals with various details that stem from this verse. Our mishnah deals with the second half of the verse.", + "If the blood of a hatat spurted on to a garment, it must be washed. As the second half of verse 20 states, if blood from a hatat splatters onto a piece of clothing, the piece of clothing must be washed.", + "Though scripture speaks only of [hatats] which are eaten, for it is said, “In the holy place shall it be eaten,” (Leviticus 6:19), yet both those which may be eaten and the inner [sacrifices] necessitate washing, for it is said, “[This is] the law of the hatat” (Leviticus 6:18), there is one law for all hatats. The mishnah clarifies that verse 20 speaks about all hatats, both those that are eaten by the priests and those that are offered inside the Sanctuary on the golden altar and are not eaten (see 5:1-2). Although verse 19 seems to refer only to hatats that are eaten, since verse 18 refers to all hatats, the rules that are in verse 20 are understood as referring to all hatats as well." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah teaches that when Leviticus 6:20 states, “And if any of its [the hatat] blood is spattered upon a garment, you shall wash the bespattered part in the holy place,” it is only referring to a valid hatat, and not to a disqualified one.", + "The blood of a disqualified hatat does not necessitate washing, whether it had a period of fitness or did not have a period of fitness. If the blood came from a disqualified hatat, then the garment does not require ritual cleansing (I might advise one to wash it before wearing it again, but that’s not the type of washing referred to here). This applies whether or not the hatat was once valid and then became disqualified (“had a period of fitness”) or whether it was disqualified from the minute it was sacrificed (“did not have a period of fitness”). The mishnah now explains these two categories.", + "Which had a period of fitness? One [whose blood] was kept overnight, or was defiled, or was taken out [of the Temple courtyard]. There are three cases where the hatat “had a period of fitness”. First it was sacrificed properly and then: 1) its blood was kept overnight in the Temple courtyard; 2) It was defiled for instance its flesh was defiled before the blood was sprinkled; 3) The blood was taken out of the Temple courtyard before it was sprinkled on the altar. For more information on these categories see 9:2.", + "Which did not have a period of fitness? One which was slaughtered [with the intention of eating it] after the appropriate time or outside the appropriate bounds; or whose blood was received by unfit persons, and sprinkled by them. If the hatat was slaughtered improperly, for instance with the wrong intention, or its blood was received and/or sprinkled by a person not qualified to do so (see 2:1), then the blood never had a period of fitness." + ], + [ + "If [blood] spurted [direct] from the [animal's] throat onto a garment, it does not require washing.
From the horn or from the base [of the altar], it does not require washing.
If it spilled out on to the floor [of the Temple] and [the priest] collected it, [and then it splattered onto a garment] it does not require washing.
Only blood which was received in a vessel and is fit for sprinkling requires washing.
If [the blood] spurted on to the hide, before it was flayed, it does not require washing.
[If it spurted] after it was flayed, it requires washing, the words of Rabbi Judah. Rabbi Elazar says: even [if it spurted on the skin] after it was flayed [it does not require washing].
Only the place of the blood requires washing.
And whatever is eligible to contract uncleanness,
And whatever is fit for washing.
Sections one-four: In section four the general rule that explains the first three sections of the mishnah is stated. The blood which if spilled on a garment requires the garment to be washed is only blood that was in a vessel and was fit for being sprinkled on the altar. In other words, totally valid blood, ready to be spilled onto the altar, contaminates the garment, because that’s not where the blood is supposed to be. But if the blood was not valid blood in a vessel, the garment need not be ritually washed.
The mishnah lists three such possibilities.
1) Blood which splatters directly from the neck of the animal onto the garment. Since it is not in a vessel, the blood doesn’t contaminate the garment.
2) If the blood was already spilled on the horn or the base of the altar, and then it gets on the garment, the blood doesn’t contaminate. This blood has already fulfilled its purpose and therefore it no longer contaminates.
3) If it had spilled onto the floor of the Temple, it can no longer be sprinkled onto the altar. Since it is no longer eligible for the altar, it doesn’t contaminate.
Section five: Before the hide is flayed from the animal, it is not a “garment” and not even in a state from which it can become a garment. Therefore, if blood spills on it, it is not contaminated.
Section six: According to Rabbi Judah, once it has been flayed, the hide is close enough to a garment, that it can become contaminated by the hatat blood. Even though a hide usually cannot become impure until it has been processed, if one should decide to use it as a garment in its current state, it would become susceptible to impurity. [We will learn more about this when we learn Seder Toharot]. Therefore, Rabbi Judah says it does require washing.
Rabbi Elazar says that since it is not at this moment susceptible to impurity, it does not require washing.
Section seven: The entire garment does not require washing, just the point that came into contact with blood.
Section eight: Only a garment that is susceptible to impurity must be washed. This would seem to exclude a piece of cloth so small that it can no longer become impure.
Section nine: Finally, if the garment cannot be washed, for instance a garment made of wood (I know, sounds weird), then it doesn’t require washing. The Torah only requires that washables be washed." + ], + [ + "Whether a garment, a sack, or a hide, it requires washing in a holy place. No matter the material of the garment, whether it be normal cloth, probably made of wool or linen, or coarse sack-cloth or a hide, it must be washed in the holy place, which means in the Temple courtyard. This is stated explicitly in Leviticus 6:20.", + "The breaking of an earthen vessel must be in a holy place. Leviticus 6:21 states, “An earthen vessel in which it [the hatat] was boiled shall be broken.” The mishnah teaches that just as the washing of the garment must be in the Temple courtyard, so too the breaking of the copper vessel must be done there. In both cases the hatat contaminates, and therefore the contamination must be cleansed.", + "And the scouring and rinsing of a copper vessel must be in a holy place. The continuation of the verse states, “If it was boiled in a copper vessel, [the vessel] shall be scoured and rinsed with water.” This too must be done in the Temple courtyard.", + "In this the hatat is more stringent than [other] sacrifices of higher sanctity. In this regard, the laws concerning the hatat are more stringent than the laws concerning other sacrifices, even most holy ones. In cases involving other sacrifices, the garment can be washed, the earthen vessel can be broken and the copper vessel can be rinsed and scoured in places other than the Temple courtyard." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to deal with washing a garment or breaking an earthen vessel in the holy place in order to cleanse it from contamination from the hatat.", + "If a garment was carried outside the curtains [of the Tabernacle], it must re-enter, and is washed it in the holy place. If the garment which was splattered with the hatat blood is brought out of Temple confines (the Mishnah always uses the term “curtains” which refers to the Tabernacle, even though it clearly means the walls of the Temple), it must be brought back into the Temple and washed there.", + "If it was defiled outside the curtains, one must tear it, then it re-enters, and is washed in the holy place. If it is defiled outside the Temple, it cannot be brought back into the Temple because it is prohibited to bring defilement into the Temple. Therefore, he should tear it, and thereby make it no longer susceptible to impurity. Once garments are torn and thereby no longer are “garments” they are pure. Then he can bring it back into the Temple and wash it there.", + "If an earthen vessel was carried outside the hangings, it re-enters and is broken in a holy place. Similarly, with regard to the earthen vessel. If it is brought out of the Temple, he should bring it back in and break it inside the Temple.", + "If it was defiled outside the curtains, a hole is made in it, then it re-enters and is broken in a holy place. And if it becomes impure outside the Temple, he puts a hole in it. This makes it pure because a vessel with a hole in it is no longer usable as a vessel and it thereby becomes pure. Then he can bring it back in and break it inside the Temple." + ], + [ + "If a copper vessel was carried outside the hangings, it re-enters and is scoured and rinsed in a holy place.
If it was defiled outside the hangings, it must be broken through, then it re-enters and is scoured and rinsed in a holy place.
This mishnah teaches the exact same law as was found in yesterday’s mishnah, except that today’s mishnah refers to a copper vessel. Since the law is the same, I refer the reader to yesterday’s mishnah for more commentary.
Section two: In order to purify the copper vessel, he must make a large hole in it, for metal vessels become pure only if large holes are put into them." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe earthen vessel is broken and the copper vessel scoured and rinsed if sacrifices were cooked in them. Our mishnah continues to deal with this law.\nWe should note that again a mishnah concerning sacrificial law later becomes halakhically significant by being applied to other areas. The laws concerning cleansing the vessel in which a sacrifice is cooked are eventually used as a source for laws for how vessels are “kashered.”", + "Whether one boiled in it or poured boiling [sacrificial flesh] into it, whether most sacred sacrifices or lesser sacrifices, [the pot] requires scouring and rinsing. Rabbi Shimon says: lesser sacrifices do not require scouring and rinsing. The earthen vessel must be broken and the copper vessel scoured and rinsed whether they were used to boil a sacrifice or whether a boiled sacrifice was poured into them. The important thing is that since the sacrifice was hot when it was in the vessel, the vessel absorbed some of the taste of the sacrifice and it must subsequently be cleansed. This remains a normative law in kashrut – vessels absorb the taste of that which is cooked in them only if the food is hot. The verses from Leviticus 6 refer only to the hatat. Nevertheless, the rabbis extend these laws to other sacrifices. Just as the taste of the hatat needs to be removed from the vessels, so too does the taste of other sacrifices. The first opinion holds that this is true for most holy sacrifices, like the hatat and the asham, and for less holy sacrifices like the shelamim and todah. Rabbi Shimon says that if the vessel was used to cook a less holy sacrifice, it need not be scoured and rinsed.", + "Rabbi Tarfon says: if one boiled [sacrifices in a pot] at the beginning of a festival, he can boil in it during the whole festival. But the sages say: until the time of eating, scouring and rinsing. Rabbi Tarfon says that if a vessel was used to cook a sacrifice at the beginning of a seven day festival (Sukkot or Pesah), one can continue to use that vessel throughout the entire festival without scouring and rinsing it. Since the vessel will be in continuous use due to the large number of sacrifices offered during the festival, each time it is used the vessel will discharge the taste of the previous sacrifice cooked in it, and thereby the taste of that sacrifice will never become “remnant,” sacrifice left over past the time when it must be eaten. The other rabbis hold that the vessel must be scoured and rinsed before the time in which any sacrifice that was in it had to be eaten. For instance, if a hatat is put into the vessel, then the vessel must be scoured and rinsed by midnight, for that is when the hatat becomes remnant. This is true even if another sacrifice, for instance a shelamim, is cooked in there before this time. The rabbis disagree that the taste of the sacrifice will be completely discharged through cooking another sacrifice. Since the taste will remain, it must be scoured and rinsed within the time that any sacrifices are cooked in it.", + "Scouring is done as the scouring of a goblet; and rinsing is as the rinsing of a goblet, Scouring and rinsing are done to the copper vessels as is done with a goblet, which means that they are thoroughly cleansed.", + "Scouring [in hot water] and rinsing in cold [water]. There are two different versions of this line. According to one version, not found in manuscripts but accepted by the Rambam, scouring is done with hot water. Since the taste came in to the vessel through hot water, it can only be removed through hot water. According to the other version, the scouring need only be done through cold water. According to both versions, rinsing is done through cold water.", + "The spit and the grill are cleansed with hot water. A spit or grill upon which a sacrifice was roasted, must be cleansed by being put into boiling water. Since these were directly on the fire, the requirements for cleansing are greater." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah introduces several principles as to when taste is transferred from one thing to another. Again, while the principles here relate directly to sacrificial law that is no longer practiced today (and wasn’t practiced at the time of the Mishnah either), these principles are also applicable to the laws of kashrut and thus historically were and remain significant practical halakhah.", + "If one boiled sacrifices and hullin in it [the copper pot], or most holy sacrifices and lesser sacrifices, if they were sufficient to impart their flavor, the less stringent must be eaten as the more stringent of them; In both cases mentioned here, a person boils two different things in one pot, one of greater stringency (sacrifices, or most holy sacrifices) and one of lesser stringency (hullin, or less holy sacrifices). If there is enough of the sacrifices to impart a taste to the hullin, or enough most holy sacrifices to impart taste to the less holy sacrifices, then the rules of the stringent will apply to everything in the pot. Thus the hullin would have to be treated like sacrificial meat and the less holy sacrifices like most holy sacrifices. But if there is not enough to impart taste, then the more lenient rules remain in place.", + "But they do not necessitate scouring and rinsing; This line seems to say that even if the sacrifices impart their flavor, the pot still need not be scoured and rinsed. However, the Talmud emends the line to read “they do necessitate scouring and rinsing and they do disqualify by touch; if there is not enough to impart taste, then the less stringent need not be eaten as the more stringent ….” In other words, the Talmud emends the line to read the opposite of what it actually says. As long as the more stringent stuff does not impart taste, the less stringent rules apply.", + "And they do not disqualify by touch. Leviticus 6:20 states that anything that touches the flesh of the hatat shall become holy. The rabbis rule that any food that absorbs the taste of sacrifices becomes holy like the sacrifice. If the sacrifice is unfit then it too is unfit. If he cooks a mixture of sacrifices and hullin in a pot, and there is not enough sacrifice to impart a taste to the mixture, then the mixture does not disqualify other food which absorbs its taste. (This is according to the talmudic reading of this line, which I mentioned above in my commentary to section two).", + "If [an unfit] wafer touched a [fit] wafer, or an [unfit] piece of meat touched a [fit] piece of meat, not the whole wafer or the whole piece of meat is forbidden; only the part that absorbed [of the unfit] is forbidden. When a permitted thing and a forbidden thing touch and the permitted thing absorbs some of the taste of the forbidden thing, only the part that absorbed the taste would become prohibited. The mishnah illustrates this with regard to the wafer (brought as an accompaniment to a sacrifice) or a piece of sacrificial flesh." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nOur chapter discusses what parts of the sacrifices the priests receive. Our mishnah begins by pointing out which priests do not receive a share.", + "A tebul yom and one who lacks atonement do not share in sacrifices for consumption in the evening. A tebul yom is a priest who immersed in a mikveh in order to cleanse himself of his impurity but the sun has not yet set upon him. He cannot eat sacrifices, although he is clean once he has been in the mikveh. “One who lacks atonement” is an impure priest, for instance one who had been a zav, who had to bring a sacrifice the day after he immerses in a mikveh. He cannot eat sacrificial meat until after he brings the sacrifices, even though he is clean after having gone in the mikveh. Both of these types of priest do not receive their share of sacrificial meat today, in order to eat it tomorrow, or tonight. Since they cannot currently eat sacrifices, they lose out on their share.", + "An onen may handle [sacrifices], but he may not offer them, and he does not receive a share for consumption in the evening. An onen is a person (in this case a priest) whose close relative has died. The priest remains an onen on the day of the death according to Torah law, but the rabbis add that he remains an onen throughout the following night as well. An onen is not allowed to eat sacrifices, but he can touch them, for he is not impure. He does not receive a share in order to eat that night, since this is rabbinically forbidden.", + "Priests with blemishes, whether permanent or passing, receive a share and may eat [of the sacrifices] but they may not offer them. A priest with a blemish cannot offer sacrifices, but he can eat them and therefore he receives his share with the other priests. See Leviticus 21:21-23.", + "Whoever is not eligible for service does not share in the flesh. A priest who is not eligible to take part in the service, for instance a priest who is impure, does not receive part of the sacrificial flesh. The exception is those with blemishes, as stated in section three.", + "And he who does not share in the flesh does not share in the hides. Someone who doesn’t get his part of the flesh, also loses out on his part of the hides of the sacrifices.", + "Even if one was unclean when the blood was sprinkled but clean when the fats were burned [on the altar], he does not share in the flesh, for it is said: “he among the sons of Aaron, that offers the blood of the shelamim, and the fat, shall have the right thigh for a portion” (Leviticus 7:33). Even if the person was impure during the day when the blood was sprinkled on the altar, and then pure in the evening when the fats were burned, he still doesn’t get a share of the flesh or hides, until he is pure at the point when the blood is sprinkled. This is derived from the verse which says that one who offers both the blood and the fat gets a portion of the flesh – but if he can’t offer the blood, he loses his portion. In other words, no blood, no flesh!" + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah teaches that the priests have the right to the hide of a sacrifice only if the flesh of the sacrifice was burned on the altar.", + "Whenever the altar does not acquire its flesh, the priests do not acquire the hide, for it is said, “[And the priest that offers] any man’s olah [the priest shall have … the hide]” (Leviticus 7:8), [this means,] an olah which went up on the altar on behalf a man. If for some reason the flesh of the sacrifice cannot be burned on the altar, for instance it was sacrificed with a disqualifying intention, then the priests also don’t acquire the hides. This is learned from a midrash on Leviticus 7:8 which implies that when the priest successfully sacrifices a person’s olah, then he gets to keep the hide. Only if the olah is actually put on the altar, does the priest receive the hide.", + "If an olah was slaughtered under a different designation, although it does not count for its owner, its hide belongs to the priests. If the olah was slaughtered with the intent of it being a different sacrifice, it can be put on the altar, even though it does not discharge the owner of his obligation (see 1:1). Since it can be put on the altar, the priest does receive the hide.", + "Whether [it be] a man’s olah or a woman's olah, the hide belong to the priests. Even the Torah says, “man”, the priest receives the hide of the sacrifice whether it was brought by a man or a woman. The word “man” in this context was not meant to exclude a woman." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses who receives the hides of different types of sacrifices.", + "The hides of less holy sacrifices belong to their owners. The Torah states that the hide of an olah goes to the priests. Since the olah is a most holy sacrifice (as is the hatat and the asham), the rabbis extrapolate that the hides of all most holy sacrifices go to the priests, as we shall see below. But when it comes to the hides of less holy sacrifices, such as the shelamim, the todah, the tithe and the first-born, they go to those who bring these sacrifices.", + "The hides of most holy sacrifices belong to the priest. This is a kal vehomer: if with an olah, even though they do not acquire its flesh they do acquire its hide, is it not logical that they acquire the hides of most holy sacrifices, when they do acquire their flesh? While the Torah states that the hides of the olah go to the priest, the rabbis expand this to include all most holy sacrifices. The argument is a kal vehomer argument, which roughly translates as an “all the more so” type of argument. If the priests receive the hide even when they don’t receive the flesh, as is the case with the olah, all the more so they receive the hide when they do receive the flesh, as is the case with the asham and hatat.", + "The altar does not refute [this argument], for it does not acquire the hide in any instance. In order to refute a kal vehomer argument, what one must do is show that the relationship between the two things being discussed is not stable. In our case, the mishnah tried to claim that the relationship between hide and flesh is stable whenever one receives the flesh, he receives the hide. However, the altar could seemingly prove the opposite the altar receives the flesh and doesn’t receive the hide. Therefore, we could say that the priests receive the flesh of most holy sacrifices but they don’t receive the hide. The mishnah rejects this argument because the altar never receives the hide, unlike the priests who do receive the hide of the olah. In other words, we reason the kal vehomer argument from the fact that the priests do receive the hide of the olah and therefore they also receive the hide of other most holy sacrifices, and not from some general argument that any time someone receives the flesh, he also receives the hide." + ], + [ + "All sacrifices which became disqualified, before they were flayed, their hides do not belong to the priests. After they were flayed, their hides belong to the priests. When sacrifices are disqualified, they cannot be eaten. The question in our mishnah is what to do with the hides when the priests do not get the flesh. If the sacrifice was disqualified before the animal was flayed, then the hide does not belong to the priest. In this case the disqualification renders the hide disqualified as well. If the disqualification takes place after the hide has already been removed, then it does not affect the status of the hide, which goes to the priest.", + "Rabbi Hanina vice-chief of the priests said: Never in my life have I seen a hide go out to the place of burning. Rabbi Hanina was the vice-chief of the priests, and hence his testimony of what occurred in the Temple is first-hand. Rabbi Hanina claims that he never saw a hide go out to be burned in the place of burning, which is what would have to be done to a hide if it was disqualified from going to either the priest or the owner. Rather, the always went to the priests (or to the owners in the case of less holy sacrifices). This line is an interesting interpolation of actual Temple practice into abstract rabbinic law concerning what is supposed to happen in the Temple. As I have stated many times, the rabbis’ laws are not simply recordings of what actually happened in the Temple. Rather, they are based mostly on rabbinic interpretation of the Torah and rabbinic application of legal principles. These interpretations and principles are occasionally mixed in with traditions about what actually happened in the Temple. Very rarely do we have a priest actually tell us what he saw in the Temple. And here, when a priest of priestly and rabbinic authority does testify, it seems to contradict what was stated above, for according to the previous halakhah, if the disqualification occurred before the animal was flayed, the hide must be burned.", + "Rabbi Akiva said: we learn from his words that if one flays a firstling and it is found to be terefah, the priests have a right to its hide. Rabbi Akiva attempts to derive a halakhah from Rabbi Hanina’s testimony. If a firstling was slaughtered, whether in the Temple as a sacrifice when it does not have a blemish, or outside the Temple when it is blemished, and it is found to be a terefah, an animal with an internal flaw such that it cannot be eaten, the priests receive the hide. Were it not for Rabbi Hanina’s testimony, we would have thought that the hide should have been burned.", + "But the sages say: “I have never seen” is not proof: rather, it [the hide] must go forth to the place of burning. The other rabbis discount Rabbi Hanina’s testimony as being valueless. The fact that he didn’t see something occur does not mean that it did not actually occur. Perhaps there was a hide burned at the burning place and not given to the priests but that this did not occur while Rabbi Hanina was serving in the Temple. Hence, the law cannot be based on his testimony, rather if the disqualification occurs before the animal is flayed, the priests do not receive the hide, as was stated in section one." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn chapter five mishnayot 1-2 we learned that in certain cases, namely that of certain bullocks and goats, the sacrificial rites are performed on the inner altar. Their blood is spilled on the inner altar. Our mishnah deals with where these sacrifices are burned.", + "Bullocks which are burned and goats which are burned: when they are burned in fulfillment of their prescribed commandment, they are burned in the ash depository (bet, and they defile garments. If the bullocks or goats had not been disqualified, then the flesh is burned in the “ash depository” or “bet hadeshen” which was outside of Jerusalem. In addition, one who burns these sacrifices must wash his clothes and any clothes that he touches, see Leviticus 16:28 and Yoma 6:7.", + "But when they are not burned in fulfillment of their commandment, they are burned in the bet habirah and they do not defile garments. However, if they were disqualified in some way, then they are burned in a place called “bet habirah.” According to some commentators there are two places that are called “bet habirah” one in the Temple courtyard, and one on the Temple Mount, outside the Temple. If they were disqualified before they left the courtyard, then they would be burned inside the Temple, and if they were disqualified after they left the courtyard, then they would be burned outside the Temple but on the Temple Mount. These bullocks and goats do not defile garments only valid ones are defiling." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to deal with the bullocks and goats whose blood was offered inside the sanctuary, in the inner altar. Specifically, the question is when do these carcasses defile the clothes of those who deal with them and cause him to defile any clothes that he touches.", + "They would carry them on staves [out of the Temple courtyard]. After the rites were performed inside the Sanctuary, they would carry the carcasses outside using staves.", + "If those in front had passed outside the wall of the Temple courtyard, but those in the back had not [yet] gone out, those in front defile their garments, while those in the back do not defile their garments, until they go out. When they both go out, both defile their garments. Rabbi Shimon says: neither defile [their garments] until the fire is burning in the greater part of them. The Torah (Leviticus 16:28) states that the one who burns these sacrifices shall wash his clothes. The debate in this section is when does someone become “one who burns.” According to the first opinion, the one who deals with these sacrifices defiles clothes once they have left the walls of the Temple courtyard. If some of those carrying the carcasses have left and some have not, then only those who have left the walls defile clothes. Once they have all left, they all defile. According to this interpretation “one who burns” is one who has left the Temple in order to burn one of these sacrifices. Rabbi Shimon holds that only once the fire has begun to consume a majority of the carcass of the bullock or goat does the one who burned it defile clothing. He interprets “one who burns” in a much more limiting fashion to defile one must actually begin the burning process.", + "When the flesh is dissolved, he who burns [it] does not defile his garments. Burning is over once the flesh has been dissolved. One who deals with the burning after this point does not defile clothes." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nChapter thirteen deals with the prohibition of slaughtering and offering sacrifices outside of the Temple. This prohibition is found in Leviticus 17 which reads:\nLeviticus 17:2-9 2 Speak to Aaron and his sons and to all the Israelite people and say to them: This is what the LORD has commanded: 3 if anyone of the house of Israel slaughters an ox or sheep or goat in the camp, or does so outside the camp, 4 and does not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting to present it as an offering to the LORD, before the LORD's Tabernacle, bloodguilt shall be imputed to that man: he has shed blood; that man shall be cut off from among his people... 8 Say to them further: If anyone of the house of Israel or of the strangers who reside among them offers a burnt offering or a sacrifice, 9 and does not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting to offer it to the LORD, that person shall be cut off from his people.\nNote that the verses prohibit slaughtering (verse 3) and offering (verse 9). The punishment for intentionally transgressing either of these prohibitions is karet, which is translated here as “cut off from his people.” According to the rabbis, any sin which is punished with karet when done intentionally, is atoned for with a sin-offering, a hatat, when done unwittingly. Our mishnah deals with how many hatats a person would be liable for if he unwittingly slaughters and offers a sacrifice outside of the Temple.", + "He who slaughters and offers up outside [the Temple courtyard] is liable in respect of slaughtering and in respect of offering. If one unwittingly slaughters and then offers a sacrifice outside of the Temple courtyard he is liable to bring two hatats one for slaughtering and one for offering it up.", + "Rabbi Yose the Galilean says: if he slaughtered inside and offered up outside, [he is liable]; if he slaughtered outside and offered up outside, he is not liable [for offering up], because he offered up only that which was unfit. Rabbi Yose the Galilean says that one is liable for offering outside the Temple only if he slaughtered it inside. If he slaughtered the animal outside and then offered it up outside he would be liable for only one hatat, since by the time he offered it up, it was already unfit by having been slaughtered outside. Rabbi Yose would read verse 3 as prohibiting slaughtering outside the Temple and verse 9 as saying that even if he slaughtered inside, where one is allowed to slaughter, he is punished for offering outside. Verse 9’s punishment for offering up does not apply if verse 3’s prohibition of slaughtering outside was already transgressed.", + "They said to him: even when one slaughters inside and offers up outside, since he carries it out, he renders it unfit. The rabbis reject his argument, claiming that even if he slaughters it inside and then carries it outside, he is still offering up something that is unfit. In other words, there is no way to offer up a fit sacrifice outside the Temple because as soon as it leaves the Temple it is unfit. Nevertheless, verse 9 punishes one who offers a sacrifice outside the Temple. The only conclusion is that this verse is applicable even if the sacrifice was already disqualified. Thus he must bring two hatats one for slaughtering and one for offering." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah contains a debate between the sages and Rabbi Yose the Galilean similar in structure to the debate in yesterday’s mishnah. Here the topic is an unclean person who eats sacrifices. This is prohibited in Leviticus 7:20.", + "An unclean [person] who eats [of sacrifices], whether unclean sacrifices or clean sacrifices, is liable. Leviticus 7:20 says that an unclean person who intentionally eats a sacrifice is punished with karet. According to the first opinion in the mishnah, this prohibition applies whether the sacrifice was clean and therefore permitted, or unclean and was prohibited.", + "Rabbi Yose the Galilean says: an unclean person who eats clean [sacrifices] is liable, but an unclean person who eats unclean [sacrifices] is not liable because he ate only that which is unclean. Rabbi Yose the Galilean says that an unclean person is liable for eating a sacrifice that he would otherwise have been allowed to eat, i.e a clean sacrifice. If he ate an unclean sacrifice he is not liable because he couldn’t have eaten it even if he was clean. This is similar to Rabbi Yose’s reasoning in yesterday’s mishnah, where he stated that one is liable for offering up a sacrifice outside of the Temple only if the sacrifice was slaughtered in the Temple.", + "They said to him: even when an unclean person eats clean [sacrifices], when he touches it, he defiles it. As in yesterday’s mishnah, the sages respond to Rabbi Yose the Galilean by saying that an unclean person cannot eat a clean sacrifice, because as soon as he touches it, he renders it unclean. Therefore, when the Torah states that it is a transgression for an unclean person to eat a sacrifice, it doesn’t make a difference whether the sacrifice was clean (before he began to eat it) or unclean in both cases he is liable.", + "A clean person who eats unclean [sacrifices] is not liable, because one is liable only on account of bodily uncleanness. The mishnah now limits the punishment in Leviticus 7:20 to a case of an unclean person who eats a clean sacrifice. While it is forbidden for a clean person to eat an unclean sacrifice, he is not liable for karet or a hatat if he does so." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with various differences between the laws governing the prohibition of slaughtering a sacrifice outside of the Temple and those prohibiting offering a sacrifice outside of the Temple.", + "Slaughtering [outside the Temple] is more stringent than offering up [outside], and offering up [is more stringent] than slaughtering. This is a classic style of introduction in the Mishnah. The rabbis seem to have been fascinated by these types of situations, sometimes the laws of x (here slaughtering) are stricter than those of the related prohibition y (here offering) whereas sometimes the situation is opposite and the laws governing y are more stringent than x.", + "Slaughtering is more stringent, for he who slaughters [a sacrifice] to a man is liable, whereas he who offers up to a man is not liable. The laws governing slaughtering are more stringent, for he who slaughters an animal to a man, in worship of that man, is liable. However, one who offers up a sacrifice in worship of a man is not liable. This distinction is derived midrashically from the verses in Leviticus 7.", + "Offering up is more stringent: two who hold a knife and slaughter are not liable, [whereas] if two take hold of a limb and offer it up, they are liable. If two people together hold a knife and slaughter an animal then neither is liable. This is because each could have done the act on his own, and often when an act that could be done by one person is performed jointly by two, both are exempt. However, we would not say about offering that it is an act that could be performed by one person. It could be performed by as many people who wish to do so. Therefore, each person who offers up a limb of the animal outside of the Temple is liable for karet or a hatat.", + "If one offered up, then offered up again, then offered up again, he is liable in respect of each [act of] offering up, the words of Rabbi Shimon. Rabbi Yose says: he is liable for only one. According to Rabbi Shimon, if one offers up the limb of an animal multiple times, he is liable for each and every act. Rabbi Shimon looks at each act as being separate and therefore each carries its own culpability. Rabbi Yose says that one cannot really offer up the same animal (or piece thereof) twice. Thus he is liable for only one hatat, even though he offered it up multiple times.", + "He is liable only when he offers up on the top of an altar. Rabbi Shimon says: he is liable even if he offers up on the top of a rock or a stone. According to the first opinion he is liable only if he offers up the sacrifice on an altar which he built outside the Temple. Without an altar, something is not really a sacrifice. Rabbi Shimon disagrees and holds that even if he offers it on a rock or a stone, which are not properly built altars, he is still liable for offering a sacrifice outside of the Temple." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to deal with the prohibition of offering a sacrifice outside of the Temple.", + "In regard to both valid sacrifices or invalid sacrifices which had become unfit within [the Temple]: if one offers them outside, he is liable. One is liable for offering up outside of the Temple either a valid sacrifice or an invalid sacrifice that had been invalidated while it was in the Temple. The rule with regard to such sacrifices is that if they are put on the altar they do not come down (see 9:2). However, if one offers up a sacrifice that had been disqualified outside of the Temple, one that if put up on the altar would have to be taken down, he is not liable.", + "If one offers up outside [the Temple] as much as an olive’s worth of an olah and its innards [combined], he is liable. In order to be liable for offering up a sacrifice outside the Temple, one must offer up at least an olive’s worth of flesh. The mishnah rules that when offering an olah, a sacrifice that is wholly burned, the flesh and the innards, which are always burned for every sacrifice, add up together. Assumedly, in a sacrifice that is partially eaten, the parts that are eaten would not be combined with the parts that are normally burned, in order to add up to the requisite olive’s worth.", + "As for the fistful [of flour], the frankincense, the incense, the priests’ meal-offering, the anointed priest’s meal-offering, and the meal offering of libations, if [one] offered up as much as an olive of one of these outside, he is liable. But Rabbi Elazar exempts him unless he offers up the whole of them. All of the types of sacrifices listed in this section were explained in 4:3. They are all completely burned on the altar, without any of their parts being eaten by priests or non-priests. According to the first opinion, even though they are completely burned, if one offers up even a part of them outside of the Temple, he is liable. Rabbi Elazar disagrees and holds that just as they must be completely burned on the altar if done properly, so too in order for one to be liable for offering them outside the Temple, they must be completely offered.", + "In all of these cases, if they offered them within, and left over an olive’s worth and one offered it outside, he is liable. Rabbi Elazar, however, agrees that if most of one of the above-mentioned things is offered on the altar, and then an olive’s worth is left over and offered outside the Temple, that one is liable. Since this olive’s worth completes the offering of the sacrifice, one is liable for offering it up outside.", + "In all of these cases, if they became lacking something, and one offered them outside, he is not liable. The sacrifices in section three must be completely offered for them to be valid. Therefore, if even the smallest part of them is missing and one offers it up outside the Temple, he is not liable. In other words, since this would not have been valid had it been offered on the altar, it doesn’t make one liable if offered outside." + ], + [ + "One who offers sacrifices together with the innards outside the Temple, is liable. In this case one offers parts of sacrifices that are eaten, together with the innards that are burned on the altar. Had he offered up just the edible parts outside the Temple, he would not be liable, because these parts did not need to be put on the altar. He is liable for offering the innards, because one is liable for offering up outside the Temple anything that should have been burned on the altar. This is true even if the sacrifices that are to be eaten were directly on the fire and the innards were on top, and not directly upon the fire. The edible parts of the sacrifices don’t cause a separation between the fire and the innards because they are of the same type, and things that are of the same type don’t cause separation.", + "If a minhah had not had its fistful removed and one offered it outside, he is exempt. When a minhah, a meal-offering, is sacrificed, a fistful is removed and burned on the altar and then the remainder of the minhah can be eaten. Since part of the minhah is burned and part is eaten one is liable for offering up only the part that is supposed to be burned, as we saw in section one. If one offered up a minhah outside of the Temple before its fistful has been removed he is exempt because it has not yet been determined what part of the minhah was supposed to have been burned.", + "If one took out the fistful, and then the fistful went back into the minhah, and he offered it outside, he is liable. However, if the fistful is removed and thereby determined, and then it falls back into the remainder of the minhah, and he offers up the whole minhah outside the Temple, in this case he is liable because the fistful was determined, even though we now cannot tell what part was the fistful and what part was the remainder." + ], + [ + "As for the fistful and the frankincense, if one offered one of them [without the other] outside [the Temple], he is liable. Rabbi Elazar says: he is exempt unless he offers the second too. [If one offered] one inside and the other outside, he is liable. In order for the non-sacrificed parts of the minhah (meal) offering to be eaten, the fistful of the minhah and the frankincense must both be burned on the altar (see Leviticus 2:2-3). If one offers one of these outside of the Temple, he is still liable, according to the first opinion, even though he didn’t offer the other one. Rabbi Elazar says that he is exempt until he offers both the fistful and the frankincense, because one is not effective without the other. This matches his opinion in mishnah four. Rabbi Elazar agrees with the sages that if he offers one of them inside and then the other outside, he is liable. This is similar to the case in mishnah four where he offered most of a certain type of sacrifice inside the Temple, but left over an olive’s worth which he offered outside the Temple. Since this completes the offering, all agree that he is liable.", + "As for the two dishes of frankincense, if one offered one of them outside, he is liable. Rabbi Elazar says: he is exempt unless he offers the second too. [If one offered] one inside and the other outside, he is liable. Burning the two dishes of frankincense allows the priests to eat the showbread. Both dishes must be burned. Again, the first opinion holds that if he offers one of them outside the Temple he is liable, whereas Rabbi Elazar holds that he is not liable unless he offers both. As above, if he offers one inside the Temple and the other outside, Rabbi Elazar agrees that he is liable.", + "If one sprinkles part of the blood outside, he is liable. Every sprinkling of the blood is considered its own separate entity. Therefore, if one offers even one sprinkling of blood outside the Temple, he is liable, even if he didn’t perform the requisite two or four sprinklings. In this case Rabbi Elazar would agree.", + "Rabbi Elazar says: also one who makes a libation of the water of the Festival [of Sukkot] on the festival, outside is liable. On Sukkot there is a water libation. If one performs this water libation outside the Temple he is liable.", + "Rabbi Nehemiah says: if one offered the residue of the blood outside, he is liable. The remainder of the blood after some of it has been sprinkled is poured onto the base of the altar. If one offers this blood outside the Temple, he is liable." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with a person who “nips,” or slaughters a bird inside or outside the Temple and offers it up outside. As a reminder “nipping,” plucking off the head from the back of the neck, was the way that bird sacrifices were slaughtered inside the Temple, whereas slaughtering, slicing the neck with a knife, was how they were slaughtered outside the Temple, to be eaten not as a sacrifice.", + "If one nips a bird [offering] inside and offers it up outside, he is liable; Inside the Temple a bird is slaughtered by nipping. Therefore, if he nips it inside the Temple he has slaughtered it correctly. When he then brings it outside the Temple and offers it up there, he is liable because he has offered a valid sacrifice outside of the Temple.", + "If one nips it outside and offers it up outside, he is exempt. However, if he nips it outside, he has disqualified it from being a valid sacrifice and when he offers it up outside he is not liable.", + "If one slaughters a bird inside and offers it up outside, he is exempt. Slaughtering it inside the Temple also disqualifies it from being a sacrifice and thus when he offers it up outside he is exempt.", + "If one slaughters [it] outside and offers [it] up outside, he is liable. Slaughtering is the proper way to kill the bird outside the Temple. So if he slaughters it and then offers it outside the Temple he is liable.", + "Thus its prescribed rite inside exempts him [if he does it] outside, while its prescribed rite outside exempts him [if he does it] inside. We now get a summary, which may also serve as a type of mnemonic device. If one kills the bird outside the Temple with the rite prescribed for inside, that is nipping, he is exempt. Similarly, if one kills the bird inside the Temple with the rite prescribed for outside, that is slaughtering with the knife, he is exempt.", + "Rabbi Shimon says: whatever he is liable for outside, he is liable in similar circumstances inside when one [subsequently] offers it up outside; except when one slaughters [a bird] inside and offers [it] up outside. Rabbi Shimon holds that one who nips outside the Temple and then offers it up outside the Temple is liable. He then adds a rule that any time one is liable for an act when done outside the Temple, he is also liable if done inside and then offered up outside the Temple. The one exception is one who slaughters an animal inside and then offers it up outside. One who does this is exempt even though if he slaughtered it outside and offered it up there he would be liable. Rabbi Shimon disagrees with Rabbi Yose the Galilean in mishnah one of our chapter, who holds that one who slaughters outside the Temple and offers it up outside the Temple is exempt, whereas one who slaughters inside the Temple and offers it up outside is liable. Rabbi Shimon holds that since he is exempt when done outside, he is also exempt when done inside. I should note that Rabbi Shimon’s words are exceedingly difficult. I have explained them according to Albeck’s commentary." + ], + [ + "As for a hatat whose blood was received in one goblet: If one [first] sprinkled [the blood] outside and then sprinkled [it] inside; [Or] inside and then outside, he is liable, because the whole of it was eligible inside. The first scenario is one in which the priest received the blood of the hatat in one goblet. All of this blood should be poured out on the altar inside the Temple. Therefore, it doesn’t matter if he first pours some blood inside the Temple and then some outside, or some outside and then some inside, he is always liable. This matches Rabbi Nehemiah’s opinion in mishnah six, who held that even if one offers up the remainder of the blood outside the Temple he is liable. Once he pours out the blood inside the Temple, he still is liable for pouring the remainder outside.", + "If the blood was received in two goblets: If he sprinkled both inside, he is exempt; Both outside, he is liable. One inside and one outside, he is exempt; One outside and one inside, he is liable on account of the one outside, while the one inside makes atonement. The situation is now more complex. The priest receives the blood in two goblets. A) If he sprinkled both inside he is obviously exempt, since he has not offered anything outside the Temple. The mishnah did not need to state this; it only did so in order to exhaust all of the possibilities. B) If he sprinkled both outside, he is liable. Again, this seems obvious. C) Once he sprinkles one inside the other cannot be sprinkled on the altar and is to be poured out into the aqueduct which cleans out the Temple. Therefore, if he offers up this one outside the Temple he is exempt. D) If he first offers up one of the goblets of blood outside, he is liable, for this one should have been offered up inside. If he then offers the other goblet inside, it is valid and it effects atonement, as the sprinkling of the blood always does. The fact that the other goblet was spilled outside does not render invalid the goblet to be spilled inside.", + "To what may this be compared? To one who set aside [an animal for] a hatat, then it was lost, and he set aside another in its place; then the first was found, and [so] both are present. If he slaughtered both of them inside, he is exempt; Both of them outside, he is liable. [If he slaughtered] one inside and one outside, he is exempt; One outside and one inside, he is liable on account of the one outside, while the one inside makes atonement. The mishnah compares this situation to a person who set aside an animal to be a hatat, lost the animal, then set aside another animal and then found the first one. The two animals are now both hatats, but only one can effect atonement. The mishnah now runs through all of the possible scenarios, as it did above. A) Obviously, if he slaughters both inside he is exempt. B) Similarly, if he slaughters both outside, he is liable. C) If he first slaughters one inside and then the second one outside he is exempt, because the first animal already effected atonement. In this case the rule with the second one is that it cannot be a valid sacrifice and therefore he is not liable for offering it outside the Temple. D) When he slaughters the first one outside the Temple he is liable for slaughtering outside the Temple. However, the second one can still effect atonement when it is slaughtered inside because the first one does not affect its status.", + "Just as the blood exempts its own flesh, so does it exempt the flesh of its companion [the other animal]. The mishnah now makes a final note with regard to the situation of the two hatats. This section is not really connected to the issue of slaughtering outside the Temple. In this situation if one was to slaughter both hatats inside the Temple and then pour the blood of one of them on the altar, the pouring of the blood exempts one who benefits from the flesh of that animal from being punished for illicit benefit from Temple property. The flesh is exempt from this prohibition because after the blood is spilled the animal can be eaten by the priest. The mishnah teaches that just as the pouring of the blood exempts the flesh of the animal whose blood was poured, so too it exempts one who benefits from the other animal. The second animal cannot be a sacrifice and it is forbidden to derive benefit from it. However, since it is no longer in the category of sacrifice, the laws of illegal use of Temple property no longer apply to it." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThe first three mishnayot of our chapter continue to deal with the prohibition of slaughtering an animal outside the Temple.", + "If one slaughtered the hatat cow [the red heifer] outside its appointed place, and likewise if one offered the scapegoat [of Yom Kippur] outside, he is not liable, because it says, “And has not brought it unto the door of the Tent of Meeting,” (Leviticus 17:4): whatever is not eligible to come to the door of the Tent of Meeting, one is not liable on its account. The hatat cow (see Numbers 19:9) is burned and its ashes are placed into water which is then used to purify people from corpse impurity. None of this is performed inside the Temple. The scapegoat of Yom Kippur is brought to Azazel, a place in the wilderness, and there it is thrown off a cliff. Neither of these animals is sacrificed in the Temple. One who slaughters the heifer in the wrong place, or offers up the scapegoat outside the Temple is not liable. This is derived from the wording of the verse: one is liable for offering outside the Temple only animals that were supposed to be brought into the Temple (Tent of Meeting while in the desert)." + ], + [ + "[As for an ox] that had sexual relations with a woman or one with whom a man had sexual relations; or an animal set aside [for idolatry], or that had been worshipped [as an idol]; or that was the fee of a whore, or [a dog's] exchange; or that was kilayim; or a terefah; or an animal born through caesarean section, if one offered any of these outside, he is not liable, because it says, “Before the Tabernacle of the Lord” (Leviticus 17:4): whatever is not eligible to come before the Tabernacle of the Lord, one is not liable on its account. All of the animals on this list were explained in 8:1, so for a more detailed explanation, look there. None of these animals can be sacrificed and they all became unfit to be put onto the altar outside the Temple. Since none of these can be sacrificed, one who offers one of them up outside the Temple is not liable.", + "[As for] blemished animals, whether with permanent blemishes or with passing blemishes, if one offers them outside, he is exempt. Rabbi Shimon says: [if one offers] animals with permanent blemishes, he is exempt; [if one offers] animals with passing blemishes, he violates a negative commandment. Blemished animals cannot be offered as sacrifices. Animals that have permanent blemishes will never be able to be used as sacrifices whereas animals that have passing blemishes are only temporarily disqualified. According to the sages (the first opinion in the mishnah), since the animal cannot now be sacrificed in the Temple, one is not liable if one offers it outside the Temple. Rabbi Shimon says that if one offers up outside the Temple an animal that is only temporarily disqualified from being used as a sacrifice on the Temple’s altar, he has transgressed the negative commandment found in Deuteronomy 12:13, “Take care not to sacrifice your burnt offerings in any place” but he has not transgressed the commandment found in Leviticus 17:8-9, which is punished with karet. This seems to be Rabbi Shimon’s way of answering why the Torah repeats the same prohibition, once in Leviticus 17 and once in Deuteronomy 12. The case in Deuteronomy refers to a person who sacrifices outside the Temple an animal that is only temporarily disqualified from being put on the altar inside the Temple.", + "[As for] turtledoves before their time and young pigeons after their time, if one offered them outside, he is exempt. Rabbi Shimon says: [if one offers] young pigeons after their time, he is exempt; turtledoves before their time, he violates a negative commandment. Turtledoves are valid as sacrifices only when they are older (about three months) whereas pigeons are valid as sacrifices when they are younger (before three months). According to the sages, if one sacrifices either of these outside the Temple at a time when it cannot be sacrificed in the Temple, he is not liable. Rabbi Shimon holds that since a turtledove that is not yet three months will eventually become fit for the altar, if one sacrifices it outside the Temple, he is liable for transgressing a negative commandment although he is exempt from karet.", + "[One who offers] an animal together with its young [on the same day], and [one who offers] an animal before its time, is not liable. Rabbi Shimon says: he violates a negative commandment. Leviticus 22:28 prohibits one from slaughtering a mother animal and her offspring on the same day. If one already slaughtered one of these animals, he can’t then slaughter the other and the other animal would not be fit on that day to be a sacrifice. Thus, according to the sages, if one offers up the other animal outside the Temple he is liable. Rabbi Shimon says that since the animal can be offered on the next day, if he offers it on the day its mother/offspring was already slaughtered, he has transgressed a negative commandment. It is also forbidden to sacrifice an animal before it is eight days old (Leviticus 22:27). The same rules apply here: the sages hold that he is exempt if he sacrifices it outside the Temple whereas Rabbi Shimon holds that he has transgressed a negative commandment, since the animal can be sacrificed after it is eight days old.", + "For Rabbi Shimon would say: whatever is eligible to come [onto the altar] later entails a negative commandment, but does not entail karet. But the sages say: whatever does not entail karet also does not entail a negative commandment. In this section we see the debate that serves as the basis for the particular debates in sections 2-4. Rabbi Shimon holds that Deuteronomy 12:13 applies to one who sacrifices an animal outside the Temple that cannot currently be sacrificed on the altar, but that will be fit later on. The other sages disagree and hold that if karet (Leviticus 17) doesn’t apply, then he doesn’t transgress the negative commandment found in Deuteronomy either." + ], + [ + "“Before time” applies both to [the animal] itself and to its owner. What is “before time” as applied to its owner? If a zav or a zavah, a woman after childbirth, or a metzora, offered their hatat or their asham outside [before the time in which they were obligated], they are exempt;
[If they offered] their olah or their shelamims outside [before their time], they are liable.
One who offers up flesh of a hatat, or flesh of an asham, or flesh of most holy sacrifices, or flesh of less holy sacrifices; or the remainder of the omer, or the two loaves, or the showbread, or the remainder of meal-offerings;
Or if he pours [the oil on to the meal-offering], or mingles [it with flour], or breaks up [the meal-offering cakes], or salts [the meal-offering], or waves it, or presents it; or sets the table [with the showbread], or trims the lamps, or takes out the fistful, or receives the blood; [If he does any of these] outside, he is exempt.
One is also not liable for any of these acts on account of not being a priest, or uncleanness, or lack of [priestly] vestments, or the non-washing of hands and feet.
This is the final mishnah that deals with the prohibition of sacrificing an animal outside the Temple (take a deep breath, we’re almost there).
Section one: At the end of yesterday’s mishnah, we learned that if someone sacrifices an animal outside the Temple before that animal is eight days old he is not liable because that animal could not be sacrificed on the altar. This section explains that “before time” refers not only to animal but also to a person who is not yet obligated to bring an animal to the Temple. There are several such categories of people: the zav or zavah, a man or woman with unusual genital discharge, bring expiatory sacrifices after having been pure for eight days (Leviticus 15:14, 29). A woman after childbirth brings a sacrifice after a set amount of time, depending upon whether the child is male or female (Leviticus 12:6). A metzora, a person suffering some sort of skin affliction, brings his sacrifices after eight days of purity (Lev 14:10). In all of these cases, if a person offered up the hatat or the asham outside the Temple that he/she would have to bring at the end of that period, they are exempt because they had not yet become liable to bring those sacrifices to the Temple.
However, if someone who is liable to bring a shelamim or an olah offers it up outside the Temple before the prescribed time has arrived, for instance if a nazirite offers up his shelamim before his naziriteship is complete, or if a zav or a zavah brings his/her olah before the eight days are over, he is liable. This is because a person can always voluntarily bring an olah or a shelamim, even without being liable for one. Since this olah or shelamim could be brought inside the Temple and put on the altar, one who brings it outside the Temple is liable. In contrast, a hatat and an asham can only be brought by someone obligated to bring such a sacrifice, and therefore if someone is not obligated and he offers one outside the Temple he is exempt.
Section three: Sections three and four teach that liability is incurred for offering up a sacrifice outside the Temple only if it was an animal, or a part thereof, that could have been put on the altar. Section three contains a list of parts of animals or other parts of sacrifices that are eaten by priests or non-priests. Since these are eaten and not sacrificed, one who offers them up outside of the Temple is not liable.
Section four: One is liable for offering up a sacrifice outside the Temple but not for performing other parts of the worship service. The first set of these are directly taken from Leviticus 2 which discusses preparing the minhah (meal-offering). Then the mishnah proceeds to note other types of work done in the Temple, such as arranging the showbread on the table, trimming the wicks of the menorah, taking a fistful of the minhah offering, and receiving blood from an animal’s neck.
The general rule is that one is liable only for an act of the sacrificial service which is the completion of that sacrifice, such as burning the animal on an altar. Since all of these acts are merely preparatory, one is not liable for performing them outside the Temple.
Section five: The mishnah now adds that just as one is not liable for performing one of these acts outside the Temple, so too several other prohibitions are not transgressed. If a non-priest does one of these acts, he is not liable for death (by the hands of heaven), as he would be had he actually offered a sacrifice (see Numbers 18:7). An impure priest is also not liable, nor is a priest who is not wearing the prescribed clothing or has not washed his hands and feet. In all of these cases, the act done by the priest (or non-priest) is invalid, but nevertheless he is not liable for having done so." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nSince the past chapter and a half have dealt with the prohibition of offering a sacrifice outside the Temple, the mishnah now notes that in the past, before the Temple was built, there were periods where it was permissible to offer a sacrifice anywhere one wished. These local altars are called “bamot,” which is close to the Hebrew word for the pulpit, “bimah.", + "Before the Tabernacle was set up bamot (local were permitted and the service was performed by the firstborn. Before the Israelites set up the Tabernacle in the desert it was permitted to offer a sacrifice anywhere. This was the way that sacrifices were performed from the time of Adam until the Tabernacle was set up in the desert. In addition, the Temple service was performed by the firstborns. This is hinted at in several places. First of all, Numbers 3:12 states, “I hereby take the Levites from among the Israelites in place of all the first-born.” This seems to state that at some earlier point in Israelite history, the firstborns performed the worship that the Levites (which here includes priests) used to perform. Second, in Exodus 24:5 Moses designates “some young men among the Israelites” to offer sacrifices. The rabbis understand these “young men” to be firstborns.", + "After the Tabernacle was set up bamot were forbidden and the service was performed by priests. After the Tabernacle was set up, it became forbidden to offer sacrifices elsewhere, as it says in Leviticus 17:5, “This is in order that the Israelites may bring the sacrifices which they have been making in the open…to the priest at the entrance of the Tent of Meeting.” At this point, the worship was performed at the Tabernacle and by priests.", + "Most holy sacrifices were [then] eaten within the curtains, and lesser sacrifices [were eaten] anywhere in the camp of the Israelites. When in the desert, most holy sacrifices, the asham and hatat, had to be eaten within the curtain of the Tabernacle. Lesser sacrifices, such as the shelamim and todah, had to be eaten within the camp of Israel." + ], + [ + "When they came to Gilgal, bamot (local were [again] permitted. When the Israelites crossed the Jordan they came first to Gilgal and they set up the Tabernacle there. However, they didn’t set up camp around the Tabernacle, as they did in the desert. The Tabernacle contained an altar, but the ark was not inside it. At this point it became permitted to offer sacrifices elsewhere. Communal sacrifices and mandatory individual sacrifices (such as the hatat and the asham) were offered in the Tabernacle whereas voluntary individual offerings could be sacrificed at local altars.", + "Most holy sacrifices were eaten within the curtains, and less holy sacrifices [were eaten] anywhere. The most holy sacrifices continued to be eaten within the Tabernacle’s curtains. Lesser sacrifices could now be eaten anywhere, since there was no official encampment." + ], + [ + "When they came to Shiloh, bamot were forbidden. When they came to Shiloh (see Joshua 18:1) the ark was put back into the Tabernacle (see I Samuel 3:3). At this point bamot were again forbidden because at Shiloh the Tabernacle was considered to be at “rest”, a reference to Deuteronomy 12:9, “Because you have not yet come to the resting place, to the inheritance, that the Lord your God is giving you.” “Resting place” is understood to be Shiloh because the Israelites came to Shiloh after fourteen years spent conquering the land of Israel. Once the Tabernacle came to rest in Shiloh, local altars, bamot, were prohibited.", + "[The Tabernacle] there had no roof, but [consisted of] a base of stones with a ceiling of curtains, and that was the “resting place” [referred to in the Torah]. In the desert, the Tabernacle was made of wood. In Shiloh the Tabernacle was made of a base of stones and a roof of curtains.", + "Most holy sacrifices were eaten within the curtains, and less holy sacrifices and second tithe [were eaten] wherever [Shiloh] could be seen. As always, most holy sacrifices were eaten within the curtains of the Tabernacle. Less holy sacrifices and second tithe could now be eaten in any place that could see Shiloh. According to the Talmud’s account, the ark was in Shiloh for 369 years." + ], + [ + "When they came to Nov and to Givon, bamot were [again] permitted. When Shiloh was destroyed and the ark was taken by the Philistines (I Samuel 4) the Tabernacle was set up in Nov (I Samuel 21). And after Nov was destroyed during Saul’s reign (I Samuel 21-22), they brought the Tabernacle to Givon (I Kings 3:4). While the Tabernacle was in Nov and Givon local altars were again permitted. It seems that these were not important central places, as were Shiloh and subsequently Jerusalem. Thus sacrifices could be offered outside of the Tabernacle.", + "Most holy sacrifices were eaten within the curtains, and less holy sacrifices in all of the cities of Israel. As was the situation before Shiloh, once Shiloh was destroyed most holy sacrifices must be eaten within the Tabernacle, whereas less holy sacrifices, specifically voluntary offerings, could be eaten anywhere within the cities of Israel. Note that when the Tabernacle was in Gilgal (mishnah five) they could eat anywhere. Once the cities were built they offered sacrifices there." + ], + [ + "When they came to Jerusalem, bamot were forbidden and were never again permitted, and that was the ‘inheritance’. Deuteronomy 12:9 reads, “Because you have not yet come to the resting place, to the inheritance, that the Lord your God is giving you.” As we saw in mishnah six “resting place” refers to Shiloh. “Inheritance” refers to Jerusalem. Once Solomon built the Temple in Jerusalem, local altars were forever thereafter prohibited, even after the destruction of the altar. We should note that this mishnah represents an ideology and not an historic fact. There were definitely Jews who offered sacrifices in places other than the Temple, both while the Temple stood and when it was destroyed. The rabbis, at least those speaking in this mishnah, were opposed to this.", + "Most holy sacrifices were eaten within the curtains, and less holy sacrifices and second tithe within the walls [of Jerusalem]. As before, most holy sacrifices must be eaten inside the Temple, whereas less holy sacrifices could be eaten anywhere within the walls of Jerusalem (see also 5:3, 5)." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nWhen it comes to sacrificing outside the Temple, according to rabbinic reckoning one can transgress three commandments: 1) A negative commandment “Take care not to sacrifice your burnt offerings in any place you like” (Deuteronomy 12:13); 2) A positive commandment “But only in the place that the Lord will choose in one of your tribal territories” (ibid 14); 3) A commandment punished by karet “If anyone of the house of Israel or of strangers who reside among them offers a burnt offering or a sacrifice and does not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting to offer it to the Lord, that person shall be cut off from his people” (Leviticus 17:8-9).\nOur mishnah deals with various situations in which one might transgress one of these commandments, but not all of them.", + "All sacrifices consecrated while bamot were forbidden and offered outside while bamot were forbidden involve the transgression of a positive and a negative commandment, and one is liable for karet on their account. The simplest situation is one in which a person consecrated the animal to be a sacrifice while bamot were forbidden and then offered it up outside Shiloh/Jerusalem also while bamot were forbidden. Such a person has transgressed both the positive and negative commandment and is liable for karet.", + "If one consecrated them while bamot were permitted, but offered them without when bamot were forbidden, they involve the transgression of a positive and a negative commandment, but one is not liable for karet on their account. If he consecrated the animal when it was permitted to offer sacrifices at bamot, for instance when the Tabernacle stood in Gilgal, and when the Tabernacle came to Shiloh he didn’t offer it there but rather at a local altar, he is not liable for karet. However, he has transgressed both a positive and negative commandment.", + "If one consecrated them when bamot were forbidden, and offered them when bamot were permitted, they involve the transgression of a positive commandment, but they do not involve the transgression of a negative commandment. If he consecrated the animal when bamot were forbidden, for instance when the Tabernacle stood in Shiloh, and then offered it once Shiloh was destroyed and bamot were again permitted, he has transgressed the positive commandment of not bringing the animal to Shiloh while the Tabernacle was still there. However, he has not transgressed the negative commandment, nor is he liable for karet." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nWhen the Tabernacle stood in Gilgal, Nov and Givon, it was permitted to offer sacrifices at local altars. Still there were certain sacrifices that were offered only at the Tabernacle, as we explained in connection to some of the earlier mishnayot of this chapter. Our mishnah discusses the difference between the “bamah of the congregation” that was in the Tabernacle and the “bamah of the individual,” the local altars that were found elsewhere.", + "The following sacrifices were offered in the Tabernacle sacrifices consecrated for the Tabernacle: Public sacrifices were offered in the Tabernacle, and private sacrifices were offered at a bamah. The general rule is that public sacrifices had to be performed at the Tabernacle, and that any private sacrifices could be offered at the local altar, the bamah of the congregation.", + "If private sacrifices were consecrated for the Tabernacle, they must be offered in the Tabernacle; yet if one offered them at a bamah, he is not liable. If an individual specifically stated that he was consecrating an animal in order to offer it at the Tabernacle, then it must be offered at the Tabernacle. If he nevertheless goes ahead and offers it at a bamah, he is not liable for offering a sacrifice outside the Temple.", + "What is the difference between the bamah of an individual and the bamah of the congregation? Laying [of hands], slaughtering in the north, sprinkling around [the altar], waving and presenting, (Rabbi Judah says: there were no meal-offerings at the; priesthood, sacrificial vestments, ministering vessels, a sweet fragrance, a line of demarcation for [the sprinkling of] the blood, and the washing of hands and feet. This list consists of actions that were to be performed at the Tabernacle, but not at a local bamah. I shall explain each separately: a) Laying [of hands]: Laying one’s hands on the sacrifice before it is slaughtered. b) Slaughtering in the north: side of the altar, obligatory for most holy sacrifices. c) Sprinkling around [the altar]: sprinkling the blood on various corners of the altar. d) Waving and presenting: the minhah (meal) offering. i) (Rabbi Judah says: there were no meal-offerings at the bamah): Rabbi Judah disagrees and holds that minhah offerings were only offered at the Tabernacle. e) Priesthood: sacrifices could be offered by non-priests at the local bamot. f) Sacrificial vestments: neither did the person offering have to wear the priestly clothing. g) Ministering vessels: He also did not need to use sanctified vessels. h) A sweet fragrance: Inside the Tabernacle (and subsequently the Temple) it was prohibited to put onto the altar limbs of a sacrifice that have already been roasted elsewhere. Such limbs will not give off the sweet fragrance of roasting meat (think bbq!). This was not prohibited at local altars, where one could first roast the limb and then put it onto the altar. i) A line of demarcation for [the sprinkling of] the blood: On the altar in the Tabernacle there was a crimson line separating the upper and lower parts. Blood of some sacrifices was sprinkled below and of others it was sprinkled above. There was no such line on the local altar. j) And the washing of hands and feet: In the Tabernacle and Temple priests had to wash their hands and feet before performing any of the worship service. There was no such requirement for local altars.", + "But [the prohibitions of] time, remnant and defilement were the same in both. When it comes to these three prohibitions, they apply to local altars just as they do to the public altar. If one offering the sacrifice intends to eat it after the prescribed time, he has rendered it invalid. The laws governing when a sacrifice must be eaten, and when it becomes “remnant,” which is prohibited, apply in all places. And the prohibition of offering or eating a sacrifice when impure, applies to individual bamot as well. Congratulations! We have finished Tractate Zevahim! It is a tradition at this point to thank God for helping us finish learning the tractate and to commit ourselves to going back and relearning it, so that we may not forget it and so that its lessons will stay with us for all of our lives. Tractate Zevahim introduced us to a world which probably seems quite strange. To imagine a version of Judaism centered on animal sacrifice is probably quite difficult for modern Jews, myself included. For two thousand years, Jews have not offered sacrifices, and it is hard to imagine returning to such a form of Judaism. However, that is not the point of learning Zevahim. In my opinion, there are at least three solid reasons to study Zevahim in particular and Seder Kodashim in general. The first is that it is always interesting and helpful to remind ourselves of where our religion comes from and what it would have been like in ancient times. I also hope that learning Zevahim will make Leviticus more interesting, when you hear it in the synagogue. Second, and more importantly, in Zevahim we can see a system created by the rabbis based on their interpretation of Torah, and not just a simple record of how things were done in the Temple. This allows us to get into the mindset of the rabbis and understand better who they were and how they created their laws. Third, many later principles of halakhah, especially those connected with prayer, have their origins in sacrificial law. So while most of these laws are no longer observed, their principles often still manifest themselves. In any case, I hope you enjoyed Zevahim. I know that I especially enjoyed writing my commentary on it, for I always learn the most when I have to try to explain something to others. Tomorrow we start Tractate Menahot." + ] + ] + ] + }, + "versions": [ + [ + "Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp", + "http://learn.conservativeyeshiva.org/mishnah/" + ] + ], + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה זבחים", + "categories": [ + "Mishnah", + "Modern Commentary on Mishnah", + "English Explanation of Mishnah", + "Seder Kodashim" + ], + "schema": { + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה זבחים", + "enTitle": "English Explanation of Mishnah Zevachim", + "key": "English Explanation of Mishnah Zevachim", + "nodes": [ + { + "heTitle": "הקדמה", + "enTitle": "Introduction" + }, + { + "heTitle": "", + "enTitle": "" + } + ] + } +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Moed/English Explanation of Mishnah Beitzah/English/Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp.json b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Moed/English Explanation of Mishnah Beitzah/English/Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..5bdfaa90fe37254598fe8e9f65eb758275994e98 --- /dev/null +++ b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Moed/English Explanation of Mishnah Beitzah/English/Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp.json @@ -0,0 +1,301 @@ +{ + "language": "en", + "title": "English Explanation of Mishnah Beitzah", + "versionSource": "http://learn.conservativeyeshiva.org/mishnah/", + "versionTitle": "Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp", + "status": "locked", + "license": "CC-BY", + "shortVersionTitle": "Dr. Joshua Kulp", + "actualLanguage": "en", + "languageFamilyName": "english", + "isBaseText": true, + "isSource": true, + "isPrimary": true, + "direction": "ltr", + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה ביצה", + "categories": [ + "Mishnah", + "Modern Commentary on Mishnah", + "English Explanation of Mishnah", + "Seder Moed" + ], + "text": { + "Introduction": [ + "Tractate Betzah (Egg) teaches the laws governing Yom Tov (the festival), which means the first and last days of Pesah, the first day of Sukkot, Shmini Atzeret and Shavuot. It is usually called “Betzah” after the first word of the first mishnah, although it was alternatively called Tractate Yom Tov. ", + "The Torah does not provide much information about the special laws of Yom Tov, those which would distinguish it from Shabbat. They are mostly contained in Exodus 12:16, “And on the first day you shall celebrate a sacred occasion and on the last day, a sacred occasion; no work at all shall be done on them; only what every person is to eat, that alone may be prepared by you.” In other words, Yom Tov is like Shabbat in that work is prohibited, with one major exception—one can prepare food. Although this verse relates specifically to Pesah, it was interpreted as referring to all of the festival days. ", + "Not all food preparations were permitted on Yom Tov. The general explanation is that all preparatory work that could have been done before Yom Tov without any loss to the quality of the food must be done before Yom Tov. For instance, one cannot harvest wheat on Yom Tov, but one can knead and bake dough. One cannot trap an animal on Yom Tov but one can slaughter, skin, salt and cut up the meat. Lighting a fire is permitted, as is carrying from domain to domain because these actions are typically involved in preparing food. ", + "One of the reasons that one was allowed to prepare food on Yom Tov was that Yom Tov was supposed to be a big celebration. The festival was supposed to be sanctified by eating and drinking and without being able to prepare fresh food (remember they had no refrigeration), the celebration would be lessened." + ], + "": [ + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThe first part of the first mishnah of Betzah is about its namesake, an egg born on Yom Tov. The second part is associated with the first part because both contain debates between Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel, and in both Bet Hillel rules strictly.", + "An egg laid on Yom Tov: Bet Shammai say: it may be eaten [on the same day]; But Bet Hillel say: it may not be eaten [until the day is over]. According to Bet Shammai, just as it is permitted to slaughter a chicken on Yom Tov, it is also permitted to eat an egg that is laid on Yom Tov. In other words, the chicken and everything in it is permitted on Yom Tov. In contrast, Bet Hillel hold that while the chicken itself is permitted, the egg that is laid is prohibited. The egg is what is called “nolad” it is born, or new, something that was not there when Yom Tov began and hence was not set aside for use at the beginning of Yom Tov. This prohibition is similar to muktzeh the idea that something that was not set aside before Yom Tov to be used on Yom Tov may not be used on Yom Tov.", + "Bet Shammai say: [the quantity of] leaven is of the size of an olive and leavened bread is of the size of a date; But Bet Hillel say: both are of the size of an olive. Exodus 13:7 says, “No leavened bread shall be seen with you and no leaven shall be found in all your territory.” The verse mentions two things: the leavening agent (starter dough) and the leavened bread, both of which are prohibited. According to Bet Shammai the point of the verse is to teach that the two prohibitions are different. Leaven is prohibited at the size of an olive, whereas leavened bread is prohibited at a larger amount, the size of a date. Beth Hillel hold that in both cases an olive’s worth is prohibited. Note that smaller amounts are not permitted either. A smaller amount is still forbidden but one who consumes a smaller amount has not transgressed the Biblical prohibition of leaven or leavened bread on Passover." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with slaughtering animals on Yom Tov.", + "He who slaughters a wild animal or a bird on a festival Bet Shammai says: he may dig with a pronged tool and cover up [the blood], but Bet Hillel says: he may not slaughter unless he has had earth made ready. According to Leviticus 17:13, when one slaughters an undomesticated animal or any type of fowl the blood must be poured out of the animal and covered with earth. One who slaughters an undomesticated animal or fowl on the festival has a problem. Although it is permitted to slaughter, if he doesn’t have any prepared earth to cover the blood newly dug earth is “muktzeh” and cannot be used. Nevertheless, Bet Shammai permits one to dig up new earth and cover the blood. Bet Hillel says one cannot slaughter unless one has earth already prepared.", + "But they agree that if he did slaughter he should dig with a pronged tool and cover up [the blood, and] that the ashes of a stove count as being prepared for the holiday. However, they all agree that if he had already slaughtered the animal, even though Bet Hillel says he should not have done so without already prepared earth, he may still dig new earth to cover the blood. This is because the principle of muktzeh is only rabbinically ordained and the obligation to cover the blood is Biblical. When one has two competing commandments, one rabbinic and one Biblical, the latter takes precedence. The two houses also agree that the ashes in the oven are considered prepared for the festival, in other words they are not muktzeh. Since people used these ashes for various purposes, we can make the assumption that before the festival began he knew in his mind that he would use these ashes." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues with two more debates between Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel over what types of food preparations one can do on Yom Tov. Today’s mishnah again deals with muktzeh, the concept that something that was designated for use on Yom Tov or Shabbat may not subsequently be used then. The specific topic is fetching pigeon-doves from a dovecote in order to eat them on Yom Tov.", + "Bet Shammai says: one may not carry a ladder [on Yom Tov] from one dovecote to another, but he may incline it from one pigeon-hole to another. But Bet Hillel permits [this]. In ancient Israel dovecotes were typically underground caves with many holes carved into the walls, each hole housing a dove. There would be ladders inside the dovecote so that the owner could reach the doves situated high up. According to Bet Shammai one may not move a ladder from one dovecote to another on Yom Tov, however one may move the ladder from one hole to the other within the dovecote. Bet Hillel is more lenient in this case and permits one to move the ladder even from one dovecote to the other. One cogent explanation for this debate is that Bet Shammai prohibits moving the ladder from one dovecote to another lest it look like he is bringing the ladder to the shop to get it fixed. Bet Hillel is not concerned since everyone should know why he would be moving the ladder.", + "Bet Shammai says: one may not take [doves] unless he has shaken [them] the day before [Yom Tov]: But Bet Hillel says: he stands and declares: this one or that one I am taking. Doves that were not set aside to be slaughtered and then eaten on Yom Tov are muktzeh and may not be used on Yom Tov. However, if they are designated before Yom Tov to be slaughtered on Yom Tov, one may use them. In this mishnah Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel debate how one designates before Yom Tov that he will slaughter certain birds on the next day. According to Bet Shammai one must designate the birds by physically lifting each one up and moving it around. This demonstrates that he intends to use that specific pigeon the next day (if only the pigeon knew that tomorrow won’t be such a Yom Tov for him). Bet Hillel says that the designation is verbal he stands in front of the pigeons and says that he will use these pigeons (good thing they don’t know Hebrew)." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn yesterday’s mishnah we learned that in order to slaughter and eat doves on Yom Tov one must designate them for use before Yom Tov begins. Otherwise they are muktzeh. Our mishnah discusses what happens if he designated doves before Yom Tov but then is not sure that the doves that he finds in the nest or dovecote are the same ones.", + "If he designated black [doves] but found [on Yom Tov] white ones, white [doves] but found black ones, two but found three, they are [all] forbidden. If the doves which he finds are a different color from those that he designated it is obvious that they are not the same doves that he designated the previous day. If he designated two doves and there are now three there, one of the doves is certainly muktzeh. The problem is that he doesn’t know which one because all three look alike (I wonder if doves think all humans look alike). Hence they are all prohibited.", + "[If he designated] three but found two, they are permitted. If he designated three but finds only two we can assume that one flew off and that the other two are the same ones he designated. Hence they are permitted.", + "[If he designated doves] inside the nest and found them in front of the nest, they are forbidden. But if none were there except these, they are permitted. If the doves are found outside of the nest but he designated them in the nest, then they may not be the same doves. If there is another nearby dovecote then he must be concerned about this possibility and he may not use those doves. However, if there are no nearby dovecotes then he can assume that these doves just found their way out and he may use them." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues with four more debates between Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel on the laws of Yom Tov.", + "Bet Shammai says: one may not remove shutters on Yom Tov. But Bet Hillel permits even to return them to their place. In mishnaic times the shutters which were used to close windows and closets were removable. Bet Shammai forbade removing them because they considered this similar to tearing down a building, a forbidden labor on Shabbat and Yom Tov. All the more so they would hold that putting the shutters back in their place is forbidden because it is similar to “building”. Bet Hillel holds that it is permitted even to put the shutters back in their place. Bet Hillel’s general principle is that if an activity is permitted because it is done in the preparation of food, then it is permitted even when it is done for another purpose. Removing a shutter to take food out of a closet is permitted therefore removing shutters is always permitted, even if it is not for the sake of removing food. Bet Hillel even allows returning the shutter to its place, because if it were prohibited people would hesitate to remove them, knowing that they would not be able to put them back in their place afterwards.", + "Bet Shammai says: one may not take a pestle even to cut up meat on it. But Bet Hillel permits [it]. A pestle is a wooden board used to grind things which cannot be ground on Yom Tov because they can be ground the day before. Bet Shammai says that the pestle cannot even be used for things that can be done on Yom Tov such as cutting up meat. The pestle is completely muktzeh because its general use is for something that is prohibited. Bet Hillel disagrees and holds that even though it is usually used during the week for things that cannot be done on Yom Tov, it may be used on Yom Tov for something that is permitted.", + "Bet Shammai says: one may not place a hide in front of one who treads upon it nor may he even lift it up unless there is an olive’s worth of flesh on it. But Bet hillel permit it. Once one has slaughtered and skinned an animal Bet Shammai prohibits one from giving the hide over to someone who will tread on it to prepare it for processing. Indeed, Bet Shammiai add that he may not even touch the removed hide. Since the hide is not food, it becomes muktzeh. One may touch the hide only if it has some flesh on it, because then it is considered “food.” Bet Hillel however allows one to give a hide over to someone who will tread on it since if this was not permitted people wouldn’t slaughter animals on Yom Tov because the valuable hides would be ruined by waiting until the next day to begin working on them. This would result in a reduction of the rejoicing on Yom Tov because there would be no fresh meat. It is noteworthy that Bet Hillel allows activities that would seemingly be prohibited if they contribute to the celebration of Yom Tov.", + "Bet Shammai says: one may not carry out an infant or a lulav or a Torah scroll into the public domain. But Bet Hillel permit [it]. According to Bet Shammai carrying something through the public domain is permitted on Yom Tov only in a case where one carries in order to prepare or eat food. Carrying a child, a lulav or a Torah scroll is not done for eating and hence it is prohibited. Bet Hillel again permits this. Since carrying is permitted in some cases (for food) it is permitted in other cases as well. However, Bet Hillel limits this to cases which involve a mitzvah or some other benefit. Taking a child for a stroll is pleasurable (as long as they’re not screaming their little heads off). The lulav and the Torah scroll are for mitzvot. To carry something with no purpose is however forbidden even according to Bet Hillel." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn this mishnah Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel debate whether one may carry to a priest hallah and priestly gifts on Yom Tov. Hallah is dough which one must separate from the dough that one kneads to bake bread (Numbers 15:17-21). Priestly gifts refers to the parts of a sacrificial animal which must be given to the priest (Deuteronomy 18:3).", + "Bet Shammai says: one may not take hallah or priestly gifts to a priest on Yom Tov, whether they were separated on the day before or on that day. But Bet Hillel permits it. In this first section we learn that Bet Shammai prohibits carrying the hallah and priestly gifts to the priest, whether they were separated on that day or earlier, whereas Bet Hillel permits this. The reasons for this debate come in the following mishnah.", + "Bet Shammai said them: An analogy [supports our view]: hallah and priestly gifts go to the priest and terumah is [likewise] goes to the priest; just as one may not take [to the priest] terumah so one may not take [to him] priestly gifts. Bet Hillel said to them: No! If you say in the case of terumah which he has not the right to separate, will you say [the same] with respect to priestly gifts which he is permitted to separate? We now learn Bet Shammai’s reasoning. They compare hallah and priestly gifts to terumah, the portion of one’s produce that one separates and gives to the priest. Terumah may not be separated on Yom Tov because it can be separated from one’s produce on the day before. Since one is not allowed to separate terumah on Yom Tov it is also forbidden to carry it to the priest. Bet Shammai reasons that the same holds true for the other things which one gives to a priest they too cannot be carried to the priest on Yom Tov. Bet Hillel critiques this analogy. One cannot carry terumah to a priest precisely because one cannot separate it on Yom Tov. However, one may separate hallah and priestly gifts on Yom Tov and therefore one is allowed to carry them to the priest as well. The reason that one may separate hallah and priestly gifts on Yom Tov is that one can slaughter an animal and knead dough on Yom Tov, and when one does so the gifts and hallah must be separated." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with grinding spices on Yom Tov. Everyone agrees that they can be ground. The debate is over whether they can be done in the normal way or they must be done differently somehow.", + "Bet Shammai says: spices may be crushed with a wooden pestle and salt in a small cruse or with a wooden ladle. According to Bet Shammai when one crushes spices on Yom Tov they have to be crushed differently. Normally spices are crushed with a stone pestle on Yom Tov they need to use a wooden pestle. When crushing salt he shouldn’t use a pestle at all, rather he should use a small earthenware cruse and a wooden soup ladle.", + "But Bet Hillel says: spices may be crushed in the usual way with a stone pestle and salt with a wooden pestle. Bet Hillel holds that since it is permitted to crush spices and grind salt on Yom Tov, it is also permissible to crush them in a normal fashion spices with a stone pestle and salt with a wooden pestle." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with how one separates out the dirt and inedible parts from a pile of beans on Yom Tov. “Sorting” is one of the prohibited labors on Shabbat, but it is permitted on Yom Tov because it is done in preparation of food.", + "One who sorts beans on Yom Tov:
Bet Shammai says: he must sort the edible parts and eat [them immediate]. According to Bet Shammai he is not really allowed to sort out the beans and make two piles, one of edible beans and one of dirt and other such yucky stuff. Rather all that he is allowed to do is sort out the beans and either eat them immediately, or put them in water to cook them if they are the type of bean that requires cooking. Again we see that Bet Shammai allows one to prepare food on Yom Tov but requires it to be done in a very minimal way, and with some significant differences from how it is done during the week.", + "But Bet Hillel says: he may sort as usual in his lap or in a basket or in a dish; but not with a board or in a sifter or in a sieve. Bet Hillel allows one to sort beans but only if he does so in a more make-shift fashion, using his lap a basket or a dish. He may not use the instruments that he regularly uses during the week, vessels such as a board, a sifter or a sieve.", + "Rabban Gamaliel says: he may even rinse them [in water] and skim off [the refuse]. Rabban Gamaliel is the most lenient of the opinions in the mishnah. He allows one to sort beans even by rinsing the beans in water and skimming off the refuse that floats to the surface." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn our mishnah the two houses debate what types of food gifts one person may send to his neighbor on Yom Tov. The problem with gifts would occur if they cannot be used on Yom Tov itself.", + "Bet Shammai says: one may not send [gifts to a neighbor] on Yom Tov except portions [of food, ready to be eaten]. Bet Shammai says that one shouldn’t send gifts on Yom Tov unless they are ready to be eaten immediately. Thus one could send pieces of meat or fish that have already been prepared.", + "But Bet Hillel says: one may send cattle, game and poultry whether alive or slaughtered. One may [also] send wine, oil, flour or pulse but not grain. Bet Hillel extends this even more and allows one to send whole live animals to one’s friends, because he could slaughter the animals and eat them on Yom Tov. Bet Hillel also permits one to send other food items to one’s friend on Yom Tov. The only exception is grain. Since grain cannot be ground into flour on Yom Tov, because one can grind it the day before, one cannot send it as a gift on Yom Tov.", + "And Rabbi Shimon permits [even] grain. Rabbi Shimon continues the trend to leniency by allowing one to send even grain. Although one cannot grind the grain on Yom Tov, he is allowed to cook the grain whole and eat it as cereal. In other words, even grain is edible on Yom Tov." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe final mishnah of chapter one discusses sending clothing as a gift on Yom Tov.", + "One may send clothes, whether they are sewn up or not sewn up, and even though there is kil'ayim (mixed wool and in them, provided they are necessary for the festival. On Yom Tov one may send even unfinished clothing which hasn’t been fully sewn because it can be used as a covering, such as a blanket. One can even send clothing that is forbidden to wear because it has a mixture of wool and linen (kilayim, also called shatnez). Although it is forbidden to wear such clothing, it is permitted to hang it up as a decoration and in certain cases to lie on top of it. In other words, as long as there is some potential use to the clothing, he may use it on Yom Tov.", + "But [one may] not [send] nailed sandals nor unfinished shoes. Sandals that have nails in them were not worn on Yom Tov. These seem to have been some sort of work shoe and since one doesn’t work on Yom Tov, one can’t wear them. Since they cannot be worn, they cannot be sent to friends either.", + "Rabbi Judah says: not even white shoes because they [still] require an artisan [to blacken them]. Rabbi Judah says even shoes that are only missing the “finishing touches”, such as white shoes that need to be blackened, cannot be sent on Yom Tov because they are not generally worn.", + "This is the general rule: whatever may be used on Yom Tov may [also] be sent [on Yom Tov]. This is the general rule that summarizes the entire mishnah. If the object could be used as is on Yom Tov, then it can’t be sent. But if it is missing some step in its preparation then it may not be sent because it is not generally used." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with preparing food on Yom Tov to use on Shabbat which falls the day after. While cooking on Yom Tov is permitted, it is only permitted to cook on Yom Tov for that day.\nThis mishnah discusses what is called “eruv tavshilin.” This is a type of “eruv” whereby one begins to cook a meal for Shabbat on the day before Yom Tov which falls before Shabbat. Beginning to cook this meal allows him to cook on Yom Tov for Shabbat. This halakhah is still observed to this day, and if you look in siddurim you will even find a blessing which one recites before setting aside the food.", + "Yom Tov which fell on the eve of Shabbat, one should not begin to cook on Yom Tov for Shabbat. Although one is allowed to cook on Yom Tov, one may not cook food on Yom Tov that will be eaten on the next day, even if the next day is Shabbat. We should note that this would have presented a bigger practical problem in the ancient world than it does today. They did not have preservatives or refrigeration (or those fantastic lock-top plastic containers) and hence it would not have been simple to prepare food for Shabbat on Thursday. Therefore, the remainder of the mishnah seems to present some ways of avoiding this problem.", + "But he may cook for Yom Tov, and if any is left over it is left over for Shabbat. If he cooks on Yom Tov with the intention of eating some of the food on that very day, he may eat on Shabbat whatever food was left over. It would even seem possible to make a large meal on Yom Tov knowing that there would be leftovers and to eat those leftovers on Shabbat.", + "And he may prepare a dish on the eve of Yom Tov and rely upon it [to prepare food] for Shabbat. This is the section that deals with “eruv tavshilin.” A person may begin to make a meal on the day before Yom Tov and then on Yom Tov “continue” to cook the meal. In this way he will not be starting to cook a meal on Yom Tov for Shabbat but rather just continuing a meal that he already began to cook the day before.", + "Bet Shammai says: two dishes. But Bet Hillel says: one dish. Yet they [both] agree that a fish and an egg upon it are [considered as] two dishes. The two houses debate how many different food items he needs to begin to prepare on the day before Yom Tov in order for it to count as an “eruv tavshilin.” According to Bet Shammai a meal consists of at least two dishes therefore he must begin to cook two dishes for it to count. Bet Hillel thinks that a meal need consist of only one dish and hence one dish is sufficient for eruv tavshilin. Bet Shammai however is lenient in what counts as two dishes even a fish with an egg on top of it counts as two dishes.", + "[If] he ate it or it was lost, he may not begin to cook [relying] on it. But if he left over any [small] portion of it, he may rely on it [to cook] for Shabbat. If the eruv tavshilin is eaten or lost before he begins to cook for Shabbat, then he may not rely on it to begin cooking a meal for Shabbat. However, if even a little bit of the eruv still remains before he begins cooking he may rely on it to cook for Shabbat." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn mishnaic times it was customary for people who observed the laws of purity to immerse vessels and for people to immerse before Yom Tov so that everything would be pure. In our mishnah Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel debate whether or not one can immerse on Shabbat in preparation for a Yom Tov which falls on Sunday.", + "If [Yom Tov] fell on the day after Shabbat:
Bet Shammai says: one must immerse everything [unclean] before Shabbat. According to Bet Shammai both vessels and people must be immersed before Shabbat. They hold that it is forbidden to immerse on Shabbat.", + "But Bet Hillel says: vessels [must be immersed] before Shabbat but people [may immerse] on Shabbat. Bet Hillel holds that it is permitted to immerse on Shabbat but that one should nevertheless immerse the vessels before Shabbat. The reason not to immerse the vessels on Shabbat is that by immersing the vessels he makes them usable. This is like “completing a vessel” which is forbidden on Shabbat. However, when a person immerses him/herself it might just look like she/he is washing, and hence it is permitted." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to deal with immersing things on Yom Tov in order to purify them.", + "They agree that one may effect surface contact for [unclean] water in a stone vessel in order to purify it, but one may not immerse [it]; Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel agree that one may purify water on Shabbat that falls the day before Yom Tov. Drinking water was purified by putting it into a stone vessel (a stone vessel cannot become impure). The vessel was then immersed in a pure mikveh until the top of the vessel just touched the water from the mikveh. The reason that a stone vessel was used was to make sure that this was not done in order to purify the vessel, which as we learned yesterday, both Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel prohibit. They both agree that one should not fully immerse the vessel because that would be similar to immersing an unclean vessel in order to purify it. In other words, only the water may be purified but not the vessels. This is also taken to mean that one should not do this with a wooden vessel because wooden vessels become impure through the contact with the unclean water and then they would require immersion.", + "And one may immerse [to change] from one intention to another or from one company to another. If a vessel is already pure it will still need to be immersed if it is going to be used for a “holier” purpose. For instance, if one immersed his vessels to purify them with the intent of using them for non-sacred things, such as regular oil, and then decided he wanted to use them to make terumah wine, he needs to immerse the vessels again. Our mishnah teaches that this is permitted on Shabbat before Yom Tov because the vessels were in any case pure before they were immersed. A person who is pure and is eating non-sacred food with one eating company and then wants to eat terumah with another company must first immerse. Again, this immersion is permitted on Yom Tov even according to Bet Shammai because the person was already pure." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with bringing certain sacrifices on Yom Tov and laying one’s hands upon them (see Leviticus 3:2).", + "Bet Shammai says: one may bring peace-offerings [on Yom Tov] but may not lay [hands] upon them, but one may not bring burnt-offerings [on Yom Tov]. One of the sacrifices which a person would bring on Yom Tov was a peace-offering. Part of the sacrifice would be offered on the altar, part would be eaten by the priests and part would be eaten by those who brought the sacrifice. Since this sacrifice is eaten, Bet Shammai allows one to offer it on Yom Tov. As we have learned before one is allowed to prepare food on Yom Tov, and this includes offering edible sacrifices. However, Bet Shammai holds that one cannot lay his hands on the sacrifice because leaning on an animal is considered using the animal and this is prohibited on Yom Tov. Bet Shammai holds that the laying of the hands must be done the day before. Furthermore, Bet Shammai does not allow the sacrifice of burnt-offerings on Yom Tov, because burnt offerings are completely consumed on the altar. Since they are not eaten they cannot be offered. One who wants to bring a burnt-offering would have to do so on Hol Hamoed, the intermediate days of the festival.", + "Bet Hillel says: one may bring peace-offerings and burnt-offerings and also lay hands upon them. Bet Hillel allows the laying of the hands on the animal since this is part of the sacrificial process. The Talmud also explains that according to Bet Hillel the laying of the hands must be done right before it is offered, and therefore he could not do it before Yom Tov. Bet Hillel also allows burnt offerings to be brought even though they are not eaten, since they are brought in fulfillment of the commandments of the festival." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIt is permitted to make a fire on Yom Tov in order that one can cook food. Our mishnah discusses making a fire so that one can heat up water to wash one’s feet.", + "Bet Shammai says: a man may not heat water for his feet unless it is also fit for drinking. Bet Shammai holds that labors that are permitted on Yom Tov because they are necessary for preparing food are permitted only if they are done in the preparation of food. One may not heat water just to wash one’s body. The only leniency for which Bet Shammai allows is that if one heats up water that is fit for drinking, one can also use it for other purposes. This is similar to cooking on Yom Tov for the day after. If one can eat some of the food cooked on Yom Tov, one is allowed to cook, knowing that there will be leftovers.", + "But Bet Hillel permits it. Bet Hillel generally holds that labors permitted in order to prepare food are permitted even if they are done not to prepare food. Hence, heating water is permitted whether one does so for drinking water or to wash one’s feet.", + "A man may make a fire and warm himself at it. The final clause in the mishnah seems to also go according to Bet Hillel. It is not only permitted to heat water in order to wash one’s feet, one may even make a fire just to keep warm. The reason we might have thought that Bet Hillel prohibits this is that in this case there is no water being heated, water which one could claim one might drink in time of great thirst. This section lets us know that Bet Hillel allows one to make a fire on Yom Tov even if there is no chance that it will lead to food preparation." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nMishnah six contains three cases in which Rabban Gamaliel ruled like Beth Shammai in connection with the laws of Yom Tov. This mishnah is also found in its entirety in tractate Eduyot 3:10.", + "This mishnah lists three cases in which Rabban Gamaliel ruled strictly, as had Bet Shammai. Although later Sages generally ruled like Beth Hillel, there were some exceptions, and some of those are listed in our mishnah.", + "In three cases Rabban Gamaliel was strict like the words of Beth Shammai.
One may not cover up hot food on Yom Tov for Shabbat; As we learned above, it is forbidden to prepare food on Yom Tov for Shabbat, since that would be considered an insult to the honor of the festival. In our mishnah we learn that Bet Shammai and Rabban Gamaliel prohibit one from hiding food in a warm place to preserve its heat for Shabbat (see Shabbat 4:1). This is true even if he made an “eruv tavshilin” because in this case everyone can tell that he is putting food aside just for Shabbat. In contrast, when one cooks, one might be cooking to eat the food on Yom Tov. Bet Hillel would allow one to put food in something that preserves its warmth. For a somewhat different explanation see my commentary on Eduyou 3:10.", + "And one may not join together a lamp on a festival; The Talmud explains that this is a case where a lamp made of several parts breaks on Yom Tov. Rabban Gamaliel forbids one to fix it, since this is a type of “building” which is forbidden on the Sabbath. Beth Hillel holds that there is no prohibition of “building” with regards to erecting vessels, and therefore this is permitted.", + "And one may not bake [on Yom] thick loaves but only wafer-cakes. Rabban Gamaliel holds that it is forbidden to bake large loaves on Yom Tov, and that only thin loaves are permitted. This is meant to prevent one from making too much bread on the festival, lest he make some for after the festival. Beth Hillel holds that it is permitted to bake large loaves, since bread cooks better when the oven is full. Furthermore, Bet Hillel in general is far more lenient when it comes to cooking on Yom Tov.", + "Rabban Gamaliel said: “In all their days, my father’s house never baked large loaves but only wafer-cakes.” They said to him: “What can we do with regards to your father’s house, for they were strict in respect to themselves but were lenient towards Israel to let them bake both large loaves and even charcoal-roasted loaves.” The final section of the mishnah contains some interaction between Rabban Gamaliel and the other sages, who hold like Beth Hillel. Rabban Gamaliel testifies that his father’s house indeed acted in this manner, and only baked wafer-cakes on the festival. The other sages accept this testimony of Rabban Gamaliel as being an accurate description of what Rabban Gamaliel’s father’s house used to do, but they understand its significance differently. The sages say that Rabban Gamaliel’s father’s house was strict upon themselves, but allowed the rest of Israel to cook large loaves, even charcoal roasted loaves which are very difficult to make. The strict actions of Rabban Gamaliel’s father’s house were only meant for themselves and were not meant to set precedent for everyone else." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn mishnah six we learned of three cases where Rabban Gamaliel was strict like Beth Shammai. In mishnah seven we learn three cases where he adopted a more lenient position than the other Sages.", + "Also he declared three decisions of a lenient character:
One may sweep up [on a festival] between the couches, In the time of the Mishnah, during formal meals people would recline on couches on the ground and eat off personal tables which were more like trays. According to Rabban Gamaliel one can sweep up between the couches after the meal on Yom Tov. The Sages forbid this for fear that one might fill in a hole that is in the floor, which could be considered a form of building, which is forbidden on the Sabbath and Yom Tov.", + "And put spices [on the coals] on a festival; As we have learned many times already, cooking food is allowed on Yom Tov. Rabban Gamaliel allowed people to put spices on coals, which would make a pleasant scent. Even though this is not cooking food, it is permitted since it is still a bodily pleasure. The sages forbid doing so since not all people are equally accustomed to put spices on coals after a meal. Cooking food is permitted because everyone eats; putting spices on coals is prohibited because this is not a practice in which all classes of people engage.", + "And roast a kid whole on the night of Passover. But the sages forbid them. When there was a Temple in Jerusalem, people would roast kids (lambs, not the human kind) as Passover sacrifices on the day before Passover and eat them at night. When the Temple was destroyed in 70 C.E. sacrifices could no longer be offered. Nevertheless, Rabban Gamaliel permitted people to make roasted kids at their own seders. The other Sages forbid this, lest someone think that they were eating sacrificial meat outside of Jerusalem (for more on this topic see Pesahim 7:1)." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nMishnah twelve contains three cases where Rabbi Elazar ben Azaryah was more lenient than the other Sages. We should note that not all of these sections deal with the laws of Yom Tov.", + "Rabbi Eleazar ben Azariah allows three things and the Sages forbid them:
His cow used to go out with the strap which she had between her horns; It is forbidden to carry things in the public domain on Shabbat. This is true even for a person’s animal, since it is forbidden to make one’s animal perform work on the Sabbath. Rabbi Eleazar ben Azariah allowed his cow to go out with a strap between its horns, since this strap was only an adornment and therefore he did not consider it “work”. In the same way a person can wear clothing in the public domain and that is not considered carrying. However, the Sages forbid cows from carrying anything, since most cows do not do so. Furthermore, if others were to see this they would think that it is permitted for an animal to work on the Sabbath. (See also Shabbat 5:4).", + "One may curry cattle on a festival; Currying is a type of combing done with a sharp metal comb. Rabbi Eleazar permits a person to curry an animal on the festival, even though that might cause a wound. Rabbi Eleazar permits this since even if he does cause a wound he did not intend to do so and unintentionally performed work is permitted on Shabbat and Yom Tov.", + "And one may grind pepper in its own mill. Rabbi Elazar holds that grinding pepper is permitted on Yom Tov because it is done in preparation of food, even if the grinding is done in a large mill. The sages however allow the grinding of pepper only in a small mill, one which will produce less ground pepper and that is easier.", + "Rabbi Judah says: one may not curry cattle on a festival, because it may cause a wound, but one may comb them. Rabbi Judah states that currying is forbidden since it will cause a wound, but combing with a wooden comb is permitted since it will not cause a wound.", + "But the Sages say: one may not curry them, and one may not even comb them. The Sages rule even more strictly. Even combing is forbidden, lest by permitting combing one might assume that currying is also permitted." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is brought here on account of section three in yesterday’s mishnah which dealt with using a pepper-mill on Yom Tov. As an aside, the mishnah teaches the susceptibility of a pepper-mill to impurities.", + "A pepper-mill is susceptible to impurity on account of [it consisting of] three [separate] utensils; on account of a receptacle, on account of a metal utensil and on account of a sifting utensil. A pepper-mill has three separate parts. Our mishnah teaches that each part is itself considered a “vessel” and therefore each part on its own can receive impurities. If one of the parts should break, while it can no longer become impure, because broken vessels are not receptive to impurities, the other two parts can still become impure. The bottom part of the pepper-mill is a wooden receptacle for the ground pepper. All vessels which have a receptacle are susceptible to impurity. The top part is made of metal. This is the part that grinds the pepper. It is susceptible to impurity because it is metal and all metal vessels are susceptible to impurity, even if they don’t have a receptacle. The middle part of the pepper-mill sifts the ground pepper. Some commentators explain that since some of the pepper gets stuck here, this part is also considered to be a receptacle and hence susceptible to impurity." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is here because of its connection with the previous mishnah, and not because of any connection with the laws of Yom Tov. It continues to deal with the impurity of vessels.", + "A child’s cart is susceptible to the impurity of midras, and it may be handled on Shabbat, and it is dragged along only on matting. A child’s cart is one that a small child would push around while learning how to walk (today these make sounds and have spinning things to keep your child entertained while you fold the laundry). Since the cart is made to lean upon, it can receive a type of impurity called “midras.” “Midras” means pressure. A zav or a zavah (a man or woman with an abnormal genital discharge) who steps, sits, lies or leans upon this cart, in other words applies bodily pressure to the cart, will render it impure. This type of impurity is derived from Leviticus 15:4. The cart may be handled on Shabbat and on Yom Tov. It is not muktzeh. However, it is forbidden to drag it along the ground because it will make grooves in the ground. This is a forbidden labor on Shabbat and on Yom Tov which is derived from the forbidden labor of plowing. The only way to use it is to drag it on some type of matting.", + "Rabbi Judah says: no vessels may be dragged along [the ground] except a wagon because it [only] presses [the earth] down. Rabbi Judah holds that the cart is the one type of vessel that may be dragged on the ground on Shabbat. All other vessels when dragged will create grooves in the ground. The cart when dragged will only press down the ground, without creating grooves. Hence, your little toddler can push his little cart knowing that he is not violating Shabbat." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with catching fish, fowl or game on Yom Tov. While slaughtering an animal is permitted on Yom Tov because it is done in the preparation of food, catching is not permitted because it could have been done the day before. Our mishnah defines what is considered “catching.” As an aside, the word in Hebrew for “catching” or “trapping” animals, fish or fowl is the same word as for hunting. However, I have translated the word as “catching” because hunting, that is killing the animal while catching it, is not allowed.", + "One may not catch fish from a fishpond on Yom Tov nor give them food, While fish in a pond are already to a certain extent trapped in a small enclosure, they still must be caught in order to eat them. Since catching a fish from a fish pond is still considered catching it is therefore forbidden on Yom Tov. It is forbidden to feed these fish lest by doing so he come to catch one of them.", + "But one may catch game or fowl from animal enclosures and one may put food before them. However, an animal which is trapped in a small enclosure is considered to already have been caught and hence one may “catch” such an animal or fowl on Yom Tov. Since it is permitted to catch them, he may also put food in front of them.", + "Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: not all enclosures are alike. This is the general rule: anything that still needs to be trapped is forbidden but anything that need not be trapped is permitted. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel points out that not all enclosures are alike. Fish in a bucket are basically already caught, whereas a deer in a very large pen is not caught. The general rule is that anything that still needs to be caught may not be caught on Yom Tov." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn yesterday’s mishnah we learned that one may not hunt (trap) animals on Yom Tov because he could do it the day before. Today we learn about taking animals out of traps on Yom Tov when the traps were set before Yom Tov.", + "Traps for wild animals, birds or fish which were set on the eve of Yom Tov, one may not take from them on Yom Tov unless he knows that they were [already] caught on the eve of Yom Tov. If the animals, birds or fish were caught in the traps the day before Yom Tov it would be permitted to take them out and slaughter them on Yom Tov. However, if they were trapped on Yom Tov then they are muktzeh because they could not have been used when Yom Tov began. When Yom Tov began he would have still had to trap them and trapping is prohibited on Yom Tov. If he finds them in the traps on Yom Tov he cannot use them unless he knows for certain that they were caught before Yom Tov. According to this opinion, something that is “doubtful muktzeh”, meaning it might or might not be muktzeh, it is prohibited.", + "It once happened that a certain non-Jew brought fish to Rabban Gamaliel [on Yom Tov] and he said: they are permitted, but I have no wish to accept [them] from him. In this story we see that Rabban Gamaliel disagrees with the previous clause. The non-Jew brings him a fish as a gift and we don’t know whether he caught the fish the day before or today. Rabban Gamaliel states that the fish is permitted because he holds that doubtful muktzeh is permitted. However, he adds that he himself acts more stringently and therefore he refuses to accept the fish. Note that we also saw in the previous chapter that Rabban Gamaliel acted strictly with regard to himself." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn this mishnah we learn two laws concerning slaughtering an animal on Yom Tov.", + "One may not slaughter [on Yom Tov] an animal which is about to die unless there is time enough on that day to eat from it as much as an olive of roasted flesh. Rabbi Akiva says: even [if there is only time to eat] as much as an olive of raw flesh [taken] from the place of slaughter. Slaughtering on Yom Tov is permitted as long as the person will have time left over in the day to eat some of the animal’s meat. If there is no time to eat any part of the animal then he can’t slaughter it because he would be doing so in order to eat it on another day. In the case in our mishnah it is clear that the person wants to slaughter the animal on Yom Tov because the animal is getting sick and if it dies he won’t be able to eat it. Even though it is clear that he is slaughtering it only in order to preserve some of its value, and that eating it is a sort of legal fiction, he still may do so, provided there is time left in the day for him to roast a small piece of meat and eat it. Roasting is the quickest form of cooking, hence the mishnah mentions roasting. Note that he does not actually have to roast and eat some of the meat, there just has to be time for him to do so. Rabbi Akiva is even more lenient and allows one to slaughter the animal even if there is only enough time to rip out a small piece of flesh from the animal’s throat (“the place of slaughter) and eat it raw. Rabbi Akiva mentions taking the meat out from the throat because to do this he wouldn’t even need to skin the animal. It seems even clearer here that this is not actually going to be done there just needs to be enough time so that it could have been done.", + "If he slaughtered it in the field, he may not bring it in on a pole or a barrow, but he may bring it in piece by piece in his hand. The mishnah rules that if someone slaughters an animal in the field he should not hoist it up on a pole or put it in a wheelbarrow in order to bring it back into his courtyard or other living quarters. Doing so would look too much like ordinary weekday work and hence it should be avoided on Yom Tov. Rather he may carry it back home piece by piece, a more modest act that others will notice less. Note that in this case there are values competing against one another. Carrying it back piece by piece is more work for him and nevertheless the mishnah recommends doing so to avoid the act looking like weekday work. To put this otherwise, the mishnah preserves the overall communal character of the day as a day free from work at the expense of the individual’s own experience." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nA first-born animal may not be eaten until it becomes blemished (Deuteronomy 15:21-22). Experts would determine whether an animal was blemished. Our mishnah deals with a first-born that fell into a pit on Yom Tov and may have been blemished there. The debate is over whether they may send down an expert to see if the animal had become blemished and if so, bring it up and slaughter it on Yom Tov.", + "A first-born beast that fell into a pit:
Rabbi Judah says: let an expert go down and inspect [it]. If it had a blemish he may bring it up and slaughter it, but if not, he may not slaughter it. Rabbi Judah allows the expert to go down into the pit to examine the animal. If the animal is blemished they may bring the animal out of the pit and slaughter it on Yom Tov. But if there is no blemish he may not slaughter it nor may he even bring it up from the pit.", + "Rabbi Shimon says: any animals whose blemish was not observed on the day before the Yom Tov, it is not prepared (. Rabbi Shimon holds that even if the animal should be found to have a blemish, they still may not bring it out of the pit and slaughter it on Yom Tov because when Yom Tov began that animal could not be slaughtered. The animal was not “mukhan”, or ready. Mukhan is the opposite muktzeh. The animal is muktzeh because when Yom Tov began it could not be used for food because it was still a first-born on whom no blemish had been found." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with what may be done with a beast (a cow, sheep, goat or bull) that has died on Yom Tov.", + "If a beast died [on Yom Tov] it may not be moved from its place. Since the beast died and was not slaughtered, it cannot be eaten. Since it cannot be eaten there is nothing that one may do with it on Yom Tov. Hence, it is muktzeh. All that he can do is leave it in its place and then when Yom Tov is over he can cut it up, use its hide and feed dogs with its meat.", + "And it happened that they once asked Rabbi Tarfon concerning this and concerning hallah that had become defiled. He went into the bet midrash and inquired, and they answered him: they may not be moved from their place. The mishnah now relates that this halakhah was asked of Rabbi Tarfon and he didn’t know the answer until he went and asked the question in the study house, the bet midrash. He also was asked about hallah, the part of the dough that is given to the priest, that had become impure on Yom Tov. Impure hallah, like an animal that died without being slaughtered, cannot be eaten and hence it is also muktzeh on Yom Tov. The answer therefore to both questions was that both are muktzeh and that neither can be moved until Yom Tov is over." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nAs we have learned many times, it is permitted to slaughter an animal on Yom Tov. In the mishnaic times most people would have bought shares in an animal from a butcher before the day the animal was slaughtered and then paid for it on the day it was slaughtered. Our mishnah teaches how this arrangement may be worked out so that people may buy freshly slaughtered meat on Yom Tov without it looking as if they are conducting business as usual.", + "They may not be counted as having a share in an animal at the outset on Yom Tov, but they may be counted [as having a share in an animal] on the eve of Yom Tov, and they may then slaughter it and divide it between them [on Yom Tov]. People may not go to a butcher on Yom Tov and decide how to divide up and pay for an animal that is to be slaughtered on that day. The problem with this is that it looks too much like one is engaging in business as usual. Hence it is prohibited. Rather what they may do is divvy up the various parts of the animal before Yom Tov before it is slaughtered and set a price for each part. Then on Yom Tov they may come have the butcher slaughter the animal and collect the parts which they reserved and pay for them at a later date. Since there is no verbal give and take on Yom Tov, it does not look as much like business as usual.", + "Rabbi Judah says: a man may weigh meat [on Yom Tov] against a utensil or against a butcher's chopper. But the sages say: one may not pay attention to the scales at all. The debate here is concerning weighing out meat at the butcher’s on Yom Tov. All agree that the butcher cannot just weigh out meat as usual, using weights on the scale, because that looks too much like conducting business as usual. They also all agree that one can go to a butcher and get meat on Yom Tov. This is necessary to ensure that the average person has access to fresh meat so that he can enjoy his Yom Tov to the fullest extent. As a solution to the problem of the butcher weighing out the meat, Rabbi Judah says that the butcher may use other utensils on the other side of the scales. For instance, if he knows that his chopping knife weighs 2 kilo, he can weigh out meat according to the weight of his knife. This looks different enough that everyone will know that he is not engaging in business as usual. The sages say that this is still too much like business as usual. The sages forbid any use of the scales on Yom Tov. All that the butcher and client may do is estimate the weight of the meat and then hope that it turns out to be fair." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to deal with the laws of slaughtering and divvying up meat on Yom Tov.", + "One may not sharpen a knife on a festival, but one may draw it over another knife. He shouldn’t sharpen a knife with a sharpening stone on Yom Tov because this is similar to completing work on a vessel which is forbidden on Yom Tov. Furthermore, he could have sharpened the knife before Yom Tov. However, if he sharpens it in an unusual manner, by using another knife, then it is permitted.", + "A man may not say to a butcher, “Weigh me a dinar’s worth of meat” but he may slaughter [the animal] and shares it among them. This section returns to discussing the problem discussed in yesterday’s mishnah, the problem of buying meat on Yom Tov. One cannot tell a butcher to give him a piece of meat worth a certain amount of money because this is considered conducting business as usual on Yom Tov, which is forbidden. This is forbidden even if he weighs the meat out in a manner that is usually permitted, as we learned in yesterday’s mishnah. Merely mentioning the price seems to be forbidden. However, the butcher may slaughter the animal and divide it up among his clients keeping in mind how much each owes him." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nAfter having dealt with how one may get meat from a butcher on Yom Tov, our mishnah deals with how one can buy other food supplies from others or from a storekeeper.\nWe will see again that the mishnah is very concerned with protecting the atmosphere of Yom Tov. Cooking is permitted and therefore we must allow people to get things at the store (remember they had no refrigeration and probably stored very little food at home), but when they do so they should refrain from any action that would send the message that business is being conducted as usual.", + "A man may say [on Yom Tov] to his fellow, “Fill me this vessel,” but not in a specific measure. A person can bring a vessel to his friend or to a storekeeper and ask him to fill it up for him on Yom Tov with wine or oil but he may not mention to him a specific amount. Since this is not the way that business is usually conducted it is permitted on Yom Tov.", + "Rabbi Judah says: if it was a measuring-vessel he may not fill it. Rabbi Judah says that this is not permitted if the vessel is one used for measuring. Although the person does not mention a specific amount, in other words, he does not say, “fill up this ten liter jug”, it is still forbidden because both he and the person giving him the wine or oil know exactly how much is being given.", + "It happened that Abba Shaul ben Batnit used to fill up his measures on the eve of Yom Tov and give them to his customers on Yom Tov. Abba Shaul says: he used to do so even during hol hamoed (the intermediate days of the, on account of clarifying the measures. But the sages say: he used also to do so on an ordinary day for the sake of the draining of the measures. In order to avoid the problem of measuring out wine or oil when giving it out on Yom Tov, Abba Shaul ben Batnit used to fill his measuring vessels before Yom Tov and then just give them out on Yom Tov. Abba Shaul says that Abba Shaul ben Batnit used to do the same thing on the intermediate days of the festival, hol hamoed. During these days people were not supposed to be doing work (we will learn this in Tractate Moed Katan) and so they had time to learn how to measure things out. Because there were so many people who came to him, he didn’t have time to fill up all of the measuring vessels that they should be completely full without any froth. Therefore he filled them up at night. Good manuscripts of the Mishnah do not contain the words “on account of clarifying the measures.” Indeed there is another explanation in the Talmud. There it says “on account of not attending the Bet Midrash.” Abba Shaul ben Batnit filled up his measuring vessels early so that he could spend all of hol hamoed teaching Torah. Rashi explains that many people would come to see him on hol hamoed because they were free from doing work, and hence he didn’t want to waste any time filling up his measures. Notice Abba Shaul ben Batnit was a businessman he just made sure that he conducted his business in a manner in which he could still teach and learn Torah. The sages say that Abba Shaul ben Batnit always filled up his measuring vessels ahead of time, even on ordinary weekdays. He would then pour from his vessels into his customers’ vessels and then wait overnight and fill them up more, depending upon how much the clay vessel had soaked up into its walls. This was his way of making sure that his customers received the full amount that they paid for.", + "A man may go to a shopkeeper to whom he generally goes and say to him, “Give me [so many] eggs and nuts” since this is the way of a householder to reckon in his own home. A person can go to a storekeeper with whom he is familiar, one that will give him food now and not make him pay back until a later day. To this storekeeper he may even tell the number of eggs or nuts that he wants. This does not look like “business as usual” because the customer does not usually count the eggs or nuts until he goes home." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nEven though carrying is allowed on Yom Tov, he should not carry things the same way that he carries things during the week because this makes it look like “business as usual.”", + "One who carries jars of wine from place to place, he may not carry them in a basket or in a large basket, but he may carry [them] on his shoulder or in front of him. It is permitted to carry jars of wine from place to place on Yom Tov, as long as one is within the Shabbat border limit. However, when carrying them he should not carry them in the same manner that he does during the week (non-Yom Tov). What he should do is carry them with his hands on his shoulder or in front of him, held against his body. This looks less like he is delivering merchandise and more like he is just bringing wine to a friend’s house.", + "Similarly, one who brings straw, he may no drape a large basket over his back, rather he must carry it in his hand. Basically, the same holds true for carrying straw used for lighting a fire or for animal feed.", + "And one may start [using] a heap of straw, but [one may] not [start using wood] from the back-yard. This third section deals with the concept of muktzeh something is prohibited if it was not designated for use on Yom Tov. He may use the heap of straw even though he did not specifically designate it and has never used that heap before. This is because heaps of straw are automatically set aside for use and do not require any special and intentional designation that they will be used on Yom Tov. In contrast, wood which is in the backyard is not necessarily designated to be used for something that can be done on Yom Tov and one cannot begin to use from that wood on Yom Tov. Indeed, the Hebrew word in this mishnah for backyard is muktzeh because in that area one sets aside things that one doesn’t have a specific intention to use (for those of you learning modern Hebrew, muktzeh is most definitely not a word for backyard.)" + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with the places where a person can collect kindling wood in order to cook on Yom Tov.", + "One may not take wood from a sukkah but only from [what is] next to it. The “sukkah” referred to here is not a sukkah used on the festival of Sukkot, but rather a sort of hut used for shade by farmers out in the field. It is forbidden to take wood that was used in building the sukkah because this is considered “tearing down” which is forbidden on Shabbat and Yom Tov. However, he may take the wood gathered next to the sukkah.", + "One may bring in from the field wood that is gathered together, and from a karpef [an enclosure] even though it is scattered about. He can bring in wood from the field if it has already been gathered together. However, if it is scattered then it is muktzeh because there was no intent to use that wood for building a fire, and therefore he may not bring it in. From a karpef, a type of enclosure used for storage (see also Eruvin 2:3, 2:5 and 5:2) he may gather even loose wood. Since this wood was put into an enclosure, it has already been designated for use and it is not muktzeh.", + "What is a karpef? Any [enclosure] next to the town, the words of Rabbi Judah. Rabbi Yose says: Any [enclosure] which one enters with a key, even if it is [only just] within the Shabbat border. In this section Rabbi Judah and Rabbi Yose debate from what kind of a karpef he can bring in wood. According to Rabbi Judah the karpef has to be close to the city, since only if it is close to the city does he intend to use it on Yom Tov. Rabbi Yose says that the criterion is that the karpef is locked and can only be opened with a key. The wood in such a karpef is not muktzeh, even if the karpef is not next to the city. However, the karpef must be within the Shabbat limit (2,000 cubits in all directions), otherwise he won’t be able to even get there." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first topic of this mishnah is chopping wood to make firewood on Yom Tov. The second topic is opening up a sealed storage room to take out produce. Both of these topics touch at least indirectly upon the subject of muktzeh.", + "One may not chop up wood, neither from beams nor from a beam which was broken on Yom Tov. This first section is concerned with chopping wood from a beam that was not designated for use as firewood before Yom Tov began. One may not chop up a beam that was meant to be used in building because it is muktzeh before Yom Tov there was no intention to use it for fire. Even if the beam breaks on Yom Tov and is now only good for lighting fires, he can’t chop it up into firewood because when Yom Tov began it was muktzeh. Only if it was broken before Yom Tov can he chop it up.", + "And one may not chop with an axe or with a saw or with a sickle but only with a [butcher's] chopper. This section refers to wood that one is allowed to chop up on Yom Tov. Even though it is permitted to do so, one shouldn’t do so in a normal fashion because this looks too much like “business as usual.” One shouldn’t use the normal instruments but rather a butcher’s knife, one usually used for cutting bones and meat. This requirement will probably make people prefer to chop up their wood before Yom Tov begins chopping wood with a butcher’s knife won’t make the butcher very happy and it’s not a good idea to tick off people who own big knives.", + "A [closed] room full of produce which was burst open [on Yom Tov] he may take [produce] out through the breach. Rabbi Meir says: he may make a hole at the outset and bring out [the produce]. This section refers to a storage room that has been closed off by a row of bricks that have not been cemented together. According to the first opinion, if some of the bricks should fall away he may go into the room through the opening and take out the produce and use it on Yom Tov. Since there was no cement sealing the bricks together, the produce is not considered muktzeh. However, according to this opinion, he may not himself remove the bricks because this is too close to “tearing down” a building, a prohibited labor on Shabbat and Yom Tov. Concerning this last ruling, Rabbi Meir disagrees. Since the bricks were not cemented together, he may even take them down and create a new opening on Yom Tov." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with several laws concerning the use and production of lamps on Yom Tov.", + "One may not make a hole in a [lump of clay for use as a] lamp because that is making a vessel. Lamps in mishnaic times were basically lumps of clay with a receptacle for oil and a small hole in which one could put a wick. While lighting a lamp is allowed on Yom Tov, making a lamp is not. One may not make a hole in a lump of clay in order to make it into a lamp because making a vessel is forbidden on Yom Tov.", + "One may not make charcoal on Yom Tov. Charcoal is also considered to be a vessel, or at least as important as a vessel. Therefore it is forbidden to make charcoal on Yom Tov.", + "And one may not cut a wick into two. Rabbi Judah says: he may cut it into two lamps using a fire. Cutting a piece of twine or other material into two in order to make two wicks is also considered similar to making a vessel and is therefore prohibited on Yom Tov. Rabbi Judah says that while one cannot cut the twine into two with a knife or scissors, he can cut it into two by using fire. The Talmud explains that he places two lamps next to each other and one wick in the two lamps, one end in each. He then lights the wick in the middle and it will split in two." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with certain preparations made in order to facilitate cooking.", + "One may not break up a potsherd or cut paper in order to roast on it a salty fish. When grilling a fish it would often be put on a broken shard of a pottery or on a piece of paper in order to prevent it from being burned. The mishnah considers breaking some pottery or cutting a piece of paper to be used as such to be “making a vessel” which is not permitted on Yom Tov.", + "And one may not rake out an oven or a range, but one may press [the ashes] down. One should not rake out the ashes and dirt from an oven or a range. This is also considered to be “making a vessel” because it makes the oven usable. However, it is permitted to “press down” the ashes, which seems to be a means of getting them out of the way in order to facilitate cooking. The Rambam notes that if one cannot cook unless the ashes are raked out, he may do so because one is allowed to cook on Yom Tov.", + "And one may not place two jars side by side in order to balance upon them saucepan. Putting two jars next to each other so that there is a fire in between them and then balancing a pan upon them is like building a makeshift range. This is prohibited because it is forbidden to build on Yom Tov.", + "And one may not prop up a pot with a wooden wedge and the same applies to a door. One may not use small pieces of wood to prop things up on Yom Tov because the wood was intended to be used as kindling. All other uses are prohibited.", + "And one may not drive cattle with a staff on a festival. But Rabbi Elazar the son of Rabbi Shimon permits it. According to the Talmud, one may not drive cattle with a stick because it looks like he is bringing them to the marketplace to sell. Rabbi Elazar disagrees." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn the middle of yesterday’s mishnah we learned that chips of wood can be used only as kindling. Today’s mishnah continues to discuss this subject.", + "Rabbi Eliezer says: a man may take a chip from that which is lying before him to pick his teeth with it, and he may collect [chips] from the court yard and make a fire, for everything in a court is prepared [for use on Yom Tov]. Rabbi Eliezer says that one may take a chip of wood that is lying inside his house and use it to pick his teeth clean (aren’t you glad we have toothbrushes). From outside the house one may collect chips of wood and use them to build a fire because according to Rabbi Eliezer all chips of wood are “prepared” to be used as wood for a fire that is they are not muktzeh.", + "But the sages say: he may collect only from that which is before him and make a fire. The sages disagree with Rabbi Eliezer on two accounts. First of all, one cannot gather wood from outside the house because it was not designated for use on Yom Tov. Only the wood from inside the house that has been set aside for use can be used. Secondly, they hold that wood can only be used to build a fire. It cannot be used to pick one’s teeth (sorry if you’re a dentist)." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first section of this mishnah teaches that it is forbidden to produce new fire on Yom Tov. This is related to the prohibition of “muktzeh” which was the topic of yesterday’s mishnah. The second half of the mishnah continues to deal with the laws of muktzeh.", + "One may not produce fire either from wood, or from stones, or from dirt, or from water (. While one is allowed to use fire on Shabbat, one is not allowed to create a new fire by “bringing it out” of a substance such as wood (rubbing sticks together) or from stones (striking a stone against another) or dirt (I don’t really know how this was done) or from water, which is the mishnah’s word for gas. We should remember that today creating new fire is exceedingly easy one just flicks a lighter or strikes a match. In ancient times starting a new fire would have been difficult. Most fire was probably just passed from one existing fire to another. The rabbis prohibited creating a new fire because it didn’t exist before Yom Tov began, much as they forbid the egg that was laid on Yom Tov in the first mishnah of this tractate.", + "Nor may one make tiles red-hot in order to roast on them. It is also forbidden to heat up tiles to cook on them because by heating them up he is forging them. This is considered like completing the making of a vessel which is forbidden on Yom Tov.", + "Rabbi Eliezer further said: A man may stand near his “muktzeh” on the eve of Shabbat in the sabbatical year and say: “From here I will eat tomorrow.” But the sages say: [This doesn’t work] unless he marks it out and says, “From here to there.” These words of Rabbi Eliezer are a continuation of his words above in mishnah six, which dealt with muktzeh. The word “muktzeh” here refers, according to its accepted interpretation, to a place where a person has set his fruit to dry out (dates, figs and grapes). In order for these fruits to be available for use on Yom Tov, in other words in order for the things in the “muktzeh” to not be “muktzeh”, one must designate them for use before Yom Tov. Furthermore, this can only happen on the Sabbatical year during which one doesn’t have to separate tithes. During the other years because the fruit in the muktzeh has not generally been tithed, and it is forbidden to tithe on Yom Tov, one cannot eat them on Yom Tov even if he had designated them for use. He could only eat them if they had already been tithed. The mishnah now brings a debate concerning how one designates drying fruit for use. According to Rabbi Eliezer all one needs to do is say “From here I will eat.” The rabbis are stricter and rule that he must point specifically to the area of fruit from which he will eat. Just as Rabbi Eliezer was more lenient in mishnah six, so too he is more lenient than the other sages here." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to deal with laws concerning fruit set out to dry and things that one may and may not do with this fruit on Yom Tov.", + "One may let down fruit through a trap-door on Yom Tov but not on Shabbat. This section deals with a person who has put his fruit up onto his roof to dry out on Yom Tov and then he sees that it is going to rain. The mishnah allows him to drop the fruit down through a trap-door in the roof because this is not considered to be a lot of work. He would not be allowed to take them down through a window or through the door because this is a greater amount of work. Furthermore, they only allowed this on Yom Tov on Shabbat it was prohibited.", + "And one may cover up fruit with vessels on account of the rain, and likewise jars of wine and jars of oil. One also may cover up fruit, jars of wine and jars of oil if rain is leaking down on them. Covering up fruit or bringing it into the house so it doesn’t get wet are activities done not in order to eat the fruit on Yom Tov, but they are nevertheless permitted in order to prevent the financial loss.", + "And one may place a vessel beneath the drops of rain [even] on Shabbat. On Shabbat one can even put a vessel underneath drops of rain coming down from a leaky roof." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis long mishnah deals with three categories of acts that are prohibited by the rabbis on Shabbat and on Yom Tov. They are all considered to be prohibited “derabbanan”, by the rabbis and not by the Torah. The three categories are:\nShevut mandated rest on Shabbat. These are activities that are prohibited because they are generally not in the spirit of the day or because by doing one of them one might come to transgress a biblical prohibition.\nReshut optional activities. These have some aspect of mitzvah in them but can be done on other days. Therefore one doesn’t do them on Yom Tov or Shabbat.\nMitzvah these are commandments that can be performed on other days and therefore shouldn’t be done on Shabbat.\nThe main point of the mishnah is that the only actions which are allowed on Yom Tov but prohibited on Shabbat those done while preparing food. All of the other Shabbat prohibitions still hold true.", + "Every [act] for which one is liable on Shabbat because of mandated rest [shevut], [or] because it is only optional [reshut], [or] even though it is a religious act [mitzvah], he is also liable on Yom Tov.
For the following acts he is liable because of shevut: One may not climb a tree, And one may not ride on an animal. And one may not swim in water. And one may not clap hands, nor slap [thighs], nor dance. Climbing a tree is forbidden lest one breaks a branch, which is forbidden to do on Shabbat. Riding an animal is considered prohibited lest one while riding break a branch to use as a switch in guiding an animal. It seems that a deeper reason for why the rabbis prohibited this was that they did not believe that riding an animal was in the spirit of Shabbat. Swimming was prohibited lest while swimming one makes a raft on which to float. Finally, certain types of clapping, slapping of thighs and dancing were prohibited on Shabbat lest one begin to make music and then come to make a musical instrument. We should note that some of these activities are no longer generally prohibited because the likelihood that by doing one of them one will come to transgress a more serious commandment is minimal. In my mind the most important thing to remember is that while one follows the minutiae of Shabbat, one should also be mindful of the spirit of Shabbat. Even things that are permitted should not always be done.", + "For the following acts he is liable because they are only optional: One may not judge; And one may not betroth a wife, nor perform halizah, nor perform yibbum [consumate a levirate marriage]. This section contains activities that have some aspect of “commandment” to them but can be done on other days. Judging, betrothing and other legal aspects of arranging various types of marriages can be done any day of the week, therefore one should not do them on Shabbat. In my opinion, this is again because these activities are not in the “spirit of Shabbat.” They might detract from the special sanctity of Shabbat, a day set aside. A more technical reason why these things are prohibited is that by doing one of them one might come to write.", + "And for the following acts one is liable even though it is a religious act [mitzvah]: One may not dedicate [anything to the Temple], nor vow a personal valuation, nor make a vow of herem, nor set aside terumah or tithes. These acts are actually mitzvot, but still one may not perform them on Shabbat or Yom Tov because they can all be done with as much ease on other days. The Rambam explains that donating something to the Temple is similar to engaging in business and hence one does not do so on Shabbat. One does not separate tithes or terumah on Yom Tov or Shabbat because by doing so one “fixes” something to make it usable. Also, this could have just as easily been done the day before.", + "All these things they [the rabbis said that they are forbidden] on Yom Tov, how much more so [are they forbidden] on Shabbat. There is no difference between Yom Tov and Shabbat except for the preparation of food alone. In conclusion the mishnah notes that when discussing the laws of Yom Tov the rabbis prohibited these activities, but they are nevertheless even more prohibited on Shabbat. The mishnah reminds us that the only type of activity which is permitted on Yom Tov but not on Shabbat is something done while preparing food." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe final three mishnayot of the chapter discuss Shabbat border limits, a topic which was discussed in far greater length in tractate Eruvin. The Shabbat border limit is 2000 cubits to each side of the city. One can set up an eruv, a meal, at the end of the limit and thereby extend it another 2000 cubits in that direction. This extension only works in extending is Shabbat border limit in one direction and causes him to lose a matching amount of distance on the opposite side of the city. Hence, one who sets up an eruv at the end of 2000 cubits on the western side of the city can now go 4000 cubits in that direction but cannot go outside the city at all on the eastern side. Our mishnah teaches that these limits apply not only to the person himself but to his animals and his utensils as well.", + "A beast and utensils are [restricted to the same limits] as the feet of the owners. As stated in the introduction, just as a person cannot go past his own personal Shabbat border limit, so too the things that belong to him cannot beyond that point.", + "One who gives his cow over to his son or to a cowherd [to tend], they are [restricted to the same limits] as the feet of the owner. The mishnah adds that if a person gives his cow over to someone just to watch it, then the cow stays under the possession of the owner and may only go as far as the owner may go on Shabbat. Therefore, if the owner set his eruv to the west side of the city, his son or his cowherd may not take the cow outside the city on the eastern side.", + "Vessels which have been set apart for [the use or] one of the brothers in a house, are [restricted to the same limits] as his feet, but [those utensils] which have not been so set apart, can be taken [only] to a place where [all the brothers] may go. If a vessel (in Hebrew the word for “vessel” includes clothing, bedding and many more objects than the word connotes in English) belonged jointly to some brothers but one brother generally used it, then it can go on Shabbat to any place where that brother may go. So if that brother set his eruv to the west, that vessel can go to the west. However, if all brothers make use of the vessel than it can only go to a place where all of the brothers can go. So if one brother set his eruv to the north and one to the south then the vessel can’t leave the city at all because each brother prevents the other one from bringing the vessel to “his” side." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to deal with the Shabbat/Yom Tov border limits placed on things. Since the mishnah deals with carrying, the rules are only applicable to Yom Tov on Shabbat all carrying is prohibited.", + "One who borrows a vessel from his neighbor on the eve of Yom Tov, [it is restricted to the same limits] as the feet of the borrower. [But if he borrowed it] on Yom Tov, it is as the feet of the lender. If one borrows an object it is considered as if the object belongs to the borrower and therefore it can go on Yom Tov to any place where he/she may go. However, this is only true if he borrowed it the day before Yom Tov, such that when Yom Tov began the object was in his possession. In other words, the border limits of the object are determined by the one who possessed the object when Yom Tov began. If he borrowed it on Yom Tov then it can go only where the feet of the lender can go.", + "A woman who borrowed from her neighbor spices, water or salt for her dough, these are [restricted to the same limits] as the feet of both them. Rabbi Judah exempts in the case of water, because it is not substantial. In this case a woman borrows some ingredients from another woman to use them in making dough on Yom Tov. Some of the ingredients therefore belong to the lender and some belong to the borrower. Since the ownership is mixed (like the dough) the dough can only go to a place where they both can go. This again means that if one set an eruv to the south and one to the north, the dough cannot leave the city at all. Rabbi Judah says that if all she borrowed was water then the dough is not restricted by the lender since the water is not substantial enough. Water is not recognized in the final product or its taste and therefore it doesn’t count towards where the dough can go." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first section of the mishnah teaches that while a live coal is considered as having substance, a flame does not have any substance.\nThe second half of the mishnah deals with the restrictions on the carrying of water drawn from a well.", + "A live coal is [restricted to the same limits] as its owner, but a flame can be taken anywhere. A live coal, one that is burning, is considered to be an object of substance and therefore it is limited to going where its owner can go. In contrast, a flame has no substance and therefore is not limited in where it can go. What this means is that a person could take a lamp and light it from somewhat else’s lamp and then not be limited by the other person’s eruv. The flame that he “takes” from another person has no substance so it is not like borrowing something from another person.", + "In respect of a live coal of sanctified property [one who makes use of it] is considered as having trespassed, but as for a flame [of sanctified property], one may not derive benefit from it, but [one who does] has not trespassed. One who makes non-holy use out of something dedicated to the Temple has “trespassed (me’ilah).” He must make financial restitution and bring an asham, a guilt offering. One who makes non-holy use out of a live coal has trespassed because a live coal has substance. In contrast, one who makes non-holy use out of a flame has not trespassed. Nevertheless, it is still forbidden to do so. The prohibition is “derabbanan” it is forbidden lest he trespass something with substance.", + "If one carries out a live coal into the public domain [on Shabbat] he is liable, but [if he carries out] a flame he is exempt. Carrying a live coal into the public domain on Shabbat counts as carrying, and hence he has transgressed. However, carrying a flame does not count as carrying and hence he has not transgressed. If you ask, how can you carry a flame? (Ouch!) The answer is that one could blow a flame from the private domain out into the public domain and that would count as carrying because it moved as a result of his force.", + "[The water from]: A private well is [restricted to the same limits] as its owner, And [the water from a well] belonging to the inhabitants of that town is [restricted to the same limits] as the people of that town; And [the water from a well] belonging to those who came up from Babylonia is [restricted to the same limits] as he who draws [the water]. There are three types of wells referred to here. The first is that of a private person. The water in that well can go on Yom Tov wherever he can go. The second is that of a public well. This water belongs to everyone in the city and therefore it can only go where everyone can go. This means that unless everyone who set up an eruv put it on the same side of the city, the water wouldn’t be able to leave the city. The third type of well is one of the public wells dug for the benefit of the people coming back from Babylonia after the exile. These wells can be used by any traveler. They can go anywhere that the person who fills them up can go. The difference between these wells and those shared by the people of a city is that the latter type is jointly owned by the people of the town whereas the former are not owned by anyone." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with a person whose produce is in another town and he wishes to retrieve it on Yom Tov.", + "If one has his produce in another town, and the inhabitants of that city made an eruv in order to bring to him some of his produce, they may not bring it to him. In the case under discussion here the inhabitants of the other city made an eruv that would allow them to get to the city of the owner of the produce. Nevertheless, they may not bring him his produce because his produce is limited by where he can go and since he didn’t set up an eruv to get to the other city, it can’t come to him. Again, a person’s things are limited to going where he may go.", + "But if he himself made an eruv, his produce is like himself. If the owner of the produce set up an eruv then he can go to the other city and bring his produce back with him. It is irrelevant whether the people of the other city set up an eruv since they are not the owners of the produce." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first section of the last mishnah of Betzah deals with guests taking food home with them. The last part of the mishnah deals with giving water to animals.", + "If one invited guests to his home, they may not take away with them [any] portions unless he [the host] had assigned for them their portions on the eve of Yom Tov. In mishnaic times the portion of meat that one received at a dinner party was considered very important. Important guests might receive bigger portions. Sometimes people wouldn’t eat their entire portion and they would be allowed to bring home the leftovers. After all, with no refrigeration the host wouldn’t be able to do anything with the leftovers in any case. Our mishnah teaches that on Yom Tov guests can’t take their leftovers home with them unless the host gave them ownership over the portions before Yom Tov began. In this way, the portions belong to the guests when Yom Tov begins and they can then go as far as they can go.", + "One may not give drink and then slaughter wilderness animals, but one may give drink and slaughter household animals. The following are household animals: they that spend the night in town. Pasture animals are they that spend the night in pasture ground. Animals that pasture out in the wild are muktzeh they have not been set aside before Yom Tov for use on Yom Tov. Hence one cannot give them water or slaughter them on Yom Tov. However, one can give water to and slaughter household animals because they are automatically “set aside” to be slaughtered. The mishnah goes on to define what household animals are and what pasture animals are. Congratulations! We have finished Betzah. It is a tradition at this point to thank God for helping us finish learning the tractate and to commit ourselves to going back and relearning it, so that we may not forget it and so that its lessons will stay with us for all of our lives. Mishnah Betzah was all about the laws of Yom Tov. I think at this point it would be worth it to think about how important the Jewish holidays are to the Jewish people. The matzot and seders of Pesah, sitting in the sukkah on Sukkot, waving the lulav and receiving the Torah on Shavuot these are some of the most important parts of the Jewish year. They remind us of our shared history and hopefully our shared destiny. Unfortunately I think that the sanctity of Yom Tov has eroded substantially in many of our communities. I hope that learning this tractate will help inspire you to increase your own personal commitment and to help lead others to increase their commitment as well. And again, as always, congratulations on learning another tractate of Mishnah. We are getting close to having finished half of the Mishnah. May you have the strength and time to keep on learning more! Tomorrow we begin Rosh Hashanah." + ] + ] + ] + }, + "schema": { + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה ביצה", + "enTitle": "English Explanation of Mishnah Beitzah", + "key": "English Explanation of Mishnah Beitzah", + "nodes": [ + { + "heTitle": "הקדמה", + "enTitle": "Introduction" + }, + { + "heTitle": "", + "enTitle": "" + } + ] + } +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Moed/English Explanation of Mishnah Beitzah/English/merged.json b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Moed/English Explanation of Mishnah Beitzah/English/merged.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..99fa1efc0c61a5eea672260ba1a4354c5615ce56 --- /dev/null +++ b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Moed/English Explanation of Mishnah Beitzah/English/merged.json @@ -0,0 +1,298 @@ +{ + "title": "English Explanation of Mishnah Beitzah", + "language": "en", + "versionTitle": "merged", + "versionSource": "https://www.sefaria.org/English_Explanation_of_Mishnah_Beitzah", + "text": { + "Introduction": [ + "Tractate Betzah (Egg) teaches the laws governing Yom Tov (the festival), which means the first and last days of Pesah, the first day of Sukkot, Shmini Atzeret and Shavuot. It is usually called “Betzah” after the first word of the first mishnah, although it was alternatively called Tractate Yom Tov. ", + "The Torah does not provide much information about the special laws of Yom Tov, those which would distinguish it from Shabbat. They are mostly contained in Exodus 12:16, “And on the first day you shall celebrate a sacred occasion and on the last day, a sacred occasion; no work at all shall be done on them; only what every person is to eat, that alone may be prepared by you.” In other words, Yom Tov is like Shabbat in that work is prohibited, with one major exception—one can prepare food. Although this verse relates specifically to Pesah, it was interpreted as referring to all of the festival days. ", + "Not all food preparations were permitted on Yom Tov. The general explanation is that all preparatory work that could have been done before Yom Tov without any loss to the quality of the food must be done before Yom Tov. For instance, one cannot harvest wheat on Yom Tov, but one can knead and bake dough. One cannot trap an animal on Yom Tov but one can slaughter, skin, salt and cut up the meat. Lighting a fire is permitted, as is carrying from domain to domain because these actions are typically involved in preparing food. ", + "One of the reasons that one was allowed to prepare food on Yom Tov was that Yom Tov was supposed to be a big celebration. The festival was supposed to be sanctified by eating and drinking and without being able to prepare fresh food (remember they had no refrigeration), the celebration would be lessened." + ], + "": [ + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThe first part of the first mishnah of Betzah is about its namesake, an egg born on Yom Tov. The second part is associated with the first part because both contain debates between Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel, and in both Bet Hillel rules strictly.", + "An egg laid on Yom Tov: Bet Shammai say: it may be eaten [on the same day]; But Bet Hillel say: it may not be eaten [until the day is over]. According to Bet Shammai, just as it is permitted to slaughter a chicken on Yom Tov, it is also permitted to eat an egg that is laid on Yom Tov. In other words, the chicken and everything in it is permitted on Yom Tov. In contrast, Bet Hillel hold that while the chicken itself is permitted, the egg that is laid is prohibited. The egg is what is called “nolad” it is born, or new, something that was not there when Yom Tov began and hence was not set aside for use at the beginning of Yom Tov. This prohibition is similar to muktzeh the idea that something that was not set aside before Yom Tov to be used on Yom Tov may not be used on Yom Tov.", + "Bet Shammai say: [the quantity of] leaven is of the size of an olive and leavened bread is of the size of a date; But Bet Hillel say: both are of the size of an olive. Exodus 13:7 says, “No leavened bread shall be seen with you and no leaven shall be found in all your territory.” The verse mentions two things: the leavening agent (starter dough) and the leavened bread, both of which are prohibited. According to Bet Shammai the point of the verse is to teach that the two prohibitions are different. Leaven is prohibited at the size of an olive, whereas leavened bread is prohibited at a larger amount, the size of a date. Beth Hillel hold that in both cases an olive’s worth is prohibited. Note that smaller amounts are not permitted either. A smaller amount is still forbidden but one who consumes a smaller amount has not transgressed the Biblical prohibition of leaven or leavened bread on Passover." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with slaughtering animals on Yom Tov.", + "He who slaughters a wild animal or a bird on a festival Bet Shammai says: he may dig with a pronged tool and cover up [the blood], but Bet Hillel says: he may not slaughter unless he has had earth made ready. According to Leviticus 17:13, when one slaughters an undomesticated animal or any type of fowl the blood must be poured out of the animal and covered with earth. One who slaughters an undomesticated animal or fowl on the festival has a problem. Although it is permitted to slaughter, if he doesn’t have any prepared earth to cover the blood newly dug earth is “muktzeh” and cannot be used. Nevertheless, Bet Shammai permits one to dig up new earth and cover the blood. Bet Hillel says one cannot slaughter unless one has earth already prepared.", + "But they agree that if he did slaughter he should dig with a pronged tool and cover up [the blood, and] that the ashes of a stove count as being prepared for the holiday. However, they all agree that if he had already slaughtered the animal, even though Bet Hillel says he should not have done so without already prepared earth, he may still dig new earth to cover the blood. This is because the principle of muktzeh is only rabbinically ordained and the obligation to cover the blood is Biblical. When one has two competing commandments, one rabbinic and one Biblical, the latter takes precedence. The two houses also agree that the ashes in the oven are considered prepared for the festival, in other words they are not muktzeh. Since people used these ashes for various purposes, we can make the assumption that before the festival began he knew in his mind that he would use these ashes." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues with two more debates between Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel over what types of food preparations one can do on Yom Tov. Today’s mishnah again deals with muktzeh, the concept that something that was designated for use on Yom Tov or Shabbat may not subsequently be used then. The specific topic is fetching pigeon-doves from a dovecote in order to eat them on Yom Tov.", + "Bet Shammai says: one may not carry a ladder [on Yom Tov] from one dovecote to another, but he may incline it from one pigeon-hole to another. But Bet Hillel permits [this]. In ancient Israel dovecotes were typically underground caves with many holes carved into the walls, each hole housing a dove. There would be ladders inside the dovecote so that the owner could reach the doves situated high up. According to Bet Shammai one may not move a ladder from one dovecote to another on Yom Tov, however one may move the ladder from one hole to the other within the dovecote. Bet Hillel is more lenient in this case and permits one to move the ladder even from one dovecote to the other. One cogent explanation for this debate is that Bet Shammai prohibits moving the ladder from one dovecote to another lest it look like he is bringing the ladder to the shop to get it fixed. Bet Hillel is not concerned since everyone should know why he would be moving the ladder.", + "Bet Shammai says: one may not take [doves] unless he has shaken [them] the day before [Yom Tov]: But Bet Hillel says: he stands and declares: this one or that one I am taking. Doves that were not set aside to be slaughtered and then eaten on Yom Tov are muktzeh and may not be used on Yom Tov. However, if they are designated before Yom Tov to be slaughtered on Yom Tov, one may use them. In this mishnah Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel debate how one designates before Yom Tov that he will slaughter certain birds on the next day. According to Bet Shammai one must designate the birds by physically lifting each one up and moving it around. This demonstrates that he intends to use that specific pigeon the next day (if only the pigeon knew that tomorrow won’t be such a Yom Tov for him). Bet Hillel says that the designation is verbal he stands in front of the pigeons and says that he will use these pigeons (good thing they don’t know Hebrew)." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn yesterday’s mishnah we learned that in order to slaughter and eat doves on Yom Tov one must designate them for use before Yom Tov begins. Otherwise they are muktzeh. Our mishnah discusses what happens if he designated doves before Yom Tov but then is not sure that the doves that he finds in the nest or dovecote are the same ones.", + "If he designated black [doves] but found [on Yom Tov] white ones, white [doves] but found black ones, two but found three, they are [all] forbidden. If the doves which he finds are a different color from those that he designated it is obvious that they are not the same doves that he designated the previous day. If he designated two doves and there are now three there, one of the doves is certainly muktzeh. The problem is that he doesn’t know which one because all three look alike (I wonder if doves think all humans look alike). Hence they are all prohibited.", + "[If he designated] three but found two, they are permitted. If he designated three but finds only two we can assume that one flew off and that the other two are the same ones he designated. Hence they are permitted.", + "[If he designated doves] inside the nest and found them in front of the nest, they are forbidden. But if none were there except these, they are permitted. If the doves are found outside of the nest but he designated them in the nest, then they may not be the same doves. If there is another nearby dovecote then he must be concerned about this possibility and he may not use those doves. However, if there are no nearby dovecotes then he can assume that these doves just found their way out and he may use them." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues with four more debates between Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel on the laws of Yom Tov.", + "Bet Shammai says: one may not remove shutters on Yom Tov. But Bet Hillel permits even to return them to their place. In mishnaic times the shutters which were used to close windows and closets were removable. Bet Shammai forbade removing them because they considered this similar to tearing down a building, a forbidden labor on Shabbat and Yom Tov. All the more so they would hold that putting the shutters back in their place is forbidden because it is similar to “building”. Bet Hillel holds that it is permitted even to put the shutters back in their place. Bet Hillel’s general principle is that if an activity is permitted because it is done in the preparation of food, then it is permitted even when it is done for another purpose. Removing a shutter to take food out of a closet is permitted therefore removing shutters is always permitted, even if it is not for the sake of removing food. Bet Hillel even allows returning the shutter to its place, because if it were prohibited people would hesitate to remove them, knowing that they would not be able to put them back in their place afterwards.", + "Bet Shammai says: one may not take a pestle even to cut up meat on it. But Bet Hillel permits [it]. A pestle is a wooden board used to grind things which cannot be ground on Yom Tov because they can be ground the day before. Bet Shammai says that the pestle cannot even be used for things that can be done on Yom Tov such as cutting up meat. The pestle is completely muktzeh because its general use is for something that is prohibited. Bet Hillel disagrees and holds that even though it is usually used during the week for things that cannot be done on Yom Tov, it may be used on Yom Tov for something that is permitted.", + "Bet Shammai says: one may not place a hide in front of one who treads upon it nor may he even lift it up unless there is an olive’s worth of flesh on it. But Bet hillel permit it. Once one has slaughtered and skinned an animal Bet Shammai prohibits one from giving the hide over to someone who will tread on it to prepare it for processing. Indeed, Bet Shammiai add that he may not even touch the removed hide. Since the hide is not food, it becomes muktzeh. One may touch the hide only if it has some flesh on it, because then it is considered “food.” Bet Hillel however allows one to give a hide over to someone who will tread on it since if this was not permitted people wouldn’t slaughter animals on Yom Tov because the valuable hides would be ruined by waiting until the next day to begin working on them. This would result in a reduction of the rejoicing on Yom Tov because there would be no fresh meat. It is noteworthy that Bet Hillel allows activities that would seemingly be prohibited if they contribute to the celebration of Yom Tov.", + "Bet Shammai says: one may not carry out an infant or a lulav or a Torah scroll into the public domain. But Bet Hillel permit [it]. According to Bet Shammai carrying something through the public domain is permitted on Yom Tov only in a case where one carries in order to prepare or eat food. Carrying a child, a lulav or a Torah scroll is not done for eating and hence it is prohibited. Bet Hillel again permits this. Since carrying is permitted in some cases (for food) it is permitted in other cases as well. However, Bet Hillel limits this to cases which involve a mitzvah or some other benefit. Taking a child for a stroll is pleasurable (as long as they’re not screaming their little heads off). The lulav and the Torah scroll are for mitzvot. To carry something with no purpose is however forbidden even according to Bet Hillel." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn this mishnah Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel debate whether one may carry to a priest hallah and priestly gifts on Yom Tov. Hallah is dough which one must separate from the dough that one kneads to bake bread (Numbers 15:17-21). Priestly gifts refers to the parts of a sacrificial animal which must be given to the priest (Deuteronomy 18:3).", + "Bet Shammai says: one may not take hallah or priestly gifts to a priest on Yom Tov, whether they were separated on the day before or on that day. But Bet Hillel permits it. In this first section we learn that Bet Shammai prohibits carrying the hallah and priestly gifts to the priest, whether they were separated on that day or earlier, whereas Bet Hillel permits this. The reasons for this debate come in the following mishnah.", + "Bet Shammai said them: An analogy [supports our view]: hallah and priestly gifts go to the priest and terumah is [likewise] goes to the priest; just as one may not take [to the priest] terumah so one may not take [to him] priestly gifts. Bet Hillel said to them: No! If you say in the case of terumah which he has not the right to separate, will you say [the same] with respect to priestly gifts which he is permitted to separate? We now learn Bet Shammai’s reasoning. They compare hallah and priestly gifts to terumah, the portion of one’s produce that one separates and gives to the priest. Terumah may not be separated on Yom Tov because it can be separated from one’s produce on the day before. Since one is not allowed to separate terumah on Yom Tov it is also forbidden to carry it to the priest. Bet Shammai reasons that the same holds true for the other things which one gives to a priest they too cannot be carried to the priest on Yom Tov. Bet Hillel critiques this analogy. One cannot carry terumah to a priest precisely because one cannot separate it on Yom Tov. However, one may separate hallah and priestly gifts on Yom Tov and therefore one is allowed to carry them to the priest as well. The reason that one may separate hallah and priestly gifts on Yom Tov is that one can slaughter an animal and knead dough on Yom Tov, and when one does so the gifts and hallah must be separated." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with grinding spices on Yom Tov. Everyone agrees that they can be ground. The debate is over whether they can be done in the normal way or they must be done differently somehow.", + "Bet Shammai says: spices may be crushed with a wooden pestle and salt in a small cruse or with a wooden ladle. According to Bet Shammai when one crushes spices on Yom Tov they have to be crushed differently. Normally spices are crushed with a stone pestle on Yom Tov they need to use a wooden pestle. When crushing salt he shouldn’t use a pestle at all, rather he should use a small earthenware cruse and a wooden soup ladle.", + "But Bet Hillel says: spices may be crushed in the usual way with a stone pestle and salt with a wooden pestle. Bet Hillel holds that since it is permitted to crush spices and grind salt on Yom Tov, it is also permissible to crush them in a normal fashion spices with a stone pestle and salt with a wooden pestle." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with how one separates out the dirt and inedible parts from a pile of beans on Yom Tov. “Sorting” is one of the prohibited labors on Shabbat, but it is permitted on Yom Tov because it is done in preparation of food.", + "One who sorts beans on Yom Tov:
Bet Shammai says: he must sort the edible parts and eat [them immediate]. According to Bet Shammai he is not really allowed to sort out the beans and make two piles, one of edible beans and one of dirt and other such yucky stuff. Rather all that he is allowed to do is sort out the beans and either eat them immediately, or put them in water to cook them if they are the type of bean that requires cooking. Again we see that Bet Shammai allows one to prepare food on Yom Tov but requires it to be done in a very minimal way, and with some significant differences from how it is done during the week.", + "But Bet Hillel says: he may sort as usual in his lap or in a basket or in a dish; but not with a board or in a sifter or in a sieve. Bet Hillel allows one to sort beans but only if he does so in a more make-shift fashion, using his lap a basket or a dish. He may not use the instruments that he regularly uses during the week, vessels such as a board, a sifter or a sieve.", + "Rabban Gamaliel says: he may even rinse them [in water] and skim off [the refuse]. Rabban Gamaliel is the most lenient of the opinions in the mishnah. He allows one to sort beans even by rinsing the beans in water and skimming off the refuse that floats to the surface." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn our mishnah the two houses debate what types of food gifts one person may send to his neighbor on Yom Tov. The problem with gifts would occur if they cannot be used on Yom Tov itself.", + "Bet Shammai says: one may not send [gifts to a neighbor] on Yom Tov except portions [of food, ready to be eaten]. Bet Shammai says that one shouldn’t send gifts on Yom Tov unless they are ready to be eaten immediately. Thus one could send pieces of meat or fish that have already been prepared.", + "But Bet Hillel says: one may send cattle, game and poultry whether alive or slaughtered. One may [also] send wine, oil, flour or pulse but not grain. Bet Hillel extends this even more and allows one to send whole live animals to one’s friends, because he could slaughter the animals and eat them on Yom Tov. Bet Hillel also permits one to send other food items to one’s friend on Yom Tov. The only exception is grain. Since grain cannot be ground into flour on Yom Tov, because one can grind it the day before, one cannot send it as a gift on Yom Tov.", + "And Rabbi Shimon permits [even] grain. Rabbi Shimon continues the trend to leniency by allowing one to send even grain. Although one cannot grind the grain on Yom Tov, he is allowed to cook the grain whole and eat it as cereal. In other words, even grain is edible on Yom Tov." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe final mishnah of chapter one discusses sending clothing as a gift on Yom Tov.", + "One may send clothes, whether they are sewn up or not sewn up, and even though there is kil'ayim (mixed wool and in them, provided they are necessary for the festival. On Yom Tov one may send even unfinished clothing which hasn’t been fully sewn because it can be used as a covering, such as a blanket. One can even send clothing that is forbidden to wear because it has a mixture of wool and linen (kilayim, also called shatnez). Although it is forbidden to wear such clothing, it is permitted to hang it up as a decoration and in certain cases to lie on top of it. In other words, as long as there is some potential use to the clothing, he may use it on Yom Tov.", + "But [one may] not [send] nailed sandals nor unfinished shoes. Sandals that have nails in them were not worn on Yom Tov. These seem to have been some sort of work shoe and since one doesn’t work on Yom Tov, one can’t wear them. Since they cannot be worn, they cannot be sent to friends either.", + "Rabbi Judah says: not even white shoes because they [still] require an artisan [to blacken them]. Rabbi Judah says even shoes that are only missing the “finishing touches”, such as white shoes that need to be blackened, cannot be sent on Yom Tov because they are not generally worn.", + "This is the general rule: whatever may be used on Yom Tov may [also] be sent [on Yom Tov]. This is the general rule that summarizes the entire mishnah. If the object could be used as is on Yom Tov, then it can’t be sent. But if it is missing some step in its preparation then it may not be sent because it is not generally used." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with preparing food on Yom Tov to use on Shabbat which falls the day after. While cooking on Yom Tov is permitted, it is only permitted to cook on Yom Tov for that day.\nThis mishnah discusses what is called “eruv tavshilin.” This is a type of “eruv” whereby one begins to cook a meal for Shabbat on the day before Yom Tov which falls before Shabbat. Beginning to cook this meal allows him to cook on Yom Tov for Shabbat. This halakhah is still observed to this day, and if you look in siddurim you will even find a blessing which one recites before setting aside the food.", + "Yom Tov which fell on the eve of Shabbat, one should not begin to cook on Yom Tov for Shabbat. Although one is allowed to cook on Yom Tov, one may not cook food on Yom Tov that will be eaten on the next day, even if the next day is Shabbat. We should note that this would have presented a bigger practical problem in the ancient world than it does today. They did not have preservatives or refrigeration (or those fantastic lock-top plastic containers) and hence it would not have been simple to prepare food for Shabbat on Thursday. Therefore, the remainder of the mishnah seems to present some ways of avoiding this problem.", + "But he may cook for Yom Tov, and if any is left over it is left over for Shabbat. If he cooks on Yom Tov with the intention of eating some of the food on that very day, he may eat on Shabbat whatever food was left over. It would even seem possible to make a large meal on Yom Tov knowing that there would be leftovers and to eat those leftovers on Shabbat.", + "And he may prepare a dish on the eve of Yom Tov and rely upon it [to prepare food] for Shabbat. This is the section that deals with “eruv tavshilin.” A person may begin to make a meal on the day before Yom Tov and then on Yom Tov “continue” to cook the meal. In this way he will not be starting to cook a meal on Yom Tov for Shabbat but rather just continuing a meal that he already began to cook the day before.", + "Bet Shammai says: two dishes. But Bet Hillel says: one dish. Yet they [both] agree that a fish and an egg upon it are [considered as] two dishes. The two houses debate how many different food items he needs to begin to prepare on the day before Yom Tov in order for it to count as an “eruv tavshilin.” According to Bet Shammai a meal consists of at least two dishes therefore he must begin to cook two dishes for it to count. Bet Hillel thinks that a meal need consist of only one dish and hence one dish is sufficient for eruv tavshilin. Bet Shammai however is lenient in what counts as two dishes even a fish with an egg on top of it counts as two dishes.", + "[If] he ate it or it was lost, he may not begin to cook [relying] on it. But if he left over any [small] portion of it, he may rely on it [to cook] for Shabbat. If the eruv tavshilin is eaten or lost before he begins to cook for Shabbat, then he may not rely on it to begin cooking a meal for Shabbat. However, if even a little bit of the eruv still remains before he begins cooking he may rely on it to cook for Shabbat." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn mishnaic times it was customary for people who observed the laws of purity to immerse vessels and for people to immerse before Yom Tov so that everything would be pure. In our mishnah Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel debate whether or not one can immerse on Shabbat in preparation for a Yom Tov which falls on Sunday.", + "If [Yom Tov] fell on the day after Shabbat:
Bet Shammai says: one must immerse everything [unclean] before Shabbat. According to Bet Shammai both vessels and people must be immersed before Shabbat. They hold that it is forbidden to immerse on Shabbat.", + "But Bet Hillel says: vessels [must be immersed] before Shabbat but people [may immerse] on Shabbat. Bet Hillel holds that it is permitted to immerse on Shabbat but that one should nevertheless immerse the vessels before Shabbat. The reason not to immerse the vessels on Shabbat is that by immersing the vessels he makes them usable. This is like “completing a vessel” which is forbidden on Shabbat. However, when a person immerses him/herself it might just look like she/he is washing, and hence it is permitted." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to deal with immersing things on Yom Tov in order to purify them.", + "They agree that one may effect surface contact for [unclean] water in a stone vessel in order to purify it, but one may not immerse [it]; Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel agree that one may purify water on Shabbat that falls the day before Yom Tov. Drinking water was purified by putting it into a stone vessel (a stone vessel cannot become impure). The vessel was then immersed in a pure mikveh until the top of the vessel just touched the water from the mikveh. The reason that a stone vessel was used was to make sure that this was not done in order to purify the vessel, which as we learned yesterday, both Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel prohibit. They both agree that one should not fully immerse the vessel because that would be similar to immersing an unclean vessel in order to purify it. In other words, only the water may be purified but not the vessels. This is also taken to mean that one should not do this with a wooden vessel because wooden vessels become impure through the contact with the unclean water and then they would require immersion.", + "And one may immerse [to change] from one intention to another or from one company to another. If a vessel is already pure it will still need to be immersed if it is going to be used for a “holier” purpose. For instance, if one immersed his vessels to purify them with the intent of using them for non-sacred things, such as regular oil, and then decided he wanted to use them to make terumah wine, he needs to immerse the vessels again. Our mishnah teaches that this is permitted on Shabbat before Yom Tov because the vessels were in any case pure before they were immersed. A person who is pure and is eating non-sacred food with one eating company and then wants to eat terumah with another company must first immerse. Again, this immersion is permitted on Yom Tov even according to Bet Shammai because the person was already pure." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with bringing certain sacrifices on Yom Tov and laying one’s hands upon them (see Leviticus 3:2).", + "Bet Shammai says: one may bring peace-offerings [on Yom Tov] but may not lay [hands] upon them, but one may not bring burnt-offerings [on Yom Tov]. One of the sacrifices which a person would bring on Yom Tov was a peace-offering. Part of the sacrifice would be offered on the altar, part would be eaten by the priests and part would be eaten by those who brought the sacrifice. Since this sacrifice is eaten, Bet Shammai allows one to offer it on Yom Tov. As we have learned before one is allowed to prepare food on Yom Tov, and this includes offering edible sacrifices. However, Bet Shammai holds that one cannot lay his hands on the sacrifice because leaning on an animal is considered using the animal and this is prohibited on Yom Tov. Bet Shammai holds that the laying of the hands must be done the day before. Furthermore, Bet Shammai does not allow the sacrifice of burnt-offerings on Yom Tov, because burnt offerings are completely consumed on the altar. Since they are not eaten they cannot be offered. One who wants to bring a burnt-offering would have to do so on Hol Hamoed, the intermediate days of the festival.", + "Bet Hillel says: one may bring peace-offerings and burnt-offerings and also lay hands upon them. Bet Hillel allows the laying of the hands on the animal since this is part of the sacrificial process. The Talmud also explains that according to Bet Hillel the laying of the hands must be done right before it is offered, and therefore he could not do it before Yom Tov. Bet Hillel also allows burnt offerings to be brought even though they are not eaten, since they are brought in fulfillment of the commandments of the festival." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIt is permitted to make a fire on Yom Tov in order that one can cook food. Our mishnah discusses making a fire so that one can heat up water to wash one’s feet.", + "Bet Shammai says: a man may not heat water for his feet unless it is also fit for drinking. Bet Shammai holds that labors that are permitted on Yom Tov because they are necessary for preparing food are permitted only if they are done in the preparation of food. One may not heat water just to wash one’s body. The only leniency for which Bet Shammai allows is that if one heats up water that is fit for drinking, one can also use it for other purposes. This is similar to cooking on Yom Tov for the day after. If one can eat some of the food cooked on Yom Tov, one is allowed to cook, knowing that there will be leftovers.", + "But Bet Hillel permits it. Bet Hillel generally holds that labors permitted in order to prepare food are permitted even if they are done not to prepare food. Hence, heating water is permitted whether one does so for drinking water or to wash one’s feet.", + "A man may make a fire and warm himself at it. The final clause in the mishnah seems to also go according to Bet Hillel. It is not only permitted to heat water in order to wash one’s feet, one may even make a fire just to keep warm. The reason we might have thought that Bet Hillel prohibits this is that in this case there is no water being heated, water which one could claim one might drink in time of great thirst. This section lets us know that Bet Hillel allows one to make a fire on Yom Tov even if there is no chance that it will lead to food preparation." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nMishnah six contains three cases in which Rabban Gamaliel ruled like Beth Shammai in connection with the laws of Yom Tov. This mishnah is also found in its entirety in tractate Eduyot 3:10.", + "This mishnah lists three cases in which Rabban Gamaliel ruled strictly, as had Bet Shammai. Although later Sages generally ruled like Beth Hillel, there were some exceptions, and some of those are listed in our mishnah.", + "In three cases Rabban Gamaliel was strict like the words of Beth Shammai.
One may not cover up hot food on Yom Tov for Shabbat; As we learned above, it is forbidden to prepare food on Yom Tov for Shabbat, since that would be considered an insult to the honor of the festival. In our mishnah we learn that Bet Shammai and Rabban Gamaliel prohibit one from hiding food in a warm place to preserve its heat for Shabbat (see Shabbat 4:1). This is true even if he made an “eruv tavshilin” because in this case everyone can tell that he is putting food aside just for Shabbat. In contrast, when one cooks, one might be cooking to eat the food on Yom Tov. Bet Hillel would allow one to put food in something that preserves its warmth. For a somewhat different explanation see my commentary on Eduyou 3:10.", + "And one may not join together a lamp on a festival; The Talmud explains that this is a case where a lamp made of several parts breaks on Yom Tov. Rabban Gamaliel forbids one to fix it, since this is a type of “building” which is forbidden on the Sabbath. Beth Hillel holds that there is no prohibition of “building” with regards to erecting vessels, and therefore this is permitted.", + "And one may not bake [on Yom] thick loaves but only wafer-cakes. Rabban Gamaliel holds that it is forbidden to bake large loaves on Yom Tov, and that only thin loaves are permitted. This is meant to prevent one from making too much bread on the festival, lest he make some for after the festival. Beth Hillel holds that it is permitted to bake large loaves, since bread cooks better when the oven is full. Furthermore, Bet Hillel in general is far more lenient when it comes to cooking on Yom Tov.", + "Rabban Gamaliel said: “In all their days, my father’s house never baked large loaves but only wafer-cakes.” They said to him: “What can we do with regards to your father’s house, for they were strict in respect to themselves but were lenient towards Israel to let them bake both large loaves and even charcoal-roasted loaves.” The final section of the mishnah contains some interaction between Rabban Gamaliel and the other sages, who hold like Beth Hillel. Rabban Gamaliel testifies that his father’s house indeed acted in this manner, and only baked wafer-cakes on the festival. The other sages accept this testimony of Rabban Gamaliel as being an accurate description of what Rabban Gamaliel’s father’s house used to do, but they understand its significance differently. The sages say that Rabban Gamaliel’s father’s house was strict upon themselves, but allowed the rest of Israel to cook large loaves, even charcoal roasted loaves which are very difficult to make. The strict actions of Rabban Gamaliel’s father’s house were only meant for themselves and were not meant to set precedent for everyone else." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn mishnah six we learned of three cases where Rabban Gamaliel was strict like Beth Shammai. In mishnah seven we learn three cases where he adopted a more lenient position than the other Sages.", + "Also he declared three decisions of a lenient character:
One may sweep up [on a festival] between the couches, In the time of the Mishnah, during formal meals people would recline on couches on the ground and eat off personal tables which were more like trays. According to Rabban Gamaliel one can sweep up between the couches after the meal on Yom Tov. The Sages forbid this for fear that one might fill in a hole that is in the floor, which could be considered a form of building, which is forbidden on the Sabbath and Yom Tov.", + "And put spices [on the coals] on a festival; As we have learned many times already, cooking food is allowed on Yom Tov. Rabban Gamaliel allowed people to put spices on coals, which would make a pleasant scent. Even though this is not cooking food, it is permitted since it is still a bodily pleasure. The sages forbid doing so since not all people are equally accustomed to put spices on coals after a meal. Cooking food is permitted because everyone eats; putting spices on coals is prohibited because this is not a practice in which all classes of people engage.", + "And roast a kid whole on the night of Passover. But the sages forbid them. When there was a Temple in Jerusalem, people would roast kids (lambs, not the human kind) as Passover sacrifices on the day before Passover and eat them at night. When the Temple was destroyed in 70 C.E. sacrifices could no longer be offered. Nevertheless, Rabban Gamaliel permitted people to make roasted kids at their own seders. The other Sages forbid this, lest someone think that they were eating sacrificial meat outside of Jerusalem (for more on this topic see Pesahim 7:1)." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nMishnah twelve contains three cases where Rabbi Elazar ben Azaryah was more lenient than the other Sages. We should note that not all of these sections deal with the laws of Yom Tov.", + "Rabbi Eleazar ben Azariah allows three things and the Sages forbid them:
His cow used to go out with the strap which she had between her horns; It is forbidden to carry things in the public domain on Shabbat. This is true even for a person’s animal, since it is forbidden to make one’s animal perform work on the Sabbath. Rabbi Eleazar ben Azariah allowed his cow to go out with a strap between its horns, since this strap was only an adornment and therefore he did not consider it “work”. In the same way a person can wear clothing in the public domain and that is not considered carrying. However, the Sages forbid cows from carrying anything, since most cows do not do so. Furthermore, if others were to see this they would think that it is permitted for an animal to work on the Sabbath. (See also Shabbat 5:4).", + "One may curry cattle on a festival; Currying is a type of combing done with a sharp metal comb. Rabbi Eleazar permits a person to curry an animal on the festival, even though that might cause a wound. Rabbi Eleazar permits this since even if he does cause a wound he did not intend to do so and unintentionally performed work is permitted on Shabbat and Yom Tov.", + "And one may grind pepper in its own mill. Rabbi Elazar holds that grinding pepper is permitted on Yom Tov because it is done in preparation of food, even if the grinding is done in a large mill. The sages however allow the grinding of pepper only in a small mill, one which will produce less ground pepper and that is easier.", + "Rabbi Judah says: one may not curry cattle on a festival, because it may cause a wound, but one may comb them. Rabbi Judah states that currying is forbidden since it will cause a wound, but combing with a wooden comb is permitted since it will not cause a wound.", + "But the Sages say: one may not curry them, and one may not even comb them. The Sages rule even more strictly. Even combing is forbidden, lest by permitting combing one might assume that currying is also permitted." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is brought here on account of section three in yesterday’s mishnah which dealt with using a pepper-mill on Yom Tov. As an aside, the mishnah teaches the susceptibility of a pepper-mill to impurities.", + "A pepper-mill is susceptible to impurity on account of [it consisting of] three [separate] utensils; on account of a receptacle, on account of a metal utensil and on account of a sifting utensil. A pepper-mill has three separate parts. Our mishnah teaches that each part is itself considered a “vessel” and therefore each part on its own can receive impurities. If one of the parts should break, while it can no longer become impure, because broken vessels are not receptive to impurities, the other two parts can still become impure. The bottom part of the pepper-mill is a wooden receptacle for the ground pepper. All vessels which have a receptacle are susceptible to impurity. The top part is made of metal. This is the part that grinds the pepper. It is susceptible to impurity because it is metal and all metal vessels are susceptible to impurity, even if they don’t have a receptacle. The middle part of the pepper-mill sifts the ground pepper. Some commentators explain that since some of the pepper gets stuck here, this part is also considered to be a receptacle and hence susceptible to impurity." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is here because of its connection with the previous mishnah, and not because of any connection with the laws of Yom Tov. It continues to deal with the impurity of vessels.", + "A child’s cart is susceptible to the impurity of midras, and it may be handled on Shabbat, and it is dragged along only on matting. A child’s cart is one that a small child would push around while learning how to walk (today these make sounds and have spinning things to keep your child entertained while you fold the laundry). Since the cart is made to lean upon, it can receive a type of impurity called “midras.” “Midras” means pressure. A zav or a zavah (a man or woman with an abnormal genital discharge) who steps, sits, lies or leans upon this cart, in other words applies bodily pressure to the cart, will render it impure. This type of impurity is derived from Leviticus 15:4. The cart may be handled on Shabbat and on Yom Tov. It is not muktzeh. However, it is forbidden to drag it along the ground because it will make grooves in the ground. This is a forbidden labor on Shabbat and on Yom Tov which is derived from the forbidden labor of plowing. The only way to use it is to drag it on some type of matting.", + "Rabbi Judah says: no vessels may be dragged along [the ground] except a wagon because it [only] presses [the earth] down. Rabbi Judah holds that the cart is the one type of vessel that may be dragged on the ground on Shabbat. All other vessels when dragged will create grooves in the ground. The cart when dragged will only press down the ground, without creating grooves. Hence, your little toddler can push his little cart knowing that he is not violating Shabbat." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with catching fish, fowl or game on Yom Tov. While slaughtering an animal is permitted on Yom Tov because it is done in the preparation of food, catching is not permitted because it could have been done the day before. Our mishnah defines what is considered “catching.” As an aside, the word in Hebrew for “catching” or “trapping” animals, fish or fowl is the same word as for hunting. However, I have translated the word as “catching” because hunting, that is killing the animal while catching it, is not allowed.", + "One may not catch fish from a fishpond on Yom Tov nor give them food, While fish in a pond are already to a certain extent trapped in a small enclosure, they still must be caught in order to eat them. Since catching a fish from a fish pond is still considered catching it is therefore forbidden on Yom Tov. It is forbidden to feed these fish lest by doing so he come to catch one of them.", + "But one may catch game or fowl from animal enclosures and one may put food before them. However, an animal which is trapped in a small enclosure is considered to already have been caught and hence one may “catch” such an animal or fowl on Yom Tov. Since it is permitted to catch them, he may also put food in front of them.", + "Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: not all enclosures are alike. This is the general rule: anything that still needs to be trapped is forbidden but anything that need not be trapped is permitted. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel points out that not all enclosures are alike. Fish in a bucket are basically already caught, whereas a deer in a very large pen is not caught. The general rule is that anything that still needs to be caught may not be caught on Yom Tov." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn yesterday’s mishnah we learned that one may not hunt (trap) animals on Yom Tov because he could do it the day before. Today we learn about taking animals out of traps on Yom Tov when the traps were set before Yom Tov.", + "Traps for wild animals, birds or fish which were set on the eve of Yom Tov, one may not take from them on Yom Tov unless he knows that they were [already] caught on the eve of Yom Tov. If the animals, birds or fish were caught in the traps the day before Yom Tov it would be permitted to take them out and slaughter them on Yom Tov. However, if they were trapped on Yom Tov then they are muktzeh because they could not have been used when Yom Tov began. When Yom Tov began he would have still had to trap them and trapping is prohibited on Yom Tov. If he finds them in the traps on Yom Tov he cannot use them unless he knows for certain that they were caught before Yom Tov. According to this opinion, something that is “doubtful muktzeh”, meaning it might or might not be muktzeh, it is prohibited.", + "It once happened that a certain non-Jew brought fish to Rabban Gamaliel [on Yom Tov] and he said: they are permitted, but I have no wish to accept [them] from him. In this story we see that Rabban Gamaliel disagrees with the previous clause. The non-Jew brings him a fish as a gift and we don’t know whether he caught the fish the day before or today. Rabban Gamaliel states that the fish is permitted because he holds that doubtful muktzeh is permitted. However, he adds that he himself acts more stringently and therefore he refuses to accept the fish. Note that we also saw in the previous chapter that Rabban Gamaliel acted strictly with regard to himself." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn this mishnah we learn two laws concerning slaughtering an animal on Yom Tov.", + "One may not slaughter [on Yom Tov] an animal which is about to die unless there is time enough on that day to eat from it as much as an olive of roasted flesh. Rabbi Akiva says: even [if there is only time to eat] as much as an olive of raw flesh [taken] from the place of slaughter. Slaughtering on Yom Tov is permitted as long as the person will have time left over in the day to eat some of the animal’s meat. If there is no time to eat any part of the animal then he can’t slaughter it because he would be doing so in order to eat it on another day. In the case in our mishnah it is clear that the person wants to slaughter the animal on Yom Tov because the animal is getting sick and if it dies he won’t be able to eat it. Even though it is clear that he is slaughtering it only in order to preserve some of its value, and that eating it is a sort of legal fiction, he still may do so, provided there is time left in the day for him to roast a small piece of meat and eat it. Roasting is the quickest form of cooking, hence the mishnah mentions roasting. Note that he does not actually have to roast and eat some of the meat, there just has to be time for him to do so. Rabbi Akiva is even more lenient and allows one to slaughter the animal even if there is only enough time to rip out a small piece of flesh from the animal’s throat (“the place of slaughter) and eat it raw. Rabbi Akiva mentions taking the meat out from the throat because to do this he wouldn’t even need to skin the animal. It seems even clearer here that this is not actually going to be done there just needs to be enough time so that it could have been done.", + "If he slaughtered it in the field, he may not bring it in on a pole or a barrow, but he may bring it in piece by piece in his hand. The mishnah rules that if someone slaughters an animal in the field he should not hoist it up on a pole or put it in a wheelbarrow in order to bring it back into his courtyard or other living quarters. Doing so would look too much like ordinary weekday work and hence it should be avoided on Yom Tov. Rather he may carry it back home piece by piece, a more modest act that others will notice less. Note that in this case there are values competing against one another. Carrying it back piece by piece is more work for him and nevertheless the mishnah recommends doing so to avoid the act looking like weekday work. To put this otherwise, the mishnah preserves the overall communal character of the day as a day free from work at the expense of the individual’s own experience." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nA first-born animal may not be eaten until it becomes blemished (Deuteronomy 15:21-22). Experts would determine whether an animal was blemished. Our mishnah deals with a first-born that fell into a pit on Yom Tov and may have been blemished there. The debate is over whether they may send down an expert to see if the animal had become blemished and if so, bring it up and slaughter it on Yom Tov.", + "A first-born beast that fell into a pit:
Rabbi Judah says: let an expert go down and inspect [it]. If it had a blemish he may bring it up and slaughter it, but if not, he may not slaughter it. Rabbi Judah allows the expert to go down into the pit to examine the animal. If the animal is blemished they may bring the animal out of the pit and slaughter it on Yom Tov. But if there is no blemish he may not slaughter it nor may he even bring it up from the pit.", + "Rabbi Shimon says: any animals whose blemish was not observed on the day before the Yom Tov, it is not prepared (. Rabbi Shimon holds that even if the animal should be found to have a blemish, they still may not bring it out of the pit and slaughter it on Yom Tov because when Yom Tov began that animal could not be slaughtered. The animal was not “mukhan”, or ready. Mukhan is the opposite muktzeh. The animal is muktzeh because when Yom Tov began it could not be used for food because it was still a first-born on whom no blemish had been found." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with what may be done with a beast (a cow, sheep, goat or bull) that has died on Yom Tov.", + "If a beast died [on Yom Tov] it may not be moved from its place. Since the beast died and was not slaughtered, it cannot be eaten. Since it cannot be eaten there is nothing that one may do with it on Yom Tov. Hence, it is muktzeh. All that he can do is leave it in its place and then when Yom Tov is over he can cut it up, use its hide and feed dogs with its meat.", + "And it happened that they once asked Rabbi Tarfon concerning this and concerning hallah that had become defiled. He went into the bet midrash and inquired, and they answered him: they may not be moved from their place. The mishnah now relates that this halakhah was asked of Rabbi Tarfon and he didn’t know the answer until he went and asked the question in the study house, the bet midrash. He also was asked about hallah, the part of the dough that is given to the priest, that had become impure on Yom Tov. Impure hallah, like an animal that died without being slaughtered, cannot be eaten and hence it is also muktzeh on Yom Tov. The answer therefore to both questions was that both are muktzeh and that neither can be moved until Yom Tov is over." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nAs we have learned many times, it is permitted to slaughter an animal on Yom Tov. In the mishnaic times most people would have bought shares in an animal from a butcher before the day the animal was slaughtered and then paid for it on the day it was slaughtered. Our mishnah teaches how this arrangement may be worked out so that people may buy freshly slaughtered meat on Yom Tov without it looking as if they are conducting business as usual.", + "They may not be counted as having a share in an animal at the outset on Yom Tov, but they may be counted [as having a share in an animal] on the eve of Yom Tov, and they may then slaughter it and divide it between them [on Yom Tov]. People may not go to a butcher on Yom Tov and decide how to divide up and pay for an animal that is to be slaughtered on that day. The problem with this is that it looks too much like one is engaging in business as usual. Hence it is prohibited. Rather what they may do is divvy up the various parts of the animal before Yom Tov before it is slaughtered and set a price for each part. Then on Yom Tov they may come have the butcher slaughter the animal and collect the parts which they reserved and pay for them at a later date. Since there is no verbal give and take on Yom Tov, it does not look as much like business as usual.", + "Rabbi Judah says: a man may weigh meat [on Yom Tov] against a utensil or against a butcher's chopper. But the sages say: one may not pay attention to the scales at all. The debate here is concerning weighing out meat at the butcher’s on Yom Tov. All agree that the butcher cannot just weigh out meat as usual, using weights on the scale, because that looks too much like conducting business as usual. They also all agree that one can go to a butcher and get meat on Yom Tov. This is necessary to ensure that the average person has access to fresh meat so that he can enjoy his Yom Tov to the fullest extent. As a solution to the problem of the butcher weighing out the meat, Rabbi Judah says that the butcher may use other utensils on the other side of the scales. For instance, if he knows that his chopping knife weighs 2 kilo, he can weigh out meat according to the weight of his knife. This looks different enough that everyone will know that he is not engaging in business as usual. The sages say that this is still too much like business as usual. The sages forbid any use of the scales on Yom Tov. All that the butcher and client may do is estimate the weight of the meat and then hope that it turns out to be fair." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to deal with the laws of slaughtering and divvying up meat on Yom Tov.", + "One may not sharpen a knife on a festival, but one may draw it over another knife. He shouldn’t sharpen a knife with a sharpening stone on Yom Tov because this is similar to completing work on a vessel which is forbidden on Yom Tov. Furthermore, he could have sharpened the knife before Yom Tov. However, if he sharpens it in an unusual manner, by using another knife, then it is permitted.", + "A man may not say to a butcher, “Weigh me a dinar’s worth of meat” but he may slaughter [the animal] and shares it among them. This section returns to discussing the problem discussed in yesterday’s mishnah, the problem of buying meat on Yom Tov. One cannot tell a butcher to give him a piece of meat worth a certain amount of money because this is considered conducting business as usual on Yom Tov, which is forbidden. This is forbidden even if he weighs the meat out in a manner that is usually permitted, as we learned in yesterday’s mishnah. Merely mentioning the price seems to be forbidden. However, the butcher may slaughter the animal and divide it up among his clients keeping in mind how much each owes him." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nAfter having dealt with how one may get meat from a butcher on Yom Tov, our mishnah deals with how one can buy other food supplies from others or from a storekeeper.\nWe will see again that the mishnah is very concerned with protecting the atmosphere of Yom Tov. Cooking is permitted and therefore we must allow people to get things at the store (remember they had no refrigeration and probably stored very little food at home), but when they do so they should refrain from any action that would send the message that business is being conducted as usual.", + "A man may say [on Yom Tov] to his fellow, “Fill me this vessel,” but not in a specific measure. A person can bring a vessel to his friend or to a storekeeper and ask him to fill it up for him on Yom Tov with wine or oil but he may not mention to him a specific amount. Since this is not the way that business is usually conducted it is permitted on Yom Tov.", + "Rabbi Judah says: if it was a measuring-vessel he may not fill it. Rabbi Judah says that this is not permitted if the vessel is one used for measuring. Although the person does not mention a specific amount, in other words, he does not say, “fill up this ten liter jug”, it is still forbidden because both he and the person giving him the wine or oil know exactly how much is being given.", + "It happened that Abba Shaul ben Batnit used to fill up his measures on the eve of Yom Tov and give them to his customers on Yom Tov. Abba Shaul says: he used to do so even during hol hamoed (the intermediate days of the, on account of clarifying the measures. But the sages say: he used also to do so on an ordinary day for the sake of the draining of the measures. In order to avoid the problem of measuring out wine or oil when giving it out on Yom Tov, Abba Shaul ben Batnit used to fill his measuring vessels before Yom Tov and then just give them out on Yom Tov. Abba Shaul says that Abba Shaul ben Batnit used to do the same thing on the intermediate days of the festival, hol hamoed. During these days people were not supposed to be doing work (we will learn this in Tractate Moed Katan) and so they had time to learn how to measure things out. Because there were so many people who came to him, he didn’t have time to fill up all of the measuring vessels that they should be completely full without any froth. Therefore he filled them up at night. Good manuscripts of the Mishnah do not contain the words “on account of clarifying the measures.” Indeed there is another explanation in the Talmud. There it says “on account of not attending the Bet Midrash.” Abba Shaul ben Batnit filled up his measuring vessels early so that he could spend all of hol hamoed teaching Torah. Rashi explains that many people would come to see him on hol hamoed because they were free from doing work, and hence he didn’t want to waste any time filling up his measures. Notice Abba Shaul ben Batnit was a businessman he just made sure that he conducted his business in a manner in which he could still teach and learn Torah. The sages say that Abba Shaul ben Batnit always filled up his measuring vessels ahead of time, even on ordinary weekdays. He would then pour from his vessels into his customers’ vessels and then wait overnight and fill them up more, depending upon how much the clay vessel had soaked up into its walls. This was his way of making sure that his customers received the full amount that they paid for.", + "A man may go to a shopkeeper to whom he generally goes and say to him, “Give me [so many] eggs and nuts” since this is the way of a householder to reckon in his own home. A person can go to a storekeeper with whom he is familiar, one that will give him food now and not make him pay back until a later day. To this storekeeper he may even tell the number of eggs or nuts that he wants. This does not look like “business as usual” because the customer does not usually count the eggs or nuts until he goes home." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nEven though carrying is allowed on Yom Tov, he should not carry things the same way that he carries things during the week because this makes it look like “business as usual.”", + "One who carries jars of wine from place to place, he may not carry them in a basket or in a large basket, but he may carry [them] on his shoulder or in front of him. It is permitted to carry jars of wine from place to place on Yom Tov, as long as one is within the Shabbat border limit. However, when carrying them he should not carry them in the same manner that he does during the week (non-Yom Tov). What he should do is carry them with his hands on his shoulder or in front of him, held against his body. This looks less like he is delivering merchandise and more like he is just bringing wine to a friend’s house.", + "Similarly, one who brings straw, he may no drape a large basket over his back, rather he must carry it in his hand. Basically, the same holds true for carrying straw used for lighting a fire or for animal feed.", + "And one may start [using] a heap of straw, but [one may] not [start using wood] from the back-yard. This third section deals with the concept of muktzeh something is prohibited if it was not designated for use on Yom Tov. He may use the heap of straw even though he did not specifically designate it and has never used that heap before. This is because heaps of straw are automatically set aside for use and do not require any special and intentional designation that they will be used on Yom Tov. In contrast, wood which is in the backyard is not necessarily designated to be used for something that can be done on Yom Tov and one cannot begin to use from that wood on Yom Tov. Indeed, the Hebrew word in this mishnah for backyard is muktzeh because in that area one sets aside things that one doesn’t have a specific intention to use (for those of you learning modern Hebrew, muktzeh is most definitely not a word for backyard.)" + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with the places where a person can collect kindling wood in order to cook on Yom Tov.", + "One may not take wood from a sukkah but only from [what is] next to it. The “sukkah” referred to here is not a sukkah used on the festival of Sukkot, but rather a sort of hut used for shade by farmers out in the field. It is forbidden to take wood that was used in building the sukkah because this is considered “tearing down” which is forbidden on Shabbat and Yom Tov. However, he may take the wood gathered next to the sukkah.", + "One may bring in from the field wood that is gathered together, and from a karpef [an enclosure] even though it is scattered about. He can bring in wood from the field if it has already been gathered together. However, if it is scattered then it is muktzeh because there was no intent to use that wood for building a fire, and therefore he may not bring it in. From a karpef, a type of enclosure used for storage (see also Eruvin 2:3, 2:5 and 5:2) he may gather even loose wood. Since this wood was put into an enclosure, it has already been designated for use and it is not muktzeh.", + "What is a karpef? Any [enclosure] next to the town, the words of Rabbi Judah. Rabbi Yose says: Any [enclosure] which one enters with a key, even if it is [only just] within the Shabbat border. In this section Rabbi Judah and Rabbi Yose debate from what kind of a karpef he can bring in wood. According to Rabbi Judah the karpef has to be close to the city, since only if it is close to the city does he intend to use it on Yom Tov. Rabbi Yose says that the criterion is that the karpef is locked and can only be opened with a key. The wood in such a karpef is not muktzeh, even if the karpef is not next to the city. However, the karpef must be within the Shabbat limit (2,000 cubits in all directions), otherwise he won’t be able to even get there." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first topic of this mishnah is chopping wood to make firewood on Yom Tov. The second topic is opening up a sealed storage room to take out produce. Both of these topics touch at least indirectly upon the subject of muktzeh.", + "One may not chop up wood, neither from beams nor from a beam which was broken on Yom Tov. This first section is concerned with chopping wood from a beam that was not designated for use as firewood before Yom Tov began. One may not chop up a beam that was meant to be used in building because it is muktzeh before Yom Tov there was no intention to use it for fire. Even if the beam breaks on Yom Tov and is now only good for lighting fires, he can’t chop it up into firewood because when Yom Tov began it was muktzeh. Only if it was broken before Yom Tov can he chop it up.", + "And one may not chop with an axe or with a saw or with a sickle but only with a [butcher's] chopper. This section refers to wood that one is allowed to chop up on Yom Tov. Even though it is permitted to do so, one shouldn’t do so in a normal fashion because this looks too much like “business as usual.” One shouldn’t use the normal instruments but rather a butcher’s knife, one usually used for cutting bones and meat. This requirement will probably make people prefer to chop up their wood before Yom Tov begins chopping wood with a butcher’s knife won’t make the butcher very happy and it’s not a good idea to tick off people who own big knives.", + "A [closed] room full of produce which was burst open [on Yom Tov] he may take [produce] out through the breach. Rabbi Meir says: he may make a hole at the outset and bring out [the produce]. This section refers to a storage room that has been closed off by a row of bricks that have not been cemented together. According to the first opinion, if some of the bricks should fall away he may go into the room through the opening and take out the produce and use it on Yom Tov. Since there was no cement sealing the bricks together, the produce is not considered muktzeh. However, according to this opinion, he may not himself remove the bricks because this is too close to “tearing down” a building, a prohibited labor on Shabbat and Yom Tov. Concerning this last ruling, Rabbi Meir disagrees. Since the bricks were not cemented together, he may even take them down and create a new opening on Yom Tov." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with several laws concerning the use and production of lamps on Yom Tov.", + "One may not make a hole in a [lump of clay for use as a] lamp because that is making a vessel. Lamps in mishnaic times were basically lumps of clay with a receptacle for oil and a small hole in which one could put a wick. While lighting a lamp is allowed on Yom Tov, making a lamp is not. One may not make a hole in a lump of clay in order to make it into a lamp because making a vessel is forbidden on Yom Tov.", + "One may not make charcoal on Yom Tov. Charcoal is also considered to be a vessel, or at least as important as a vessel. Therefore it is forbidden to make charcoal on Yom Tov.", + "And one may not cut a wick into two. Rabbi Judah says: he may cut it into two lamps using a fire. Cutting a piece of twine or other material into two in order to make two wicks is also considered similar to making a vessel and is therefore prohibited on Yom Tov. Rabbi Judah says that while one cannot cut the twine into two with a knife or scissors, he can cut it into two by using fire. The Talmud explains that he places two lamps next to each other and one wick in the two lamps, one end in each. He then lights the wick in the middle and it will split in two." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with certain preparations made in order to facilitate cooking.", + "One may not break up a potsherd or cut paper in order to roast on it a salty fish. When grilling a fish it would often be put on a broken shard of a pottery or on a piece of paper in order to prevent it from being burned. The mishnah considers breaking some pottery or cutting a piece of paper to be used as such to be “making a vessel” which is not permitted on Yom Tov.", + "And one may not rake out an oven or a range, but one may press [the ashes] down. One should not rake out the ashes and dirt from an oven or a range. This is also considered to be “making a vessel” because it makes the oven usable. However, it is permitted to “press down” the ashes, which seems to be a means of getting them out of the way in order to facilitate cooking. The Rambam notes that if one cannot cook unless the ashes are raked out, he may do so because one is allowed to cook on Yom Tov.", + "And one may not place two jars side by side in order to balance upon them saucepan. Putting two jars next to each other so that there is a fire in between them and then balancing a pan upon them is like building a makeshift range. This is prohibited because it is forbidden to build on Yom Tov.", + "And one may not prop up a pot with a wooden wedge and the same applies to a door. One may not use small pieces of wood to prop things up on Yom Tov because the wood was intended to be used as kindling. All other uses are prohibited.", + "And one may not drive cattle with a staff on a festival. But Rabbi Elazar the son of Rabbi Shimon permits it. According to the Talmud, one may not drive cattle with a stick because it looks like he is bringing them to the marketplace to sell. Rabbi Elazar disagrees." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn the middle of yesterday’s mishnah we learned that chips of wood can be used only as kindling. Today’s mishnah continues to discuss this subject.", + "Rabbi Eliezer says: a man may take a chip from that which is lying before him to pick his teeth with it, and he may collect [chips] from the court yard and make a fire, for everything in a court is prepared [for use on Yom Tov]. Rabbi Eliezer says that one may take a chip of wood that is lying inside his house and use it to pick his teeth clean (aren’t you glad we have toothbrushes). From outside the house one may collect chips of wood and use them to build a fire because according to Rabbi Eliezer all chips of wood are “prepared” to be used as wood for a fire that is they are not muktzeh.", + "But the sages say: he may collect only from that which is before him and make a fire. The sages disagree with Rabbi Eliezer on two accounts. First of all, one cannot gather wood from outside the house because it was not designated for use on Yom Tov. Only the wood from inside the house that has been set aside for use can be used. Secondly, they hold that wood can only be used to build a fire. It cannot be used to pick one’s teeth (sorry if you’re a dentist)." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first section of this mishnah teaches that it is forbidden to produce new fire on Yom Tov. This is related to the prohibition of “muktzeh” which was the topic of yesterday’s mishnah. The second half of the mishnah continues to deal with the laws of muktzeh.", + "One may not produce fire either from wood, or from stones, or from dirt, or from water (. While one is allowed to use fire on Shabbat, one is not allowed to create a new fire by “bringing it out” of a substance such as wood (rubbing sticks together) or from stones (striking a stone against another) or dirt (I don’t really know how this was done) or from water, which is the mishnah’s word for gas. We should remember that today creating new fire is exceedingly easy one just flicks a lighter or strikes a match. In ancient times starting a new fire would have been difficult. Most fire was probably just passed from one existing fire to another. The rabbis prohibited creating a new fire because it didn’t exist before Yom Tov began, much as they forbid the egg that was laid on Yom Tov in the first mishnah of this tractate.", + "Nor may one make tiles red-hot in order to roast on them. It is also forbidden to heat up tiles to cook on them because by heating them up he is forging them. This is considered like completing the making of a vessel which is forbidden on Yom Tov.", + "Rabbi Eliezer further said: A man may stand near his “muktzeh” on the eve of Shabbat in the sabbatical year and say: “From here I will eat tomorrow.” But the sages say: [This doesn’t work] unless he marks it out and says, “From here to there.” These words of Rabbi Eliezer are a continuation of his words above in mishnah six, which dealt with muktzeh. The word “muktzeh” here refers, according to its accepted interpretation, to a place where a person has set his fruit to dry out (dates, figs and grapes). In order for these fruits to be available for use on Yom Tov, in other words in order for the things in the “muktzeh” to not be “muktzeh”, one must designate them for use before Yom Tov. Furthermore, this can only happen on the Sabbatical year during which one doesn’t have to separate tithes. During the other years because the fruit in the muktzeh has not generally been tithed, and it is forbidden to tithe on Yom Tov, one cannot eat them on Yom Tov even if he had designated them for use. He could only eat them if they had already been tithed. The mishnah now brings a debate concerning how one designates drying fruit for use. According to Rabbi Eliezer all one needs to do is say “From here I will eat.” The rabbis are stricter and rule that he must point specifically to the area of fruit from which he will eat. Just as Rabbi Eliezer was more lenient in mishnah six, so too he is more lenient than the other sages here." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to deal with laws concerning fruit set out to dry and things that one may and may not do with this fruit on Yom Tov.", + "One may let down fruit through a trap-door on Yom Tov but not on Shabbat. This section deals with a person who has put his fruit up onto his roof to dry out on Yom Tov and then he sees that it is going to rain. The mishnah allows him to drop the fruit down through a trap-door in the roof because this is not considered to be a lot of work. He would not be allowed to take them down through a window or through the door because this is a greater amount of work. Furthermore, they only allowed this on Yom Tov on Shabbat it was prohibited.", + "And one may cover up fruit with vessels on account of the rain, and likewise jars of wine and jars of oil. One also may cover up fruit, jars of wine and jars of oil if rain is leaking down on them. Covering up fruit or bringing it into the house so it doesn’t get wet are activities done not in order to eat the fruit on Yom Tov, but they are nevertheless permitted in order to prevent the financial loss.", + "And one may place a vessel beneath the drops of rain [even] on Shabbat. On Shabbat one can even put a vessel underneath drops of rain coming down from a leaky roof." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis long mishnah deals with three categories of acts that are prohibited by the rabbis on Shabbat and on Yom Tov. They are all considered to be prohibited “derabbanan”, by the rabbis and not by the Torah. The three categories are:\nShevut mandated rest on Shabbat. These are activities that are prohibited because they are generally not in the spirit of the day or because by doing one of them one might come to transgress a biblical prohibition.\nReshut optional activities. These have some aspect of mitzvah in them but can be done on other days. Therefore one doesn’t do them on Yom Tov or Shabbat.\nMitzvah these are commandments that can be performed on other days and therefore shouldn’t be done on Shabbat.\nThe main point of the mishnah is that the only actions which are allowed on Yom Tov but prohibited on Shabbat those done while preparing food. All of the other Shabbat prohibitions still hold true.", + "Every [act] for which one is liable on Shabbat because of mandated rest [shevut], [or] because it is only optional [reshut], [or] even though it is a religious act [mitzvah], he is also liable on Yom Tov.
For the following acts he is liable because of shevut: One may not climb a tree, And one may not ride on an animal. And one may not swim in water. And one may not clap hands, nor slap [thighs], nor dance. Climbing a tree is forbidden lest one breaks a branch, which is forbidden to do on Shabbat. Riding an animal is considered prohibited lest one while riding break a branch to use as a switch in guiding an animal. It seems that a deeper reason for why the rabbis prohibited this was that they did not believe that riding an animal was in the spirit of Shabbat. Swimming was prohibited lest while swimming one makes a raft on which to float. Finally, certain types of clapping, slapping of thighs and dancing were prohibited on Shabbat lest one begin to make music and then come to make a musical instrument. We should note that some of these activities are no longer generally prohibited because the likelihood that by doing one of them one will come to transgress a more serious commandment is minimal. In my mind the most important thing to remember is that while one follows the minutiae of Shabbat, one should also be mindful of the spirit of Shabbat. Even things that are permitted should not always be done.", + "For the following acts he is liable because they are only optional: One may not judge; And one may not betroth a wife, nor perform halizah, nor perform yibbum [consumate a levirate marriage]. This section contains activities that have some aspect of “commandment” to them but can be done on other days. Judging, betrothing and other legal aspects of arranging various types of marriages can be done any day of the week, therefore one should not do them on Shabbat. In my opinion, this is again because these activities are not in the “spirit of Shabbat.” They might detract from the special sanctity of Shabbat, a day set aside. A more technical reason why these things are prohibited is that by doing one of them one might come to write.", + "And for the following acts one is liable even though it is a religious act [mitzvah]: One may not dedicate [anything to the Temple], nor vow a personal valuation, nor make a vow of herem, nor set aside terumah or tithes. These acts are actually mitzvot, but still one may not perform them on Shabbat or Yom Tov because they can all be done with as much ease on other days. The Rambam explains that donating something to the Temple is similar to engaging in business and hence one does not do so on Shabbat. One does not separate tithes or terumah on Yom Tov or Shabbat because by doing so one “fixes” something to make it usable. Also, this could have just as easily been done the day before.", + "All these things they [the rabbis said that they are forbidden] on Yom Tov, how much more so [are they forbidden] on Shabbat. There is no difference between Yom Tov and Shabbat except for the preparation of food alone. In conclusion the mishnah notes that when discussing the laws of Yom Tov the rabbis prohibited these activities, but they are nevertheless even more prohibited on Shabbat. The mishnah reminds us that the only type of activity which is permitted on Yom Tov but not on Shabbat is something done while preparing food." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe final three mishnayot of the chapter discuss Shabbat border limits, a topic which was discussed in far greater length in tractate Eruvin. The Shabbat border limit is 2000 cubits to each side of the city. One can set up an eruv, a meal, at the end of the limit and thereby extend it another 2000 cubits in that direction. This extension only works in extending is Shabbat border limit in one direction and causes him to lose a matching amount of distance on the opposite side of the city. Hence, one who sets up an eruv at the end of 2000 cubits on the western side of the city can now go 4000 cubits in that direction but cannot go outside the city at all on the eastern side. Our mishnah teaches that these limits apply not only to the person himself but to his animals and his utensils as well.", + "A beast and utensils are [restricted to the same limits] as the feet of the owners. As stated in the introduction, just as a person cannot go past his own personal Shabbat border limit, so too the things that belong to him cannot beyond that point.", + "One who gives his cow over to his son or to a cowherd [to tend], they are [restricted to the same limits] as the feet of the owner. The mishnah adds that if a person gives his cow over to someone just to watch it, then the cow stays under the possession of the owner and may only go as far as the owner may go on Shabbat. Therefore, if the owner set his eruv to the west side of the city, his son or his cowherd may not take the cow outside the city on the eastern side.", + "Vessels which have been set apart for [the use or] one of the brothers in a house, are [restricted to the same limits] as his feet, but [those utensils] which have not been so set apart, can be taken [only] to a place where [all the brothers] may go. If a vessel (in Hebrew the word for “vessel” includes clothing, bedding and many more objects than the word connotes in English) belonged jointly to some brothers but one brother generally used it, then it can go on Shabbat to any place where that brother may go. So if that brother set his eruv to the west, that vessel can go to the west. However, if all brothers make use of the vessel than it can only go to a place where all of the brothers can go. So if one brother set his eruv to the north and one to the south then the vessel can’t leave the city at all because each brother prevents the other one from bringing the vessel to “his” side." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to deal with the Shabbat/Yom Tov border limits placed on things. Since the mishnah deals with carrying, the rules are only applicable to Yom Tov on Shabbat all carrying is prohibited.", + "One who borrows a vessel from his neighbor on the eve of Yom Tov, [it is restricted to the same limits] as the feet of the borrower. [But if he borrowed it] on Yom Tov, it is as the feet of the lender. If one borrows an object it is considered as if the object belongs to the borrower and therefore it can go on Yom Tov to any place where he/she may go. However, this is only true if he borrowed it the day before Yom Tov, such that when Yom Tov began the object was in his possession. In other words, the border limits of the object are determined by the one who possessed the object when Yom Tov began. If he borrowed it on Yom Tov then it can go only where the feet of the lender can go.", + "A woman who borrowed from her neighbor spices, water or salt for her dough, these are [restricted to the same limits] as the feet of both them. Rabbi Judah exempts in the case of water, because it is not substantial. In this case a woman borrows some ingredients from another woman to use them in making dough on Yom Tov. Some of the ingredients therefore belong to the lender and some belong to the borrower. Since the ownership is mixed (like the dough) the dough can only go to a place where they both can go. This again means that if one set an eruv to the south and one to the north, the dough cannot leave the city at all. Rabbi Judah says that if all she borrowed was water then the dough is not restricted by the lender since the water is not substantial enough. Water is not recognized in the final product or its taste and therefore it doesn’t count towards where the dough can go." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first section of the mishnah teaches that while a live coal is considered as having substance, a flame does not have any substance.\nThe second half of the mishnah deals with the restrictions on the carrying of water drawn from a well.", + "A live coal is [restricted to the same limits] as its owner, but a flame can be taken anywhere. A live coal, one that is burning, is considered to be an object of substance and therefore it is limited to going where its owner can go. In contrast, a flame has no substance and therefore is not limited in where it can go. What this means is that a person could take a lamp and light it from somewhat else’s lamp and then not be limited by the other person’s eruv. The flame that he “takes” from another person has no substance so it is not like borrowing something from another person.", + "In respect of a live coal of sanctified property [one who makes use of it] is considered as having trespassed, but as for a flame [of sanctified property], one may not derive benefit from it, but [one who does] has not trespassed. One who makes non-holy use out of something dedicated to the Temple has “trespassed (me’ilah).” He must make financial restitution and bring an asham, a guilt offering. One who makes non-holy use out of a live coal has trespassed because a live coal has substance. In contrast, one who makes non-holy use out of a flame has not trespassed. Nevertheless, it is still forbidden to do so. The prohibition is “derabbanan” it is forbidden lest he trespass something with substance.", + "If one carries out a live coal into the public domain [on Shabbat] he is liable, but [if he carries out] a flame he is exempt. Carrying a live coal into the public domain on Shabbat counts as carrying, and hence he has transgressed. However, carrying a flame does not count as carrying and hence he has not transgressed. If you ask, how can you carry a flame? (Ouch!) The answer is that one could blow a flame from the private domain out into the public domain and that would count as carrying because it moved as a result of his force.", + "[The water from]: A private well is [restricted to the same limits] as its owner, And [the water from a well] belonging to the inhabitants of that town is [restricted to the same limits] as the people of that town; And [the water from a well] belonging to those who came up from Babylonia is [restricted to the same limits] as he who draws [the water]. There are three types of wells referred to here. The first is that of a private person. The water in that well can go on Yom Tov wherever he can go. The second is that of a public well. This water belongs to everyone in the city and therefore it can only go where everyone can go. This means that unless everyone who set up an eruv put it on the same side of the city, the water wouldn’t be able to leave the city. The third type of well is one of the public wells dug for the benefit of the people coming back from Babylonia after the exile. These wells can be used by any traveler. They can go anywhere that the person who fills them up can go. The difference between these wells and those shared by the people of a city is that the latter type is jointly owned by the people of the town whereas the former are not owned by anyone." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with a person whose produce is in another town and he wishes to retrieve it on Yom Tov.", + "If one has his produce in another town, and the inhabitants of that city made an eruv in order to bring to him some of his produce, they may not bring it to him. In the case under discussion here the inhabitants of the other city made an eruv that would allow them to get to the city of the owner of the produce. Nevertheless, they may not bring him his produce because his produce is limited by where he can go and since he didn’t set up an eruv to get to the other city, it can’t come to him. Again, a person’s things are limited to going where he may go.", + "But if he himself made an eruv, his produce is like himself. If the owner of the produce set up an eruv then he can go to the other city and bring his produce back with him. It is irrelevant whether the people of the other city set up an eruv since they are not the owners of the produce." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first section of the last mishnah of Betzah deals with guests taking food home with them. The last part of the mishnah deals with giving water to animals.", + "If one invited guests to his home, they may not take away with them [any] portions unless he [the host] had assigned for them their portions on the eve of Yom Tov. In mishnaic times the portion of meat that one received at a dinner party was considered very important. Important guests might receive bigger portions. Sometimes people wouldn’t eat their entire portion and they would be allowed to bring home the leftovers. After all, with no refrigeration the host wouldn’t be able to do anything with the leftovers in any case. Our mishnah teaches that on Yom Tov guests can’t take their leftovers home with them unless the host gave them ownership over the portions before Yom Tov began. In this way, the portions belong to the guests when Yom Tov begins and they can then go as far as they can go.", + "One may not give drink and then slaughter wilderness animals, but one may give drink and slaughter household animals. The following are household animals: they that spend the night in town. Pasture animals are they that spend the night in pasture ground. Animals that pasture out in the wild are muktzeh they have not been set aside before Yom Tov for use on Yom Tov. Hence one cannot give them water or slaughter them on Yom Tov. However, one can give water to and slaughter household animals because they are automatically “set aside” to be slaughtered. The mishnah goes on to define what household animals are and what pasture animals are. Congratulations! We have finished Betzah. It is a tradition at this point to thank God for helping us finish learning the tractate and to commit ourselves to going back and relearning it, so that we may not forget it and so that its lessons will stay with us for all of our lives. Mishnah Betzah was all about the laws of Yom Tov. I think at this point it would be worth it to think about how important the Jewish holidays are to the Jewish people. The matzot and seders of Pesah, sitting in the sukkah on Sukkot, waving the lulav and receiving the Torah on Shavuot these are some of the most important parts of the Jewish year. They remind us of our shared history and hopefully our shared destiny. Unfortunately I think that the sanctity of Yom Tov has eroded substantially in many of our communities. I hope that learning this tractate will help inspire you to increase your own personal commitment and to help lead others to increase their commitment as well. And again, as always, congratulations on learning another tractate of Mishnah. We are getting close to having finished half of the Mishnah. May you have the strength and time to keep on learning more! Tomorrow we begin Rosh Hashanah." + ] + ] + ] + }, + "versions": [ + [ + "Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp", + "http://learn.conservativeyeshiva.org/mishnah/" + ] + ], + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה ביצה", + "categories": [ + "Mishnah", + "Modern Commentary on Mishnah", + "English Explanation of Mishnah", + "Seder Moed" + ], + "schema": { + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה ביצה", + "enTitle": "English Explanation of Mishnah Beitzah", + "key": "English Explanation of Mishnah Beitzah", + "nodes": [ + { + "heTitle": "הקדמה", + "enTitle": "Introduction" + }, + { + "heTitle": "", + "enTitle": "" + } + ] + } +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Moed/English Explanation of Mishnah Chagigah/English/Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp.json b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Moed/English Explanation of Mishnah Chagigah/English/Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..456ce3b8fb78dc4c27d6390cbfdd1c6334b9b2e9 --- /dev/null +++ b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Moed/English Explanation of Mishnah Chagigah/English/Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp.json @@ -0,0 +1,178 @@ +{ + "language": "en", + "title": "English Explanation of Mishnah Chagigah", + "versionSource": "http://learn.conservativeyeshiva.org/mishnah/", + "versionTitle": "Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp", + "status": "locked", + "license": "CC-BY", + "shortVersionTitle": "Dr. Joshua Kulp", + "actualLanguage": "en", + "languageFamilyName": "english", + "isBaseText": true, + "isSource": true, + "isPrimary": true, + "direction": "ltr", + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה חגיגה", + "categories": [ + "Mishnah", + "Modern Commentary on Mishnah", + "English Explanation of Mishnah", + "Seder Moed" + ], + "text": { + "Introduction": [ + "Tractate Hagigah deals with the three sacrifices that according to the rabbis a person had to bring on all three festivals, Sukkot, Pesah and Shavuot. ", + "The first of these sacrifices is called the “Hagigah.” The rabbis derived the concept of the Hagigah from the word “hag” used in the context of the three festivals. According to the rabbis, every person had to bring on the first day of the festival a Hagigah. If they could not offer it on the first day, then they could bring it for the remaining seven days. The Hagigah is a type of thanksgiving sacrifice; some of the meat went to the owners and some of the fats were offered on the altar.", + "The second type of sacrifice is a celebratory thanksgiving offering. This is meant to fulfill the commandment to celebrate on the festival (Deuteronomy 16:14). Celebrating means eating meat (sorry if you’re a vegetarian). People were supposed to eat these thanksgiving offerings for all seven days. ", + "The third sacrifice is called a “re’eyah” which means “to be seen.” Deuteronomy 16:16 says that all males must “be seen” at the Temple three times a year, on the three festivals. The rabbis understood that they were not to be seen empty-handed, but rather they had to bring a sacrifice. This sacrifice is a whole burnt offering, an olah. ", + "Tractate Hagigah deals mostly with these three sacrifices. Along the way there are some fascinating mishnayot that deal with sacrifices and purity and shed much light on certain historical aspects of the Second Temple and Mishnaic periods. While some of these mishnayot may be a little difficult to understand, those who persist in learning them will find them quite intriguing. \n" + ], + "": [ + [ + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah delineates who is obligated to make the pilgrimage to Jerusalem on the three festivals. Exodus 23:17 says, “Three times a year all your male shall appear before the Sovereign, the Lord.” Our mishnah elaborates on this verse.", + "All are obligated to appear [at the Temple], except a deaf person, an imbecile and a minor, a person of unknown sex [tumtum], a hermaphrodite, women, unfreed slaves, a lame person, a blind person, a sick person, an aged person, and one who is unable to go up on foot. I will explain each category of persons exempted from making the pilgrimage one at a time. A deaf person, an imbecile and a minor: These three people are usually lumped together because they are not considered to have “awareness/intelligence” (daat). They are exempt from all commandments, this one included. A person of unknown sex [tumtum], a hermaphrodite, women: Exodus 23:17 says that only males are obligated. The mishnah therefore exempts anyone whose sex as a male is not certain. A tumtum is a person with neither male nor female genitalia. A hermaphrodite has both. Since neither is a certain male, neither is obligated. Unfreed slaves: Slaves are not obligated for any mitzvah from which a woman is exempt. A lame person, a blind person, a sick person, an aged person, and one who is unable to go up on foot: Except for the blind person, the other people in this list will have great difficulty in walking up to the Temple Mount. Since the word for festival is “regel” which also means “leg,” these people are exempt. The blind person is exempt because the Torah says that the mitzvah is “to be seen” there. Since the blind person cannot see, he does not have to be seen.", + "Who is a minor? Whoever is unable to ride on his father’s shoulders and go up from Jerusalem to the Temple Mount, the words of Bet Shammai. But Bet Hillel say: whoever is unable to hold his father’s hand and go up from Jerusalem to the Temple Mount, as it is said: “Three regalim” (Exodus 23:14). Bet Hillel and Bet Shammai debate the age at which a minor is obligated to make the pilgrimage. According to Bet Shammai, as long as the child can ride on his father’s shoulders he must go to the Temple. Shammai (and his eponymous house) is generally strict when it comes to the observance of commandments by children. For instance, Shammai made a sukkah for his infant son, and he wanted the same son to fast on Yom Kippur. For Shammai, as long as the child can physically perform the commandment, he must do so. Bet Hillel holds that the child must be able to walk on his own. This is derived from the fact that the Torah uses the word “regel” which also means leg. The Torah’s choice of this word, as opposed to “Three pa’amim” (three times) implies that the child must be able to walk on his own. On a perhaps deeper level, Bet Hillel holds that the mitzvah is for the person to go there on his own, through the power of his own body. Having someone else carry one there is simply not a fulfillment of the mitzvah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn this mishnah the two houses debate the minimum value of the pilgrimage offering and the hagigah offering. These two offerings were explained in the introduction to the tractate.", + "Bet Shammai say: the pilgrimage-offering (re’eyah) must be worth [at least] two pieces of silver and the hagigah one piece (ma’ah) of silver. But Bet Hillel say: the pilgrimage-offering must be worth [at least] one ma'ah of silver and the hagigah two pieces of silver. The pilgrimage offering is an olah, a wholly burnt offering, whereas the hagigah is a shelamim, a thanksgiving offering, part eaten by the priests, part by its owners and part offered on the altar. According to Bet Shammai the sacrifice that is completely for God, the pilgrimage offering, is the more expensive offering. If we extrapolate, we might say that when a person has a limited budget, he should spend more on God than on himself. Bet Hillel holds the opposite the hagigah offering, eaten by people, is to be the more expensive offering. Extrapolating again, Bet Hillel seems to put humans at the center, focusing on enriching their religious experience by providing them more food." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nWhen people would make their pilgrimage festivals to Jerusalem, they would usually bring with them money which they had used to redeem their second tithe. Second tithe can be eaten by its owners but only in Jerusalem. To make things easier for people the Torah allows them to redeem the produce for money, take the money to Jerusalem and use it there to buy food items. Our mishnah deals with which sacrifices one can buy from second tithe money and which have to be purchased with “hullin,” unconsecrated money. It is in the best interests of the pilgrim to be able to use his second tithe money, money which he will have to spend in Jerusalem in any case.", + "Burnt-offerings during the festival [week] are to be brought from [animals bought with] unconsecrated money, and thanksgiving offerings, from [animals bought with] tithe money. This section deals with hol hamoed, the middle of the week of Sukkot and Pesah. Burnt-offerings, the pilgrimage offerings, which are obligatory, must be brought with animals purchased with unconsecrated money. This is the same rule as for all mandatory offerings they may not be purchased with tithe money. Celebratory thanksgiving offering, brought during the middle of the festival are not obligatory as are the other festival offerings. A person has to eat meat during the week and while it was customary to use thanksgiving offerings, it was not mandated. Since this sacrifice wasn’t mandated, one can use tithe money to purchase it.", + "On the first festival day of Pesah: Bet Shammai say: [they must be brought] from [animals bought with] unconsecrated money. And Bet Hillel say: [they can be brought also] from [animals bought with] tithe money. On the first day of both Pesah and Sukkot, and on Shavuot, the thanksgiving offering, the hagigah, is obligatory. Since it is a mandated offering, Bet Shammai holds that it must come from animals purchased with unconsecrated money. Bet Hillel holds that one can still use tithe money because the hagigah is partially eaten by its owners. The Torah states that second tithe must be used to purchase food and the hagigah is food. According to the Talmud, second tithe cannot be used to purchase the whole animal, because some of the animal is offered on the altar. It may only be used as part of the purchasing price." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nDuring the festival it was a mitzvah to celebrate by eating meat. This was done by bringing celebratory thanksgiving offerings to the Temple and eating them in Jerusalem. Our mishnah teaches that both Israelites and priests can use animals and meat dedicated or made holy for other purposes in order to fulfill this obligation.", + "Israelites fulfill their obligation with vow-offerings, freewill-offerings and cattle tithe. An Israelite can fulfill his obligation to bring/eat a celebratory thanksgiving offering by bringing vow-offerings and freewill-offerings that he had set aside during the year for other purposes. During the year a person might make an offering to the Temple for all sorts of reasons (as a supplication, to show gratitude). He may take this animal with him on his pilgrimage and it can count as his celebratory thanksgiving offering. Cattle tithe, the tenth animal born of cows, sheep and goats, is “holy to the Lord” (Leviticus 27:32). This animal is brought to Jerusalem and eaten there. An Israelite can use an animal that was set aside to be cattle tithe as his celebratory thanksgiving offering.", + "And priests with sin-offerings and guilt-offerings, firstlings, the breast and the shoulder, but not with bird-offerings, and not with meal-offerings. Pilgrims would also bring with them the various sin-offerings and guilt-offerings that they had become liable for during the year. They would also bring the “firstlings”, the first-born of every kosher animal. All of these go to the priest and he may use them to fulfill his obligation for celebratory thanksgiving offerings. The breast and the shoulder of thanksgiving offerings go to the priest. This meat will count for him in order to fulfill his obligation for eating meat. However, bird-offerings and meal-offerings don’t count because one can only fulfill the obligation with mammal meat sheep, goats and cows." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nAs I have explained in the previous mishnayot, the pilgrimage offering is a wholly burnt offering and is not eaten, whereas the celebratory offering is a thanksgiving offering and is eaten. Our mishnah gives four different possibilities for how much of each offering a person should bring.", + "He that has many people to eat [with him] and little money, brings many thanksgiving-offerings and few burnt-offerings. If a person has a lot of people he needs to feed and not a lot of money with which to buy the animals to use as sacrifices, he should spend more money on the edible thanksgiving offerings and less on the burnt offerings.", + "[He that has] a lot of money and few to eat [with him] brings many burnt-offerings and few thanksgiving-offerings. If he has a lot of money and wishes to spend it on sacrifices and he doesn’t have a lot of people to eat with him, he should spend more money on the burnt offerings. If he buys too many thanksgiving offerings (or too large of an animal) the meat will have to be burned (not as a sacrifice but as the remnant of uneaten sacrifice).", + "[He that has] little of either, for him is it is said: “One ma'ah of silver’, ‘two pieces of silver.” If he has few people to feed and little money, he should buy the minimum amount of each sacrifice. Our mishnah makes reference to mishnah 2 above where Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel debated the minimum amount for each sacrifice.", + "He that has a lot of both, of him it is said: “Every man as he is able, according to the blessing that the Lord your God has bestowed upon you” (Deuteronomy 16:17). If he is lucky enough to have brought a lot of people with him on the pilgrimage, and to have a lot of money, then he has been blessed by God. The mishnah quotes the verse which says that each brings according to his own blessing, meaning he can bring as many sacrifices as he wants." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah teaches that if one did not bring the hagigah offering on the first day of the festival, he has the rest of the festival to bring it. This is derived from Leviticus 23:41 which says, “You shall observe it as a festival of the Lord for seven days” implying that the hagigah can be brought throughout the festival.", + "He who did not bring his hagigah on the first day of the festival of Sukkot, may bring it during the whole of the festival, even on the last festival day of Sukkot. Even though the last day of Sukkot is a different festival called Shmini Atzeret, nevertheless even on this day one can bring his hagigah offering and have it count as his Sukkot hagigah.", + "If the festival, passed and he did not bring the festival offering, he is no longer liable for it. Of such a person it is said: “A twisted thing cannot be made straight, a lack cannot be made good” (Ecclesiastes 1:15). Once the festival is over, he cannot bring the hagigah offering. Even if he set aside an animal to be a hagigah and then it was lost during the festival and found afterwards, he cannot offer that animal as a hagigah. In such a case the animal would be offered as a freewill offering. The mistake of not bringing the hagigah during the correct time is a “lack that cannot be made good.”" + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe end of yesterday’s mishnah brought a quote from Ecclesiastes 1:15 about a wrong that cannot be corrected. Our mishnah continues to discuss this verse.", + "Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya says: Who is “a twisted thing that cannot be made straight?” He who has intercourse with a forbidden relation and bears by her a mamzer. Should you say that it applies to a thief or robber, he is able to restore [the stolen object] and make straight. Most transgressions can be “made straight,” that is to say they can be fixed. The damage is not irreparable. However, when a man has intercourse with a woman forbidden to him and they have a child, that child is a mamzer for life, there is nothing he can do to get out of this status. He/she will forever be a mamzer, restricted in marriage. Other sins such as stealing can be repaired by returning the stolen object.", + "Rabbi Shimon ben Yohai says: They only call something “twisted” if it was straight at first and then became twisted. And who is this? A disciple of the sages who forsakes the Torah. Rabbi Shimon ben Yohai reads the verse slightly differently. The verse does not relate simply to a wrong that cannot be corrected. Something is only considered to be twisted if it was originally straight. A mamzer was born “twisted” and hence is not referred to in the verse. Rather the verse refers to a Torah scholar who rejects his Torah learning. He was straight when he was dedicated to a life of Torah and became twisted when he separated from that life. The Talmud on this mishnah contains many of the legends about the famous Elisha ben Abuyah, the great Torah sage who later rejected his learning, professing, “there is no law and no judge.” For a very interesting read, one which illuminates the mishnaic period better than any book I know, check out Milton Steinberg’s “As A Driven Leaf.”" + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah, and the first two mishnayot of the next chapter, do not deal with the hagigah. Rather they are loosely connected to the end of the previous mishnah concerning the Torah scholar who separates from the Torah. Our mishnah deals with one issue which may have caused some rabbis to dismiss the Torah, especially the Oral Torah. There are many halakhot in the Mishnah which seem to have little connection to the Written Torah. Some rabbis may have rejected rabbinic learning claiming that the rabbis were just “making it up.” This was a common anti-rabbinic claim made throughout Jewish history, most famously by the Sadducees and later by the Karaites. Our mishnah acknowledges that some halakhot are indeed not well connected to Scripture and yet at the same time the mishnah seems to bequeath to these laws the same authority as those firmly anchored in the Written Torah.", + "[The laws concerning] the dissolution of vows hover in the air and have nothing to rest on. According to the rabbis, a sage has the power to dissolve a vow. This was a subject we covered when we learned Tractate Nedarim. However, there is no scriptural basis, no verses in the Torah, that give the rabbis (or anyone else) such power. These halakhot “hover in the air” meaning they are not grounded in the written Torah.", + "The laws concerning Shabbat, hagigot, and trespassing are as mountains hanging by a hair, for they have scant scriptural basis but many halakhot. There are three categories of halakhah which have some scriptural basis, but not a lot and yet they have a lot of halakhot in the Mishnah and in other rabbinic works. The first of these is Shabbat. There were 24 chapters in Mishnah Shabbat and another 11 in Eruvin and yet the Torah barely discusses what types of work are prohibited on Shabbat. Hagigah, the subject of our tractate, is also another case of a lot of halakhah with little scriptural basis. The Torah only says the word “hag,” which the rabbis interpret to mean a sacrifice. This is not a lot of scriptural support for a whole tractate. Finally, “trespassing” which means illicit use of Temple property. There is a whole tractate called Meilah dedicate to this subject, and yet it too has scant scriptural support.", + "[The laws concerning] civil cases and [Temple] worship, purity and impurity, and the forbidden relations have what to rest on, and they that are the essentials of the Torah. The Torah is full of verses dedicated to civil laws, the main topic of all of Seder Nezikin, Temple worship, the main topic of Seder Kodashim, purity laws, the main topic of Seder Toharot and the laws of forbidden relations, the main topic of large parts of Seder Nashim. These are the “essentials of Torah” in that the Torah dedicates to them more verses than to anything else." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "They may not expound upon the subject of forbidden relations in the presence of three.
Nor the work of creation in the presence of two.
Nor [the work of] the chariot in the presence of one, unless he is a sage and understands of his own knowledge.
Whoever speculates upon four things, it would have been better had he not come into the world: (1) what is above, (2) what is beneath, (3) what came before, and (4) what came after.
And whoever takes no thought for the honor of his creator, it would have been better had he not come into the world.
This mishnah is brought here because like yesterday’s mishnah it may refer to certain reasons why sages abandoned the world of Torah. There are some subjects which are, according to our mishnah, dangerous to speculate upon or to discuss in front of the masses. Pondering upon the unknowable may have contributed towards apostasy.
Section one: The danger of expounding upon the verses about forbidden relations in the Torah is either that people will be confused and make irreparable mistakes (i.e. create mamzerim) or that they will be titillated by the attention paid to these verses and they will not be able to control their urges and they will come to sin. Therefore, these verses are not expounded before even a group as small as three.
Section two: How the world was created and whether it was created from already existing material was a much debated and sensitive issue in the ancient world. That there might have been material which pre-existed God would have been seen by the rabbis to be heretical. Due to the speculative nature of this subject, it was forbidden to talk about it in front of even two people.
Section three: The study of the chariot, Ezekiel’s heavenly vision (Ezekiel 1) is the mystical study of God, God’s physical attributes and God’s unknowable mysteries. The sages seem to have believed that God had a physical existence, perhaps even a body in a certain sense, but that God’s body was hidden from human beings. It was forbidden for one sage to teach this subject to another sage unless the learning sage could understand things without really being explained to them. What this seems to mean is that one sage could begin to discuss this topic with another sage but he shouldn’t reveal to him the secrets of God unless he sees that the sage understands and can proceed on his own. However, we interpret this, what is clear is that the sages were extremely hesitant to engage publicly in mysticism.
Section four: There were some things that humans couldn’t know and therefore should not try to know. They are: 1) what is above the sky; 2) what is below the earth; 3) what came before the earth was created; 4) what will come after it is destroyed. Again, these four subjects are (or at least were) completely speculative. A person should spend their time in this world studying subjects that are knowable, such as the interpretation of Torah and halakhah. Metaphysical speculation was ruled out by this mishnah. The final line of the mishnah seems to be a continuation of the previous line. Those who try to uncover God’s secrets and reveal them to the public are not acting with respect to God’s honor. It is almost as if they are undressing God in public. Had God wanted these secrets to be revealed they would have been revealed.
I should note that there do seem to have been rabbis in this period who did engage in such speculative study and even composed works dedicated to the topic. There are two ways to justify this mishnah with those other works. First of all, there were different groups of rabbis, some of which focused on halakhah/midrash and others who focused on mysticism. The second possibility, which I believe to be more likely, is that the rabbis thought that mysticism was not an appropriate focus for most people’s study. Mysticism, which they considered dangerous, should be reserved for the elite and not spread to the masses." + ], + [ + "Yose ben Yoezer says that [on a festival] the laying of the hands [on the head of a sacrifice] may not be performed. Yosef ben Johanan says that it may be performed.
Joshua ben Perahia says that it may not be performed. Nittai the Arbelite says that it may be performed.
Judah ben Tabai says that it may not be performed. Shimon ben Shetah says that it may be performed.
Shamayah says that it may be performed. Avtalyon says that it may not be performed.
Hillel and Menahem did not dispute. Menahem went out, Shammai entered.
Shammai says that it may not be performed. Hillel says that it may be performed.
The former [of each] pair were patriarchs and the latter were heads of the court.
Our mishnah is possibly the most unique mishnah in the entire Mishnah. It contains a debate about whether or not a person can lay their hands on a sacrifice on Yom Tov, the first and last days of a festival. According to Leviticus 1:4 and other parallel verses, when a person brings a sacrifice he lays his hands, or leans, on the sacrifice before it is slaughtered. On Yom Tov it is forbidden to use an animal and leaning on an animal is considered to be use of an animal. Therefore, the question could be asked, can one lean on the sacrificial animal on Yom Tov or must he do so the day before?
What is unique about our mishnah is that there are five pairs (zugot) of sages, each from a different generation, who debated this issue. The sages here are early sages who lived during the Second Temple period, from the beginning of the Hasmonean period until close to the beginning of the millennium. They might even be called proto-sages, or proto-rabbis. With one exception, all of these sages are found in Avot 1:4-10, where each transmits a moral exhortation. The final clause of the mishnah determines that of each pair the first was the patriarch and the second was the head of the court. As far as I know, there are no other mishnayot that have this structure in which the same debate being repeated generation after generation.
The fact that they debate specifically this issue is significant. We know that ancient Jews argued a lot about the laws of Yom Tov and Shabbat and that the Pharisees tended to be more lenient than the other two main sects, the Essenes and the Sadducees. This seems to be the trend in this mishnah as well Hillel allows one to lean on the animal, whereas Shammai does not.
Section four: Note that the mishnah switches order here. In all three previous pairs, the first said that it may not be performed, whereas the second said that it should be performed. It seems that there may have been some historical switch at this period, where the position of the patriarch changed.
Section five: Little is known about Menahem from rabbinic literature, except that he seems to have separated from the fold. Josephus, Antiquities 15:10, 5 relates a story about a certain Menahem who was an Essene. This Menahem receives a divine revelation that Herod will become king and he relates it to him. According to some scholars this is the same Menahem referred to in our mishnah. In any case, it is interesting that he is replaced by Shammai. It is as if the mishnah is letting us know that Shammai is not like Menahem. While Shammai’s opinions are usually not the accepted halakhah, he is still legitimate." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn this mishnah Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel debate which sacrifices may be brought on Yom Tov and whether it is permitted to lay hands on them. The second of these debates is the same as the debate in yesterday’s mishnah.", + "Bet Shammai say: They may bring thanksgiving offerings [on Yom Tov] but they may not lay their hands on them, and [they may not bring] wholly burnt-offerings. And Bet Hillel say: They may bring thanksgiving offerings and wholly burnt-offerings and lay their hands on them. The debate here is over two subjects. 1) Can wholly burnt-offerings be brought on Yom Tov? 2) When a sacrifice is brought on Yom Tov, do they lay their hands on the sacrifice as is usually mandated with sacrifices? Bet Shammai states that wholly burnt-offerings cannot be brought on Yom Tov at all since they are not eaten. The Torah permits preparing food on Yom Tov (see Tractate Betzah) but since wholly-burnt offerings are not food, they may not be prepared on Yom Tov. The wholly burnt offering which must be brought on account of the festival (re’eyah) should be sacrificed during the festival week. Bet Hillel allows the bringing of wholly burnt offerings because they hold that any work that is permitted when it is done in the preparation of food is also permitted when it is done for other reasons. Bet Shammai rules as did their eponymous leader in the previous mishnah, that it is forbidden to lay hands on the sacrificial animal on Yom Tov because that is considered to be making the animal work. Bet Hillel allows this, reasoning that if the sacrifice is allowed, all of the acts that accompany the sacrifice are also allowed." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nAtzeret (the rabbinic term for the festival of Shavuot) is the only festival that lasts for just one day. Since Bet Shammai holds that the wholly burnt offering brought as the pilgrimage offering cannot be offered on Yom Tov but they agree that this sacrifice must be offered at some point, the question must be asked, when should it be brought.", + "Atzeret ( which fell on a Friday: Bet Shammai say: the day of the slaughter [of the wholly burnt offerings] is after Shabbat. And Bet Hillel say: the day of the slaughter is not after Shabbat. Since Bet Shammai holds that the wholly burnt offering cannot be brought on Yom Tov itself, they have to posit that there is a “day of the slaughter” that comes the day afterward Atzeret. Bet Hillel says that there is no special “day of the slaughter” because the sacrifice is brought on Atzeret itself.", + "They agree, however, that if it falls on Shabbat, the day of the slaughter is after Shabbat. If Atzeret falls on Shabbat, then Bet Hillel agrees that the sacrifice is offered the day after because the sacrifice of the hagigah and the pilgrimage wholly burnt offering do not override the prohibition of slaughtering an animal on Shabbat. This is because they can be sacrificed on another day.", + "The high priest does not [in that case] put on his [special] garments, and mourning and fasting are permitted, in order not to confirm the view of those who say that Atzeret is after Shabbat. Perhaps the bitterest dispute between the Sadducees and Pharisees was over the date of Atzeret. The Sadducees held that the Omer began to be brought on the day after Shabbat, hence Shavuot would always fall on Sunday, seven weeks later. The Pharisees/rabbis held that the Omer began to be brought on the second day of Pesah, and hence the day of the week of Shavuot would vary from year to year depending upon the day of the week upon which the first day of Pesah fell. We just learned that if Atzeret fell on Shabbat, they would slaughter the wholly-burnt offerings on Sunday. The problem this creates is that people will think that the halakhah is like the Sadducees. To avoid creating this impression, the rabbis distinguished between this day of slaughter and a normal festival in several ways which would have been evident to the public. First of all the high priest would not wear his eight special garments that he normally wears while performing his worship service. Second, mourning and fasting was permitted. People who saw these changes would understand that the only reason that they were offering the sacrifices on Sunday was that they could not be offered on Shabbat. They would not think that the sages were actually postponing Shavuot to Sunday." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nFrom here until the end of the tractate the mishnah teaches laws of purity and impurity. The reason why these laws are here is that when Israel would come to Jerusalem and to the Temple for the festival they had to be pure in order to eat their sacrifices. They would immerse their vessels to purify them before Yom Tov. During the festival all of the people of Israel acted like the Pharisees and were extra stringent on eating only while in a state of ritual purity.\nOur mishnah deals with the topic of washing hands versus washing one’s whole body. There are some foods which only required one’s hands to be washed while holier foods required one to immerse one’s entire body.", + "They wash hands for [eating] unconsecrated [food], and [second] tithe, and for terumah [heave-offering]. One of the things that the Pharisees were famous for was washing their hands before they ate even regular unconsecrated food. There is nothing wrong with eating impure food but the Pharisees wished to preserve the laws of purity on a higher level than was required. During the festival, in Jerusalem everyone was expected to purify their hands before eating, even unconsecrated food. Second tithe and terumah are holy and therefore they certainly require one to wash one’s hands before being touched. The handwashing referred to here is done with water poured over one’s hands with a vessel.", + "But for sacred food they must immerse [their hands in a mikveh]. Before eating sacred food, such as the thanksgiving offering eaten by Israelites and the sin and guilt offerings eaten by the priests the hands must be immersed in a valid mikveh. In the Talmud they debate what this section refers to. According to one opinion this clause refers only to hands which were certainly made impure. Unless one knows that one’s hands had become impure, it would be sufficient to wash them with a vessel. According to the other opinion, in all cases before one eats sacrificial meat one must wash hands by immersing them in the mikveh.", + "With regard to the [water of] purification, if one’s hands became impure, one’s [whole] body is impure. The “water of purification” refers to the water with the red heifer’s ashes in it used to purify people who had contracted a serious level of impurity. One who comes to prepare the waters must be completely pure. If his hands had become impure then his whole body was also considered impure and he would have to immerse his whole body." + ], + [ + "If he immersed for unconsecrated [food], and was presumed to be fit to eat unconsecrated [food], he is prohibited from [eating second] tithe.
If he immersed for [second] tithe, and was presumed to be fit to eat [second] tithe, he is prohibited from [eating] terumah.
If he immersed for terumah, and was presumed to be fit to eat terumah, he is prohibited from [eating] holy things.
If he immersed for holy things, and was presumed to be fit to eat holy things he is prohibited from [touching the waters of] purification.
If one immersed for something possessing a stricter [degree of holiness], one is permitted [to have contact with] something possessing a lighter [degree of holiness].
If he immersed but without special intention, it is as though he had not immersed.
This mishnah deals with the intention that one has to have when one immerses. There are various levels of holy objects ranked below from lowest to highest:
1) Unconsecrated food.
2) Second tithe (eaten by its owners in Jerusalem).
3) Terumah (separated from produce and given to priests).
4) Sacrifices
5) The waters of purification made from the ashes of the red heifer.
The general rule of the mishnah is quite clear and stated explicitly at the end of the mishnah itself. If one immerses with the intention of eating a less holy thing, say unconsecrated food, he cannot count that immersion in order to eat a more holy thing. He would have to immerse again to eat the more holy thing. However, if one immerses with the intention of eating a holy thing, say a sacrifice, that immersion counts for eating a less holy thing such as terumah. Finally, if one immerses without any specific intention in mind, the immersion doesn’t count.
This explanation should aid in explaining the whole mishnah, so you will not see a fuller explanation below." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe vessel that a zav or zavah (a man or woman who had an unusual genital discharge) steps, sits, leans or lies upon is impure. This vessel will now transmit impurity to those who touch it. This type of impurity is called “midras” which means “stepped upon.” In our mishnah the rabbis state that the garments of people who have immersed for a lesser purpose possess midras-impurity for those who wish to preserve a higher degree of impurity. What this would mean is that if the person who wished to possess the higher degree of impurity touched these clothes, he would become impure.\nOn a less literal level, this mishnah seems to rank those who preserve their purity, granting a higher status to those who are more cautious about the purity laws. Also, this mishnah is parallel to yesterday’s mishnah, both ranking degrees of purity.", + "The garments of an am haaretz possess midras-impurity for Pharisees. An am-haaretz literally means, “one of the land” but it is used to refer to a person who does not observe the laws of purity and tithing as do the Pharisees. As an aside, the word does not have quite as negative a connotation in the Mishnah as it does in later rabbinic literature. In later literature one could translate the term as “ignoramus.” In any case, since they were not cautious about purity laws, their clothes have midras-impurity for Pharisees.", + "The garments of Pharisees possess midras-impurity for those who eat terumah. While Pharisees were cautious about purity, they were not as pure as priests who ate terumah. The Pharisees immersed to eat unconsecrated food and we learned in yesterday’s mishnah that one who immerses to eat unconsecrated food cannot eat terumah. Hence the clothes of Pharisees have midras-impurity for a priest who eats terumah.", + "The garments of those who eat terumah possess midras-impurity for [those who eat] sacred things. Yesterday we learned that one who immerses to eat terumah is not pure enough to eat sacrifices (sacred things). Today we learn that the clothes of the one who eats terumah have midras-impurity for the one who wishes to eat sacrifices.", + "The garments of [those who eat] sacred things possess midras-impurity for [those who occupy themselves with the waters of] purification. One who wishes to deal with the waters of purification cannot touch even the clothes of one who immersed to eat sacrifices.", + "Yose ben Yoezer was the most pious in the priesthood, yet his apron was [considered to possess] midras-impurity for [those who ate] sacred things. Yose ben Yoezer was mentioned above at the beginning of mishnah two. He was, according to our mishnah, the most pious of priests and he would immerse before eating unconsecrated food as it is was terumah. Nevertheless, his apron which he used to wipe his hands after eating, possessed midras-impurity for one who wished to eat sacrifices. As strict as he was in matters of purity, they still treated his clothes according to the above rules.", + "Yohanan ben Gudgada all his life used to eat [unconsecrated food] in accordance with the purity required for sacred things, yet his apron was [considered to possess] midras-impurity for [those who occupied themselves with the water of] purification. Yohanan ben Gudgada was even stricter with regard to purity and ate even unconsecrated food as if he was eating sacrifices. This is one level stricter than the Pharisees who ate unconsecrated food as if it was terumah. Nevertheless, since there is one level higher than the purity for sacrifices, his garments were still considered to possess midras-impurity for one who wished to deal with the waters of purification. These last two sections demonstrate that favor was not shown in matters of purity." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nIn the previous two mishnayot we learned that the rules regarding eating “sacred things,” namely sacrifices, are more stringent than the rules regarding eating terumah. Our mishnah teaches several more aspects in which eating sacred things is treated more stringently.", + "Greater stringency applies to sacred things than to terumah, that they may immerse vessels within vessels [together] for terumah, but not for sacred things. When it comes to immersing impure vessels in order to purify them, if they are going to be used to hold terumah, one vessel may be immersed inside another vessel. If the vessel is going to be used for sacrifices, then the vessels cannot be immersed one inside the other.", + "The outside and inside and handle [of a vessel are regarded as separate] for terumah, but not for sacred things. When it comes to terumah, each part of the vessel is considered as being separate. So if an impure thing touches the handle of the vessel, only the handle is impure and the contents inside the vessel are still pure. If something touches the outside of the vessel, only the outside is impure and not the inside. Finally, if something impure touches the inside only the inside is impure. When it comes to sacred things, if one part of the vessel is impure, the whole vessel is impure and will cause other things to become impure as well.", + "One that carries anything possessing midras-uncleanness may carry [at the same time] terumah, but not sacred things. I explained “midras-impurity” in yesterday’s mishnah. Today’s mishnah teaches that if someone is holding an object that had become impure through midras (someone sat, stood, lied or applied pressure on it) he can hold in his other hand terumah. The vessel does not make him impure such that he makes the terumah impure. However, he cannot hold sacred things at the same time.", + "The garments of those who eat terumah posses midras-uncleanness for [those who eat] sacred things. This is the exact same halakhah as that found in section three of yesterday’s mishnah.", + "The rule [for the immersion of garments] for [those who would eat terumah is not the same as the rule for [those who would eat] sacred things: for in the case of sacred things, he must [first] untie [any knots in the unclean garment], dry it [if it is wet, then] immerse it, and afterwards retie it; but in case of terumah, it may [first] be tied and afterwards immersed. When one wants to immerse something to be used for sacred things must first untie all of the knots, dry them all off, then he may immerse it and then once it’s been immersed he may retie the knots. In contrast, if a vessel is going to be used for terumah, the knots don’t have to be taken out before it is immersed." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to provide aspects of purity/impurity in sacrifices are treated with greater stringency than terumah.", + "Vessels that have been finished in purity require immersion [before they are used] for sacred things, but not [before they are used] for terumah. Once the production of a vessel has been completed the vessel can now receive impurity. Even if the artisan was careful not to defile the vessel it still requires immersion before it can be used with sacred things. In contrast, if the vessel is going to be used with terumah then it doesn’t need to be immersed unless it has been defiled.", + "A vessel unites all its contents [for impurity] in the case of sacred things, but not in the case of terumah. If there are a bunch of separate food items in a vessel, say some fruit or separate pieces of meat, and one becomes impure, then all of them are impure, if they are sacred things. The vessel causes the impurity to travel from one piece to the other. However, if they are terumah, then the vessel does not convey the impurity from one to the other.", + "Sacred things become invalid [by impurity] of a fourth degree, but terumah [only by impurity] of a third degree. There are different levels of impurity, the higher the number the closer the item is to the source of impurity, which is called a “father of impurity.” A “father of impurity” that touches something give it first degree impurity, and a first degree conveys second degree impurity, and so on. Sacred things can become invalid through contact even with a third degree of impurity, meaning that these things cannot be put on the altar, because they have “fourth degree” of impurity. There is no such thing as fifth degree of impurity. Terumah becomes disqualified only by something with a second degree of impurity. If something of third degree impurity touches terumah it does not affect it.", + "In the case of terumah, if one hand of his hands became impure, the other remains clean, but in the case of sacred things, he must immerse both [hands], because the one hand defiles the other for sacred things but not for terumah. If one of one’s hands becomes impure, he cannot use the other hand to touch a sacred thing, even if one hand didn’t touch the other. But when it comes to terumah, if one of one’s hands is impure he can use the other hand to touch terumah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nAnother two stringencies for sacred things.", + "They may eat dry foods with impure hands when it comes to terumah, but not when it comes to sacred things. Wet food is susceptible to impurity whereas dry food is not (see Leviticus 11:34, 38). This is true in all cases except for the case of sacred food. The idea is that “the love of the sacred makes it susceptible to impurity.” [This is a fascinating concept, demonstrating well that the concept of sacredness and susceptible to impurity are intimately connected.] Therefore one cannot eat sacred food with impure hands, even if the hands are dry. Terumah is like normal food and doesn’t receive impurity unless it becomes wet.", + "The one who has not yet buried his dead (an and one who lacks atonement require immersion for sacred things but not for terumah. When one of a person’s seven close relatives dies, he/she is an onen on that day and the night thereafter. An onen may not eat sacrifices. Similarly a person who needed to bring certain sacrifices in order to complete his period of impurity (such as a leper, see Leviticus 14:10) cannot eat other sacrifices until he brings these mandated sacrifices. The rabbis decreed that before these people can eat sacrifices they must go to the mikveh. This immersion would aid in the transition between their former state of not being able to eat sacrifices to a state of being able to eat sacrifices. In contrast, an onen and a formerly impure person who had not brought sacrifices can eat terumah, therefore upon the completion of the period of being an onen and after bringing the sacrifice he may continue to eat terumah without another immersion." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah begins to teach ways in which terumah is treated with greater stringency than sacrifices. The central issue in this mishnah is how much to trust an am haaretz, an unlearned person, when he tells you that he preserved the purity of a food item. As we shall see, if he says that he preserved its purity so that it would be used for a sacred thing (wine for a libation or oil for a minhah offering) than he is believed because the am haaretz respects the purity of sacred things. He would not allow an impure thing to be offered on the altar of the Temple. However, if he says he preserved its purity because it is terumah then the am haaretz is not believed.", + "Greater stringency applies to terumah [than to sacred things], for in Judah [the people of the land (amei] are trusted in regard to the purity of [sacred] wine and oil throughout the year; and at the season of the wine-presses and olive-presses even in regard to terumah. The farmers in Judah would have known that some of their produce, namely wine and oil would need to be pure so it could be used as libations and to accompany the minhah sacrifice. They respected this and would not have allowed it to become impure. Since sacrifices are needed all year round, they are believed all year if they say that they preserved its purity for it to be used as sacrifices. However, they are not believed if they say that they preserved the produce because of the terumah that would have to be separated from it. However, during the main time of the year when everyone presses their grapes and olives they are believed because everyone purifies their vessels at that time of the year, in anticipation of having to take terumah out of the wine and oil. One could think of this as sort of the “high holiday season” of purity, at least for farmers. Although they may not be particularly meticulous in their observance during the rest of the year, they are during these two periods.", + "If [the season of] the wine-presses and olive-presses passed, and they brought to him a jar of wine of terumah, he [the priest] should not accept it from him, but [the am ha-aretz] may leave it for the coming [season] of the wine-press. If the time of wine and olive pressing has passed, a priest who is meticulous about his observance should not accept wine or olive oil from an am haaretz. However, the am haaretz can leave over that wine until the next wine pressing and then the priest can accept it from him, even if the priest knows that this was not made during the current pressing. It’s as if we are willing to believe the am haaretz because he was willing to hold onto his wine for so long.", + "But if he said to him, “I have set apart a quarter log [of wine] as a sacred thing,” he is believed [in regard to the purity of the whole jug]. If the am haaretz says that he set apart some of the wine to be used in the sacrificial service, then he is believed to say that the whole jug is pure, even for the terumah in the jug. Since he is believed when it comes to the sacred part of the wine, he is believed for the terumah as well.", + "[When it comes to] jugs of wine and jugs of oil that are meant for terumah, they are believed during the season of the wine-presses and the olive-vats and prior to [the season of] the wine-presses seventy days. The am haaretz is trusted when he says he preserved the purity of the empty wine and oil jugs both in the time of the pressing and before the pressing for seventy days. Evidently, they would begin preparing the jugs to hold the wine and oil for seventy days before the pressing. However, for the terumah itself they are only believed to have preserved its purity during the time of the pressing." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe previous mishnah discussed when a person is trusted with regard to the purity of his things. Today’s mishnah discusses another such rule when is a pottery maker trusted that he has preserved the purity of his pots.", + "From Modi’im inwards [the potters] are trusted in regard to [the purity of] earthenware vessels; from Modi'im outwards they are not trusted. Modiim is famous for being the city where the Maccabees lived. It is about 30 kilometers northwest of Jerusalem, about a day’s travel by foot. (It is also where I live, but that won’t really help you understand this mishnah). The closer a pottery maker is to Jerusalem the more it will be in his best interests to preserve the purity of his pottery because it is likely that people buying his goods may want to use them in connection with the sacrificial service. Therefore, if the pottery-maker lives from Modiim and inwards toward Jerusalem, he is believed to say that his pots are pure. We should note that the Temple would have required many clay pots because they could be used only one time. Once a clay pot was used to cook sacrificial meat it could no longer be used because the meat that was absorbed into the pot would become remnant (leftover sacrifice) which is forbidden. Therefore the pots had to be disposed of after one use.", + "How so? A potter who sells the pots entered inwards of Modi'im, then the same potter, the same pots and the same buyers are trusted [to be pure]. But if he went out [from Modi’im outwards] he is not trusted. In this section we learn that the rule that the potter is believed when he is inside of the Modiim border is an absolute rule. The same potter, pots and buyers that are trusted to be pure when they are between Modiim and Jerusalem are no longer believed to be pure when they go out beyond Modiim." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah continues to deal with the question of when to trust a person when he says that he has not made vessels impure.", + "Tax-collectors who entered a house, and similarly thieves who restored [stolen] vessels are believed if they say, “We have not touched [anything].” The mishnah refers to a tax collector who has taken someone’s possessions in order to use them as collateral for a tax debt. When he returns the object to its owner he is believed if he says that he didn’t make the object impure. The same is true for the thief who is returning something he had stolen. It seems that these people are believed specifically because they are doing “teshuvah”, repentance, by returning the stolen/collected item. Since they are repenting, they are at the same time believed with regard to other aspects of religious law. Some commentators say that these people are believed if the item is going to be used for sacrifices, because even tax collectors and thieves respect the purity of sacrifices. But they are not believed with regard to terumah. Other commentators say that they are believed for both.", + "And in Jerusalem they are believed in regard to sacred things, and during a festival also in regard to terumah. Amei Haaretz (uneducated people) are believed when they are in Jerusalem to say that their vessels are pure so that they could be used with sacrifices. During a festival their trustworthiness is even greater because everybody, even the uneducated, would purify themselves before the festival. Therefore they are even believed with regard to terumah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nDuring the festival the am haaretz, the uneducated “person of the land” is believed with regard to issues of purity far more than he is during the rest of the year. The first part of our mishnah deals with how far this trustworthiness extends.\nThe second part deals with the period after the festival has passed and with the question of how to cope with the fact that there have been people in the Temple courtyard who may have been impure.", + "One who opened his jar [of wine] or broke into his dough [to sell them] on account of the festival [and an am haaretz touched the wine or dough]: Rabbi Judah says: he may finish [selling them after the festival]; But the sages say: he may not finish. The mishnah is addressed to a store owner who is cautious about matters of purity. He is what is called a haver or an associate, a member of the rabbinic circle, the opposite of an am haaretz. During the festival he opens up jugs of wine and he breaks into prepared dough to sell these products to customers for their use during the festival. Some of the customers are amei haaretz and they touch the wine and dough. We have already stated that during the festival the am haaretz is trusted to say that he is pure. The question is, can the store owner continue to sell these items after the festival as if the amei haaretz really were pure. Rabbi Judah says that he can. According to Rabbi Judah, since we assume that the am haaretz was pure during the festival, we can assume that the wine and dough are pure even after the festival. The other sages disagree. During the festival they are believed not so much because we are sure that the am haaretz is pure but because the sages wished to be lenient during the festival. We might even say that the sages wished to be lenient in order to encourage all of the people from the land to participate in the festival and its sacrifices. However, when the festival was over the rules return to normal and we must be concerned lest the wine or dough had been made impure.", + "When the festival was over, they undertook the purification of the Temple court. If the festival ended on Friday, they did not undertake [the purification of the Temple court] because of the honor of the Shabbat. Rabbi Judah said: even not on Thursday, for the priests are not free. When the festival was over they had to face the fact that the people may have made the Temple’s vessels impure. The trustworthiness bequeathed to everyone during the festival was over. They would then begin to purify the Temple’s vessels. How they did so will be described in tomorrow’s mishnah. If the festival was over on Friday, meaning that Thursday was the last day of the festival, the priests would not have had time on Friday to purify the vessels because they were busy preparing for Shabbat. Therefore they would wait until Sunday to purify the vessels. According to Rabbi Judah, even if the festival was over on Wednesday, they wouldn’t begin the purification until Sunday. On Thursday the priests were not available because they were cleaning out all of the ashes that had accumulated on the altar during the entire festival. They would not have had time on Thursday to purify the vessels. On Friday they were busy preparing for Shabbat." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe final mishnah of the chapter, tractate and seder (game, set and match) explains how they purified the Temple’s vessels.", + "How did they undertake the purification of the Temple court? They immersed the vessels which were in the Temple, and they say to them: “Be cautious lest you touch the table or menorah and defile them.” All the vessels in the Temple were immersed in order to purify them lest they had become impure during the festival. However, the table upon which the showbread was placed could not be immersed because the showbread had to be on it always (Exodus 25:30). Similarly, the menorah had to always be lit (Leviticus 24:2) and therefore it couldn’t be immersed either. Since these could not be immersed because they were in constant use, they would tell the priests to be very careful to make sure that the impure vessels which they were immersing would not touch the table or the menorah.", + "All the vessels that were in the Temple had second and third sets, so that if the first was defiled, they might bring a second set in its place. All the vessels in the Temple had backups in case the first set became impure. You could think of these as sort of “understudy vessels”, just waiting for their day in the sun!", + "All the vessels that were in the Temple required immersion, except the altar of gold and the altar of bronze, for they are like the ground, the words of Rabbi Eliezer. But the sages say: because they were overlaid [with metal]. There were two vessels in the Temple that did not require immersion, the two altars. The bronze altar was used for the sacrifices and the gold altar was used for the burning of the incense. There is a debate between Rabbi Eliezer and the sages why these altars do not require immersion. According to Rabbi Eliezer because they are attached to the ground, they are treated like the ground which cannot become impure. According to the sages their metal covering prevents impurity from getting to the vessel itself. The metal covering itself cannot become impure because it is not a vessel. Congratulations! We have finished Moed Katan and Seder Moed! It is a tradition at this point to thank God for helping us finish learning the tractate and to commit ourselves to going back and relearning it, so that we may not forget it and so that its lessons will stay with us for all of our lives. For those of you who have been following along with Mishnah Yomit from its beginning, you have now learned half of the entire Mishnah! We began with Seder Nezikin, continued with Seder Nashim and now we have finished Seder Moed. This is quite an impressive amount of learning. These are the three orders of Mishnah most learned and for which there exists both Babylonian and Jerusalem Talmuds. You should feel really good about this accomplishment and hopefully, you are looking at the proverbial glass as half full. However, we still have half the Mishnah to go. Mishnah Yomit never lets up. Tomorrow we begin Seder Zeraim, Tractate Berakhot." + ] + ] + ] + }, + "schema": { + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה חגיגה", + "enTitle": "English Explanation of Mishnah Chagigah", + "key": "English Explanation of Mishnah Chagigah", + "nodes": [ + { + "heTitle": "הקדמה", + "enTitle": "Introduction" + }, + { + "heTitle": "", + "enTitle": "" + } + ] + } +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Moed/English Explanation of Mishnah Chagigah/English/merged.json b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Moed/English Explanation of Mishnah Chagigah/English/merged.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..1388e733b179582cfbb62d0a958a42d0ddd2c9d3 --- /dev/null +++ b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Moed/English Explanation of Mishnah Chagigah/English/merged.json @@ -0,0 +1,175 @@ +{ + "title": "English Explanation of Mishnah Chagigah", + "language": "en", + "versionTitle": "merged", + "versionSource": "https://www.sefaria.org/English_Explanation_of_Mishnah_Chagigah", + "text": { + "Introduction": [ + "Tractate Hagigah deals with the three sacrifices that according to the rabbis a person had to bring on all three festivals, Sukkot, Pesah and Shavuot. ", + "The first of these sacrifices is called the “Hagigah.” The rabbis derived the concept of the Hagigah from the word “hag” used in the context of the three festivals. According to the rabbis, every person had to bring on the first day of the festival a Hagigah. If they could not offer it on the first day, then they could bring it for the remaining seven days. The Hagigah is a type of thanksgiving sacrifice; some of the meat went to the owners and some of the fats were offered on the altar.", + "The second type of sacrifice is a celebratory thanksgiving offering. This is meant to fulfill the commandment to celebrate on the festival (Deuteronomy 16:14). Celebrating means eating meat (sorry if you’re a vegetarian). People were supposed to eat these thanksgiving offerings for all seven days. ", + "The third sacrifice is called a “re’eyah” which means “to be seen.” Deuteronomy 16:16 says that all males must “be seen” at the Temple three times a year, on the three festivals. The rabbis understood that they were not to be seen empty-handed, but rather they had to bring a sacrifice. This sacrifice is a whole burnt offering, an olah. ", + "Tractate Hagigah deals mostly with these three sacrifices. Along the way there are some fascinating mishnayot that deal with sacrifices and purity and shed much light on certain historical aspects of the Second Temple and Mishnaic periods. While some of these mishnayot may be a little difficult to understand, those who persist in learning them will find them quite intriguing. \n" + ], + "": [ + [ + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah delineates who is obligated to make the pilgrimage to Jerusalem on the three festivals. Exodus 23:17 says, “Three times a year all your male shall appear before the Sovereign, the Lord.” Our mishnah elaborates on this verse.", + "All are obligated to appear [at the Temple], except a deaf person, an imbecile and a minor, a person of unknown sex [tumtum], a hermaphrodite, women, unfreed slaves, a lame person, a blind person, a sick person, an aged person, and one who is unable to go up on foot. I will explain each category of persons exempted from making the pilgrimage one at a time. A deaf person, an imbecile and a minor: These three people are usually lumped together because they are not considered to have “awareness/intelligence” (daat). They are exempt from all commandments, this one included. A person of unknown sex [tumtum], a hermaphrodite, women: Exodus 23:17 says that only males are obligated. The mishnah therefore exempts anyone whose sex as a male is not certain. A tumtum is a person with neither male nor female genitalia. A hermaphrodite has both. Since neither is a certain male, neither is obligated. Unfreed slaves: Slaves are not obligated for any mitzvah from which a woman is exempt. A lame person, a blind person, a sick person, an aged person, and one who is unable to go up on foot: Except for the blind person, the other people in this list will have great difficulty in walking up to the Temple Mount. Since the word for festival is “regel” which also means “leg,” these people are exempt. The blind person is exempt because the Torah says that the mitzvah is “to be seen” there. Since the blind person cannot see, he does not have to be seen.", + "Who is a minor? Whoever is unable to ride on his father’s shoulders and go up from Jerusalem to the Temple Mount, the words of Bet Shammai. But Bet Hillel say: whoever is unable to hold his father’s hand and go up from Jerusalem to the Temple Mount, as it is said: “Three regalim” (Exodus 23:14). Bet Hillel and Bet Shammai debate the age at which a minor is obligated to make the pilgrimage. According to Bet Shammai, as long as the child can ride on his father’s shoulders he must go to the Temple. Shammai (and his eponymous house) is generally strict when it comes to the observance of commandments by children. For instance, Shammai made a sukkah for his infant son, and he wanted the same son to fast on Yom Kippur. For Shammai, as long as the child can physically perform the commandment, he must do so. Bet Hillel holds that the child must be able to walk on his own. This is derived from the fact that the Torah uses the word “regel” which also means leg. The Torah’s choice of this word, as opposed to “Three pa’amim” (three times) implies that the child must be able to walk on his own. On a perhaps deeper level, Bet Hillel holds that the mitzvah is for the person to go there on his own, through the power of his own body. Having someone else carry one there is simply not a fulfillment of the mitzvah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn this mishnah the two houses debate the minimum value of the pilgrimage offering and the hagigah offering. These two offerings were explained in the introduction to the tractate.", + "Bet Shammai say: the pilgrimage-offering (re’eyah) must be worth [at least] two pieces of silver and the hagigah one piece (ma’ah) of silver. But Bet Hillel say: the pilgrimage-offering must be worth [at least] one ma'ah of silver and the hagigah two pieces of silver. The pilgrimage offering is an olah, a wholly burnt offering, whereas the hagigah is a shelamim, a thanksgiving offering, part eaten by the priests, part by its owners and part offered on the altar. According to Bet Shammai the sacrifice that is completely for God, the pilgrimage offering, is the more expensive offering. If we extrapolate, we might say that when a person has a limited budget, he should spend more on God than on himself. Bet Hillel holds the opposite the hagigah offering, eaten by people, is to be the more expensive offering. Extrapolating again, Bet Hillel seems to put humans at the center, focusing on enriching their religious experience by providing them more food." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nWhen people would make their pilgrimage festivals to Jerusalem, they would usually bring with them money which they had used to redeem their second tithe. Second tithe can be eaten by its owners but only in Jerusalem. To make things easier for people the Torah allows them to redeem the produce for money, take the money to Jerusalem and use it there to buy food items. Our mishnah deals with which sacrifices one can buy from second tithe money and which have to be purchased with “hullin,” unconsecrated money. It is in the best interests of the pilgrim to be able to use his second tithe money, money which he will have to spend in Jerusalem in any case.", + "Burnt-offerings during the festival [week] are to be brought from [animals bought with] unconsecrated money, and thanksgiving offerings, from [animals bought with] tithe money. This section deals with hol hamoed, the middle of the week of Sukkot and Pesah. Burnt-offerings, the pilgrimage offerings, which are obligatory, must be brought with animals purchased with unconsecrated money. This is the same rule as for all mandatory offerings they may not be purchased with tithe money. Celebratory thanksgiving offering, brought during the middle of the festival are not obligatory as are the other festival offerings. A person has to eat meat during the week and while it was customary to use thanksgiving offerings, it was not mandated. Since this sacrifice wasn’t mandated, one can use tithe money to purchase it.", + "On the first festival day of Pesah: Bet Shammai say: [they must be brought] from [animals bought with] unconsecrated money. And Bet Hillel say: [they can be brought also] from [animals bought with] tithe money. On the first day of both Pesah and Sukkot, and on Shavuot, the thanksgiving offering, the hagigah, is obligatory. Since it is a mandated offering, Bet Shammai holds that it must come from animals purchased with unconsecrated money. Bet Hillel holds that one can still use tithe money because the hagigah is partially eaten by its owners. The Torah states that second tithe must be used to purchase food and the hagigah is food. According to the Talmud, second tithe cannot be used to purchase the whole animal, because some of the animal is offered on the altar. It may only be used as part of the purchasing price." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nDuring the festival it was a mitzvah to celebrate by eating meat. This was done by bringing celebratory thanksgiving offerings to the Temple and eating them in Jerusalem. Our mishnah teaches that both Israelites and priests can use animals and meat dedicated or made holy for other purposes in order to fulfill this obligation.", + "Israelites fulfill their obligation with vow-offerings, freewill-offerings and cattle tithe. An Israelite can fulfill his obligation to bring/eat a celebratory thanksgiving offering by bringing vow-offerings and freewill-offerings that he had set aside during the year for other purposes. During the year a person might make an offering to the Temple for all sorts of reasons (as a supplication, to show gratitude). He may take this animal with him on his pilgrimage and it can count as his celebratory thanksgiving offering. Cattle tithe, the tenth animal born of cows, sheep and goats, is “holy to the Lord” (Leviticus 27:32). This animal is brought to Jerusalem and eaten there. An Israelite can use an animal that was set aside to be cattle tithe as his celebratory thanksgiving offering.", + "And priests with sin-offerings and guilt-offerings, firstlings, the breast and the shoulder, but not with bird-offerings, and not with meal-offerings. Pilgrims would also bring with them the various sin-offerings and guilt-offerings that they had become liable for during the year. They would also bring the “firstlings”, the first-born of every kosher animal. All of these go to the priest and he may use them to fulfill his obligation for celebratory thanksgiving offerings. The breast and the shoulder of thanksgiving offerings go to the priest. This meat will count for him in order to fulfill his obligation for eating meat. However, bird-offerings and meal-offerings don’t count because one can only fulfill the obligation with mammal meat sheep, goats and cows." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nAs I have explained in the previous mishnayot, the pilgrimage offering is a wholly burnt offering and is not eaten, whereas the celebratory offering is a thanksgiving offering and is eaten. Our mishnah gives four different possibilities for how much of each offering a person should bring.", + "He that has many people to eat [with him] and little money, brings many thanksgiving-offerings and few burnt-offerings. If a person has a lot of people he needs to feed and not a lot of money with which to buy the animals to use as sacrifices, he should spend more money on the edible thanksgiving offerings and less on the burnt offerings.", + "[He that has] a lot of money and few to eat [with him] brings many burnt-offerings and few thanksgiving-offerings. If he has a lot of money and wishes to spend it on sacrifices and he doesn’t have a lot of people to eat with him, he should spend more money on the burnt offerings. If he buys too many thanksgiving offerings (or too large of an animal) the meat will have to be burned (not as a sacrifice but as the remnant of uneaten sacrifice).", + "[He that has] little of either, for him is it is said: “One ma'ah of silver’, ‘two pieces of silver.” If he has few people to feed and little money, he should buy the minimum amount of each sacrifice. Our mishnah makes reference to mishnah 2 above where Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel debated the minimum amount for each sacrifice.", + "He that has a lot of both, of him it is said: “Every man as he is able, according to the blessing that the Lord your God has bestowed upon you” (Deuteronomy 16:17). If he is lucky enough to have brought a lot of people with him on the pilgrimage, and to have a lot of money, then he has been blessed by God. The mishnah quotes the verse which says that each brings according to his own blessing, meaning he can bring as many sacrifices as he wants." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah teaches that if one did not bring the hagigah offering on the first day of the festival, he has the rest of the festival to bring it. This is derived from Leviticus 23:41 which says, “You shall observe it as a festival of the Lord for seven days” implying that the hagigah can be brought throughout the festival.", + "He who did not bring his hagigah on the first day of the festival of Sukkot, may bring it during the whole of the festival, even on the last festival day of Sukkot. Even though the last day of Sukkot is a different festival called Shmini Atzeret, nevertheless even on this day one can bring his hagigah offering and have it count as his Sukkot hagigah.", + "If the festival, passed and he did not bring the festival offering, he is no longer liable for it. Of such a person it is said: “A twisted thing cannot be made straight, a lack cannot be made good” (Ecclesiastes 1:15). Once the festival is over, he cannot bring the hagigah offering. Even if he set aside an animal to be a hagigah and then it was lost during the festival and found afterwards, he cannot offer that animal as a hagigah. In such a case the animal would be offered as a freewill offering. The mistake of not bringing the hagigah during the correct time is a “lack that cannot be made good.”" + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe end of yesterday’s mishnah brought a quote from Ecclesiastes 1:15 about a wrong that cannot be corrected. Our mishnah continues to discuss this verse.", + "Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya says: Who is “a twisted thing that cannot be made straight?” He who has intercourse with a forbidden relation and bears by her a mamzer. Should you say that it applies to a thief or robber, he is able to restore [the stolen object] and make straight. Most transgressions can be “made straight,” that is to say they can be fixed. The damage is not irreparable. However, when a man has intercourse with a woman forbidden to him and they have a child, that child is a mamzer for life, there is nothing he can do to get out of this status. He/she will forever be a mamzer, restricted in marriage. Other sins such as stealing can be repaired by returning the stolen object.", + "Rabbi Shimon ben Yohai says: They only call something “twisted” if it was straight at first and then became twisted. And who is this? A disciple of the sages who forsakes the Torah. Rabbi Shimon ben Yohai reads the verse slightly differently. The verse does not relate simply to a wrong that cannot be corrected. Something is only considered to be twisted if it was originally straight. A mamzer was born “twisted” and hence is not referred to in the verse. Rather the verse refers to a Torah scholar who rejects his Torah learning. He was straight when he was dedicated to a life of Torah and became twisted when he separated from that life. The Talmud on this mishnah contains many of the legends about the famous Elisha ben Abuyah, the great Torah sage who later rejected his learning, professing, “there is no law and no judge.” For a very interesting read, one which illuminates the mishnaic period better than any book I know, check out Milton Steinberg’s “As A Driven Leaf.”" + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah, and the first two mishnayot of the next chapter, do not deal with the hagigah. Rather they are loosely connected to the end of the previous mishnah concerning the Torah scholar who separates from the Torah. Our mishnah deals with one issue which may have caused some rabbis to dismiss the Torah, especially the Oral Torah. There are many halakhot in the Mishnah which seem to have little connection to the Written Torah. Some rabbis may have rejected rabbinic learning claiming that the rabbis were just “making it up.” This was a common anti-rabbinic claim made throughout Jewish history, most famously by the Sadducees and later by the Karaites. Our mishnah acknowledges that some halakhot are indeed not well connected to Scripture and yet at the same time the mishnah seems to bequeath to these laws the same authority as those firmly anchored in the Written Torah.", + "[The laws concerning] the dissolution of vows hover in the air and have nothing to rest on. According to the rabbis, a sage has the power to dissolve a vow. This was a subject we covered when we learned Tractate Nedarim. However, there is no scriptural basis, no verses in the Torah, that give the rabbis (or anyone else) such power. These halakhot “hover in the air” meaning they are not grounded in the written Torah.", + "The laws concerning Shabbat, hagigot, and trespassing are as mountains hanging by a hair, for they have scant scriptural basis but many halakhot. There are three categories of halakhah which have some scriptural basis, but not a lot and yet they have a lot of halakhot in the Mishnah and in other rabbinic works. The first of these is Shabbat. There were 24 chapters in Mishnah Shabbat and another 11 in Eruvin and yet the Torah barely discusses what types of work are prohibited on Shabbat. Hagigah, the subject of our tractate, is also another case of a lot of halakhah with little scriptural basis. The Torah only says the word “hag,” which the rabbis interpret to mean a sacrifice. This is not a lot of scriptural support for a whole tractate. Finally, “trespassing” which means illicit use of Temple property. There is a whole tractate called Meilah dedicate to this subject, and yet it too has scant scriptural support.", + "[The laws concerning] civil cases and [Temple] worship, purity and impurity, and the forbidden relations have what to rest on, and they that are the essentials of the Torah. The Torah is full of verses dedicated to civil laws, the main topic of all of Seder Nezikin, Temple worship, the main topic of Seder Kodashim, purity laws, the main topic of Seder Toharot and the laws of forbidden relations, the main topic of large parts of Seder Nashim. These are the “essentials of Torah” in that the Torah dedicates to them more verses than to anything else." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "They may not expound upon the subject of forbidden relations in the presence of three.
Nor the work of creation in the presence of two.
Nor [the work of] the chariot in the presence of one, unless he is a sage and understands of his own knowledge.
Whoever speculates upon four things, it would have been better had he not come into the world: (1) what is above, (2) what is beneath, (3) what came before, and (4) what came after.
And whoever takes no thought for the honor of his creator, it would have been better had he not come into the world.
This mishnah is brought here because like yesterday’s mishnah it may refer to certain reasons why sages abandoned the world of Torah. There are some subjects which are, according to our mishnah, dangerous to speculate upon or to discuss in front of the masses. Pondering upon the unknowable may have contributed towards apostasy.
Section one: The danger of expounding upon the verses about forbidden relations in the Torah is either that people will be confused and make irreparable mistakes (i.e. create mamzerim) or that they will be titillated by the attention paid to these verses and they will not be able to control their urges and they will come to sin. Therefore, these verses are not expounded before even a group as small as three.
Section two: How the world was created and whether it was created from already existing material was a much debated and sensitive issue in the ancient world. That there might have been material which pre-existed God would have been seen by the rabbis to be heretical. Due to the speculative nature of this subject, it was forbidden to talk about it in front of even two people.
Section three: The study of the chariot, Ezekiel’s heavenly vision (Ezekiel 1) is the mystical study of God, God’s physical attributes and God’s unknowable mysteries. The sages seem to have believed that God had a physical existence, perhaps even a body in a certain sense, but that God’s body was hidden from human beings. It was forbidden for one sage to teach this subject to another sage unless the learning sage could understand things without really being explained to them. What this seems to mean is that one sage could begin to discuss this topic with another sage but he shouldn’t reveal to him the secrets of God unless he sees that the sage understands and can proceed on his own. However, we interpret this, what is clear is that the sages were extremely hesitant to engage publicly in mysticism.
Section four: There were some things that humans couldn’t know and therefore should not try to know. They are: 1) what is above the sky; 2) what is below the earth; 3) what came before the earth was created; 4) what will come after it is destroyed. Again, these four subjects are (or at least were) completely speculative. A person should spend their time in this world studying subjects that are knowable, such as the interpretation of Torah and halakhah. Metaphysical speculation was ruled out by this mishnah. The final line of the mishnah seems to be a continuation of the previous line. Those who try to uncover God’s secrets and reveal them to the public are not acting with respect to God’s honor. It is almost as if they are undressing God in public. Had God wanted these secrets to be revealed they would have been revealed.
I should note that there do seem to have been rabbis in this period who did engage in such speculative study and even composed works dedicated to the topic. There are two ways to justify this mishnah with those other works. First of all, there were different groups of rabbis, some of which focused on halakhah/midrash and others who focused on mysticism. The second possibility, which I believe to be more likely, is that the rabbis thought that mysticism was not an appropriate focus for most people’s study. Mysticism, which they considered dangerous, should be reserved for the elite and not spread to the masses." + ], + [ + "Yose ben Yoezer says that [on a festival] the laying of the hands [on the head of a sacrifice] may not be performed. Yosef ben Johanan says that it may be performed.
Joshua ben Perahia says that it may not be performed. Nittai the Arbelite says that it may be performed.
Judah ben Tabai says that it may not be performed. Shimon ben Shetah says that it may be performed.
Shamayah says that it may be performed. Avtalyon says that it may not be performed.
Hillel and Menahem did not dispute. Menahem went out, Shammai entered.
Shammai says that it may not be performed. Hillel says that it may be performed.
The former [of each] pair were patriarchs and the latter were heads of the court.
Our mishnah is possibly the most unique mishnah in the entire Mishnah. It contains a debate about whether or not a person can lay their hands on a sacrifice on Yom Tov, the first and last days of a festival. According to Leviticus 1:4 and other parallel verses, when a person brings a sacrifice he lays his hands, or leans, on the sacrifice before it is slaughtered. On Yom Tov it is forbidden to use an animal and leaning on an animal is considered to be use of an animal. Therefore, the question could be asked, can one lean on the sacrificial animal on Yom Tov or must he do so the day before?
What is unique about our mishnah is that there are five pairs (zugot) of sages, each from a different generation, who debated this issue. The sages here are early sages who lived during the Second Temple period, from the beginning of the Hasmonean period until close to the beginning of the millennium. They might even be called proto-sages, or proto-rabbis. With one exception, all of these sages are found in Avot 1:4-10, where each transmits a moral exhortation. The final clause of the mishnah determines that of each pair the first was the patriarch and the second was the head of the court. As far as I know, there are no other mishnayot that have this structure in which the same debate being repeated generation after generation.
The fact that they debate specifically this issue is significant. We know that ancient Jews argued a lot about the laws of Yom Tov and Shabbat and that the Pharisees tended to be more lenient than the other two main sects, the Essenes and the Sadducees. This seems to be the trend in this mishnah as well Hillel allows one to lean on the animal, whereas Shammai does not.
Section four: Note that the mishnah switches order here. In all three previous pairs, the first said that it may not be performed, whereas the second said that it should be performed. It seems that there may have been some historical switch at this period, where the position of the patriarch changed.
Section five: Little is known about Menahem from rabbinic literature, except that he seems to have separated from the fold. Josephus, Antiquities 15:10, 5 relates a story about a certain Menahem who was an Essene. This Menahem receives a divine revelation that Herod will become king and he relates it to him. According to some scholars this is the same Menahem referred to in our mishnah. In any case, it is interesting that he is replaced by Shammai. It is as if the mishnah is letting us know that Shammai is not like Menahem. While Shammai’s opinions are usually not the accepted halakhah, he is still legitimate." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn this mishnah Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel debate which sacrifices may be brought on Yom Tov and whether it is permitted to lay hands on them. The second of these debates is the same as the debate in yesterday’s mishnah.", + "Bet Shammai say: They may bring thanksgiving offerings [on Yom Tov] but they may not lay their hands on them, and [they may not bring] wholly burnt-offerings. And Bet Hillel say: They may bring thanksgiving offerings and wholly burnt-offerings and lay their hands on them. The debate here is over two subjects. 1) Can wholly burnt-offerings be brought on Yom Tov? 2) When a sacrifice is brought on Yom Tov, do they lay their hands on the sacrifice as is usually mandated with sacrifices? Bet Shammai states that wholly burnt-offerings cannot be brought on Yom Tov at all since they are not eaten. The Torah permits preparing food on Yom Tov (see Tractate Betzah) but since wholly-burnt offerings are not food, they may not be prepared on Yom Tov. The wholly burnt offering which must be brought on account of the festival (re’eyah) should be sacrificed during the festival week. Bet Hillel allows the bringing of wholly burnt offerings because they hold that any work that is permitted when it is done in the preparation of food is also permitted when it is done for other reasons. Bet Shammai rules as did their eponymous leader in the previous mishnah, that it is forbidden to lay hands on the sacrificial animal on Yom Tov because that is considered to be making the animal work. Bet Hillel allows this, reasoning that if the sacrifice is allowed, all of the acts that accompany the sacrifice are also allowed." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nAtzeret (the rabbinic term for the festival of Shavuot) is the only festival that lasts for just one day. Since Bet Shammai holds that the wholly burnt offering brought as the pilgrimage offering cannot be offered on Yom Tov but they agree that this sacrifice must be offered at some point, the question must be asked, when should it be brought.", + "Atzeret ( which fell on a Friday: Bet Shammai say: the day of the slaughter [of the wholly burnt offerings] is after Shabbat. And Bet Hillel say: the day of the slaughter is not after Shabbat. Since Bet Shammai holds that the wholly burnt offering cannot be brought on Yom Tov itself, they have to posit that there is a “day of the slaughter” that comes the day afterward Atzeret. Bet Hillel says that there is no special “day of the slaughter” because the sacrifice is brought on Atzeret itself.", + "They agree, however, that if it falls on Shabbat, the day of the slaughter is after Shabbat. If Atzeret falls on Shabbat, then Bet Hillel agrees that the sacrifice is offered the day after because the sacrifice of the hagigah and the pilgrimage wholly burnt offering do not override the prohibition of slaughtering an animal on Shabbat. This is because they can be sacrificed on another day.", + "The high priest does not [in that case] put on his [special] garments, and mourning and fasting are permitted, in order not to confirm the view of those who say that Atzeret is after Shabbat. Perhaps the bitterest dispute between the Sadducees and Pharisees was over the date of Atzeret. The Sadducees held that the Omer began to be brought on the day after Shabbat, hence Shavuot would always fall on Sunday, seven weeks later. The Pharisees/rabbis held that the Omer began to be brought on the second day of Pesah, and hence the day of the week of Shavuot would vary from year to year depending upon the day of the week upon which the first day of Pesah fell. We just learned that if Atzeret fell on Shabbat, they would slaughter the wholly-burnt offerings on Sunday. The problem this creates is that people will think that the halakhah is like the Sadducees. To avoid creating this impression, the rabbis distinguished between this day of slaughter and a normal festival in several ways which would have been evident to the public. First of all the high priest would not wear his eight special garments that he normally wears while performing his worship service. Second, mourning and fasting was permitted. People who saw these changes would understand that the only reason that they were offering the sacrifices on Sunday was that they could not be offered on Shabbat. They would not think that the sages were actually postponing Shavuot to Sunday." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nFrom here until the end of the tractate the mishnah teaches laws of purity and impurity. The reason why these laws are here is that when Israel would come to Jerusalem and to the Temple for the festival they had to be pure in order to eat their sacrifices. They would immerse their vessels to purify them before Yom Tov. During the festival all of the people of Israel acted like the Pharisees and were extra stringent on eating only while in a state of ritual purity.\nOur mishnah deals with the topic of washing hands versus washing one’s whole body. There are some foods which only required one’s hands to be washed while holier foods required one to immerse one’s entire body.", + "They wash hands for [eating] unconsecrated [food], and [second] tithe, and for terumah [heave-offering]. One of the things that the Pharisees were famous for was washing their hands before they ate even regular unconsecrated food. There is nothing wrong with eating impure food but the Pharisees wished to preserve the laws of purity on a higher level than was required. During the festival, in Jerusalem everyone was expected to purify their hands before eating, even unconsecrated food. Second tithe and terumah are holy and therefore they certainly require one to wash one’s hands before being touched. The handwashing referred to here is done with water poured over one’s hands with a vessel.", + "But for sacred food they must immerse [their hands in a mikveh]. Before eating sacred food, such as the thanksgiving offering eaten by Israelites and the sin and guilt offerings eaten by the priests the hands must be immersed in a valid mikveh. In the Talmud they debate what this section refers to. According to one opinion this clause refers only to hands which were certainly made impure. Unless one knows that one’s hands had become impure, it would be sufficient to wash them with a vessel. According to the other opinion, in all cases before one eats sacrificial meat one must wash hands by immersing them in the mikveh.", + "With regard to the [water of] purification, if one’s hands became impure, one’s [whole] body is impure. The “water of purification” refers to the water with the red heifer’s ashes in it used to purify people who had contracted a serious level of impurity. One who comes to prepare the waters must be completely pure. If his hands had become impure then his whole body was also considered impure and he would have to immerse his whole body." + ], + [ + "If he immersed for unconsecrated [food], and was presumed to be fit to eat unconsecrated [food], he is prohibited from [eating second] tithe.
If he immersed for [second] tithe, and was presumed to be fit to eat [second] tithe, he is prohibited from [eating] terumah.
If he immersed for terumah, and was presumed to be fit to eat terumah, he is prohibited from [eating] holy things.
If he immersed for holy things, and was presumed to be fit to eat holy things he is prohibited from [touching the waters of] purification.
If one immersed for something possessing a stricter [degree of holiness], one is permitted [to have contact with] something possessing a lighter [degree of holiness].
If he immersed but without special intention, it is as though he had not immersed.
This mishnah deals with the intention that one has to have when one immerses. There are various levels of holy objects ranked below from lowest to highest:
1) Unconsecrated food.
2) Second tithe (eaten by its owners in Jerusalem).
3) Terumah (separated from produce and given to priests).
4) Sacrifices
5) The waters of purification made from the ashes of the red heifer.
The general rule of the mishnah is quite clear and stated explicitly at the end of the mishnah itself. If one immerses with the intention of eating a less holy thing, say unconsecrated food, he cannot count that immersion in order to eat a more holy thing. He would have to immerse again to eat the more holy thing. However, if one immerses with the intention of eating a holy thing, say a sacrifice, that immersion counts for eating a less holy thing such as terumah. Finally, if one immerses without any specific intention in mind, the immersion doesn’t count.
This explanation should aid in explaining the whole mishnah, so you will not see a fuller explanation below." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe vessel that a zav or zavah (a man or woman who had an unusual genital discharge) steps, sits, leans or lies upon is impure. This vessel will now transmit impurity to those who touch it. This type of impurity is called “midras” which means “stepped upon.” In our mishnah the rabbis state that the garments of people who have immersed for a lesser purpose possess midras-impurity for those who wish to preserve a higher degree of impurity. What this would mean is that if the person who wished to possess the higher degree of impurity touched these clothes, he would become impure.\nOn a less literal level, this mishnah seems to rank those who preserve their purity, granting a higher status to those who are more cautious about the purity laws. Also, this mishnah is parallel to yesterday’s mishnah, both ranking degrees of purity.", + "The garments of an am haaretz possess midras-impurity for Pharisees. An am-haaretz literally means, “one of the land” but it is used to refer to a person who does not observe the laws of purity and tithing as do the Pharisees. As an aside, the word does not have quite as negative a connotation in the Mishnah as it does in later rabbinic literature. In later literature one could translate the term as “ignoramus.” In any case, since they were not cautious about purity laws, their clothes have midras-impurity for Pharisees.", + "The garments of Pharisees possess midras-impurity for those who eat terumah. While Pharisees were cautious about purity, they were not as pure as priests who ate terumah. The Pharisees immersed to eat unconsecrated food and we learned in yesterday’s mishnah that one who immerses to eat unconsecrated food cannot eat terumah. Hence the clothes of Pharisees have midras-impurity for a priest who eats terumah.", + "The garments of those who eat terumah possess midras-impurity for [those who eat] sacred things. Yesterday we learned that one who immerses to eat terumah is not pure enough to eat sacrifices (sacred things). Today we learn that the clothes of the one who eats terumah have midras-impurity for the one who wishes to eat sacrifices.", + "The garments of [those who eat] sacred things possess midras-impurity for [those who occupy themselves with the waters of] purification. One who wishes to deal with the waters of purification cannot touch even the clothes of one who immersed to eat sacrifices.", + "Yose ben Yoezer was the most pious in the priesthood, yet his apron was [considered to possess] midras-impurity for [those who ate] sacred things. Yose ben Yoezer was mentioned above at the beginning of mishnah two. He was, according to our mishnah, the most pious of priests and he would immerse before eating unconsecrated food as it is was terumah. Nevertheless, his apron which he used to wipe his hands after eating, possessed midras-impurity for one who wished to eat sacrifices. As strict as he was in matters of purity, they still treated his clothes according to the above rules.", + "Yohanan ben Gudgada all his life used to eat [unconsecrated food] in accordance with the purity required for sacred things, yet his apron was [considered to possess] midras-impurity for [those who occupied themselves with the water of] purification. Yohanan ben Gudgada was even stricter with regard to purity and ate even unconsecrated food as if he was eating sacrifices. This is one level stricter than the Pharisees who ate unconsecrated food as if it was terumah. Nevertheless, since there is one level higher than the purity for sacrifices, his garments were still considered to possess midras-impurity for one who wished to deal with the waters of purification. These last two sections demonstrate that favor was not shown in matters of purity." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nIn the previous two mishnayot we learned that the rules regarding eating “sacred things,” namely sacrifices, are more stringent than the rules regarding eating terumah. Our mishnah teaches several more aspects in which eating sacred things is treated more stringently.", + "Greater stringency applies to sacred things than to terumah, that they may immerse vessels within vessels [together] for terumah, but not for sacred things. When it comes to immersing impure vessels in order to purify them, if they are going to be used to hold terumah, one vessel may be immersed inside another vessel. If the vessel is going to be used for sacrifices, then the vessels cannot be immersed one inside the other.", + "The outside and inside and handle [of a vessel are regarded as separate] for terumah, but not for sacred things. When it comes to terumah, each part of the vessel is considered as being separate. So if an impure thing touches the handle of the vessel, only the handle is impure and the contents inside the vessel are still pure. If something touches the outside of the vessel, only the outside is impure and not the inside. Finally, if something impure touches the inside only the inside is impure. When it comes to sacred things, if one part of the vessel is impure, the whole vessel is impure and will cause other things to become impure as well.", + "One that carries anything possessing midras-uncleanness may carry [at the same time] terumah, but not sacred things. I explained “midras-impurity” in yesterday’s mishnah. Today’s mishnah teaches that if someone is holding an object that had become impure through midras (someone sat, stood, lied or applied pressure on it) he can hold in his other hand terumah. The vessel does not make him impure such that he makes the terumah impure. However, he cannot hold sacred things at the same time.", + "The garments of those who eat terumah posses midras-uncleanness for [those who eat] sacred things. This is the exact same halakhah as that found in section three of yesterday’s mishnah.", + "The rule [for the immersion of garments] for [those who would eat terumah is not the same as the rule for [those who would eat] sacred things: for in the case of sacred things, he must [first] untie [any knots in the unclean garment], dry it [if it is wet, then] immerse it, and afterwards retie it; but in case of terumah, it may [first] be tied and afterwards immersed. When one wants to immerse something to be used for sacred things must first untie all of the knots, dry them all off, then he may immerse it and then once it’s been immersed he may retie the knots. In contrast, if a vessel is going to be used for terumah, the knots don’t have to be taken out before it is immersed." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to provide aspects of purity/impurity in sacrifices are treated with greater stringency than terumah.", + "Vessels that have been finished in purity require immersion [before they are used] for sacred things, but not [before they are used] for terumah. Once the production of a vessel has been completed the vessel can now receive impurity. Even if the artisan was careful not to defile the vessel it still requires immersion before it can be used with sacred things. In contrast, if the vessel is going to be used with terumah then it doesn’t need to be immersed unless it has been defiled.", + "A vessel unites all its contents [for impurity] in the case of sacred things, but not in the case of terumah. If there are a bunch of separate food items in a vessel, say some fruit or separate pieces of meat, and one becomes impure, then all of them are impure, if they are sacred things. The vessel causes the impurity to travel from one piece to the other. However, if they are terumah, then the vessel does not convey the impurity from one to the other.", + "Sacred things become invalid [by impurity] of a fourth degree, but terumah [only by impurity] of a third degree. There are different levels of impurity, the higher the number the closer the item is to the source of impurity, which is called a “father of impurity.” A “father of impurity” that touches something give it first degree impurity, and a first degree conveys second degree impurity, and so on. Sacred things can become invalid through contact even with a third degree of impurity, meaning that these things cannot be put on the altar, because they have “fourth degree” of impurity. There is no such thing as fifth degree of impurity. Terumah becomes disqualified only by something with a second degree of impurity. If something of third degree impurity touches terumah it does not affect it.", + "In the case of terumah, if one hand of his hands became impure, the other remains clean, but in the case of sacred things, he must immerse both [hands], because the one hand defiles the other for sacred things but not for terumah. If one of one’s hands becomes impure, he cannot use the other hand to touch a sacred thing, even if one hand didn’t touch the other. But when it comes to terumah, if one of one’s hands is impure he can use the other hand to touch terumah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nAnother two stringencies for sacred things.", + "They may eat dry foods with impure hands when it comes to terumah, but not when it comes to sacred things. Wet food is susceptible to impurity whereas dry food is not (see Leviticus 11:34, 38). This is true in all cases except for the case of sacred food. The idea is that “the love of the sacred makes it susceptible to impurity.” [This is a fascinating concept, demonstrating well that the concept of sacredness and susceptible to impurity are intimately connected.] Therefore one cannot eat sacred food with impure hands, even if the hands are dry. Terumah is like normal food and doesn’t receive impurity unless it becomes wet.", + "The one who has not yet buried his dead (an and one who lacks atonement require immersion for sacred things but not for terumah. When one of a person’s seven close relatives dies, he/she is an onen on that day and the night thereafter. An onen may not eat sacrifices. Similarly a person who needed to bring certain sacrifices in order to complete his period of impurity (such as a leper, see Leviticus 14:10) cannot eat other sacrifices until he brings these mandated sacrifices. The rabbis decreed that before these people can eat sacrifices they must go to the mikveh. This immersion would aid in the transition between their former state of not being able to eat sacrifices to a state of being able to eat sacrifices. In contrast, an onen and a formerly impure person who had not brought sacrifices can eat terumah, therefore upon the completion of the period of being an onen and after bringing the sacrifice he may continue to eat terumah without another immersion." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah begins to teach ways in which terumah is treated with greater stringency than sacrifices. The central issue in this mishnah is how much to trust an am haaretz, an unlearned person, when he tells you that he preserved the purity of a food item. As we shall see, if he says that he preserved its purity so that it would be used for a sacred thing (wine for a libation or oil for a minhah offering) than he is believed because the am haaretz respects the purity of sacred things. He would not allow an impure thing to be offered on the altar of the Temple. However, if he says he preserved its purity because it is terumah then the am haaretz is not believed.", + "Greater stringency applies to terumah [than to sacred things], for in Judah [the people of the land (amei] are trusted in regard to the purity of [sacred] wine and oil throughout the year; and at the season of the wine-presses and olive-presses even in regard to terumah. The farmers in Judah would have known that some of their produce, namely wine and oil would need to be pure so it could be used as libations and to accompany the minhah sacrifice. They respected this and would not have allowed it to become impure. Since sacrifices are needed all year round, they are believed all year if they say that they preserved its purity for it to be used as sacrifices. However, they are not believed if they say that they preserved the produce because of the terumah that would have to be separated from it. However, during the main time of the year when everyone presses their grapes and olives they are believed because everyone purifies their vessels at that time of the year, in anticipation of having to take terumah out of the wine and oil. One could think of this as sort of the “high holiday season” of purity, at least for farmers. Although they may not be particularly meticulous in their observance during the rest of the year, they are during these two periods.", + "If [the season of] the wine-presses and olive-presses passed, and they brought to him a jar of wine of terumah, he [the priest] should not accept it from him, but [the am ha-aretz] may leave it for the coming [season] of the wine-press. If the time of wine and olive pressing has passed, a priest who is meticulous about his observance should not accept wine or olive oil from an am haaretz. However, the am haaretz can leave over that wine until the next wine pressing and then the priest can accept it from him, even if the priest knows that this was not made during the current pressing. It’s as if we are willing to believe the am haaretz because he was willing to hold onto his wine for so long.", + "But if he said to him, “I have set apart a quarter log [of wine] as a sacred thing,” he is believed [in regard to the purity of the whole jug]. If the am haaretz says that he set apart some of the wine to be used in the sacrificial service, then he is believed to say that the whole jug is pure, even for the terumah in the jug. Since he is believed when it comes to the sacred part of the wine, he is believed for the terumah as well.", + "[When it comes to] jugs of wine and jugs of oil that are meant for terumah, they are believed during the season of the wine-presses and the olive-vats and prior to [the season of] the wine-presses seventy days. The am haaretz is trusted when he says he preserved the purity of the empty wine and oil jugs both in the time of the pressing and before the pressing for seventy days. Evidently, they would begin preparing the jugs to hold the wine and oil for seventy days before the pressing. However, for the terumah itself they are only believed to have preserved its purity during the time of the pressing." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe previous mishnah discussed when a person is trusted with regard to the purity of his things. Today’s mishnah discusses another such rule when is a pottery maker trusted that he has preserved the purity of his pots.", + "From Modi’im inwards [the potters] are trusted in regard to [the purity of] earthenware vessels; from Modi'im outwards they are not trusted. Modiim is famous for being the city where the Maccabees lived. It is about 30 kilometers northwest of Jerusalem, about a day’s travel by foot. (It is also where I live, but that won’t really help you understand this mishnah). The closer a pottery maker is to Jerusalem the more it will be in his best interests to preserve the purity of his pottery because it is likely that people buying his goods may want to use them in connection with the sacrificial service. Therefore, if the pottery-maker lives from Modiim and inwards toward Jerusalem, he is believed to say that his pots are pure. We should note that the Temple would have required many clay pots because they could be used only one time. Once a clay pot was used to cook sacrificial meat it could no longer be used because the meat that was absorbed into the pot would become remnant (leftover sacrifice) which is forbidden. Therefore the pots had to be disposed of after one use.", + "How so? A potter who sells the pots entered inwards of Modi'im, then the same potter, the same pots and the same buyers are trusted [to be pure]. But if he went out [from Modi’im outwards] he is not trusted. In this section we learn that the rule that the potter is believed when he is inside of the Modiim border is an absolute rule. The same potter, pots and buyers that are trusted to be pure when they are between Modiim and Jerusalem are no longer believed to be pure when they go out beyond Modiim." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah continues to deal with the question of when to trust a person when he says that he has not made vessels impure.", + "Tax-collectors who entered a house, and similarly thieves who restored [stolen] vessels are believed if they say, “We have not touched [anything].” The mishnah refers to a tax collector who has taken someone’s possessions in order to use them as collateral for a tax debt. When he returns the object to its owner he is believed if he says that he didn’t make the object impure. The same is true for the thief who is returning something he had stolen. It seems that these people are believed specifically because they are doing “teshuvah”, repentance, by returning the stolen/collected item. Since they are repenting, they are at the same time believed with regard to other aspects of religious law. Some commentators say that these people are believed if the item is going to be used for sacrifices, because even tax collectors and thieves respect the purity of sacrifices. But they are not believed with regard to terumah. Other commentators say that they are believed for both.", + "And in Jerusalem they are believed in regard to sacred things, and during a festival also in regard to terumah. Amei Haaretz (uneducated people) are believed when they are in Jerusalem to say that their vessels are pure so that they could be used with sacrifices. During a festival their trustworthiness is even greater because everybody, even the uneducated, would purify themselves before the festival. Therefore they are even believed with regard to terumah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nDuring the festival the am haaretz, the uneducated “person of the land” is believed with regard to issues of purity far more than he is during the rest of the year. The first part of our mishnah deals with how far this trustworthiness extends.\nThe second part deals with the period after the festival has passed and with the question of how to cope with the fact that there have been people in the Temple courtyard who may have been impure.", + "One who opened his jar [of wine] or broke into his dough [to sell them] on account of the festival [and an am haaretz touched the wine or dough]: Rabbi Judah says: he may finish [selling them after the festival]; But the sages say: he may not finish. The mishnah is addressed to a store owner who is cautious about matters of purity. He is what is called a haver or an associate, a member of the rabbinic circle, the opposite of an am haaretz. During the festival he opens up jugs of wine and he breaks into prepared dough to sell these products to customers for their use during the festival. Some of the customers are amei haaretz and they touch the wine and dough. We have already stated that during the festival the am haaretz is trusted to say that he is pure. The question is, can the store owner continue to sell these items after the festival as if the amei haaretz really were pure. Rabbi Judah says that he can. According to Rabbi Judah, since we assume that the am haaretz was pure during the festival, we can assume that the wine and dough are pure even after the festival. The other sages disagree. During the festival they are believed not so much because we are sure that the am haaretz is pure but because the sages wished to be lenient during the festival. We might even say that the sages wished to be lenient in order to encourage all of the people from the land to participate in the festival and its sacrifices. However, when the festival was over the rules return to normal and we must be concerned lest the wine or dough had been made impure.", + "When the festival was over, they undertook the purification of the Temple court. If the festival ended on Friday, they did not undertake [the purification of the Temple court] because of the honor of the Shabbat. Rabbi Judah said: even not on Thursday, for the priests are not free. When the festival was over they had to face the fact that the people may have made the Temple’s vessels impure. The trustworthiness bequeathed to everyone during the festival was over. They would then begin to purify the Temple’s vessels. How they did so will be described in tomorrow’s mishnah. If the festival was over on Friday, meaning that Thursday was the last day of the festival, the priests would not have had time on Friday to purify the vessels because they were busy preparing for Shabbat. Therefore they would wait until Sunday to purify the vessels. According to Rabbi Judah, even if the festival was over on Wednesday, they wouldn’t begin the purification until Sunday. On Thursday the priests were not available because they were cleaning out all of the ashes that had accumulated on the altar during the entire festival. They would not have had time on Thursday to purify the vessels. On Friday they were busy preparing for Shabbat." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe final mishnah of the chapter, tractate and seder (game, set and match) explains how they purified the Temple’s vessels.", + "How did they undertake the purification of the Temple court? They immersed the vessels which were in the Temple, and they say to them: “Be cautious lest you touch the table or menorah and defile them.” All the vessels in the Temple were immersed in order to purify them lest they had become impure during the festival. However, the table upon which the showbread was placed could not be immersed because the showbread had to be on it always (Exodus 25:30). Similarly, the menorah had to always be lit (Leviticus 24:2) and therefore it couldn’t be immersed either. Since these could not be immersed because they were in constant use, they would tell the priests to be very careful to make sure that the impure vessels which they were immersing would not touch the table or the menorah.", + "All the vessels that were in the Temple had second and third sets, so that if the first was defiled, they might bring a second set in its place. All the vessels in the Temple had backups in case the first set became impure. You could think of these as sort of “understudy vessels”, just waiting for their day in the sun!", + "All the vessels that were in the Temple required immersion, except the altar of gold and the altar of bronze, for they are like the ground, the words of Rabbi Eliezer. But the sages say: because they were overlaid [with metal]. There were two vessels in the Temple that did not require immersion, the two altars. The bronze altar was used for the sacrifices and the gold altar was used for the burning of the incense. There is a debate between Rabbi Eliezer and the sages why these altars do not require immersion. According to Rabbi Eliezer because they are attached to the ground, they are treated like the ground which cannot become impure. According to the sages their metal covering prevents impurity from getting to the vessel itself. The metal covering itself cannot become impure because it is not a vessel. Congratulations! We have finished Moed Katan and Seder Moed! It is a tradition at this point to thank God for helping us finish learning the tractate and to commit ourselves to going back and relearning it, so that we may not forget it and so that its lessons will stay with us for all of our lives. For those of you who have been following along with Mishnah Yomit from its beginning, you have now learned half of the entire Mishnah! We began with Seder Nezikin, continued with Seder Nashim and now we have finished Seder Moed. This is quite an impressive amount of learning. These are the three orders of Mishnah most learned and for which there exists both Babylonian and Jerusalem Talmuds. You should feel really good about this accomplishment and hopefully, you are looking at the proverbial glass as half full. However, we still have half the Mishnah to go. Mishnah Yomit never lets up. Tomorrow we begin Seder Zeraim, Tractate Berakhot." + ] + ] + ] + }, + "versions": [ + [ + "Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp", + "http://learn.conservativeyeshiva.org/mishnah/" + ] + ], + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה חגיגה", + "categories": [ + "Mishnah", + "Modern Commentary on Mishnah", + "English Explanation of Mishnah", + "Seder Moed" + ], + "schema": { + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה חגיגה", + "enTitle": "English Explanation of Mishnah Chagigah", + "key": "English Explanation of Mishnah Chagigah", + "nodes": [ + { + "heTitle": "הקדמה", + "enTitle": "Introduction" + }, + { + "heTitle": "", + "enTitle": "" + } + ] + } +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Moed/English Explanation of Mishnah Eruvin/English/Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp.json b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Moed/English Explanation of Mishnah Eruvin/English/Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..88294cf8cf3c203571b70f76ba01de3a250044ba --- /dev/null +++ b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Moed/English Explanation of Mishnah Eruvin/English/Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp.json @@ -0,0 +1,598 @@ +{ + "language": "en", + "title": "English Explanation of Mishnah Eruvin", + "versionSource": "http://learn.conservativeyeshiva.org/mishnah/", + "versionTitle": "Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp", + "status": "locked", + "license": "CC-BY", + "shortVersionTitle": "Dr. Joshua Kulp", + "actualLanguage": "en", + "languageFamilyName": "english", + "isBaseText": true, + "isSource": true, + "isPrimary": true, + "direction": "ltr", + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה עירובין", + "categories": [ + "Mishnah", + "Modern Commentary on Mishnah", + "English Explanation of Mishnah", + "Seder Moed" + ], + "text": { + "Introduction": [ + "Tractate Eruvin is a continuation of tractate Shabbat. Most of Eruvin deals with the different types of domains: public, private and two in-between domains, which we shall explain when they appear. The categorization of property into different domains is relevant for the laws of carrying. The tractate also deals with the borders outside of a city which one may not go past on Shabbat. ", + "In order to understand Eruvin it is helpful to understand how a typical city was structured in the mishnaic period. Houses shared a courtyard, each house opening up to a courtyard. Alleys connected several courtyards to the public areas, and there were two different types of alleys, a closed one (mavoy satum) and an open one (mavoy mefulash). A closed alley opened to the public domain on only one side, whereas an open alley was open on both sides. ", + "Our tractate will deal with two different types of “eruvin”. Literally “eruv” means to mix something. This meaning will become apparent as we learn what an eruv is. According to Torah law (deoraita) it is permitted to carry something out of a house and bring it into a courtyard and vice versa. Similarly, one may, according to Torah law, carry something from a courtyard into a closed alley, provided that the open end of the alley had either a sidepost (lehi) or a beam (korah) over its top. The pole and the beam serve symbolically to close off the alley such that it is in reality closed from three sides and symbolically closed from the fourth. ", + "The sages feared that if they allowed carrying from the courtyard or closed alley or house into one of the other of these areas (for instance from their house into the courtyard), people would forget and they would also carry into the public domain. Therefore they forbade this unless one set up an “eruv”. An “eruv” is a meal shared by all of the members of the courtyard, which turns the courtyard into a fictional private domain. Similarly, if they wanted to carry in the closed alley, all of the members of the alley had to share in a meal set up in one of the houses. The eruv for the courtyard is called “the courtyard eruv” (eruvei hatzerot) and the alley eruv is called “alley partnerships” (shitufei mevuot). Tractate Eruvin deals with the details of how these eruvin work.", + "The second (or really third) type of eruv is the “border eruv” (eruvei techumin). On Shabbat it is forbidden for a person to go more than 2000 cubits outside of the place where he is when Shabbat began. However, if he is in a city, he may travel freely anywhere within that city, no matter how large it is. The 2000 cubits are counted from outside of the city. This halakhah is learned from Exodus 16:29-30, “‘Let everyone remain where he is; let no one leave his place on the seventh day.’ So the people remained inactive on the seventh day.” “His place” is defined by the rabbis as his city, and not merely his house. The border of two thousand cubits is derived midrashically from Numbers 35:5, a verse which deals with the fields surrounding the Levite cities. ", + "If a person needs to go beyond the Shabbat border for the purposes of a commandment, for instance to learn Torah or for a circumcision, the rabbis allowed him to set up an eruv that would allow him to extend that distance by another 2000 cubits. What he would do is put a meal someplace within his border and then from that point he could walk another 2000 cubits. If, for instance, he were to put his meal 2000 cubits outside the city, he could then walk 4000 cubits on Shabbat. However, if he does so, on the other side of the city he can not walk out at al. The 2000 cubits on the one side means that his border is at that point and therefore he can’t walk out at all on the other side of the city. However, if he left it 1000 cubits outside of the city on one side, he could then walk 3000 cubits on that side and 1000 cubits on the other side. Our tractate deals extensively with the details these laws as well." + ], + "": [ + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThe first mishnah in Eruvin deals with the entrance to a closed alley. As we mentioned in the introduction, Torah law allows one to carry within this alley. However, the sages forbade this unless there is either a side-post or a cross-beam on top of the entrance. The purpose of either the side-post or the cross-beam was so that people would recognize that the alley was not a public domain and they would realize that while it is permitted to carry in the alley, it is forbidden to carry in the public domain.", + "[The crossbeam] of an alley [whose entrance] is more than twenty cubits high should be lowered. Rabbi Judah says: this is unnecessary. The crossbeam cannot be more than twenty cubits high, otherwise people will not notice it. This is the same rule as the sukkah the sukkah’s roof (skhakh) cannot be more than twenty cubits high because people should notice that they are sitting in a sukkah. In both cases, that of the crossbeam and the sukkah, Rabbi Judah rules that they may be more than twenty cubits high.", + "And [any entrance] that is wider than ten cubits should be reduced [in width]. An entrance to an alley may not be more than ten cubits wide for it to be allowed to carry within the alley. If it is more than ten cubits, then it’s not truly an entranceway but a gap in the walls of the alley. If it is more than ten cubits wide he can reduce it in order to carry in the alley.", + "But if it has the shape of a doorway there is no need to reduce it even though it is wider than ten cubits. If the opening has the shape of a doorway, meaning there are poles on both sides and a beam on top of it, then it looks like an entrance and it may be wider than ten cubits. According to the Rambam, if it has such an opening, the beam may even be more than twenty cubits high." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn this mishnah Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel debate how one validates an alley such that it is permitted to carry within it.", + "There are two levels of debates in this mishnah. There is a debate between Bet Shammai, Bet Hillel and R. Eliezer about how one validates an alley. The second debate is between Rabbi Ishmael, as presented by one of his students, and Rabbi Akiva over what was the actual dispute between Bet Hillel and Bet Shammai.", + "The validation of an alley: Bet Shammai says: a side-post and a crossbeam. And Bet Hillel says: either a side-post or a crossbeam. R. Eliezer says: two side-posts. In this version, Bet Shammai says that the alley must have the side-post and a crossbeam in order to carry in it, whereas Bet Hillel says that either is sufficient. Rabbi Eliezer says that the crossbeam is irrelevant and that what are needed are two side-posts.", + "In the name of Rabbi Ishmael one student stated in front of Rabbi Akiva: Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel did not disagree concerning an alley that was less than four cubits [in width], that it [may be validated] by either a side-post or a crossbeam. About what did they disagree? In the case of one that was wider than four, and narrower than ten cubits: Bet Shammai says: both a side-post and a crossbeam [are required] and Bet Hillel says: either a side-post or a crossbeam. Rabbi Akiva said they disagree about both cases. In this statement, a student of Rabbi Ishmael’s comes in front of Rabbi Akiva to present a more limited version of the debate. According to this version, both houses agree that if the alley is less than four cubits wide, either a side-post or crossbeam is sufficient. Probably the reason that Bet Shammai agrees in this case is that if the entrance is narrower it is clearer that this is not a public domain. The debate is only when the entrance is between four and ten cubits wide. Rabbi Akiva rejects this version and rules that in both cases, Bet Hillel and Bet Shammai disagree. The first section of the mishnah is therefore representative of Rabbi Akiva’s position. As an aside, we can learn a fair amount of rabbinic history from this mishnah. Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Ishmael were the heads of competing academies, some time in the early part of the second century CE. Both academies produced midrashic compilations that while similar to each, have notable differences. This mishnah is one indicator that Rabbi Akiva’s academy became more dominant, perhaps especially so after Rabbi Ishmael’s demise. Rabbi Ishmael’s students come in front of Rabbi Akiva to see if their traditions are acceptable in his eyes. This is a sign of their turning to his authority, probably after their own master’s death. Rabbi Akiva rejects the Ishmaelian tradition and the anonymous piece which opens the mishnah is taught according to Rabbi Akiva. Indeed, the Mishnah is a work produced by the Akivan academy, a work in which Akiva’s students, most notably Rabbis Judah, Meir, Shimon and Yose dominate." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses the size of the cross-beam about which Bet Hillel and Bet Shammai debated in yesterday’s mishnah.", + "The cross-beam of which they spoke must be wide enough to hold a small brick (, a small brick which is half of a regular brick, the size of three handbreadths. The width of the cross-beam must be one and half handbreadths, in order to support an “ariah”, a half-brick, which would, at least potentially, be placed on top of it.", + "It is enough for the cross-beam to be one handbreadth wide in order to hold the width of a small brick. The length of the cross-beam need only be one handbreadth. This way when the brick is placed on the cross-beam there will be a little space on each side (a finger on each side), where they can put the mortar to attach the brick to the beam. Even if the cross-beam is not actually attached to the brick, at least it looks as if it will be. This lends it more of an air of permanence." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is a direct continuation of yesterday’s mishnah, in which we learned that the cross-beam needs to be wide enough to support a half-brick.", + "Wide enough to hold a half-brick but also strong enough to support such a half-brick. Rabbi Judah says: wide enough, even though it is not strong enough. In this mishnah there is a debate whether or not the cross-beam must actually be strong enough to support the half-brick, or whether it is sufficient for it to merely look big enough. According to the first opinion, the cross-beam must actually be strong enough, whereas Rabbi Judah holds that is must only be wide enough, but not actually strong enough." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is a continuation of Rabbi Judah’s words from yesterday’s mishnah. Rabbi Judah held that the cross-beam need not actually be strong enough to support a half-brick.", + "If [the cross-beam] was made of straw or reeds, we look at it as if it was of metal. If the cross-beam was made of a material which could not hold a half-brick, Rabbi Judah considers it nevertheless as if it was strong enough to do so.", + "[If it was] curved we look at it as if it were straight. If it was curved, it also could not hold a half-brick. Nevertheless, Rabbi Judah holds that it is valid.", + "[If it was] round we look at it as if it were square. Whatever has a circumference of three handbreadths has a diameter of one handbreadth. Again, a round cross-beam could not hold a half-brick. However, it still must be wide enough to hold a one handbreadth half-brick. In order for this to be true, it must have a circumference of three handbreadths (the rabbis knew that pi was roughly three to one, and they knew that this was not exact)." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe mishnah now begins to talk about side-posts (see mishnayot one and two) and their minimum measurements.", + "The side-posts of which they spoke [must be no less than] ten hand-breadths in height, but their width and thickness may be of any size whatsoever. Rabbi Yose says: their width [must be no less than] three handbreadths. The only size requirement for the side-posts is that they be at least ten handbreadths high (about a meter). This is the minimum measurement for most things that need to be a certain height. For instance a sukkah must be ten handbreadths high. The mishnah uses the plural form of “side-posts” even though Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel require only one side-post, to teach that even those who follow Rabbi Eliezer, who does require two side-posts must still make them ten handbreadths high. According to the first opinion in the mishnah, there is no minimum measurement for their width and thickness. Rabbi Yose holds that they must be at least three handbreadths wide, a size worthy of actually serving as doorposts." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses the material which can be used to make the side-posts.", + "One may make the side-posts out of anything, even something that is alive. But Rabbi Yose prohibits this. According to the first opinion, one may use even an animal to make the side-post. The animal would have to be tied in place, so that it couldn’t wander away. Similarly, one can, according to some opinions, use an animal to make a wall of a sukkah. We have seen several similarities between the laws of setting up the cross-beam and side-post and the sukkah. Rabbi Yose prohibits using an animal, lest it dies and become less than the required ten handbreadths high.", + "It also causes defilement as the covering of a tomb, But Rabbi Meir makes pure. If one used an animal to cover a tomb, the animal will convey ritual defilement, as do all coverings of tombs. The tomb described here was not in the ground, as tombs usually are today, but a cave in the side of a hill. The animal must be tied to the tomb in order for it to be considered a tomb covering. Rabbi Meir holds that anything that is alive cannot transmit impurity if used as a tomb covering. Therefore, one who touches an animal used to cover a tomb is still pure.", + "One may write on them gittin, But Rabbi Yose the Galilean declares it unfit. One can write a get on animal, for instance on the horn of a cow, and then divorce one’s wife by giving her the cow (see Gittin 2:3). Rabbi Yose the Galilean says that such a get is invalid because it is not like a scroll, specifically mentioned as the divorce document in Deuteronomy 24:3." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with the conditions under which members of a traveling caravan may carry.", + "If a caravan camped in a valley and it was surrounded by the instruments used for the cattle it is permissible to move objects within it, provided [the instruments] form a fence ten handbreadths high and the gaps do not exceed the built-up parts. Any gap which is wider than ten cubits it is permitted [to carry within], because it is like an entrance. If it is greater, it is forbidden [to carry within]. A valley is considered neither a public domain (since a true public domain is only one which is used as a public thoroughfare), nor is it a private domain. It is called by the rabbis a “karmelit” and it is forbidden by rabbinic ordinance (derabbanan) to carry within one. However, if the caravan which finds itself on Shabbat in a valley sets up there a makeshift fence by using the instruments used in caring for the cattle, they may carry within this area, if several conditions are met. First of all, the instruments must be ten handbreadths high to be considered a “fence.” This is because walls must be ten handbreadths high. Second, the gaps between the instruments cannot be greater than the area covered by the instruments. In other words, more must be closed than open. Thirdly, there can be no gap greater than ten cubits. A ten or less cubit gap can be considered an entrance to this enclosed area. More than that cannot be considered an entrance and thus turns the entire area into an unfenced area. This is true even if the total area closed by the instruments is greater than the gaps. However, if they put up two side-posts and a crossbeam over a more than ten cubit gap, this would turn the gap into an entrance and it would become permitted to carry within the area." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn yesterday’s mishnah we learned that a caravan that finds itself on Shabbat in a valley (which really just means any uninhabited area) may surround themselves with their cattle instruments to form a makeshift fence which allows them to carry within the fenced-in area. One condition for this fence to be effective was that the closed part would be larger than the open gaps in this “fence”. Our mishnah discusses another way of making a fence, one that requires even less material.\nIn order to understand this mishnah we need to understand the principle of “levud”. This principle means that an open area of less than three handbreadths can be treated as if it was actually closed. We shall see below how this works in our context. When we learn Sukkah, we shall see that one can hang the sukkah’s walls down from the top and as long as they fall to within three handbreadths of the ground the sukkah is valid because a less than three handbreadth gap is treated as if it legally does not exist.", + "They may surround [the caravan] by three ropes, this one above this one, and this one above this one, provided that [the space] between the one rope and the other is less than three handbreadths. The size of the ropes [must be such] that their [total] thickness is more than a handbreadth, so that the total height is ten handbreadths. The mishnah says that they may encircle their encampment with three ropes, one above the other, to form a fence. Each rope should not be more than three handbreadths apart from the rope on top of it. This way there is no gap in the fence of three handbreadths or more, and as we learned above, a gap of less than three handbreadths can legally be considered to be closed. The total thickness of the ropes must be greater than one handbreadth, so that the caravan is left with a “fence” ten handbreadths high. To summarize, the caravan has a ten handbreadths high wall, up to nine of which is in reality empty space and a little over one of which is made up of rope. Even though in this fence the gaps are certainly greater than the closed part, it is effective because all of gaps are less than three handbreadths and therefore don’t legally exist." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to deal with setting up a partition around an encampment so that one may carry within the encampment.", + "They may also surround [the camp] with reeds, provided there is no [gap of] three handbreadths between one reed and the next. Yesterday we learned that they can set up a partition around the encampment by encircling it with three ropes, so long as there are no more than three handbreadths between each rope. Today we see how a partition can be set up horizontally. This is done by setting up reeds (poles) around the encampment. Between each reed there can be no more than three handbreadths, for less than three handbreadths is an amount that is legally considered as if it doesn’t exist.", + "[The rabbis] spoke only of a caravan, the words of Rabbi Judah. But the sages say that they only spoke of a caravan because it is a usual occurrence. So far these mishnayot have only been speaking about surrounding a caravan with a partition. The rabbis now debate whether the same type of partition may be used in other cases as well. According to Rabbi Judah, the previous mishnayot relate only to the situation of a caravan. An individual stuck out in an uninhabited place for Shabbat would have to make a partition of both horizontal and vertical pieces in order to carry within. The other sages disagree and rule that the previous mishnayot mentioned the encamped caravan only because that was a normal situation. The same rules would apply to other situations as well.", + "Any partition that is not [made up of] both vertical and horizontal [pieces] is not a valid partition, the words of Rabbi Yose bar Judah. But the sages say: one of the two [is sufficient]. Rabbi Yose disagrees with his father who held that for the caravan a partition of either horizontal ropes or vertical reeds is sufficient. Rabbi Yose holds that a partition that does not have both is not a valid partition, neither for an individual nor for a caravan. The sages continue to rule that a partition can be set up with either vertical or horizontal pieces, as we learned in the previous mishnayot. Both are not necessary.", + "They exempted four obligations [to soldiers] in an encampment: They may bring wood from anywhere; they are exempt from the washing of the hands, and from [separating tithes from] doubtfully tithed produce ( and from the setting up an eruv. There are four ways in which the rabbis were lenient with regard to the rules governing soldiers in an encampment. Note that these rules do not apply specifically to Shabbat; only the last one refers to Shabbat. First of all, they may bring wood from anywhere they find it and it is not considered stealing. Second, they need not wash their hands before eating. Third, if they are eating doubtfully tithed produce (demai), they need not tithe it. Tithing demai is only a rabbinic obligation and hence there is space to be lenient. Fourth, to carry from tent to tent within the encampment, they do not need to set up an eruv (a communal meal). A partition surrounding the encampment is sufficient, as we have learned." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nA well ten handbreadths deep which is found in the public domain is considered to be a private domain, and hence one is not allowed to draw water from the well on Shabbat. Our mishnah teaches that the rabbis allowed people to make a special arrangement around the well so that they could draw water from the well on Shabbat.", + "They may make posts for wells, [by setting up] four corner-pieces that have the appearance of eight [single posts], the words of Rabbi Judah. Rabbi Meir says: eight that have the appearance of twelve, four corner-pieces and four single [posts]. The rabbis said that around the well they could set up a pseudo-fence, one which would prevent the area from being a public domain but still allow easy access. According to Rabbi Judah, this is done by setting up corner-posts at each of four corners. Each corner post would have two pieces of wood set at a right angle so that it would look as if there were four walls. Rabbi Meir says that it is not sufficient for there to be four corner-posts. There must also be four single pieces around each side. These form pseudo-walls which give the structure more of an appearance of a fenced in area.", + "Their height must be ten handbreadths, their width six, and their thickness [may be] of any size whatsoever. The height of the posts must be ten handbreadths in order for them to constitute a separate domain. Their width must be six handbreaths, which makes a cubit. There thickness is not important.", + "Between them [there may be] as much [space as to admit] two teams of three oxen each, the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Judah says: [two teams] of four [oxen each] . [These teams being] tied together and not untied, [enough for] one to enter while the other goes out. In between the posts they can leave room for cattle to come in and out and drink from water drawn from the well. It was necessary for the cattle to come into the area because it was forbidden to take the water out from the area and bring it into the public domain. Again, the sages debate how much space may be left between the posts. According to Rabbi Meir, they may leave enough room for two teams of three cattle to enter and exit. In the Talmud it is explained that each cow is a cubit and two-thirds thick, making a total of 10 cubits. Rabbi Judah is again more lenient and allows a gap large enough for two teams of four cows, which adds up to 13 1/3 cubits. The end of the mishnah notes that these teams of cattle are to be tied to each other, and not walking separately. When they are untied the distance between them is even greater. Furthermore, the reference is not to two teams entering simultaneously, but rather to one team coming in and one going out. This is slightly larger than two teams of cattle going in the same direction." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues yesterday’s discussion of the enclosure around the well. Yesterday we talked about the posts set up to enclose the space. Today we talk about the proximity of the posts to the well itself.", + "It is permitted to bring [the posts] close to the well, provided that a cow’s head and the greater part of its body can be within [the enclosure] when drinking. Some people might not want to make the enclosure to large since a large enclosure would overly interfere with the passing traffic in the public domain. The mishnah allows them to bring the posts in close to the well as long as a single cow can fit its head and most of its body within the enclosure when drinking. The Talmud explains that this is two cubits. More than this amount and there may be a problem of carrying from the private domain to the public domain.", + "It is permitted to remove [the posts] to any [distance] provided one increases the posts. They can move the posts as far away from the well as they wish, as long as they increase the number or size of posts so that there remains no gap greater than either 10 cubits (Rabbi Meir) or 13 1/3 cubits (Rabbi Judah), as explained in yesterday’s mishnah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn yesterday’s mishnah we saw that there is no limit to how large the enclosure around the well may be, so long as the gaps are kept to a certain minimum. In today’s mishnah, which is a direct continuation of yesterday’s, we will learn that this was the opinion of the sages whereas Rabbi Judah disagrees.", + "Rabbi Judah says: [the enclosure may be only] as large as two bet se'ah. They said to him: they only prescribed [the limit of] two beth se’ah for a garden or a karpaf only, but if [the enclosure] was a pen, or sahar, a backyard or courtyard even if it is five or ten bet kor, it is permitted. And it is permitted to remove [the posts] to any [distance] provided one increases the posts. Rabbi Judah limits the size of the enclosure to two bet se’ah, which means a piece of land upon which one can grow enough wheat to produce a se’ah of grain. This is about 5000 square cubits (about 50 meters by 25 meters), the size of the mishkan (the tabernacle). The other sages respond to Rabbi Judah that the measure of 5000 square cubits does not apply to the halakhah about the enclosure surrounding a well, but rather applies to a garden or a karpaf, neither of which are enclosed as living spaces but rather to keep out animals or thieves. A karpaf is a large field behind a house or a courtyard or outside of a city which has been enclosed so that it can store wood. Since these are fenced in only to keep things out and not to keep things in, they have a relatively small minimum measurement. In contrast, things which are enclosed for those things which inhabit them, such as a pen, a sahar (a pen in the field to keep in the flocks), a backyard or a courtyard can be even the size of five or even ten bet kor. A kor is 30 se’ah, so this measure is significantly larger. The final clause of the mishnah is a repeat of the last clause in yesterday’s mishnah. Since the enclosure of a well is also enclosed for the use of those who wish to drink the water in the well, it to may be as large as one wants it to be. In summary, according to the sages there is a simple rule: if it is enclosed as a living space for either people or animals, the enclosure may be as large as one wants it to be. If it is enclosed to protect something stored inside, then the limit is two bet se’ah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first section of this mishnah deals with a situation where a public road cuts through the enclosure around the well. The second section, which is the conclusion to the Mishnah’s discussion of this enclosure, teaches which types of wells and cisterns may be surrounded with this type of enclosure.", + "Rabbi Judah says: if a public road cuts through them it should be diverted to one side; But the sages say: this is not necessary. By surrounding the well with a pseudo-fence, the area is transformed from a public domain to a non-public domain (although not necessarily a private domain). According to Rabbi Judah, if a public road cuts through the enclosure, it would remain a public domain, because the fence surrounding the enclosure is not a full fence. In such a situation it would be forbidden to draw water from the well on Shabbat. Therefore, the public road must be diverted. The sages say that this is not necessary since there is a fence surrounding the area. Even though this fence does not fully surround the area, it is sufficient such that the fact that the public uses the road does not nullify it.", + "Both for a public cistern, a public well as well as a private well, they may make [an enclosure] of posts, but for a private cistern, they must make a partition ten handbreadths high, the words of Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Judah ben Baba says: they make [an enclosure] of posts for a public well only while for the others they must make a belt ten handbreadths high. A well is a structure through which one draws water from an underground spring. A cistern is filled with rain water or water drawn from an aqueduct. According to Rabbi Akiva they may make the above-described enclosure around all of these structures on Shabbat so that they can draw water, with the exception of a private cistern. The reason that this type of enclosure may not be made around a private well is that the water may dry up on Shabbat. The fence around the enclosure is a special rabbinic enactment which permits carrying only while there is water in the well/cistern. The waters of a well will not dry up. Furthermore, since this cistern is owned by a private individual, she/he may forget that it is forbidden to carry into the public domain. At a publicly-owned cistern people will remind each other that this is forbidden. Rabbi Judah ben Baba says that this enactment applies only to a publicly-owned well. It does not apply to cisterns, and even public ones, because their water may dry up. It does not apply to a private well because at a private well an individual may forget that it is forbidden to carry from the private domain to the public domain. In order to draw water from a public cistern or a private well or cistern they have to rope the entire area off." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn mishnah three we learned that the maximum size of a garden or karpaf (enclosed area for storing wood) within which one may carry on Shabbat is two bet se’ah, or 5000 square cubits, the size of the mishkan (tabernacle) which was 100 cubits by 50 cubits. Our mishnah discusses a square garden or karpaf.", + "Rabbi Judah ben Bava further said: a garden or a karpaf whose [area does not exceed] seventy cubits and a fraction by seventy cubits and a fraction, which is surrounded by a fence ten handbreadths high, it is permitted to carry within it, provided there is in it a watchman’s hut or a dwelling place or it is near to a town. If the garden or karpaf is square its sides can be 70 and a fraction cubits long. Most commentators consider this “fraction” to be up to 2/3. 70 2/3 squared is 4993 7/9, a number pretty close to the maximum 5000 (the square root of 5000 is 70.71...). Other commentators reckon the exact fraction slightly differently. Rabbi Judah ben Bava also requires that the garden or karpaf be at least partially enclosed to serve as living quarters (see mishnah three). If it has a watchman’s hut, or is used even temporarily as a dwelling place he may carry witin it. Additionally, if it is close enough to town (within 2000 cubits, the Shabbat limit see introduction) then he frequently goes there and it is as if he lives in it. If it does not meet these requirements Rabbi Judah ben Bava forbids carrying there.", + "Rabbi Judah says: even if it contained only a cistern, a ditch or a cave it is permitted to carry within it. According to Rabbi Judah, in order to be allowed to carry in the garden or karpaf they need not serve as dwelling places, but they must have been enclosed to serve some purpose for human beings (and not just to store things). A cistern and a ditch are used to collect rain water and a cave protects a person from the hot sun.", + "Rabbi Akiva says: even if it contained none of these it is permitted to carry within it, provided its area [does not exceed] seventy cubits and a fraction by seventy cubits and a fraction. Rabbi Akiva says that as long as the karpaf or garden do not exceed the maximum size, it is permitted to carry within them, no matter what they are used for.", + "Rabbi Eliezer says: if its length exceeded its breadth even by a single cubit it is not permitted to carry within it. Rabbi Eliezer says that one can only carry in a square karpaf or garden and not in a rectangular one.", + "Rabbi Yose says: even if its length is twice its breadth it is permitted to carry within it. Rabbi Yose says that the garden and karpaf can be rectangular or square. They can even be more rectangular than the mishkan, whose length was twice its width (100 x 50 cubits)." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn this mishnah Rabbi Ilai transmits three halakhot in the name of Rabbi Eliezer, the first two dealing with the topic of eruvin and the third dealing with the identification of bitter herbs for Pesach. The structure of this mishnah is similar to that which we encountered in tractate Eduyot mishnayot were ordered by names of the sages and not by topic.", + "Rabbi Ilai said: I heard from Rabbi Eliezer, even if it is as large as a bet kor. According to this tradition, Rabbi Eliezer allows carrying within a garden or karpaf even if it is large enough to sow a kor of produce. A kor is 30 se’ah, and a bet kor is 75,000 square cubits. Rabbi Eliezer allows carrying here even if the area is not designated to serve as a living space, as long as it has a proper partition.", + "I also heard from him that if one of the residents of a courtyard forgot to join in the eruv, his house is forbidden to him for taking in or taking out any object but it is permitted to them. In subsequent chapters we will learn that in order for residents who share a courtyard to carry from their homes to the courtyard (and vice versa), they must set up an eruv, which consists of a common meal. If one of the people did not participate in setting up the eruv (meaning he did not help pay for the meal) then it is generally forbidden for everyone to carry from their homes into the courtyard since all of those who own the courtyard did not participate in the eruv. In other words since he partly owns the courtyard but did not participate in the eruv, others cannot carry in and out of the courtyard since all of the courtyard’s owners did not participate in the eruv. The Talmud explains that in the case described by the mishnah, the person who did not share in the eruv annuls his partial ownership of the courtyard, thereby granting those who did participate in the eruv full ownership over the courtyard. In such a case, all of the other people who share the courtyard may carry from their homes to the courtyard and even from his home to the courtyard, since he annulled his ownership. However, he may not carry from his home to the courtyard because that would look like he is retracting his annulment, an act which would make carrying forbidden. He may nevertheless carry from their homes to the courtyard since he is like a guest at their homes, and guests rely on the eruv of their hosts.", + "I also heard from him that people may fulfill their duty [for bitter herbs] at Pesach by eating hart’s tongue (. “Akrevanim” is a type of herb, which according to this tradition, may be used as bitter herbs on Pesach. The mishnah in tractate Pesachim does not list this herb as a possibility. Albeck identifies it as scolopendrium (hart’s tongue), which is a type of fern.", + "I went round among all his disciples seeking a fellowstudent but I found none. Rabbi Ilai did not find any other students who corroborated these traditions. This mishnah provides an interesting glimpse of how the oral tradition worked. Students would seek other students who had the same traditions and thereby strengthen their own certainty with regard to what their masters had taught them." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah begins to discuss how one sets up an eruv (either for a courtyard or to extend the Shabbat border) or shittuf mavoi (alleyway partnership). An “eruv” refers to the common meal shared by those who share a courtyard and a “shittuf mavoi” is the common meal shared by those who share an alleyway. An “eruv” can also refer to a meal set up at the end of the limit where one can go on Shabbat, so that one can go another 2000 cubits. For more info, see in the introduction.", + "With all [kinds of food] they may make an ‘eruv and a shittuf, except water and salt. Any type of food may be used to constitute the meal for an eruv or for a shittuf. An eruv refers to either a courtyard eruv or a Shabbat border eruv. A shittuf refers to the alleyway partnership. The only exception is salt and water which do not count as food.", + "And all [kinds of food] may be purchased with money of the second tithe, except water and salt. Second tithe is redeemed by its owners with money, the money is brought to Jerusalem and there it is used to buy food. It cannot be used to buy non-food products. We should note that food includes drink. However, as in the previous section, it does not include salt and water.", + "One who vowed to abstain from food is allowed [to consume] both water and salt. If a person vowed to abstain from eating, he may still drink water and eat salt because neither is considered food.", + "An eruv may be prepared for a nazirite with wine and for an Israelite with terumah, But Symmachus says: with unconsecrated produce only. Although a nazirite cannot have wine and an Israelite cannot have terumah, both may use them to make their eruv, since other Jews can eat them. We see from here that the meal is symbolic. It does not have to be edible by the one who sets it up, it just has to be food that can be eaten by a Jew. Symmachus disagrees and holds that the eruv must be edible by those who participate in it. Therefore, an Israelite cannot use terumah as his eruv. However, a nazirite can still use wine since it is possible for him to ask a sage to release him from his nazirite vow. In other words, the prohibition of terumah to Israelites is immutable while the prohibition of wine to any given nazirite is not.", + "[An eruv may be prepared] for a priest in a bet hapras. Rabbi Judah says: even in a cemetary, because he can put up a partition and thus enter [the area] and eat [his eruv]. A bet hapras is a place that used to have a grave in it and now has been plowed over. It is rabbinically prohibited for a priest to enter such a place, lest there be a bone that remains or was spread out somewhere in the vicinity. However, in some ways the rabbis were lenient with the laws governing a bet hapras, since the prohibition is not toraitic. One of these leniencies is that a priest’s eruv may be set up there. This eruv refers to a Shabbat border eruv (eruv tehumin), since a bet hapras would not be within the courtyard or alley. Rabbi Judah is even more lenient and allows the priest’s eruv to be set up in an actual cemetery. This is because the priest can set up a partition to get to his eruv." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first section of this mishnah deals with foods that may or may not be used to set up an eruv.\nThe second section deals with sending an eruv (a meal) with an agent.", + "They may make an eruv with demai (doubtfully tithed, or with first tithe from which terumah had been taken, or with second tithe or consecrated [food] that have been redeemed; and priests [may make their eruv] with hallah and terumah. [It may] not [be prepared], with untithed produce, nor with first tithe from which terumah has not been taken, nor with second tithe or consecrated [food] that have not been redeemed. All of the things listed in this section are not completely prohibited, at least not by the Torah. Demai is doubtfully tithed produce, which may be given to poor people. First tithe may be eaten by Levites, once the terumah has been removed and given to the priest. Once second tithe and consecrated food are redeemed they may be eaten (the money is taken to Jerusalem and used their to buy food). Priests may use hallah and terumah to make their eruv. Hallah refers to the separated dough that Israelites must give to priests. In yesterday’s mishnah we learned that all people may make their eruv from terumah and not just priests. This seemingly contradicts today’s mishnah which specifies that only priests may use terumah, since only they can eat it. There are two answers to this problem: 1) priests commonly use terumah to make their eruv. 2) Mishnah Pesahim 2:5, a mishnah which deals with the types of grains which can be used for matzah, contains the exact same line. There it can refer only to priests, since Israelites could not eat terumah. Our mishnah copied the list from that mishnah. The list that follows is of foods which may not be consumed by anyone. Since no one can eat these things, they may not be used in making an eruv.", + "This section deals with a person who sends an agent to set up an eruv (meaning a meal) at the end of his Shabbat border, that is 2000 cubits outside of the city, or wherever else he may be. The mishnah teaches that if the person sent it with a deaf-mute, an imbecile or a minor, the eruv cannot be relied upon. According to the rabbis, these people lack the intelligence which is necessary to have the proper intention to set up an eruv. He also cannot send the eruv with someone who does not believe in the halakhic viability of eruvin, since that person will obviously not intend to set up a proper eruv. However, if he sends it with one of these people in order to bring it to someone else who will actually set up the eruv, then the eruv is valid. We should note that this mishnah alludes to people who deny the validity of eruvin. The Talmud comments that this is a reference to the Samaritans who took the Exodus 16:29, “no man should leave his place” literally. This is a classic case where we can see that not all Jews in the time of the Mishnah accepted rabbinic midrash and that there were those who read the Bible far more literally than did the rabbis." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with an eruv that was put somewhere where he might not be able to retrieve it. To help in understanding this mishnah I should explain that the eruv must be accessible and existent at twilight (between sunset and darkness) when Shabbat begins. This is the period in which an eruv is “set”. It is also a period in which it is halakhically doubtful whether it is Shabbat.", + "If he put [the eruv] in a tree above [a height] of ten handbreadths, his eruv is not valid; below ten handbreadths, his eruv is valid. This section refers to a person who put his eruv in a tree that stands in the public domain, and he intends to dwell underneath the tree for at least part of the Shabbat. If the tree is four handbreadths by four handbreadths and the eruv is ten handbreadths high, then the eruv is in a private domain, while he is in the public domain. He cannot take his eruv down from the tree for that would be carrying from a private domain to a public domain. The rule is that he and his eruv must be in the same place at twilight, so that he could get to it legally on Shabbat. If the eruv is below ten handbreadths, then it is in a “karmelit”, which is neither a public nor a private domain. It is still prohibited from rabbinic law to take something from a karmelit to another domain. However, when it comes to an eruv, it need only be in its place at twilight and the prohibition to carry at twilight is in itself only of rabbinic origin. Therefore, you have a rabbinically prohibited act which occurs only at a time where all prohibitions are only rabbinic. Hence, the halakhah can be lenient and allow him to retrieve his eruv. The eruv is therefore effective.", + "If he put it in a cistern, even if it is a hundred cubits deep, his eruv is valid. There are two explanations of this section. The Yerushalmi explains that the cistern is in the public domain but that he intends to actually dwell in the cistern on Shabbat, at least at twilight. Therefore, the eruv is effective. The Bavli explains that the cistern is in an area that is a karmelit. Hence, this is not a situation where he would be taking out from a private to a public domain, as we encountered in the first section. We cannot explain, however, that the cistern is in the public domain but that he wishes to dwell outside of the cistern at twilight, for then his eruv and he would be in different domains.", + "If he put it on the top of a reed or on the top of a pole, if it had been uprooted and then inserted in the ground, even though it was a hundred cubits high, the eruv is valid. This section discusses an eruv that was placed on top of a type of pole or reed. The pole is not four handbreadths wide, hence it does not constitute its own domain, as does the tree. Even if the pole is very high, it is still not a separate domain. If the pole or reed was detached from the ground, meaning it had been part of a tree but then he detached it and stuck it back in the ground, the eruv is valid. However, if the pole or reed is still attached to the ground, then the eruv is invalid, since we are concerned lest he might chop down part of the pole or reed to get to his eruv. Cutting down part of a plant attached to the ground is a violation of the laws of Shabbat.", + "If it he put it in a chest and the key was lost, the eruv is [nevertheless] valid. Rabbi Eliezer says: if he does not know that the key is in its place, the eruv is invalid. In this section, he puts the eruv into a chest, locks the chest and then loses the key. According to the first opinion, the eruv is still valid as long as he can break the chest and enter during twilight, the critical moment for establishing the eruv. Rabbi Eliezer holds that the chest may only be opened with the key. His ability to break the chest would not make the eruv valid. However, if he knows that the key is in certain place, but he can’t remember exactly where that place is, the eruv is valid, under the assumption that he will at some point remember. The eruv is invalid only if he thinks he truly lost the key." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses an eruv (a meal) which was set up before Shabbat but then something happened to it such that it became unattainable, inedible or in some other way invalid. The question is, is the eruv still effective?", + "[An eruv] which rolled away beyond the [Shabbat] limit, or a heap of stones fell on it, or was burnt, [or was] terumah and became impure: [If one of these occurred] while it was yet day, it is invalid, [But if it occurred] after it became the eruv is valid. The mishnah begins by describing situations where a Shabbat border eruv became invalid in some way. If it rolled away beyond the Shabbat limit, then he cannot get to it on Shabbat. If a heap of stones fell on it, he cannot uncover it because it is forbidden to clear a heap of stones on Shabbat. Obviously, if it is burnt there is nothing left to eat. Finally, if it was terumah and it became impure, it is forbidden to eat it. The mishnah now teaches that the validity of the eruv depends upon when one of these things happened. If the eruv was ruined before Shabbat began, when it was still Friday, the eruv is invalid, because it did not exist at twilight. If it was ruined after dark, the eruv is certainly valid, because it did exist at twilight.", + "If it is doubtful [when it occurred]: Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Judah say: this is a donkey-driver/camel driver. Rabbi Yose and Rabbi Shimon say: a doubtful eruv is valid. Rabbi Yose says: Avtulmos testified on the authority of five elders that a doubtful eruv is valid. The bigger problem is a situation in which we don’t know whether the eruv was valid at twilight. Probably, this is the most typical situation a person sets up an eruv before Shabbat and then checks it on Shabbat and sees that it has been ruined but does not know when it happened. Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Judah use a proverb to describe this situation he is like a camel driver and a donkey driver. A camel driver stands in front of the camel and pulls him along. A donkey driver stands behind the donkey and whips him to go forward faster. Someone who needs to drive both a camel and a donkey has a problem if he whips the donkey he’ll bump into the camel and if he pulls the camel he’ll go to fast for the donkey. All he can do is go at a medium pace between the two animals. This is the situation of one whose Shabbat border eruv may be invalid he loses in both directions. To remember, an effective Shabbat border eruv extends his Shabbat limit in one direction by 2000 cubits, but causes him to lose 2000 cubits in the other direction. If he sets it 2000 cubits to the west of the city, he can go 4000 cubits in that direction, but he can’t go any cubits to the east of the city. In our situation, let’s say he set up the eruv 2000 cubits to the west and then discovered that it was invalid but does not know when it occurred. He cannot go another 2000 cubits to the west because the eruv might be invalid. However, he also cannot go 2000 cubits to the east of the city (or any other direction) lest his eruv is valid. In other words, he loses in both directions. Rabbi Yose and Rabbi Shimon say that a doubtful eruv is effective. This is because it was known to be existent before Shabbat and was only known to be nonexistent after Shabbat started. We can presume that it existed until we know that it did not, and therefore, we can presume that it existed at twilight, the critical time. Rabbi Yose supplements his opinion with testimony provided by Avtulmos, who taught in the name of five elders, that the a doubtful eruv is valid." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with a person who puts an eruv on both sides of the town, because he doesn’t know whether he will need to go to the west or to the east. Normally, a person cannot make two eruvin and have them both be effective, because a person is considered to be where he left his eruv and he can’t be in both places. The mishnah teaches that there is a way of getting around this problem by making a stipulation.", + "A man may make a stipulation concerning his eruv and say, “If foreigners came from the east, let my eruv be that of the west; [if they came] from the west let my eruv be that of the east; if they came from both directions, I will go in whatever direction I desire; and if they came from neither direction I will be like the people of my town.” In this situation, he knows before Shabbat that foreigners may be coming and he wants to be able to run away from them to one of the sides of the town. However, he doesn’t know from which direction they will be coming, so he puts an eruv (a meal) in both directions. He then says, that if they come from the west, the valid eruv should be in the east and vice versa. If they come from both directions, then he may choose whichever eruv he wishes. Finally, if the foreigner doesn’t come after him, then he shall be like the other people in the city, who can go 2000 cubits in each direction without an eruv (2000 cubits is the Shabbat border). Note that this mishnah is not referring to a life or death situation, for in such a situation the rules would be suspended in any case.", + "[Likewise say,] “If a sage came from the east let my eruv be that of the east; if from the west let my eruv be that of the west; If he came from either direction I will go in whatever direction I desire; and if no one came from either direction I will be like the people of my town.” Rabbi Judah says: if one of them was his teacher he may go only to his teacher, but if both were his teachers he may go in whatever direction he prefers. In this situation, instead of foreigners coming to cause trouble, a sage is coming to give a derashah (expound upon the Torah) and he wants to go here the derashah. He may again make a stipulation which will allow him the flexibility to have an eruv in either direction. Rabbi Judah says that if one of the sages coming was his teacher, then he can only go to him. This is because we assume that he wishes to hear his teacher and hence only the eruv on that side of the city is effective. However if both are his teachers and they come from different directions he may choose freely between them." + ], + [ + "Introduction This mishnah deals with setting up a Shabbat border eruv for two consecutive days, one of which is Shabbat the other of which is a festival. As an aside, we learn in this mishnah that just as it is prohibited to go beyond the Shabbat border (2000 cubits) so too on a festival it is prohibited to go beyond the same distance. This is somewhat of an innovation for the verse in the Torah which implies that people must not travel refers only to Shabbat.", + "Rabbi Eliezer says: if a festival day immediately precedes or follows Shabbat a man may prepare two eruvs and make the following declaration: “my eruv for the first day is that of the east and for the second day is that of the west”; “the one for the first day is that of the west and the one for the second day is that of the east”; “my eruv is for the first day, and for the second day I will be as the people of my town”; or “my eruv is for the second day, and for the first day I will be as the people of my town”. Rabbi Eliezer allows one to make two separate eruvin, one for Shabbat and one for the festival. These two eruvin can function differently. That is to say each can work on opposite sides of the city. Alternatively, he can set up an eruv for one day and have it not be effective for the next day. Rabbi Eliezer holds that Shabbat and the festival are two distinct entities of holiness, and therefore he can set up two different eruvin.", + "But the sages say: he either prepares an eruv for one direction or none at all; he either prepares one eruv for the two days or none at all. The sages hold that it is impossible for a person to set up two different eruvin for two consecutive days. Either he sets up an eruv for both days, in which case he loses his ability to leave town on the side for which he did not set up an eruv, or he just doesn’t set up an eruv at all and is limited to going 2000 cubits outside of the city in each direction.", + "How should he act? He brings [the eruv] on the first day, he lets it get dark and then he takes it and goes away. On the second day [he again carries the eruv to the same place] and lets it grow dark and then he may eat it. He thus benefits both in his going and in [eating] his eruv. The sages now explain how one should set up an eruv if he wishes it to work for two days. What he needs to avoid is the eruv being eaten up before the second day begins, for this will mean that the eruv is not effective on the second day, as we shall learn in the next section. What he should do is take the eruv to wherever he wants it to be (assumedly 2000 cubits outside of the city so that he can later go another 2000 cubits from there) and make sure it is there at dusk on the eve of the first day. This is the time which “sets” the eruv, and it must be in place at this time. As long as it is there at this time, it need not remain there all day. Therefore, he may take it back with him into town, or anywhere he wants to go within the limit. At the second day, he should again make sure that the eruv is in the same place at dusk. Once it is there through dusk, he may eat it. In this way, he gets to extend his Shabbat limit and still eat his eruv (you can have your eruv and eat it too!).", + "If the eruv was eaten up on the first day it remains effective for the first day but not for the second. Rabbi Eliezer said to them: you do then agree with me that they are two distinct holinesses. Rabbi Eliezer now responds to the sages by saying that they have in essence admitted that the two days are distinct. He knows this because the sages agree that if he set up an eruv for the first day and it didn’t exist when the second day began, the eruv is not valid. If the sages agree that the two days are distinct entities of holiness, then they should agree that one could set up two different eruvin. If they weren’t then the eruv which was good for the first day should also be good for the second, even if it has been eaten up. The mishnah does not provide an answer from the sages. In the Talmud it is explained that the sages don’t know whether the two days are distinct or not, and therefore they are strict in both cases. They don’t allow two different eruvin to be set up, lest they are not distinct. On the other hand, they say that the eruv which was set up for the first day must exist on the second day lest they are distinct holinesses and the eruv for one is not effective for the other." + ], + [ + "Introduction In the time of the Mishnah, every Hebrew month had either 29 or 30 days, but people would not know before the end of the month how many days any given month had. This was decided by the testimony of witnesses who would come to the court in Jerusalem and testify that they had seen a new moon (we will learn about this in tractate Rosh Hashanah). Therefore, before the calendar was fully fixed, on the 28th day of a month, a person would not know if the next day will be Rosh Hodesh (the first of the month) or the last day of the preceding month. This was an especially significant problem on the last day of Elul, the month that precedes Rosh Hashanah. Until witnesses came one would not know if the next day was Rosh Hashanah or not. Our mishnah deals with the problem of setting up an eruv in such a situation.", + "Rabbi Judah says: [if on the eve of the] New Year a man was afraid that [the preceding month of Elul] might be intercalated, he may prepare two eruvs and make this declaration: “My eruv for the first day is that to the east and the one for the second day is that to the west”; “the one for the first day is that to the west and the one for the second day is that to the east”; “my eruv is for the first day, and for the second I shall be as the people of my town”; “my eruv is for the second day, and for the first I shall be as the people of my town.” The person described in this mishnah finds himself on the 28th of Elul, assuming that the next day is going to be Rosh Hashanah, but not knowing if the day after will also be Rosh Hashanah. If witnesses come the next day by a certain time, then it and it alone will be Rosh Hashanah, but if they do not come, then the following day will also be Rosh Hashanah. The problem therefore is how to set up an eruv for both days? Rabbi Judah says that he can treat these two days as if they were two separate entities of holiness, just as Rabbi Eliezer in yesterday’s mishnah said concerning the festival which precedes or comes after Shabbat.", + "But the sages did not agree with him. Just as the rabbis disagreed with Rabbi Eliezer in yesterday’s mishnah, so too they disagree with Rabbi Judah in this mishnah. They reason that the two days may be one entity of holiness, in which case one cannot set two separate eruvin for the two days. We should note that at a certain point during the mishnaic period it became fixed that Rosh Hashanah was two days, and to this day Jews all over the world, and even those in the land of Israel observe two days of Rosh Hashanah. The two days are considered to be one long day of kedushah (holiness) and therefore, one cannot set up two different eruvin for the two days. In contrast, the second day of festivals (second day of Yom Tov) is only observed in the Diaspora. Where this second day is observed, one may set up two different eruvin for the two days." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn yesterday’s mishnah we learned that according to Rabbi Judah, a person may make make two separate eruvin for the two days of Rosh Hashanah because they are distinct entities. In today’s mishnah we learn other halakhot concerning the two days of Rosh Hashanah, which Rabbi Judah considers to be two distinct days.", + "Rabbi Judah further said: a man may stipulate concerning a basket [of produce] on the first festival day [of Rosh Hashanah] and may then eat it on the second day, On the first day of Rosh Hashanah a person finds himself with a basket of produce from which terumah and tithes have not been separated. It is forbidden to eat the produce without separating the tithes and terumah but on Rosh Hashanah it is forbidden to separate them. Rabbi Judah offers a halakhic solution to this problem, one that would at least allow him to eat the produce on the second day. On the first day, he takes out the tithes and terumah and declares, “If today is not Rosh Hashanah and tomorrow is, then behold I am separating terumah and tithes for this produce. But if today is Rosh Hashanah, then my declaring these to be tithes and terumah is invalid.” On that day he cannot eat them, lest that day actually be Rosh Hashanah, in which case his declaration was invalid. The next day he again picks up the tithes and terumah and declares, “If today is Rosh Hashanah and yesterday was not, then behold I already separated them yesterday. And if today is not Rosh Hashanah and yesterday was, then behold I am now separating the tithes and terumah.” He may now eat the produce since he either separated yesterday (if yesterday was not Rosh Hashanah) or today (if today was not Rosh Hashanah.", + "And so also if an egg was laid on the first [festival] day it may be eaten on the second. One cannot eat an egg laid on a festival because it was not available to be eaten when the festival began. However, Rabbi Judah says that on the second day of Rosh Hashanah one could eat an egg laid on the first day. If the first day was really Rosh Hashanah, then he can eat it on the second day because Rosh Hashanah is over. If the second day is Rosh Hashanah then he can eat it then because it was laid before Rosh Hashanah began.", + "But the sages did not agree with him. Again the other rabbis disagree with Rabbi Judah and claim that the two days are not distinct, one being the actual Rosh Hashanah and the other not being Rosh Hashanah at all, but rather are to be treated as one long day. Therefore, things cannot be permitted on the second day if they were prohibited on the first." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn the previous mishnayot we learned that the sages and Rabbi Judah debate whether or not one day of Rosh Hashanah is the real day and the other is only observed because we don’t know which day Rosh Hashanah really is, or whether both days of Rosh Hashanah are treated as one extended day, neither of which is considered to be of doubtful status. In the final mishnah of this chapter we see that this debate has ramifications for the prayers recited as well.", + "Rabbi Dosa ben Harkinas says: the person who goes in front of the ark on [the first day of] of Rosh Hashanah says: “Strengthen us, o Lord our God, on this first day of the month, whether it be today or tomorrow”; and on the following day he says: ‘[Strengthen us...] whether it be today or yesterday.” But the sages did not agree with him. According to Rabbi Dosa ben Harkinas, in the prayers themselves one must include a mention of the fact that it is uncertain which day Rosh Hashanah really is. The prayer to which the mishnah refers is the Amidah, also called the Shmonah Esrei (the Eighteen). On the first day he must mention “whether it be today or tomorrow” and on the second day “whether it be today or yesterday.” Again, the sages disagree because they hold that we don’t treat the two days as if one was certain and one was doubtful but rather we treat them as one long extended holiday. In the Talmud it teaches that this debate is not only about Rosh Hashanah but Rosh Hodesh (the first of the new month) as well. The sages hold that prayer is not the time for making legal stipulations. While the status of these two days may indeed be somewhat doubtful, at least to certain sages, it doesn’t seem appropriate to mention this doubt in prayer, at the point where a person is pouring one’s heart out to God and asking for strength. The expression of such doubts during prayer might lead to doubts concerning the rabbis’ ability in general to dictate when holidays are, or at least lead to doubts concerning the efficacy of the community’s prayers." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nWe have already learned several times that it is forbidden to go beyond a Shabbat border of 2000 cubits, measured from where a person is or the town in which he is in when Shabbat begins. Our mishnah deals with a person who finds himself against his will outside of this border.", + "One whom Gentiles, or an evil spirit, have taken out [beyond the Shabbat border] has no more than four cubits [in which to move]. In this case a person was taken out of his Shabbat border against his will, either by Gentiles or by an evil spirit (i.e. he lost his wits). Despite the fact that this is not his fault, once outside his border he may not move more than four cubits in any direction. This is the same rule as for one who left his Shabbat border intentionally he may move only four cubits. The idea comes from Exodus 16:29, “Let everyone remain where he is.” Four cubits is composed of three for a person’s body and one so he can stretch out his legs in other words, that is “where he is.”", + "If they brought him back, it is as if he had never gone out. He is not allowed to return to his town but if the Gentiles or evil spirit brings him back he returns to being like the other people of his town, who may go anywhere in the town and 2000 cubits outside of it in each direction. The Talmud notes that if he returns intentionally or if he left intentionally but was returned by Gentiles, he does not return to being able to go anywhere in the town, but rather even within the town he may only go four cubits.", + "If they took him to another town, or if they put him in a pen or a sahar: Rabban Gamaliel and Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah say he may move throughout the entire area; But Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Akiva says: he has only four cubits [in which to move]. In this section he is taken out of the town where he began Shabbat and moved to another town. Alternatively, he is taken out of his town and put into a pen or sahar (a type of pen, see above 3:2) in which one may walk without limit on Shabbat. According to Rabban Gamaliel and Rabbi Elazar ben Azaryah, he may walk throughout either the city or the pen, and we treat the situation as if he began Shabbat there. Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Akiva disagree and hold that since he did not begin Shabbat there he is only allowed to walk four cubits.", + "It once happened that they were coming from Brindisi and their ship sailed out to sea [on Shabbat]. Rabban Gamaliel and Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah walked about throughout its area, but Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Akiba did not move beyond four cubits because they wanted to be stringent upon themselves. In this story, Rabbi Joshua, Rabbi Akiva, Rabban Gamaliel and Rabbi Elazar ben Azaryah are on an anchored boat when Shabbat begins. In this situation they can walk throughout the entire boat, although they may not disembark on Shabbat. The boat then sailed off without their consent and went past their Shabbat limit. The latter two rabbis continued to walk about the boat, because they hold that if Gentiles (the sailors in this case) take a Jew beyond his Shabbat limit to another town, he is treated as a person who began Shabbat in that town. Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Akiva remained within four cubits, just as they held with regard to a person taken out of his town and brought to another town. However, the mishnah notes that this is not the law but rather a stringency. The halakhah itself distinguishes between a person who is taken from one town to another and one whose ship sets sail for two reasons. First of all, Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Akiva were on the ship when Shabbat began and therefore when Shabbat began they could walk throughout the entire ship. Secondly, a ship’s position is constantly changing such that no one can truly stay within four cubits in any case. They probably wished to be strict upon themselves so that people wouldn’t think that in the case of a person brought to a pen or another city he too may walk throughout the entire area." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn yesterday’s mishnah we learned about a person who set sail (against his will) on Shabbat. Today we learn about a person who docks on Shabbat, and whether or not he may disembark.", + "Once they did not enter the harbor until dusk [on Shabbat eve]. They asked Rabban Gamaliel, “Can we disembark?” He said to them, “You may for I was already observing and we were already within the Shabbat limit before it grew dark.” As we have previously learned, one’s Shabbat limit is fixed by where he is at dusk on the eve of Shabbat. If the boat was out of the Shabbat limit of the harbor at dusk, then when the boat docks they may not disembark. This is what the other rabbis asked Rabban Gamaliel. He answered them that he had been observing carefully where they were when Shabbat began and he is certain that they were already within the limit of the harbor. Therefore they may disembark. The relationship of this mishnah to the previous one is slightly tricky. Above, Rabban Gamaliel held that one who was taken out of his city against his will and put into a second city becomes like the people of the second city. Hence, we would think that in this situation, where Gentile sailors brought him into the port, even if they docked on Shabbat he should be allowed to disembark. One answer to this problem is that Rabban Gamaliel is responding to Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Joshua according to their halakhah and not stating his own opinion. They hold that if they were not within the border of the port before Shabbat began, that they cannot go more than four cubits, so he responds to them that they were within the Shabbat border. According to his opinion, this is not important." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nA court may give someone permission to go beyond the Shabbat limit so that he can go to Jerusalem to testify that he saw the new moon, or so that he may go somewher to save property from marauders. Our mishnah deals with a person who was given permission to go out and then found out that what he set out to do was already accomplished.", + "One who went beyond the Shabbat limit with permission and was then told that the act had already been performed, [he is allowed to move] within two thousand cubits in any direction. A person was given permission to go beyond the Shabbat limit either to testify concerning the new month or to save property. Once beyond the limit he heard from someone else that what he set out to do had already been done. The question is, what is he to do now? Is he stuck within his four cubits? The answer is that he retains his right to walk 2000 cubits in all directions. The rabbis did not want to penalize this person for if they did they might discourage people from setting out to testify concerning the new month.", + "If he was within the Shabbat limit, it is as if he had not gone out. If those 2000 cubits which he is given once he finds out that he doesn’t need to go any further bring him back into his old Shabbat limit, which is within 2000 cubits of the town where he began Shabbat, it is now as if he never left. He may go throughout the town and a 2000 cubit perimeter around the town. Again, the rabbis wished to be lenient with this person because he left his Shabbat limit for a sanctioned purpose.", + "All who go out to save life may return to their original places. Anybody who goes out to save a life may return to the place from where he comes. If they did not allow this, people might have refrained from traveling to save a life. The rabbis were lenient not just concerning traveling somewhere to save someone’s life, but also concerning traveling back." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOne who is walking on a road and arrives within 2000 cubits of the city by dusk and intends to spend Shabbat in the city, is considered as a resident of the town and may walk throughout it and 2000 cubits around it, even though he didn’t get there until after nightfall. He is considered to be like the people of the town.\nOur mishnah talks about one who gets to within these 2000 cubits but does not realize he has done so and does not, therefore, have intention to spend Shabbat in that town.", + "One who sat down on the road [at dusk on Friday eve] and then got up and saw that he was near a town he may not enter it, since it had not been his intention to do so, the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Judah says: he may enter it. Rabbi Judah said: it once actually happened and Rabbi Tarfon entered the town, even though this was not his intention [when Shabbat had begun]. The mishnah talks about a person who was walking on the road on Friday and sat down to rest at dusk. This now becomes his Shabbat place, and the border should be two thousand cubits in all directions. He then notices that he is within the Shabbat border of a town. According to Rabbi Meir, he is not considered as a member of the town, since he did not have the intention to spend Shabbat in that town. Therefore, he may only go 2000 cubits from where he was when Shabbat began (at dusk). If that means he can only walk up until a certain point in the town, then he can go no further, even within the town. Rabbi Judah says that he may enter the town, since if he knew when he sat down at dusk that he was that so close to the town, he surely would have entered the town. Therefore, his intention to spend Shabbat at that particular place outside of the town was actually a mistake. We should note that if he did notice the city before Shabbat and intentionally did not enter, then Rabbi Judah would agree that he can go only 2000 cubits from the point where he was when Shabbat began. Rabbi Judah proves that his halakhah is correct from a story concerning Rabbi Tarfon. Proving one’s halakhah with an actual occurrence is considered a strong means by which to prove something." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with someone who fell asleep on the road on Friday afternoon and then woke up after nightfall. This traveller did not intend to spend Shabbat in the place where he was when Shabbat began and therefore we will see that the sages disagree over whether or not he may move 2000 cubits in all directions.", + "If one slept on the road and was unaware that night had fallen, he may move two thousand cubits in any direction, the words of Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri. Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri holds that even though he didn’t intend to spend Shabbat in the place where he was when Shabbat began, he still may move 2000 cubits in any direction.", + "But the sages say: he has only four cubits within which to move. The sages say that one must have intention in order to set one’s “place” when Shabbat begins. Since this person was asleep, he certainly cannot have such intention.", + "Rabbi Eliezer says: and the man is deemed to be in the middle of them. Rabbi Eliezer explains what the sages mean when they say that he has four cubits in which to move. In actuality he may move only two cubits in each direction, forming a circle around himself with a diameter of four cubits. According to the Talmud, the “sages” mentioned in section two, refers to Rabbi Meir, who holds that he may move 4 cubits in each direction, forming a circle with a diameter of eight cubits.", + "Rabbi Judah says: he may move in any direction he desires. And Rabbi Judah agrees that once chosen his direction he may not go back on it. Rabbi Judah is slightly more lenient than Rabbi Eliezer and allows the person to move four cubits in one direction, at least at the outset. However, once he moves four cubits, he has now set his circle and he may not move four cubits to the opposite direction of where he was at the outset. Put in other words, according to Rabbi Eliezer the position of his body at the outset is what defines his circle, whereas Rabbi Judah says that the person himself may define his circle. However, both agree that the circle has a diameter of only 4 cubits." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with several people who are traveling on the road, fall asleep and wake up after Shabbat has begun, the situation described in yesterday’s mishnah.", + "Two men, some of whose cubits enter into the cubits of the other, may bring their meals and eat them in the middle, provided that this one does not carry out anything from his limit into that of the other. Two men wake up and find that they both fell asleep and Shabbat began. As we learned yesterday, they cannot walk 2000 cubits because they did not have intention to spend Shabbat there. Basically what the mishnah teaches is that one’s four cubit circle is not extended by the other’s. If they have cubits which are shared by the two of them, they can bring their meals and eat them in the middle, but neither may go past his four cubit limit nor bring anything past his four cubit limit.", + "If there were three men and the prescribed limit of the middle one overlapped with the limits of the others, he is permitted to eat with either of them and either of them is permitted to eat with him, but the two outer persons are forbidden to eat with one another. The same is true of three people who find themselves in the same situation. They may each go their four cubits. If one of them shares cubits with the other two, but the other two don’t share with each other, the middle one may go into their area and they may each go into his, but the two outer ones may not go into each other’s cubits. Perhaps, were it not for this mishnah, we might have thought that the person in the middle, who can walk in all three persons’ areas, allows the two outer persons to also go into all three others area. The mishnah says that this assumption would be incorrect.", + "Rabbi Shimon said: To what is this similar? To three courtyards that open one into the other and also into a public domain: If they made an eruv for the outer ones with the middle one, the middle one is permitted with them and they are permitted with it, but the two outer ones are forbidden access to one another. Rabbi Shimon draws an analogy between the above situation and the situation of three courtyards all open to one another and also open to the public domain. The fact that they are open to the public domain means that a person may not carry from one to the other without an eruv. If they made an eruv for the two outer one’s to carry into the middle one, then it is permitted to carry from the middle courtyard to the two outer ones and vice versa. However, it is still forbidden to carry from one of the outer courtyards into the other outer courtyard." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses a person who doesn’t make it back to his town before Shabbat begins, but arrives at a place where he recognizes a tree or a fence within 2000 cubits from his town.", + "One who was on a journey and it became dark, and he recognized a tree or a fence and said, “Let my Shabbat place be under it”, he has said nothing. A “Shabbat place” is the place from which we measure the 2000 cubits which a person may walk on Shabbat. One who says “let my Shabbat place be under it [the tree or fence]” is not specific enough because he did not say which four cubits under the tree will be his “Shabbat place”. In the Talmud, two amoraim (sages who lived after the Mishnah) debate what this means. According to Rav, he cannot even walk to the tree and all he has is four cubits in each direction. Since he did not acquire a Shabbat place under the tree, he has no Shabbat place at all. According to Shmuel, he may walk to the tree or fence, but he may not walk from there to his house.", + "If he said, “Let my Shabbat place be at its root”, he may walk from the place where he stands to its root a distance of two thousand cubits, and from its root to his house another two thousand cubits. Thus he can walk four thousand cubits after dusk. If he says “at its root”, then he has been specific about where he wants his Shabbat place to be, and he may go from his current position to the tree and then from the tree to his home. His Shabbat place is at the tree or fence and so he may walk 2000 cubits to get there and then another 2000 cubits in all directions from there." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn this mishnah we learn of a debate concerning the measuring of the 2000 cubits which a person may walk on Shabbat.", + "If he does not recognize [any tree or fence], or if he is not familiar with the halakhah, and said, “Let my present position be my Shabbat place”, his position acquires for him the right of movement two thousand cubits in any direction. In a circle, the words of Rabbi Hanina ben Antigonus. But the sages say: the distances are square, in the shape of a square tablet, so that he may gain the area of the corners. The mishnah deals with a person who is traveling on the road and doesn’t recognize anything in the distance (as the person did in yesterday’s mishnah) or with a person who doesn’t know that the halakhah allows him to establish his Shabbat place at a distance by making an oral statement. He thinks that because he is far away from the point he recognizes that he can’t set up his 2000 cubit ring from there. The person then says that his present position is where he will spend Shabbat. He now has 2000 cubits within which to move in all directions. This halakhah is actually obvious; even if he didn’t make any statement he still has 2000 cubits in which to move. The halakhah is probably here as an introduction to the next section.", + "According to Rabbi Hanina ben Antigonus, the 2000 cubits form a circle. That is to say one simply draws a circle with a 2000 cubit radius around the person and that is the area within which he may walk. The Sages hold that this area is actually a square, drawn around the 2000 cubit radius circle. The advantage to the sages’ position is that the corners of the square increase the area. The square’s total area is 4004 x 4004=16,032,016 cubits. Note that the additional four cubits takes into account the person’s personal four cubits which his body occupies. In contrast the circle’s area is 10022 (radius, including 2 for his own body) x 3.14 (pi)= 12,585,132 (approximately)." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn today’s mishnah we see another essential debate about how the Shabbat border eruv works. The debate is whether one has to put a meal in the place which he wants to establish as his Shabbat place, or whether his physical presence in that place is sufficient.", + "This is what [the rabbis] have said: “a poor man makes his eruv with his feet.” In the previous mishnayot we have seen several instances where a person traveling on the road says “Let this be my Shabbat place” and that statement alone has been sufficient to establish that place as the point from which he may walk 2000 cubits in each direction. Our mishnah applies to this halakhah the early rabbinic statement that “a poor man makes his eruv with his feet.” This means that the poor man traveling on the road need not have bread or a meal with him at the place which he establishes as his Shabbat place.", + "Rabbi Meir said: we can apply this law to a poor man only. According to Rabbi Meir, only a poor man can establish his Shabbat place by mere physical presence. A rich person, sitting in his house, must establish his Shabbat place with bread. He must bring the bread out to where he wants to set up his Shabbat place; his physical presence is not sufficient.", + "Rabbi Judah says: it applies to both rich and poor; they only said that an eruv is prepared with bread in order to make it easier for the rich man, so that he does not have to go out and make the eruv with his feet. According to Rabbi Judah, the halakhah that a person may make his eruv by mere physical presence without bread applies to all people, both rich and poor. The sages allowed a rich person to set his Shabbat place with bread (a meal) in order to make it easier for him. He may send some of his bread outside of the city and set his Shabbat place there, without him actually having to go there. However, bread is a leniency and not a requirement. In the Talmud they explain that Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Judah only debate whether a rich person sitting in his home can go outside of the city and establish his Shabbat place by being there when Shabbat begins. Rabbi Meir says he needs to set up a meal there as well. However, Rabbi Judah agrees that only a poor person traveling on the road can see a far away place and say that his Shabbat place will be there (see mishnah seven). A rich person in his house must either send a meal there or go there himself." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah deals with two towns which are located in close proximity to one another (within 4000 cubits), and the people from one town customarily set up an eruv so that they can get to the other town on Shabbat.", + "One who left to go to a town with which [his home town is wished to be] connected by an eruv, but a friend of his returned him home, he himself is allowed to go to the other town but all the other townspeople are forbidden, the words of Rabbi Judah. This person left his town to go set up a communal eruv that would allow him and the other people of his town to travel from their town to a neighboring town. While on the way, his friend tells him that he will set up the eruv instead, but then his friend does not set up the eruv. According to Rabbi Judah, the person who went out to set up the eruv may go to the other town on Shabbat, even though his friend never set up the eruv for him and the rest of the town. Since this person began to go on the way to where he wanted to set up his Shabbat place, his situation is like the person in mishnah seven who was traveling and saw a familiar point. In other words, since he sees where he wants to go, he may establish his Shabbat place there at a distance. This is an eruv set up by physical presence just at a distance. However, the other people of the town who were relying on an eruv of a meal cannot go to the other town because their eruv was not set up. They get the normal 2000 cubits in all directions", + "Rabbi Meir says: whoeve is able to prepare an eruv and neglected to do so is like one who is both a donkey-driver and a camel-driver. Rabbi Meir disagrees with Rabbi Judah concerning the person who began to go on the road in order to set up his eruv. According to Rabbi Meir this person loses in both ways. He doesn’t get to go all the way to the city, because he didn’t set up his eruv, neither with bread, nor with a full declaration of “my Shabbat place shall be here.” However, he is also not allowed to walk 2000 cubits around his own city lest he did set for himself a “Shabbat place” on the way to the other city. All he may do is walk 2000 cubits from his city to the other city. Rabbi Meir compares this to a person driving a camel and a donkey, standing in between the two (see above 3:4, where we explained this image)." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first section of this mishnah deals with someone who goes beyond the Shabbat limit without having permission to do so. The second mishnah deals with someone who is just outside the city’s Shabbat limits on Friday when dusk comes. In both cases the issue at hand is may he enter the Shabbat limit after Shabbat has begun.", + "One who went out beyond his Shabbat limit, even one cubit may not re-enter. Rabbi Eliezer says: [if he went] two cubits [beyond his Shabbat limit] he may re-enter, three cubits he may not re-enter. According to the first opinion in the mishnah, once someone goes beyond his Shabbat limit, he may not come back inside the border. He may now move only four cubits in each direction. Rabbi Eliezer holds that if he is two cubits or less outside the border, he may come back in. According to Rabbi Eliezer a person can always walk two cubits in each direction (above mishnah five) and therefore he can come back into the border. However, if he is more than two cubits outside the border he may not come back.", + "One who was overtaken by dusk when only one cubit [outside the Shabbat limit] may not enter [the Shabbat border]. Rabbi Shimon says: even if he was fifteen cubits away he may enter since the surveyors do not measure exactly on account of those who err. If the person is not within the Shabbat border at dusk, he may not enter after Shabbat begins, even if he is only one cubit outside the border. If he intended for that place to be his “Shabbat place” then he may walk 2000 cubits in all directions, but he may not enter the city. The Talmud Yerushalmi explains that Rabbi Eliezer also disagrees with this clause and holds that if he is within two cubits of the border, he may enter. Rabbi Shimon holds that even if he is fifteen cubits outside of the border, he still may enter because when the surveyors set up their marks of Shabbat limits, they do not measure precisely. This is explained in two different ways. One explanation is that the surveyors leave fifteen cubits extra so that if people take a few steps beyond the Shabbat limit, they can come back. The other explanation is that the surveyors themselves make mistakes and these mistakes are typically up to fifteen cubits." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThe Hebrew word for “extensions” here is the same word used to extend the month (from 28 to 29 days) and to extend the year (from 12 to 13 months). The “extensions” to the city are critical when figuring out how far the Shabbat limit goes. Before we reckon the 2000 cubits around the city, we must first delineate exactly what is included in the city.", + "How do they make extensions for cities [for the purpose of defining the Shabbat limit]?
If one house recedes and another projects, If at the end of the city there is a row of houses, but the row is not set up evenly, the Shabbat limit is measured from the house that projects the most and not from the house that recedes.", + "Or if one turret [of the wall] recedes and another projects, If there is part of the wall (such as a turret, a tower used to guard the city) which projects further than other parts, the Shabbat limit is measured from the further projection.", + "If there were ruins ten handbreadths high, or bridges, or sepulchral monuments that contained dwelling places, they extend the boundary of the town is to include them. If there were ruins outside the parts of the city, or bridges or structures made over graves, then all of these are also included in the city.", + "And they make it [the Shabbat limit] like a square tablet in order that the use of the corners might be gained. When they come to set the Shabbat limit, the first thing they do is make the city into a rectangle, with the furthest structure on each side being the city’s limits. Even if the city is circular, they draw a rectangle around it, so that people get some extra place to travel at the corners. The 2000 cubits are now measured in a square around this square, so that people again get the benefit of the corners (see also above 4:8)." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nA karpaf is a field used for storing wood. Its typical size is seventy cubits and a fraction long. In our mishnah the sages debate whether the size of a town is automatically extended by a karpaf.", + "They give a karpaf [as an extension] for every town, the words of Rabbi Meir. According to Rabbi Meir, when measuring the Shabbat limit they extend a karpaf’s length of a field to the size of the city. From the end of this field they will measure the 2000 cubits square.", + "But the sages say: they said [the of a] karpaf only in regard to two towns that if there was to this one [a piece] of land of seventy cubits and a fraction and to the other one [a piece of land] seventy cubits and a fraction, they can consider the karpaf as combining the two into one. The other sages do not agree that every city is automatically extended by a karpaf. They agree that there was a halakhah stated concerning a karpaf and its use in extending a city, but this halakhah is more limited in scope. If there are two cities close enough to one another that if there was a karpaf of seventy and a fraction cubits attached to each one, they would overlap (they are not more than 140 and 2/3 cubits apart), then the two cities can be considered one. The ramification would be that people could go from one to the other and that their Shabbat border would be drawn around the two cities." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with three villages in the shape of a triangle. If they are close enough to each other they can be treated as one village, and one eruv can be set for all three and the Shabbat border is drawn around all three.", + "So also three villages arranged in the shape of a triangle, if between the two outer ones there is a distance of a hundred and forty-one and a third cubits, the middle one causes all the three of them to be regarded as one. In the previous mishnah we learned that if there were less than 70 and a fraction cubits between two towns, that they can be treated as one town and that the Shabbat border is drawn around the two of them together. Here we learn that if there are three towns in the shape of a triangle, the middle town can join the outer one’s together, as long as there is not an empty space of more than 140 and a third cubits (twice 70 and a fraction) between each outer town and the middle, joining town. In other words, they are all treated as if they are in a row, a situation which we dealt with in the previous mishnah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses how they actually go out and measure the Shabbat limit.", + "They measure the Shabbat limit only with a rope fifty cubits long, neither less nor more. The mishnah mandates the use of a fifty cubit rope in measuring the Shabbat limit. A shorter rope will stretch and yield to large of an area, whereas too long of a rope will not stretch enough the area will be too small.", + "And one should measure only while holding the end of the rope on a level with his heart. Measuring with a rope requires two people, one to hold each end of the rope. If the two hold the rope in different places the measurement will be off. Therefore, the rabbis said that the rope should be held at the level of one’s heart.", + "If he was measuring and he reached a valley or a wall he spans it and resumes his measuring. If when measuring they come to a small valley (we might call this a large ditch) or a wall, the elevation of the wall or the descent into the ditch should not count as part of the measuring of the Shabbat limit. What they should do is span the rope over the valley, with one person standing on one side and the other person standing on the other. Similarly, if they get to a wall they do not run the rope over the wall, measuring the incline and decline leading up to the wall. Rather they measure up to the wall, then the thickness of the wall and then they proceed from the other side.", + "If he reached a hill he spans it and resumes his measuring, provided he does not go beyond the Shabbat limit. The same way they measure the wall and valley is how they measure a hill. However, in all of these cases they cannot go beyond the Shabbat limit. What this means is that if the valley, wall or hill were wide within the limit (too wide for a fifty cubit rope), but narrower outside the limit, they should not walk out of the Shabbat limit to perform their measurements and then set a place parallel to that point within the limit. The Talmud explains that the problem would be that if others saw them doing this, they might think that the point where they went to measure was the Shabbat limit, and not realize that they were measuring outside of the border in order to set up a parallel point within the border.", + "If he is unable to span it in connection with this Rabbi Dostai ben Yannai stated in the name of Rabbi Meir: “I have heard that they pierce the hills.” The mishnah now deals with a valley or hill which were too big to measure with a fifty cubit rope, or were narrow only outside of the Shabbat limit. Rabbi Dostai says that we look at the mountains as if they were pierced. In other words, their ascent and descent are not taken into account. The Talmud explains how this is done. They use a small rope of four cubits, and the person holding below puts the rope next to his heart and the person holding above puts the rope next to his feet. In this way the four cubits are lessened a certain percentage for every four cubits. This is the size of the mountain’s ascent and descent, according to the rabbis. If you are having trouble picturing this, imagine a right triangle with its slope ascending, as if it was going up the mountain. If the top line is four cubits (the length of the rope) and the person hold the rope below is 3 cubits (the size of an average person), then you have a triangle whose sides are 4, 3 and 5, the side of 5 being the slope going up the hill (all of this is remembered from 10th grade geometry thank you Mr. Formica!). Thus the five cubits up the mountain are spanned with a four cubit rope, thereby gaining one cubit for every four. [I hope this helped!]." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to deal with measuring the Shabbat limit.", + "They measure [the Shabbat limit] only through an expert. The Shabbat limit should be measured only by an expert at taking such measurements. As we saw in yesterday’s mishnah, taking such measurements was not easy, so it is understandable why the rabbis required this to be done by an expert.", + "If he extended the limit at one point and limited it at another, they observe the place where he extended it. There are several different explanations for this section. The Rambam, basing himself on the Talmud, explains that this refers to an expert who measured the limit and it was longer than the people of the city thought at one point, but shorter at another point. The mishnah teaches that just as the people of the city must listen to the expert’s measurement for where he limited the size, so too they may listen to him with regard to the place where he expanded it. Others explain that on one side he came up with two different measurements. For instance, his measurement to the northeast was longer than that to the southeast. In such a situation we assume that the shorter measurement was mistaken and we listen to the longer one.", + "If there was one who made it a greater distance and one who made it a lesser distance, the greater distance is observed. If two experts come up with different measurements, the bigger measurement is observed.", + "Even a slave and even a female slave are believed when they say, “Thus far is the Shabbat limit”, since the sages did not enact the law in order to be strict but in order to be lenient. Anybody is trustworthy to testify concerning where the Shabbat limit is, even slaves and female slaves who normally cannot testify. In Ketuboth 2:10 we also learned that the rabbis allowed minors to testify where the Shabbat border was, or more precisely they allow a person who has reached majority age to testify where the Shabbat border was when they were a minor. The mishnah explains that the rules concerning the Shabbat limit were meant to create leniencies, to allow people to travel further, and not to be stringent. This is because going past the Shabbat limit is only a rabbinic prohibition (derabanan), and therefore in cases of doubt, the halakhah can be lenient." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah does not seem to have anything to do with our chapter. The previous mishnayot discussed measuring the city in order to determine the Shabbat border. The topic is therefore “eruvei techumin” Shabbat border eruvin which allow one to travel an added 2000 cubits outside of the city. The remainder of the chapter will also deal with this subject. This mishnah, in contrast, deals with “eruvei hatzerot” courtyard eruvin, or “shitufei mevuoth” alley partnerships, which allow people to carry within the city on Shabbat. Traditional commentators struggled to understand what this mishnah is doing here and offered various solutions. Abraham Goldberg, in his modern commentary to Mishnah Eruvin, suggests that there is a certain affinity in language between this mishnah and the preceding mishnayot, but his suggestion is also not without its difficulties.\nIn any case, the mishnah deals with an eruv/shittuf (partnership) that allows one to carry within a city. A city that has a wall ten handbreadths high, and a gate that is locked at night, is treated like an alley, and hence if there is an “alley partnership” meaning a shared meal (which for convenience sake I will call “an eruv” people can carry within the entire city. However, there is a difference in this matter between a privately owned city where an individual owns the city and rents out houses to others, and a city owned by many of its residents. In a privately owned city, they may set up an eruv and everyone may carry in the entire city. However, in a publicly owned city, they must leave one area that does not participate in the eruv. This is done so that people don’t forget that it is forbidden to carry in the public domain without an eruv. The area that does not participate in the city’s eruv may set up its own eruv for its own area, and carry within that area, but not throughout the rest of the city. The mishnah deals with a city owned by an individual that becomes a publicly owned city and vice versa. Similarly it deals with the size of the area that cannot participate in a publicly owned city eruv.", + "If a town that belonged to an individual was converted into one belonging to the many, they may make an eruv for the entire town. As we explained above, for a town owned by an individual they may set up an eruv that allows all of the town’s residents to carry within the entire town. Our mishnah teaches that even if this town is converted into one owned by the many, they still may set up an eruv for the entire town. Its conversion does not affect its status.", + "But if a town belonged to the many and was converted into one belonging to an individual, they may not make an eruv for the entire town unless they excluded from it a section the size of the town of Hadashah in Judea, which contains fifty residents, the words of Rabbi Judah. Rabbi Shimon says: three courtyards each of which contains two houses. Similarly, a town which used to belong to the many and now is acquired by an individual is still treated as a town which belongs to the many. Its status is also not affected by its conversion. Therefore, they may not set up an eruv to allow people to carry in the entire town. Rather they must exclude from the area which participates in the eruv a section the size of the town Hadashah in Judea. “Hadashah” means new, and is mentioned in Joshua 15:37. Here the name of the city is read “midrashically” it is a new city which adds to the old city, sort of an appendage to the older city. In this “New City”, there were 50 residents. According to Rabbi Judah, by excluding an area this size, they may set up an eruv in the rest of the city. Rabbi Shimon disagrees and holds that the excluded part need only be an area the size of three courtyards, each of which has at least two homes. This would probably yield an area slightly smaller than that according to Rabbi Judah’s ruling." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah returns to the subject of Shabbat border eruvin.", + "If one was in the east and said to his son, “Prepare for me an eruv in the west”, or if he was in the west and he said to his son, “Prepare for me an eruv in the east”, if the distance between him and his house was no more than two thousand cubits and that between him and his eruv was more than this, he is permitted to go to his house but forbidden to go to his eruv. If the distance to his eruv was no more than two thousand cubits and that to his house more than this, he is forbidden to go to his house but permitted to go to his eruv. Before this person left his home on Friday, he told his son to set up for him an eruv to either the west or east of the city. At dusk on Friday eve, he finds himself on the opposite side of the city. If he is two thousand cubits or less from his home but more than two thousand cubits from his eruv, he may go to his home but not to his eruv. In other words, his eruv is ineffective and he may not go two thousand cubits beyond it. Since when Shabbat began he could not reach his eruv, which was more than two thousand cubits away from him, we say that his intention was that his home would be his “Shabbat place” and from his home, and not the eruv, we measure a Shabbat limit of 2000 cubits. If, on the other hand, he is 2000 cubits or less from his eruv but more than that from his home, he may go to his eruv but not to his home. Again, since he couldn’t get to his home when Shabbat began, we assume that he wished that his eruv would be his “Shabbat place” and from that point and that point only he can travel 2000 cubits.", + "One who puts his eruv within the extension of a town, he has done nothing. If a person puts his eruv within the extensions of the city, his eruv doesn’t help him at all. Even without the eruv, he can go 2000 cubits beyond the extensions of the city. Rather an eruv should ideally be put 2000 cubits beyond the city and its extensions. In this way it extends the distance a person can travel in that direction. The “extensions of the city” refer to the inns and shops which are outside of the city but count in measuring the city’s borders.", + "If he put it even one cubit only beyond the limit he loses what he gains. This refers to a person who sets up his eruv outside the city, but within the 2000 cubit border which surrounds it. This is where an eruv should be set up. The mishnah teaches that every cubit he gains in his ability to travel on one side of the town, he loses on the other. So if he puts the eruv 1000 cubits outside the town on the west, he may now travel 3000 cubits to the west but only 1000 cubits to the east." + ], + [ + "The people of a large town may walk through the whole of a small town, but the people of a small town may not walk through the whole of a large town.
How is this so? If a man was in a large town and deposited his eruv in a small town or if he stayed in a small town and deposited his eruv in a large town, he may walk through all the town and two thousand cubits beyond it.
Rabbi Akiva says: he only has the place of his eruv and another two thousand cubits.
The wording of our mishnah is somewhat difficult, and the talmudic sages already recognized different versions. However, the different versions are usually explained the same way. All agree that one who resides in a town and begins Shabbat there can travel two thousand cubits in all directions. However, the sages debate concerning a person who resides in one town but puts his eruv in another town. The question is: does this eruv, placed in another town, allow him to walk throughout the town and two thousand cubits around it, or is the area of the town included in the two thousand cubits? In other words, since he acquired his “Shabbat place” in that town through an eruv and not through his actually being there, is he treated as if he was there or do we look at this as a normal case of placing one’s eruv outside of one’s own town?
The other issue in the mishnah is concerning one who measures the two thousand cubits around his city and finds that another city is within this area. If the two thousand cubits ends in the middle of the city, all of the sages agree that he cannot go anywhere beyond the city on the other side. However, if the two thousand cubits ends at the end of the city, the city is treated as if it was merely four cubits in area and it doesn’t count for the two thousand cubit measure. Rather the two thousand cubits is completed on the other side of the city. This halakhah is the first section of the mishnah.
Section one: As I explained in the introduction, the wording of this mishnah is quite difficult. I shall explain the mishnah in the same that Albeck and Kehati do. The people of a large town, who have a small town entirely within their 2000 cubit Shabbat border, may walk throughout the entire small town and it counts only as four cubits toward their Shabbat limit. The remaining 2000 cubits surrounding the large town continue on the other side. For instance if there are 96 cubits from the large town to the small town, and the small town is 1800 cubits, he may walk through the whole small town and another 1900 cubits on the other side, since the town itself counts as only four cubits.
However, if the Shabbat border of a small town ends within a neighboring large town, the people from the small town can only walk within it up until their border ends.
We should note that according to this explanation, the size of the person’s original town does not seem to matter all that much. All that matters is whether or not the Shabbat border ends within the neighboring town.
Section two: The phrase “how is this so” does not seem to explain the previous clause in the mishnah. Hence, the Yerushalmi removes the word, whereas the Bavli adds in an entire clause. In any case, it seems that this is a new section and not a continuation of the previous one. This section deals with a person from one city who puts his eruv in another city. According to the first opinion, if one puts his eruv in another city that is within the 2000 cubits of one’s own city, the eruv makes the person as if he was a full resident of that city. Therefore, he may walk the full area of the city, plus 2000 cubits around it, just as can the residents of that city.
Rabbi Akiva disagrees and holds that the eruv in the other city works as do all normal eruvin they allow one to walk 2000 cubits beyond the eruv. If the city in which the eruv was placed goes further, he may not walk in that area of the city." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is a direct continuation of the second clause of yesterday’s mishnah. To remind ourselves, Rabbi Akiva and the Sages had a debate concerning a person in one city who places his eruv in another city which is within the Shabbat border of his own city. According to Rabbi Akiva, this is treated as a normal case he may go 2000 cubits from his eruv and no more. The Sages hold that the city itself only counts as four cubits and that he may continue to go beyond the city the distance which remains to him after traveling from the first city.", + "Rabbi Akiva said to them: Do you not agree with me that one who puts his eruv in a cave may walk no further than two thousand cubits from the place of his eruv? One who puts his eruv in a cave outside of his city, may travel another 2000 cubits outside of the eruv, including the length of the cave. The cave does not count for just four cubits rather each cubit within it counts. Rabbi Akiva asks the sages why they agree concerning this halakhah but not concerning one who puts his eruv in a neighboring city. In other words, why in the case of the city does the entire city only count as four cubits, no matter how large it is?", + "They replied: when is this true? Only where no people dwell in it, but where people dwell in it one may walk through the whole of it and two thousand cubits beyond it. The sages respond that the rule regarding one who puts his eruv in a cave is true only if no one lives in the cave. The situation regarding the city is different when he puts his eruv there he counts as one of its residents. Just as the city’s residents may travel anywhere in the city and not have it count toward their 2000 cubits, so too he may travel anywhere in the city and not have it count towards his 2000 cubits.", + "Thus [where an eruv is put] within [the cave] the law is more lenient than [where one is put] on top of it. This section is way of remembering the rule of the Sages in section two. If the eruv is put on top of a cave which is in a city, then the eruv is in the city and he may walk within the entire city and not have it count toward his 2000 cubits. However, if he puts the eruv in the cave below the city, the cave and certainly the city count toward his 2000 cubit limit. This means that the law is more lenient when the eruv is on top then when it is within.", + "And to the measurer, of whom they spoke, they give him a distance of two thousand cubits even if the end of his measure terminates within a cave. In this section the sages agree with Rabbi Akiva concerning one who measures his Shabbat border, that he gets only 2000 cubits, even if this measure ends in the middle of a cave. Even if there are residents in the cave, he still cannot go through to the end of the cave, because his original Shabbat limit ended before he got there. This matches what we learned in the beginning of yesterday’s mishnah, concerning a Shabbat border that ends within a neighboring city. In such a case, he may only go up to the end of his Shabbat border." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nFrom here until the end of the ninth chapter the Mishnah will discuss courtyard eruvin (eruve hatzerot) and alley partnerships (shittufe mevuoth). These allow people to carry in courtyards and common alleys respectively. The eruv or shittuf is a common meal, which creates the legal fiction that the entire courtyard or alley is one person’s domain. For a more general introduction, see the introduction to the tractate.\nIn general, everyone who lives in the courtyard or alley must participate in the eruv, meaning they must contribute to the common meal. If one does not, he causes the entire courtyard or alley to be prohibited from carrying for all of the residents. Our mishnah teaches about a case where one of the residents is a non-Jew or a Jew who doesn’t admit to the validity of eruvin in general.", + "One who lives in a courtyard with a non-Jew or with one who does not acknowledge the [principle of] eruv, behold this one restricts him [from making use of the eruv], the words of Rabbi Meir. According to Rabbi Meir, if a non-Jew or a Jew who doesn’t believe in eruvin (perhaps a Sadducee or Samaritan) lives in a courtyard or alley with other Jews, his lack of participation in the eruv makes it forbidden for other Jews to use the eruv. As stated above, the eruv must be jointly owned by all of the residents if even one resident does not own it, it doesn’t work. The Talmud teaches a way to remedy this problem. The non-Jew can rent to the Jew the part of the courtyard that he owns, and in this way it is as if on Shabbat he doesn’t own it. Admittedly this is a legal fiction but if it did not exist, it would have been exceedingly difficult to set up eruvin in many, if not all towns, in the mishnaic period, since Jews did not live totally separate from non-Jews.", + "Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov says: one can never restrict another [from making use of the eruv] unless there are two Jews who restrict each other. According to Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov, a non-Jew’s residence in the courtyard or alley does not affect the eruv for the other Jews. Indeed, his residency doesn’t in essence count. Only a non-participatory Jew can cause another Jew’s eruv to be ineffective. If one of the Jewish residents does not participate in the eruv with the other residents, the eruv is ineffective for all of them." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nAccording to the Talmud, in this mishnah Rabban Gamaliel disagrees with the opinion in yesterday’s mishnah. There we learned that a Jew who doesn’t believe in the efficacy of eruvin causes the other Jews in his courtyard or alley to be prohibited from carrying, by making their eruv ineffective. According to the Talmud, while the non-Jew can annul his partnership in the courtyard or alley, and thereby let the other Jews eruv be effective, a Jew who doesn’t believe in eruvin, such as a Sadducee or Samaritan cannot do so. Rabban Gamaliel says that even a Sadducee can annul his share in the alley or courtyard. Our mishnah deals with one who has already made such an annulment. The question is, can his annulment be overturned by his actions?", + "Rabban Gamaliel said: A Sadducee once lived with us in the same alley in Jerusalem and father told us: “Hurry up and carry out all vessels into the alley before he carries out his and thereby restricts you”. According to the explanation provided above, this Sadducee who lived in the same alley (!) as Rabban Gamaliel’s father, Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel, nullified his partial ownership in the alley such that the eruv of the Jews would be effective. (A rather nice Sadducee if he was a Samaritan, we could call him the “Good Samaritan”!). However, Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel holds that if afterwards, on Shabbat, the Sadducee uses the alley to carry out his things then he has reneged on his renunciation and he again owns a share of the alley. Therefore, the Jews must use the alley to carry on Shabbat, so that they own the alley before he does. Once they have demonstrated such ownership, even if he uses the alley, this does not make it prohibited for them to carry there.", + "Rabbi Judah said [the instruction was given] in different language: “Hurry up and perform all of your needs in the alley before he carries out his and thereby restricts you”. According to the Talmud, section one is Rabbi Meir’s version, of what Rabban Gamaliel said his father said. Rabbi Judah agrees with Rabban Gamaliel, that a Sadducee can renounce his ownership. However, he disagrees with Rabbi Meir concerning the precise language of Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel’s statement. According to Rabbi Judah, even if the other Jews use the alley first, if the Sadducee then comes to use it, he will cause it to be prohibited for them to carry there. Therefore, the Jews must carry all of the things that they need to carry before the Sadducee uses the alley. Once he uses it, it is prohibited to them." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn the previous mishnayot we discussed a resident of a courtyard or alley who intentionally did not participate in the eruv with the other residents. In our mishnah the rabbis discuss a person who forgot to join in the eruv with the others.", + "If one of the residents of a courtyard forgot to join in the eruv, his house is forbidden both to him and to them for the taking in or for the taking out of any object. The Talmud explains that this resident nullified his partial ownership in the courtyard and alley. Hence, the other people can carry in those areas. However, neither he nor they can carry in and out of his house. They cannot carry in and out of his house because although he nullified his partial ownership in the courtyard and alley, he did not nullify ownership over his own house. He too cannot carry in and out of his house because the courtyard is owned exclusively by them and his house is owned exclusively by him.", + "But their houses are permitted both to him and to them. They obviously can carry from the courtyard to their own homes, because they all participated in the eruv. However, even he can carry from the courtyard to their homes because he is a guest in both their courtyard and their home. A guest in someone else’s home follows the same rules as does the homeowner himself if the homeowner carries from the courtyard into the home, so too does the guest.", + "If they gave their part [of the courtyard] to him, he is permitted but they are forbidden. If the other residents who did set up the eruv give him their share of the courtyard, he may carry from his own home into the courtyard, because he owns both the courtyard and his home. However, they may not carry from their homes into the courtyard because they are owned by different people. They are not considered to be his guests in his courtyard because many people cannot be considered the guests of one individual.", + "If there were two [who forgot to join in the eruv], they restrict each other, because one may give his part and also acquire the part [of others] but two may give their parts but may not acquire the parts [of others]. In this case there were two people who forgot to participate in the eruv. There is no way for them to carry in the courtyard. Even if the other residents were to give them their share in the courtyard, they can’t carry there. In such a case both would own the courtyard but neither set up an eruv, so neither can carry. The Talmud explains that even if one of these now gives his partial ownership of the courtyard to the other, the other still can’t carry there. When the others nullified their ownership, this nullification didn’t work to allow both of the others to carry there. We therefore say that the courtyard is still owned by the others and therefore the individual cannot nullify his ownership over a courtyard which he doesn’t fully own. The mishnah summarizes these rules: one person can annul his ownership and take ownership from others (sections one-three). Two people can nullify their ownership over the courtyard, but not take ownership from the others (section four)." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to discuss cases where a person does not participate in the eruv but in order that his lack of participation should not prevent the others from carrying, he gives away his share in the courtyard or alley.", + "When must they give away their share [courtyard or alley]? Bet Shammai says: while it is yet day, And Bet Hillel says: after dusk. According to Bet Shammai, he must give away his share in the ownership of the courtyard or alley before Shabbat begins, because it is prohibited to engage in any type of business on Shabbat. Bet Hillel says that it is permitted even after Shabbat has begun. In other versions of this mishnah Bet Hillel says “even after dusk”, a text that matches my explanation above. Bet Hillel does not consider relinquishing ownership to be business and hence it is permitted to do so on Shabbat.", + "One who gave away his share and then carried out an object, whether unwittingly or intentionally, he restricts [the others from carrying in the courtyard or alley], the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Judah says: if he acted with intention he restricts [the others], but if unwittingly he does not restrict. This person gave away his share in the courtyard, thereby allowing the others who shared in the eruv to carry there. He is not allowed to carry from his own home to the courtyard, which now doesn’t belong to them. If he does carry his stuff out of his house and into the courtyard he is in essence reneging on his annulment of courtyard ownership. He now regains his share in the courtyard and thereby prohibits the eruv’s effectiveness for the others (since he didn’t participate in the eruv). Rabbi Judah says that he is only reneging on his annulment if he carries his things out intentionally. Rabbi Meir says that his actions cause the others to be restricted whether he carried things out intentionally or unwittingly. He prohibits in the case of the latter, lest one come to permit even in the former. In other words, if the law were lenient in a case where he carried out unwittingly, people would be lenient in a case where he carried things out intentionally." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah deals with people who share an alley or courtyard and who also have a business partnership in some type of food item. Under certain circumstances, they need not make an eruv because their partnership counts as if it was an eruv.", + "A householder who was in partnership with his neighbors: with this one in wine and with the other in wine, they need not prepare an eruv. Since the residents of the alley/courtyard jointly own wine, this wine counts as their eruv, even though the wine is for business and not for the shared meal of the eruv.", + "But if his partnership was with the one in wine and with the other in oil, they must make an eruv. Rabbi Shimon says: neither in the one case nor in the other need they make an eruv. In this case, one of the residents has a partnership with one person in wine and with another in oil. However, there is not one partnership in one food item that exists between all three people. Since there is no partnership that bridges between all three of them, they must set up an eruv and their business partnerships do not count as an eruv. Rabbi Shimon says that if he has a partnership with one in wine and with the other in oil he need not set up an eruv, because sometimes eruvin are set up with two or more items, even with wine and oil. Therefore, the partnership bridges the gap between the three of them." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with a situation where five different companies of men are spending Shabbat in one hall within a courtyard. The question is whether each company must contribute separately to the courtyard’s eruv set, or whether it is sufficient for all of the five companies to make one joint contribution to the eruv.", + "Five companies [of men] who spent Shabbat in one hall:: Bet Shammai says: an eruv for each an every company; But Bet Hillel says: one eruv for them all. According to Bet Shammai, since each of the five groups is distinct from the other, they must each set up their own eruv. Bet Hillel holds that since they are residing in the same hall, they can be treated as one entity and they may make one joint contribution to the eruv.", + "They agree that where some of them occupy rooms or upper chambers, that they must make an eruv for each and every company. If the hall leads to other rooms or to upper chambers and some members of the various groups are in these other areas, each company must make a separate contribution to the eruv. Even though all of these areas are connected to the main hall, the hall is not sufficient to make it as if they were all in the same house. The Yerushalmi explains that the hall is to the rooms as a courtyard is to houses: just as every house connected to the courtyard must contribute to the eruv, so too every company in the hall must contribute." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with a family that eats in one home but the children have their own homes and sleep there. The question is does the father’s contribution to the eruv count for his children since they eat together or do they each have to individually contribute to the eruv since they live separately.", + "Brothers or partners who were eating at their father’s table but slept in their own homes must each have an eruv. Since each of these brothers has his own home and lives in that home, they don’t count as part of their father’s household anymore. Each must contribute separately to the eruv.", + "Hence, if any one of them forgot and did not [contribute] to the eruv, he must annul his right to his share in the courtyard. If one of the brother’s did not contribute to the eruv, then he must do the same thing that all people do when one did not contribute to his courtyard’s eruv. He must annul his partial ownership in the courtyard. If he does not do so then all of the other courtyard’s residents may not carry from their homes into the courtyard. Good manuscripts of the Mishnah read “he annulled his share” instead of “he must annul his share”. In this case, the meaning is that we assume that he annulled his share, and not that he had to have done so in actuality.", + "When does this apply? When they bring their eruv into some other place but if their eruv is deposited with them or if there are no other tenants with them in the courtyard they need not prepare any eruv. The halakhot in the previous two sections apply only when the eruv (the common meal) is not placed in the father’s house and there are other residents in the courtyard besides the brothers and the father. The house in which the eruv is placed does not need to participate in the eruv because the fact that it is in his house and he is letting them put it in his house counts as his participation. Therefore, if the eruv is in the father’s house his children need not participate in paying for the eruv, because they receive their support from their father. Furthermore, if there are no other residents in the courtyard besides the father and his children, then it is all one domain and there is no need for any eruv at all. Think of it this way: the meals that they eat at their father’s home are in essence the same as the eruv they make the entire courtyard into one domain. The word “partners” in the first clause of the mishnah means that the same laws which refer to the father and his children also refers to partners all of whom are receiving their food from one provider. This is a situation exactly parallel to that of the father and the five sons. Rashi and some other commentators did not have this word in the mishnah which was in front of them, but it appears in good manuscripts of the Mishnah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nTo remind ourselves, in order to carry in a courtyard they would set up an eruv, and in order to carry in the alley, which would lead from courtyard to other courtyards they set up a “shittuf”, an alley partnership. Just as the eruv is a common meal placed in one of the homes, so too is the shittuf. The basic difference is functional one works for a courtyard and the other for an alley. Our mishnah deals with cases where one (either an eruv or shittuf) was set up but not the other.", + "Five courtyards which were each opened into the other and into an alley, and they made an eruv for the courtyards but they did not share in a shittuf for the alley, they are permitted [the use of the] courtyards but forbidden that of the alley. The eruv which they made for the courtyards is sufficient to allow them to carry in the courtyards, but not sufficient in and of itself to allow them to carry in the alley. For that they would have needed a shittuf.", + "If they shared in a shittuf for the alley [but not in the eruv for the courtyards], they are permitted the use of both. In this case, they shared in the shittuf for the alley, and this is sufficient, at least ex post facto, to allow them to carry in the courtyards as well. The shittuf is to the courtyards what the courtyards are to the individual homes, as we will see at the end of the mishnah. In other words, the alley includes the courtyards and since they can carry in the alley, they can carry in the courtyards as well.", + "If they made an eruv for the courtyards and they made a shittuf for the alley, and one of the tenants of a courtyard forgot to contribute to the eruv, they are permitted the use of both. This case is similar, in essence, to the previous case. The fact that one person didn’t participate in the eruv renders the eruv invalid. Nevertheless, the fact that they all participated in the shittuf renders it valid and as we learned above, sufficient to allow carrying in the courtyard as well. This section emphasizes that even if they intended to allow carrying in the courtyard by setting up the eruv but did not succeed in doing so, the shittuf is still sufficient to allow carrying in the courtyard.", + "If one of the residents of the alley forgot to share in the shittuf, they are permitted the use of the courtyards but forbidden that of the alley, Since an alley to its courtyards is as a courtyard to its houses. This section is to section one what section three was to two (note the chiastic structure). Since the shittuf was not valid, they cannot carry in the alley. However, this doesn’t affect the eruv which they did set up and which allows carrying in the courtyards. The final clause explains the relationship between the three areas, the alley, the courtyard and the homes. Simply put, an eruv/shittuf for the larger more encompassing area is effective for the more limited area, but the opposite is not true." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah and the following one deal with two courtyards, an outer and an inner one. The inner courtyard opens to the outer one and through the outer one the residents get to the alley, and then to the public domain. It is important to realize that those from the outer courtyard do not need to use the inner courtyard.", + "Two courtyards, this one inside the other:
If the [residents] of the inner one prepared an eruv but those of the outer one did not prepare an eruv, the inner one is permitted but the outer one is forbidden. In this case it is permitted for the residents of the inner courtyard to carry there because their eruv covers all of the residents of their courtyard. In other words, since no one else owns any element of their courtyard, it turns out that all of the residents have helped in setting up the eruv.", + "If the [residents] of the outer one prepared an eruv but not those of the inner one, they both are forbidden. In this case, no one can carry in either courtyard. The residents of the inner courtyard cannot because they didn’t set up an eruv. Those of the outer courtyard cannot because those of the inner courtyard own part of the outer courtyard due to their right to walk through there to get to the alley or public domain. The right to walk through there is a form of ownership and since the people who have this right didn’t set up an eruv, this turns out to be a courtyard in which not everyone has set up an eruv.", + "If the [residents] of each [courtyard] prepared an eruv for themselves, each is permitted on its own. Rabbi Akiva forbids the outer one because the right to walk in it prohibits it. The sages say that the right of way does not prohibit it. In this case, each courtyard separately set up their own eruv. According to the opinion of the sages, the residents of each courtyard can carry within their own courtyard but not that of the other. This must be distinguished from the previous situation, where the fact that the residents of the inner courtyard have certain rights to the outer courtyard made the outer courtyard’s eruv ineffective. Here, since those of the inner courtyard may carry in their own area, they don’t prohibit the other courtyard from carrying in their own domain. Rabbi Akiva disagrees and holds that just as it did in the case in section two, the right of those from the inner courtyard to walk in the outer courtyard renders the outer courtyard’s eruv incomplete and hence ineffective. The final opinion, that of the sages, is, according to the simple meaning of the mishnah, a defense of their own position above, that each is permitted to carry in its own domain. However, the Bavli reads this clause as a third opinion, which disagrees with that in section two (and does not merely support three). According to this opinion, the fact that those of the inner courtyard may walk in the outer courtyard does not render them partial owners. Therefore, if the outer courtyard set up an eruv and the inner one did not, those of the outer courtyard may still carry in their own area." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to deal with two courtyards, an inner one and an outer one.", + "If one of the [residents] of the outer courtyard forgot to participate in the eruv, the inner courtyard is permitted but the outer one is forbidden. If one of the residents of the outer courtyard forgot to participate in their eruv, the eruv of that courtyard is ineffective, as we have learned several times in this chapter. However, the inner courtyard’s eruv is still valid, since it doesn’t depend on that of the outer one.", + "If one of the [residents] of the inner courtyard forgot to contribute to the eruv, both courtyards are forbidden. In this case, since the inner courtyard’s eruv is invalid, the outer courtyard’s eruv is ineffective as well (as we learned in section two of yesterday’s mishnah).", + "If they gave their eruv in the same place and one [resident], whether of the inner courtyard or of the outer courtyard, forgot to contribute to the eruv, both courtyards are forbidden. If both courtyards put their eruv together, they become like one domain with one eruv. Therefore, if even one resident from either courtyard forgot to participate in the eruv, it becomes forbidden to carry in either courtyard. This is like the normal situation where one person forgot to participate in the eruv, thereby causing it to be forbidden to carry in the entire courtyard.", + "If the courtyards belonged to individuals, they need not prepare any eruv. If each courtyard belongs to an individual, then neither must set up an eruv in order to carry within his own courtyard. This opinion matches that which was taught in section three of yesterday’s mishnah, that if each courtyard sets up its own eruv, the residents of each may carry in their own courtyard." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThe first five mishnayot of this chapter deal with two courtyards that are adjacent to one another and whether or not they may make a joint eruv.", + "If a window between two courtyards was four handbreadths by four handbreadths, and was within ten handbreadths [from the ground], the tenants prepare two eruvin or, if they want, they may prepare one. If there is a window which is four by four handbreadths and is less than ten handbreadths from the ground, then this window has the potential but not the necessity to join the two courtyards into one common domain. If the residents of the two courtyards make one joint eruv, then they may both carry in both courtyards, because both courtyards are in essence one. If they set up separate eruvin, the residents may carry only in their own courtyards.", + "If [the size of the window was] less than four handbreadths by four handbreadths or higher than ten handbreadths from the ground, they may prepare two eruvin but not one. However, if the window was smaller than four by four handbreadths, or higher, then it doesn’t join the two courtyards and each can only set up their own eruv. The reason why the window does not join the two courtyards if it is set higher is that in such a case there is a full ten handbreadth wall separating the two. Such a wall is sufficient to count as a full separation. Furthermore, with a window this high it will be difficult to see from one courtyard into the other, helping separate their identities." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with what constitutes a wall between two courtyards.", + "If a wall between two courtyards was ten handbreadths high and four handbreadths thick, two eruvin must be prepared, but not one. In order for the wall to count as a full partition between the two courtyards, it needs to be ten handbreadths high. Such a wall fully separates the two, such that each must make their own eruv. According to the Yerushalmi, although the mishnah says that the wall must be four handbreadths thick, even a wall less thick still counts as a full partition. The mishnah mentions a thickness of four handbreadths because of clause 2, which says that they may not bring the fruit down. According to the Yerushalmi, if the wall is less than four handbreadths wide it is not its own domain, and one can take produce down from there.", + "If there was produce on top of it, the [residents] from this side may climb up and eat and those from this side may climb up and eat, provided they do not bring it down. The top of a ten handbreadth high, four handbreadth wide wall is a domain unto itself, and therefore, one cannot take something down from there to another domain. However, people from either side may climb up and eat the produce while sitting on top of the wall.", + "If the wall was breached a breach of ten cubits, the residents prepare two eruvin or, if they prefer, they prepare one eruv, because it is like a doorway. A breach of less than ten cubits can count as a doorway, and therefore, the residents of the two courtyards may make either separate eruvin, or one eruv for both courtyards. The advantage to making two different eruvin is that if one of those from one courtyard does not participate in the eruv, those of the other courtyard will still be able to carry within their own courtyard. The advantage to making one eruv is that it is obviously easier (and slightly cheaper) to set up one eruv than two.", + "If the breach was bigger, only one eruv and not two may be prepared. If the breach in the wall is greater than ten cubits the breach cannot be considered a doorway and we must consider the two courtyards to be one. This would mean that if one person from either courtyard does not participate, none of the residents of either courtyard may carry." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah is about a ditch that separates two courtyards. The rules concerning the ditch are very similar to the rules about the wall which we learned yesterday.", + "If a ditch between two courtyards was ten handbreadths deep and four handbreadths wide, they may make two eruvin but not one, even if it was full of stubble or straw. Just as a ten handbreadth high, four handbreadth wide wall is sufficiently large to separate the two courtyards, so too acts a ditch ten handbreadths deep and four handbreadths wide. This is true even if the ditch is full of straw or stubble. These do not count as filling up the ditch because people don’t generally leave them there for good. Rather they may store the straw or stubble in the ditch for a while until they need them later on. In other words, it’s still a ditch. Since these are two separate courtyards, each one must have its own eruv.", + "If it was full of earth or gravel, only one eruv may be prepared, but not two. In contrast, usually when people fill a ditch with earth or gravel, it is because they no longer want the ditch. They don’t usually “store” their dirt there, only to get it back later. Once filled with earth or gravel, the ditch is no longer there. Therefore, the two courtyards are actually only one and only one eruv may be prepared." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to deal with a ditch separating two courtyards.", + "If he placed over it a board four handbreadths wide, and so also where two balconies are opposite one another, the residents may prepare two eruvin or, if they prefer, only one. [If the board] was less wide two eruvs may be prepared, but not one. If someone “bridges” the ditch with a board four handbreadths wide, the two courtyards can now be treated as one. The board is to the ditch like the opening was to the wall both serve as passages from one courtyard to the other. The second clause of the mishnah states the opposite if the board was less than four handbreadths wide, then it does not serve as a passage because people would be hesitant about crossing. In such a case each courtyard must set up its own eruv. The mention of the two balconies is abbreviated here and must be fleshed out. The two balconies can join two courtyards if there is a four handbreadth wide board which bridges the two. In such a case they may make either two separate eruvin or one for both. If there is no such board, then they must make separate eruvin." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses a heap of straw that divides two courtyards.", + "If a heap of straw between two courtyards yards was ten handbreadths high, they make two eruvin but not one. Although we learned above in mishnah three that straw that was used to fill a ditch is not significant and that the ditch remains a partition between the two courtyards, here we learn that a heap of straw itself can serve as such a partition. This is because people sometimes do use heaps of straw in order to divide areas.", + "These may feed [their cattle] from this side and these may feed from the other side. Just as it was permitted to eat the produce on top of the wall, so too cattle-owners on each side can allow their cattle to graze from either side of the straw heap.", + "If the height of the straw heap was reduced to less than ten handbreadths, one eruv may be prepared but not two. If the heap of straw became less than ten handbreadths high, it ceases to serve as a partition, and then both courtyards must share an eruv." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah discusses how one sets up an “alley partnership”, which in Hebrew is called a “shittuf mavoi”. This type of eruv (common meal) allows people from different courtyards to carry within the alley which leads from the courtyards out to the public domain. There are a few differences between courtyard eruvin and alley partnerships. A courtyard eruv must consist of bread, whereas any food will suffice for an alley partnership. Secondly, all members of the courtyard must participate in the eruv, whereas one person who lives off the alley can confer ownership of some food to all who live in the alley and thereby render it effective as a commonly owned meal without the financial contribution of others.", + "How does one make an “alley partnership”? One [of the residents] places a jar and declares, “Behold, this belongs to all the residents of the alley”, and he confers possession upon [the other residents] through his adult son or daughter, through his Hebrew servant or maidservant or through his wife. But he may not confer possession through his minor son or daughter or through his Canaanite slave or female slave, because their hand is as his hand. How does one make an “alley partnership”? One [of the residents] places a jar and declares, “Behold, this belongs to all the residents of the alley”, and he confers possession upon [the other residents] through his adult son or daughter, through his Hebrew servant or maidservant or through his wife. But he may not confer possession through his minor son or daughter or through his Canaanite slave or female slave, because their hand is as his hand. The mishnah describes two stages ways in setting up an alley partnership. The first stage is to take a jar of any type of food and to declare that he confers joint ownership of the food on all of the residents of the alley. The announcement serves to let everyone know what he is doing so that they will know that they can carry in the alley. He then takes this jar of food and gives it to another person who will accept it on behalf of all of the residents of the alley. However, in order for this transfer to be valid the other person must be independent of the giver. A man’s adult children, wife and Hebrew servants are all independent of him and therefore he may transfer through them ownership of the food to the other people in the alley. This is true even if he provides food and shelter for these people. The mishnah need not state that he could confer ownership through other people to whom he is not related. However, he may not transfer ownership through his non-Jewish (called Canaanite) slaves since he owns them. When he gives them something it does not leave his possession since they too are in his possession." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is a continuation of yesterday’s mishnah which discussed how one sets up an alley partnership.", + "If the food was reduced, he must add to it and confer possession [upon the other residents] but he need not inform them. In tomorrow’s mishnah we will learn that there is a minimum amount of food that is necessary for the eruv to be valid. If the amount of food is reduced (before Shabbat begins) he (or another one of the residents) must add to it to make it reach the minimum measure. He must confer ownership of this extra food upon the other residents of the alley, in the same way that he did when he set up the eruv to begin with. However, since he already announced that he was setting up an alley partnership, and thereby let all of the residents know that he was including them, he need not inform them that he is adding to the food.", + "If the number of residents has increased, he must add food and confer possession [upon them], and he must inform them. As we will learn tomorrow, the size of the eruv is somewhat related to the number of residents in the alley. If between when he set up the eruv and the beginning of Shabbat the number of residents increased (this is admittedly unlikely) he might have to increase the food in the eruv. When doing this he must again confer possession upon them and in this case he must inform them of what he is doing, because some of the residents were not there when he made his original announcement." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah introduces how much food must be set aside for both courtyard eruvin and alley partnership.", + "What is the quantity required?
When the residents are many there should be food sufficient for two meals for all of them; According to the Talmud, “many” means that there are more than 18 residents in the courtyard or alley. In such a case they need leave enough food for two meals (this will be more fully explained in 8:2). Even if there are a thousand residents, two meals is sufficient to count as an eruv for all of them.", + "And when they are few there should be food of the size of a dried fig for each one. If there are fewer residents, then there has to be food the size of a dried fig for each one. If “fewer residents” means that there are less than 18 residents, it means that there the eruv “18 dried figs”. According to the Talmud, two meals must be more than 18 dried figs meaning the size of the eruv for courtyards with many residents will always be greater than that for few residents." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first part of this mishnah is a continuation of yesterday’s mishnah. The second part explains why the rabbis instituted courtyard eruvin in the first place.", + "Rabbi Yose says: When does this apply? To the beginnings of the eruv but in the case of the remnants of an eruv even the smallest quantity of food is sufficient, According to Rabbi Yose, the minimum measurement for the eruv provided in yesterday’s mishnah applies only to when the eruv is set up before Shabbat. When one sets up an eruv, it must contain a minimum amount of food. If the eruv is lessened during Shabbat as long as there is a minimum amount that remains, it is still valid.", + "They said that one should set up an eruv for courtyards only so that the law should not be forgotten by the children. This section is usually interpreted as being independent of the previous section. The mishnah addresses the problem of why both courtyard eruvin and alley partnerships are necessary since the alley is larger, it alone should suffice to allow people to carry within its area. The mishnah explains that since alleys are bigger, children will not notice the food set aside for the alley partnership and will think that it is permitted to carry without an eruv at all. Therefore, the rabbis instituted courtyard eruvin so that children would remember that without an eruv one cannot carry things out of one’s house into the courtyard or alley, nor carry things within those two areas. Some commentators explain that this is why the courtyard eruv can be valid even if there only remains a minute amount of food." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn today’s mishnah Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Joshua disagree over whether one can set up an eruv with a broken loaf of bread.", + "They may set up an eruv or a shittuf with all kinds [of food] except for water or salt, the words of Rabbi Eliezer. Rabbi Joshua says: a whole loaf of bread is a valid eruv. Even a baking of one se’ah, if it is a broken loaf, may not be used for eruv while a loaf of the size of an issar, provided it is whole, may be used for eruv. The first line of this mishnah was already taught above in mishnah 3:1, but the context there was border eruvin (eruvei techumin), while here it is courtyard eruvin and alley partnerships (shittufim). Everyone agrees that all types of food except salt and water may be used to set up an eruv. The disagreement in our mishnah is about whether a broken loaf of bread may be used. According to Rabbi Eliezer even a broken loaf is valid. Rabbi Joshua disagrees and holds that only a full loaf is valid. Even if it contains a large amount of dough, even a full seah, if it is broken it is not valid. However, if it is a complete loaf, even if it small, it can count towards one’s eruv. According to the Rambam, a full loaf can constitute an eruv even if it doesn’t meet the minimum requirements listed above in mishnah eight. However, according to Rashi, the small loaf counts towards the eruv, but doesn’t count as the whole eruv unless the minimum requirements are met." + ], + [ + "A man may give a ma’ah to a shopkeeper or a baker in order to acquire a share in the eruv, the words of Rabbi Eliezer.
The sages say: his money acquires no share for him
They agree that in the case of all other men his money may acquire [an eruv for him],
Since they do not prepare an eruv except with one’s consent.
Rabbi Judah says: To what does this apply? To Shabbat border eruvin, but in the case of courtyard eruvin they prepare an eruv with his consent and without his consent, since they confer a benefit on a person in his absence but they do not confer a disability on a person except in his presence.
This mishnah discusses one person’s ability to set up an eruv for someone else.
Section one: According to Rabbi Eliezer, a person can give a small amount of money (a ma’ah, which is a small coin) to a baker or shopkeeper in order that they will contribute from their food toward the eruv on his behalf. The coin acquires for him the food for the eruv and it is as if he is contributing directly toward the eruv.
Section two: The sages disagree because money cannot acquire movable property (things see the first chapter of Kiddushin). In order to acquire something, one must lift it up or at least pull it towards himself. Therefore, he has not acquired the food that the shopkeeper gives for the eruv. Therefore, he has not effectively contributed to the eruv.
Section three: The sages agree with Rabbi Eliezer that if he gives the money to a different person, meaning some sort of agent, and the agent buys the food from the shopkeeper or baker, this is an effective means to set up an eruv. This is effective because the person’s agent validly acquires the food from the shopkeeper or baker by actually taking it from him. Similarly, a person can ask a shopkeeper to set up an eruv on his behalf, since the shopkeeper will give the food to another person, causing the other person to acquire the food, and therefore the shopkeeper is acting as the person’s agent. The only problematic situation is if the person says to the shopkeeper that his money should acquire the eruv since money cannot effect acquisition, this type of eruv setup is invalid.
Section four: Although this section seems attached to the previous one, it is actually separate. According to the first opinion, one cannot set up an eruv without the consent of the person who will benefit from the eruv. This is true, according to this opinion, for both Shabbat border eruvin and courtyard eruvin. Rabbi Judah, on the other hand, says there is a difference between the two types of eruvin. Consent is required to set up a Shabbat border eruv for someone because there is some “disability” in this as well. Namely, if the Shabbat border eruv extends his ability to travel outside the city toward one direction, he loses a commensurate amount in the other direction. Hence, one cannot set up a Shabbat border eruv for someone without his permission. However, one only gains by having a courtyard eruv set up on his behalf and therefore, one can set up a courtyard eruv for someone without their consent." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah deals with how one can set up a collective Shabbat border limit eruv, meaning an eruv that will allow many people to extend their Shabbat border limit by 2000 cubits to one direction.", + "How does one effect participation in connection with Shabbat limits? One sets down a jar and says, “Behold this is for all the inhabitants of my town, for anyone who may desire to go to a house of mourning or to a house of feasting”. Any one who accepted [the eruv] while it was still day is permitted [to enjoy its benefits] but if one did it after dusk he is forbidden, since they do not set up an eruv after dusk. The language of this mishnah is parallel to that of 7:6 above, which discussed alley partnerships. Again, a person takes a jar of food and brings it to wherever he wants to establish his “Shabbat resting place”. It is from this place that his 2000 cubit radius will be counted. He announces that this eruv will count for anyone who wishes to make use of it. However, unlike alley partnership eruvin, Shabbat border eruvin require the person to accept the eruv actively. This is because by accepting the extension on one side of town, he loses on the other side of town. The person must accept the eruv before Shabbat begins, since this is the determinative moment for the establishment of eruvin. He cannot accept the eruv after Shabbat has already begun. Note that the mishnah mentions two common reasons why one would set up a border eruv to pay a shivah call or to visit a house of feasting, a place where a wedding was being celebrated (a wedding which took place before Shabbat). The reason why the mishnah mentioned these examples is that the mishnah holds that one can set up a border eruv only in order to attend to a mitzvah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses the minimum measure of food which is need for a Shabbat border eruv.", + "What is the minimum measure [for Shabbat border eruvin]?
Food for two meals for each person, for weekdays and not for Shabbat, the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Judah says: for Shabbat and not for weekdays. And both intended to give a leniency. According to Rabbi Meir, the eruv must consist of enough food for two weekday meals. Rabbi Judah says the food should be enough for Shabbat meals and not weekday meals. Seemingly we would think that a person eats more on Shabbat than during the week, so Rabbi Judah would be stricter than Rabbi Meir. However, the mishnah says that both intended to be lenient. In order to understand this, we need to explain that the eruv’s minimum measurement was set according to the amount of bread eaten at a typical meal. According to Rabbi Meir, on Shabbat one eats a lot of different types of food and a lot of bread to accompany the food. Therefore, on Shabbat one eats more, and the minimum amount of food for the eruv is set according to the bread eaten during the week, a lesser amount. According to Rabbi Judah, since on Shabbat there are many side dishes a person eats less bread than he would during the week when there are less side dishes. Therefore, Rabbi Judah sets the minimum amount of bread for the eruv according to what one eats on Shabbat.", + "Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka says: not less than a loaf that is purchased for a pondium when the price of wheat is four se’ah for a sela. Rabbi Yohanan ben Baroka gives a minimum amount of bread that must be used for the eruv. This amount of bread is what is sufficient for two meals. It is the size of a loaf that can be bought for one pundion (a coin) when 4 se’ah (24 kav, a measure of volume) of wheat are sold for a sela (a coin worth 48 pundion). If we do the math, we can see that a kav of wheat is bought for two pundionim, meaning that one pundion will buy half a kav of wheat, which according to Rabbi Yohanan ben Baroka is sufficient for two meals.", + "Rabbi Shimon says: two thirds of a loaf, when three [loaves] are made from a kav [of wheat]. Half of this loaf is the size prescribed for a leprous house, and half of its half is the size that disqualifies one’s body [from eating terumah]. According to Rabbi Shimon, two meals are equivalent to two-thirds of a loaf when three loaves are made from a kav of wheat. A loaf is therefore 1/3 of a kav and 2/3 of a loaf is two meals. This is a smaller amount than that set by Rabbi Yohanan ben Baroka. Rabbi Shimon now mentions two other halakhot which are connected to the size of a loaf of bread he mentioned above. Half of this loaf, meaning 1/6 of a kav is related to the laws of an infected (leprous house). One who stays in the house long enough to eat a loaf of bread of this size is impure. Half of this, meaning 1/12 of a kav is relevant to disqualifying someone from eating terumah. This means that a person who eats 1/12 of a kav of impure food cannot eat terumah until he immerses in a mikveh." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah goes back to discussing courtyard eruvin.", + "If the tenants of a courtyard and the tenants of its gallery forgot and did not participate [together] in the eruv, anything that is higher than ten handbreadths belongs to the [residents of the] gallery, and anything lower belongs to the [residents of the] courtyard. The “gallery” is like a porch off the second floor of a building. It is open to the building and it has steps that lead down to the courtyard. The tenants of the lower floor and those of the upper floor forgot to jointly set up the eruv so that the people from the upper floor could carry in the courtyard. Rather each set of residents set up their own eruv. The mishnah rules that anything that is in the courtyard that is above ten handbreadths is considered to be in the domain of the people who live on the upper floor, and they may use it and anything on it, and carry while in those areas. Those of the lower floor may use only that which is lower than ten handbreadths. In other words, we divide the domain at ten handbreadths high anything above belongs to the upper eruv and anything below belongs to the lower eruv. The reason is that above ten handbreadths is easier for those on the upper floor to use, while things below are easier for those on the lower floor to use.", + "The rim around a cistern, or a rock, if they are ten handbreadths high they belong to the gallery but if lower than they belong to the courtyard. They used to build a rim of earth around a cistern to serve as the cistern’s railing so people wouldn’t fall in. If this rim, or any rock in the courtyard is higher than ten handbreadths high, then it belongs to the residents of the gallery. If it is lower than that, then only the residents of the courtyard may use it. The mishnah mentions these because they are normal examples of things found in a courtyard that may be more than ten handbreadths high.", + "To what does this apply? To one that is adjacent to the gallery, but one that is distanced from it, even if ten handbreadths high, belongs to the courtyard. And what is regarded as adjacent? One that is not further than four handbreadths. The previous rule only applies to things that are adjacent to the gallery. If they are within four handbreadths, then the people who live on the upper floor can reach over and use these areas. However, if they are farther away, then even something above ten handbreadths can be used only by the residents of the courtyard." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses the status of certain structures within a courtyard. As we shall learn, only places that are considered to be “dwelling places” are considered in dealing with various laws of eruvin.", + "If one put his eruv in a gate-house, a portico or a gallery it is not a valid eruv; And one who dwells in it does not prohibit [others from carrying if he doesn’t participate in the eruv]. The gate-house is a hut in the courtyard in which the guard sits. The “portico” is an open but covered area in front of the house. Pillars hold the roof up. The gallery was explained in yesterday’s mishnah. Since these are not dwelling places, one cannot put the eruv (the meal) in them. The eruv must be put in a place that is considered to be a place of dwelling. Furthermore, since these are not normal dwelling places if a person does dwell there and does not participate in the eruv, he doesn’t prohibit the other people of the courtyard from using the eruv, as would a resident in a normal dwelling place who did not participate in the eruv.", + "[If one put his eruv] in a straw-shed, a cattle-shed, a wood-shed or storehouse it is a valid eruv; And one who dwells in it prohibits [others from carrying if he doesn’t participate in the eruv]. Rabbi Judah says: if the householder has there any ownership the resident does not prohibit. In contrast, the straw-shed, cattle-shed, wood-shed and storehouse are considered to be dwelling places and therefore an eruv which is put there is valid. Since these are considered living places, if someone who dwells there does not participate in the eruv, he renders the eruv ineffective and prohibits the other residents of the courtyard from carrying there. Rabbi Judah refines the previous halakhah and says that if the householder owns rights to one of the sheds, the fact that the person who dwells there doesn’t participate in the eruv does not render it invalid. Even if the homeowner only has the right to use the shed, without actually owning the shed at all, the shed-dweller’s ownership is not considered complete. Only if the person who dwells in the shed fully owns it and the homeowner has no rights to it, then the shed-dweller renders the eruv ineffective if he doesn’t participate." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with a resident of a courtyard who does not spend Shabbat in his own home. The question is, if he doesn’t participate in the eruv, does he render it ineffective for the other residents?", + "One who leaves his house and goes to spend Shabbat in another town, whether he was a Gentile or an Israelite, he prohibits [the other residents from using the eruv], the words of Rabbi Meir. According to Rabbi Meir, although the person is not present, the very fact that he owns a home in the courtyard and that home does not participate in the eruv, means that the entire eruv is ineffective.", + "Rabbi Judah says: he does not prohibit. Rabbi Judah diametrically opposes Rabbi Meir. He holds that when a person is not present in his home, his lack of participation does not prohibit others from using the eruv. When he is not there he is not considered one of the owner’s of the courtyard and therefore he need not participate.", + "Rabbi Yose says: a Gentile prohibits but an Israelite does not prohibit because it is not usual for an Israelite to return on Shabbat. Rabbi Yose agrees with Rabbi Judah that if he doesn’t dwell in the courtyard he doesn’t count as one of the courtyard’s residents, at least as long as he’s not there. However, since a Gentile may return on Shabbat, he does render the eruv ineffective. In contrast, a Jew will not be likely to return on Shabbat and hence does not render the eruv ineffective.", + "Rabbi Shimon says: even if he left his house and went to spend Shabbat with his daughter in the same town he does not prohibit, since he turned his attention away. Rabbi Yose implied that if the Jew was likely to return on Shabbat, his lack of participation might indeed render the eruv ineffective. Rabbi Shimon goes a step further. Even if the Jew is spending Shabbat in a nearby courtyard within the same town, and therefore might return, the fact that he is not actually there means that he doesn’t render the eruv ineffective. Since he turned his attention away from his own courtyard and decided to spend Shabbat elsewhere, we don’t treat his courtyard as if he is actually there." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with a cistern situated between two courtyards, when the two courtyards have set up separate eruvin. In other words, the wall that separates the courtyard goes over the well, leaving half the cistern on one side and half on the other. The mishnah teaches how they can set up the cistern so that people from both courtyards can draw water from it on Shabbat.", + "A cistern between two courtyards they do not fill up from it on Shabbat, unless they made for it a partition ten handbreadths high, whether above, below or from its rim. Without a partition, it is forbidden for residents of either courtyard to draw from the cistern, since it belongs partly to other people, since half of the cistern is in other people’s domains. The only way that both sides can use the cistern is if they make a special partition, more than just the wall that separates the two courtyards. According to the first opinion in the mishnah, it doesn’t matter whether or not the partition is above or below the water, it is effective. In the Talmud, Rav Judah explains that “below the water” means that most of the partition is below the water, whereas “above the water” means that most of the partition is above the water, but there is at least some partition, at least one handbreadth, in the water.", + "Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: Bet Shammai say: below, And Bet Hillel say: above. According to Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel, this question was debated by Bet Hillel and Bet Shammai. Bet Shammai holds that the partition must be below the water, a more stringent position. The partition must actually divide the water between the two courtyards so that the residents of different courtyards are not really sharing any of the water. In contrast, Bet Hillel is lenient and allows the partition to be above or below the water. The anonymous opinion in section one was according to Bet Hillel.", + "Rabbi Judah said: the partition could not be more effective than the wall between the two courtyards. According to Rabbi Judah, the wall that separates the two courtyards is sufficient in and of itself to allow the residents of both courtyards to draw from the cistern. The wall which is above the cistern is fictionally drawn down through the cistern and is considered as if it divides the cistern in half, even if in reality it does not." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with drawing water from a water-channel that goes through a courtyard.", + "A water channel that passes through a courtyard they do not draw water from there on Shabbat unless they made for it a partition ten handbreadths high at its entrance and exit. The water channel is at least four handbreadths wide and ten handbreadths deep, and therefore it is a separate domain, one that is called a “karmelit”. Since the courtyard is a private domain, it is forbidden to draw water from the “karmelit” on Shabbat. In order to allow drawing water from it, they need to make a special partition above or below it, as we learned concerning the cistern in yesterday’s mishnah. In this case, they must make the partition both at the channel’s entrance and the channel’s exit.", + "Rabbi Judah says: the wall above it may be regarded as a partition. As he did in yesterday’s mishnah, Rabbi Judah holds that the courtyard wall, which goes over the channel, is sufficient to allow drawing from it on Shabbat.", + "Rabbi Judah said: it happened with the water-channel of Avel that they would draw water was from it on Shabbat on the authority of the elders. They said to him: because it was not of the prescribed size. Rabbi Judah relates a story that took place in Avel (a town in the Lower Galilee) where people drew from the channel on Shabbat, and the elders who were in the courtyard allowed it to happen. The Sages respond that the reason that the elders allowed people to draw from this channel was that it was not four handbreadths wide and ten deep. In such a case it is not its own domain, but rather it takes on the status of the domain in which it is situation. Therefore, everyone agrees that the residents of the courtyard can draw from it. Thee elders of Avel did not permit the drawing of the water because of the wall, as Rabbi Judah believed." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to deal with drawing water on Shabbat.", + "A balcony that was situated above the water, they do not draw water from there on Shabbat, unless they made for it a partition ten handbreadths high either above or below [the water]. The mishnah is dealing with a balcony which is situated over a stream that runs below it. There is a hole in the floor of the balcony from which they normally draw water. The mishnah says that they cannot draw water because the stream is a “karmelit” (a domain which is neither public nor private) and the balcony is a private domain. However, if they made a partition which surrounds the balcony and the stream they may draw water from the stream because we consider the water to be within the private domain of the balcony. The partition needs to be ten handbreadths high to be a valid partition, but it may be either above or below the water. Others explain that the partition is either hanging below the floor of the balcony or is on the balcony itself, around the hole in the floor.", + "So also two balconies, one on top of the other. In this case there are two balconies, one above the other, and below the lower one is the stream, from which they draw water through a hole in the floor. If they wish to draw water on Shabbat, they must make a partition for both the upper and lower balconies.", + "If they made [a partition] for the upper one but not for the lower one, they are both prohibited until they make an eruv. If they made a partition for the upper balcony but not for the lower balcony, neither may draw water. This is because the people from the upper balcony draw their water through the lower balcony, which does not have a partition. The same would be true if they set up a partition for the lower balcony, but not for the upper balcony. Since the people of the upper balcony have usage rights to the hole in the floor of the lower balcony, their lack of a partition prohibits those of the lower balcony from drawing as well. However, all of these prohibitions refer only to a case where they didn’t set up a joint eruv. If they set up a joint eruv, then it is all one domain and they may all draw water." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nWhereas the previous mishnayot dealt with drawing water from cisterns or streams, today’s mishnah deals with pouring out water inside a courtyard. The problem is that this may be considered taking something from the private domain and moving it to the public domain. Our mishnah deals with when this is considered a problem and when it is not.", + "A courtyard which is less than four cubits: they may not pour out water in it on Shabbat unless they made a trough holding two se’ah from its drainage point downwards, regardless of whether [the trough] was outside or inside, except that if it was outside it is necessary to cover it and if it inside it is not necessary to cover it. In a courtyard which is larger than four square cubits, the sages allowed one to pour out water because they assumed that the water would be absorbed in the ground and would not make it out to the public domain. Even if the water should escape to the public domain, since the person didn’t intend to pour water from a private to a public domain, he has not transgressed any commandments. However, the sages prohibited pouring water out onto the ground in a courtyard smaller than four square cubits lest the water goes from the public to the private domain. He is allowed to pour water out onto the ground in a small courtyard if he makes a drainage trough to catch the water before it goes out to the public domain. The trough must be able to hold at least two se’ah of liquid (about 24 liters), which the sages estimated to be the average amount of water that a person would use in day. The drainage point was at the top of the trough, to allow overflowing liquid a way out. The mishnah teaches that the trough can either be in or outside the courtyard’s walls. Even though if it is outside the courtyard, it is in the public domain, it is still not considered part of the public domain. However, if he makes it outside, he must cover lest he make the trough four by four handbreadths wide and three handbreadths deep in which case it is a karmelit. It would be prohibited to pour water from a private domain (inside the courtyard) to a karmelit. If he covers it, it is no longer considered a karmelit. If he makes the trough inside the courtyard, like the courtyard, the trough is also a private domain and there is therefore no need to cover it." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah is a continuation of yesterday’s mishnah, which dealt with the problem of pouring out waste water on Shabbat. Today’s mishnah deals with a person who is in a courtyard and wants to pour his waste water into a sewage drain which leads out to the public domain.", + "Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov says: a sewage drain which is covered over four cubits in the public domain, it is permitted to pour water into it on Shabbat. The person is in his courtyard and wants to pour water out into the sewage drain. If the drain is four cubits long in the public domain but is covered, then he may pour out the water, according to Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov. This is because an area four cubits long and four cubits wide is sufficient to absorb the average amount of water a person uses during the day. The covered drain has the same status as the courtyard itself, and therefore, it is as if the water remains in the courtyard. Even though the water will afterwards leave the covered part and go into the non-covered part of the drain, he is still allowed to do so because he initially put the water into the covered part.", + "But the Sages say: even where a roof or a courtyard was a hundred cubits in area, he may not pour water over the mouth of the drain, but he may pour upon the roof, and the water will flow into the drain. The Sages are more strict than Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov and say that he should never pour water into a sewage drain, even if 100 cubits of it are covered by a roof or if he is 100 cubits from the exit to the public domain. The Talmud explains that this is prohibited lest people think that he is pouring directly into the public domain, and think that just as it is permitted to pour water from the private domain into the public domain, so too it is permitted to carry things from one domain to the other. However, the sages do allow one to pour water on a roof or on the ground in the courtyard, even though the water will then flow to the sewage drain, since this is more indirect.", + "The courtyard and the portico combined to make up the four cubits. This section refers back to yesterday’s mishnah which taught that if the courtyard was smaller than four square cubits, it is forbidden to pour water out onto the ground unless there is a drainage trough. The mishnah now states that the portico (an area with columns supporting a roof) counts towards the size of the courtyard, so that if the two together add up to four cubits, one may pour out water there." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to deal with pouring out water. The situation is one in which two buildings are opposite from each other in a courtyard that is less than four cubits.", + "So too in the case of two two-storied buildings this one opposite that one: if some of the tenants made a trough and others did not, those who made the trough are permitted to pour down their water, but those who did not make any trough are forbidden. The basic message of this mishnah is that every row of buildings needs its own drainage trough, whether or not people are living in all of the buildings. If there is only one trough, then only the side that made the trough can pour water out. The difficulty with this mishnah is determining whether or not they set up an eruv. If they set up an eruv together, then both sides should be permitted, and if they didn’t, then neither side should be. The Talmud explains that the mishnah relates to a case where they did not set up an eruv. Pouring out water into the drain is permitted even without an eruv, but the sages said that only the side that set up the eruv is allowed to do so lest the people from the other side take out their waste-water containers and carry them to the other side’s drainage ditches. Without an eruv carrying out these vessels would be prohibited. However, if the two sides set up an eruv, it matters not how many drainage ditches there are and all may pour there water out into even one ditch." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with carrying from one roof to another. In order to understand this mishnah we need to remember that without an eruv it is only prohibited to carry things from the house to the courtyard. Even without an eruv it is permitted to carry things from one courtyard to another, provided those things were in the courtyard when Shabbat began.", + "All the roofs of a town are a single domain, provided no roof is ten handbreadths higher or lower [than the neighboring roof], the words of Rabbi Meir. According to Rabbi Meir, one is allowed to carry vessels from roof to roof even without an eruv, as long as the vessels were on the roof when Shabbat began. However, if one roof is higher or lower ten handbreadths than the next, it is prohibited, since they are then considered to be two different domains.", + "The Sages say: each one is its own domain. The Sages hold that just as it is prohibited to carry from one house to another without an eruv, so too it is prohibited to carry from one roof to another without an eruv. In other words, the roof is treated as an extension of the house below. In contrast, it is permitted to carry from courtyard to courtyard because there is no area below which is prohibited.", + "Rabbi Shimon says: roofs, courtyards and karpafs are all one domain with regard to objects that were within them when Shabbat began, but not with regard to objects that were in the house when Shabbat began. Rabbi Shimon holds that it is permitted to carry from roof to roof, from courtyard to courtyard and from karpaf to karpaf (a karpaf is a small area behind the home used to store wood or other things) as long as the vessels were in those areas (and not in the house) when Shabbat began. However, if they were in the house when Shabbat began, without an eruv it is forbidden to take them out. Rabbi Shimon basically agrees with Rabbi Meir but does not make any exception for roofs which are ten handbreadths higher or lower than the others." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with situations in which an area, either a roof or a courtyard, is missing one wall. As we shall see, if the wall is totally missing, it is prohibited to carry in this area.", + "A large roof close to a small roof: the large one is permitted but that of the small one is forbidden. The mishnah describes a situation where there is a large roof and a small roof that share one wall. The fourth wall of the small roof is totally open to the large roof. Since the small roof has only three closed walls, it is forbidden to carry on the small roof. However, the large roof’s fourth side is not completely open to the small roof; only the middle part of that side is open. At the ends of each side, there would be existing sections of walls. These partial walls count as a full wall and it is permitted to carry on the larger roof.", + "If [the wall of a] large courtyard which shared a wall with a small courtyard was broken down, the use of the large one is permitted, but that of the smaller one is forbidden, because the gap is like a doorway to the large one. This section is exactly the same situation as above, but it describes courtyards instead of roofs. The gap in the wall is like a doorway for the larger courtyard, but for the small courtyard the gap means that it is simply a missing wall. Therefore, it is forbidden to carry in the smaller courtyard.", + "If [the wall of a] courtyard which shared a wall with the public domain was broken down, one who brings from it into a private domain or from a private domain into it is liable, the words of Rabbi Eliezer. The sages say: from it into the public domain or from the public domain into it he is exempt because it is like a karmelit. In this case, the wall of a courtyard is broken and opens to the public domain. The wall is either completely fallen down, or at least 10 cubits of it have fallen down. According to Rabbi Eliezer, the courtyard now has the same status as that of the public domain. Therefore, one who carries from there into another private domain or from a private domain into there is liable for transgressing Shabbat. The rabbis disagree with Rabbi Eliezer and say that the courtyard has the status of a karmelit, a domain which is neither like the public domain nor like the private domain. Hence, while it is still forbidden to carry an object in or out of this area, one who does so is not liable for a toraitic transgression of Shabbat." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with an area in which it was permitted to carry when Shabbat began but then in some way the area changed during Shabbat such that had it been that way when Shabbat began it would have been forbidden to carry in the area.", + "The mishnah describes three situations in which it was permitted to carry in an area when Shabbat began and then during Shabbat the area changed such that it became an area in which it is prohibited to carry. The first is a courtyard whose walls broke down from two directions, opening it up either to a karmelit or to a public domain. The Talmud explains that this refers to a corner of the courtyard and not two opposite directions. Even if this breach is smaller than 10 cubits it is still not considered an “opening” to the courtyard (if it were considered an opening it would be permitted to carry), nor can this type of breach in the wall be repaired with a cross-beam or post (see above 1:6). The second situation is a house whose wall broke down from two directions, meaning at its corner. The third situation is an alley which had been properly enclosed with either a cross-beam or side-post (see again 1:6) but they were removed. When the cross-beam or side-post was in place it allowed people to carry in the alley, if an eruv had been set up.", + "A courtyard [whose walls] were breached from two sides, and so also a house [whose walls] were breached from two of its sides, or an alley from which the cross-beam or side-post was removed:
They are permitted for that Shabbat but prohibited for the future, the words of Rabbi Judah. According to Rabbi Judah, since it was permitted to carry in these areas when Shabbat began, it is permitted to carry there for all of Shabbat. However, in future Shabbatot it will be prohibited unless the problems are fixed.", + "Rabbi Yose says: if they are permitted on that Shabbat they are also permitted for the future and if they are prohibited in the future, they are also prohibited for that Shabbat. Rabbi Yose does not allow a situation where it would be permitted for the current Shabbat but prohibited in future Shabbatot. Perhaps this would be too confusing for people and they would come to think that if they can carry this Shabbat, then they can carry on subsequent Shabbatot as well, not realizing that when this Shabbat began the walls or cross-beam/side-post was still in place. Hence, Rabbi Yose holds that since it will be prohibited in the future (without repairs), it is prohibited for the current Shabbat as well." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah deals with carrying underneath areas that are considered to be public domains.", + "One who builds an upper room on the top of two houses, and so too in the case of viaducts, they may carry underneath them on Shabbat, the words of Rabbi Judah. But the sages prohibit this. There are two situations described in this section. In the first a person builds an upper chamber on top of two houses, meaning it spans two houses which are on opposite sides of the public domain. This means that people below are passing through a “covered public domain”. Similarly, a viaduct is a bridge which passes over the public domain, such that the people who walk beneath it are passing through a covered public domain. Rabbi Judah says that one can carry in a covered public domain, and therefore one can carry in these areas. According to the Talmud, we fictionally draw the edges of the roofs down to the ground so that the public domain has four walls, making it in essence a private domain. The rabbis prohibit carrying in this type of area. Although they do not consider the area to truly be a public domain, and one who carries there is not liable for a Toraitic transgression, it is nevertheless prohibited.", + "Rabbi Judah moreover said: an eruv may be prepared for an alley that is a thoroughfare; But the sages forbid this. Most of the alleys that we have been discussing up until now have been alleys with only one open end. All agree that one can set up an eruv for this type of an alley. They disagree with regard to an alley which is open on two ends, one which people can use as a thoroughfare. Rabbi Judah says that one may set up an eruv even for an alley with two open ends whereas the rabbis say that this type of alley is like a public domain and it is forbidden to set up an eruv there." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThe final chapter of Eruvin is a sort of appendix to all of tractates Shabbat and Eruvin. It contains assorted rules which deal with both topics.\nToday’s and tomorrow’s mishnah deals with a person who finds a pair of tefillin in the public domain and wishes to bring them into the private domain to protect them.", + "One who finds tefillin should bring them in one pair at a time. Rabban Gamaliel says: two pairs at a time. One who finds tefillin in a place where they may come to be damaged should not just leave them there. However, on Shabbat he cannot just carry them to safety because of the prohibition against carrying. According to the first opinion in the mishnah, he should put on a pair at a time and wear them until he can get them to a safe place. Then he should remove the pair he is wearing and go out and bring in another pair. The reason that this is allowed is that he is considered to be “wearing” the tefillin and not to be carrying them. A “pair” refers to a set one box for the head and one for the arm. Rabban Gamaliel holds that he can put two pairs on at the same time, because there is room on one’s head for two boxes and on one’s arm for two as well.", + "To what does this apply? To old ones but in the case of new ones he is exempt. The previous halakhah refers only to old sets of tefillin, tefillin which we know were made properly and are valid. However, new pairs of tefillin may not even actually be tefillin (they could be amulets), and even if they are tefillin, they may have been made improperly. Therefore, he is neither mandated to carry them in nor even allowed to do so.", + "If he found them arranged in a set or in bundles he shall wait by them until it is dark and then bring them in. If he finds many sets of tefillin in one place, he can’t bring them in because there are just too many to carry in one (or two) sets at a time. Neither should he just leave them there because they could be damaged. His only option is to sit and guard them until Shabbat is over.", + "In a time of danger, he should cover them and walk away. Guarding or wearing lost tefillin in a time of danger is not mandated. One shouldn’t endanger one’s life to protect a pair of tefillin. Therefore, if it is dangerous to either wear or guard them, the mishnah gives one permission to first cover them up so that they will not be noticed, and then to walk away and leave them there. The “danger” referred to in our mishnah refers to a time when the Roman authorities forbade the observance of commandments. This is probably the Hadrianic persecutions which preceded and followed the Bar-Kokhba revolt in 135 C.E. We should note that the Talmud ties the debate in section one to the issue of whether or not one is commanded to wear tefillin on Shabbat. Some tannaim hold that one does not wear tefillin on Shabbat and some hold that they are worn. The accepted halakhah is that they are not worn." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is a continuation of yesterday’s mishnah, in which we discussed carrying tefillin in from the public domain.", + "Rabbi Shimon says: he should pass them [the tefillin] to his fellow and his fellow should pass them to his fellow, and so on, until they reach the outermost courtyard. Rabbi Shimon is more lenient than the sages in the previous mishnah concerning bringing tefillin in from the public domain. While he also obviously cannot just allow a person to carry them in himself since this would be a toraitic prohibition, he does allow one to pass them in from person to person. Since no single person carries the tefillin more than four cubits in the public domain (which would be a toraitic transgression) this is allowed in order to protect the tefillin. Once the tefillin get to the outermost courtyard, where they will be protected, they shouldn’t pass them any further.", + "The same is true in the case of his child: he passes him to his fellow and his fellow passes him to his fellow, and so on, even if there are a hundred. This refers to a child who is born out on the field on Shabbat. The father (or anyone else) may not just carry him, since carrying a child who cannot walk on his own is a violation of carrying on Shabbat. Rather what he should do, according to Rabbi Shimon, is pass him from person to person until the child reaches the city. According to the Talmud, the other sages disagree with Rabbi Shimon and hold that in cases such as this, it would be better for one person to carry the child all the way back, as long as he stops to rest before he walks four cubits at one time. In such a way, he does not commit a toraitic transgression of Shabbat. This is preferred because this involves far less people than does Rabbi Shimon’s suggestion. In contrast, Rabbi Shimon reasons that advising someone to carry for a distance of less than four cubits at a time is dangerous because he may easily walk too far and thereby commit a toraitic transgression. We see here that there is a debate over what is worse the appearance of many people together carrying something on Shabbat, or the possibility that one person may commit an actual toraitic transgression.", + "Rabbi Judah says: one may pass a jar to his fellow and his fellow may pass it to his fellow even beyond the Shabbat limit. They said to him: this must not go further than the feet of its owner. Rabbi Judah extends the halakhah stated by Rabbi Shimon above to include a situation where someone is stuck outside of the Shabbat border and need food or water on Shabbat. People from within the city may pass food or water out to him, even if it goes beyond the Shabbat limit. The sages partially disagree and hold that one may not pass something beyond the place to which the object’s owner may himself go. If the owner was dwelling in the city when Shabbat began, then just as he may not go beyond the Shabbat limit, so too his belongings may not be passed beyond that limit." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with a person who was reading a scroll while in one domain and the end of the scroll rolled out of his hand and went into another domain. He is left holding only one end of the scroll. The question is: can he roll it back to himself?", + "If one was reading a scroll on a threshold and the scroll rolled out of his hand, he may roll it back to himself. This person is not in the house but on the threshold of the house. The threshold is considered a “karmelit” a place that is neither a public nor a private domain. The scroll’s end rolls out of his hand and goes into the public domain. The mishnah allows him to roll it back to himself due to two factors: 1) he still holds one end of the scroll. Therefore, the scroll has not totally gone into the public domain. 2) The threshold is a karmelit and not a private domain.", + "If he was reading on the top of a roof and the scroll rolled out of his hand: Before it reached ten handbreadths from the ground, he may roll it back to himself; But after it had reached ten handbreadths from the ground he must turn it over with its writing downwards. In this case he is on the roof which is considered a private domain, and the scroll’s end falls down toward the ground. According to the first opinion, if the scroll gets to within ten handbreadths of the ground he may not roll it back. The area within ten handbreadths of the ground is considered to be part of the public domain, and it is forbidden to roll something back from the public domain into a private domain. What he should do in such a situation is turn the scroll over on its face in order to protect the side which has the writing. As we shall see below, this isn’t just any scroll, it’s a biblical scroll (a Scroll!) whose writing must be protected. If the scroll did not reach ten handbreadths within the ground then he may roll it back because it has not yet reached the public domain.", + "Rabbi Judah says: even if it was removed from the ground by no more than a thread's thickness he may roll it back to himself. According to Rabbi Judah, even if the scroll has reached ten handbreadths of the ground, it is still permissible to roll it back, as long as it has not touched the ground itself. Rabbi Judah seems to disagree with the previous opinion concerning whether or not the area ten handbreadths from the ground has the same status as the ground itself.", + "Rabbi Shimon says: even if it touched the actual ground he may roll it back to himself, since no prohibition that is due to “Shabbat rest” stands before the Holy Writings. Rabbi Shimon holds that in all cases this is permitted since this is a prohibition that is not “deoraita” from the Torah, but rather due to “Shabbat rest” (shevut). This term denotes an prohibition that the rabbis added to those of the Torah, the point of which is to preserve the character of Shabbat as a day of rest. In this case, rolling the scroll back is only a violation of “Shabbat rest” and not a deoraita violation. The reason for this is that he holds one end of the scroll in his hand when he rolls it back he is not taking something that is completely in the public domain and bringing it into the public domain. According to Rabbi Shimon, the respect and concern for the Holy Writings outweighs the rabbinic prohibition, and therefore he may roll it back." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah contains two independent mishnayot. The first deals with a ledge in front of a window and the second deals with a person standing in one domain and moving objects in another.", + "If there was a ledge in front of a window it is permitted to put objects on it or to remove objects from it on Shabbat. The ledge in front of the window of a house is assumedly more than ten handbreadths above the public domain. As we learned in yesterday’s mishnah, the air more than ten handbreadths above the public domain is not considered to be part of the public domain. Therefore, it is permitted to move objects from the house onto the ledge and vice versa. Some commentaries add that the ledge must be four handbreadths wide and long so that it can be considered a private domain.", + "A man may stand in a private domain and move objects in a public domain or he may stand in a public domain and move objects in a private domain, provided he does not take them beyond four cubits. The mishnah teaches that a man may stand in one domain and move objects within another domain and that we are not concerned lest he come to bring something from one domain into the other. Had we had that concern we would not have allowed him to stand in one domain and even touch an object in another domain. The only thing that he is not allowed to do is stand in the private domain and move an object four cubits in the public domain, since this is always prohibited." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with moving body fluids, urine and spit, from one domain to the other.", + "A man may not stand in a private domain and urinate in a public domain or in a public domain and urinate in a private domain, and similarly he may not spit. It is forbidden to stand on Shabbat in one domain and urinate or spit into another domain. The Talmud adds that one who does so is liable to bring a sin offering, which means that this is considered a toraitic violation. We might have thought that since the urine and spit come from his own body that he is not liable, therefore the mishnah comes to teach us that he is liable.", + "Rabbi Judah says: even when a person’s spit accumulated in his mouth, he must not walk four cubits before he spat out. Rabbi Judah adds that one is liable even for carrying accumulated spit in one’s mouth. Note that this is only true once the spit has accumulated otherwise he would be obligated to spit (or swallow) every four cubits." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with standing in one domain and drinking from another.", + "A man may not stand in a private domain and drink in the public domain or stand in a public domain and drink in a private domain unless he puts his head and the greater part of his body into the domain in which he drinks. If one stands in one domain and drinks from another, he is considered to be bringing water from one domain to the other. This is the opposite of the case of urinating in the previous mishnah. However, this is permitted if his head and most of his body are in the domain in which he is drinking. Even though his legs are in the other domain, since the water won’t really go directly down to his legs this is permitted.", + "And similarly concerning a winepress. The same rule as above also applies to standing outside of a winepress and drinking directly from the winepress. This is prohibited unless his head and most of his body is in the area of the winepress. The Talmud explains that this is prohibited even if the winepress is only a karmelit and not a private domain.", + "A man may intercept water from a gutter at a level below ten handbreadths, This refers to someone standing in the public domain who wishes to collect the runoff rainwater overflowing from the gutters on a roof. He may not collect this water directly from the gutter because the gutter is in the private domain and he is in the public domain. What he should do is put his vessel ten handbreadths within the ground of the public domain and catch the water there. Once the water is within the ten handbreadths mark it is already in the public domain and he is therefore not taking water from one domain to another.", + "And from a water-spout he may drink in any manner. Whereas the gutter goes all the way around the wall, the water spout goes straight from the wall emptying out in the public domain. It does not have the status of a private domain and therefore he may drink directly from it." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with drawing water from a nearby cistern into a house or pouring water out from a house into a nearby garbage heap. In both cases this is allowed so long as both areas are private domains.", + "If a cistern in a public domain had an embankment ten handbreadths high, it is permitted to draw water from it on the sabbath through a window above it. Around a cistern they would make a rim of earth. If this rim was higher than ten handbreadths, then it and all of the area from the ground and above is considered to be a private domain. The window is also a private domain and therefore, one could draw water from the cistern through the window.", + "If a garbage heap in a public domain was ten handbreadths high, it is permitted to pour water on it on Shabbat from a window above it. This is basically the same situation as in the previous section. If the garbage heap is ten handbreadths high then it is a private domain, and again he is taking something (the water) from one private domain and pouring it into another private domain." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first part of this mishnah deals with carrying below the branches of a tree and sitting on a tree’s roots. The second part of the mishnah deals with setting up a make-shift door.", + "If a tree overshadows the ground: if its branches are not higher than three handbreadths from the ground it is permitted to carry underneath it. If a tree’s branches lie within three handbreadths from the ground it is as if they are attached to the ground. This is a special rule that is applied in certain circumstances according to which anything that is three handbreadths from the ground it is as if it is attached to the ground. Assumedly the branches are at least ten handbreadths high and therefore they act as partitions. The area in between the branches is therefore considered a private domain and it is permitted to carry there.", + "If its roots are three handbreadths high above the ground, one may not sit on them. On Shabbat it is forbidden to climb on or make any use of a tree, lest by doing so one comes to break off a branch, an activity which is forbidden. The mishnah teaches that if the roots are higher than three handbreadths one may not sit on them, since they are part of the tree. However, if they are less than three handbreadths than they are part of the ground and it is permitted to sit on them.", + "With the door in the “muktzeh”, and the thorns in the breach [of a wall] and reed mats, one may not close an opening, unless they are high off the ground. In this context “muktzeh” refers to a backyard separate from the courtyard which was used usually for storage. Since people didn’t regularly go in and out of the muktzeh and it was only used to store items which were not particularly valuable (like produce and wood) it did not have a regular door, with a hinge and lock. Rather the door was just propped up against the opening in the wall and when people went in, they would take the door down and lay it on the ground. The thorns referred to here were used to fill up holes in a wall. The mishnah says that it is forbidden to use these three things (the muktzeh door, the thorns and the reed mats) to make a door. The reason is that these are not actually doors (which have hinges and locks) and therefore one who puts them into the opening of the wall looks like he is building, and not just putting a door in its place. In other words, this is prohibited because it looks too much like building. However, if when placing them he raised them from the ground, then it is clearer that he is not building and it is permitted. Others explain differently. They explain that these three things will make furrows in the ground when the door is opened and it is forbidden on Shabbat to make furrows. Therefore, if he wishes to use them as a door, he must lift them a little off the ground so that they won’t make furrows." + ], + [ + "A man may not stand in a private domain and open a door in the public domain, or in the public domain and open a door in a private domain, unless he has made a partition ten handbreadths high, the words of Rabbi Meir.
They said to him: it happened at the [oxen and chicken] fatteners’ market in Jerusalem that they would lock their shops and leave the key in a window above a shop door.
Rabbi Yose says: it was the wool-dealers’ market.
This mishnah deals with standing in one domain and opening a door in another domain.
Section one: The person in this mishnah is standing in one domain and wants to open a door with a lock in another domain. The key is already in the other domain, the one in which the door is located, for if it were not, it would be obviously prohibited to move the key from one domain to the other. Rabbi Meir rules that this is prohibited lest after he is done unlocking the door, he pulls the key back into the domain in which he is in, thereby moving it from one domain to another. The only way that this is permitted is if he makes a partition ten handbreadths high. For instance, if he is in the private domain and the door is in the public domain, he could make a partition ten handbreadths high in the public domain, in the area where the key is, so that he and the key would both be in private domains. Alternatively, if he is in the public domain, he could make a ten handbreadth high partition where he is and then he may open the door which is also in a private domain.
Section two: The people who worked in a certain type of market in Jerusalem would stand in the public domain and lock their shops and leave the key in the window (the key must never have been in the public domain). From here we can see that it is permitted to stand in one domain and lock a door in another.
There is a debate in the mishnah over what type of market it was. According to the first opinion it was a “fattener’s market” where they would fatten up fowl and cattle before slaughtering them. According to Rabbi Yose it was a wool market. However, the actual content of the halakhah is not debated." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with a bolt or type of peg that they would use to lock a door. The bolt has a knob on one end of it, which makes it possible to do other types of work (for instance grinding) with the contraption.", + "A bolt which has a knob at one end: Rabbi Eliezer forbids it [to be moved]; But Rabbi Yose permits it. Rabbi Eliezer forbids using this type of bolt on Shabbat, whereas Rabbi Joshua permits it. There are several explanations for this debate. One is that Rabbi Eliezer holds that the bolt is not considered to be a “vessel” and hence it is muktzeh. The knob, which is a vessel, is secondary to the bolt and hence it is not considered. Rabbi Judah holds that the knob is primary and hence the entire contraption is considered to be a vessel. Another explanation is that according to Rabbi Eliezer when he puts the bolt into the door, it looks as if he is building, because the bolt is not a “vessel.” In contrast, Rabbi Joshua holds that since the bolt is a vessel, it does not look as if he is building.", + "Rabbi Eliezer said: It happened in a synagogue in Tiberias that they were customary to permit it, until Rabban Gamaliel and the elders came and forbade it to them. Rabbi Yose said: they treated it as forbidden, Rabban Gamaliel and the elders came and permitted it to them. In this section both rabbis bring precedents for there rulings. Both precedents are really opposite versions of the same event. According to Rabbi Eliezer the people used to permit its use until Rabban Gamaliel and the other elders came and prohibited. According to Rabbi Joshua, the people used to prohibit until Rabban Gamaliel came and permitted it. One thing I find interesting in this story (in either version) is the relationship of the rabbi to the synagogue and its customs. In the beginning, the synagogue operates separately from the realm of the rabbis and in halakhic contradistinction to them. There certainly is no “synagogue rabbi”, an invention which is rather modern. However, according to the story, the rabbis seem to be periodically visiting the synagogues and when they get there they issue a halakhic ruling which is followed. The relationship of the rabbis to the synagogue in antiquity is a complex subject, one about which much has been written. This mishnah demonstrates how complex the subject can be." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to deal with bolts, this time referring to a bolt that does not have a knob on it.", + "A bolt that drags along the ground: it is permitted to lock [a door] with it in the Temple but not in the country; The bolts were usually attached to the door with a rope and put into their place when one wanted to lock the door. The first section deals with a bolt attached to the door by a rope, but a rope long enough to let one end of the bolt drag on the ground. The first opinion holds that use of this bolt is prohibited, but its prohibition is only “derabannan” of rabbinic origin. Rabbinic prohibitions do not generally apply within the Temple and hence this type of bolt may be used to lock a door in the Temple. However, it is forbidden in the rest of the country, because it looks as if he is building. Since it is attached to the door already, it is not actually building and hence the prohibition is only of rabbinic origin. If it were attached to the door and not dragging it would have been completely permitted but since it is dragging one who looks at it may not notice that it is actually attached to the door and therefore it is prohibited.", + "But one that rests on the ground is forbidden both here and there. In this case the bolt is totally detached from the door and it is resting on the ground. Since it is not attached to the door at all, he is considered to be building and the prohibition is deoraita, or toraitic origin. Toraitic prohibitions are still prohibited even in the Temple.", + "Rabbi Judah says: one that rests on the ground is permitted in the Temple but one that drags on the ground is permitted [even] in the country. Rabbi Judah is more lenient than the first opinion. He holds that a bolt that rests in the ground is also only prohibited derabanan (from the rabbis) and hence it is only prohibited outside of the Temple. The bolt that drags on the ground and is attached to the door is not prohibited at all since everyone can see that this is not actually building." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses a hinge that has fallen off a door and whether or not one may reinsert it on Shabbat. The language and structure of this mishnah closely follows yesterday’s mishnah.", + "A lower hinge [of a door] may be reinserted in the Temple but not in the country. The upper one is forbidden in both. According to the first opinion, it is forbidden to reinsert the lower hinge in the country [anywhere outside the Temple], lest while doing so he puts in a nail and strikes it, which would be an act forbidden according to the Torah. In the Temple this is permitted since in the Temple certain rabbinic prohibitions do not apply. As we shall see, outside of the Temple it is all the more so forbidden to reinsert the upper hinge. It is forbidden to reinsert the upper hinge in all regions even in the Temple. The upper hinge is more essential towards holding the door in its place and without it, the entire door would fall. The prohibition is still only of rabbinic origin, lest he come to strike a nail, but since it is more likely that he might violate a toraitic prohibition, the act is prohibited in the Temple as well.", + "Rabbi Judah says: the upper one may be re-inserted in the Temple and the lower one in the country. Rabbi Judah is again more lenient, as he was in yesterday’s mishnah,. In the Temple, reinserting the upper hinge is permitted, and all the more so reinserting the lower one is permitted. According to Rabbi Judah, we need not be strict inside the Temple for fear that someone will violate a toraitic law, since those observing in the Temple will ensure that this does not happen. Outside of the Temple reinserting the upper hinge is still prohibited lest he come to strike a nail, but reinserting the lower one is permitted, and we are not concerned that by permitting this he might come to violate the toraitic prohibition of striking a nail." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThere are three independent sections to this mishnah. What is common to all three is that they mention actions which are permitted on Shabbat in the Temple but not permitted outside of it. As we learned in the previous two mishnayot, in the Temple certain rabbinic prohibitions are waved, under the assumption that even if one performs the activity, one will not come to violate a toraitic prohibition. Another similarity is that in all three cases, under certain circumstances the activity would be prohibited even in the Temple.", + "One may replace a plaster bandage on a wound in the Temple but not in the country. At the outset, it is prohibited in both. This section refers to a priest who has a wound and enters the Temple with a bandage over the wound. Under the bandage is a poultice. If the bandage falls off he may replace it, because the prohibition of putting on a bandage on Shabbat is only of rabbinic origin (shevut), and rabbinic prohibitions are permitted in the Temple. It is prohibited outside the Temple lest one come to prepare a poultice, which is a toraitic prohibition. Finally, the mishnah notes that to put on a new bandage is prohibited in either place because when making a new bandage it is very likely that he will come to prepare a poultice.", + "A harp string may be tied up in the Temple but not in the country. At the outset, it is prohibited in both. If a harp string breaks on one of the harps (or other string instruments) in the Temple, it may be tied. Since this prohibition is only of rabbinic origin, it is permitted in the Temple. Outside the Temple it is prohibited. Both in and outside of the Temple, it is forbidden to tie a new harp string to the harp. The commentators explain that this string is tied in a place where it will not remain permanently, for if it was tied permanently it would be a toraitic violation, and hence prohibited in the Temple as well. Finally, if the harp string was not there before Shabbat, he may not tie it there on Shabbat even in the Temple because he should have tied it there before Shabbat.", + "One may remove a wart in the Temple but not in the country. If [the operation must be performed] with an instrument it is forbidden in both. A priest who has a wart (a yabelet) may not serve in the Temple (Leviticus 22:22). However, this wart may be removed in the Temple on Shabbat either by picking it off with his hand or biting it off with his teeth, since this is not the normal means by which to remove a wart (sounds quite painful). We have noted on several occasions that if an activity that would normally be prohibited by the Torah is done in an unusual manner, it is only prohibited by rabbinic decree. Since the prohibition is only rabbinic, it is permitted in the Temple. Outside the Temple it remains prohibited. Finally, the wart may not be removed using an instrument in either place, since this would be a toraitic violation." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to deal with things which may be done on Shabbat in the Temple but not outside of it.", + "A priest who was wounded in his finger may wrap some reed-grass round it in the Temple but not in the country. But if he intended to draw out blood it is forbidden in both cases. The reed-grass mentioned in this mishnah was a type of bandage that also had medicinal properties. As we have learned previously, it is forbidden to heal on Shabbat; therefore it is forbidden to use this reed-grass on Shabbat outside of the Temple. However, the rabbis allowed it to be used in the Temple since it was necessary to cover the wound while the priest performed his service in the Temple. Drawing blood from a wound on Shabbat is a toraitic violation it is derived from the prohibited labor of “squeezing.” Therefore, if the reed-grass was put on the wound with the intention to draw out blood, it is prohibited even within the Temple. As we have stressed many times, only rabbinic violations are waived in the Temple, not toraitic ones.", + "They scatter salt on the altar’s ramp so that the priests shall not slip. In the Temple it was permitted for them to scatter salt on the altar’s ramp so that the priests would not slip while going up and down to offer sacrifices. Outside of the Temple this is prohibited because it is considered “fixing.”", + "They draw water by means of a wheel on Shabbat from the cistern of the exiles and from the great cistern, and on a festival day from the Hakar cistern. The mishnah mentions two cisterns that were situated within the Temple confines from which it was permitted to draw water using a wheel. However, outside of the Temple the rabbis forbade drawing water by means of a wheel, since this might lead to large quantities of water being drawn and a person might use the water to irrigate his field, an activity prohibited on Shabbat. Unlike the previous two cisterns, the “Hakar” cistern was not in the Temple. Nevertheless, in contrast to all other cisterns outside of the Temple it was permitted to draw from it using a wheel on festivals. The Hakar cistern was used by the pilgrims during the Second Temple period that came for the festivals. The prophets and Jewish leaders at the time allowed the Jews to draw from it by means of a wheel on the festival because of the necessity for large quantity of waters for the many pilgrims. Since it was justifiably permitted in the past the rabbis allowed Jews to continue to use it even after the destruction." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe final mishnah deals with removing a dead creeping thing, which is a primary source of impurity, from the Temple.", + "If a [dead] creeping thing was found in the Temple, a priest should carry it out in his girdle in order not to keep the impurity there any longer than is necessary, the words of Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka. Rabbi Judah says: [it should be removed] with wooden tongs in order that uncleanness shall not increase. In this section we see two different strategies concerning how to respond to a dead creeping thing that found its way into the Temple. According to Rabbi Yohanan ben Baroka the priest should pick it up with his girdle in order to remove it as fast as possible. However, he should not pick it up with his hands because that would cause him to become impure. Even though when he picks it up with the girdle the girdle will become impure, the girdle will not in turn cause him to become impure because clothes don’t impurify people. The main goal is to get the creeping thing out of the Temple as quickly as possible. Rabbi Judah says that he should pick it up with wooden tongs which cannot become impure. The problem with this is that it will be harder to catch the creeping thing with wooden tongs than with his girdle. Nevertheless, according to Rabbi Judah it is preferable not to increase the things which it causes to be impure.", + "From where must it be removed? From the sanctuary, from the hall, and from between the hall and the altar, the words of Rabbi Shimon ben Nanas. Rabbi Akiva says: from any place where karet is incurred for entering intentionally and a sin-offering for entering in error from there it must be removed, and from any other place they cover it with a large pot. Rabbi Shimon says: wherever the sages have permitted you anything they have only given you what is really yours, since they have only permitted you that which is forbidden as shevut. The second section of the mishnah deals with the question of from where must the creeping thing be removed if it is found in the Temple on Shabbat. The problem is that by removing the creeping thing he is moving something from one domain to another, which is a violation of carrying on Shabbat, although as we shall see below, it is only a rabbinic violation. According to Rabbi Shimon ben Nanas, it must be found from within the sanctuary and inwards. However, if it is found in the courtyard they cover it with a pot and leave it there until after Shabbat. Rabbi Akiva expands this area to include any area which makes a person liable for karet if he intentionally enters it impure and for a sin-offering if he unwittingly enters it impure. Practically speaking, this means that Rabbi Akiva includes the entire courtyard, from within the Nikanor Gate. According to both sages, if the creeping thing is found in another area, one from which it may not be removed, they cover it with a pot so that nothing comes into contact with it. Rabbi Shimon’s comment does not directly relate to this topic but is really a remark meant to complete all of tractate Shabbat and Eruvin, two tractates which are really only one. Rabbi Shimon explains that all of the leniencies which we have found strewn throughout the two tractates, cases where we thought something would be prohibited but the rabbis allowed one to do the action because there was some necessity, are only cases of the sages giving to the people what is really theirs. This means that the prohibition was only of rabbinic origin in the first place under certain circumstances the rabbis allow what they would otherwise prohibit. However, Rabbi Shimon is adamant that one not construe these leniencies as rabbis allowing one to abrogate or even circumnavigate toraitic law. It seems to me likely that Rabbi Shimon’s comment is directed at those who doubt the entire validity of eruvin what gives the rabbis the right to allow a person to carry from domain to domain on Shabbat, they ask. Rabbi Shimon responds that an eruv allows one to carry only in cases where the prohibition is only “derabanan” of rabbinic origin, and not cases which would be prohibited by toraitic law. Congratulations! We have finished Eruvin. It is a tradition at this point to thank God for helping us to finish learning the tractate and to commit ourselves to going back and relearning it, so that we may not forget it and so that its lessons will stay with us for all of our lives. Eruvin is known as one of the most difficult of tractates, its laws and rules are intricate and very precise. Perhaps in a more “midrashic” interpretation of the tractate, we saw how one builds a community by sharing a common meal and by sharing Shabbat together. While the Mishnah Yomit community does not eat together nor spend Shabbat together, I hope that our common Torah learning will serve us all as “spiritual food” (I hope I’m not surprising you all too much by becoming so “mushy”.) In any case, for those of you who stuck with it and made it through this difficult material, a hearty Yasher Koach. May you have the strength and time to keep on learning more Mishnah! Tomorrow we begin Pesahim." + ] + ] + ] + }, + "schema": { + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה עירובין", + "enTitle": "English Explanation of Mishnah Eruvin", + "key": "English Explanation of Mishnah Eruvin", + "nodes": [ + { + "heTitle": "הקדמה", + "enTitle": "Introduction" + }, + { + "heTitle": "", + "enTitle": "" + } + ] + } +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Moed/English Explanation of Mishnah Eruvin/English/merged.json b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Moed/English Explanation of Mishnah Eruvin/English/merged.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..0b6dec16b8fc95b72f47bedd86374b978f50416e --- /dev/null +++ b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Moed/English Explanation of Mishnah Eruvin/English/merged.json @@ -0,0 +1,595 @@ +{ + "title": "English Explanation of Mishnah Eruvin", + "language": "en", + "versionTitle": "merged", + "versionSource": "https://www.sefaria.org/English_Explanation_of_Mishnah_Eruvin", + "text": { + "Introduction": [ + "Tractate Eruvin is a continuation of tractate Shabbat. Most of Eruvin deals with the different types of domains: public, private and two in-between domains, which we shall explain when they appear. The categorization of property into different domains is relevant for the laws of carrying. The tractate also deals with the borders outside of a city which one may not go past on Shabbat. ", + "In order to understand Eruvin it is helpful to understand how a typical city was structured in the mishnaic period. Houses shared a courtyard, each house opening up to a courtyard. Alleys connected several courtyards to the public areas, and there were two different types of alleys, a closed one (mavoy satum) and an open one (mavoy mefulash). A closed alley opened to the public domain on only one side, whereas an open alley was open on both sides. ", + "Our tractate will deal with two different types of “eruvin”. Literally “eruv” means to mix something. This meaning will become apparent as we learn what an eruv is. According to Torah law (deoraita) it is permitted to carry something out of a house and bring it into a courtyard and vice versa. Similarly, one may, according to Torah law, carry something from a courtyard into a closed alley, provided that the open end of the alley had either a sidepost (lehi) or a beam (korah) over its top. The pole and the beam serve symbolically to close off the alley such that it is in reality closed from three sides and symbolically closed from the fourth. ", + "The sages feared that if they allowed carrying from the courtyard or closed alley or house into one of the other of these areas (for instance from their house into the courtyard), people would forget and they would also carry into the public domain. Therefore they forbade this unless one set up an “eruv”. An “eruv” is a meal shared by all of the members of the courtyard, which turns the courtyard into a fictional private domain. Similarly, if they wanted to carry in the closed alley, all of the members of the alley had to share in a meal set up in one of the houses. The eruv for the courtyard is called “the courtyard eruv” (eruvei hatzerot) and the alley eruv is called “alley partnerships” (shitufei mevuot). Tractate Eruvin deals with the details of how these eruvin work.", + "The second (or really third) type of eruv is the “border eruv” (eruvei techumin). On Shabbat it is forbidden for a person to go more than 2000 cubits outside of the place where he is when Shabbat began. However, if he is in a city, he may travel freely anywhere within that city, no matter how large it is. The 2000 cubits are counted from outside of the city. This halakhah is learned from Exodus 16:29-30, “‘Let everyone remain where he is; let no one leave his place on the seventh day.’ So the people remained inactive on the seventh day.” “His place” is defined by the rabbis as his city, and not merely his house. The border of two thousand cubits is derived midrashically from Numbers 35:5, a verse which deals with the fields surrounding the Levite cities. ", + "If a person needs to go beyond the Shabbat border for the purposes of a commandment, for instance to learn Torah or for a circumcision, the rabbis allowed him to set up an eruv that would allow him to extend that distance by another 2000 cubits. What he would do is put a meal someplace within his border and then from that point he could walk another 2000 cubits. If, for instance, he were to put his meal 2000 cubits outside the city, he could then walk 4000 cubits on Shabbat. However, if he does so, on the other side of the city he can not walk out at al. The 2000 cubits on the one side means that his border is at that point and therefore he can’t walk out at all on the other side of the city. However, if he left it 1000 cubits outside of the city on one side, he could then walk 3000 cubits on that side and 1000 cubits on the other side. Our tractate deals extensively with the details these laws as well." + ], + "": [ + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThe first mishnah in Eruvin deals with the entrance to a closed alley. As we mentioned in the introduction, Torah law allows one to carry within this alley. However, the sages forbade this unless there is either a side-post or a cross-beam on top of the entrance. The purpose of either the side-post or the cross-beam was so that people would recognize that the alley was not a public domain and they would realize that while it is permitted to carry in the alley, it is forbidden to carry in the public domain.", + "[The crossbeam] of an alley [whose entrance] is more than twenty cubits high should be lowered. Rabbi Judah says: this is unnecessary. The crossbeam cannot be more than twenty cubits high, otherwise people will not notice it. This is the same rule as the sukkah the sukkah’s roof (skhakh) cannot be more than twenty cubits high because people should notice that they are sitting in a sukkah. In both cases, that of the crossbeam and the sukkah, Rabbi Judah rules that they may be more than twenty cubits high.", + "And [any entrance] that is wider than ten cubits should be reduced [in width]. An entrance to an alley may not be more than ten cubits wide for it to be allowed to carry within the alley. If it is more than ten cubits, then it’s not truly an entranceway but a gap in the walls of the alley. If it is more than ten cubits wide he can reduce it in order to carry in the alley.", + "But if it has the shape of a doorway there is no need to reduce it even though it is wider than ten cubits. If the opening has the shape of a doorway, meaning there are poles on both sides and a beam on top of it, then it looks like an entrance and it may be wider than ten cubits. According to the Rambam, if it has such an opening, the beam may even be more than twenty cubits high." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn this mishnah Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel debate how one validates an alley such that it is permitted to carry within it.", + "There are two levels of debates in this mishnah. There is a debate between Bet Shammai, Bet Hillel and R. Eliezer about how one validates an alley. The second debate is between Rabbi Ishmael, as presented by one of his students, and Rabbi Akiva over what was the actual dispute between Bet Hillel and Bet Shammai.", + "The validation of an alley: Bet Shammai says: a side-post and a crossbeam. And Bet Hillel says: either a side-post or a crossbeam. R. Eliezer says: two side-posts. In this version, Bet Shammai says that the alley must have the side-post and a crossbeam in order to carry in it, whereas Bet Hillel says that either is sufficient. Rabbi Eliezer says that the crossbeam is irrelevant and that what are needed are two side-posts.", + "In the name of Rabbi Ishmael one student stated in front of Rabbi Akiva: Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel did not disagree concerning an alley that was less than four cubits [in width], that it [may be validated] by either a side-post or a crossbeam. About what did they disagree? In the case of one that was wider than four, and narrower than ten cubits: Bet Shammai says: both a side-post and a crossbeam [are required] and Bet Hillel says: either a side-post or a crossbeam. Rabbi Akiva said they disagree about both cases. In this statement, a student of Rabbi Ishmael’s comes in front of Rabbi Akiva to present a more limited version of the debate. According to this version, both houses agree that if the alley is less than four cubits wide, either a side-post or crossbeam is sufficient. Probably the reason that Bet Shammai agrees in this case is that if the entrance is narrower it is clearer that this is not a public domain. The debate is only when the entrance is between four and ten cubits wide. Rabbi Akiva rejects this version and rules that in both cases, Bet Hillel and Bet Shammai disagree. The first section of the mishnah is therefore representative of Rabbi Akiva’s position. As an aside, we can learn a fair amount of rabbinic history from this mishnah. Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Ishmael were the heads of competing academies, some time in the early part of the second century CE. Both academies produced midrashic compilations that while similar to each, have notable differences. This mishnah is one indicator that Rabbi Akiva’s academy became more dominant, perhaps especially so after Rabbi Ishmael’s demise. Rabbi Ishmael’s students come in front of Rabbi Akiva to see if their traditions are acceptable in his eyes. This is a sign of their turning to his authority, probably after their own master’s death. Rabbi Akiva rejects the Ishmaelian tradition and the anonymous piece which opens the mishnah is taught according to Rabbi Akiva. Indeed, the Mishnah is a work produced by the Akivan academy, a work in which Akiva’s students, most notably Rabbis Judah, Meir, Shimon and Yose dominate." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses the size of the cross-beam about which Bet Hillel and Bet Shammai debated in yesterday’s mishnah.", + "The cross-beam of which they spoke must be wide enough to hold a small brick (, a small brick which is half of a regular brick, the size of three handbreadths. The width of the cross-beam must be one and half handbreadths, in order to support an “ariah”, a half-brick, which would, at least potentially, be placed on top of it.", + "It is enough for the cross-beam to be one handbreadth wide in order to hold the width of a small brick. The length of the cross-beam need only be one handbreadth. This way when the brick is placed on the cross-beam there will be a little space on each side (a finger on each side), where they can put the mortar to attach the brick to the beam. Even if the cross-beam is not actually attached to the brick, at least it looks as if it will be. This lends it more of an air of permanence." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is a direct continuation of yesterday’s mishnah, in which we learned that the cross-beam needs to be wide enough to support a half-brick.", + "Wide enough to hold a half-brick but also strong enough to support such a half-brick. Rabbi Judah says: wide enough, even though it is not strong enough. In this mishnah there is a debate whether or not the cross-beam must actually be strong enough to support the half-brick, or whether it is sufficient for it to merely look big enough. According to the first opinion, the cross-beam must actually be strong enough, whereas Rabbi Judah holds that is must only be wide enough, but not actually strong enough." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is a continuation of Rabbi Judah’s words from yesterday’s mishnah. Rabbi Judah held that the cross-beam need not actually be strong enough to support a half-brick.", + "If [the cross-beam] was made of straw or reeds, we look at it as if it was of metal. If the cross-beam was made of a material which could not hold a half-brick, Rabbi Judah considers it nevertheless as if it was strong enough to do so.", + "[If it was] curved we look at it as if it were straight. If it was curved, it also could not hold a half-brick. Nevertheless, Rabbi Judah holds that it is valid.", + "[If it was] round we look at it as if it were square. Whatever has a circumference of three handbreadths has a diameter of one handbreadth. Again, a round cross-beam could not hold a half-brick. However, it still must be wide enough to hold a one handbreadth half-brick. In order for this to be true, it must have a circumference of three handbreadths (the rabbis knew that pi was roughly three to one, and they knew that this was not exact)." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe mishnah now begins to talk about side-posts (see mishnayot one and two) and their minimum measurements.", + "The side-posts of which they spoke [must be no less than] ten hand-breadths in height, but their width and thickness may be of any size whatsoever. Rabbi Yose says: their width [must be no less than] three handbreadths. The only size requirement for the side-posts is that they be at least ten handbreadths high (about a meter). This is the minimum measurement for most things that need to be a certain height. For instance a sukkah must be ten handbreadths high. The mishnah uses the plural form of “side-posts” even though Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel require only one side-post, to teach that even those who follow Rabbi Eliezer, who does require two side-posts must still make them ten handbreadths high. According to the first opinion in the mishnah, there is no minimum measurement for their width and thickness. Rabbi Yose holds that they must be at least three handbreadths wide, a size worthy of actually serving as doorposts." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses the material which can be used to make the side-posts.", + "One may make the side-posts out of anything, even something that is alive. But Rabbi Yose prohibits this. According to the first opinion, one may use even an animal to make the side-post. The animal would have to be tied in place, so that it couldn’t wander away. Similarly, one can, according to some opinions, use an animal to make a wall of a sukkah. We have seen several similarities between the laws of setting up the cross-beam and side-post and the sukkah. Rabbi Yose prohibits using an animal, lest it dies and become less than the required ten handbreadths high.", + "It also causes defilement as the covering of a tomb, But Rabbi Meir makes pure. If one used an animal to cover a tomb, the animal will convey ritual defilement, as do all coverings of tombs. The tomb described here was not in the ground, as tombs usually are today, but a cave in the side of a hill. The animal must be tied to the tomb in order for it to be considered a tomb covering. Rabbi Meir holds that anything that is alive cannot transmit impurity if used as a tomb covering. Therefore, one who touches an animal used to cover a tomb is still pure.", + "One may write on them gittin, But Rabbi Yose the Galilean declares it unfit. One can write a get on animal, for instance on the horn of a cow, and then divorce one’s wife by giving her the cow (see Gittin 2:3). Rabbi Yose the Galilean says that such a get is invalid because it is not like a scroll, specifically mentioned as the divorce document in Deuteronomy 24:3." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with the conditions under which members of a traveling caravan may carry.", + "If a caravan camped in a valley and it was surrounded by the instruments used for the cattle it is permissible to move objects within it, provided [the instruments] form a fence ten handbreadths high and the gaps do not exceed the built-up parts. Any gap which is wider than ten cubits it is permitted [to carry within], because it is like an entrance. If it is greater, it is forbidden [to carry within]. A valley is considered neither a public domain (since a true public domain is only one which is used as a public thoroughfare), nor is it a private domain. It is called by the rabbis a “karmelit” and it is forbidden by rabbinic ordinance (derabbanan) to carry within one. However, if the caravan which finds itself on Shabbat in a valley sets up there a makeshift fence by using the instruments used in caring for the cattle, they may carry within this area, if several conditions are met. First of all, the instruments must be ten handbreadths high to be considered a “fence.” This is because walls must be ten handbreadths high. Second, the gaps between the instruments cannot be greater than the area covered by the instruments. In other words, more must be closed than open. Thirdly, there can be no gap greater than ten cubits. A ten or less cubit gap can be considered an entrance to this enclosed area. More than that cannot be considered an entrance and thus turns the entire area into an unfenced area. This is true even if the total area closed by the instruments is greater than the gaps. However, if they put up two side-posts and a crossbeam over a more than ten cubit gap, this would turn the gap into an entrance and it would become permitted to carry within the area." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn yesterday’s mishnah we learned that a caravan that finds itself on Shabbat in a valley (which really just means any uninhabited area) may surround themselves with their cattle instruments to form a makeshift fence which allows them to carry within the fenced-in area. One condition for this fence to be effective was that the closed part would be larger than the open gaps in this “fence”. Our mishnah discusses another way of making a fence, one that requires even less material.\nIn order to understand this mishnah we need to understand the principle of “levud”. This principle means that an open area of less than three handbreadths can be treated as if it was actually closed. We shall see below how this works in our context. When we learn Sukkah, we shall see that one can hang the sukkah’s walls down from the top and as long as they fall to within three handbreadths of the ground the sukkah is valid because a less than three handbreadth gap is treated as if it legally does not exist.", + "They may surround [the caravan] by three ropes, this one above this one, and this one above this one, provided that [the space] between the one rope and the other is less than three handbreadths. The size of the ropes [must be such] that their [total] thickness is more than a handbreadth, so that the total height is ten handbreadths. The mishnah says that they may encircle their encampment with three ropes, one above the other, to form a fence. Each rope should not be more than three handbreadths apart from the rope on top of it. This way there is no gap in the fence of three handbreadths or more, and as we learned above, a gap of less than three handbreadths can legally be considered to be closed. The total thickness of the ropes must be greater than one handbreadth, so that the caravan is left with a “fence” ten handbreadths high. To summarize, the caravan has a ten handbreadths high wall, up to nine of which is in reality empty space and a little over one of which is made up of rope. Even though in this fence the gaps are certainly greater than the closed part, it is effective because all of gaps are less than three handbreadths and therefore don’t legally exist." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to deal with setting up a partition around an encampment so that one may carry within the encampment.", + "They may also surround [the camp] with reeds, provided there is no [gap of] three handbreadths between one reed and the next. Yesterday we learned that they can set up a partition around the encampment by encircling it with three ropes, so long as there are no more than three handbreadths between each rope. Today we see how a partition can be set up horizontally. This is done by setting up reeds (poles) around the encampment. Between each reed there can be no more than three handbreadths, for less than three handbreadths is an amount that is legally considered as if it doesn’t exist.", + "[The rabbis] spoke only of a caravan, the words of Rabbi Judah. But the sages say that they only spoke of a caravan because it is a usual occurrence. So far these mishnayot have only been speaking about surrounding a caravan with a partition. The rabbis now debate whether the same type of partition may be used in other cases as well. According to Rabbi Judah, the previous mishnayot relate only to the situation of a caravan. An individual stuck out in an uninhabited place for Shabbat would have to make a partition of both horizontal and vertical pieces in order to carry within. The other sages disagree and rule that the previous mishnayot mentioned the encamped caravan only because that was a normal situation. The same rules would apply to other situations as well.", + "Any partition that is not [made up of] both vertical and horizontal [pieces] is not a valid partition, the words of Rabbi Yose bar Judah. But the sages say: one of the two [is sufficient]. Rabbi Yose disagrees with his father who held that for the caravan a partition of either horizontal ropes or vertical reeds is sufficient. Rabbi Yose holds that a partition that does not have both is not a valid partition, neither for an individual nor for a caravan. The sages continue to rule that a partition can be set up with either vertical or horizontal pieces, as we learned in the previous mishnayot. Both are not necessary.", + "They exempted four obligations [to soldiers] in an encampment: They may bring wood from anywhere; they are exempt from the washing of the hands, and from [separating tithes from] doubtfully tithed produce ( and from the setting up an eruv. There are four ways in which the rabbis were lenient with regard to the rules governing soldiers in an encampment. Note that these rules do not apply specifically to Shabbat; only the last one refers to Shabbat. First of all, they may bring wood from anywhere they find it and it is not considered stealing. Second, they need not wash their hands before eating. Third, if they are eating doubtfully tithed produce (demai), they need not tithe it. Tithing demai is only a rabbinic obligation and hence there is space to be lenient. Fourth, to carry from tent to tent within the encampment, they do not need to set up an eruv (a communal meal). A partition surrounding the encampment is sufficient, as we have learned." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nA well ten handbreadths deep which is found in the public domain is considered to be a private domain, and hence one is not allowed to draw water from the well on Shabbat. Our mishnah teaches that the rabbis allowed people to make a special arrangement around the well so that they could draw water from the well on Shabbat.", + "They may make posts for wells, [by setting up] four corner-pieces that have the appearance of eight [single posts], the words of Rabbi Judah. Rabbi Meir says: eight that have the appearance of twelve, four corner-pieces and four single [posts]. The rabbis said that around the well they could set up a pseudo-fence, one which would prevent the area from being a public domain but still allow easy access. According to Rabbi Judah, this is done by setting up corner-posts at each of four corners. Each corner post would have two pieces of wood set at a right angle so that it would look as if there were four walls. Rabbi Meir says that it is not sufficient for there to be four corner-posts. There must also be four single pieces around each side. These form pseudo-walls which give the structure more of an appearance of a fenced in area.", + "Their height must be ten handbreadths, their width six, and their thickness [may be] of any size whatsoever. The height of the posts must be ten handbreadths in order for them to constitute a separate domain. Their width must be six handbreaths, which makes a cubit. There thickness is not important.", + "Between them [there may be] as much [space as to admit] two teams of three oxen each, the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Judah says: [two teams] of four [oxen each] . [These teams being] tied together and not untied, [enough for] one to enter while the other goes out. In between the posts they can leave room for cattle to come in and out and drink from water drawn from the well. It was necessary for the cattle to come into the area because it was forbidden to take the water out from the area and bring it into the public domain. Again, the sages debate how much space may be left between the posts. According to Rabbi Meir, they may leave enough room for two teams of three cattle to enter and exit. In the Talmud it is explained that each cow is a cubit and two-thirds thick, making a total of 10 cubits. Rabbi Judah is again more lenient and allows a gap large enough for two teams of four cows, which adds up to 13 1/3 cubits. The end of the mishnah notes that these teams of cattle are to be tied to each other, and not walking separately. When they are untied the distance between them is even greater. Furthermore, the reference is not to two teams entering simultaneously, but rather to one team coming in and one going out. This is slightly larger than two teams of cattle going in the same direction." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues yesterday’s discussion of the enclosure around the well. Yesterday we talked about the posts set up to enclose the space. Today we talk about the proximity of the posts to the well itself.", + "It is permitted to bring [the posts] close to the well, provided that a cow’s head and the greater part of its body can be within [the enclosure] when drinking. Some people might not want to make the enclosure to large since a large enclosure would overly interfere with the passing traffic in the public domain. The mishnah allows them to bring the posts in close to the well as long as a single cow can fit its head and most of its body within the enclosure when drinking. The Talmud explains that this is two cubits. More than this amount and there may be a problem of carrying from the private domain to the public domain.", + "It is permitted to remove [the posts] to any [distance] provided one increases the posts. They can move the posts as far away from the well as they wish, as long as they increase the number or size of posts so that there remains no gap greater than either 10 cubits (Rabbi Meir) or 13 1/3 cubits (Rabbi Judah), as explained in yesterday’s mishnah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn yesterday’s mishnah we saw that there is no limit to how large the enclosure around the well may be, so long as the gaps are kept to a certain minimum. In today’s mishnah, which is a direct continuation of yesterday’s, we will learn that this was the opinion of the sages whereas Rabbi Judah disagrees.", + "Rabbi Judah says: [the enclosure may be only] as large as two bet se'ah. They said to him: they only prescribed [the limit of] two beth se’ah for a garden or a karpaf only, but if [the enclosure] was a pen, or sahar, a backyard or courtyard even if it is five or ten bet kor, it is permitted. And it is permitted to remove [the posts] to any [distance] provided one increases the posts. Rabbi Judah limits the size of the enclosure to two bet se’ah, which means a piece of land upon which one can grow enough wheat to produce a se’ah of grain. This is about 5000 square cubits (about 50 meters by 25 meters), the size of the mishkan (the tabernacle). The other sages respond to Rabbi Judah that the measure of 5000 square cubits does not apply to the halakhah about the enclosure surrounding a well, but rather applies to a garden or a karpaf, neither of which are enclosed as living spaces but rather to keep out animals or thieves. A karpaf is a large field behind a house or a courtyard or outside of a city which has been enclosed so that it can store wood. Since these are fenced in only to keep things out and not to keep things in, they have a relatively small minimum measurement. In contrast, things which are enclosed for those things which inhabit them, such as a pen, a sahar (a pen in the field to keep in the flocks), a backyard or a courtyard can be even the size of five or even ten bet kor. A kor is 30 se’ah, so this measure is significantly larger. The final clause of the mishnah is a repeat of the last clause in yesterday’s mishnah. Since the enclosure of a well is also enclosed for the use of those who wish to drink the water in the well, it to may be as large as one wants it to be. In summary, according to the sages there is a simple rule: if it is enclosed as a living space for either people or animals, the enclosure may be as large as one wants it to be. If it is enclosed to protect something stored inside, then the limit is two bet se’ah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first section of this mishnah deals with a situation where a public road cuts through the enclosure around the well. The second section, which is the conclusion to the Mishnah’s discussion of this enclosure, teaches which types of wells and cisterns may be surrounded with this type of enclosure.", + "Rabbi Judah says: if a public road cuts through them it should be diverted to one side; But the sages say: this is not necessary. By surrounding the well with a pseudo-fence, the area is transformed from a public domain to a non-public domain (although not necessarily a private domain). According to Rabbi Judah, if a public road cuts through the enclosure, it would remain a public domain, because the fence surrounding the enclosure is not a full fence. In such a situation it would be forbidden to draw water from the well on Shabbat. Therefore, the public road must be diverted. The sages say that this is not necessary since there is a fence surrounding the area. Even though this fence does not fully surround the area, it is sufficient such that the fact that the public uses the road does not nullify it.", + "Both for a public cistern, a public well as well as a private well, they may make [an enclosure] of posts, but for a private cistern, they must make a partition ten handbreadths high, the words of Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Judah ben Baba says: they make [an enclosure] of posts for a public well only while for the others they must make a belt ten handbreadths high. A well is a structure through which one draws water from an underground spring. A cistern is filled with rain water or water drawn from an aqueduct. According to Rabbi Akiva they may make the above-described enclosure around all of these structures on Shabbat so that they can draw water, with the exception of a private cistern. The reason that this type of enclosure may not be made around a private well is that the water may dry up on Shabbat. The fence around the enclosure is a special rabbinic enactment which permits carrying only while there is water in the well/cistern. The waters of a well will not dry up. Furthermore, since this cistern is owned by a private individual, she/he may forget that it is forbidden to carry into the public domain. At a publicly-owned cistern people will remind each other that this is forbidden. Rabbi Judah ben Baba says that this enactment applies only to a publicly-owned well. It does not apply to cisterns, and even public ones, because their water may dry up. It does not apply to a private well because at a private well an individual may forget that it is forbidden to carry from the private domain to the public domain. In order to draw water from a public cistern or a private well or cistern they have to rope the entire area off." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn mishnah three we learned that the maximum size of a garden or karpaf (enclosed area for storing wood) within which one may carry on Shabbat is two bet se’ah, or 5000 square cubits, the size of the mishkan (tabernacle) which was 100 cubits by 50 cubits. Our mishnah discusses a square garden or karpaf.", + "Rabbi Judah ben Bava further said: a garden or a karpaf whose [area does not exceed] seventy cubits and a fraction by seventy cubits and a fraction, which is surrounded by a fence ten handbreadths high, it is permitted to carry within it, provided there is in it a watchman’s hut or a dwelling place or it is near to a town. If the garden or karpaf is square its sides can be 70 and a fraction cubits long. Most commentators consider this “fraction” to be up to 2/3. 70 2/3 squared is 4993 7/9, a number pretty close to the maximum 5000 (the square root of 5000 is 70.71...). Other commentators reckon the exact fraction slightly differently. Rabbi Judah ben Bava also requires that the garden or karpaf be at least partially enclosed to serve as living quarters (see mishnah three). If it has a watchman’s hut, or is used even temporarily as a dwelling place he may carry witin it. Additionally, if it is close enough to town (within 2000 cubits, the Shabbat limit see introduction) then he frequently goes there and it is as if he lives in it. If it does not meet these requirements Rabbi Judah ben Bava forbids carrying there.", + "Rabbi Judah says: even if it contained only a cistern, a ditch or a cave it is permitted to carry within it. According to Rabbi Judah, in order to be allowed to carry in the garden or karpaf they need not serve as dwelling places, but they must have been enclosed to serve some purpose for human beings (and not just to store things). A cistern and a ditch are used to collect rain water and a cave protects a person from the hot sun.", + "Rabbi Akiva says: even if it contained none of these it is permitted to carry within it, provided its area [does not exceed] seventy cubits and a fraction by seventy cubits and a fraction. Rabbi Akiva says that as long as the karpaf or garden do not exceed the maximum size, it is permitted to carry within them, no matter what they are used for.", + "Rabbi Eliezer says: if its length exceeded its breadth even by a single cubit it is not permitted to carry within it. Rabbi Eliezer says that one can only carry in a square karpaf or garden and not in a rectangular one.", + "Rabbi Yose says: even if its length is twice its breadth it is permitted to carry within it. Rabbi Yose says that the garden and karpaf can be rectangular or square. They can even be more rectangular than the mishkan, whose length was twice its width (100 x 50 cubits)." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn this mishnah Rabbi Ilai transmits three halakhot in the name of Rabbi Eliezer, the first two dealing with the topic of eruvin and the third dealing with the identification of bitter herbs for Pesach. The structure of this mishnah is similar to that which we encountered in tractate Eduyot mishnayot were ordered by names of the sages and not by topic.", + "Rabbi Ilai said: I heard from Rabbi Eliezer, even if it is as large as a bet kor. According to this tradition, Rabbi Eliezer allows carrying within a garden or karpaf even if it is large enough to sow a kor of produce. A kor is 30 se’ah, and a bet kor is 75,000 square cubits. Rabbi Eliezer allows carrying here even if the area is not designated to serve as a living space, as long as it has a proper partition.", + "I also heard from him that if one of the residents of a courtyard forgot to join in the eruv, his house is forbidden to him for taking in or taking out any object but it is permitted to them. In subsequent chapters we will learn that in order for residents who share a courtyard to carry from their homes to the courtyard (and vice versa), they must set up an eruv, which consists of a common meal. If one of the people did not participate in setting up the eruv (meaning he did not help pay for the meal) then it is generally forbidden for everyone to carry from their homes into the courtyard since all of those who own the courtyard did not participate in the eruv. In other words since he partly owns the courtyard but did not participate in the eruv, others cannot carry in and out of the courtyard since all of the courtyard’s owners did not participate in the eruv. The Talmud explains that in the case described by the mishnah, the person who did not share in the eruv annuls his partial ownership of the courtyard, thereby granting those who did participate in the eruv full ownership over the courtyard. In such a case, all of the other people who share the courtyard may carry from their homes to the courtyard and even from his home to the courtyard, since he annulled his ownership. However, he may not carry from his home to the courtyard because that would look like he is retracting his annulment, an act which would make carrying forbidden. He may nevertheless carry from their homes to the courtyard since he is like a guest at their homes, and guests rely on the eruv of their hosts.", + "I also heard from him that people may fulfill their duty [for bitter herbs] at Pesach by eating hart’s tongue (. “Akrevanim” is a type of herb, which according to this tradition, may be used as bitter herbs on Pesach. The mishnah in tractate Pesachim does not list this herb as a possibility. Albeck identifies it as scolopendrium (hart’s tongue), which is a type of fern.", + "I went round among all his disciples seeking a fellowstudent but I found none. Rabbi Ilai did not find any other students who corroborated these traditions. This mishnah provides an interesting glimpse of how the oral tradition worked. Students would seek other students who had the same traditions and thereby strengthen their own certainty with regard to what their masters had taught them." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah begins to discuss how one sets up an eruv (either for a courtyard or to extend the Shabbat border) or shittuf mavoi (alleyway partnership). An “eruv” refers to the common meal shared by those who share a courtyard and a “shittuf mavoi” is the common meal shared by those who share an alleyway. An “eruv” can also refer to a meal set up at the end of the limit where one can go on Shabbat, so that one can go another 2000 cubits. For more info, see in the introduction.", + "With all [kinds of food] they may make an ‘eruv and a shittuf, except water and salt. Any type of food may be used to constitute the meal for an eruv or for a shittuf. An eruv refers to either a courtyard eruv or a Shabbat border eruv. A shittuf refers to the alleyway partnership. The only exception is salt and water which do not count as food.", + "And all [kinds of food] may be purchased with money of the second tithe, except water and salt. Second tithe is redeemed by its owners with money, the money is brought to Jerusalem and there it is used to buy food. It cannot be used to buy non-food products. We should note that food includes drink. However, as in the previous section, it does not include salt and water.", + "One who vowed to abstain from food is allowed [to consume] both water and salt. If a person vowed to abstain from eating, he may still drink water and eat salt because neither is considered food.", + "An eruv may be prepared for a nazirite with wine and for an Israelite with terumah, But Symmachus says: with unconsecrated produce only. Although a nazirite cannot have wine and an Israelite cannot have terumah, both may use them to make their eruv, since other Jews can eat them. We see from here that the meal is symbolic. It does not have to be edible by the one who sets it up, it just has to be food that can be eaten by a Jew. Symmachus disagrees and holds that the eruv must be edible by those who participate in it. Therefore, an Israelite cannot use terumah as his eruv. However, a nazirite can still use wine since it is possible for him to ask a sage to release him from his nazirite vow. In other words, the prohibition of terumah to Israelites is immutable while the prohibition of wine to any given nazirite is not.", + "[An eruv may be prepared] for a priest in a bet hapras. Rabbi Judah says: even in a cemetary, because he can put up a partition and thus enter [the area] and eat [his eruv]. A bet hapras is a place that used to have a grave in it and now has been plowed over. It is rabbinically prohibited for a priest to enter such a place, lest there be a bone that remains or was spread out somewhere in the vicinity. However, in some ways the rabbis were lenient with the laws governing a bet hapras, since the prohibition is not toraitic. One of these leniencies is that a priest’s eruv may be set up there. This eruv refers to a Shabbat border eruv (eruv tehumin), since a bet hapras would not be within the courtyard or alley. Rabbi Judah is even more lenient and allows the priest’s eruv to be set up in an actual cemetery. This is because the priest can set up a partition to get to his eruv." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first section of this mishnah deals with foods that may or may not be used to set up an eruv.\nThe second section deals with sending an eruv (a meal) with an agent.", + "They may make an eruv with demai (doubtfully tithed, or with first tithe from which terumah had been taken, or with second tithe or consecrated [food] that have been redeemed; and priests [may make their eruv] with hallah and terumah. [It may] not [be prepared], with untithed produce, nor with first tithe from which terumah has not been taken, nor with second tithe or consecrated [food] that have not been redeemed. All of the things listed in this section are not completely prohibited, at least not by the Torah. Demai is doubtfully tithed produce, which may be given to poor people. First tithe may be eaten by Levites, once the terumah has been removed and given to the priest. Once second tithe and consecrated food are redeemed they may be eaten (the money is taken to Jerusalem and used their to buy food). Priests may use hallah and terumah to make their eruv. Hallah refers to the separated dough that Israelites must give to priests. In yesterday’s mishnah we learned that all people may make their eruv from terumah and not just priests. This seemingly contradicts today’s mishnah which specifies that only priests may use terumah, since only they can eat it. There are two answers to this problem: 1) priests commonly use terumah to make their eruv. 2) Mishnah Pesahim 2:5, a mishnah which deals with the types of grains which can be used for matzah, contains the exact same line. There it can refer only to priests, since Israelites could not eat terumah. Our mishnah copied the list from that mishnah. The list that follows is of foods which may not be consumed by anyone. Since no one can eat these things, they may not be used in making an eruv.", + "This section deals with a person who sends an agent to set up an eruv (meaning a meal) at the end of his Shabbat border, that is 2000 cubits outside of the city, or wherever else he may be. The mishnah teaches that if the person sent it with a deaf-mute, an imbecile or a minor, the eruv cannot be relied upon. According to the rabbis, these people lack the intelligence which is necessary to have the proper intention to set up an eruv. He also cannot send the eruv with someone who does not believe in the halakhic viability of eruvin, since that person will obviously not intend to set up a proper eruv. However, if he sends it with one of these people in order to bring it to someone else who will actually set up the eruv, then the eruv is valid. We should note that this mishnah alludes to people who deny the validity of eruvin. The Talmud comments that this is a reference to the Samaritans who took the Exodus 16:29, “no man should leave his place” literally. This is a classic case where we can see that not all Jews in the time of the Mishnah accepted rabbinic midrash and that there were those who read the Bible far more literally than did the rabbis." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with an eruv that was put somewhere where he might not be able to retrieve it. To help in understanding this mishnah I should explain that the eruv must be accessible and existent at twilight (between sunset and darkness) when Shabbat begins. This is the period in which an eruv is “set”. It is also a period in which it is halakhically doubtful whether it is Shabbat.", + "If he put [the eruv] in a tree above [a height] of ten handbreadths, his eruv is not valid; below ten handbreadths, his eruv is valid. This section refers to a person who put his eruv in a tree that stands in the public domain, and he intends to dwell underneath the tree for at least part of the Shabbat. If the tree is four handbreadths by four handbreadths and the eruv is ten handbreadths high, then the eruv is in a private domain, while he is in the public domain. He cannot take his eruv down from the tree for that would be carrying from a private domain to a public domain. The rule is that he and his eruv must be in the same place at twilight, so that he could get to it legally on Shabbat. If the eruv is below ten handbreadths, then it is in a “karmelit”, which is neither a public nor a private domain. It is still prohibited from rabbinic law to take something from a karmelit to another domain. However, when it comes to an eruv, it need only be in its place at twilight and the prohibition to carry at twilight is in itself only of rabbinic origin. Therefore, you have a rabbinically prohibited act which occurs only at a time where all prohibitions are only rabbinic. Hence, the halakhah can be lenient and allow him to retrieve his eruv. The eruv is therefore effective.", + "If he put it in a cistern, even if it is a hundred cubits deep, his eruv is valid. There are two explanations of this section. The Yerushalmi explains that the cistern is in the public domain but that he intends to actually dwell in the cistern on Shabbat, at least at twilight. Therefore, the eruv is effective. The Bavli explains that the cistern is in an area that is a karmelit. Hence, this is not a situation where he would be taking out from a private to a public domain, as we encountered in the first section. We cannot explain, however, that the cistern is in the public domain but that he wishes to dwell outside of the cistern at twilight, for then his eruv and he would be in different domains.", + "If he put it on the top of a reed or on the top of a pole, if it had been uprooted and then inserted in the ground, even though it was a hundred cubits high, the eruv is valid. This section discusses an eruv that was placed on top of a type of pole or reed. The pole is not four handbreadths wide, hence it does not constitute its own domain, as does the tree. Even if the pole is very high, it is still not a separate domain. If the pole or reed was detached from the ground, meaning it had been part of a tree but then he detached it and stuck it back in the ground, the eruv is valid. However, if the pole or reed is still attached to the ground, then the eruv is invalid, since we are concerned lest he might chop down part of the pole or reed to get to his eruv. Cutting down part of a plant attached to the ground is a violation of the laws of Shabbat.", + "If it he put it in a chest and the key was lost, the eruv is [nevertheless] valid. Rabbi Eliezer says: if he does not know that the key is in its place, the eruv is invalid. In this section, he puts the eruv into a chest, locks the chest and then loses the key. According to the first opinion, the eruv is still valid as long as he can break the chest and enter during twilight, the critical moment for establishing the eruv. Rabbi Eliezer holds that the chest may only be opened with the key. His ability to break the chest would not make the eruv valid. However, if he knows that the key is in certain place, but he can’t remember exactly where that place is, the eruv is valid, under the assumption that he will at some point remember. The eruv is invalid only if he thinks he truly lost the key." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses an eruv (a meal) which was set up before Shabbat but then something happened to it such that it became unattainable, inedible or in some other way invalid. The question is, is the eruv still effective?", + "[An eruv] which rolled away beyond the [Shabbat] limit, or a heap of stones fell on it, or was burnt, [or was] terumah and became impure: [If one of these occurred] while it was yet day, it is invalid, [But if it occurred] after it became the eruv is valid. The mishnah begins by describing situations where a Shabbat border eruv became invalid in some way. If it rolled away beyond the Shabbat limit, then he cannot get to it on Shabbat. If a heap of stones fell on it, he cannot uncover it because it is forbidden to clear a heap of stones on Shabbat. Obviously, if it is burnt there is nothing left to eat. Finally, if it was terumah and it became impure, it is forbidden to eat it. The mishnah now teaches that the validity of the eruv depends upon when one of these things happened. If the eruv was ruined before Shabbat began, when it was still Friday, the eruv is invalid, because it did not exist at twilight. If it was ruined after dark, the eruv is certainly valid, because it did exist at twilight.", + "If it is doubtful [when it occurred]: Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Judah say: this is a donkey-driver/camel driver. Rabbi Yose and Rabbi Shimon say: a doubtful eruv is valid. Rabbi Yose says: Avtulmos testified on the authority of five elders that a doubtful eruv is valid. The bigger problem is a situation in which we don’t know whether the eruv was valid at twilight. Probably, this is the most typical situation a person sets up an eruv before Shabbat and then checks it on Shabbat and sees that it has been ruined but does not know when it happened. Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Judah use a proverb to describe this situation he is like a camel driver and a donkey driver. A camel driver stands in front of the camel and pulls him along. A donkey driver stands behind the donkey and whips him to go forward faster. Someone who needs to drive both a camel and a donkey has a problem if he whips the donkey he’ll bump into the camel and if he pulls the camel he’ll go to fast for the donkey. All he can do is go at a medium pace between the two animals. This is the situation of one whose Shabbat border eruv may be invalid he loses in both directions. To remember, an effective Shabbat border eruv extends his Shabbat limit in one direction by 2000 cubits, but causes him to lose 2000 cubits in the other direction. If he sets it 2000 cubits to the west of the city, he can go 4000 cubits in that direction, but he can’t go any cubits to the east of the city. In our situation, let’s say he set up the eruv 2000 cubits to the west and then discovered that it was invalid but does not know when it occurred. He cannot go another 2000 cubits to the west because the eruv might be invalid. However, he also cannot go 2000 cubits to the east of the city (or any other direction) lest his eruv is valid. In other words, he loses in both directions. Rabbi Yose and Rabbi Shimon say that a doubtful eruv is effective. This is because it was known to be existent before Shabbat and was only known to be nonexistent after Shabbat started. We can presume that it existed until we know that it did not, and therefore, we can presume that it existed at twilight, the critical time. Rabbi Yose supplements his opinion with testimony provided by Avtulmos, who taught in the name of five elders, that the a doubtful eruv is valid." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with a person who puts an eruv on both sides of the town, because he doesn’t know whether he will need to go to the west or to the east. Normally, a person cannot make two eruvin and have them both be effective, because a person is considered to be where he left his eruv and he can’t be in both places. The mishnah teaches that there is a way of getting around this problem by making a stipulation.", + "A man may make a stipulation concerning his eruv and say, “If foreigners came from the east, let my eruv be that of the west; [if they came] from the west let my eruv be that of the east; if they came from both directions, I will go in whatever direction I desire; and if they came from neither direction I will be like the people of my town.” In this situation, he knows before Shabbat that foreigners may be coming and he wants to be able to run away from them to one of the sides of the town. However, he doesn’t know from which direction they will be coming, so he puts an eruv (a meal) in both directions. He then says, that if they come from the west, the valid eruv should be in the east and vice versa. If they come from both directions, then he may choose whichever eruv he wishes. Finally, if the foreigner doesn’t come after him, then he shall be like the other people in the city, who can go 2000 cubits in each direction without an eruv (2000 cubits is the Shabbat border). Note that this mishnah is not referring to a life or death situation, for in such a situation the rules would be suspended in any case.", + "[Likewise say,] “If a sage came from the east let my eruv be that of the east; if from the west let my eruv be that of the west; If he came from either direction I will go in whatever direction I desire; and if no one came from either direction I will be like the people of my town.” Rabbi Judah says: if one of them was his teacher he may go only to his teacher, but if both were his teachers he may go in whatever direction he prefers. In this situation, instead of foreigners coming to cause trouble, a sage is coming to give a derashah (expound upon the Torah) and he wants to go here the derashah. He may again make a stipulation which will allow him the flexibility to have an eruv in either direction. Rabbi Judah says that if one of the sages coming was his teacher, then he can only go to him. This is because we assume that he wishes to hear his teacher and hence only the eruv on that side of the city is effective. However if both are his teachers and they come from different directions he may choose freely between them." + ], + [ + "Introduction This mishnah deals with setting up a Shabbat border eruv for two consecutive days, one of which is Shabbat the other of which is a festival. As an aside, we learn in this mishnah that just as it is prohibited to go beyond the Shabbat border (2000 cubits) so too on a festival it is prohibited to go beyond the same distance. This is somewhat of an innovation for the verse in the Torah which implies that people must not travel refers only to Shabbat.", + "Rabbi Eliezer says: if a festival day immediately precedes or follows Shabbat a man may prepare two eruvs and make the following declaration: “my eruv for the first day is that of the east and for the second day is that of the west”; “the one for the first day is that of the west and the one for the second day is that of the east”; “my eruv is for the first day, and for the second day I will be as the people of my town”; or “my eruv is for the second day, and for the first day I will be as the people of my town”. Rabbi Eliezer allows one to make two separate eruvin, one for Shabbat and one for the festival. These two eruvin can function differently. That is to say each can work on opposite sides of the city. Alternatively, he can set up an eruv for one day and have it not be effective for the next day. Rabbi Eliezer holds that Shabbat and the festival are two distinct entities of holiness, and therefore he can set up two different eruvin.", + "But the sages say: he either prepares an eruv for one direction or none at all; he either prepares one eruv for the two days or none at all. The sages hold that it is impossible for a person to set up two different eruvin for two consecutive days. Either he sets up an eruv for both days, in which case he loses his ability to leave town on the side for which he did not set up an eruv, or he just doesn’t set up an eruv at all and is limited to going 2000 cubits outside of the city in each direction.", + "How should he act? He brings [the eruv] on the first day, he lets it get dark and then he takes it and goes away. On the second day [he again carries the eruv to the same place] and lets it grow dark and then he may eat it. He thus benefits both in his going and in [eating] his eruv. The sages now explain how one should set up an eruv if he wishes it to work for two days. What he needs to avoid is the eruv being eaten up before the second day begins, for this will mean that the eruv is not effective on the second day, as we shall learn in the next section. What he should do is take the eruv to wherever he wants it to be (assumedly 2000 cubits outside of the city so that he can later go another 2000 cubits from there) and make sure it is there at dusk on the eve of the first day. This is the time which “sets” the eruv, and it must be in place at this time. As long as it is there at this time, it need not remain there all day. Therefore, he may take it back with him into town, or anywhere he wants to go within the limit. At the second day, he should again make sure that the eruv is in the same place at dusk. Once it is there through dusk, he may eat it. In this way, he gets to extend his Shabbat limit and still eat his eruv (you can have your eruv and eat it too!).", + "If the eruv was eaten up on the first day it remains effective for the first day but not for the second. Rabbi Eliezer said to them: you do then agree with me that they are two distinct holinesses. Rabbi Eliezer now responds to the sages by saying that they have in essence admitted that the two days are distinct. He knows this because the sages agree that if he set up an eruv for the first day and it didn’t exist when the second day began, the eruv is not valid. If the sages agree that the two days are distinct entities of holiness, then they should agree that one could set up two different eruvin. If they weren’t then the eruv which was good for the first day should also be good for the second, even if it has been eaten up. The mishnah does not provide an answer from the sages. In the Talmud it is explained that the sages don’t know whether the two days are distinct or not, and therefore they are strict in both cases. They don’t allow two different eruvin to be set up, lest they are not distinct. On the other hand, they say that the eruv which was set up for the first day must exist on the second day lest they are distinct holinesses and the eruv for one is not effective for the other." + ], + [ + "Introduction In the time of the Mishnah, every Hebrew month had either 29 or 30 days, but people would not know before the end of the month how many days any given month had. This was decided by the testimony of witnesses who would come to the court in Jerusalem and testify that they had seen a new moon (we will learn about this in tractate Rosh Hashanah). Therefore, before the calendar was fully fixed, on the 28th day of a month, a person would not know if the next day will be Rosh Hodesh (the first of the month) or the last day of the preceding month. This was an especially significant problem on the last day of Elul, the month that precedes Rosh Hashanah. Until witnesses came one would not know if the next day was Rosh Hashanah or not. Our mishnah deals with the problem of setting up an eruv in such a situation.", + "Rabbi Judah says: [if on the eve of the] New Year a man was afraid that [the preceding month of Elul] might be intercalated, he may prepare two eruvs and make this declaration: “My eruv for the first day is that to the east and the one for the second day is that to the west”; “the one for the first day is that to the west and the one for the second day is that to the east”; “my eruv is for the first day, and for the second I shall be as the people of my town”; “my eruv is for the second day, and for the first I shall be as the people of my town.” The person described in this mishnah finds himself on the 28th of Elul, assuming that the next day is going to be Rosh Hashanah, but not knowing if the day after will also be Rosh Hashanah. If witnesses come the next day by a certain time, then it and it alone will be Rosh Hashanah, but if they do not come, then the following day will also be Rosh Hashanah. The problem therefore is how to set up an eruv for both days? Rabbi Judah says that he can treat these two days as if they were two separate entities of holiness, just as Rabbi Eliezer in yesterday’s mishnah said concerning the festival which precedes or comes after Shabbat.", + "But the sages did not agree with him. Just as the rabbis disagreed with Rabbi Eliezer in yesterday’s mishnah, so too they disagree with Rabbi Judah in this mishnah. They reason that the two days may be one entity of holiness, in which case one cannot set two separate eruvin for the two days. We should note that at a certain point during the mishnaic period it became fixed that Rosh Hashanah was two days, and to this day Jews all over the world, and even those in the land of Israel observe two days of Rosh Hashanah. The two days are considered to be one long day of kedushah (holiness) and therefore, one cannot set up two different eruvin for the two days. In contrast, the second day of festivals (second day of Yom Tov) is only observed in the Diaspora. Where this second day is observed, one may set up two different eruvin for the two days." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn yesterday’s mishnah we learned that according to Rabbi Judah, a person may make make two separate eruvin for the two days of Rosh Hashanah because they are distinct entities. In today’s mishnah we learn other halakhot concerning the two days of Rosh Hashanah, which Rabbi Judah considers to be two distinct days.", + "Rabbi Judah further said: a man may stipulate concerning a basket [of produce] on the first festival day [of Rosh Hashanah] and may then eat it on the second day, On the first day of Rosh Hashanah a person finds himself with a basket of produce from which terumah and tithes have not been separated. It is forbidden to eat the produce without separating the tithes and terumah but on Rosh Hashanah it is forbidden to separate them. Rabbi Judah offers a halakhic solution to this problem, one that would at least allow him to eat the produce on the second day. On the first day, he takes out the tithes and terumah and declares, “If today is not Rosh Hashanah and tomorrow is, then behold I am separating terumah and tithes for this produce. But if today is Rosh Hashanah, then my declaring these to be tithes and terumah is invalid.” On that day he cannot eat them, lest that day actually be Rosh Hashanah, in which case his declaration was invalid. The next day he again picks up the tithes and terumah and declares, “If today is Rosh Hashanah and yesterday was not, then behold I already separated them yesterday. And if today is not Rosh Hashanah and yesterday was, then behold I am now separating the tithes and terumah.” He may now eat the produce since he either separated yesterday (if yesterday was not Rosh Hashanah) or today (if today was not Rosh Hashanah.", + "And so also if an egg was laid on the first [festival] day it may be eaten on the second. One cannot eat an egg laid on a festival because it was not available to be eaten when the festival began. However, Rabbi Judah says that on the second day of Rosh Hashanah one could eat an egg laid on the first day. If the first day was really Rosh Hashanah, then he can eat it on the second day because Rosh Hashanah is over. If the second day is Rosh Hashanah then he can eat it then because it was laid before Rosh Hashanah began.", + "But the sages did not agree with him. Again the other rabbis disagree with Rabbi Judah and claim that the two days are not distinct, one being the actual Rosh Hashanah and the other not being Rosh Hashanah at all, but rather are to be treated as one long day. Therefore, things cannot be permitted on the second day if they were prohibited on the first." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn the previous mishnayot we learned that the sages and Rabbi Judah debate whether or not one day of Rosh Hashanah is the real day and the other is only observed because we don’t know which day Rosh Hashanah really is, or whether both days of Rosh Hashanah are treated as one extended day, neither of which is considered to be of doubtful status. In the final mishnah of this chapter we see that this debate has ramifications for the prayers recited as well.", + "Rabbi Dosa ben Harkinas says: the person who goes in front of the ark on [the first day of] of Rosh Hashanah says: “Strengthen us, o Lord our God, on this first day of the month, whether it be today or tomorrow”; and on the following day he says: ‘[Strengthen us...] whether it be today or yesterday.” But the sages did not agree with him. According to Rabbi Dosa ben Harkinas, in the prayers themselves one must include a mention of the fact that it is uncertain which day Rosh Hashanah really is. The prayer to which the mishnah refers is the Amidah, also called the Shmonah Esrei (the Eighteen). On the first day he must mention “whether it be today or tomorrow” and on the second day “whether it be today or yesterday.” Again, the sages disagree because they hold that we don’t treat the two days as if one was certain and one was doubtful but rather we treat them as one long extended holiday. In the Talmud it teaches that this debate is not only about Rosh Hashanah but Rosh Hodesh (the first of the new month) as well. The sages hold that prayer is not the time for making legal stipulations. While the status of these two days may indeed be somewhat doubtful, at least to certain sages, it doesn’t seem appropriate to mention this doubt in prayer, at the point where a person is pouring one’s heart out to God and asking for strength. The expression of such doubts during prayer might lead to doubts concerning the rabbis’ ability in general to dictate when holidays are, or at least lead to doubts concerning the efficacy of the community’s prayers." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nWe have already learned several times that it is forbidden to go beyond a Shabbat border of 2000 cubits, measured from where a person is or the town in which he is in when Shabbat begins. Our mishnah deals with a person who finds himself against his will outside of this border.", + "One whom Gentiles, or an evil spirit, have taken out [beyond the Shabbat border] has no more than four cubits [in which to move]. In this case a person was taken out of his Shabbat border against his will, either by Gentiles or by an evil spirit (i.e. he lost his wits). Despite the fact that this is not his fault, once outside his border he may not move more than four cubits in any direction. This is the same rule as for one who left his Shabbat border intentionally he may move only four cubits. The idea comes from Exodus 16:29, “Let everyone remain where he is.” Four cubits is composed of three for a person’s body and one so he can stretch out his legs in other words, that is “where he is.”", + "If they brought him back, it is as if he had never gone out. He is not allowed to return to his town but if the Gentiles or evil spirit brings him back he returns to being like the other people of his town, who may go anywhere in the town and 2000 cubits outside of it in each direction. The Talmud notes that if he returns intentionally or if he left intentionally but was returned by Gentiles, he does not return to being able to go anywhere in the town, but rather even within the town he may only go four cubits.", + "If they took him to another town, or if they put him in a pen or a sahar: Rabban Gamaliel and Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah say he may move throughout the entire area; But Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Akiva says: he has only four cubits [in which to move]. In this section he is taken out of the town where he began Shabbat and moved to another town. Alternatively, he is taken out of his town and put into a pen or sahar (a type of pen, see above 3:2) in which one may walk without limit on Shabbat. According to Rabban Gamaliel and Rabbi Elazar ben Azaryah, he may walk throughout either the city or the pen, and we treat the situation as if he began Shabbat there. Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Akiva disagree and hold that since he did not begin Shabbat there he is only allowed to walk four cubits.", + "It once happened that they were coming from Brindisi and their ship sailed out to sea [on Shabbat]. Rabban Gamaliel and Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah walked about throughout its area, but Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Akiba did not move beyond four cubits because they wanted to be stringent upon themselves. In this story, Rabbi Joshua, Rabbi Akiva, Rabban Gamaliel and Rabbi Elazar ben Azaryah are on an anchored boat when Shabbat begins. In this situation they can walk throughout the entire boat, although they may not disembark on Shabbat. The boat then sailed off without their consent and went past their Shabbat limit. The latter two rabbis continued to walk about the boat, because they hold that if Gentiles (the sailors in this case) take a Jew beyond his Shabbat limit to another town, he is treated as a person who began Shabbat in that town. Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Akiva remained within four cubits, just as they held with regard to a person taken out of his town and brought to another town. However, the mishnah notes that this is not the law but rather a stringency. The halakhah itself distinguishes between a person who is taken from one town to another and one whose ship sets sail for two reasons. First of all, Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Akiva were on the ship when Shabbat began and therefore when Shabbat began they could walk throughout the entire ship. Secondly, a ship’s position is constantly changing such that no one can truly stay within four cubits in any case. They probably wished to be strict upon themselves so that people wouldn’t think that in the case of a person brought to a pen or another city he too may walk throughout the entire area." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn yesterday’s mishnah we learned about a person who set sail (against his will) on Shabbat. Today we learn about a person who docks on Shabbat, and whether or not he may disembark.", + "Once they did not enter the harbor until dusk [on Shabbat eve]. They asked Rabban Gamaliel, “Can we disembark?” He said to them, “You may for I was already observing and we were already within the Shabbat limit before it grew dark.” As we have previously learned, one’s Shabbat limit is fixed by where he is at dusk on the eve of Shabbat. If the boat was out of the Shabbat limit of the harbor at dusk, then when the boat docks they may not disembark. This is what the other rabbis asked Rabban Gamaliel. He answered them that he had been observing carefully where they were when Shabbat began and he is certain that they were already within the limit of the harbor. Therefore they may disembark. The relationship of this mishnah to the previous one is slightly tricky. Above, Rabban Gamaliel held that one who was taken out of his city against his will and put into a second city becomes like the people of the second city. Hence, we would think that in this situation, where Gentile sailors brought him into the port, even if they docked on Shabbat he should be allowed to disembark. One answer to this problem is that Rabban Gamaliel is responding to Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Joshua according to their halakhah and not stating his own opinion. They hold that if they were not within the border of the port before Shabbat began, that they cannot go more than four cubits, so he responds to them that they were within the Shabbat border. According to his opinion, this is not important." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nA court may give someone permission to go beyond the Shabbat limit so that he can go to Jerusalem to testify that he saw the new moon, or so that he may go somewher to save property from marauders. Our mishnah deals with a person who was given permission to go out and then found out that what he set out to do was already accomplished.", + "One who went beyond the Shabbat limit with permission and was then told that the act had already been performed, [he is allowed to move] within two thousand cubits in any direction. A person was given permission to go beyond the Shabbat limit either to testify concerning the new month or to save property. Once beyond the limit he heard from someone else that what he set out to do had already been done. The question is, what is he to do now? Is he stuck within his four cubits? The answer is that he retains his right to walk 2000 cubits in all directions. The rabbis did not want to penalize this person for if they did they might discourage people from setting out to testify concerning the new month.", + "If he was within the Shabbat limit, it is as if he had not gone out. If those 2000 cubits which he is given once he finds out that he doesn’t need to go any further bring him back into his old Shabbat limit, which is within 2000 cubits of the town where he began Shabbat, it is now as if he never left. He may go throughout the town and a 2000 cubit perimeter around the town. Again, the rabbis wished to be lenient with this person because he left his Shabbat limit for a sanctioned purpose.", + "All who go out to save life may return to their original places. Anybody who goes out to save a life may return to the place from where he comes. If they did not allow this, people might have refrained from traveling to save a life. The rabbis were lenient not just concerning traveling somewhere to save someone’s life, but also concerning traveling back." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOne who is walking on a road and arrives within 2000 cubits of the city by dusk and intends to spend Shabbat in the city, is considered as a resident of the town and may walk throughout it and 2000 cubits around it, even though he didn’t get there until after nightfall. He is considered to be like the people of the town.\nOur mishnah talks about one who gets to within these 2000 cubits but does not realize he has done so and does not, therefore, have intention to spend Shabbat in that town.", + "One who sat down on the road [at dusk on Friday eve] and then got up and saw that he was near a town he may not enter it, since it had not been his intention to do so, the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Judah says: he may enter it. Rabbi Judah said: it once actually happened and Rabbi Tarfon entered the town, even though this was not his intention [when Shabbat had begun]. The mishnah talks about a person who was walking on the road on Friday and sat down to rest at dusk. This now becomes his Shabbat place, and the border should be two thousand cubits in all directions. He then notices that he is within the Shabbat border of a town. According to Rabbi Meir, he is not considered as a member of the town, since he did not have the intention to spend Shabbat in that town. Therefore, he may only go 2000 cubits from where he was when Shabbat began (at dusk). If that means he can only walk up until a certain point in the town, then he can go no further, even within the town. Rabbi Judah says that he may enter the town, since if he knew when he sat down at dusk that he was that so close to the town, he surely would have entered the town. Therefore, his intention to spend Shabbat at that particular place outside of the town was actually a mistake. We should note that if he did notice the city before Shabbat and intentionally did not enter, then Rabbi Judah would agree that he can go only 2000 cubits from the point where he was when Shabbat began. Rabbi Judah proves that his halakhah is correct from a story concerning Rabbi Tarfon. Proving one’s halakhah with an actual occurrence is considered a strong means by which to prove something." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with someone who fell asleep on the road on Friday afternoon and then woke up after nightfall. This traveller did not intend to spend Shabbat in the place where he was when Shabbat began and therefore we will see that the sages disagree over whether or not he may move 2000 cubits in all directions.", + "If one slept on the road and was unaware that night had fallen, he may move two thousand cubits in any direction, the words of Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri. Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri holds that even though he didn’t intend to spend Shabbat in the place where he was when Shabbat began, he still may move 2000 cubits in any direction.", + "But the sages say: he has only four cubits within which to move. The sages say that one must have intention in order to set one’s “place” when Shabbat begins. Since this person was asleep, he certainly cannot have such intention.", + "Rabbi Eliezer says: and the man is deemed to be in the middle of them. Rabbi Eliezer explains what the sages mean when they say that he has four cubits in which to move. In actuality he may move only two cubits in each direction, forming a circle around himself with a diameter of four cubits. According to the Talmud, the “sages” mentioned in section two, refers to Rabbi Meir, who holds that he may move 4 cubits in each direction, forming a circle with a diameter of eight cubits.", + "Rabbi Judah says: he may move in any direction he desires. And Rabbi Judah agrees that once chosen his direction he may not go back on it. Rabbi Judah is slightly more lenient than Rabbi Eliezer and allows the person to move four cubits in one direction, at least at the outset. However, once he moves four cubits, he has now set his circle and he may not move four cubits to the opposite direction of where he was at the outset. Put in other words, according to Rabbi Eliezer the position of his body at the outset is what defines his circle, whereas Rabbi Judah says that the person himself may define his circle. However, both agree that the circle has a diameter of only 4 cubits." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with several people who are traveling on the road, fall asleep and wake up after Shabbat has begun, the situation described in yesterday’s mishnah.", + "Two men, some of whose cubits enter into the cubits of the other, may bring their meals and eat them in the middle, provided that this one does not carry out anything from his limit into that of the other. Two men wake up and find that they both fell asleep and Shabbat began. As we learned yesterday, they cannot walk 2000 cubits because they did not have intention to spend Shabbat there. Basically what the mishnah teaches is that one’s four cubit circle is not extended by the other’s. If they have cubits which are shared by the two of them, they can bring their meals and eat them in the middle, but neither may go past his four cubit limit nor bring anything past his four cubit limit.", + "If there were three men and the prescribed limit of the middle one overlapped with the limits of the others, he is permitted to eat with either of them and either of them is permitted to eat with him, but the two outer persons are forbidden to eat with one another. The same is true of three people who find themselves in the same situation. They may each go their four cubits. If one of them shares cubits with the other two, but the other two don’t share with each other, the middle one may go into their area and they may each go into his, but the two outer ones may not go into each other’s cubits. Perhaps, were it not for this mishnah, we might have thought that the person in the middle, who can walk in all three persons’ areas, allows the two outer persons to also go into all three others area. The mishnah says that this assumption would be incorrect.", + "Rabbi Shimon said: To what is this similar? To three courtyards that open one into the other and also into a public domain: If they made an eruv for the outer ones with the middle one, the middle one is permitted with them and they are permitted with it, but the two outer ones are forbidden access to one another. Rabbi Shimon draws an analogy between the above situation and the situation of three courtyards all open to one another and also open to the public domain. The fact that they are open to the public domain means that a person may not carry from one to the other without an eruv. If they made an eruv for the two outer one’s to carry into the middle one, then it is permitted to carry from the middle courtyard to the two outer ones and vice versa. However, it is still forbidden to carry from one of the outer courtyards into the other outer courtyard." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses a person who doesn’t make it back to his town before Shabbat begins, but arrives at a place where he recognizes a tree or a fence within 2000 cubits from his town.", + "One who was on a journey and it became dark, and he recognized a tree or a fence and said, “Let my Shabbat place be under it”, he has said nothing. A “Shabbat place” is the place from which we measure the 2000 cubits which a person may walk on Shabbat. One who says “let my Shabbat place be under it [the tree or fence]” is not specific enough because he did not say which four cubits under the tree will be his “Shabbat place”. In the Talmud, two amoraim (sages who lived after the Mishnah) debate what this means. According to Rav, he cannot even walk to the tree and all he has is four cubits in each direction. Since he did not acquire a Shabbat place under the tree, he has no Shabbat place at all. According to Shmuel, he may walk to the tree or fence, but he may not walk from there to his house.", + "If he said, “Let my Shabbat place be at its root”, he may walk from the place where he stands to its root a distance of two thousand cubits, and from its root to his house another two thousand cubits. Thus he can walk four thousand cubits after dusk. If he says “at its root”, then he has been specific about where he wants his Shabbat place to be, and he may go from his current position to the tree and then from the tree to his home. His Shabbat place is at the tree or fence and so he may walk 2000 cubits to get there and then another 2000 cubits in all directions from there." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn this mishnah we learn of a debate concerning the measuring of the 2000 cubits which a person may walk on Shabbat.", + "If he does not recognize [any tree or fence], or if he is not familiar with the halakhah, and said, “Let my present position be my Shabbat place”, his position acquires for him the right of movement two thousand cubits in any direction. In a circle, the words of Rabbi Hanina ben Antigonus. But the sages say: the distances are square, in the shape of a square tablet, so that he may gain the area of the corners. The mishnah deals with a person who is traveling on the road and doesn’t recognize anything in the distance (as the person did in yesterday’s mishnah) or with a person who doesn’t know that the halakhah allows him to establish his Shabbat place at a distance by making an oral statement. He thinks that because he is far away from the point he recognizes that he can’t set up his 2000 cubit ring from there. The person then says that his present position is where he will spend Shabbat. He now has 2000 cubits within which to move in all directions. This halakhah is actually obvious; even if he didn’t make any statement he still has 2000 cubits in which to move. The halakhah is probably here as an introduction to the next section.", + "According to Rabbi Hanina ben Antigonus, the 2000 cubits form a circle. That is to say one simply draws a circle with a 2000 cubit radius around the person and that is the area within which he may walk. The Sages hold that this area is actually a square, drawn around the 2000 cubit radius circle. The advantage to the sages’ position is that the corners of the square increase the area. The square’s total area is 4004 x 4004=16,032,016 cubits. Note that the additional four cubits takes into account the person’s personal four cubits which his body occupies. In contrast the circle’s area is 10022 (radius, including 2 for his own body) x 3.14 (pi)= 12,585,132 (approximately)." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn today’s mishnah we see another essential debate about how the Shabbat border eruv works. The debate is whether one has to put a meal in the place which he wants to establish as his Shabbat place, or whether his physical presence in that place is sufficient.", + "This is what [the rabbis] have said: “a poor man makes his eruv with his feet.” In the previous mishnayot we have seen several instances where a person traveling on the road says “Let this be my Shabbat place” and that statement alone has been sufficient to establish that place as the point from which he may walk 2000 cubits in each direction. Our mishnah applies to this halakhah the early rabbinic statement that “a poor man makes his eruv with his feet.” This means that the poor man traveling on the road need not have bread or a meal with him at the place which he establishes as his Shabbat place.", + "Rabbi Meir said: we can apply this law to a poor man only. According to Rabbi Meir, only a poor man can establish his Shabbat place by mere physical presence. A rich person, sitting in his house, must establish his Shabbat place with bread. He must bring the bread out to where he wants to set up his Shabbat place; his physical presence is not sufficient.", + "Rabbi Judah says: it applies to both rich and poor; they only said that an eruv is prepared with bread in order to make it easier for the rich man, so that he does not have to go out and make the eruv with his feet. According to Rabbi Judah, the halakhah that a person may make his eruv by mere physical presence without bread applies to all people, both rich and poor. The sages allowed a rich person to set his Shabbat place with bread (a meal) in order to make it easier for him. He may send some of his bread outside of the city and set his Shabbat place there, without him actually having to go there. However, bread is a leniency and not a requirement. In the Talmud they explain that Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Judah only debate whether a rich person sitting in his home can go outside of the city and establish his Shabbat place by being there when Shabbat begins. Rabbi Meir says he needs to set up a meal there as well. However, Rabbi Judah agrees that only a poor person traveling on the road can see a far away place and say that his Shabbat place will be there (see mishnah seven). A rich person in his house must either send a meal there or go there himself." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah deals with two towns which are located in close proximity to one another (within 4000 cubits), and the people from one town customarily set up an eruv so that they can get to the other town on Shabbat.", + "One who left to go to a town with which [his home town is wished to be] connected by an eruv, but a friend of his returned him home, he himself is allowed to go to the other town but all the other townspeople are forbidden, the words of Rabbi Judah. This person left his town to go set up a communal eruv that would allow him and the other people of his town to travel from their town to a neighboring town. While on the way, his friend tells him that he will set up the eruv instead, but then his friend does not set up the eruv. According to Rabbi Judah, the person who went out to set up the eruv may go to the other town on Shabbat, even though his friend never set up the eruv for him and the rest of the town. Since this person began to go on the way to where he wanted to set up his Shabbat place, his situation is like the person in mishnah seven who was traveling and saw a familiar point. In other words, since he sees where he wants to go, he may establish his Shabbat place there at a distance. This is an eruv set up by physical presence just at a distance. However, the other people of the town who were relying on an eruv of a meal cannot go to the other town because their eruv was not set up. They get the normal 2000 cubits in all directions", + "Rabbi Meir says: whoeve is able to prepare an eruv and neglected to do so is like one who is both a donkey-driver and a camel-driver. Rabbi Meir disagrees with Rabbi Judah concerning the person who began to go on the road in order to set up his eruv. According to Rabbi Meir this person loses in both ways. He doesn’t get to go all the way to the city, because he didn’t set up his eruv, neither with bread, nor with a full declaration of “my Shabbat place shall be here.” However, he is also not allowed to walk 2000 cubits around his own city lest he did set for himself a “Shabbat place” on the way to the other city. All he may do is walk 2000 cubits from his city to the other city. Rabbi Meir compares this to a person driving a camel and a donkey, standing in between the two (see above 3:4, where we explained this image)." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first section of this mishnah deals with someone who goes beyond the Shabbat limit without having permission to do so. The second mishnah deals with someone who is just outside the city’s Shabbat limits on Friday when dusk comes. In both cases the issue at hand is may he enter the Shabbat limit after Shabbat has begun.", + "One who went out beyond his Shabbat limit, even one cubit may not re-enter. Rabbi Eliezer says: [if he went] two cubits [beyond his Shabbat limit] he may re-enter, three cubits he may not re-enter. According to the first opinion in the mishnah, once someone goes beyond his Shabbat limit, he may not come back inside the border. He may now move only four cubits in each direction. Rabbi Eliezer holds that if he is two cubits or less outside the border, he may come back in. According to Rabbi Eliezer a person can always walk two cubits in each direction (above mishnah five) and therefore he can come back into the border. However, if he is more than two cubits outside the border he may not come back.", + "One who was overtaken by dusk when only one cubit [outside the Shabbat limit] may not enter [the Shabbat border]. Rabbi Shimon says: even if he was fifteen cubits away he may enter since the surveyors do not measure exactly on account of those who err. If the person is not within the Shabbat border at dusk, he may not enter after Shabbat begins, even if he is only one cubit outside the border. If he intended for that place to be his “Shabbat place” then he may walk 2000 cubits in all directions, but he may not enter the city. The Talmud Yerushalmi explains that Rabbi Eliezer also disagrees with this clause and holds that if he is within two cubits of the border, he may enter. Rabbi Shimon holds that even if he is fifteen cubits outside of the border, he still may enter because when the surveyors set up their marks of Shabbat limits, they do not measure precisely. This is explained in two different ways. One explanation is that the surveyors leave fifteen cubits extra so that if people take a few steps beyond the Shabbat limit, they can come back. The other explanation is that the surveyors themselves make mistakes and these mistakes are typically up to fifteen cubits." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThe Hebrew word for “extensions” here is the same word used to extend the month (from 28 to 29 days) and to extend the year (from 12 to 13 months). The “extensions” to the city are critical when figuring out how far the Shabbat limit goes. Before we reckon the 2000 cubits around the city, we must first delineate exactly what is included in the city.", + "How do they make extensions for cities [for the purpose of defining the Shabbat limit]?
If one house recedes and another projects, If at the end of the city there is a row of houses, but the row is not set up evenly, the Shabbat limit is measured from the house that projects the most and not from the house that recedes.", + "Or if one turret [of the wall] recedes and another projects, If there is part of the wall (such as a turret, a tower used to guard the city) which projects further than other parts, the Shabbat limit is measured from the further projection.", + "If there were ruins ten handbreadths high, or bridges, or sepulchral monuments that contained dwelling places, they extend the boundary of the town is to include them. If there were ruins outside the parts of the city, or bridges or structures made over graves, then all of these are also included in the city.", + "And they make it [the Shabbat limit] like a square tablet in order that the use of the corners might be gained. When they come to set the Shabbat limit, the first thing they do is make the city into a rectangle, with the furthest structure on each side being the city’s limits. Even if the city is circular, they draw a rectangle around it, so that people get some extra place to travel at the corners. The 2000 cubits are now measured in a square around this square, so that people again get the benefit of the corners (see also above 4:8)." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nA karpaf is a field used for storing wood. Its typical size is seventy cubits and a fraction long. In our mishnah the sages debate whether the size of a town is automatically extended by a karpaf.", + "They give a karpaf [as an extension] for every town, the words of Rabbi Meir. According to Rabbi Meir, when measuring the Shabbat limit they extend a karpaf’s length of a field to the size of the city. From the end of this field they will measure the 2000 cubits square.", + "But the sages say: they said [the of a] karpaf only in regard to two towns that if there was to this one [a piece] of land of seventy cubits and a fraction and to the other one [a piece of land] seventy cubits and a fraction, they can consider the karpaf as combining the two into one. The other sages do not agree that every city is automatically extended by a karpaf. They agree that there was a halakhah stated concerning a karpaf and its use in extending a city, but this halakhah is more limited in scope. If there are two cities close enough to one another that if there was a karpaf of seventy and a fraction cubits attached to each one, they would overlap (they are not more than 140 and 2/3 cubits apart), then the two cities can be considered one. The ramification would be that people could go from one to the other and that their Shabbat border would be drawn around the two cities." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with three villages in the shape of a triangle. If they are close enough to each other they can be treated as one village, and one eruv can be set for all three and the Shabbat border is drawn around all three.", + "So also three villages arranged in the shape of a triangle, if between the two outer ones there is a distance of a hundred and forty-one and a third cubits, the middle one causes all the three of them to be regarded as one. In the previous mishnah we learned that if there were less than 70 and a fraction cubits between two towns, that they can be treated as one town and that the Shabbat border is drawn around the two of them together. Here we learn that if there are three towns in the shape of a triangle, the middle town can join the outer one’s together, as long as there is not an empty space of more than 140 and a third cubits (twice 70 and a fraction) between each outer town and the middle, joining town. In other words, they are all treated as if they are in a row, a situation which we dealt with in the previous mishnah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses how they actually go out and measure the Shabbat limit.", + "They measure the Shabbat limit only with a rope fifty cubits long, neither less nor more. The mishnah mandates the use of a fifty cubit rope in measuring the Shabbat limit. A shorter rope will stretch and yield to large of an area, whereas too long of a rope will not stretch enough the area will be too small.", + "And one should measure only while holding the end of the rope on a level with his heart. Measuring with a rope requires two people, one to hold each end of the rope. If the two hold the rope in different places the measurement will be off. Therefore, the rabbis said that the rope should be held at the level of one’s heart.", + "If he was measuring and he reached a valley or a wall he spans it and resumes his measuring. If when measuring they come to a small valley (we might call this a large ditch) or a wall, the elevation of the wall or the descent into the ditch should not count as part of the measuring of the Shabbat limit. What they should do is span the rope over the valley, with one person standing on one side and the other person standing on the other. Similarly, if they get to a wall they do not run the rope over the wall, measuring the incline and decline leading up to the wall. Rather they measure up to the wall, then the thickness of the wall and then they proceed from the other side.", + "If he reached a hill he spans it and resumes his measuring, provided he does not go beyond the Shabbat limit. The same way they measure the wall and valley is how they measure a hill. However, in all of these cases they cannot go beyond the Shabbat limit. What this means is that if the valley, wall or hill were wide within the limit (too wide for a fifty cubit rope), but narrower outside the limit, they should not walk out of the Shabbat limit to perform their measurements and then set a place parallel to that point within the limit. The Talmud explains that the problem would be that if others saw them doing this, they might think that the point where they went to measure was the Shabbat limit, and not realize that they were measuring outside of the border in order to set up a parallel point within the border.", + "If he is unable to span it in connection with this Rabbi Dostai ben Yannai stated in the name of Rabbi Meir: “I have heard that they pierce the hills.” The mishnah now deals with a valley or hill which were too big to measure with a fifty cubit rope, or were narrow only outside of the Shabbat limit. Rabbi Dostai says that we look at the mountains as if they were pierced. In other words, their ascent and descent are not taken into account. The Talmud explains how this is done. They use a small rope of four cubits, and the person holding below puts the rope next to his heart and the person holding above puts the rope next to his feet. In this way the four cubits are lessened a certain percentage for every four cubits. This is the size of the mountain’s ascent and descent, according to the rabbis. If you are having trouble picturing this, imagine a right triangle with its slope ascending, as if it was going up the mountain. If the top line is four cubits (the length of the rope) and the person hold the rope below is 3 cubits (the size of an average person), then you have a triangle whose sides are 4, 3 and 5, the side of 5 being the slope going up the hill (all of this is remembered from 10th grade geometry thank you Mr. Formica!). Thus the five cubits up the mountain are spanned with a four cubit rope, thereby gaining one cubit for every four. [I hope this helped!]." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to deal with measuring the Shabbat limit.", + "They measure [the Shabbat limit] only through an expert. The Shabbat limit should be measured only by an expert at taking such measurements. As we saw in yesterday’s mishnah, taking such measurements was not easy, so it is understandable why the rabbis required this to be done by an expert.", + "If he extended the limit at one point and limited it at another, they observe the place where he extended it. There are several different explanations for this section. The Rambam, basing himself on the Talmud, explains that this refers to an expert who measured the limit and it was longer than the people of the city thought at one point, but shorter at another point. The mishnah teaches that just as the people of the city must listen to the expert’s measurement for where he limited the size, so too they may listen to him with regard to the place where he expanded it. Others explain that on one side he came up with two different measurements. For instance, his measurement to the northeast was longer than that to the southeast. In such a situation we assume that the shorter measurement was mistaken and we listen to the longer one.", + "If there was one who made it a greater distance and one who made it a lesser distance, the greater distance is observed. If two experts come up with different measurements, the bigger measurement is observed.", + "Even a slave and even a female slave are believed when they say, “Thus far is the Shabbat limit”, since the sages did not enact the law in order to be strict but in order to be lenient. Anybody is trustworthy to testify concerning where the Shabbat limit is, even slaves and female slaves who normally cannot testify. In Ketuboth 2:10 we also learned that the rabbis allowed minors to testify where the Shabbat border was, or more precisely they allow a person who has reached majority age to testify where the Shabbat border was when they were a minor. The mishnah explains that the rules concerning the Shabbat limit were meant to create leniencies, to allow people to travel further, and not to be stringent. This is because going past the Shabbat limit is only a rabbinic prohibition (derabanan), and therefore in cases of doubt, the halakhah can be lenient." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah does not seem to have anything to do with our chapter. The previous mishnayot discussed measuring the city in order to determine the Shabbat border. The topic is therefore “eruvei techumin” Shabbat border eruvin which allow one to travel an added 2000 cubits outside of the city. The remainder of the chapter will also deal with this subject. This mishnah, in contrast, deals with “eruvei hatzerot” courtyard eruvin, or “shitufei mevuoth” alley partnerships, which allow people to carry within the city on Shabbat. Traditional commentators struggled to understand what this mishnah is doing here and offered various solutions. Abraham Goldberg, in his modern commentary to Mishnah Eruvin, suggests that there is a certain affinity in language between this mishnah and the preceding mishnayot, but his suggestion is also not without its difficulties.\nIn any case, the mishnah deals with an eruv/shittuf (partnership) that allows one to carry within a city. A city that has a wall ten handbreadths high, and a gate that is locked at night, is treated like an alley, and hence if there is an “alley partnership” meaning a shared meal (which for convenience sake I will call “an eruv” people can carry within the entire city. However, there is a difference in this matter between a privately owned city where an individual owns the city and rents out houses to others, and a city owned by many of its residents. In a privately owned city, they may set up an eruv and everyone may carry in the entire city. However, in a publicly owned city, they must leave one area that does not participate in the eruv. This is done so that people don’t forget that it is forbidden to carry in the public domain without an eruv. The area that does not participate in the city’s eruv may set up its own eruv for its own area, and carry within that area, but not throughout the rest of the city. The mishnah deals with a city owned by an individual that becomes a publicly owned city and vice versa. Similarly it deals with the size of the area that cannot participate in a publicly owned city eruv.", + "If a town that belonged to an individual was converted into one belonging to the many, they may make an eruv for the entire town. As we explained above, for a town owned by an individual they may set up an eruv that allows all of the town’s residents to carry within the entire town. Our mishnah teaches that even if this town is converted into one owned by the many, they still may set up an eruv for the entire town. Its conversion does not affect its status.", + "But if a town belonged to the many and was converted into one belonging to an individual, they may not make an eruv for the entire town unless they excluded from it a section the size of the town of Hadashah in Judea, which contains fifty residents, the words of Rabbi Judah. Rabbi Shimon says: three courtyards each of which contains two houses. Similarly, a town which used to belong to the many and now is acquired by an individual is still treated as a town which belongs to the many. Its status is also not affected by its conversion. Therefore, they may not set up an eruv to allow people to carry in the entire town. Rather they must exclude from the area which participates in the eruv a section the size of the town Hadashah in Judea. “Hadashah” means new, and is mentioned in Joshua 15:37. Here the name of the city is read “midrashically” it is a new city which adds to the old city, sort of an appendage to the older city. In this “New City”, there were 50 residents. According to Rabbi Judah, by excluding an area this size, they may set up an eruv in the rest of the city. Rabbi Shimon disagrees and holds that the excluded part need only be an area the size of three courtyards, each of which has at least two homes. This would probably yield an area slightly smaller than that according to Rabbi Judah’s ruling." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah returns to the subject of Shabbat border eruvin.", + "If one was in the east and said to his son, “Prepare for me an eruv in the west”, or if he was in the west and he said to his son, “Prepare for me an eruv in the east”, if the distance between him and his house was no more than two thousand cubits and that between him and his eruv was more than this, he is permitted to go to his house but forbidden to go to his eruv. If the distance to his eruv was no more than two thousand cubits and that to his house more than this, he is forbidden to go to his house but permitted to go to his eruv. Before this person left his home on Friday, he told his son to set up for him an eruv to either the west or east of the city. At dusk on Friday eve, he finds himself on the opposite side of the city. If he is two thousand cubits or less from his home but more than two thousand cubits from his eruv, he may go to his home but not to his eruv. In other words, his eruv is ineffective and he may not go two thousand cubits beyond it. Since when Shabbat began he could not reach his eruv, which was more than two thousand cubits away from him, we say that his intention was that his home would be his “Shabbat place” and from his home, and not the eruv, we measure a Shabbat limit of 2000 cubits. If, on the other hand, he is 2000 cubits or less from his eruv but more than that from his home, he may go to his eruv but not to his home. Again, since he couldn’t get to his home when Shabbat began, we assume that he wished that his eruv would be his “Shabbat place” and from that point and that point only he can travel 2000 cubits.", + "One who puts his eruv within the extension of a town, he has done nothing. If a person puts his eruv within the extensions of the city, his eruv doesn’t help him at all. Even without the eruv, he can go 2000 cubits beyond the extensions of the city. Rather an eruv should ideally be put 2000 cubits beyond the city and its extensions. In this way it extends the distance a person can travel in that direction. The “extensions of the city” refer to the inns and shops which are outside of the city but count in measuring the city’s borders.", + "If he put it even one cubit only beyond the limit he loses what he gains. This refers to a person who sets up his eruv outside the city, but within the 2000 cubit border which surrounds it. This is where an eruv should be set up. The mishnah teaches that every cubit he gains in his ability to travel on one side of the town, he loses on the other. So if he puts the eruv 1000 cubits outside the town on the west, he may now travel 3000 cubits to the west but only 1000 cubits to the east." + ], + [ + "The people of a large town may walk through the whole of a small town, but the people of a small town may not walk through the whole of a large town.
How is this so? If a man was in a large town and deposited his eruv in a small town or if he stayed in a small town and deposited his eruv in a large town, he may walk through all the town and two thousand cubits beyond it.
Rabbi Akiva says: he only has the place of his eruv and another two thousand cubits.
The wording of our mishnah is somewhat difficult, and the talmudic sages already recognized different versions. However, the different versions are usually explained the same way. All agree that one who resides in a town and begins Shabbat there can travel two thousand cubits in all directions. However, the sages debate concerning a person who resides in one town but puts his eruv in another town. The question is: does this eruv, placed in another town, allow him to walk throughout the town and two thousand cubits around it, or is the area of the town included in the two thousand cubits? In other words, since he acquired his “Shabbat place” in that town through an eruv and not through his actually being there, is he treated as if he was there or do we look at this as a normal case of placing one’s eruv outside of one’s own town?
The other issue in the mishnah is concerning one who measures the two thousand cubits around his city and finds that another city is within this area. If the two thousand cubits ends in the middle of the city, all of the sages agree that he cannot go anywhere beyond the city on the other side. However, if the two thousand cubits ends at the end of the city, the city is treated as if it was merely four cubits in area and it doesn’t count for the two thousand cubit measure. Rather the two thousand cubits is completed on the other side of the city. This halakhah is the first section of the mishnah.
Section one: As I explained in the introduction, the wording of this mishnah is quite difficult. I shall explain the mishnah in the same that Albeck and Kehati do. The people of a large town, who have a small town entirely within their 2000 cubit Shabbat border, may walk throughout the entire small town and it counts only as four cubits toward their Shabbat limit. The remaining 2000 cubits surrounding the large town continue on the other side. For instance if there are 96 cubits from the large town to the small town, and the small town is 1800 cubits, he may walk through the whole small town and another 1900 cubits on the other side, since the town itself counts as only four cubits.
However, if the Shabbat border of a small town ends within a neighboring large town, the people from the small town can only walk within it up until their border ends.
We should note that according to this explanation, the size of the person’s original town does not seem to matter all that much. All that matters is whether or not the Shabbat border ends within the neighboring town.
Section two: The phrase “how is this so” does not seem to explain the previous clause in the mishnah. Hence, the Yerushalmi removes the word, whereas the Bavli adds in an entire clause. In any case, it seems that this is a new section and not a continuation of the previous one. This section deals with a person from one city who puts his eruv in another city. According to the first opinion, if one puts his eruv in another city that is within the 2000 cubits of one’s own city, the eruv makes the person as if he was a full resident of that city. Therefore, he may walk the full area of the city, plus 2000 cubits around it, just as can the residents of that city.
Rabbi Akiva disagrees and holds that the eruv in the other city works as do all normal eruvin they allow one to walk 2000 cubits beyond the eruv. If the city in which the eruv was placed goes further, he may not walk in that area of the city." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is a direct continuation of the second clause of yesterday’s mishnah. To remind ourselves, Rabbi Akiva and the Sages had a debate concerning a person in one city who places his eruv in another city which is within the Shabbat border of his own city. According to Rabbi Akiva, this is treated as a normal case he may go 2000 cubits from his eruv and no more. The Sages hold that the city itself only counts as four cubits and that he may continue to go beyond the city the distance which remains to him after traveling from the first city.", + "Rabbi Akiva said to them: Do you not agree with me that one who puts his eruv in a cave may walk no further than two thousand cubits from the place of his eruv? One who puts his eruv in a cave outside of his city, may travel another 2000 cubits outside of the eruv, including the length of the cave. The cave does not count for just four cubits rather each cubit within it counts. Rabbi Akiva asks the sages why they agree concerning this halakhah but not concerning one who puts his eruv in a neighboring city. In other words, why in the case of the city does the entire city only count as four cubits, no matter how large it is?", + "They replied: when is this true? Only where no people dwell in it, but where people dwell in it one may walk through the whole of it and two thousand cubits beyond it. The sages respond that the rule regarding one who puts his eruv in a cave is true only if no one lives in the cave. The situation regarding the city is different when he puts his eruv there he counts as one of its residents. Just as the city’s residents may travel anywhere in the city and not have it count toward their 2000 cubits, so too he may travel anywhere in the city and not have it count towards his 2000 cubits.", + "Thus [where an eruv is put] within [the cave] the law is more lenient than [where one is put] on top of it. This section is way of remembering the rule of the Sages in section two. If the eruv is put on top of a cave which is in a city, then the eruv is in the city and he may walk within the entire city and not have it count toward his 2000 cubits. However, if he puts the eruv in the cave below the city, the cave and certainly the city count toward his 2000 cubit limit. This means that the law is more lenient when the eruv is on top then when it is within.", + "And to the measurer, of whom they spoke, they give him a distance of two thousand cubits even if the end of his measure terminates within a cave. In this section the sages agree with Rabbi Akiva concerning one who measures his Shabbat border, that he gets only 2000 cubits, even if this measure ends in the middle of a cave. Even if there are residents in the cave, he still cannot go through to the end of the cave, because his original Shabbat limit ended before he got there. This matches what we learned in the beginning of yesterday’s mishnah, concerning a Shabbat border that ends within a neighboring city. In such a case, he may only go up to the end of his Shabbat border." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nFrom here until the end of the ninth chapter the Mishnah will discuss courtyard eruvin (eruve hatzerot) and alley partnerships (shittufe mevuoth). These allow people to carry in courtyards and common alleys respectively. The eruv or shittuf is a common meal, which creates the legal fiction that the entire courtyard or alley is one person’s domain. For a more general introduction, see the introduction to the tractate.\nIn general, everyone who lives in the courtyard or alley must participate in the eruv, meaning they must contribute to the common meal. If one does not, he causes the entire courtyard or alley to be prohibited from carrying for all of the residents. Our mishnah teaches about a case where one of the residents is a non-Jew or a Jew who doesn’t admit to the validity of eruvin in general.", + "One who lives in a courtyard with a non-Jew or with one who does not acknowledge the [principle of] eruv, behold this one restricts him [from making use of the eruv], the words of Rabbi Meir. According to Rabbi Meir, if a non-Jew or a Jew who doesn’t believe in eruvin (perhaps a Sadducee or Samaritan) lives in a courtyard or alley with other Jews, his lack of participation in the eruv makes it forbidden for other Jews to use the eruv. As stated above, the eruv must be jointly owned by all of the residents if even one resident does not own it, it doesn’t work. The Talmud teaches a way to remedy this problem. The non-Jew can rent to the Jew the part of the courtyard that he owns, and in this way it is as if on Shabbat he doesn’t own it. Admittedly this is a legal fiction but if it did not exist, it would have been exceedingly difficult to set up eruvin in many, if not all towns, in the mishnaic period, since Jews did not live totally separate from non-Jews.", + "Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov says: one can never restrict another [from making use of the eruv] unless there are two Jews who restrict each other. According to Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov, a non-Jew’s residence in the courtyard or alley does not affect the eruv for the other Jews. Indeed, his residency doesn’t in essence count. Only a non-participatory Jew can cause another Jew’s eruv to be ineffective. If one of the Jewish residents does not participate in the eruv with the other residents, the eruv is ineffective for all of them." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nAccording to the Talmud, in this mishnah Rabban Gamaliel disagrees with the opinion in yesterday’s mishnah. There we learned that a Jew who doesn’t believe in the efficacy of eruvin causes the other Jews in his courtyard or alley to be prohibited from carrying, by making their eruv ineffective. According to the Talmud, while the non-Jew can annul his partnership in the courtyard or alley, and thereby let the other Jews eruv be effective, a Jew who doesn’t believe in eruvin, such as a Sadducee or Samaritan cannot do so. Rabban Gamaliel says that even a Sadducee can annul his share in the alley or courtyard. Our mishnah deals with one who has already made such an annulment. The question is, can his annulment be overturned by his actions?", + "Rabban Gamaliel said: A Sadducee once lived with us in the same alley in Jerusalem and father told us: “Hurry up and carry out all vessels into the alley before he carries out his and thereby restricts you”. According to the explanation provided above, this Sadducee who lived in the same alley (!) as Rabban Gamaliel’s father, Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel, nullified his partial ownership in the alley such that the eruv of the Jews would be effective. (A rather nice Sadducee if he was a Samaritan, we could call him the “Good Samaritan”!). However, Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel holds that if afterwards, on Shabbat, the Sadducee uses the alley to carry out his things then he has reneged on his renunciation and he again owns a share of the alley. Therefore, the Jews must use the alley to carry on Shabbat, so that they own the alley before he does. Once they have demonstrated such ownership, even if he uses the alley, this does not make it prohibited for them to carry there.", + "Rabbi Judah said [the instruction was given] in different language: “Hurry up and perform all of your needs in the alley before he carries out his and thereby restricts you”. According to the Talmud, section one is Rabbi Meir’s version, of what Rabban Gamaliel said his father said. Rabbi Judah agrees with Rabban Gamaliel, that a Sadducee can renounce his ownership. However, he disagrees with Rabbi Meir concerning the precise language of Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel’s statement. According to Rabbi Judah, even if the other Jews use the alley first, if the Sadducee then comes to use it, he will cause it to be prohibited for them to carry there. Therefore, the Jews must carry all of the things that they need to carry before the Sadducee uses the alley. Once he uses it, it is prohibited to them." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn the previous mishnayot we discussed a resident of a courtyard or alley who intentionally did not participate in the eruv with the other residents. In our mishnah the rabbis discuss a person who forgot to join in the eruv with the others.", + "If one of the residents of a courtyard forgot to join in the eruv, his house is forbidden both to him and to them for the taking in or for the taking out of any object. The Talmud explains that this resident nullified his partial ownership in the courtyard and alley. Hence, the other people can carry in those areas. However, neither he nor they can carry in and out of his house. They cannot carry in and out of his house because although he nullified his partial ownership in the courtyard and alley, he did not nullify ownership over his own house. He too cannot carry in and out of his house because the courtyard is owned exclusively by them and his house is owned exclusively by him.", + "But their houses are permitted both to him and to them. They obviously can carry from the courtyard to their own homes, because they all participated in the eruv. However, even he can carry from the courtyard to their homes because he is a guest in both their courtyard and their home. A guest in someone else’s home follows the same rules as does the homeowner himself if the homeowner carries from the courtyard into the home, so too does the guest.", + "If they gave their part [of the courtyard] to him, he is permitted but they are forbidden. If the other residents who did set up the eruv give him their share of the courtyard, he may carry from his own home into the courtyard, because he owns both the courtyard and his home. However, they may not carry from their homes into the courtyard because they are owned by different people. They are not considered to be his guests in his courtyard because many people cannot be considered the guests of one individual.", + "If there were two [who forgot to join in the eruv], they restrict each other, because one may give his part and also acquire the part [of others] but two may give their parts but may not acquire the parts [of others]. In this case there were two people who forgot to participate in the eruv. There is no way for them to carry in the courtyard. Even if the other residents were to give them their share in the courtyard, they can’t carry there. In such a case both would own the courtyard but neither set up an eruv, so neither can carry. The Talmud explains that even if one of these now gives his partial ownership of the courtyard to the other, the other still can’t carry there. When the others nullified their ownership, this nullification didn’t work to allow both of the others to carry there. We therefore say that the courtyard is still owned by the others and therefore the individual cannot nullify his ownership over a courtyard which he doesn’t fully own. The mishnah summarizes these rules: one person can annul his ownership and take ownership from others (sections one-three). Two people can nullify their ownership over the courtyard, but not take ownership from the others (section four)." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to discuss cases where a person does not participate in the eruv but in order that his lack of participation should not prevent the others from carrying, he gives away his share in the courtyard or alley.", + "When must they give away their share [courtyard or alley]? Bet Shammai says: while it is yet day, And Bet Hillel says: after dusk. According to Bet Shammai, he must give away his share in the ownership of the courtyard or alley before Shabbat begins, because it is prohibited to engage in any type of business on Shabbat. Bet Hillel says that it is permitted even after Shabbat has begun. In other versions of this mishnah Bet Hillel says “even after dusk”, a text that matches my explanation above. Bet Hillel does not consider relinquishing ownership to be business and hence it is permitted to do so on Shabbat.", + "One who gave away his share and then carried out an object, whether unwittingly or intentionally, he restricts [the others from carrying in the courtyard or alley], the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Judah says: if he acted with intention he restricts [the others], but if unwittingly he does not restrict. This person gave away his share in the courtyard, thereby allowing the others who shared in the eruv to carry there. He is not allowed to carry from his own home to the courtyard, which now doesn’t belong to them. If he does carry his stuff out of his house and into the courtyard he is in essence reneging on his annulment of courtyard ownership. He now regains his share in the courtyard and thereby prohibits the eruv’s effectiveness for the others (since he didn’t participate in the eruv). Rabbi Judah says that he is only reneging on his annulment if he carries his things out intentionally. Rabbi Meir says that his actions cause the others to be restricted whether he carried things out intentionally or unwittingly. He prohibits in the case of the latter, lest one come to permit even in the former. In other words, if the law were lenient in a case where he carried out unwittingly, people would be lenient in a case where he carried things out intentionally." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah deals with people who share an alley or courtyard and who also have a business partnership in some type of food item. Under certain circumstances, they need not make an eruv because their partnership counts as if it was an eruv.", + "A householder who was in partnership with his neighbors: with this one in wine and with the other in wine, they need not prepare an eruv. Since the residents of the alley/courtyard jointly own wine, this wine counts as their eruv, even though the wine is for business and not for the shared meal of the eruv.", + "But if his partnership was with the one in wine and with the other in oil, they must make an eruv. Rabbi Shimon says: neither in the one case nor in the other need they make an eruv. In this case, one of the residents has a partnership with one person in wine and with another in oil. However, there is not one partnership in one food item that exists between all three people. Since there is no partnership that bridges between all three of them, they must set up an eruv and their business partnerships do not count as an eruv. Rabbi Shimon says that if he has a partnership with one in wine and with the other in oil he need not set up an eruv, because sometimes eruvin are set up with two or more items, even with wine and oil. Therefore, the partnership bridges the gap between the three of them." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with a situation where five different companies of men are spending Shabbat in one hall within a courtyard. The question is whether each company must contribute separately to the courtyard’s eruv set, or whether it is sufficient for all of the five companies to make one joint contribution to the eruv.", + "Five companies [of men] who spent Shabbat in one hall:: Bet Shammai says: an eruv for each an every company; But Bet Hillel says: one eruv for them all. According to Bet Shammai, since each of the five groups is distinct from the other, they must each set up their own eruv. Bet Hillel holds that since they are residing in the same hall, they can be treated as one entity and they may make one joint contribution to the eruv.", + "They agree that where some of them occupy rooms or upper chambers, that they must make an eruv for each and every company. If the hall leads to other rooms or to upper chambers and some members of the various groups are in these other areas, each company must make a separate contribution to the eruv. Even though all of these areas are connected to the main hall, the hall is not sufficient to make it as if they were all in the same house. The Yerushalmi explains that the hall is to the rooms as a courtyard is to houses: just as every house connected to the courtyard must contribute to the eruv, so too every company in the hall must contribute." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with a family that eats in one home but the children have their own homes and sleep there. The question is does the father’s contribution to the eruv count for his children since they eat together or do they each have to individually contribute to the eruv since they live separately.", + "Brothers or partners who were eating at their father’s table but slept in their own homes must each have an eruv. Since each of these brothers has his own home and lives in that home, they don’t count as part of their father’s household anymore. Each must contribute separately to the eruv.", + "Hence, if any one of them forgot and did not [contribute] to the eruv, he must annul his right to his share in the courtyard. If one of the brother’s did not contribute to the eruv, then he must do the same thing that all people do when one did not contribute to his courtyard’s eruv. He must annul his partial ownership in the courtyard. If he does not do so then all of the other courtyard’s residents may not carry from their homes into the courtyard. Good manuscripts of the Mishnah read “he annulled his share” instead of “he must annul his share”. In this case, the meaning is that we assume that he annulled his share, and not that he had to have done so in actuality.", + "When does this apply? When they bring their eruv into some other place but if their eruv is deposited with them or if there are no other tenants with them in the courtyard they need not prepare any eruv. The halakhot in the previous two sections apply only when the eruv (the common meal) is not placed in the father’s house and there are other residents in the courtyard besides the brothers and the father. The house in which the eruv is placed does not need to participate in the eruv because the fact that it is in his house and he is letting them put it in his house counts as his participation. Therefore, if the eruv is in the father’s house his children need not participate in paying for the eruv, because they receive their support from their father. Furthermore, if there are no other residents in the courtyard besides the father and his children, then it is all one domain and there is no need for any eruv at all. Think of it this way: the meals that they eat at their father’s home are in essence the same as the eruv they make the entire courtyard into one domain. The word “partners” in the first clause of the mishnah means that the same laws which refer to the father and his children also refers to partners all of whom are receiving their food from one provider. This is a situation exactly parallel to that of the father and the five sons. Rashi and some other commentators did not have this word in the mishnah which was in front of them, but it appears in good manuscripts of the Mishnah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nTo remind ourselves, in order to carry in a courtyard they would set up an eruv, and in order to carry in the alley, which would lead from courtyard to other courtyards they set up a “shittuf”, an alley partnership. Just as the eruv is a common meal placed in one of the homes, so too is the shittuf. The basic difference is functional one works for a courtyard and the other for an alley. Our mishnah deals with cases where one (either an eruv or shittuf) was set up but not the other.", + "Five courtyards which were each opened into the other and into an alley, and they made an eruv for the courtyards but they did not share in a shittuf for the alley, they are permitted [the use of the] courtyards but forbidden that of the alley. The eruv which they made for the courtyards is sufficient to allow them to carry in the courtyards, but not sufficient in and of itself to allow them to carry in the alley. For that they would have needed a shittuf.", + "If they shared in a shittuf for the alley [but not in the eruv for the courtyards], they are permitted the use of both. In this case, they shared in the shittuf for the alley, and this is sufficient, at least ex post facto, to allow them to carry in the courtyards as well. The shittuf is to the courtyards what the courtyards are to the individual homes, as we will see at the end of the mishnah. In other words, the alley includes the courtyards and since they can carry in the alley, they can carry in the courtyards as well.", + "If they made an eruv for the courtyards and they made a shittuf for the alley, and one of the tenants of a courtyard forgot to contribute to the eruv, they are permitted the use of both. This case is similar, in essence, to the previous case. The fact that one person didn’t participate in the eruv renders the eruv invalid. Nevertheless, the fact that they all participated in the shittuf renders it valid and as we learned above, sufficient to allow carrying in the courtyard as well. This section emphasizes that even if they intended to allow carrying in the courtyard by setting up the eruv but did not succeed in doing so, the shittuf is still sufficient to allow carrying in the courtyard.", + "If one of the residents of the alley forgot to share in the shittuf, they are permitted the use of the courtyards but forbidden that of the alley, Since an alley to its courtyards is as a courtyard to its houses. This section is to section one what section three was to two (note the chiastic structure). Since the shittuf was not valid, they cannot carry in the alley. However, this doesn’t affect the eruv which they did set up and which allows carrying in the courtyards. The final clause explains the relationship between the three areas, the alley, the courtyard and the homes. Simply put, an eruv/shittuf for the larger more encompassing area is effective for the more limited area, but the opposite is not true." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah and the following one deal with two courtyards, an outer and an inner one. The inner courtyard opens to the outer one and through the outer one the residents get to the alley, and then to the public domain. It is important to realize that those from the outer courtyard do not need to use the inner courtyard.", + "Two courtyards, this one inside the other:
If the [residents] of the inner one prepared an eruv but those of the outer one did not prepare an eruv, the inner one is permitted but the outer one is forbidden. In this case it is permitted for the residents of the inner courtyard to carry there because their eruv covers all of the residents of their courtyard. In other words, since no one else owns any element of their courtyard, it turns out that all of the residents have helped in setting up the eruv.", + "If the [residents] of the outer one prepared an eruv but not those of the inner one, they both are forbidden. In this case, no one can carry in either courtyard. The residents of the inner courtyard cannot because they didn’t set up an eruv. Those of the outer courtyard cannot because those of the inner courtyard own part of the outer courtyard due to their right to walk through there to get to the alley or public domain. The right to walk through there is a form of ownership and since the people who have this right didn’t set up an eruv, this turns out to be a courtyard in which not everyone has set up an eruv.", + "If the [residents] of each [courtyard] prepared an eruv for themselves, each is permitted on its own. Rabbi Akiva forbids the outer one because the right to walk in it prohibits it. The sages say that the right of way does not prohibit it. In this case, each courtyard separately set up their own eruv. According to the opinion of the sages, the residents of each courtyard can carry within their own courtyard but not that of the other. This must be distinguished from the previous situation, where the fact that the residents of the inner courtyard have certain rights to the outer courtyard made the outer courtyard’s eruv ineffective. Here, since those of the inner courtyard may carry in their own area, they don’t prohibit the other courtyard from carrying in their own domain. Rabbi Akiva disagrees and holds that just as it did in the case in section two, the right of those from the inner courtyard to walk in the outer courtyard renders the outer courtyard’s eruv incomplete and hence ineffective. The final opinion, that of the sages, is, according to the simple meaning of the mishnah, a defense of their own position above, that each is permitted to carry in its own domain. However, the Bavli reads this clause as a third opinion, which disagrees with that in section two (and does not merely support three). According to this opinion, the fact that those of the inner courtyard may walk in the outer courtyard does not render them partial owners. Therefore, if the outer courtyard set up an eruv and the inner one did not, those of the outer courtyard may still carry in their own area." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to deal with two courtyards, an inner one and an outer one.", + "If one of the [residents] of the outer courtyard forgot to participate in the eruv, the inner courtyard is permitted but the outer one is forbidden. If one of the residents of the outer courtyard forgot to participate in their eruv, the eruv of that courtyard is ineffective, as we have learned several times in this chapter. However, the inner courtyard’s eruv is still valid, since it doesn’t depend on that of the outer one.", + "If one of the [residents] of the inner courtyard forgot to contribute to the eruv, both courtyards are forbidden. In this case, since the inner courtyard’s eruv is invalid, the outer courtyard’s eruv is ineffective as well (as we learned in section two of yesterday’s mishnah).", + "If they gave their eruv in the same place and one [resident], whether of the inner courtyard or of the outer courtyard, forgot to contribute to the eruv, both courtyards are forbidden. If both courtyards put their eruv together, they become like one domain with one eruv. Therefore, if even one resident from either courtyard forgot to participate in the eruv, it becomes forbidden to carry in either courtyard. This is like the normal situation where one person forgot to participate in the eruv, thereby causing it to be forbidden to carry in the entire courtyard.", + "If the courtyards belonged to individuals, they need not prepare any eruv. If each courtyard belongs to an individual, then neither must set up an eruv in order to carry within his own courtyard. This opinion matches that which was taught in section three of yesterday’s mishnah, that if each courtyard sets up its own eruv, the residents of each may carry in their own courtyard." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThe first five mishnayot of this chapter deal with two courtyards that are adjacent to one another and whether or not they may make a joint eruv.", + "If a window between two courtyards was four handbreadths by four handbreadths, and was within ten handbreadths [from the ground], the tenants prepare two eruvin or, if they want, they may prepare one. If there is a window which is four by four handbreadths and is less than ten handbreadths from the ground, then this window has the potential but not the necessity to join the two courtyards into one common domain. If the residents of the two courtyards make one joint eruv, then they may both carry in both courtyards, because both courtyards are in essence one. If they set up separate eruvin, the residents may carry only in their own courtyards.", + "If [the size of the window was] less than four handbreadths by four handbreadths or higher than ten handbreadths from the ground, they may prepare two eruvin but not one. However, if the window was smaller than four by four handbreadths, or higher, then it doesn’t join the two courtyards and each can only set up their own eruv. The reason why the window does not join the two courtyards if it is set higher is that in such a case there is a full ten handbreadth wall separating the two. Such a wall is sufficient to count as a full separation. Furthermore, with a window this high it will be difficult to see from one courtyard into the other, helping separate their identities." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with what constitutes a wall between two courtyards.", + "If a wall between two courtyards was ten handbreadths high and four handbreadths thick, two eruvin must be prepared, but not one. In order for the wall to count as a full partition between the two courtyards, it needs to be ten handbreadths high. Such a wall fully separates the two, such that each must make their own eruv. According to the Yerushalmi, although the mishnah says that the wall must be four handbreadths thick, even a wall less thick still counts as a full partition. The mishnah mentions a thickness of four handbreadths because of clause 2, which says that they may not bring the fruit down. According to the Yerushalmi, if the wall is less than four handbreadths wide it is not its own domain, and one can take produce down from there.", + "If there was produce on top of it, the [residents] from this side may climb up and eat and those from this side may climb up and eat, provided they do not bring it down. The top of a ten handbreadth high, four handbreadth wide wall is a domain unto itself, and therefore, one cannot take something down from there to another domain. However, people from either side may climb up and eat the produce while sitting on top of the wall.", + "If the wall was breached a breach of ten cubits, the residents prepare two eruvin or, if they prefer, they prepare one eruv, because it is like a doorway. A breach of less than ten cubits can count as a doorway, and therefore, the residents of the two courtyards may make either separate eruvin, or one eruv for both courtyards. The advantage to making two different eruvin is that if one of those from one courtyard does not participate in the eruv, those of the other courtyard will still be able to carry within their own courtyard. The advantage to making one eruv is that it is obviously easier (and slightly cheaper) to set up one eruv than two.", + "If the breach was bigger, only one eruv and not two may be prepared. If the breach in the wall is greater than ten cubits the breach cannot be considered a doorway and we must consider the two courtyards to be one. This would mean that if one person from either courtyard does not participate, none of the residents of either courtyard may carry." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah is about a ditch that separates two courtyards. The rules concerning the ditch are very similar to the rules about the wall which we learned yesterday.", + "If a ditch between two courtyards was ten handbreadths deep and four handbreadths wide, they may make two eruvin but not one, even if it was full of stubble or straw. Just as a ten handbreadth high, four handbreadth wide wall is sufficiently large to separate the two courtyards, so too acts a ditch ten handbreadths deep and four handbreadths wide. This is true even if the ditch is full of straw or stubble. These do not count as filling up the ditch because people don’t generally leave them there for good. Rather they may store the straw or stubble in the ditch for a while until they need them later on. In other words, it’s still a ditch. Since these are two separate courtyards, each one must have its own eruv.", + "If it was full of earth or gravel, only one eruv may be prepared, but not two. In contrast, usually when people fill a ditch with earth or gravel, it is because they no longer want the ditch. They don’t usually “store” their dirt there, only to get it back later. Once filled with earth or gravel, the ditch is no longer there. Therefore, the two courtyards are actually only one and only one eruv may be prepared." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to deal with a ditch separating two courtyards.", + "If he placed over it a board four handbreadths wide, and so also where two balconies are opposite one another, the residents may prepare two eruvin or, if they prefer, only one. [If the board] was less wide two eruvs may be prepared, but not one. If someone “bridges” the ditch with a board four handbreadths wide, the two courtyards can now be treated as one. The board is to the ditch like the opening was to the wall both serve as passages from one courtyard to the other. The second clause of the mishnah states the opposite if the board was less than four handbreadths wide, then it does not serve as a passage because people would be hesitant about crossing. In such a case each courtyard must set up its own eruv. The mention of the two balconies is abbreviated here and must be fleshed out. The two balconies can join two courtyards if there is a four handbreadth wide board which bridges the two. In such a case they may make either two separate eruvin or one for both. If there is no such board, then they must make separate eruvin." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses a heap of straw that divides two courtyards.", + "If a heap of straw between two courtyards yards was ten handbreadths high, they make two eruvin but not one. Although we learned above in mishnah three that straw that was used to fill a ditch is not significant and that the ditch remains a partition between the two courtyards, here we learn that a heap of straw itself can serve as such a partition. This is because people sometimes do use heaps of straw in order to divide areas.", + "These may feed [their cattle] from this side and these may feed from the other side. Just as it was permitted to eat the produce on top of the wall, so too cattle-owners on each side can allow their cattle to graze from either side of the straw heap.", + "If the height of the straw heap was reduced to less than ten handbreadths, one eruv may be prepared but not two. If the heap of straw became less than ten handbreadths high, it ceases to serve as a partition, and then both courtyards must share an eruv." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah discusses how one sets up an “alley partnership”, which in Hebrew is called a “shittuf mavoi”. This type of eruv (common meal) allows people from different courtyards to carry within the alley which leads from the courtyards out to the public domain. There are a few differences between courtyard eruvin and alley partnerships. A courtyard eruv must consist of bread, whereas any food will suffice for an alley partnership. Secondly, all members of the courtyard must participate in the eruv, whereas one person who lives off the alley can confer ownership of some food to all who live in the alley and thereby render it effective as a commonly owned meal without the financial contribution of others.", + "How does one make an “alley partnership”? One [of the residents] places a jar and declares, “Behold, this belongs to all the residents of the alley”, and he confers possession upon [the other residents] through his adult son or daughter, through his Hebrew servant or maidservant or through his wife. But he may not confer possession through his minor son or daughter or through his Canaanite slave or female slave, because their hand is as his hand. How does one make an “alley partnership”? One [of the residents] places a jar and declares, “Behold, this belongs to all the residents of the alley”, and he confers possession upon [the other residents] through his adult son or daughter, through his Hebrew servant or maidservant or through his wife. But he may not confer possession through his minor son or daughter or through his Canaanite slave or female slave, because their hand is as his hand. The mishnah describes two stages ways in setting up an alley partnership. The first stage is to take a jar of any type of food and to declare that he confers joint ownership of the food on all of the residents of the alley. The announcement serves to let everyone know what he is doing so that they will know that they can carry in the alley. He then takes this jar of food and gives it to another person who will accept it on behalf of all of the residents of the alley. However, in order for this transfer to be valid the other person must be independent of the giver. A man’s adult children, wife and Hebrew servants are all independent of him and therefore he may transfer through them ownership of the food to the other people in the alley. This is true even if he provides food and shelter for these people. The mishnah need not state that he could confer ownership through other people to whom he is not related. However, he may not transfer ownership through his non-Jewish (called Canaanite) slaves since he owns them. When he gives them something it does not leave his possession since they too are in his possession." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is a continuation of yesterday’s mishnah which discussed how one sets up an alley partnership.", + "If the food was reduced, he must add to it and confer possession [upon the other residents] but he need not inform them. In tomorrow’s mishnah we will learn that there is a minimum amount of food that is necessary for the eruv to be valid. If the amount of food is reduced (before Shabbat begins) he (or another one of the residents) must add to it to make it reach the minimum measure. He must confer ownership of this extra food upon the other residents of the alley, in the same way that he did when he set up the eruv to begin with. However, since he already announced that he was setting up an alley partnership, and thereby let all of the residents know that he was including them, he need not inform them that he is adding to the food.", + "If the number of residents has increased, he must add food and confer possession [upon them], and he must inform them. As we will learn tomorrow, the size of the eruv is somewhat related to the number of residents in the alley. If between when he set up the eruv and the beginning of Shabbat the number of residents increased (this is admittedly unlikely) he might have to increase the food in the eruv. When doing this he must again confer possession upon them and in this case he must inform them of what he is doing, because some of the residents were not there when he made his original announcement." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah introduces how much food must be set aside for both courtyard eruvin and alley partnership.", + "What is the quantity required?
When the residents are many there should be food sufficient for two meals for all of them; According to the Talmud, “many” means that there are more than 18 residents in the courtyard or alley. In such a case they need leave enough food for two meals (this will be more fully explained in 8:2). Even if there are a thousand residents, two meals is sufficient to count as an eruv for all of them.", + "And when they are few there should be food of the size of a dried fig for each one. If there are fewer residents, then there has to be food the size of a dried fig for each one. If “fewer residents” means that there are less than 18 residents, it means that there the eruv “18 dried figs”. According to the Talmud, two meals must be more than 18 dried figs meaning the size of the eruv for courtyards with many residents will always be greater than that for few residents." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first part of this mishnah is a continuation of yesterday’s mishnah. The second part explains why the rabbis instituted courtyard eruvin in the first place.", + "Rabbi Yose says: When does this apply? To the beginnings of the eruv but in the case of the remnants of an eruv even the smallest quantity of food is sufficient, According to Rabbi Yose, the minimum measurement for the eruv provided in yesterday’s mishnah applies only to when the eruv is set up before Shabbat. When one sets up an eruv, it must contain a minimum amount of food. If the eruv is lessened during Shabbat as long as there is a minimum amount that remains, it is still valid.", + "They said that one should set up an eruv for courtyards only so that the law should not be forgotten by the children. This section is usually interpreted as being independent of the previous section. The mishnah addresses the problem of why both courtyard eruvin and alley partnerships are necessary since the alley is larger, it alone should suffice to allow people to carry within its area. The mishnah explains that since alleys are bigger, children will not notice the food set aside for the alley partnership and will think that it is permitted to carry without an eruv at all. Therefore, the rabbis instituted courtyard eruvin so that children would remember that without an eruv one cannot carry things out of one’s house into the courtyard or alley, nor carry things within those two areas. Some commentators explain that this is why the courtyard eruv can be valid even if there only remains a minute amount of food." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn today’s mishnah Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Joshua disagree over whether one can set up an eruv with a broken loaf of bread.", + "They may set up an eruv or a shittuf with all kinds [of food] except for water or salt, the words of Rabbi Eliezer. Rabbi Joshua says: a whole loaf of bread is a valid eruv. Even a baking of one se’ah, if it is a broken loaf, may not be used for eruv while a loaf of the size of an issar, provided it is whole, may be used for eruv. The first line of this mishnah was already taught above in mishnah 3:1, but the context there was border eruvin (eruvei techumin), while here it is courtyard eruvin and alley partnerships (shittufim). Everyone agrees that all types of food except salt and water may be used to set up an eruv. The disagreement in our mishnah is about whether a broken loaf of bread may be used. According to Rabbi Eliezer even a broken loaf is valid. Rabbi Joshua disagrees and holds that only a full loaf is valid. Even if it contains a large amount of dough, even a full seah, if it is broken it is not valid. However, if it is a complete loaf, even if it small, it can count towards one’s eruv. According to the Rambam, a full loaf can constitute an eruv even if it doesn’t meet the minimum requirements listed above in mishnah eight. However, according to Rashi, the small loaf counts towards the eruv, but doesn’t count as the whole eruv unless the minimum requirements are met." + ], + [ + "A man may give a ma’ah to a shopkeeper or a baker in order to acquire a share in the eruv, the words of Rabbi Eliezer.
The sages say: his money acquires no share for him
They agree that in the case of all other men his money may acquire [an eruv for him],
Since they do not prepare an eruv except with one’s consent.
Rabbi Judah says: To what does this apply? To Shabbat border eruvin, but in the case of courtyard eruvin they prepare an eruv with his consent and without his consent, since they confer a benefit on a person in his absence but they do not confer a disability on a person except in his presence.
This mishnah discusses one person’s ability to set up an eruv for someone else.
Section one: According to Rabbi Eliezer, a person can give a small amount of money (a ma’ah, which is a small coin) to a baker or shopkeeper in order that they will contribute from their food toward the eruv on his behalf. The coin acquires for him the food for the eruv and it is as if he is contributing directly toward the eruv.
Section two: The sages disagree because money cannot acquire movable property (things see the first chapter of Kiddushin). In order to acquire something, one must lift it up or at least pull it towards himself. Therefore, he has not acquired the food that the shopkeeper gives for the eruv. Therefore, he has not effectively contributed to the eruv.
Section three: The sages agree with Rabbi Eliezer that if he gives the money to a different person, meaning some sort of agent, and the agent buys the food from the shopkeeper or baker, this is an effective means to set up an eruv. This is effective because the person’s agent validly acquires the food from the shopkeeper or baker by actually taking it from him. Similarly, a person can ask a shopkeeper to set up an eruv on his behalf, since the shopkeeper will give the food to another person, causing the other person to acquire the food, and therefore the shopkeeper is acting as the person’s agent. The only problematic situation is if the person says to the shopkeeper that his money should acquire the eruv since money cannot effect acquisition, this type of eruv setup is invalid.
Section four: Although this section seems attached to the previous one, it is actually separate. According to the first opinion, one cannot set up an eruv without the consent of the person who will benefit from the eruv. This is true, according to this opinion, for both Shabbat border eruvin and courtyard eruvin. Rabbi Judah, on the other hand, says there is a difference between the two types of eruvin. Consent is required to set up a Shabbat border eruv for someone because there is some “disability” in this as well. Namely, if the Shabbat border eruv extends his ability to travel outside the city toward one direction, he loses a commensurate amount in the other direction. Hence, one cannot set up a Shabbat border eruv for someone without his permission. However, one only gains by having a courtyard eruv set up on his behalf and therefore, one can set up a courtyard eruv for someone without their consent." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah deals with how one can set up a collective Shabbat border limit eruv, meaning an eruv that will allow many people to extend their Shabbat border limit by 2000 cubits to one direction.", + "How does one effect participation in connection with Shabbat limits? One sets down a jar and says, “Behold this is for all the inhabitants of my town, for anyone who may desire to go to a house of mourning or to a house of feasting”. Any one who accepted [the eruv] while it was still day is permitted [to enjoy its benefits] but if one did it after dusk he is forbidden, since they do not set up an eruv after dusk. The language of this mishnah is parallel to that of 7:6 above, which discussed alley partnerships. Again, a person takes a jar of food and brings it to wherever he wants to establish his “Shabbat resting place”. It is from this place that his 2000 cubit radius will be counted. He announces that this eruv will count for anyone who wishes to make use of it. However, unlike alley partnership eruvin, Shabbat border eruvin require the person to accept the eruv actively. This is because by accepting the extension on one side of town, he loses on the other side of town. The person must accept the eruv before Shabbat begins, since this is the determinative moment for the establishment of eruvin. He cannot accept the eruv after Shabbat has already begun. Note that the mishnah mentions two common reasons why one would set up a border eruv to pay a shivah call or to visit a house of feasting, a place where a wedding was being celebrated (a wedding which took place before Shabbat). The reason why the mishnah mentioned these examples is that the mishnah holds that one can set up a border eruv only in order to attend to a mitzvah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses the minimum measure of food which is need for a Shabbat border eruv.", + "What is the minimum measure [for Shabbat border eruvin]?
Food for two meals for each person, for weekdays and not for Shabbat, the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Judah says: for Shabbat and not for weekdays. And both intended to give a leniency. According to Rabbi Meir, the eruv must consist of enough food for two weekday meals. Rabbi Judah says the food should be enough for Shabbat meals and not weekday meals. Seemingly we would think that a person eats more on Shabbat than during the week, so Rabbi Judah would be stricter than Rabbi Meir. However, the mishnah says that both intended to be lenient. In order to understand this, we need to explain that the eruv’s minimum measurement was set according to the amount of bread eaten at a typical meal. According to Rabbi Meir, on Shabbat one eats a lot of different types of food and a lot of bread to accompany the food. Therefore, on Shabbat one eats more, and the minimum amount of food for the eruv is set according to the bread eaten during the week, a lesser amount. According to Rabbi Judah, since on Shabbat there are many side dishes a person eats less bread than he would during the week when there are less side dishes. Therefore, Rabbi Judah sets the minimum amount of bread for the eruv according to what one eats on Shabbat.", + "Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka says: not less than a loaf that is purchased for a pondium when the price of wheat is four se’ah for a sela. Rabbi Yohanan ben Baroka gives a minimum amount of bread that must be used for the eruv. This amount of bread is what is sufficient for two meals. It is the size of a loaf that can be bought for one pundion (a coin) when 4 se’ah (24 kav, a measure of volume) of wheat are sold for a sela (a coin worth 48 pundion). If we do the math, we can see that a kav of wheat is bought for two pundionim, meaning that one pundion will buy half a kav of wheat, which according to Rabbi Yohanan ben Baroka is sufficient for two meals.", + "Rabbi Shimon says: two thirds of a loaf, when three [loaves] are made from a kav [of wheat]. Half of this loaf is the size prescribed for a leprous house, and half of its half is the size that disqualifies one’s body [from eating terumah]. According to Rabbi Shimon, two meals are equivalent to two-thirds of a loaf when three loaves are made from a kav of wheat. A loaf is therefore 1/3 of a kav and 2/3 of a loaf is two meals. This is a smaller amount than that set by Rabbi Yohanan ben Baroka. Rabbi Shimon now mentions two other halakhot which are connected to the size of a loaf of bread he mentioned above. Half of this loaf, meaning 1/6 of a kav is related to the laws of an infected (leprous house). One who stays in the house long enough to eat a loaf of bread of this size is impure. Half of this, meaning 1/12 of a kav is relevant to disqualifying someone from eating terumah. This means that a person who eats 1/12 of a kav of impure food cannot eat terumah until he immerses in a mikveh." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah goes back to discussing courtyard eruvin.", + "If the tenants of a courtyard and the tenants of its gallery forgot and did not participate [together] in the eruv, anything that is higher than ten handbreadths belongs to the [residents of the] gallery, and anything lower belongs to the [residents of the] courtyard. The “gallery” is like a porch off the second floor of a building. It is open to the building and it has steps that lead down to the courtyard. The tenants of the lower floor and those of the upper floor forgot to jointly set up the eruv so that the people from the upper floor could carry in the courtyard. Rather each set of residents set up their own eruv. The mishnah rules that anything that is in the courtyard that is above ten handbreadths is considered to be in the domain of the people who live on the upper floor, and they may use it and anything on it, and carry while in those areas. Those of the lower floor may use only that which is lower than ten handbreadths. In other words, we divide the domain at ten handbreadths high anything above belongs to the upper eruv and anything below belongs to the lower eruv. The reason is that above ten handbreadths is easier for those on the upper floor to use, while things below are easier for those on the lower floor to use.", + "The rim around a cistern, or a rock, if they are ten handbreadths high they belong to the gallery but if lower than they belong to the courtyard. They used to build a rim of earth around a cistern to serve as the cistern’s railing so people wouldn’t fall in. If this rim, or any rock in the courtyard is higher than ten handbreadths high, then it belongs to the residents of the gallery. If it is lower than that, then only the residents of the courtyard may use it. The mishnah mentions these because they are normal examples of things found in a courtyard that may be more than ten handbreadths high.", + "To what does this apply? To one that is adjacent to the gallery, but one that is distanced from it, even if ten handbreadths high, belongs to the courtyard. And what is regarded as adjacent? One that is not further than four handbreadths. The previous rule only applies to things that are adjacent to the gallery. If they are within four handbreadths, then the people who live on the upper floor can reach over and use these areas. However, if they are farther away, then even something above ten handbreadths can be used only by the residents of the courtyard." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses the status of certain structures within a courtyard. As we shall learn, only places that are considered to be “dwelling places” are considered in dealing with various laws of eruvin.", + "If one put his eruv in a gate-house, a portico or a gallery it is not a valid eruv; And one who dwells in it does not prohibit [others from carrying if he doesn’t participate in the eruv]. The gate-house is a hut in the courtyard in which the guard sits. The “portico” is an open but covered area in front of the house. Pillars hold the roof up. The gallery was explained in yesterday’s mishnah. Since these are not dwelling places, one cannot put the eruv (the meal) in them. The eruv must be put in a place that is considered to be a place of dwelling. Furthermore, since these are not normal dwelling places if a person does dwell there and does not participate in the eruv, he doesn’t prohibit the other people of the courtyard from using the eruv, as would a resident in a normal dwelling place who did not participate in the eruv.", + "[If one put his eruv] in a straw-shed, a cattle-shed, a wood-shed or storehouse it is a valid eruv; And one who dwells in it prohibits [others from carrying if he doesn’t participate in the eruv]. Rabbi Judah says: if the householder has there any ownership the resident does not prohibit. In contrast, the straw-shed, cattle-shed, wood-shed and storehouse are considered to be dwelling places and therefore an eruv which is put there is valid. Since these are considered living places, if someone who dwells there does not participate in the eruv, he renders the eruv ineffective and prohibits the other residents of the courtyard from carrying there. Rabbi Judah refines the previous halakhah and says that if the householder owns rights to one of the sheds, the fact that the person who dwells there doesn’t participate in the eruv does not render it invalid. Even if the homeowner only has the right to use the shed, without actually owning the shed at all, the shed-dweller’s ownership is not considered complete. Only if the person who dwells in the shed fully owns it and the homeowner has no rights to it, then the shed-dweller renders the eruv ineffective if he doesn’t participate." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with a resident of a courtyard who does not spend Shabbat in his own home. The question is, if he doesn’t participate in the eruv, does he render it ineffective for the other residents?", + "One who leaves his house and goes to spend Shabbat in another town, whether he was a Gentile or an Israelite, he prohibits [the other residents from using the eruv], the words of Rabbi Meir. According to Rabbi Meir, although the person is not present, the very fact that he owns a home in the courtyard and that home does not participate in the eruv, means that the entire eruv is ineffective.", + "Rabbi Judah says: he does not prohibit. Rabbi Judah diametrically opposes Rabbi Meir. He holds that when a person is not present in his home, his lack of participation does not prohibit others from using the eruv. When he is not there he is not considered one of the owner’s of the courtyard and therefore he need not participate.", + "Rabbi Yose says: a Gentile prohibits but an Israelite does not prohibit because it is not usual for an Israelite to return on Shabbat. Rabbi Yose agrees with Rabbi Judah that if he doesn’t dwell in the courtyard he doesn’t count as one of the courtyard’s residents, at least as long as he’s not there. However, since a Gentile may return on Shabbat, he does render the eruv ineffective. In contrast, a Jew will not be likely to return on Shabbat and hence does not render the eruv ineffective.", + "Rabbi Shimon says: even if he left his house and went to spend Shabbat with his daughter in the same town he does not prohibit, since he turned his attention away. Rabbi Yose implied that if the Jew was likely to return on Shabbat, his lack of participation might indeed render the eruv ineffective. Rabbi Shimon goes a step further. Even if the Jew is spending Shabbat in a nearby courtyard within the same town, and therefore might return, the fact that he is not actually there means that he doesn’t render the eruv ineffective. Since he turned his attention away from his own courtyard and decided to spend Shabbat elsewhere, we don’t treat his courtyard as if he is actually there." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with a cistern situated between two courtyards, when the two courtyards have set up separate eruvin. In other words, the wall that separates the courtyard goes over the well, leaving half the cistern on one side and half on the other. The mishnah teaches how they can set up the cistern so that people from both courtyards can draw water from it on Shabbat.", + "A cistern between two courtyards they do not fill up from it on Shabbat, unless they made for it a partition ten handbreadths high, whether above, below or from its rim. Without a partition, it is forbidden for residents of either courtyard to draw from the cistern, since it belongs partly to other people, since half of the cistern is in other people’s domains. The only way that both sides can use the cistern is if they make a special partition, more than just the wall that separates the two courtyards. According to the first opinion in the mishnah, it doesn’t matter whether or not the partition is above or below the water, it is effective. In the Talmud, Rav Judah explains that “below the water” means that most of the partition is below the water, whereas “above the water” means that most of the partition is above the water, but there is at least some partition, at least one handbreadth, in the water.", + "Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: Bet Shammai say: below, And Bet Hillel say: above. According to Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel, this question was debated by Bet Hillel and Bet Shammai. Bet Shammai holds that the partition must be below the water, a more stringent position. The partition must actually divide the water between the two courtyards so that the residents of different courtyards are not really sharing any of the water. In contrast, Bet Hillel is lenient and allows the partition to be above or below the water. The anonymous opinion in section one was according to Bet Hillel.", + "Rabbi Judah said: the partition could not be more effective than the wall between the two courtyards. According to Rabbi Judah, the wall that separates the two courtyards is sufficient in and of itself to allow the residents of both courtyards to draw from the cistern. The wall which is above the cistern is fictionally drawn down through the cistern and is considered as if it divides the cistern in half, even if in reality it does not." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with drawing water from a water-channel that goes through a courtyard.", + "A water channel that passes through a courtyard they do not draw water from there on Shabbat unless they made for it a partition ten handbreadths high at its entrance and exit. The water channel is at least four handbreadths wide and ten handbreadths deep, and therefore it is a separate domain, one that is called a “karmelit”. Since the courtyard is a private domain, it is forbidden to draw water from the “karmelit” on Shabbat. In order to allow drawing water from it, they need to make a special partition above or below it, as we learned concerning the cistern in yesterday’s mishnah. In this case, they must make the partition both at the channel’s entrance and the channel’s exit.", + "Rabbi Judah says: the wall above it may be regarded as a partition. As he did in yesterday’s mishnah, Rabbi Judah holds that the courtyard wall, which goes over the channel, is sufficient to allow drawing from it on Shabbat.", + "Rabbi Judah said: it happened with the water-channel of Avel that they would draw water was from it on Shabbat on the authority of the elders. They said to him: because it was not of the prescribed size. Rabbi Judah relates a story that took place in Avel (a town in the Lower Galilee) where people drew from the channel on Shabbat, and the elders who were in the courtyard allowed it to happen. The Sages respond that the reason that the elders allowed people to draw from this channel was that it was not four handbreadths wide and ten deep. In such a case it is not its own domain, but rather it takes on the status of the domain in which it is situation. Therefore, everyone agrees that the residents of the courtyard can draw from it. Thee elders of Avel did not permit the drawing of the water because of the wall, as Rabbi Judah believed." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to deal with drawing water on Shabbat.", + "A balcony that was situated above the water, they do not draw water from there on Shabbat, unless they made for it a partition ten handbreadths high either above or below [the water]. The mishnah is dealing with a balcony which is situated over a stream that runs below it. There is a hole in the floor of the balcony from which they normally draw water. The mishnah says that they cannot draw water because the stream is a “karmelit” (a domain which is neither public nor private) and the balcony is a private domain. However, if they made a partition which surrounds the balcony and the stream they may draw water from the stream because we consider the water to be within the private domain of the balcony. The partition needs to be ten handbreadths high to be a valid partition, but it may be either above or below the water. Others explain that the partition is either hanging below the floor of the balcony or is on the balcony itself, around the hole in the floor.", + "So also two balconies, one on top of the other. In this case there are two balconies, one above the other, and below the lower one is the stream, from which they draw water through a hole in the floor. If they wish to draw water on Shabbat, they must make a partition for both the upper and lower balconies.", + "If they made [a partition] for the upper one but not for the lower one, they are both prohibited until they make an eruv. If they made a partition for the upper balcony but not for the lower balcony, neither may draw water. This is because the people from the upper balcony draw their water through the lower balcony, which does not have a partition. The same would be true if they set up a partition for the lower balcony, but not for the upper balcony. Since the people of the upper balcony have usage rights to the hole in the floor of the lower balcony, their lack of a partition prohibits those of the lower balcony from drawing as well. However, all of these prohibitions refer only to a case where they didn’t set up a joint eruv. If they set up a joint eruv, then it is all one domain and they may all draw water." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nWhereas the previous mishnayot dealt with drawing water from cisterns or streams, today’s mishnah deals with pouring out water inside a courtyard. The problem is that this may be considered taking something from the private domain and moving it to the public domain. Our mishnah deals with when this is considered a problem and when it is not.", + "A courtyard which is less than four cubits: they may not pour out water in it on Shabbat unless they made a trough holding two se’ah from its drainage point downwards, regardless of whether [the trough] was outside or inside, except that if it was outside it is necessary to cover it and if it inside it is not necessary to cover it. In a courtyard which is larger than four square cubits, the sages allowed one to pour out water because they assumed that the water would be absorbed in the ground and would not make it out to the public domain. Even if the water should escape to the public domain, since the person didn’t intend to pour water from a private to a public domain, he has not transgressed any commandments. However, the sages prohibited pouring water out onto the ground in a courtyard smaller than four square cubits lest the water goes from the public to the private domain. He is allowed to pour water out onto the ground in a small courtyard if he makes a drainage trough to catch the water before it goes out to the public domain. The trough must be able to hold at least two se’ah of liquid (about 24 liters), which the sages estimated to be the average amount of water that a person would use in day. The drainage point was at the top of the trough, to allow overflowing liquid a way out. The mishnah teaches that the trough can either be in or outside the courtyard’s walls. Even though if it is outside the courtyard, it is in the public domain, it is still not considered part of the public domain. However, if he makes it outside, he must cover lest he make the trough four by four handbreadths wide and three handbreadths deep in which case it is a karmelit. It would be prohibited to pour water from a private domain (inside the courtyard) to a karmelit. If he covers it, it is no longer considered a karmelit. If he makes the trough inside the courtyard, like the courtyard, the trough is also a private domain and there is therefore no need to cover it." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah is a continuation of yesterday’s mishnah, which dealt with the problem of pouring out waste water on Shabbat. Today’s mishnah deals with a person who is in a courtyard and wants to pour his waste water into a sewage drain which leads out to the public domain.", + "Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov says: a sewage drain which is covered over four cubits in the public domain, it is permitted to pour water into it on Shabbat. The person is in his courtyard and wants to pour water out into the sewage drain. If the drain is four cubits long in the public domain but is covered, then he may pour out the water, according to Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov. This is because an area four cubits long and four cubits wide is sufficient to absorb the average amount of water a person uses during the day. The covered drain has the same status as the courtyard itself, and therefore, it is as if the water remains in the courtyard. Even though the water will afterwards leave the covered part and go into the non-covered part of the drain, he is still allowed to do so because he initially put the water into the covered part.", + "But the Sages say: even where a roof or a courtyard was a hundred cubits in area, he may not pour water over the mouth of the drain, but he may pour upon the roof, and the water will flow into the drain. The Sages are more strict than Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov and say that he should never pour water into a sewage drain, even if 100 cubits of it are covered by a roof or if he is 100 cubits from the exit to the public domain. The Talmud explains that this is prohibited lest people think that he is pouring directly into the public domain, and think that just as it is permitted to pour water from the private domain into the public domain, so too it is permitted to carry things from one domain to the other. However, the sages do allow one to pour water on a roof or on the ground in the courtyard, even though the water will then flow to the sewage drain, since this is more indirect.", + "The courtyard and the portico combined to make up the four cubits. This section refers back to yesterday’s mishnah which taught that if the courtyard was smaller than four square cubits, it is forbidden to pour water out onto the ground unless there is a drainage trough. The mishnah now states that the portico (an area with columns supporting a roof) counts towards the size of the courtyard, so that if the two together add up to four cubits, one may pour out water there." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to deal with pouring out water. The situation is one in which two buildings are opposite from each other in a courtyard that is less than four cubits.", + "So too in the case of two two-storied buildings this one opposite that one: if some of the tenants made a trough and others did not, those who made the trough are permitted to pour down their water, but those who did not make any trough are forbidden. The basic message of this mishnah is that every row of buildings needs its own drainage trough, whether or not people are living in all of the buildings. If there is only one trough, then only the side that made the trough can pour water out. The difficulty with this mishnah is determining whether or not they set up an eruv. If they set up an eruv together, then both sides should be permitted, and if they didn’t, then neither side should be. The Talmud explains that the mishnah relates to a case where they did not set up an eruv. Pouring out water into the drain is permitted even without an eruv, but the sages said that only the side that set up the eruv is allowed to do so lest the people from the other side take out their waste-water containers and carry them to the other side’s drainage ditches. Without an eruv carrying out these vessels would be prohibited. However, if the two sides set up an eruv, it matters not how many drainage ditches there are and all may pour there water out into even one ditch." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with carrying from one roof to another. In order to understand this mishnah we need to remember that without an eruv it is only prohibited to carry things from the house to the courtyard. Even without an eruv it is permitted to carry things from one courtyard to another, provided those things were in the courtyard when Shabbat began.", + "All the roofs of a town are a single domain, provided no roof is ten handbreadths higher or lower [than the neighboring roof], the words of Rabbi Meir. According to Rabbi Meir, one is allowed to carry vessels from roof to roof even without an eruv, as long as the vessels were on the roof when Shabbat began. However, if one roof is higher or lower ten handbreadths than the next, it is prohibited, since they are then considered to be two different domains.", + "The Sages say: each one is its own domain. The Sages hold that just as it is prohibited to carry from one house to another without an eruv, so too it is prohibited to carry from one roof to another without an eruv. In other words, the roof is treated as an extension of the house below. In contrast, it is permitted to carry from courtyard to courtyard because there is no area below which is prohibited.", + "Rabbi Shimon says: roofs, courtyards and karpafs are all one domain with regard to objects that were within them when Shabbat began, but not with regard to objects that were in the house when Shabbat began. Rabbi Shimon holds that it is permitted to carry from roof to roof, from courtyard to courtyard and from karpaf to karpaf (a karpaf is a small area behind the home used to store wood or other things) as long as the vessels were in those areas (and not in the house) when Shabbat began. However, if they were in the house when Shabbat began, without an eruv it is forbidden to take them out. Rabbi Shimon basically agrees with Rabbi Meir but does not make any exception for roofs which are ten handbreadths higher or lower than the others." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with situations in which an area, either a roof or a courtyard, is missing one wall. As we shall see, if the wall is totally missing, it is prohibited to carry in this area.", + "A large roof close to a small roof: the large one is permitted but that of the small one is forbidden. The mishnah describes a situation where there is a large roof and a small roof that share one wall. The fourth wall of the small roof is totally open to the large roof. Since the small roof has only three closed walls, it is forbidden to carry on the small roof. However, the large roof’s fourth side is not completely open to the small roof; only the middle part of that side is open. At the ends of each side, there would be existing sections of walls. These partial walls count as a full wall and it is permitted to carry on the larger roof.", + "If [the wall of a] large courtyard which shared a wall with a small courtyard was broken down, the use of the large one is permitted, but that of the smaller one is forbidden, because the gap is like a doorway to the large one. This section is exactly the same situation as above, but it describes courtyards instead of roofs. The gap in the wall is like a doorway for the larger courtyard, but for the small courtyard the gap means that it is simply a missing wall. Therefore, it is forbidden to carry in the smaller courtyard.", + "If [the wall of a] courtyard which shared a wall with the public domain was broken down, one who brings from it into a private domain or from a private domain into it is liable, the words of Rabbi Eliezer. The sages say: from it into the public domain or from the public domain into it he is exempt because it is like a karmelit. In this case, the wall of a courtyard is broken and opens to the public domain. The wall is either completely fallen down, or at least 10 cubits of it have fallen down. According to Rabbi Eliezer, the courtyard now has the same status as that of the public domain. Therefore, one who carries from there into another private domain or from a private domain into there is liable for transgressing Shabbat. The rabbis disagree with Rabbi Eliezer and say that the courtyard has the status of a karmelit, a domain which is neither like the public domain nor like the private domain. Hence, while it is still forbidden to carry an object in or out of this area, one who does so is not liable for a toraitic transgression of Shabbat." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with an area in which it was permitted to carry when Shabbat began but then in some way the area changed during Shabbat such that had it been that way when Shabbat began it would have been forbidden to carry in the area.", + "The mishnah describes three situations in which it was permitted to carry in an area when Shabbat began and then during Shabbat the area changed such that it became an area in which it is prohibited to carry. The first is a courtyard whose walls broke down from two directions, opening it up either to a karmelit or to a public domain. The Talmud explains that this refers to a corner of the courtyard and not two opposite directions. Even if this breach is smaller than 10 cubits it is still not considered an “opening” to the courtyard (if it were considered an opening it would be permitted to carry), nor can this type of breach in the wall be repaired with a cross-beam or post (see above 1:6). The second situation is a house whose wall broke down from two directions, meaning at its corner. The third situation is an alley which had been properly enclosed with either a cross-beam or side-post (see again 1:6) but they were removed. When the cross-beam or side-post was in place it allowed people to carry in the alley, if an eruv had been set up.", + "A courtyard [whose walls] were breached from two sides, and so also a house [whose walls] were breached from two of its sides, or an alley from which the cross-beam or side-post was removed:
They are permitted for that Shabbat but prohibited for the future, the words of Rabbi Judah. According to Rabbi Judah, since it was permitted to carry in these areas when Shabbat began, it is permitted to carry there for all of Shabbat. However, in future Shabbatot it will be prohibited unless the problems are fixed.", + "Rabbi Yose says: if they are permitted on that Shabbat they are also permitted for the future and if they are prohibited in the future, they are also prohibited for that Shabbat. Rabbi Yose does not allow a situation where it would be permitted for the current Shabbat but prohibited in future Shabbatot. Perhaps this would be too confusing for people and they would come to think that if they can carry this Shabbat, then they can carry on subsequent Shabbatot as well, not realizing that when this Shabbat began the walls or cross-beam/side-post was still in place. Hence, Rabbi Yose holds that since it will be prohibited in the future (without repairs), it is prohibited for the current Shabbat as well." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah deals with carrying underneath areas that are considered to be public domains.", + "One who builds an upper room on the top of two houses, and so too in the case of viaducts, they may carry underneath them on Shabbat, the words of Rabbi Judah. But the sages prohibit this. There are two situations described in this section. In the first a person builds an upper chamber on top of two houses, meaning it spans two houses which are on opposite sides of the public domain. This means that people below are passing through a “covered public domain”. Similarly, a viaduct is a bridge which passes over the public domain, such that the people who walk beneath it are passing through a covered public domain. Rabbi Judah says that one can carry in a covered public domain, and therefore one can carry in these areas. According to the Talmud, we fictionally draw the edges of the roofs down to the ground so that the public domain has four walls, making it in essence a private domain. The rabbis prohibit carrying in this type of area. Although they do not consider the area to truly be a public domain, and one who carries there is not liable for a Toraitic transgression, it is nevertheless prohibited.", + "Rabbi Judah moreover said: an eruv may be prepared for an alley that is a thoroughfare; But the sages forbid this. Most of the alleys that we have been discussing up until now have been alleys with only one open end. All agree that one can set up an eruv for this type of an alley. They disagree with regard to an alley which is open on two ends, one which people can use as a thoroughfare. Rabbi Judah says that one may set up an eruv even for an alley with two open ends whereas the rabbis say that this type of alley is like a public domain and it is forbidden to set up an eruv there." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThe final chapter of Eruvin is a sort of appendix to all of tractates Shabbat and Eruvin. It contains assorted rules which deal with both topics.\nToday’s and tomorrow’s mishnah deals with a person who finds a pair of tefillin in the public domain and wishes to bring them into the private domain to protect them.", + "One who finds tefillin should bring them in one pair at a time. Rabban Gamaliel says: two pairs at a time. One who finds tefillin in a place where they may come to be damaged should not just leave them there. However, on Shabbat he cannot just carry them to safety because of the prohibition against carrying. According to the first opinion in the mishnah, he should put on a pair at a time and wear them until he can get them to a safe place. Then he should remove the pair he is wearing and go out and bring in another pair. The reason that this is allowed is that he is considered to be “wearing” the tefillin and not to be carrying them. A “pair” refers to a set one box for the head and one for the arm. Rabban Gamaliel holds that he can put two pairs on at the same time, because there is room on one’s head for two boxes and on one’s arm for two as well.", + "To what does this apply? To old ones but in the case of new ones he is exempt. The previous halakhah refers only to old sets of tefillin, tefillin which we know were made properly and are valid. However, new pairs of tefillin may not even actually be tefillin (they could be amulets), and even if they are tefillin, they may have been made improperly. Therefore, he is neither mandated to carry them in nor even allowed to do so.", + "If he found them arranged in a set or in bundles he shall wait by them until it is dark and then bring them in. If he finds many sets of tefillin in one place, he can’t bring them in because there are just too many to carry in one (or two) sets at a time. Neither should he just leave them there because they could be damaged. His only option is to sit and guard them until Shabbat is over.", + "In a time of danger, he should cover them and walk away. Guarding or wearing lost tefillin in a time of danger is not mandated. One shouldn’t endanger one’s life to protect a pair of tefillin. Therefore, if it is dangerous to either wear or guard them, the mishnah gives one permission to first cover them up so that they will not be noticed, and then to walk away and leave them there. The “danger” referred to in our mishnah refers to a time when the Roman authorities forbade the observance of commandments. This is probably the Hadrianic persecutions which preceded and followed the Bar-Kokhba revolt in 135 C.E. We should note that the Talmud ties the debate in section one to the issue of whether or not one is commanded to wear tefillin on Shabbat. Some tannaim hold that one does not wear tefillin on Shabbat and some hold that they are worn. The accepted halakhah is that they are not worn." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is a continuation of yesterday’s mishnah, in which we discussed carrying tefillin in from the public domain.", + "Rabbi Shimon says: he should pass them [the tefillin] to his fellow and his fellow should pass them to his fellow, and so on, until they reach the outermost courtyard. Rabbi Shimon is more lenient than the sages in the previous mishnah concerning bringing tefillin in from the public domain. While he also obviously cannot just allow a person to carry them in himself since this would be a toraitic prohibition, he does allow one to pass them in from person to person. Since no single person carries the tefillin more than four cubits in the public domain (which would be a toraitic transgression) this is allowed in order to protect the tefillin. Once the tefillin get to the outermost courtyard, where they will be protected, they shouldn’t pass them any further.", + "The same is true in the case of his child: he passes him to his fellow and his fellow passes him to his fellow, and so on, even if there are a hundred. This refers to a child who is born out on the field on Shabbat. The father (or anyone else) may not just carry him, since carrying a child who cannot walk on his own is a violation of carrying on Shabbat. Rather what he should do, according to Rabbi Shimon, is pass him from person to person until the child reaches the city. According to the Talmud, the other sages disagree with Rabbi Shimon and hold that in cases such as this, it would be better for one person to carry the child all the way back, as long as he stops to rest before he walks four cubits at one time. In such a way, he does not commit a toraitic transgression of Shabbat. This is preferred because this involves far less people than does Rabbi Shimon’s suggestion. In contrast, Rabbi Shimon reasons that advising someone to carry for a distance of less than four cubits at a time is dangerous because he may easily walk too far and thereby commit a toraitic transgression. We see here that there is a debate over what is worse the appearance of many people together carrying something on Shabbat, or the possibility that one person may commit an actual toraitic transgression.", + "Rabbi Judah says: one may pass a jar to his fellow and his fellow may pass it to his fellow even beyond the Shabbat limit. They said to him: this must not go further than the feet of its owner. Rabbi Judah extends the halakhah stated by Rabbi Shimon above to include a situation where someone is stuck outside of the Shabbat border and need food or water on Shabbat. People from within the city may pass food or water out to him, even if it goes beyond the Shabbat limit. The sages partially disagree and hold that one may not pass something beyond the place to which the object’s owner may himself go. If the owner was dwelling in the city when Shabbat began, then just as he may not go beyond the Shabbat limit, so too his belongings may not be passed beyond that limit." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with a person who was reading a scroll while in one domain and the end of the scroll rolled out of his hand and went into another domain. He is left holding only one end of the scroll. The question is: can he roll it back to himself?", + "If one was reading a scroll on a threshold and the scroll rolled out of his hand, he may roll it back to himself. This person is not in the house but on the threshold of the house. The threshold is considered a “karmelit” a place that is neither a public nor a private domain. The scroll’s end rolls out of his hand and goes into the public domain. The mishnah allows him to roll it back to himself due to two factors: 1) he still holds one end of the scroll. Therefore, the scroll has not totally gone into the public domain. 2) The threshold is a karmelit and not a private domain.", + "If he was reading on the top of a roof and the scroll rolled out of his hand: Before it reached ten handbreadths from the ground, he may roll it back to himself; But after it had reached ten handbreadths from the ground he must turn it over with its writing downwards. In this case he is on the roof which is considered a private domain, and the scroll’s end falls down toward the ground. According to the first opinion, if the scroll gets to within ten handbreadths of the ground he may not roll it back. The area within ten handbreadths of the ground is considered to be part of the public domain, and it is forbidden to roll something back from the public domain into a private domain. What he should do in such a situation is turn the scroll over on its face in order to protect the side which has the writing. As we shall see below, this isn’t just any scroll, it’s a biblical scroll (a Scroll!) whose writing must be protected. If the scroll did not reach ten handbreadths within the ground then he may roll it back because it has not yet reached the public domain.", + "Rabbi Judah says: even if it was removed from the ground by no more than a thread's thickness he may roll it back to himself. According to Rabbi Judah, even if the scroll has reached ten handbreadths of the ground, it is still permissible to roll it back, as long as it has not touched the ground itself. Rabbi Judah seems to disagree with the previous opinion concerning whether or not the area ten handbreadths from the ground has the same status as the ground itself.", + "Rabbi Shimon says: even if it touched the actual ground he may roll it back to himself, since no prohibition that is due to “Shabbat rest” stands before the Holy Writings. Rabbi Shimon holds that in all cases this is permitted since this is a prohibition that is not “deoraita” from the Torah, but rather due to “Shabbat rest” (shevut). This term denotes an prohibition that the rabbis added to those of the Torah, the point of which is to preserve the character of Shabbat as a day of rest. In this case, rolling the scroll back is only a violation of “Shabbat rest” and not a deoraita violation. The reason for this is that he holds one end of the scroll in his hand when he rolls it back he is not taking something that is completely in the public domain and bringing it into the public domain. According to Rabbi Shimon, the respect and concern for the Holy Writings outweighs the rabbinic prohibition, and therefore he may roll it back." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah contains two independent mishnayot. The first deals with a ledge in front of a window and the second deals with a person standing in one domain and moving objects in another.", + "If there was a ledge in front of a window it is permitted to put objects on it or to remove objects from it on Shabbat. The ledge in front of the window of a house is assumedly more than ten handbreadths above the public domain. As we learned in yesterday’s mishnah, the air more than ten handbreadths above the public domain is not considered to be part of the public domain. Therefore, it is permitted to move objects from the house onto the ledge and vice versa. Some commentaries add that the ledge must be four handbreadths wide and long so that it can be considered a private domain.", + "A man may stand in a private domain and move objects in a public domain or he may stand in a public domain and move objects in a private domain, provided he does not take them beyond four cubits. The mishnah teaches that a man may stand in one domain and move objects within another domain and that we are not concerned lest he come to bring something from one domain into the other. Had we had that concern we would not have allowed him to stand in one domain and even touch an object in another domain. The only thing that he is not allowed to do is stand in the private domain and move an object four cubits in the public domain, since this is always prohibited." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with moving body fluids, urine and spit, from one domain to the other.", + "A man may not stand in a private domain and urinate in a public domain or in a public domain and urinate in a private domain, and similarly he may not spit. It is forbidden to stand on Shabbat in one domain and urinate or spit into another domain. The Talmud adds that one who does so is liable to bring a sin offering, which means that this is considered a toraitic violation. We might have thought that since the urine and spit come from his own body that he is not liable, therefore the mishnah comes to teach us that he is liable.", + "Rabbi Judah says: even when a person’s spit accumulated in his mouth, he must not walk four cubits before he spat out. Rabbi Judah adds that one is liable even for carrying accumulated spit in one’s mouth. Note that this is only true once the spit has accumulated otherwise he would be obligated to spit (or swallow) every four cubits." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with standing in one domain and drinking from another.", + "A man may not stand in a private domain and drink in the public domain or stand in a public domain and drink in a private domain unless he puts his head and the greater part of his body into the domain in which he drinks. If one stands in one domain and drinks from another, he is considered to be bringing water from one domain to the other. This is the opposite of the case of urinating in the previous mishnah. However, this is permitted if his head and most of his body are in the domain in which he is drinking. Even though his legs are in the other domain, since the water won’t really go directly down to his legs this is permitted.", + "And similarly concerning a winepress. The same rule as above also applies to standing outside of a winepress and drinking directly from the winepress. This is prohibited unless his head and most of his body is in the area of the winepress. The Talmud explains that this is prohibited even if the winepress is only a karmelit and not a private domain.", + "A man may intercept water from a gutter at a level below ten handbreadths, This refers to someone standing in the public domain who wishes to collect the runoff rainwater overflowing from the gutters on a roof. He may not collect this water directly from the gutter because the gutter is in the private domain and he is in the public domain. What he should do is put his vessel ten handbreadths within the ground of the public domain and catch the water there. Once the water is within the ten handbreadths mark it is already in the public domain and he is therefore not taking water from one domain to another.", + "And from a water-spout he may drink in any manner. Whereas the gutter goes all the way around the wall, the water spout goes straight from the wall emptying out in the public domain. It does not have the status of a private domain and therefore he may drink directly from it." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with drawing water from a nearby cistern into a house or pouring water out from a house into a nearby garbage heap. In both cases this is allowed so long as both areas are private domains.", + "If a cistern in a public domain had an embankment ten handbreadths high, it is permitted to draw water from it on the sabbath through a window above it. Around a cistern they would make a rim of earth. If this rim was higher than ten handbreadths, then it and all of the area from the ground and above is considered to be a private domain. The window is also a private domain and therefore, one could draw water from the cistern through the window.", + "If a garbage heap in a public domain was ten handbreadths high, it is permitted to pour water on it on Shabbat from a window above it. This is basically the same situation as in the previous section. If the garbage heap is ten handbreadths high then it is a private domain, and again he is taking something (the water) from one private domain and pouring it into another private domain." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first part of this mishnah deals with carrying below the branches of a tree and sitting on a tree’s roots. The second part of the mishnah deals with setting up a make-shift door.", + "If a tree overshadows the ground: if its branches are not higher than three handbreadths from the ground it is permitted to carry underneath it. If a tree’s branches lie within three handbreadths from the ground it is as if they are attached to the ground. This is a special rule that is applied in certain circumstances according to which anything that is three handbreadths from the ground it is as if it is attached to the ground. Assumedly the branches are at least ten handbreadths high and therefore they act as partitions. The area in between the branches is therefore considered a private domain and it is permitted to carry there.", + "If its roots are three handbreadths high above the ground, one may not sit on them. On Shabbat it is forbidden to climb on or make any use of a tree, lest by doing so one comes to break off a branch, an activity which is forbidden. The mishnah teaches that if the roots are higher than three handbreadths one may not sit on them, since they are part of the tree. However, if they are less than three handbreadths than they are part of the ground and it is permitted to sit on them.", + "With the door in the “muktzeh”, and the thorns in the breach [of a wall] and reed mats, one may not close an opening, unless they are high off the ground. In this context “muktzeh” refers to a backyard separate from the courtyard which was used usually for storage. Since people didn’t regularly go in and out of the muktzeh and it was only used to store items which were not particularly valuable (like produce and wood) it did not have a regular door, with a hinge and lock. Rather the door was just propped up against the opening in the wall and when people went in, they would take the door down and lay it on the ground. The thorns referred to here were used to fill up holes in a wall. The mishnah says that it is forbidden to use these three things (the muktzeh door, the thorns and the reed mats) to make a door. The reason is that these are not actually doors (which have hinges and locks) and therefore one who puts them into the opening of the wall looks like he is building, and not just putting a door in its place. In other words, this is prohibited because it looks too much like building. However, if when placing them he raised them from the ground, then it is clearer that he is not building and it is permitted. Others explain differently. They explain that these three things will make furrows in the ground when the door is opened and it is forbidden on Shabbat to make furrows. Therefore, if he wishes to use them as a door, he must lift them a little off the ground so that they won’t make furrows." + ], + [ + "A man may not stand in a private domain and open a door in the public domain, or in the public domain and open a door in a private domain, unless he has made a partition ten handbreadths high, the words of Rabbi Meir.
They said to him: it happened at the [oxen and chicken] fatteners’ market in Jerusalem that they would lock their shops and leave the key in a window above a shop door.
Rabbi Yose says: it was the wool-dealers’ market.
This mishnah deals with standing in one domain and opening a door in another domain.
Section one: The person in this mishnah is standing in one domain and wants to open a door with a lock in another domain. The key is already in the other domain, the one in which the door is located, for if it were not, it would be obviously prohibited to move the key from one domain to the other. Rabbi Meir rules that this is prohibited lest after he is done unlocking the door, he pulls the key back into the domain in which he is in, thereby moving it from one domain to another. The only way that this is permitted is if he makes a partition ten handbreadths high. For instance, if he is in the private domain and the door is in the public domain, he could make a partition ten handbreadths high in the public domain, in the area where the key is, so that he and the key would both be in private domains. Alternatively, if he is in the public domain, he could make a ten handbreadth high partition where he is and then he may open the door which is also in a private domain.
Section two: The people who worked in a certain type of market in Jerusalem would stand in the public domain and lock their shops and leave the key in the window (the key must never have been in the public domain). From here we can see that it is permitted to stand in one domain and lock a door in another.
There is a debate in the mishnah over what type of market it was. According to the first opinion it was a “fattener’s market” where they would fatten up fowl and cattle before slaughtering them. According to Rabbi Yose it was a wool market. However, the actual content of the halakhah is not debated." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with a bolt or type of peg that they would use to lock a door. The bolt has a knob on one end of it, which makes it possible to do other types of work (for instance grinding) with the contraption.", + "A bolt which has a knob at one end: Rabbi Eliezer forbids it [to be moved]; But Rabbi Yose permits it. Rabbi Eliezer forbids using this type of bolt on Shabbat, whereas Rabbi Joshua permits it. There are several explanations for this debate. One is that Rabbi Eliezer holds that the bolt is not considered to be a “vessel” and hence it is muktzeh. The knob, which is a vessel, is secondary to the bolt and hence it is not considered. Rabbi Judah holds that the knob is primary and hence the entire contraption is considered to be a vessel. Another explanation is that according to Rabbi Eliezer when he puts the bolt into the door, it looks as if he is building, because the bolt is not a “vessel.” In contrast, Rabbi Joshua holds that since the bolt is a vessel, it does not look as if he is building.", + "Rabbi Eliezer said: It happened in a synagogue in Tiberias that they were customary to permit it, until Rabban Gamaliel and the elders came and forbade it to them. Rabbi Yose said: they treated it as forbidden, Rabban Gamaliel and the elders came and permitted it to them. In this section both rabbis bring precedents for there rulings. Both precedents are really opposite versions of the same event. According to Rabbi Eliezer the people used to permit its use until Rabban Gamaliel and the other elders came and prohibited. According to Rabbi Joshua, the people used to prohibit until Rabban Gamaliel came and permitted it. One thing I find interesting in this story (in either version) is the relationship of the rabbi to the synagogue and its customs. In the beginning, the synagogue operates separately from the realm of the rabbis and in halakhic contradistinction to them. There certainly is no “synagogue rabbi”, an invention which is rather modern. However, according to the story, the rabbis seem to be periodically visiting the synagogues and when they get there they issue a halakhic ruling which is followed. The relationship of the rabbis to the synagogue in antiquity is a complex subject, one about which much has been written. This mishnah demonstrates how complex the subject can be." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to deal with bolts, this time referring to a bolt that does not have a knob on it.", + "A bolt that drags along the ground: it is permitted to lock [a door] with it in the Temple but not in the country; The bolts were usually attached to the door with a rope and put into their place when one wanted to lock the door. The first section deals with a bolt attached to the door by a rope, but a rope long enough to let one end of the bolt drag on the ground. The first opinion holds that use of this bolt is prohibited, but its prohibition is only “derabannan” of rabbinic origin. Rabbinic prohibitions do not generally apply within the Temple and hence this type of bolt may be used to lock a door in the Temple. However, it is forbidden in the rest of the country, because it looks as if he is building. Since it is attached to the door already, it is not actually building and hence the prohibition is only of rabbinic origin. If it were attached to the door and not dragging it would have been completely permitted but since it is dragging one who looks at it may not notice that it is actually attached to the door and therefore it is prohibited.", + "But one that rests on the ground is forbidden both here and there. In this case the bolt is totally detached from the door and it is resting on the ground. Since it is not attached to the door at all, he is considered to be building and the prohibition is deoraita, or toraitic origin. Toraitic prohibitions are still prohibited even in the Temple.", + "Rabbi Judah says: one that rests on the ground is permitted in the Temple but one that drags on the ground is permitted [even] in the country. Rabbi Judah is more lenient than the first opinion. He holds that a bolt that rests in the ground is also only prohibited derabanan (from the rabbis) and hence it is only prohibited outside of the Temple. The bolt that drags on the ground and is attached to the door is not prohibited at all since everyone can see that this is not actually building." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses a hinge that has fallen off a door and whether or not one may reinsert it on Shabbat. The language and structure of this mishnah closely follows yesterday’s mishnah.", + "A lower hinge [of a door] may be reinserted in the Temple but not in the country. The upper one is forbidden in both. According to the first opinion, it is forbidden to reinsert the lower hinge in the country [anywhere outside the Temple], lest while doing so he puts in a nail and strikes it, which would be an act forbidden according to the Torah. In the Temple this is permitted since in the Temple certain rabbinic prohibitions do not apply. As we shall see, outside of the Temple it is all the more so forbidden to reinsert the upper hinge. It is forbidden to reinsert the upper hinge in all regions even in the Temple. The upper hinge is more essential towards holding the door in its place and without it, the entire door would fall. The prohibition is still only of rabbinic origin, lest he come to strike a nail, but since it is more likely that he might violate a toraitic prohibition, the act is prohibited in the Temple as well.", + "Rabbi Judah says: the upper one may be re-inserted in the Temple and the lower one in the country. Rabbi Judah is again more lenient, as he was in yesterday’s mishnah,. In the Temple, reinserting the upper hinge is permitted, and all the more so reinserting the lower one is permitted. According to Rabbi Judah, we need not be strict inside the Temple for fear that someone will violate a toraitic law, since those observing in the Temple will ensure that this does not happen. Outside of the Temple reinserting the upper hinge is still prohibited lest he come to strike a nail, but reinserting the lower one is permitted, and we are not concerned that by permitting this he might come to violate the toraitic prohibition of striking a nail." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThere are three independent sections to this mishnah. What is common to all three is that they mention actions which are permitted on Shabbat in the Temple but not permitted outside of it. As we learned in the previous two mishnayot, in the Temple certain rabbinic prohibitions are waved, under the assumption that even if one performs the activity, one will not come to violate a toraitic prohibition. Another similarity is that in all three cases, under certain circumstances the activity would be prohibited even in the Temple.", + "One may replace a plaster bandage on a wound in the Temple but not in the country. At the outset, it is prohibited in both. This section refers to a priest who has a wound and enters the Temple with a bandage over the wound. Under the bandage is a poultice. If the bandage falls off he may replace it, because the prohibition of putting on a bandage on Shabbat is only of rabbinic origin (shevut), and rabbinic prohibitions are permitted in the Temple. It is prohibited outside the Temple lest one come to prepare a poultice, which is a toraitic prohibition. Finally, the mishnah notes that to put on a new bandage is prohibited in either place because when making a new bandage it is very likely that he will come to prepare a poultice.", + "A harp string may be tied up in the Temple but not in the country. At the outset, it is prohibited in both. If a harp string breaks on one of the harps (or other string instruments) in the Temple, it may be tied. Since this prohibition is only of rabbinic origin, it is permitted in the Temple. Outside the Temple it is prohibited. Both in and outside of the Temple, it is forbidden to tie a new harp string to the harp. The commentators explain that this string is tied in a place where it will not remain permanently, for if it was tied permanently it would be a toraitic violation, and hence prohibited in the Temple as well. Finally, if the harp string was not there before Shabbat, he may not tie it there on Shabbat even in the Temple because he should have tied it there before Shabbat.", + "One may remove a wart in the Temple but not in the country. If [the operation must be performed] with an instrument it is forbidden in both. A priest who has a wart (a yabelet) may not serve in the Temple (Leviticus 22:22). However, this wart may be removed in the Temple on Shabbat either by picking it off with his hand or biting it off with his teeth, since this is not the normal means by which to remove a wart (sounds quite painful). We have noted on several occasions that if an activity that would normally be prohibited by the Torah is done in an unusual manner, it is only prohibited by rabbinic decree. Since the prohibition is only rabbinic, it is permitted in the Temple. Outside the Temple it remains prohibited. Finally, the wart may not be removed using an instrument in either place, since this would be a toraitic violation." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to deal with things which may be done on Shabbat in the Temple but not outside of it.", + "A priest who was wounded in his finger may wrap some reed-grass round it in the Temple but not in the country. But if he intended to draw out blood it is forbidden in both cases. The reed-grass mentioned in this mishnah was a type of bandage that also had medicinal properties. As we have learned previously, it is forbidden to heal on Shabbat; therefore it is forbidden to use this reed-grass on Shabbat outside of the Temple. However, the rabbis allowed it to be used in the Temple since it was necessary to cover the wound while the priest performed his service in the Temple. Drawing blood from a wound on Shabbat is a toraitic violation it is derived from the prohibited labor of “squeezing.” Therefore, if the reed-grass was put on the wound with the intention to draw out blood, it is prohibited even within the Temple. As we have stressed many times, only rabbinic violations are waived in the Temple, not toraitic ones.", + "They scatter salt on the altar’s ramp so that the priests shall not slip. In the Temple it was permitted for them to scatter salt on the altar’s ramp so that the priests would not slip while going up and down to offer sacrifices. Outside of the Temple this is prohibited because it is considered “fixing.”", + "They draw water by means of a wheel on Shabbat from the cistern of the exiles and from the great cistern, and on a festival day from the Hakar cistern. The mishnah mentions two cisterns that were situated within the Temple confines from which it was permitted to draw water using a wheel. However, outside of the Temple the rabbis forbade drawing water by means of a wheel, since this might lead to large quantities of water being drawn and a person might use the water to irrigate his field, an activity prohibited on Shabbat. Unlike the previous two cisterns, the “Hakar” cistern was not in the Temple. Nevertheless, in contrast to all other cisterns outside of the Temple it was permitted to draw from it using a wheel on festivals. The Hakar cistern was used by the pilgrims during the Second Temple period that came for the festivals. The prophets and Jewish leaders at the time allowed the Jews to draw from it by means of a wheel on the festival because of the necessity for large quantity of waters for the many pilgrims. Since it was justifiably permitted in the past the rabbis allowed Jews to continue to use it even after the destruction." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe final mishnah deals with removing a dead creeping thing, which is a primary source of impurity, from the Temple.", + "If a [dead] creeping thing was found in the Temple, a priest should carry it out in his girdle in order not to keep the impurity there any longer than is necessary, the words of Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka. Rabbi Judah says: [it should be removed] with wooden tongs in order that uncleanness shall not increase. In this section we see two different strategies concerning how to respond to a dead creeping thing that found its way into the Temple. According to Rabbi Yohanan ben Baroka the priest should pick it up with his girdle in order to remove it as fast as possible. However, he should not pick it up with his hands because that would cause him to become impure. Even though when he picks it up with the girdle the girdle will become impure, the girdle will not in turn cause him to become impure because clothes don’t impurify people. The main goal is to get the creeping thing out of the Temple as quickly as possible. Rabbi Judah says that he should pick it up with wooden tongs which cannot become impure. The problem with this is that it will be harder to catch the creeping thing with wooden tongs than with his girdle. Nevertheless, according to Rabbi Judah it is preferable not to increase the things which it causes to be impure.", + "From where must it be removed? From the sanctuary, from the hall, and from between the hall and the altar, the words of Rabbi Shimon ben Nanas. Rabbi Akiva says: from any place where karet is incurred for entering intentionally and a sin-offering for entering in error from there it must be removed, and from any other place they cover it with a large pot. Rabbi Shimon says: wherever the sages have permitted you anything they have only given you what is really yours, since they have only permitted you that which is forbidden as shevut. The second section of the mishnah deals with the question of from where must the creeping thing be removed if it is found in the Temple on Shabbat. The problem is that by removing the creeping thing he is moving something from one domain to another, which is a violation of carrying on Shabbat, although as we shall see below, it is only a rabbinic violation. According to Rabbi Shimon ben Nanas, it must be found from within the sanctuary and inwards. However, if it is found in the courtyard they cover it with a pot and leave it there until after Shabbat. Rabbi Akiva expands this area to include any area which makes a person liable for karet if he intentionally enters it impure and for a sin-offering if he unwittingly enters it impure. Practically speaking, this means that Rabbi Akiva includes the entire courtyard, from within the Nikanor Gate. According to both sages, if the creeping thing is found in another area, one from which it may not be removed, they cover it with a pot so that nothing comes into contact with it. Rabbi Shimon’s comment does not directly relate to this topic but is really a remark meant to complete all of tractate Shabbat and Eruvin, two tractates which are really only one. Rabbi Shimon explains that all of the leniencies which we have found strewn throughout the two tractates, cases where we thought something would be prohibited but the rabbis allowed one to do the action because there was some necessity, are only cases of the sages giving to the people what is really theirs. This means that the prohibition was only of rabbinic origin in the first place under certain circumstances the rabbis allow what they would otherwise prohibit. However, Rabbi Shimon is adamant that one not construe these leniencies as rabbis allowing one to abrogate or even circumnavigate toraitic law. It seems to me likely that Rabbi Shimon’s comment is directed at those who doubt the entire validity of eruvin what gives the rabbis the right to allow a person to carry from domain to domain on Shabbat, they ask. Rabbi Shimon responds that an eruv allows one to carry only in cases where the prohibition is only “derabanan” of rabbinic origin, and not cases which would be prohibited by toraitic law. Congratulations! We have finished Eruvin. It is a tradition at this point to thank God for helping us to finish learning the tractate and to commit ourselves to going back and relearning it, so that we may not forget it and so that its lessons will stay with us for all of our lives. Eruvin is known as one of the most difficult of tractates, its laws and rules are intricate and very precise. Perhaps in a more “midrashic” interpretation of the tractate, we saw how one builds a community by sharing a common meal and by sharing Shabbat together. While the Mishnah Yomit community does not eat together nor spend Shabbat together, I hope that our common Torah learning will serve us all as “spiritual food” (I hope I’m not surprising you all too much by becoming so “mushy”.) In any case, for those of you who stuck with it and made it through this difficult material, a hearty Yasher Koach. May you have the strength and time to keep on learning more Mishnah! Tomorrow we begin Pesahim." + ] + ] + ] + }, + "versions": [ + [ + "Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp", + "http://learn.conservativeyeshiva.org/mishnah/" + ] + ], + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה עירובין", + "categories": [ + "Mishnah", + "Modern Commentary on Mishnah", + "English Explanation of Mishnah", + "Seder Moed" + ], + "schema": { + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה עירובין", + "enTitle": "English Explanation of Mishnah Eruvin", + "key": "English Explanation of Mishnah Eruvin", + "nodes": [ + { + "heTitle": "הקדמה", + "enTitle": "Introduction" + }, + { + "heTitle": "", + "enTitle": "" + } + ] + } +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Moed/English Explanation of Mishnah Megillah/English/Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp.json b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Moed/English Explanation of Mishnah Megillah/English/Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..44dcf4389c87078110109fd0cf0ef84642643f61 --- /dev/null +++ b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Moed/English Explanation of Mishnah Megillah/English/Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp.json @@ -0,0 +1,243 @@ +{ + "language": "en", + "title": "English Explanation of Mishnah Megillah", + "versionSource": "http://learn.conservativeyeshiva.org/mishnah/", + "versionTitle": "Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp", + "status": "locked", + "license": "CC-BY", + "shortVersionTitle": "Dr. Joshua Kulp", + "actualLanguage": "en", + "languageFamilyName": "english", + "isBaseText": true, + "isSource": true, + "isPrimary": true, + "direction": "ltr", + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה מגילה", + "categories": [ + "Mishnah", + "Modern Commentary on Mishnah", + "English Explanation of Mishnah", + "Seder Moed" + ], + "text": { + "Introduction": [ + "Tractate Megillah deals mostly with the public reading of Scripture at fixed times—on holidays and on certain days of the week. The first two chapters deal with reading Esther and the second two chapters deal with reading the Torah and Haftarah.", + "The Book of Esther does not itself mandate its own reading. However, the rabbis understood the following verse to allude to a yearly reading of Esther. 9:28 states: “Consequently, these days are recalled and observed in every generation: by every family, every province, and every city. And these days of Purim shall never cease among the Jews, and the memory of them shall never perish among their descendants.” The rabbis understood that the memory of Purim was to be preserved by the reading of Esther on Purim itself. ", + "The main mitzvah of reading the Megillah is to read it during the day. However, by Talmudic times they had already added that one should read the Megillah at night as well. Most cities would read the Megillah on the fourteenth of Adar. However, cities that were walled when Joshua conquered Canaan read on fifteenth of Adar and smaller cities sometimes read on an earlier date. This is an issue which we shall explore in depth in the first three mishnayot of the tractate. ", + "The public reading of the Torah is an ancient custom. Ancient Jewish and non-Jewish descriptions of synagogues almost always describe the Torah as being read in the synagogue. The Talmudim variously attribute this custom to Moses, to the prophets or to Ezra. From an early period the Torah was read on Shabbat and holidays at Shacharit as well as at Minhah on Shabbat, and on Monday and Thursday at Shacharit.", + "The reading of a portion from the Prophets, the Haftarah, also seems to be an ancient custom. According to some commentators, the reading of the Haftarah was a response to a decree that Jews could not read from the Torah. Perhaps a more cogent explanation is that Jews wanted to hear the Prophets as well as the Torah. ", + "In the land of Israel, from Mishnaic times through the early medieval period, the custom was to complete the reading of the Torah once every three or perhaps three and half years. This is stated explicitly in the Babylonian Talmud, and is clearly reflected in some midrashim and in lists of the Haftarot. This is commonly called the “triennial cycle.” In Babylonia they read the entire Torah once a year, completing it on Simchat Torah. I should note the ancient “triennial cycle” is very different from the “triennial cycle” as it is observed in some Conservative congregations today. Most congregations follow along with “parshat hashavua” the weekly Torah reading as determined by the annual Babylonian cycle, but read only a third of it. This preserves the ability to follow after the weekly Torah reading but creates the problem that the Torah is not read consecutively. In ancient Israel they certainly read the Torah consecutively. ", + "Finally, we should note another key distinction between current practice and ancient practice. In the time of the Mishnah, one who received an “aliyah” literally “going up to the Torah,” would have read the Torah and recited the blessing. Today this usually doesn’t happen. Usually, one person goes up to recite the blessing and another person reads on his behalf. There are other customs that we observe differently from those prescribed in the Mishnah, and we shall note them as opportunity arises. \n" + ], + "": [ + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThe first mishnah of Megillah teaches that the Megillah might be read on different days, depending on the locality. Tomorrow’s mishnah will explain this in greater detail.", + "The Megillah is read on the eleventh, the twelfth, the thirteenth, the fourteenth, and the fifteenth [of Adar], never earlier and never later. This section provides all of the possible dates in Adar on which the Megillah might be read. Tomorrow’s mishnah will explain in what situation it might be read on the eleventh, twelfth, or thirteenth.", + "Cities which have been walled since the days of Joshua ben Nun read on the fifteenth; villages and large towns read on the fourteenth, Esther 9:19 reads, “That is why village Jews, who live in unwalled towns, observe the fourteenth day of the month of Adar and make it a day of merrymaking and feasting, and as a holiday and an occasion for sending gifts to one another.” If Jews in unwalled towns celebrate Purim on the fourteenth, it implies that Jews in walled cities celebrate on another day. This day must be the fifteenth, since in verse 18 the Jews in Shushan rest from their fighting on the fifteenth. The mishnah determines what is a walled city by reference to Joshua, even though Joshua lived hundreds of years before the events of Purim. The mishnah refers back to Joshua because the land of Israel was desolate in the time of Achashverosh and none of its cities were walled. In order to honor Israel, we therefore refer back to the original conquering.", + "Except that villages move the reading up to the day of gathering. Small villages move the reading up to the Monday or Thursday prior to the fourteenth of Adar. These were the market days, the days on which the court would convene and the days on which the Torah was read. The idea was that on these days the Jews would gather in the larger cities and it would be more possible to have a large celebration than if each individual village had celebrated separately on the fourteenth." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah explains how depending on when Purim falls the Megillah might be read on the eleventh, twelfth, thirteenth, fourteenth or fifteenth. To explain the mishnah we need to remind ourselves that small villages would not read alone in their own village, but rather would move up, if necessary, the day of the reading so that it would fall on the same day as “the day of gathering,” the market and court day in the larger towns. As we shall see, this can lead to their reading the Megillah on the eleventh, twelfth or thirteenth. The fourteenth and fifteenth are the days when the Megillah is normally read.", + "How so?
If the fourteenth [of Adar] falls on Monday, the villages and large towns read on that day and the walled places on the next day. The mishnah begins with the easiest situation. Purim (the fourteenth of Adar) falls on the fourteenth, so everyone can read on that day except for those in walled cities who read on the fifteenth.", + "If it falls on Tuesday or on Wednesday, the villages move the reading up to the day of gathering, the large towns read on that day, and the walled places on the next day. If it falls on Tuesday, the people of the villages read on Monday (the 13th), the day of the gathering, and if it falls on Wednesday then they also move it up to the 12th, which is Monday. Again, the people of the large towns read on the fourteenth and the people of the walled cities on the fifteenth.", + "If it falls on Thursday, the villages and large towns read on that day and the walled places on the next day. If it falls on Thursday, again, everyone can read on that day except for those in walled cities who read on the fifteenth, on Friday.", + "If it falls on Friday, the villages move the reading up to the day of gathering and the large towns and walled places read on that day. If it falls on Friday, the villagers read on the Thursday the thirteenth, those from the large towns and even those from walled cities read on Friday, because the Megillah is not read on Shabbat. The reason that the Megillah is not read on Shabbat is that it is possible to move it up to Friday, so there is no reason to disturb Shabbat. The Talmud also explains that if they were allowed to read on Friday, they might end up carrying the Megillah through the public domain in order to get to synagogue.", + "If it falls on Shabbat, the villages and large towns move the reading up to the day of gathering, and the walled places read on the next day. If it falls on Shabbat, everyone moves the reading up to Thursday. Since it can’t be read on Shabbat and it will therefore have to be moved up in any case, they move it up for the large towns all the way to Thursday so that they end up reading it on the same day as the villagers.", + "If it falls on Sunday, the villages move the reading up to the day of gathering, the large towns read on that day, and the walled cities on the day following. Finally, if it falls on Sunday, the villagers move the reading up to Thursday, the 11th of Adar, the people from the large towns read on Sunday and those from walled towns read on Tuesday, the 15th." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to deal with the topic of the various days upon which the Megillah might be read.", + "What is considered a large town? One which has in it ten idle men. One that has fewer is considered a village. A large town is one that is considered wealthy enough to support ten men who do not work but rather sit in the synagogue or study house and study all day. Put another way, a large town is one that can support a small leisurely class. In Greece and Rome this meant philosophers and in Israel this meant rabbis. Anything smaller is considered a village and moves the reading of the Megillah up to the day of the gathering, Monday or Thursday.", + "In respect of these they said that they should be moved up but not postponed. There are other holidays and semi-holidays during the year that are not observed on the day upon which they fall if they fall on Shabbat. The reading of the Megillah is the only holiday that is moved up all the rest are postponed. The Talmud provides a midrashic explanation for this. Esther 9:27 states, “the Jews accepted upon themselves and their descendants and all those who might join them, that these days should not pass without observing them as it is written and in their time, year after year.” My translation is intentionally slightly awkward so that we can note the midrash. The words “should not pass” are understood by the rabbis to mean that one cannot observe Purim after the fourteenth/fifteenth of Adar has already passed.", + "But with regard to the bringing the wood for the priests, the [fast of] Tisha B’Av, the hagigah, and assembling the people they postpone [until after Shabbat] and they do not move them up. I will briefly explain these holidays here. The bringing of the wood for the priests occurred nine times a year. Certain families would bring wood to the Temple to be used on the altar. This was discussed in Taanit 4:5. It would not be done on Shabbat. The hagigah is a sacrifice brought on Yom Tov, the first day of the festival. If Yom Tov falls on Shabbat it is postponed until the next day. The “assembling of the people” or “Hakhel” in Hebrew occurs during the sabbatical year on Sukkot, when they would gather all the people together to read the Torah. This would not be done on Shabbat.", + "Although they said that they should be moved up but not postponed, it is permissible to mourn, to fast, and to distribute gifts to the poor [on these earlier days]. On both the fourteenth and fifteenth of Adar, one is not allowed to fast or to mourn, because these are the two days of Purim. However, even though the eleventh, twelfth and thirteenth are also days on which one might read the Megillah, it is still permitted to mourn or fast on those days. The mishnah says that it is also permitted to give gifts to the poor on those days. Giving gifts to the poor is one of the central obligations of Purim. Some commentators explain the mishnah to mean that one who gives gifts to the poor on one of these days has fulfilled his obligation. However, others say that the mishnah means that one is exempt from giving gifts to the poor on these days.", + "Rabbi Judah said: When is this so? In a place where people gather on Mondays and Thursdays, but in places where people do not gather on Mondays and Thursdays, the Megillah is read only on its proper day. Rabbi Judah points out that the system of moving the reading up to the 11th-13th was done only when it made realistic sense at a time when Mondays and Thursdays were the days of gathering. It seems quite certain that by Rabbi Judah’s time this system of gathering on Monday and Thursday was already defunct and hence everyone would read at the proper time." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nWhen Jews adjust the lunar calendar to keep it in sync with the solar calendar, they add a second month of Adar, the month during which Purim falls. The rabbis hold that Purim should be observed during the second Adar. Today because our calendar is fixed this is quite simple. Ahead of time we know which year will have a second Adar. In mishnaic times this was more difficult because the calendar had not yet been fixed. Our mishnah addresses this problem.", + "If they read the Megillah during the first Adar and the year was intercalated (a month was, it is read again in the second Adar. If they read the Megillah during the first Adar and then the court decided to add a month to the year, they must read it again during the second Adar.", + "There is no difference between the first Adar and the second Adar except the reading of the Megillah and the giving of gifts to the poor. The only difference with regard to Purim between the first month of Adar and the second is that the Megillah is read and gifts are given to the poor during the second month and not during the first month. However, when it comes to the prohibition of fasting and mourning, it is forbidden to fast on the fourteenth and fifteenth of both months. It is unclear from our mishnah whether the other two obligations for Purim, giving portions of food to friends and having a festive meal, are done both times or not. It seems to me that it would make little sense for these customs to be performed during the first Adar at a time when the Megillah is not being read." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nFrom here until the end of the chapter there is a series of mishnayot in which each mishnah begins with the literary structure of “there is no difference between x and y except,” the literary structure that we saw in yesterday’s mishnah. This type of structure is probably a result of the Mishnah’s being an oral text. Halakhot phrased in this style are simply easier to remember.", + "There is no difference between Shabbat and Yom Tov except the preparation of food. All work prohibited on Shabbat is also prohibited on Yom Tov, except work done in the preparation of food. For further reading on this subject look at the introduction to tractate Betzah.", + "There is no difference between Shabbat and Yom HaKippurim except that the deliberate violation of the one is punished by a human court and the deliberate violation of the other by karet. An intentional transgression of Shabbat carries with it the death penalty, a punishment that is carried out by a human court. In contrast, an intentional transgression of Yom Kippur is not punished by a human court, but rather by karet, a punishment that is dished out by God." + ], + [ + "There is no difference between one who is prohibited by vow from benefiting from his fellow and one who is prohibited by vow from [benefiting from] his food, except in the matter of setting foot [on his property] and of vessels which are not used for [preparing] food. There are two things which are permitted to one who is under a vow not to derive food benefit from his neighbor which are not permitted to one who may not benefit from his neighbor at all: walking on his property and the use of things not involved in the making of food. For more information look at Nedarim 4:1.", + "There is no difference between vowed offerings and freewill-offerings except that he is responsible for vowed offering but not responsible for freewill-offerings. Vowed offerings are stated using the language “Behold, I will bring an animal as an offering.” If a person sets aside an animal to be a vowed offering and the animal cannot for whatever reason be sacrificed (for instance, it gets lost or dies) he must bring a substitute. However, if he makes a freewill-offering using the language, “I will bring this animal as a sacrifice” and the animal is lost, he need not bring another. In all other respects, there is no difference between the two types of offerings." + ], + [ + "There is no difference between a zav who sees [genital discharge] twice and one who sees three, except the sacrifice. A man who experiences an abnormal discharge for one or two consecutive days is impure for seven days after the discharge ends. If he sees the discharge for a third consecutive day, he must bring a sacrifice at the end of the seven day period. See Leviticus 15.", + "There is no difference between a metzora who is under observation and one declared to be a definite metzora except the disheveling of hair and tearing the clothes. A metzora is a person with some sort of skin affliction. After his skin affliction is identified he is set aside for seven days for observation by a priest. If the skin affliction spreads, then the priest declares him to be a definite metzora. There is no difference between the two stages except that one who has been declared to be a definite metzora has to have his hair disheveled and his clothes torn, as prescribed in Leviticus 13:45. [I should note that some interpret the Hebrew for “disheveling the hair” to mean that he has to let his hair grow long.] Other than these differences, the two types of metzora are equal in their impurity.", + "There is no difference between a metzora who has been declared clean after being under observation and one who has been declared clean after having been a definite metzorah except shaving and [sacrificing] the birds. If the priest declares a metzora who had been under observation to be pure, he does not bring a sacrifice nor does he have to shave his hair. If the metzora had been definite then he must bring two birds as a sacrifice and shave his hair. See Leviticus 14. The two different types of metzora are the same in that at the end of their period of impurity they both must immerse in the mikveh and purify their clothes (see Lev. 13:6, 34)." + ], + [ + "There is no difference between scrolls [of the Tanakh] and tefillin and mezuzahs except that scrolls may be written in any language whereas tefillin and mezuzahs may be written only in Assyrian. Scrolls of the Tanakh may be written in any language and in any type of writing. However, mezuzot and tefillin may be written only in Assyrian, the alphabet in which Hebrew was and is still written and they may be written only in Hebrew.", + "Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says that scrolls [of the Tanakh] were permitted [by the sages] to be written only in Greek. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says that while Tanakh scrolls may indeed be written in languages other than Hebrew, they may not be written in any language, just Greek. At the time of the Mishnah Greek was the international language of the intelligentsia. It was also the language into which the Tanakh had already been translated. This translation is called the Septuagint and was widely used in the period by Jews in the Greek-speaking Diaspora." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah deals with differences between different types of high priests.", + "There is no difference between a priest anointed with the oil of anointment and one who [only] wears the additional garments except for the bull which is offered for the [unwitting transgression of] any of the commandments. The high priest was supposed to be anointed with special anointing oil, except that the composition of this type of oil was unknown in the Second Temple period and hence not used. The distinction in the Second Temple period between high priests and ordinary priests was that the high priest had eight garments and the ordinary priest wore only four. Our mishnah teaches that the difference between the high priest in the First Temple and the high priest in the Second Temple is that only the anointed priest brings a bull for an unwitting transgression, as is stated in Leviticus 4:3, “If it is the anointed priest who has incurred guilt…”", + "There is no difference between a serving [high] priest and one whose time has passed except the bull of Yom HaKippurim and the tenth of the ephah. The high priest who is currently serving in office brings the sacrificial bull on Yom HaKippurim (Leviticus 16:6) and the tenth of an ephah of flour offered every day (Leviticus 6:13). Otherwise a high priest who has been removed or otherwise left office is treated the same as the currently serving high priest. For more information on this, see Horayot 3:4." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nBefore the Temple in Jerusalem was built it was permitted to build personal altars and offer sacrifices on them. At this time period there were also communal altars. The personal altars are called “small altars” whereas the communal altars are called “great altars”. The “great altar” is referred to in I Kings 3:2, “The people, however, continued to offer sacrifices at altars, because up to that time no house had been built for the name of the Lord. The king went up to Gibeon to sacrifice there, for that was the great altar…”\nOur mishnah outlines the differences that existed in this time period between great, communal altars and personal, small altars.", + "There is no difference between a great altar and a small altar except for the pesach offering. An individual cannot sacrifice the pesah at his own altar, but rather must bring it to the communal altar. The Talmud explains that not only the pesah cannot be offered at the small altar, but all mandatory sacrifices as well. This is illustrated in the next section’s general principle.", + "This is the general principle: any animal which can be brought as a vow-offering or a freewill offering may be brought on a [small] altar, any animal which is not the object of a vow or a freewill-offering may not be brought on a [small] altar. Only voluntary offerings can be offered at a small altar. Mandatory offerings, such as the tamid, the musaf, the pesah, sin-offerings, guilt-offerings, holiday-related offerings and others, must be brought to the central altar." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe final mishnah of this series continues to deal with differences between places in which sacrifices can be offered.", + "There is no difference between Shiloh and Jerusalem except that in Shiloh sacrifices of lesser sanctity and second tithe could be eaten anywhere within sight [of the town], whereas in Jerusalem [they had to be eaten] within the walls. During the time of Samuel the ark was at Shiloh (see I Samuel 3-4). Since the ark had a permanent home, it was prohibited to offer sacrifices at local altars, just as it was prohibited to offer sacrifices when the Temple stood in Jerusalem. There is only one difference between Shiloh and Jerusalem, and that is with regard to where certain sacrifices and second tithe could be eaten. When Shiloh was the center of worship, these could be eaten in any place within sight of Shiloh. In Jerusalem they had to be eaten within the city walls.", + "In both places the most holy sacrifices were eaten within the curtains. In both Shiloh and Jerusalem most holy sacrifices, such as sin and guilt offerings, had to be eaten within the Temple/Tabernacle (Mishkan) precincts.", + "After the sanctification of Shiloh there is permission [for altars], but after the sanctification of Jerusalem there is no such permission. When Shiloh was destroyed, it again became permitted to offer sacrifices at other communal and personal altars but when the two Temples in Jerusalem were destroyed there was no such permission and it continued to be forbidden to offer sacrifices at other altars. Put another way, when the Temple in Jerusalem was destroyed it became forbidden to offer sacrifices elsewhere and after the destruction of the Second Temple it remained forbidden until the Temple will be rebuilt." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThe Mishnah now begins to talk about how the Megillah is actually read.", + "If one reads the Megillah out of order, he has not fulfilled his obligation. The Megillah must be read in order. One cannot skip around and then go back.", + "If he reads it by heart, if he reads it in a translation [targum], or in any other language, he has not fulfilled his obligation. The Megillah must be read from a scroll. Despite its brevity, it, like other Torah readings, may not be read by memory. It also may not be read using a translation or in any other language, even if it is written in that language. This section refers to a person who understands Hebrew. Such a person who hears in another language has not fulfilled his obligation.", + "But they may read it to those who do not understand Hebrew in a language other than Hebrew. One who doesn’t understand Hebrew who heard it in Assyrian [Hebrew], has fulfilled his obligation. In contrast, somebody who doesn’t understand Hebrew may fulfill his obligation by hearing the Megillah in a language other than Hebrew. Nevertheless, if a person hears it in Hebrew he has fulfilled his obligation even if he doesn’t understand it. In this aspect Hebrew is greater than the other languages other languages need to be understood while Hebrew does not. Hebrew is referred to as “Assyrian” because it is written using the Assyrian alphabet." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first part of this mishnah deals with having proper intention while reading the Megillah. The second part deals with the physical material with which the Megillah is written.", + "If one reads it with breaks, or naps [in between readings], he has fulfilled his obligation. In yesterday’s mishnah we learned that one must read the Megillah in its proper order. Our mishnah teaches that it need not be read without breaks. One may read some of the Megillah, stop for a while, and then continue on and thereby fulfill one’s obligation. Similarly, one may read, take a nap and then continue where one has left off [no, this is not permission to sleep in shul].", + "If he was copying it, explaining it or correcting [a scroll of Esther], if he directed his heart, he has fulfilled his obligation, but if not, he has not fulfilled his obligation. When one reads the Megillah, or hears it being read, he must have in mind that he is fulfilling the religious obligation to hear the Megillah on Purim. The mishnah describes other activities in which a person might be engaged that count as reading the Megillah only if he has the proper intent. A person who was copying a scroll, explaining it or correcting it and did not remember that it was Purim has not fulfilled his obligation. While doing any of these activities he must have the intention of fulfilling his obligation. Assumedly, he must also read it out loud.", + "If it was written with arsenic, with red chalk, with gum or with sulfate of copper, or on paper or on scratch paper, he has not fulfilled his obligation, unless it is written in Assyrian on parchment and in ink. One cannot write a Megillah with these types of dyes or on these types of paper because it is not permanent. In order for the Megillah to be valid for a religious occasion, it must be written in Hebrew, on parchment (made from animal skins) and with permanent ink." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first section of this mishnah deals with a person who travels from a walled city which reads on the 15th of Adar to a town which reads on the 14th or vice versa.\nThe second section discusses how much of the Megillah must be read on Purim.", + "A resident of a town who has gone to a walled city or a resident of a walled city who has gone to a town, if he is to return to his own place he reads according to the rule of his own place, and if not reads with them. The mishnah states simply that if a person travels from one type of town to another he retains the custom of the town of his origin if his intention is not to move to his new town. If his intention is not to return to his previous town, then he reads with the new place. In the Talmud they explain that “if he is to return to his own place” means if he is to return there that very night, and get there before the morning. If he goes to another town but returns to his own town in the morning, then he celebrates Purim with his own town. But if he goes to another town and is there in the morning, he must celebrate Purim and hear the Megillah on that day. By the way, as someone who lives in Modiin, which reads on the 14th, and goes to Jerusalem which reads on the 15th, I encounter this issue pretty much every year.", + "From where does a man read the Megillah and thereby fulfill his obligation? Rabbi Meir says: all of it. Rabbi Judah says: from “There was a Jew” (Esther 2:5). Rabbi Yose says: from “After these things” (3:1). Today we read the entire book of Esther, but whether this is necessary is debated by the sages. Rabbi Meir says that one has to read the whole thing. Rabbi Judah says that he only has to read from 2:5, where Mordecai is first mentioned. Rabbi Yose says he only has to read from 3:1, where the actual plot by Haman (make a lot of noise when you say this) begins." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first section of the mishnah deals with who is qualified to read the Megillah. The second section deals with when it can be read.", + "All are qualified to read the Megillah except a deaf person, an idiot and a minor. Rabbi Judah qualifies a minor. Deaf people, idiots (this refers either to one who is mentally retarded or an insane person) and minors are generally not obligated to perform the commandments. As we have mentioned on several occasions, in those days they had no way to communicate with the deaf and little understanding of the insane or retarded. Hence these people were mostly cut off from participating in society. Minors are too young to understand the meaning of the commandments and hence are not obligated. Since these people are not obligated, they cannot perform the commandment for others. This was stated also in Rosh Hashanah 3:8, at the end of that mishnah. Rabbi Judah says that a minor is qualified.", + "They do not read the Megillah, nor circumcise, nor go to the mikveh, nor sprinkling [purificatory waters], and similarly a woman keeping day for day should not take a ritual bath until the sun has risen. But if any of these things is done after dawn, it is valid. The main reading of the Megillah takes place during the day. The Mishnah teaches that during the day means after the sun has risen. This is also the time for other mitzvoth that need to take place during the day. “Sprinkling” refers to the water mixed with the ashes of the red heifer. “A woman keeping a day for a day” refers to a woman who was impure do to non-menstrual genital discharge. She is impure a day for every day on which she has a discharge. All of these things should be done after the sun has risen. However, if someone did them after dawn, meaning when the sky begins to become light, the actions are still valid, at least ex post facto." + ], + [ + "The whole day is a valid time for
reading the Megillah;
reciting Hallel;
for the blowing of the shofar;
for taking up the lulav;
for the Musaf prayer;
for Musaf sacrifices;
for confession over the oxen;
for the confession over the tithe;
for the confession of sins on Yom HaKippurim;
for laying on of hands;
for slaughtering [the sacrifices];
for waving [them];
for bringing near [the vessel with the minhah-offering to the altar];
for taking a handful;
for placing it on the fire;
for pinching off [the head of a bird-offering];
for receiving the blood [in a vessel];
for sprinkling [the blood on the altar];
for making the sotah drink [the bitter waters];
for breaking the neck of the heifer;
and for purifying the metzora.
One can fulfill one’s obligation of hearing the Megillah at any time during the day. Our mishnah gives a very long list of numerous other rituals that one can perform at any time during the day.
Since this list is very long, I will not explain each item in detail, but rather mostly make reference to the relevant biblical verse(s) which deal with the issue. I will not even comment on issues that seem abundantly clear.
Sections 6-7: On Shabbat, holidays and Rosh Hodesh there are musaf sacrifices and musaf prayers. The sacrifices can be offered at any time during the day and the prayers may be recited throughout the whole day.
Section 8: For confession over the ox One who brings an ox as a sacrifice also confesses to the sin for which the ox is brought (Leviticus 4:3,14).
Section 9: For the confession over the tithe On the fourth and seventh years of the sabbatical cycle one makes a confession that he has “removed all of the holy produce from his home” (Deuteronomy 26:13).
Section 10: For the confession of sins on Yom HaKippurim The high priest recites a confession over the sacrifices (Leviticus 16:21; see also Yoma 3:8, 4:2, 6:2).
Section 11: For laying on of hands one lays one’s hands on an animal sacrifice before it is slaughtered (Leviticus 1:4).
Section 13: For waving [them] one waves the innards and the breast of wellbeing offerings (Leviticus 7:30).
Section 14-16: these are all elements of the minhah offering.
Section 17: For pinching off [the head of a bird-offering] Leviticus 1:15, 5:8.
Section 18: For receiving the blood [in a vessel] in order to sprinkle it on the altar.
Section 20: For breaking the neck of the heifer if a dead body is found in a field and the identity of the murderer is unknown (Deuteronomy 21:1)
Section 21: And for purifying the metzora Leviticus 14." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is the complement to yesterday’s mishnah. It teaches that mitzvoth which must be performed at night can be performed all night.", + "The whole night is valid for reaping the Omer and for burning fat and limbs [on the altar]. There are two mitzvoth listed here that must be done at night. The first is reaping the Omer, the barley offering which is brought from the second day of Pesah through Shavuot (Leviticus 23:10). The second is putting on the altar fat and limbs that had not been burned during the day.", + "This is the general principle: any matter whose commandment is during the day, is valid all day and any matter whose commandment is at night is valid all night. This general principle illustrates that which we learned in the last two mishnayot." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThe first three mishnayot of this chapter deal with the holiness of the synagogue and the articles found in it. Our mishnah deals with what one may do with the proceeds of a sale of the synagogue or the things in it.", + "Townspeople who sold the town square, they may buy with the proceeds a synagogue. [If they sold] a synagogue, they may buy with the proceeds an ark. [If they sold] an ark they may buy covers [for scrolls]. (1) [If they sold] covers, they may buy scrolls [of the Tanakh]. ( [If they sold] scrolls they may buy a Torah. One can sell an object and buy something that is somewhat holier. The town square has some holiness to it because it is occasionally used for gathering in prayer, such as during a public fast (see Taanit 2:1). “Scrolls” refers to books of the Tanakh not part of the Five Books of Moses.", + "But if they sold a Torah they may not buy with the proceeds scrolls [of the Tanakh]. ( If [they sold] scrolls they may not buy covers. (1) If [they sold] covers they may not buy an ark. If [they sold] an ark they may not buy a synagogue. If [they sold] a synagogue they may not buy a town square. Conversely, one cannot sell an object and buy something with an object of less holiness.", + "The same applies to any money left over. If there is money left over from a permitted sale then they must still use that money to buy something with greater holiness. Thus if they sell covers and use the proceeds to buy scrolls and there is money left over, they must use the proceeds to buy other scrolls, or a Torah.", + "They may not sell [something] belonging to a community because this lowers its sanctity, the words of Rabbi Meir. They said to him: if so, it should not be allowed to sell from a larger town to a smaller one. According to Rabbi Meir there is an additional restriction when it comes to selling holy items. The community cannot sell an item that belongs to the community to an individual. So if the members of the synagogue own scrolls and they wish to sell them to buy a Torah, they may not sell the scrolls to an individual. This means that according to Rabbi Meir there seems to be holiness in the community. The item is more holy because it is owned by a community, an entity which has greater holiness than an individual. Alternatively, an item is holier if it is used by more people. The other sages respond that it is problematic to quantify holiness based on the number of people within an entity. If a community is holier than an individual, than a large community is holier than a small community. Since this doesn’t make sense, the sages reject Rabbi Meir’s halakhah altogether." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals specifically with selling a synagogue.", + "They may not sell a synagogue except with the stipulation that it may be bought back whenever they want, the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Meir holds that the community can sell the synagogue but only on condition that the synagogue can be bought back any time they wish. It sounds like Rabbi Meir intends to say that while the community may sell the synagogue because they need to buy holier items, what the community should really do is save up so that they can buy the synagogue back. Also, if they saw that the synagogue was being put to improper use, they could demand to purchase it back immediately.", + "But the sages say: they may sell it in perpetuity, except for four purposes for it to become one of four things: a bathhouse, a tannery, a ritual bath, or a urinal. The rabbis are more lenient when it comes to selling the synagogue and do not require the seller to be able to buy it back whenever he should so please. The one restriction is that the sellers may not sell it knowing that it will be used for a something smelly (a tannery, a urinal) or for something where people will be naked (a bathhouse or a ritual bath).", + "Rabbi Judah says: they may sell it to be a courtyard, and the purchaser may do what he likes with it. Rabbi Judah points out that if the synagogue’s owners cannot by right repurchase the synagogue, then the new owners can trick the system by first buying it to be a courtyard and then doing with it whatever they like, including turning it into a urinal. It is unclear whether Rabbi Judah says that this is permitted and there’s nothing that can be done about it, or what he is really doing is criticizing the sages’ position by pointing out that they can’t really enforce their halakhah. As we shall see in the next mishnah, Rabbi Judah believes that a synagogue retains its sanctity even after it is destroyed. It therefore seems less likely that Rabbi Judah would condone the synagogue becoming something like a urinal." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn this mishnah Rabbi Judah teaches that the holiness of a synagogue remains even if it has fallen into ruins. Rabbi Judah applies the holiness of the Temple in Jerusalem to the synagogue of the post-destruction period. Just as the holiness of the Temple and the Temple Mount remained even when Jerusalem was destroyed, so too the holiness of a synagogue remains when it physically lies in ruins. There is a deep message in this mishnah. The holiness of the synagogue is not dependent upon the existence of its physical structure. Once people have treated the place as holy, it will retain that sanctity forever.", + "Rabbi Judah said further: a synagogue that has fallen into ruins, they may not eulogize in it, nor twist ropes, nor to spread nets [to trap animals], nor to lay out produce on its roof [to dry], nor to use it as a short cut, as it says, “And I will desolate your holy places” (Leviticus 26:3 their holiness remains even when they are desolate. One may not use a synagogue that lays in ruins for a profane, every day purpose. One cannot deliver eulogies in it because eulogies are not delivered in synagogues, even when they have been destroyed. [As an aside, the custom to deliver eulogies and conduct funerals inside synagogues is a modern custom, probably borrowed from the Christians. Jews used to deliver eulogies either at the cemetery on the path on the way there.] One can’t use it as a place of work. The mishnah uses the example of “twisting rope” because twisting rope requires space, but it means that no work should be done there. It should not be used to trap animals nor should its roof be used to dry out fruit. One shouldn’t use it as a short cut. In summary, it should only be entered for its intended purpose as a place of worship and Torah study. The mishnah uses a midrash, exegesis of a biblical verse, to prove this point. In a section in which God rebukes Israel, He threatens that He will “desolate your holy places.” The fact that the verse calls these places holy implies that they retain their holiness even when they have been destroyed.", + "If grass comes up in it, it should not be plucked, [in order to elicit] melancholy. The mishnah now changes direction and seems to acknowledge that there is some significance to the synagogue’s having been destroyed. According to the theology reflected in this mishnah, a destroyed synagogue is sign of God’s wrath, which comes as a result of Israel’s sin. When one sees grasses growing in a synagogue, a person will surely experience deep sadness. It will remind him that the synagogue was destroyed and that he should repent. It will also remind him that he should dedicate himself to rebuilding the synagogue as quickly as possible." + ], + [ + "If Rosh Hodesh Adar falls on Shabbat the portion of shekalim is read [on that day]. If it falls in the middle of the week, it is read on the Shabbat before, and on the next Shabbat there is a break.
On the second [of the special Shabbatot] they read “Zakhor;”
On the third the portion of the red heifer;
On the fourth “This month shall be for you;”
On the fifth the regular order is resumed.
They interrupt [the regular order] for anything: for Rosh Hodesh, for Hanukkah, for Purim, for fasts, for Ma’amadot, and for Yom HaKippurim.
The rest of this chapter deals with the portions of the Torah read on holidays and special Shabbatot. In mishnaic times they did not complete the Torah once a year as they did in Babylonia and as we do today, but rather about once every three years. Another difference between the ancient custom and that of today is that today when certain holidays fall on Shabbat we read the regular Torah portion and then we add a special reading for that day. In mishnaic times, since they didn’t really have a regular Torah portion, they only read the special reading. Thus if Rosh Hodesh fell on Shabbat they would read only the portion for Rosh Hodesh and interrupt the regular continuous reading of the Torah.
Our mishnah deals with the four special Shabbatot that precede Pesah. They are:
1) Shekalim to remind people that on Adar they would have to bring the half-shekel to the Temple (see tractate Shekalim). This was read before Rosh Hodesh Adar.
2) Zakhor Deuteronomy 25:17-19. This is read before Purim and connects Amalek with Haman.
3) Parah Numbers 19. We read about the red heifer to remind people that before Pesah they must be pure in order to eat the Pesah sacrifice.
4) Hahodesh Exodus 12:1-20. Read the Shabbat before Nissan to remind people that Pesah is approaching and that they must begin preparing.
Section one: On Rosh Hodesh Adar which falls on Shabbat they read Shekalim, which is Exodus 30:11-16. However, if Rosh Hodesh Adar falls during the week, they would read Shekalim on the Shabbat before Rosh Hodesh. On the Shabbat following Rosh Hodesh they would go back to reading where they had last left off in the regular cycle. This week would then be a break from the four special portions enumerated in our mishnah.
Sections 2-5: The mishnah now enumerates the four special portions, described above in the introduction. After Hahodesh, the order returns to its regular cycle. We should note the concept of Shabbat Hagadol, the Shabbat before Pesah, did not exist in mishnaic or talmudic times.
Section six: The regular reading of the Torah is interrupted for any special occasion. This includes all holidays. On fast days, meaning Mondays or Thursdays when they would fast for rain, they would not read the regular portion but rather the special readings for fasts. Ma’amadot were described in greater length in tractate Taanit. These were gatherings by people in towns when their kohanim would go to the Temple. The people in the town would read from the beginning of Genesis and not from the regular Torah portion." + ], + [ + "On Pesah we read from the portion of the festivals in Leviticus (Torat (Leviticus 23:4).
On Shavuot, “Seven weeks” (Deuteronomy 16:9).
On Rosh Hashanah “On the seventh day on the first of the month” (Leviticus 23:2.
On Yom Hakippurim, “After the death” (Leviticus 16).
On the first day of the Festival [of Sukkot] they read from the portion of the festivals in Leviticus, and on the other days of the Festival [of Sukkot] the [sections] on the offerings of the Festival.
This mishnah lists the portions read on the three pilgrimage holidays, Pesah, Shavuot and Sukkot and on Rosh Hashanah and Yom Hakippurim as well.
Most of these are straightforward and do not require explanation.
The one slightly confusing issue is the readings for Sukkot. On the first day of Sukkot we read from Leviticus 23, the same reading as on Pesah. On the remaining days we read the sacrifices listed for that day in Numbers 29:17 ff. Sukkot differs from Pesah in that on Pesah the same musaf offerings are made every day. On Sukkot each day has a different number of offerings. As an aside, this is one reason why we recite the full Hallel for all seven days of Sukkot but only on the first day of Pesah." + ], + [ + "On Hanukkah they read the section of the princes (Numbers 7).
On Purim, “And Amalek came” (Exodus 17:8).
On Rosh Hodesh, “And on the first of your months” (Numbers 28:11).
On Maamadot, the account of the creation (Genesis 1:1-2:3).
On fast days, the blessings and curses (Leviticus 26:3 ff and Deuteronomy 28). They do not interrupt while reading the curses, but rather one reads them all.
On Monday and Thursday and on Shabbat at minhah they read according to the regular order and this does not count as part of the reading [for the succeeding Shabbat].
As it says, “And Moshe declared to the children of Israel the appointed seasons of the Lord” (Leviticus 23:44) it is their mitzvah that each should be read in its appropriate time.
The final mishnah of our chapter details what sections are read on non-Toraitic holidays or events. Since there are no passages in the Torah about these days, the sages had to find other passages whose themes they deemed appropriate.
The mishnah concludes with a midrash explaining why it is that we read from passages in the Torah appropriate to the holiday.
Section one: Hannukah literally means “dedication” and refers to the dedication of the Temple after its restoration in the time of the Maccabees. The portion in the Torah read on Hannukah is a list of the gifts brought by the princes of each tribe at the dedication of the Mishkah, the tabernacle.
Section two: On Purim we read about Amalek because Haman was, according to the rabbis, from Amalek.
Section four: On Ma’amadot people would gather in the Temple or in their own cities while their local kohanim took there turn at service in the Temple. See Taanit 4:2-3.
Section five: The curses (called today the “tochekhah” or rebuke) are read on fast days as a warning to people that they must repent. When reading the curses we don’t interrupt, making them into two or more aliyot rather they are all read by the same person. This is still the custom today, making one of the aliyot in Ki Tavo the longest aliyah of the year.
Section six: Besides Shabbat morning, the Torah is also read on Mondays, Thursdays and Shabbat at minhah (the afternoon service). These readings go according to the regular cycle but they don’t count toward the regular progression. This means that the same portion that is read at all three occasions and then again on Shabbat. We only move forward on Shabbat.
Section seven: The chapter ends with a midrash on Leviticus 23:44. The verse states that Moshe told the holidays to the people of Israel, but this verse is superfluous Moshe taught all of the commandments to the people. Therefore the midrash teaches that not only did Moshe teach the holidays, but he taught each one at the time that it fell. By his example we learn that on all holidays we read the Torah portion relevant to that holiday." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nMost of the last chapter of Megillah is about the public reading of the Torah. The one main difference between how we read today and how they read in their time is that today the person who receives the aliyah and recites the blessing is usually not the same person who actually reads the Torah. This allows people who don’t know how to read from the Torah to receive aliyot. In mishnaic and talmudic times, the person who read the Torah was the same person who received the aliyah. There are other differences which we will discuss throughout the chapter.", + "He who reads the Megillah may either stand or sit. One may read the Megillah while either standing or sitting. Today the custom is to stand but this is not mandatory. In contrast, when reading the Torah one has to stand.", + "Whether one read it or two read it [together] they [those listening] have fulfilled their obligation. Two people may read the Megillah together when reading in front of the community. However, when it comes to reading Torah only one person at a time can read. The idea behind this is that it is harder for people to hear two people chanting together than one chanting alone. Since hearing the Megillah is halakhically less significant than hearing the Torah, they allow to people to read simultaneously.", + "In places where it is the custom to say a blessing, they say the blessing, and where it is not the custom they do not say the blessing. According to the simple reading of the Mishnah, there were various customs with regard to reciting a blessing over reading the Megillah. Some did and some did not. The Talmud however explains that this only refers to the blessing after the Megillah. In all places they would recite the blessing before reading. Today our custom is to recite a blessing before and after.", + "On Mondays and Thursdays and on Shabbat at minhah, three read from the torah, they do not add [to this number] nor decrease [from it], nor do they conclude with [a haftarah] from the Prophets. The mishnah now begins to discuss regular Torah reading. On Mondays, Thursdays and on Shabbat at minhah only three people receive aliyot (go up to the Torah). This number may not be increased nor may it be decreased. There is no haftarah (portion from the Prophets section of the Bible) on these occasions.", + "The one who begins the Torah reading and the one who concludes the Torah reading blesses before it and after it. In the time of the Mishnah the first person to read would recite the first blessing and the last person to read would recite the concluding blessing. Those reading in between would not recite any blessing at all. Today, each person receiving an aliyah recites a blessing before and after." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to teach how many aliyot there are on the different occasions in which the Torah is read. Yesterday’s mishnah dealt with occasions in which there are only three, the minimum number of aliyot. Today’s mishnah lists occasions with four, five, six and seven aliyot. It seems that the more holy a holiday is, the more aliyot there are, and the more Torah is read.", + "On Rosh Hodesh and on the intermediate days of festivals four read. They do not add [to this number] nor decrease [from it], nor do they conclude with [a haftarah] from the Prophets. The one who begins the Torah reading and the one who concludes the Torah reading blesses before it and after it. This is the general rule: on any day which has a musaf and is not a festival four read. Rosh Hodesh and the intermediate days of the festival both have a musaf service (and when the Temple still stood there was a musaf sacrifice). However, they are not festivals, meaning that work is permitted on these days. These are sort of “in-between days.” Therefore they have four aliyot more than a normal day but less than a festival. The mishnah reiterates the rule that the first person who receives an aliyah recites the blessing before and the last person recites the blessing after.", + "On a festival five. On the first and last day of Pesah, on the first day of Sukkot, on Shmini Atzeret (the last day of Sukkot), on Shavuot and on Rosh Hashanah there are five aliyot.", + "On Yom Hakippurim six. On Yom Kippur there are six aliyot. Note that this makes Yom Kippur unlike all other holidays.", + "On Shabbat seven; they may not decrease [from this number] but they may add [to it], and they conclude with [a haftarah] from the Prophets. The one who begins the Torah reading and the one who concludes the Torah reading blesses before it and after it. Shabbat differs from other occasions in several key ways. First of all, there are more aliyot on Shabbat than at any other time of the year. On other occasions there are a maximum of six aliyot and the mishnah states explicitly that they may not add to this number. Indeed, the mishnah may emphasize this to make sure that people do not try to turn other holidays into Shabbat by adding more aliyot. In contrast, on Shabbat they may add aliyot. Finally, there is a haftarah on Shabbat. Today we read a haftarah on festivals and on Yom Kippur as well. Finally, the same rule about the blessings still applies." + ], + [ + "Introduction This mishnah teaches what rituals require a minyan of ten men in order to perform them.", + "They do not recite the Shema responsively, In the time of the mishnah they recited the Shema in a way that we might call responsively the leader would recite one half of the verse and the congregation would respond with the second half. This practice changed some time during the talmudic period. There are actually many different explanations for what they did, but this seems to be the most accepted by scholars.", + "And they do not pass before the ark; Passing before the ark refers to reciting the Sh’moneh Esrei or Amidah. Without a minyan there is no public Amidah or repetition everyone just does it silently.", + "And the [the priests] do not lift up their hands; The priestly blessing is recited before the end of the Amidah, but only with a minyan.", + "And they do not read the Torah [publicly]; Without a minyan there is no public reading of the Torah.", + "And they do not conclude with a haftarah from the prophets; Nor is there a haftarah, lest one think that although they can’t read from the Torah, they might be able to read from the prophets.", + "And they do not make stops [at funeral] processions; On the way to the cemetery and on the way back they would make formal stops at which they would recite eulogies. They would do this seven times, but it was only done with a minyan.", + "And they do not say the blessing for mourners, or the comfort of mourners, or the blessing of bridegrooms; The blessing for mourners was recited in the public square, whereas “comforting mourners” was done on the return from the cemetery. The blessing of the bridegrooms refers to the blessings recited under the huppah (the wedding canopy). In mishnaic times they probably recited three blessings, but by the time of the Talmud this had been increased to seven. None of these blessings is recited without a minyan.", + "And they do not mention God’s name in the invitation [to say Birkat Hamazon]; Except in the presence of ten. Before Birkat Hamazon, the blessing after the meal, there is an invitation to bless. This invitation is recited with God’s name only if there are ten present.", + "[For redeeming sanctified] land nine and a priest [are sufficient], and similarly with human beings. If someone wishes to dedicate a piece of land to the Temple they estimate the value of the land and then he must pay that amount. The estimate is carried out by ten people, only one of whom must be a priest. Similarly, if a person dedicates himself or someone else to the Temple, and he can’t afford to pay the price mandated in Leviticus 27, then they estimate how much he can afford. This estimate is again done by nine regular men and one priest." + ], + [ + "Introduction This mishnah teaches various rules about reading the Torah in public.", + "One who reads the Torah [in public] may not read less than three verses. An aliyah may not consist of less than three verses.", + "And he should not read to the translator more than one verse [at a time], but [if reading from the book of a] prophet [he may read to him] three at a time. If the three verses constitute three separate paragraphs, he must read them [to the translator] one by one. In mishnaic times the spoken language was Aramaic. Many people, perhaps most people, would have had trouble understanding the Torah in its original Hebrew. Therefore, as part of the public reading of the Torah, there was a translator who would translate verse by verse. The reader was to read one verse and then the translator would translate this verse. However, when it came to reading the haftarah from one of the prophets, they allowed the reader to read three verses at a time. They were less exacting on the precision of the haftarah translation than they were for the translation of the Torah. However, if each verse is its own section, then the reader must read each one on its own. This refers to Isaiah 52:3-5 where there are three verses, each considered to be its own section.", + "They may skip [from place to place] in a prophet but not in the Torah. How far may he skip [in the prophet]? [Only] so far that the translator will not have stopped [before he finds his place]. When reading the haftarah, he may skip from place to place so long as he doesn’t have to roll the scroll so far that the translator has completed his translation before he gets to the new verse. Today there are many haftarot where we skip from one place in the book to another, or if reading from one of the twelve minor prophets, from one prophet to another. However, when it comes to the Torah it is forbidden to skip around." + ], + [ + "Introduction This mishnah and the mishnayot following it deal with who is qualified to receive certain honors in the synagogue. I have explained this mishnah according to Albeck’s explanation. Others explain it somewhat differently.", + "The one who concludes with the haftarah also leads the responsive reading of the Shema and he passes before the ark and he lifts up his hands. The person honored by reading the haftarah is worthy of also being the leader of the other crucial elements of the service. He can lead the responsive reading of the Shema (explained in yesterday’s mishnah), he can pass before the ark (meaning recite the Amidah and thereby aid other’s in fulfilling their obligation) and if he is a priest, he can lift up his hands to bless the people with the priestly blessing. In the following mishnayot we will see that not everyone is worthy of these honors.", + "If he is a child, his father or his teacher passes before the ark in his place. A child is allowed to read the haftarah, but he may not pass before the ark. The person who recites the amidah (passes before the ark) helps others to fulfill their obligation to recite the amidah. In order to help others fulfill their obligation, the person himself must also be obligated. A child who is not obligated cannot fulfill the congregation’s obligation. Therefore, if a child read the haftarah either his father or teacher takes his place in passing before the ark." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah illustrates the important principle that one who is obligated to perform a given ritual may aid others in fulfilling their obligation. It also deals with other reasons which might potentially disqualify a person from leading parts of the synagogue service.", + "A child may read in the Torah and translate, but he may not pass before the ark or lift up his hands. In yesterday’s mishnah we learned that a child can read the haftarah. Today we learn that a child may read from the Torah as well. He may also serve as the translator of the Torah reading. However, he may not pass before the ark, since he is not obligated in prayer (see yesterday’s mishnah). He also may not lift up his hands to recite the priestly blessing if he is a priest because it was considered disgraceful for the community to have to be blessed by a minor.", + "A person in rags may lead the responsive reading of the Shema and translate, but he may not read in the Torah, pass before the ark, or lift up his hands. A person in rags, meaning one who is dressed shabbily and whose flesh can be seen through his clothes, may still lead the responsive reading of the Shema because this was done from one’s seat. One didn’t have to get up in front of the community. Since he would not be seen by the entire congregation, he was allowed to fulfill this role. He was also allowed to serve as the translator, since this was not considered all that important of a function. However, he was not allowed to read from the Torah because it would be disgraceful to read the Torah while dressed in rags. He was not allowed to pass before the ark or lift up his hands (if he was a priest) for the same reason everyone would see him and his improper clothing.", + "A blind man may lead the responsive reading of the Shema and translate. Rabbi Judah says: one who has never seen the light from his birth may not lead the responsive reading of the Shema. One of the blessings before the Shema is “who creates light.” According to the first opinion in the mishnah, a blind man can recite this blessing even though he can’t see the light. He may also translate the Torah because translating does not require one to read. Rabbi Judah holds that a person blind from birth cannot recite the Shema because he can’t thank God for having ever seen the light." + ], + [ + "A priest whose hands are deformed should not lift up his hands [to say the priestly blessing].
Rabbi Judah says: also one whose hands are colored with woad or madder should not lift up his hands, because [this makes] the congregation look at him.
This mishnah teaches that priests who have something distracting on their hands, either a deformation or a discoloring should not lift up their hands because this makes the people look at them and not think about the blessing that they are receiving. The mishnah considers it crucial that the congregation focus not on the external attributes of the priest but the contents of the blessing that they are receiving.
We should note that today people refrain from looking at the priests’ hands when they are reciting the blessing and their hands are also covered with a tallit.
Since the mishnah is straightforward I have refrained from commenting below." + ], + [ + "If one says, “I will not pass before the ark in colored clothes,” even in white clothes he may not pass before it.
[If one says], “I will not pass before it in shoes,” even barefoot he may not pass before it.
One who makes his tefillin [for the head] round, it is dangerous and has no religious value.
If he put them on his forehead or on the palm of his hand, behold this is the way of heresy.
If he overlaid them with gold or put [the one for the hand] on his sleeve, behold this is the manner of the outsiders.
The next two mishnayot deal with certain practices which the rabbis deemed to be heretical or at least potentially heretical.
Sections one or two: In the first two sections we learn of people who refuse to pass before the ark (to lead the Amidah) either while wearing colored robes or while wearing shoes. The rabbis suspected that one who demanded to wear white clothes or go barefoot may have had heretical beliefs. Therefore, they said that such a person cannot pass before the ark at all, even in white clothes or barefoot. In other words, wearing white clothes and going barefoot seem to have been valid practices but one who insists upon them is suspected of heresy.
We should note that the groups being described here seem to be taking Temple practice and applying it to the synagogue. In the Temple the priests’ robes were white and they went barefoot. The mishnah may be trying to emphasize that the synagogue is not the Temple and one who insists on dressing in the synagogue as if it were the Temple is potentially a heretic. There also may be a covert battle for leadership in this mishnah between priests and rabbis. Rabbis may be telling priests that when in the synagogue leading the Amidah (as opposed to reciting the priestly blessing) they are functioning as regular Jews and not as priests.
Section three: The boxes of tefillin are supposed to be square. Our mishnah deals with a period of oppression when the Romans prohibited Jews from wearing tefillin. In response someone makes his tefillin round so that the Romans will not notice that he is wearing tefillin. According to the mishnah this attempt is doubly mistaken. The Romans will realize that he is wearing tefillin and therefore it is still dangerous. Secondly, by making his tefillin round he is not fulfilling the mitzvah of tefillin. There is also the idea that tefillin can protect a person from danger. But since these tefillin are not valid they offer no protection from the Roman oppressors.
Section four: The Torah says that you should place tefillin “as a sign upon your hand and as a remembrance between your eyes.” Non-rabbinic groups of Jews (sectarians) interpreted these verses literally; tefillin are put on one’s hands and on the forehead between one’s eyes. The rabbis did not interpret the verses literally tefillin go on top of one’s head, where the hairline ends, and on one’s arms, next to one’s heart. A person who wears his tefillin between the eyes or on the hand is acting as a heretic. I should note that I have seen many, many instances of people wearing their tefillin too low on their heads. One who wears tefillin between his eyes has not fulfilled his obligation.
Section five: Covering tefillin in gold or wearing them on one’s sleeves is not proper fulfillment of the mitzvah. The mishnah deems this as the practice of “outsiders” those who have separated from the rabbinic fold." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to identify heretical behavior. In yesterday’s mishnah we saw heretical behavior involving what a person wears, be it clothing, footwear or tefillin. In today’s mishnah we see heretical behavior involving things a person says while leading the prayers or translating the Torah.", + "If one says “May the good bless you,” this is the way of heresy. The heresy here seems to be one of dualism. Saying “May the good bless you” sounds as if there are two gods, one that governs the good and one that governs the bad. This was a common theology at the time of the Mishnah, especially among groups dubbed “Gnostics” by modern scholars. The rabbis were insistent that one God was responsible for both evil and good.", + "[If one says], “May Your mercy reach the nest of a bird,” “May Your name be mentioned for the good,” “We give thanks, we give thanks,” they silence him. There are three “heretical” saying in this mishnah. I’ll try to explain them one at a time. The mishnah says that for each “they silence him.” This implies that the mishnah is describing one who “passes before the ark,” meaning one who leads the Amidah prayer. If he tries to enter in one of these prayers they remove him as prayer leader. ““May Your mercy reach the nest of a bird:” This line is explained in the Talmud in several different ways. One is that he is complaining to God saying, “Your mercy is on the nest of this bird” but not on me. God commanded shooing away the mother bird before taking the young, an act of mercy for the mother (Deuteronomy 22:6). The person praying complains that God has not shown similar mercy to him. A different explanation is that this saying understands God’s commandments as being only about mercy, when really they are decrees which we are to obey without questioning their reasoning. Another explanation is that he says “Your mercy reaches only to this nest” but cannot extend any further. In such a way he limits God’s power. “May Your name be mentioned for the good:” This implies that God’s name should not be connected with the bad or the evil. As in the first section, this might imply some sort of dualism we thank God for the good and don’t mention the evil because its source is a different god. “We give thanks, we give thanks:” Again the problem seems to be one of dualism giving thanks twice sounds like it is being given to two different gods. However, in this section the dualism may not be of a good god and a bad god, but simply two gods. There were ancient sects of Jews (including Christians) who while professing monotheism, gave divine roles to other characters, such as God’s word (the Logos), God’s spirit or Jesus.", + "One who uses euphemisms in the portion dealing with forbidden marriages, he is silenced. Leviticus 18:7 says, “you shall not uncover the nakedness of your father.” If a person translates this as “you shall not uncover the nakedness of his father,” in an attempt to use a more innocuous third person, he is silenced. The translation of the Torah is to be literal, and even in the section concerning forbidden relations.", + "If he says, [instead of] “And you shall not give any of your seed to be passed to Moloch,” (Leviticus 18:21) “You shall not give [your seed] to pass to a Gentile woman,” he silenced with a rebuke. The Torah prohibits “passing one’s child to Moloch.” Some ancient translators understood this as a prohibition against impregnating or having sexual relations with a Gentile (Aramean) woman or perhaps against giving one’s child to a Gentile to raise. Since passing one’s child to Moloch is a capital crime, this might imply that having sexual relations with is a capital crime. Therefore the rabbis insisted upon a literal translation of the verse." + ], + [ + "Introduction In yesterday’s mishnah we learned that translations must be literal. Today’s mishnah, the last in tractate Megillah, teaches that some portions of the Torah are not translated at all because of the nature of their content.", + "The incident of Reuven is read but not translated. Reuven sleeps with Bilhah, his father’s concubine (Genesis 35:22). This story is not translated in order not to shame Reuven.", + "The story of Tamar is read and translated. Tamar tricks Judah into sleeping with her (see Genesis 38). This story is read and translated because it is actually to Judah’s credit. When he discovers that he has committed a wrong (vs. 26), he doesn’t try to hide his crime, as embarrassing as it might be. Note that Judah serves as a foil for Reuven. Reuven intentionally commits a crime, so we must hide it from the public. Judah accidentally commits a crime and then confesses, so we make public the entire story.", + "The first part of the incident of the golden calf is both read and translated, but the second is read but not translated. The first part of the golden calf story is from Exodus 32:1-20. This part is translated either because Israel does receive atonement, or in order so that the congregation will learn from their mistakes. In verse 21 Moses questions and accuses Aaron. In order not to embarrass Aaron, this section is not translated.", + "The blessing of the priests, the stories of David and Amnon are not read or translated. The version of this mishnah in good manuscripts says that these sections are neither read nor translated. The priestly blessing is not read, perhaps because it is a regular part of the prayer service. According to the version of the mishna in the Talmud, these verses are read but not translated. The Talmud explains that they are not translated because one of the verses says, “May God show favor to you” and people might think that God shows favor in judgment and doesn’t judge justly. The story of David and Batsheva (II Samuel 11) is not read as a haftarah because it is embarrassing to David. In the story of Amnon (II Samuel 13), Amnon rapes Tamar and then wants to abandon her. He eventually is killed by Absolom, David’s other son. This is also quite embarrassing to David and to his house.", + "They do not conclude with the portion of the chariot as a haftarah. But Rabbi Judah permits this. We don’t read the description of the chariot contained in Ezekiel, chapter one, as a haftarah because ordinary people are not supposed to study this mystical chapter. However, Rabbi Judah allows this.", + "R. Eliezar says: they do not conclude with “Proclaim Jerusalem’s [abominations]” (Ezekiel 1 as a haftarah. Rabbi Eliezer prohibits reading Ezekiel 16 as a haftarah because its content is simply too graphic. Read the chapter for yourself to get an idea of its disturbing content. Congratulations! We have finished Megillah. It is a tradition at this point to thank God for helping us finish learning the tractate and to commit ourselves to going back and relearning it, so that we may not forget it and so that its lessons will stay with us for all of our lives. Megillah was full of practical halakhah that is still relevant today. We learned about reading the Megillah and reading the Torah in the synagogue. The information in this tractate is just the tip of the iceberg to all of the many halakhot about these two issues, so keep learning. As always, congratulations on learning another tractate of Mishnah. Tomorrow we start Moed Katan." + ] + ] + ] + }, + "schema": { + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה מגילה", + "enTitle": "English Explanation of Mishnah Megillah", + "key": "English Explanation of Mishnah Megillah", + "nodes": [ + { + "heTitle": "הקדמה", + "enTitle": "Introduction" + }, + { + "heTitle": "", + "enTitle": "" + } + ] + } +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Moed/English Explanation of Mishnah Megillah/English/merged.json b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Moed/English Explanation of Mishnah Megillah/English/merged.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..93392b3228a13b212355ba03f71f2bd33a5f7e66 --- /dev/null +++ b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Moed/English Explanation of Mishnah Megillah/English/merged.json @@ -0,0 +1,240 @@ +{ + "title": "English Explanation of Mishnah Megillah", + "language": "en", + "versionTitle": "merged", + "versionSource": "https://www.sefaria.org/English_Explanation_of_Mishnah_Megillah", + "text": { + "Introduction": [ + "Tractate Megillah deals mostly with the public reading of Scripture at fixed times—on holidays and on certain days of the week. The first two chapters deal with reading Esther and the second two chapters deal with reading the Torah and Haftarah.", + "The Book of Esther does not itself mandate its own reading. However, the rabbis understood the following verse to allude to a yearly reading of Esther. 9:28 states: “Consequently, these days are recalled and observed in every generation: by every family, every province, and every city. And these days of Purim shall never cease among the Jews, and the memory of them shall never perish among their descendants.” The rabbis understood that the memory of Purim was to be preserved by the reading of Esther on Purim itself. ", + "The main mitzvah of reading the Megillah is to read it during the day. However, by Talmudic times they had already added that one should read the Megillah at night as well. Most cities would read the Megillah on the fourteenth of Adar. However, cities that were walled when Joshua conquered Canaan read on fifteenth of Adar and smaller cities sometimes read on an earlier date. This is an issue which we shall explore in depth in the first three mishnayot of the tractate. ", + "The public reading of the Torah is an ancient custom. Ancient Jewish and non-Jewish descriptions of synagogues almost always describe the Torah as being read in the synagogue. The Talmudim variously attribute this custom to Moses, to the prophets or to Ezra. From an early period the Torah was read on Shabbat and holidays at Shacharit as well as at Minhah on Shabbat, and on Monday and Thursday at Shacharit.", + "The reading of a portion from the Prophets, the Haftarah, also seems to be an ancient custom. According to some commentators, the reading of the Haftarah was a response to a decree that Jews could not read from the Torah. Perhaps a more cogent explanation is that Jews wanted to hear the Prophets as well as the Torah. ", + "In the land of Israel, from Mishnaic times through the early medieval period, the custom was to complete the reading of the Torah once every three or perhaps three and half years. This is stated explicitly in the Babylonian Talmud, and is clearly reflected in some midrashim and in lists of the Haftarot. This is commonly called the “triennial cycle.” In Babylonia they read the entire Torah once a year, completing it on Simchat Torah. I should note the ancient “triennial cycle” is very different from the “triennial cycle” as it is observed in some Conservative congregations today. Most congregations follow along with “parshat hashavua” the weekly Torah reading as determined by the annual Babylonian cycle, but read only a third of it. This preserves the ability to follow after the weekly Torah reading but creates the problem that the Torah is not read consecutively. In ancient Israel they certainly read the Torah consecutively. ", + "Finally, we should note another key distinction between current practice and ancient practice. In the time of the Mishnah, one who received an “aliyah” literally “going up to the Torah,” would have read the Torah and recited the blessing. Today this usually doesn’t happen. Usually, one person goes up to recite the blessing and another person reads on his behalf. There are other customs that we observe differently from those prescribed in the Mishnah, and we shall note them as opportunity arises. \n" + ], + "": [ + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThe first mishnah of Megillah teaches that the Megillah might be read on different days, depending on the locality. Tomorrow’s mishnah will explain this in greater detail.", + "The Megillah is read on the eleventh, the twelfth, the thirteenth, the fourteenth, and the fifteenth [of Adar], never earlier and never later. This section provides all of the possible dates in Adar on which the Megillah might be read. Tomorrow’s mishnah will explain in what situation it might be read on the eleventh, twelfth, or thirteenth.", + "Cities which have been walled since the days of Joshua ben Nun read on the fifteenth; villages and large towns read on the fourteenth, Esther 9:19 reads, “That is why village Jews, who live in unwalled towns, observe the fourteenth day of the month of Adar and make it a day of merrymaking and feasting, and as a holiday and an occasion for sending gifts to one another.” If Jews in unwalled towns celebrate Purim on the fourteenth, it implies that Jews in walled cities celebrate on another day. This day must be the fifteenth, since in verse 18 the Jews in Shushan rest from their fighting on the fifteenth. The mishnah determines what is a walled city by reference to Joshua, even though Joshua lived hundreds of years before the events of Purim. The mishnah refers back to Joshua because the land of Israel was desolate in the time of Achashverosh and none of its cities were walled. In order to honor Israel, we therefore refer back to the original conquering.", + "Except that villages move the reading up to the day of gathering. Small villages move the reading up to the Monday or Thursday prior to the fourteenth of Adar. These were the market days, the days on which the court would convene and the days on which the Torah was read. The idea was that on these days the Jews would gather in the larger cities and it would be more possible to have a large celebration than if each individual village had celebrated separately on the fourteenth." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah explains how depending on when Purim falls the Megillah might be read on the eleventh, twelfth, thirteenth, fourteenth or fifteenth. To explain the mishnah we need to remind ourselves that small villages would not read alone in their own village, but rather would move up, if necessary, the day of the reading so that it would fall on the same day as “the day of gathering,” the market and court day in the larger towns. As we shall see, this can lead to their reading the Megillah on the eleventh, twelfth or thirteenth. The fourteenth and fifteenth are the days when the Megillah is normally read.", + "How so?
If the fourteenth [of Adar] falls on Monday, the villages and large towns read on that day and the walled places on the next day. The mishnah begins with the easiest situation. Purim (the fourteenth of Adar) falls on the fourteenth, so everyone can read on that day except for those in walled cities who read on the fifteenth.", + "If it falls on Tuesday or on Wednesday, the villages move the reading up to the day of gathering, the large towns read on that day, and the walled places on the next day. If it falls on Tuesday, the people of the villages read on Monday (the 13th), the day of the gathering, and if it falls on Wednesday then they also move it up to the 12th, which is Monday. Again, the people of the large towns read on the fourteenth and the people of the walled cities on the fifteenth.", + "If it falls on Thursday, the villages and large towns read on that day and the walled places on the next day. If it falls on Thursday, again, everyone can read on that day except for those in walled cities who read on the fifteenth, on Friday.", + "If it falls on Friday, the villages move the reading up to the day of gathering and the large towns and walled places read on that day. If it falls on Friday, the villagers read on the Thursday the thirteenth, those from the large towns and even those from walled cities read on Friday, because the Megillah is not read on Shabbat. The reason that the Megillah is not read on Shabbat is that it is possible to move it up to Friday, so there is no reason to disturb Shabbat. The Talmud also explains that if they were allowed to read on Friday, they might end up carrying the Megillah through the public domain in order to get to synagogue.", + "If it falls on Shabbat, the villages and large towns move the reading up to the day of gathering, and the walled places read on the next day. If it falls on Shabbat, everyone moves the reading up to Thursday. Since it can’t be read on Shabbat and it will therefore have to be moved up in any case, they move it up for the large towns all the way to Thursday so that they end up reading it on the same day as the villagers.", + "If it falls on Sunday, the villages move the reading up to the day of gathering, the large towns read on that day, and the walled cities on the day following. Finally, if it falls on Sunday, the villagers move the reading up to Thursday, the 11th of Adar, the people from the large towns read on Sunday and those from walled towns read on Tuesday, the 15th." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to deal with the topic of the various days upon which the Megillah might be read.", + "What is considered a large town? One which has in it ten idle men. One that has fewer is considered a village. A large town is one that is considered wealthy enough to support ten men who do not work but rather sit in the synagogue or study house and study all day. Put another way, a large town is one that can support a small leisurely class. In Greece and Rome this meant philosophers and in Israel this meant rabbis. Anything smaller is considered a village and moves the reading of the Megillah up to the day of the gathering, Monday or Thursday.", + "In respect of these they said that they should be moved up but not postponed. There are other holidays and semi-holidays during the year that are not observed on the day upon which they fall if they fall on Shabbat. The reading of the Megillah is the only holiday that is moved up all the rest are postponed. The Talmud provides a midrashic explanation for this. Esther 9:27 states, “the Jews accepted upon themselves and their descendants and all those who might join them, that these days should not pass without observing them as it is written and in their time, year after year.” My translation is intentionally slightly awkward so that we can note the midrash. The words “should not pass” are understood by the rabbis to mean that one cannot observe Purim after the fourteenth/fifteenth of Adar has already passed.", + "But with regard to the bringing the wood for the priests, the [fast of] Tisha B’Av, the hagigah, and assembling the people they postpone [until after Shabbat] and they do not move them up. I will briefly explain these holidays here. The bringing of the wood for the priests occurred nine times a year. Certain families would bring wood to the Temple to be used on the altar. This was discussed in Taanit 4:5. It would not be done on Shabbat. The hagigah is a sacrifice brought on Yom Tov, the first day of the festival. If Yom Tov falls on Shabbat it is postponed until the next day. The “assembling of the people” or “Hakhel” in Hebrew occurs during the sabbatical year on Sukkot, when they would gather all the people together to read the Torah. This would not be done on Shabbat.", + "Although they said that they should be moved up but not postponed, it is permissible to mourn, to fast, and to distribute gifts to the poor [on these earlier days]. On both the fourteenth and fifteenth of Adar, one is not allowed to fast or to mourn, because these are the two days of Purim. However, even though the eleventh, twelfth and thirteenth are also days on which one might read the Megillah, it is still permitted to mourn or fast on those days. The mishnah says that it is also permitted to give gifts to the poor on those days. Giving gifts to the poor is one of the central obligations of Purim. Some commentators explain the mishnah to mean that one who gives gifts to the poor on one of these days has fulfilled his obligation. However, others say that the mishnah means that one is exempt from giving gifts to the poor on these days.", + "Rabbi Judah said: When is this so? In a place where people gather on Mondays and Thursdays, but in places where people do not gather on Mondays and Thursdays, the Megillah is read only on its proper day. Rabbi Judah points out that the system of moving the reading up to the 11th-13th was done only when it made realistic sense at a time when Mondays and Thursdays were the days of gathering. It seems quite certain that by Rabbi Judah’s time this system of gathering on Monday and Thursday was already defunct and hence everyone would read at the proper time." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nWhen Jews adjust the lunar calendar to keep it in sync with the solar calendar, they add a second month of Adar, the month during which Purim falls. The rabbis hold that Purim should be observed during the second Adar. Today because our calendar is fixed this is quite simple. Ahead of time we know which year will have a second Adar. In mishnaic times this was more difficult because the calendar had not yet been fixed. Our mishnah addresses this problem.", + "If they read the Megillah during the first Adar and the year was intercalated (a month was, it is read again in the second Adar. If they read the Megillah during the first Adar and then the court decided to add a month to the year, they must read it again during the second Adar.", + "There is no difference between the first Adar and the second Adar except the reading of the Megillah and the giving of gifts to the poor. The only difference with regard to Purim between the first month of Adar and the second is that the Megillah is read and gifts are given to the poor during the second month and not during the first month. However, when it comes to the prohibition of fasting and mourning, it is forbidden to fast on the fourteenth and fifteenth of both months. It is unclear from our mishnah whether the other two obligations for Purim, giving portions of food to friends and having a festive meal, are done both times or not. It seems to me that it would make little sense for these customs to be performed during the first Adar at a time when the Megillah is not being read." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nFrom here until the end of the chapter there is a series of mishnayot in which each mishnah begins with the literary structure of “there is no difference between x and y except,” the literary structure that we saw in yesterday’s mishnah. This type of structure is probably a result of the Mishnah’s being an oral text. Halakhot phrased in this style are simply easier to remember.", + "There is no difference between Shabbat and Yom Tov except the preparation of food. All work prohibited on Shabbat is also prohibited on Yom Tov, except work done in the preparation of food. For further reading on this subject look at the introduction to tractate Betzah.", + "There is no difference between Shabbat and Yom HaKippurim except that the deliberate violation of the one is punished by a human court and the deliberate violation of the other by karet. An intentional transgression of Shabbat carries with it the death penalty, a punishment that is carried out by a human court. In contrast, an intentional transgression of Yom Kippur is not punished by a human court, but rather by karet, a punishment that is dished out by God." + ], + [ + "There is no difference between one who is prohibited by vow from benefiting from his fellow and one who is prohibited by vow from [benefiting from] his food, except in the matter of setting foot [on his property] and of vessels which are not used for [preparing] food. There are two things which are permitted to one who is under a vow not to derive food benefit from his neighbor which are not permitted to one who may not benefit from his neighbor at all: walking on his property and the use of things not involved in the making of food. For more information look at Nedarim 4:1.", + "There is no difference between vowed offerings and freewill-offerings except that he is responsible for vowed offering but not responsible for freewill-offerings. Vowed offerings are stated using the language “Behold, I will bring an animal as an offering.” If a person sets aside an animal to be a vowed offering and the animal cannot for whatever reason be sacrificed (for instance, it gets lost or dies) he must bring a substitute. However, if he makes a freewill-offering using the language, “I will bring this animal as a sacrifice” and the animal is lost, he need not bring another. In all other respects, there is no difference between the two types of offerings." + ], + [ + "There is no difference between a zav who sees [genital discharge] twice and one who sees three, except the sacrifice. A man who experiences an abnormal discharge for one or two consecutive days is impure for seven days after the discharge ends. If he sees the discharge for a third consecutive day, he must bring a sacrifice at the end of the seven day period. See Leviticus 15.", + "There is no difference between a metzora who is under observation and one declared to be a definite metzora except the disheveling of hair and tearing the clothes. A metzora is a person with some sort of skin affliction. After his skin affliction is identified he is set aside for seven days for observation by a priest. If the skin affliction spreads, then the priest declares him to be a definite metzora. There is no difference between the two stages except that one who has been declared to be a definite metzora has to have his hair disheveled and his clothes torn, as prescribed in Leviticus 13:45. [I should note that some interpret the Hebrew for “disheveling the hair” to mean that he has to let his hair grow long.] Other than these differences, the two types of metzora are equal in their impurity.", + "There is no difference between a metzora who has been declared clean after being under observation and one who has been declared clean after having been a definite metzorah except shaving and [sacrificing] the birds. If the priest declares a metzora who had been under observation to be pure, he does not bring a sacrifice nor does he have to shave his hair. If the metzora had been definite then he must bring two birds as a sacrifice and shave his hair. See Leviticus 14. The two different types of metzora are the same in that at the end of their period of impurity they both must immerse in the mikveh and purify their clothes (see Lev. 13:6, 34)." + ], + [ + "There is no difference between scrolls [of the Tanakh] and tefillin and mezuzahs except that scrolls may be written in any language whereas tefillin and mezuzahs may be written only in Assyrian. Scrolls of the Tanakh may be written in any language and in any type of writing. However, mezuzot and tefillin may be written only in Assyrian, the alphabet in which Hebrew was and is still written and they may be written only in Hebrew.", + "Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says that scrolls [of the Tanakh] were permitted [by the sages] to be written only in Greek. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says that while Tanakh scrolls may indeed be written in languages other than Hebrew, they may not be written in any language, just Greek. At the time of the Mishnah Greek was the international language of the intelligentsia. It was also the language into which the Tanakh had already been translated. This translation is called the Septuagint and was widely used in the period by Jews in the Greek-speaking Diaspora." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah deals with differences between different types of high priests.", + "There is no difference between a priest anointed with the oil of anointment and one who [only] wears the additional garments except for the bull which is offered for the [unwitting transgression of] any of the commandments. The high priest was supposed to be anointed with special anointing oil, except that the composition of this type of oil was unknown in the Second Temple period and hence not used. The distinction in the Second Temple period between high priests and ordinary priests was that the high priest had eight garments and the ordinary priest wore only four. Our mishnah teaches that the difference between the high priest in the First Temple and the high priest in the Second Temple is that only the anointed priest brings a bull for an unwitting transgression, as is stated in Leviticus 4:3, “If it is the anointed priest who has incurred guilt…”", + "There is no difference between a serving [high] priest and one whose time has passed except the bull of Yom HaKippurim and the tenth of the ephah. The high priest who is currently serving in office brings the sacrificial bull on Yom HaKippurim (Leviticus 16:6) and the tenth of an ephah of flour offered every day (Leviticus 6:13). Otherwise a high priest who has been removed or otherwise left office is treated the same as the currently serving high priest. For more information on this, see Horayot 3:4." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nBefore the Temple in Jerusalem was built it was permitted to build personal altars and offer sacrifices on them. At this time period there were also communal altars. The personal altars are called “small altars” whereas the communal altars are called “great altars”. The “great altar” is referred to in I Kings 3:2, “The people, however, continued to offer sacrifices at altars, because up to that time no house had been built for the name of the Lord. The king went up to Gibeon to sacrifice there, for that was the great altar…”\nOur mishnah outlines the differences that existed in this time period between great, communal altars and personal, small altars.", + "There is no difference between a great altar and a small altar except for the pesach offering. An individual cannot sacrifice the pesah at his own altar, but rather must bring it to the communal altar. The Talmud explains that not only the pesah cannot be offered at the small altar, but all mandatory sacrifices as well. This is illustrated in the next section’s general principle.", + "This is the general principle: any animal which can be brought as a vow-offering or a freewill offering may be brought on a [small] altar, any animal which is not the object of a vow or a freewill-offering may not be brought on a [small] altar. Only voluntary offerings can be offered at a small altar. Mandatory offerings, such as the tamid, the musaf, the pesah, sin-offerings, guilt-offerings, holiday-related offerings and others, must be brought to the central altar." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe final mishnah of this series continues to deal with differences between places in which sacrifices can be offered.", + "There is no difference between Shiloh and Jerusalem except that in Shiloh sacrifices of lesser sanctity and second tithe could be eaten anywhere within sight [of the town], whereas in Jerusalem [they had to be eaten] within the walls. During the time of Samuel the ark was at Shiloh (see I Samuel 3-4). Since the ark had a permanent home, it was prohibited to offer sacrifices at local altars, just as it was prohibited to offer sacrifices when the Temple stood in Jerusalem. There is only one difference between Shiloh and Jerusalem, and that is with regard to where certain sacrifices and second tithe could be eaten. When Shiloh was the center of worship, these could be eaten in any place within sight of Shiloh. In Jerusalem they had to be eaten within the city walls.", + "In both places the most holy sacrifices were eaten within the curtains. In both Shiloh and Jerusalem most holy sacrifices, such as sin and guilt offerings, had to be eaten within the Temple/Tabernacle (Mishkan) precincts.", + "After the sanctification of Shiloh there is permission [for altars], but after the sanctification of Jerusalem there is no such permission. When Shiloh was destroyed, it again became permitted to offer sacrifices at other communal and personal altars but when the two Temples in Jerusalem were destroyed there was no such permission and it continued to be forbidden to offer sacrifices at other altars. Put another way, when the Temple in Jerusalem was destroyed it became forbidden to offer sacrifices elsewhere and after the destruction of the Second Temple it remained forbidden until the Temple will be rebuilt." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThe Mishnah now begins to talk about how the Megillah is actually read.", + "If one reads the Megillah out of order, he has not fulfilled his obligation. The Megillah must be read in order. One cannot skip around and then go back.", + "If he reads it by heart, if he reads it in a translation [targum], or in any other language, he has not fulfilled his obligation. The Megillah must be read from a scroll. Despite its brevity, it, like other Torah readings, may not be read by memory. It also may not be read using a translation or in any other language, even if it is written in that language. This section refers to a person who understands Hebrew. Such a person who hears in another language has not fulfilled his obligation.", + "But they may read it to those who do not understand Hebrew in a language other than Hebrew. One who doesn’t understand Hebrew who heard it in Assyrian [Hebrew], has fulfilled his obligation. In contrast, somebody who doesn’t understand Hebrew may fulfill his obligation by hearing the Megillah in a language other than Hebrew. Nevertheless, if a person hears it in Hebrew he has fulfilled his obligation even if he doesn’t understand it. In this aspect Hebrew is greater than the other languages other languages need to be understood while Hebrew does not. Hebrew is referred to as “Assyrian” because it is written using the Assyrian alphabet." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first part of this mishnah deals with having proper intention while reading the Megillah. The second part deals with the physical material with which the Megillah is written.", + "If one reads it with breaks, or naps [in between readings], he has fulfilled his obligation. In yesterday’s mishnah we learned that one must read the Megillah in its proper order. Our mishnah teaches that it need not be read without breaks. One may read some of the Megillah, stop for a while, and then continue on and thereby fulfill one’s obligation. Similarly, one may read, take a nap and then continue where one has left off [no, this is not permission to sleep in shul].", + "If he was copying it, explaining it or correcting [a scroll of Esther], if he directed his heart, he has fulfilled his obligation, but if not, he has not fulfilled his obligation. When one reads the Megillah, or hears it being read, he must have in mind that he is fulfilling the religious obligation to hear the Megillah on Purim. The mishnah describes other activities in which a person might be engaged that count as reading the Megillah only if he has the proper intent. A person who was copying a scroll, explaining it or correcting it and did not remember that it was Purim has not fulfilled his obligation. While doing any of these activities he must have the intention of fulfilling his obligation. Assumedly, he must also read it out loud.", + "If it was written with arsenic, with red chalk, with gum or with sulfate of copper, or on paper or on scratch paper, he has not fulfilled his obligation, unless it is written in Assyrian on parchment and in ink. One cannot write a Megillah with these types of dyes or on these types of paper because it is not permanent. In order for the Megillah to be valid for a religious occasion, it must be written in Hebrew, on parchment (made from animal skins) and with permanent ink." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first section of this mishnah deals with a person who travels from a walled city which reads on the 15th of Adar to a town which reads on the 14th or vice versa.\nThe second section discusses how much of the Megillah must be read on Purim.", + "A resident of a town who has gone to a walled city or a resident of a walled city who has gone to a town, if he is to return to his own place he reads according to the rule of his own place, and if not reads with them. The mishnah states simply that if a person travels from one type of town to another he retains the custom of the town of his origin if his intention is not to move to his new town. If his intention is not to return to his previous town, then he reads with the new place. In the Talmud they explain that “if he is to return to his own place” means if he is to return there that very night, and get there before the morning. If he goes to another town but returns to his own town in the morning, then he celebrates Purim with his own town. But if he goes to another town and is there in the morning, he must celebrate Purim and hear the Megillah on that day. By the way, as someone who lives in Modiin, which reads on the 14th, and goes to Jerusalem which reads on the 15th, I encounter this issue pretty much every year.", + "From where does a man read the Megillah and thereby fulfill his obligation? Rabbi Meir says: all of it. Rabbi Judah says: from “There was a Jew” (Esther 2:5). Rabbi Yose says: from “After these things” (3:1). Today we read the entire book of Esther, but whether this is necessary is debated by the sages. Rabbi Meir says that one has to read the whole thing. Rabbi Judah says that he only has to read from 2:5, where Mordecai is first mentioned. Rabbi Yose says he only has to read from 3:1, where the actual plot by Haman (make a lot of noise when you say this) begins." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first section of the mishnah deals with who is qualified to read the Megillah. The second section deals with when it can be read.", + "All are qualified to read the Megillah except a deaf person, an idiot and a minor. Rabbi Judah qualifies a minor. Deaf people, idiots (this refers either to one who is mentally retarded or an insane person) and minors are generally not obligated to perform the commandments. As we have mentioned on several occasions, in those days they had no way to communicate with the deaf and little understanding of the insane or retarded. Hence these people were mostly cut off from participating in society. Minors are too young to understand the meaning of the commandments and hence are not obligated. Since these people are not obligated, they cannot perform the commandment for others. This was stated also in Rosh Hashanah 3:8, at the end of that mishnah. Rabbi Judah says that a minor is qualified.", + "They do not read the Megillah, nor circumcise, nor go to the mikveh, nor sprinkling [purificatory waters], and similarly a woman keeping day for day should not take a ritual bath until the sun has risen. But if any of these things is done after dawn, it is valid. The main reading of the Megillah takes place during the day. The Mishnah teaches that during the day means after the sun has risen. This is also the time for other mitzvoth that need to take place during the day. “Sprinkling” refers to the water mixed with the ashes of the red heifer. “A woman keeping a day for a day” refers to a woman who was impure do to non-menstrual genital discharge. She is impure a day for every day on which she has a discharge. All of these things should be done after the sun has risen. However, if someone did them after dawn, meaning when the sky begins to become light, the actions are still valid, at least ex post facto." + ], + [ + "The whole day is a valid time for
reading the Megillah;
reciting Hallel;
for the blowing of the shofar;
for taking up the lulav;
for the Musaf prayer;
for Musaf sacrifices;
for confession over the oxen;
for the confession over the tithe;
for the confession of sins on Yom HaKippurim;
for laying on of hands;
for slaughtering [the sacrifices];
for waving [them];
for bringing near [the vessel with the minhah-offering to the altar];
for taking a handful;
for placing it on the fire;
for pinching off [the head of a bird-offering];
for receiving the blood [in a vessel];
for sprinkling [the blood on the altar];
for making the sotah drink [the bitter waters];
for breaking the neck of the heifer;
and for purifying the metzora.
One can fulfill one’s obligation of hearing the Megillah at any time during the day. Our mishnah gives a very long list of numerous other rituals that one can perform at any time during the day.
Since this list is very long, I will not explain each item in detail, but rather mostly make reference to the relevant biblical verse(s) which deal with the issue. I will not even comment on issues that seem abundantly clear.
Sections 6-7: On Shabbat, holidays and Rosh Hodesh there are musaf sacrifices and musaf prayers. The sacrifices can be offered at any time during the day and the prayers may be recited throughout the whole day.
Section 8: For confession over the ox One who brings an ox as a sacrifice also confesses to the sin for which the ox is brought (Leviticus 4:3,14).
Section 9: For the confession over the tithe On the fourth and seventh years of the sabbatical cycle one makes a confession that he has “removed all of the holy produce from his home” (Deuteronomy 26:13).
Section 10: For the confession of sins on Yom HaKippurim The high priest recites a confession over the sacrifices (Leviticus 16:21; see also Yoma 3:8, 4:2, 6:2).
Section 11: For laying on of hands one lays one’s hands on an animal sacrifice before it is slaughtered (Leviticus 1:4).
Section 13: For waving [them] one waves the innards and the breast of wellbeing offerings (Leviticus 7:30).
Section 14-16: these are all elements of the minhah offering.
Section 17: For pinching off [the head of a bird-offering] Leviticus 1:15, 5:8.
Section 18: For receiving the blood [in a vessel] in order to sprinkle it on the altar.
Section 20: For breaking the neck of the heifer if a dead body is found in a field and the identity of the murderer is unknown (Deuteronomy 21:1)
Section 21: And for purifying the metzora Leviticus 14." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is the complement to yesterday’s mishnah. It teaches that mitzvoth which must be performed at night can be performed all night.", + "The whole night is valid for reaping the Omer and for burning fat and limbs [on the altar]. There are two mitzvoth listed here that must be done at night. The first is reaping the Omer, the barley offering which is brought from the second day of Pesah through Shavuot (Leviticus 23:10). The second is putting on the altar fat and limbs that had not been burned during the day.", + "This is the general principle: any matter whose commandment is during the day, is valid all day and any matter whose commandment is at night is valid all night. This general principle illustrates that which we learned in the last two mishnayot." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThe first three mishnayot of this chapter deal with the holiness of the synagogue and the articles found in it. Our mishnah deals with what one may do with the proceeds of a sale of the synagogue or the things in it.", + "Townspeople who sold the town square, they may buy with the proceeds a synagogue. [If they sold] a synagogue, they may buy with the proceeds an ark. [If they sold] an ark they may buy covers [for scrolls]. (1) [If they sold] covers, they may buy scrolls [of the Tanakh]. ( [If they sold] scrolls they may buy a Torah. One can sell an object and buy something that is somewhat holier. The town square has some holiness to it because it is occasionally used for gathering in prayer, such as during a public fast (see Taanit 2:1). “Scrolls” refers to books of the Tanakh not part of the Five Books of Moses.", + "But if they sold a Torah they may not buy with the proceeds scrolls [of the Tanakh]. ( If [they sold] scrolls they may not buy covers. (1) If [they sold] covers they may not buy an ark. If [they sold] an ark they may not buy a synagogue. If [they sold] a synagogue they may not buy a town square. Conversely, one cannot sell an object and buy something with an object of less holiness.", + "The same applies to any money left over. If there is money left over from a permitted sale then they must still use that money to buy something with greater holiness. Thus if they sell covers and use the proceeds to buy scrolls and there is money left over, they must use the proceeds to buy other scrolls, or a Torah.", + "They may not sell [something] belonging to a community because this lowers its sanctity, the words of Rabbi Meir. They said to him: if so, it should not be allowed to sell from a larger town to a smaller one. According to Rabbi Meir there is an additional restriction when it comes to selling holy items. The community cannot sell an item that belongs to the community to an individual. So if the members of the synagogue own scrolls and they wish to sell them to buy a Torah, they may not sell the scrolls to an individual. This means that according to Rabbi Meir there seems to be holiness in the community. The item is more holy because it is owned by a community, an entity which has greater holiness than an individual. Alternatively, an item is holier if it is used by more people. The other sages respond that it is problematic to quantify holiness based on the number of people within an entity. If a community is holier than an individual, than a large community is holier than a small community. Since this doesn’t make sense, the sages reject Rabbi Meir’s halakhah altogether." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals specifically with selling a synagogue.", + "They may not sell a synagogue except with the stipulation that it may be bought back whenever they want, the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Meir holds that the community can sell the synagogue but only on condition that the synagogue can be bought back any time they wish. It sounds like Rabbi Meir intends to say that while the community may sell the synagogue because they need to buy holier items, what the community should really do is save up so that they can buy the synagogue back. Also, if they saw that the synagogue was being put to improper use, they could demand to purchase it back immediately.", + "But the sages say: they may sell it in perpetuity, except for four purposes for it to become one of four things: a bathhouse, a tannery, a ritual bath, or a urinal. The rabbis are more lenient when it comes to selling the synagogue and do not require the seller to be able to buy it back whenever he should so please. The one restriction is that the sellers may not sell it knowing that it will be used for a something smelly (a tannery, a urinal) or for something where people will be naked (a bathhouse or a ritual bath).", + "Rabbi Judah says: they may sell it to be a courtyard, and the purchaser may do what he likes with it. Rabbi Judah points out that if the synagogue’s owners cannot by right repurchase the synagogue, then the new owners can trick the system by first buying it to be a courtyard and then doing with it whatever they like, including turning it into a urinal. It is unclear whether Rabbi Judah says that this is permitted and there’s nothing that can be done about it, or what he is really doing is criticizing the sages’ position by pointing out that they can’t really enforce their halakhah. As we shall see in the next mishnah, Rabbi Judah believes that a synagogue retains its sanctity even after it is destroyed. It therefore seems less likely that Rabbi Judah would condone the synagogue becoming something like a urinal." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn this mishnah Rabbi Judah teaches that the holiness of a synagogue remains even if it has fallen into ruins. Rabbi Judah applies the holiness of the Temple in Jerusalem to the synagogue of the post-destruction period. Just as the holiness of the Temple and the Temple Mount remained even when Jerusalem was destroyed, so too the holiness of a synagogue remains when it physically lies in ruins. There is a deep message in this mishnah. The holiness of the synagogue is not dependent upon the existence of its physical structure. Once people have treated the place as holy, it will retain that sanctity forever.", + "Rabbi Judah said further: a synagogue that has fallen into ruins, they may not eulogize in it, nor twist ropes, nor to spread nets [to trap animals], nor to lay out produce on its roof [to dry], nor to use it as a short cut, as it says, “And I will desolate your holy places” (Leviticus 26:3 their holiness remains even when they are desolate. One may not use a synagogue that lays in ruins for a profane, every day purpose. One cannot deliver eulogies in it because eulogies are not delivered in synagogues, even when they have been destroyed. [As an aside, the custom to deliver eulogies and conduct funerals inside synagogues is a modern custom, probably borrowed from the Christians. Jews used to deliver eulogies either at the cemetery on the path on the way there.] One can’t use it as a place of work. The mishnah uses the example of “twisting rope” because twisting rope requires space, but it means that no work should be done there. It should not be used to trap animals nor should its roof be used to dry out fruit. One shouldn’t use it as a short cut. In summary, it should only be entered for its intended purpose as a place of worship and Torah study. The mishnah uses a midrash, exegesis of a biblical verse, to prove this point. In a section in which God rebukes Israel, He threatens that He will “desolate your holy places.” The fact that the verse calls these places holy implies that they retain their holiness even when they have been destroyed.", + "If grass comes up in it, it should not be plucked, [in order to elicit] melancholy. The mishnah now changes direction and seems to acknowledge that there is some significance to the synagogue’s having been destroyed. According to the theology reflected in this mishnah, a destroyed synagogue is sign of God’s wrath, which comes as a result of Israel’s sin. When one sees grasses growing in a synagogue, a person will surely experience deep sadness. It will remind him that the synagogue was destroyed and that he should repent. It will also remind him that he should dedicate himself to rebuilding the synagogue as quickly as possible." + ], + [ + "If Rosh Hodesh Adar falls on Shabbat the portion of shekalim is read [on that day]. If it falls in the middle of the week, it is read on the Shabbat before, and on the next Shabbat there is a break.
On the second [of the special Shabbatot] they read “Zakhor;”
On the third the portion of the red heifer;
On the fourth “This month shall be for you;”
On the fifth the regular order is resumed.
They interrupt [the regular order] for anything: for Rosh Hodesh, for Hanukkah, for Purim, for fasts, for Ma’amadot, and for Yom HaKippurim.
The rest of this chapter deals with the portions of the Torah read on holidays and special Shabbatot. In mishnaic times they did not complete the Torah once a year as they did in Babylonia and as we do today, but rather about once every three years. Another difference between the ancient custom and that of today is that today when certain holidays fall on Shabbat we read the regular Torah portion and then we add a special reading for that day. In mishnaic times, since they didn’t really have a regular Torah portion, they only read the special reading. Thus if Rosh Hodesh fell on Shabbat they would read only the portion for Rosh Hodesh and interrupt the regular continuous reading of the Torah.
Our mishnah deals with the four special Shabbatot that precede Pesah. They are:
1) Shekalim to remind people that on Adar they would have to bring the half-shekel to the Temple (see tractate Shekalim). This was read before Rosh Hodesh Adar.
2) Zakhor Deuteronomy 25:17-19. This is read before Purim and connects Amalek with Haman.
3) Parah Numbers 19. We read about the red heifer to remind people that before Pesah they must be pure in order to eat the Pesah sacrifice.
4) Hahodesh Exodus 12:1-20. Read the Shabbat before Nissan to remind people that Pesah is approaching and that they must begin preparing.
Section one: On Rosh Hodesh Adar which falls on Shabbat they read Shekalim, which is Exodus 30:11-16. However, if Rosh Hodesh Adar falls during the week, they would read Shekalim on the Shabbat before Rosh Hodesh. On the Shabbat following Rosh Hodesh they would go back to reading where they had last left off in the regular cycle. This week would then be a break from the four special portions enumerated in our mishnah.
Sections 2-5: The mishnah now enumerates the four special portions, described above in the introduction. After Hahodesh, the order returns to its regular cycle. We should note the concept of Shabbat Hagadol, the Shabbat before Pesah, did not exist in mishnaic or talmudic times.
Section six: The regular reading of the Torah is interrupted for any special occasion. This includes all holidays. On fast days, meaning Mondays or Thursdays when they would fast for rain, they would not read the regular portion but rather the special readings for fasts. Ma’amadot were described in greater length in tractate Taanit. These were gatherings by people in towns when their kohanim would go to the Temple. The people in the town would read from the beginning of Genesis and not from the regular Torah portion." + ], + [ + "On Pesah we read from the portion of the festivals in Leviticus (Torat (Leviticus 23:4).
On Shavuot, “Seven weeks” (Deuteronomy 16:9).
On Rosh Hashanah “On the seventh day on the first of the month” (Leviticus 23:2.
On Yom Hakippurim, “After the death” (Leviticus 16).
On the first day of the Festival [of Sukkot] they read from the portion of the festivals in Leviticus, and on the other days of the Festival [of Sukkot] the [sections] on the offerings of the Festival.
This mishnah lists the portions read on the three pilgrimage holidays, Pesah, Shavuot and Sukkot and on Rosh Hashanah and Yom Hakippurim as well.
Most of these are straightforward and do not require explanation.
The one slightly confusing issue is the readings for Sukkot. On the first day of Sukkot we read from Leviticus 23, the same reading as on Pesah. On the remaining days we read the sacrifices listed for that day in Numbers 29:17 ff. Sukkot differs from Pesah in that on Pesah the same musaf offerings are made every day. On Sukkot each day has a different number of offerings. As an aside, this is one reason why we recite the full Hallel for all seven days of Sukkot but only on the first day of Pesah." + ], + [ + "On Hanukkah they read the section of the princes (Numbers 7).
On Purim, “And Amalek came” (Exodus 17:8).
On Rosh Hodesh, “And on the first of your months” (Numbers 28:11).
On Maamadot, the account of the creation (Genesis 1:1-2:3).
On fast days, the blessings and curses (Leviticus 26:3 ff and Deuteronomy 28). They do not interrupt while reading the curses, but rather one reads them all.
On Monday and Thursday and on Shabbat at minhah they read according to the regular order and this does not count as part of the reading [for the succeeding Shabbat].
As it says, “And Moshe declared to the children of Israel the appointed seasons of the Lord” (Leviticus 23:44) it is their mitzvah that each should be read in its appropriate time.
The final mishnah of our chapter details what sections are read on non-Toraitic holidays or events. Since there are no passages in the Torah about these days, the sages had to find other passages whose themes they deemed appropriate.
The mishnah concludes with a midrash explaining why it is that we read from passages in the Torah appropriate to the holiday.
Section one: Hannukah literally means “dedication” and refers to the dedication of the Temple after its restoration in the time of the Maccabees. The portion in the Torah read on Hannukah is a list of the gifts brought by the princes of each tribe at the dedication of the Mishkah, the tabernacle.
Section two: On Purim we read about Amalek because Haman was, according to the rabbis, from Amalek.
Section four: On Ma’amadot people would gather in the Temple or in their own cities while their local kohanim took there turn at service in the Temple. See Taanit 4:2-3.
Section five: The curses (called today the “tochekhah” or rebuke) are read on fast days as a warning to people that they must repent. When reading the curses we don’t interrupt, making them into two or more aliyot rather they are all read by the same person. This is still the custom today, making one of the aliyot in Ki Tavo the longest aliyah of the year.
Section six: Besides Shabbat morning, the Torah is also read on Mondays, Thursdays and Shabbat at minhah (the afternoon service). These readings go according to the regular cycle but they don’t count toward the regular progression. This means that the same portion that is read at all three occasions and then again on Shabbat. We only move forward on Shabbat.
Section seven: The chapter ends with a midrash on Leviticus 23:44. The verse states that Moshe told the holidays to the people of Israel, but this verse is superfluous Moshe taught all of the commandments to the people. Therefore the midrash teaches that not only did Moshe teach the holidays, but he taught each one at the time that it fell. By his example we learn that on all holidays we read the Torah portion relevant to that holiday." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nMost of the last chapter of Megillah is about the public reading of the Torah. The one main difference between how we read today and how they read in their time is that today the person who receives the aliyah and recites the blessing is usually not the same person who actually reads the Torah. This allows people who don’t know how to read from the Torah to receive aliyot. In mishnaic and talmudic times, the person who read the Torah was the same person who received the aliyah. There are other differences which we will discuss throughout the chapter.", + "He who reads the Megillah may either stand or sit. One may read the Megillah while either standing or sitting. Today the custom is to stand but this is not mandatory. In contrast, when reading the Torah one has to stand.", + "Whether one read it or two read it [together] they [those listening] have fulfilled their obligation. Two people may read the Megillah together when reading in front of the community. However, when it comes to reading Torah only one person at a time can read. The idea behind this is that it is harder for people to hear two people chanting together than one chanting alone. Since hearing the Megillah is halakhically less significant than hearing the Torah, they allow to people to read simultaneously.", + "In places where it is the custom to say a blessing, they say the blessing, and where it is not the custom they do not say the blessing. According to the simple reading of the Mishnah, there were various customs with regard to reciting a blessing over reading the Megillah. Some did and some did not. The Talmud however explains that this only refers to the blessing after the Megillah. In all places they would recite the blessing before reading. Today our custom is to recite a blessing before and after.", + "On Mondays and Thursdays and on Shabbat at minhah, three read from the torah, they do not add [to this number] nor decrease [from it], nor do they conclude with [a haftarah] from the Prophets. The mishnah now begins to discuss regular Torah reading. On Mondays, Thursdays and on Shabbat at minhah only three people receive aliyot (go up to the Torah). This number may not be increased nor may it be decreased. There is no haftarah (portion from the Prophets section of the Bible) on these occasions.", + "The one who begins the Torah reading and the one who concludes the Torah reading blesses before it and after it. In the time of the Mishnah the first person to read would recite the first blessing and the last person to read would recite the concluding blessing. Those reading in between would not recite any blessing at all. Today, each person receiving an aliyah recites a blessing before and after." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to teach how many aliyot there are on the different occasions in which the Torah is read. Yesterday’s mishnah dealt with occasions in which there are only three, the minimum number of aliyot. Today’s mishnah lists occasions with four, five, six and seven aliyot. It seems that the more holy a holiday is, the more aliyot there are, and the more Torah is read.", + "On Rosh Hodesh and on the intermediate days of festivals four read. They do not add [to this number] nor decrease [from it], nor do they conclude with [a haftarah] from the Prophets. The one who begins the Torah reading and the one who concludes the Torah reading blesses before it and after it. This is the general rule: on any day which has a musaf and is not a festival four read. Rosh Hodesh and the intermediate days of the festival both have a musaf service (and when the Temple still stood there was a musaf sacrifice). However, they are not festivals, meaning that work is permitted on these days. These are sort of “in-between days.” Therefore they have four aliyot more than a normal day but less than a festival. The mishnah reiterates the rule that the first person who receives an aliyah recites the blessing before and the last person recites the blessing after.", + "On a festival five. On the first and last day of Pesah, on the first day of Sukkot, on Shmini Atzeret (the last day of Sukkot), on Shavuot and on Rosh Hashanah there are five aliyot.", + "On Yom Hakippurim six. On Yom Kippur there are six aliyot. Note that this makes Yom Kippur unlike all other holidays.", + "On Shabbat seven; they may not decrease [from this number] but they may add [to it], and they conclude with [a haftarah] from the Prophets. The one who begins the Torah reading and the one who concludes the Torah reading blesses before it and after it. Shabbat differs from other occasions in several key ways. First of all, there are more aliyot on Shabbat than at any other time of the year. On other occasions there are a maximum of six aliyot and the mishnah states explicitly that they may not add to this number. Indeed, the mishnah may emphasize this to make sure that people do not try to turn other holidays into Shabbat by adding more aliyot. In contrast, on Shabbat they may add aliyot. Finally, there is a haftarah on Shabbat. Today we read a haftarah on festivals and on Yom Kippur as well. Finally, the same rule about the blessings still applies." + ], + [ + "Introduction This mishnah teaches what rituals require a minyan of ten men in order to perform them.", + "They do not recite the Shema responsively, In the time of the mishnah they recited the Shema in a way that we might call responsively the leader would recite one half of the verse and the congregation would respond with the second half. This practice changed some time during the talmudic period. There are actually many different explanations for what they did, but this seems to be the most accepted by scholars.", + "And they do not pass before the ark; Passing before the ark refers to reciting the Sh’moneh Esrei or Amidah. Without a minyan there is no public Amidah or repetition everyone just does it silently.", + "And the [the priests] do not lift up their hands; The priestly blessing is recited before the end of the Amidah, but only with a minyan.", + "And they do not read the Torah [publicly]; Without a minyan there is no public reading of the Torah.", + "And they do not conclude with a haftarah from the prophets; Nor is there a haftarah, lest one think that although they can’t read from the Torah, they might be able to read from the prophets.", + "And they do not make stops [at funeral] processions; On the way to the cemetery and on the way back they would make formal stops at which they would recite eulogies. They would do this seven times, but it was only done with a minyan.", + "And they do not say the blessing for mourners, or the comfort of mourners, or the blessing of bridegrooms; The blessing for mourners was recited in the public square, whereas “comforting mourners” was done on the return from the cemetery. The blessing of the bridegrooms refers to the blessings recited under the huppah (the wedding canopy). In mishnaic times they probably recited three blessings, but by the time of the Talmud this had been increased to seven. None of these blessings is recited without a minyan.", + "And they do not mention God’s name in the invitation [to say Birkat Hamazon]; Except in the presence of ten. Before Birkat Hamazon, the blessing after the meal, there is an invitation to bless. This invitation is recited with God’s name only if there are ten present.", + "[For redeeming sanctified] land nine and a priest [are sufficient], and similarly with human beings. If someone wishes to dedicate a piece of land to the Temple they estimate the value of the land and then he must pay that amount. The estimate is carried out by ten people, only one of whom must be a priest. Similarly, if a person dedicates himself or someone else to the Temple, and he can’t afford to pay the price mandated in Leviticus 27, then they estimate how much he can afford. This estimate is again done by nine regular men and one priest." + ], + [ + "Introduction This mishnah teaches various rules about reading the Torah in public.", + "One who reads the Torah [in public] may not read less than three verses. An aliyah may not consist of less than three verses.", + "And he should not read to the translator more than one verse [at a time], but [if reading from the book of a] prophet [he may read to him] three at a time. If the three verses constitute three separate paragraphs, he must read them [to the translator] one by one. In mishnaic times the spoken language was Aramaic. Many people, perhaps most people, would have had trouble understanding the Torah in its original Hebrew. Therefore, as part of the public reading of the Torah, there was a translator who would translate verse by verse. The reader was to read one verse and then the translator would translate this verse. However, when it came to reading the haftarah from one of the prophets, they allowed the reader to read three verses at a time. They were less exacting on the precision of the haftarah translation than they were for the translation of the Torah. However, if each verse is its own section, then the reader must read each one on its own. This refers to Isaiah 52:3-5 where there are three verses, each considered to be its own section.", + "They may skip [from place to place] in a prophet but not in the Torah. How far may he skip [in the prophet]? [Only] so far that the translator will not have stopped [before he finds his place]. When reading the haftarah, he may skip from place to place so long as he doesn’t have to roll the scroll so far that the translator has completed his translation before he gets to the new verse. Today there are many haftarot where we skip from one place in the book to another, or if reading from one of the twelve minor prophets, from one prophet to another. However, when it comes to the Torah it is forbidden to skip around." + ], + [ + "Introduction This mishnah and the mishnayot following it deal with who is qualified to receive certain honors in the synagogue. I have explained this mishnah according to Albeck’s explanation. Others explain it somewhat differently.", + "The one who concludes with the haftarah also leads the responsive reading of the Shema and he passes before the ark and he lifts up his hands. The person honored by reading the haftarah is worthy of also being the leader of the other crucial elements of the service. He can lead the responsive reading of the Shema (explained in yesterday’s mishnah), he can pass before the ark (meaning recite the Amidah and thereby aid other’s in fulfilling their obligation) and if he is a priest, he can lift up his hands to bless the people with the priestly blessing. In the following mishnayot we will see that not everyone is worthy of these honors.", + "If he is a child, his father or his teacher passes before the ark in his place. A child is allowed to read the haftarah, but he may not pass before the ark. The person who recites the amidah (passes before the ark) helps others to fulfill their obligation to recite the amidah. In order to help others fulfill their obligation, the person himself must also be obligated. A child who is not obligated cannot fulfill the congregation’s obligation. Therefore, if a child read the haftarah either his father or teacher takes his place in passing before the ark." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah illustrates the important principle that one who is obligated to perform a given ritual may aid others in fulfilling their obligation. It also deals with other reasons which might potentially disqualify a person from leading parts of the synagogue service.", + "A child may read in the Torah and translate, but he may not pass before the ark or lift up his hands. In yesterday’s mishnah we learned that a child can read the haftarah. Today we learn that a child may read from the Torah as well. He may also serve as the translator of the Torah reading. However, he may not pass before the ark, since he is not obligated in prayer (see yesterday’s mishnah). He also may not lift up his hands to recite the priestly blessing if he is a priest because it was considered disgraceful for the community to have to be blessed by a minor.", + "A person in rags may lead the responsive reading of the Shema and translate, but he may not read in the Torah, pass before the ark, or lift up his hands. A person in rags, meaning one who is dressed shabbily and whose flesh can be seen through his clothes, may still lead the responsive reading of the Shema because this was done from one’s seat. One didn’t have to get up in front of the community. Since he would not be seen by the entire congregation, he was allowed to fulfill this role. He was also allowed to serve as the translator, since this was not considered all that important of a function. However, he was not allowed to read from the Torah because it would be disgraceful to read the Torah while dressed in rags. He was not allowed to pass before the ark or lift up his hands (if he was a priest) for the same reason everyone would see him and his improper clothing.", + "A blind man may lead the responsive reading of the Shema and translate. Rabbi Judah says: one who has never seen the light from his birth may not lead the responsive reading of the Shema. One of the blessings before the Shema is “who creates light.” According to the first opinion in the mishnah, a blind man can recite this blessing even though he can’t see the light. He may also translate the Torah because translating does not require one to read. Rabbi Judah holds that a person blind from birth cannot recite the Shema because he can’t thank God for having ever seen the light." + ], + [ + "A priest whose hands are deformed should not lift up his hands [to say the priestly blessing].
Rabbi Judah says: also one whose hands are colored with woad or madder should not lift up his hands, because [this makes] the congregation look at him.
This mishnah teaches that priests who have something distracting on their hands, either a deformation or a discoloring should not lift up their hands because this makes the people look at them and not think about the blessing that they are receiving. The mishnah considers it crucial that the congregation focus not on the external attributes of the priest but the contents of the blessing that they are receiving.
We should note that today people refrain from looking at the priests’ hands when they are reciting the blessing and their hands are also covered with a tallit.
Since the mishnah is straightforward I have refrained from commenting below." + ], + [ + "If one says, “I will not pass before the ark in colored clothes,” even in white clothes he may not pass before it.
[If one says], “I will not pass before it in shoes,” even barefoot he may not pass before it.
One who makes his tefillin [for the head] round, it is dangerous and has no religious value.
If he put them on his forehead or on the palm of his hand, behold this is the way of heresy.
If he overlaid them with gold or put [the one for the hand] on his sleeve, behold this is the manner of the outsiders.
The next two mishnayot deal with certain practices which the rabbis deemed to be heretical or at least potentially heretical.
Sections one or two: In the first two sections we learn of people who refuse to pass before the ark (to lead the Amidah) either while wearing colored robes or while wearing shoes. The rabbis suspected that one who demanded to wear white clothes or go barefoot may have had heretical beliefs. Therefore, they said that such a person cannot pass before the ark at all, even in white clothes or barefoot. In other words, wearing white clothes and going barefoot seem to have been valid practices but one who insists upon them is suspected of heresy.
We should note that the groups being described here seem to be taking Temple practice and applying it to the synagogue. In the Temple the priests’ robes were white and they went barefoot. The mishnah may be trying to emphasize that the synagogue is not the Temple and one who insists on dressing in the synagogue as if it were the Temple is potentially a heretic. There also may be a covert battle for leadership in this mishnah between priests and rabbis. Rabbis may be telling priests that when in the synagogue leading the Amidah (as opposed to reciting the priestly blessing) they are functioning as regular Jews and not as priests.
Section three: The boxes of tefillin are supposed to be square. Our mishnah deals with a period of oppression when the Romans prohibited Jews from wearing tefillin. In response someone makes his tefillin round so that the Romans will not notice that he is wearing tefillin. According to the mishnah this attempt is doubly mistaken. The Romans will realize that he is wearing tefillin and therefore it is still dangerous. Secondly, by making his tefillin round he is not fulfilling the mitzvah of tefillin. There is also the idea that tefillin can protect a person from danger. But since these tefillin are not valid they offer no protection from the Roman oppressors.
Section four: The Torah says that you should place tefillin “as a sign upon your hand and as a remembrance between your eyes.” Non-rabbinic groups of Jews (sectarians) interpreted these verses literally; tefillin are put on one’s hands and on the forehead between one’s eyes. The rabbis did not interpret the verses literally tefillin go on top of one’s head, where the hairline ends, and on one’s arms, next to one’s heart. A person who wears his tefillin between the eyes or on the hand is acting as a heretic. I should note that I have seen many, many instances of people wearing their tefillin too low on their heads. One who wears tefillin between his eyes has not fulfilled his obligation.
Section five: Covering tefillin in gold or wearing them on one’s sleeves is not proper fulfillment of the mitzvah. The mishnah deems this as the practice of “outsiders” those who have separated from the rabbinic fold." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to identify heretical behavior. In yesterday’s mishnah we saw heretical behavior involving what a person wears, be it clothing, footwear or tefillin. In today’s mishnah we see heretical behavior involving things a person says while leading the prayers or translating the Torah.", + "If one says “May the good bless you,” this is the way of heresy. The heresy here seems to be one of dualism. Saying “May the good bless you” sounds as if there are two gods, one that governs the good and one that governs the bad. This was a common theology at the time of the Mishnah, especially among groups dubbed “Gnostics” by modern scholars. The rabbis were insistent that one God was responsible for both evil and good.", + "[If one says], “May Your mercy reach the nest of a bird,” “May Your name be mentioned for the good,” “We give thanks, we give thanks,” they silence him. There are three “heretical” saying in this mishnah. I’ll try to explain them one at a time. The mishnah says that for each “they silence him.” This implies that the mishnah is describing one who “passes before the ark,” meaning one who leads the Amidah prayer. If he tries to enter in one of these prayers they remove him as prayer leader. ““May Your mercy reach the nest of a bird:” This line is explained in the Talmud in several different ways. One is that he is complaining to God saying, “Your mercy is on the nest of this bird” but not on me. God commanded shooing away the mother bird before taking the young, an act of mercy for the mother (Deuteronomy 22:6). The person praying complains that God has not shown similar mercy to him. A different explanation is that this saying understands God’s commandments as being only about mercy, when really they are decrees which we are to obey without questioning their reasoning. Another explanation is that he says “Your mercy reaches only to this nest” but cannot extend any further. In such a way he limits God’s power. “May Your name be mentioned for the good:” This implies that God’s name should not be connected with the bad or the evil. As in the first section, this might imply some sort of dualism we thank God for the good and don’t mention the evil because its source is a different god. “We give thanks, we give thanks:” Again the problem seems to be one of dualism giving thanks twice sounds like it is being given to two different gods. However, in this section the dualism may not be of a good god and a bad god, but simply two gods. There were ancient sects of Jews (including Christians) who while professing monotheism, gave divine roles to other characters, such as God’s word (the Logos), God’s spirit or Jesus.", + "One who uses euphemisms in the portion dealing with forbidden marriages, he is silenced. Leviticus 18:7 says, “you shall not uncover the nakedness of your father.” If a person translates this as “you shall not uncover the nakedness of his father,” in an attempt to use a more innocuous third person, he is silenced. The translation of the Torah is to be literal, and even in the section concerning forbidden relations.", + "If he says, [instead of] “And you shall not give any of your seed to be passed to Moloch,” (Leviticus 18:21) “You shall not give [your seed] to pass to a Gentile woman,” he silenced with a rebuke. The Torah prohibits “passing one’s child to Moloch.” Some ancient translators understood this as a prohibition against impregnating or having sexual relations with a Gentile (Aramean) woman or perhaps against giving one’s child to a Gentile to raise. Since passing one’s child to Moloch is a capital crime, this might imply that having sexual relations with is a capital crime. Therefore the rabbis insisted upon a literal translation of the verse." + ], + [ + "Introduction In yesterday’s mishnah we learned that translations must be literal. Today’s mishnah, the last in tractate Megillah, teaches that some portions of the Torah are not translated at all because of the nature of their content.", + "The incident of Reuven is read but not translated. Reuven sleeps with Bilhah, his father’s concubine (Genesis 35:22). This story is not translated in order not to shame Reuven.", + "The story of Tamar is read and translated. Tamar tricks Judah into sleeping with her (see Genesis 38). This story is read and translated because it is actually to Judah’s credit. When he discovers that he has committed a wrong (vs. 26), he doesn’t try to hide his crime, as embarrassing as it might be. Note that Judah serves as a foil for Reuven. Reuven intentionally commits a crime, so we must hide it from the public. Judah accidentally commits a crime and then confesses, so we make public the entire story.", + "The first part of the incident of the golden calf is both read and translated, but the second is read but not translated. The first part of the golden calf story is from Exodus 32:1-20. This part is translated either because Israel does receive atonement, or in order so that the congregation will learn from their mistakes. In verse 21 Moses questions and accuses Aaron. In order not to embarrass Aaron, this section is not translated.", + "The blessing of the priests, the stories of David and Amnon are not read or translated. The version of this mishnah in good manuscripts says that these sections are neither read nor translated. The priestly blessing is not read, perhaps because it is a regular part of the prayer service. According to the version of the mishna in the Talmud, these verses are read but not translated. The Talmud explains that they are not translated because one of the verses says, “May God show favor to you” and people might think that God shows favor in judgment and doesn’t judge justly. The story of David and Batsheva (II Samuel 11) is not read as a haftarah because it is embarrassing to David. In the story of Amnon (II Samuel 13), Amnon rapes Tamar and then wants to abandon her. He eventually is killed by Absolom, David’s other son. This is also quite embarrassing to David and to his house.", + "They do not conclude with the portion of the chariot as a haftarah. But Rabbi Judah permits this. We don’t read the description of the chariot contained in Ezekiel, chapter one, as a haftarah because ordinary people are not supposed to study this mystical chapter. However, Rabbi Judah allows this.", + "R. Eliezar says: they do not conclude with “Proclaim Jerusalem’s [abominations]” (Ezekiel 1 as a haftarah. Rabbi Eliezer prohibits reading Ezekiel 16 as a haftarah because its content is simply too graphic. Read the chapter for yourself to get an idea of its disturbing content. Congratulations! We have finished Megillah. It is a tradition at this point to thank God for helping us finish learning the tractate and to commit ourselves to going back and relearning it, so that we may not forget it and so that its lessons will stay with us for all of our lives. Megillah was full of practical halakhah that is still relevant today. We learned about reading the Megillah and reading the Torah in the synagogue. The information in this tractate is just the tip of the iceberg to all of the many halakhot about these two issues, so keep learning. As always, congratulations on learning another tractate of Mishnah. Tomorrow we start Moed Katan." + ] + ] + ] + }, + "versions": [ + [ + "Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp", + "http://learn.conservativeyeshiva.org/mishnah/" + ] + ], + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה מגילה", + "categories": [ + "Mishnah", + "Modern Commentary on Mishnah", + "English Explanation of Mishnah", + "Seder Moed" + ], + "schema": { + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה מגילה", + "enTitle": "English Explanation of Mishnah Megillah", + "key": "English Explanation of Mishnah Megillah", + "nodes": [ + { + "heTitle": "הקדמה", + "enTitle": "Introduction" + }, + { + "heTitle": "", + "enTitle": "" + } + ] + } +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Moed/English Explanation of Mishnah Moed Katan/English/Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp.json b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Moed/English Explanation of Mishnah Moed Katan/English/Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ea2eaa77e1441044e799329dedaf10e89d21e85b --- /dev/null +++ b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Moed/English Explanation of Mishnah Moed Katan/English/Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp.json @@ -0,0 +1,181 @@ +{ + "language": "en", + "title": "English Explanation of Mishnah Moed Katan", + "versionSource": "http://learn.conservativeyeshiva.org/mishnah/", + "versionTitle": "Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp", + "status": "locked", + "license": "CC-BY", + "shortVersionTitle": "Dr. Joshua Kulp", + "actualLanguage": "en", + "languageFamilyName": "english", + "isBaseText": true, + "isSource": true, + "isPrimary": true, + "direction": "ltr", + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה מועד קטן", + "categories": [ + "Mishnah", + "Modern Commentary on Mishnah", + "English Explanation of Mishnah", + "Seder Moed" + ], + "text": { + "Introduction": [ + "Moed Katan is about the halakhot governing the intermediate days of Pesah and Sukkot (called Hol Hamoed, which means the non-sacred days of the festival). The Torah says that one cannot do work on the first and seventh days of Pesah, on the first day of Sukkot and on Shmini Atzeret. It doesn’t say anything about the intermediate days. One the one hand these days are still part of the festival. Special sacrifices are offered and special prayers recited. On the other hand the Torah does not prohibit work on these days. This leaves their laws somewhat ambiguous. They tend to be quite flexible. The same work that in one situation is prohibited may be in other situations permitted. According to the rabbis, some work is prohibited on Hol Hamoed but some work is allowed. There are certain general principles that guided the rabbis in deciding which work was allowed and which was not. I shall list these briefly here. Most of our tractate gives examples that lead to these principles.", + "1) If the work must be done on Hol Hamoed or a financial loss will be incurred, it is generally permitted. 2) If it is very difficult, laborious work, it will likely be prohibited. 3) One should not do work on Hol Hamoed that could have been done beforehand.", + "Much of the third chapter deals with the laws of mourning. These laws are brought there on account of a mishnah which teaches that one cannot mourn on a festival and that a festival can put an end to the shivah (seven) days of mourning. We will discuss this at much greater length when we get to the third chapter." + ], + "": [ + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThe first mishnah of Moed Katan deals with watering a field during the festival. Watering a field is sometimes necessary or the crops will be lost. Therefore, watering in these types of situations tends to be permitted. However, watering is also quite laborious and hence some types of watering are prohibited.", + "They may water an irrigated field during the festival [week] or in the sabbatical year, both from a newly-emerging spring and from a spring that is not just emerged. “An irrigated field” refers to a field that cannot subsist on rainwater alone. Therefore, the mishnah allows one to water it on the festival. During the sabbatical year it is forbidden to work the land. However, irrigating a field is not considered to be working the field, as is plowing or planting. Nevertheless, the rabbis did prohibit watering during the sabbatical year, but they did not prohibit watering a field that needed to be irrigated. Certainly the field may be watered through an old spring, whose water has already been directed at the field. The mishnah says that it may be watered even from a new spring, despite the extra work of directing the water to the field.", + "But they may not water the field with water from stored rain, and not with a swipe and bucket. Carrying water to the field from a cistern of stored rain water is a lot of work. Therefore they are not allowed to water the field in this way. They are also not allowed to water using a method called “swipe and bucket,” which was a type of sweeping pump used to get water out of deep cisterns. This was also considered too laborious. We can see that first the mishnah allows watering these types of fields because otherwise the crops will be lost. It then limits that by saying that some labors are prohibited because one shouldn’t be doing so much work on the festival.", + "And they may not make small ditches around the vines. Finally, one may not make water ditches around vines. These ditches were made so that they would fill up and the water would seep into the roots. Again, digging these ditches was considered too much work for it to be permitted on the festival." + ], + [ + "Introduction This mishnah continues to discuss irrigation on the festival and sabbatical year. It then proceeds to deal with the more general topic of repairing community property. As we shall see, this is another category that makes something more permitted during the intermediate days of the festival.", + "Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah says: they may not make a new water channel may not during the festival [week] or in the sabbatical year. But the sages say: they may make a new water channel during the sabbatical year, and they may repair broken ones during the festival. Making a new water channel involves digging and it is a considerable amount of work. Since it involves digging, it is similar to plowing and therefore Rabbi Elazar ben Azaryah forbids it during the sabbatical year, a time when plowing is forbidden. Since it involves a substantial amount of work, he holds that it is forbidden during the festival. The sages agree that it is forbidden to make a new water channel during the festival, because this involves a lot of work. However, they allow repairing old water channels because this is less work. Also, new water channels should have been dug before the festival, whereas having to fixing broken ones was usually not anticipated. They also disagree with Rabbi Elazar ben Azaryah concerning digging new water channels during the sabbatical year. Whereas he held it was similar to plowing they hold that it is different enough such that it is permitted.", + "And they may repair impaired water works in the public domain, and clean them out. If water channels have become clogged with debris, they may be cleaned out during the festival, because this is both necessary and not a significant amount of work.", + "And they may repair roads, town squares and [ritual] pools, and they may do all public needs may be performed, and mark graves, and [inspectors] may go out to inspect kilayim (mixed seeds). They are also allowed to fix the public roads and ritual baths, because these are significant public needs. In addition they were allowed to perform other public duties. In the time of the Mishnah, they would mark graves with lime so that priests, commanded to avoid becoming impure, could see where the graves were and avoid them. This could also be done on the festival. Finally, public inspectors were allowed to go out to inspect people’s fields that kilayim, forbidden mixtures of seeds were not growing there. This was an immediate need because once kilayim grow in one’s field, all of the crops become forbidden. The final section of the mishnah is contained word for word in Shekalim 1:1. For a fuller explanation, one that is appropriate to a slightly different context, look there." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah returns to the subject of irrigating during the festival. As an aside, the fact that the first three mishnayot of this tractate are dedicated to this subject testifies to how crucial irrigation was in Israel, especially during Sukkot and Pesah.", + "Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov says: they may draw water from [one] tree to [another] tree, as long as they don’t water the whole field. Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov holds that if a lot of water had collected around one tree, they were allowed to draw the water from that tree to another tree, because this is not a lot of work. However, one cannot use this way of watering to water the entire field, because that would be too much work.", + "Seeds that have not had [any] drink before the festival, he may not water them during the festival. The sages however allow it in both cases. If he planted seeds before the festival but had not yet watered them, then he cannot water them during the festival, because they will do fine without being watered. The seeds don’t start to open until the first time they are watered. However, if he has watered them already, then he may continue to water them during the festival, because if he does not, they will die. This illustrates an important principle if something will be lost, it is usually permitted to do that given work on the festival. The sages allow the seeds to be watered even if they had not yet been watered before the festival. They allow this for one of two reasons: 1) they think the seeds will be lost; 2) they think that it is not a significant amount of work." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first section of the mishnah deals with trapping pests in a field and the second half deals with repairing breaches in a fence surrounding a field. Both of these may need to be done in order to protect the crops and therefore they may be permitted.", + "They may trap moles and mice in a tree-field or a white field in an unusual way during the festival and in the sabbatical year. But the sages say: in the tree-field in the usual way and in the white field in an unusual way. According to the first opinion in the mishnah (this is probably Rabbi Eliezer b. Yaakov, the sage from yesterday’s mishnah), one can trap moles and mice in the normal way of trapping them, from both a field of trees and a field of produce (called a white field). The normal way of trapping them seems to have involved digging a hole so that they would fall in. We might have thought that this was prohibited on the sabbatical year because it looks like plowing. On the festival it might have prohibited because it is a lot of work. The sages are stricter. In a tree-field, where the moles and mice can do more damage, one can trap them in the usual way. However in a white field, where the loss that they cause is more minor, they can only trap them in an unusual way. According to the Talmud this means that they dig the hole in an unusual way so that everyone will know that the person is cognizant of the fact that it is either the Sabbatical year or the festival. This is another general principle we will see frequently in Moed Katan. Work which is forbidden may sometimes be done with a change, even though this change may cause the work to be more laborious. This seems to me to be a way that the rabbis could allow people to prevent a financial loss, while still making sure that they knew that it was a festival.", + "And they may block up a breach in a wall during the festival, and in the sabbatical year they may build it in the usual way. If a wall has opened up on the festival and the crops are left exposed to wild animals, it is permitted to make a temporary wall to close it up during the festival. It is forbidden, however, to build a more permanent wall because this is too much work. This is with regard to the festival. During the Sabbatical year it is permitted to build even a new wall because this is not similar to plowing. Only plowing and activities similar to it were prohibited during the sabbatical year, not all work involved in maintaining a field." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first section of this mishnah deals with a priest inspecting leprous symptoms on a person. Leprosy (or some other similar type of skin disease) is dealt with in Leviticus 13.\nThe second part of the mishnah deals with certain acts of mourning during the festival. It is brought here because the first of those acts involves digging, which is generally forbidden on the festival because it is laborious.", + "Rabbi Meir says: [Priests] may inspect leprous symptoms at the outset [during the festival] for [the priest to make] a lenient assessment, but not to make a strict one. But the sages say: neither for a lenient nor for a severe assessment. According to Rabbi Meir a priest may inspect a person to decide whether his symptoms make him impure, but only if he is going to pronounce the person pure. The mishnah does not want anything to damper the celebration of the festival, and pronouncing him impure will only distress him. It seems that if the priest sees that the person is impure, he is not supposed to say anything at all. The mishnah allows this even at the outset, meaning at the initial stage of the process, when the infected person is going from a state of purity to impure. The priest may also examine him later on when the infected person is already impure, as long as he will declare him to be pure. The sages think that once the priest goes to examine the symptoms and sees that the person has tzaraat (the skin-disease) he must declare the person impure. He cannot remain silent. Rabbi Meir’s halakhah is therefore untenable. The sages however agree that we should avoid a situation where a person might be declared impure on the festival. Therefore, they instruct the priest not to even examine the symptoms in the first place. Better to avoid the problem altogether than to be put in the situation where he would have to remain silent in the face of impurity. What is fascinating about this section is how the notion of impurity is treated. It is as if impurity doesn’t even exist unless the priest declares it impure. In other words, the priest’s declaration is what makes something impure, not its actual physicality. Both Rabbi Meir and the sages seem completely unbothered by the fact that a person might really have this disease and yet not be declared impure.", + "Furthermore Rabbi Meir said: a man may gather his father’s and mother’s bones, since this is a joy for him. Rabbi Yose says: it is mourning for him. In mishnaic times they would first bury the body until the flesh had decomposed. About a year later they would gather the bones and put them into a more permanent place, called in English an “ossuary.” In our mishnah two rabbis debate whether the gathering of bones is a joyous or a sad occasion. According to Rabbi Meir, bringing one’s parents’ bones to their final resting place is a joyous occasion. Therefore, it is permitted during the festival. Rabbi Yose says that collecting the bones is part of the mourning process, since it will remind him of the painful loss of his parents. Therefore, he may not collect the bones during this week.", + "A man should not stir up wailing for his dead, nor hold a lamentation for him thirty days before the festival. When it comes to other mourning practices, even Rabbi Meir agrees that he may not do so during the festival. This mishnah does not deal with a person who died during or right before the festival, a topic which shall be covered in chapter three. Rather, the mishnah refers to a person who tells a professional eulogizer to recite a public eulogy for someone who died a long time before the festival, or to someone who himself recites a eulogy for someone close to him who died a long time before the festival. Reciting eulogies for one who died a while before the festival should not be done even within the thirty days preceding the festival because the memory of the powerful eulogy will stay with those who hear it for thirty days, dampening their ability to celebrate on the festival." + ], + [ + "Introduction It was certainly permitted to bury the dead on the festival. It would hardly be possible or desirable to wait an entire week to bury a body. Since burials would have taken place quite frequently during a festival, this mishnah deals with the critical subject of digging graves and other various places to bury or place the body.", + "They may not dig burial niches and graves during the festival. But they may adapt burial niches [to the size of the dead body] during the festival. Burial niches are holes the walls of caves where they used to bury people. “Graves” refers to the caves themselves. These may not be dug on the festival because it is a tremendous amount of work and there are other ways to bury a dead body, such as digging a hole in the ground, which is permitted if necessary (see below). However, if there was already a niche in the wall of the burial cave and all they needed to do was expand it to make it fit the size of the body, they may do so because it is not a significant amount of work. Also, it would have been difficult, if not impossible to know how big to make the niches ahead of time.", + "And they may make a temporary grave during the festival, and a coffin, if a dead [body] is close by in the courtyard. Rabbi Judah forbids, unless there are sawn boards at hand. They may make a temporary grave, one in which they would put the body until the bones are collected. They may also make a coffin if there is a dead body in the courtyard where the coffin is being built. If there is no dead body there then they may not make a coffin because people will not realize that it is being made for somebody who has already died. This is another criterion with regard to permitting work on the festival we must take into consideration what people will think when they see the person working. If they realize that it was for an imminent need, and that the work cannot be pushed off, then it is more likely to be permitted. As an aside, we can see from this mishnah that some people were buried in coffins but not all. It seems that there was quite a large range of burial practices in Israel during mishnaic times. Rabbi Judah says that it is prohibited to make the coffin if in order to do so he will also have to make planks. In other words, despite the fact that this is an immediate need, Rabbi Judah still prohibits it because making planks is too much work to be done on the festival. Only if he had available planks could he make the coffin." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah prohibits marriage during the festival. It seems that the central idea is that one should use the festival to celebrate the festival and not as an opportunity to celebrate something else. The rabbis did not want people to say, “Since I can’t work on the festival anyway, I might as well use it for a wedding celebration.” Rather, both the week of the festival and the week of the wedding celebration should have their own separate times.", + "One may not marry a woman during the festival, whether a virgin or a widow, nor may one perform levirate marriage, because this is a joy for him. But one may remarry his divorced wife. As stated in the introduction, one may not get married during a festival. The mishnah emphasizes that this is true even if the woman is a widow, for whom a wedding celebration was not as expansive. It is forbidden even to have levirate marriage with one’s dead brother’s widow. Even though this was probably not as celebratory occasion as a more typical marriage, it is still a joy and therefore it is prohibited. There is only one type of marriage remarrying one’s divorcee which one can have on a festival. Since the couple has already been married, this is not as joyous of occasion and therefore it is permitted. This clause sheds some light on the first clause. Marriages are prohibited when they are the first time that a couple will have a chance to be married. It is partly, at least, the anticipation of the new that makes a marriage a joyous occasion and therefore prohibited during the festival. When the novelty is gone, the joy is diminished. [I realize that many will disagree with this assessment, thinking that remarriage is a great joy. While this point is debatable, the rabbis thought otherwise.]", + "And a woman may make the adornments [for her wedding] during the festival. Rabbi Judah says: she may not put on lime, as that is a [temporary] disfigurement to her. Although marriage is prohibited on the festival, a woman use that week to make the adornments (the perfumes and makeup) that she will need on her wedding day. Although she is using the festival to prepare for something that she will not need during the festival, since it is not a lot of work she is allowed to do so. Rabbi Judah places one limitation on this. She cannot put lime on her body to remove hair and to make her skin look better because while the lime is on she is disfigured. Rabbi Judah holds that she should not do anything that will make her look ugly on the festival, even if it is only temporary." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with sewing on the festival. It introduces a principle which we have not yet seen in the previous mishnayot. There are certain types of labor that may be done by a non-professional but not by a craftsman. This prevents professionals from working on the festival, while still allowing ordinary people to engage in light labors.", + "An ordinary person may sew in the usual way, but a craftsman may sew [only using] uneven stitches. An ordinary person can sew in a normal way, assuming he has an immediate need to do so. Sewing is not a heavy labor, and therefore it is permitted on the festival. However, a professional craftsman cannot sew in a normal way because that would allow him to engage in his profession during the festival. This is prohibited even if he is not paid for the work. The mishnah allows him to make some sort of uneven stitches. This might allow him to fix things that need to be fixed while still preventing him from engaging in his normal profession.", + "And they may weave the ropes of a bed. Rabbi Yose says: they may even be tightened. In the mishnaic period beds were made with a frame around which they would loop ropes. The tighter the ropes, the firmer the bed (this is the origin of the phrase “sleep tight”). The mishnah allows a person to weave ropes around the frame of a bed because this is not a significant amount of work. It is also necessary if one wants to sleep on a bed. There are two versions of Rabbi Yose’s statement. According to the version which I have translated he even allows ropes that are already on the bed to be tightened. We might have thought that since the ropes were already there that tightening them is not really necessary and hence forbidden on the festival. In this version, Rabbi Yose is more lenient than the previous opinion. According to the other version, Rabbi Yose only allows tightening ropes and not weaving ropes that are not already attached to the bed frame. In this version Rabbi Yose is stricter." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with setting up various instruments needed for the preparation of food.", + "They may set up an oven, stove or a millstone during the festival. Setting up an oven, stove or a mill involved assembling the separate parts and connecting them with plaster. The mishnah allows this because it is not a lot of work and it is necessary for the festival.", + "Rabbi Judah says: they may not roughen millstones for the first time. For the millstones to grind well, their face was had to be roughened by putting grooves and ridges on it. While Rabbi Judah agrees that one can set up the millstone, he doesn’t allow it to be roughened for this is strenuous work. The roughening also could have been done before the festival." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe final mishnah of this chapter introduces two more categories relevant to the laws of the festival. While some work may be done during the festival, one should not leave work for the festival that could have been done beforehand. Second, one should not use the festival as a time to prepare things for after the festival.", + "They may put up a railing around a roof or a gallery porch, in the style of an ordinary person but not in the style of a professional. It is permitted to put up a railing on a roof or a second-floor porch, but only if it is done in a non-professional manner. For instance, putting up a rough stone fence would be permitted, but a nicely finished iron fence would not.", + "They may put plaster on crevices [on the roof] and flatten them down with a roller, by hand or foot, but not using professional tools. This refers to fixing a roof. It is permitted to fill in the crevices and to flatten the plaster, but not with professional tools. The central idea is that work that needs to be done should be done differently during the festival.", + "A hinge, a socket, a beam, a lock, a key which broke they may repair them during the festival, as long as he doesn’t intend to do this work during the festival. If a part of a door broke (these are all parts of a door), it may be fixed on the festival, and in the normal way. There doesn’t seem to be any “non-professional” way of fixing the door and hence all ways of fixing the door are okay. The mishnah does, however, offer one reservation. He may not delay fixing the door until the festival, saving his work for when he has more time. The door should only be fixed if it actually broke on the festival, an unforeseen problem.", + "And all the pickled food that he may eat during the festival, he may pickle. He can pickle food on the festival, but only if he is going to actually be able to eat the food during the festival. He may not use the festival as a time to prepare for the future. Note how this section is the mirror image of section three. There we learned that a person may not save for the festival work that should have been done before the festival. In this section we learn that a person may not do work on the festival for after the festival." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThe beginning of chapter one introduces yet another criterion used in determining whether work is permitted on the festival. We have already learned that one should not save work to be done on the festival. Things that can be done before the festival cannot be done during the festival. Our mishnah deals with a person who intended to do something before the festival but then was not able to. If he doesn’t do the work during the festival, he will incur a financial loss.", + "If one had turned his olives, and mourning or some unforeseen circumstance befell him, or workmen misled him, he may [during the festival] put on the beam for the first time and leave it until after the festival, the words of Rabbi Judah. The mishnah refers to the preparation of olives. They would put the olives in a large sack so that they would heat up and start to release the oil. After time they would flip the bag with a special stick so that they would get very soft. This was done prior to pressing them with a large beam. In our mishnah someone turned his olives over and was planning to put them under the beam before the festival. However, he was not able to do so due to some unforeseen circumstance. The mishnah gives a couple of examples of such a circumstance. First of all, someone in his family might have died and a mourner is not allowed to work. Alternatively, he might have had workers who reneged on an agreement to help press his olives. In any case, Rabbi Judah allows him to begin pressing the olives so that they will not rot, but he does not allow him to complete this process.", + "Rabbi Yose says: he may pour off [the oil] and complete the process and seal [the jars] in his usual way. Rabbi Yose is more lenient. He allows him to take the oil that comes out of the first pressing and even do the second and third pressing. He may put the oil in jars and close them up as well. Rabbi Yose reasons that once he has been allowed to do some of the work, he should be allowed to complete it." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is similar to yesterday’s mishnah but deals with the production of wine instead of olive oil.", + "Similarly, if one had his wine [already] in a cistern and mourning or some unforeseen circumstance befell him, or workmen misled him, he may draw off [the wine], complete the process and seal [the jars] in his usual way, the words of Rabbi Yose. In this case, someone has already pressed his grapes and the juices have run off into the cistern, and for some reason he was not able to jar the wine before the festival. According to Rabbi Yose, since the process was started and it was not his fault that he could not complete it, he may complete the process during the festival. He may remove the wine from the cistern, finish squeezing all of the juice out of the grapes and put the wine into jars.", + "Rabbi Judah says: he [may only] cover [the cistern] with boards to prevent it from turning into vinegar. Consistent with his opinion in yesterday’s mishnah, Rabbi Judah does not allow him to complete the process. Rather, all he may do is cover the wine in the cistern so that it does not spoil." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThere are certain labors that are permitted on the festival because if they are not done immediately, the product will be ruined. However, this is only permitted if he did not purposely set his schedule so that the work would end up needing to be done during the festival.", + "A man may bring his produce indoors for fear of thieves and withdraw his flax from a soaking pool to prevent it spoiling, as long as he doesn’t intend to do this work during the festival. If one has left produce outside but fears that it might be stolen by thieves, he may bring it indoors on the festival. He may also take his flax out of a soaking pool (used to soften the flax so that it can be made into linen) lest it become too soft and spoil. However, he may not start a certain labor before the festival knowing that he will have to continue to do the work during the festival. The only time these labors may be performed is if some unforeseen circumstance prevented him from being able to perform them before the festival.", + "And all those who deliberately intended to do their work on the festival, they must leave it to spoil. This is a summary of the basic rule governing all of the previous sections. If one has intentionally left over work for the festival, he must let it spoil. A different explanation is that this refers to a court which penalizes a person who left his work for the festival by taking it away from him. According to this interpretation we would need to translate the last clause as “they cause him to lose [his property]”, which is a viable translation." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with two subjects: 1) buying large items on the festival; 2) using the festival as time to move one’s belongings.", + "They may not purchase houses, slaves or cattle unless it is for the needs of the festival, or the need of the seller who does not have enough to eat. It is forbidden to make large purchases on the festival, because the festival should not be used as a time to engage in activities needed for after the festival. There are, however, two circumstances, that allow one to make a large purchase on the festival. First of all, if the sale is necessary to the buyer for the needs of the festival. For instance, if one’s house burned down right before the festival, he may buy a new one during the festival. The second circumstance is if the seller needs the cash immediately to buy food for the holiday. The general prohibition of buying and selling large items on the festival is waved if the seller needs money immediately in order to buy food in order to celebrate the festival itself.", + "They may not move [belongings] from one house to another house, but he may move [his belongings] within his courtyard. Moving from one house to another is obviously a difficult and laborious endeavor. Since it involves so much work, one may not do so on the festival. However, he is allowed to move his stuff out to the adjacent courtyard because this is not nearly as strenuous. The Talmud explains that he can move from one house to another house within the same courtyard.", + "They may not bring back vessels from the house of the craftsman, but if one is anxious about them, he may remove them to another courtyard. If one has left his vessels (clothes, utensils, cloth etc.) at a craftsman for repair, he cannot bring them home on the festival. According to the Talmud, this refers to vessels which are not needed on the festival. However, if he fears that someone might steal them from the craftsman’s workshop, he may move them to a better-guarded workshop. While this may be just as much work as moving them to his own home, he is not allowed to bring them home lest someone plan ahead of time to use the festival as a opportunity to bring his things home from the craftsman." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe final mishnah of this chapter deals with people whose work might be necessary during the festival. The general rule is that while they may engage in their work, they should do so in as private a manner as possible.", + "They may cover [drying] figs with straw. Rabbi Judah says: they may even be pile [the figs] up [in heaps]. Drying figs were covered with straw so that they wouldn’t get dirty. The mishnah permits one to cover them with straw on the festival, because if they are left uncovered, they might get ruined. Rabbi Judah says that one may even heap them up together in order to preserve them better.", + "Sellers of produce, clothing and [other] vessels may sell privately for the requirements of the festival. The people referred to in this section are selling items that the public might need for the festival. The mishnah says that they may do so, but that they should try to sell in as private a manner as possible. The rabbis wanted to allow people to buy items necessary for the festival, but they also wanted to prevent the week from turning into “business as usual.”", + "Trappers [of fish and birds], groats-makers and grist-millers may engage in their work privately for the requirements of the festival. Rabbi Yose says: they were strict upon themselves. Similarly, people who engage in food production may work, but only in a private manner. “Groats-makers” pounded grain to make it into cereal whereas “grist-millers” grind it to break it up into small kernels. Since people need these foods during the festival, and they can’t be done much ahead of time (they had little means to preserve food), they may continue to work during the festival, as long as they try to be as private about it as possible. Rabbi Yose adds a fascinating note. He says that people in these professions were strict upon themselves and didn’t engage in this work at all. In other words, the previous clause’s intention was not to tell these workers that they had to do their work in private, but rather to emphasize to them that they were allowed to work." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nGenerally speaking one may not cut one’s hair/shave during the festival. This is not because cutting hair was a lot of work. Rather it was to encourage people to get a hair cut and shave before the festival, so that they would be properly groomed when the festival began. In other words, if you don’t prepare before the festival, you’re going to look disheveled the whole time.\nOur mishnah lists the exceptions to this rule those people who may get a haircut during the festival because they could not do so during the week before.\nWhen the mishnah speaks of cutting one’s hair, it also includes shaving (they would shave with scissors). There is no halakhic difference between the two. I have translated the verb that the mishnah uses as shaving.", + "And these may shave during the festival: one coming back from a trip abroad, or one coming out from a place of captivity, or coming out of prison, or one excommunicated whom the sages have released. The people in this section could not cut their hair the week before the festival for various practical reasons. 1) They came back from a trip abroad, from a place where shaving was not possible. 2) They came out of captivity, and while captives they couldn’t shave. 3) They came out of prison no cutting hair in prison. 4) They were excommunicated. A person excommunicated by the Jewish community may not shave or cut his hair until he is released from his excommunication. If any of these people did not have enough time to cut his hair before the festival, he may do so during the festival. On the other hand, if he had time to prepare for the festival and neglected to do so, then he is penalized for his lack of preparation.", + "And similarly one who asked a sage [to be released from a vow] and was released, and a nazirite or a leper on emerging from his state of impurity to his state of purification. The people in this section could not shave for religious reasons. 1) The person had taken a vow not to cut his hair. Only a sage can release someone from a vow. If the person could not find a sage who would release his vow before the festival and then found one during the festival, he is allowed to shave during the festival. When a nazirite completes his term of naziriteship and when a leper becomes pure from his leprosy they both undergo a ritual which includes cutting one’s hair and shaving. If the term of naziriteship is over during the festival or a leper’s period of impurity is completed during the festival they may shave and cut their hair then." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nFor the same reason that it is prohibited to shave/cut hair during the festival, it is also prohibited to wash one’s clothes the prohibition during the festival encourages people to wash their clothes before the festival. As was the case with yesterday’s mishnah, today’s mishnah lists the exceptions, those people who may wash their clothes because they could not have done so before the festival began.", + "These may launder [their clothes] during the festival: one coming back from a trip abroad, or one coming out from a place of captivity, or coming out of prison, or one excommunicated whom the sages have released. This is the same list that appeared in section one of yesterday’s mishnah.", + "And similarly one who asked a sage [to be released from a vow] and was released. This is the same as the beginning of the second section of yesterday’s mishnah.", + "Hand-towels, barber’s towels and bath-towels [may be laundered]. Towels which are used on a daily basis and will quickly become dirty may be laundered. “Barber’s towels” is somewhat of a strange category, considering the fact that most people should not be getting a haircut on the festival. Either this refers to towels used in cutting the hair of those few people who can get a haircut or alternatively the word for “barber” really means “books” the words are spelled the same but pronounced differently in Hebrew (sapar=barber; sefer=book). The mishnah would then refer to coverings of books, i.e Torah scrolls, which become dirty due to frequent usage. However, it seems strange to me that book coverings need to be washed with such urgency.", + "Zavim and zavot, menstruants, and women who have given birth, and anyone going from a state of purity to impurity, are permitted [to launder their clothes]. This section refers to various people who have some sort of genital emission and therefore need to wash their clothes frequently. Zavim and zavot have some sort of unusual genital emission which would dirty their clothes. They are allowed to wash their clothes because it would not be seemly to force them to go around in public with stained clothing. People who become pure on the festival need to wash their clothes (Leviticus 11:25, 28; 14: 5, 47; Numbers 19:19). They are allowed to do so during the festival since they could not control the timing of their becoming pure.", + "But everyone else is prohibited. The mishnah ends by emphasizing that other people may not launder their clothes on the festival. During the time of the mishnah laundering was heavy labor and was not done with great frequency. Hence, the festival should not be used as an opportunity to launder clothes." + ], + [ + "They may write the following documents during the festival:
Betrothal of women [documents], divorce documents and receipts, wills of a dying person, bequests and prosbols; evaluation certificates and orders for support, documents of halitzah and of repudiation [of marriage] and arbitration records; decrees of the court and correspondence.
Writing was not nearly as common of a skill in the time of the mishnah as it is now. Indeed, most people could probably not write, and if they could, they could write only simple things. Since writing was not common it was considered a professional skill. Hence it was generally forbidden on the festival. Our mishnah lists exceptions. These were allowed because they were of immediate necessity. I will explain each type of document.
Betrothal of women [documents]: This refers to all sorts of documents connected to marriage, either arranging the betrothal and its economic elements (tannaim) or a document used to effect betrothal itself. In such a document the man would write, “Behold you (or your daughter) are betrothed to me.” Note that kiddushin (betrothal) can take place during the festival, but marriage may not. Therefore, ketubot, marriage documents, are not included in this list.
Divorce documents: Gittin. This is the document that a husband writes to his wife. Divorce is permitted on the festival.
And receipts: The creditor writes to the lender stating that he has received the money. This may also refer to a case of divorce, where a woman writes a receipt to her husband upon receiving the marriage settlement (her ketubah money).
The will of a dying person: Wills, which must be written and executed while the person is alive, are obviously not something that can be put off, especially when they are written by a dying person, the case to which our mishnah refers.
Bequests: A document transferring a present from one person to another.
Prozbuls: These documents allow a person’s loans to carry through the Sabbatical year. If they are not written, then the loan is annulled in the sabbatical year.
Evaluation certificates: Documents which evaluate a debtor’s possessions so that the appropriate amount may be collected by the creditor.
And orders for support: These documents allow a widow to sell her dead husband’s property in order to provide for herself.
Documents of halitzah: Halitzah is the refusal of levirate marriage. A woman might need this document to prove that she had been released and was free to marry another man.
And of repudiation [of marriage]: A minor girl whose father has died may be married off by her mother or brother. When she reaches majority age she may repudiate the marriage and have it annulled. She would need this document to prove that she had repudiated the marriage and was allowed to marry another man without having been divorced.
And arbitration records: Certain court cases would begin by the litigants choosing judges. These records would prove which judges had been chosen.
Decrees of the court: Documents recording their decision.
And correspondence: According to the Yerushalmi’s interpretation of this clause, it refers to simple letters of correspondence. In those days sending mail would have been quite difficult. It was not always easy to find someone going to the place where one wanted to send a letter. If such a person was found on the festival one was allowed to write a letter because the opportunity would be lost later. A different (and later interpretation) is that this clause refers to letters written to the government. Only such letters are permitted on the festival because they are of a greater need than simple letters of friendship." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nMost of this mishnah continues to deal with writing on the festival.", + "They may not write loan documents during the festival; but if he [the creditor] does not trust him or he does not have food to eat, he may write. Loan documents may not be written during the festival, because one can lend money without a document, using witnesses to secure the loan. The mishnah immediately lists two major exceptions. If the creditor does not trust the borrower enough to lend him money without a document, then they may write a document. The rabbis considered it important enough for the borrower to be able to secure the loan that they allowed the document to be written during the festival. The second exception is interpreted in two different ways. The Jerusalem Talmud interprets it to refer to the borrower if the borrower needs a loan so that he can afford to eat, the document can be written. The problem with this interpretation is that if the lender trusts the borrower, then he doesn’t need a document, and if he doesn’t trust him, then the mishnah has already stated that he may write the document. Due to these difficulties, the Babylonian Talmud interprets the clause to refer to the scribe. If he needs his wages in order to eat during the festival, they may have him write the document.", + "They may not write [Torah] scrolls, tefillin and mezuzot during the festival, nor may they correct [even] a single letter, even in the [ancient] Temple-scroll. We might have thought that since Torah scrolls, tefillin and mezuzot are sacred objects, a scribe could write them during the festival. The mishnah rules otherwise even holy objects cannot be written on the festival. One cannot even fix one letter in a scroll, even in the “ancient Temple scroll,” the scroll which was kept in the Temple from which other scrolls were copied.", + "Rabbi Judah says: a man may write tefillin and mezuzot for himself. Rabbi Judah allows one to write a personal set of tefillin or a mezuzah for personal use, but he agrees with the previous opinion that a scribe may not write these documents in order to sell them. The problem, according to Rabbi Judah, is not inherent in the writing itself. The problem with writing is when it becomes a “craft” done by a professional.", + "And one may spin on his thigh the blue-wool for his fringe. The mishnah allows one to spin tzitzit (fringes on the corner of one’s garment) but only for personal usage, while the garment is resting on one’s thigh. He may not put the threads onto a spinning wheel to spin the tzitzit, the way this is normally done. Again, in order to distinguish something from the way it is done normally, the rabbis demanded it be done differently on the festival." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nFrom here until the end, Moed Katan deals with mourning practices. There is no separate tractate in the Mishnah concerning mourning so the few halakhot that the Mishnah does contain are placed here. There are probably several reasons for this. First of all, as we shall see below, the Mishnah deals with the question of mourning which occurs right before a festival. On a deeper level, the week of mourning (the shivah) and the week of the festival seem to be flipsides of the same coin. Both are seven days long, one of celebration and one of sadness. It is forbidden to do work during the festival because one is supposed to be celebrating. During shivah it is forbidden to do work because one is supposed to be mourning. Similarly, marriages are prohibited during the festival and during the shivah. There are other halakhot which are shared by both holidays.\nThe two periods of mourning mentioned in our mishnah are shivah, seven days, and shloshim, thirty days. The first period is more intense and its restrictions are more numerous than the latter. The mishnah deals with the question of a person whose period of mourning is interrupted by a festival.", + "One who buries his dead three days before a festival, the decrees of shiva are annulled from him; If one of a person’s close relatives dies at least three days before the start of a festival, the festival annuls the shivah (the seven day period of mourning). When the festival is over he will not need to complete the shivah. Today, the halakhah is that if the person’s relative dies and is buried right right before the festival, even an hour before the festival, the shivah is cancelled. However, the mishnah and earlier halakhah held that at least three days of the shivah had to be observed. If three days were not observed than the shivah continues after the festival. These three days seem to be the essential period of mourning, more critical than the rest of the shivah.", + "[One he buries his dead] eight days before a festival, the decrees of the shloshim [thirty days] are annulled from him. If he buries a close relative eight days before the festival, he has begun to observe “shloshim,” the second stage of mourning when the festival begins and the festival annuls the remainder of shloshim. This would mean that after the festival there is no more mourning at all (except in the case of a dead parent).", + "Because they [the sages] said that Shabbat counts but does not interrupt, while festivals interrupt and do not count. This section explains the rationale of the previous two sections. Shabbat counts as part of the shivah and shloshim and does not interrupt either of them. The festivals, in contrast, do not count. This means that if someone dies on the festival, the mourners do not begin mourning until after the festival, when they will have a full period of shivah and shloshim. However, the festival does interrupt, such that if someone begins mourning three days before the festival the festival will annul shivah; eight days will annul shloshim." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe festivals which most clearly put an end to shivah and shloshim are Pesah and Sukkot since they are both seven or if you include Shmini Atzeret (the last day of Sukkot), eight days long. In contrast, Shavuot, Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur last only one day. Further complicating the matter, Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur are holidays, but not actually festivals. “Festival” in Hebrew (regel) refers only to the three pilgrimage holidays Pesah, Shavuot and Sukkot, when one was supposed to visit the Temple. Due to these complications, our mishnah contains a debate over where these one day holidays are treated like Shabbat or like Pesah and Sukkot.", + "Rabbi Eliezer says: From the time the Temple was destroyed, Atzeret ( is like Shabbat. Atzeret is the word used in the Mishnah to refer to Shavuot. When the Temple still stood, Atzeret was similar to the other festivals. One who did not bring the appropriate sacrifice on Atzeret itself could bring it for the following six days. Hence, in a sense Atzeret was a seven day holiday, even though it was only fully observed for one day. When the Temple still stood, it would interrupt mourning. Once the Temple was destroyed and sacrifices could no longer be brought, Atzeret ceased being a seven day holiday and hence is treated like Shabbat when it comes to mourning.", + "Rabban Gamaliel says: Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur are like festivals. According to Rabban Gamaliel Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur are like festivals. Assumedly, his reasoning is that anything that is not Shabbat counts as a festival. He would therefore disagree with Rabbi Eliezer. Today the halakhah follows Rabban Gamaliel. Only Shabbat does not interrupt mourning.", + "The sages say: [the rule is] not according to the words of this one nor that one, rather Atzeret is like the festivals and Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur are like Shabbat. The other sages disagree with both Rabban Gamaliel and Rabbi Eliezer. The category of festivals includes all pilgrimage holidays, and even Atzeret after the destruction of the Temple. Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur are not “festivals” and hence they function like Shabbat. The sages’ opinion seems to be a literal interpretation of the last clause of yesterday’s mishnah which stated that festivals interrupt. The sages interpret this to mean only festivals and not other holidays." + ], + [ + "They do not rend [their clothes] or bare [their shoulders], or provide a meal [for the mourners] except for the relatives of the dead.
And they do not provide a meal except on an upright couch.
They do not bring [food] to the house of mourning on an [ornamental] tray, platter, or flat basket, but in plain baskets.
And they do not say the mourners’ blessing during the festival.
But they may stand in a row and comfort [the mourners] and [the mourners] may formally dismiss the community. Section one: When one heard that a close relative had died, one would rend whatever clothes they were wearing. Baring the shoulder was also a sign of mourning. The mourner was provided by the community with the first meal after the funeral. On Hol Hamoed only a close relative would perform these practices. Others would not. I should note that today only close relatives do these actions in any case. The circle of mourners was bigger in the Talmudic period. Section two: It was customary to overturn the bed during mourning and then sit on the bed as a sign of mourning. But one does not overturn the bed during Hol Hamoed. This practice fell into disuse sometime after the Talmudic period. Section three: This halakhah is true in all cases. When bringing food to the mourner, they should bring it in plain baskets. A source in the Talmud relates that originally people would use fancy silver and gold vessels, but poor people would be embarrassed that they could not afford such fancy funerals and mourning homes. As a response the rabbis decreed that everyone must bring in a simple vessel. The mourning home is not a place where one should be showing off one’s wealth. Section four: The mourners’ blessing was stated on return from burial. They would stand in a line and comfort the mourner with this blessing. It may have also been recited at other points as well. But it is a public sign of mourning and should not be done on Hol Hamoed. Section five: While the blessing is not recited on Hol Hamoed, burial is. Along with the burial, they may have the formal line of comforters that would accompany the mourners on their way home. The same goes true for the official words that the mourner seems to have said to the comforters, to allow them to go home without accompanying the mourner all the way home.
Today’s Mishnah discusses mourning practices not observed during Hol Hamoed. It is interesting to note that this Mishnah is one of the main sources of the laws of mourning. It seems, at least to me, that the Mishnah did not feel it was necessary to teach people how to mourn. People just knew what to do. The only reason they are mentioned is to let people know when not to observe these practices." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to deal with mourning practices during the festival.", + "They do not place the bier on the thruway [during the festival] so as not to encourage eulogizing. Normally, the bier, a stretcher with the body on it, would be placed on the thruway, the central road that passes through the town, so that people would have the opportunity to offer up public eulogies. Since eulogies are forbidden on the festival, the bier is not placed on the thruway.", + "And the bier of women is never [set down on the thruway] for the sake of propriety. The body of the dead person was covered only with a shroud while it was on the bier. It could become exposed. Due to the rabbis’ concerns of modesty, they did not wish the woman’s bier to be placed on the thruway even on non-festival occasions.", + "Women may raise a wail during the festival, but not clap [their hands in grief]. Rabbi Ishmael says: those that are close to the bier clap [their hands in grief]. Women played a significant role at funerals. A common role attributed to them is that of professional wailers (people who cry out loud, not those who hunt big animals in the sea). The mishnah allows them to wail during the festival, but they may not clap their hands. This seems to have been a common funerary practice. Others explain that this doesn’t refer to clapping one’s hands or slapping one’s hands on thigh but beating one’s breast. Rabbi Ishmael is more lenient and allows the women closest to the bier to also clap their hands." + ], + [ + "On Rosh Hodesh, on Hannukah and on Purim they may wail and clap [their hands in grief].
Neither on the former nor on the latter occasions may they offer a lamentation.
After the dead has been buried they neither wail nor clap [their hands in grief].
What is meant by wailing? When all wail in unison.
What is meant by a lament? When one speaks and all respond after her, as it is said: “And teach your daughters wailing and one another [each] lamentation” (Jeremiah 9:19).
But as to the future, it says: “He will destroy death forever, and the Lord God will wipe away the tears from all faces” (Isaiah 25:9).
The last mishnah in Moed Katan continues to discuss womens’ mourning practices during the festival. It concludes with a note of hope for the future, for a messianic age when God will conquer death.
Section one: Rosh Hodesh, Hannukah and Purim are semi-holidays. There are special prayers and Torah readings for all three of them, but work is not prohibited. Two of them (Hannukah and Purim) are not mentioned in the Torah and hence, their importance is less than that of the other holidays. Due to their diminished status, the women may even clap their hands in grief at a funeral. This was prohibited during the festival.
Section two: Lamenting (explained below) is forbidden on all holidays, both those mentioned in section one of this mishnah and the festivals discussed in yesterday’s mishnah.
Section three: The women are permitted to wail or clap only as long as the dead body has not been buried. Once the body is buried, both practices become forbidden.
Section four: The mishnah now defines, at least partially, wailing and lamenting. Wailing is done by all of the women simultaneously. Lamenting is done responsively, one woman speaking and the others answering after her. This is hinted at in Jeremiah who says that one woman teaches another lamentation, interpreted to mean that one woman recites the lamentation and the others repeat after her.
Section five: All of this talk about death can be depressing and scary. Indeed, it was often considered forbidden for young men to learn the third chapter of Moed Katan because all of this talk about death could bring on bad luck (the evil eye). To alleviate this distress, the tractate ends on a positive note. The current stage of humanity, where we must face the distressing possibility of mourning in the middle of the joy of a festival, will be alleviated in the messianic period, when God will conquer death.
Congratulations! We have finished Megillah.
[You probably already know what I’m going to say but I’ll say it anyway].
It is a tradition at this point to thank God for helping us finish learning the tractate and to commit ourselves to going back and relearning it, so that we may not forget it and so that its lessons will stay with us for all of our lives.
Most of Moed Katan was about the laws of the festival. These laws are fascinating (at least to me) because they are grayer, more ambiguous, than the prohibitions in effect on Shabbat and Yom Tov. Some activities are generally prohibited but are allowed under extenuating circumstances, unlike Shabbat where any given labor is basically always prohibited. When I think of the laws of the Moed (the festival), I think of a sort of mathematical equation which we would need to perform before determining whether a labor is permitted or forbidden. There are several factors that might lead to something being permitted/forbidden. For instance, will not doing the work cause a significant financial loss? Could the work have been done before the festival? Is it strenuous? Did the person plan on working on the festival? Is it being done in the normal fashion? Only when we know the answers to these questions can we decide whether the work is permitted.
Today, many of these laws are neglected. In our busy modern economies it is hard enough to take off of work for Yom Tov (the first and last days of the festival), let alone for the rest of the festival. Many of these halakhot are basically no longer observed because any cessation of work causes a “grave financial loss.” While this may be to a certain extent true, I think we should keep in mind that the rabbis wanted to preserve the character of the festival by turning it into a celebratory vacation. Rejoicing is one of the main obligations on the festival and its much easier to party when you’re not working.
As always, congratulations on learning another tractate of Mishnah. One more tractate to go and we’ll have finished Moed, and half of the Mishnah! Hard to believe. Tomorrow we start Hagigah." + ] + ] + ] + }, + "schema": { + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה מועד קטן", + "enTitle": "English Explanation of Mishnah Moed Katan", + "key": "English Explanation of Mishnah Moed Katan", + "nodes": [ + { + "heTitle": "הקדמה", + "enTitle": "Introduction" + }, + { + "heTitle": "", + "enTitle": "" + } + ] + } +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Moed/English Explanation of Mishnah Moed Katan/English/merged.json b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Moed/English Explanation of Mishnah Moed Katan/English/merged.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..65360c30d9b7daa0925b9527eccec90800b6244a --- /dev/null +++ b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Moed/English Explanation of Mishnah Moed Katan/English/merged.json @@ -0,0 +1,178 @@ +{ + "title": "English Explanation of Mishnah Moed Katan", + "language": "en", + "versionTitle": "merged", + "versionSource": "https://www.sefaria.org/English_Explanation_of_Mishnah_Moed_Katan", + "text": { + "Introduction": [ + "Moed Katan is about the halakhot governing the intermediate days of Pesah and Sukkot (called Hol Hamoed, which means the non-sacred days of the festival). The Torah says that one cannot do work on the first and seventh days of Pesah, on the first day of Sukkot and on Shmini Atzeret. It doesn’t say anything about the intermediate days. One the one hand these days are still part of the festival. Special sacrifices are offered and special prayers recited. On the other hand the Torah does not prohibit work on these days. This leaves their laws somewhat ambiguous. They tend to be quite flexible. The same work that in one situation is prohibited may be in other situations permitted. According to the rabbis, some work is prohibited on Hol Hamoed but some work is allowed. There are certain general principles that guided the rabbis in deciding which work was allowed and which was not. I shall list these briefly here. Most of our tractate gives examples that lead to these principles.", + "1) If the work must be done on Hol Hamoed or a financial loss will be incurred, it is generally permitted. 2) If it is very difficult, laborious work, it will likely be prohibited. 3) One should not do work on Hol Hamoed that could have been done beforehand.", + "Much of the third chapter deals with the laws of mourning. These laws are brought there on account of a mishnah which teaches that one cannot mourn on a festival and that a festival can put an end to the shivah (seven) days of mourning. We will discuss this at much greater length when we get to the third chapter." + ], + "": [ + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThe first mishnah of Moed Katan deals with watering a field during the festival. Watering a field is sometimes necessary or the crops will be lost. Therefore, watering in these types of situations tends to be permitted. However, watering is also quite laborious and hence some types of watering are prohibited.", + "They may water an irrigated field during the festival [week] or in the sabbatical year, both from a newly-emerging spring and from a spring that is not just emerged. “An irrigated field” refers to a field that cannot subsist on rainwater alone. Therefore, the mishnah allows one to water it on the festival. During the sabbatical year it is forbidden to work the land. However, irrigating a field is not considered to be working the field, as is plowing or planting. Nevertheless, the rabbis did prohibit watering during the sabbatical year, but they did not prohibit watering a field that needed to be irrigated. Certainly the field may be watered through an old spring, whose water has already been directed at the field. The mishnah says that it may be watered even from a new spring, despite the extra work of directing the water to the field.", + "But they may not water the field with water from stored rain, and not with a swipe and bucket. Carrying water to the field from a cistern of stored rain water is a lot of work. Therefore they are not allowed to water the field in this way. They are also not allowed to water using a method called “swipe and bucket,” which was a type of sweeping pump used to get water out of deep cisterns. This was also considered too laborious. We can see that first the mishnah allows watering these types of fields because otherwise the crops will be lost. It then limits that by saying that some labors are prohibited because one shouldn’t be doing so much work on the festival.", + "And they may not make small ditches around the vines. Finally, one may not make water ditches around vines. These ditches were made so that they would fill up and the water would seep into the roots. Again, digging these ditches was considered too much work for it to be permitted on the festival." + ], + [ + "Introduction This mishnah continues to discuss irrigation on the festival and sabbatical year. It then proceeds to deal with the more general topic of repairing community property. As we shall see, this is another category that makes something more permitted during the intermediate days of the festival.", + "Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah says: they may not make a new water channel may not during the festival [week] or in the sabbatical year. But the sages say: they may make a new water channel during the sabbatical year, and they may repair broken ones during the festival. Making a new water channel involves digging and it is a considerable amount of work. Since it involves digging, it is similar to plowing and therefore Rabbi Elazar ben Azaryah forbids it during the sabbatical year, a time when plowing is forbidden. Since it involves a substantial amount of work, he holds that it is forbidden during the festival. The sages agree that it is forbidden to make a new water channel during the festival, because this involves a lot of work. However, they allow repairing old water channels because this is less work. Also, new water channels should have been dug before the festival, whereas having to fixing broken ones was usually not anticipated. They also disagree with Rabbi Elazar ben Azaryah concerning digging new water channels during the sabbatical year. Whereas he held it was similar to plowing they hold that it is different enough such that it is permitted.", + "And they may repair impaired water works in the public domain, and clean them out. If water channels have become clogged with debris, they may be cleaned out during the festival, because this is both necessary and not a significant amount of work.", + "And they may repair roads, town squares and [ritual] pools, and they may do all public needs may be performed, and mark graves, and [inspectors] may go out to inspect kilayim (mixed seeds). They are also allowed to fix the public roads and ritual baths, because these are significant public needs. In addition they were allowed to perform other public duties. In the time of the Mishnah, they would mark graves with lime so that priests, commanded to avoid becoming impure, could see where the graves were and avoid them. This could also be done on the festival. Finally, public inspectors were allowed to go out to inspect people’s fields that kilayim, forbidden mixtures of seeds were not growing there. This was an immediate need because once kilayim grow in one’s field, all of the crops become forbidden. The final section of the mishnah is contained word for word in Shekalim 1:1. For a fuller explanation, one that is appropriate to a slightly different context, look there." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah returns to the subject of irrigating during the festival. As an aside, the fact that the first three mishnayot of this tractate are dedicated to this subject testifies to how crucial irrigation was in Israel, especially during Sukkot and Pesah.", + "Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov says: they may draw water from [one] tree to [another] tree, as long as they don’t water the whole field. Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov holds that if a lot of water had collected around one tree, they were allowed to draw the water from that tree to another tree, because this is not a lot of work. However, one cannot use this way of watering to water the entire field, because that would be too much work.", + "Seeds that have not had [any] drink before the festival, he may not water them during the festival. The sages however allow it in both cases. If he planted seeds before the festival but had not yet watered them, then he cannot water them during the festival, because they will do fine without being watered. The seeds don’t start to open until the first time they are watered. However, if he has watered them already, then he may continue to water them during the festival, because if he does not, they will die. This illustrates an important principle if something will be lost, it is usually permitted to do that given work on the festival. The sages allow the seeds to be watered even if they had not yet been watered before the festival. They allow this for one of two reasons: 1) they think the seeds will be lost; 2) they think that it is not a significant amount of work." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first section of the mishnah deals with trapping pests in a field and the second half deals with repairing breaches in a fence surrounding a field. Both of these may need to be done in order to protect the crops and therefore they may be permitted.", + "They may trap moles and mice in a tree-field or a white field in an unusual way during the festival and in the sabbatical year. But the sages say: in the tree-field in the usual way and in the white field in an unusual way. According to the first opinion in the mishnah (this is probably Rabbi Eliezer b. Yaakov, the sage from yesterday’s mishnah), one can trap moles and mice in the normal way of trapping them, from both a field of trees and a field of produce (called a white field). The normal way of trapping them seems to have involved digging a hole so that they would fall in. We might have thought that this was prohibited on the sabbatical year because it looks like plowing. On the festival it might have prohibited because it is a lot of work. The sages are stricter. In a tree-field, where the moles and mice can do more damage, one can trap them in the usual way. However in a white field, where the loss that they cause is more minor, they can only trap them in an unusual way. According to the Talmud this means that they dig the hole in an unusual way so that everyone will know that the person is cognizant of the fact that it is either the Sabbatical year or the festival. This is another general principle we will see frequently in Moed Katan. Work which is forbidden may sometimes be done with a change, even though this change may cause the work to be more laborious. This seems to me to be a way that the rabbis could allow people to prevent a financial loss, while still making sure that they knew that it was a festival.", + "And they may block up a breach in a wall during the festival, and in the sabbatical year they may build it in the usual way. If a wall has opened up on the festival and the crops are left exposed to wild animals, it is permitted to make a temporary wall to close it up during the festival. It is forbidden, however, to build a more permanent wall because this is too much work. This is with regard to the festival. During the Sabbatical year it is permitted to build even a new wall because this is not similar to plowing. Only plowing and activities similar to it were prohibited during the sabbatical year, not all work involved in maintaining a field." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first section of this mishnah deals with a priest inspecting leprous symptoms on a person. Leprosy (or some other similar type of skin disease) is dealt with in Leviticus 13.\nThe second part of the mishnah deals with certain acts of mourning during the festival. It is brought here because the first of those acts involves digging, which is generally forbidden on the festival because it is laborious.", + "Rabbi Meir says: [Priests] may inspect leprous symptoms at the outset [during the festival] for [the priest to make] a lenient assessment, but not to make a strict one. But the sages say: neither for a lenient nor for a severe assessment. According to Rabbi Meir a priest may inspect a person to decide whether his symptoms make him impure, but only if he is going to pronounce the person pure. The mishnah does not want anything to damper the celebration of the festival, and pronouncing him impure will only distress him. It seems that if the priest sees that the person is impure, he is not supposed to say anything at all. The mishnah allows this even at the outset, meaning at the initial stage of the process, when the infected person is going from a state of purity to impure. The priest may also examine him later on when the infected person is already impure, as long as he will declare him to be pure. The sages think that once the priest goes to examine the symptoms and sees that the person has tzaraat (the skin-disease) he must declare the person impure. He cannot remain silent. Rabbi Meir’s halakhah is therefore untenable. The sages however agree that we should avoid a situation where a person might be declared impure on the festival. Therefore, they instruct the priest not to even examine the symptoms in the first place. Better to avoid the problem altogether than to be put in the situation where he would have to remain silent in the face of impurity. What is fascinating about this section is how the notion of impurity is treated. It is as if impurity doesn’t even exist unless the priest declares it impure. In other words, the priest’s declaration is what makes something impure, not its actual physicality. Both Rabbi Meir and the sages seem completely unbothered by the fact that a person might really have this disease and yet not be declared impure.", + "Furthermore Rabbi Meir said: a man may gather his father’s and mother’s bones, since this is a joy for him. Rabbi Yose says: it is mourning for him. In mishnaic times they would first bury the body until the flesh had decomposed. About a year later they would gather the bones and put them into a more permanent place, called in English an “ossuary.” In our mishnah two rabbis debate whether the gathering of bones is a joyous or a sad occasion. According to Rabbi Meir, bringing one’s parents’ bones to their final resting place is a joyous occasion. Therefore, it is permitted during the festival. Rabbi Yose says that collecting the bones is part of the mourning process, since it will remind him of the painful loss of his parents. Therefore, he may not collect the bones during this week.", + "A man should not stir up wailing for his dead, nor hold a lamentation for him thirty days before the festival. When it comes to other mourning practices, even Rabbi Meir agrees that he may not do so during the festival. This mishnah does not deal with a person who died during or right before the festival, a topic which shall be covered in chapter three. Rather, the mishnah refers to a person who tells a professional eulogizer to recite a public eulogy for someone who died a long time before the festival, or to someone who himself recites a eulogy for someone close to him who died a long time before the festival. Reciting eulogies for one who died a while before the festival should not be done even within the thirty days preceding the festival because the memory of the powerful eulogy will stay with those who hear it for thirty days, dampening their ability to celebrate on the festival." + ], + [ + "Introduction It was certainly permitted to bury the dead on the festival. It would hardly be possible or desirable to wait an entire week to bury a body. Since burials would have taken place quite frequently during a festival, this mishnah deals with the critical subject of digging graves and other various places to bury or place the body.", + "They may not dig burial niches and graves during the festival. But they may adapt burial niches [to the size of the dead body] during the festival. Burial niches are holes the walls of caves where they used to bury people. “Graves” refers to the caves themselves. These may not be dug on the festival because it is a tremendous amount of work and there are other ways to bury a dead body, such as digging a hole in the ground, which is permitted if necessary (see below). However, if there was already a niche in the wall of the burial cave and all they needed to do was expand it to make it fit the size of the body, they may do so because it is not a significant amount of work. Also, it would have been difficult, if not impossible to know how big to make the niches ahead of time.", + "And they may make a temporary grave during the festival, and a coffin, if a dead [body] is close by in the courtyard. Rabbi Judah forbids, unless there are sawn boards at hand. They may make a temporary grave, one in which they would put the body until the bones are collected. They may also make a coffin if there is a dead body in the courtyard where the coffin is being built. If there is no dead body there then they may not make a coffin because people will not realize that it is being made for somebody who has already died. This is another criterion with regard to permitting work on the festival we must take into consideration what people will think when they see the person working. If they realize that it was for an imminent need, and that the work cannot be pushed off, then it is more likely to be permitted. As an aside, we can see from this mishnah that some people were buried in coffins but not all. It seems that there was quite a large range of burial practices in Israel during mishnaic times. Rabbi Judah says that it is prohibited to make the coffin if in order to do so he will also have to make planks. In other words, despite the fact that this is an immediate need, Rabbi Judah still prohibits it because making planks is too much work to be done on the festival. Only if he had available planks could he make the coffin." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah prohibits marriage during the festival. It seems that the central idea is that one should use the festival to celebrate the festival and not as an opportunity to celebrate something else. The rabbis did not want people to say, “Since I can’t work on the festival anyway, I might as well use it for a wedding celebration.” Rather, both the week of the festival and the week of the wedding celebration should have their own separate times.", + "One may not marry a woman during the festival, whether a virgin or a widow, nor may one perform levirate marriage, because this is a joy for him. But one may remarry his divorced wife. As stated in the introduction, one may not get married during a festival. The mishnah emphasizes that this is true even if the woman is a widow, for whom a wedding celebration was not as expansive. It is forbidden even to have levirate marriage with one’s dead brother’s widow. Even though this was probably not as celebratory occasion as a more typical marriage, it is still a joy and therefore it is prohibited. There is only one type of marriage remarrying one’s divorcee which one can have on a festival. Since the couple has already been married, this is not as joyous of occasion and therefore it is permitted. This clause sheds some light on the first clause. Marriages are prohibited when they are the first time that a couple will have a chance to be married. It is partly, at least, the anticipation of the new that makes a marriage a joyous occasion and therefore prohibited during the festival. When the novelty is gone, the joy is diminished. [I realize that many will disagree with this assessment, thinking that remarriage is a great joy. While this point is debatable, the rabbis thought otherwise.]", + "And a woman may make the adornments [for her wedding] during the festival. Rabbi Judah says: she may not put on lime, as that is a [temporary] disfigurement to her. Although marriage is prohibited on the festival, a woman use that week to make the adornments (the perfumes and makeup) that she will need on her wedding day. Although she is using the festival to prepare for something that she will not need during the festival, since it is not a lot of work she is allowed to do so. Rabbi Judah places one limitation on this. She cannot put lime on her body to remove hair and to make her skin look better because while the lime is on she is disfigured. Rabbi Judah holds that she should not do anything that will make her look ugly on the festival, even if it is only temporary." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with sewing on the festival. It introduces a principle which we have not yet seen in the previous mishnayot. There are certain types of labor that may be done by a non-professional but not by a craftsman. This prevents professionals from working on the festival, while still allowing ordinary people to engage in light labors.", + "An ordinary person may sew in the usual way, but a craftsman may sew [only using] uneven stitches. An ordinary person can sew in a normal way, assuming he has an immediate need to do so. Sewing is not a heavy labor, and therefore it is permitted on the festival. However, a professional craftsman cannot sew in a normal way because that would allow him to engage in his profession during the festival. This is prohibited even if he is not paid for the work. The mishnah allows him to make some sort of uneven stitches. This might allow him to fix things that need to be fixed while still preventing him from engaging in his normal profession.", + "And they may weave the ropes of a bed. Rabbi Yose says: they may even be tightened. In the mishnaic period beds were made with a frame around which they would loop ropes. The tighter the ropes, the firmer the bed (this is the origin of the phrase “sleep tight”). The mishnah allows a person to weave ropes around the frame of a bed because this is not a significant amount of work. It is also necessary if one wants to sleep on a bed. There are two versions of Rabbi Yose’s statement. According to the version which I have translated he even allows ropes that are already on the bed to be tightened. We might have thought that since the ropes were already there that tightening them is not really necessary and hence forbidden on the festival. In this version, Rabbi Yose is more lenient than the previous opinion. According to the other version, Rabbi Yose only allows tightening ropes and not weaving ropes that are not already attached to the bed frame. In this version Rabbi Yose is stricter." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with setting up various instruments needed for the preparation of food.", + "They may set up an oven, stove or a millstone during the festival. Setting up an oven, stove or a mill involved assembling the separate parts and connecting them with plaster. The mishnah allows this because it is not a lot of work and it is necessary for the festival.", + "Rabbi Judah says: they may not roughen millstones for the first time. For the millstones to grind well, their face was had to be roughened by putting grooves and ridges on it. While Rabbi Judah agrees that one can set up the millstone, he doesn’t allow it to be roughened for this is strenuous work. The roughening also could have been done before the festival." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe final mishnah of this chapter introduces two more categories relevant to the laws of the festival. While some work may be done during the festival, one should not leave work for the festival that could have been done beforehand. Second, one should not use the festival as a time to prepare things for after the festival.", + "They may put up a railing around a roof or a gallery porch, in the style of an ordinary person but not in the style of a professional. It is permitted to put up a railing on a roof or a second-floor porch, but only if it is done in a non-professional manner. For instance, putting up a rough stone fence would be permitted, but a nicely finished iron fence would not.", + "They may put plaster on crevices [on the roof] and flatten them down with a roller, by hand or foot, but not using professional tools. This refers to fixing a roof. It is permitted to fill in the crevices and to flatten the plaster, but not with professional tools. The central idea is that work that needs to be done should be done differently during the festival.", + "A hinge, a socket, a beam, a lock, a key which broke they may repair them during the festival, as long as he doesn’t intend to do this work during the festival. If a part of a door broke (these are all parts of a door), it may be fixed on the festival, and in the normal way. There doesn’t seem to be any “non-professional” way of fixing the door and hence all ways of fixing the door are okay. The mishnah does, however, offer one reservation. He may not delay fixing the door until the festival, saving his work for when he has more time. The door should only be fixed if it actually broke on the festival, an unforeseen problem.", + "And all the pickled food that he may eat during the festival, he may pickle. He can pickle food on the festival, but only if he is going to actually be able to eat the food during the festival. He may not use the festival as a time to prepare for the future. Note how this section is the mirror image of section three. There we learned that a person may not save for the festival work that should have been done before the festival. In this section we learn that a person may not do work on the festival for after the festival." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThe beginning of chapter one introduces yet another criterion used in determining whether work is permitted on the festival. We have already learned that one should not save work to be done on the festival. Things that can be done before the festival cannot be done during the festival. Our mishnah deals with a person who intended to do something before the festival but then was not able to. If he doesn’t do the work during the festival, he will incur a financial loss.", + "If one had turned his olives, and mourning or some unforeseen circumstance befell him, or workmen misled him, he may [during the festival] put on the beam for the first time and leave it until after the festival, the words of Rabbi Judah. The mishnah refers to the preparation of olives. They would put the olives in a large sack so that they would heat up and start to release the oil. After time they would flip the bag with a special stick so that they would get very soft. This was done prior to pressing them with a large beam. In our mishnah someone turned his olives over and was planning to put them under the beam before the festival. However, he was not able to do so due to some unforeseen circumstance. The mishnah gives a couple of examples of such a circumstance. First of all, someone in his family might have died and a mourner is not allowed to work. Alternatively, he might have had workers who reneged on an agreement to help press his olives. In any case, Rabbi Judah allows him to begin pressing the olives so that they will not rot, but he does not allow him to complete this process.", + "Rabbi Yose says: he may pour off [the oil] and complete the process and seal [the jars] in his usual way. Rabbi Yose is more lenient. He allows him to take the oil that comes out of the first pressing and even do the second and third pressing. He may put the oil in jars and close them up as well. Rabbi Yose reasons that once he has been allowed to do some of the work, he should be allowed to complete it." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is similar to yesterday’s mishnah but deals with the production of wine instead of olive oil.", + "Similarly, if one had his wine [already] in a cistern and mourning or some unforeseen circumstance befell him, or workmen misled him, he may draw off [the wine], complete the process and seal [the jars] in his usual way, the words of Rabbi Yose. In this case, someone has already pressed his grapes and the juices have run off into the cistern, and for some reason he was not able to jar the wine before the festival. According to Rabbi Yose, since the process was started and it was not his fault that he could not complete it, he may complete the process during the festival. He may remove the wine from the cistern, finish squeezing all of the juice out of the grapes and put the wine into jars.", + "Rabbi Judah says: he [may only] cover [the cistern] with boards to prevent it from turning into vinegar. Consistent with his opinion in yesterday’s mishnah, Rabbi Judah does not allow him to complete the process. Rather, all he may do is cover the wine in the cistern so that it does not spoil." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThere are certain labors that are permitted on the festival because if they are not done immediately, the product will be ruined. However, this is only permitted if he did not purposely set his schedule so that the work would end up needing to be done during the festival.", + "A man may bring his produce indoors for fear of thieves and withdraw his flax from a soaking pool to prevent it spoiling, as long as he doesn’t intend to do this work during the festival. If one has left produce outside but fears that it might be stolen by thieves, he may bring it indoors on the festival. He may also take his flax out of a soaking pool (used to soften the flax so that it can be made into linen) lest it become too soft and spoil. However, he may not start a certain labor before the festival knowing that he will have to continue to do the work during the festival. The only time these labors may be performed is if some unforeseen circumstance prevented him from being able to perform them before the festival.", + "And all those who deliberately intended to do their work on the festival, they must leave it to spoil. This is a summary of the basic rule governing all of the previous sections. If one has intentionally left over work for the festival, he must let it spoil. A different explanation is that this refers to a court which penalizes a person who left his work for the festival by taking it away from him. According to this interpretation we would need to translate the last clause as “they cause him to lose [his property]”, which is a viable translation." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with two subjects: 1) buying large items on the festival; 2) using the festival as time to move one’s belongings.", + "They may not purchase houses, slaves or cattle unless it is for the needs of the festival, or the need of the seller who does not have enough to eat. It is forbidden to make large purchases on the festival, because the festival should not be used as a time to engage in activities needed for after the festival. There are, however, two circumstances, that allow one to make a large purchase on the festival. First of all, if the sale is necessary to the buyer for the needs of the festival. For instance, if one’s house burned down right before the festival, he may buy a new one during the festival. The second circumstance is if the seller needs the cash immediately to buy food for the holiday. The general prohibition of buying and selling large items on the festival is waved if the seller needs money immediately in order to buy food in order to celebrate the festival itself.", + "They may not move [belongings] from one house to another house, but he may move [his belongings] within his courtyard. Moving from one house to another is obviously a difficult and laborious endeavor. Since it involves so much work, one may not do so on the festival. However, he is allowed to move his stuff out to the adjacent courtyard because this is not nearly as strenuous. The Talmud explains that he can move from one house to another house within the same courtyard.", + "They may not bring back vessels from the house of the craftsman, but if one is anxious about them, he may remove them to another courtyard. If one has left his vessels (clothes, utensils, cloth etc.) at a craftsman for repair, he cannot bring them home on the festival. According to the Talmud, this refers to vessels which are not needed on the festival. However, if he fears that someone might steal them from the craftsman’s workshop, he may move them to a better-guarded workshop. While this may be just as much work as moving them to his own home, he is not allowed to bring them home lest someone plan ahead of time to use the festival as a opportunity to bring his things home from the craftsman." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe final mishnah of this chapter deals with people whose work might be necessary during the festival. The general rule is that while they may engage in their work, they should do so in as private a manner as possible.", + "They may cover [drying] figs with straw. Rabbi Judah says: they may even be pile [the figs] up [in heaps]. Drying figs were covered with straw so that they wouldn’t get dirty. The mishnah permits one to cover them with straw on the festival, because if they are left uncovered, they might get ruined. Rabbi Judah says that one may even heap them up together in order to preserve them better.", + "Sellers of produce, clothing and [other] vessels may sell privately for the requirements of the festival. The people referred to in this section are selling items that the public might need for the festival. The mishnah says that they may do so, but that they should try to sell in as private a manner as possible. The rabbis wanted to allow people to buy items necessary for the festival, but they also wanted to prevent the week from turning into “business as usual.”", + "Trappers [of fish and birds], groats-makers and grist-millers may engage in their work privately for the requirements of the festival. Rabbi Yose says: they were strict upon themselves. Similarly, people who engage in food production may work, but only in a private manner. “Groats-makers” pounded grain to make it into cereal whereas “grist-millers” grind it to break it up into small kernels. Since people need these foods during the festival, and they can’t be done much ahead of time (they had little means to preserve food), they may continue to work during the festival, as long as they try to be as private about it as possible. Rabbi Yose adds a fascinating note. He says that people in these professions were strict upon themselves and didn’t engage in this work at all. In other words, the previous clause’s intention was not to tell these workers that they had to do their work in private, but rather to emphasize to them that they were allowed to work." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nGenerally speaking one may not cut one’s hair/shave during the festival. This is not because cutting hair was a lot of work. Rather it was to encourage people to get a hair cut and shave before the festival, so that they would be properly groomed when the festival began. In other words, if you don’t prepare before the festival, you’re going to look disheveled the whole time.\nOur mishnah lists the exceptions to this rule those people who may get a haircut during the festival because they could not do so during the week before.\nWhen the mishnah speaks of cutting one’s hair, it also includes shaving (they would shave with scissors). There is no halakhic difference between the two. I have translated the verb that the mishnah uses as shaving.", + "And these may shave during the festival: one coming back from a trip abroad, or one coming out from a place of captivity, or coming out of prison, or one excommunicated whom the sages have released. The people in this section could not cut their hair the week before the festival for various practical reasons. 1) They came back from a trip abroad, from a place where shaving was not possible. 2) They came out of captivity, and while captives they couldn’t shave. 3) They came out of prison no cutting hair in prison. 4) They were excommunicated. A person excommunicated by the Jewish community may not shave or cut his hair until he is released from his excommunication. If any of these people did not have enough time to cut his hair before the festival, he may do so during the festival. On the other hand, if he had time to prepare for the festival and neglected to do so, then he is penalized for his lack of preparation.", + "And similarly one who asked a sage [to be released from a vow] and was released, and a nazirite or a leper on emerging from his state of impurity to his state of purification. The people in this section could not shave for religious reasons. 1) The person had taken a vow not to cut his hair. Only a sage can release someone from a vow. If the person could not find a sage who would release his vow before the festival and then found one during the festival, he is allowed to shave during the festival. When a nazirite completes his term of naziriteship and when a leper becomes pure from his leprosy they both undergo a ritual which includes cutting one’s hair and shaving. If the term of naziriteship is over during the festival or a leper’s period of impurity is completed during the festival they may shave and cut their hair then." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nFor the same reason that it is prohibited to shave/cut hair during the festival, it is also prohibited to wash one’s clothes the prohibition during the festival encourages people to wash their clothes before the festival. As was the case with yesterday’s mishnah, today’s mishnah lists the exceptions, those people who may wash their clothes because they could not have done so before the festival began.", + "These may launder [their clothes] during the festival: one coming back from a trip abroad, or one coming out from a place of captivity, or coming out of prison, or one excommunicated whom the sages have released. This is the same list that appeared in section one of yesterday’s mishnah.", + "And similarly one who asked a sage [to be released from a vow] and was released. This is the same as the beginning of the second section of yesterday’s mishnah.", + "Hand-towels, barber’s towels and bath-towels [may be laundered]. Towels which are used on a daily basis and will quickly become dirty may be laundered. “Barber’s towels” is somewhat of a strange category, considering the fact that most people should not be getting a haircut on the festival. Either this refers to towels used in cutting the hair of those few people who can get a haircut or alternatively the word for “barber” really means “books” the words are spelled the same but pronounced differently in Hebrew (sapar=barber; sefer=book). The mishnah would then refer to coverings of books, i.e Torah scrolls, which become dirty due to frequent usage. However, it seems strange to me that book coverings need to be washed with such urgency.", + "Zavim and zavot, menstruants, and women who have given birth, and anyone going from a state of purity to impurity, are permitted [to launder their clothes]. This section refers to various people who have some sort of genital emission and therefore need to wash their clothes frequently. Zavim and zavot have some sort of unusual genital emission which would dirty their clothes. They are allowed to wash their clothes because it would not be seemly to force them to go around in public with stained clothing. People who become pure on the festival need to wash their clothes (Leviticus 11:25, 28; 14: 5, 47; Numbers 19:19). They are allowed to do so during the festival since they could not control the timing of their becoming pure.", + "But everyone else is prohibited. The mishnah ends by emphasizing that other people may not launder their clothes on the festival. During the time of the mishnah laundering was heavy labor and was not done with great frequency. Hence, the festival should not be used as an opportunity to launder clothes." + ], + [ + "They may write the following documents during the festival:
Betrothal of women [documents], divorce documents and receipts, wills of a dying person, bequests and prosbols; evaluation certificates and orders for support, documents of halitzah and of repudiation [of marriage] and arbitration records; decrees of the court and correspondence.
Writing was not nearly as common of a skill in the time of the mishnah as it is now. Indeed, most people could probably not write, and if they could, they could write only simple things. Since writing was not common it was considered a professional skill. Hence it was generally forbidden on the festival. Our mishnah lists exceptions. These were allowed because they were of immediate necessity. I will explain each type of document.
Betrothal of women [documents]: This refers to all sorts of documents connected to marriage, either arranging the betrothal and its economic elements (tannaim) or a document used to effect betrothal itself. In such a document the man would write, “Behold you (or your daughter) are betrothed to me.” Note that kiddushin (betrothal) can take place during the festival, but marriage may not. Therefore, ketubot, marriage documents, are not included in this list.
Divorce documents: Gittin. This is the document that a husband writes to his wife. Divorce is permitted on the festival.
And receipts: The creditor writes to the lender stating that he has received the money. This may also refer to a case of divorce, where a woman writes a receipt to her husband upon receiving the marriage settlement (her ketubah money).
The will of a dying person: Wills, which must be written and executed while the person is alive, are obviously not something that can be put off, especially when they are written by a dying person, the case to which our mishnah refers.
Bequests: A document transferring a present from one person to another.
Prozbuls: These documents allow a person’s loans to carry through the Sabbatical year. If they are not written, then the loan is annulled in the sabbatical year.
Evaluation certificates: Documents which evaluate a debtor’s possessions so that the appropriate amount may be collected by the creditor.
And orders for support: These documents allow a widow to sell her dead husband’s property in order to provide for herself.
Documents of halitzah: Halitzah is the refusal of levirate marriage. A woman might need this document to prove that she had been released and was free to marry another man.
And of repudiation [of marriage]: A minor girl whose father has died may be married off by her mother or brother. When she reaches majority age she may repudiate the marriage and have it annulled. She would need this document to prove that she had repudiated the marriage and was allowed to marry another man without having been divorced.
And arbitration records: Certain court cases would begin by the litigants choosing judges. These records would prove which judges had been chosen.
Decrees of the court: Documents recording their decision.
And correspondence: According to the Yerushalmi’s interpretation of this clause, it refers to simple letters of correspondence. In those days sending mail would have been quite difficult. It was not always easy to find someone going to the place where one wanted to send a letter. If such a person was found on the festival one was allowed to write a letter because the opportunity would be lost later. A different (and later interpretation) is that this clause refers to letters written to the government. Only such letters are permitted on the festival because they are of a greater need than simple letters of friendship." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nMost of this mishnah continues to deal with writing on the festival.", + "They may not write loan documents during the festival; but if he [the creditor] does not trust him or he does not have food to eat, he may write. Loan documents may not be written during the festival, because one can lend money without a document, using witnesses to secure the loan. The mishnah immediately lists two major exceptions. If the creditor does not trust the borrower enough to lend him money without a document, then they may write a document. The rabbis considered it important enough for the borrower to be able to secure the loan that they allowed the document to be written during the festival. The second exception is interpreted in two different ways. The Jerusalem Talmud interprets it to refer to the borrower if the borrower needs a loan so that he can afford to eat, the document can be written. The problem with this interpretation is that if the lender trusts the borrower, then he doesn’t need a document, and if he doesn’t trust him, then the mishnah has already stated that he may write the document. Due to these difficulties, the Babylonian Talmud interprets the clause to refer to the scribe. If he needs his wages in order to eat during the festival, they may have him write the document.", + "They may not write [Torah] scrolls, tefillin and mezuzot during the festival, nor may they correct [even] a single letter, even in the [ancient] Temple-scroll. We might have thought that since Torah scrolls, tefillin and mezuzot are sacred objects, a scribe could write them during the festival. The mishnah rules otherwise even holy objects cannot be written on the festival. One cannot even fix one letter in a scroll, even in the “ancient Temple scroll,” the scroll which was kept in the Temple from which other scrolls were copied.", + "Rabbi Judah says: a man may write tefillin and mezuzot for himself. Rabbi Judah allows one to write a personal set of tefillin or a mezuzah for personal use, but he agrees with the previous opinion that a scribe may not write these documents in order to sell them. The problem, according to Rabbi Judah, is not inherent in the writing itself. The problem with writing is when it becomes a “craft” done by a professional.", + "And one may spin on his thigh the blue-wool for his fringe. The mishnah allows one to spin tzitzit (fringes on the corner of one’s garment) but only for personal usage, while the garment is resting on one’s thigh. He may not put the threads onto a spinning wheel to spin the tzitzit, the way this is normally done. Again, in order to distinguish something from the way it is done normally, the rabbis demanded it be done differently on the festival." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nFrom here until the end, Moed Katan deals with mourning practices. There is no separate tractate in the Mishnah concerning mourning so the few halakhot that the Mishnah does contain are placed here. There are probably several reasons for this. First of all, as we shall see below, the Mishnah deals with the question of mourning which occurs right before a festival. On a deeper level, the week of mourning (the shivah) and the week of the festival seem to be flipsides of the same coin. Both are seven days long, one of celebration and one of sadness. It is forbidden to do work during the festival because one is supposed to be celebrating. During shivah it is forbidden to do work because one is supposed to be mourning. Similarly, marriages are prohibited during the festival and during the shivah. There are other halakhot which are shared by both holidays.\nThe two periods of mourning mentioned in our mishnah are shivah, seven days, and shloshim, thirty days. The first period is more intense and its restrictions are more numerous than the latter. The mishnah deals with the question of a person whose period of mourning is interrupted by a festival.", + "One who buries his dead three days before a festival, the decrees of shiva are annulled from him; If one of a person’s close relatives dies at least three days before the start of a festival, the festival annuls the shivah (the seven day period of mourning). When the festival is over he will not need to complete the shivah. Today, the halakhah is that if the person’s relative dies and is buried right right before the festival, even an hour before the festival, the shivah is cancelled. However, the mishnah and earlier halakhah held that at least three days of the shivah had to be observed. If three days were not observed than the shivah continues after the festival. These three days seem to be the essential period of mourning, more critical than the rest of the shivah.", + "[One he buries his dead] eight days before a festival, the decrees of the shloshim [thirty days] are annulled from him. If he buries a close relative eight days before the festival, he has begun to observe “shloshim,” the second stage of mourning when the festival begins and the festival annuls the remainder of shloshim. This would mean that after the festival there is no more mourning at all (except in the case of a dead parent).", + "Because they [the sages] said that Shabbat counts but does not interrupt, while festivals interrupt and do not count. This section explains the rationale of the previous two sections. Shabbat counts as part of the shivah and shloshim and does not interrupt either of them. The festivals, in contrast, do not count. This means that if someone dies on the festival, the mourners do not begin mourning until after the festival, when they will have a full period of shivah and shloshim. However, the festival does interrupt, such that if someone begins mourning three days before the festival the festival will annul shivah; eight days will annul shloshim." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe festivals which most clearly put an end to shivah and shloshim are Pesah and Sukkot since they are both seven or if you include Shmini Atzeret (the last day of Sukkot), eight days long. In contrast, Shavuot, Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur last only one day. Further complicating the matter, Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur are holidays, but not actually festivals. “Festival” in Hebrew (regel) refers only to the three pilgrimage holidays Pesah, Shavuot and Sukkot, when one was supposed to visit the Temple. Due to these complications, our mishnah contains a debate over where these one day holidays are treated like Shabbat or like Pesah and Sukkot.", + "Rabbi Eliezer says: From the time the Temple was destroyed, Atzeret ( is like Shabbat. Atzeret is the word used in the Mishnah to refer to Shavuot. When the Temple still stood, Atzeret was similar to the other festivals. One who did not bring the appropriate sacrifice on Atzeret itself could bring it for the following six days. Hence, in a sense Atzeret was a seven day holiday, even though it was only fully observed for one day. When the Temple still stood, it would interrupt mourning. Once the Temple was destroyed and sacrifices could no longer be brought, Atzeret ceased being a seven day holiday and hence is treated like Shabbat when it comes to mourning.", + "Rabban Gamaliel says: Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur are like festivals. According to Rabban Gamaliel Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur are like festivals. Assumedly, his reasoning is that anything that is not Shabbat counts as a festival. He would therefore disagree with Rabbi Eliezer. Today the halakhah follows Rabban Gamaliel. Only Shabbat does not interrupt mourning.", + "The sages say: [the rule is] not according to the words of this one nor that one, rather Atzeret is like the festivals and Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur are like Shabbat. The other sages disagree with both Rabban Gamaliel and Rabbi Eliezer. The category of festivals includes all pilgrimage holidays, and even Atzeret after the destruction of the Temple. Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur are not “festivals” and hence they function like Shabbat. The sages’ opinion seems to be a literal interpretation of the last clause of yesterday’s mishnah which stated that festivals interrupt. The sages interpret this to mean only festivals and not other holidays." + ], + [ + "They do not rend [their clothes] or bare [their shoulders], or provide a meal [for the mourners] except for the relatives of the dead.
And they do not provide a meal except on an upright couch.
They do not bring [food] to the house of mourning on an [ornamental] tray, platter, or flat basket, but in plain baskets.
And they do not say the mourners’ blessing during the festival.
But they may stand in a row and comfort [the mourners] and [the mourners] may formally dismiss the community. Section one: When one heard that a close relative had died, one would rend whatever clothes they were wearing. Baring the shoulder was also a sign of mourning. The mourner was provided by the community with the first meal after the funeral. On Hol Hamoed only a close relative would perform these practices. Others would not. I should note that today only close relatives do these actions in any case. The circle of mourners was bigger in the Talmudic period. Section two: It was customary to overturn the bed during mourning and then sit on the bed as a sign of mourning. But one does not overturn the bed during Hol Hamoed. This practice fell into disuse sometime after the Talmudic period. Section three: This halakhah is true in all cases. When bringing food to the mourner, they should bring it in plain baskets. A source in the Talmud relates that originally people would use fancy silver and gold vessels, but poor people would be embarrassed that they could not afford such fancy funerals and mourning homes. As a response the rabbis decreed that everyone must bring in a simple vessel. The mourning home is not a place where one should be showing off one’s wealth. Section four: The mourners’ blessing was stated on return from burial. They would stand in a line and comfort the mourner with this blessing. It may have also been recited at other points as well. But it is a public sign of mourning and should not be done on Hol Hamoed. Section five: While the blessing is not recited on Hol Hamoed, burial is. Along with the burial, they may have the formal line of comforters that would accompany the mourners on their way home. The same goes true for the official words that the mourner seems to have said to the comforters, to allow them to go home without accompanying the mourner all the way home.
Today’s Mishnah discusses mourning practices not observed during Hol Hamoed. It is interesting to note that this Mishnah is one of the main sources of the laws of mourning. It seems, at least to me, that the Mishnah did not feel it was necessary to teach people how to mourn. People just knew what to do. The only reason they are mentioned is to let people know when not to observe these practices." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to deal with mourning practices during the festival.", + "They do not place the bier on the thruway [during the festival] so as not to encourage eulogizing. Normally, the bier, a stretcher with the body on it, would be placed on the thruway, the central road that passes through the town, so that people would have the opportunity to offer up public eulogies. Since eulogies are forbidden on the festival, the bier is not placed on the thruway.", + "And the bier of women is never [set down on the thruway] for the sake of propriety. The body of the dead person was covered only with a shroud while it was on the bier. It could become exposed. Due to the rabbis’ concerns of modesty, they did not wish the woman’s bier to be placed on the thruway even on non-festival occasions.", + "Women may raise a wail during the festival, but not clap [their hands in grief]. Rabbi Ishmael says: those that are close to the bier clap [their hands in grief]. Women played a significant role at funerals. A common role attributed to them is that of professional wailers (people who cry out loud, not those who hunt big animals in the sea). The mishnah allows them to wail during the festival, but they may not clap their hands. This seems to have been a common funerary practice. Others explain that this doesn’t refer to clapping one’s hands or slapping one’s hands on thigh but beating one’s breast. Rabbi Ishmael is more lenient and allows the women closest to the bier to also clap their hands." + ], + [ + "On Rosh Hodesh, on Hannukah and on Purim they may wail and clap [their hands in grief].
Neither on the former nor on the latter occasions may they offer a lamentation.
After the dead has been buried they neither wail nor clap [their hands in grief].
What is meant by wailing? When all wail in unison.
What is meant by a lament? When one speaks and all respond after her, as it is said: “And teach your daughters wailing and one another [each] lamentation” (Jeremiah 9:19).
But as to the future, it says: “He will destroy death forever, and the Lord God will wipe away the tears from all faces” (Isaiah 25:9).
The last mishnah in Moed Katan continues to discuss womens’ mourning practices during the festival. It concludes with a note of hope for the future, for a messianic age when God will conquer death.
Section one: Rosh Hodesh, Hannukah and Purim are semi-holidays. There are special prayers and Torah readings for all three of them, but work is not prohibited. Two of them (Hannukah and Purim) are not mentioned in the Torah and hence, their importance is less than that of the other holidays. Due to their diminished status, the women may even clap their hands in grief at a funeral. This was prohibited during the festival.
Section two: Lamenting (explained below) is forbidden on all holidays, both those mentioned in section one of this mishnah and the festivals discussed in yesterday’s mishnah.
Section three: The women are permitted to wail or clap only as long as the dead body has not been buried. Once the body is buried, both practices become forbidden.
Section four: The mishnah now defines, at least partially, wailing and lamenting. Wailing is done by all of the women simultaneously. Lamenting is done responsively, one woman speaking and the others answering after her. This is hinted at in Jeremiah who says that one woman teaches another lamentation, interpreted to mean that one woman recites the lamentation and the others repeat after her.
Section five: All of this talk about death can be depressing and scary. Indeed, it was often considered forbidden for young men to learn the third chapter of Moed Katan because all of this talk about death could bring on bad luck (the evil eye). To alleviate this distress, the tractate ends on a positive note. The current stage of humanity, where we must face the distressing possibility of mourning in the middle of the joy of a festival, will be alleviated in the messianic period, when God will conquer death.
Congratulations! We have finished Megillah.
[You probably already know what I’m going to say but I’ll say it anyway].
It is a tradition at this point to thank God for helping us finish learning the tractate and to commit ourselves to going back and relearning it, so that we may not forget it and so that its lessons will stay with us for all of our lives.
Most of Moed Katan was about the laws of the festival. These laws are fascinating (at least to me) because they are grayer, more ambiguous, than the prohibitions in effect on Shabbat and Yom Tov. Some activities are generally prohibited but are allowed under extenuating circumstances, unlike Shabbat where any given labor is basically always prohibited. When I think of the laws of the Moed (the festival), I think of a sort of mathematical equation which we would need to perform before determining whether a labor is permitted or forbidden. There are several factors that might lead to something being permitted/forbidden. For instance, will not doing the work cause a significant financial loss? Could the work have been done before the festival? Is it strenuous? Did the person plan on working on the festival? Is it being done in the normal fashion? Only when we know the answers to these questions can we decide whether the work is permitted.
Today, many of these laws are neglected. In our busy modern economies it is hard enough to take off of work for Yom Tov (the first and last days of the festival), let alone for the rest of the festival. Many of these halakhot are basically no longer observed because any cessation of work causes a “grave financial loss.” While this may be to a certain extent true, I think we should keep in mind that the rabbis wanted to preserve the character of the festival by turning it into a celebratory vacation. Rejoicing is one of the main obligations on the festival and its much easier to party when you’re not working.
As always, congratulations on learning another tractate of Mishnah. One more tractate to go and we’ll have finished Moed, and half of the Mishnah! Hard to believe. Tomorrow we start Hagigah." + ] + ] + ] + }, + "versions": [ + [ + "Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp", + "http://learn.conservativeyeshiva.org/mishnah/" + ] + ], + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה מועד קטן", + "categories": [ + "Mishnah", + "Modern Commentary on Mishnah", + "English Explanation of Mishnah", + "Seder Moed" + ], + "schema": { + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה מועד קטן", + "enTitle": "English Explanation of Mishnah Moed Katan", + "key": "English Explanation of Mishnah Moed Katan", + "nodes": [ + { + "heTitle": "הקדמה", + "enTitle": "Introduction" + }, + { + "heTitle": "", + "enTitle": "" + } + ] + } +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Moed/English Explanation of Mishnah Pesachim/English/Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp.json b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Moed/English Explanation of Mishnah Pesachim/English/Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..514eeb10e0d4834f9a17ed5d700ae4d6599b0a72 --- /dev/null +++ b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Moed/English Explanation of Mishnah Pesachim/English/Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp.json @@ -0,0 +1,586 @@ +{ + "language": "en", + "title": "English Explanation of Mishnah Pesachim", + "versionSource": "http://learn.conservativeyeshiva.org/mishnah/", + "versionTitle": "Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp", + "status": "locked", + "license": "CC-BY", + "shortVersionTitle": "Dr. Joshua Kulp", + "actualLanguage": "en", + "languageFamilyName": "english", + "isBaseText": true, + "isSource": true, + "isPrimary": true, + "direction": "ltr", + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה פסחים", + "categories": [ + "Mishnah", + "Modern Commentary on Mishnah", + "English Explanation of Mishnah", + "Seder Moed" + ], + "text": { + "Introduction": [ + "Tractate Pesahim can basically be broken down into three sections. The first four chapters deal with laws concerning the removal of leaven (chametz). However, there are many digressions in these chapters, and the fourth chapter really goes on to discuss many different subjects. The next five chapters deal with the passover sacrifice. The final chapter contains instructions for the seder (although this word is not used until the post-Talmudic period.) Due to the continued importance of the seder to Jews of all generations, I will give a separate introduction when we begin to learn the tenth chapter of our tractate. ", + "The Passover holiday was obviously a central pilgrimage festival when the Temple still stood, although in reality more Jews may have come to Jerusalem during Sukkot than during Passover. What is unique though about Pesach is the combination of a home and Temple holiday. While the paschal lamb was slaughtered in the Temple, it was not consumed by the priests but rather by groups of Jews called “havurot”—fellowship groups. This lamb, shared by all, was a symbol of redemption from Egypt, of God’s protection in the past and a continued sign of God’s providence. Throughout history, the lamb and the entire story of the Exodus continued to capture the imagination of Jews and many other groups (Christians, Americans etc.) in their attempt to connect history to the future. Furthermore, the story of the Exodus has been the model for people hoping for their freedom for three thousand years. It was the model for those who founded the United States of America, and 100 years later by black slaves fighting for their freedom. It is a timeless message, one whose impact has not been dulled and never will as long as there are enslaved and oppressed people anywhere in the world. \n" + ], + "": [ + [ + [ + "Introduction\nAs do several tractates, Pesahim begins chronologically with the events that lead up to the beginning of Pesah namely checking the house to make sure there is no chametz on the night before Pesah. As many of you know, this is still a custom today. Even though most Jews have thoroughly checked their homes for chametz and removed (or put it away to be sold no one sold their chametz in mishnaic and talmudic times) they still ritually check the home with a candle, or perhaps a flashlight, and remove any chametz found on the search.", + "On the evening of the fourteenth [of Nissan] they search they house for chametz by the light of a lamp. The house is to be thoroughly searched for chametz the evening before the fourteenth of Nissan, the day on which the chametz must be destroyed. In rabbinic times, a lamp was considered the most effective means by which to search the corners of the house, the nooks and crannies, the cracks and crevices to discover hidden chametz. Their houses were obviously less lit than ours and they had fewer windows. Candlelight would, at least according to the Mishnan, have been most effective. Furthermore, at night most people are home from work and can participate in searching for the chametz. Finally, we would do well to remember that people kept far less food in their homes and generally had far simpler material lives than we do now. It may just be that they didn’t even need to begin cleaning at all until the evening before Pesah. Ahh, the good old days!", + "Every place into which chametz is not brought does not require searching, There is no need to check places into which chametz is never or almost never brought.", + "So why did they rule: two rows of the wine cellar [must be searched]? [This is actually] a place into which chametz might be taken. The mishnah raises a difficulty with the previous statement. There is an older mishnah according to which two rows of the wine cellar must be searched. We would think that the wine cellar is a place into which chametz is not brought and therefore there is no need for it to be searched. The mishnah answers that this older mishnah refers to a cellar into which chametz actually is brought.", + "Bet Shammai say: two rows over the front of the whole cellar; But Bet Hillel say: the two outer rows, which are the uppermost. In the final section of the mishnah, Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel debate how much of the wine cellar must be searched. There are two interpretations to this debate in the Talmud. According to the first interpretation, Bet Shammai says that they search the entire first row, from ceiling to floor and the row behind it. Both these rows are checked from wall to wall. According to the second interpretation, the two rows are perpendicular to each other the top row and the row next to the entrance. The sages also debate the interpretation of Bet Hillel. Some explain that according to Bet Hillel they check the top two rows, whereas others hold that they check the top row and the one behind it." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues yesterday’s mishnah in which we learned that they need not check places into which chametz is not brought.", + "They need not fear that a weasel may have dragged [chametz] from one room to another or from one place to another, for if so, [they must also fear] from courtyard to courtyard and from town to town, and there would be no end to the matter. There are two basic explanations to this mishnah. Some explain that once a room has been searched for chametz, they need not recheck the room lest a weasel dragged chametz into it after it had been searched. [In my house, my 1 ½ year old son is our little weasel, dragging chametz all over the place. Since I know he does this and I see him do it, I do check.] The Rambam explains that they need not check a room into which chametz is not brought, lest a weasel brought chametz into there. If we were to have such fears, they would never end and there would be no meaning to the statement in yesterday’s mishnah that we need not check a place into which chametz is not brought. Alternatively, even once a room had been checked, it would have to be constantly rechecked lest a weasel had dragged chametz into there." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to prescribe when the house must be searched for chametz.", + "Rabbi Judah says: they search on the evening of the fourteenth and in the morning of the fourteenth, and at the time of destroying. According to the simple interpretation of Rabbi Judah’s opinion, he seems to require that the house be searched three times, once in the evening (as we learned in mishnah one), once in the morning and once at “the time of destroying”. The “time of destroying” is the fifth hour of the 14th of Nissan (in the evening Pesah will begin), at which time all chametz must be destroyed. However, in the Talmud there is an explanation that according to Rabbi Judah one need check only once either in the evening, in the morning or at the time of destroying. If one has not searched by this time, Rabbi Judah says another search should not be done later, lest he comes to find the chametz and eat it. In other words, it is safer not to know about the chametz at all then to find it.", + "But the sages say: if he did not search in the evening of the fourteenth he must search on the fourteenth; if he did not search in [the morning of] the fourteenth, he must search during the festival; if he did not search during the festival, he must search after the festival. The sages hold that it is preferable to search in the evening as we learned in the first mishnah above. However, if he did not search in the evening then he may search later, even during the festival itself. Ultimately, if he has not searched the house during Pesah itself, he must search afterwards since it is forbidden for a Jew to derive any benefit from any chametz that a Jew owned during Pesah. He must search lest there is some chametz that was in his possession during Pesah in order to prevent him from using this chametz after Pesah.", + "And what he leaves over he must put away in a hidden place, so that he should not need searching after it. If he finds chametz during his search, he should put it away discreetly until he burns it the following morning. Were he to leave it out and then later notice that some of it was missing, he would have to perform another search." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nAfter having discussed the search for chametz, the Mishnah begins to discuss burning the chametz, the most common and preferred way of destroying it.\nAll of the sages agree that from the seventh hour and onwards (daylight was divided into twelve hours, so the seventh hour is roughly speaking 1 PM, but would change depending on latitude and time of year) it is forbidden to eat or possess chametz. This is derived from Exodus 12:15 which says that one must destroy the chametz “on the first day” the first day is interpreted to be the 14th of Nissan, the day on which the Pesah lamb is sacrificed. Chametz is forbidden from the beginning of the seventh hour of that day because it is at this time that the Pesah sacrifice may be brought, and Exodus 34:25 (“You shall not offer the blood of My sacrifice with anything leavened”) is interpreted as prohibiting the offering of the Pesah sacrifice while one is in possession of chametz.\nIn our mishnah Rabbi Judah and Rabbi Meir dispute how much earlier than the seventh hour one must cease from eating chametz. They both agree, however, that the chametz is burned at the beginning of the sixth hour.", + "Rabbi Meir says: one may eat [chametz] the whole of the five [hours] and must burn [it] at the beginning of the sixth. According to Rabbi Meir, through the fifth hour one may continue to eat chametz. So if daylight began at we call 6 AM and the daylight hours were equal to the hours of darkness, then one could eat chametz until 11 AM. At the beginning of the sixth hour they must begin to burn the chametz, since from the seventh hour and onwards it is prohibited from the Torah to eat it. Rabbi Meir gives a one hour cushion in order to prevent people from erring and accidentally eating chametz after the Torah has already prohibited it. The cushion is necessary because it is difficult to determine precisely when the sun has completed its rising and has begun to set.", + "Rabbi Judah says: one may eat the whole of the four [hours], suspend it the whole of the fifth, and must burn it at the beginning of the sixth. Rabbi Judah provides an even larger cushion between the time when it is prohibited to eat chametz and the time when this prohibition becomes toraitic. Although the prohibition is only toraitic from the seventh hour and onwards, he says that after four hours it is forbidden to eat chametz. Rabbi Judah agrees with Rabbi Meir that the chametz need not be burned until the sixth hour. During the fifth hour it is “suspended” meaning it is neither eaten nor burned. One may still derive benefit from the chametz at this time; for instance one may feed it to animals. According to the Talmud the extra hour of cushion was because it was difficult to determine the precise time on a cloudy day (and in Israel there are still clouds during Pesah)." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to deal with the time when chametz is burned.", + "Rabbi Judah further said: two unfit loaves of thanksgiving used to lie on the roof of the [Temple] portico: as long as they lay [there] all the people would eat [chametz]. When one was removed, they would keep it in suspense, neither eating nor burning [it]. When both were removed, all the people began to burn [their chametz]. Rabbi Judah relates that in the Temple they made a sign which would let the people know until what time they could eat the chametz. They would put their two loaves of bread which were used in the thanksgiving offering (see Leviticus 7:13). They would use only loaves which were unfit for use (for instance, the time in which they could be eaten had passed), because they wouldn’t take fit loaves and leave them there to intentionally render them inedible. The rest is simple: the loaves were left there until the beginning of the fourth hour, the time until which Rabbi Judah holds one can eat chametz. When one was removed at the beginning of the fifth hour, they would cease eating their chametz, but not yet burn it. When the second was removed, they would begin to burn their chametz at the beginning of the sixth hour.", + "Rabban Gamaliel says: non-sacred chametz may be eaten the whole of the four [hours] and terumah the whole of the five [hours] and they burn [them] at the beginning of the sixth [hour]. Rabban Gamaliel presents an opinion which lies somewhere between that of Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Judah from the previous mishnah. Rabban Gamaliel agrees with Rabbi Judah that non-sacred chametz, i.e. chametz which was not terumah, can only be eaten through the fourth hour. However, he holds that terumah may be eaten through the end of the fifth hour. This is to try to prevent as much as possible the need to burn terumah, which according to halakhah should not be burnt unnecessarily. Rabban Gamaliel agrees that they burn all of the chametz in the sixth hour." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with burning impure sacrificial meat of a low degree of impurity with impure sacrificial meat of a higher degree of impurity, a potential problem since it causes the less impure meat to become more impure. The mishnah is brought here because of the mishnah which follows it, which deals with burning unclean chametz with clean chametz.", + "Rabbi Hanina the vice-chief of the priests said: during all of the days of the priests they never refrained from burning [sacrificial] meat which had been defiled by an offspring of uncleanness with meat which had been defiled by a father of uncleanness, even though they add uncleanness to its uncleanness. Rabbi Hanina, a rabbi who served in the Temple, testifies that the priests did not refrain from burning meat which had become unclean with other meat that had become unclean, even if the levels of uncleanness were different. When what is called a “father of uncleanness” (av hatuma) comes into contact with something that is receptive to impurity it renders it impure in the first degree; something impure in the first degree renders that which it comes into contact with impure in the second degree, and so on (up to four degrees). Everything besides the “father of uncleanness” is called an “offspring of uncleanness”. Meat which has come into contact with an “offspring” is at most impure in the second degree, since the “offspring can be no higher than a first degree. This meat is nevertheless rendered ineffective as a sacrifice. Rabbi Hanina teaches that they would burn this type of meat with meat that had come into contact with a “father of impurity”, even though this meat was of first degree uncleanness and hence it would add to the uncleanness of the other meat by making it of second degree uncleanness. Since both pieces of meat were impure in any case, they did not refrain from burning them together.", + "Rabbi Akiva added and said: during [all] the days of the priests they did not refrain from lighting oil which had been rendered unclean by a tevul yom in a lamp which had been made unclean by one who had contracted corpse impurity, even though they add uncleanness to its uncleanness. Rabbi Akiva adds that the same halakhah is also true with regard to oil. A “tevul yom” is someone who was impure, immersed in a mikveh but because the sun has not set, thereby ending the day, he is still impure. Until the sun sets he is considered to be of second degree impurity. If he comes into contact with oil that is terumah he renders it of third degree impurity. Rabbi Akiva teaches that this oil may be put into a lamp that is of first degree impurity, because it (the lamp) had been in contact with someone who had contracted corpse impurity (the corpse is the “granddaddy of all uncleanness, and one who comes into contact with a corpse is a “father of uncleanness). The lamp renders the oil of second degree impurity, bumping it up one level." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn today’s mishnah Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yose argue over whether we may draw an analogy between the cases in the previous mishnah (burning together meats and oils of differing degrees of impurity) and the case of burning together clean and unclean terumah chametz on the eve of Pesah.", + "Rabbi Meir said: from their words we learn that we may burn clean terumah together with unclean terumah on Pesah. Rabbi Meir draws an analogy between the cases presented in yesterday’s mishnah and the case of burning impure terumah chametz with pure terumah chametz before Pesah. The analogy is that in both cases it is permitted to increase levels of impurity in the process of burning something in order to get rid of it.", + "Rabbi Yose said: that is not a [proper] analogy. Rabbi Yose says that this is poor analogy. In the cases in yesterday’s mishnah the meat or oil was already impure and the only issue was increasing its level of impurity. In the case of pure and impure terumah chametz we are talking about something pure. Therefore, they must burn both separately.", + "And Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Joshua agree that each is burnt separately. Concerning what do they disagree? In respect of doubtful [terumah] and unclean [terumah]: Rabbi Eliezer says: each is burnt separately But Rabbi Joshua rules: both together. Rabbi Yose continues to point out that both Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Eliezer agree that impure and pure terumah are not burnt together. And if the two of them agree, then Rabbi Meir’s conclusion must be wrong. Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Joshua disagreed only concerning the burning of doubtfully impure terumah with pure terumah. Rabbi Eliezer is strict and rules that both must still be burnt separately, whereas Rabbi Joshua rules that since one is only doubtfully impure it may be burned with terumah that is certainly impure." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThe second chapter continues chronologically where the first chapter left off with rules concerning the removal of chametz.", + "Any hour in which one is permitted to eat [chametz], one may feed it to cattle, beasts and birds, and one may sell it to a gentile, and benefit from it is permitted. When its time has passed benefit from it is forbidden, and he may not [even] fire an oven or a stove with it. As long as one may eat chametz on the day before Pesah, one may still derive benefit from it (see 1:4). This mishnah is opposed to Rabbi Judah’s opinion above in 1:4, where he states that during the fifth hour it is forbidden to eat chametz, but it is still permitted to derive benefit from it. The mishnah lists two of the most common ways to derive benefit from a food item without eating it giving it to animals and selling it to non-Jews. Once the time has passed, he may derive no benefit from the chametz. Even while he is burning it in order to destroy it, he may not put it in an oven or stove to use it as fuel. In other words, he must burn it in such a way that he derives no benefit.", + "Rabbi Judah says: there is no removal of chametz except by burning; But the sages say: he may also crumble it and throw it to the wind or cast it into the sea. In this section the rabbis dispute how chametz is to be removed in order to fulfill the commandment found in Exodus 12:15, “you shall remove leaven from your house.” According to Rabbi Judah the chametz must be burned. This is how he interprets the word “remove” in the verse. The sages are more flexible and accept other means by which to remove/destroy the chametz casting it into the sea or by crumbling it up and throwing it into the wind. The important thing is that he not be able to recover the chametz and eat it, or even possess it." + ], + [ + "Introduction This mishnah and tomorrow’s mishnah complete the chronologically ordered discussion about removing chametz. (In chapter three the mishnah will discuss what exactly chametz is, and which chametz must be removed.) While we were previously discussing the day before Pesah, these mishnayot skip ahead until after Pesah and rule what is to be done with chametz that was not destroyed before Pesah.", + "Chametz which belongs to a gentile over which Pesach has passed is permitted for benefit; A Jew may eat chametz that a gentile owned on Pesah since there is no prohibition for a gentile to own chametz on Pesah. The phrase “over which Pesah has passed” means that the chametz existed during Pesah.", + "But that of an Israelite is forbidden for benefit, as it is said, “No leavened bread shall be found with you.” However, a Jew may not eat or derive any benefit from chametz that any Jew (himself or other) owned over Pesah. Practically this is a very significant issue in the modern world. If a store owned by a Jew does not either get rid of or sell its chametz before Pesah a Jew may not eat that chametz even after Pesah. In Israel restaurants and food stores hang up signs which guarantee that they have sold their chametz before Pesah. The midrash at the end of this mishnah presents the prohibition for possessing chametz. According to the Talmud, since the Jew did not get rid of his chametz before Pesah, he is punished and it becomes forbidden for him or any other Jew to derive benefit from it every again." + ], + [ + "Introduction The first section of this mishnah discusses chametz which was used to secure a loan. The second half deals with chametz upon which a large pile of stones has fallen.", + "If a gentile lent [money] to an Israelite on his chametz, after Pesah it is permitted for use. A gentile lent money to a Jew and the Jew used his chametz as a collateral to secure the loan. According to the Talmud, the Jew said to the non-Jew, “If I don’t come [to claim my chametz] before Pesach it is sold to you.” In such a case, the chametz belongs fully to the non-Jew when Pesach arrives and therefore a Jew may benefit from it after Pesach has passed.", + "But if an Israelite lent [money] to a gentile on his chametz, after Pesah it is prohibited for use. This is the opposite case a Jew lent money to a gentile before Pesach and the gentile used his chametz as collateral for the loan. He said to the Jew, “If I don’t come [to claim my chametz] before Pesach it is sold to you.” When Pesach comes this chametz fully belongs to the Jew. Therefore, a Jew may not derive any benefit from it after Pesach.", + "If ruins fell on chametz it is as if it is has been removed. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: provided that a dog cannot search it out. Chametz which is totally inaccessible because a large pile of stones have fallen on it, need not be removed from a person’s property before Pesach. This is because the owner of the property does not consider this to be his chametz anymore, and indeed it is highly unlikely that he will ever again have access to it. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel clarifies that in order for chametz upon which ruins have fallen to be considered destroyed, it has to be buried deep enough that a dog wouldn’t search after it. According to the Talmud, this is three handbreadths deep." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with a non-priest who eats on Pesah terumah which is also chametz. The case is either one in which before Pesah he separated terumah from his chametz or that he separated terumah from his matzah on Pesah and it became chametz.", + "One who unwittingly eats terumah chametz on Pesah must repay [to a priest] the principal plus a fifth. If he eats this terumah chametz unwittingly, he is liable for what one is normally liable to pay when a non-priest eats terumah. He must repay the value of the terumah and an added fifth to a priest (see Leviticus 22:14). Even though it was forbidden for him to derive benefit from the chametz on Pesah and therefore it is as if the chametz is not worth anything, still he makes restitution based on the size of the terumah that he ate and not its monetary value. The chametz may not have any value but it has size.", + "Intentionally, he is exempt from payment and from [liability for] its value as fuel. Normally speaking, when not Pesah, one who intentionally eats terumah is liable to repay the value of the terumah which he ate. He is treated like a robber, who pays the value of that which he robbed. Since the chametz terumah is worthless on Pesah a Jew cannot derive any benefit from it he is not liable for anything. The mishnah goes on to say he is not even liable for the value of the terumah chametz had it been used as fuel, since on Pesah not only is eating the chametz prohibited, but deriving any benefit from it is as well." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah lists those types of grains with which one can make the obligatory matzah on Pesah. There is a duel function to this list anything which can be used to make matzah can also become chametz. Hence, this mishnah also indirectly teaches us which types of grain must be removed before Pesah.", + "These are the things with which they fulfill their obligation on Pesah: with wheat, with barley, with spelt, with rye, and with oats. This is the list of grains from which one may make the obligatory matzah. Note that rice is not on the list. According to the mishnah, matzah may not be made out of rice nor does rice become chametz.", + "And they fulfill [the obligation] with demai, with first tithe whose terumah has been separated, and with second tithe or sanctified property which have been redeemed; We have encountered this list on several occasions already (Shabbat 18:1; Eruvin 3:2; Sanhedrin 8:2; Makkot 3:2). It is basically a list of foods which can be eaten, at least according to toraitic law. The opposite is in section four those foods are prohibited and hence one cannot use them to fulfill the obligation to eat matzah.", + "And priests [can fulfill their obligation] with hallah and terumah. Hallah (which a person must separate when he makes dough) and terumah are given to the priest, who may use them to make his matzah. A non-priest cannot eat them and hence cannot use them for matzah.", + "But not with untithed produce, nor with first tithe whose terumah has not been separated, nor with second tithe or sanctified property which have not been redeemed. The opposite list of that in section two.", + "Loaves of the thanksgiving offering and the wafers of a nazirite: If he made them for himself, they cannot fulfill [their obligation] with them; If he made them to sell in the market, they can fulfill [their obligation] with them. These loaves and wafers are not chametz and hence might potentially be usable for matzah. The mishnah rules that if he made them for his own personal use then they are already sanctified and one cannot use them for matzah. In other words, although they physically fulfill the requirements of matzah, since they were sanctified for another use they cannot count also as matzah on Pesah. However, if he is a merchant and made them to sell to those who need to bring sacrifices, then they have not yet become sanctified and they may be used as obligatory matzah on Pesah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nSince we learned in yesterday’s mishnah what grains one can use for matzah, today we learn what vegetables one can use for bitter herbs (marror).\nAs an aside, I will add a rare practical halakhic issue. Horseradish is not one of the vegetables on this list. Horseradish is not native to the land of Israel. It was introduced as “bitter herbs” in Europe where the herbs listed in the Mishnah did not grow, or were exceedingly difficult to cultivate. The most commonly used and acceptable “bitter herb” today is Romaine lettuce. Most people (I shall not name names, but some of them share my last name) complain to me that lettuce isn’t bitter so how can we use it for “bitter herbs”. They are correct through thousands of years of cultivation we have managed to take the bitter taste out of most lettuces. A potential solution which many people do is to mix some horseradish with their lettuce. In any case, I urge you to use lettuce on Pesah and not exclusively horseradish.\nFinally, I am not a botanist. I don’t pretend to know exactly what most of these vegetables look or taste like. I have relied on Yehudah Felix’s article in the Encyclopedia Judaica and on Albeck’s commentary for my translation and interpretation.", + "And these are the herbs with which one discharges his obligation on Pesah: with lettuce [hazaret]; with chicory [olshin]; with wild chicory [tamkah]; with picridium [harhavina], and with sonchus [maror]. Concerning all of these, Yehudah Felix (Encyclopedia Judaica, entry Bitter Herbs) writes: “The rabbis included under merorim plants whose common features are: “bitterness, possessing sap, with a grayish appearance” (Pes. 39a), meaning wild or cultivated vegetables, with leaves of a silvery-grayish-green color, that have a milk-like sap and leaves with a bitter taste.” In his commentary on Exodus 12:8, “They shall eat it roasted over the fire, with unleavened bread and bitter herbs”, Nahum Sarna (JPS Commentary: Exodus, 55) writes, “Hebrew merorim (sing. maror) is a generic term and probably referred originally to the kind of pungent condiment with which pastoral nomads habitually season their meals of roasted flesh.”", + "They fulfill their obligation whether they are moist or dry, but not preserved [in vinegar], nor stewed nor boiled. The vegetables may be dry, but moist would be better. The Talmud says that only the stalks may be dry the leaves must be fresh. However, they cannot be cooked or preserved, which is usually considered to be akin to cooking.", + "And they combine to the size of an olive. On Pesah one must eat an olive’s worth of maror. The mishnah teaches that one can combine them to equal an olive’s worth, eating half an olive’s worth of one kind and half an olive’s worth of another.", + "And they fulfill their obligation with their stalk[s]. The leaves and stalks count toward fulfilling one’s obligation.", + "And with demai, and with first tithe from which terumah has been separated, and second tithe and sacred property which have been redeemed. This is the same list as found in section two of yesterday’s mishnah. Notice that the mishnah does not even have to list those things with which one cannot fulfill one’s obligation, because they are the same as section four in yesterday’s mishnah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah returns to discussing the prohibition of chametz on Pesah.", + "All three sections of this mishnah teach that one must avoid letting grains come into contact with water on Pesah because this allows them to turn into chametz. We should note that today religious Jews do not keep grain in their possession on Pesah, nor do they bake matzot during Pesah. In the time of the Talmud Jews did not get rid of dry grains, grains which had not yet become chametz and when they needed to, they did bake matzah on Pesah. This mishnah deals with what one may do and not do with grain on Pesah.", + "One may not soak bran for fowls, but one may scald it. Soaking bran will lead it to become chametz. However, putting it in boiling water will not cause it to become chametz because the hot water arrests the leavening process.", + "A woman may not soak bran to take with her to the bathhouse, but she may rub dry [bran] on her skin . Soaked bran was used by women to cleanse their skin in the bathhouse. She may not soak the bran before she goes to the bathhouse because that will cause it to become chametz. However, she may rub dry bran directly on her skin even though her skin is moist.", + "And a man may not chew wheat and place it on his wound, because it turns into chametz. Chewed wheat was used as a salve for wounds. When he chews it he gets the wheat wet, thereby making it likely to become chametz. Hence, this is forbidden. On a small note concerning gender, it is interesting that men are wounded and women go to the bathhouse." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah contains three more prohibited mixtures, two of which deal with chametz.", + "One may not put flour into haroset or into mustard; “Haroset” is a mixture of fruit and wine or wine vinegar and it was customary to put flour in it as well. However, on Pesah it is forbidden to put flour in it because the wine or wine vinegar will cause it to become chametz. Mustard is also made with vinegar and therefore it is also forbidden to put flour into it.", + "And if he did put [it], it must be eaten immediately; But Rabbi Meir forbids [it]. If he nevertheless did put flour into either mustard or haroset, he must eat it immediately so that it doesn’t become chametz. Rabbi Meir, however, holds that it becomes chametz immediately and therefore one cannot eat it.", + "One may not boil the Pesah sacrifice, neither in liquids nor in fruit juice but one may baste and dip it in them. Exodus 12:9 forbids eating the Pesach sacrifice if it has been boiled. Our mishnah adds that this prohibition holds true for all liquids, water and fruit juices the sacrifice may not be boiled in any liquid. However, it is not prohibited to baste the sacrifice with liquids such as wine or oil while it is roasting and one can dip the meat in liquids after the roasting is complete. Perhaps the reason that this section is here is that above we dealt with Exodus 12:8 and here we deal with Exodus 12:9. Alternatively, since the previous sections and the following one deal with juices, this halakhah is brought here.", + "The water used by a baker must be poured out, because it causes leavening. While baking matzah, the baker will dip his fingers in water to keep them moist. The water bowl into which he dips his fingers must be dumped out so that the flour in it doesn’t turn into chametz. It should be dumped out somewhere where it will not gather in one place so that it doesn’t turn into chametz on the ground." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah provides two lists: one of food items which have small amounts of chametz mixed into them, and the other a list of non-food items which are made from dough. It is forbidden to eat or to possess any of the things on this list. However, one who does so is not subject to the full punishment of “karet” (extirpation), the punishment given for eating plain, non-mixed and edible chametz on Pesah (see Exodus 12:15). The reason that the punishment is less is that these are either not fully chametz but rather mixtures, or if they are fully chametz they are not generally edible or considered to be food.", + "These must be removed on Pesah:
Babylonian kutah, Medean beer, Idumean vinegar, Egyptian zitom, Babylonian kutah is a mixture of curds, crumbs and salt. Medean beer (the word in Hebrew for beer just means a strong drink) has barley in it, as does Idumean vinegar and Egyptian zitom (another strong drink). All of these things are foods which must be removed from one’s possession before Pesach because they contain in them grains which have turned into chametz. It is curious to me that the mishnah lists only foreign products. Indeed, these are four of the empires that ruled over Israel: Babylonia, Medea (Persia), Edom (Rome) and Egypt. However, Greece usually appears in this list and Egypt does not.", + "The dyer’s pulp, cook’s dough, and the scribes’ paste. Dyer’s broth has bran in it, probably as a thickener. Cook’s dough is dough that is used to soak up the extra, dirty liquid from cooking pots. Scribe’s paste was used to glue parts of parchments together. None of these three things is intended to be used as food and indeed they all probably taste terrible. Nevertheless, since they all do have chametz in them they must be removed before Pesach.", + "Rabbi Eliezer says: women’s ornaments too. Rabbi Eliezer adds women’s ornaments, which are made with mixtures of chametz. The Talmud understands this as referring to various salves and not to jewelry.", + "This is the general rule: whatever is of a species of grain must be removed on Pesah. These are subject to a warning but they do not involve karet. The mishnah now provides two general rules, rules which I explained in my introduction. The first is that anything that has in it grain, even if that grain is only in a mixture with other non-grain items, must be removed from one’s possession on Pesah. The second one is that one is not liable for karet for eating or possessing things that are not fully chametz i.e. foods which are not in a mixture with other things. However, they are still prohibited." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nMost of this mishnah deals with dough which is found in the crevices of a kneading trough and whether or not one must remove this dough on Pesach. The final clause of the mishnah deals with dough that may or not have already begun to become chametz.", + "[With regard to] the dough in the cracks of the kneading trough: if there is as much as an olive in one place, he must remove [it]; but if not, it is nullified through the smallness of its quantity. With regard to removing the dough from the cracks of the kneading trough, it all depends on whether or not there is an olive’s worth of dough in one place. If there is, then he must remove it; but if not the dough is considered as if it doesn’t exist and he need not bother removing it.", + "And it is likewise in the matter of uncleanness: if he objects to it, it makes a break; but if he desires its preservation, it is like the kneading-trough. There is a similar rule with regard to uncleanness, but the rule is actually different. With regard to uncleanness the issue is whether or not the dough is an essential and desired part of the kneading trough. If the dough is an essential part of the trough, then if a sheretz (an impure creeping thing) touches the dough the entire trough is impure, even if though the sheretz didn’t touch the trough itself. If the dough is not an essential part of the trough, then only the dough is impure and the rest of the trough remains pure. The mishnah says that the dough’s being an essential part of the trough hinges on the desire of its owner. If the owner wishes the dough to remain there because it is helping to fill a gap in the trough (functioning like plaster), then it is part of the trough and does not stop the uncleanness from spreading. If the owner wants it to be removed, it does break the uncleanness; only the dough is impure and not the trough.", + "[With regard to] “deaf” dough, if there is [a dough] similar to it which has become chametz, it is forbidden. Dough is here compared to a deaf person. When one talks to a deaf person (they didn’t have sign language back then) the deaf person doesn’t get up to respond. So too, this “deaf” dough does not seem to be “getting up” meaning it doesn’t seem to be rising. The mishnah says that if other dough that was kneaded with it is rising, then the deaf dough must also be chametz and it needs to be removed. If not, then the deaf dough is not chametz and need not be removed before Pesah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses a halakhic quandary. In order to understand it we need to first mention some background halakhot.\n1) When one prepares dough there is a mitzvah to separate some dough. This separated dough is called hallah (Numbers 15:20). If the dough is ritually clean it is given to a Kohen; if it is ritually unclean it cannot be eaten and must be burned.\n2) On Pesah all dough needs to be baked immediately lest it become chametz.\n3) On festivals one is allowed to cook food, but one is not allowed to cook food which cannot be eaten.\n4) One is not allowed to burn sacred things in order to remove them on a festival. This includes challah, which is considered sacred.\nThe problem then is what to do with baking unclean hallah on one of the festival days of Pesah. If she bakes it then she may be transgressing the laws of the festival which allows one to cook only food which can be eaten. The unclean hallah cannot be eaten so it can’t be baked. She can’t burn it either. If she just leaves it, it will ferment and become chametz.\nIn our mishnah the rabbis debate what to do with this dough.", + "How do they separate hallah on the festival [from dough which is] in [a state of] uncleanness?
Rabbi Eliezer says: she should not call it [hallah] until it is baked. Rabbi Eliezer tries to find a means to avoid the problem. Usually, one separates and designates dough as hallah while it is still dough, before it is baked. In this case, to avoid the problem, what the woman baking the dough should do is not designate which piece will be hallah until after it has been baked. In this way, while the loaves are being baked, we could point to each loaf and say, “this one will not be hallah.” After it has already been cooked we need not be concerned about it becoming chametz. In the evening, she may burn the unclean hallah.", + "Rabbi Judah ben Batera says: she should put [the dough] into cold water. Rabbi Judah ben Batera comes up with a different solution. Separate the hallah when it is still dough, but instead of baking it put it in cold water. The cold water will arrest the fermentation process.", + "Rabbi Joshua said: this is not the chametz concerning which we are warned with, “It shall not be seen”, and “It shall not be found”. Rather she separates it and leaves it until the evening, and if it ferments it ferments. Rabbi Joshua rejects both of the previous solutions and rather says that she should separate the dough and if it becomes chametz then it becomes chametz. There is no need to be concerned that this is a transgression. The Torah’s prohibitions “It (chametz) shall not be seen” (Exodus 13:7) and “It shall not be found” (Exodus 12:19) do not apply to this chametz because it doesn’t belong to its owners anymore. From the minute she separates it to make it challah it already belongs to the kohen." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with how people should bake matzot on Pesah to avoid them becoming chametz. The mishnah reflects a reality in which several women shared one oven for baking bread/matzah.\nWe should note that today no one bakes matzah on Pesah. All matzah is baked before Pesah in order to avoid the risk of the dough becoming chametz.", + "Rabban Gamaliel says: three women may knead at the same time and bake in one oven, one after the other. Rabban Gamaliel says that three women may knead dough simultaneously and then use the same oven, even though the dough of one woman will have to wait while the dough of the other two women is baking. Rabban Gamaliel does not think that the dough will turn into chametz in this short amount of time.", + "But the sages say: three women may be engaged with the dough at the same time: one kneads, one shapes and one bakes. The sages disagree and think that if one batch of dough has to wait while the other two bake, it is likely that it will turn into chametz. What the women should do is set up an assembly line, one woman will knead, one woman will shape the dough and one woman will bake. If they time it correctly then no one will have to wait to bake their bread.", + "Rabbi Akiba says: not all women and not all kinds of wood and not all ovens are alike. Rabbi Akiva says it is impossible to a hard and fast rule since some women prepare bread faster than others, some wood makes ovens hotter than others and some ovens cook faster than others.", + "This is the general principle: if it [the dough] rises, she should slap it with [hands dipped in] cold water. Some commentators explain that this section is a continuation of Rabbi Akiva’s statement but I believe that it is an independent statement. All of the rabbis agree that if the woman begins to see signs of the dough turning into chametz what she should do is slap it with cold water to arrest the fermentation process." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with how one can tell when a piece of dough has started to become chametz.", + "Si’ur must be burnt, while he who eats it is exempt; sidduk must be burnt, while he who eats it is liable to kareth. The halakhah in this section seems to be an old halakhah, one which Rabbi Judah and the other sages debate in the remainder of this mishnah. The halakhah is that “si’ur” dough must be burnt, meaning it must be removed before Pesah, but that one who eats it is not liable for karet as he would be were he to have eaten chametz. “Si’ur” comes from the word for hair (se’ar) and we will see in the remainder of the mishnah that both Rabbi Judah and the sages explain it so that it has some connection with hair. “Sidduk” means “cracked” and it is already chametz and therefore one who eats it is liable for karet.", + "What is si'ur? [When there are lines on the surface] like locusts’ horns. Sidduk is when the cracks have intermingled with each other, the words of Rabbi Judah. Rabbi Judah and the sages now debate the definition of si’ur and sidduk. According to Rabbi Judah si’ur dough already shows some signs of cracking on the surface and the lines look like locusts’ horns. These horns are similar enough to hair that the dough is called si’ur. The lines on sidduk dough are more numerous and have already begun to intermingle with each other. One who eats dough with this many cracks is liable for karet for having eaten chametz.", + "But the sages say: regarding the one and the other, he who eats it is liable for karet. And what is si'ur? When its surface is blanched, like [the face of] a man whose hair is standing [on end]. The sages say that what Rabbi Judah called si’ur is actually sidduk and therefore one who eats it is liable for karet. They redefine si’ur as dough that has begun to turn white, like the face of a person who is frightened. Note again the connection with hair to the sages this dough is called si’ur because when a person is frightened not only does his face turn white but his hair stands on end." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nChametz is usually removed the day before Pesah, on the fourteenth of the month of Nisan. This potentially becomes a problem when the day before Pesah is Shabbat because chametz is usually removed by being burnt and one cannot burn chametz on Shabbat. In our mishnah the sages debate how to handle this problem.", + "If the fourteenth [of Nisan] falls on Shabbat, they remove everything before Shabbat, the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Meir says that all of the chametz is to be burned before Shabbat. Most commentators add, based on a talmudic source, that he may leave enough chametz to eat two meals, one on Friday night and one on Shabbat morning. This is because halakhah forbids the eating of matzah on the day before Pesah. However, the custom not to eat matzah on the day before Pesah may not yet have developed in the time of the Mishnah. It is likely that Rabbi Meir assumes that one will eat matzah for Friday night dinner and for the first meal on Shabbat itself. In any case, today when this occurs, many people destroy all of their chametz on Friday, but some people leave enough bread to eat for Friday night dinner and a very early Shabbat morning lunch. This meal must be eaten before the fourth hour of the day, by which time all chametz must be removed.", + "The sages say: at its [usual] time. The sages say that all of the chametz is removed at its usual time, meaning on Shabbat itself. The sages assume that they will remove the chametz by eating it or by giving it to his animals. If it can’t be eaten, then it may crumbled up and thrown into the wind (see above 2:1).", + "Rabbi Eleazar bar Zadok says: terumah before Shabbat, and non-sacred [chametz] at its [usual] time. The problem with waiting until Shabbat to remove the terumah is that far fewer people can eat terumah only kohanim and their families may eat it. Therefore, he should burn the terumah the day before Pesah. However, regular chametz may be eaten by anyone, and therefore they can wait to remove it until Shabbat itself. On this point he agrees with the sages." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses a person who starts on a journey and once he has already left he remembers that he forgot to remove his chametz. The question is whether or not he must return home to remove the chametz or whether he may continue on his way.", + "He who is on his way to slaughter his Pesah sacrifice or to circumcise his son or to dine at a betrothal feast at the house of his father-in-law, and remembers that he has chametz at home: if he is able to go back, remove [it], and [then] return to his religious duty, he must go back and remove [it]; but if not, he annuls it in his heart. In the first section, the person is on his way to perform a commandment when he remembers that he forgot to remove his chametz. The first two commandments are extremely significant and time-bound. The commandment to participate in the Pesah sacrifice and the commandment to circumcise are the only two positive commandments which carry with them the punishment of karet for lack of fulfillment. Furthermore, the Pesah must be sacrificed on the fourteenth of Nisan and if the eighth day of a boy’s life falls out on the fourteenth of Nisan then it must take place then. It is not surprising that the halakhah allows him to continue on his way to perform these weighty commandments. What is perhaps more surprising is that participating in a betrothal feast is placed in the same category. This perhaps can be read as a rabbinic statement concerning the importance of marriage. In any case, if a person sets off to engage in one of these activities and realizes that he has not burned his chametz, if he can still return home, burn the chametz and get to where he needs to be on time, then he must do so. However, if there is not sufficient time for this, then he need not return. Rather, in his heart he annuls the chametz, that it should be to him as is the dust of the earth.", + "[If he is on his way] to save from an invasion or from a river or from brigands or from a fire or from a collapse [of a building], he annuls it in his heart. In this section he is on his way to save someone’s life. In such a case, even if he could return to remove his chametz and still make it to where he needs to go on time, he need not do so. Since these are matters of life or death, he shouldn’t hesitate or take a risk by returning to remove his chametz. Life takes precedent over all commandments. Therefore, all he should do is annul the chametz in his heart.", + "[But if] to rest for pleasure, he must return immediately. If he sets out just for pleasure, for instance on a vacation, without there being any commandment that he is going to perform, then he must return and remove his chametz even if this will cause him to not be able to get to where he needs to go. In such a case, the mishnah does not allow him to annul the chametz in his heart." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is a direct continuation of yesterday’s mishnah.", + "Similarly, he who went out of Jerusalem and remembered that he had holy meat with him: If he has passed Scopus, he burns it where he is; but if not, he returns and burns it in front of the Temple with the wood of the [altar] pile. Certain sacrifices, such as a thanksgiving offering, may be eaten anywhere in Jerusalem but may not be brought outside. If they are brought outside of Jerusalem they must be burnt. The person in this mishnah is leaving Jerusalem when he discovers that he has with him “holy meat” some sacrificial meat that he didn’t eat. According to the Mishnah, if he has passed Mt. Scopus, a mountain from which the Temple Mount can be seen (this is where Hebrew University is today), then he need not go back to the Temple and burn the meat there. However, if he still has not yet reached that point, he must return to the Temple and burn the sacrifice with the wood of the altar pile.", + "And for what [quantity] must they return? Rabbi Meir says: for both when there is as much as an egg; Rabbi Judah says: for both, when there is as much as an olive; But the sages say: holy meat, when there is as much as an olive and chametz, when there is as much as an egg. The mishnah now asks about the two cases we have discussed in today’s and yesterday’s mishnah: sacrifices and chametz for the sake of what quantity must one return to burn/remove them? According to Rabbi Meir, the amount is the same for both a measure the size of an egg. The Talmud says that Rabbi Meir learns this from the laws of uncleanness just as food that is less than the size of an egg cannot become unclean, so too he need return only for this measure of sacrifice or chametz. Rabbi Judah disagrees (these guys do seem to always disagree) and holds that in both cases he need return for an amount the size of an olive, a smaller amount than an egg. The Talmud explains that Rabbi Judah learns this from the amount that is prohibited an amount the size of an olive is prohibited and therefore this is the minimum amount for which one must return. Finally, the sages differentiate between the two for sacred meat he must return for the smaller amount of an olive but for chametz he need only return for an egg’s amount." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThrough the middle of mishnah five this chapter deals with customs which differ from place to place. The basic attitude of the Mishnah is that local customs are acceptable, so long as they are not opposed to halakhah. However, complications will arise when people from a place with one custom come to a place with a different custom. This is the specific problem with which our mishnah deals.", + "In a place where it is the custom to do work on the eve of Pesah until midday one may do work; where it is the custom not to do work, one may not do work. Of all the different customs which the first five mishnayot of our chapter will discuss, this is the only one that is connected to Pesah. It is because this collection begins with a custom related to Pesah that the mishnah is found here in Pesahim. In some places it was customary not to work on the morning before Pesah. This was to make sure that people didn’t forget to burn their chametz on time. People who live in a place with such a custom should not work at all on this day. However, people who live in a place where the custom is to do work on the morning before Pesah may indeed work. In any case, even in a place where they are accustomed to work on the eve of Pesah, they only work until midday. Since the Pesah sacrifice could be offered any time after midday, the sages treated this part of the day as if it were a holiday unto itself and they forbade a person to work. Even after the Pesah sacrifice could no longer be offered this prohibition remained in its place. We should note that on the eve of Shabbat and other holidays the sages ruled that it was forbidden to do work from minchah time (the late afternoon) and onward. On Pesah they were stricter and forbade work from midday.", + "He who goes from a place where they work to a place where they do not work, or from a place where they do not work to a place where they do work, they place upon him the restrictions of the place from where he departed and the restrictions of the place to where he has gone. As is clear when you read this section carefully, whether he comes from a place that doesn’t do work or goes to a place that doesn’t do work, he won’t be allowed to do work on the eve of Pesah. No matter where he is or where he is from, he is always subject to the stricter rule.", + "And a man must not act differently [from local custom] on account of the quarrels [which would ensue]. If by not observing the local custom he will cause quarrels then he should not act differently. The simplest meaning of this line is that even if he is going from a place that does not do work to a place that does do work, he should do work if by refraining from work he would cause people to quarrel. In other words, the mishnah wants to make sure that when a person is visiting another place, his customs don’t make other people feel that he is trying to act “holier than thou”. If this will give that impression, then he should observe the local custom." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIt is permissible to eat produce which was reaped during the sabbatical year so long as that type of produce is still growing in the fields. Once it no longer grows in the fields it is forbidden to eat it. Our mishnah deals with a person who goes from a place where a certain produce grows in the field to a place where that produce does not grow in the field, or vice versa.", + "Similarly, he who transports sabbatical year produce from a place where it has ceased [to exist in the field] to a place where it has not ceased or from a place where it has not ceased to a place where it has ceased, he is bound to remove it. Again, the mishnah rules that one who travels from one place to another follows the stricter rule. If for instance he is traveling from Hebron where bananas are still in the field, to Bet El, where they are no longer in the field, he must remove the bananas he brings with him. Similarly, if he travels from Bet El which has no bananas in the field (yes, they have no bananas) to Hebron, where the bananas are still thriving, he must still get rid of his bananas because in his home town he can’t have them.", + "Rabbi Judah says: he can say to them “You can go out too and bring [produce] for yourself.” Rabbi Judah says that if he goes from a place that has a certain bananas in the field to a place that doesn’t he can still eat the bananas because he can say to the people of the other place, you can go back to my place where you can eat them as well as I can. According to Rabbi Judah this is not an issue of following the local custom, as was the issue in yesterday’s mishnah. Rather he understands that the prohibition is to eat produce from a field when that produce no longer grows in that area. Therefore, in our example above, it is only forbidden to eat Bet El bananas because Bet El has no bananas in the field. To eat Hebron bananas is okay, even in Bet El. [Note, I have explained this section according to Albeck’s commentary. The Talmud contains different interpretations.]" + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses the prohibition of a Jew from selling animals to non-Jews, lest the non-Jews use them for work on the Sabbath. [This same mishnah appeared in Avodah Zarah 1:6. ]", + "In a place where it is the custom to sell small domesticated animals to non-Jews, such sale is permitted; but where the custom is not to sell, such sale is not permitted. The Torah teaches on several occasions that an animal must rest on the Sabbath (see for instance Exodus 20:9). Our mishnah prohibits a Jew from selling an animal to a non-Jew, lest the non-Jew use the animal for work on the Sabbath. Small animals, such as sheep and goats, are not used for work. Therefore in a place where it is customary to sell them to non-Jews it is permitted to do so. In other places it was customary not to sell even small animals to non-Jews, lest the Jew become confused and sell them large animals, which is prohibited in all places.", + "In no place however is it permitted to sell large animals, calves or foals, whether whole or maimed. It is forbidden in all places to sell large animals, such as oxen and horses, to non-Jews since they will be used to perform work on the Sabbath. Even though once the non-Jew buys the animal it is no longer a “Jewish” animal and hence the Shabbat prohibitions apply to it, the mishnah still prohibits the sale because sometimes a Jew might give the animal for a trial period and then the non-Jew might return it. In such a situation, the animal still belongs to the Jew and should not work on Shabbat. The prohibition of selling animals includes calves and foals, even though they do not usually perform work.", + "Rabbi Judah permits in the case of a maimed one. Rabbi Judah allows one to sell injured animals to non-Jews since they are clearly being purchased for their meat and not in order to do work.", + "And Ben Bateira permits in the case of a horse. Ben Bateira allows the sale of a horse since horses are used for riding, which is not considered by the Rabbis to be work. Pulling plows, a work performed by oxen is considered work." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first section of this mishnah deals with eating roasted meat on the eve of the first night of Pesah. The second section deals with lighting a lamp on the eve of Yom Kippur.", + "In a place where it is the custom to eat roasted [meat] on the night of Pesah, they may eat [it]; where it is the custom not to eat [it], they may not eat [it]. The Pesach sacrifice must be eaten roasted (Exodus 12:8). After the Temple was destroyed, the some of the sages wanted to emphasize to people that it was forbidden to offer a Pesach sacrifice without a Temple. Hence, they forbade people from eating a roasted lamb on this night. When we learn tractate Betzah, we will see that some sages allowed the eating of a roasted lamb. In any case, according to all of the sages, eating roasted meat was not strictly prohibited and was tied to local custom. Those who lived in a place where they ate eat roasted meat (other than lamb) could do so, but those who lived in a place without such a custom were prohibited because it was thought that this might lead people to think that they were eating the Pesach sacrifice.", + "In a place where it is the practice to light a lamp [at home] on the night of Yom Kippur, they may light; where it is the practice not to light, they may not light. On the eve of Shabbat and festivals it is obligatory to light a Shabbat candle. This is part of the mitzvah to enjoy Shabbat it is more pleasurable to sit in the light than to sit in dark. However, on Yom Kippur, when we are not commanded to enjoy ourselves, lighting a candle was not obligatory but rather tied to local custom. Some lit candles as they did on other holidays, while others did not. It is explained that those who did not thought that the light might lead couples to have sexual relations, which are prohibited on Yom Kippur.", + "And they light [lamps] in synagogues, study-houses, and dark alleys, and for the sake of invalids. In public places, such as synagogues and study-houses and in places that need light, such as dark alleys, they lit lamps on Yom Kippur. Those who prohibited it only prohibited within the home. Finally, if there was a sick person who needed light for whatever reason, they of course lit one for him." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis is the last mishnah to note different customs in different places. It returns to the original topic of the chapter doing work on semi-holidays. The first section of the mishnah deals with the ninth of Av, a day of mourning commemorating the destruction of both Temples, while the second section returns to discuss the day before Pesah, the very topic that was discussed above in mishnah one. The fact that the mishnah returns to the same subject with which it began is a sign of its careful editing.", + "In a place where it is the custom to do work on the ninth of Av, one may do it; where it is the custom not to do work, one may not do it. And in all places students of sages desist [from work on that day]. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel said: a man should always make himself a student of sages. The ninth of Av is not a festival such that it is strictly forbidden to do work on that day. Rather just as it is not appropriate for a mourner to work, so too in some places it was felt that it was not appropriate to work on this day. However, others allowed work on the ninth of Av. According to this position the mourning for the Temple is not the same as normal mourning since the tragedy has long passed. Even in places where work is allowed, students of sages (alternatively we might understand “talmidei hachamim” as referring to sages themselves) should not work. Their extra devotion to the Torah demands of them an extra observance of this day as well. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says that everyone should strive to act like students of the sages and not work on the ninth of Av. Such behavior is not considered to be overly arrogant.", + "But the sages say: In Judea they used to do work on the eve of Pesah until midday, while in Galilee they did not work at all. The sages here disagree with the mishnah in the beginning of the chapter. According to the sages, working on the eve of Pesach is not dependent on local custom, as was described above. Rather, in Judea they allowed people to work until midday, whereas in the Galilee they forbid work the whole day. Some explain that in this mishnah the sages explain the first mishnah above. When the mishnah said that there were places with different customs it meant, according to the sages, that these customs differed between Judea and Galilee.", + "[With regard to] the night: Beth Shammai forbid [work], but Bet Hillel permit it until sunrise. In this section Beth Shammai and Bet Hillel debate what the custom was in Galilee, where they did not work on the eve of Pesah. According to Bet Shammai, this prohibition included working on the night before Pesah (the night before the seder), whereas Bet Hillel held that the prohibition of work did not begin until sunrise on the fourteenth." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nAccording to some commentators, this mishnah teaches that even in places where they did do work on the fourteenth of Nisan, the eve of Pesah, not all types of work were permitted. According to this understanding, the mishnah restricts that which we previously thought was permitted. Others understand this mishnah to refer to places in which work is generally not done. Our mishnah would then teach that in such places while most work is not done, some work may indeed be done. This mishnah then would be allowing that which we thought was prohibited.", + "Rabbi Meir says: any work which he began before the fourteenth, he may finish it on the fourteenth; but he may not begin [new work] on the fourteenth, even if he can finish it [on the same day]. According to Rabbi Meir one may complete already-begun work on the fourteenth of Nisan, the eve of Pesah, but one may not start new work. Starting new work is prohibited even if he will be able to finish it before the day is over, or more specifically before midday, at which point all work is prohibited.", + "The sages say: three craftsmen may work on the eve of Pesah until midday, and these are they: tailors, hairdressers, and laundrymen. Rabbi Yose bar Judah says: shoemakers too. The sages say that only three types of craftsmen can do work. All other types of craftsmen may not work, even if they can complete their work before midday. All three of these types of work are considered to be essential for the full appreciation of the holiday. Furthermore, these types of work are sometimes allowed even during the intermediate days of the holidays, if they could not have been done before the holiday (we will learn more about this when we learn Moed Katan). Therefore it is allowed on the day before Pesah as well. Rabbi Yose bar Judah adds that shoemakers are allowed to work on the fourteenth because the sages allowed pilgrims to Jerusalem to have their shoes fixed, if they had worn out on their travels to Jerusalem. In any case, even these types of craftsmen can only work until midday." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to deal with work that is permitted on the fourteenth of Nisan.", + "They may set up chicken-houses for fowls on the fourteenth; and if a fowl ran away, one may return her to her place; and if she died, one may set another in her place. According to Rashi this clause means that it is permitted to put eggs under hens so that the eggs will stay warm and eventually hatch. Others explain that this clause refers to fixing nests for newly-born domesticated fowl. In any case, from the context of the rest of the mishnah, it is clear that there is some immediate need being referred to. Albeck explains that the mishnah repeats “on the fourteenth” in order to emphasize that it is permitted to do this all day, and not just until midday, because this is not actually work. If a chicken ran away from sitting on her eggs, one may return her to her spot because the eggs need to be kept warm. This too is not actually work but is rather merely laborious. Similarly, if a chicken who was sitting on her eggs died, a new one may be put in her place.", + "They may sweep away [the manure] from under an animal’s feet on the fourteenth, but on the festival one may only move it to the side. It is allowed on the fourteenth (all day) to clean up the manure that has accumulated under an animal and to bring the manure out to the garbage pile. However, on the intermediate days of the festival, when work is more prohibited, it is only permissible to move it to the sides. To completely remove it is forbidden. Note that the mishnah compares here the laws concerning the fourteenth with those concerning the intermediate days of the festival. This comparison is emphasized because they are both “grayish” areas of halakhah some things are permitted and some are not, and sometimes the same work may under certain circumstances be permitted and under other circumstances be forbidden.", + "They may take vessels to and bring them back from a craftsman’s house, even if they are not required for the festival. One can bring things to a craftsman’s house to be fixed or worked on and one can pick up things from his house that have already been completed. This is permissible even if these things are not necessary for the holiday. In contrast, on the intermediate days of the festival it is forbidden to bring things to a craftsman house even if they are needed for the festival and it is forbidden to pick things up unless they are necessary for the holiday. We can see that the laws concerning the fourteenth are more lenient." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah relates to six practices observed by the inhabitants of Jericho three against which the sages protested and three against which they did not. The reason that the mishnah is here in this chapter is that the first thing that these people did is connected to the issue of work on the eve of Pesah, the main topic of our chapter.\nWe should note that we hear in this mishnah of groups of Jews who did not necessarily listen to the rabbis (this shouldn’t really be surprising). The rabbis protest against some of their practices, and live with other ones. We have no idea whether the rabbis’ protests caused the people of Jericho to change their behavior. We should always remember that when we read Mishnah we are learning how the rabbis envisioned the Jewish world to be we are not learning what it was really like.", + "Six things the inhabitants of Jericho did: against three they [the sages] protested, and against three [they] did not protest.
And these are those against which they did not protest: They grafted palm trees all day [on the eve of Pesah]; They ‘wrapped up’ the Shema; And they harvested and stacked [their produce] before [the bringing of] the ‘omer. And [for these] they did not protest. In this section the mishnah lists practices that the sages did not protest. 1) Jericho is a region in which many date-trees grow. In the spring they would graft these trees in order to improve them. Even though they did this work all day, the sages did not protest because there is a lot of pressure to get this work done in the correct season. 2) There are two interpretations for what it means to “wrap the Shema”. According to one interpretation it means that they would not pause between words, and according to another interpretation they would not say “barukh shem kevod malkhuto leolam vaed” a line normally recited after the first line of the Shema. Although one should not do either of these practices, the sages still did not feel the need to protest against them. 3) According to the sages, the omer (first grains) are brought on the second day of Pesah. Until this time it is forbidden to harvest the wheat (see Leviticus 23:10). Nevertheless, the people of Jericho would harvest the wheat and stack it, before the omer was brought. The Talmud explains that it is indeed permissible to harvest the type of wheat which grows in the Jericho region, so the sages did not protest the harvesting itself. However, stacking the harvested wheat is prohibited and it is against the stacking that they did protest.", + "And these are those against which they did protest: They permitted [for use] the small branches [of sycamore trees] belonging to sacred property, And they ate the fallen fruit from beneath [trees] on Shabbat, and they gave pe’ah from vegetables; And [for these] they did protest. In this section we learn of three practices against which the sages did protest. 1) The people of Jericho would use the small branches of sycamore trees which had been dedicated to the Temple. They reasoned that when these trees were dedicated by their forefathers it was only their trunks which were dedicated because people don’t usually use the branches. This is how Rashi explains the mishnah. The Rambam explains that they would use that which grew from the tree, reasoning that when the tree was dedicated to the Temple, only the parts that existed at the time of the dedication were sanctified. In any case, the sages felt that once the tree was sanctified none of its parts could be used. 2) Fruit that falls off a tree on Shabbat is muktzeh (forbidden to touch) since it could not be eaten when Shabbat began (reaping is prohibited). The people of Jericho would eat the fruit which they found under the tree even though they didn’t know whether the fruit fell on Shabbat, in which case it is forbidden, or before Shabbat, in which case it is permitted. 3) One is not obligated to leave the corners (pe’ah) of vegetable fields for poor people. The problem with leaving them is that pe’ah is exempt from tithes. When the poor people would eat these vegetables, they would eat them untithed which is prohibited. Against all three of these practices the sages protested." + ], + [ + "Six things King Hezekiah did, concerning three they [the sages] agreed with him, and concerning three they did not agree with him: He dragged his father's bones [corpse] on a rope bier, and they agreed with him; He crushed the bronze serpent, and they agreed with him; He hid the book of remedies, and they agreed with him.
And concerning three they did not agree with him: He cut down the doors of the Temple and sent them to the king of Assyria, and they did not agree with him; He closed up the waters of the Upper Gihon, and they did not agree with him; He intercalated [the month of] Nisan in Nisan, and they did not agree with him.
This mishnah was not originally part of the Mishnah but rather a tannaitic source from the Talmud that was added later into the Mishnah. It is missing from many mishnaic manuscripts. Nevertheless, since it appears in printed editions of the Mishnah, we will treat it as a mishnah.
The “mishnah” is in the same format as yesterday’s mishnah (six things, three of which the sages liked and three that they did not). It relates to King Hezekiah who ruled in Judea in the late 8th century. He is often idealized in the aggadah as a righteous king.
Section one:
1) Hezekiah’s father, Ahaz, was an evil king. Hezekiah did not provide a proper burial for his father (see II Chronicles 29:27) but rather dragged his corpse around on a bier made of ropes. The belief in this mishnah is that this ill treatment would cause posthumous suffering to Ahaz and that this suffering would bring him atonement.
2) Hezekiah crushed the bronze serpent which Moses had made (see Numbers 21:6-9) because Israel was worshipping this serpent (II Kings 18:4).
3) Rashi explains that the reason that Hezekiah hid the “book of remedies” and that the sages agreed with him is that people believed that the remedies were healing and not God. The Rambam vehemently disagrees with this understanding, which he finds to be completely irrational. Would one tell a hungry man not to eat but to rely on God? The Rambam (who was himself a doctor) therefore explains that this book of remedies was really a book of astrology, one which led people away from both rational medicine and from God.
Section two:
1) In order to appease the king of Syria, Hezekiah cut the gold off of the doors of the Temple (II Kings 18:16). The sages did not agree with this action he should have had faith and relied on God to protect.
2) Hezekiah closed up the waters of the Upper Gihon spring so that the Assyrians would not have water (II Chronicles 32:30). The sages did not agree for two reasons: 1) he should have had faith in God; 2) he caused suffering to his own people.
3) About once every three years the Hebrew lunar calendar needs to have an extra month added in order so that it keeps pace with the solar calendar. The way that this is done is by adding an extra month of Adar, the twelfth month of the year (according to the way months are counted in the Bible). Once Nissan has begun (the first month of the year) it is supposed to be impossible to add an extra month. Hezekiah tried to intercalate the year in Nisan, and thereby push off the observance of Pesah for another month (II Chronicles 30:2-3)." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThe following four chapters of mishnah deal with the Pesah sacrifice and discuss how it was offered in Jerusalem. Our mishnah deals with the afternoon tamid (daily) offering. Every day there were two tamid offerings, one in the morning and one in the afternoon (Numbers 28:3-4; Exodus 29:39). Usually the afternoon tamid was the last offering of the day. The one exception was the Pesah sacrifice which was offered after the tamid. Our mishnah comes to teach that normally the tamid was sacrificed later in the afternoon, but on the eve of Pesah they would sacrifice the tamid earlier in order to leave more time to sacrifice the Pesah.", + "The [afternoon] tamid is slaughtered at eight and a half hours and is offered at nine and a half hours. On normal days the afternoon tamid is slaughtered at eight and a half hours (remember the day is divided into twelve equal hours). It is offered at nine and a half hours. This leaves another two and a half hours to perform other tasks, such as various grain and incense offerings and lighting the menorah, the last thing done in the Temple before nightfall.", + "On the eve of Pesah it is slaughtered at seven and a half hours and offered at eight and a half hours, whether it is a weekday or Shabbat. On the eve of Pesah they moved the tamid sacrifice up one hour to give more time afterwards to sacrifice the pesah. This was true whether the eve of Pesah fell on Shabbat or on a weekday.", + "If the eve of Pesah fell on the eve of Shabbat it is slaughtered at six and a half hours and offered at seven and a half hours, and the pesah offering after it. The only exception to this was when the eve of Pesah fell on the eve of Shabbat. In this case they had to finish roasting the pesah lamb before Shabbat began since cooking is prohibited on Shabbat. Therefore, they offered the tamid sacrifice as early as possible at six and a half hours which is when the sun begins to set. The afternoon tamid cannot be offered earlier because at an earlier time it is not afternoon. They would then immediately begin to slaughter and prepare the pesah lamb." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThere are four parts of the offering of an animal which need to be performed before an animal sacrifice can be eaten or burned on the altar: slaughtering, catching the blood in a vessel, bring the blood to the altar and the sprinkling of the blood on the altar. All four of these actions must be done with the proper intent in mind. That is to say the person performing these four actions must be at all times intend to offer the animal as the specific sacrifice which he is intending to perform. Our mishnah teaches that a pesah for which one of these actions is done with the wrong intent is not a valid pesah offering.", + "A pesah sacrifice which a person slaughtered another purpose, or caught [the blood] or brought it or sprinkled its [blood] for another purpose; As stated above in the introduction, if any of the four activities are done with the intent of the animal serving another purpose besides a pesah, then the animal cannot be used as a pesah sacrifice.", + "Or for its own purpose and for another purpose; or for another purpose and for its own purpose, it is disqualified. The mishnah now emphasizes that even if one began one of the activities, for instance slaughtering, with one intention in mind and completed the activity with another intention, the sacrifice is disqualified. The entire activity from beginning to end must be performed with the correct intention in mind. The mishnah will now illustrate these possibilities.", + "How is it “for its own purpose” and [then] “for another purpose”? For the purpose of being a pesah sacrifice [first] and [then] for the purpose of being a well-being offering. In the previous section we learned that even if one of the actions was first performed “for its own purpose” meaning for it to be a pesah and then “for another purpose”, that it is disqualified. The mishnah now illustrates such an example. He began to slaughter the animal (or any of the other three actions) with the intent of it being a pesah and then while still performing the act he intended it to be a well-being offering. Even though he began the act with the correct intent, it is still disqualified.", + "[How is it] “for another purpose” and [then] “for its own purpose”? For the purpose of being a well-being offering [first] and [then] for the purpose of being a pesah sacrifice. In this case he began to perform one of the actions with the incorrect intent, for instance for the animal to be a well-being offering, and then he completed the action with the correct intent, for the animal to be pesah. Even though he completed the action with the correct intent, the sacrifice is still disqualified because he began even one of the actions with the incorrect intent." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to discuss ways in which improper intent can disqualify the pesah sacrifice. The second half of the mishnah discusses a pesah which was offered at the wrong time of day.", + "If he slaughtered it for those who cannot eat it or for those who are not registered for it, for uncircumcised persons or for unclean persons, it is unfit. This section lists people who cannot for various reasons eat the pesah sacrifice. If he slaughters the lamb with the intent of it being eaten only by people from these categories then the sacrifice is unfit. There are four categories of people listed here. 1) “Those who cannot eat it” refers to sick or old people who will not be able to eat even a minimum amount of the sacrificial meat. 2) Before the sacrifice is slaughtered a group of people must register themselves for eating the sacrifice meaning they intend to be the group that eats the sacrifice. Unregistered people may not eat from the pesah. If he sacrifices it for people who are not registered for that specific pesah, it is unfit. 3) The pesah may not be eaten by uncircumcised males (Exodus 12:48). 4) In order to eat the pesah a person must be ritually clean.", + "[If he slaughtered it] for those who can eat it and for those who cannot eat it, for those who are registered for it and for those who are not registered for it, for circumcised and for uncircumcised persons, for unclean and for clean persons, it is fit. This section teaches that if he slaughtered the pesah with a group of people in mind, some of whom could eat it and some of whom could not, the pesah is still valid. As long as at least one of the people for whom he sacrificed it can eat it, it is valid.", + "If he slaughtered it before midday, it is disqualified, because it is said, “[and all of the assembled congregation of Israelites shall slaughter it] at twilight” (Exodus 12:6). According to the rabbis “twilight” is when the sun has already reached its peak and has begun to descend to the west. This is from six and a half hours and onwards. If the pesah was slaughtered before this time it is invalid.", + "If he slaughtered it before the [evening] tamid, it is fit, providing that a person stirs its blood until [that of] the tamid is sprinkled. [Nevertheless] if it was sprinkled [before the tamid], it is fit. The pesah should a priori be slaughtered after the evening tamid (daily offering). We learned this above in mishnah one. However, ex post facto, even if it was slaughtered before the tamid, it is still valid, provided that a person stirs the blood of the pesah so that it can be sprinkled on the altar after the blood of the tamid is sprinkled. However, even this requirement is only “a priori” if the blood of the pesah is sprinkled before that of the tamid it is still valid." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nExodus 34:25 states, “You shall not offer the blood of My sacrifice with anything leavened.” The sages interpret this verse to mean that the pesah cannot be sacrificed by a person who still has chametz in his possession. Our mishnah discusses various aspects of this prohibition.", + "One who slaughters the pesah with chametz [in his possession] violates a negative commandment. The negative commandment which he violates is the one in Exodus 34:25, quoted above in the introduction.", + "Rabbi Judah says: also the [evening] tamid. Rabbi Judah extends this prohibition to include the evening tamid offered on the fourteenth of Nisan. According to a midrash, Rabbi Judah derives this from the word “My sacrifice” in Exodus 34:25. A tamid might be referred to by God as “My sacrifice” because it is not eaten but rather wholly burnt on the altar. Alternatively (get the pun!) he may read the word “My sacrifice” as being a plural word meaning “sacrifices”, in which case the verse reads “You shall not offer the blood of sacrifices with anything leavened.” In any case, Rabbi Judah holds that one who sacrifices the evening tamid on the fourteenth of Nisan while in possession of chametz has violated a negative commandment.", + "Rabbi Shimon says: [If he slaughters] the pesah [with chametz] on the fourteenth for its own purpose, he is liable; [if] for a different purpose, he is exempt. But [for] all other sacrifices, whether slaughtered for their own purpose or for a different purpose, he is exempt. [If he slaughters the pesah with chametz] on the festival for its own purpose, he is exempt; if for a different purpose, he is liable; But [for] all other sacrifices [slaughtered on the festival with chametz], whether for their own purpose or for another purpose, he is liable, except [in the case or] a sin-offering which he slaughtered for a different purpose. Rabbi Shimon makes several refinements as to when a person is liable for transgressing Exodus 34:25. The first section deals with sacrifices made on the fourteenth of Nisan. If he slaughters the pesah with the intent of it being a pesah he is liable (all of the below cases refer to someone in possession of chametz when making the sacrifice). However, if he slaughters the pesah with the intent of it being a different sacrifice the pesah itself is not valid. Since it is not a valid pesah, he has not transgressed Exodus 34:25 which refers only to slaughtering a valid pesah while in possession of chametz. If he slaughters a different sacrifice on the fourteenth of Nisan while owning chametz he is not liable, whether or not the sacrifice was offered with the proper intent. Rabbi Shimon holds that the verse applies only to a valid pesah and not to other sacrifices. The third section refers to one who slaughters an animal as a pesah sacrifice during the festival. The sacrifice is invalid since he can’t offer a pesah after the fourteenth of Nisan. Therefore, he has not transgressed the verse. On the other hand, if he sacrificed it with another intent, then the sacrifice is considered to be a valid well-being offering. In such a case, he is liable for making a sacrifice during Pesah while owning chametz. Rabbi Shimon derives this from Exodus 23:18, “You shall not offer the blood of My sacrifice with anything leavened”, a verse nearly identical to Exodus 34:25. From this verse he derives a prohibition of offering any valid sacrifice on Pesah while in possession of chametz. Finally, if he offers any other sacrifice during Pesah while in possession of chametz, he has transgressed, as we explained above. This is true whether or not the sacrifice was done with the proper intent. The only exception is a sin-offering which is disqualified if offered with the improper intent during Pesah. Since it is a disqualified offering, he has not transgressed by slaughtering it while in possession of chametz." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah now begins to describe how the pesah was slaughtered in the Temple.\nWe should note that scholars frequently attempt to estimate how many people actually came to the Temple on Pesah and how many sacrifices were offered there. Clearly, the numbers were impressive but even rough estimates of numbers are impossible. Rabbinic literature, composed at least one hundred years after the destruction, is not considered by most scholars to be a particularly reliable source of history for the Second Temple period. Nevertheless, from this mishnah we can at least detect that Pesah was the busiest time of the year at the Temple, or at least the time of the year when the most sacrifices were offered. Similar descriptions can be found in Philo and Josephus both of whom lived and wrote while the Temple still stood.", + "The pesah is slaughtered in three divisions, as it is said, “And the whole assembly of the congregation of Israel shall slaughter it” (Exodus 12:6): “assembly,” “congregation,” and “Israel.” Because of the large number of lambs that needed to be slaughtered on the eve of Pesah, the people of Israel were divided into three divisions each taking a turn to slaughter the Pesah. The mishnah derives this midrashically from three terms used in the biblical verse: “assembly”, “congregation” and “Israel.” The Talmud explains that a division could not be less than thirty people. Assumedly, they were much larger than that.", + "The first division entered, the Temple court was filled, and they closed the doors of the Temple court. Once the first group had entered they would lock the doors so that people from the second group would not push to get in.", + "They sounded a teki'ah, a teru'ah, and a teki'ah. These are the same notes which we still make on Rosh Hashanah. The tekiah is the single long note and the teruah is the staccato note. What we call “shevarim” (three notes) is a variant version of the “teruah”.", + "The priests stood in rows, and in their hands were basins of silver and basins of gold, a row which was entirely of silver was of silver, and a row which was entirely of gold was of gold, they were not mixed. And the basins did not have flat bottoms, lest they put them down and the blood becomes congealed. The basins were there to receive the blood after the animal was slaughtered. The separation of gold from silver vessels was done for aesthetic purposes. Since the blood needed to be sprinkled onto the altar, it was crucial that it not become congealed in the basins. Therefore they did not have flat bottoms." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe mishnah continues to describe the slaughtering process.", + "The Israelite killed [the lamb]; If an Israelite wishes to slaughter his own pesah he may do so. Most other sacrifices are slaughtered only by priests. However, in Ezra 6:20 and II Chronicles 30:17, 35:6,11, the Levites are those who slaughter the pesah.", + "And the priest caught [the blood]. Only the priest is allowed to catch the blood in the basin, not the Israelite.", + "He would hand it to his colleague and his colleague [would hand it] to his colleague. And he would receive the full [basin] and give back the empty one. The priest nearest the altar would sprinkle it once over against the base [or the altar]. To expedite the process the priests would pass the blood down the rows which we encountered in yesterday’s mishnah. The priest at the end of row would sprinkle the blood over the base of the altar and then pass the empty basins back so that more blood could be received in them. We should note that the mishnah is precise in the order of activities. The priest should first take the full basin and then give back the empty one. This is because the full basin is one with which a commandment will be performed and one should not pass over the opportunity, even for a moment, to perform a commandment." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to describe the sacrifice of the Pesah, focusing especially on the singing of Hallel by the Levites.", + "The first division [then] went out and the second entered; the second went out and the third entered. As did the first, so did the second and the third. As mentioned in mishnah five, those who came to the Temple to offer the sacrifice divided into three groups. Each group would go through the same process described in the above two mishnayot.", + "They recited the Hallel. While the sacrifice was being offered the Levites recited the Hallel. We should note that this is one of the elements of the sacrificial ceremony which was eventually adopted into the seder ritual. Indeed, all early descriptions of the sacrifice and/or seder ritual include the recitation of Psalms, i.e. the Hallel. This includes descriptions in the Bible itself, in Josephus, Philo, the Christian Gospels and of course, in rabbinic literature.", + "If they finished it, they repeated, and if they repeated [and were not finished yet], they recited it a third time, though they never did recite it a third time. Rabbi Judah says: the third division never reached, “I love Lord for he hears” (Psalms 116), because the people for it were few. Sometimes the Levites would finish the Hallel before all of the lambs had been slaughtered and their blood sprinkled on the altar. If this happened the Levites would repeat the Hallel a second and even a third time. However, according to the tradition in this mishnah, they never had to repeat it a third time. Rabbi Judah relates that when it came to the third division, the Levites never even got as far as Psalm 116 in reciting the Hallel. Hallel begins at Psalms 113, so if they never even got to Psalm 116 the first time through this is indeed strong evidence that the third division was rather small. Assumedly most people wanted to be in the first two divisions so they could get their lambs slaughtered and start digging in. Even in ancient times people were anxious to begin their Pesah meal some things never change." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first section of the mishnah teaches that the sacrificial ritual was performed on Shabbat the same way that it was performed during the week. The second section discusses a practice done in order to ensure that blood from each of the lambs had been poured out onto the altar.", + "As it was done on weekdays so it was done on Shabbat, except that the priests would mop up the Temple court, against the will of the sages. The ritual was performed on Shabbat in the exact same manner that it was performed during the week. However, the sages would have liked to have seen one difference in how the ritual was performed on Shabbat. As they did during the week, so too on Shabbat the priests would mop up the floor of the Temple courtyard, which had surely become quite dirty with the blood from the many sacrifices. They did this against the will of the sages who thought that mopping up the floor is prohibited on Shabbat. As an aside, we can detect here a note of dissonance between the sages and the priests who ran the Temple. Clearly, these priests did not feel themselves subject to the sages’ authority.", + "Rabbi Judah says: he [a priest] would fill a goblet with the mixed blood [and] he sprinkled it once on the altar, but the sages did not agree with him. Rabbi Judah relates that a priest would fill a goblet with the mixed blood that he found on the floor and then pour the contents of the goblet onto the altar. The reason he would do this is lest the blood of one of the sacrifices had not been sprinkled on the altar. Not having its blood spilled on the altar would render the sacrifice invalid. It was assumed that some of the blood of all of the animals would be in this mixture and therefore pouring it out was sort of an insurance policy. The sages did not agree with Rabbi Judah that this was done in the Temple." + ], + [ + "How did they hang up [the sacrifices] and flay [them]?
There were iron hooks fixed in the walls and in the pillars, on which they hung up [the sacrifices] and flayed [them].
If any one had no place to suspend and flay [their sacrifice], there were there thin smooth staves which he placed on his shoulder and on his fellow’s shoulder, and so hung up [the animal] and flayed [it].
Rabbi Eliezer says: when the fourteenth fell on Shabbat, he placed his hand on his fellow’s shoulder and his fellow’s hand on his shoulder, and he hung up [the sacrifice] and flayed [it].
After the blood of the sacrifice had been thrown onto the altar the next step was to flay the animal so that some of its inner fats could be taken out and offered on the altar. Our mishnah describes how the animal was flayed.
The animal was hung up by its hind legs and its skin was flayed and removed. The hanging was done on fixed hooks in the walls or in pillars which were in the slaughtering area in the Temple courtyard. From section two we can see that there were not always enough hooks to hang up all of the sacrifices. In such a case two people would hold up poles on their shoulders and suspend the animal from them. Rabbi Eliezer holds that on Shabbat these poles could not be carried and therefore instead of using poles they would simply hang up the animal on two people’s shoulders. The rabbis disagree with Rabbi Eliezer. According to their opinion the prohibition of using these poles on Shabbat is only one of “shevut” rabbinically mandated rest on Shabbat. In the Temple, since these prohibitions are not “deoraita” of toraitic origin they are waived. Since the sages hold that the flaying is done in the same way on Shabbat and during the week, this was not listed as a difference in yesterday’s mishnah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah completes the description of the sacrificial aspects of the pesah sacrifice. In chapter seven we will describe how it is roasted so that it could be eaten.", + "Then he tore it and took out its inner fats, placed them in a tray and burnt them on the altar. After the animal was flayed he would tear a hole in it and take out the fats that need to be sacrificed on the altar. We should note that non-priests could do the flaying and the tearing but that only the priest could offer the fats on the altar.", + "The first division went out and sat down on the Temple mount, the second [sat] in the hel, while the third remained in its place. When it grew dark they went out and roasted their pesah lambs. At this point, the sacrificial elements have been completed and the animal is ready to be roasted. On a weekday, the people would now take the sacrifice back to their homes or to wherever in Jerusalem they were planning to eat the pesah meal. However, if the eve of Pesah fell on Shabbat they could not carry the pesah out of the Temple confines. So therefore each division would remain in a certain place. The first division would go out of the Temple and sit on the Temple mount, the second division would sit in the hel, a place right outside the courtyard and the third division remained in the courtyard. When Shabbat was over they would go home and roast their lambs." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah and the following one discuss which activities in connection with the pesah sacrifice may be performed on Shabbat.\nWe should note that this was a “hot” issue in the Second Temple period. Different sects of Jews argued over the potential conflicts between strict Shabbat observance and the necessary sacrifices which occur on festivals. Indeed, the calendar of the Dead Sea sect (and perhaps of others as well) had all of the holidays falling on Wednesdays (their calendar was 364 days, 52 weeks), the day furthest away from Shabbat. Part of the reason for this was to avoid what they perceived to be the desecration of Shabbat.", + "These things in [connection with] the pesah override Shabbat: its slaughtering and the sprinkling of its blood and the cleansing of its innards and the burning of its fat. The pesah has to be slaughtered on the fourteenth of Nisan. Therefore, its slaughtering will have to be done on Shabbat, if the fourteenth of Nisan falls on Shabbat. Other mandatory sacrifices such as the tamid are also slaughtered on Shabbat. Similarly, the sprinkling of its blood must be done immediately after it has been slaughtered and hence it too can be done on Shabbat. If the sacrifice is left as it is until evening, without its innards being removed, it will start to rot and hence its innards may also be removed. Finally, the burning of its fat on the altar also can be done on Shabbat. Although this could wait until later in the day, since they allowed the animal to be slaughtered they also allowed its fat to be burned. It also seems to me that activities that were “sacrificial” in nature were allowed, whereas, as we shall see below, preparing the animal to be eaten was not allowed.", + "But its roasting and the washing of its innards do not override Shabbat. Roasting the sacrifice is prohibited on Shabbat, since it can be done either before or after Shabbat. If the fourteenth fell on Nisan this would have to be after Shabbat was over. If the fourteenth fell on Friday, then the roasting would have to be completed before Shabbat began. Washing its innards with water can wait until Shabbat is over and there is no fear that the carcass will begin to rot. Hence this activity can also not be performed on Shabbat.", + "Carrying it and bringing it from outside the Shabbat border and cutting off its wart do not override Shabbat. Putting the animal on his shoulders to carry him through the public domain is forbidden. Similarly bringing the animal outside of the Shabbat border (2000 cubits around the city) is forbidden on Shabbat. Finally, a lamb that has a wart cannot be offered as a pesah. In order to make it possible to use it as an offering the wart has to be cut off. This too cannot be done on Shabbat. All three of these activities could have been done before Shabbat began and hence they do not override the Shabbat. Rabbi Eliezer disagrees and holds that just as the actual performance of the mitzvah overrides Shabbat, so too the preparing of the accessories which help to perform a mitzvah overrides Shabbat. We have encountered this debate before in Shabbat 19:1 concerning making and carrying a knife with which to circumcise. In tomorrow’s mishnah Rabbi Eliezer and the sages will debate this issue. Stay tuned!" + ], + [ + "Introduction This mishnah contains an extended debate between Rabbi Eliezer, Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Akiva concerning what overrides the Shabbat. In order to understand the mishnah we should briefly remind ourselves of the laws of Shabbat. There are two categories of prohibited labor mentioned here and critical for understanding this mishnah’s arguments: 1) a forbidden labor; 2) mandated rest, which is called shevut. The former prohibitions are considered to be directly from the Torah (de’oraita) and are more serious than the latter which are only of rabbinic origin (derabbanan). The three activities focused upon in this mishnah are: 1) Slaughtering the pesah. Slaughtering an animal on Shabbat is a forbidden labor. 2) Carrying the pesah on one’s shoulders through the public domain or bringing it outside the Shabbat border. These are considered to be prohibitions of shevut because “a living thing carries itself”, that is it is not considered to be a biblical violation of carrying on Shabbat to carry a living thing. Also, the prohibition of leaving the Shabbat border is considered by most sages to be only of rabbinic origin. 3) Sprinkling red heifer water on a person who has come into contact with the dead. This is not done on Shabbat even though it is only a shevut prohibition. Finally, it is not often that we get a chance to see in the Mishnah how the sages actually argued. While we certainly do not have here a “recording” of their exchanges, even the literary record affords a fascinating glimpse into their intellectual world.", + "Rabbi Eliezer said: is it not logical: if slaughtering, which is [usually forbidden] as a labor, overrides Shabbat, shouldn’t these, which are [only forbidden] as mandated rest, override Shabbat? Rabbi Eliezer’s first argument is straightforward. The sages admitted in mishnah one that slaughtering the pesah is permitted on Shabbat. Slaughtering an animal on Shabbat is a violation of one of the forbidden labors of Shabbat. If a forbidden labor is permitted, shouldn’t carrying the animal, which is only an issue of shevut, also be permitted.", + "Rabbi Joshua said to him: let the festival prove this, for they permitted labor [on the festival] and forbade [activities forbidden because of] shevut. Rabbi Joshua responds that Rabbi Eliezer’s argument is not decisive because of the issue of work on the festival. Generally on a festival it is permitted to slaughter an animal and cook it because one is allowed to prepare food on Shabbat. These activities were permitted even though they are forbidden labors. Nevertheless, when it came to issues of shevut, for instance carrying something from outside the Shabbat border, the sages did not permit these types of activities on a festival. Therefore, it makes sense in the case of the pesah for the sages to be strict with regard to shevut infractions and lenient with regard to forbidden labors.", + "Rabbi Eliezer said to him: what is this, Joshua? What proof is a voluntary act in respect of a commandment! Rabbi Eliezer responds that Rabbi Joshua’s analogy is not good. Preparing food on a festival is a voluntary act and hence the rabbis could be strict and forbid shevut violations. However, eating the pesah is a commandment and hence the law should be lenient and allow shevut violations.", + "Rabbi Akiva answered and said: let sprinkling [purificatory waters] prove it, which is [performed] because it is a commandment and is [forbidden only] as a shevut, yet it does not override Shabbat; so you too, do not wonder at these, that though they are [required] on account of a commandment and are [forbidden only] as shevut, yet they do not override Shabbat. Rabbi Akiva, ever the creative sage, steps in after Rabbi Joshua’s argument fails and employs a new analogy. Purificatory waters are sprinkled on a person who has contracted corpse impurity on the third and seventh days of the purification process. However, if the seventh day is Shabbat, the fourteenth of Nisan, they are not sprinkled even though this is necessary to allow the person to be pure and eat his pesah in the evening. The prohibition of sprinkling the water is only one of shevut, and it is a mitzvah and nevertheless it remains prohibited on Shabbat. So too, the carrying of the pesah on the shoulders and outside of the border remain prohibited even though they are for a mitzvah and only prohibited due to shevut.", + "Rabbi Eliezer said to him: but in respect of that I am arguing: if slaughtering, which is a labor, overrides Shabbat, is it not logical that sprinkling, which is [only] a shevut, should override Shabbat! Rabbi Eliezer basically answers that he disagrees concerning that halakhah as well. Just as carrying the animal is shevut and therefore overrides Shabbat, so too sprinkling which is shevut also should override Shabbat.", + "Rabbi Akiva said to him: or the opposite: if sprinkling, which is [forbidden] as a shevut, does not override Shabbat, then slaughtering, which is [normally forbidden] on account of labor, is it not logical that it should not override Shabbat. Rabbi Akiva responds that now that Rabbi Eliezer is trying to overturn traditions (that we don’t sprinkle the purificatory water on Shabbat), he too can overturn a tradition. If we don’t sprinkle the water, even though it is only shevut, then all the more so we shouldn’t slaughter the animal which is a forbidden labor. Rabbi Akiva does not really wish to rule that we shouldn’t slaughter the pesah on Shabbat. What he means to do is reject Rabbi Eliezer’s argument.", + "Rabbi Eliezer said to him: Akiva! You are uprooting what is written in the Torah, “at twilight, offer it at its set time” (Numbers 9:3), both on week-days and on Shabbat. Rabbi Eliezer responds that the Torah explicitly mandates that the pesah be slaughtered on the fourteenth even if this is on Shabbat. Hence, the argument that Rabbi Akiva was trying to make in section six would directly contradict the Torah.", + "He said to him: master, give me an appointed time for these as there is an appointed season for slaughtering! Rabbi Akiva returns to the original argument. The Torah specifically mandates an appointed time for the slaughtering of the pesah. Hence slaughtering overrides Shabbat. The other labors which are not specified by the Torah do not override the Shabbat. This is basically the end of the argument. In the end only activities that seem to be specifically mandated by the Torah are allowed on Shabbat.", + "Rabbi Akiva stated a general rule: work which could be done on the eve of Shabbat does not override Shabbat; slaughtering, which could not be done on the eve of Shabbat, does override Shabbat. The mishnah ends with the same general principle that Rabbi Akiva iterated in Shabbat 19:1 any labor which can be performed before Shabbat must be performed then and does not override Shabbat, but any labor which cannot be performed until Shabbat itself does override Shabbat. Slaughtering the pesah cannot be done before Shabbat, hence it overrides the Shabbat. Carrying the pesah could have been done earlier, hence it does not override the Shabbat. The fact that the mishnah ends with Rabbi Akiva’s opinion is a clear expression of the Mishnah’s general connection to Rabbi Akiva and his school." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nExodus 12 clearly mandates that a lamb be brought for the pesah sacrifice. Deuteronomy 16:2 states, “You shall slaughter the pesah sacrifice for the Lord your God, from the flock and the herd.” The herd refers to cattle (cows) and the flock refers to sheep. The problem is that this verse which allows the pesah to be brought from cattle contradicts Exodus 12 which mandates a lamb. II Chronicles 35 also mentions that cattle were brought along with the lambs. However, in II Chronicles it becomes somewhat clearer that the cattle were not the pesah sacrifice but an accompanying sacrifice. The rabbis call this sacrifice the “hagigah”, a word which comes from “hag” the word for festival in Hebrew, as in “hag sameah” happy holiday. They would eat the hagigah before they ate the pesah so that the pesah could be eaten on a full stomach. Since lambs which could be used for the pesah were not easy to come by, they ate the additional sacrifice before the pesah and then everyone would eat a small amount of pesah to fulfill the commandment.\nOur mishnah teaches that this sacrifice was not really a separate mitzvah in and of itself, but merely an accompaniment to the pesah. Hence it was not always brought.", + "When does he bring a hagigah with it [the pesah sacrifice]? When it comes during the week, in purity, and in small [amounts]. But when it comes on Shabbat, in large [amounts], and in impurity, one does not bring the hagigah with it. The hagigah is not brought in the following three situations: 1) Shabbat. While slaughtering the pesah does override the Shabbat, slaughtering the hagigah does not. Hence, if the eve of Pesah falls on Shabbat the hagigah is not brought. 2) In impurity: Usually, those who eat the pesah sacrifice must be ritually pure. However, if most of the congregation of Israel is in a state of impurity, these laws are waived and they may conduct the sacrifice and eat it while impure (we will learn this in 7:6). Our mishnah teaches that in such a case while they can bring the pesah they do not bring the hagigah. 3) In large amounts: If there is enough pesah meat to feed everyone then the hagigah is not brought. It is only brought if there is a necessity for some extra meat." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to teach the laws regarding the hagigah: what animals can be used for the hagigah and for how long it may be eaten.", + "The hagigah was brought of flocks, herds, lambs or goats, of the males or the females. And it is eaten two days and one night. Any animal, be it a sheep, goat, cow or bull will do for the hagigah. It can also be either male or female. This is contrasted with the pesah which must be a male flock animal (sheep or goat).", + "The hagigah may be eaten on the day it is sacrificed, the night afterwards and the whole following day. This is the same rule as for all sacrifices of well-being (shelamim). In contrast, the pesah sacrifice can only be eaten that very night, and it must be completed before midnight." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe topic of this mishnah is one who slaughters an animal that is supposed to be a sacrifice on Shabbat, the eve of Pesah, but sacrifices it for the wrong purpose. Again we will see an extended argument between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Joshua, two of the same sages who disputed above in mishnah two.", + "If the pesah was slaughtered for a different purpose on Shabbat, he [the slaughterer] is liable to a sin-offering on its account. If a person takes an animal set aside to be a pesah and slaughters it on Shabbat, the eve of Pesah, with the intent of the animal being another type of sacrifice, the sacrifice is invalid and he is liable for transgressing Shabbat. Since he slaughtered an animal without performing a mitzvah, he is not exempt for having slaughtered.", + "All other sacrifices which he slaughtered as a pesah: if they are not fit [to be a pesah] he is liable; if they are fit [to be a pesah]: Rabbi Eliezer makes him liable to a sin-offering, But Rabbi Joshua exempts him. In this case he takes an animal set aside to be another sacrifice and slaughters it for it to be a pesah. If the animal cannot be a pesah, for instance it is a cow, he is liable for the same reason that he was above he has slaughtered an animal without performing a mitzvah. The more debatable issue is if he slaughtered an animal set aside for another sacrifice and that animal can be a pesah, such as a one year old male sheep. In such a case he has performed a valid sacrifice, which is a mitzvah, but he has not fulfilled his pesah obligation and he must bring another pesah sacrifice. According to Rabbi Eliezer he is liable even though he has performed a mitzvah. Rabbi Joshua exempts him because he has performed a mitzvah. The remainder of the mishnah is an extended argument between these two rabbis, an argument very similar to that which we saw in mishnah two.", + "Rabbi Eliezer said to him: if for the pesah, which it is permitted [to slaughter] for its own purpose, yet when he changes its purpose he is liable; then [other] sacrifices, which are forbidden [to slaughter even] for their own purpose, if he changes their purpose is it not logical that he should be liable. Rabbi Eliezer starts out again in a very straightforward manner. Everyone agrees that he is liable if he slaughters a pesah with the wrong intention. If he is liable in this case in which it was permitted to slaughter the pesah, he should also be liable for slaughtering a different sacrifice, which he shouldn’t have been doing in the first place. To put it another way, Rabbi Eliezer is pointing out a problem in Rabbi Joshua’s ruling if he had slaughtered the other sacrifice with the intention of it being that which it should have been, he would have been liable. Why should he be exempt just because he sacrificed it with the intent of it being a pesah?", + "Rabbi Joshua said to him: not so. If you say [with regard to] the pesah, [he is liable] because he changed it to something that is forbidden; will you say [the same] of [other] sacrifices, where he changed them for something that is permitted? Rabbi Joshua says that rather than decide based on what the animal was supposed to be (permitted pesah or forbidden other sacrifice) we should focus on what intent he had when he sacrificed it. When it came to the pesah which he sacrificed with something else in mind he is liable because he changed it to something which is forbidden on Shabbat. His intent was to offer a forbidden sacrifice. In contrast, when it came to the other sacrifice he is exempt since he changed it to something which is permitted. Here, his intent was to offer a permitted sacrifice.", + "Rabbi Eliezer said to him: let the community sacrifices prove it, which are permitted for their own sake, yet he who slaughters [other sacrifices] in their name is liable. Rabbi Eliezer now brings into the debate another type of sacrifice which may be offered on Shabbat public sacrifices such as the tamid or the mussaf. These are permitted if sacrificed with the proper intent, but one who slaughters an animal set aside to be a different animal with the intent of it being a tamid or musaf is liable. This is true even though it is permitted to sacrifice a tamid or musaf. So too, one who slaughters a different animal with the intent of it being a pesah should be liable. In both cases one is slaughtering a different sacrifice with the intent of it being a sacrifice which is permitted on Shabbat, and therefore in both cases the person should be liable.", + "Rabbi Joshua said him: not so. If you say [with regard to] the public sacrifices, [that is] because they have a limit; will you say [the same] of the pesah, which has no limit? Rabbi Joshua points out that this analogy is faulty. There is a limit to the amount of public, mandated sacrifices that can be brought. One can only bring one tamid in the morning and one in the afternoon. The Torah prescribes exactly what must be brought for the musaf. After these have been slaughtered it is forbidden to slaughter any more on Shabbat. Therefore, one who slaughters on Shabbat another sacrifice with the intent of it being a tamid or musaf has performed a forbidden labor. There is no limit to the number of pesah sacrifices that Israel may offer and hence one he offers an additional pesah has not performed a forbidden labor. This is the end of the argument between Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Eliezer. Again, Rabbi Eliezer seems to lose. Clearly the editor of the Mishnah’s sympathies do not lie with him.", + "Rabbi Meir says: he too who slaughters [other sacrifices] in the name of public sacrifice is not liable. Rabbi Meir actually goes a step further than Rabbi Joshua. According to Rabbi Meir one who slaughters another sacrifice with the intent of it being a public sacrifice is also exempt, just like one who slaughters another sacrifice with the intent of it being a pesah. This is a step further because unlike the pesah, these sacrifices cannot be used. He is exempt because his intent was to slaughter the animal for a permitted sacrifice." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe final mishnah of this chapter continues to deal with cases in which a person is liable for slaughtering a pesah on Shabbat.", + "If he slaughtered it for those who are not its eaters, or for those who were not registered for it, for uncircumcised or for unclean [persons], he is liable. In all of these cases he slaughtered the pesah for people who could not eat it (these categories were explained above in 5:3). Since the pesah is disqualified he is liable for having slaughtered on Shabbat.", + "[If he slaughtered it] for its eaters and for those who are not its eaters, for those who are registered for it and for those who are not registered for it, for circumcised and for uncircumcised, for unclean and for clean [persons], he is exempt. In these cases he slaughters the animal for a group of people, some of whom can eat it and some of whom can’t. The pesah is valid (see above 5:3) and therefore he is exempt for having slaughtered on Shabbat.", + "If he slaughtered it, and it was found to possess a blemish, he is liable. Certain blemishes on the animal rend the animal unfit as a sacrifice. If he slaughters such a blemished animal on Shabbat he is liable. He should have checked the animal before he slaughtered it to make sure it was unblemished.", + "If he slaughtered it and it was found to be an internal terefah, he is exempt. A terefah is an animal that has an injury that will cause it to die. A terefah cannot be a valid sacrifice. However, in this case he is exempt because the injury was internal and he had no way of knowing about it until he slaughtered the animal.", + "If he slaughtered it, and [then] it became known that its owners had withdrawn their hands from it, or that they had died, or that they had become unclean, he is not culpable, because he slaughtered it with permission. In these cases he thought he was slaughtering it for a group of people who could eat it, but before he slaughtered it they changed their status such that they could not eat it. Either they “withdrew their hands from it”, meaning they registered for a different pesah, or they died, or they became unclean. In all three cases the pesah is invalid but he is nevertheless not liable because when he slaughtered it he thought he was doing so in a permitted situation." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nExodus 12:9 states that the pesah must be roasted and that it may not be cooked with water. Today’s mishnah and the following one deal with how the pesah is roasted such that there is no water or even hint thereof used in the process.", + "How is the pesah roasted?
They bring a spit of pomegranate wood and thrust it into its mouth [right down] as far as its buttocks, and place its legs and its entrails inside it, the words of Rabbi Yose the Galilean. The pesah is roasted in an oven while on a spit. The spit is made of pomegranate wood, the driest of woods, so that there is as little moisture used in the process as possible. Exodus 12:9 also states that the pesah should be cooked “roasted, head, legs and entrails.” The Hebrew in this verse is oddly phrased and could be translated as “its head, on its legs and entrails.” Rabbi Yose the Galilean interprets this to mean that the legs and entrails, once cut off or removed, should be stuffed into the pesah itself and then roasted inside of it.", + "Rabbi Akiva says: this is like boiling, rather they are hung outside it. Rabbi Akiva disagrees and holds that this would be like boiling the entrails and legs inside the pesah, and any cooking with moisture is forbidden. Rather the entrails and legs are hung on the spit outside the pesah and they are roasted separately. The verse merely means to emphasize that the whole thing must be roasted." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to discuss ways in which they avoided all possibility that the pesah would be cooked with water.", + "One may not roast the pesah either on a [metal] spit or on a grill. Rabbi Zadok said: it once happened that Rabban Gamaliel said to his servant Tabi, “Go out and roast us the pesah on the grill.” According to the first opinion in the mishnah, the pesah cannot be cooked using any metal. The problem with metal is that it will heat up and it will cook the pesah and not the fire. The rabbis were adamant that the pesah be cooked only by the fire itself and not by things which had been themselves heated by fire. Rabban Gamaliel disagrees and holds that heat which is derived from the fire has the same status as the fire itself. Therefore, he could tell his slave to go out and roast the pesah on a grill. As an aside, we should note that Rabban Gamaliel in this mishnah probably is the Rabban Gamaliel who lived after the destruction of the Temple. Nevertheless, he continues to eat a “pesah”. This is not the only evidence for such a practice after the destruction of the Temple. Nevertheless, as time passed, this practice became less and less accepted.", + "If it [the pesah] touched the clay of the oven, he should pare its place. If the pesah touched the oven, then they should pare off the place on the pesah which the oven touched. This piece of its meat was cooked by the heat of the oven’s clay and not directly by the fire and hence it shouldn’t be eaten.", + "If some of its juice dripped on to the clay [of the oven] and dripped back on to it, he must remove its place. If some of the juices from the pesah fell onto the oven and were there cooked by the clay of the oven and then fell back onto the pesah, then it is not enough just to pare off some of the pesah. Rather they must cut off the part onto which the juices fell and were absorbed and not eat that part. The Talmud says that they should cut off an inch deep of meat.", + "If some of its juice fell on the flour, he must take a handful away from its place. If some of the juices of the pesah fell onto some flour which was boiling, then the juices are being cooked by the flour and therefore cannot be eaten. What he must do is take a handful away from the flour and burn it in the same way that all disqualified sacrifices are burned." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe two sections of this mishnah deal with a person who basted their pesah with oils that are restricted by who can eat them or where they can be eaten. The mishnah deals with the consequences of such an action.", + "If he basted it [the pesah] with oil of terumah: If they who registered for it are a company of priests, they may eat [it]. But if Israelites, if it is [still] raw, they may wash it off; if it is roasted, he must pare the outer part. Terumah oil can only be eaten by priests. If the pesah which has been basted with terumah oil is intended for a company of priests, then they may still eat it. However, a company of Israelites cannot eat the oil. If the pesah is still raw they may wash it off, dry it (so that it won’t be cooked with water) and then roast it. Washing it off is a valid way of removing the oil. If they basted it with the terumah oil and then roasted it, the oil has sunk into the pesah. What they must do is pare off the outer layer of the pesah’s meat. This meat cannot be eaten by the Israelites because it has terumah oil cooked into it.", + "If he anointed it with oil of second tithe, he must not charge its value for the members of the company, because second tithe must not be redeemed in Jerusalem. Second tithe is usually redeemed for money, the money is brought to Jerusalem and it is used there to buy food. However, second tithe that has arrived in Jerusalem without being redeemed may not be redeemed there. Therefore, if a person has basted his company’s pesah offering with second tithe he may not charge the other members of the company for the value of the oil since this would be a form of redeeming the second tithe in Jerusalem, the only place where the pesah can be eaten." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nAccording to Numbers 9, if a person is impure when the pesah sacrifice is offered on the fourteenth of Nisan, he receives a second chance on the fourteenth of Iyyar, the following month. The rabbis understood this to mean that individuals could not offer and eat the pesah sacrifice while impure but that if most of the congregation of Israel was impure, or if the priests or their vessels were impure on the fourteenth of Nisan, they would in any case bring the pesah sacrifice and eat it as well. The same is true for all sacrifices whose time is fixed they are offered even if the people are impure.\nOur mishnah deals with five other sacrifices that are eaten by priests and that are offered even in “uncleanness” because their time is fixed. The difference between these five and the pesah is that the pesah is not only offered when the priests or the people are unclean, it is eaten as well.", + "Five things [sacrifices] may come in uncleanness, but may not be eaten in uncleanness:
the omer, The omer, an offering of barley, is offered on the day after the first day of Pesah (Leviticus 23:10).", + "the two loaves, These are brought on Shavuot (see Leviticus 23:17).", + "the showbread, Twelve new loaves are placed on the table in the Temple every Shabbat (Leviticus 24:5).", + "the sacrifices of the public peace-offerings, This refers to the two sheep which are brought on Shavuot with the two loaves (Leviticus 23:19).", + "and the goats of new months. See Numbers 25:15. The same is true for all of the goats which are brought on various holidays and are referred to in Numbers 25. All of these sacrifices are brought even in uncleanness but are not eaten in uncleanness because the main purpose of bringing them is not to eat them but to sacrifice them.", + "The pesah which comes in uncleanness is [also] eaten in uncleanness, for from the very beginning it came for no other purpose but to be eaten. In contrast, the pesah is eaten as well because the main purpose of bringing the pesah is that it should be eaten. This is derived from Exodus 12:4 which emphasizes that the groups formed to eat the pesah are composed of the number of people who can eat one lamb. The main point is the eating and not just the sacrificing." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah deals with cases where the congregation of Israel is pure but part of the pesah sacrifice has become unclean.", + "If the flesh was defiled while the fat remained [clean], he may not sprinkle the blood but if the fat was defiled while the flesh has remained [clean], he must sprinkle the blood. If the flesh was defiled but the fat which is supposed to be burned on the altar remains clean he cannot sprinkle the blood on the altar. Since the pesah’s main purpose is to be eaten, if the flesh cannot be eaten the sacrifice is not valid and the blood cannot be sprinkled. In the opposite case, if the fat has been defiled and the flesh remains pure, the fat cannot be burned on the altar but the blood can still be sprinkled. Since the main purpose of the pesah is to be eaten, as long as the flesh can be eaten the blood can be sprinkled.", + "But in the case of [other] dedicated sacrifices it is not so, rather even if the flesh was defiled while the fat has remained clean, he must sprinkle the blood. Other sacrifices are different. Since their main purpose is to be sacrificed and not necessarily to be eaten, their blood may be sprinkled in either case. If the flesh becomes impure the blood is sprinkled in order to allow the fat to be burned on the altar. If the fat becomes impure, the blood is sprinkled in order to allow the flesh to be eaten." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah provides the basic laws concerning when the pesah sacrifice is offered in “uncleanness.” We should note that the form of impurity/uncleanness to which this topic refers to is one who has come into contact with a dead body.", + "If the community or the majority thereof was unclean, or if the priests were unclean and the community clean, they make [the pesah sacrifice] in uncleanness. The pesah sacrifice is offered in uncleanness only if either a majority of the community of Israel was unclean or if the priests were unclean. In one of these two situations, they offer the sacrifice on the fourteenth of Nisan, its usual date.", + "If a minority of the community were unclean: those who are clean observe the first [Pesah], while those who are unclean observe the second. If, however, only a minority of the community were unclean, then the laws of Numbers 9 apply. Those who are clean offer the pesah on the fourteenth of Nisan while those who are unclean are given a second chance, on the fourteenth of Iyyar." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah deals with a case where the blood of the pesah sacrifice was sprinkled on the altar and then it became known that either the pesah had been unclean or that its owners were unclean.", + "A pesah whose blood has been sprinkled and then it became known that it was unclean, the frontlet propitiates. The frontlet was one of the pieces of clothing worn by the high priest. In reference to this frontlet Exodus 28:38 states, “It shall be on Aaron’s forehead, that Aaron may take away any sin arising from the holy things that the Israelites consecrate.” According to the sages, this means that if the blood of a sacrifice, in our case the pesah sacrifice, was sprinkled against the altar and afterwards it became known that it was unclean, the frontlet propitiates (makes up) for the sin and the pesah’s owners do not need to bring another pesah sacrifice. However, this pesah cannot be eaten only in the cases in yesterday’s mishnah can an impure pesah be eaten.", + "If the body of [the owner] became unclean, the frontlet does not propitiate, because they [the sages] said: [in the case of] a nazirite, and he who sacrifices the pesah-offering, the frontlet propitiates for the uncleanness of the blood, but the frontlet does not propitiate for the uncleanness of the body [of the owner]. However, if the owners themselves were impure the frontlet does not propitiate for the blood having been sprinkled on the altar. In this case the owners would be liable to bring another pesah on what is called “Pesah Sheni” the Second Passover on the fourteenth of the next month. The mishnah explains that for two types of sacrifices the frontlet does not propitiate in cases where the owner was unclean the pesah and the nazirite offering. The nazirite situation refers to a situation in which a nazirite completed the period of his naziriteship and brought the requisite sacrifices. It then turns out that the nazirite was unclean, and it is forbidden for a nazirite to defile himself. He therefore must bring a different sacrifice for having become impure during his naziriteship and then begin a new term. For all other sacrifices besides these two, the frontlet propitiates whether the sacrifice is unclean or the sacrifice’s owner is unclean.", + "If he was defiled with the uncleanness of the deep, the frontlet propitiates. “Uncleanness of the deep” refers to someone who becomes defiled through contact with a dead body that no one knew was there. It could be understood as “previously unknown uncleanness” the impurity is hidden as if it was “in the deep.” This type of impurity is an exception to the above case if someone who brought a pesah or his nazirite offerings finds out that he had been defiled by “uncleanness of the deep” the frontlet does propitiate and the sacrifices do count." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nA pesah that has become unclean cannot be eaten, at least not when the pesah is done in purity (see above 7:6). Our mishnah teaches where an unclean pesah is burned.", + "If all or most of [the pesah] became unclean they burn it in front of the Birah with the wood of the pile. If most or all of the pesah becomes impure it is burned in front of the “Birah.” In the Talmud there is a debate over what the “Birah” is. According to one opinion, it refers to a tower on the Temple mount. According to another opinion the entire Temple is called the “Birah.” All sacrifices that have become impure can be burned in any place in which they may be eaten. In our case, this would mean that the pesah could be burned anywhere in Jerusalem, since it may be eaten anywhere in Jerusalem. The Talmud explains that forcing its owners to burn it in a very public place is a penalty placed upon them for letting there pesah become impure. The wood they use is wood from the Temple’s wood pile, wood normally used to burn the sacrifices on the altar.", + "If a lesser part of it became unclean, and also “remainder”, they [the people] burn it in their courtyards or on their roofs with their own wood. Misers burn it in front of the Birah, in order to benefit from the wood of the pile. If only a minority portion of the pesah became unclean then its owners can burn it in his own courtyard in Jerusalem. The same is true for “remainder” the part of the sacrifice which hasn’t been eaten within the proscribed time. For the pesah this means that anything left by the next morning (see Exodus 12:10). “Remainder” of all sacrifices must be burned. In these two cases they should use their own wood to burn the unclean or leftover portion. They may not use Temple wood within their own courtyard lest they use the wood for other purposes. The mishnah relates that misers, those who are stingy and want to save their own wood for other purposes, would burn even a partially unclean pesah or remainder at the Birah with wood from the pile. While this is technically allowed, it is frowned upon by the rabbis, and those who do so are awarded by our mishnah with the epitaph “misers.”" + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to deal with a pesah sacrifice, one that has already been slaughtered, that must be burned because it has been disqualified.", + "A pesah which went out [beyond the walls of Jerusalem] or was defiled must be burned immediately. The pesah, once slaughtered, cannot be brought outside of the walls of Jerusalem. If it does it is disqualified. A pesah that has been disqualified, either by becoming defiled or by being brought beyond the walls of Jerusalem must be burned immediately, on the fourteenth of Nisan.", + "If its owners were defiled or they died, its form must change and [then] it is burned on the sixteenth [of Nisan]. Rabbi Yohanan ben Berokah says: this too must be burned immediately, because there are none to eat it. In this case the pesah itself did not become disqualified but rather those who were supposed to eat it were either disqualified or died. The pesah itself now has no one that can eat it. According to the first opinion, it is not burned immediately but rather they wait until the following night, when its form has already begun to change. “Form changing” does not refer to the pesah’s physical form but to its halakhic form it is now “remainder” and must be burned. Note that it could not be burned on the fifteenth because the fifteenth is a festival day and sanctified meat which has been disqualified is not burned on a festival. Rabbi Yohanan ben Berokah says that this pesah, which has no one to eat it (poor little lamby) is treated the same as if the pesah itself had become disqualified. It is burned immediately on the fourteenth and they do not wait until it becomes “remainder.”" + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah teaches when the uneaten parts of the pesah are to be burned.", + "The bones, and the sinews, and the “remainder” [of the pesah] are burned on the sixteenth. Exodus 12:10 states, “Do not leave any of it [the pesah] until morning, and anything which remains in the morning must be burned in fire.” This is the law of “remainder” referred to in our mishnah and in the mishnayot above. However, this refers to the edible meat it is unclear why one has to burn the bones and sinews which are not edible. One opinion explains that the marrow of the bones is edible, so therefore the bones must be burned as well. The sinews to which the mishnah refers are sinews which are edible. Another explanation is that the bones and sinews are not edible but they are burned in any case in order to prevent people from thinking that they can eat their pesah the next day. In other words, the halakhah tells people to burn everything that is left so that they will be careful and not eat the remaining meat.", + "If the sixteenth falls on Shabbat, they are burned on the seventeenth, because they do not override either Shabbat or the festival. Burning the “remainder” does not override the Shabbat or festival prohibition against burning. Burning the “remainder” is a positive commandment and not burning on Shabbat or the festival is considered to be both a positive and a negative commandment. Generally, a positive commandment does not override one which has both a positive and negative aspect. Therefore, the pesah is normally burned on the sixteenth, the day after the first day of the festival, but if the sixteenth falls on Shabbat it is burned on the seventeenth." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first section of this mishnah deals with what parts of the pesah sacrifice are eaten.\nThe second section deals with several potential violations involved in eating the pesah.", + "Everything which can be eaten of a full-grown ox may be eaten of a tender goat, as well as the tops of the forelegs and the cartilages. As we have mentioned on several occasions, people needed to register to eat the pesah sacrifice before it was sacrificed. There had to be enough meat for each person to eat at least an olive amount’s worth of the pesah. Therefore they had to estimate how much of the animal could be eaten. The mishnah states that any part of a fully grown ox that can be eaten can also be eaten from a tender goat, the animal used as the pesah sacrifice. Additionally, the tops of the forelegs and the cartilages of the tender goat may be eaten as well. However, besides these two things any part of the tender goat that is not eaten in a fully grown ox does not count when they figure out how much meat there will be to go around from the pesah. Furthermore, it is permitted to leave inedible parts uneaten and one does not violate the prohibition of leaving any of it until morning.", + "He who breaks a bone of a clean pesah receives forty [lashes] but he who leaves over [flesh] of a clean [pesah] or breaks [a bone] of an unclean [one] does not receive the forty [lashes.] Exodus 12:46 prohibits breaking the bone of a pesah sacrifice. One who breaks the bone of a pure pesah sacrifice has violated a negative commandment. The mishnah expresses this violation by saying that he gets forty lashes, the amount of lashes prescribed for the violation of any negative commandment. The Torah also prohibits leaving any of the pesah over until the following morning. However, one is not lashed for violating this prohibition because the verse gives a remedy for the violation. Exodus 12:10 states, “Do not leave any of it over until morning, and what remains in the morning shall be burned in fire.” The fact that a remedy exists for the violation means that one is not punished by lashes for the violation itself. An alternative reason that punishments are not meted out for leaving over the pesah is that it is a passive violation and only active violations are punished. Breaking a bone of an unclean pesah is not punished by lashes since the pesah is in any case disqualified." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nAbove in mishnah nine we learned that if the pesah is taken out of the city of Jerusalem it is thereby disqualified. Similarly, once the meat of a pesah has been brought into the house in which it is supposed to be eaten, it may not be taken out. Our mishnah teaches what happens if part of the pesah is taken out of the city after it has already been slaughtered.", + "If part of a limb went outside, he cuts [the flesh] as far as the bone and pares it until he reaches the joint and cuts it away. If part of the a limb goes out, he cuts away to the bone but does not cut the bone itself because it is forbidden to break the bone of a pesah. He then pares away the meat that did not go out of either Jerusalem or the home and then they may eat that meat. After the meat has been scraped off he cuts off the limb at the joint and then burns the rest of the limb because part of it has gone beyond its border.", + "But in the case of [other] sanctified meat he cuts it off with a large knife, because they are not subject to the [prohibition of] breaking a bone. With other sacrifices that have gone beyond their permitted borders, either Jerusalem or the Temple, he need not be so cautious since there is no prohibition of breaking a bone. Instead he may simply cut off the part that went beyond the border and the remainder may still be eaten.", + "From the door-stop and within it is as the inside; From the door-stop and without is as outside. The windows and the thickness of the wall are as the inside. This section discusses when something is considered to have actually left the city. The door-stop refers to the molding of the door frame against which a door stops. If it is inside the door-stop it is still considered to be inside the house or the city. If it is within the windows or within the thickness of the wall (for instance the thick walls of Jerusalem, or of the Temple) it is considered to be inside." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nAs we have stated before, people would divide into “companies” in order to eat the pesah, and each company would eat one pesah. It is forbidden for a person to eat the pesah with two different companies and it is also forbidden for one company to eat in two places. Our mishnah deals with how two companies can share one house.\nI should note that I have explained the mishnah according to the Rambam’s explanation, one which is adopted by Albeck. Others explain it differently.", + "Two companies which are eating in one room, these turn their faces in one direction and eat and they turn their faces in another direction and eat, and the boiler is in the middle. In order for it not to seem that the two companies are mixed and are sharing two different pesah sacrifices, each company faces in a different direction. The mishnah allows one boiler to be placed in the middle, even though this would contribute to the impression that the two are sharing their pesahim. The boiler is a pot of hot water with which to mix the wine.", + "When the servant rises to mix [the wine], he must shut his mouth and turn his face away [from the other company] until he reaches his own company and [there] he eats. Although the servant, a Jew, can serve both groups, he may be registered with only one of them. So that it is clear that he is not eating from the other group, when he mixes wine for a group other than his own he must close his mouth and not swallow. He must also turn his mouth towards his own group so that they don’t think that he is eating with the other group.", + "But a bride may turn her face away and eat. A bride, who may be embarrassed to eat in front of others, is allowed to turn her face away from her own group. This will not seem like she is eating with two groups." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nIt would have been customary for the head of a household to slaughter a pesah on behalf of the members of his household, on the assumption that they would eat it. Our mishnah deals with certain persons about whom it is unclear to which household they belong. The problem will arise if two households slaughter a pesah on behalf of one person from which one can they eat?", + "A wife, when she is in her husband’s home, and her husband slaughtered on her behalf and her father slaughtered on her behalf, she must eat of her husband's. A wife who is spending pesah in her husband’s home is assumed to be part of her husband’s household. Therefore, if both her husband and her father slaughtered a pesah on her behalf, she must eat of her husband’s.", + "If she went to spend the first festival in her father's home, and her father slaughtered on her behalf and her husband slaughtered on her behalf, she may eat wherever she pleases. If she went to spend the festival in her father’s house, and again both her father and husband slaughtered a pesah on her behalf, she may eat from whichever she chooses. Since she was with her father she may even eat of his. Nevertheless, since she is already married she may alternatively eat of her husband’s pesah. Of course, she cannot eat of both.", + "An orphan on whose behalf his guardians slaughtered may eat wherever he pleases. If an orphan has two or more guardians, each of whom slaughtered a pesah on his behalf, he may eat from whichever he pleases. He does not belong exclusively to any one of them.", + "A slave of two partners may not eat of either. A master cannot slaughter a pesah for his slave if that slave is partially owned by another master. The only way to arrange this situation is for the two slave owners to jointly make one pesah.", + "He who is half slave and half free may not eat of his master's. A half-slave, one who was owned jointly and then freed by one of the partners but not the other may not eat of his master’s pesah. The assumption is that when the master slaughtered the pesah, he did not do so on behalf of his slave whom he owned only partially. The master would have assumed that the slave would make his own pesah. Therefore, this is what the half-slave must do." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nA pesah can be either a kid (a goat) or a lamb (a sheep) (see Exodus 12:5). This mishnah deals with a slave who slaughters a pesah on behalf of his master, who may or not have cared whether the pesah was a kid or a lamb. The mishnah resolves how to deal with potential confusions.", + "One who says to his slave, “Go out and slaughter the pesah on my behalf”, if he slaughtered a kid, he may eat it; if he slaughtered a lamb, he may eat it; if he slaughtered a kid and a lamb, he eats the first. In this case his master did not tell him what type of animal, a kid (a goat) or a lamb (sheep), to slaughter for his pesah. Therefore, the slave may slaughter either of them, even though he knows that his master generally prefers one type or the other, or perhaps generally makes his pesah from a certain type and not the other. If the slave slaughters both a kid and a lamb the first counts as the master’s pesah, whichever that one may be, and the second does not.", + "If he forgot what his master told him, how should he act? He should slaughter a lamb and a kid and declare, “If my master told me [to slaughter] a kid, the kid is his and the lamb is mine; and if my master told me [to slaughter] a lamb, the lamb is his and the kid is mine.” In this case the master did tell him which animal to slaughter but the slave forgot. The solution is for the slave to make stipulations when he slaughters both animals. He slaughters them both and makes a stipulation that if the lamb is what his master wanted, then the lamb is the master’s pesah and the goat is his and vice versa.", + "If his master [also] forgot what he told him, both animals go to the place of burning, but they [the master and the slave] are exempt from sacrificing the second pesah. In this case when the slave returns to the master it turns out that even the master has forgotten what he told his slave to do. The stipulation will not avail because the master doesn’t know which is his and which the slave’s is. Therefore, neither animal can be eaten; both must be burned. However, the mishnah states that neither the slave nor the master has to offer a second pesah a month later because when the blood was sprinkled upon the altar, the master still knew which one was his (assuming that this is true). He only forgot later when the slave returned with the two slaughtered animals." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to deal with slaughtering the pesah on behalf of members of one’s family.", + "If a man says to his children, “Behold, I am going to slaughter the pesah on behalf of whichever of you goes up first to Jerusalem,” as soon as the first has put his head and the greater part of his body [into Jerusalem] he has acquired his portion, and he acquires it on behalf of his brothers with him. A father says to his children that he is going to slaughter a pesah on behalf of the first one that gets to Jerusalem. The idea is not that only one of them will get to eat the pesah and that the others will have to slaughter their own pesah but that the first to get to Jerusalem will merit having the pesah be “his pesah” and his siblings will join him. The mishnah rules that the first person to get his head and majority of his body is the “owner of the pesah” and that he acquires it on behalf of the others.", + "One may always register for it as long as there is as much as an olive’s worth for each one [registered]. Each person is obligated to eat an olive’s worth of the pesah sacrifice in order to fulfill his obligation. Hence, the mishnah rules that as many people as wish to may register for any given pesah so long as there is an olive’s worth of meat for each one.", + "They may register and withdraw their hands from it until it has been slaughtered; Rabbi Shimon says: until the blood is sprinkled. New people may register and those who have already registered may deregister (“withdraw their hands”) until the pesah has been slaughtered. Rabbi Shimon says that they may continue to do so until the blood of the pesah has been sprinkled on the altar. According to a source in the Talmud Rabbi Shimon allows people only to deregister after the pesah has been slaughtered and before the blood has been sprinkled. He agrees that one must register before it is slaughtered." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah teaches what happens if a person registers others to share with him in his portion of the pesah.", + "If one registers others with him [to share] in his portion, the members of the company are permitted to give him his [portion], and he eats his and they eat theirs. The person in this mishnah registers others to eat his portion of the pesah but he doesn’t tell the other members of the company. When they find out they don’t want to share their pesah with this person. What they may do is tell their friend that he can share his portion with those who registered with him and that they are not going to share their portion. He and those who registered with him eat his portion and the other people eat theirs. In essence, he has made his own new eating company." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn order to understand this mishnah we will first need to explain some of the terms and halakhot it mentions. These are some technical laws concerning purity/impurity.\nThe mishnah deals with a “zav” and a “zavah” a man or woman who have had abnormal genital discharge (i.e. not semen or menstrual blood). A man who experiences one such occurrence is impure until the evening, the same as a man who has a seminal discharge. If he experiences two such discharges, either on the same day or on consecutive days he is now a zav (see Leviticus 15:1-12). He is impure for seven days. If he experiences three discharges he must also bring a sacrifice at the end of the period of his impurity, on the eighth day. In both latter cases he cannot eat sacred food until he is pure and if necessary has brought the requisite sacrifices.\nThe main difference between a zav and a zavah is that a zavah must experience her discharges on different days two discharges on one day count as one and not as two. Furthermore, the discharge must not come when she normally has her menstrual period. Since this is not supposed to be her menstrual period, even blood counts as “abnormal discharge.” Calculating when this period falls is complicated and I shall not enter into it here. If during this period she sees discharge/blood for one day she needs not to have a discharge the following day, and then she can go to the mikveh (ritual bath). This woman is called “observing a day for a day.” If she has two consecutive days of discharge, on the third day she can go to the mikveh, provided that she has no discharge on that day. However, if she has three consecutive days of discharge she becomes a “complete zavah”. She must now wait seven days in which she does not have a discharge, on the seventh day she can go to the mikveh and on the eighth day she brings a sacrifice. As is the case with the zav, she cannot eat sacred food until she has brought these sacrifices.\nOur mishnah teaches that one should slaughter the pesah on behalf of a person who can eat sacred food in the evening of the fifteenth of Nisan, the time when the pesah is eaten, even though on the fourteenth he/she is still unable to do so. The only exception to this rule is someone who is impure through contact with a corpse even if he becomes pure at night if he is impure during the day of the fourteenth they do not slaughter the pesah on his behalf.", + "If a zav saw two instances [of discharge], they slaughter [the pesah] on his behalf on his seventh [day]. This zav has seen only two episodes of discharge and hence he is not a “complete zav” who would have to bring a sacrifice at the end of seven days. At the end of seven days he need only go to the mikveh. If his seventh day falls on the fourteenth of Nisan they slaughter the pesah on his behalf because he can eat it that night.", + "If he saw three [instances of discharge], they slaughter on his behalf on his eighth [day]. If he saw three instances of discharge he goes to the mikveh on the seventh day and must bring sacrifices on the eighth day. He cannot eat sacred food until after he has brought his sacrifices. Therefore if the eighth day falls on the fourteenth they may slaughter the pesah on his behalf. If, however, the seventh day were to fall on the fourteenth they would not be able to slaughter the pesah for him because he could not eat it at night, before he brings the sacrifices the next day.", + "If a woman observes a “day for a day”, they slaughter on her behalf on her second day. This woman has experienced one episode of discharge/blood during a non-menstrual time of the month. She may go to the mikveh the following night. Therefore, if the second day falls on the fourteenth of Nisan, they slaughter the pesah on her behalf.", + "If she saw [a discharge] on two days, they slaughter on her behalf on the third [day]. This woman has experienced discharges for two consecutive days. On the third day she may go to the mikveh, provided she doesn’t have a discharge on that day. Since that evening she may eat sacred food they slaughter the pesah on her behalf.", + "And as for a zavah, they slaughter on her behalf on the eighth [day]. This woman has experienced three consecutive days of discharge and is therefore a “complete zavah.” She must wait seven clean days (days in which she doesn’t experience discharge) and then she may go to the mikveh at night and must bring sacrifices the following day, the eighth day. If the fourteenth falls on this, the eighth day, they may slaughter the pesah on her behalf because she will be able to eat the pesah that evening." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses slaughtering the pesah on behalf of various categories of people who may not be able to eat it.", + "[As to] an onen, and one who is removing a heap [of stones], and likewise one whom they promised to take out of prison, and a sick or an old person who can eat as much as an olive, they slaughter on their behalf. This is a list of people who may be able to eat the pesah offering in the evening even though they are currently (i.e. on the 14th of Pesah) in a state in which they cannot eat it. A person whose close relative (one of the seven for whom he must mourn: mother, father, brother, sister, daughter, son or spouse) has died is an onen on the day of the death. He is forbidden to eat sacred food. However, the following evening he is no longer an onen and he may eat his pesah. They sacrifice the pesah on his behalf even though there is a chance that while burying his dead he may contract corpse impurity and not be able to eat the pesah. “One who is removing a heap of stones” refers to a person clearing out a heap of stones which may have fallen upon and killed a person. If it turns out that there is a dead body under the heap then he will be impure and will not be able to eat his pesah that evening. Nevertheless, until a dead body is found the remover is assumed to be pure and they do slaughter the pesah on his behalf. One who is stuck in prison on the fourteenth of Nisan may not be able to eat his pesah. Evidently the pesah is not part of the prison meal plan. If they promised to let him out they do slaughter the pesah on his behalf even though it is not certain that he will actually be let out in time. An old or sick person may not be able to eat an olive’s worth of the pesah, even though it seems like they will be able to. In any case, since it seems likely that these people will be able to eat the pesah, they do slaughter it on their behalf. Note that if we know that the old or sick person will not be able to eat even an olive’s worth of the pesah they do not slaughter on his behalf.", + "[Yet in the case of] all these, they may not slaughter for them alone, lest they bring the pesah to disqualification. They should not slaughter the pesah on behalf of a group which is entirely made up of the above categories of people. The problem is that if an entire group cannot eat the pesah then the pesah itself becomes disqualified. It is best to avoid this situation and therefore the entire group should not consist of people who are in a “risky” category.", + "Therefore if a disqualification occurs to them, they are exempt from keeping the second pesah, except for one who was removing the heap, because he was unclean from the beginning. If they slaughter the pesah on behalf of one of the people in this category and then it they become impure or become otherwise unable to eat the pesah (stuck in jail or sick), they do not need to observe the second pesah. This is because at the moment that the blood of the first pesah was sprinkled on the altar they looked like they were going to be able to eat the pesah at night. The only exception is the one who was uncovering the heap of stones because he was impure at the outset, when the blood was sprinkled. If it turns out that there was a body under the heap, then he was already impure when they slaughtered the pesah on his behalf and sprinkled its blood. To put it another way, concerning this person what is unclear is not whether he will become impure, as it is with the onen, but rather whether he has already been made impure." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to deal with how the company of those who would together eat the pesah was formed.", + "They may not slaughter the pesah for a single person, the words of Rabbi Judah. But Rabbi Yose permits it. The problem with slaughtering the pesah for a single person is that it is highly unlikely that he will be able to eat the whole thing. In all likelihood, a large portion of it will become “remainder” and it is prohibited to let any of the pesah remain uneaten until the morning. Therefore, Rabbi Judah forbids slaughtering the pesah for a single person. Rabbi Yose permits it, assuming that the person will be able to eat the entire pesah (a Homer Simpsonesque pesah feast).", + "And even a company of a hundred who cannot eat as much as an olive, one may not slaughter [a pesah] for them. While Rabbi Yose allows one to slaughter a pesah for a single person who can eat the whole thing he does not allow slaughtering for a large group that can certainly together eat the whole thing unless each person can eat as much as an olive’s worth.", + "And one may not form a company of women and slaves and minors. There are two different explanations for this section. According to one explanation, it is forbidden to have a company that is all women, all slaves or all minors. According to another explanation, it is forbidden to have a company mixed with slaves and women for fear of licentiousness. This is a common theme with regard to slaves they are considered to be sexually licentious." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses whether various categories of people may eat their pesah in the evening.", + "An onen immerses [in a mikveh] and eats his pesah in the evening, but not [other] sacred food. To remind ourselves that which we learned above in mishnah six, a person is an onen on the day upon which one of his seven close relative dies. According to Torah law, a person is an onen only during the day. An onen may not eat sacred food. The rabbis added that on the following evening he remains an onen, but at this point he is only an “onen derabbanan”, an onen of rabbinic status. Since his status is not so severe, he may eat the pesah in the evening. The rabbis did not disallow this because this is his only opportunity to eat the pesah. However, he may still not eat other sacred food until the following day.", + "One who hears about his dead [for the first time], and one who gathers the bones [of his dead relative] immerses and eats sacred food. If one hears that one of his relatives died after some time has passed, meaning not on the day upon which they died, that day he has the status of an onen derabbanan. At night he is not an onen at all and he may therefore eat any sacred food. It was customary in the mishnaic period to bury people and then about a year later when the flesh was gone to collect their bones and put them into an ossuary. On the day upon which a person collects his mother or father’s bones he is an onen derabbanan. He too may eat sacred food, including the pesah, in the evening.", + "A convert who converts on the eve of Pesah: Bet Shammai say: he immerses and eats his pesah in the evening. Bet Hillel say: anyone who separates from the foreskin is like one who separates from the grave. This is somewhat of a difficult section to understand because it is unclear what the immersion in this mishnah is for. It does not seem to be the immersion customary upon conversion. Rather it seems to be some type of immersion to rid the non-Jew of an impurity which he carries over with him through his conversion. According to Bet Shammai this is a mild form of impurity and therefore, once he immerses himself, he may eat the pesah that evening. Bet Hillel says that the impurity is like that of corpse impurity, which is seven days. Hence he may not eat the pesah that evening, just as one who has come into contact with a corpse may not eat the pesah in the evening. The Talmud explains that the debate is about the concern that the non-Jew may have contracted corpse impurity right before he converts. A non-Jew is not subject to corpse impurity and hence when he converts he is pure and could technically eat the pesah. However, if he is allowed to eat the pesah this year then the following year he may think that he is also allowed to eat the pesah, even if he contracts corpse impurity. Therefore Bet Hillel forbids him from eating the pesah this year as well. Bet Shammai does not share in this concern and hence allows him to eat the pesah that night." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThe first four mishnayot of our chapter deal with what is called “Pesah Sheni”, the second pesah. The laws of Pesah Sheni are taught in Numbers 9:9-13. Pesah Sheni is observed on the fourteenth of Iyyar, one month after the first Pesah.", + "He who was unclean or on a far-off journey and did not keep the first [Pesah] must keep the second. The Torah specifies that a person who was unclean during the first Pesah, or one who was far from Jerusalem on a long journey and therefore could not offer the first Pesah must observe Pesah Sheni. There is no new information in this section in the Mishnah it is taught in order to serve as an introduction to the following clauses.", + "If he unwittingly erred or was prevented and did not keep the first, he must keep the second. This section teaches that not only one who was unclean or far away is allowed to keep Pesah Sheni, but also one who couldn’t offer the pesah on its original date for another reason. This would include an error in remembering the date of Pesah or any other thing which prevented him, as long as it was not intentional.", + "If so, why does it say “an unclean person” and “one who was one a long journey” specified? That these are not liable to karet, whereas these are liable to karet. This question is midrashic in nature it asks a question about a verse in the Torah. If everyone who through no fault of his own cannot observe the first Pesah is allowed to observe Pesah Sheni, then why does the Torah specify these two categories of people? The answer is that someone who was unclean or on a far-off journey for the first Pesah and then did not keep Pesah Sheni is exempt from the punishment of karet, the usual punishment for one who didn’t observe Pesah. This is true even if they intentionally did not keep Pesah Sheni. This is because they were exempt from the first Pesah and the Torah does not mention the punishment of karet with regard to one who does not keep Pesah Sheni. In contrast, a person who didn’t keep the first Pesah because of error or because something prevented him and then he intentionally didn’t observe Pesah Sheni is liable for karet. These people were obligated for the first Pesah and even though something prevented them from doing so, the obligation still stood. The Torah specifies concerning this person, “But if a man who is clean and not on a journey refrains from offering the passover sacrifice, that person shall be cut off from his kin (karet)” (Numbers 9:13). The rabbis say that this verse refers to one who unintentionally missed the first opportunity but intentionally skipped the second." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn yesterday’s mishnah we learned that one who was far away from the Temple when the first Pesah occurred gets a second chance and may observe Pesah Sheni. Our mishnah defines what “far off” means.", + "What is “a far-off journey”?
From Modi’im and beyond, and the same distance on all sides [of Jerusalem], the words of Rabbi Akiva. According to Rabbi Akiva “far-off” means the distance from Modi’im to Jerusalem, about 30 km (I should know, I live in Modiin and travel to Jerusalem every day. With traffic this takes between 45 minutes and an hour, but they didn’t have cars. Then again, they didn’t have traffic either. Modi’im is also where the Maccabees lived). According to the Talmud it would take about half a spring day’s walk to get from Modi’im to Jerusalem. The reason for half a day’s walk is that if he wanted to slaughter the pesah on time he had to get there while they were still doing so.", + "Rabbi Eliezer says: from the threshold of the Temple court and beyond. Rabbi Yose said to him: for that reason the heh has a dot on it in order to say, not because it is really far-off, but [even when one is] from the threshold of the Temple court and beyond. Rabbi Eliezer holds that “far-off” means anyone who was not actually in the Temple at that time. This is somewhat perplexing why should “far-off” mean one step away? Rabbi Yose doesn’t answer this question but says that the dot on top of the heh in the word “far-off” (Numbers 9:10) hints that “far-off” is not to be taken literally. If you look at a Torah or a Humash you will see that that dot is still there today." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah lists some differences and similarities between the first Pesah and the second.", + "What is the difference between the first Pesah and the second?
The first is subject to the prohibition of [chametz] shall not be seen and [chametz] shall not be found, while at the second matzah and chametz are in the house with him. The chametz prohibitions are stated only in Exodus 12-13 (Pesah Rishon the first Pesah) and are not mentioned in Numbers 9 (Pesah Sheni). Therefore, the rabbis teach that these prohibitions apply only to the first Pesah and not to the second.", + "The first requires [the reciting of] Hallel when it is eaten, while the second does not require Hallel when it is eaten. The Hallel, the recitation of a group of Psalms, is one of the oldest elements of the Pesah celebration. As we shall see in chapter ten, it continued to be observed in the post-destruction seder and is a central part of the Passover Haggadah to this day. According to the Talmud, the Hallel is hinted at in Isaiah 30:29, “For you, there shall be singing as on a night when a festival is hallowed.” Our mishnah teaches that the Hallel was recited both while the pesah was being sacrificed and while it was being eaten. The difference between Pesah Rishon and Pesah Sheni is that on the first the Hallel is recited both while the Pesah is eaten and when it is sacrificed whereas on Pesah Sheni it is only recited when the pesah is sacrificed.", + "But both require [the reciting of] Hallel when they are sacrificed, and they are eaten roasted with matzah and bitter herbs, and they override Shabbat. Besides the fact that the Hallel is recited on both of the Pesah’s at the time of the sacrifice, there are two other similarities between the two. On both occasions the pesah is eaten with matzah and bitter herbs (see Numbers 9:11-12) and on both occasions if the fourteenth of Nisan falls on Shabbat the pesah is still sacrificed (see above 6:2)." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nWe have already learned above in 7:4 that if most of the community of Israel is impure they observe the first Pesah in impurity. Pesah Sheni is only observed by individuals who could not observe Pesah Rishon due to impurity or distance from the Temple. Our mishnah teaches that only impure Israelites who have become impure through contact with a corpse observe Pesah Rishon while impure; those with impurities that come from their own body do not observe the first Pesah while impure.", + "The pesah which comes in impurity: zavin and zavot, menstruant women and women after childbirth do not from eat it, yet if they did eat they are exempt from karet. Zavin and zavot are men and women who have had some sort of abnormal genital discharge (see 8:5). The impurity of the menstruant is mentioned in Leviticus 15:19 ff. and that of the woman after childbirth is Leviticus 12:1 ff. People with these types of impurity are not supposed to eat the pesah on Pesah Rishon, even if the community is impure and is eating the Pesah “in impurity”. However, if they do eat the pesah they are not liable for karet as would be the case had they eaten the pesah when the community was pure (see Leviticus 7:20). They are exempt because other people who are eating it are impure.", + "Rabbi Eliezer exempts [them] even [of the karet normally incurred] for entering the sanctuary. Rabbi Eliezer goes even further. Normally an impure person who intentionally enters the Temple is liable for karet. This is derived from Numbers 5:2 which specifically mentions both the zav and the one defiled by a corpse. From this juxtaposition Rabbi Eliezer learns that the zav and others in a similar category (i.e. the source of impurity is their own body) are liable for entering the Temple only when one defiled by a corpse is liable for entering the Temple. When the pesah is offered by an impure community a person defiled by a corpse is obviously allowed into the Temple. Hence, when this occurs the zav is exempt from entering the Temple as well, even though he doesn’t eat the pesah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThere are certain requirements for offering the pesah sacrifice which were only mandated during the first pesah, that which was observed on the night on which the Israelites left Egypt. These requirements were not observed in subsequent years. Our mishnah lists some of the differences between this first pesah and that offered and obligatory for the generations that followed.", + "What is the difference between the pesah [which was offered] in Egypt and the pesah of [subsequent] generations?
The pesah in Egypt was taken on the tenth [of Nisan], The first lamb or kid which was to be used for the first pesah was separated out of the flock by the Israelites on the tenth of Nisan (Exodus 12:3). This early separation was only required for that year.", + "And it required sprinkling with a bunch of hyssop on the lintel and on the two door-posts, The Israelites were required to apply the blood of the pesah on the lintel and two door-posts, using a bunch of hyssop (zatar in Arabic still commonly used in the Middle East) as a sort of paintbrush (v. 22). In subsequent years this was not done.", + "And it was eaten in haste on one night, whereas the pesah of [subsequent] generations is kept the whole seven [days]. The original pesah was to be eaten in haste (v. 11). It was only eaten on one night. This last statement is somewhat puzzling because in subsequent years the same was true the pesah was eaten for only one night. The Talmud therefore adds here that in Egypt the prohibition of chametz was only for one night. In subsequent years the prohibition of chametz was observed for a full seven days (v. 8)." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nLeviticus 27:10 states, “If one substitutes one animal for another, the thing vowed and its substitute shall both be holy.” This teaches that if one has an animal already dedicated to the Temple to be offered as a sacrifice and he says concerning another animal, “Let this one be its substitute”, the first animal remains sacred and its substitute becomes sacred as well (there is a whole mishnaic tractate about substitutes). Our mishnah deals with someone who tries to offer a substitute for a pesah. In order to understand the mishnah we also need to know that animals dedicated to be pesahim which are not offered as such are offered later as offerings of wellbeing.", + "Rabbi Joshua said: I have heard that the substitute of a pesah is sacrificed, and that the substitute of a pesah is not sacrificed, and I cannot explain. Rabbi Joshua says that he has heard a puzzling tradition which he does not understand. He has heard that sometimes the substitute of a pesah is sacrificed as a thanksgiving offering and sometimes it is not, but he doesn’t know how to explain this tradition. As an aside, we should note that this statement provides us with an interesting glimpse into how the rabbinic tradition was transmitted and developed. Rabbi Joshua has heard a statement, has memorized it, but didn’t receive along with the statement any interpretation and hence doesn’t know what it means. The statement was brief and probably easy to memorize but was difficult to understand.", + "Rabbi Akiva said: I will explain: The pesah which was found before the slaughtering of the pesah must be left to graze until it becomes unfit, and then it may be sold, and one brings a peace-offering with the money; and the same applies to its substitute. [If found] after the slaughtering of the pesah, it is offered as a wellbeing offering, and the same applies to it substitute. Rabbi Akiva uses his reason to figure out this conundrum. If it happens that a lamb/kid set aside to be a pesah is lost and another is set aside to be offered in its place (this is not the substitute, but a replacement), and the original one is found before the replacement is sacrificed then the replacement is not offered. Rather it is left to graze until it can no longer be offered as a pesah (until it becomes flawed), then it is sold and then the proceeds from the sale are used to buy another animal to serve as a wellbeing offering. It itself cannot be sacrificed because it existed when the pesah was offered but it itself was rejected as a pesah and not sacrificed. If a person makes a substitute for this second pesah then the substitute is also not offered. The substitute has the same rules as that for which it was substituted. This is the substitute which is not sacrificed. If it happens that the lost pesah is not found until after the new one has been sacrificed, the original pesah is offered as a sacrifice of wellbeing. So too, if one makes a substitute for this original pesah, it too is offered as a sacrifice of wellbeing. This is the substitute which is sacrificed." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with cases where an animal set aside to be a pesah offering cannot be offered as such.", + "If a man sets aside a female for his pesah or a two-year old male, it should be left to graze until it becomes unfit, then it should be sold, and its money is spent on a voluntary sacrifice. The pesah offering must be brought from a one year old male goat or sheep (Exodus 12:5). A female animal or a two-year old male animal is unfit for a pesah. If a person set aside such an animal to be his pesah, then the animal is sacred despite the fact that it cannot be a pesah. The animal should be left to graze until it becomes unfit, meaning it becomes blemished in such a way that it could not be offered as a pesah. Then it is sold and the proceeds are used to purchase voluntary sacrifices. There is a variant reading of this mishnah according to which the proceeds of the sale are used to buy offerings of well-being, the offering that is usually brought in place of an unfit pesah.", + "If a man separates his pesah and dies, his son after him should not bring it as a pesah but rather as a wellbeing offering. The father who set aside his pesah dies before he can offer it and there are no others registered to eat this pesah. (Had others been registered there would have been no problem.) The pesah now has no owners and therefore cannot be offered as a pesah. The mishnah teaches that even the son who inherits from his father cannot offer it as a pesah. In other words the son does not inherit his father’s registration for that sacrifice. Therefore it is sacrificed as a sacrifice of wellbeing." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with an animal set aside to be a pesah that gets mixed up with other animals set aside to be other sacrifices. We should note that this is a common theme that the Mishnah just loves to discuss different animals or items of different statuses getting mixed up with each other.", + "If a pesah became mixed up with other sacrifices, they all graze until they become unfit [through a blemish], then they are sold, and then he must bring [a replacement] for the price of the best of this type, and bring for the price of the best of this type and he loses the remainder from his own pocket. In this case the pesah gets mixed up with other animals that are set aside for other sacrifices. The rules and restrictions concerning each of these sacrifices may be different: their blood is sprinkled differently on the altar and their meat is eaten for a different period of time. Since we don’t know which animal was set aside for which sacrifice, none of them may be sacrificed. All of the animals must be sold and then the proceeds used to purchase new sacrifices. However, the way in which the new sacrifices are bought is somewhat complicated. Every new purchase must be made at the value of the most expensive of the mixed-up animals, lest that sacrifice was from that expensive animal. For instance, three lambs were set aside for three different sacrifices and then were mixed up. When he sells them, one lamb sells for two zuzim (had gadya, had gadya, dizban Abba b’tre zuze) and the other two lambs sell for one zuz each (if you know Aramaic this would be dizban Abba b’zuza hada). When he buys replacement sacrifices he must buy three lambs worth two zuz each, because he doesn’t know which sacrifice was from the more expensive lamb. This loss of money (two zuzim) is made up from his own pocket.", + "If it became mixed up with first-borns: Rabbi Shimon says: if [the pesah belonged to] a company of priests, they eat [all of the animals that night]. In this case the pesah becomes mixed up with firstborn animals. Generally, the firstborn of a sheep or goat (or other kosher animal) must be given to the priest. The animal is slaughtered and its blood is sprinkled on the altar and then it may be eaten by priests. The sprinkling of the blood for the firstborn is performed in the same was as that of the pesah. Therefore, the mishnah rules that if the company of people registered to eat the pesah are priests, they may eat these animals on Pesah as if they were valid pesahim. In other words, they can treat all of the animals as if they were all pesahim. However, they can only eat them that night, because a pesah cannot be left over till morning." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with a company of people who had set aside a lamb/kid for their pesah and then the animal wandered off and got lost. One person searched for the animal and found it and slaughtered while at the same time the company slaughtered another animal as their pesah, assuming that the person looking for it would not return in time. The main question is which animal can be eaten and by whom.", + "A company lost their pesah and they said to one [who was registered with them], “Go and seek it, and slaughter it on our behalf”; and he went, found, and slaughtered it, and they [also] took an animal and slaughtered [it]: If his was slaughtered first, he eats of his and they eat with him. And if theirs was first slaughtered, they eat of theirs, while he eats of his. And if it is unknown which of them was first slaughtered, or if they slaughtered both of them at the same time, he eats of his, but they may not eat with him; while theirs goes forth to the place of burning, and they are exempt from keeping the second Pesah. In this case the company sent one of its people to go and slaughter a new pesah on their behalf, after their original one was lost. However, instead of just relying on him to slaughter the original animal on their behalf, they also find their own new pesah and slaughter it as well. If his was slaughtered both he and they may eat of the pesah which he slaughtered. He may eat of it because he slaughtered it for himself and they may eat of it because they instructed him to do so. Their pesah is invalid since no one can eat it and it must be burned. If their pesah was slaughtered first they may eat of their pesah because we consider them as having withdrawn from being registered for the original pesah. He may eat of his own pesah, even though theirs was slaughtered first because he never told them to slaughter a new pesah on his behalf. If it is unclear whose pesah was slaughtered first or perhaps they both slaughtered at the same time he may eat his own pesah, because he never told them to slaughter one on his behalf. In other words, from his perspective, their pesah is irrelevant. However, they may not eat either pesah. They can’t eat his because theirs might have been the first offered in which case they weren’t registered for his. They can’t eat theirs because his might have been the first offered in which case theirs is invalid. Since no one can eat their pesah it must be burned. Despite the fact that they do not eat a pesah, they still are not liable for observing Pesah Sheni because there was a pesah slaughtered on their behalf and its blood was sprinkled on the altar.", + "He said to them, “If I delay, go forth and slaughter on my behalf,’, [and] then he went and found it and slaughtered [it], while they took [another] and slaughtered [it]: If theirs was slaughtered first, they eat of theirs while he eats with them; And if his was slaughtered first, he eats of his and they eat of theirs. And if it is unknown which of them was slaughtered first, or if they slaughtered both of them at the same time, they eat of theirs, but he may not eat with them, while his goes forth to the place of burning, and he is exempt from keeping the second Pesah. In this case, the group does not appoint the individual person to be their agent but rather he tells them that he is going to go look for the lost lamb but that if he is late in returning they should offer one on his behalf. They are now his agent but he has not been appointed to be their agent. Again, he finds the original pesah and they slaughter a new one. The mishnah again runs through all of the variations. This case is the mirror image of the previous section. If theirs was slaughtered first, they and he may eat of it. They slaughtered it for themselves and they also acted as his agent. In such a case, his must be burned. If his was slaughtered first he may eat of it because he slaughtered it for himself. They may not eat of it because they did not appoint him to be their agent. Rather, they eat their own pesah even though it was slaughtered second. If it is unclear which was slaughtered first or both were slaughtered at the same time they may eat theirs because to them his pesah is irrelevant they did not appoint him to act as their agent. He, however, may not eat his because he appointed them to act as his agent and theirs might have been slaughtered first. He also may not eat theirs lest his came first. His pesah must therefore be burned but he need not observe pesah sheni, as we explained above.", + "He said to them, and they said to him: they all eat of the first [to be slaughtered], and if it is unknown which of them was slaughtered first, both go forth to the place of burning. In this case, he appointed them to act on his behalf and they appointed him to act on his behalf. In such a case, both he and they always eat from the first one slaughtered. If it is unclear which was slaughtered first or if both were slaughtered at the same time, then neither he nor they may eat of either pesah. Both pesahim are burned and no one must observe pesah sheni.", + "If he did not say to them and they did not say to him, they are not responsible for each other. If neither of them appointed the other to act as an agent, then they are all on their own. He eats his own and they eat their own no matter the order in which the animals were slaughtered." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with remedying a situation in which the pesah offerings of different companies got mixed up with each other.", + "Two companies whose pesah sacrifices became mixed up: these take possession of one [animal] and these take possession of one. One member of these joins those, and one member of those joins these, and thus they declare: if this pesah is ours, your hands are withdrawn from your own and you are registered for ours; while if this pesah is yours, our hands are withdrawn from ours and we are registered for yours. The pesahim of each of two companies have become mixed up. Since a company must be registered for a pesah before they can slaughter it and eat it, they may not simple slaughter whichever one they want. The mishnah therefore works out a remedy for such a situation. One person from each company switches companies. Then all of the members of each company declare to the new person a declaration which I shall now explain. If the pesah which they took into their hands was theirs, then they tell him that he is switching his registration from his original one to theirs. Similarly, if the pesah which they possess was originally his, then they declare that they are withdrawing from their original pesah and registering for his. What they cannot do is simply register without having one person switch companies because it is forbidden to leave any pesah without anyone registered for it for even a moment. Also, they couldn’t register for a new pesah without first withdrawing from being registered for the old one because a person cannot be registered for two pesahim at the same time. All of this is not a problem if one person switches companies, because it then turns out that at no point is either pesah left without any owners.", + "Similarly, if there are five companies consisting of five members each or of ten each, they draw one from each company and say thusly. The mishnah now elaborates now that the same above method of resolving the problem also works if there are five companies each with five members of ten companies each with ten members and all of the pesahim got mixed up. In each case, one person from each company has to go to each of the other companies. Each newly formed company would have one member from each of the old companies, and each person in each company would have to make the declaration." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is similar to that which we learned yesterday except instead of the pesah sacrifices of companies being mixed up the pesah sacrifices of two individuals are mixed up.", + "If the pesah sacrifices belonging to two [individuals] became mixed up, each takes possession of one [animal]; This one registers someone from the marketplace with him and that one registers someone from the marketplace with him. This one goes over to that one and that one goes over to this one, and thus they declare: “If this pesah is mine, your hands are withdrawn from yours and you are registered for mine; while if this pesah is yours, my hands are withdrawn from mine and I am registered for yours.” The key to understanding this mishnah is that each person needs to register another person with him (one from the marketplace) for his pesah otherwise when he switches to the other person’s group a pesah will be left temporarily without any owners, and this is prohibited. I shall explain the scenario using proper names. Let’s say Reuven and Shimon have their pesah sacrifices mixed up. If Reuven were to even temporarily withdraw from his and register for Shimon’s his would be left without any owner. Therefore, Reuven signs up Moshe and Shimon signs up Aharon, and now there are two companies as opposed to two individuals. One person will now always “stay behind”. Reuven and Shimon each take an animal, and Moshe leaves Reuven’s group and goes to Shimon’s and Aharon leaves Shimon’s group and goes to Reuven’s. Reuven then makes the declaration to Aharon and Shimon makes the declaration to Moshe. In this way both groups have a pesah and neither pesah was ever left without an owner." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThe tenth chapter of Pesahim is perhaps the best known chapter in the entire Mishnah, for it describes the Pesah seder, one of the rituals most-observed by Jews in the modern world. The laws and practices of this chapter form the basis of the seder and Haggadah to this day. Some of its texts will be familiar to us from their inclusion in the Haggadah. It has also been studied exhaustively by scholars, partly because of its importance to the Christian tradition according to three of the four Gospels, Jesus’s last supper took place on the eve of Pesah, the same time when we celebrate our seder. (Note that I did not say that Jesus’s last meal was a seder. I do not believe that this is an accurate statement.)\nI will make some introductory remarks due to the importance of this chapter. First of all, most scholars today do not think that a seder meal on Pesah existed during the Second Temple period, while the pesah was still offered. While the Temple stood, the meal consisted of the eating of the pesah, matzah and maror, and they were probably accompanied by some singing and perhaps drinking of wine, but there was no formal ritually ordered meal that accompanied them. The rabbis after the destruction of the Temple initially struggled to find a replacement for their cataclysmic loss. One replacement for the loss of the Temple and the pesah sacrifice was the institution of a formal meal on Pesah, one certainly modeled after the Greco-Roman symposium, the formal “high-class” meal with which the rabbis were familiar. The most notable aspects of the seder, the reclining, the wine, the hand-washing, the dipping of food, the types of food served and even the discussion surrounding the Exodus from Egypt all have parallels in Greco-Roman descriptions of the formal meal called the symposium. That rabbis borrowed Greek and Roman customs should be no more surprising to us than the fact that when Jews get dressed up to go to synagogue today they dress in the same clothes as do the other members of society. Therefore, rather than characterize the rabbis as borrowing Greek and Roman customs, a more accurate statement would be to say that when the rabbis looked to shape their own religious experience by establishing a formal Pesah meal, they did so in the way with which they were familiar.\nThe seder continued to develop throughout the centuries and therefore what we read in the Mishnah is an early form of the seder and not all that close to that which we know and observe today. The first Haggadot, written texts, were not composed until the 8th or 9th centuries, the same time when the first siddurim were composed.\nWith regard to the Mishnah itself, there are many later interpolations that have found there way into our text. These interpolations, almost all of which are liturgical, come from the Haggadah. As the Haggadah developed, people added to the Mishnah texts that they knew from their Haggadah or changed the Mishnah to match their practices. I shall note many examples as we proceed. However, the basic text upon which I will base my commentary is the version found in the common printed editions such as Kehati, Albeck, etc.", + "On the eve of Pesah close to minhah one may not eat until nightfall. On the eve of Pesah one should not eat from minhah time and afterward so that when it comes time for the meal one is hungry and one will eat the matzah with a good appetite. This is at the ninth hour, roughly speaking around 3 PM.", + "Even the poorest person in Israel must not eat [on the night of Pesah] until he reclines. In the ancient world formal meals were eaten while reclining on couches which lied close to the ground. One leaned to the left and a small table was placed in front of the diners. Usually there were about three diners per couch. Typically, only the wealthier classes ate in this manner whereas the poorer folk ate while sitting. On Pesah, according to the Mishnah, even poor people are to eat while reclining.", + "And they should give him not less than four cups [of wine], and even from the charity plate. The seder meal is structured around the drinking of four cups as we shall see in the coming mishnayot. Our mishnah states that when charity distributors are handing out wine to poor people so that they shall have wine to drink they should not give them less than four cups of wine. Others explain that the mishnah is addressing all Israelites when observing the seder they should not have less than four cups of wine, even if they have to take from the charity plate." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah contains a debate between Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel over the order of the blessings recited over the first cup of wine. Today we call these two blessings together “Kiddush”, which comes from the word “sanctify.”", + "They mixed him the first cup: Bet Shammai says: first he blesses over the day and then over the wine. Bet Hillel says: first he blesses over the wine and then over the day. As we shall see throughout this chapter, important events at the seder are marked by the “mixing” of a cup of wine. In the ancient world wine was drunk diluted with water so as to prevent a person from becoming intoxicated. To drink undiluted wine was considered coarse behavior. Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel debate the order of the blessings. Bet Shammai says that we first recite the blessing over the day. This blessing is “Who sanctifies Israel and the festivals.” Afterwards we recite the blessing over the wine, “Who creates the fruit of the vine.” The reasoning for this is that according to Bet Shammai the day causes the wine to be drunk. Bet Hillel says that the wine is blessed first. There are two reasons for this. First of all, the presence of the wine allows us to recite the blessing over the day. Secondly, the blessing over the wine is a commonly recited blessing whereas the blessing over the day is rare. The rule is that common things are recited before uncommon things. The order which we follow today is, as is almost always the case, according to Bet Hillel." + ], + [ + "Introduction In this mishnah they begin to bring in front of him the food. We should note that the foods are brought in front of him before the discussion and recitations which we shall encounter in the following mishnayot. It is not entirely clear from the Mishnah itself whether they ate before the recitation of the “haggadah”, the ritual retelling of the story of the Exodus, or whether they first told the story and then ate, as we do today.", + "They bring [it] in front of him. He dips lettuce before until he reaches the appetizer that precedes the bread. As did the previous mishnah, this mishnah continues to describe foods brought in front of him by a servant. Although many Jews probably could not afford servants, the mishnah relates to each Jew on the seder evening as if he is a member of the upper class. The mishnah does not say what “it” is that they bring in front of him. Some commentators add that it is vegetables and lettuce, while others say that it is a table. Whatever it is, it is clear that appetizers are served before the meal. Today we call this appetizer “karpas”, a Persian, Aramaic and Arabic word for celery. In mishnaic times they probably used lettuce as the appetizer. Other sources mention other appetizers as well. The mishnah may allude to this when it says “until he reaches the appetizer that precedes the bread.” The mishnah may be stating that he continues to eat appetizers until the final appetizer is brought. We should note how different this is from today’s custom, according to which a very small amount of a vegetable is eaten and then people can go hungry until the main meal is brought (and if they are at my seder they can shoot me mean looks as I go on and on).", + "They bring before him matzah, lettuce, and haroset (and two dishes) though the haroset is not mandatory. Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Zadok says: it is mandatory. After the appetizers are completed, the servants bring in front of him the main festival foods, the matzah, lettuce and haroset. The matzah is explicitly commanded by the Torah. The lettuce is the bitter herbs (see abover 2:6) also mandated by the Torah. Haroset does not appear in the Torah. Haroset, a mixture of wine and fruit or wine-vinegar and fruit, was a common food in the Greco-Roman world. It was probably added to the Pesah meal after the destruction in an attempt to provide more foods for the seder. In the Talmud it is explained as having different symbolic meanings, most familiarly that it represents the mortar used to make the bricks in Egypt. Others say that it should have a sharp flavor to remind us of the slavery in Egypt. Still others say that the apples used in making it are to remind us of the “apple” in Egypt, a symbol of the fertility of the Israelite women. According to the first opinion, haroset is brought to the table but it is not mandatory. Rabbi Elazar bar Zadok says that it is mandatory.", + "And in the Temple they bring the body of the pesah before him. The mishnah notes that in Temple days at this point they would bring the pesah in front of the seder participant. Note that the main part of the mishnah describes the seder as it existed after the Temple was destroyed. Only at the end does the mishnah note when the pesah was eaten during Temple times." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah contains the heart of the commandment to tell the story of the Exodus, including the so-called “four questions” or “Mah Nishtanah” and the midrash. These are all still part of the seder ritual to this day.\nIn this mishnah I have deviated from my normal practice of using the version contained in printed versions of the text because it is so radically different from the original version. The “four questions” developed over time and later copyists revised the original “questions” of the mishnah with those familiar to them. If you wish to see the “four questions” as they are recited today, you can check any standard Haggadah and they can easily be found on line. Cited and explained below is the “Mah Nishtanah” as found in early mishnaic manuscripts.", + "They mixed him a second cup, and here the son questions his father. The significance of the moment is marked by the pouring of the second cup. The occasion is the beginning of the telling of the story of the Exodus, which begins with a question. The reason that the story begins with a question is probably in allusion to a few verses in the Torah in which a son asks his father the meaning of the rituals observed (see Exodus 12:26, 13:14, and Deuteronomy 6:20-21).", + "If the son lacks the intelligence to ask, his father instructs him: On all other nights we dip once, on this night we dip twice? On all other nights we eat hametz or matzah, on this night only matzah. On all other nights we eat roasted, stewed or boiled meat, on this night only roasted. The son is supposed to freely form his own question. The mishnah does not provide him with a list of questions which he must ask. I repeat, the “Mah Nishtanah” which we will examine below is not a list of questions which a child must ask but originally was a list of prompts, statements which the father would make to spur a kid who has not asked a question into doing so. I am not telling you this to ruin your Pesah celebration. (Please believe me.) You should continue with the lovely practice of the youngest child reciting the Mah Nishtanah, just as we do in our house. Just know that things used to be done slightly differently. Also, it might be a good idea to get the children genuinely thinking about the content of what we are saying and not just focused on singing the song.", + "He begins with shame and concludes with praise; and expounds from “A wandering Aramean was my father” (Deuteronomy 6:20-25) until he completes the whole section. We now get to the list of statements (after my previous comment I won’t call them questions). You should immediately note that there are only three, and only one of them is the same as the one we still recite today (#2). I shall explain each statement briefly. They are recited in the order in which they are done during the seder. 1) Dipping was a normal part of every meal. However, it was normally done at one part of the meal and therefore, the second dipping which was done with the haroset and bitter herbs was unusual. 2) This question has remained to this day and should not need any explanation. 3) As we learned in the above chapters, the pesah could only be eaten roasted. Therefore, the statement notes that on other nights the meat could be cooked in any way while tonight it can only be roasted. The most interesting thing about this section is that it seems that people were still eating a pesah-like lamb after the destruction of the Temple. Indeed, there is evidence that some Jews continued to eat roasted meat after the destruction, and this mishnah fits with those practices.", + "The main part of the seder is telling the story of the Exodus. The mishnah notes two elements to this. The first is telling the story by beginning with “disgrace and concluding with praise.” In the Talmud they debate whether the disgrace is the physical slavery in Egypt or the spiritual degradation of our idol-worshipping forefathers. The praise is the praise to God for taking us out of Egypt. The second element is an extended midrash (expounding) on Deuteronomy 6:20-25. It is not entirely clear why these verses and not others were chosen but in my opinion the likeliest answer is that they are brief yet comprehensive. The midrashist connects these few verses with the original story in Exodus and adds his own commentary as well. In my translation I have left the words “Arami oved avi” untranslated because they can be translated either as “My forefather was a wandering Aramean”, in which case the phrase refers to Jacob or “An Aramean tried to kill my forefather” in which it is Lavan to whom the verse refers. Our Haggadot understand it the second way." + ], + [ + "Rabban Gamaliel used to say: whoever does not make mention of these three things on Pesah does not fulfill his duty. And these are they: the pesah, matzah, and bitter herbs. The pesah because the Omnipresent passed over the houses of our fathers in Egypt. The matzah because our fathers were redeemed from Egypt. The bitter herb because the Egyptians embittered the lives of our fathers in Egypt. In every generation a man is obligated to regard himself as though he personally had gone forth from Egypt, because it is said, “And you shall tell your son on that day, saying: ‘It is because of that which the Lord did for me when I came forth out of Egypt” (Exodus 13:8). Therefore it is our duty to thank, praise, laud, glorify, raise up, beautify, bless, extol, and adore Him who made all these miracles for our fathers and ourselves; He brought us forth from slavery into freedom, from sorrow into joy, from mourning into festivity, from darkness into great light, and from servitude into redemption. Let us say before him, Hallelujah!
This mishnah has become a liturgical text, that is a text that is recited on a ritual occasion, namely the seder. It has been a part of the Haggadah since the Haggadah was composed. As is common, as the liturgy expanded the text of the mishnah grew as well. Below, the pieces that are in small font are later additions to the mishnah, additions which appear in our Haggadot but were not originally part of the Mishnah itself. There are other additions in the Haggadah which do not appear even in later versions of the mishnah.
Now to the content. In this mishnah Rabban Gamaliel demands that we explain the three main food items at the table, pesah, matzah and marror, while these items lay in front of us. Because he mentions the pesah, some scholars posited that this Rabban Gamaliel lived while the Temple still stood and the pesah was sacrificed. I believe it is more likely that the mishnah is representing a post-Temple reality and that this is the same Rabban Gamaliel whom we already encountered who believes that the pesah can still be eaten even without a Temple. The ritual here replaces, at least as best as is possible, the loss of the Temple. When sacrifices can no longer be offered, words, study and prayer take their place.
An interesting side note to be made is the comparison of Rabban Gamaliel with Jesus’s words at the Last Supper, assumed by three of the four Gospels to have taken place on the eve of Pesah. Jesus gives symbolic meaning to the wine (his blood) and to the matzah (his body). There is some correlation between that which Rabban Gamaliel demands and that which Jesus does according to the Gospels. Scholars have attempted to discover which ritual was earlier did the early Christians modify an ancient Jewish custom? Or did rabbinic Jews engage in polemics against Christians, saying this is the symbolic meaning and not what you say it is? I don’t believe we can know the answer to this question, and it may not be a good question. What the two faiths have in common is that both impart symbolic meaning to the seder meal in a world in which the central structure, the Temple, has been destroyed.
The mishnah itself is straightforward and probably familiar to most of us; hence I have refrained from making any direct comments." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is concerned with the recitation of the Hallel at the seder. The Hallel is a group of Psalms from Psalm 113 through Psalm 118. Today it is recited on the three festivals (Pesah, Sukkot and Shavuot), on Hannukah and on Rosh Hodesh (the new month).\nAll of the sages agree that at the seder the Hallel is split into two parts. The first part is recited before the meal and the rest is recited afterwards. The disagreement is over how much is recited before the meal.\nThe second section of the mishnah contains the formula of the blessing recited after this first part of the Hallel is recited.", + "How far does one recite it? Bet Shammai say: Until “As a joyous mother of children” (Psalm 113). But Bet Hillel say: Until “The flinty rock into a fountain of waters” (Psalm 114). Bet Shammai says that before the meal is eaten, at a relatively early hour in the evening, they should not recite Psalm 114 which starts, “When Israel went forth from Egypt” because the children of Israel had not left Egypt at that early time in the evening. In contrast, Bet Hillel says that the children of Israel did not leave until the next daybreak does this mean that we shouldn’t say Psalm 114 until daybreak? That would be absurd. Rather, since they began to tell the story of the Exodus before the actual Exodus happened, they may recite Psalm 114 before the meal.", + "And he concludes with [a formula of] redemption. Rabbi Tarfon says: “Who redeemed us and redeemed our fathers from Egypt”, but he did not conclude [with a blessing]. Rabbi Akiva says: “So may the Lord our God and the God of our fathers bring us to other appointed times and festivals which come towards us for peace, rejoicing in the rebuilding of Your city and glad in Your service, and there we will eat of the sacrifices and the pesahim” etc. until “Blessed are You who has redeemed Israel.” Bet Hillel holds that one should conclude the blessing with a formula mentioning redemption. It seems that Bet Shammai would hold that redemption is not mentioned at this point in the evening because the children of Israel have still not been redeemed from Egypt. Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva disagree over how the blessing is formulated. For Rabbi Tarfon it is a simple blessing, one which mentions the past redemption but does not have a formal conclusion. The whole blessing reads “Blessed are You, Lord our God, Master of the Universe Who redeemed us and redeemed our fathers from Egypt and brought us to this night.” Note that “and brought us to this night” is not found in the printed edition of the Mishnah but is found in early manuscripts. According to Rabbi Tarfon only the past redemption is mentioned. Rabbi Akiva, on the other hand, sees the Pesah redemption as the paradigm for the future redemption, one which will bring Israel back to her land and the Temple to restoration. Hence the blessing includes a mention of hope for the future. We should note that the version of the blessing which I have translated above is the one found in the printed edition of the Mishnah. The end reads “Who has redeemed Israel”, which refers to the past. The version found in early manuscripts is “Who redeems Israel”, referring to the future. Today we recite Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Tarfon’s version in a combination and we conclude with “Who has redeemed Israel.”" + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses the third and fourth cups of wine and the conclusion of the meal.", + "They poured him a third cup, blesses over his meal. The Grace after the Meal, or Birkat Hamazon, is recited over a third cup of wine. We should note that according to the Mishnah and Talmud Birkat Hamazon is normally recited over a cup of wine, meaning that one holds a cup of wine while reciting the Birkat Hamazon, then recites a blessing over drinking wine (borei peri hagefen) and then drinks the cup at the end. Some people still have this custom today, at least on Shabbat and festivals.", + "A fourth [cup], he concludes the Hallel, and recites over it the blessing of song. The fourth cup is recited over the recitation of the Hallel. In the Talmud there is a debate over what the “blessing of the song” is. Some say it is “Nishmat Kol Hai”, a prayer recited during the morning prayers of Shabbat and festivals. Others say it is “Yehallukhah Adonai Elohenu”, which is a prayer recited at the end of Hallel on other occasions. Today we recite both.", + "Between these cups if he wants he may drink; between the third and the fourth he may not drink. Between the second and third cups it is permitted to drink more wine. This is the time when the meal is consumed and it was allowed to drink extra cups during the meal itself. However, it is forbidden to drink between the third and fourth cups lest he gets drunk and is not able to complete the seder. The rabbis thought that drinking alcohol while eating would not cause one to get drunk." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah brings the description of the seder to its conclusion.", + "One may not conclude the pesah meal with an afikoman. Saul Lieberman, the great Talmudic scholar of the past century, explained that “afikoman” refers to a Greco-Roman custom to engage in revelry at the conclusion of the symposium, the formal meal. People would go from house to house, drinking and carousing. The rabbis prohibited this custom, preferring instead that a Jew should discuss the laws of Pesah and the story of the Exodus until the morning prayers. As an aside, the fact that the rabbis had to assert the differences between the seder and the symposium strengthens the theory that the two were essentially not all that different, and that in essence the seder was a “Jewish symposium” as some scholars have called it. The Talmud explains the word “afikoman” in two ways. First, of all it may mean that one should not go from one house to the other. Secondly, it may mean that one should not eat anything after eating the pesah. Lieberman explains both as referring to the Greek custom of revelry. The foods which the Talmud proscribes were meant to whet one’s appetite so that one would wish to drink more.", + "If some of them fell asleep, they may eat [the pesah when they wake up]. If all of them fell asleep they may not eat. Rabbi Jose says: if they napped, they may eat, but if they fell asleep, they may not eat. This section deals with the laws concerning the pesah sacrifice. If some of the members of the “havurah”, the eating company, fell asleep during the meal, when they wake up they may continue to eat the pesah because other people stayed awake the whole time. However, if everyone fell asleep then they have all turned their attention away from the pesah and they may not go back to eating it. This is akin to eating the pesah in two different places, which is forbidden. [This sort of reminds me of our seder!] Rabbi Yose says that even if everyone fell asleep they may eat it, as long as they only napped. If they fell into a deep sleep, they may not eat it when they wake up." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe final mishnah of Pesahim deals with the status of the pesah after it has been left pass the time in which it may be eaten. It also deals with the blessings recited over the pesah and the hagigah, the sacrifice that accompanies the pesah.", + "The pesah defiles one’s hands after midnight. The pesah sacrifice can be eaten only until midnight (Exodus 12:8). This verse does not actually specify midnight, but this is how it is interpreted by some sages. Since it cannot be eaten after midnight, it becomes “remnant” if it is left over (see Leviticus 7:17-18). The issue of defiling hands is explained below.", + "Piggul and remnant defile one’s hands. If any one of the four essential procedures (slaughtering, receiving the blood in a vessel, bringing the blood to the altar and sprinkling the blood on the altar) for a sacrifice is done with the intent of eating the sacrifice or burning up its non-eaten parts on the altar after the time in which this must be done the sacrifice is considered “piggul” and it must be burnt (not on the altar). “Remnant” refers to any sacrifice that is left over past the time in which it may be eaten. The sages decreed that piggul defiles the hands so as to discourage priests who wanted make people’s sacrifices into piggul. They decreed that remnant defiles the hands so that priests wouldn’t be lax in eating and then disposing of the sacrifices.", + "If he recited the blessing for the pesah, he thereby exempts the sacrifice [the hagigah]; [but] if he recited the blessing for the sacrifice [the hagigah], he does not exempt the pesah, the words of Rabbi Ishmael. Rabbi Akiva says: this does not exempt that nor does that exempt this. According to Rabbi Ishmael, the pesah is the more essential of the sacrifices. The hagigah (for an explanation of this sacrifice see above 6:3) accompanies the pesah, but it itself is secondary. Therefore, if one recites the blessing over the pesah (the essential), he is exempt from reciting the blessing over the hagigah, which is only an accompanying sacrifice. But if one recites the blessing over the hagigah he is still obligated to bless over the pesah. Rabbi Akiva, on the other hand, sees both sacrifices as being different, neither “accompanying” the other. Therefore, reciting a blessing over one does not exempt the other. Congratulations! We have finished Pesahim. It is a tradition at this point to thank God for helping us to finish learning the tractate and to commit ourselves to going back and relearning it, so that we may not forget it and so that its lessons will stay with us for all of our lives. Pesah is certainly one of the most important and closely observed holidays in the Jewish calendar. The seder is perhaps the single Jewish ritual that has been observed for the longest period of time and has captured the hearts of Jews for thousands of years. Even the most casually observant Jew knows that on Pesah one does not eat bread. I hope that learning this tractate has helped us get back to the sources of some of these laws, and that when we observe our own Pesah holidays and our own seder we keep them in mind and share them with others. Congratulations on learning another tractate of Mishnah. May you have the strength and time to keep on learning more! Tomorrow we begin Shekalim." + ] + ] + ] + }, + "schema": { + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה פסחים", + "enTitle": "English Explanation of Mishnah Pesachim", + "key": "English Explanation of Mishnah Pesachim", + "nodes": [ + { + "heTitle": "הקדמה", + "enTitle": "Introduction" + }, + { + "heTitle": "", + "enTitle": "" + } + ] + } +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Moed/English Explanation of Mishnah Pesachim/English/merged.json b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Moed/English Explanation of Mishnah Pesachim/English/merged.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e32258976ef82ed646e2c80e5e85f12c43509ad2 --- /dev/null +++ b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Moed/English Explanation of Mishnah Pesachim/English/merged.json @@ -0,0 +1,583 @@ +{ + "title": "English Explanation of Mishnah Pesachim", + "language": "en", + "versionTitle": "merged", + "versionSource": "https://www.sefaria.org/English_Explanation_of_Mishnah_Pesachim", + "text": { + "Introduction": [ + "Tractate Pesahim can basically be broken down into three sections. The first four chapters deal with laws concerning the removal of leaven (chametz). However, there are many digressions in these chapters, and the fourth chapter really goes on to discuss many different subjects. The next five chapters deal with the passover sacrifice. The final chapter contains instructions for the seder (although this word is not used until the post-Talmudic period.) Due to the continued importance of the seder to Jews of all generations, I will give a separate introduction when we begin to learn the tenth chapter of our tractate. ", + "The Passover holiday was obviously a central pilgrimage festival when the Temple still stood, although in reality more Jews may have come to Jerusalem during Sukkot than during Passover. What is unique though about Pesach is the combination of a home and Temple holiday. While the paschal lamb was slaughtered in the Temple, it was not consumed by the priests but rather by groups of Jews called “havurot”—fellowship groups. This lamb, shared by all, was a symbol of redemption from Egypt, of God’s protection in the past and a continued sign of God’s providence. Throughout history, the lamb and the entire story of the Exodus continued to capture the imagination of Jews and many other groups (Christians, Americans etc.) in their attempt to connect history to the future. Furthermore, the story of the Exodus has been the model for people hoping for their freedom for three thousand years. It was the model for those who founded the United States of America, and 100 years later by black slaves fighting for their freedom. It is a timeless message, one whose impact has not been dulled and never will as long as there are enslaved and oppressed people anywhere in the world. \n" + ], + "": [ + [ + [ + "Introduction\nAs do several tractates, Pesahim begins chronologically with the events that lead up to the beginning of Pesah namely checking the house to make sure there is no chametz on the night before Pesah. As many of you know, this is still a custom today. Even though most Jews have thoroughly checked their homes for chametz and removed (or put it away to be sold no one sold their chametz in mishnaic and talmudic times) they still ritually check the home with a candle, or perhaps a flashlight, and remove any chametz found on the search.", + "On the evening of the fourteenth [of Nissan] they search they house for chametz by the light of a lamp. The house is to be thoroughly searched for chametz the evening before the fourteenth of Nissan, the day on which the chametz must be destroyed. In rabbinic times, a lamp was considered the most effective means by which to search the corners of the house, the nooks and crannies, the cracks and crevices to discover hidden chametz. Their houses were obviously less lit than ours and they had fewer windows. Candlelight would, at least according to the Mishnan, have been most effective. Furthermore, at night most people are home from work and can participate in searching for the chametz. Finally, we would do well to remember that people kept far less food in their homes and generally had far simpler material lives than we do now. It may just be that they didn’t even need to begin cleaning at all until the evening before Pesah. Ahh, the good old days!", + "Every place into which chametz is not brought does not require searching, There is no need to check places into which chametz is never or almost never brought.", + "So why did they rule: two rows of the wine cellar [must be searched]? [This is actually] a place into which chametz might be taken. The mishnah raises a difficulty with the previous statement. There is an older mishnah according to which two rows of the wine cellar must be searched. We would think that the wine cellar is a place into which chametz is not brought and therefore there is no need for it to be searched. The mishnah answers that this older mishnah refers to a cellar into which chametz actually is brought.", + "Bet Shammai say: two rows over the front of the whole cellar; But Bet Hillel say: the two outer rows, which are the uppermost. In the final section of the mishnah, Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel debate how much of the wine cellar must be searched. There are two interpretations to this debate in the Talmud. According to the first interpretation, Bet Shammai says that they search the entire first row, from ceiling to floor and the row behind it. Both these rows are checked from wall to wall. According to the second interpretation, the two rows are perpendicular to each other the top row and the row next to the entrance. The sages also debate the interpretation of Bet Hillel. Some explain that according to Bet Hillel they check the top two rows, whereas others hold that they check the top row and the one behind it." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues yesterday’s mishnah in which we learned that they need not check places into which chametz is not brought.", + "They need not fear that a weasel may have dragged [chametz] from one room to another or from one place to another, for if so, [they must also fear] from courtyard to courtyard and from town to town, and there would be no end to the matter. There are two basic explanations to this mishnah. Some explain that once a room has been searched for chametz, they need not recheck the room lest a weasel dragged chametz into it after it had been searched. [In my house, my 1 ½ year old son is our little weasel, dragging chametz all over the place. Since I know he does this and I see him do it, I do check.] The Rambam explains that they need not check a room into which chametz is not brought, lest a weasel brought chametz into there. If we were to have such fears, they would never end and there would be no meaning to the statement in yesterday’s mishnah that we need not check a place into which chametz is not brought. Alternatively, even once a room had been checked, it would have to be constantly rechecked lest a weasel had dragged chametz into there." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to prescribe when the house must be searched for chametz.", + "Rabbi Judah says: they search on the evening of the fourteenth and in the morning of the fourteenth, and at the time of destroying. According to the simple interpretation of Rabbi Judah’s opinion, he seems to require that the house be searched three times, once in the evening (as we learned in mishnah one), once in the morning and once at “the time of destroying”. The “time of destroying” is the fifth hour of the 14th of Nissan (in the evening Pesah will begin), at which time all chametz must be destroyed. However, in the Talmud there is an explanation that according to Rabbi Judah one need check only once either in the evening, in the morning or at the time of destroying. If one has not searched by this time, Rabbi Judah says another search should not be done later, lest he comes to find the chametz and eat it. In other words, it is safer not to know about the chametz at all then to find it.", + "But the sages say: if he did not search in the evening of the fourteenth he must search on the fourteenth; if he did not search in [the morning of] the fourteenth, he must search during the festival; if he did not search during the festival, he must search after the festival. The sages hold that it is preferable to search in the evening as we learned in the first mishnah above. However, if he did not search in the evening then he may search later, even during the festival itself. Ultimately, if he has not searched the house during Pesah itself, he must search afterwards since it is forbidden for a Jew to derive any benefit from any chametz that a Jew owned during Pesah. He must search lest there is some chametz that was in his possession during Pesah in order to prevent him from using this chametz after Pesah.", + "And what he leaves over he must put away in a hidden place, so that he should not need searching after it. If he finds chametz during his search, he should put it away discreetly until he burns it the following morning. Were he to leave it out and then later notice that some of it was missing, he would have to perform another search." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nAfter having discussed the search for chametz, the Mishnah begins to discuss burning the chametz, the most common and preferred way of destroying it.\nAll of the sages agree that from the seventh hour and onwards (daylight was divided into twelve hours, so the seventh hour is roughly speaking 1 PM, but would change depending on latitude and time of year) it is forbidden to eat or possess chametz. This is derived from Exodus 12:15 which says that one must destroy the chametz “on the first day” the first day is interpreted to be the 14th of Nissan, the day on which the Pesah lamb is sacrificed. Chametz is forbidden from the beginning of the seventh hour of that day because it is at this time that the Pesah sacrifice may be brought, and Exodus 34:25 (“You shall not offer the blood of My sacrifice with anything leavened”) is interpreted as prohibiting the offering of the Pesah sacrifice while one is in possession of chametz.\nIn our mishnah Rabbi Judah and Rabbi Meir dispute how much earlier than the seventh hour one must cease from eating chametz. They both agree, however, that the chametz is burned at the beginning of the sixth hour.", + "Rabbi Meir says: one may eat [chametz] the whole of the five [hours] and must burn [it] at the beginning of the sixth. According to Rabbi Meir, through the fifth hour one may continue to eat chametz. So if daylight began at we call 6 AM and the daylight hours were equal to the hours of darkness, then one could eat chametz until 11 AM. At the beginning of the sixth hour they must begin to burn the chametz, since from the seventh hour and onwards it is prohibited from the Torah to eat it. Rabbi Meir gives a one hour cushion in order to prevent people from erring and accidentally eating chametz after the Torah has already prohibited it. The cushion is necessary because it is difficult to determine precisely when the sun has completed its rising and has begun to set.", + "Rabbi Judah says: one may eat the whole of the four [hours], suspend it the whole of the fifth, and must burn it at the beginning of the sixth. Rabbi Judah provides an even larger cushion between the time when it is prohibited to eat chametz and the time when this prohibition becomes toraitic. Although the prohibition is only toraitic from the seventh hour and onwards, he says that after four hours it is forbidden to eat chametz. Rabbi Judah agrees with Rabbi Meir that the chametz need not be burned until the sixth hour. During the fifth hour it is “suspended” meaning it is neither eaten nor burned. One may still derive benefit from the chametz at this time; for instance one may feed it to animals. According to the Talmud the extra hour of cushion was because it was difficult to determine the precise time on a cloudy day (and in Israel there are still clouds during Pesah)." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to deal with the time when chametz is burned.", + "Rabbi Judah further said: two unfit loaves of thanksgiving used to lie on the roof of the [Temple] portico: as long as they lay [there] all the people would eat [chametz]. When one was removed, they would keep it in suspense, neither eating nor burning [it]. When both were removed, all the people began to burn [their chametz]. Rabbi Judah relates that in the Temple they made a sign which would let the people know until what time they could eat the chametz. They would put their two loaves of bread which were used in the thanksgiving offering (see Leviticus 7:13). They would use only loaves which were unfit for use (for instance, the time in which they could be eaten had passed), because they wouldn’t take fit loaves and leave them there to intentionally render them inedible. The rest is simple: the loaves were left there until the beginning of the fourth hour, the time until which Rabbi Judah holds one can eat chametz. When one was removed at the beginning of the fifth hour, they would cease eating their chametz, but not yet burn it. When the second was removed, they would begin to burn their chametz at the beginning of the sixth hour.", + "Rabban Gamaliel says: non-sacred chametz may be eaten the whole of the four [hours] and terumah the whole of the five [hours] and they burn [them] at the beginning of the sixth [hour]. Rabban Gamaliel presents an opinion which lies somewhere between that of Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Judah from the previous mishnah. Rabban Gamaliel agrees with Rabbi Judah that non-sacred chametz, i.e. chametz which was not terumah, can only be eaten through the fourth hour. However, he holds that terumah may be eaten through the end of the fifth hour. This is to try to prevent as much as possible the need to burn terumah, which according to halakhah should not be burnt unnecessarily. Rabban Gamaliel agrees that they burn all of the chametz in the sixth hour." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with burning impure sacrificial meat of a low degree of impurity with impure sacrificial meat of a higher degree of impurity, a potential problem since it causes the less impure meat to become more impure. The mishnah is brought here because of the mishnah which follows it, which deals with burning unclean chametz with clean chametz.", + "Rabbi Hanina the vice-chief of the priests said: during all of the days of the priests they never refrained from burning [sacrificial] meat which had been defiled by an offspring of uncleanness with meat which had been defiled by a father of uncleanness, even though they add uncleanness to its uncleanness. Rabbi Hanina, a rabbi who served in the Temple, testifies that the priests did not refrain from burning meat which had become unclean with other meat that had become unclean, even if the levels of uncleanness were different. When what is called a “father of uncleanness” (av hatuma) comes into contact with something that is receptive to impurity it renders it impure in the first degree; something impure in the first degree renders that which it comes into contact with impure in the second degree, and so on (up to four degrees). Everything besides the “father of uncleanness” is called an “offspring of uncleanness”. Meat which has come into contact with an “offspring” is at most impure in the second degree, since the “offspring can be no higher than a first degree. This meat is nevertheless rendered ineffective as a sacrifice. Rabbi Hanina teaches that they would burn this type of meat with meat that had come into contact with a “father of impurity”, even though this meat was of first degree uncleanness and hence it would add to the uncleanness of the other meat by making it of second degree uncleanness. Since both pieces of meat were impure in any case, they did not refrain from burning them together.", + "Rabbi Akiva added and said: during [all] the days of the priests they did not refrain from lighting oil which had been rendered unclean by a tevul yom in a lamp which had been made unclean by one who had contracted corpse impurity, even though they add uncleanness to its uncleanness. Rabbi Akiva adds that the same halakhah is also true with regard to oil. A “tevul yom” is someone who was impure, immersed in a mikveh but because the sun has not set, thereby ending the day, he is still impure. Until the sun sets he is considered to be of second degree impurity. If he comes into contact with oil that is terumah he renders it of third degree impurity. Rabbi Akiva teaches that this oil may be put into a lamp that is of first degree impurity, because it (the lamp) had been in contact with someone who had contracted corpse impurity (the corpse is the “granddaddy of all uncleanness, and one who comes into contact with a corpse is a “father of uncleanness). The lamp renders the oil of second degree impurity, bumping it up one level." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn today’s mishnah Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yose argue over whether we may draw an analogy between the cases in the previous mishnah (burning together meats and oils of differing degrees of impurity) and the case of burning together clean and unclean terumah chametz on the eve of Pesah.", + "Rabbi Meir said: from their words we learn that we may burn clean terumah together with unclean terumah on Pesah. Rabbi Meir draws an analogy between the cases presented in yesterday’s mishnah and the case of burning impure terumah chametz with pure terumah chametz before Pesah. The analogy is that in both cases it is permitted to increase levels of impurity in the process of burning something in order to get rid of it.", + "Rabbi Yose said: that is not a [proper] analogy. Rabbi Yose says that this is poor analogy. In the cases in yesterday’s mishnah the meat or oil was already impure and the only issue was increasing its level of impurity. In the case of pure and impure terumah chametz we are talking about something pure. Therefore, they must burn both separately.", + "And Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Joshua agree that each is burnt separately. Concerning what do they disagree? In respect of doubtful [terumah] and unclean [terumah]: Rabbi Eliezer says: each is burnt separately But Rabbi Joshua rules: both together. Rabbi Yose continues to point out that both Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Eliezer agree that impure and pure terumah are not burnt together. And if the two of them agree, then Rabbi Meir’s conclusion must be wrong. Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Joshua disagreed only concerning the burning of doubtfully impure terumah with pure terumah. Rabbi Eliezer is strict and rules that both must still be burnt separately, whereas Rabbi Joshua rules that since one is only doubtfully impure it may be burned with terumah that is certainly impure." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThe second chapter continues chronologically where the first chapter left off with rules concerning the removal of chametz.", + "Any hour in which one is permitted to eat [chametz], one may feed it to cattle, beasts and birds, and one may sell it to a gentile, and benefit from it is permitted. When its time has passed benefit from it is forbidden, and he may not [even] fire an oven or a stove with it. As long as one may eat chametz on the day before Pesah, one may still derive benefit from it (see 1:4). This mishnah is opposed to Rabbi Judah’s opinion above in 1:4, where he states that during the fifth hour it is forbidden to eat chametz, but it is still permitted to derive benefit from it. The mishnah lists two of the most common ways to derive benefit from a food item without eating it giving it to animals and selling it to non-Jews. Once the time has passed, he may derive no benefit from the chametz. Even while he is burning it in order to destroy it, he may not put it in an oven or stove to use it as fuel. In other words, he must burn it in such a way that he derives no benefit.", + "Rabbi Judah says: there is no removal of chametz except by burning; But the sages say: he may also crumble it and throw it to the wind or cast it into the sea. In this section the rabbis dispute how chametz is to be removed in order to fulfill the commandment found in Exodus 12:15, “you shall remove leaven from your house.” According to Rabbi Judah the chametz must be burned. This is how he interprets the word “remove” in the verse. The sages are more flexible and accept other means by which to remove/destroy the chametz casting it into the sea or by crumbling it up and throwing it into the wind. The important thing is that he not be able to recover the chametz and eat it, or even possess it." + ], + [ + "Introduction This mishnah and tomorrow’s mishnah complete the chronologically ordered discussion about removing chametz. (In chapter three the mishnah will discuss what exactly chametz is, and which chametz must be removed.) While we were previously discussing the day before Pesah, these mishnayot skip ahead until after Pesah and rule what is to be done with chametz that was not destroyed before Pesah.", + "Chametz which belongs to a gentile over which Pesach has passed is permitted for benefit; A Jew may eat chametz that a gentile owned on Pesah since there is no prohibition for a gentile to own chametz on Pesah. The phrase “over which Pesah has passed” means that the chametz existed during Pesah.", + "But that of an Israelite is forbidden for benefit, as it is said, “No leavened bread shall be found with you.” However, a Jew may not eat or derive any benefit from chametz that any Jew (himself or other) owned over Pesah. Practically this is a very significant issue in the modern world. If a store owned by a Jew does not either get rid of or sell its chametz before Pesah a Jew may not eat that chametz even after Pesah. In Israel restaurants and food stores hang up signs which guarantee that they have sold their chametz before Pesah. The midrash at the end of this mishnah presents the prohibition for possessing chametz. According to the Talmud, since the Jew did not get rid of his chametz before Pesah, he is punished and it becomes forbidden for him or any other Jew to derive benefit from it every again." + ], + [ + "Introduction The first section of this mishnah discusses chametz which was used to secure a loan. The second half deals with chametz upon which a large pile of stones has fallen.", + "If a gentile lent [money] to an Israelite on his chametz, after Pesah it is permitted for use. A gentile lent money to a Jew and the Jew used his chametz as a collateral to secure the loan. According to the Talmud, the Jew said to the non-Jew, “If I don’t come [to claim my chametz] before Pesach it is sold to you.” In such a case, the chametz belongs fully to the non-Jew when Pesach arrives and therefore a Jew may benefit from it after Pesach has passed.", + "But if an Israelite lent [money] to a gentile on his chametz, after Pesah it is prohibited for use. This is the opposite case a Jew lent money to a gentile before Pesach and the gentile used his chametz as collateral for the loan. He said to the Jew, “If I don’t come [to claim my chametz] before Pesach it is sold to you.” When Pesach comes this chametz fully belongs to the Jew. Therefore, a Jew may not derive any benefit from it after Pesach.", + "If ruins fell on chametz it is as if it is has been removed. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: provided that a dog cannot search it out. Chametz which is totally inaccessible because a large pile of stones have fallen on it, need not be removed from a person’s property before Pesach. This is because the owner of the property does not consider this to be his chametz anymore, and indeed it is highly unlikely that he will ever again have access to it. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel clarifies that in order for chametz upon which ruins have fallen to be considered destroyed, it has to be buried deep enough that a dog wouldn’t search after it. According to the Talmud, this is three handbreadths deep." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with a non-priest who eats on Pesah terumah which is also chametz. The case is either one in which before Pesah he separated terumah from his chametz or that he separated terumah from his matzah on Pesah and it became chametz.", + "One who unwittingly eats terumah chametz on Pesah must repay [to a priest] the principal plus a fifth. If he eats this terumah chametz unwittingly, he is liable for what one is normally liable to pay when a non-priest eats terumah. He must repay the value of the terumah and an added fifth to a priest (see Leviticus 22:14). Even though it was forbidden for him to derive benefit from the chametz on Pesah and therefore it is as if the chametz is not worth anything, still he makes restitution based on the size of the terumah that he ate and not its monetary value. The chametz may not have any value but it has size.", + "Intentionally, he is exempt from payment and from [liability for] its value as fuel. Normally speaking, when not Pesah, one who intentionally eats terumah is liable to repay the value of the terumah which he ate. He is treated like a robber, who pays the value of that which he robbed. Since the chametz terumah is worthless on Pesah a Jew cannot derive any benefit from it he is not liable for anything. The mishnah goes on to say he is not even liable for the value of the terumah chametz had it been used as fuel, since on Pesah not only is eating the chametz prohibited, but deriving any benefit from it is as well." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah lists those types of grains with which one can make the obligatory matzah on Pesah. There is a duel function to this list anything which can be used to make matzah can also become chametz. Hence, this mishnah also indirectly teaches us which types of grain must be removed before Pesah.", + "These are the things with which they fulfill their obligation on Pesah: with wheat, with barley, with spelt, with rye, and with oats. This is the list of grains from which one may make the obligatory matzah. Note that rice is not on the list. According to the mishnah, matzah may not be made out of rice nor does rice become chametz.", + "And they fulfill [the obligation] with demai, with first tithe whose terumah has been separated, and with second tithe or sanctified property which have been redeemed; We have encountered this list on several occasions already (Shabbat 18:1; Eruvin 3:2; Sanhedrin 8:2; Makkot 3:2). It is basically a list of foods which can be eaten, at least according to toraitic law. The opposite is in section four those foods are prohibited and hence one cannot use them to fulfill the obligation to eat matzah.", + "And priests [can fulfill their obligation] with hallah and terumah. Hallah (which a person must separate when he makes dough) and terumah are given to the priest, who may use them to make his matzah. A non-priest cannot eat them and hence cannot use them for matzah.", + "But not with untithed produce, nor with first tithe whose terumah has not been separated, nor with second tithe or sanctified property which have not been redeemed. The opposite list of that in section two.", + "Loaves of the thanksgiving offering and the wafers of a nazirite: If he made them for himself, they cannot fulfill [their obligation] with them; If he made them to sell in the market, they can fulfill [their obligation] with them. These loaves and wafers are not chametz and hence might potentially be usable for matzah. The mishnah rules that if he made them for his own personal use then they are already sanctified and one cannot use them for matzah. In other words, although they physically fulfill the requirements of matzah, since they were sanctified for another use they cannot count also as matzah on Pesah. However, if he is a merchant and made them to sell to those who need to bring sacrifices, then they have not yet become sanctified and they may be used as obligatory matzah on Pesah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nSince we learned in yesterday’s mishnah what grains one can use for matzah, today we learn what vegetables one can use for bitter herbs (marror).\nAs an aside, I will add a rare practical halakhic issue. Horseradish is not one of the vegetables on this list. Horseradish is not native to the land of Israel. It was introduced as “bitter herbs” in Europe where the herbs listed in the Mishnah did not grow, or were exceedingly difficult to cultivate. The most commonly used and acceptable “bitter herb” today is Romaine lettuce. Most people (I shall not name names, but some of them share my last name) complain to me that lettuce isn’t bitter so how can we use it for “bitter herbs”. They are correct through thousands of years of cultivation we have managed to take the bitter taste out of most lettuces. A potential solution which many people do is to mix some horseradish with their lettuce. In any case, I urge you to use lettuce on Pesah and not exclusively horseradish.\nFinally, I am not a botanist. I don’t pretend to know exactly what most of these vegetables look or taste like. I have relied on Yehudah Felix’s article in the Encyclopedia Judaica and on Albeck’s commentary for my translation and interpretation.", + "And these are the herbs with which one discharges his obligation on Pesah: with lettuce [hazaret]; with chicory [olshin]; with wild chicory [tamkah]; with picridium [harhavina], and with sonchus [maror]. Concerning all of these, Yehudah Felix (Encyclopedia Judaica, entry Bitter Herbs) writes: “The rabbis included under merorim plants whose common features are: “bitterness, possessing sap, with a grayish appearance” (Pes. 39a), meaning wild or cultivated vegetables, with leaves of a silvery-grayish-green color, that have a milk-like sap and leaves with a bitter taste.” In his commentary on Exodus 12:8, “They shall eat it roasted over the fire, with unleavened bread and bitter herbs”, Nahum Sarna (JPS Commentary: Exodus, 55) writes, “Hebrew merorim (sing. maror) is a generic term and probably referred originally to the kind of pungent condiment with which pastoral nomads habitually season their meals of roasted flesh.”", + "They fulfill their obligation whether they are moist or dry, but not preserved [in vinegar], nor stewed nor boiled. The vegetables may be dry, but moist would be better. The Talmud says that only the stalks may be dry the leaves must be fresh. However, they cannot be cooked or preserved, which is usually considered to be akin to cooking.", + "And they combine to the size of an olive. On Pesah one must eat an olive’s worth of maror. The mishnah teaches that one can combine them to equal an olive’s worth, eating half an olive’s worth of one kind and half an olive’s worth of another.", + "And they fulfill their obligation with their stalk[s]. The leaves and stalks count toward fulfilling one’s obligation.", + "And with demai, and with first tithe from which terumah has been separated, and second tithe and sacred property which have been redeemed. This is the same list as found in section two of yesterday’s mishnah. Notice that the mishnah does not even have to list those things with which one cannot fulfill one’s obligation, because they are the same as section four in yesterday’s mishnah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah returns to discussing the prohibition of chametz on Pesah.", + "All three sections of this mishnah teach that one must avoid letting grains come into contact with water on Pesah because this allows them to turn into chametz. We should note that today religious Jews do not keep grain in their possession on Pesah, nor do they bake matzot during Pesah. In the time of the Talmud Jews did not get rid of dry grains, grains which had not yet become chametz and when they needed to, they did bake matzah on Pesah. This mishnah deals with what one may do and not do with grain on Pesah.", + "One may not soak bran for fowls, but one may scald it. Soaking bran will lead it to become chametz. However, putting it in boiling water will not cause it to become chametz because the hot water arrests the leavening process.", + "A woman may not soak bran to take with her to the bathhouse, but she may rub dry [bran] on her skin . Soaked bran was used by women to cleanse their skin in the bathhouse. She may not soak the bran before she goes to the bathhouse because that will cause it to become chametz. However, she may rub dry bran directly on her skin even though her skin is moist.", + "And a man may not chew wheat and place it on his wound, because it turns into chametz. Chewed wheat was used as a salve for wounds. When he chews it he gets the wheat wet, thereby making it likely to become chametz. Hence, this is forbidden. On a small note concerning gender, it is interesting that men are wounded and women go to the bathhouse." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah contains three more prohibited mixtures, two of which deal with chametz.", + "One may not put flour into haroset or into mustard; “Haroset” is a mixture of fruit and wine or wine vinegar and it was customary to put flour in it as well. However, on Pesah it is forbidden to put flour in it because the wine or wine vinegar will cause it to become chametz. Mustard is also made with vinegar and therefore it is also forbidden to put flour into it.", + "And if he did put [it], it must be eaten immediately; But Rabbi Meir forbids [it]. If he nevertheless did put flour into either mustard or haroset, he must eat it immediately so that it doesn’t become chametz. Rabbi Meir, however, holds that it becomes chametz immediately and therefore one cannot eat it.", + "One may not boil the Pesah sacrifice, neither in liquids nor in fruit juice but one may baste and dip it in them. Exodus 12:9 forbids eating the Pesach sacrifice if it has been boiled. Our mishnah adds that this prohibition holds true for all liquids, water and fruit juices the sacrifice may not be boiled in any liquid. However, it is not prohibited to baste the sacrifice with liquids such as wine or oil while it is roasting and one can dip the meat in liquids after the roasting is complete. Perhaps the reason that this section is here is that above we dealt with Exodus 12:8 and here we deal with Exodus 12:9. Alternatively, since the previous sections and the following one deal with juices, this halakhah is brought here.", + "The water used by a baker must be poured out, because it causes leavening. While baking matzah, the baker will dip his fingers in water to keep them moist. The water bowl into which he dips his fingers must be dumped out so that the flour in it doesn’t turn into chametz. It should be dumped out somewhere where it will not gather in one place so that it doesn’t turn into chametz on the ground." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah provides two lists: one of food items which have small amounts of chametz mixed into them, and the other a list of non-food items which are made from dough. It is forbidden to eat or to possess any of the things on this list. However, one who does so is not subject to the full punishment of “karet” (extirpation), the punishment given for eating plain, non-mixed and edible chametz on Pesah (see Exodus 12:15). The reason that the punishment is less is that these are either not fully chametz but rather mixtures, or if they are fully chametz they are not generally edible or considered to be food.", + "These must be removed on Pesah:
Babylonian kutah, Medean beer, Idumean vinegar, Egyptian zitom, Babylonian kutah is a mixture of curds, crumbs and salt. Medean beer (the word in Hebrew for beer just means a strong drink) has barley in it, as does Idumean vinegar and Egyptian zitom (another strong drink). All of these things are foods which must be removed from one’s possession before Pesach because they contain in them grains which have turned into chametz. It is curious to me that the mishnah lists only foreign products. Indeed, these are four of the empires that ruled over Israel: Babylonia, Medea (Persia), Edom (Rome) and Egypt. However, Greece usually appears in this list and Egypt does not.", + "The dyer’s pulp, cook’s dough, and the scribes’ paste. Dyer’s broth has bran in it, probably as a thickener. Cook’s dough is dough that is used to soak up the extra, dirty liquid from cooking pots. Scribe’s paste was used to glue parts of parchments together. None of these three things is intended to be used as food and indeed they all probably taste terrible. Nevertheless, since they all do have chametz in them they must be removed before Pesach.", + "Rabbi Eliezer says: women’s ornaments too. Rabbi Eliezer adds women’s ornaments, which are made with mixtures of chametz. The Talmud understands this as referring to various salves and not to jewelry.", + "This is the general rule: whatever is of a species of grain must be removed on Pesah. These are subject to a warning but they do not involve karet. The mishnah now provides two general rules, rules which I explained in my introduction. The first is that anything that has in it grain, even if that grain is only in a mixture with other non-grain items, must be removed from one’s possession on Pesah. The second one is that one is not liable for karet for eating or possessing things that are not fully chametz i.e. foods which are not in a mixture with other things. However, they are still prohibited." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nMost of this mishnah deals with dough which is found in the crevices of a kneading trough and whether or not one must remove this dough on Pesach. The final clause of the mishnah deals with dough that may or not have already begun to become chametz.", + "[With regard to] the dough in the cracks of the kneading trough: if there is as much as an olive in one place, he must remove [it]; but if not, it is nullified through the smallness of its quantity. With regard to removing the dough from the cracks of the kneading trough, it all depends on whether or not there is an olive’s worth of dough in one place. If there is, then he must remove it; but if not the dough is considered as if it doesn’t exist and he need not bother removing it.", + "And it is likewise in the matter of uncleanness: if he objects to it, it makes a break; but if he desires its preservation, it is like the kneading-trough. There is a similar rule with regard to uncleanness, but the rule is actually different. With regard to uncleanness the issue is whether or not the dough is an essential and desired part of the kneading trough. If the dough is an essential part of the trough, then if a sheretz (an impure creeping thing) touches the dough the entire trough is impure, even if though the sheretz didn’t touch the trough itself. If the dough is not an essential part of the trough, then only the dough is impure and the rest of the trough remains pure. The mishnah says that the dough’s being an essential part of the trough hinges on the desire of its owner. If the owner wishes the dough to remain there because it is helping to fill a gap in the trough (functioning like plaster), then it is part of the trough and does not stop the uncleanness from spreading. If the owner wants it to be removed, it does break the uncleanness; only the dough is impure and not the trough.", + "[With regard to] “deaf” dough, if there is [a dough] similar to it which has become chametz, it is forbidden. Dough is here compared to a deaf person. When one talks to a deaf person (they didn’t have sign language back then) the deaf person doesn’t get up to respond. So too, this “deaf” dough does not seem to be “getting up” meaning it doesn’t seem to be rising. The mishnah says that if other dough that was kneaded with it is rising, then the deaf dough must also be chametz and it needs to be removed. If not, then the deaf dough is not chametz and need not be removed before Pesah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses a halakhic quandary. In order to understand it we need to first mention some background halakhot.\n1) When one prepares dough there is a mitzvah to separate some dough. This separated dough is called hallah (Numbers 15:20). If the dough is ritually clean it is given to a Kohen; if it is ritually unclean it cannot be eaten and must be burned.\n2) On Pesah all dough needs to be baked immediately lest it become chametz.\n3) On festivals one is allowed to cook food, but one is not allowed to cook food which cannot be eaten.\n4) One is not allowed to burn sacred things in order to remove them on a festival. This includes challah, which is considered sacred.\nThe problem then is what to do with baking unclean hallah on one of the festival days of Pesah. If she bakes it then she may be transgressing the laws of the festival which allows one to cook only food which can be eaten. The unclean hallah cannot be eaten so it can’t be baked. She can’t burn it either. If she just leaves it, it will ferment and become chametz.\nIn our mishnah the rabbis debate what to do with this dough.", + "How do they separate hallah on the festival [from dough which is] in [a state of] uncleanness?
Rabbi Eliezer says: she should not call it [hallah] until it is baked. Rabbi Eliezer tries to find a means to avoid the problem. Usually, one separates and designates dough as hallah while it is still dough, before it is baked. In this case, to avoid the problem, what the woman baking the dough should do is not designate which piece will be hallah until after it has been baked. In this way, while the loaves are being baked, we could point to each loaf and say, “this one will not be hallah.” After it has already been cooked we need not be concerned about it becoming chametz. In the evening, she may burn the unclean hallah.", + "Rabbi Judah ben Batera says: she should put [the dough] into cold water. Rabbi Judah ben Batera comes up with a different solution. Separate the hallah when it is still dough, but instead of baking it put it in cold water. The cold water will arrest the fermentation process.", + "Rabbi Joshua said: this is not the chametz concerning which we are warned with, “It shall not be seen”, and “It shall not be found”. Rather she separates it and leaves it until the evening, and if it ferments it ferments. Rabbi Joshua rejects both of the previous solutions and rather says that she should separate the dough and if it becomes chametz then it becomes chametz. There is no need to be concerned that this is a transgression. The Torah’s prohibitions “It (chametz) shall not be seen” (Exodus 13:7) and “It shall not be found” (Exodus 12:19) do not apply to this chametz because it doesn’t belong to its owners anymore. From the minute she separates it to make it challah it already belongs to the kohen." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with how people should bake matzot on Pesah to avoid them becoming chametz. The mishnah reflects a reality in which several women shared one oven for baking bread/matzah.\nWe should note that today no one bakes matzah on Pesah. All matzah is baked before Pesah in order to avoid the risk of the dough becoming chametz.", + "Rabban Gamaliel says: three women may knead at the same time and bake in one oven, one after the other. Rabban Gamaliel says that three women may knead dough simultaneously and then use the same oven, even though the dough of one woman will have to wait while the dough of the other two women is baking. Rabban Gamaliel does not think that the dough will turn into chametz in this short amount of time.", + "But the sages say: three women may be engaged with the dough at the same time: one kneads, one shapes and one bakes. The sages disagree and think that if one batch of dough has to wait while the other two bake, it is likely that it will turn into chametz. What the women should do is set up an assembly line, one woman will knead, one woman will shape the dough and one woman will bake. If they time it correctly then no one will have to wait to bake their bread.", + "Rabbi Akiba says: not all women and not all kinds of wood and not all ovens are alike. Rabbi Akiva says it is impossible to a hard and fast rule since some women prepare bread faster than others, some wood makes ovens hotter than others and some ovens cook faster than others.", + "This is the general principle: if it [the dough] rises, she should slap it with [hands dipped in] cold water. Some commentators explain that this section is a continuation of Rabbi Akiva’s statement but I believe that it is an independent statement. All of the rabbis agree that if the woman begins to see signs of the dough turning into chametz what she should do is slap it with cold water to arrest the fermentation process." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with how one can tell when a piece of dough has started to become chametz.", + "Si’ur must be burnt, while he who eats it is exempt; sidduk must be burnt, while he who eats it is liable to kareth. The halakhah in this section seems to be an old halakhah, one which Rabbi Judah and the other sages debate in the remainder of this mishnah. The halakhah is that “si’ur” dough must be burnt, meaning it must be removed before Pesah, but that one who eats it is not liable for karet as he would be were he to have eaten chametz. “Si’ur” comes from the word for hair (se’ar) and we will see in the remainder of the mishnah that both Rabbi Judah and the sages explain it so that it has some connection with hair. “Sidduk” means “cracked” and it is already chametz and therefore one who eats it is liable for karet.", + "What is si'ur? [When there are lines on the surface] like locusts’ horns. Sidduk is when the cracks have intermingled with each other, the words of Rabbi Judah. Rabbi Judah and the sages now debate the definition of si’ur and sidduk. According to Rabbi Judah si’ur dough already shows some signs of cracking on the surface and the lines look like locusts’ horns. These horns are similar enough to hair that the dough is called si’ur. The lines on sidduk dough are more numerous and have already begun to intermingle with each other. One who eats dough with this many cracks is liable for karet for having eaten chametz.", + "But the sages say: regarding the one and the other, he who eats it is liable for karet. And what is si'ur? When its surface is blanched, like [the face of] a man whose hair is standing [on end]. The sages say that what Rabbi Judah called si’ur is actually sidduk and therefore one who eats it is liable for karet. They redefine si’ur as dough that has begun to turn white, like the face of a person who is frightened. Note again the connection with hair to the sages this dough is called si’ur because when a person is frightened not only does his face turn white but his hair stands on end." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nChametz is usually removed the day before Pesah, on the fourteenth of the month of Nisan. This potentially becomes a problem when the day before Pesah is Shabbat because chametz is usually removed by being burnt and one cannot burn chametz on Shabbat. In our mishnah the sages debate how to handle this problem.", + "If the fourteenth [of Nisan] falls on Shabbat, they remove everything before Shabbat, the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Meir says that all of the chametz is to be burned before Shabbat. Most commentators add, based on a talmudic source, that he may leave enough chametz to eat two meals, one on Friday night and one on Shabbat morning. This is because halakhah forbids the eating of matzah on the day before Pesah. However, the custom not to eat matzah on the day before Pesah may not yet have developed in the time of the Mishnah. It is likely that Rabbi Meir assumes that one will eat matzah for Friday night dinner and for the first meal on Shabbat itself. In any case, today when this occurs, many people destroy all of their chametz on Friday, but some people leave enough bread to eat for Friday night dinner and a very early Shabbat morning lunch. This meal must be eaten before the fourth hour of the day, by which time all chametz must be removed.", + "The sages say: at its [usual] time. The sages say that all of the chametz is removed at its usual time, meaning on Shabbat itself. The sages assume that they will remove the chametz by eating it or by giving it to his animals. If it can’t be eaten, then it may crumbled up and thrown into the wind (see above 2:1).", + "Rabbi Eleazar bar Zadok says: terumah before Shabbat, and non-sacred [chametz] at its [usual] time. The problem with waiting until Shabbat to remove the terumah is that far fewer people can eat terumah only kohanim and their families may eat it. Therefore, he should burn the terumah the day before Pesah. However, regular chametz may be eaten by anyone, and therefore they can wait to remove it until Shabbat itself. On this point he agrees with the sages." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses a person who starts on a journey and once he has already left he remembers that he forgot to remove his chametz. The question is whether or not he must return home to remove the chametz or whether he may continue on his way.", + "He who is on his way to slaughter his Pesah sacrifice or to circumcise his son or to dine at a betrothal feast at the house of his father-in-law, and remembers that he has chametz at home: if he is able to go back, remove [it], and [then] return to his religious duty, he must go back and remove [it]; but if not, he annuls it in his heart. In the first section, the person is on his way to perform a commandment when he remembers that he forgot to remove his chametz. The first two commandments are extremely significant and time-bound. The commandment to participate in the Pesah sacrifice and the commandment to circumcise are the only two positive commandments which carry with them the punishment of karet for lack of fulfillment. Furthermore, the Pesah must be sacrificed on the fourteenth of Nisan and if the eighth day of a boy’s life falls out on the fourteenth of Nisan then it must take place then. It is not surprising that the halakhah allows him to continue on his way to perform these weighty commandments. What is perhaps more surprising is that participating in a betrothal feast is placed in the same category. This perhaps can be read as a rabbinic statement concerning the importance of marriage. In any case, if a person sets off to engage in one of these activities and realizes that he has not burned his chametz, if he can still return home, burn the chametz and get to where he needs to be on time, then he must do so. However, if there is not sufficient time for this, then he need not return. Rather, in his heart he annuls the chametz, that it should be to him as is the dust of the earth.", + "[If he is on his way] to save from an invasion or from a river or from brigands or from a fire or from a collapse [of a building], he annuls it in his heart. In this section he is on his way to save someone’s life. In such a case, even if he could return to remove his chametz and still make it to where he needs to go on time, he need not do so. Since these are matters of life or death, he shouldn’t hesitate or take a risk by returning to remove his chametz. Life takes precedent over all commandments. Therefore, all he should do is annul the chametz in his heart.", + "[But if] to rest for pleasure, he must return immediately. If he sets out just for pleasure, for instance on a vacation, without there being any commandment that he is going to perform, then he must return and remove his chametz even if this will cause him to not be able to get to where he needs to go. In such a case, the mishnah does not allow him to annul the chametz in his heart." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is a direct continuation of yesterday’s mishnah.", + "Similarly, he who went out of Jerusalem and remembered that he had holy meat with him: If he has passed Scopus, he burns it where he is; but if not, he returns and burns it in front of the Temple with the wood of the [altar] pile. Certain sacrifices, such as a thanksgiving offering, may be eaten anywhere in Jerusalem but may not be brought outside. If they are brought outside of Jerusalem they must be burnt. The person in this mishnah is leaving Jerusalem when he discovers that he has with him “holy meat” some sacrificial meat that he didn’t eat. According to the Mishnah, if he has passed Mt. Scopus, a mountain from which the Temple Mount can be seen (this is where Hebrew University is today), then he need not go back to the Temple and burn the meat there. However, if he still has not yet reached that point, he must return to the Temple and burn the sacrifice with the wood of the altar pile.", + "And for what [quantity] must they return? Rabbi Meir says: for both when there is as much as an egg; Rabbi Judah says: for both, when there is as much as an olive; But the sages say: holy meat, when there is as much as an olive and chametz, when there is as much as an egg. The mishnah now asks about the two cases we have discussed in today’s and yesterday’s mishnah: sacrifices and chametz for the sake of what quantity must one return to burn/remove them? According to Rabbi Meir, the amount is the same for both a measure the size of an egg. The Talmud says that Rabbi Meir learns this from the laws of uncleanness just as food that is less than the size of an egg cannot become unclean, so too he need return only for this measure of sacrifice or chametz. Rabbi Judah disagrees (these guys do seem to always disagree) and holds that in both cases he need return for an amount the size of an olive, a smaller amount than an egg. The Talmud explains that Rabbi Judah learns this from the amount that is prohibited an amount the size of an olive is prohibited and therefore this is the minimum amount for which one must return. Finally, the sages differentiate between the two for sacred meat he must return for the smaller amount of an olive but for chametz he need only return for an egg’s amount." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThrough the middle of mishnah five this chapter deals with customs which differ from place to place. The basic attitude of the Mishnah is that local customs are acceptable, so long as they are not opposed to halakhah. However, complications will arise when people from a place with one custom come to a place with a different custom. This is the specific problem with which our mishnah deals.", + "In a place where it is the custom to do work on the eve of Pesah until midday one may do work; where it is the custom not to do work, one may not do work. Of all the different customs which the first five mishnayot of our chapter will discuss, this is the only one that is connected to Pesah. It is because this collection begins with a custom related to Pesah that the mishnah is found here in Pesahim. In some places it was customary not to work on the morning before Pesah. This was to make sure that people didn’t forget to burn their chametz on time. People who live in a place with such a custom should not work at all on this day. However, people who live in a place where the custom is to do work on the morning before Pesah may indeed work. In any case, even in a place where they are accustomed to work on the eve of Pesah, they only work until midday. Since the Pesah sacrifice could be offered any time after midday, the sages treated this part of the day as if it were a holiday unto itself and they forbade a person to work. Even after the Pesah sacrifice could no longer be offered this prohibition remained in its place. We should note that on the eve of Shabbat and other holidays the sages ruled that it was forbidden to do work from minchah time (the late afternoon) and onward. On Pesah they were stricter and forbade work from midday.", + "He who goes from a place where they work to a place where they do not work, or from a place where they do not work to a place where they do work, they place upon him the restrictions of the place from where he departed and the restrictions of the place to where he has gone. As is clear when you read this section carefully, whether he comes from a place that doesn’t do work or goes to a place that doesn’t do work, he won’t be allowed to do work on the eve of Pesah. No matter where he is or where he is from, he is always subject to the stricter rule.", + "And a man must not act differently [from local custom] on account of the quarrels [which would ensue]. If by not observing the local custom he will cause quarrels then he should not act differently. The simplest meaning of this line is that even if he is going from a place that does not do work to a place that does do work, he should do work if by refraining from work he would cause people to quarrel. In other words, the mishnah wants to make sure that when a person is visiting another place, his customs don’t make other people feel that he is trying to act “holier than thou”. If this will give that impression, then he should observe the local custom." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIt is permissible to eat produce which was reaped during the sabbatical year so long as that type of produce is still growing in the fields. Once it no longer grows in the fields it is forbidden to eat it. Our mishnah deals with a person who goes from a place where a certain produce grows in the field to a place where that produce does not grow in the field, or vice versa.", + "Similarly, he who transports sabbatical year produce from a place where it has ceased [to exist in the field] to a place where it has not ceased or from a place where it has not ceased to a place where it has ceased, he is bound to remove it. Again, the mishnah rules that one who travels from one place to another follows the stricter rule. If for instance he is traveling from Hebron where bananas are still in the field, to Bet El, where they are no longer in the field, he must remove the bananas he brings with him. Similarly, if he travels from Bet El which has no bananas in the field (yes, they have no bananas) to Hebron, where the bananas are still thriving, he must still get rid of his bananas because in his home town he can’t have them.", + "Rabbi Judah says: he can say to them “You can go out too and bring [produce] for yourself.” Rabbi Judah says that if he goes from a place that has a certain bananas in the field to a place that doesn’t he can still eat the bananas because he can say to the people of the other place, you can go back to my place where you can eat them as well as I can. According to Rabbi Judah this is not an issue of following the local custom, as was the issue in yesterday’s mishnah. Rather he understands that the prohibition is to eat produce from a field when that produce no longer grows in that area. Therefore, in our example above, it is only forbidden to eat Bet El bananas because Bet El has no bananas in the field. To eat Hebron bananas is okay, even in Bet El. [Note, I have explained this section according to Albeck’s commentary. The Talmud contains different interpretations.]" + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses the prohibition of a Jew from selling animals to non-Jews, lest the non-Jews use them for work on the Sabbath. [This same mishnah appeared in Avodah Zarah 1:6. ]", + "In a place where it is the custom to sell small domesticated animals to non-Jews, such sale is permitted; but where the custom is not to sell, such sale is not permitted. The Torah teaches on several occasions that an animal must rest on the Sabbath (see for instance Exodus 20:9). Our mishnah prohibits a Jew from selling an animal to a non-Jew, lest the non-Jew use the animal for work on the Sabbath. Small animals, such as sheep and goats, are not used for work. Therefore in a place where it is customary to sell them to non-Jews it is permitted to do so. In other places it was customary not to sell even small animals to non-Jews, lest the Jew become confused and sell them large animals, which is prohibited in all places.", + "In no place however is it permitted to sell large animals, calves or foals, whether whole or maimed. It is forbidden in all places to sell large animals, such as oxen and horses, to non-Jews since they will be used to perform work on the Sabbath. Even though once the non-Jew buys the animal it is no longer a “Jewish” animal and hence the Shabbat prohibitions apply to it, the mishnah still prohibits the sale because sometimes a Jew might give the animal for a trial period and then the non-Jew might return it. In such a situation, the animal still belongs to the Jew and should not work on Shabbat. The prohibition of selling animals includes calves and foals, even though they do not usually perform work.", + "Rabbi Judah permits in the case of a maimed one. Rabbi Judah allows one to sell injured animals to non-Jews since they are clearly being purchased for their meat and not in order to do work.", + "And Ben Bateira permits in the case of a horse. Ben Bateira allows the sale of a horse since horses are used for riding, which is not considered by the Rabbis to be work. Pulling plows, a work performed by oxen is considered work." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first section of this mishnah deals with eating roasted meat on the eve of the first night of Pesah. The second section deals with lighting a lamp on the eve of Yom Kippur.", + "In a place where it is the custom to eat roasted [meat] on the night of Pesah, they may eat [it]; where it is the custom not to eat [it], they may not eat [it]. The Pesach sacrifice must be eaten roasted (Exodus 12:8). After the Temple was destroyed, the some of the sages wanted to emphasize to people that it was forbidden to offer a Pesach sacrifice without a Temple. Hence, they forbade people from eating a roasted lamb on this night. When we learn tractate Betzah, we will see that some sages allowed the eating of a roasted lamb. In any case, according to all of the sages, eating roasted meat was not strictly prohibited and was tied to local custom. Those who lived in a place where they ate eat roasted meat (other than lamb) could do so, but those who lived in a place without such a custom were prohibited because it was thought that this might lead people to think that they were eating the Pesach sacrifice.", + "In a place where it is the practice to light a lamp [at home] on the night of Yom Kippur, they may light; where it is the practice not to light, they may not light. On the eve of Shabbat and festivals it is obligatory to light a Shabbat candle. This is part of the mitzvah to enjoy Shabbat it is more pleasurable to sit in the light than to sit in dark. However, on Yom Kippur, when we are not commanded to enjoy ourselves, lighting a candle was not obligatory but rather tied to local custom. Some lit candles as they did on other holidays, while others did not. It is explained that those who did not thought that the light might lead couples to have sexual relations, which are prohibited on Yom Kippur.", + "And they light [lamps] in synagogues, study-houses, and dark alleys, and for the sake of invalids. In public places, such as synagogues and study-houses and in places that need light, such as dark alleys, they lit lamps on Yom Kippur. Those who prohibited it only prohibited within the home. Finally, if there was a sick person who needed light for whatever reason, they of course lit one for him." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis is the last mishnah to note different customs in different places. It returns to the original topic of the chapter doing work on semi-holidays. The first section of the mishnah deals with the ninth of Av, a day of mourning commemorating the destruction of both Temples, while the second section returns to discuss the day before Pesah, the very topic that was discussed above in mishnah one. The fact that the mishnah returns to the same subject with which it began is a sign of its careful editing.", + "In a place where it is the custom to do work on the ninth of Av, one may do it; where it is the custom not to do work, one may not do it. And in all places students of sages desist [from work on that day]. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel said: a man should always make himself a student of sages. The ninth of Av is not a festival such that it is strictly forbidden to do work on that day. Rather just as it is not appropriate for a mourner to work, so too in some places it was felt that it was not appropriate to work on this day. However, others allowed work on the ninth of Av. According to this position the mourning for the Temple is not the same as normal mourning since the tragedy has long passed. Even in places where work is allowed, students of sages (alternatively we might understand “talmidei hachamim” as referring to sages themselves) should not work. Their extra devotion to the Torah demands of them an extra observance of this day as well. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says that everyone should strive to act like students of the sages and not work on the ninth of Av. Such behavior is not considered to be overly arrogant.", + "But the sages say: In Judea they used to do work on the eve of Pesah until midday, while in Galilee they did not work at all. The sages here disagree with the mishnah in the beginning of the chapter. According to the sages, working on the eve of Pesach is not dependent on local custom, as was described above. Rather, in Judea they allowed people to work until midday, whereas in the Galilee they forbid work the whole day. Some explain that in this mishnah the sages explain the first mishnah above. When the mishnah said that there were places with different customs it meant, according to the sages, that these customs differed between Judea and Galilee.", + "[With regard to] the night: Beth Shammai forbid [work], but Bet Hillel permit it until sunrise. In this section Beth Shammai and Bet Hillel debate what the custom was in Galilee, where they did not work on the eve of Pesah. According to Bet Shammai, this prohibition included working on the night before Pesah (the night before the seder), whereas Bet Hillel held that the prohibition of work did not begin until sunrise on the fourteenth." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nAccording to some commentators, this mishnah teaches that even in places where they did do work on the fourteenth of Nisan, the eve of Pesah, not all types of work were permitted. According to this understanding, the mishnah restricts that which we previously thought was permitted. Others understand this mishnah to refer to places in which work is generally not done. Our mishnah would then teach that in such places while most work is not done, some work may indeed be done. This mishnah then would be allowing that which we thought was prohibited.", + "Rabbi Meir says: any work which he began before the fourteenth, he may finish it on the fourteenth; but he may not begin [new work] on the fourteenth, even if he can finish it [on the same day]. According to Rabbi Meir one may complete already-begun work on the fourteenth of Nisan, the eve of Pesah, but one may not start new work. Starting new work is prohibited even if he will be able to finish it before the day is over, or more specifically before midday, at which point all work is prohibited.", + "The sages say: three craftsmen may work on the eve of Pesah until midday, and these are they: tailors, hairdressers, and laundrymen. Rabbi Yose bar Judah says: shoemakers too. The sages say that only three types of craftsmen can do work. All other types of craftsmen may not work, even if they can complete their work before midday. All three of these types of work are considered to be essential for the full appreciation of the holiday. Furthermore, these types of work are sometimes allowed even during the intermediate days of the holidays, if they could not have been done before the holiday (we will learn more about this when we learn Moed Katan). Therefore it is allowed on the day before Pesah as well. Rabbi Yose bar Judah adds that shoemakers are allowed to work on the fourteenth because the sages allowed pilgrims to Jerusalem to have their shoes fixed, if they had worn out on their travels to Jerusalem. In any case, even these types of craftsmen can only work until midday." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to deal with work that is permitted on the fourteenth of Nisan.", + "They may set up chicken-houses for fowls on the fourteenth; and if a fowl ran away, one may return her to her place; and if she died, one may set another in her place. According to Rashi this clause means that it is permitted to put eggs under hens so that the eggs will stay warm and eventually hatch. Others explain that this clause refers to fixing nests for newly-born domesticated fowl. In any case, from the context of the rest of the mishnah, it is clear that there is some immediate need being referred to. Albeck explains that the mishnah repeats “on the fourteenth” in order to emphasize that it is permitted to do this all day, and not just until midday, because this is not actually work. If a chicken ran away from sitting on her eggs, one may return her to her spot because the eggs need to be kept warm. This too is not actually work but is rather merely laborious. Similarly, if a chicken who was sitting on her eggs died, a new one may be put in her place.", + "They may sweep away [the manure] from under an animal’s feet on the fourteenth, but on the festival one may only move it to the side. It is allowed on the fourteenth (all day) to clean up the manure that has accumulated under an animal and to bring the manure out to the garbage pile. However, on the intermediate days of the festival, when work is more prohibited, it is only permissible to move it to the sides. To completely remove it is forbidden. Note that the mishnah compares here the laws concerning the fourteenth with those concerning the intermediate days of the festival. This comparison is emphasized because they are both “grayish” areas of halakhah some things are permitted and some are not, and sometimes the same work may under certain circumstances be permitted and under other circumstances be forbidden.", + "They may take vessels to and bring them back from a craftsman’s house, even if they are not required for the festival. One can bring things to a craftsman’s house to be fixed or worked on and one can pick up things from his house that have already been completed. This is permissible even if these things are not necessary for the holiday. In contrast, on the intermediate days of the festival it is forbidden to bring things to a craftsman house even if they are needed for the festival and it is forbidden to pick things up unless they are necessary for the holiday. We can see that the laws concerning the fourteenth are more lenient." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah relates to six practices observed by the inhabitants of Jericho three against which the sages protested and three against which they did not. The reason that the mishnah is here in this chapter is that the first thing that these people did is connected to the issue of work on the eve of Pesah, the main topic of our chapter.\nWe should note that we hear in this mishnah of groups of Jews who did not necessarily listen to the rabbis (this shouldn’t really be surprising). The rabbis protest against some of their practices, and live with other ones. We have no idea whether the rabbis’ protests caused the people of Jericho to change their behavior. We should always remember that when we read Mishnah we are learning how the rabbis envisioned the Jewish world to be we are not learning what it was really like.", + "Six things the inhabitants of Jericho did: against three they [the sages] protested, and against three [they] did not protest.
And these are those against which they did not protest: They grafted palm trees all day [on the eve of Pesah]; They ‘wrapped up’ the Shema; And they harvested and stacked [their produce] before [the bringing of] the ‘omer. And [for these] they did not protest. In this section the mishnah lists practices that the sages did not protest. 1) Jericho is a region in which many date-trees grow. In the spring they would graft these trees in order to improve them. Even though they did this work all day, the sages did not protest because there is a lot of pressure to get this work done in the correct season. 2) There are two interpretations for what it means to “wrap the Shema”. According to one interpretation it means that they would not pause between words, and according to another interpretation they would not say “barukh shem kevod malkhuto leolam vaed” a line normally recited after the first line of the Shema. Although one should not do either of these practices, the sages still did not feel the need to protest against them. 3) According to the sages, the omer (first grains) are brought on the second day of Pesah. Until this time it is forbidden to harvest the wheat (see Leviticus 23:10). Nevertheless, the people of Jericho would harvest the wheat and stack it, before the omer was brought. The Talmud explains that it is indeed permissible to harvest the type of wheat which grows in the Jericho region, so the sages did not protest the harvesting itself. However, stacking the harvested wheat is prohibited and it is against the stacking that they did protest.", + "And these are those against which they did protest: They permitted [for use] the small branches [of sycamore trees] belonging to sacred property, And they ate the fallen fruit from beneath [trees] on Shabbat, and they gave pe’ah from vegetables; And [for these] they did protest. In this section we learn of three practices against which the sages did protest. 1) The people of Jericho would use the small branches of sycamore trees which had been dedicated to the Temple. They reasoned that when these trees were dedicated by their forefathers it was only their trunks which were dedicated because people don’t usually use the branches. This is how Rashi explains the mishnah. The Rambam explains that they would use that which grew from the tree, reasoning that when the tree was dedicated to the Temple, only the parts that existed at the time of the dedication were sanctified. In any case, the sages felt that once the tree was sanctified none of its parts could be used. 2) Fruit that falls off a tree on Shabbat is muktzeh (forbidden to touch) since it could not be eaten when Shabbat began (reaping is prohibited). The people of Jericho would eat the fruit which they found under the tree even though they didn’t know whether the fruit fell on Shabbat, in which case it is forbidden, or before Shabbat, in which case it is permitted. 3) One is not obligated to leave the corners (pe’ah) of vegetable fields for poor people. The problem with leaving them is that pe’ah is exempt from tithes. When the poor people would eat these vegetables, they would eat them untithed which is prohibited. Against all three of these practices the sages protested." + ], + [ + "Six things King Hezekiah did, concerning three they [the sages] agreed with him, and concerning three they did not agree with him: He dragged his father's bones [corpse] on a rope bier, and they agreed with him; He crushed the bronze serpent, and they agreed with him; He hid the book of remedies, and they agreed with him.
And concerning three they did not agree with him: He cut down the doors of the Temple and sent them to the king of Assyria, and they did not agree with him; He closed up the waters of the Upper Gihon, and they did not agree with him; He intercalated [the month of] Nisan in Nisan, and they did not agree with him.
This mishnah was not originally part of the Mishnah but rather a tannaitic source from the Talmud that was added later into the Mishnah. It is missing from many mishnaic manuscripts. Nevertheless, since it appears in printed editions of the Mishnah, we will treat it as a mishnah.
The “mishnah” is in the same format as yesterday’s mishnah (six things, three of which the sages liked and three that they did not). It relates to King Hezekiah who ruled in Judea in the late 8th century. He is often idealized in the aggadah as a righteous king.
Section one:
1) Hezekiah’s father, Ahaz, was an evil king. Hezekiah did not provide a proper burial for his father (see II Chronicles 29:27) but rather dragged his corpse around on a bier made of ropes. The belief in this mishnah is that this ill treatment would cause posthumous suffering to Ahaz and that this suffering would bring him atonement.
2) Hezekiah crushed the bronze serpent which Moses had made (see Numbers 21:6-9) because Israel was worshipping this serpent (II Kings 18:4).
3) Rashi explains that the reason that Hezekiah hid the “book of remedies” and that the sages agreed with him is that people believed that the remedies were healing and not God. The Rambam vehemently disagrees with this understanding, which he finds to be completely irrational. Would one tell a hungry man not to eat but to rely on God? The Rambam (who was himself a doctor) therefore explains that this book of remedies was really a book of astrology, one which led people away from both rational medicine and from God.
Section two:
1) In order to appease the king of Syria, Hezekiah cut the gold off of the doors of the Temple (II Kings 18:16). The sages did not agree with this action he should have had faith and relied on God to protect.
2) Hezekiah closed up the waters of the Upper Gihon spring so that the Assyrians would not have water (II Chronicles 32:30). The sages did not agree for two reasons: 1) he should have had faith in God; 2) he caused suffering to his own people.
3) About once every three years the Hebrew lunar calendar needs to have an extra month added in order so that it keeps pace with the solar calendar. The way that this is done is by adding an extra month of Adar, the twelfth month of the year (according to the way months are counted in the Bible). Once Nissan has begun (the first month of the year) it is supposed to be impossible to add an extra month. Hezekiah tried to intercalate the year in Nisan, and thereby push off the observance of Pesah for another month (II Chronicles 30:2-3)." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThe following four chapters of mishnah deal with the Pesah sacrifice and discuss how it was offered in Jerusalem. Our mishnah deals with the afternoon tamid (daily) offering. Every day there were two tamid offerings, one in the morning and one in the afternoon (Numbers 28:3-4; Exodus 29:39). Usually the afternoon tamid was the last offering of the day. The one exception was the Pesah sacrifice which was offered after the tamid. Our mishnah comes to teach that normally the tamid was sacrificed later in the afternoon, but on the eve of Pesah they would sacrifice the tamid earlier in order to leave more time to sacrifice the Pesah.", + "The [afternoon] tamid is slaughtered at eight and a half hours and is offered at nine and a half hours. On normal days the afternoon tamid is slaughtered at eight and a half hours (remember the day is divided into twelve equal hours). It is offered at nine and a half hours. This leaves another two and a half hours to perform other tasks, such as various grain and incense offerings and lighting the menorah, the last thing done in the Temple before nightfall.", + "On the eve of Pesah it is slaughtered at seven and a half hours and offered at eight and a half hours, whether it is a weekday or Shabbat. On the eve of Pesah they moved the tamid sacrifice up one hour to give more time afterwards to sacrifice the pesah. This was true whether the eve of Pesah fell on Shabbat or on a weekday.", + "If the eve of Pesah fell on the eve of Shabbat it is slaughtered at six and a half hours and offered at seven and a half hours, and the pesah offering after it. The only exception to this was when the eve of Pesah fell on the eve of Shabbat. In this case they had to finish roasting the pesah lamb before Shabbat began since cooking is prohibited on Shabbat. Therefore, they offered the tamid sacrifice as early as possible at six and a half hours which is when the sun begins to set. The afternoon tamid cannot be offered earlier because at an earlier time it is not afternoon. They would then immediately begin to slaughter and prepare the pesah lamb." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThere are four parts of the offering of an animal which need to be performed before an animal sacrifice can be eaten or burned on the altar: slaughtering, catching the blood in a vessel, bring the blood to the altar and the sprinkling of the blood on the altar. All four of these actions must be done with the proper intent in mind. That is to say the person performing these four actions must be at all times intend to offer the animal as the specific sacrifice which he is intending to perform. Our mishnah teaches that a pesah for which one of these actions is done with the wrong intent is not a valid pesah offering.", + "A pesah sacrifice which a person slaughtered another purpose, or caught [the blood] or brought it or sprinkled its [blood] for another purpose; As stated above in the introduction, if any of the four activities are done with the intent of the animal serving another purpose besides a pesah, then the animal cannot be used as a pesah sacrifice.", + "Or for its own purpose and for another purpose; or for another purpose and for its own purpose, it is disqualified. The mishnah now emphasizes that even if one began one of the activities, for instance slaughtering, with one intention in mind and completed the activity with another intention, the sacrifice is disqualified. The entire activity from beginning to end must be performed with the correct intention in mind. The mishnah will now illustrate these possibilities.", + "How is it “for its own purpose” and [then] “for another purpose”? For the purpose of being a pesah sacrifice [first] and [then] for the purpose of being a well-being offering. In the previous section we learned that even if one of the actions was first performed “for its own purpose” meaning for it to be a pesah and then “for another purpose”, that it is disqualified. The mishnah now illustrates such an example. He began to slaughter the animal (or any of the other three actions) with the intent of it being a pesah and then while still performing the act he intended it to be a well-being offering. Even though he began the act with the correct intent, it is still disqualified.", + "[How is it] “for another purpose” and [then] “for its own purpose”? For the purpose of being a well-being offering [first] and [then] for the purpose of being a pesah sacrifice. In this case he began to perform one of the actions with the incorrect intent, for instance for the animal to be a well-being offering, and then he completed the action with the correct intent, for the animal to be pesah. Even though he completed the action with the correct intent, the sacrifice is still disqualified because he began even one of the actions with the incorrect intent." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to discuss ways in which improper intent can disqualify the pesah sacrifice. The second half of the mishnah discusses a pesah which was offered at the wrong time of day.", + "If he slaughtered it for those who cannot eat it or for those who are not registered for it, for uncircumcised persons or for unclean persons, it is unfit. This section lists people who cannot for various reasons eat the pesah sacrifice. If he slaughters the lamb with the intent of it being eaten only by people from these categories then the sacrifice is unfit. There are four categories of people listed here. 1) “Those who cannot eat it” refers to sick or old people who will not be able to eat even a minimum amount of the sacrificial meat. 2) Before the sacrifice is slaughtered a group of people must register themselves for eating the sacrifice meaning they intend to be the group that eats the sacrifice. Unregistered people may not eat from the pesah. If he sacrifices it for people who are not registered for that specific pesah, it is unfit. 3) The pesah may not be eaten by uncircumcised males (Exodus 12:48). 4) In order to eat the pesah a person must be ritually clean.", + "[If he slaughtered it] for those who can eat it and for those who cannot eat it, for those who are registered for it and for those who are not registered for it, for circumcised and for uncircumcised persons, for unclean and for clean persons, it is fit. This section teaches that if he slaughtered the pesah with a group of people in mind, some of whom could eat it and some of whom could not, the pesah is still valid. As long as at least one of the people for whom he sacrificed it can eat it, it is valid.", + "If he slaughtered it before midday, it is disqualified, because it is said, “[and all of the assembled congregation of Israelites shall slaughter it] at twilight” (Exodus 12:6). According to the rabbis “twilight” is when the sun has already reached its peak and has begun to descend to the west. This is from six and a half hours and onwards. If the pesah was slaughtered before this time it is invalid.", + "If he slaughtered it before the [evening] tamid, it is fit, providing that a person stirs its blood until [that of] the tamid is sprinkled. [Nevertheless] if it was sprinkled [before the tamid], it is fit. The pesah should a priori be slaughtered after the evening tamid (daily offering). We learned this above in mishnah one. However, ex post facto, even if it was slaughtered before the tamid, it is still valid, provided that a person stirs the blood of the pesah so that it can be sprinkled on the altar after the blood of the tamid is sprinkled. However, even this requirement is only “a priori” if the blood of the pesah is sprinkled before that of the tamid it is still valid." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nExodus 34:25 states, “You shall not offer the blood of My sacrifice with anything leavened.” The sages interpret this verse to mean that the pesah cannot be sacrificed by a person who still has chametz in his possession. Our mishnah discusses various aspects of this prohibition.", + "One who slaughters the pesah with chametz [in his possession] violates a negative commandment. The negative commandment which he violates is the one in Exodus 34:25, quoted above in the introduction.", + "Rabbi Judah says: also the [evening] tamid. Rabbi Judah extends this prohibition to include the evening tamid offered on the fourteenth of Nisan. According to a midrash, Rabbi Judah derives this from the word “My sacrifice” in Exodus 34:25. A tamid might be referred to by God as “My sacrifice” because it is not eaten but rather wholly burnt on the altar. Alternatively (get the pun!) he may read the word “My sacrifice” as being a plural word meaning “sacrifices”, in which case the verse reads “You shall not offer the blood of sacrifices with anything leavened.” In any case, Rabbi Judah holds that one who sacrifices the evening tamid on the fourteenth of Nisan while in possession of chametz has violated a negative commandment.", + "Rabbi Shimon says: [If he slaughters] the pesah [with chametz] on the fourteenth for its own purpose, he is liable; [if] for a different purpose, he is exempt. But [for] all other sacrifices, whether slaughtered for their own purpose or for a different purpose, he is exempt. [If he slaughters the pesah with chametz] on the festival for its own purpose, he is exempt; if for a different purpose, he is liable; But [for] all other sacrifices [slaughtered on the festival with chametz], whether for their own purpose or for another purpose, he is liable, except [in the case or] a sin-offering which he slaughtered for a different purpose. Rabbi Shimon makes several refinements as to when a person is liable for transgressing Exodus 34:25. The first section deals with sacrifices made on the fourteenth of Nisan. If he slaughters the pesah with the intent of it being a pesah he is liable (all of the below cases refer to someone in possession of chametz when making the sacrifice). However, if he slaughters the pesah with the intent of it being a different sacrifice the pesah itself is not valid. Since it is not a valid pesah, he has not transgressed Exodus 34:25 which refers only to slaughtering a valid pesah while in possession of chametz. If he slaughters a different sacrifice on the fourteenth of Nisan while owning chametz he is not liable, whether or not the sacrifice was offered with the proper intent. Rabbi Shimon holds that the verse applies only to a valid pesah and not to other sacrifices. The third section refers to one who slaughters an animal as a pesah sacrifice during the festival. The sacrifice is invalid since he can’t offer a pesah after the fourteenth of Nisan. Therefore, he has not transgressed the verse. On the other hand, if he sacrificed it with another intent, then the sacrifice is considered to be a valid well-being offering. In such a case, he is liable for making a sacrifice during Pesah while owning chametz. Rabbi Shimon derives this from Exodus 23:18, “You shall not offer the blood of My sacrifice with anything leavened”, a verse nearly identical to Exodus 34:25. From this verse he derives a prohibition of offering any valid sacrifice on Pesah while in possession of chametz. Finally, if he offers any other sacrifice during Pesah while in possession of chametz, he has transgressed, as we explained above. This is true whether or not the sacrifice was done with the proper intent. The only exception is a sin-offering which is disqualified if offered with the improper intent during Pesah. Since it is a disqualified offering, he has not transgressed by slaughtering it while in possession of chametz." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah now begins to describe how the pesah was slaughtered in the Temple.\nWe should note that scholars frequently attempt to estimate how many people actually came to the Temple on Pesah and how many sacrifices were offered there. Clearly, the numbers were impressive but even rough estimates of numbers are impossible. Rabbinic literature, composed at least one hundred years after the destruction, is not considered by most scholars to be a particularly reliable source of history for the Second Temple period. Nevertheless, from this mishnah we can at least detect that Pesah was the busiest time of the year at the Temple, or at least the time of the year when the most sacrifices were offered. Similar descriptions can be found in Philo and Josephus both of whom lived and wrote while the Temple still stood.", + "The pesah is slaughtered in three divisions, as it is said, “And the whole assembly of the congregation of Israel shall slaughter it” (Exodus 12:6): “assembly,” “congregation,” and “Israel.” Because of the large number of lambs that needed to be slaughtered on the eve of Pesah, the people of Israel were divided into three divisions each taking a turn to slaughter the Pesah. The mishnah derives this midrashically from three terms used in the biblical verse: “assembly”, “congregation” and “Israel.” The Talmud explains that a division could not be less than thirty people. Assumedly, they were much larger than that.", + "The first division entered, the Temple court was filled, and they closed the doors of the Temple court. Once the first group had entered they would lock the doors so that people from the second group would not push to get in.", + "They sounded a teki'ah, a teru'ah, and a teki'ah. These are the same notes which we still make on Rosh Hashanah. The tekiah is the single long note and the teruah is the staccato note. What we call “shevarim” (three notes) is a variant version of the “teruah”.", + "The priests stood in rows, and in their hands were basins of silver and basins of gold, a row which was entirely of silver was of silver, and a row which was entirely of gold was of gold, they were not mixed. And the basins did not have flat bottoms, lest they put them down and the blood becomes congealed. The basins were there to receive the blood after the animal was slaughtered. The separation of gold from silver vessels was done for aesthetic purposes. Since the blood needed to be sprinkled onto the altar, it was crucial that it not become congealed in the basins. Therefore they did not have flat bottoms." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe mishnah continues to describe the slaughtering process.", + "The Israelite killed [the lamb]; If an Israelite wishes to slaughter his own pesah he may do so. Most other sacrifices are slaughtered only by priests. However, in Ezra 6:20 and II Chronicles 30:17, 35:6,11, the Levites are those who slaughter the pesah.", + "And the priest caught [the blood]. Only the priest is allowed to catch the blood in the basin, not the Israelite.", + "He would hand it to his colleague and his colleague [would hand it] to his colleague. And he would receive the full [basin] and give back the empty one. The priest nearest the altar would sprinkle it once over against the base [or the altar]. To expedite the process the priests would pass the blood down the rows which we encountered in yesterday’s mishnah. The priest at the end of row would sprinkle the blood over the base of the altar and then pass the empty basins back so that more blood could be received in them. We should note that the mishnah is precise in the order of activities. The priest should first take the full basin and then give back the empty one. This is because the full basin is one with which a commandment will be performed and one should not pass over the opportunity, even for a moment, to perform a commandment." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to describe the sacrifice of the Pesah, focusing especially on the singing of Hallel by the Levites.", + "The first division [then] went out and the second entered; the second went out and the third entered. As did the first, so did the second and the third. As mentioned in mishnah five, those who came to the Temple to offer the sacrifice divided into three groups. Each group would go through the same process described in the above two mishnayot.", + "They recited the Hallel. While the sacrifice was being offered the Levites recited the Hallel. We should note that this is one of the elements of the sacrificial ceremony which was eventually adopted into the seder ritual. Indeed, all early descriptions of the sacrifice and/or seder ritual include the recitation of Psalms, i.e. the Hallel. This includes descriptions in the Bible itself, in Josephus, Philo, the Christian Gospels and of course, in rabbinic literature.", + "If they finished it, they repeated, and if they repeated [and were not finished yet], they recited it a third time, though they never did recite it a third time. Rabbi Judah says: the third division never reached, “I love Lord for he hears” (Psalms 116), because the people for it were few. Sometimes the Levites would finish the Hallel before all of the lambs had been slaughtered and their blood sprinkled on the altar. If this happened the Levites would repeat the Hallel a second and even a third time. However, according to the tradition in this mishnah, they never had to repeat it a third time. Rabbi Judah relates that when it came to the third division, the Levites never even got as far as Psalm 116 in reciting the Hallel. Hallel begins at Psalms 113, so if they never even got to Psalm 116 the first time through this is indeed strong evidence that the third division was rather small. Assumedly most people wanted to be in the first two divisions so they could get their lambs slaughtered and start digging in. Even in ancient times people were anxious to begin their Pesah meal some things never change." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first section of the mishnah teaches that the sacrificial ritual was performed on Shabbat the same way that it was performed during the week. The second section discusses a practice done in order to ensure that blood from each of the lambs had been poured out onto the altar.", + "As it was done on weekdays so it was done on Shabbat, except that the priests would mop up the Temple court, against the will of the sages. The ritual was performed on Shabbat in the exact same manner that it was performed during the week. However, the sages would have liked to have seen one difference in how the ritual was performed on Shabbat. As they did during the week, so too on Shabbat the priests would mop up the floor of the Temple courtyard, which had surely become quite dirty with the blood from the many sacrifices. They did this against the will of the sages who thought that mopping up the floor is prohibited on Shabbat. As an aside, we can detect here a note of dissonance between the sages and the priests who ran the Temple. Clearly, these priests did not feel themselves subject to the sages’ authority.", + "Rabbi Judah says: he [a priest] would fill a goblet with the mixed blood [and] he sprinkled it once on the altar, but the sages did not agree with him. Rabbi Judah relates that a priest would fill a goblet with the mixed blood that he found on the floor and then pour the contents of the goblet onto the altar. The reason he would do this is lest the blood of one of the sacrifices had not been sprinkled on the altar. Not having its blood spilled on the altar would render the sacrifice invalid. It was assumed that some of the blood of all of the animals would be in this mixture and therefore pouring it out was sort of an insurance policy. The sages did not agree with Rabbi Judah that this was done in the Temple." + ], + [ + "How did they hang up [the sacrifices] and flay [them]?
There were iron hooks fixed in the walls and in the pillars, on which they hung up [the sacrifices] and flayed [them].
If any one had no place to suspend and flay [their sacrifice], there were there thin smooth staves which he placed on his shoulder and on his fellow’s shoulder, and so hung up [the animal] and flayed [it].
Rabbi Eliezer says: when the fourteenth fell on Shabbat, he placed his hand on his fellow’s shoulder and his fellow’s hand on his shoulder, and he hung up [the sacrifice] and flayed [it].
After the blood of the sacrifice had been thrown onto the altar the next step was to flay the animal so that some of its inner fats could be taken out and offered on the altar. Our mishnah describes how the animal was flayed.
The animal was hung up by its hind legs and its skin was flayed and removed. The hanging was done on fixed hooks in the walls or in pillars which were in the slaughtering area in the Temple courtyard. From section two we can see that there were not always enough hooks to hang up all of the sacrifices. In such a case two people would hold up poles on their shoulders and suspend the animal from them. Rabbi Eliezer holds that on Shabbat these poles could not be carried and therefore instead of using poles they would simply hang up the animal on two people’s shoulders. The rabbis disagree with Rabbi Eliezer. According to their opinion the prohibition of using these poles on Shabbat is only one of “shevut” rabbinically mandated rest on Shabbat. In the Temple, since these prohibitions are not “deoraita” of toraitic origin they are waived. Since the sages hold that the flaying is done in the same way on Shabbat and during the week, this was not listed as a difference in yesterday’s mishnah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah completes the description of the sacrificial aspects of the pesah sacrifice. In chapter seven we will describe how it is roasted so that it could be eaten.", + "Then he tore it and took out its inner fats, placed them in a tray and burnt them on the altar. After the animal was flayed he would tear a hole in it and take out the fats that need to be sacrificed on the altar. We should note that non-priests could do the flaying and the tearing but that only the priest could offer the fats on the altar.", + "The first division went out and sat down on the Temple mount, the second [sat] in the hel, while the third remained in its place. When it grew dark they went out and roasted their pesah lambs. At this point, the sacrificial elements have been completed and the animal is ready to be roasted. On a weekday, the people would now take the sacrifice back to their homes or to wherever in Jerusalem they were planning to eat the pesah meal. However, if the eve of Pesah fell on Shabbat they could not carry the pesah out of the Temple confines. So therefore each division would remain in a certain place. The first division would go out of the Temple and sit on the Temple mount, the second division would sit in the hel, a place right outside the courtyard and the third division remained in the courtyard. When Shabbat was over they would go home and roast their lambs." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah and the following one discuss which activities in connection with the pesah sacrifice may be performed on Shabbat.\nWe should note that this was a “hot” issue in the Second Temple period. Different sects of Jews argued over the potential conflicts between strict Shabbat observance and the necessary sacrifices which occur on festivals. Indeed, the calendar of the Dead Sea sect (and perhaps of others as well) had all of the holidays falling on Wednesdays (their calendar was 364 days, 52 weeks), the day furthest away from Shabbat. Part of the reason for this was to avoid what they perceived to be the desecration of Shabbat.", + "These things in [connection with] the pesah override Shabbat: its slaughtering and the sprinkling of its blood and the cleansing of its innards and the burning of its fat. The pesah has to be slaughtered on the fourteenth of Nisan. Therefore, its slaughtering will have to be done on Shabbat, if the fourteenth of Nisan falls on Shabbat. Other mandatory sacrifices such as the tamid are also slaughtered on Shabbat. Similarly, the sprinkling of its blood must be done immediately after it has been slaughtered and hence it too can be done on Shabbat. If the sacrifice is left as it is until evening, without its innards being removed, it will start to rot and hence its innards may also be removed. Finally, the burning of its fat on the altar also can be done on Shabbat. Although this could wait until later in the day, since they allowed the animal to be slaughtered they also allowed its fat to be burned. It also seems to me that activities that were “sacrificial” in nature were allowed, whereas, as we shall see below, preparing the animal to be eaten was not allowed.", + "But its roasting and the washing of its innards do not override Shabbat. Roasting the sacrifice is prohibited on Shabbat, since it can be done either before or after Shabbat. If the fourteenth fell on Nisan this would have to be after Shabbat was over. If the fourteenth fell on Friday, then the roasting would have to be completed before Shabbat began. Washing its innards with water can wait until Shabbat is over and there is no fear that the carcass will begin to rot. Hence this activity can also not be performed on Shabbat.", + "Carrying it and bringing it from outside the Shabbat border and cutting off its wart do not override Shabbat. Putting the animal on his shoulders to carry him through the public domain is forbidden. Similarly bringing the animal outside of the Shabbat border (2000 cubits around the city) is forbidden on Shabbat. Finally, a lamb that has a wart cannot be offered as a pesah. In order to make it possible to use it as an offering the wart has to be cut off. This too cannot be done on Shabbat. All three of these activities could have been done before Shabbat began and hence they do not override the Shabbat. Rabbi Eliezer disagrees and holds that just as the actual performance of the mitzvah overrides Shabbat, so too the preparing of the accessories which help to perform a mitzvah overrides Shabbat. We have encountered this debate before in Shabbat 19:1 concerning making and carrying a knife with which to circumcise. In tomorrow’s mishnah Rabbi Eliezer and the sages will debate this issue. Stay tuned!" + ], + [ + "Introduction This mishnah contains an extended debate between Rabbi Eliezer, Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Akiva concerning what overrides the Shabbat. In order to understand the mishnah we should briefly remind ourselves of the laws of Shabbat. There are two categories of prohibited labor mentioned here and critical for understanding this mishnah’s arguments: 1) a forbidden labor; 2) mandated rest, which is called shevut. The former prohibitions are considered to be directly from the Torah (de’oraita) and are more serious than the latter which are only of rabbinic origin (derabbanan). The three activities focused upon in this mishnah are: 1) Slaughtering the pesah. Slaughtering an animal on Shabbat is a forbidden labor. 2) Carrying the pesah on one’s shoulders through the public domain or bringing it outside the Shabbat border. These are considered to be prohibitions of shevut because “a living thing carries itself”, that is it is not considered to be a biblical violation of carrying on Shabbat to carry a living thing. Also, the prohibition of leaving the Shabbat border is considered by most sages to be only of rabbinic origin. 3) Sprinkling red heifer water on a person who has come into contact with the dead. This is not done on Shabbat even though it is only a shevut prohibition. Finally, it is not often that we get a chance to see in the Mishnah how the sages actually argued. While we certainly do not have here a “recording” of their exchanges, even the literary record affords a fascinating glimpse into their intellectual world.", + "Rabbi Eliezer said: is it not logical: if slaughtering, which is [usually forbidden] as a labor, overrides Shabbat, shouldn’t these, which are [only forbidden] as mandated rest, override Shabbat? Rabbi Eliezer’s first argument is straightforward. The sages admitted in mishnah one that slaughtering the pesah is permitted on Shabbat. Slaughtering an animal on Shabbat is a violation of one of the forbidden labors of Shabbat. If a forbidden labor is permitted, shouldn’t carrying the animal, which is only an issue of shevut, also be permitted.", + "Rabbi Joshua said to him: let the festival prove this, for they permitted labor [on the festival] and forbade [activities forbidden because of] shevut. Rabbi Joshua responds that Rabbi Eliezer’s argument is not decisive because of the issue of work on the festival. Generally on a festival it is permitted to slaughter an animal and cook it because one is allowed to prepare food on Shabbat. These activities were permitted even though they are forbidden labors. Nevertheless, when it came to issues of shevut, for instance carrying something from outside the Shabbat border, the sages did not permit these types of activities on a festival. Therefore, it makes sense in the case of the pesah for the sages to be strict with regard to shevut infractions and lenient with regard to forbidden labors.", + "Rabbi Eliezer said to him: what is this, Joshua? What proof is a voluntary act in respect of a commandment! Rabbi Eliezer responds that Rabbi Joshua’s analogy is not good. Preparing food on a festival is a voluntary act and hence the rabbis could be strict and forbid shevut violations. However, eating the pesah is a commandment and hence the law should be lenient and allow shevut violations.", + "Rabbi Akiva answered and said: let sprinkling [purificatory waters] prove it, which is [performed] because it is a commandment and is [forbidden only] as a shevut, yet it does not override Shabbat; so you too, do not wonder at these, that though they are [required] on account of a commandment and are [forbidden only] as shevut, yet they do not override Shabbat. Rabbi Akiva, ever the creative sage, steps in after Rabbi Joshua’s argument fails and employs a new analogy. Purificatory waters are sprinkled on a person who has contracted corpse impurity on the third and seventh days of the purification process. However, if the seventh day is Shabbat, the fourteenth of Nisan, they are not sprinkled even though this is necessary to allow the person to be pure and eat his pesah in the evening. The prohibition of sprinkling the water is only one of shevut, and it is a mitzvah and nevertheless it remains prohibited on Shabbat. So too, the carrying of the pesah on the shoulders and outside of the border remain prohibited even though they are for a mitzvah and only prohibited due to shevut.", + "Rabbi Eliezer said to him: but in respect of that I am arguing: if slaughtering, which is a labor, overrides Shabbat, is it not logical that sprinkling, which is [only] a shevut, should override Shabbat! Rabbi Eliezer basically answers that he disagrees concerning that halakhah as well. Just as carrying the animal is shevut and therefore overrides Shabbat, so too sprinkling which is shevut also should override Shabbat.", + "Rabbi Akiva said to him: or the opposite: if sprinkling, which is [forbidden] as a shevut, does not override Shabbat, then slaughtering, which is [normally forbidden] on account of labor, is it not logical that it should not override Shabbat. Rabbi Akiva responds that now that Rabbi Eliezer is trying to overturn traditions (that we don’t sprinkle the purificatory water on Shabbat), he too can overturn a tradition. If we don’t sprinkle the water, even though it is only shevut, then all the more so we shouldn’t slaughter the animal which is a forbidden labor. Rabbi Akiva does not really wish to rule that we shouldn’t slaughter the pesah on Shabbat. What he means to do is reject Rabbi Eliezer’s argument.", + "Rabbi Eliezer said to him: Akiva! You are uprooting what is written in the Torah, “at twilight, offer it at its set time” (Numbers 9:3), both on week-days and on Shabbat. Rabbi Eliezer responds that the Torah explicitly mandates that the pesah be slaughtered on the fourteenth even if this is on Shabbat. Hence, the argument that Rabbi Akiva was trying to make in section six would directly contradict the Torah.", + "He said to him: master, give me an appointed time for these as there is an appointed season for slaughtering! Rabbi Akiva returns to the original argument. The Torah specifically mandates an appointed time for the slaughtering of the pesah. Hence slaughtering overrides Shabbat. The other labors which are not specified by the Torah do not override the Shabbat. This is basically the end of the argument. In the end only activities that seem to be specifically mandated by the Torah are allowed on Shabbat.", + "Rabbi Akiva stated a general rule: work which could be done on the eve of Shabbat does not override Shabbat; slaughtering, which could not be done on the eve of Shabbat, does override Shabbat. The mishnah ends with the same general principle that Rabbi Akiva iterated in Shabbat 19:1 any labor which can be performed before Shabbat must be performed then and does not override Shabbat, but any labor which cannot be performed until Shabbat itself does override Shabbat. Slaughtering the pesah cannot be done before Shabbat, hence it overrides the Shabbat. Carrying the pesah could have been done earlier, hence it does not override the Shabbat. The fact that the mishnah ends with Rabbi Akiva’s opinion is a clear expression of the Mishnah’s general connection to Rabbi Akiva and his school." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nExodus 12 clearly mandates that a lamb be brought for the pesah sacrifice. Deuteronomy 16:2 states, “You shall slaughter the pesah sacrifice for the Lord your God, from the flock and the herd.” The herd refers to cattle (cows) and the flock refers to sheep. The problem is that this verse which allows the pesah to be brought from cattle contradicts Exodus 12 which mandates a lamb. II Chronicles 35 also mentions that cattle were brought along with the lambs. However, in II Chronicles it becomes somewhat clearer that the cattle were not the pesah sacrifice but an accompanying sacrifice. The rabbis call this sacrifice the “hagigah”, a word which comes from “hag” the word for festival in Hebrew, as in “hag sameah” happy holiday. They would eat the hagigah before they ate the pesah so that the pesah could be eaten on a full stomach. Since lambs which could be used for the pesah were not easy to come by, they ate the additional sacrifice before the pesah and then everyone would eat a small amount of pesah to fulfill the commandment.\nOur mishnah teaches that this sacrifice was not really a separate mitzvah in and of itself, but merely an accompaniment to the pesah. Hence it was not always brought.", + "When does he bring a hagigah with it [the pesah sacrifice]? When it comes during the week, in purity, and in small [amounts]. But when it comes on Shabbat, in large [amounts], and in impurity, one does not bring the hagigah with it. The hagigah is not brought in the following three situations: 1) Shabbat. While slaughtering the pesah does override the Shabbat, slaughtering the hagigah does not. Hence, if the eve of Pesah falls on Shabbat the hagigah is not brought. 2) In impurity: Usually, those who eat the pesah sacrifice must be ritually pure. However, if most of the congregation of Israel is in a state of impurity, these laws are waived and they may conduct the sacrifice and eat it while impure (we will learn this in 7:6). Our mishnah teaches that in such a case while they can bring the pesah they do not bring the hagigah. 3) In large amounts: If there is enough pesah meat to feed everyone then the hagigah is not brought. It is only brought if there is a necessity for some extra meat." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to teach the laws regarding the hagigah: what animals can be used for the hagigah and for how long it may be eaten.", + "The hagigah was brought of flocks, herds, lambs or goats, of the males or the females. And it is eaten two days and one night. Any animal, be it a sheep, goat, cow or bull will do for the hagigah. It can also be either male or female. This is contrasted with the pesah which must be a male flock animal (sheep or goat).", + "The hagigah may be eaten on the day it is sacrificed, the night afterwards and the whole following day. This is the same rule as for all sacrifices of well-being (shelamim). In contrast, the pesah sacrifice can only be eaten that very night, and it must be completed before midnight." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe topic of this mishnah is one who slaughters an animal that is supposed to be a sacrifice on Shabbat, the eve of Pesah, but sacrifices it for the wrong purpose. Again we will see an extended argument between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Joshua, two of the same sages who disputed above in mishnah two.", + "If the pesah was slaughtered for a different purpose on Shabbat, he [the slaughterer] is liable to a sin-offering on its account. If a person takes an animal set aside to be a pesah and slaughters it on Shabbat, the eve of Pesah, with the intent of the animal being another type of sacrifice, the sacrifice is invalid and he is liable for transgressing Shabbat. Since he slaughtered an animal without performing a mitzvah, he is not exempt for having slaughtered.", + "All other sacrifices which he slaughtered as a pesah: if they are not fit [to be a pesah] he is liable; if they are fit [to be a pesah]: Rabbi Eliezer makes him liable to a sin-offering, But Rabbi Joshua exempts him. In this case he takes an animal set aside to be another sacrifice and slaughters it for it to be a pesah. If the animal cannot be a pesah, for instance it is a cow, he is liable for the same reason that he was above he has slaughtered an animal without performing a mitzvah. The more debatable issue is if he slaughtered an animal set aside for another sacrifice and that animal can be a pesah, such as a one year old male sheep. In such a case he has performed a valid sacrifice, which is a mitzvah, but he has not fulfilled his pesah obligation and he must bring another pesah sacrifice. According to Rabbi Eliezer he is liable even though he has performed a mitzvah. Rabbi Joshua exempts him because he has performed a mitzvah. The remainder of the mishnah is an extended argument between these two rabbis, an argument very similar to that which we saw in mishnah two.", + "Rabbi Eliezer said to him: if for the pesah, which it is permitted [to slaughter] for its own purpose, yet when he changes its purpose he is liable; then [other] sacrifices, which are forbidden [to slaughter even] for their own purpose, if he changes their purpose is it not logical that he should be liable. Rabbi Eliezer starts out again in a very straightforward manner. Everyone agrees that he is liable if he slaughters a pesah with the wrong intention. If he is liable in this case in which it was permitted to slaughter the pesah, he should also be liable for slaughtering a different sacrifice, which he shouldn’t have been doing in the first place. To put it another way, Rabbi Eliezer is pointing out a problem in Rabbi Joshua’s ruling if he had slaughtered the other sacrifice with the intention of it being that which it should have been, he would have been liable. Why should he be exempt just because he sacrificed it with the intent of it being a pesah?", + "Rabbi Joshua said to him: not so. If you say [with regard to] the pesah, [he is liable] because he changed it to something that is forbidden; will you say [the same] of [other] sacrifices, where he changed them for something that is permitted? Rabbi Joshua says that rather than decide based on what the animal was supposed to be (permitted pesah or forbidden other sacrifice) we should focus on what intent he had when he sacrificed it. When it came to the pesah which he sacrificed with something else in mind he is liable because he changed it to something which is forbidden on Shabbat. His intent was to offer a forbidden sacrifice. In contrast, when it came to the other sacrifice he is exempt since he changed it to something which is permitted. Here, his intent was to offer a permitted sacrifice.", + "Rabbi Eliezer said to him: let the community sacrifices prove it, which are permitted for their own sake, yet he who slaughters [other sacrifices] in their name is liable. Rabbi Eliezer now brings into the debate another type of sacrifice which may be offered on Shabbat public sacrifices such as the tamid or the mussaf. These are permitted if sacrificed with the proper intent, but one who slaughters an animal set aside to be a different animal with the intent of it being a tamid or musaf is liable. This is true even though it is permitted to sacrifice a tamid or musaf. So too, one who slaughters a different animal with the intent of it being a pesah should be liable. In both cases one is slaughtering a different sacrifice with the intent of it being a sacrifice which is permitted on Shabbat, and therefore in both cases the person should be liable.", + "Rabbi Joshua said him: not so. If you say [with regard to] the public sacrifices, [that is] because they have a limit; will you say [the same] of the pesah, which has no limit? Rabbi Joshua points out that this analogy is faulty. There is a limit to the amount of public, mandated sacrifices that can be brought. One can only bring one tamid in the morning and one in the afternoon. The Torah prescribes exactly what must be brought for the musaf. After these have been slaughtered it is forbidden to slaughter any more on Shabbat. Therefore, one who slaughters on Shabbat another sacrifice with the intent of it being a tamid or musaf has performed a forbidden labor. There is no limit to the number of pesah sacrifices that Israel may offer and hence one he offers an additional pesah has not performed a forbidden labor. This is the end of the argument between Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Eliezer. Again, Rabbi Eliezer seems to lose. Clearly the editor of the Mishnah’s sympathies do not lie with him.", + "Rabbi Meir says: he too who slaughters [other sacrifices] in the name of public sacrifice is not liable. Rabbi Meir actually goes a step further than Rabbi Joshua. According to Rabbi Meir one who slaughters another sacrifice with the intent of it being a public sacrifice is also exempt, just like one who slaughters another sacrifice with the intent of it being a pesah. This is a step further because unlike the pesah, these sacrifices cannot be used. He is exempt because his intent was to slaughter the animal for a permitted sacrifice." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe final mishnah of this chapter continues to deal with cases in which a person is liable for slaughtering a pesah on Shabbat.", + "If he slaughtered it for those who are not its eaters, or for those who were not registered for it, for uncircumcised or for unclean [persons], he is liable. In all of these cases he slaughtered the pesah for people who could not eat it (these categories were explained above in 5:3). Since the pesah is disqualified he is liable for having slaughtered on Shabbat.", + "[If he slaughtered it] for its eaters and for those who are not its eaters, for those who are registered for it and for those who are not registered for it, for circumcised and for uncircumcised, for unclean and for clean [persons], he is exempt. In these cases he slaughters the animal for a group of people, some of whom can eat it and some of whom can’t. The pesah is valid (see above 5:3) and therefore he is exempt for having slaughtered on Shabbat.", + "If he slaughtered it, and it was found to possess a blemish, he is liable. Certain blemishes on the animal rend the animal unfit as a sacrifice. If he slaughters such a blemished animal on Shabbat he is liable. He should have checked the animal before he slaughtered it to make sure it was unblemished.", + "If he slaughtered it and it was found to be an internal terefah, he is exempt. A terefah is an animal that has an injury that will cause it to die. A terefah cannot be a valid sacrifice. However, in this case he is exempt because the injury was internal and he had no way of knowing about it until he slaughtered the animal.", + "If he slaughtered it, and [then] it became known that its owners had withdrawn their hands from it, or that they had died, or that they had become unclean, he is not culpable, because he slaughtered it with permission. In these cases he thought he was slaughtering it for a group of people who could eat it, but before he slaughtered it they changed their status such that they could not eat it. Either they “withdrew their hands from it”, meaning they registered for a different pesah, or they died, or they became unclean. In all three cases the pesah is invalid but he is nevertheless not liable because when he slaughtered it he thought he was doing so in a permitted situation." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nExodus 12:9 states that the pesah must be roasted and that it may not be cooked with water. Today’s mishnah and the following one deal with how the pesah is roasted such that there is no water or even hint thereof used in the process.", + "How is the pesah roasted?
They bring a spit of pomegranate wood and thrust it into its mouth [right down] as far as its buttocks, and place its legs and its entrails inside it, the words of Rabbi Yose the Galilean. The pesah is roasted in an oven while on a spit. The spit is made of pomegranate wood, the driest of woods, so that there is as little moisture used in the process as possible. Exodus 12:9 also states that the pesah should be cooked “roasted, head, legs and entrails.” The Hebrew in this verse is oddly phrased and could be translated as “its head, on its legs and entrails.” Rabbi Yose the Galilean interprets this to mean that the legs and entrails, once cut off or removed, should be stuffed into the pesah itself and then roasted inside of it.", + "Rabbi Akiva says: this is like boiling, rather they are hung outside it. Rabbi Akiva disagrees and holds that this would be like boiling the entrails and legs inside the pesah, and any cooking with moisture is forbidden. Rather the entrails and legs are hung on the spit outside the pesah and they are roasted separately. The verse merely means to emphasize that the whole thing must be roasted." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to discuss ways in which they avoided all possibility that the pesah would be cooked with water.", + "One may not roast the pesah either on a [metal] spit or on a grill. Rabbi Zadok said: it once happened that Rabban Gamaliel said to his servant Tabi, “Go out and roast us the pesah on the grill.” According to the first opinion in the mishnah, the pesah cannot be cooked using any metal. The problem with metal is that it will heat up and it will cook the pesah and not the fire. The rabbis were adamant that the pesah be cooked only by the fire itself and not by things which had been themselves heated by fire. Rabban Gamaliel disagrees and holds that heat which is derived from the fire has the same status as the fire itself. Therefore, he could tell his slave to go out and roast the pesah on a grill. As an aside, we should note that Rabban Gamaliel in this mishnah probably is the Rabban Gamaliel who lived after the destruction of the Temple. Nevertheless, he continues to eat a “pesah”. This is not the only evidence for such a practice after the destruction of the Temple. Nevertheless, as time passed, this practice became less and less accepted.", + "If it [the pesah] touched the clay of the oven, he should pare its place. If the pesah touched the oven, then they should pare off the place on the pesah which the oven touched. This piece of its meat was cooked by the heat of the oven’s clay and not directly by the fire and hence it shouldn’t be eaten.", + "If some of its juice dripped on to the clay [of the oven] and dripped back on to it, he must remove its place. If some of the juices from the pesah fell onto the oven and were there cooked by the clay of the oven and then fell back onto the pesah, then it is not enough just to pare off some of the pesah. Rather they must cut off the part onto which the juices fell and were absorbed and not eat that part. The Talmud says that they should cut off an inch deep of meat.", + "If some of its juice fell on the flour, he must take a handful away from its place. If some of the juices of the pesah fell onto some flour which was boiling, then the juices are being cooked by the flour and therefore cannot be eaten. What he must do is take a handful away from the flour and burn it in the same way that all disqualified sacrifices are burned." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe two sections of this mishnah deal with a person who basted their pesah with oils that are restricted by who can eat them or where they can be eaten. The mishnah deals with the consequences of such an action.", + "If he basted it [the pesah] with oil of terumah: If they who registered for it are a company of priests, they may eat [it]. But if Israelites, if it is [still] raw, they may wash it off; if it is roasted, he must pare the outer part. Terumah oil can only be eaten by priests. If the pesah which has been basted with terumah oil is intended for a company of priests, then they may still eat it. However, a company of Israelites cannot eat the oil. If the pesah is still raw they may wash it off, dry it (so that it won’t be cooked with water) and then roast it. Washing it off is a valid way of removing the oil. If they basted it with the terumah oil and then roasted it, the oil has sunk into the pesah. What they must do is pare off the outer layer of the pesah’s meat. This meat cannot be eaten by the Israelites because it has terumah oil cooked into it.", + "If he anointed it with oil of second tithe, he must not charge its value for the members of the company, because second tithe must not be redeemed in Jerusalem. Second tithe is usually redeemed for money, the money is brought to Jerusalem and it is used there to buy food. However, second tithe that has arrived in Jerusalem without being redeemed may not be redeemed there. Therefore, if a person has basted his company’s pesah offering with second tithe he may not charge the other members of the company for the value of the oil since this would be a form of redeeming the second tithe in Jerusalem, the only place where the pesah can be eaten." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nAccording to Numbers 9, if a person is impure when the pesah sacrifice is offered on the fourteenth of Nisan, he receives a second chance on the fourteenth of Iyyar, the following month. The rabbis understood this to mean that individuals could not offer and eat the pesah sacrifice while impure but that if most of the congregation of Israel was impure, or if the priests or their vessels were impure on the fourteenth of Nisan, they would in any case bring the pesah sacrifice and eat it as well. The same is true for all sacrifices whose time is fixed they are offered even if the people are impure.\nOur mishnah deals with five other sacrifices that are eaten by priests and that are offered even in “uncleanness” because their time is fixed. The difference between these five and the pesah is that the pesah is not only offered when the priests or the people are unclean, it is eaten as well.", + "Five things [sacrifices] may come in uncleanness, but may not be eaten in uncleanness:
the omer, The omer, an offering of barley, is offered on the day after the first day of Pesah (Leviticus 23:10).", + "the two loaves, These are brought on Shavuot (see Leviticus 23:17).", + "the showbread, Twelve new loaves are placed on the table in the Temple every Shabbat (Leviticus 24:5).", + "the sacrifices of the public peace-offerings, This refers to the two sheep which are brought on Shavuot with the two loaves (Leviticus 23:19).", + "and the goats of new months. See Numbers 25:15. The same is true for all of the goats which are brought on various holidays and are referred to in Numbers 25. All of these sacrifices are brought even in uncleanness but are not eaten in uncleanness because the main purpose of bringing them is not to eat them but to sacrifice them.", + "The pesah which comes in uncleanness is [also] eaten in uncleanness, for from the very beginning it came for no other purpose but to be eaten. In contrast, the pesah is eaten as well because the main purpose of bringing the pesah is that it should be eaten. This is derived from Exodus 12:4 which emphasizes that the groups formed to eat the pesah are composed of the number of people who can eat one lamb. The main point is the eating and not just the sacrificing." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah deals with cases where the congregation of Israel is pure but part of the pesah sacrifice has become unclean.", + "If the flesh was defiled while the fat remained [clean], he may not sprinkle the blood but if the fat was defiled while the flesh has remained [clean], he must sprinkle the blood. If the flesh was defiled but the fat which is supposed to be burned on the altar remains clean he cannot sprinkle the blood on the altar. Since the pesah’s main purpose is to be eaten, if the flesh cannot be eaten the sacrifice is not valid and the blood cannot be sprinkled. In the opposite case, if the fat has been defiled and the flesh remains pure, the fat cannot be burned on the altar but the blood can still be sprinkled. Since the main purpose of the pesah is to be eaten, as long as the flesh can be eaten the blood can be sprinkled.", + "But in the case of [other] dedicated sacrifices it is not so, rather even if the flesh was defiled while the fat has remained clean, he must sprinkle the blood. Other sacrifices are different. Since their main purpose is to be sacrificed and not necessarily to be eaten, their blood may be sprinkled in either case. If the flesh becomes impure the blood is sprinkled in order to allow the fat to be burned on the altar. If the fat becomes impure, the blood is sprinkled in order to allow the flesh to be eaten." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah provides the basic laws concerning when the pesah sacrifice is offered in “uncleanness.” We should note that the form of impurity/uncleanness to which this topic refers to is one who has come into contact with a dead body.", + "If the community or the majority thereof was unclean, or if the priests were unclean and the community clean, they make [the pesah sacrifice] in uncleanness. The pesah sacrifice is offered in uncleanness only if either a majority of the community of Israel was unclean or if the priests were unclean. In one of these two situations, they offer the sacrifice on the fourteenth of Nisan, its usual date.", + "If a minority of the community were unclean: those who are clean observe the first [Pesah], while those who are unclean observe the second. If, however, only a minority of the community were unclean, then the laws of Numbers 9 apply. Those who are clean offer the pesah on the fourteenth of Nisan while those who are unclean are given a second chance, on the fourteenth of Iyyar." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah deals with a case where the blood of the pesah sacrifice was sprinkled on the altar and then it became known that either the pesah had been unclean or that its owners were unclean.", + "A pesah whose blood has been sprinkled and then it became known that it was unclean, the frontlet propitiates. The frontlet was one of the pieces of clothing worn by the high priest. In reference to this frontlet Exodus 28:38 states, “It shall be on Aaron’s forehead, that Aaron may take away any sin arising from the holy things that the Israelites consecrate.” According to the sages, this means that if the blood of a sacrifice, in our case the pesah sacrifice, was sprinkled against the altar and afterwards it became known that it was unclean, the frontlet propitiates (makes up) for the sin and the pesah’s owners do not need to bring another pesah sacrifice. However, this pesah cannot be eaten only in the cases in yesterday’s mishnah can an impure pesah be eaten.", + "If the body of [the owner] became unclean, the frontlet does not propitiate, because they [the sages] said: [in the case of] a nazirite, and he who sacrifices the pesah-offering, the frontlet propitiates for the uncleanness of the blood, but the frontlet does not propitiate for the uncleanness of the body [of the owner]. However, if the owners themselves were impure the frontlet does not propitiate for the blood having been sprinkled on the altar. In this case the owners would be liable to bring another pesah on what is called “Pesah Sheni” the Second Passover on the fourteenth of the next month. The mishnah explains that for two types of sacrifices the frontlet does not propitiate in cases where the owner was unclean the pesah and the nazirite offering. The nazirite situation refers to a situation in which a nazirite completed the period of his naziriteship and brought the requisite sacrifices. It then turns out that the nazirite was unclean, and it is forbidden for a nazirite to defile himself. He therefore must bring a different sacrifice for having become impure during his naziriteship and then begin a new term. For all other sacrifices besides these two, the frontlet propitiates whether the sacrifice is unclean or the sacrifice’s owner is unclean.", + "If he was defiled with the uncleanness of the deep, the frontlet propitiates. “Uncleanness of the deep” refers to someone who becomes defiled through contact with a dead body that no one knew was there. It could be understood as “previously unknown uncleanness” the impurity is hidden as if it was “in the deep.” This type of impurity is an exception to the above case if someone who brought a pesah or his nazirite offerings finds out that he had been defiled by “uncleanness of the deep” the frontlet does propitiate and the sacrifices do count." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nA pesah that has become unclean cannot be eaten, at least not when the pesah is done in purity (see above 7:6). Our mishnah teaches where an unclean pesah is burned.", + "If all or most of [the pesah] became unclean they burn it in front of the Birah with the wood of the pile. If most or all of the pesah becomes impure it is burned in front of the “Birah.” In the Talmud there is a debate over what the “Birah” is. According to one opinion, it refers to a tower on the Temple mount. According to another opinion the entire Temple is called the “Birah.” All sacrifices that have become impure can be burned in any place in which they may be eaten. In our case, this would mean that the pesah could be burned anywhere in Jerusalem, since it may be eaten anywhere in Jerusalem. The Talmud explains that forcing its owners to burn it in a very public place is a penalty placed upon them for letting there pesah become impure. The wood they use is wood from the Temple’s wood pile, wood normally used to burn the sacrifices on the altar.", + "If a lesser part of it became unclean, and also “remainder”, they [the people] burn it in their courtyards or on their roofs with their own wood. Misers burn it in front of the Birah, in order to benefit from the wood of the pile. If only a minority portion of the pesah became unclean then its owners can burn it in his own courtyard in Jerusalem. The same is true for “remainder” the part of the sacrifice which hasn’t been eaten within the proscribed time. For the pesah this means that anything left by the next morning (see Exodus 12:10). “Remainder” of all sacrifices must be burned. In these two cases they should use their own wood to burn the unclean or leftover portion. They may not use Temple wood within their own courtyard lest they use the wood for other purposes. The mishnah relates that misers, those who are stingy and want to save their own wood for other purposes, would burn even a partially unclean pesah or remainder at the Birah with wood from the pile. While this is technically allowed, it is frowned upon by the rabbis, and those who do so are awarded by our mishnah with the epitaph “misers.”" + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to deal with a pesah sacrifice, one that has already been slaughtered, that must be burned because it has been disqualified.", + "A pesah which went out [beyond the walls of Jerusalem] or was defiled must be burned immediately. The pesah, once slaughtered, cannot be brought outside of the walls of Jerusalem. If it does it is disqualified. A pesah that has been disqualified, either by becoming defiled or by being brought beyond the walls of Jerusalem must be burned immediately, on the fourteenth of Nisan.", + "If its owners were defiled or they died, its form must change and [then] it is burned on the sixteenth [of Nisan]. Rabbi Yohanan ben Berokah says: this too must be burned immediately, because there are none to eat it. In this case the pesah itself did not become disqualified but rather those who were supposed to eat it were either disqualified or died. The pesah itself now has no one that can eat it. According to the first opinion, it is not burned immediately but rather they wait until the following night, when its form has already begun to change. “Form changing” does not refer to the pesah’s physical form but to its halakhic form it is now “remainder” and must be burned. Note that it could not be burned on the fifteenth because the fifteenth is a festival day and sanctified meat which has been disqualified is not burned on a festival. Rabbi Yohanan ben Berokah says that this pesah, which has no one to eat it (poor little lamby) is treated the same as if the pesah itself had become disqualified. It is burned immediately on the fourteenth and they do not wait until it becomes “remainder.”" + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah teaches when the uneaten parts of the pesah are to be burned.", + "The bones, and the sinews, and the “remainder” [of the pesah] are burned on the sixteenth. Exodus 12:10 states, “Do not leave any of it [the pesah] until morning, and anything which remains in the morning must be burned in fire.” This is the law of “remainder” referred to in our mishnah and in the mishnayot above. However, this refers to the edible meat it is unclear why one has to burn the bones and sinews which are not edible. One opinion explains that the marrow of the bones is edible, so therefore the bones must be burned as well. The sinews to which the mishnah refers are sinews which are edible. Another explanation is that the bones and sinews are not edible but they are burned in any case in order to prevent people from thinking that they can eat their pesah the next day. In other words, the halakhah tells people to burn everything that is left so that they will be careful and not eat the remaining meat.", + "If the sixteenth falls on Shabbat, they are burned on the seventeenth, because they do not override either Shabbat or the festival. Burning the “remainder” does not override the Shabbat or festival prohibition against burning. Burning the “remainder” is a positive commandment and not burning on Shabbat or the festival is considered to be both a positive and a negative commandment. Generally, a positive commandment does not override one which has both a positive and negative aspect. Therefore, the pesah is normally burned on the sixteenth, the day after the first day of the festival, but if the sixteenth falls on Shabbat it is burned on the seventeenth." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first section of this mishnah deals with what parts of the pesah sacrifice are eaten.\nThe second section deals with several potential violations involved in eating the pesah.", + "Everything which can be eaten of a full-grown ox may be eaten of a tender goat, as well as the tops of the forelegs and the cartilages. As we have mentioned on several occasions, people needed to register to eat the pesah sacrifice before it was sacrificed. There had to be enough meat for each person to eat at least an olive amount’s worth of the pesah. Therefore they had to estimate how much of the animal could be eaten. The mishnah states that any part of a fully grown ox that can be eaten can also be eaten from a tender goat, the animal used as the pesah sacrifice. Additionally, the tops of the forelegs and the cartilages of the tender goat may be eaten as well. However, besides these two things any part of the tender goat that is not eaten in a fully grown ox does not count when they figure out how much meat there will be to go around from the pesah. Furthermore, it is permitted to leave inedible parts uneaten and one does not violate the prohibition of leaving any of it until morning.", + "He who breaks a bone of a clean pesah receives forty [lashes] but he who leaves over [flesh] of a clean [pesah] or breaks [a bone] of an unclean [one] does not receive the forty [lashes.] Exodus 12:46 prohibits breaking the bone of a pesah sacrifice. One who breaks the bone of a pure pesah sacrifice has violated a negative commandment. The mishnah expresses this violation by saying that he gets forty lashes, the amount of lashes prescribed for the violation of any negative commandment. The Torah also prohibits leaving any of the pesah over until the following morning. However, one is not lashed for violating this prohibition because the verse gives a remedy for the violation. Exodus 12:10 states, “Do not leave any of it over until morning, and what remains in the morning shall be burned in fire.” The fact that a remedy exists for the violation means that one is not punished by lashes for the violation itself. An alternative reason that punishments are not meted out for leaving over the pesah is that it is a passive violation and only active violations are punished. Breaking a bone of an unclean pesah is not punished by lashes since the pesah is in any case disqualified." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nAbove in mishnah nine we learned that if the pesah is taken out of the city of Jerusalem it is thereby disqualified. Similarly, once the meat of a pesah has been brought into the house in which it is supposed to be eaten, it may not be taken out. Our mishnah teaches what happens if part of the pesah is taken out of the city after it has already been slaughtered.", + "If part of a limb went outside, he cuts [the flesh] as far as the bone and pares it until he reaches the joint and cuts it away. If part of the a limb goes out, he cuts away to the bone but does not cut the bone itself because it is forbidden to break the bone of a pesah. He then pares away the meat that did not go out of either Jerusalem or the home and then they may eat that meat. After the meat has been scraped off he cuts off the limb at the joint and then burns the rest of the limb because part of it has gone beyond its border.", + "But in the case of [other] sanctified meat he cuts it off with a large knife, because they are not subject to the [prohibition of] breaking a bone. With other sacrifices that have gone beyond their permitted borders, either Jerusalem or the Temple, he need not be so cautious since there is no prohibition of breaking a bone. Instead he may simply cut off the part that went beyond the border and the remainder may still be eaten.", + "From the door-stop and within it is as the inside; From the door-stop and without is as outside. The windows and the thickness of the wall are as the inside. This section discusses when something is considered to have actually left the city. The door-stop refers to the molding of the door frame against which a door stops. If it is inside the door-stop it is still considered to be inside the house or the city. If it is within the windows or within the thickness of the wall (for instance the thick walls of Jerusalem, or of the Temple) it is considered to be inside." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nAs we have stated before, people would divide into “companies” in order to eat the pesah, and each company would eat one pesah. It is forbidden for a person to eat the pesah with two different companies and it is also forbidden for one company to eat in two places. Our mishnah deals with how two companies can share one house.\nI should note that I have explained the mishnah according to the Rambam’s explanation, one which is adopted by Albeck. Others explain it differently.", + "Two companies which are eating in one room, these turn their faces in one direction and eat and they turn their faces in another direction and eat, and the boiler is in the middle. In order for it not to seem that the two companies are mixed and are sharing two different pesah sacrifices, each company faces in a different direction. The mishnah allows one boiler to be placed in the middle, even though this would contribute to the impression that the two are sharing their pesahim. The boiler is a pot of hot water with which to mix the wine.", + "When the servant rises to mix [the wine], he must shut his mouth and turn his face away [from the other company] until he reaches his own company and [there] he eats. Although the servant, a Jew, can serve both groups, he may be registered with only one of them. So that it is clear that he is not eating from the other group, when he mixes wine for a group other than his own he must close his mouth and not swallow. He must also turn his mouth towards his own group so that they don’t think that he is eating with the other group.", + "But a bride may turn her face away and eat. A bride, who may be embarrassed to eat in front of others, is allowed to turn her face away from her own group. This will not seem like she is eating with two groups." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nIt would have been customary for the head of a household to slaughter a pesah on behalf of the members of his household, on the assumption that they would eat it. Our mishnah deals with certain persons about whom it is unclear to which household they belong. The problem will arise if two households slaughter a pesah on behalf of one person from which one can they eat?", + "A wife, when she is in her husband’s home, and her husband slaughtered on her behalf and her father slaughtered on her behalf, she must eat of her husband's. A wife who is spending pesah in her husband’s home is assumed to be part of her husband’s household. Therefore, if both her husband and her father slaughtered a pesah on her behalf, she must eat of her husband’s.", + "If she went to spend the first festival in her father's home, and her father slaughtered on her behalf and her husband slaughtered on her behalf, she may eat wherever she pleases. If she went to spend the festival in her father’s house, and again both her father and husband slaughtered a pesah on her behalf, she may eat from whichever she chooses. Since she was with her father she may even eat of his. Nevertheless, since she is already married she may alternatively eat of her husband’s pesah. Of course, she cannot eat of both.", + "An orphan on whose behalf his guardians slaughtered may eat wherever he pleases. If an orphan has two or more guardians, each of whom slaughtered a pesah on his behalf, he may eat from whichever he pleases. He does not belong exclusively to any one of them.", + "A slave of two partners may not eat of either. A master cannot slaughter a pesah for his slave if that slave is partially owned by another master. The only way to arrange this situation is for the two slave owners to jointly make one pesah.", + "He who is half slave and half free may not eat of his master's. A half-slave, one who was owned jointly and then freed by one of the partners but not the other may not eat of his master’s pesah. The assumption is that when the master slaughtered the pesah, he did not do so on behalf of his slave whom he owned only partially. The master would have assumed that the slave would make his own pesah. Therefore, this is what the half-slave must do." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nA pesah can be either a kid (a goat) or a lamb (a sheep) (see Exodus 12:5). This mishnah deals with a slave who slaughters a pesah on behalf of his master, who may or not have cared whether the pesah was a kid or a lamb. The mishnah resolves how to deal with potential confusions.", + "One who says to his slave, “Go out and slaughter the pesah on my behalf”, if he slaughtered a kid, he may eat it; if he slaughtered a lamb, he may eat it; if he slaughtered a kid and a lamb, he eats the first. In this case his master did not tell him what type of animal, a kid (a goat) or a lamb (sheep), to slaughter for his pesah. Therefore, the slave may slaughter either of them, even though he knows that his master generally prefers one type or the other, or perhaps generally makes his pesah from a certain type and not the other. If the slave slaughters both a kid and a lamb the first counts as the master’s pesah, whichever that one may be, and the second does not.", + "If he forgot what his master told him, how should he act? He should slaughter a lamb and a kid and declare, “If my master told me [to slaughter] a kid, the kid is his and the lamb is mine; and if my master told me [to slaughter] a lamb, the lamb is his and the kid is mine.” In this case the master did tell him which animal to slaughter but the slave forgot. The solution is for the slave to make stipulations when he slaughters both animals. He slaughters them both and makes a stipulation that if the lamb is what his master wanted, then the lamb is the master’s pesah and the goat is his and vice versa.", + "If his master [also] forgot what he told him, both animals go to the place of burning, but they [the master and the slave] are exempt from sacrificing the second pesah. In this case when the slave returns to the master it turns out that even the master has forgotten what he told his slave to do. The stipulation will not avail because the master doesn’t know which is his and which the slave’s is. Therefore, neither animal can be eaten; both must be burned. However, the mishnah states that neither the slave nor the master has to offer a second pesah a month later because when the blood was sprinkled upon the altar, the master still knew which one was his (assuming that this is true). He only forgot later when the slave returned with the two slaughtered animals." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to deal with slaughtering the pesah on behalf of members of one’s family.", + "If a man says to his children, “Behold, I am going to slaughter the pesah on behalf of whichever of you goes up first to Jerusalem,” as soon as the first has put his head and the greater part of his body [into Jerusalem] he has acquired his portion, and he acquires it on behalf of his brothers with him. A father says to his children that he is going to slaughter a pesah on behalf of the first one that gets to Jerusalem. The idea is not that only one of them will get to eat the pesah and that the others will have to slaughter their own pesah but that the first to get to Jerusalem will merit having the pesah be “his pesah” and his siblings will join him. The mishnah rules that the first person to get his head and majority of his body is the “owner of the pesah” and that he acquires it on behalf of the others.", + "One may always register for it as long as there is as much as an olive’s worth for each one [registered]. Each person is obligated to eat an olive’s worth of the pesah sacrifice in order to fulfill his obligation. Hence, the mishnah rules that as many people as wish to may register for any given pesah so long as there is an olive’s worth of meat for each one.", + "They may register and withdraw their hands from it until it has been slaughtered; Rabbi Shimon says: until the blood is sprinkled. New people may register and those who have already registered may deregister (“withdraw their hands”) until the pesah has been slaughtered. Rabbi Shimon says that they may continue to do so until the blood of the pesah has been sprinkled on the altar. According to a source in the Talmud Rabbi Shimon allows people only to deregister after the pesah has been slaughtered and before the blood has been sprinkled. He agrees that one must register before it is slaughtered." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah teaches what happens if a person registers others to share with him in his portion of the pesah.", + "If one registers others with him [to share] in his portion, the members of the company are permitted to give him his [portion], and he eats his and they eat theirs. The person in this mishnah registers others to eat his portion of the pesah but he doesn’t tell the other members of the company. When they find out they don’t want to share their pesah with this person. What they may do is tell their friend that he can share his portion with those who registered with him and that they are not going to share their portion. He and those who registered with him eat his portion and the other people eat theirs. In essence, he has made his own new eating company." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn order to understand this mishnah we will first need to explain some of the terms and halakhot it mentions. These are some technical laws concerning purity/impurity.\nThe mishnah deals with a “zav” and a “zavah” a man or woman who have had abnormal genital discharge (i.e. not semen or menstrual blood). A man who experiences one such occurrence is impure until the evening, the same as a man who has a seminal discharge. If he experiences two such discharges, either on the same day or on consecutive days he is now a zav (see Leviticus 15:1-12). He is impure for seven days. If he experiences three discharges he must also bring a sacrifice at the end of the period of his impurity, on the eighth day. In both latter cases he cannot eat sacred food until he is pure and if necessary has brought the requisite sacrifices.\nThe main difference between a zav and a zavah is that a zavah must experience her discharges on different days two discharges on one day count as one and not as two. Furthermore, the discharge must not come when she normally has her menstrual period. Since this is not supposed to be her menstrual period, even blood counts as “abnormal discharge.” Calculating when this period falls is complicated and I shall not enter into it here. If during this period she sees discharge/blood for one day she needs not to have a discharge the following day, and then she can go to the mikveh (ritual bath). This woman is called “observing a day for a day.” If she has two consecutive days of discharge, on the third day she can go to the mikveh, provided that she has no discharge on that day. However, if she has three consecutive days of discharge she becomes a “complete zavah”. She must now wait seven days in which she does not have a discharge, on the seventh day she can go to the mikveh and on the eighth day she brings a sacrifice. As is the case with the zav, she cannot eat sacred food until she has brought these sacrifices.\nOur mishnah teaches that one should slaughter the pesah on behalf of a person who can eat sacred food in the evening of the fifteenth of Nisan, the time when the pesah is eaten, even though on the fourteenth he/she is still unable to do so. The only exception to this rule is someone who is impure through contact with a corpse even if he becomes pure at night if he is impure during the day of the fourteenth they do not slaughter the pesah on his behalf.", + "If a zav saw two instances [of discharge], they slaughter [the pesah] on his behalf on his seventh [day]. This zav has seen only two episodes of discharge and hence he is not a “complete zav” who would have to bring a sacrifice at the end of seven days. At the end of seven days he need only go to the mikveh. If his seventh day falls on the fourteenth of Nisan they slaughter the pesah on his behalf because he can eat it that night.", + "If he saw three [instances of discharge], they slaughter on his behalf on his eighth [day]. If he saw three instances of discharge he goes to the mikveh on the seventh day and must bring sacrifices on the eighth day. He cannot eat sacred food until after he has brought his sacrifices. Therefore if the eighth day falls on the fourteenth they may slaughter the pesah on his behalf. If, however, the seventh day were to fall on the fourteenth they would not be able to slaughter the pesah for him because he could not eat it at night, before he brings the sacrifices the next day.", + "If a woman observes a “day for a day”, they slaughter on her behalf on her second day. This woman has experienced one episode of discharge/blood during a non-menstrual time of the month. She may go to the mikveh the following night. Therefore, if the second day falls on the fourteenth of Nisan, they slaughter the pesah on her behalf.", + "If she saw [a discharge] on two days, they slaughter on her behalf on the third [day]. This woman has experienced discharges for two consecutive days. On the third day she may go to the mikveh, provided she doesn’t have a discharge on that day. Since that evening she may eat sacred food they slaughter the pesah on her behalf.", + "And as for a zavah, they slaughter on her behalf on the eighth [day]. This woman has experienced three consecutive days of discharge and is therefore a “complete zavah.” She must wait seven clean days (days in which she doesn’t experience discharge) and then she may go to the mikveh at night and must bring sacrifices the following day, the eighth day. If the fourteenth falls on this, the eighth day, they may slaughter the pesah on her behalf because she will be able to eat the pesah that evening." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses slaughtering the pesah on behalf of various categories of people who may not be able to eat it.", + "[As to] an onen, and one who is removing a heap [of stones], and likewise one whom they promised to take out of prison, and a sick or an old person who can eat as much as an olive, they slaughter on their behalf. This is a list of people who may be able to eat the pesah offering in the evening even though they are currently (i.e. on the 14th of Pesah) in a state in which they cannot eat it. A person whose close relative (one of the seven for whom he must mourn: mother, father, brother, sister, daughter, son or spouse) has died is an onen on the day of the death. He is forbidden to eat sacred food. However, the following evening he is no longer an onen and he may eat his pesah. They sacrifice the pesah on his behalf even though there is a chance that while burying his dead he may contract corpse impurity and not be able to eat the pesah. “One who is removing a heap of stones” refers to a person clearing out a heap of stones which may have fallen upon and killed a person. If it turns out that there is a dead body under the heap then he will be impure and will not be able to eat his pesah that evening. Nevertheless, until a dead body is found the remover is assumed to be pure and they do slaughter the pesah on his behalf. One who is stuck in prison on the fourteenth of Nisan may not be able to eat his pesah. Evidently the pesah is not part of the prison meal plan. If they promised to let him out they do slaughter the pesah on his behalf even though it is not certain that he will actually be let out in time. An old or sick person may not be able to eat an olive’s worth of the pesah, even though it seems like they will be able to. In any case, since it seems likely that these people will be able to eat the pesah, they do slaughter it on their behalf. Note that if we know that the old or sick person will not be able to eat even an olive’s worth of the pesah they do not slaughter on his behalf.", + "[Yet in the case of] all these, they may not slaughter for them alone, lest they bring the pesah to disqualification. They should not slaughter the pesah on behalf of a group which is entirely made up of the above categories of people. The problem is that if an entire group cannot eat the pesah then the pesah itself becomes disqualified. It is best to avoid this situation and therefore the entire group should not consist of people who are in a “risky” category.", + "Therefore if a disqualification occurs to them, they are exempt from keeping the second pesah, except for one who was removing the heap, because he was unclean from the beginning. If they slaughter the pesah on behalf of one of the people in this category and then it they become impure or become otherwise unable to eat the pesah (stuck in jail or sick), they do not need to observe the second pesah. This is because at the moment that the blood of the first pesah was sprinkled on the altar they looked like they were going to be able to eat the pesah at night. The only exception is the one who was uncovering the heap of stones because he was impure at the outset, when the blood was sprinkled. If it turns out that there was a body under the heap, then he was already impure when they slaughtered the pesah on his behalf and sprinkled its blood. To put it another way, concerning this person what is unclear is not whether he will become impure, as it is with the onen, but rather whether he has already been made impure." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to deal with how the company of those who would together eat the pesah was formed.", + "They may not slaughter the pesah for a single person, the words of Rabbi Judah. But Rabbi Yose permits it. The problem with slaughtering the pesah for a single person is that it is highly unlikely that he will be able to eat the whole thing. In all likelihood, a large portion of it will become “remainder” and it is prohibited to let any of the pesah remain uneaten until the morning. Therefore, Rabbi Judah forbids slaughtering the pesah for a single person. Rabbi Yose permits it, assuming that the person will be able to eat the entire pesah (a Homer Simpsonesque pesah feast).", + "And even a company of a hundred who cannot eat as much as an olive, one may not slaughter [a pesah] for them. While Rabbi Yose allows one to slaughter a pesah for a single person who can eat the whole thing he does not allow slaughtering for a large group that can certainly together eat the whole thing unless each person can eat as much as an olive’s worth.", + "And one may not form a company of women and slaves and minors. There are two different explanations for this section. According to one explanation, it is forbidden to have a company that is all women, all slaves or all minors. According to another explanation, it is forbidden to have a company mixed with slaves and women for fear of licentiousness. This is a common theme with regard to slaves they are considered to be sexually licentious." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses whether various categories of people may eat their pesah in the evening.", + "An onen immerses [in a mikveh] and eats his pesah in the evening, but not [other] sacred food. To remind ourselves that which we learned above in mishnah six, a person is an onen on the day upon which one of his seven close relative dies. According to Torah law, a person is an onen only during the day. An onen may not eat sacred food. The rabbis added that on the following evening he remains an onen, but at this point he is only an “onen derabbanan”, an onen of rabbinic status. Since his status is not so severe, he may eat the pesah in the evening. The rabbis did not disallow this because this is his only opportunity to eat the pesah. However, he may still not eat other sacred food until the following day.", + "One who hears about his dead [for the first time], and one who gathers the bones [of his dead relative] immerses and eats sacred food. If one hears that one of his relatives died after some time has passed, meaning not on the day upon which they died, that day he has the status of an onen derabbanan. At night he is not an onen at all and he may therefore eat any sacred food. It was customary in the mishnaic period to bury people and then about a year later when the flesh was gone to collect their bones and put them into an ossuary. On the day upon which a person collects his mother or father’s bones he is an onen derabbanan. He too may eat sacred food, including the pesah, in the evening.", + "A convert who converts on the eve of Pesah: Bet Shammai say: he immerses and eats his pesah in the evening. Bet Hillel say: anyone who separates from the foreskin is like one who separates from the grave. This is somewhat of a difficult section to understand because it is unclear what the immersion in this mishnah is for. It does not seem to be the immersion customary upon conversion. Rather it seems to be some type of immersion to rid the non-Jew of an impurity which he carries over with him through his conversion. According to Bet Shammai this is a mild form of impurity and therefore, once he immerses himself, he may eat the pesah that evening. Bet Hillel says that the impurity is like that of corpse impurity, which is seven days. Hence he may not eat the pesah that evening, just as one who has come into contact with a corpse may not eat the pesah in the evening. The Talmud explains that the debate is about the concern that the non-Jew may have contracted corpse impurity right before he converts. A non-Jew is not subject to corpse impurity and hence when he converts he is pure and could technically eat the pesah. However, if he is allowed to eat the pesah this year then the following year he may think that he is also allowed to eat the pesah, even if he contracts corpse impurity. Therefore Bet Hillel forbids him from eating the pesah this year as well. Bet Shammai does not share in this concern and hence allows him to eat the pesah that night." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThe first four mishnayot of our chapter deal with what is called “Pesah Sheni”, the second pesah. The laws of Pesah Sheni are taught in Numbers 9:9-13. Pesah Sheni is observed on the fourteenth of Iyyar, one month after the first Pesah.", + "He who was unclean or on a far-off journey and did not keep the first [Pesah] must keep the second. The Torah specifies that a person who was unclean during the first Pesah, or one who was far from Jerusalem on a long journey and therefore could not offer the first Pesah must observe Pesah Sheni. There is no new information in this section in the Mishnah it is taught in order to serve as an introduction to the following clauses.", + "If he unwittingly erred or was prevented and did not keep the first, he must keep the second. This section teaches that not only one who was unclean or far away is allowed to keep Pesah Sheni, but also one who couldn’t offer the pesah on its original date for another reason. This would include an error in remembering the date of Pesah or any other thing which prevented him, as long as it was not intentional.", + "If so, why does it say “an unclean person” and “one who was one a long journey” specified? That these are not liable to karet, whereas these are liable to karet. This question is midrashic in nature it asks a question about a verse in the Torah. If everyone who through no fault of his own cannot observe the first Pesah is allowed to observe Pesah Sheni, then why does the Torah specify these two categories of people? The answer is that someone who was unclean or on a far-off journey for the first Pesah and then did not keep Pesah Sheni is exempt from the punishment of karet, the usual punishment for one who didn’t observe Pesah. This is true even if they intentionally did not keep Pesah Sheni. This is because they were exempt from the first Pesah and the Torah does not mention the punishment of karet with regard to one who does not keep Pesah Sheni. In contrast, a person who didn’t keep the first Pesah because of error or because something prevented him and then he intentionally didn’t observe Pesah Sheni is liable for karet. These people were obligated for the first Pesah and even though something prevented them from doing so, the obligation still stood. The Torah specifies concerning this person, “But if a man who is clean and not on a journey refrains from offering the passover sacrifice, that person shall be cut off from his kin (karet)” (Numbers 9:13). The rabbis say that this verse refers to one who unintentionally missed the first opportunity but intentionally skipped the second." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn yesterday’s mishnah we learned that one who was far away from the Temple when the first Pesah occurred gets a second chance and may observe Pesah Sheni. Our mishnah defines what “far off” means.", + "What is “a far-off journey”?
From Modi’im and beyond, and the same distance on all sides [of Jerusalem], the words of Rabbi Akiva. According to Rabbi Akiva “far-off” means the distance from Modi’im to Jerusalem, about 30 km (I should know, I live in Modiin and travel to Jerusalem every day. With traffic this takes between 45 minutes and an hour, but they didn’t have cars. Then again, they didn’t have traffic either. Modi’im is also where the Maccabees lived). According to the Talmud it would take about half a spring day’s walk to get from Modi’im to Jerusalem. The reason for half a day’s walk is that if he wanted to slaughter the pesah on time he had to get there while they were still doing so.", + "Rabbi Eliezer says: from the threshold of the Temple court and beyond. Rabbi Yose said to him: for that reason the heh has a dot on it in order to say, not because it is really far-off, but [even when one is] from the threshold of the Temple court and beyond. Rabbi Eliezer holds that “far-off” means anyone who was not actually in the Temple at that time. This is somewhat perplexing why should “far-off” mean one step away? Rabbi Yose doesn’t answer this question but says that the dot on top of the heh in the word “far-off” (Numbers 9:10) hints that “far-off” is not to be taken literally. If you look at a Torah or a Humash you will see that that dot is still there today." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah lists some differences and similarities between the first Pesah and the second.", + "What is the difference between the first Pesah and the second?
The first is subject to the prohibition of [chametz] shall not be seen and [chametz] shall not be found, while at the second matzah and chametz are in the house with him. The chametz prohibitions are stated only in Exodus 12-13 (Pesah Rishon the first Pesah) and are not mentioned in Numbers 9 (Pesah Sheni). Therefore, the rabbis teach that these prohibitions apply only to the first Pesah and not to the second.", + "The first requires [the reciting of] Hallel when it is eaten, while the second does not require Hallel when it is eaten. The Hallel, the recitation of a group of Psalms, is one of the oldest elements of the Pesah celebration. As we shall see in chapter ten, it continued to be observed in the post-destruction seder and is a central part of the Passover Haggadah to this day. According to the Talmud, the Hallel is hinted at in Isaiah 30:29, “For you, there shall be singing as on a night when a festival is hallowed.” Our mishnah teaches that the Hallel was recited both while the pesah was being sacrificed and while it was being eaten. The difference between Pesah Rishon and Pesah Sheni is that on the first the Hallel is recited both while the Pesah is eaten and when it is sacrificed whereas on Pesah Sheni it is only recited when the pesah is sacrificed.", + "But both require [the reciting of] Hallel when they are sacrificed, and they are eaten roasted with matzah and bitter herbs, and they override Shabbat. Besides the fact that the Hallel is recited on both of the Pesah’s at the time of the sacrifice, there are two other similarities between the two. On both occasions the pesah is eaten with matzah and bitter herbs (see Numbers 9:11-12) and on both occasions if the fourteenth of Nisan falls on Shabbat the pesah is still sacrificed (see above 6:2)." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nWe have already learned above in 7:4 that if most of the community of Israel is impure they observe the first Pesah in impurity. Pesah Sheni is only observed by individuals who could not observe Pesah Rishon due to impurity or distance from the Temple. Our mishnah teaches that only impure Israelites who have become impure through contact with a corpse observe Pesah Rishon while impure; those with impurities that come from their own body do not observe the first Pesah while impure.", + "The pesah which comes in impurity: zavin and zavot, menstruant women and women after childbirth do not from eat it, yet if they did eat they are exempt from karet. Zavin and zavot are men and women who have had some sort of abnormal genital discharge (see 8:5). The impurity of the menstruant is mentioned in Leviticus 15:19 ff. and that of the woman after childbirth is Leviticus 12:1 ff. People with these types of impurity are not supposed to eat the pesah on Pesah Rishon, even if the community is impure and is eating the Pesah “in impurity”. However, if they do eat the pesah they are not liable for karet as would be the case had they eaten the pesah when the community was pure (see Leviticus 7:20). They are exempt because other people who are eating it are impure.", + "Rabbi Eliezer exempts [them] even [of the karet normally incurred] for entering the sanctuary. Rabbi Eliezer goes even further. Normally an impure person who intentionally enters the Temple is liable for karet. This is derived from Numbers 5:2 which specifically mentions both the zav and the one defiled by a corpse. From this juxtaposition Rabbi Eliezer learns that the zav and others in a similar category (i.e. the source of impurity is their own body) are liable for entering the Temple only when one defiled by a corpse is liable for entering the Temple. When the pesah is offered by an impure community a person defiled by a corpse is obviously allowed into the Temple. Hence, when this occurs the zav is exempt from entering the Temple as well, even though he doesn’t eat the pesah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThere are certain requirements for offering the pesah sacrifice which were only mandated during the first pesah, that which was observed on the night on which the Israelites left Egypt. These requirements were not observed in subsequent years. Our mishnah lists some of the differences between this first pesah and that offered and obligatory for the generations that followed.", + "What is the difference between the pesah [which was offered] in Egypt and the pesah of [subsequent] generations?
The pesah in Egypt was taken on the tenth [of Nisan], The first lamb or kid which was to be used for the first pesah was separated out of the flock by the Israelites on the tenth of Nisan (Exodus 12:3). This early separation was only required for that year.", + "And it required sprinkling with a bunch of hyssop on the lintel and on the two door-posts, The Israelites were required to apply the blood of the pesah on the lintel and two door-posts, using a bunch of hyssop (zatar in Arabic still commonly used in the Middle East) as a sort of paintbrush (v. 22). In subsequent years this was not done.", + "And it was eaten in haste on one night, whereas the pesah of [subsequent] generations is kept the whole seven [days]. The original pesah was to be eaten in haste (v. 11). It was only eaten on one night. This last statement is somewhat puzzling because in subsequent years the same was true the pesah was eaten for only one night. The Talmud therefore adds here that in Egypt the prohibition of chametz was only for one night. In subsequent years the prohibition of chametz was observed for a full seven days (v. 8)." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nLeviticus 27:10 states, “If one substitutes one animal for another, the thing vowed and its substitute shall both be holy.” This teaches that if one has an animal already dedicated to the Temple to be offered as a sacrifice and he says concerning another animal, “Let this one be its substitute”, the first animal remains sacred and its substitute becomes sacred as well (there is a whole mishnaic tractate about substitutes). Our mishnah deals with someone who tries to offer a substitute for a pesah. In order to understand the mishnah we also need to know that animals dedicated to be pesahim which are not offered as such are offered later as offerings of wellbeing.", + "Rabbi Joshua said: I have heard that the substitute of a pesah is sacrificed, and that the substitute of a pesah is not sacrificed, and I cannot explain. Rabbi Joshua says that he has heard a puzzling tradition which he does not understand. He has heard that sometimes the substitute of a pesah is sacrificed as a thanksgiving offering and sometimes it is not, but he doesn’t know how to explain this tradition. As an aside, we should note that this statement provides us with an interesting glimpse into how the rabbinic tradition was transmitted and developed. Rabbi Joshua has heard a statement, has memorized it, but didn’t receive along with the statement any interpretation and hence doesn’t know what it means. The statement was brief and probably easy to memorize but was difficult to understand.", + "Rabbi Akiva said: I will explain: The pesah which was found before the slaughtering of the pesah must be left to graze until it becomes unfit, and then it may be sold, and one brings a peace-offering with the money; and the same applies to its substitute. [If found] after the slaughtering of the pesah, it is offered as a wellbeing offering, and the same applies to it substitute. Rabbi Akiva uses his reason to figure out this conundrum. If it happens that a lamb/kid set aside to be a pesah is lost and another is set aside to be offered in its place (this is not the substitute, but a replacement), and the original one is found before the replacement is sacrificed then the replacement is not offered. Rather it is left to graze until it can no longer be offered as a pesah (until it becomes flawed), then it is sold and then the proceeds from the sale are used to buy another animal to serve as a wellbeing offering. It itself cannot be sacrificed because it existed when the pesah was offered but it itself was rejected as a pesah and not sacrificed. If a person makes a substitute for this second pesah then the substitute is also not offered. The substitute has the same rules as that for which it was substituted. This is the substitute which is not sacrificed. If it happens that the lost pesah is not found until after the new one has been sacrificed, the original pesah is offered as a sacrifice of wellbeing. So too, if one makes a substitute for this original pesah, it too is offered as a sacrifice of wellbeing. This is the substitute which is sacrificed." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with cases where an animal set aside to be a pesah offering cannot be offered as such.", + "If a man sets aside a female for his pesah or a two-year old male, it should be left to graze until it becomes unfit, then it should be sold, and its money is spent on a voluntary sacrifice. The pesah offering must be brought from a one year old male goat or sheep (Exodus 12:5). A female animal or a two-year old male animal is unfit for a pesah. If a person set aside such an animal to be his pesah, then the animal is sacred despite the fact that it cannot be a pesah. The animal should be left to graze until it becomes unfit, meaning it becomes blemished in such a way that it could not be offered as a pesah. Then it is sold and the proceeds are used to purchase voluntary sacrifices. There is a variant reading of this mishnah according to which the proceeds of the sale are used to buy offerings of well-being, the offering that is usually brought in place of an unfit pesah.", + "If a man separates his pesah and dies, his son after him should not bring it as a pesah but rather as a wellbeing offering. The father who set aside his pesah dies before he can offer it and there are no others registered to eat this pesah. (Had others been registered there would have been no problem.) The pesah now has no owners and therefore cannot be offered as a pesah. The mishnah teaches that even the son who inherits from his father cannot offer it as a pesah. In other words the son does not inherit his father’s registration for that sacrifice. Therefore it is sacrificed as a sacrifice of wellbeing." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with an animal set aside to be a pesah that gets mixed up with other animals set aside to be other sacrifices. We should note that this is a common theme that the Mishnah just loves to discuss different animals or items of different statuses getting mixed up with each other.", + "If a pesah became mixed up with other sacrifices, they all graze until they become unfit [through a blemish], then they are sold, and then he must bring [a replacement] for the price of the best of this type, and bring for the price of the best of this type and he loses the remainder from his own pocket. In this case the pesah gets mixed up with other animals that are set aside for other sacrifices. The rules and restrictions concerning each of these sacrifices may be different: their blood is sprinkled differently on the altar and their meat is eaten for a different period of time. Since we don’t know which animal was set aside for which sacrifice, none of them may be sacrificed. All of the animals must be sold and then the proceeds used to purchase new sacrifices. However, the way in which the new sacrifices are bought is somewhat complicated. Every new purchase must be made at the value of the most expensive of the mixed-up animals, lest that sacrifice was from that expensive animal. For instance, three lambs were set aside for three different sacrifices and then were mixed up. When he sells them, one lamb sells for two zuzim (had gadya, had gadya, dizban Abba b’tre zuze) and the other two lambs sell for one zuz each (if you know Aramaic this would be dizban Abba b’zuza hada). When he buys replacement sacrifices he must buy three lambs worth two zuz each, because he doesn’t know which sacrifice was from the more expensive lamb. This loss of money (two zuzim) is made up from his own pocket.", + "If it became mixed up with first-borns: Rabbi Shimon says: if [the pesah belonged to] a company of priests, they eat [all of the animals that night]. In this case the pesah becomes mixed up with firstborn animals. Generally, the firstborn of a sheep or goat (or other kosher animal) must be given to the priest. The animal is slaughtered and its blood is sprinkled on the altar and then it may be eaten by priests. The sprinkling of the blood for the firstborn is performed in the same was as that of the pesah. Therefore, the mishnah rules that if the company of people registered to eat the pesah are priests, they may eat these animals on Pesah as if they were valid pesahim. In other words, they can treat all of the animals as if they were all pesahim. However, they can only eat them that night, because a pesah cannot be left over till morning." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with a company of people who had set aside a lamb/kid for their pesah and then the animal wandered off and got lost. One person searched for the animal and found it and slaughtered while at the same time the company slaughtered another animal as their pesah, assuming that the person looking for it would not return in time. The main question is which animal can be eaten and by whom.", + "A company lost their pesah and they said to one [who was registered with them], “Go and seek it, and slaughter it on our behalf”; and he went, found, and slaughtered it, and they [also] took an animal and slaughtered [it]: If his was slaughtered first, he eats of his and they eat with him. And if theirs was first slaughtered, they eat of theirs, while he eats of his. And if it is unknown which of them was first slaughtered, or if they slaughtered both of them at the same time, he eats of his, but they may not eat with him; while theirs goes forth to the place of burning, and they are exempt from keeping the second Pesah. In this case the company sent one of its people to go and slaughter a new pesah on their behalf, after their original one was lost. However, instead of just relying on him to slaughter the original animal on their behalf, they also find their own new pesah and slaughter it as well. If his was slaughtered both he and they may eat of the pesah which he slaughtered. He may eat of it because he slaughtered it for himself and they may eat of it because they instructed him to do so. Their pesah is invalid since no one can eat it and it must be burned. If their pesah was slaughtered first they may eat of their pesah because we consider them as having withdrawn from being registered for the original pesah. He may eat of his own pesah, even though theirs was slaughtered first because he never told them to slaughter a new pesah on his behalf. If it is unclear whose pesah was slaughtered first or perhaps they both slaughtered at the same time he may eat his own pesah, because he never told them to slaughter one on his behalf. In other words, from his perspective, their pesah is irrelevant. However, they may not eat either pesah. They can’t eat his because theirs might have been the first offered in which case they weren’t registered for his. They can’t eat theirs because his might have been the first offered in which case theirs is invalid. Since no one can eat their pesah it must be burned. Despite the fact that they do not eat a pesah, they still are not liable for observing Pesah Sheni because there was a pesah slaughtered on their behalf and its blood was sprinkled on the altar.", + "He said to them, “If I delay, go forth and slaughter on my behalf,’, [and] then he went and found it and slaughtered [it], while they took [another] and slaughtered [it]: If theirs was slaughtered first, they eat of theirs while he eats with them; And if his was slaughtered first, he eats of his and they eat of theirs. And if it is unknown which of them was slaughtered first, or if they slaughtered both of them at the same time, they eat of theirs, but he may not eat with them, while his goes forth to the place of burning, and he is exempt from keeping the second Pesah. In this case, the group does not appoint the individual person to be their agent but rather he tells them that he is going to go look for the lost lamb but that if he is late in returning they should offer one on his behalf. They are now his agent but he has not been appointed to be their agent. Again, he finds the original pesah and they slaughter a new one. The mishnah again runs through all of the variations. This case is the mirror image of the previous section. If theirs was slaughtered first, they and he may eat of it. They slaughtered it for themselves and they also acted as his agent. In such a case, his must be burned. If his was slaughtered first he may eat of it because he slaughtered it for himself. They may not eat of it because they did not appoint him to be their agent. Rather, they eat their own pesah even though it was slaughtered second. If it is unclear which was slaughtered first or both were slaughtered at the same time they may eat theirs because to them his pesah is irrelevant they did not appoint him to act as their agent. He, however, may not eat his because he appointed them to act as his agent and theirs might have been slaughtered first. He also may not eat theirs lest his came first. His pesah must therefore be burned but he need not observe pesah sheni, as we explained above.", + "He said to them, and they said to him: they all eat of the first [to be slaughtered], and if it is unknown which of them was slaughtered first, both go forth to the place of burning. In this case, he appointed them to act on his behalf and they appointed him to act on his behalf. In such a case, both he and they always eat from the first one slaughtered. If it is unclear which was slaughtered first or if both were slaughtered at the same time, then neither he nor they may eat of either pesah. Both pesahim are burned and no one must observe pesah sheni.", + "If he did not say to them and they did not say to him, they are not responsible for each other. If neither of them appointed the other to act as an agent, then they are all on their own. He eats his own and they eat their own no matter the order in which the animals were slaughtered." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with remedying a situation in which the pesah offerings of different companies got mixed up with each other.", + "Two companies whose pesah sacrifices became mixed up: these take possession of one [animal] and these take possession of one. One member of these joins those, and one member of those joins these, and thus they declare: if this pesah is ours, your hands are withdrawn from your own and you are registered for ours; while if this pesah is yours, our hands are withdrawn from ours and we are registered for yours. The pesahim of each of two companies have become mixed up. Since a company must be registered for a pesah before they can slaughter it and eat it, they may not simple slaughter whichever one they want. The mishnah therefore works out a remedy for such a situation. One person from each company switches companies. Then all of the members of each company declare to the new person a declaration which I shall now explain. If the pesah which they took into their hands was theirs, then they tell him that he is switching his registration from his original one to theirs. Similarly, if the pesah which they possess was originally his, then they declare that they are withdrawing from their original pesah and registering for his. What they cannot do is simply register without having one person switch companies because it is forbidden to leave any pesah without anyone registered for it for even a moment. Also, they couldn’t register for a new pesah without first withdrawing from being registered for the old one because a person cannot be registered for two pesahim at the same time. All of this is not a problem if one person switches companies, because it then turns out that at no point is either pesah left without any owners.", + "Similarly, if there are five companies consisting of five members each or of ten each, they draw one from each company and say thusly. The mishnah now elaborates now that the same above method of resolving the problem also works if there are five companies each with five members of ten companies each with ten members and all of the pesahim got mixed up. In each case, one person from each company has to go to each of the other companies. Each newly formed company would have one member from each of the old companies, and each person in each company would have to make the declaration." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is similar to that which we learned yesterday except instead of the pesah sacrifices of companies being mixed up the pesah sacrifices of two individuals are mixed up.", + "If the pesah sacrifices belonging to two [individuals] became mixed up, each takes possession of one [animal]; This one registers someone from the marketplace with him and that one registers someone from the marketplace with him. This one goes over to that one and that one goes over to this one, and thus they declare: “If this pesah is mine, your hands are withdrawn from yours and you are registered for mine; while if this pesah is yours, my hands are withdrawn from mine and I am registered for yours.” The key to understanding this mishnah is that each person needs to register another person with him (one from the marketplace) for his pesah otherwise when he switches to the other person’s group a pesah will be left temporarily without any owners, and this is prohibited. I shall explain the scenario using proper names. Let’s say Reuven and Shimon have their pesah sacrifices mixed up. If Reuven were to even temporarily withdraw from his and register for Shimon’s his would be left without any owner. Therefore, Reuven signs up Moshe and Shimon signs up Aharon, and now there are two companies as opposed to two individuals. One person will now always “stay behind”. Reuven and Shimon each take an animal, and Moshe leaves Reuven’s group and goes to Shimon’s and Aharon leaves Shimon’s group and goes to Reuven’s. Reuven then makes the declaration to Aharon and Shimon makes the declaration to Moshe. In this way both groups have a pesah and neither pesah was ever left without an owner." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThe tenth chapter of Pesahim is perhaps the best known chapter in the entire Mishnah, for it describes the Pesah seder, one of the rituals most-observed by Jews in the modern world. The laws and practices of this chapter form the basis of the seder and Haggadah to this day. Some of its texts will be familiar to us from their inclusion in the Haggadah. It has also been studied exhaustively by scholars, partly because of its importance to the Christian tradition according to three of the four Gospels, Jesus’s last supper took place on the eve of Pesah, the same time when we celebrate our seder. (Note that I did not say that Jesus’s last meal was a seder. I do not believe that this is an accurate statement.)\nI will make some introductory remarks due to the importance of this chapter. First of all, most scholars today do not think that a seder meal on Pesah existed during the Second Temple period, while the pesah was still offered. While the Temple stood, the meal consisted of the eating of the pesah, matzah and maror, and they were probably accompanied by some singing and perhaps drinking of wine, but there was no formal ritually ordered meal that accompanied them. The rabbis after the destruction of the Temple initially struggled to find a replacement for their cataclysmic loss. One replacement for the loss of the Temple and the pesah sacrifice was the institution of a formal meal on Pesah, one certainly modeled after the Greco-Roman symposium, the formal “high-class” meal with which the rabbis were familiar. The most notable aspects of the seder, the reclining, the wine, the hand-washing, the dipping of food, the types of food served and even the discussion surrounding the Exodus from Egypt all have parallels in Greco-Roman descriptions of the formal meal called the symposium. That rabbis borrowed Greek and Roman customs should be no more surprising to us than the fact that when Jews get dressed up to go to synagogue today they dress in the same clothes as do the other members of society. Therefore, rather than characterize the rabbis as borrowing Greek and Roman customs, a more accurate statement would be to say that when the rabbis looked to shape their own religious experience by establishing a formal Pesah meal, they did so in the way with which they were familiar.\nThe seder continued to develop throughout the centuries and therefore what we read in the Mishnah is an early form of the seder and not all that close to that which we know and observe today. The first Haggadot, written texts, were not composed until the 8th or 9th centuries, the same time when the first siddurim were composed.\nWith regard to the Mishnah itself, there are many later interpolations that have found there way into our text. These interpolations, almost all of which are liturgical, come from the Haggadah. As the Haggadah developed, people added to the Mishnah texts that they knew from their Haggadah or changed the Mishnah to match their practices. I shall note many examples as we proceed. However, the basic text upon which I will base my commentary is the version found in the common printed editions such as Kehati, Albeck, etc.", + "On the eve of Pesah close to minhah one may not eat until nightfall. On the eve of Pesah one should not eat from minhah time and afterward so that when it comes time for the meal one is hungry and one will eat the matzah with a good appetite. This is at the ninth hour, roughly speaking around 3 PM.", + "Even the poorest person in Israel must not eat [on the night of Pesah] until he reclines. In the ancient world formal meals were eaten while reclining on couches which lied close to the ground. One leaned to the left and a small table was placed in front of the diners. Usually there were about three diners per couch. Typically, only the wealthier classes ate in this manner whereas the poorer folk ate while sitting. On Pesah, according to the Mishnah, even poor people are to eat while reclining.", + "And they should give him not less than four cups [of wine], and even from the charity plate. The seder meal is structured around the drinking of four cups as we shall see in the coming mishnayot. Our mishnah states that when charity distributors are handing out wine to poor people so that they shall have wine to drink they should not give them less than four cups of wine. Others explain that the mishnah is addressing all Israelites when observing the seder they should not have less than four cups of wine, even if they have to take from the charity plate." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah contains a debate between Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel over the order of the blessings recited over the first cup of wine. Today we call these two blessings together “Kiddush”, which comes from the word “sanctify.”", + "They mixed him the first cup: Bet Shammai says: first he blesses over the day and then over the wine. Bet Hillel says: first he blesses over the wine and then over the day. As we shall see throughout this chapter, important events at the seder are marked by the “mixing” of a cup of wine. In the ancient world wine was drunk diluted with water so as to prevent a person from becoming intoxicated. To drink undiluted wine was considered coarse behavior. Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel debate the order of the blessings. Bet Shammai says that we first recite the blessing over the day. This blessing is “Who sanctifies Israel and the festivals.” Afterwards we recite the blessing over the wine, “Who creates the fruit of the vine.” The reasoning for this is that according to Bet Shammai the day causes the wine to be drunk. Bet Hillel says that the wine is blessed first. There are two reasons for this. First of all, the presence of the wine allows us to recite the blessing over the day. Secondly, the blessing over the wine is a commonly recited blessing whereas the blessing over the day is rare. The rule is that common things are recited before uncommon things. The order which we follow today is, as is almost always the case, according to Bet Hillel." + ], + [ + "Introduction In this mishnah they begin to bring in front of him the food. We should note that the foods are brought in front of him before the discussion and recitations which we shall encounter in the following mishnayot. It is not entirely clear from the Mishnah itself whether they ate before the recitation of the “haggadah”, the ritual retelling of the story of the Exodus, or whether they first told the story and then ate, as we do today.", + "They bring [it] in front of him. He dips lettuce before until he reaches the appetizer that precedes the bread. As did the previous mishnah, this mishnah continues to describe foods brought in front of him by a servant. Although many Jews probably could not afford servants, the mishnah relates to each Jew on the seder evening as if he is a member of the upper class. The mishnah does not say what “it” is that they bring in front of him. Some commentators add that it is vegetables and lettuce, while others say that it is a table. Whatever it is, it is clear that appetizers are served before the meal. Today we call this appetizer “karpas”, a Persian, Aramaic and Arabic word for celery. In mishnaic times they probably used lettuce as the appetizer. Other sources mention other appetizers as well. The mishnah may allude to this when it says “until he reaches the appetizer that precedes the bread.” The mishnah may be stating that he continues to eat appetizers until the final appetizer is brought. We should note how different this is from today’s custom, according to which a very small amount of a vegetable is eaten and then people can go hungry until the main meal is brought (and if they are at my seder they can shoot me mean looks as I go on and on).", + "They bring before him matzah, lettuce, and haroset (and two dishes) though the haroset is not mandatory. Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Zadok says: it is mandatory. After the appetizers are completed, the servants bring in front of him the main festival foods, the matzah, lettuce and haroset. The matzah is explicitly commanded by the Torah. The lettuce is the bitter herbs (see abover 2:6) also mandated by the Torah. Haroset does not appear in the Torah. Haroset, a mixture of wine and fruit or wine-vinegar and fruit, was a common food in the Greco-Roman world. It was probably added to the Pesah meal after the destruction in an attempt to provide more foods for the seder. In the Talmud it is explained as having different symbolic meanings, most familiarly that it represents the mortar used to make the bricks in Egypt. Others say that it should have a sharp flavor to remind us of the slavery in Egypt. Still others say that the apples used in making it are to remind us of the “apple” in Egypt, a symbol of the fertility of the Israelite women. According to the first opinion, haroset is brought to the table but it is not mandatory. Rabbi Elazar bar Zadok says that it is mandatory.", + "And in the Temple they bring the body of the pesah before him. The mishnah notes that in Temple days at this point they would bring the pesah in front of the seder participant. Note that the main part of the mishnah describes the seder as it existed after the Temple was destroyed. Only at the end does the mishnah note when the pesah was eaten during Temple times." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah contains the heart of the commandment to tell the story of the Exodus, including the so-called “four questions” or “Mah Nishtanah” and the midrash. These are all still part of the seder ritual to this day.\nIn this mishnah I have deviated from my normal practice of using the version contained in printed versions of the text because it is so radically different from the original version. The “four questions” developed over time and later copyists revised the original “questions” of the mishnah with those familiar to them. If you wish to see the “four questions” as they are recited today, you can check any standard Haggadah and they can easily be found on line. Cited and explained below is the “Mah Nishtanah” as found in early mishnaic manuscripts.", + "They mixed him a second cup, and here the son questions his father. The significance of the moment is marked by the pouring of the second cup. The occasion is the beginning of the telling of the story of the Exodus, which begins with a question. The reason that the story begins with a question is probably in allusion to a few verses in the Torah in which a son asks his father the meaning of the rituals observed (see Exodus 12:26, 13:14, and Deuteronomy 6:20-21).", + "If the son lacks the intelligence to ask, his father instructs him: On all other nights we dip once, on this night we dip twice? On all other nights we eat hametz or matzah, on this night only matzah. On all other nights we eat roasted, stewed or boiled meat, on this night only roasted. The son is supposed to freely form his own question. The mishnah does not provide him with a list of questions which he must ask. I repeat, the “Mah Nishtanah” which we will examine below is not a list of questions which a child must ask but originally was a list of prompts, statements which the father would make to spur a kid who has not asked a question into doing so. I am not telling you this to ruin your Pesah celebration. (Please believe me.) You should continue with the lovely practice of the youngest child reciting the Mah Nishtanah, just as we do in our house. Just know that things used to be done slightly differently. Also, it might be a good idea to get the children genuinely thinking about the content of what we are saying and not just focused on singing the song.", + "He begins with shame and concludes with praise; and expounds from “A wandering Aramean was my father” (Deuteronomy 6:20-25) until he completes the whole section. We now get to the list of statements (after my previous comment I won’t call them questions). You should immediately note that there are only three, and only one of them is the same as the one we still recite today (#2). I shall explain each statement briefly. They are recited in the order in which they are done during the seder. 1) Dipping was a normal part of every meal. However, it was normally done at one part of the meal and therefore, the second dipping which was done with the haroset and bitter herbs was unusual. 2) This question has remained to this day and should not need any explanation. 3) As we learned in the above chapters, the pesah could only be eaten roasted. Therefore, the statement notes that on other nights the meat could be cooked in any way while tonight it can only be roasted. The most interesting thing about this section is that it seems that people were still eating a pesah-like lamb after the destruction of the Temple. Indeed, there is evidence that some Jews continued to eat roasted meat after the destruction, and this mishnah fits with those practices.", + "The main part of the seder is telling the story of the Exodus. The mishnah notes two elements to this. The first is telling the story by beginning with “disgrace and concluding with praise.” In the Talmud they debate whether the disgrace is the physical slavery in Egypt or the spiritual degradation of our idol-worshipping forefathers. The praise is the praise to God for taking us out of Egypt. The second element is an extended midrash (expounding) on Deuteronomy 6:20-25. It is not entirely clear why these verses and not others were chosen but in my opinion the likeliest answer is that they are brief yet comprehensive. The midrashist connects these few verses with the original story in Exodus and adds his own commentary as well. In my translation I have left the words “Arami oved avi” untranslated because they can be translated either as “My forefather was a wandering Aramean”, in which case the phrase refers to Jacob or “An Aramean tried to kill my forefather” in which it is Lavan to whom the verse refers. Our Haggadot understand it the second way." + ], + [ + "Rabban Gamaliel used to say: whoever does not make mention of these three things on Pesah does not fulfill his duty. And these are they: the pesah, matzah, and bitter herbs. The pesah because the Omnipresent passed over the houses of our fathers in Egypt. The matzah because our fathers were redeemed from Egypt. The bitter herb because the Egyptians embittered the lives of our fathers in Egypt. In every generation a man is obligated to regard himself as though he personally had gone forth from Egypt, because it is said, “And you shall tell your son on that day, saying: ‘It is because of that which the Lord did for me when I came forth out of Egypt” (Exodus 13:8). Therefore it is our duty to thank, praise, laud, glorify, raise up, beautify, bless, extol, and adore Him who made all these miracles for our fathers and ourselves; He brought us forth from slavery into freedom, from sorrow into joy, from mourning into festivity, from darkness into great light, and from servitude into redemption. Let us say before him, Hallelujah!
This mishnah has become a liturgical text, that is a text that is recited on a ritual occasion, namely the seder. It has been a part of the Haggadah since the Haggadah was composed. As is common, as the liturgy expanded the text of the mishnah grew as well. Below, the pieces that are in small font are later additions to the mishnah, additions which appear in our Haggadot but were not originally part of the Mishnah itself. There are other additions in the Haggadah which do not appear even in later versions of the mishnah.
Now to the content. In this mishnah Rabban Gamaliel demands that we explain the three main food items at the table, pesah, matzah and marror, while these items lay in front of us. Because he mentions the pesah, some scholars posited that this Rabban Gamaliel lived while the Temple still stood and the pesah was sacrificed. I believe it is more likely that the mishnah is representing a post-Temple reality and that this is the same Rabban Gamaliel whom we already encountered who believes that the pesah can still be eaten even without a Temple. The ritual here replaces, at least as best as is possible, the loss of the Temple. When sacrifices can no longer be offered, words, study and prayer take their place.
An interesting side note to be made is the comparison of Rabban Gamaliel with Jesus’s words at the Last Supper, assumed by three of the four Gospels to have taken place on the eve of Pesah. Jesus gives symbolic meaning to the wine (his blood) and to the matzah (his body). There is some correlation between that which Rabban Gamaliel demands and that which Jesus does according to the Gospels. Scholars have attempted to discover which ritual was earlier did the early Christians modify an ancient Jewish custom? Or did rabbinic Jews engage in polemics against Christians, saying this is the symbolic meaning and not what you say it is? I don’t believe we can know the answer to this question, and it may not be a good question. What the two faiths have in common is that both impart symbolic meaning to the seder meal in a world in which the central structure, the Temple, has been destroyed.
The mishnah itself is straightforward and probably familiar to most of us; hence I have refrained from making any direct comments." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is concerned with the recitation of the Hallel at the seder. The Hallel is a group of Psalms from Psalm 113 through Psalm 118. Today it is recited on the three festivals (Pesah, Sukkot and Shavuot), on Hannukah and on Rosh Hodesh (the new month).\nAll of the sages agree that at the seder the Hallel is split into two parts. The first part is recited before the meal and the rest is recited afterwards. The disagreement is over how much is recited before the meal.\nThe second section of the mishnah contains the formula of the blessing recited after this first part of the Hallel is recited.", + "How far does one recite it? Bet Shammai say: Until “As a joyous mother of children” (Psalm 113). But Bet Hillel say: Until “The flinty rock into a fountain of waters” (Psalm 114). Bet Shammai says that before the meal is eaten, at a relatively early hour in the evening, they should not recite Psalm 114 which starts, “When Israel went forth from Egypt” because the children of Israel had not left Egypt at that early time in the evening. In contrast, Bet Hillel says that the children of Israel did not leave until the next daybreak does this mean that we shouldn’t say Psalm 114 until daybreak? That would be absurd. Rather, since they began to tell the story of the Exodus before the actual Exodus happened, they may recite Psalm 114 before the meal.", + "And he concludes with [a formula of] redemption. Rabbi Tarfon says: “Who redeemed us and redeemed our fathers from Egypt”, but he did not conclude [with a blessing]. Rabbi Akiva says: “So may the Lord our God and the God of our fathers bring us to other appointed times and festivals which come towards us for peace, rejoicing in the rebuilding of Your city and glad in Your service, and there we will eat of the sacrifices and the pesahim” etc. until “Blessed are You who has redeemed Israel.” Bet Hillel holds that one should conclude the blessing with a formula mentioning redemption. It seems that Bet Shammai would hold that redemption is not mentioned at this point in the evening because the children of Israel have still not been redeemed from Egypt. Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva disagree over how the blessing is formulated. For Rabbi Tarfon it is a simple blessing, one which mentions the past redemption but does not have a formal conclusion. The whole blessing reads “Blessed are You, Lord our God, Master of the Universe Who redeemed us and redeemed our fathers from Egypt and brought us to this night.” Note that “and brought us to this night” is not found in the printed edition of the Mishnah but is found in early manuscripts. According to Rabbi Tarfon only the past redemption is mentioned. Rabbi Akiva, on the other hand, sees the Pesah redemption as the paradigm for the future redemption, one which will bring Israel back to her land and the Temple to restoration. Hence the blessing includes a mention of hope for the future. We should note that the version of the blessing which I have translated above is the one found in the printed edition of the Mishnah. The end reads “Who has redeemed Israel”, which refers to the past. The version found in early manuscripts is “Who redeems Israel”, referring to the future. Today we recite Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Tarfon’s version in a combination and we conclude with “Who has redeemed Israel.”" + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses the third and fourth cups of wine and the conclusion of the meal.", + "They poured him a third cup, blesses over his meal. The Grace after the Meal, or Birkat Hamazon, is recited over a third cup of wine. We should note that according to the Mishnah and Talmud Birkat Hamazon is normally recited over a cup of wine, meaning that one holds a cup of wine while reciting the Birkat Hamazon, then recites a blessing over drinking wine (borei peri hagefen) and then drinks the cup at the end. Some people still have this custom today, at least on Shabbat and festivals.", + "A fourth [cup], he concludes the Hallel, and recites over it the blessing of song. The fourth cup is recited over the recitation of the Hallel. In the Talmud there is a debate over what the “blessing of the song” is. Some say it is “Nishmat Kol Hai”, a prayer recited during the morning prayers of Shabbat and festivals. Others say it is “Yehallukhah Adonai Elohenu”, which is a prayer recited at the end of Hallel on other occasions. Today we recite both.", + "Between these cups if he wants he may drink; between the third and the fourth he may not drink. Between the second and third cups it is permitted to drink more wine. This is the time when the meal is consumed and it was allowed to drink extra cups during the meal itself. However, it is forbidden to drink between the third and fourth cups lest he gets drunk and is not able to complete the seder. The rabbis thought that drinking alcohol while eating would not cause one to get drunk." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah brings the description of the seder to its conclusion.", + "One may not conclude the pesah meal with an afikoman. Saul Lieberman, the great Talmudic scholar of the past century, explained that “afikoman” refers to a Greco-Roman custom to engage in revelry at the conclusion of the symposium, the formal meal. People would go from house to house, drinking and carousing. The rabbis prohibited this custom, preferring instead that a Jew should discuss the laws of Pesah and the story of the Exodus until the morning prayers. As an aside, the fact that the rabbis had to assert the differences between the seder and the symposium strengthens the theory that the two were essentially not all that different, and that in essence the seder was a “Jewish symposium” as some scholars have called it. The Talmud explains the word “afikoman” in two ways. First, of all it may mean that one should not go from one house to the other. Secondly, it may mean that one should not eat anything after eating the pesah. Lieberman explains both as referring to the Greek custom of revelry. The foods which the Talmud proscribes were meant to whet one’s appetite so that one would wish to drink more.", + "If some of them fell asleep, they may eat [the pesah when they wake up]. If all of them fell asleep they may not eat. Rabbi Jose says: if they napped, they may eat, but if they fell asleep, they may not eat. This section deals with the laws concerning the pesah sacrifice. If some of the members of the “havurah”, the eating company, fell asleep during the meal, when they wake up they may continue to eat the pesah because other people stayed awake the whole time. However, if everyone fell asleep then they have all turned their attention away from the pesah and they may not go back to eating it. This is akin to eating the pesah in two different places, which is forbidden. [This sort of reminds me of our seder!] Rabbi Yose says that even if everyone fell asleep they may eat it, as long as they only napped. If they fell into a deep sleep, they may not eat it when they wake up." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe final mishnah of Pesahim deals with the status of the pesah after it has been left pass the time in which it may be eaten. It also deals with the blessings recited over the pesah and the hagigah, the sacrifice that accompanies the pesah.", + "The pesah defiles one’s hands after midnight. The pesah sacrifice can be eaten only until midnight (Exodus 12:8). This verse does not actually specify midnight, but this is how it is interpreted by some sages. Since it cannot be eaten after midnight, it becomes “remnant” if it is left over (see Leviticus 7:17-18). The issue of defiling hands is explained below.", + "Piggul and remnant defile one’s hands. If any one of the four essential procedures (slaughtering, receiving the blood in a vessel, bringing the blood to the altar and sprinkling the blood on the altar) for a sacrifice is done with the intent of eating the sacrifice or burning up its non-eaten parts on the altar after the time in which this must be done the sacrifice is considered “piggul” and it must be burnt (not on the altar). “Remnant” refers to any sacrifice that is left over past the time in which it may be eaten. The sages decreed that piggul defiles the hands so as to discourage priests who wanted make people’s sacrifices into piggul. They decreed that remnant defiles the hands so that priests wouldn’t be lax in eating and then disposing of the sacrifices.", + "If he recited the blessing for the pesah, he thereby exempts the sacrifice [the hagigah]; [but] if he recited the blessing for the sacrifice [the hagigah], he does not exempt the pesah, the words of Rabbi Ishmael. Rabbi Akiva says: this does not exempt that nor does that exempt this. According to Rabbi Ishmael, the pesah is the more essential of the sacrifices. The hagigah (for an explanation of this sacrifice see above 6:3) accompanies the pesah, but it itself is secondary. Therefore, if one recites the blessing over the pesah (the essential), he is exempt from reciting the blessing over the hagigah, which is only an accompanying sacrifice. But if one recites the blessing over the hagigah he is still obligated to bless over the pesah. Rabbi Akiva, on the other hand, sees both sacrifices as being different, neither “accompanying” the other. Therefore, reciting a blessing over one does not exempt the other. Congratulations! We have finished Pesahim. It is a tradition at this point to thank God for helping us to finish learning the tractate and to commit ourselves to going back and relearning it, so that we may not forget it and so that its lessons will stay with us for all of our lives. Pesah is certainly one of the most important and closely observed holidays in the Jewish calendar. The seder is perhaps the single Jewish ritual that has been observed for the longest period of time and has captured the hearts of Jews for thousands of years. Even the most casually observant Jew knows that on Pesah one does not eat bread. I hope that learning this tractate has helped us get back to the sources of some of these laws, and that when we observe our own Pesah holidays and our own seder we keep them in mind and share them with others. Congratulations on learning another tractate of Mishnah. May you have the strength and time to keep on learning more! Tomorrow we begin Shekalim." + ] + ] + ] + }, + "versions": [ + [ + "Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp", + "http://learn.conservativeyeshiva.org/mishnah/" + ] + ], + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה פסחים", + "categories": [ + "Mishnah", + "Modern Commentary on Mishnah", + "English Explanation of Mishnah", + "Seder Moed" + ], + "schema": { + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה פסחים", + "enTitle": "English Explanation of Mishnah Pesachim", + "key": "English Explanation of Mishnah Pesachim", + "nodes": [ + { + "heTitle": "הקדמה", + "enTitle": "Introduction" + }, + { + "heTitle": "", + "enTitle": "" + } + ] + } +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Moed/English Explanation of Mishnah Shabbat/English/Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp.json b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Moed/English Explanation of Mishnah Shabbat/English/Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..cb278e324dd9a11ec84b4426c05abef3772a9a86 --- /dev/null +++ b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Moed/English Explanation of Mishnah Shabbat/English/Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp.json @@ -0,0 +1,894 @@ +{ + "language": "en", + "title": "English Explanation of Mishnah Shabbat", + "versionSource": "http://learn.conservativeyeshiva.org/mishnah/", + "versionTitle": "Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp", + "status": "locked", + "license": "CC-BY", + "shortVersionTitle": "Dr. Joshua Kulp", + "actualLanguage": "en", + "languageFamilyName": "english", + "isBaseText": true, + "isSource": true, + "isPrimary": true, + "direction": "ltr", + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה שבת", + "categories": [ + "Mishnah", + "Modern Commentary on Mishnah", + "English Explanation of Mishnah", + "Seder Moed" + ], + "text": { + "Introduction": [ + "Most of tractate Shabbat goes into great detail as to what type of work is prohibited on Shabbat. There is not a lot of information about this in the Torah itself. Indeed the only four activities specifically prohibited in the Torah are plowing and reaping (Exodus 34:21), fire (Exodus 35:3) and gathering wood (Numbers 15:32). The paucity of verses and the volume of rabbinic halakhah led the rabbis to conclude that “the laws of Shabbat are like mountains hanging by a thread” (Hagigah 1:8). There is a little bit of information in the prophets about the observance of Shabbath, but this does not add up to much. However, from the literature that remains from the Second Temple period it seems that Jews were very stringent about the observance of the Sabbath. From Josephus and the books of the Maccabees we learn that some Jews did not even want to engage in battle on Shabbat, and rather than do so gave up their lives, until Mattathias taught them that engaging in battle to save one’s life was permitted. The Book of Jubilees, a rewritten version of Genesis popular among certain groups of Second Temple Jews is very stringent on Sabbath observance. So too were the groups that composed the Dead Sea scrolls. However, in this period the concept of prohibited “work” on the Sabbath was somewhat ill-defined. In contrast, the Rabbis define “work” in great detail. There are 39 categories of work, and anything that is considered to be prohibited from the Torah must fit somehow into one of these categories. These will not be listed until chapter 7, mishnah two. These are called “avot” or arch-categories of work. Anything derived from one of these arch-categories is either an arch-category in and of itself or is a “toldah”, a derivative. Anything that does not fit into one of these categories, and yet is still prohibited is considered to only be prohibited from “rabbinic law”—derabbanan— and not from “toraitic law”—deoraita. I should emphasize that a law’s being “derabbanan” does not necessarily make it less important. It only means that the rabbis could not somehow tie it into one of the 39 categories. These laws are also called “shvut” which means “rest”. The rabbis prohibited certain activities so that a person would be able to rest on Shabbat. ", + "There are some terms we should know before we begin learning. 1. Liable—this means that a person who does a certain activity has transgressed a biblical prohibition. S/he is liable to either bring a sacrifice if the transgression was done without intention, or for the death penalty if done with intention. We should not get ourselves caught up with “did this really happen/did the rabbis execute people for Shabbat infractions?” The point of “liable” is merely to define what the prohibitions are. Their enforcement is a totally different issue. 2. Exempt—this almost always means that the activity is prohibited but that one who has done so has not transgressed a biblical prohibition. 3. Permitted—this means that an activity is completely permissible. ", + "A couple of words of warning before we begin learning. Shabbat observance still plays a major role in the life of observant Jews. The prohibitions that we learn about in the Mishnah are the foundations of an incredibly complex system of halakhah that is codified throughout the ages. The system is perhaps the most complex areas of halakhah still observed today. Learning the Mishnah is not equivalent to learning how halakhah is observed, certainly not in its minutae of detail. Halakhah is not derived directly from the Mishnah, but rather from the Talmud and from its codifiers. Hence, while learning the Mishnah we should refrain from expecting a direct correlation to how the Shabbat is observed today. Furthermore, I am not a “posek” an arbitrator of Jewish law. I will try not to answer many questions of modern halakhah in this forum and instead will refer you to other sources and especially to your local rabbi. Second, I realize that people reading this commentary have different levels of observance. However, this realization will not impact my commentary on the mishnah, at least not regularly. Whether you personally “keep Shabbat” or don’t, the rabbis of the Mishnah firmly believed it to be mandatory. Thirdly, the Conservative movement has in the past made certainly leniencies regarding Shabbat observance, most famously allowing under certain circumstances driving to synagogue on Shabbat. This teshuvah (responsa) will not be relevant to our learning of the Mishnah. Even those rabbis who supported this responsa would agree that a simple reading of the sources would lead to prohibiting driving on the Sabbath, mostly because of the prohibition of fire. Fourthly, we should remember that “work” has a specific legal definition. It is not a nebulous idea but carefully defined through exhaustive definitions. A person who says that driving to the golf course and enjoying a game of golf, or going shopping, is not breaking Shabbat because to him/her these activities are not “work” may be stating a subjective truth, but it is a truth that does not fit into the more objective and impersonal halakhic system. The famous example is that you can lift a heavy piece of furniture in your house and you have not performed a prohibited labor, but if you lift a feather outside and carry it four cubits you have. Finally, the Mishnah talks almost exclusively of prohibitions. It is my firm belief that the rabbis did not see the Sabbath only as a day of prohibitions, but also as an opportunity—an opportunity to pray, to study, to rejoice and to be with the people who one wants to be with. These other aspects just were not as fruitful for halakhic material and hence are rarely discussed in the Mishnah. Nevertheless, if Shabbat is to be an integral part of one’s life, it must be regarded not only as a day of things one can’t do, but a day of wonderful opportunities. It is a time to refrain and thereby allow ourselves to experience the joy of just being. " + ], + "": [ + [ + [ + "Introduction\nTractate Shabbat begins with a formulaic teaching about the prohibition of carrying. The remainder of the chapter discusses preparations before Shabbat, but it seems that the Mishnah’s editors wanted to begin with a mishnah that contains the formula “two which are four”. This is the same way that tractate Shevuoth began, and it seems that this type of opening was often preferred by the Mishnah. Indeed, Abraham Goldberg (whose Hebrew critical commentary on Shabbat I will use from time to time published by the Jewish Theological Seminary of America) notes that about half of the tractates of the Mishnah begin with numbers or an issue related to numbers. Goldberg also believes that opening the tractate with a mishnah concerning carrying something from one domain to another was intended as a polemic against the Sadducees who did not agree with the Pharisees in all of the details of these laws.\nThe prohibition of carrying will be further discussed later on in chapter five and will continue to be discussed through chapter eleven.", + "The mishnah lists eight slightly different scenarios in which an object is brought from outside in the public domain to inside the house, the private domain. These scenarios can be divided twice. In the first four examples a person has performed a complete action, taking something from one domain and bringing into another and is therefore liable. In two of these cases the object is brought in and in two it is taken out. In the second four cases, the two people share in bringing the object in or taking it out and hence they are both exempt (remember that this does not mean that this is permitted.) These cases can also be divided into two subcategories. The mishnah probably uses the example of a poor person standing outside and a householder inside because this is a realistic situation and it will be easier to remember.", + "The carryings out of Shabbat are two which are four from the inside, and two which are four from the outside. How is this so? The poor man stands outside and the householder stands inside:
If the poor man reaches his hand inside and places [something] into the hand of the householder, The poor man is liable because he took something from the public domain and brought it in.", + "or if he takes [something] from it and carries it out, the poor man is liable, and the householder is exempt. The poor man is liable because he took something out. In both cases the householder has not done anything and hence he is exempt.", + "If the householder reaches his hand outside and places [an object] in the poor man's hand, The householder has brought something out and is liable.", + "or takes [something] and carries it in, the master is liable, while the poor man is exempt. The householder brought something in.", + "If the poor man reaches his hand inside and the master takes [an object] from it, The poor man brought something in, but is not liable because he didn’t put it down in the private domain. Rather the householder took it out of his hands. Both are exempt even though together they have performed a forbidden act of work. We now learn that in order to be liable the person must uproot something from one domain and put it down in another domain. One is not liable for half of an activity.", + "or places [an object] in it and he carries it out, both are exempt; The poor man didn’t pick the object up so he’s not liable and the householder didn’t bring it out so he’s not liable. Both are exempt.", + "If the householder stretches his hand outside and the poor man takes [an object] from it, The householder picks up an object and brings his hand out of the house but the poor man takes the object out of his hand. Both have performed half of a forbidden labor and both are exempt.", + "or places [an article] in it and he carries it inside, both are exempt. Finally, the poor man puts the object in the householder’s hand and the householder brings it inside, so again both have performed half of a forbidden labor and again both are exempt." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nAfter an introductory mishnah, the Mishnah continues with laws relevant to the day before Shabbat. Our mishnah deals with things that one shouldn’t do once the time for the afternoon prayer, minhah, has arrived. The problem is that if one becomes engaged with one of these activities, he may become swept away and forget to pray minhah.\nThese laws apply not only to the day before Shabbat, but to any day of the week.\nThe minhah referred to here is from the time of 9 1/2 hours, the day being divided into 12 daylight hours. So on a day where daylight begins at 6 AM and ends at 6 PM, minhah is from 3:30 in the afternoon. In the Northern Hemisphere the hours will be longer in the summer months and shorter during the winter. We should note that one can also pray minhah at an earlier time of day, from 6 1/2 hours.", + "One may not sit down before a barber near Minhah until he has prayed. One shouldn’t begin to get a hair cut right before Minhah, lest the hair cut take a long time and he forget that he must pray his minhah prayers. After the sun has set, he will not be able to pray minhah.", + "One may not enter the baths or a tannery, or [sit down] to eat or [begin] a court case. Similarly, a person shouldn’t begin any of these activities close to minhah time, lest he forget to pray. A tannery is an example of any type of work which is somewhat complicated and may cause him to forget that the time to pray has arrived.", + "But if they began, they need not break off. However, if he began one of these things, then he need not stop in order to pray. Rather he may complete his haircut, etc. and then pray afterwards.", + "One must break off for the reading of the Shema, but not for prayer. This section explains that one must stop what he is doing to recite the Shema but one doesn’t have to stop for “prayer”, otherwise known as the Shmoneh Esreh, or the Amidah. The reason is that the obligation to say Shema is from the Torah whereas the obligation to recite the Shmoneh Esreh is only derabbanan, of rabbinic origin." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe mishnah continues to deal with laws that are concerned with the day before the Sabbath. However, through associative thought, this mishnah also includes one law that is not concerned with the Sabbath eve and one law that is concerned with another topic altogether.", + "A tailor must not go out with his needle near nightfall, lest he forget and go out. Nor a scribe with his quill. On the Sabbath itself, it will be prohibited for the tailor to carry his needle around (or anything else). Therefore, even as nightfall draws near, he should take his needle out of his coat where he typically stores it, lest he forget and accidentally carry it on the Sabbath. Similarly, a scribe should not go out on the Sabbath eve with his quill. Both of these things, the scribe’s quill and the tailor’s needle are small items that can easily be carried without a person knowing. Therefore, he should make sure he puts them away before the Sabbath. In essence, this is part of his Shabbat preparation.", + "And one may not search his garments [for lice or fleas], nor read by the light of a lamp. This halakhah is concerned not with the eve of Shabbat but with Shabbat itself. It is brought here because the nature of the halakhah is similar to the nature of the other halakhot. They are all “gezerot” that is prohibitions created to prevent a situation which might cause a person to transgress. A person should not check his clothes for lice or fleas or read by candlelight on Shabbat lest he tilt the candle to bring more oil to the wick an activity considered to be prohibited due to the prohibition of lighting a fire.", + "In truth it was said, the hazzan may see where the children are reading from, but he himself must not read. Although a person shouldn’t read by candlelight, children may do so because their teacher will stop them from tilting the candle. The Palestinian Talmud explains that children want the candle to go out so that they won’t have to read anymore, hence they won’t tilt it. Their teacher, the hazzan (today the word is used to refer to the cantor, but in the Mishnah it has a different meaning), may also help them read with the candlelight. However, he must not use the candle for his own reading. A note on the phrase “in truth” be’emet: According to Goldberg, this phrase is used to introduce an exception to the previous rule which was taught above. The Talmud claims that this phrase means that the law was given directly to Moses on Sinai.", + "Similarly, a zav must not eat together with a zavah, because it may lead to sin. This section contains another “gezerah” a prohibition meant to keep a person from transgressing. A zav and a zavah are a man and woman who have abnormal genital flows. They are both impure. A pure person should not eat together with a zav or a zavah because the zav or zavah will cause the food they share to become impure. Seemingly, there should be no problem with a zav eating with a zavah, because they are both impure. However, in order to prevent people from becoming accustomed to eating with zavim, even this is prohibited." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah does not actually teach any halakhah. Rather it places the halakhot which we learned above in an historical context.", + "And these are of halakhot which they stated in the upper chamber of Hananiah ben Hezekiah ben Gurion, when they went up to visit him. They took a count, and Bet Shammai outnumbered Beth Hillel and on that day they enacted eighteen measures. This mishnah begins by teaching that the halakhot which were taught in the previous several mishnayot were stated on a famous, somewhat legendary and obscure, day in the history of the rabbis when the Sages visited the upper chamber of Hananiah ben Hezekiah ben Gurion. According to the Rambam, the “eighteen measures” mentioned in section two refer to eighteen halakhot stated from the beginning of the tractate until this point. According to this interpretation, these were eighteen prohibitions about which Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel agreed. Mishnah 1 lists eight things, and there are five in both mishnayot 2 and 3 (these could be counted in different ways). The Rambam holds that on that day they made eighteen enactments, which are not listed in our mishnah. They also disagreed over eighteen issues, and thirteen of these will be listed in the upcoming mishnayot. The remainder of the disagreements are listed elsewhere. There are several other ways to understand this mishnah, but the Rambam’s seems to be straightforward. Some explain that the mishnah does not refer to those things halakhoth that are found in the above mishnayot but that it refers to a list preserved in the Talmud. However, we understand the mishnah, we should note how unusual it is. Rarely do mishnayoth provide us with information about where or when they were taught. Although we cannot be sure of what happened on that day in the upper chamber, it certainly was a day that became legendary in the mind of the rabbis." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe next four mishnayot contain disputes between Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel over things that can be done before the Sabbath.\nMost of the disputes revolve around one central issue: can a person’s vessels perform work for them on the Sabbath? It is clear that a person herself cannot perform a forbidden act of work on the Sabbath; the debate is whether a person can set in motion a process which will cause work to be done on the Sabbath. Today it is clear to us that this is permitted. For instance, I can set a timer on my clock and it can go on on Shabbat and light my house. Bet Shammai, however, would say that such an act is forbidden.\nWe should note, the it seems that the sect of Jews who lived in Qumran and produced the Dead Sea Scrolls probably held like Bet Shammai. According to this understanding, work may not be done for a Jew on the Sabbath. The verse from the Ten Commandments which reads, “Six days you shall labor and do all your work” (Exodus 20:9) is interpreted to mean that all of a person’s work must be done within six day. In contrast, the Hillelites would hold that a Jew may not perform work on the Sabbath. They interpret the verse to mean that a person can do work for only six days, not that all of a person’s work must be done in six days. Although these positions might seem similar, they are based on different understandings of the Sabbath and indeed of halakhah in general.", + "Beth Shammai says: ink, dyes and vetch may not be soaked [on Friday afternoon] unless they can be fully soaked while it is yet day; And Bet Hillel permits it. Inks, dyes and vetch (a legume soaked and then used as animal food) are all processed by soaking a plant in water to soften it. According to Bet Shammai it is forbidden to start such a process on Friday unless the person can sure that she can complete the process before Shabbat. As we learned above in the introduction, Bet Shammai forbids a person from having her “things” work for her on Shabbat. Bet Hillel permits this." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah contains two more debates between Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel over whether work may be begun on Friday before Shabbat, if that work will continue on its own throughout Shabbat.", + "Beth Shammai says: bundles of wet flax may not be placed in an oven unless they can begin to steam while it is still day, nor wool in the dyer’s kettle unless it can [absorb the color] such that [the color] is visible. But Bet Hillel permits it. Bet Shammai prohibits putting flax in the oven or wool in the dyer’s kettle if the work will continue to be performed on Shabbat. If the essential part of drying the flax or dying the wool has been done before Shabbat, then she may leave her things over Shabbat. But if not, Bet Shammai prohibits. Bet Hillel again permits this.", + "Bet Shammai says: traps for wild beasts, fowl, and fish may not be spread unless they can be caught while it is still day; But Bet Hillel permits it. This is in essence the same debate as above. The one innovation is that Bet Hillel permits even though the whole work might end up being done on the Shabbat, as opposed to the other cases where the work began on Friday. Similarly, Bet Shammai forbids this, even though there is no certainty that the traps will catch anything on Shabbat." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is related to the last couple of mishnayot in that again Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel debate and yet the subject is different. In this mishnah a Jew gives something to a non-Jew before Shabbat for the non-Jew to carry away on Shabbat.", + "Bet Shammai says: one must not sell [something] to a non-Jew, or help him to load [a donkey], or lift up [an article] upon him unless he can reach a near place [before Shabbat]. But Bet Hillel permits it. Bet Shammai holds that one shouldn’t create a situation where it will look like the non-Jew is doing forbidden work for the Jew on Shabbat. A non-Jew may not perform work for a Jew on Shabbat. Despite the prevalence of the “shabbes goy”, a non-Jew who does things for a Jew on Shabbat that the Jew cannot herself do, this is actually prohibited. Bet Shammai says that if a Jew sells something to a non-Jew on Friday or helps the non-Jew load up a donkey or the non-Jew himself, it will look as if the non-Jew is setting out to do the Jew’s work. Therefore, it is prohibited. In order for it to be permitted, he must arrive either at his own home (according to one opinion in the Talmud) or at least to his home city (according to another opinion). Bet Hillel is not concerned with creating such an appearance, and hence this is permitted." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis is the final debate between Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel over work that is begun on Friday.", + "Bet Shammai says: hides must not be given to a [non-Jewish] tanner, nor clothing to a non-Jewish launderer, unless they can be done while it is yet day; But in all these [cases] Bet Hillel, permits as long as the sun is still shining. Like yesterday’s mishnah, this mishnah continues to deal with a Jew giving things to a gentile with which the gentile will work on the Sabbath. In the case of today’s mishnah we might have thought that Bet Hillel would prohibit because it looks like the non-Jew will be doing work for the Jew on the Sabbath. The last part of the mishnah refers to all of the debates above. In all of these cases, Bet Hillel permits the Jew to set the motion in process as long as the sun has not yet set. The addition of “as long as the sun is still shining” also signals that this is the end of the series of debates." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first section of this mishnah is a continuation of the previous mishnayot. Here we learn that Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel’s house behaved like Bet Shamma and refrained from doing work on Friday if that work would continue onto Shabbat.\nThe second section begins to list things that may be done on Friday, even according to Bet Shammai.", + "Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel said: My father’s house was accustomed to giving white clothing to a non-Jewish launderer three days before Shabbat. The custom of Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel’s house was that of Bet Shammai. In the Tosefta (a text from the same time period as the Mishnah) it is related that they would give colored laundry on Friday, because colored laundry is easier to clean than white laundry.", + "And these and these agree that they lay down an olive press beams and wine press rollers. Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel agree that one can begin the process of pressing olives and grapes on Friday, even though the work will continue on Shabbat. Since as soon as she lays down the beams, most of the good juices will come out and the grapes and olives are crushed, the continuation of such a process is not considered to be work forbidden by the Torah on Shabbat. Therefore, Bet Shammai allows this. Even on Shabbat, crushing already crushed grapes and already pressed olives is not considered to be work forbidden by the Torah, but rather only prohibited by rabbinic law derabbanan." + ], + [ + "Meat, onion[s], and egg[s] may not be roasted unless they can be [fully] roasted while it is still day.
Bread may not be put into an oven just before nightfall, nor a cake upon coals, unless its surface can form a crust while it is still day. Rabbi Elazar says: there must be time for the bottom to form a crust.
In today’s mishnah we learn that Bet Hillel agrees with Bet Shammai that food may not be put into an oven on Friday in order for it to cook on Shabbat, unless it has already been fully cooked before Shabbat begins.
Note that in yesterday’s mishnah we learned of a case where Bet Shammai agrees with Bet Hillel and in today’s mishnah we learn of a case where Bet Hillel agrees with Bet Shammai.
We can explain both of these sections together, since they are both in essence the same halakhah. Bet Hillel does not allow food to be left in the oven if the food is uncooked lest someone rakes the coals in the oven in order to increase the heat and cook the food faster. Since unlike the items in the previous mishnayot, the person will want her food on the Shabbat itself there is a fear that she will do something to hurry the food’s cooking. Raking the coals is forbidden on Shabbat under the category of lighting a fire. Hence, to “keep one away from sin” it is prohibited to even have uncooked food in the fire.
Cooking cakes or bread involved placing them on the sides of ovens. The bottom would crust before the top. Rabbi Elazar is therefore more lenient. He allows leaving the bread in the oven as long as the bottom has already crusted over, which will be before the top." + ], + [ + "Introduction This mishnah continues to discuss lighting fires in ovens on Friday so that they will stay lit over Shabbat. Since the prohibition of putting something into an oven on Friday was only “derabbanan”—of rabbinic origin—and intended to prevent a person from committing a transgression of biblical law, there are cases where this prohibition may be suspended. This is generally the case with rabbinic law—it is more flexible than toraitic law. ", + " The passover sacrifice may be lowered into the oven just before nightfall; In yesterday’s mishnah we learned that one is not allowed to put meat into an oven on Friday unless it will already be cooked before Shabbat begins. Today’s mishnah relates an exception to this rule: the Passover sacrifice. The reason that one is not allowed to put meat into an oven is that we are concerned lest on Shabbat itself she come to rake the coals in order to speed up the cooking, which is prohibited on Shabbat. However, in this case, since people eat the passover sacrifice in a group setting, we are not concerned that one of them will rake the coals, because others will stop her. These people are engaged in fulfilling a commandment and it is unlikely that they would transgress a commandment at this time. In addition, because of the quantity of people who had to sacrifice their passover sacrifices, not everybody could roast theirs before the Shabbat began. Hence the usual restrictions did not apply.", + "And the fire may be lighted in the fireplace of the Chamber of the Hearth. The Chamber of the Hearth was where the fire was kept constantly lit in the Temple. The priests would gather around there to keep warm. Hence, they could add to the fire there on Friday without fear that someone would stoke the fire, since the priests would make sure that would not happen. ", + "But in the provinces there must be time for the fire to take hold of its greater part. Outside of the Temple it is forbidden to light a fire on Friday unless it the fire has time to take hold before the Shabbat. Small fires need to be stoked, and therefore the fire must be fully lit before Shabbat begins.", + "Rabbi Judah says: in the case of charcoal, just a little [is sufficient]. Rabbi Judah adds in a leniency concerning lighting coals on Friday. Once coals are lit, they will stay lit and therefore there is little fear that he will stoke them. Hence it is permitted to light them on Friday afternoon as long as they will be at least a little bit lit before Shabbat begins." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis chapter deals with candle lighting on Friday eve before Shabbat. Candle lighting is part of the joy that we are commanded to experience on Shabbat. Today, with electric lights in abundance we no longer appreciate the function of a simple candle on Friday eve. In the time of the Mishnah, on most nights people would have gone to sleep at nightfall. It was just too expensive to use up oil for light on normal occasions. On Friday night they lit candles, stayed up late, ate a festive meal and studied Torah.\nMost of the chapter deals with the technical details of lighting wicks, oils, lamps, etc.", + "With what may they kindle [the Shabbat light] and with what may they not kindle them?
They may not kindle with cedar fiber, uncarded flax, a raw silk, a desert wick, or seaweed, The list in this section is of material which may not be used for wicks in lighting the Sabbath candles. The reason that we do not light with these types of wicks is that they don’t absorb the oil well, and someone might tilt the lamp on Shabbat to try to get more oil on the wick. Such tilting is prohibited because it is like lighting a fire. Also, since they are not good wicks they might go out, forcing the family to sit in the dark.", + "And not with pitch, wax, castor oil, [terumah] oil [which must be] burnt, tail fat, or tallow. Nahum the Mede says: they may kindle with melted tallow. And the sages say: whether melted or not, they may not kindle with it. The same reason that the above-mentioned wicks were prohibited is why most of these types of oil are also prohibited. The exception is terumah oil which must be burned. This refers to terumah oil which has been made impure and therefore has to be burned. It is prohibited to burn unclean sacrifices or terumah on Shabbat and on holidays. The final debate is on whether all types of tallow are prohibited or just tallow that has not been melted." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to discuss oils which may be used for lighting the Shabbat lights.", + "They may not kindle [the Shabbat light] with [terumah] oil [which must be] burnt on festivals. This section deals with festivals. Of all of the forbidden oils listed at the end of yesterday’s mishnah, this is the only one prohibited on festivals. The other oils are permitted. They are prohibited on Shabbat because they don’t light well and someone might come to tilt the lamp. Tilting the lamp is prohibited on Shabbat but not on festivals. Hence, on festivals there is no reason to prohibit these types of oils.", + "Rabbi Ishmael says: they may not light with tar, because of the honor of the Shabbat. Rabbi Ishmael says that tar may not be used because it smells bad. Furthermore, if the smell is really bad the person might extinguish it, which is prohibited on Shabbat.", + "But the sages permit with all oils: with sesame oil, nut oil, radish oil, fish oil, gourd oil, tar and naphtha. The sages allow the use of any type of oil, even tar and naphta. It seems that the reason that most of the sages were so lenient is to keep the costs down, especially in places where good olive oil is not abundant.", + "Rabbi Tarfon says: they don’t light with anything but olive oil. Olive oil is the best type of oil for lighting a lamp. That is why it is customary to use olive oil on Hannukah (despite our modern custom of using wax candles). Rabbi Tarfon demands only the best for Shabbat. In the Talmud the Sages respond by asking Rabbi Tarfon what people in lands outside of Israel who don’t have access to olive oil do." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah returns to discussing what may be used as wicks for Shabbat lights.", + "Whatever comes from a tree they may not light [the Shabbat light] except for flax. The only type of material which comes from a tree which may be used as a wick is flax, which is used to make linen. Although we would not consider flax to be a tree, it is called a tree in Joshua 2:6.", + "And whatever comes from a tree cannot be defiled with tent-uncleanness except linen. There is a connection between what type of material can be used as a Shabbat candle wick and what type of material contracts tent-uncleanness. If a corpse or piece thereof is under a tent and something else is under the tent is well, the corpse transmits its impurity to the other thing under the tent. Any type of material except linen which covers both the corpse and the other thing will carry the impurity but it itself will remain pure. A tent made of linen not only causes the impurity to go from the corpse to the other thing but it itself becomes impure.", + "A wick made of cloth which was twisted but not singed: Rabbi Eliezer says: it is unclean, and one may not light with it; Rabbi Akiva says: it is clean and one may light with it. They would make wicks by twisting cloth and then singing them. Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiba debate the status of twisted cloth that has not been singed. According to Rabbi Eliezer it is still considered to be a cloth and hence it can still receive impurities. Since it has not been singed it should not however be used as a wick. Rabbi Akiva holds that since it has been twisted it is no longer considered cloth, but even though it has not been singed one may light with it." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah teaches that it is forbidden to set up a lamp such that someone might take away some of its oil. Taking away oil is like extinguishing it because it will cause it to go out earlier. Extinguishing, like kindling, is a labor prohibited by the Torah.", + "One may not pierce an egg shell, fill it with oil, and place it over the mouth of a lamp, in order that it should drip, and even if it is of clay. And Rabbi Judah permits it. But if the potter connects it beforehand it is permitted, because it is one utensil. This section describes a person who fills an egg shell or piece of clay with oil and pierces a tiny hole in the bottom so that it should drip into the lamp. We should note that he does this before Shabbat; during Shabbat it would clearly be strictly forbidden since this is considered to be the forbidden work of “kindling”. The problem is that since this is a vessel separate from the lamp itself, a person may think that it is permitted to take from it and use the oil. However, the oil is “muktzeh” set aside for the use in the lamp and may not be used for other purposes. It is also considered to be extinguishing the lamp, because by taking oil away he is causing the light to go out early. “Muktzeh” is a broad category which usually means that something may not be used or even touched on Shabbat. We will learn more about muktzeh throughout the tractate. Rabbi Judah is not concerned lest someone take the oil from the external vessel and hence permits this. If the egg shell or external clay vessel was attached to the lamp (before Shabbat) then it is permitted. We are only concerned lest someone take the oil from an external vessel, reasoning that she is not really taking it from the lamp itself. People know that it is forbidden to take oil out of a lamp and hence will not do this.", + "One may not fill a dish of oil, place it at the side of a lamp, and put the wick end in it in order that it should draw. And Rabbi Judah permits it. In this case a person has a wick which has several ends. She puts the lit end into one lamp and then the other end extends out of the lamp into another vessel so that it can draw more oil. This is prohibited for the same reason as above. Since the other vessel is external, a person might think that it is okay to take oil from it. Again, the problem is that the other oil is muktzeh and by taking it away she is causing the lamp to go out early. As above, Rabbi Judah is not concerned lest she take away from the oil." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah introduces an abstract concept called “work which is not needed for its own sake.” This refers to someone who performs a prohibited labor on Shabbat but does not need the results of the labor itself but a side result. The tannaim debate whether someone who does this activity is liable for having transgressed the Shabbat. We shall see an illustration of this in the mishnah.\nThe immediate topic is laws concerning extinguish lamps.", + "One who extinguishes the lamp because he is afraid of non-Jews, robbers, or an evil spirit, or so that a sick person may sleep, he is exempt. Extinguishing a fire is forbidden on Shabbat. However, saving a life always takes precedence over the laws of Shabbat. Hence, any of the activities listed in this mishnah are permitted. We should note that the mishnah states “exempt.” Exempt usually means that one who does such a thing is not liable for a penalty, but the activity is still not permitted. This mishnah is an exception exempt means that it is totally permitted. The sick person referred to in this mishnah is someone with a potentially life-threatening disease. It is forbidden to extinguish a lamp for someone who only has a slight headache, or similar non life-threatening illness.", + "If [he does so because] he wants to spare the lamp, the oil, or the wick, he is liable. Rabbi Yose exempts in all cases, except for the wick, because he makes charcoal. According to the first opinion, if a person puts out a lamp not because she wants it to be dark, but because she wants to save the material used in the lamp she is still liable. This is “a work not needed for its own sake.” According to this opinion a person who does this type of work is liable. Rabbi Yose holds that one who performs “a work not needed for its own sake” is generally exempt. The exemption is one who puts out a lamp because she wants to singe the wick. Singing the wick makes it into a type of charcoal and therefore this is no longer “work not needed for its own sake” but rather work for its own sake and hence she would be liable." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah provides a quite strongly worded exhortation to women to be scrupulous in the observation of three mitzvoth with which they are strongly associated: lighting Shabbat candles, separating hallah (a percentage of dough which has to be taken from all bread) and niddah menstrual purity. The mishnah says that women die in childbirth for not observing these mitzvoth correctly.\nI should add a personal note. Loss of life is always difficult, and a woman’s death while giving birth is probably one of the most difficult losses a husband and his and her family could experience. Thankfully, the number of women who die in childbirth is drastically lower in the modern western world than it was in the past. In the time of the Mishnah, it would have been fairly common. The rabbis were struggling to understand why so many women died while giving birth. This must have been especially difficult for them since having children was on of their most important values. While we may have difficulties with their answer, and I don’t think that we should go around saying that people die for non-observance of commandments, we nevertheless can appreciate the difficult theological problem with which the rabbis were trying to cope.\nFinally, lest you think that the rabbis “had it out for women” the Talmud discusses at great length all types of travails that afflict the world and why they come to the world. The idea that people are punished for sins is normative biblical theology, with no special connection to women.", + "For three sins women die in childbirth: because they are not observant of [the laws of] niddah, hallah, and the kindling of the [Shabbat] lights. A midrash connects this mishnah with the sin of Eve. Eve caused Adam’s blood to be spilled (by bringing death into the world), therefore she is commanded in the laws of niddah. By sinning she extinguished the light of the world and therefore she is commanded in lighting the Shabbat candles. She lost the “hallah” of the world by causing the death of Adam, who was the “hallah” of the Garden of Eden; therefore she is commanded in the laws of hallah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe final mishnah of this chapter discusses what last minute preparations should be double-checked right before Shabbat begins. The mishnah then proceeds to discuss what things may be done during twilight, a time which the rabbis were unsure whether to consider night or not.", + "A person must say three things in his house on the eve of Shabbat just before night: Have you separated tithes? Have you prepared the ‘eruv? Kindle the [Shabbat] lamp. There are three things a person should check before Shabbat begins. The first is that his food has been tithed. Tithes may not be separated on Shabbat and therefore food which has not been tithed will not be able to be eaten on Shabbat. He should also ask if the “eruv” has been set up. There are two types of eruvin (the plural of eruv): one which allows a person to go further out of the city than he would otherwise be allowed to go and one which allows a person to carry things in places where it would normally be prohibited. The tractate which follows Shabbat is tractate Eruvin so we will reserve in-depth discussion of these issues until later. Setting up both types of eruvin is an important part of Shabbat preparation. When all other preparations have been made, he tells his wife to light the Shabbat candles.", + "If it is doubtful, whether it is night or not, they do not tithe that which is certainly [untithed], they do not immerse utensils, and they do not kindle the lights. The mishnah now begins to discuss what things may be done during twilight, the period after sunset before it is completely dark. It is forbidden to tithe produce which we know has not been tithed. Tithes are part of a forbidden labor called “completing” something’s preparation (metaken). Similarly, immersing an impure vessel in a mikveh is considered completing its preparation and is forbidden. Finally, if the candles have not yet been lit, they do not light them. All three of these activities are prohibited by the Torah (deoraita) and hence cannot be done even during twilight.", + "But they can tithe doubtfully tithed produce, and they can set up an eruv, and they can store hot food. However, the following three activities are permitted. It is permitted to tithe doubtfully tithed produce (demai) because according to Torah law he doesn’t even need to separate tithes from demai in the first place. Since the entire obligation is only a rabbinic stringency, the rabbis allowed it to be done during twilight, although not on Shabbat. One can still set up an eruv. Finally, it is permitted to cover hot food with something that will maintain the food’s warmth. On Shabbat it is forbidden to do so lest by doing so she cooks, an activity which is prohibited. This last clause also functions as a transition to the next chapter which is devoted to the important prohibition of cooking on Shabbat." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nYesterday’s mishnah ended with a halakhah concerning covering hot food before Shabbat so that it would stay hot during Shabbat. Our mishnah continues to discuss halakhot of a similar nature.\nThis mishnah refers to leaving a dish of cooked food on a stove during Shabbat in a case where it was put there before Shabbat. The potential problem here is not the prohibited labor of cooking, since the dish is already cooked. Rather the problem is that he might rake the coals to make them get hotter and raking coals is prohibited because it lights a fire.", + "If a double stove was heated with stubble or straw, they may put a cooked dish on it. If a dish of cooked food was put on a stove before Shabbat it is permitted to leave it on the stove during Shabbat as long as the stove was heated with stubble or straw. Since stubble and straw do not become coals, there is no fear that a person may come to rake coals.", + "If it was heated with peat or wood, one may not place [a dish on it] until he sweeps it out or covers it with ashes. If the stove was heated with peat or wood, then the dish may not be left on it during Shabbat. Peat is refuse left over from olive production and it was used in cooking. Both peat and wood turn into coals and therefore if she doesn’t do some sort of preparation to the stove before Shabbat we are concerned lest she come to rake them on Shabbat, a prohibited act. What she needs to do is either remove the coals or cover them with ashes so that they will cool down and she will not come to rake them on Shabbat.", + "Bet Shammai says: hot water, but not a dish; And Bet Hillel says: both hot water and a dish. The debates in this section and in the next refer to cases where it is permitted to leave food on the stove. Bet Shammai says it is permitted to leave only hot water but not a dish of cooked food. Bet Shammai holds that since people really want their food to be cooked the halakhah is more stringent for food than it is for water. Bet Hillel says that the halakhah is the same for both food and water.", + "Bet Shammai says: one may remove it, but not put it back; But Bet Hillel says: one may even put it back. Bet Shammai says that it is permitted to leave the water on the stove but if she takes it off she may not put it back. Bet Shammai thinks that putting it back on the stove looks too much like cooking. Bet Hillel holds that it is permitted even to put the water or food back." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn yesterday’s mishnah we learned about leaving a cooked dish on a double stove during Shabbat. Today’s mishnah discusses ovens and single stoves. To understand these mishnayot we need to understand a little bit about how these things were made. Double stoves are as wide on top as they are below and therefore they do not preserve heat particularly well. Ovens are wider below than they are up top and are the best at preserving heat. Single stoves have only one opening up top they are hotter than double stoves but cooler than ovens.", + "If an oven was heated with stubble or straw, one may not place [a dish] either inside or on top. Since the heat of an oven is greater than that of a stove, it is forbidden to leave anything in or on top of an oven. Even if there is only a little fire, we are concerned lest she come to rake the coals on Shabbat. The mishnah states that this is prohibited when the oven is lit with stubble or straw; all the more so it is prohibited if the oven is lit with peat or wood.", + "If a single stove was heated with stubble or straws, it is like a double stove; With peat or wood, it is like an oven. If a single stove is heated with stubble or straw then we can treat it like the double stove and leave a dish on it on Shabbat. However, if it was heated with peat or wood then it is like an oven and it is forbidden to leave dishes both on top and inside. The Talmud adds that even if the coals had been removed or covered with ash it is still prohibited." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses cooking eggs in ways that might not be considered to really be cooking.", + "They may not place an egg at the side of a boiler for it to be lightly roasted and one must not break it into a [hot] cloth. And Rabbi Yose permits it. Placing an egg next to a hot boiler will not suffice to really cook the egg, but it can lightly roast it, perhaps like a soft-boiled egg. Similarly, putting the egg into a hot cloth can make it lightly cooked. The first opinion in the mishnah holds that these actions are considered cooking and are therefore prohibited. Rabbi Yose holds that this is not cooking and is hence permitted.", + "And one may not put it away in hot sand or road dust for it to be roasted. Burying the egg in hot sand or dust will really cook it and hence even Rabbi Yose agrees that it is prohibited." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses heating water on Shabbat.", + "It once happened that the people of Tiberias conducted a pipe of cold water through an arm of the hot springs. The sages said to them: if this happened on the Shabbat, it is like hot water heated on the Shabbat, and is forbidden both for washing and for drinking; If on a festival, it is like water heated on a festival, which is forbidden for washing but permitted for drinking. In Tiberias before Shabbat the people set up a pipe of cold water to flow through the hot springs so that the water in the pipe would heat up on Shabbat and they would have hot water for drinking and bathing. This is not actually cooking because there is no fire, but it is similar enough to cooking such that this is prohibited on Shabbat. Therefore on Shabbat it is forbidden to use this water for either cooking or washing. On festivals (Yom Tov) it is permitted to cook in order to eat. Therefore, if they did this on the festival they may use the water for drinking, but not for washing. It is not permitted to heat water for washing on a festival.", + "A miliarum which is cleared of its ashes--they may drink from it on Shabbat. A miliarum is a clay vessel for water which has a pipe in it in which they would put hot coals to heat water. One can drink the water from a milarium only if the coals were removed before Shabbat.", + "An antiki even if its ashes have been cleared--they may not drink from it. An antiki is a copper pot which has a large place to put coals in it so that the water would get very hot. It retains its heat better than a mililarum. Since it retains its heat so well, it is forbidden to use it on Shabbat even if the coals have been removed before Shabbat." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe previous mishnayot dealt with leaving things on the fire. Today’s mishnah deals with things that are prohibited because they are considered cooking, even if the dish has been taken off the fire.", + "A kettle which was removed [from the fire]: one may not pour cold water into it so that it should warm up, but one may pour it [water] into or into a cup in order to temper it. This section discusses a hot water kettle which has been removed from the fire. It is forbidden to pour a small amount of water into the kettle because the hot water that it is in the kettle will cook the water which is put in. However, she may put a large quantity of cold water into the kettle because this will not cause the cold water to be cooked but rather the hot water to be cooled down. If the water from the hot water kettle has been poured into a cup she may also put in cold water in order to cool the hot water down.", + "The pan or pot which was removed [from the fire] while it is boiling, one must not put spices into it, but one may put [spices] into a dish or a tureen. This section discusses a pan or pot with boiling hot contents which was removed from the fire right before Shabbat began. On Shabbat it is forbidden to put spices directly into the pan or pot because in this way the spices will be cooked. However, if she moves the contents of the pan into a dish or tureen which is not on the fire, then she may put into the dish anything she wants. Once the contents have been moved from their original pan, they will not cook any spices put into them.", + "Rabbi Judah says: he may put [spices] into anything except what contains vinegar or brine. Rabbi Judah holds that she may put spices into any dish, even one that is boiling and was just removed from the fire. The only thing that is prohibited is putting something into a dish with vinegar or brine. According to Rabbi Judah, the spiciness of the vinegar and brine aid in cooking the food in the dish. [I must admit that I have a wish to say fish in dish, but that is probably because I have been reading Dr. Seuss to my children.]" + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with the concept of “muktzeh” things set aside that cannot be used on Shabbat. It is forbidden to move anything that is muktzeh on Shabbat. The opposite of muktzeh is “mukhan”, things which are prepared to be used on Shabbat. As an aside, we should note that the laws of Shabbat are intimately connected with the intentions of the person performing the act. The same activity has different consequences depending on what intention the activity was performed with. This also shows us that these mishnayot are addressed to audiences who already “buy into the system” that is to say they are not looking to get away with things that are actually forbidden on Shabbat. Otherwise, a person could always lie about her intention or about what actually happened. This is an important point that in my opinion applies to a large percentage of halakhah.", + "They may not place a vessel under a lamp to catch the oil. But if it was placed there before sunset it is permitted. Yet one may not benefit from it because it is not prepared (. The oil that was in the lamp is “muktzeh” since it had been set aside for lighting the lamp. While the oil is in the lamp she could not take any. Once the muktzeh oil falls into the vessel the vessel itself also becomes muktzeh. Anything that holds something that is muktzeh is itself muktzeh. Hence putting the vessel there to catch the oil is forbidden for she will be holding something which is muktzeh. However, she may put the vessel there before Shabbat and we are not concerned lest she take oil from the vessel or move the vessel itself on Shabbat. Even in a case where it was permitted to put the vessel under the lamp it is still forbidden to use the oil on Shabbat because the oil itself is always muktzeh.", + "They may handle a new lamp but not an old one. Rabbi Shimon says: all lamps may be handled, except a lamp [actually] burning on Shabbat. It is permitted to handle a new, unused lamp on Shabbat. Such a lamp is not muktzeh. However, an old lamp may not be handled on Shabbat even if it is not lit because it is muktzeh. The reason that it is muktzeh is that it is repulsive. An old lamp may be caked with oil and shmutz and hence people will not like handling it. Repulsive things are muktzeh on Shabbat because people don’t intend to handle them. Rabbi Shimon does not hold that things which are “muktzeh” may not be handled on Shabbat. Therefore in his opinion an old lamp may be handled. The only type of lamp that may not be handled is one that it is already lit lest by carrying it he causes it to go out.", + "A vessel may be placed under a lamp to catch the sparks, but one must not pour water into it, because he extinguishes [them]. Above we learned that it is forbidden to put a vessel under a lamp to catch the oil. Here we learn that it is permitted to put a vessel under a lamp to catch the sparks that might fly out of the lamp. The rabbis considered the sparks to not be “material” and therefore they are not muktzeh and they do not make the vessel muktzeh. However, it is forbidden to put water into the vessel since this extinguishes the sparks and extinguishing is prohibited on Shabbat." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis brief chapter deals with covering up hot food with something that will preserve its heat. The general rule is that the rabbis allowed storage in something that would preserve the heat but not in something that would increase the heat. The reason is that if this were allowed she might store the food in hot coals and then rake the coals to make them hotter. Raking coals is prohibited. When storage is prohibited it is prohibited even if she stores the dish before Shabbat begins.", + "In what things may they cover up [food], and in what things may they not cover it up?
They may not cover up [food] in peat, compost, salt, lime, or sand, whether moist or dry; The material in this section adds heat to the dish whether it is moist or dried out.", + "Nor in straw, grape-skins, rags or grasses, when they are moist; but they may cover up [food] in them when they are dry. The material in this section adds heat if it is still moist but not when it is dry. Hence it is permitted to cover up food with these things when they are dry.", + "They may cover up [food] in garments, produce, doves’ wings, carpenters’ sawdust and thoroughly beaten flax. Rabbi Judah forbids [storing] in fine [flax], but permits [it] in coarse [flax]. The material in this section does not add heat and only preserves it. Hence it is permitted to cover up food with these things. Rabbi Judah holds that fine beaten flax adds heat and it is therefore forbidden to cover up food with it." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe second (and last) mishnah of this brief chapter teaches that sometimes one may use certain material to cover up food to preserve its heat and yet the material is “muktzeh” and hence cannot be handled on Shabbat.", + "They may cover up [food] with hides, and they may be handled; Hides only preserve heat and do not add heat and therefore they may be used to cover up food on Shabbat. The hides also can be used as mats for sitting or lying down. Since they can be used on Shabbat they are not muktzeh and they may be handled.", + "[They may cover up food] with wool shearings, but they may not be handled. Wool shearings may be used for covering up food but they may not be handled. Normally wool shearings are used for spinning wool and making cloth, an activity prohibited on Shabbat. Hence, they are muktzeh.", + "What then is done? The lid [of the pot] is lifted, and they [the shearings] fall off of their own accord. The mishnah now addresses the problem of a pot that was covered with wool shearings before Shabbat: how does she get to the pot when it is covered by material which is muktzeh? The answer is that she may simply pick up the lid and allow the wool shearings to fall by the side.", + "Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah says: the basket [holding the pot] he turns on its side and [the food] is removed, lest one lift [the lid of the pot] and is unable to replace it. But the Sages say: one may take [out the pot] and replace [it]. This section refers to a situation where a person put a pot into a basket. The basket was filled with material (wool shearing in this case) to preserve the heat of the pot. She made space in the shearings so that the pot could fit in. The problem is that if she removes the pot she won’t be able to make space in the basket so that it can be returned. Rabbi Elazar says that she tilts the basket to the side and takes directly from the pot while it is in the basket. She is not allowed to remove the pot lest she move the muktzeh wool shearings in order to return it. The Sages hold that we are not concerned lest there not be space to return the pot and therefore she may take it out. However, if she takes it out and there is no space to return it, she may not move aside the wool shearings in order to return it.", + "If he did not cover it [a pot] while it was yet day, it may not be covered after nightfall. If it was covered but became uncovered, it may be recovered. It was permitted to cover up food only before Shabbat began. Once Shabbat has begun covering up is prohibited lest someone find that her food has grown cold and come to actually cook it on Shabbat. However, it is permitted to return food to where it had been covered and therefore if the covering comes off, it is also permitted to return the covering.", + "One may fill a jug with [cold water] and place it under a pillow or blanket [to keep it cool]. There is no prohibition to cover cold things in order to preserve their coolness on Shabbat. The entire prohibition of “covering up” only referred to hot foods because of the concern that someone might come to cook on Shabbat." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nExodus 23:12 reads, “Six days you shall do your work and on the seventh day you shall cease, in order that your ox and donkey will rest.” From here we see that on Shabbat a Jew may not have his animals do work on her behalf. Just as it is forbidden for a person to carry things in the public domain, so too it is forbidden for a Jew’s animal to carry things for the Jew. Our chapter deals with things that an animal may carry or wear. Anything needed to guard the animal is permitted, as is anything needed for the animal’s own protection from heat or cold. However, anything which is not really necessary for the animal itself (such as loading up a donkey with one’s personal belongings) may not be placed on an animal on Shabbat.", + "With what may an animal go out [on Shabbat], and with what may it not go out?
A camel may go out with a bit, a female camel with its nose-ring, a Libyan donkey with an iron bridle, a horse with its chain, and all chain-wearing animals may go out with their chains and be led by their chains. All of the things in this section are normally worn by animals and they are used to lead the animals around. Therefore, the animal may wear them on Shabbat. In a sense they are to the animal like clothes are to human beings. By carrying them the animal is not performing a labor for someone else. Rather they are part of the animal’s normal gear.", + "And they may sprinkle upon them [with purifying waters], and they may be immersed in their place. This section is an aside about the chains mentioned in the previous section. If these chains become impure they can be made pure without removing them from the animal. If they become impure with corpse impurity, they can sprinkle purifying waters on the chains while they are in their place. If they contract a lesser impurity, the chains may be immersed while still on the animal." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is a continuation of yesterday’s mishnah.", + "A donkey may go out with its saddle-cloth if it is tied to it. If the saddle is put on the donkey before Shabbat, the donkey may go out on Shabbat with it on its back and it is not considered carrying but rather “wearing” which is permitted on Shabbat.", + "Rams may go out with hides tied to them. Some explain that these hides were put on the rams’ chests to protect them. Others explain that they were put on their genitals, also for protection.", + "Ewes may go out with their tails tied up, tied down, or covered. If the ewe’s tail was tied up, that is so males can mount them. If the tail was tied down it was so males could not mount them (there has to be some humor in this, but I won’t be the one to try). The tail was covered for general protection.", + "Goats may go out [with their udders] tied up. The goats’ udders were sometimes covered up in order to dry them up and sometimes covered up in order to preserve their milk.", + "Rabbi Yose forbids in all these cases, save ewes that are covered. Rabbi Yose forbids all of the above cases except covering the ewes because all of the rest of them are for human benefit and not for the benefit of the animal. If the covering was for human benefit then the animal may not go out with that covering on Shabbat.", + "Rabbi Judah says: goats may go out [with their udders] tied in order to dry them up, but not to save their milk. Rabbi Judah is slightly more lenient than Rabbi Yose but less so than the first opinion. He adds that goats’ udders may be tied up in order to dry them up because that is for the sake of the animal. However, if the intent is to preserve their milk, that is for the sake of the goats’ owners and it is therefore considered carrying on Shabbat." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn the previous two mishnayoth we saw cases where t was permitted for an animal to carry certain things on Shabbat. In today’s mishnah and tomorrow’s we see examples where it is forbidden.", + "And with what may it not go out?
A camel may not go out with a pad The pad referred to her is put on top of its hump. Sometimes it was tied underneath its tail so that it wouldn’t scratch the camel’s skin. The reason that it is forbidden is that these often fall and we are concerned lest the pad falls off the camel and the owner carries the pad herself.", + "Or with forelegs bound together or with hind legs bound together; And the same is true for other animals. One is not allowed to tie the animal’s legs together on Shabbat because this is considered overly cautious protection. While it is permitted to offer reasonable protection so that the animal doesn’t run away, tying its legs together is beyond normal and hence this is considered “carrying.” This prohibition applies not only to camels but to all animals.", + "One should not tie camels together and pull [one of them]. But one may take the cords in his hand and pull [them] providing he does not twist them together. Tying camels together and pulling them together makes it look like they are going to market. To prevent this appearance it is forbidden to do so on Shabbat. However, if she just takes the cords of several camels together in her hand and leads them together it is permitted because it doesn’t look like they are going to the market." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe final mishnah of this chapter continues to provide examples of things that an animal may not carry on Shabbat.", + "A donkey may not go out with a saddle-cloth, when it is not tied to it, If the saddle-cloth is not tied to the donkey, we are concerned lest it fall off and the owner picks it up on Shabbat. Above in mishnah two we learned that if it is tied to the donkey, it is permitted.", + "or with a bell, even if it is plugged, Putting the bell on the donkey makes it look as if its owner is bringing it to the market to sell it. Hence, even if the bell is plugged up and doesn’t make a sound it is prohibited.", + "or with a ladder[-shaped yoke] around its neck, This yoke was placed on the donkey when it had sores on its back. The yoke prevents the donkey from biting its sores.", + "or with a strap around its foot. If the donkey’s legs rub each other when it walks they would place a thong around its feet to keep the legs apart.", + "Fowls may not go out with ribbons, The ribbons were placed on its legs so that people could tell their fowl apart from those of others.", + "or with straps on their legs. Straps were placed on their legs to prevent them from hopping too far and damaging other people’s things.", + "Rams may not go out with a wagon under their tails. These little wagons were placed under their tails to keep them from dragging on the ground.", + "Ewes may not go out with a hanun. According to the Talmud a “hanun” was a certain herb that they would place in the nose of female sheep so that the worms would come out (sounds like Vick’s vapor rub for sheep!). Since males butt each other and the worms will come out when they do so, they don’t need this herb. Hence it is forbidden to place this herb on a ram.", + "A calf may not go out with a small yoke. They would place a small yoke on the calf to accustom it to being yoked.", + "Or a cow with the skin of a hedgehog, They would attach the skin of a hedgehog to the udders of a cow to prevent other animals from suckling from the cow when she is asleep.", + "or with the strap between its horns. Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah’s cow used to go out with a strap between its horns, not with the approval of the rabbis. The strap was purely decorative. Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah let his cow go out with this strap, meaning that this is permitted. All of these are prohibited because putting them on an animal is considered carrying or because we are concerned that the thing will fall and someone will pick it up on Shabbat." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nAs we learned in the first mishnah to the tractate, it is forbidden for a person to carry something from the private domain to the public domain or vice versa. However, people are obviously allowed to wear clothing and thereby “carry” their clothing through the public domain. Wearing jewelry on Shabbat would not be considered carrying and therefore it should be permitted. However, the sages were concerned lest the jewelry fall or lest someone remove the jewelry to show others so they prohibited it. Our mishnah deals with jewelry which a woman may not wear out of her home on Shabbat.", + "With what may a woman go out and with what may she not go out?
A woman may not go out with wool ribbons, linen ribbons, or straps around her head; The words “around her head” refer to all of the ribbons or straps in this section. With all of them we are afraid that they may fall off her head and that she may thereby come to carry them on the Shabbat.", + "Nor may she immerse while wearing them, until she loosens them. This halakhah is an aside which does not deal directly with Shabbat. It teaches that when a woman immerses in a mikveh if she has a ribbon on her head she must loosen it. Otherwise the ribbon will prevent the water from having direct contact with her head. The Talmud connects this small discursion to the previous section’s prohibition. Since a woman who goes to the mikveh on Shabbat will have to loosen her ribbons, she might forget to tie them back tightly and therefore they might drop off her head on Shabbat.", + "[She may not go out] with frontlets or head-bangles if they are not sewn, Frontlets or head-bangles are types of tiaras which go on her forehead. She can’t go out with them if they are not tied to her head covering because they might fall off.", + "Or with a hair-net into the public domain, A hair-net would be placed under the frontlets or head-bangles. According to Maimonides the words “into the public domain” refer to all of the prohibitions above. While she may not go out into the public domain, she may go out to her courtyard.", + "Or with a golden city, or with a necklace or with ear-rings, or with a finger-ring [even if it has] no signet, or with a needle [even if it] is unpierced. The things in this section are all jewelry. She may not go out with them lest she take them off to show them to someone else or lest they fall off and she carry them in the public domain. By the way, “city of gold” is where the phrase “Jerusalem of gold” or “Yerushalayim shel zahav” originally comes from.", + "But if she goes out with these, she is not liable to a sin-offering. The prohibition of going out with any of the things listed in this mishnah is only a rabbinic (derabbanan) prohibition. Therefore, even if she does go out with one of them she is not liable to bring a sin-offering, as she would be if she carried something in the public domain that was biblically prohibited (deoraita). In other words, going out wearing any of these things is not considered to be “carrying”, and therefore she is not liable if she does so." + ], + [ + "A man may not go out with a nail-studded sandal,
Nor with a single [sandal] if he has no wound on his foot;
Nor with tefillin,
Nor with an amulet, if it is not from an expert;
Nor with a breastplate,
Nor with a helmet;
Nor with iron boots.
Yet if he goes out with these, he is not liable for a sin-offering.
In yesterday’s mishnah we learned that a woman may not go out into the public domain wearing certain types of jewelry, but that if she does she has not transgressed a biblical commandment. Today we learn the parallel laws for a man.
Section one: Albeck suggests that nail-studded sandals were part of a soldier’s gear and therefore just as the mishnah forbids breastplates, helmets and iron boots, so too it forbids nail-studded sandals. Interestingly, Josephus, Wars of the Jews Book VI, I, VI, refers to soldiers wearing such sandals.
Section two: He shouldn’t go out with one sandal because people will think that he is holding the other sandal. However, if he has a wound on his other foot everyone will see that he is wearing one sandal because of his wound. Therefore, if he has a wound on one foot he may go out with one sandal. In both talmuds they debate whether he wears the sandal on his wounded or healthy foot.
Section three: The sages debated whether or not tefillin are worn on Shabbat (today we don’t wear tefillin on Shabbat). For those who held that tefillin are not worn on Shabbat it was obvious that he can’t wear them out into the public domain. Since they are prohibited there is no reason to wear them around. However, even for the sages who hold that tefillin are worn on Shabbat, he should not wear them in the public domain lest he need to remove them and thereby come to carry them. He would need to remove them if he needed to relieve himself or if he came into a dirty place.
Section four: The sages believed in the efficacy of amulets, but only if they were made by expert amulet-makers. If an amulet was made by an expert then a person could wear it around on Shabbat, but if it was not made by an expert it is useless and forbidden to wear in the public domain. We should note that there are many descriptions of amulets in the Talmud and that many manuscripts describing amulet formulas and how to make amulets exist in ancient, medieval and even modern Jewish literature.
Sections 5-7: Anything that is clothing specifically designed for war may not be worn out into the public domain on Shabbat. Since he shouldn’t be going out to war (except in self-defense) on Shabbat, there is no need to wear these types of clothing and hence wearing them is considered carrying.
Section eight: The prohibition of wearing all of these things is only from the sages (derabbanan). From the Torah wearing them is not prohibited and hence if he wears one of the above listed things he is not liable to bring a sin-offering." + ], + [ + "A woman may not go out with a needle that is pierced,
Nor with a ring bearing a signet,
Nor with a cochlea brooch,
Nor with a spice tie,
Nor with a perfume vial; And if she does go out, she is liable to a sin-offering, the words of Rabbi Meir. But the sages say that she is not liable in the case of a spice tie and a perfume vial.
The previous two mishnayot listed things which it was permitted according to Torah law to wear into the public domain but which the sages nevertheless prohibited for various reasons. Today’s mishnah lists things which are prohibited even according to Torah law.
Section one: A pierced needle is one which is used for sewing, an activity which is prohibited on Shabbat. Therefore it is prohibited from the Torah for a woman (or a man, for that matter) to go out carrying one on Shabbat.
Section two: A ring with a signet is for signing, which is prohibited from the Torah on Shabbat.
Section three: This is a type of crown not commonly worn. Since it is not common attire, carrying it is considered “carrying” and not “wearing.”
Sections 4-5: Spice ties and perfume vials are only worn by women with extraordinarily bad smells. Rabbi Meir says that since most women don’t wear these things, they are considered “carrying” and hence prohibited by the Torah. The sages disagree and hold that the spice tie and perfume vial are not really carrying and hence there is only a rabbinic prohibition to carry them into the public domain." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first section of our mishnah contains a fascinating debate concerning carrying weapons of war on Shabbat. The second section discusses garters used to hold up hose worn on legs.", + "A man may not go out with a sword, bow, shield, club, or spear, and if he does go out, he incurs a sin-offering. Rabbi Eliezer says: they are ornaments for him. But the sages say, they are nothing but a disgrace, as it is said, “And they shall beat their swords into plowshares, and their spears into pruning hooks: nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more” (Isaiah 2:4). According to the sages weapons are disgraceful to a human being. While the sages would not deny that weapons are necessary in times of war, they should not be worn as mere decorations, meant to make a person look tougher. The sages derive this opinion from the famous messianic vision in Isaiah. As an aside, it seems to me that this is an approach deeply emblematic of Judaism war and it accoutrements are necessary evils not to be celebrated during times of peace. On the other hand, Rabbi Eliezer holds that weapons are ornaments for men. The word “ornaments” is the same word in Hebrew as “jewelry” for women. Just as women may wear jewelry for its intent is to improve their image, so too men may wear their weapons.", + "A garter is clean, and they go out [wearing] it on Shabbat. Knee-bands are unclean, and they may not go out with them on Shabbat. A garter is worn on the thighs to hold up the hose (socks). “It is clean” means that it is not receptive to impurities. The reason is that it is not considered an article of clothing in and of itself; rather it is part of another piece of clothing. Since it is not itself an article of clothing it cannot receive impurity. It may be worn on Shabbat since it is necessary to hold up a person’s hose. “Knee-bands” refers to chains attached to the garter to keep the legs from spreading to far apart. According to the Talmud these were typically worn by women. Since they have chains, they are considered to be in and of themselves an article of clothing and hence susceptible to impurity. They may not be worn on Shabbat lest the woman wearing them takes the chain off and carries them in the public domain." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nMost of this mishnah is the opposite of the first mishnah of this chapter. There we learned what things a woman may not wear into the public domain. Here we learn things that she may wear.", + "A woman may go out with ribbons made of hair, whether they are of her own hair or her friend’s, or an animal’s; In the first mishnah we learned that a woman may not go out with ribbons of wool or flax since she might take them off and carry them in the public domain. Also, since she had to remove them before immersing in a mikveh we feared that she may remove them on Shabbat in order to immerse. Here we learn that she may wear ribbons of hair, since she need not remove them when immersing.", + "And with frontlets or head-bangles if they are sewn, Since these are sewn to her hair-net, she may wear them out on Shabbat and we are not concerned lest she remove them.", + "And with a hair-net and with a wig into a courtyard; She may wear her wig and hair-net into a courtyard but not into the public domain.", + "And with wool in her ear, with wool in her sandals, and with wool which she prepared for her menstruation; She may go out with pieces of wool cloth in her ear (to keep in the puss from an infection), in her sandal (if her feet are sore) and as a tampon. Since these are necessary and we are not concerned that she will remove them in the public domain, she may go out with them.", + "With a peppercorn, with a lump of salt and anything that is placed in her mouth, providing that she does not put it in her mouth in the first place on Shabbat, And if it falls out, she may not put it back. People put peppercorns in their mouths to improve their breath and salt to heal a wound. The mishnah teaches that a woman may go out with these things in her mouth on Shabbat and it is not considered “carrying.” However, she may not put them in her mouth on Shabbat itself because they are like medicines. As we shall learn, taking medicine was prohibited on Shabbat lest someone come to grind their own drugs. Grinding is a labor prohibited by the Torah. Furthermore, even if it was in her mouth before Shabbat and then fell out, she may not put it back in.", + "A false tooth or a gold tooth: Rabbi permits but the sages forbid it. According to the sages, she may not wear false teeth lest her friends laugh at her or admire them and she removes them to show her friends. Rabbi is not concerned with this possibility and hence permits wearing false teeth.", + "With a peppercorn, with a lump of salt and anything that is placed in her mouth, providing that she does not put it in her mouth in the first place on Shabbat, And if it falls out, she may not put it back. Sections five and six are addressed to women (as is the entire mishnah) but it is likely that the same rules would also apply to men. The reason that these sections are addressed to women is probably that these things were more customarily done by women." + ], + [ + "She may go out with the sela on a callus.
Young girls may go out with threads, and even with chips in their ears.
Arabian women may go out veiled.
Medean women may go out with their cloaks thrown over their shoulders.
Indeed, all people [may do likewise] but that the sages spoke of prevailing custom.
This mishnah continues to list things which may be worn on Shabbat.
Section one: They would put a coin on a callus to help heal it. Since it was tied to the foot, the rabbis were not concerned lest it be removed and the owner carry it in the public domain.
Section two: Threads and chips were used in piercing girls’ ears. After the initial piercing, they would put a thread in to begin the hole and eventually they would put in a wood chip to widen the hole. When the hole was large enough they would put in an earring. Since the strings and chips are not regularly removed, they may be worn in the public domain.
Sections 3-4: These sections refer to the customs of certain women from certain origins. Women from Arab lands would wear veils and those from Medea (Persia) would wear cloaks over their shoulders (like capes). The straps of the cloaks were connected by a tie with a nut, coin or small stone.
Section five: Although sections three and four single out Arabian and Medean women, anyone may wear these things. The only reason that these women were singled out is that these were commonly worn by certain women." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nAt the end of yesterday’s mishnah we learned that a Medean woman may wear her cloak on Shabbat. We explained that these cloaks were tied with a stone, nut or coin. Today’s mishnah is based on that ruling.", + "A woman may weight [her cloak] with a stone, nut, or coin, providing that she does not attach the weight in the first place on Shabbat. As we learned yesterday, a woman may wear a cloak that is tied with one of these things. However, she may not attach the weight itself on Shabbat. The Talmud explains that this prohibition refers only to the coin. Since coins may not be handled on Shabbat (they are muktzeh) she may not tie her cloak with one. However, if the tie was made before Shabbat she may wear the cloak. According to the Talmud she may make the tie with a nut or stone even on Shabbat." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nMost of this mishnah deals with a person lacking a leg going out on Shabbat with his stump. This stump was not really an artificial leg rather a support for his stump leg. The mishnah also uses this opportunity to discuss a few other laws concerning artificial legs and arms.", + "A crippled person [lacking a leg] may go out with his wooden stump, the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yose forbids it. According to Rabbi Meir, a wooden stump made for a crippled person is like his shoe and hence the person lacking a leg may go out with it on Shabbat. Rabbi Yose holds that the crippled person doesn’t really use the stump like a shoe; rather he relies mostly on his crutches. Hence the stump is considered to be “carrying” and it is prohibited.", + "And if it has a receptacle for pads, it is unclean. If the stump has a hollow place inside not only for his stump leg but pads, then it can receive impurity. Generally speaking, wooden things which have receptacles are susceptible to impurity.", + "His supports are unclean through midras, and one may go out with them on Shabbat, and enter the Temple court while wearing them. “Supports” are like crutches. They can receive impurity through “midras”, which means pressure by a zav (a person with unusual genital discharge). If a zav sits, leans or lies on them they are impure. Anything which is meant to be stepped on is susceptible to this type of impurity. He may go out with them on Shabbat since they are like his shoes. It is forbidden to enter the Temple while wearing shoes. However, the crippled person’s supports are not included in the category of “shoes” as far as entering the Temple is concerned.", + "His chair and its supports are unclean through midras, and one may not go out with them on Shabbat, and one may not enter the Temple court with them. Similarly, a crippled person’s chair and its supports (this is kind of like a walker) are all susceptible to midras impurity, since they are made for sitting and leaning. According to talmudic commentators it is prohibited for him to go out on Shabbat with the supports, since the chair itself is sufficient. He may, however, go out with the special chair on Shabbat. If he has a chair he shouldn’t enter the Temple court with his supports since in this case they are like shoes.", + "An artificial arm is clean, but one may not go out with it [on Shabbat]. An artificial arm is not susceptible to impurity since it is not considered to be a vessel. It is forbidden to go out with it on Shabbat. Others explain that the word for artificial arm here (ankatmin) refers to a piece of equipment which clowns use." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah teaches things that young boys may wear out on Shabbat.", + "Boys may go out with garlands and children of royalty children may go out with bells, and all people [may do likewise], but the sages spoke of the usual practice. Boys may go out with garlands, which according to the Talmud were made to protect them from evil. Children of royalty may go out with bells. The mishnah adds that anyone may go out with a bell. The mishnah mentioned royalty because they were the ones who typically did so." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe final mishnah of chapter six deals with carrying things which were believed to have healing powers.", + "One may go out with a locust’s egg, a fox’s tooth, and a nail from [the cross of] a crucified convict for purposes of healing, the words of Rabbi Meir’s view. But the sages say: even on weekdays this is forbidden on account of “the ways of the Amorite” [which Israelites are forbidden from adopting]. The three things listed in this mishnah were believed to have healing powers. The locust’s egg was believed to aid in healing the ear, the fox’s tooth helped people who slept too much and the nail was believed to heal wounds. According to Rabbi Meir a person can carry these items on Shabbat since they were used for healing. Wearing them is therefore not considered “carrying.” The sages don’t really disagree that wearing these things is not considered “carrying.” Rather, the sages say that it is always forbidden to use these things because they are “the ways of the Amorite.” This refers to Leviticus 18:3 according to which Israelites should not imitate the nations that occupied Canaan. The Rambam explains that anything which doctors state has medicinal value cannot be prohibited because of the “the ways of the Amorite.” The only things that are prohibited are things which doctors say have not medicinal value but are believed by other nations to aid in healing. We should note that in the ancient world, the distinction between medicine and superstition was far less clear than is the distinction today (and even today the line between the two is not always so clear.)" + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nIn the introduction to Shabbat we explained that a person who performs a forbidden labor on Shabbat intentionally is liable for the death penalty (if they warned him) and for karet extirpation (if unwarned). For accidental performance of a forbidden labor, one must bring a sin-offering. Our mishnah asks a frequently-asked rabbinic question: how do we know how many sin-offerings a person is liable for? Asked another way, what constitutes one performance of a forbidden labor?", + "A great principle they stated in respect to Shabbat: anyone who forgets the fundamental law of Shabbat and performs many labors on many Shabbatot, is liable for only one sin-offering. The mishnah begins by referring to a person who doesn’t remember that work is prohibited on Shabbat. Such a person has in essence only transgressed once, no matter how many Shabbatot she performed the forbidden labor and no matter how many labors she performed. For instance, a person who never learned about Shabbat and then later in life learned that it was forbidden to work on Shabbat, would only be liable for one sin-offering.", + "One who knows the fundamental law of Shabbat and performs many labors on many Shabbatot is liable for a sin-offering for each and every Shabbat. This section refers to a person who knows that it is forbidden to work on Shabbat but doesn’t know which day of the week is Shabbat. All of the forbidden labors which she performs on any given Shabbat are considered one transgression. Therefore she brings one sin-offering for every Shabbat which she forgot was Shabbat, no matter how many forbidden labors she performed.", + "One who knows that it is Shabbat and performs many labors on many Shabbatot, is liable for every primary labor. This person knows which day is Shabbat and knows that it is forbidden to perform work on Shabbat but doesn’t know which labors are prohibited. Such a person is liable for every primary labor. As we shall see in tomorrow’s mishnah, there are thirty-nine categories of prohibited labor. Each category is a “primary labor.” Within each category there are derived labors, prohibitions which are similar enough to the primary labor to also be prohibited. Derived labors” are as prohibited as “primary labors” (they are all in the category of “deoraita” toraitic prohibitions.) The only difference is that if one performs several different “primary labors” she is liable for a sin-offering for each primary labor. However, if she performs a primary labor and several derived labors from the same category, she is only liable for one sin-offering. Furthermore, in the case in this section since the person didn’t know that such a labor was prohibited on Shabbat, she is only liable for one sin-offering no matter how many Shabbatot she performed the labor.", + "One who performs many labors belonging to the same category is obligated for only one sin-offering. In this case the person knows pretty much everything (that labor is prohibited on Shabbat, which labor is prohibited and which day is Shabbat). She is liable for every primary labor she performs on each Shabbat. However, if she also performs derived labors that are under the same category, she is liable for only one sin-offering for each category of labor she performs." + ], + [ + "Introduction This mishnah lists the thirty-nine primary labors. As can be easily seen there are three main lists in the mishnah: 1) the work involved in baking bread; 2) the work involved in making clothing; 3) the work involved in writing. These are the first three lists. The fourth section contains six more labors that are also prohibited but do not easily fit into the other lists. The Talmud states that these labors were all learned from the juxtaposition of the laws of building the Tabernacle with the prohibition of work on Shabbat (Exodus 31:35). Since the Torah had to state not to break Shabbat to build the Temple, it must be that any work which was done in building the Temple is prohibited on Shabbat. Much of the rest of the tractate will explain these labors, so we will be brief here.", + "The primary labors are forty less one:
sowing, plowing, reaping, binding sheaves, threshing, winnowing, selecting, grinding, sifting, kneading, baking, These are the labors involved in making bread, from the beginning to the very end. Personally, I am happy that for me baking bread involves going to the store, plunking down a few shekels and taking a loaf home.", + "shearing wool, bleaching, hackling, dyeing, spinning, weaving, the making of two loops, weaving two threads, dividing two threads, tying and untying, sewing two stitches, tearing in order to sew two stitches, These are all of the labors involved in making clothing. One interesting thing to note is that many commentators hold that tearing is prohibited only if the tear is made in order to sew new stitches. Only constructive, purposeful work is prohibited “deoraita” on Shabbat. Tearing in a destructive manner with no other purpose is still prohibited but only “derabbanan” a rabbinic prohibition. “Hackling” refers to separating strands of wool.", + "capturing a deer, slaughtering, or flaying, or salting it, curing its hide, scraping it [of its hair], cutting it up, writing two letters, erasing in order to write two letters [over the erasure], These are the labors involved in writing a scroll. Most of the work is making the parchment on which to write the scroll.", + "building, tearing down, extinguishing, kindling, striking with a hammer, These are all labors which are involved in building and in creating the material needed to build. We should make a couple of important notes. Tearing down is only considered a primary labor if it is performed with the intent of rebuilding. Extinguishing is also only prohibited deoraita if it makes charcoal (like extinguishing a candle.) “Striking with a hammer” is sort of a code-name for the completion of any piece of work. When finished with a metal project the silversmith would strike it with a hammer to complete it. That is why it is called “striking with a hammer.”", + "[and] carrying out from one domain to another, These are the forty primary labors less one. Carrying from one domain to another is a labor unlike any of the others for instead of altering the nature of an object, it alters its location." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nFrom here until the beginning of chapter eleven the mishnah discusses the labor of carrying. Our mishnah introduces a general principle related to carrying.", + "They also stated another general principle: whatever is fit to store and people generally store things like it, and one carries it out on Shabbat, he is liable for a sin-offering on its account. But whatever is not fit to store and people do not [generally] store things like it, and one carries it out on Shabbat, only he that stores it is liable. A person is only obligated for carrying something from one domain to another if the object which she carries is one that is important enough that people store it and guard it. The object has to be one put to use by people. For instance keys are something that people are generally careful about, whereas a pebble is not. It also has to be of the size that people are generally careful with and will store. A loaf of bread would have such a size but a few small crumbs would not. If one carries something from one domain to another that has this size and is of a nature that people store it to protect it, then the person is obligated to bring a sin-offering. If it is not something about which people generally care, then only a person who does care about it is liable for it. For instance if most people are not careful with a tiny piece of bread and a person who is not careful with such a piece of bread carries it from one domain to another, she is not liable. However, if a person is careful with a small piece of bread and does take care of it, she would be liable for carrying it from one domain to another." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses how much food a person must carry on Shabbat to be liable for carrying. The mishnah is divided into two sections: the first half deals with animal food and the second half deals with human food.", + "He who carries out a cow’s mouthful of straw, a camel’s mouthful of bean stalks, a lamb’s mouthful of clover, a goat’s mouthful of grasses, moist leaves of garlic or moist leaves of onion the size of a dried fig, [or] a goat’s mouthful of dry [leaves], [is liable]. And they do not combine with each other, because they are not alike in their standards. The general rule is that a person is liable for carrying an amount of animal food equal to a mouthful of the animal that eats that type of food. Cows eat straw, so if he carries a mouthful of straw he is liable. Moist leaves of garlic and onion are fit for human consumption. Therefore one who carries an amount the size of a dried fig is liable. Goats eat dried leaves of onion and garlic, therefore to be liable for carrying these he must carry a goat’s mouthful. These are listed in this section probably because they are more normally eaten by goats. If a person carries a combination of these things each of which is less than the prohibited amount, they do not add up to create a prohibited amount. For instance, if he carries half a cow’s mouthful of straw and half a camel’s mouthful of bean stubble he is not liable. Since all of the amounts are different and one is for one type of animal and another for other types of animal, they do not add up together.", + "He who carries out [human] food the size of a dried fig is liable, And they combine with each other, because they are equal in their standards, except their shells, kernels, stalks, husks and coarse bran. Rabbi Judah said: excluding the shells of lentils, because they are boiled together with them. To be liable for carrying human food the amount need only be the size of a dried fig. If a person carries two different types of food, they add up. So if one carries half a fig’s worth of raisins and half a fig’s worth of peanuts, she is liable for carrying. This is because there is one standard amount for all human food. When figuring out the size of a piece of food, the non-edible parts are not considered. Rabbi Judah says that the shells of lentils are edible and hence they count in considering how much is being carried." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses how much liquid one must carry in order to be liable.", + "One who carries out: [unmixed] wine, [is liable if it is] enough for the mixing of a cup; milk, as much as is swallowed at a time; honey, as much as is placed on a scab; oil, as much as is required to rub on a small limb; water, enough to rub with it collyrium; and all other liquids, a revi’it; and all waste water, a revi’it. The amount for which one is liable for carrying these liquids is dependent upon the minimal amount that is useful. Wine was mixed with water to dilute it. Therefore, if one carries unmixed wine, she is liable if she carries enough to mix a cup. For carrying milk, she is liable if she carries the amount normally swallowed at one time. Honey was evidently used to heal wounds. Oil was used like lotion and therefore she is liable if she carries enough to oil up a small limb, for instance a finger. Water was mixed with collyrium, an eye ointment. Although there are certainly other uses for water, this is the smallest amount that has any use. All other liquids and even waste water must be a revi’it (less than 100 cl, or 3 oz.)", + "Rabbi Shimon says: all of them are a revi’it, they stated all of these measures only in respect of those who put them away. Rabbi Shimon disagrees with the previous opinion. He holds that all liquids have the same measure a revi’it. These measures have a different relevance with regard to liquid, one which relates back to that which we learned in 7:3. There we learned that if someone cares enough about an object to store it, she is liable if she carries it from domain to domain on Shabbat. Rabbi Shimon adds that the object also has to have a minimum measure. Our mishnah provides, according to Rabbi Shimon, the minimum measure for liquids. If a person is one who “stores” these liquids then the minimum measure to be liable for carrying is as listed above in section one. However, if a person is not careful about these liquids than she is liable only if she carries a revi’it." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah teaches how much rope or paper a person must carry in order to be liable for carrying on Shabbat. Again, in each case she is liable if she carries an amount that can be put to some use.", + "One who carries out rope, as much as is required for making a handle for a basket; A small amount of rope could be used to make a handle for a basket. Therefore she is liable if she carries this small amount of rope.", + "A reed cord: as much as is required for making a hanger for a sifter or a sieve. Rabbi Judah says: as much as is required for taking the measure of a child's shoe. A reed cord might be used to make a hanger for a sieve or sifter; hence the minimum amount for which a person is liable is this amount.", + "Paper, in order to write a tax-collector’s receipt on it. And one who carries out a tax-collector’s receipt is liable. The smallest paper document would be a tax-collector’s receipt. Therefore, if one carries paper which is this size she is liable. Furthermore, if one carries out a tax-collector’s receipt written on something else such as parchment for which the minimum measure is normally larger (as we will learn in tomorrow’s mishnah), she is also liable. According to the Talmud, the tax-collector would write only two letters on such a receipt.", + "Erased paper, as much as is required to wrap round a small vial of perfume. Erased paper is used paper which is no longer fit for use. One of its uses was as a wrap around bottles, the smallest of which would have been a small vial of perfume. Therefore, even if she carries such a small amount of erased paper, she is liable. We should note that this amount is larger than the size mentioned in section three." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe mishnah continues to list the minimum amount of various items which must be carried in order for one to be liable. Again, the rule of thumb is the smallest amount that has practical use will make one liable.", + "[One who carries] animal hide: as much as is required for making an amulet; Animal hide was used to make small amulets. Therefore, one who carries enough to make such an amulet is liable.", + "Parchment, for writing on it the shortest passage of the tefillin, which is “Sh’ma Yisrael”: Parchment is used for writing tefillin. The smallest passage that goes on one piece of parchment in the tefillin is the Sh’ma.", + "Ink, for writing two letters; As we saw in yesterday’s mishnah, the shortest document, that of the tax collector, had two letters. Therefore, one who carries enough ink to write such a document is liable.", + "Eye shadow, for painting one eye. Usually women would paint both eyes, but sometimes women would paint only one. Therefore, one who carries enough eye-shadow to paint one eye is liable." + ], + [ + "Paste, for putting on the top of a lime twig.
Pitch and sulfur, for making a small hole.
Wax, for putting over a small hole.
Clay, for making a hole in a gold refiner’s pot. Rabbi Judah says: for making a [tripod’s] leg.
Bran, for putting on the mouth of a gold refiner’s pot.
Lime, for smearing the smallest of girls. Rabbi Judah says: enough to take off the hair on the temples. Rabbi Nehemiah says: enough to take the hair of the forehead.
This mishnah discusses minimum measurements for carrying various pastes and mixtures. Some of these references are quite obscure and it is hard to tell exactly what the mishnah is referring to.
Section one: This paste was used to trap birds. The birds would sit on a branch and if the branch was smeared with paste, the bird would get stuck.
Sections two and three: To “make” a hole means to plug up a hole. Pitch, sulfur and wax were all used for this purpose.
Section four: Clay was used to plug up a hole in a gold refiner’s pot. Rabbi Judah disagrees and holds that the minimum amount is enough to fix the leg of a tripod, used to hold up small stoves.
Section five: Bran was not regularly eaten by people (see 7:4). Rather it was used to plug holes on the mouth of a gold refiner’s pot.
Section six: Lime was used to remove hair on women. The Talmud explains that the amount referred to here is enough to remove the hair from a small girl’s finger.
Rabbi Judah and Rabbi Nehemiah provide slightly different measures for lime than does the first opinion." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nAnd even more minimum measurements for which a person is liable for carrying!\nOne interesting thing to note is that as we reach the end of the chapter, there are more and more debates between the sages. According to Abraham Goldberg, the editor of the Mishnah intentionally saves debates for latter portions of the discussion in order not to confuse the reader at an earlier point. In other words, the redaction of the mishnah serves the pedagogic purpose of making the material clearer. This is probably one of the unique attributes of the Mishnah that make it the best-edited work in the entire corpus of rabbinic literature.", + "Red earth, as much as is required for a seal on merchandise bags, the words of Rabbi Akiva. But the sages say: as much as is required for the seal on letters. Red earth was used for making seals. According to Rabbi Akiva, the minimum amount of red earth which causes a person to be liable for carrying is enough to make a seal on a merchandise bag. The sages disagree and set an even smaller amount the amount used to make a seal on a letter.", + "Manure, or thin sand, as much as is required for fertilizing a cabbage stalk, the words of Rabbi Akiva. But the sages say: for fertilizing one leek plant. Manure and thin sand were used to fertilize vegetables. Rabbi Akiva sets the minimum amount at enough to fertilize a cabbage stalk, whereas the sages set the minimum amount at enough to fertilize a leek plant. In both this section and the above Rabbi Akiva is more lenient than the sages.", + "Thick sand, as much as is required for putting on a full plaster trowel. Lime plasterers would mix thick sand with their lime. The measure of thick sand for which one is obligated for carrying on Shabbat is enough to fill one plasterer’s trowel so that the sand can be mixed with lime. This is the minimum amount of thick sand that has practical use.", + "Reed, as much as is required for making a pen. But if it is thick or crushed, as much as is required for boiling the lightest of eggs beaten up and placed in a stew pot. Reeds were often used to make pens. If the reed was usable for making pens, then the minimum amount is enough to make one pen. This would be a very small amount. If it was not possible to use the reed to make a pen, for instance the reed was too thick or it was crushed, then they would burn it in the fire. With regard to carrying such types of reed, the minimum amount is enough to make a fire which would fry a small egg. This would obviously be a much larger amount than above." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with harder materials: bone, glass, pebbles and stones.", + "Bone, is as much as is required for making a spoon. Rabbi Judah says: enough for making a tooth [of a key] with it; According to the first opinion, the minimum amount of bone for which one is liable for carrying must be enough to make a large spoon. Rabbi Judah sets a smaller amount enough to make part of a key which was typically made from bone.", + "Glass, enough for scraping the end of a shuttle. A small piece of glass would be used to scrape the end of the spinning shuttle (used in weaving). Therefore, one who carries a piece of glass large enough for this purpose is liable.", + "A pebble or a stone, large enough to throw at a bird; Rabbi Elazar ben Yaakov says: large enough to throw at an animal. Pebbles and stones were used to kill birds and small animals (although for Jews these animals would not be edible.) According to the first opinion the pebble or stone need only be large enough to throw at a bird, whereas Rabbi Elazar ben Yaakov holds that it needs to be large enough to throw at an animal." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe final mishnah of our chapter is about the minimum size of a shard for which a person is liable for carrying.", + "A shard, as much as is needed for placing between one board and another, the words of Rabbi Judah. A small shard would be placed between building pillars used in making a house, if there were gaps between the pillars or boards. According to Rabbi Judah this is the measure of the type of shard one is liable for carrying on Shabbat. This is the smallest of the measures given in the mishnah.", + "Rabbi Meir says: enough to scoop out the coals with it. Rabbi Meir sets a slightly larger amount. The shard must be enough to scoop out coals from a fire. This is the largest measure of the three that are in the mishnah.", + "Rabbi Yose says: large enough to contain a revi’it. Rabbi Yose holds that the shard must only be large enough to hold a revi’it of water, which is about 3 oz.", + "Rabbi Meir said: even though there is no proof of the matter, there is a hint: “So that no shard is left in its breakage to scoop coals from a brazier” (Isaiah 30:1. Rabbi Yose said to him: proof [of my view] is from there [as well]: “Or to take ladle water from a puddle” (. In this section Rabbi Meir tries to prove from a verse in Isaiah that shards were used for scooping out coals. Rabbi Yose responds that if that verse is going to be used, why not look to the end of the verse which proves that shards were also used to ladle water. Therefore, a shard that is large enough to use to draw water is already large enough such that one who carries it is liable for carrying on Shabbat." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nIn the last chapter of mishnah eight Rabbi Meir brought a proof for his halakhah from the book of Isaiah. The proof was more of a “support” than an actual proof. This phenomenon is called an “asmakhta” in rabbinic parlance. The first four mishnayoth in our chapter all contain Biblical prooftexts of this nature.", + "Rabbi Akiva said: From where do we know that an idol defiles by being carried like a menstruant? Because it is said, “You shall cast them [the idols] away as a menstruous woman. Out! You will say to them” (Isaiah 30:22): just as a menstruant defiles by being carried, so does an idol defile by being carried. Rabbi Akiva holds that a person who carries an idol is defiled by the idol, even if he doesn’t touch it and only carries it. He derives this halakhah from a comparison that Isaiah makes between idols and a menstruant. In his exhortation against idolatry Isaiah states that the people of Israel will cast out their idols like a menstruous woman. Leviticus 15:22 teaches that a menstruous woman defiles things not just by touching them but even by sitting on them. From here the rabbis derive that she transmits impurity also by being carried. Rabbi Akiva learns from Isaiah that idols transmit impurity in the same way." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThere are two more midrashim in this mishnah which are both based on passages that are not from the Torah.", + "How do we know that a ship is clean? Because it is said, “The way of a ship is in the midst of the sea” (Proverbs 30:19). A ship cannot contract ritual impurity (uncleanness). This is derived from Proverbs 30:19: just as the sea cannot become impure, so too a ship cannot become impure.", + "How do we know that if a furrow is six handbreadths by six handbreadths, they may sow in it five kinds of seeds, four on the four sides, and one in the middle? Because it is said, “For as the earth brings forth her growth, and as the garden causes its seeds to spring forth” (Isaiah 61:11) not its seed, but its seeds is stated. This section has to do with the laws of forbidden mixtures of seeds. The mishnah teaches a way that five different species can be planted in a six by six handbreadth furrow. This would look like the table below (this is my first graphic, so here goes): Since no seeds are actually next to each other, this is not considered “kilayim” a forbidden mixture of seeds. Eventually when we learn tractate Kilayim we will learn more about this halakhah. The mishnah derives this halakhah from the plural use of the word “seeds” in Isaiah. The verse implies that one garden can make five different kinds of seeds come up at the same time. We should note, however, that the verse does not teach that five is possible and that six is not." + ], + [ + "How do we know that if one [a woman] discharges semen on the third day she is unclean? Because it is said, “Be ready for the third day” (Exodus 19:15). Semen imparts ritual impurity. A woman who discharges semen up until three days after having intercourse is made unclean by this semen. This is why Moses told the people of Israel not to have intercourse for three days before receiving the Torah. If the woman would have a discharge of semen after the third day, the semen would no longer transmit impurity.", + "How do we know that one who has been circumcised may be bathed on the third day [after circumcision] which falls on Shabbat? Because it is said, “And it came to pass on the third day, when they were in pain” (Genesis 34:25). It is permitted to warm water (but not to light a fire) in order to bathe someone who has just been circumcised. The mishnah assumes that we know that it is permitted to do so on the first and second days after the circumcision. It is permitted up until the third day. This is derived from what it says about the people of Shechem who were still in pain three days after their circumcision.", + "How do we know that a crimson-colored strap is tied to the head of the goat that is sent [to Azazel]? Because it is said, “If your sins be as scarlet, they shall be as white as snow” (Isaiah 1:18). According to rabbinic sources, (see Yoma 6:6) the priests would tie a crimson ribbon to the horns of the goat sent to Azazel on Yom Kippur. If the ribbon turned white, it was a sign that the children of Israel’s sins had been forgiven. This is connected in our mishnah to the verse from Isaiah." + ], + [ + "How do we know that anointing is the same as drinking on Yom Kippur? Though there is no proof of this, yet there is a suggestion of it, for it is said, “And it came into his inward parts like water, and like oil into his bones” (Psalms 109:18). Two of the prohibitions on Yom Kippur are anointing (rubbing oil on oneself) and drinking. Our mishnah teaches that both are similarly prohibited (although their punishments are different). Their similarity is derived from the verse in Psalms which compares water with anointing with oil. We should note that according to most commentators the phrase, “though there is no proof of this, yet there is a suggestion of it” refers to all of the “proofs” in the above three mishnayot as well. None of them are true “proofs” but rather “suggestions.”" + ], + [ + "If one carries out wood, as much as is required for boiling a light egg; For carrying wood, one is liable if she carries enough to fuel the boiling of a light egg.", + "Spices, as much as is required for seasoning a light egg, and they combine with each other. For carrying spices, it must be enough to season an egg. If she carries different types of spices, they all join together to equal one measure.", + "Nutshells, pomegranate peel, woad and madder, as much as is required for dyeing a small piece of cloth the size of a hairnet. These things were all used as dyes. Woad was used to make blue dye and madder made red dye. She is liable if she carries enough of these things to dye a small piece of cloth the size of a woman’s hairnet.", + "Urine, baking soda, lye, cimolian earth, and lion’s leaf, as much as is required for washing a small piece of cloth the size of a hairnet. Rabbi Judah says: as much as is required for removing the stain. These materials were all used in laundering (sounds yucky doesn’t it? aren’t you glad you use Tide!). Therefore, she is liable if she carries enough to wash a small piece of cloth the size of a hairnet. Rabbi Judah says that it must be enough to remove “the stain.” This refers to a situation where a stain was found on a woman’s clothing and it is unclear whether or not the stain is menstrual blood. They would wash it with the above five materials as well as two others (see Mishnah Nidah 9:6). If the stain didn’t come out, then they knew it was dye and not blood. The amount of each type for which one is liable on Shabbat is the amount that they used to put on the cloth to see if the stain would come out." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with things for which one is liable for carrying even the smallest amount. The reason in the first three sections is that even the smallest quantity of these things is usable. In the final two sections, the reason why one is liable for carrying even the smallest amount is that the objects are holy and when worn out, may not be thrown away.", + "[If one carries out] pepper, in whatever quantity. Since even the tiniest amount of pepper can be used to spice up a dish or for other purposes, one is liable for carrying even the tiniest amount.", + "Olive-refuse, in whatever quantity. Small amounts of olive-refuse were used to heal headaches.", + "Various kinds of spices and various kinds of metal, in whatever quantity. This section refers to spices which were not used for cooking but for perfumes. Since even the smallest amount might be used, one would be liable for even a tiny amount. Metal was quite precious and even small amounts would be preserved.", + "[Pieces] of the stones of the altar or the earth from the altar, worn-out pieces of scrolls or their worn-out covers, in whatever quantity, because they are stored away in order to hide them. When pieces of the altar needed to be removed or parts of holy scrolls or their covers needed to be replaced, the old material must be put into a “genizah”, a place to hide them and protect them. The word “genizah” indeed means “to be stored away.” They may not be thrown into the garbage. Since even the smallest amounts are important enough to forbid their being thrown away, one is liable for carrying even the smallest amount.", + "Rabbi Judah says: also he who carries out the service vessels of idols, in whatever quantity, [is liable], for it is said, “Let nothing that has been doomed stick to your hand” (Deuteronomy 13:18). Rabbi Judah thinks that even for carrying things used in idol worship, if one carries even the smallest amount one is liable. This is because of the verse “let nothing...” The Torah considers even the smallest amount to be forbidden due to the prohibition of idolatry. Rabbi Judah learns from here that even the smallest amount has “importance” and therefore one who carries such an amount is liable." + ], + [ + "If one carries out a peddler’s basket, even though it contains many types of things, he is liable for only one sin-offering. A peddler’s basket contains a variety of goods. We might have thought that one who carries such a basket full of different things from one domain to another would be liable for several sin-offerings, one for each thing in the basket. Therefore, the mishnah teaches that she is liable for only one, for the basket joins them together.", + "Garden seeds, less than the size of a dried fig; Rabbi Judah ben Batera ruled: five. Cucumber seed, two. Gourd seed, two. Egyptian bean seed, two. This section refers to seeds which will be used for planting. The mishnah lists the minimum amount of seeds of certain types of vegetables which would be planted in one furrow. With regard to garden-seeds, the first opinion holds that there must be a total amount of seeds equal to the size of a dried fig. Rabbi Judah ben Batera connects this rule with that which we learned above in mishnah two a person is allowed to plant five different kinds of seeds in one 6 by 6 handbreadth furrow.", + "A live clean locust, whatever its size. Dead, the size of a dried fig. The bird of the vineyards, whether live or dead, whatever its size, because they store it for a medicine. Rabbi Judah says: even one who carries out a live unclean locust, whatever its size, [is liable], because they store it away for a child to play with. The Torah teaches that some locusts are clean and may be eaten and some are unclean and are forbidden. According to the first opinion, one is liable for carrying a live clean locust of any size because they would put it aside for a child to play with. They would not give unclean locusts to children because if the locust died the child might eat it. Rabbi Judah at the end of this mishnah holds that even unclean locusts are stored away for children to play with and therefore one is liable also for carrying them. For dead clean locusts which are edible everyone agrees that the minimum is the same as it is for other foods (7:4). One would not be liable at all for carrying dead unclean locusts since they have no practical use. Due to its inclusion in this section, it seems likely the “bird of the vineyards” is actually a type of locust. Since even the smallest amount is used for medicinal purposes, one is liable for carrying even a small one, whether live or dead." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah connects back to what we learned above in 7:3. If a person cares enough to store a certain something away, that means that that thing is important to her. Therefore, if she carries it from domain to domain on Shabbat, she is liable no matter what its size is. However, others who do not store such a thing, are only liable if they carry the minimum measure mentioned above.", + "If one stores something for planting, for a sample, or for medicine, and [then] carries it out on Shabbat, he is liable no matter the size. But all others are not liable except for its standard measure. If a person stores a single seed in order to plant it, to show it to someone else or to use it for medicinal purposes, that person is liable for carrying it, even if it is of a minimal measure. However, if another person carries that same seed, she is liable only if she carries a measure equal to that mentioned in yesterday’s mishnah.", + "If he carries it back again, he is liable only for its standard measure. If after carrying this minimum measure of seed, the person who stored it carries it again, she is only liable if she carries a minimum measure. The fact that she previously stored it away was only relevant for the first time she carried it. If she carries it again and doesn’t again store it away, she is treated like all other people, and is liable only if she carries a minimum measure." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah teaches two things: 1) a person is not liable unless she takes something from the public domain and puts it into the private domain or vice verse. A domain that is neither public nor private does not count. 2) A person is not liable for performing one act of forbidden labor if the act is performed in two steps.", + "If one carries out food and places it on the threshold, whether he [himself] subsequently carries it out [into the street] or another does so, he is not liable, because the [whole] act was not performed at once. The threshold of a person’s house is considered to be neither the public domain nor the private domain. While it is forbidden to bring something from inside the house and place it on the threshold, one who does so is not liable for carrying on Shabbat. Our mishnah teaches that if the person divides carrying something from within the house to outside into two separate actions, first taking the object and putting it on the threshold and then picking it back up and carrying it out, she is not liable because she did not perform the entire forbidden act at once.", + "[If one carries out] a basket which is full of produce and places it on the outer threshold, though most of the produce is outside of the threshold, he is not liable unless he carries out the whole basket. This section builds upon the previous one. The person has a basket of produce, which as we learned in 9:7 is treated as one item. She places it on the threshold such that most of the produce that is within the basket is in the public domain. Nevertheless, because the entire basket is not in the public domain, she is not liable. Note that had she carried the food outside of the basket, she would have been liable." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah teaches that in order for a person to be liable for carrying she must carry in a way that is normal for carrying. If she carries in an unusual manner, she is not liable.", + "If one carries something out, whether with his right or with his left hand, in his lap or on his shoulder, he is liable, because this the way of the carrying of the children of Kohat (Numbers 7:9). According to Numbers 7:9, the children of Kohat carried the Tabernacle with their shoulders. Since we learn many of the principles of forbidden labor from the work in the Tabernacle, we can derive that carrying with one’s shoulders causes one to be liable for carrying on Shabbat. By extension, any normal form of carrying makes one liable.", + "In a backhanded manner, with his foot, in his mouth, with his elbow, in his ear, in his hair, in his belt with its opening downwards, between his belt and his shirt, in the hem of his shirt, in his shoes or sandals, he is not liable, because he has not carried [it] out as people [generally] carry out. If the person carries something out in an unusual manner, she is not liable. All of the ways mentioned in this section are unusual ways of carrying. We should note that it is not permitted to carry in such a way. When the mishnah says it is not liable it means that it is forbidden to do so, but if one does so, she is not liable." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah discusses the difference between carrying things in front of oneself, the way they are normally carried (picture the way you carry dishes) and carrying things behind oneself, a way of carrying that in most cases (but not all) is unusual and less effective.", + "If one intends to carry out [an object] in front of him, but it comes around behind him, he is not liable. In this case the person intended to carry the object out in front of her, but somehow the object came around to the other side of her body and she carried it behind her. Had her intentions been fulfilled, she would have been liable. However, since she ended up carrying it behind her, in a way that does not make a person liable, she is not liable for carrying. The central idea is that her intention was not fulfilled, so she is not liable.", + "Behind him, but it comes around in front of him, he is liable. This is the opposite scenario: she intended to carry it behind her in which case she would have been exempt. When the object comes around to her front, it is now in a more protected position, one which she would normally be happy about. Therefore, she is liable. The idea is that she would want the object to be more protected, and therefore she is liable for carrying. In other words, her intention is actually fulfilled.", + "In truth they said: a woman who wraps herself with an apron whether in front of her or behind her, is liable, because it is normal for it to reverse itself. From the above two sections we can see that normally, when a person carries something behind themselves, they are exempt. This section brings up an exception the woman’s apron. It is normal for a woman’s apron, in which she carries things, to reverse itself. Since this is normal and she can anticipate that the apron will reverse itself and that the object she is carrying may end up in front of her or behind her, she is liable in all cases.", + "Rabbi Judah said: also those who receive notes. Rabbi Judah adds an additional category of people who are liable whether they carry the object in front or behind those who receive notes. These are messengers who would carry their bags on poles, either in front or behind them. Since the messenger could anticipate that the object might go in front or behind, he is liable in either case." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah teaches two main things. First of all, if two people jointly perform a forbidden labor that could be performed by one person, they are both exempt.\nSecondly, when we consider what a person is liable for carrying, we only consider the main thing and not those things that are ancillary to it.", + "If one carries out a loaf into the public domain, he is liable. If two carry it out, both are exempt. If one could not carry it out and two carry it out, they are liable; But Rabbi Shimon exempts [them]. Here we learn that if two people jointly perform a forbidden labor that could have been performed by one person, both are exempt. In the Talmud this is derived from Leviticus 4:27, “If one person should unintentionally sin,” if one person does the entire labor for which one must bring a sin offering, she is liable, but if two people perform the labor together, they are both exempt. Again, we should emphasize that “exempt” does not mean that it is permitted. This is forbidden but nevertheless both are exempt from bringing a sin-offering. However, if the labor was something that one person couldn’t perform alone, for instance carrying a large table, then both are liable because both are performing as much of a forbidden labor that one person can perform. Rabbi Shimon disagrees and holds that two people can never be liable for one jointly performed labor.", + "If one carries out less than the standard quantity of food in a utensil, he is not liable for the utensil, because the utensil is secondary to the [food]. This section discusses situations where a person takes out two things, one of them being the main thing and the other being secondary. For instance, a person takes out food in a vessel. The intention is to bring the food out and the vessel is merely a means to transport the food. If the food is less than the minimum measurement for which one incurs liability (usually the size of a dried fig) then she is exempt even for carrying out the vessel. This is because her intention was to carry out the food, and the vessel was secondary. Had she carried just the vessel, she would be liable, but since she carries the food as well, it becomes obvious that her intention was to carry the food.", + "[If one carries out] a living person on a bed, he is not liable even in respect of the bed, because the bed is secondary to him. A corpse in a bed, he is liable. We learn two things in this section. First of all, the rabbis believed that a living thing “carries itself.” This means that one does not incur liability for carrying a living thing, at least one that can walk on its own. So if a person carries out a living person on a bed, she is not liable for carrying the person. She is also exempt for carrying the bed since the reason that she carried the bed was to carry the person. However, if she carries a dead body on a bed (the word for bed is the same word as that for bier) she is liable for carrying the dead body.", + "And similarly [if one carries out] the size of an olive of a corpse, the size of an olive of a nevelah, or the size of a lentil of a [dead] creeping thing, he is liable. But Rabbi Shimon exempts him. In the above section we learned that a person is liable for carrying a dead body. Similarly, according to the first opinion in this section, a person is liable for carrying parts of a dead body, as long as they have a minimum measure. The minimum measures here are the minimum amounts that transmit impurity. Rabbi Shimon exempts one who carries parts of a dead body because this is “work not needed for its own sake.” That is to say, when she carries out these parts she is not doing so because she wants to do something with them outside in the public domain; rather she wants to clear them from the house. Therefore, she is exempt." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is not concerned with carrying as are the preceding and following mishnayot. It is here because at the end of this mishnah Rabbi Shimon has a debate with the other sages as he did in yesterday’s mishnah.", + "If one pares his nails with each other or with his teeth, likewise [if one plucks] his hair, likewise his mustache, likewise his beard; And likewise if [a woman] braids [her hair], likewise if she paints [her eyelids] likewise if she puts rouge on [her face]: Rabbi Eliezer makes them liable, But the rabbis forbid [these actions] because of “shevuth.” According to Rabbi Eliezer all of these actions are derivatives of forbidden labors and hence one who performs them is liable. Cutting nails and hair is a derivative of “shearing.” Braiding is a derivative of “building.” Painting body parts is a derivative of “writing” or “dyeing.” The rabbis say that these things are forbidden but they are not considered true derivatives of prohibited labors since they are not done in the way that those labors are usually performed. However, they are still prohibited because of “shevut” which means desisting. This means that a person should desist from things that are similar enough to forbidden labors. However, the level of prohibition is only “derabbanan”, of rabbinic origin.", + "If one picks [something] from a perforated pot, he is liable. If it is unperforated, he is exempt. Rabbi Shimon exempts in both cases. A perforated pot contains plants whose roots are attached to the ground. Hence, one who plucks something from such a pot has performed the forbidden act of reaping. However, if the pot has no hole in its bottom than he is exempt because reaping is defined as detaching a plant or part thereof from the ground. Rabbi Shimon says that in both cases the one who plucks is exempt because we don’t consider even a perforated pot as being attached to the ground." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nAfter having learned the laws of carrying from one domain to another, this chapter teaches laws concerning throwing something from one domain to another.", + "If one throws from the private domain into the public domain [or] from the public domain into the private domain, he is liable. Throwing is considered to be like carrying and hence one who throws from one domain to another is liable.", + "From one private domain to another private domain, and the public domain lies between: Rabbi Akiva makes him liable, But the sages exempt him. Rabbi Akiva treats the object which flies over the public domain as if it had actually landed in the public domain. Therefore, in his opinion this person has taken something from the private domain and brought it out to the public domain. The sages, however, rule that he is exempt because the object never actually landed in public domain." + ], + [ + "How so?
If there are two balconies facing each other in the public domain, he who reaches over or throws [an article] from one to the other is exempt.
If both are on the same row, he who reaches over is liable, while he who throws is exempt, for thus was the service of the Levites.
Two wagons, this one behind this one in the public domain, [and] they reached over the boards from one to another, but they did not throw.
[As for] he borders of a cistern, and a rock, which are ten [handbreadths] high and four in breath, if one removes [something] from them or places [something] upon them, his is liable; If less than this, he is exempt.
This mishnah explicates yesterday’s mishnah in which we learned that one who throws something from one private domain to another private domain and there lies a public domain in the middle, is exempt.
Section one: In this case two balconies are on opposite sides of the public domain. One who throws from one balcony to the other, or one who reaches something over from one to the other is exempt (according to the sages, see yesterday’s mishnah). As we shall see below, the reason is that this type of labor was not performed in the construction of the Tabernacle.
Sections two and three: Here the two balconies are on the same side of the street, lying adjacent to one another. In this case the sages agree that one who reaches something over from one balcony to the other is liable, for this is how the Levites worked in the construction and deconstruction of the Tabernacle in the desert. As we learn in the next section, the Levites had wagons which were placed one behind the other and they would pass boards from one to the other. The wagons are considered to be private domains and that which lay in between them is the public domain. Therefore, you have a case of people passing things from one public domain to another and a private domain lying in between. However, the Levites did not throw the boards for that would not have been respectful of the inherent holiness of the parts of the Tabernacle. Again, the principle is that anything that Levites did in the building of the Tabernacle is considered forbidden on Shabbat. Since they didn’t throw, today people are not liable for throwing from one domain to another. And since they only passed from wagons which were placed one behind the other, today people are not liable if they pass things across the public domain, as we learned in the previous section.
Section four: If the border of a cistern is ten handbreadths high and four handbreadths wide, it is considered to be a private domain and one who takes something from the public domain and puts it on this border or vice versa is liable. If the borders are smaller than this measure, one who does so is exempt. The same would be true if there was a rock in the public domain. If it is four handbreadths wide and ten tall, then one who puts something on it or takes something off is liable. If not he is exempt." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIt is forbidden to carry something four cubits in the public domain. Our mishnah deals with someone who throws something four cubits in the public domain and some nuances concerning this halakhah.", + "One who throws [something] four cubits on to a wall: if [the wall] is above ten handbreadths, it is as if he throws it into the air; if below, it is as if it he throws it on to the ground. ( And one who throws [something] four cubits on the ground is liable. According to the rabbis, above ten handbreadths is no longer the public domain, but neither is it a private domain. It is called a “makom patur”, a place that is exempt from the laws of carrying. Therefore, one who throws something onto a wall that is higher than ten handbreadths is exempt. However, if she throws it and it goes four cubits and lands on a wall lower than ten cubits, it is as if the object landed on the ground and she is liable. This is because someone who throws something four cubits on the ground is liable.", + "If one threw [something] within four cubits and it rolled beyond four cubits, he is exempt; [If one threw something] beyond four cubits and it rolled within four cubits, he is liable. This section deals with throwing something that afterwards rolls. If she throws the object less than four cubits and it rolls further, she is exempt. This is because she did not intend to throw something four cubits. Alternatively, she is exempt because the object didn’t at first land the necessary four cubits away. However, if she threw something four cubits and then it rolled back she is still liable because it did land four cubits from where she threw it." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with throwing in bodies of water.", + "If one throws in the sea four cubits, he is exempt. The sea is considered a “karmelit”, a place which is neither a public nor a private domain. That means that one is not liable for carrying or throwing in the sea.", + "If there is a pool of water and a public road crosses it, and one throws [an object] four cubits in it, he is liable. And how deep is a pool of water? Less than ten handbreadths. [For] if there is a pool of water and a public road crosses it, and one throws [an object] four cubits in it, he is liable. This section deals with a pool of water that lies in the public domain. If, the pool of water is less than ten handbreadths deep then one who throws an object four cubits into it is liable. The reason is that if it is less than ten handbreadths, then it is considered to be part of the public domain and one who throws or carries in it is liable. However, if the pool of water is more than ten handbreadths deep then it is no longer considered to be the public domain and one who throws in it she is exempt. We should note that the Talmud questions why section two seems to repeat itself at the end. From this repetition the talmud derives additional laws." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with throwing from either the sea to dry land (or the opposite) or from ships to the sea or other ships.", + "If one throws [somethign] from the sea to dry land, or from dry land to the sea, from the sea to a ship or from a ship to the sea or from one ship to another, he is exempt. As we mentioned earlier, the sea is considered a “karmelit” a place that is neither the public domain nor the private domain. Hence, one who throws from dry land (the public domain) to the sea or vice versa is exempt. One is liable only for moving something from the public domain to the private domain or vice versa. A ship is considered a private domain. Hence, if one throws from the sea to a ship or from a ship to the sea, she is also exempt, for this is throwing from a “karmelit” to a private domain. Finally, one who throws from one ship to another is exempt, just as one who throws from one private domain to another private domain with the public domain lying in-between is exempt (see mishnah 11:1). In this case, it would seem that even Rabbi Akiva would exempt the thrower because what lies in-between is not a public domain but the sea (a karmelit).", + "If ships are tied together, one may carry from one to another. In this case the two ships are tied together and lying adjacent to one another. According to Albeck, who explains the mishnah according to the Yerushalmi (the Palestinian Talmud) since there is no karmelit lying between the ships, one can carry from one to the other. In the Babylonian Talmud, this section is explained as referring to boats owned by two different people. They may carry from one to the other if they set up an eruv, a concept about which we learn in the next tractate.", + "If they are not tied together, even though they lie close [to each other], one may not carry from one to another. If the ships are not tied together, one may not carry from one to the other, even if they lie adjacent to each other. Since the two boats may become separate, thereby forming a karmelit between them, the halakhah is more stringent in this case." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah teaches and illustrates the rule that in order for a person to be liable to bring a sin-offering, the entire forbidden act must be performed unwittingly. If part of the act is performed intentionally, then no sin-offering is brought.", + "If one throws [something] and remembers [that it is Shabbat] after it leaves his hand, and another catches it, or a dog catches it or it is burnt, he is not liable. If someone throws something not remembering that it is the Sabbath and then, while the object is still in the air, she remembers that it is the Sabbath, it turns out that in the beginning of her forbidden activity she was an unintentional sinner and at the end she was already an intentional sinner. She is not liable, for as we learn later in the mishnah, in order for one to be liable to bring a sin-offering the entire action from beginning to end must be performed unwittingly. This section also includes several other cases where someone throws something and she is nevertheless exempt. If the object is caught by a dog or by another person or is burnt up before it lands, it turns out that she uprooted the object but she didn’t cause it to be put down. Therefore, she is exempt. Note, that this does not mean that one is allowed to throw things to one’s fellow in the public domain or from one domain to the other. Rather, one who does so is not liable.", + "If one throws [something] in order to inflict a wound whether to a person or a beast, and he remembers [that it is Shabbat] before the wound is inflicted he is not liable. Putting a wound into somebody is a derivative of one of the forbidden labors on Shabbat. In this case the person throws something at another person or at an animal while not knowing that it is Shabbat but remembers before the thrown object wounds the other person or animal. Similar to above, the beginning of the act was performed unwittingly and at the end the act was intentional. Hence the thrower is exempt.", + "This is the general principle: all who are liable to sin-offerings are liable only if the beginning and the end [of the forbidden action] are unwitting. If their beginning is unwitting while their end is intentional, if their beginning is intentional while their end is unwitting, they are not liable, unless their beginning and end are intentional. This section states explicitly the general rule that stood behind the previous two sections." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nAfter completing its explication of the various aspects of “carrying”, the Mishnah now turns its attention to various other prohibited labors mentioned above in 7:2. Today’s mishnah deals with building.", + "One who builds: how much must he build to be liable? He who builds any amount, and he who chisels, and he who strikes with a hammer or with an axe, and he who bores [a hole] of any size, is liable. There is no minimum measure for building. Any act of building, no matter how insignificant, can cause the builder to be liable. Building, as we see includes various aspects of construction such as chiseling, striking with a hammer and boring a hole. “Striking with a hammer” also can be understood as referring to the completion of labor.", + "This is the general principle: whoever does work and his work endures on Shabbat, he is liable. There are two explanations for this section. The first is that it means that the person performs work which will be left in its current situation on Shabbat. In other words, even if the work is not complete and will be added to after Shabbat, if it is sufficiently complete such that one would leave it that way on Shabbat, the person is liable. The second explanation is that the clause refers to a person who does work on Shabbat that is actually complete, meaning no one will add to it later on.", + "Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: even one who strikes with a hammer on the anvil at the completion of his work is liable, because he is as one who improves his work. At the end of their work, metalworkers would strike their hammers on the anvil. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says that this causes them to be liable, even though they don’t strike a blow to the vessel which they are making. The reason is that this blow actually improves the anvil and is therefore considered to be a forbidden labor." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with plowing, reaping and binding sheaves.", + "He who plows any amount, or who weeds, or who prunes [trees], or who cuts off young shoots, no matter the amount, is liable. Plowing is one of the categories of forbidden labor mentioned in 7:2. Weeding, pruning or cutting off young shoots are not listed in that mishnah. According to some commentators, these are prohibited because they are similar to “plowing”. According to others they are similar to “planting” because they are means by which a person helps her plants grow. In all of these cases, a person is liable no matter how much work they perform.", + "He who gathers wood: if in order to effect an improvement, [he is liable] for any amount; if for lighting a fire, as much as is required for boiling a light egg. Gathering wood is considered by commentators to be forbidden because of “binding sheaves”, a forbidden labor listed in 7:2. If she gathers wood from a tree in order to improve the tree, then she is liable for any amount, similar to those labors listed above. However, if she gathers wood in order to light a stove, she is only liable if she gathers enough wood to light a fire sufficient to cook an egg (see above, 8:5).", + "He who collects grasses: if to effect an improvement, [he is liable] for any amount; if for an animal, as much as fits in a kid’s mouth. If a person gathers grasses in order to improve the land, then she is liable for “plowing” and she is therefore liable for any amount. However, if she does so in order to feed an animal, then she needs to collect enough to fill the mouth of a kid (a young goat, as in “had gadya”). As above, she is liable because of “binding sheaves.”" + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah deals with the prohibition of writing, which is one of the labors prohibited in 7:2.", + "He who writes two letters, whether with his right hand or with his left hand, whether the same letter or two different letters or in two pigments, in any language, is liable. For one to be liable for “writing” she must write two letters. It matters not if she writes with her right or left hand. She is liable even if she writes the same letter twice. The letters can be written with different pigments or in different languages. In all cases, writing two letters makes one liable.", + "Rabbi Jose said: they made one liable for writing two letters only because [he makes] a mark, since this is how they would write on each board of the tabernacle, to know which its companion was. Rabbi Yose holds that even one who makes a mark is liable for writing, since this is how the work was done in the construction of the Tabernacle. They would make marks (scratch marks or impressions) on the wood to know which piece went with which other piece. Therefore, when one writes one is really liable for the indentation they make on whatever they are writing.", + "Rabbi Judah said: we find a short name [forming part] of a long name: “Shem” as part of “Shimon” or “Shmuel”, “Noah” as part of “Nahor”, “Dan” as part of “Daniel”, “Gad” as part of “Gaddiel”. According to Rabbi Judah, merely writing any two letters is not sufficient to incur liability unless the two letters are a complete word. However, the two letters do not have to be the complete word which she intended to write. If she intends to write a longer word, for instance “Shimon” but then writes “Shem” (Noah’s son) which in Hebrew consists of the first two letters in Shimon, she is liable. This is because Shem is in and of itself a full word. However, if the two letters she writes are not a complete word, she is exempt. We should note that according to the Talmud, a person is not liable if they write with their weak hand. They explain the mishnah as referring to an ambidextrous person." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to deal with the prohibition of writing on Shabbat.", + "He who writes two letters in one state of unawareness is liable. If one wrote two letters and in-between writing the two she did not realize that she had transgressed, she is liable. This rule shall be contrasted later in mishnah six.", + "He who writes with ink, arsenic, red chalk, gum, sulphate of copper or with anything that leaves a mark, One is liable for writing with any type of ink that leaves a mark. This list is the same as the list we saw in Gittin 2:3, where the mishnah listed inks which may be used in writing a divorce document.", + "on the angle of two walls, or on the two leaves of a ledger, and they [the two letters] are read together, is liable. If one writes two letters on two different walls but writes them in the place where the two walls meet, she is liable. Similarly, if she writes them on two pages of a ledger, if the two letters are read together, she is liable. We shall see the opposite case in tomorrow’s mishnah.", + "He who writes on his flesh, he is liable. One is liable for writing one’s flesh. According to the Rambam, the reason is that flesh is similar to parchment, which is made from animal flesh.", + "He who scratches a mark on his flesh: Rabbi Eliezer declares him liable to a sin-offering; But the sages exempt him. One who scratches marks onto her skin is liable, according to Rabbi Eliezer. The other sages say that she is exempt since this is not a normal way of writing." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah lists cases in which a person is not liable for writing.", + "If he wrote with liquids, or with fruit juice, on the dust of the road, or on writer’s powder, or with anything that cannot endure, he is exempt. In all of these cases, she is exempt because she didn’t write with an ink that will last, or she didn’t write on something that will last. Today, this would mean that writing with pencil does not make one liable on Shabbat. Similarly, writing something on the sand on the beach would not make one liable. Again, this doesn’t mean that these things are permitted; it only means that one who does so does not incur liability.", + "[If he wrote] with the back of his hand, with his foot, with his mouth, or with his elbow; In this case, the person wrote with a part of her body not typically used in writing. She is therefore exempt.", + "If he wrote one letter near [other] writing, She is exempt because she didn’t write two letters, even though she wrote next to an already existent letter.", + "If he wrote on top of other writing; Here, she wrote on top of already existing letters. She is not liable because the letters existed before she wrote them. Even though she may have added to them, she is still exempt.", + "If he intended to write a cheth but wrote two zayyinin; Here she intended to write the Hebrew letter chet, but instead of joining the two parts together, she left the top empty and it turned out that she had twice written the letter zayin. Since she did not intend to write two letters, she is exempt.", + "[If he wrote] one [letter] on the ground and another on a beam; If he wrote on two walls of the house, or on two leaves of a ledger which are not read together, he is exempt. In all three of these cases she did not write the two letters next to each other. Therefore she is exempt.", + "If he wrote one letter as an abbreviation: Rabbi Joshua ben Bathyra declares him liable, But the sages exempt him. In Hebrew sometimes one letter can be an abbreviation for a full word. For instance a resh with an apostrophe can be used to mean Rabbi. According to Rabbi Judah ben Batera, one who writes one letter as an abbreviation is liable. The sages say that she is exempt because she only wrote one letter." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe final mishnah in this chapter finishes our discussion of writing on Shabbat.", + "He who writes two letters in two states of unawareness, one in the morning and one in the evening: Rabban Gamaliel declares him liable; But the sages exempt him. The case is one where someone wrote two letters adjacent to one another, but she wrote them at different times, having remembered in-between that it was forbidden to write on Shabbat. For example, she wrote the first letter in the morning, then remembered that it was forbidden to write on Shabbat and then she wrote another letter towards evening, again having forgotten that writing is forbidden on Shabbat. Rabban Gamaliel says that she is liable. He holds that finding out that something is forbidden in the midst of performing one forbidden labor (writing two letters) does not count as “finding out” in order to separate these into two distinct acts. [In contrast, if she wrote two letters in the morning and then remembered that it was Shabbat, and then wrote two letters later in the day, she would be liable for two sin offerings. The knowledge in-between separates it into two different acts. If she did not remember in the middle she would be liable for only one sin offering.] The rabbis hold that since these were two different states of unawareness, they do not join together and she is exempt." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis chapter deals with the work involved in making clothes. Today’s mishnah deals with the prohibited labor of weaving.", + "Rabbi Eliezer says: he who weaves three threads at the beginning or one [thread] added to woven stuff is liable; But the sages say: whether at the beginning or at the end, the standard [for liability] is two threads. According to Rabbi Eliezer, there are two different standards for how much weaving causes one to be liable, depending on when the weaving is performed. When beginning to weave cloth, one is liable only if she weaves three threads. This is because without three threads the cloth has not really been begun. However, if she weaves part of something that has already been started, she is liable even for one thread. Even one thread contributes to an already-started cloth. The sages, whose opinion was already stated in 7:2, provide one standard measure, no matter when the weaving was done. Liability is always for two threads, no matter at the beginning or in the middle." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first part of the mishnah explains the prohibited labor of “making two loops.” The second part deals with sewing.", + "He who makes two loops, on either the cross-pieces [nirim] or one the slips [keros], or in a sifter, sieve, or basket, is liable. We need not fully understand how the ancient loom worked to understand that making two loops, no matter where or how they are done, is considered labor prohibited by the Torah. One is also liable if she makes two loops while weaving a sifter (for sifting flour), a sieve (for separating kernels of grain) or a basket.", + "And he who sews two stitches, and he who tears in order to sew two stitches [is liable]. In order to be liable for sewing one needs to sew two stitches. Tearing makes one liable only if the tearing was done with a constructive purpose in mind. If one tears in order to sew up the garment, then one is liable. If the purpose is only destructive, there is no liability." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is a continuation of yesterday’s mishnah where we learned that one is liable for tearing only if she tears in order to sew two stitches.", + "He who tears in his anger or [in mourning] for his dead, and all who damage are exempt. According to this mishnah, one who tears his clothes in anger or as a sign of mourning over the dead is not liable, for there is no constructive purpose to such tearing. However, the Talmud notes that when one is liable for rending one’s clothes as a sign of mourning for one’s dead, for instance over a close relative (parent, sibling, child or spouse), then there is constructive purpose to such tearing it fulfills the commandment to tear. Therefore, when a person is obligated to tear and she tears on Shabbat, she is liable. However, if one is exempt from tearing and nevertheless does so, she is exempt. There is also an interesting note on tearing in anger. According to the Rambam, despite what the mishnah says, one is usually liable for tearing in anger because by such tearing one cools down. Again, this makes the tearing constructive and therefore carries with it liability. However, other commentators argue with the Rambam and say, based on a passage in the Talmud, that destroying things out of anger is akin to idol worship, because both are submissions to one’s evil inclination. If a person’s evil inclination dictates that they destroy something, and they submit, they have begun down a slippery slope which will eventually lead to total demise which is symbolized in the Talmud by idol worship. Since such tearing is ultimately not productive, there is no incurred liability. Similarly, any forbidden labor which is performed with only destructive intentions, does not cause one to be liable.", + "But he who damages in order to repair, his measure [for liability] is as for repairing. As noted, a person is liable for destructive acts only if such acts are performed with constructive intent. If they are performed with such intent, then the measure for liability is the same as the measure for the positive act. For instance, one is liable for erasing only if it is with the intent of writing. Since to be liable for writing one must write two letters, so too with erasing she must erase two letters in order to be liable." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with minimum measures in processing wool and flax.", + "The minimum measure for bleaching, hackling, dyeing or spinning is a full double sit. These are all forbidden labors mentioned above in 7:2. The minimum measure for which one incurs liability is double a “sit” the length between one’s thumb and finger, as far as they can be spread.", + "And he who weaves two threads together, the minimum meausure is a full sit. If one weaves two threads together on a loom, the minimum measure for liability is half of that above, meaning one “sit”." + ], + [ + "Rabbi Judah says: he who hunts a bird into a tower trap, or a deer into a house, is liable;
But the sages say: [he who hunts] a bird into a tower trap, and a deer into a house, courtyard or corral.
Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: not all corrals are the same.
This is the general principle: if it lacks further work of hunting, he is exempt. If it does not lack further work of hunting, he is liable.
This mishnah deals with hunting. We should note that hunting is not exactly what we think of it today going out and killing an animal. Hunting refers to trapping an animal such that it remains alive. Killing an animal is a different, yet still prohibited labor.
Section one: According to Rabbi Judah, once one traps a bird in a tower trap, which was a box in the shape of a tower, she has sufficiently trapped the animal such that she is liable for hunting. Similarly, if she traps a deer in a house she is liable. However, if she traps a bird in a house she is exempt because it will still require further trapping in order to get the bird. Furthermore, the bird can escape the house and therefore, the bird is not really trapped. Also, if the deer is trapped into a larger space, then she is not liable.
Section two: The sages agree with Rabbi Judah with regard to the bird but disagree with him with regard to the trapping of the deer. Even if she traps the deer into a courtyard or corral she is still liable.
Section three: Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel notes that liability depends on the size of the corral into which the deer has been trapped. We can’t just state unequivocally that trapping into all corrals makes one liable. If catching the deer requires no further worth of hunting (meaning it can be caught easily) than it has already been hunted and she is liable. However, if catching the deer will require further work, then the one who catches it in the corral is not liable.
It is interesting to note that Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says that not all corrals are the same. It may be that in contrast, most houses and courtyards were the same, meaning they were similarly built and of similar size." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is similar to 10:5 above, where we learned that if two people jointly perform a labor that could have been performed by one person, they are exempt. If they jointly perform a work that required two people, the sages say that both are liable and Rabbi Shimon exempts them both.", + "If a deer enters a house and one person shuts [the door] before it, he is liable. By closing the door, she is liable, even though she didn’t actually cause the deer to come into the house.", + "If two shut it, they are exempt. If one could not shut it, and both shut it, they are liable. Rabbi Shimon exempts them. If two shut the door, both are exempt because they have both performed only half a labor. However, if the door was so large (or the people so small!) that they could only close it together, they are both liable. Rabbi Shimon exempts them, because he holds that two people can never be liable for one jointly performed labor." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe final mishnah of this chapter continues to deal with hunting (trapping).", + "If one sat down in the doorway but did not fill it, and a second sat down and filled it, the second is liable. If there is a deer in the house and a person sits down and with her body closes the opening of the house, she is liable for hunting. If she doesn’t fill the opening with her body, and a second person comes and fills the opening, the second person has closed the house and has thereby trapped the deer. Therefore, the second person is liable and the first person is exempt.", + "If the first sat down in the doorway and fills it, and a second came and sat down at his side, even if the first [then] rises and goes away, the first is liable and the second is exempt. To what is this similar? To one who shuts his house to guard it, and a deer is found to be guarded in it. Once the first person sits in the doorway and thereby traps the deer, the first person is liable. What the second person does is really irrelevant, because the first person has already trapped the animal. Even if the first person gets up and leaves, and the second person is now keeping the animal in the house, the second person is not liable because she did not perform the labor herself. The mishnah compares this to a case where a person closes her door to guard it from thieves and then finds that a deer is trapped inside. There is nothing wrong in such a situation with keeping an already trapped deer inside the house." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to deal with hunting (trapping) the topic covered in the last chapter. It also begins to discuss wounding animals.", + "The eight creeping things which are mentioned in the Torah: he who hunts them or wounds them [on Shabbat] is liable; The Torah lists eight creeping things which are impure. According to our mishnah, one who hunts one of these things is liable, for it is was normal to hunt them in order to use their hide. Furthermore, one who wounds them is also liable, a forbidden labor derived from the prohibition against slaughtering. Other commentators explain that “wounding” is derived not from slaughtering but from dyeing, since when the blood comes out it colors the hide. Maimonides explains that “wounding” is derived from “threshing” both are activities which separate one thing from another. In wounding, blood is separated from the body.", + "But [as for] other abominations and creeping things, he who wounds them is exempt. Other “creeping things” do not have hides and hence one who wounds them is not liable. In order to be liable for something like slaughtering the animal must have a hide for on the hide a permanent scar would be life.", + "He who hunts them for need is liable; Not for need, he is exempt. With regard to hunting, if she hunts them to use them for a specific purpose, such as medicine, she is liable. However, it is not normal to hunt these things and therefore if she hunts them for no specific purpose, she is not liable.", + "A beast or a chicken in one’s own domain, he who hunts them is exempt. He who wounds them is liable. If a beast (a domesticated) or chicken is already on one’s domain, then they need not be further trapped, and therefore one who does trap them is exempt. Cows, sheep, goats and chickens, the domesticated animals, are already trapped by their very domesticated nature. Therefore, further hunting (trapping) of them does not apply. However, since they (according to the rabbis) have hides one who wounds them is liable." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with preparing pickling brine on Shabbat. According to commentators, this is similar to processing hides because both change the nature of something by soaking it in a mixture.", + "They do not prepare [pickling] brine on Shabbat, but he may prepare salt water and dip his bread into it or put it into a cooked dish. Pickling brine is “hilmi” in Hebrew. “Hilmi” was a mixture of water, salt and a little bit of oil. It was used to pickle vegetables. Making “hilmi” is prohibited but making “salt water” is allowed (note that she is not merely “exempt” rather this is allowed.) Albeck explains (based on the Palestinian Talmud) that making “hilmi” is the work of a professional and was therefore prohibited. “Salt water” is made by non-professionals and hence is prohibited. The Babylonian Talmud explains that “hilmi” was a large mixture, whereas as “salt water” is the same mixture but a smaller amount.", + "Rabbi Yose said: but that is brine, whether [one prepares] much or little? Rather what is the salt water that is permitted? Oil is first put into the water or into the salt. Rabbi Yose says that even “salt water” can be considered “hilmi” and therefore it too should be forbidden. According to the Babylonian Talmud’s explanation, Rabbi Yose says that if we allow the making of salt water which is a small amount of “hilmi” people will think that small amounts of work are permitted but larger amounts are prohibited. Therefore, if she wishes to make salt water, she should first put the oil either into the water or into the salt, and only afterwards put in the water. In this way she weakens the salt, making it dissimilar enough to “hilmi” that it is permitted. No one will think that she is making a solution that will pickle the vegetables." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah discusses taking medicine or performing acts of healing on Shabbat. If there is any danger to a person’s life, even a potential danger, all medicines and acts of healing are permitted. Indeed they are mandated. However, the sages forbade the use of medicines which are for aches, pains, etc. that are not life-threatening. According to most commentators, the reason for this prohibition is that most drugs were made by grinding roots or other parts of plants. Grinding roots is prohibited as a derivative of grinding wheat. However, in the Palestinian Talmud the reason that healing is prohibited on Shabbat is so that a person should distinguish between Shabbat and the week.", + "They do not eat Greek hyssop on Shabbat, because it is not the food of healthy people. Greek hyssop is eaten only by sick people. When one eats this type of hyssop everyone knows that the person is eating it for medicinal purposes. Hence, it is prohibited, as we explained above.", + "But he may eat yo’ezer and drink abuv ro’eh. Yo’ezer and abuv ro’eh are types of plants that are often used for medicinal purposes, but they are also eaten or drunk in potions by healthy people. Since, when a person eats or drinks these things, it won’t be recognized that she is taking medicine, it is permitted. It is only prohibited to eat or drink something for medicinal purposes if everyone observing will see that she is doing so for healing.", + "A man may eat any kind of food as medicine, and drink any liquid, except water of palm trees and a potion of roots, because they are for jaundice. Foods may always be eaten and liquids may always be imbibed even if the person intends to use them for medicinal purposes. Since healthy people also eat these foods or drink these drinks, it will not be recognizable that she is doing anything for medicinal purposes. The only exception to this rule is water of palm trees and a potion of roots which were used for jaundice. Since the face of the person drinking these things is yellow, it will be recognized that she is drinking them for medicinal purposes. Hence, a person who has jaundice is not allowed to drink these things.", + "But he may drink water of palm trees for his thirst and rub himself with oil of roots for a non-medical purpose. However, a person who does not have jaundice and is merely thirsty may drink these things. Since she looks healthy, no one will think she is taking medicine on Shabbat. She may also rub herself with oil of roots, as long as she does so for comfort and not for medicinal purposes." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to deal with acts of healing on Shabbat.", + "He who feels pain in his teeth may not sip vinegar through them, but he may dip [his bread in vinegar] in the usual manner, and if he is cured, he is cured. Vinegar was used as an ailment for toothaches. Therefore, one who has a toothache is not allowed to sip vinegar through his teeth, since this is obviously for healing purposes. However, he may dip his bread in vinegar in a manner which is done typically during the week. Since this is a normal activity performed not only for healing, it is permitted. If by doing so he is cured, so be it.", + "He who feels pain in his hips may not rub them with wine or vinegar, but he may anoint them with oil but not rose oil. The children of royalty may anoint their wounds with rose oil, since it is their practice to anoint themselves thus on weekdays. Rabbi Shimon said: all Israel are royal children. Vinegar or wine was evidently rubbed on a person’s hips to cure pains (backache? arthritis?). Since this is the only reason that they would be rubbed on one’s body, it is forbidden to do so on Shabbat. However, oil may be rubbed on a person’s body for a variety of other reasons and therefore it is permitted to rub oil for medicinal purposes as well. When one does so it will not be recognized by others that she is healing herself. Nevertheless, rose oil is forbidden since normal people don’t rub expensive rose oil on themselves except for medicinal purposes. Again, this rule suffers one exception. Children of royalty may anoint themselves with rose oil since they do so on the weekdays. The rule is consistent: a person may perform an act of healing on Shabbat if she regularly performs that same act for purposes other than healing. Finally, on a more poetic note, Rabbi Shimon states that all Jews are to be considered as the children of royalty, and therefore they all may anoint themselves with oil, regardless of their actual wealth. We might delay for a moment on the philosophy that lies behind Rabbi Shimon’s words. Differences in wealth do not create essential distinctions between Jews and therefore the halakhah must (at least in this case) treat them equally. Their value stems from their having accepted the Torah and is irregardless of their actual monetary wealth." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah and the following one deal with the prohibited labors of tying and untying. As we shall see in the mishnah, one is liable only if the knot is one that is intended to last.", + "These are the knots for which a person is liable? Camel-drivers’ knots and sailors’ knots. And just as one is guilty for tying them, so one is guilty for untying them. Rabbi Meir says: any knot which one can untie with one hand they are not liable for it. Camel-drivers would tie ropes to their camels’ noses and the ropes would remain permanently attached to the camels. Similarly, sailors would permanently tie their ropes to their ships. Since these knots are intended to remain in their place for good, one who ties are unties such a knot is liable. Rabbi Meir states a different criterion for determining whether a given knot entails liability. If one can untie the knot with one hand it is not a knot which entails a liability, even if it is intended to remain permanently in its place. It is interesting to note that according to the first opinion, what determines liability is intent if it is intended that the knot remain forever then one is liable. In contrast, the physical nature of the knot is, according to Rabbi Meir, what determines liability. This is a debate we have often noted in the Mishnah is the halakhah determined by the physical nature of an act or by the intention with which the act was performed." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is a direct continuation of yesterday’s mishnah.", + "You have some knots for which one is not liable like [one is] for camel-drivers’ knots and sailors’ knots. The mishnah explains that there are some knots for which one is not liable and yet it is still prohibited to tie or untie them. These knots are somewhat like camel drivers’ and sailors’ knots and yet they are different. The mishnah itself does not explain what these knots are. The Babylonian Talmud explains that these are semi-permanent knots, ones which remain in place for some time but are not meant to be permanent. Since these remain in place for a long time, it is forbidden to tie or untie them. However, since they are not truly permanent, one who does tie or untie them is not liable.", + "A woman may tie up the opening of her chemise, the strings of her hair-net and of her belt, the laces of her shoes or sandals, leather-bottles of wine and oil, and a meat dish. Now the mishnah lists knots which one is completely permitted to tie and untie on Shabbat. These are all impermanent knots and therefore they entail no liability.", + "Rabbi Elazar ben Ya’akov says: one may tie [a rope] in front of an animal, that it should not go out. According to Rabbi Elazar ben Ya’akov it is permitted to tie a rope across the pen of an animal so that the animal will not escape.", + "One may tie a bucket [over a well] with a belt but not with a rope; Rabbi Judah permits it. Rabbi Judah stated a general rule: any knot that is not permanent one is not liable for it. According to the sages, it is forbidden to tie a bucket over a well with a rope because sometimes these ropes are left there permanently. However, it is permitted with a belt because the belt won’t be left there for very long. Rabbi Judah however, permits one to tie a bucket over a well even with a rope because the bucket will not be left there permanently. In the last clause of the mishnah, Rabbi Judah explains that as long as the knot is not permanent, one cannot be liable for it. This is the same opinion as the sages in the previous mishnah, but it differs from Rabbi Meir in that mishnah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nSince yesterday’s mishnah dealt briefly with clothing (a woman tying her clothing on Shabbat) today’s mishnah also deals with clothing.", + "One may fold clothing even four or five times, and spread the sheets on the beds on the Shabbat evening for [use on] Shabbat, but not on Shabbat for [use on] the day after Shabbat. This mishnah deals with preparing things on Shabbat for use either on Shabbat or after Shabbat. The first section teaches that one may fold clothing and spread sheets on a bed as long as the clothing or bed will be used on Shabbat itself. It is forbidden to fold clothes or spread sheets on a bed if they will not be used until after Shabbat. We may deduce from here that in general it is prohibited to prepare things on Shabbat that will not be used until after Shabbat.", + "Rabbi Yishmael says: one may fold clothing and spread the sheets on the beds on Yom Kippur for [use on] Shabbat, and the fat pieces of the Shabbat offering may be offered on Yom Kippur. Rabbi Yishmael allows preparing things on Yom Kippur which will not be used until Shabbat, since the sanctity of Yom Kippur is less than that of Shabbat. [Note, in today’s calendar which is fixed Yom Kippur cannot fall on Friday. In the time of the Mishnah the calendar was not fixed and hence this was possible.] Furthermore, if Yom Kippur falls on Sunday [this also can’t happen according to our fixed calendar] then Shabbat offerings that hadn’t been fully offered on Shabbat may be offered on Yom Kippur. However, if Yom Kippur were to fall on Friday, the Yom Kippur offerings could not be offered on Shabbat because Shabbat’s holiness is higher than that of Yom Kippur. On Shabbat only sacrifices that must be offered on Shabbat can be sacrificed.", + "Rabbi Akiva says: those of Shabbat may not be offered on Yom Kippur, nor may those of Yom Kippur be offered on Shabbat. Rabbi Akiva thinks that the sanctity of Shabbat and Yom Kippur is equivalent. Therefore the offerings of one day cannot be offered on the other. All the more so would it be forbidden to fold clothes or spread bed sheets on one of these days in preparation for the other." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis entire chapter deals with fires that have broken out on Shabbat. The rabbis forbade saving things from being destroyed by a fire lest a person come to extinguish the fire, an activity which is prohibited on Shabbat. Nevertheless there are some things which may be saved from fires on Shabbat.", + "All sacred writings may be saved from a fire, whether we read from them or not [on Shabbat]. Any scroll which contains part of the Bible (the “sacred writings”) may be saved from a fire on Shabbat, irregardless of whether that scroll is used on Shabbat. Some commentators explain that the mishnah refers to scrolls which were not read publicly on Shabbat. Others explain that the mishnah refers to scrolls that were not even read in private.", + "And even if they are written in any language, they must be stored. As an aside, the mishnah notes that scrolls containing the sacred writings must be put into a genizah (a place of storage) no matter what language they are written in. According to the Yerushalmi, these scrolls also must be saved from the fire.", + "And why do we not read them? Because of the neglect of the study house. The mishnah now asks the obvious question: why are there are scrolls from which we don’t read on Shabbat? The answer is that these scrolls are not read from lest the reader come to neglect the study sessions that occur in the study hall on Shabbat. On Shabbat the sages would teach the people halakhah in the study house. The problem was that often the people would find it more interesting to read what was in the Bible than to listen to these lectures. To prevent people from reading the Bible and thereb yneglecting the halakhic lectures of the sages, the sages forbade reading these scrolls on Shabbat. According to the Talmud, this prohibition only refers to the time when the lecture was actually taking place.", + "One may save the container of a scroll together with the scroll, and the container of tefillin together with the tefillin, even if it [also] contains money. Just as it is permitted to save sacred writings and tefillin (which contain scrolls of sacred writings) from fires, so too it is permitted to save their containers.", + "And to where may one rescue them? Into a closed alley. Ben Batera says: even into an open one. The mishnah now asks to where these scrolls may be saved. They certainly may not be removed from the private domain to the public domain, for that would in and of itself be a forbidden labor. According to the first opinion, they may be removed to a closed alley, which means one that it is not open on both ends. Ben Batera says it even may be removed to an alley which is open from both ends." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with how much food may be saved from a fire on Shabbat.", + "Food for three meals may be saved, that which is fit for a person, for a person, that which is fit for a beast, for a beast. If a fire breaks out and threatens to destroy food, one may save only enough food for Shabbat itself. It is forbidden to save food that will not be used until after Shabbat. It is permitted to save three meals for a person if the food is fit for a person and sufficient food for animals, if the food is fit for animals.", + "How is this so? If a fire breaks out on the eve of Shabbat, food for three meals may be saved. If in the morning, food for two meals may be saved. If at [the time of] minhah, food for one meal. The mishnah now illustrates when three meals may be saved. The principle is simple: one can save food for as many meals as will be eaten on Shabbat, assuming that a person will eat three meals. Therefore, if the fire breaks out before the evening meal, then three meals may be saved. If in the morning, then two meals may be saved and if at minhah time (in the afternoon) then only enough for one meal may be saved.", + "Rabbi Yose says: at all times we may save food for three meals. Rabbi Yose holds that the measure of food which may be saved remains the same no matter when the fire breaks out." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah continues to deal with saving food from a fire on Shabbat.", + "One may save a basket full of loaves, even if it contains [enough for] a hundred meals, and a round cake of pressed figs, and a barrel of wine. In yesterday’s mishnah we learned that a person may save only enough for three meals on Shabbat. Today we learn that if a lot of food is bundled into one package, she may save the entire package even though there is more than enough for three meals. Since the food is all packaged together, it is treated as if she is only saving one thing and therefore it is permissible.", + "And he [the owner] may say to others, “Come and save for yourselves.” And if they are clever, they make an account with him after Shabbat. The mishnah now tries to arrange a “legal fiction” whereby a person can save more than enough for three meals. If she sees that her food will be destroyed by the fire, she may say to her neighbors, “Come and save this food for yourselves.” In this way, everyone may save three meals. This is permitted since people normally invite over guests on Shabbat. Furthermore, if the neighbors are clever they may realize that her intention is not really to give the food away but rather recover it for herself. The mishnah permits them to come back to her after Shabbat so that the original owners may pay to get it back. According to Albeck, the people who saved the food will actually pay for the food they used. According to the Talmud, those whose food was saved pay them for their troubles. .", + "To where may they be saved? Into a courtyard which has an eruv. Ben Batera says: even into a courtyard which does not have an eruv. The mishnah now asks where the food can be removed to. It obviously cannot be removed to the public domain, for that would constitute carrying from one domain to another. According to the first opinion, it can only be removed to a courtyard in which carrying is allowed, that is to say one which already has an eruv. Ben Batera is slightly more lenient, as he was in the first mishnah of this chapter. He allows the food to be removed even to a courtyard which does not have an eruv. In any case the halakhah is more stringent here than it was with regard to the Holy Scriptures in mishnah one." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses saving clothing from the fire on Shabbat.", + "And to there he may carry out all his utensils; She may also save any utensils that he will need on that Shabbat. She may bring them out to the courtyard mentioned in yesterday’s mishnah.", + "And he may wear all that he can wear and wrap himself in all that he can wrap himself. Rabbi Yose says: [only] eighteen pieces of clothing. She may also put on as much clothing as she wishes in order to wear it out into the courtyard, and thereby prevent it from being destroyed by the fire. Rabbi Yose does not allow this. He limits the amount of clothing to eighteen articles, which according to the Talmud, is what people would normally wear during the week.", + "Then he may go back in and put on [more clothes] and carry them out. The mishnah allows her to keep going back into the house to wear more clothing. This is another legal fiction meant to allow one to save more than just one set of clothing.", + "And he may say to others, “Come and save with me.” The person whose clothing is threatened by the fire may invite other people to come wear her clothing, and thereby save them from the fire. The “fiction” is that she is only inviting people to wear her clothing, wherein reality it is obvious that they are saving for her. Indeed, unlike the case of food in the previous mishnah, here she actually says, “Come and save with me.” Above she said, “For you.”" + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah introduces means which may be used to keep the fire from spreading.", + "Rabbi Shimon ben Nannas says: one may spread a goat skin over a box, chest, or trunk which has caught fire, because he singes. Rabbi Shimon ben Nannas allows one to spread a goat’s hide over various types of boxes since the hide won’t burn but will only become singed. The will serve as an effective barrier from the fire.", + "And one may make a barrier with all vessels, whether full [of water] or empty, that the fire should not travel onward. Rabbi Yose forbids in the case of new earthen vessels filled with water, because since they cannot stand the heat, they will burst and extinguish the fire. Other barriers may also be erected, and one may fill vessels even with water to prevent the fire from traveling onward. Even though this will almost surely cause the fire to go out, since the fire is being put out indirectly it is permitted in a case such as this where there is a fear of financial loss. Rabbi Yose, however, prohibits setting up new vessels filled with water to stop the fire since these will certainly break. Rabbi Yose holds that it is forbidden to indirectly cause a fire to be extinguished, even if this will cause a loss." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with a non-Jew or minor, both of whom are not obligated to observe the commandments, who want to extinguish the fire.", + "If a non-Jew comes to extinguish, they do not say to him, “extinguish it” or “do not extinguish,” because his resting is not their obligation. One may not ask a non-Jew to perform a forbidden labor on behalf of a Jew on Shabbat. Even though people often think that this is permitted, talmudic literature and subsequent halakhic authorities clearly prohibit it. However, if the non-Jew comes on his own accord to extinguish the fire, Jews are not obligated to stop her from doing so. A Jew is not obligated to make a non-Jew rest on Shabbat. Therefore, if the non-Jew wishes to, she may put out the fire.", + "But if a minor comes to extinguish, they must not listen to him, because his resting is their obligation. If a minor comes to extinguish the fire the Jew must stop the minor from doing so, because the Jew has an obligation to make sure that the minor ceases performing forbidden labors on Shabbat. The fact that the minor doesn’t really know that what she is doing is forbidden does not mean that she is allowed to do forbidden work on Shabbat, or that we may allow her to do such work. We should note that according to the Talmud Jews do not have to stop minors from doing forbidden things such as eating non-kosher food, or performing forbidden labors on Shabbat. The mishnah refers to a case where the minor knows that the father wants to put the fire out and hence is doing so on her father’s behalf. In such a case, other Jews are required to stop the minor from doing so." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe mishnah teaches that sometimes one may cover certain things with a dish on Shabbat in order to avoid undesirable results.", + "One may turn a dish over a lamp so that the beams should not catch [fire], and over an infant’s excrement, and over a scorpion so that it should not bite. Rabbi Judah said: an incident came before Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai in Arabia and he said, “I fear that he may be liable for a sin-offering.” Again, the mishnah teaches that one can do certain things to prevent a fire from spreading on Shabbat. In the case mentioned here, if the fire were to catch the beams which hold up the roof, it could cause significant damage. Hence, it is permitted to turn a dish over it to prevent it from spreading. The mishnah continues to list other instances in which one can overturn a dish on Shabbat. The first is over the excrement of an infant, which itself cannot be moved because it is muktzeh (off-limits). It is muktzeh because it is disgusting. So even though it is muktzeh, one may carry a vessel to cover it. The second thing is covering a scorpion with a dish so that it will not bite. Although this may be seen as trapping/hunting, since she does so not for her own need (i.e. to use the scorpion) but rather to prevent it from causing damage, it is permitted. However, R. Yohanan ben Zakkai thinks that one who turns a dish over a scorpion is dangerously close to being liable to bring a sin-offering on Shabbat, i.e. this may be prohibited. The problem is that if she covers the scorpion to catch it and then use it for medicinal purposes, she would be liable (see Eduyot 2:5). When this incident came before R. Yohanan ben Zakkai he didn’t outright rule that the person was liable, but neither did he say that it was fully permissible." + ], + [ + "If a Gentile lights a lamp, an Israelite may make use of its light. But if [he does it] for the sake of the Israelite, it is forbidden.
If he draws water to give his own animal to drink, an Israelite may water his [animal] after him. But if [he draws it] for the Israelite’s sake, it is forbidden.
If a Gentile makes a plank to descend [off a ship by] it, an Israelite may descend after him; But if on the Israelite’s account, it is forbidden. It once happened that Rabban Gamaliel and the elders were traveling in a ship, when a Gentile made a plank for getting off, and Rabban Gamaliel, and the elders descended by it.
The central point of this mishnah is that if a Gentile does a prohibited labor on Shabbat for his own benefit, then an Israelite may make use of what the Gentile did. However, if the Gentile does on the Israelite’s behalf, it is prohibited for the Jew to benefit from it. A Jew can certainly not tell a non-Jew to perform for the Jew on Shabbat an activity which the Jew himself may not perform. According to the mishnah, even if the Gentile did it without being told, if he did it on the Jew’s behalf it is forbidden.
Section two: The reason that drawing water is prohibited is that the cistern from which the water is drawn is considered a “private domain” and the cistern itself is found in the public domain. Taking water out of the cistern is therefore prohibited because of “carrying.”
Section three: Laying down the plank is forbidden because it is considered “building.” Rabban Gamaliel and the other elders descended because the Gentile had made the plank for his own use, or at least for his own use as well as the use of others." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThere are certain objects which it is forbidden to carry or move on Shabbat and they are called in Hebrew, “muktzeh” which literally means “set aside.” There are several reasons why the rabbis prohibited carrying certain types of vessels on Shabbat, but the most basic reason is to preserve the character of Shabbat as distinct from all other days. In other words, even though certain activities may be technically permitted, they are opposed to the “spirit” of Shabbat, and hence the sages did all that they could to keep a person away from such activities or even from the appearance of performing such activities. Another reason is that if one is allowed to touch a vessel which is used to perform prohibited work, one might come to perform the work itself.\nAs a general rule, if a vessel is used for activities which are permitted on Shabbat, then one can carry the vessel on Shabbat. An example of such a vessel would be a cup or a plate. If the vessel is used for things prohibited on Shabbat, then it is still permissible to carry the vessel as long as the intention is not to use it to perform a prohibited labor. It can be carried to perform a permitted labor and it also may be carried because the person simply doesn’t want it to be where it currently is.\nThis chapter will teach the details of the laws of muktzeh.\nA note on translation: the Hebrew word for vessel is “keli.” This word can be used to refer to things that we commonly call utensils, and it can also refer to clothes. It would include most anything made by people with the exception of things attached to the ground such as homes. The article also must be used as an instrument to do something else a book or a document is not a “keli.”", + "All utensils may be carried on Shabbat and their doors with them, even if they became detached on Shabbat, for they are not like the doors of a house, which are not set aside for use. All vessels that have doors and which are used for permitted activities on Shabbat, may be carried with their doors. An example would be a trunk which has a door on its top. Furthermore, one may carry the doors on Shabbat even if the doors become detached from their vessels. This is true even if the doors became detached before Shabbat. The mishnah compares these doors with those of a house. House doors may not be carried on Shabbat because they are not normally carried around; rather they are attached to the house which is attached to the ground. Something may be carried only if it is an item that is normally carried. This is true with regard to doors of a vessel which are in normal situations carried with as part of their vessels." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah teaches that one may carry a vessel that is normally used to perform prohibited labor provided that the intent is to use it for something permitted on Shabbat.", + "A man may take a hammer to split nuts, an axe to cut a cake of pressed figs, a saw for sawing cheese, a rake to scoop up dried figs, a winnowing shovel and a pitchfork to place [food] upon it for a child, a reed or a shuttle to stick [food], a small needle to remove a thorn, and a sack [needle] to open a door. There are several types of utensils mentioned in this mishnah: a hammer, an axe, a saw, a rake, a shovel or pitchfork, a reed or shuttle (both used in sewing), a needle and a sack needle. All of these things are normally used to perform forbidden labors. However, this mishnah teaches that a person may use them for permitted labors on Shabbat. In all of these cases, the vessel listed is not the one normally used for such a labor. Nevertheless, since the vessel can be used for said purpose, it is permitted. For instance, if a person lost the key to a door, she may use a needle to try to pick a lock." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses a “reed for olives.” This is a vessel used in the process of making olive oil. They would put the olives in a large container so that they would heat up, start to soften and the juice would flow out. The container would be flipped over by using the “reed for olives.” When they flipped the container they would check the reed to see if it was moist. If it was they would know that the olives were soft and that they could begin to press them. Our mishnah teaches two laws with regard to this reed: its susceptibility to impurity and whether it may be carried on Shabbat. Both laws depend on whether or not the reed is considered to be a “vessel.”", + "A reed for olives, if it has a knot on its top, is susceptible to impurity; if not, it is not susceptible to impurity. Sometimes they would make a small knot on top of the reed. This knot would serve as a small receptacle for the olive oil and it would make it easier to check if the olives were ready. If the reed has such a knot then it is susceptible to impurity and if not, then it is not susceptible. Wooden vessels are generally only susceptible to impurity if they have a receptacle.", + "In both cases it may be handled on Shabbat. Since this is a vessel, it is permitted to carry it on Shabbat either to use it to do something permitted, or to move it because she needs to use the space it occupies. In other words, with regard to receiving impurity, this is not a vessel unless it has a knot, but when it comes to Shabbat, it is considered a vessel with or without the knot. Had it not been considered a vessel, it would have been prohibited to carry it on Shabbat for any reason." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah provides some general rules concerning which vessels may be carried on Shabbat and when they may be carried.", + "Rabbi Yose says: all vessels may be carried, except a large saw and the pin of a plough. The reason that one may not carry a large saw or the pin of a plough is that people are very careful not to ruin these things. Since they are so careful with these things, they won’t use them for other purposes, and since the normal use of these things is prohibited on Shabbat, they may not be carried at all.", + "All vessels may be carried whether required or not required. Rabbi Nehemiah says: they may be handled only for what is required. According to the first opinion in the mishnah, all vessels may be carried whether there is a need for them or not. In the Talmud there is a debate what it means when the mishnah says they are “not required.” According to one explanation, “not required” means that the person doesn’t want to use the vessel itself, but rather wants to move it away from its current place. For instance, I might want to move a knife not to use the knife to cut something but to keep it away from my child. According to this explanation, there must be some purpose to moving the knife. Another explanation is that “not required” means that the person is carrying it for no reason whatsoever. Our explanation of this clause will impact our explanation of Rabbi Nehemiah’s debate. According to the first explanation, Rabbi Nehemiah forbids carrying the object unless the object itself is needed. For instance, a knife may be carried only if one wants to use the knife itself. According to the second explanation, Rabbi Nehemiah would allow carrying the knife even if one only wants to move it to clear it from its current place. He would forbid moving the vessel only if there was truly no purpose to doing so." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is concerned with carrying the fragments of vessels on Shabbat.", + "All vessels which may be carried on Shabbat, their broken pieces may be carried with them, as long as they can perform something in the nature of work. [Thus]: the fragments of a kneading trough [can be used] to cover the mouth of a barrel, [and] the fragments of glass [can be used] to cover the mouth of a flask. Broken pieces of vessels may still be carried on Shabbat as long as the broken pieces can be used for some purpose. The mishnah illustrates what this means. According to the first opinion, the shard need no longer fill any function related to the purpose of the vessel from which it came. Rather it needs only to have some minimal amount of use.", + "Rabbi Judah says: as long as they can perform something in the nature of their own work; [Thus:] the fragments of a kneading trough, to pour into them a thick mixture; and [the fragments] of a glass, to pour into them oil. Rabbi Judah says that the vessel must still have a use related to the function of the vessel of which it was originally a part. Thus a piece of a kneading trough must still be large enough to hold a thick mixture, a usage similar to its original usage. The Talmud explains that Rabbi Judah is referring to a case where the vessel broke on Shabbat itself. In such a case, since when Shabbat began the vessel was intended for a specific purpose (such as kneading) no part of it can be used for something else on Shabbat. By breaking on Shabbat and being used for something else it would be like a new vessel, one that was in essence made on Shabbat. However, if the vessel was broken before Shabbat its pieces can be carried for other purposes on Shabbat, because when Shabbat began they were already capable of fulfilling other purposes." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with certain unusual contraptions used to draw water from a well.", + "A stone in a dried-out pumpkin: If one can draw [water] in it and it [the stone] does not fall out, one may draw [water] in it; if not, one may not draw water in it. They would use the dried-out pumpkin to draw water from a cistern or well. Because the pumpkin would float, they would place a stone in it to weigh the pumpkin down and submerge it in the water. If the stone was attached well to the pumpkin, such that the stone would not fall out when submerged, one can use this contraption to draw water on Shabbat. In such a case the stone is part of the vessel and it is not muktzeh. However, if the stone is not attached well then one can’t use it, just as one cannot pick up other non-useful stones on Shabbat. Such stones are muktzeh because they have no practical use.", + "A vine-branch tied to a pitcher: one may draw [water] with it on Shabbat. The pitcher was attached to a vine in order to lower it down into the well. The mishnah rules that one may use such a contraption on Shabbat and that the vine is not muktzeh. Were the vine not to have a practical use, it would be muktzeh." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses window-shutters. These shutters were not always attached to the frame of the house as they are today. Rather, they were sometimes attached and sometimes totally detached.", + "A window-shutter: Rabbi Eliezer says: when it is connected and suspended, one may close [the window] with it; if not, one may not close [the window] with it. But the sages say: in both cases one may close [the window] with it. According to Rabbi Eliezer, it is permitted to close the window with the shutter only if the shutter is already connected to the frame of the house. If it is not connected, then closing the window with it would be prohibited because it is similar to “building.” In essence by closing the window it is as if he is adding another plank to the structure of the house. However, if the shutter is attached and suspended from the house, then it is already part of the house and closing it is no different from closing the door of a house, which is of course permitted. The sages say that it is permitted to close the window whether or not the shutter is attached to the house. It is not considered “building” because the shutter is not permanently going to become part of the house." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with carrying lids on Shabbat.", + "All lids of utensils which have a handle may be carried on Shabbat. Since the lids have handles, they may be carried on Shabbat independent of the vessels which they cover. Indeed, they themselves are considered vessels/utensils, since they have handles.", + "Rabbi Yose said: in reference to what is that said? In the case of lids which cover the ground, but lids of vessels may in any case be carried on Shabbat. Rabbi Yose limits the application of the rule stated above. That rule applies only to lids used to cover holes in the ground. These may only be carried on Shabbat if they have handles. If they don’t have handles, it looks like one is using them to permanently cover a hole in the ground, in which case this would be too similar to “building.” If they have handles, then it is clear that they will not be used to permanently cover the hole. However, lids of vessels (i.e. pots and pans) may be carried whether or not they have handles. It is clear that such lids are only temporary and that they are part of the vessel which they cover." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with clearing food away in order to make room for other things. Even though it is permitted to carry foods (both those for animals and those for people), the sages did not permit this if it was a lot of trouble to do so. Under certain circumstances, it was permitted even if moving the food required a lot of work.", + "One may clear away even four or five baskets of straw or produce to make room for guests or on account of the neglect of the study hall, but not the storehouse. Under normal circumstances, it would be forbidden to move large portions of straw and produce on Shabbat. Moving large baskets is a lot of work, and so to preserve the character of Shabbat as a day of rest, the sages said that this was forbidden. Therefore, moving baskets out of a storehouse is forbidden. However, if moving baskets is done in order to make room for guests or in order to clear out the study hall so that people can sit and learn, it is permitted. These are two important mitzvot (welcoming guests and studying Torah) and therefore the sages allowed one to do things for their sake that would normally be prohibited.", + "One may clear away pure terumah, doubtfully tithed produce, the first tithe whose terumah has been separated, redeemed second tithe and sanctified things, and dry lupinus, because it is food for goats. But [one may] not [clear away] untithed produce, first tithe whose terumah has not been taken, unredeemed second tithe and sanctified things, luf or mustard. Rabbi Shimon b. Gamaliel permits [it] in the case of luf, because it is food for ravens. The mishnah now deals with which foods one is allowed to move and which foods one is not allowed to move on Shabbat. The first list is mostly of foods that may be eaten on Shabbat, even if not everyone can eat them. Pure terumah may be eaten by priests, so it may be carried even by Israelites. In contrast, impure terumah cannot be eaten by anyone and therefore it cannot be carried. Doubtfully-tithed produce may be eaten by poor people. The first tithe is eaten by Levites, but only once terumah has been separated from it. Second tithe and sanctified things are redeemed with money and then one brings the money to Jerusalem and uses it there. The produce and sanctified things then become non-sacred and one may eat them, hence they can be carried. Lupinus is a type of bean and since it is eaten by goats, it may be carried on Shabbat. [Note that printed editions of the mishnah state that lupinus is eaten by poor people. Albeck says that this is a mistake.] The second list is of things which may not be eaten on Shabbat and hence cannot be carried. These include most of the opposites to the previous list. Note, terumah and tithes may not be separated on Shabbat such that un-tithed produce cannot be “fixed” by tithing it until after Shabbat. Mustard seed is not eaten until it is processed. Since it can’t be processed on Shabbat, the raw seeds cannot be carried either [you may carry your Grey Poupon as long as it has a heksher ☺. “Luf” is a type of onion. According to the first opinion, it is not eaten it can’t be carried on Shabbat. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel disagrees and holds that since luf is eaten by ravens, it is food and can be carried on Shabbat. The Talmud explains that rich people and kings would raise ravens and give them luf to eat. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says that all Jews are considered to be like kings and therefore all Jews can carry luf on Shabbat. The other sages hold that since people don’t normally raise ravens, food for ravens cannot be carried on Shabbat." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe mishnah begins by discussing things which were prepared to be given as fodder to animals. The remainder of the mishnah deals with other laws concerning animals on Shabbat.", + "Bundles of straw, bundles of twigs, or bundles of young shoots, if they were prepared as animal food, they may be carried; if not, they may not be carried. It is permissible to carry animal food on Shabbat, so if these bundles of various things were prepared for this purpose they may be carried. However, if they weren’t specifically prepared to be animal food then we can assume that they were prepared to be used in lighting a stove or oven, an act prohibited on Shabbat. Therefore, they may not be carried for they are muktzeh.", + "One may overturn a basket before young birds, so that they will get up and then get down. The young birds themselves are muktzeh since there is nothing that one can do with them on Shabbat. However, the mishnah holds that one may nevertheless move a basket in front of them so that they will get up onto the basket and then get off of it.", + "A chicken which has run away, they may push her until she re-enters. Again, it is forbidden to hold the chicken itself because it is muktzeh. However, if it runs away one may push it back to its place. This is assumedly allowed to prevent the loss of the chicken, just as activities normally prohibited on Shabbat were allowed to prevent loss of property from fire.", + "One may make calves and foals walk in the public domain. And a woman may make her son walk. Rabbi Judah says: when is this so? If he lifts one [foot] and places [another] down; but if he drags them it is forbidden. One can help small animals or toddlers walk around on Shabbat and we need not be concerned that the mother or the one helping the animal will pick the animal up, which is forbidden. Rabbi Judah limits this permission to a child who can at least walk a little bit on his own. But if the child is only “dragging its feet”, then one can’t help it walk on Shabbat, lest one come to pick it up and thereby carry it." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nMost of this mishnah discusses assisting an animal and a woman in giving birth on Shabbat and festivals. The final clause begins to discuss circumcision, a topic which will more fully be covered in chapter nineteen.", + "One may not deliver an animal [in giving birth] on a festival, but one may assist it. It is forbidden for a Jew to deliver an animal’s newborn on a festival, because this is considered to be too much work for a Jew to do on a festival. Although it may not violate any specific prohibited labor (no pun intended) it is too great of a labor (now, pun intended) to be permitted on a festival or on Shabbat. By “delivering”, the Mishnah means to put one’s hand into the womb and remove the newborn. However, one may assist the animal in giving birth by receiving it as it comes out so that it doesn’t just fall to the floor. Since this is a lesser amount of work, it is permitted. This may only be done on the festival; on Shabbat even assisting the animal is forbidden.", + "One may deliver a woman [in giving birth] on Shabbat, summon a midwife for her from place to place, desecrate Shabbat on her account, and tie up the umbilical cord. Rabbi Yose says: one may cut it too. When it comes to aiding a woman in delivering her baby, any work is permitted on festivals and on Shabbat, even activities which are not directly connected to the birth. A midwife may be summoned from a far, even if this means she must travel to get there. Shabbat may be in all ways desecrated because the woman’s health is in danger and according to halakhah saving a life supersedes the laws of Shabbat. There is a debate about whether or not the umbilical cord may be cut. The first opinion holds that it may not be cut, since there is no real danger in leaving it connected until the end of Shabbat. Rabbi Yose holds that it may be cut, and the halakhah rules in accordance with his opinion.", + "And all the requirements of circumcision may be done on Shabbat. Anything connected with circumcision may be done on Shabbat. Leviticus 12:3 states that the child shall be circumcised on the eighth day and the rabbis read this to mean that he must be circumcised even if the eighth day falls on Shabbat. We will learn more about circumcision on Shabbat in the proceeding chapter." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses desecrating Shabbat in order to circumcise a child on Shabbat. While the tannaim do not debate that the circumcision itself is done on Shabbat, the question is what preparations for the circumcision may be done.", + "Rabbi Eliezer says: if one did not bring an instrument [with which to circumcise] on the eve of Shabbat, he must bring it on Shabbat uncovered; but in [times of] danger he hides it on the testimony of witnesses. Obviously, a knife is needed to perform the circumcision. According to Rabbi Eliezer, if one forgot to bring the knife he may bring it on Shabbat eve, even if this entails violating the prohibition of carrying on Shabbat. In normal times, the knife should be carried openly so that people will learn that the Shabbat is violated in order to perform the circumcision on Shabbat. However, in a time when the Roman authorities forbade circumcision (the Hadrianic persecutions, leading up to and following the Bar Kochba revolt) the knife should be hidden so as to avoid danger. The witnesses are needed to testify that the reason that he is carrying is only in order to perform a circumcision. In other words, they are for his protection.", + "Rabbi Eliezer said further: one may cut wood to make charcoal to make an iron instrument. Rabbi Eliezer goes to an even greater extreme. Even if one does not have any knife with which to circumcise, one may cut down wood to heat up iron to make a knife. It seems unlikely that one would actually find oneself in such a situation. Rabbi Eliezer’s statement is meant to have polemical value anything may be done so that the circumcision may be carried out on Shabbat.", + "Rabbi Akiva stated a general principle: any [manner of] work which could be performed on the eve of Shabbat does not supersede Shabbat; but that which could not be performed on the eve of Shabbat does supersede Shabbat. Rabbi Akiva disagrees with Rabbi Eliezer and holds that only activities that cannot be performed before Shabbat can be done on Shabbat itself. This would include the circumcision itself, as we shall learn in tomorrow’s mishnah. However, preparatory activities such as making the knife and carrying it to where the circumcision will be performed must be performed before Shabbat begins. The reason that Rabbi Akiva’s statement is phrased as a general rule is that it applies to several other halakhot as well (see Pesahim 6:2 and Menahot 11:3)." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah lists what aspects of circumcision may be performed on Shabbat according to Rabbi Akiva.", + "They may perform all the necessities of circumcision on Shabbat: circumcising, uncovering [the corona], sucking [the wound], and placing a compress and cumin upon [the wound]. The main necessities for performing the actual circumcision may all be performed on Shabbat, since these obviously cannot be performed prior to Shabbat. This includes the two main parts of the circumcision itself the cut and the tearing of the membrane which covers the corona. “Sucking the wound” was believed to have certain health benefits and hence was considered to be an essential part of the circumcision. Indeed the Talmud states that any mohel who doesn’t suck the wound is to be removed from his job. In our day, due to our knowledge of orally transmitted diseases, this part of the ritual has become very controversial. Some groups do not do this at all, claiming that there is no health benefit and that even in the Talmud it was not considered to be as essential as the “cutting and tearing”. Since the 19th century some mohels have been using various other contraptions to do the sucking, including a sponge and a glass tube. Some ultraorthodox groups still suck by direct contact with the mouth. The compress and cumin mixture were placed on the wound to aid in the healing. I do not know of any group that still uses cumin although compresses are still used by all.", + "If one did not grind [the cumin] on the eve of Shabbat, he may chew [it] with his teeth and apply [it to the wound]. On Shabbat itself, since grinding is a forbidden labor, it would be forbidden to grind the cumin in order to put it on the wound. If he hasn’t prepared the cumin before Shabbat while he may not grind it, he may chew it up in his mouth and then put it on the wound. Again, they didn’t know about germs in the days of the Talmud.", + "If he did not beat up wine and oil on the eve of Shabbat, he should apply each separately. They would also put a mixture of wine and oil on the wound. This mixture was beaten before Shabbat. If he hadn’t prepared the wine and oil before Shabbat, he cannot beat them on Shabbat but he may place the wine and oil in a bowl without vigorously beating them and then put them together on the wound.", + "They may not make a cloak for it in the first place, but he may wrap a rag about it. They would also make a special bandage called by the Mishnah a “cloak” which would be used to cover the head of the penis. This “cloak” should not be made on Shabbat. So if he didn’t make it before Shabbat, what he may do is temporarily wrap a small rag around the penis.", + "If this was not prepared from the eve of Shabbat, he may wind it about his finger and bring it, and even from another courtyard. If he didn’t bring the small rag to the place of the circumcision before Shabbat, he may not simply carry it, for that would be an outright violation of Shabbat. However, he may wrap the rag around his finger and carry it. This way it is as if he is wearing the rag (which is permitted) and not just carrying it. The mishnah allows it to be carried even from another courtyard. The commentators debate whether this implies that it also may be carried through the public domain." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first part of this mishnah discusses bathing the child on Shabbat before and after his circumcision. The second part of the mishnah deals with circumcision of a child on Shabbat if something about his status is doubtful.", + "They bathe the infant both before and after the circumcision, and sprinkle [warm water] over him by hand but not with a vessel. It is permitted to bathe the infant with hot water on Shabbat both before and after the circumcision. The mishnah now proceeds to explain that this bathing is not a full bath as is usually done when it is not Shabbat but rather just sprinkling him with water by hand. Some commentators explain that before he is circumcised the hot water may not be heated on Shabbat, but that after he is circumcised, when the bath is more crucial for his recovery, the water may be heated even on Shabbat.", + "R. Elazar ben Azaryah says: they may bathe an infant on the third day [of circumcision] which falls on the Shabbat, as it is said, “And it came to pass on the third day, when they were sore” (Genesis 34:25). Rabbi Elazar ben Azaryah disagrees with the previous opinion in two ways. First of all, he holds that the child may be bathed in a normal manner and not just by sprinkling on him. Secondly, the child may be bathed even if Shabbat falls on the third day after his circumcision, and not just on the day of the circumcision itself. This Rabbi Elazar ben Azaryah learns from the story of Shechem’s circumcision where we see that he and the people from his city were still hurting on the third day. Talmudic commentators debate whether this means that the infant may be bathed up until the third day, and also on the first and second day after the circumcision, or just the third day, but not the first two days. It seems to me that the first position is more reasonable. According to the latter position we would have to say that for some reason the pain is worse on the third day.", + "For one who about whom it is doubtful, and a hermaphrodite, they may not desecrate Shabbat But Rabbi Judah permits [it] in the case of a hermaphrodite. If a child is born at twilight it is considered doubtful whether he was born on the previous day or on the following day. Such a child can never be circumcised on Shabbat. For instance, let’s say he was born on twilight between Friday and Shabbat. His circumcision will end up being on Sunday. It can’t be on Friday, lest he was born on Shabbat and Friday is only the seventh day. It can’t be on Shabbat lest he was born on Friday and Shabbat would be the ninth day. Circumcision overrides the rules of Shabbat only if it is on the eighth day. Therefore the circumcision is pushed off until Sunday (we shall learn more about this below in mishnah five.) I should note that others explain the mishnah differently. This explanation goes according to Albeck. A hermaphrodite has signs of being both male and female. He is circumcised but his circumcision cannot take place on Shabbat. This is because we are not sure of his halakhic status as male and hence it could be that he doesn’t really need to be circumcised. His circumcision is “doubtful” and therefore it doesn’t override Shabbat. Rabbi Judah considers a hermaphrodite to be a male and therefore his circumcision overrides Shabbat." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses a case where there are two infants, one who should be circumcised on Shabbat and the other who should not be circumcised on Shabbat. The question is what happens if the babies get switched and someone circumcises on Shabbat the one who should have been circumcised on a different day.", + "If a man has two infants, one to circumcise after Shabbat and the other to circumcise on Shabbat, and he forgets and circumcises the one who should be circumcised after Shabbat on the Shabbat, he is liable. In the first case the mohel (the circumciser) ends up circumcising a baby on Shabbat who should have been circumcised after Shabbat. In other words, he desecrated Shabbat to circumcise a boy who had not yet reached his eighth day. This child was not yet obligated to be circumcised. Hence the circumciser is liable to bring a sin-offering for accidentally desecrating Shabbat.", + "[If he has] one to circumcise on the eve of Shabbat and another to circumcise on Shabbat, and he forgets and circumcises the one who should be circumcised on the eve of Shabbat on Shabbat: Rabbi Eliezer holds [him] liable to a sin-offering, but Rabbi Joshua exempts [him]. In this case it turns out that he circumcised a boy on Shabbat who should have been circumcised on Friday. Rabbi Eliezer maintains that he is still liable since he did, after all, circumcise on Shabbat in a case where he should not have done so. Only circumcision on the eighth day overrides Shabbat (this we learned in yesterday’s mishnah and we will learn again in tomorrow’s mishnah). Rabbi Joshua holds that since the child had already passed his eighth day and had therefore become obligated to be circumcised, the circumciser has fulfilled the commandment and is not liable. Note that Rabbi Joshua agrees that it is forbidden to circumcise a child on Shabbat on any other day but the eighth day. He only holds that if someone mistakenly did so to a child who was already obligated for circumcision, he is not liable." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nAs we have already mentioned, circumcision is done on Shabbat only if it is done on the eighth day. If it is done on any other day besides the eighth, then the circumcision must wait until after Shabbat. Our mishnah shows that sometimes this will delay the circumcision by several days.", + "An infant is circumcised on the eighth, ninth, tenth, eleventh, and twelfth [days], neither before nor later. How so?
In the normal situation, on the eighth. Normally, a child is circumcised on the eighth day.", + "If he is born at twilight, on the ninth; Twilight is a halakhically doubtful time we don’t know whether to consider it still the previous day or the day after. Therefore, if a boy is born at twilight, he is circumcised on what might be the ninth day. In other words we act as if he was born on the next day.", + "At twilight on the eve of Shabbat, on the tenth. If he is born on twilight on the eve of Shabbat, he can’t be circumcised on Shabbat because only circumcision on the eighth day overrides Shabbat, and Shabbat may be the ninth day. Therefore he is circumcised on Sunday, the tenth day.", + "If a festival follows Shabbat, on the eleventh. If Sunday is a festival, we must delay his circumcision until the eleventh day. Just as circumcision does not override Shabbat unless it is the eighth day, so too it does not override a festival unless it is on the eighth day.", + "If the two days of Rosh Hashanah [follow Shabbat], on the twelfth. Finally, if the two days of Rosh Hashanah follow Shabbat, then he will be circumcised on the twelfth day. We should note that even in the land of Israel Rosh Hashanah was observed for two days. In the Diaspora the same would hold true for the second day of festivals.", + "An infant who is sick is not circumcised until he recovers. Healthy infants can be circumcised on the eighth through twelfth days, but sick infants must wait until they recover from their illness to be circumcised. Their health overrides their need to be circumcised." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah talks about some of the physical aspects of circumcision.", + "These are the shreds which invalidate circumcision: flesh that covers the greater part of the corona; and he may not eat terumah. If there are little pieces of skin left after the foreskin was circumcised, they must be removed if they cover the greater part of the corona. If they are not removed the child is not considered circumcised and if he is a priest, he may not eat terumah, just as any non-circumcised priest may not eat terumah.", + "And if he is chubby, he must repair it for appearance sake. If the circumcision was done correctly, but due to the child’s chubby appearance it looks as if he was not circumcised, the mohel should repair the circumcision so that it looks like he was circumcised. Otherwise people will say that the child was not circumcised.", + "If one circumcises but does not uncover the circumcision, it is as though he has not circumcised. As we learned in mishnah two, an essential part of the circumcision is the tearing of the membrane underneath the corona. If this is not done, the circumcision is invalid. Note, that other aspects of the circumcision are less essential, including the sucking. The mishnah does not say that if the mohel did not suck the wound, the circumcision is invalid. This left room for some authorities to say that we don’t need to suck the wound, or at least that it need not be sucked through direct mouth to mouth contact." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with pouring wine through a strainer on festivals and Shabbat. They would suspend or sort of stretch the strainer over the mouth of a vessel and the unstrained wine would be poured through it.\nIn order to understand the mishnah we must remember that on festivals food may be prepared, even if this requires a labor normally prohibited such as slaughtering an animal or cooking a dish. The issue discussed here is can one prepare vessels with which to prepare food if these vessels could have been done prepared before the festival.\nOn Shabbat there are two issues involved in this mishnah: 1) the preparation of food; 2) the making of a vessel.", + "R. Eliezer says: one may suspend a strainer on festivals, and pour [wine] through a suspended [strainer] on Shabbat. According to Rabbi Eliezer, even though she could have set up the strainer the day before the festival, since the strainer is set up in order to prepare food, which is permitted on festivals, she may also suspend it on top of the vessel on the festival itself. She obviously may pour wine through it. On Shabbat, she cannot suspend the strainer for this is considered similar to making a tent, because she is placing the strainer on top of the vessel. However, Rabbi Eliezer holds that it is permitted to pour the wine through the strainer if it is already suspended and this is not considered an act of “selecting” (see 7:2). “Selecting” is separating the pebbles from the kernels and this is not similar enough to be forbidden.", + "But the sages say: one may not suspend a strainer on festivals, nor pour [wine] through a suspended [strainer] on Shabbat, but one may pour [it] through a suspended [strainer] on festivals. The sages disagree with Rabbi Eliezer on both issues. Since she could have prepared the strainer before the festival, it is forbidden to do so on the festival itself. This is the same opinion as Rabbi Akiva’s in 19:1 vessels which can be prepared before Shabbat or a festival cannot be prepared on Shabbat or a festival. Secondly, the sages hold that pouring the wine over the strainer is an act similar enough to “selecting” that it is prohibited on Shabbat. This is only permitted on festivals since on festivals food preparation is permitted." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to deal with straining things on Shabbat.", + "One may pour water over lees in order to clarify them; There are two explanations for this section. The first is that the lees of the wine are on the bottom of the strainer and that one may pour water over them so that the wine will flow through the strainer. While pouring the unfilterd wine over the strainer was forbidden, this is permitted. The second explanation is that the lees are on the bottom of a jug. One may pour water into the jug so that the lees will mix with the water and make a weak wine mixture.", + "and one may strain wine through cloths and through a basket made of palm twigs; This section allows wine to be passed through either a special cloth or basket to help clarify it. The question which we must ask is what makes this different from the previous mishnah where the sages were more stringent regarding pouring wine through a strainer? According to some commentators, this cloth or basket was already set up before Shabbat. Furthermore, there is no problem of “selecting” here because this wine is drinkable even if it isn’t passed through these secondary strainers. Others explain that this is permitted because it is not the usual way of straining and things are often more permissible if they are done differently on Shabbat.", + "and one may place an egg in a mustard strainer; This refers to breaking an egg into a strainer which has mustard already in it. This is done so that the mustard will receive some of the color from the egg. It is not a prohibited act of “selecting” because even though the yoke will remain in the strainer, it is still edible. “Selecting” refers to taking waste away from edible parts and not separating a food into two different edible parts.", + "and one may make anumlin on Shabbat. Rabbi Judah says: on Shabbat [it may only be made] in a cup; on festivals, in a jug; and on the intermediate days of festivals in a barrel. Rabbi Zadok says: it all depends on the [number of] guests. “Anumlin” is a mixture of wine, honey and pepper. This mixture can be made on Shabbat because there is no prohibited labor involved in preparing it. However, the rabbis debate how much can be made. According to Rabbi Judah, on Shabbat she can prepare only a cup’s worth at a time, because more than that is considered to be too much labor to do on Shabbat. On a festival she can make slightly more, a jug’s worth and on the intermediate days of the festival, when work is most permitted, she can make a barrel’s worth. For Rabbi Judah the operative criterion is how much work is involved. In contrast, for Rabbi Zadok the operative criterion is how many guests are in attendance. No matter what the day, she can only make enough anumlin for the guests who are there. She may not prepare anything to be used at some later date." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe mishnah deals with food preparations that may not be done in a normal manner on Shabbat but may be performed by doing them slightly differently.", + "One may not soak hiltith in warm water, but he may put it into vinegar. Hiltith is an herb which was used both as a spice and as medicine. It is forbidden to soak it in warm water on Shabbat, but one may put it in vinegar and dip her food in it. The prohibition is explained in either of two ways: 1) it looks like something that is only done during the week; 2) it is medicinal and therefore prohibited.", + "And one may not soak leeks, nor rub them, but he may put them into a sieve or a basket. Above in 1:5 Bet Hillel allowed one to begin soaking leeks before Shabbat and leave them to soak over Shabbat. Here we see that all agree that they may not be soaked on Shabbat itself, and according to commentators, even putting water over them is prohibited. The prohibition is “separating” putting water over them causes the waste parts to float and separate from the leeks. Similarly, they may not be rubbed in order to remove the inedible parts. This is prohibited under the category of “threshing” separating the wheat from the chaff. However, one may put them into a sieve or basket, even though this also will sometimes cause the separation of the inedible parts. The difference is that in this case these parts separate on their own, and hence she has not performed a forbidden act.", + "One may not sift straw through a sieve, nor put it on a high place, for the chaff to drop down, but one may take it up in a sieve and put it into the trough. One may not sift stubble through a sieve; sifting is one of the 39 prohibited labors listed in 7:2. Even though that mishnah is dealing with separating the wheat from the chaff, and here we are dealing with separating straw for an animal from dirt, it is still essentially the same activity. One also may not put the stubble in a high place so that the dirt blows away, because this is “separating”. However, one may pick up a bunch of straw with a sieve and put it in front of an animal’s trough, even though this may also cause the dirt to separate. The key difference is that this is not the direct intention of the activity." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses cleaning out a trough for an animal on Shabbat. The mishnah is placed here due to the end of yesterday’s mishnah which also discussed a trough.", + "One may rake out [the trough] for a stall ox, and move [the remnants] aside for the sake of a grazing [ox], the words of Rabbi Dosa. But the sages prohibit it. One may sweep out the trough of the remnants that are left over after the a previous feeding so that the old food the ox would not eat before doesn’t become mixed with the food given to it in the current feeding. A “stall ox” is one that is being fattened up by giving it high quality food. Since it is rather “fussy”, Rabbi Dosa allows its trough to be cleaned out on Shabbat. A “grazing” ox is less fussy and used to dirtier food and hence one may not completely rake out the trough on its behalf. However, one may move the remnants to the side so that they don’t get mixed up with the next feeding. The sages prohibit both of these things because of sweeping and raking on Shabbat. The problem is that by sweeping or raking one may come to fill up a hole, an activity prohibited on Shabbat.", + "One may take [food] from one animal and place it before another animal on Shabbat. One may move food from one trough to another on Shabbat. We might have thought that this is prohibited because it is carrying without purpose. However, since one animal will generally eat food which has already been put in front of another animal, this is not considered “carrying without a purpose” and it is permitted." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first section of this mishnah discusses clearing things off one’s bed in order to sleep on it. The second section deals with removing clothes from a “clothes press.” A “clothes press” was made by placing a piece of clothing between two boards and then fastening them together.", + "The straw [lying] upon a bed one may not move it with his hand, but he may move it with his body. Straw is usually used for lighting a stove and hence it is muktzeh. If this straw is on her bed she can’t just remove it with her hand. However, she may move the bed with her body and thereby cause the straw to fall off. “Carrying” with the side of one’s body is not considered carrying and therefore this is permitted.", + "But if it is animal feed, or a pillow or a sheet was upon it [on the eve of Shabbat], he may move it with his hand. If the straw had been designated to serve as animal feed, then it is not muktzeh and she may remove it by hand. We see here that something is defined to be that which it is intended to be used for if it is intended to be used for something permitted on Shabbat, then it is not muktzeh. Furthermore, if she set the bed aside for sleeping (as opposed to using it to store things) by placing on it a pillow or sheet, then she may move the straw even though it was set aside to light a fire. It was only forbidden if it was unclear whether the bed was going to be used for storage or for sleeping.", + "A householder’s clothes press one may undo it, but not force it down. But a launderer’s [press] one may not touch it. Rabbi Judah says: if it was undone before Shabbat, one may unfasten the whole and remove it. A “householder’s clothes press” is not an item used by a professional. Therefore, one may undo it, meaning take the clothes out, but not put the clothes in. Putting clothes in the clothes press is considering “fixing” them, and “fixing” is forbidden on Shabbat. A launderer’s press is a professional piece of equipment. Hence one may not touch it at all on Shabbat. This is forbidden because of “tearing down” by taking it apart it is as if she is “tearing down.” Rabbi Judah, however, is more lenient. If the launderer’s press was already somewhat unfastened before Shabbat, she may take the rest of the press apart and take the clothes out. Since it was already not fully closed up, this is not considered “tearing down.”" + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with picking up something that is muktzeh (forbidden to be touched on Shabbat) with something which a person is allowed to carry on Shabbat.", + "A man may pick up his son while he has a stone in his hand or a basket with a stone in it. One can carry a child on Shabbat; a child is not “muktzeh.” However, the stone which the child is holding is muktzeh (because there is no purpose to it on Shabbat). The mishnah teaches that the parent can pick up the child even though she has a stone in her hand. Similarly, one can pick up a basket (not muktzeh) with a stone in it, even though the stone is muktzeh.", + "And one may carry impure terumah together with pure [terumah] or with non-sacred produce. Impure terumah cannot be eaten and therefore it can’t be used on Shabbat. This makes it muktzeh. Nevertheless, if the impure terumah is in the same container as either pure terumah or non-sacred produce (hullin), both of which can be used on Shabbat, then it may be carried. The Talmud explains that this is so only if the pure terumah cannot be taken off the top. If however, the pure terumah can be removed without touching the impure terumah then the impure terumah should not be touched.", + "Rabbi Judah said: one may also remove the mixture [of terumah in non-sacred produce] when one [part is neutralized] in a hundred [parts]. If terumah becomes mixed with non-terumah (hullin) then the whole mixture takes on the status of terumah and it may only be eaten by priests. However, if there are more than one hundred parts hullin to one part terumah than one may take up one part out of the one hundred and one parts, give that part to terumah and the remainder reverts to being hullin, edible by non-priests. Rabbi Judah teaches that on Shabbat one can carry a mixture of one part terumah and one hundred parts hullin and even take out the one part on Shabbat in order to make it edible by non-priests." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with retrieving things that have on them something that is muktzeh.", + "If a stone is on the mouth of a cask [of wine], one tilts it to its side and it falls off. She can’t just pick up the stone because it is muktzeh. However, she can tilt the cask of wine and thereby cause the stone to fall off.", + "If it [the cask] is [standing] among [other] casks, he lifts it up, tilts it on its side, and it falls off. In this case she is afraid that if she tilts the cask the stone may fall off and break the other cask. Alternatively, there may not be room to tilt the cask to the side. In such a case she can pick the cask up and then let the stone fall off.", + "If money is lying on a cushion, one shakes the cushion, and it falls off. Money is muktzeh since it cannot be used on Shabbat. As an aside, the reason that it can’t be used on Shabbat is lest one write a receipt or an account of the money spent. To move the money one merely tilts the cushion and the money falls off. Again, we see that if something which is “muktzeh” rests on something that is not muktzeh, the bottom item may be moved to get the muktzeh item to fall off.", + "If snot is on it, one wipes it off with a rag; “Snot” may alternately be translated as “feces”, or some other type of disgusting material. This “snot” is on a cushion which she wants to use. To clean it off she must wipe it with a rag. She can’t pour water over it because this is prohibited due to “laundering.”", + "If it is on leather, one pours water over it until it disappears. However, if the snot is on leather, she may pour water over it, because putting water over leather is not considered “laundering”. However, to actually launder the leather is prohibited." + ], + [ + "Bet Shammai says: one may remove bones and nutshells from the table; But Beth Hillel says: one must remove the whole board and shake it off.
One may remove from the table crumbs less than the size of an olive and the husks of beans and lentils, because they are food for animals.
A sponge, if it has a handle, one may wipe [the board] with it;
If not, one may not wipe [the board] with it.
The sages say: in either case it may be handled on Shabbat and it is not susceptible to defilement.
This mishnah deals with clearing the table at the end of a meal on Shabbat.
Section one: Bet Shammai does not hold that the bones and nutshells left over on the table after the meal are muktzeh even though they have no use. Hence one may remove them. Bet Hillel disagrees and holds that these are muktzeh. Hence, if she wishes to remove them, she must remove the board from the table (a sort of personal tray placed in front of one or several diners) and shake it off. In the Talmud they bring a source according to which these two opinions should be reversed, Bet Hillel holding the more lenient opinion and Bet Shammai the stricter one.
Section two: Animal food is not muktzeh. Since crumbs and husks of beans and lentils may be used for animal food, they are not muktzeh and it is permitted to remove them from the table on Shabbat.
Section three: This section discusses the problem of sponges. Squeezing water or liquids out of something is prohibited. Its prohibition is derived from the prohibited labor of “laundering”, since squeezing water out of clothes is part of the laundering process. One can’t use a sponge that does not have a handle because by doing so one might squeeze water from the sponge.
The sages say that whether or not it has a handle it may be carried on Shabbat because it is a vessel and all vessels may be carried on Shabbat. However, it is not the type of vessel that can receive impurity.
Some manuscripts read differently in the concluding clause. Some read, “and the sages say: in any case he may use it for wiping.” According to this version, the sages disagree with the previous opinion, according to which wiping with a sponge without a handle is forbidden. Other versions skip the words “and the sages say” and rather read the final point as a point of agreement between all. All agree that even though you can’t use the sponge to wipe things, it still may be carried." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThe first section of this mishnah deals with a cask of wine which broke on Shabbat and the owner wishes to save as much wine as possible.\nThe remainder of the mishnah discusses the prohibition of squeezing juice or other liquids out of something.", + "A cask [of wine] which was broken, one may save from it the requirements for three meals. And he [the owner] may say to others, “come and save for yourselves”, provided that it is not sponged up. Above in 16:2 the mishnah taught that one can rescue from a fire food sufficient for three meals, the standard number of meals eaten on Shabbat. In our explanation there we explained that the reason that a person was not allowed to rescue more than that was lest she come to extinguish the fire. However, here it is less clear what the concern is. The commentators explain that if they let her rescue more than three meals she may carry them in the public domain. Alternatively, she may come to fix the casket. An alternative explanation which I would suggest is that more than three meals is muktzeh since it won’t be eaten on Shabbat. As above, she is allowed to say to other people, “come save the wine for yourselves.” However, no one is allowed to rescue the wine by sponging it up. The fear is that if they sponge it up they may squeeze the sponge out afterwards, and as we have already learned and will continue to learn below, squeezing liquids out of something is prohibited.", + "One may not squeeze fruit in order to get out their juices, and if they exude of their own accord they are prohibited. Rabbi Judah says: if [the fruit is meant] to be food, that which exudes from it is permitted, but if [is meant to be] juice, that which exudes from it is prohibited. Squeezing juice out of fruit is considered to be a prohibited labor derived from the prohibited labor of “threshing”. Just as “threshing” separates the desirable wheat from the undesirable chaff, so too squeezing separates the juice from the fruit. The mishnah teaches that even if the juice exudes without being squeezed by a person. The fear is that if this juice is allowed people will become confused and think it is permitted to actually squeeze the juice out. Rabbi Judah distinguishes between fruit that is intended to be eaten and fruit that is intended to be used for juice. If the juice exudes from fruit which is intended to be eaten, then it is permitted because a person doesn’t want the juice to come out of this fruit. A person won’t come to squeeze such a fruit. However, if the fruit is intended for juice then Rabbi Judah too is strict and rules that even the juice that exudes is forbidden.", + "Honeycombs which crushed on the eve of Shabbat and it [the honey] exudes on its own, it is forbidden; But Rabbi Eleazar permits it. In this section a person has crushed honeycombs before Shabbat in order to start the process of extracting the honey from them. If honey exudes from them on Shabbat, such honey may not be eaten. Again the fear is that if they permit such honey people will think that the honeycombs may be squeezed on Shabbat itself. Rabbi Elazar is not concerned with such a possibility and hence he allows this honey to be eaten on Shabbat." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with soaking food in hot water on Shabbat.", + "Whatever was put into hot water before Shabbat, may be soaked in hot water on Shabbat; Things that are already cooked cannot be again “cooked”, since the definition of “cooking” is using heat to turn something raw into something not raw. Therefore, if something was already cooked before Shabbat, it can be put back in hot water on Shabbat without this being considered “cooking.” In other words, “there is no cooking something that has already been cooked.”", + "But whatever was not put into hot water before Shabbat may [only] be rinsed with hot water on Shabbat, except old salted fish, small salted fish, and Spanish colius, because their rinsing completes their preparation. If it was not cooked in hot water before Shabbat, then it may not be soaked in hot water on Shabbat, because that would be cooking. However, it still may be rinsed in hot water because rinsing is generally not considered to be cooking. The mishnah lists a few exceptions to this rule. These are all small fish which have thin skins and can be cooked by merely rinsing them in hot water. Since “their rinsing completes their preparation” they may not even be rinsed in hot water." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah teaches that one may break open a container to get food out of it, but one may not break open the container in such a way that the container becomes a vessel. Making a vessel is prohibited on Shabbat but ruining vessels is permitted, so long as there is a purpose to ruining them, like getting the food out.", + "A man may break open a cask in order to eat dried figs from it, provided that he does not intend to make the cask into a vessel. Since breaking the ceramic cask ruins it, she may break it open in order to get out the figs (or whatever else may be inside). However, she may not break it open and leave a nice opening in such a way that the cask becomes a vessel.", + "And one may not perforate the stopper of a cask, the words of Rabbi Judah. But the sages permit it. Rabbi Judah holds that one may not perforate the ceramic stopper which is on the top of a cask because that is considered making a vessel. What she should do is remove the stopper altogether. The sages allow it because this is not a normal way of making a vessel.", + "And one may not pierce it at its side; All agree that one cannot pierce it at its side. In the Talmud there is a debate whether this refers to the side of the cask or the side of the stopper.", + "And if it is already perforated one may not place wax upon it, because he smoothes it out. Rabbi Judah said: a case came before Rabbi Yohanan ben Zakkai in Arav and he said, “I fear [that he may be liable] to a sin-offering.” If the cask/stopper is already perforated she may not spread wax upon it in order to close it up. The problem is that when she pours wax she will also need to smooth it out. The rabbis thought that smoothing out wax was like “erasing” which is prohibited. Rabbi Judah relates a case where a person who perforated a cask/stopper at its side came in front of R. Yohanan ben Zakai and R. Yohanan said that he might be obligated to bring a sin-offering for having unwittingly transgressed Shabbat." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first half of this mishnah deals with preserving the coolness or heat of cooked dishes or water. The second half deals with someone whose clothes got wet and how she may dry them without transgressing the prohibition of squeezing out the water.", + "One may place a cooked dish in a pit for it to be guarded; One can put a cooked dish into the ground in order to protect it from the heat (the ground will keep the dish cool). The Talmud explains that the point of the mishnah is to teach us that we are not concerned lest she come to fill a hole in the ground, an activity which would be prohibited on Shabbat.", + "And good water into foul water for it to be cooled; or cold water in the sun for it to be heated. If one has a pitcher of good warm water and a larger container (tub, perhaps) of warm foul water, one may place the pitcher in the tub so that the good water will cool off. It is obvious that this is permitted since this isn’t in any way cooking. The mishnah teaches the first section to introduce the next clause in which we learn that one can place a pitcher of cool water in the sun in order for the water to warm up. Other versions of the mishnah read that one may place a pitcher of cold water into a larger container of hot water. The point of the mishnah is to teach that we are not concerned lest this leads a person to think that it is permitted to cook on Shabbat.", + "One whose clothes fell into water on the road may walk in them without concern. When he reaches the outer courtyard he may spread them out in the sun, but not in sight of the people. If a person’s clothes become wet while walking on the road on Shabbat, she may not just squeeze the water out of them because squeezing water out of something is prohibited on Shabbat. The mishnah teaches that she may continue to wear the clothes and if by walking or sitting she causes the water to be squeezed out then it is a by-product of normal activity and it is not forbidden. Others explain that the mishnah teaches that she need not be concerned lest others think she laundered her clothes on Shabbat. However, once she reaches the outer courtyard of the city, meaning the first courtyard she finds, she should take off her wet clothes (obviously not if this will leave her naked in public) and she may spread them out so that they may dry. She shouldn’t spread them out so that others see what she is doing lest others think that she did her laundry on Shabbat." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses drying oneself off with a towel after bathing and the potential problem involved in wringing the towel.", + "One who bathes in the water of a pit or in the waters of Tiberias and dries himself even with ten towels, he must not bring them [back] in his hand. After the bather has dried herself, she may not bring the towel back to her home, lest in doing so she wrings it in order to squeeze out the water. This is true even if she uses ten towels to dry herself and the last one has almost no water in it and doesn’t need to be wrung out. It too may not be carried back to her home.", + "But ten men may dry their faces, hands, and feet on one towel and they may bring it [back] in their hands. However, a towel which has been shared by a large group of people, and has therefore become very wet, may nevertheless be carried by the group. Since there are many people together, they will remind each other that it is forbidden to wring a towel on Shabbat and they won’t come to transgress. Note how the mishnah purposely exaggerates each section. In the first section the tenth towel is barely wet, and nevertheless, it may not be carried. In the second section the towel is soaked and nevertheless it may be carried." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with acts that are similar to healing in that they manipulate the body in some way. As we have learned above in 14:3, healing is prohibited on Shabbat.", + "One may oil and [lightly] massage [the body] but not step on [the body] or scrape [the skin]. One may lightly rub oil or massage one’s body (or another person’s body) on Shabbat, but not do so vigorously by stepping on a person or roughly scraping off skin. Most commentators say that this is too much like an act of healing and it is forbidden to heal a person on Shabbat. Furthermore, all of these things were done in the bathhouse and the rabbis may have wanted to keep people from fully engaging in bathhouse activities on Shabbat.", + "One may not go down to a piloma, I have adopted a reading of this section in accordance with manuscripts and Albeck’s suggestion. A piloma is a place where a person takes a mud bath. There are a host of different explanations for this section. Albeck’s seems most convincing. At a piloma one would engage in the activities prohibited in section one. Hence one shouldn’t even go into a piloma.", + "And one may not drink an epiktvizin [to induce vomiting]; An epiktvizin was a potion used to induce vomiting. This was forbidden because it was like healing.", + "And one may not straighten an infant[‘s limbs]. If an infant’s limbs were crooked, they would manipulate them in order to straighten them out. This may not be done on Shabbat because it is similar to the prohibited labor of “building.”", + "And one may not set a broken bone. Similarly, one may not set the broken bone of an adult.", + "If one's hand or foot is dislocated, he must not agitate it violently in cold water but he may bathe it in the usual way, and if it heals, it heals. If one separated a limb, such as a hand or foot and it needs to be put back into its place, one shouldn’t vigorously shake it in cold water because everyone will see that this is an act of healing. However, if one wishes to wash in a more normal manner, one may do so and if by doing so the separated limb is healed, then nothing wrong has been done." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses borrowing food items on Shabbat with the intent of paying the person back after Shabbat.", + "A man may borrow pitchers of wine and pitchers of oil from his neighbor, provided he does not say to him, “lend [them] to me”; It is permitted for a person to borrow things from another person on Shabbat as long as he doesn’t say “lend to me.” There are actually two words in Hebrew for “lend” one which implies money or something that will be paid back, and the other which implies returning the object itself. Using the first verb sounds too much like doing business and it is therefore prohibited on Shabbat. This is the verb in our mishnah. However, the second verb is not problematic. For instance, if the borrowed object was a book which itself will be returned, there is no problem.", + "And similarly a woman [may borrow] loaves from her neighbor. Just as a man may ask his neighbor to borrow pitchers of wine and oil, so too a woman may ask her neighbor to borrow loaves of bread.", + "If he does not trust him he may leave his cloak with him [as a pledge] and squares up with him after Shabbat. The mishnah now provides a means by which the lender may guarantee that he receives compensation for his loan. The borrower cannot merely pay the lender, nor can they write down an amount or even state how much is owed. What they can do is have the borrower leave his cloak with the lender as a pledge. After Shabbat they can square up and the borrower can pay the lender back.", + "Similarly, if the eve of Passover in Jerusalem falls on Shabbat, he may leave his cloak with him [the vendor] and take his paschal lamb and squares up with him after the festival. This section deals with a situation where a person had not bought his pesach sacrifice (the paschal lamb) before Shabbat which fell the day before Pesach. He may do what the person in section one did to buy wine and oil he leaves his cloak with the merchant selling lambs, buys his lamb and then on Monday he can settle up how much he owes." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah has to do with reckoning certain types of accounts on Shabbat.", + "A man may count his guests and his appetizers/desserts by word, but not from writing. A host may want to count his guests or his food before or while the meal is being served. He may do so but he may not count them from a written list. The Tosefta explains that this is forbidden because it is acting on Shabbat the way one acts during the week. In the Talmud they explain that if he reads from a written list and sees that someone is not there or hears that they are not coming, he may erase their name from the list, a prohibited activity on Shabbat. Alternatively, he may grow accustomed to reading bills, lists and other types of business documents that a person should not read on Shabbat.", + "A man may cast lots with his sons and the members of his household on the table, provided that he does not make a large portion against a small one, because of gambling. This section deals with casting lots for who will get to choose his portion of meat first and who will get the largest portion. We should note that this was an important issue in eating customs at the time and we hear a lot from contemporary sources about people complaining that they didn’t get a good portion. The head of the household or any other person may cast lots on Shabbat for who gets what portion, but he should not make the portions a disparate size to begin with, hoping that he will get the bigger portion, because this is a type of gambling. Gambling is always problematic according to Jewish law, but it certainly shouldn’t be done on Shabbat.", + "And [priests] may cast lots for sacrifices on festivals, but not for the portions. The priests could cast lots over who would get which sacrifice of the sacrifices offered on a festival. However, they may not cast lots on the festival over the sacrifices offered the day before, since they could have cast the lots then. As we have learned many times, anything that could be done before the holiday may not be done on the holiday itself." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first section of the mishnah deals with hiring laborers on Shabbat.\nThe remaining portions of the mishnah deal with going out to the Shabbat border in order to perform an activity after Shabbat that may not be performed on Shabbat itself. The “Shabbat border” is the limit which a person is allowed to walk out of town on Shabbat. This border is two thousand cubits outside of the city.\nThe commonality between these two subjects (hiring workers and going out to the border) is that both are connected to Isaiah 58:13, “If you honor [the Sabbath] and do not do your business, nor look to your affairs, nor make statements [then you can seek the favor of the Lord]”. This translation tries to capture the spirit of how the rabbis understand the verse. Isaiah speaks of activities that are not necessarily forbidden by the Torah but nevertheless are activities which turn Shabbat into an ordinary day. As an aside, I should mention my belief that preserving the spirit of Shabbat is as important as observing the halakhic details. Shabbat must be a day set aside from work and from many normal daily activities, even if the performance of such work is not a technical violation of Shabbat.", + "One may not hire laborers on Shabbat, nor say to his fellow to hire laborers for him. Hiring laborers on Shabbat to do work after Shabbat is not technically a violation of one of the 39 prohibited labors. However, it is clearly against the “spirit of Shabbat” as is described in the verse from Isaiah above. One shouldn’t even say to one’s friend to hire laborers.", + "One may not go to the Shabbat border to await nightfall in order to hire laborers or bring in produce; but one may do so in order to watch [his field] and [then] he can bring produce [back] with him. One is allowed to go on Shabbat up until the Shabbat border, 2000 cubits outside the city. However, one should not do so in order to get a jump start on performing an activity prohibited on Shabbat. This is again a violation of the spirit of Shabbat and it is using time on Shabbat to prepare for the performance of work after Shabbat. However, one may go out to the Shabbat border before Shabbat is over to perform an activity, such as guarding produce, which is permitted on Shabbat. In such a case, the only thing preventing her from guarding her fields is that they lie outside of the Shabbat border (as fields usually do). If she goes out to guard her fields (a permitted activity), she may also bring back produce with her when she returns (an activity permitted on Shabbat). What is prohibited is going to wait at the border specifically to perform a prohibited activity.", + "Abba Shaul stated a general principle: whatever I have a right to say [that it be done], I am permitted to go to await nightfall, for it [at the border]. Abba Shaul does not disagree with the previous opinion, but rather summarizes that opinion using a general principle. Anything that a person may ask another person to do on Shabbat, such as guard fruit, one may also go out to the Shabbat border in order to perform the activity at nightfall. This would include watching fruit and also those activities which will be listed in the following mishnah. Put in other words, if the activity is not prohibited on Shabbat, nor in violation of the spirit of Shabbat, one may go out to the border in order to perform the activity right after Shabbat." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses exceptions to the rule in the previous mishnah, that one should not go out on Shabbat to the Shabbat border in order to go beyond the border after Shabbat to perform an activity prohibited on Shabbat.", + "One may go to the Shabbat border before nightfall in order to attend to the affairs of a bride or of a corpse to bring him a coffin and shrouds. Arranging a marriage and arranging proper burial are two of the highest values in Judaism, competing perhaps only with the study of Torah. One may therefore say to a fellow Jew on Shabbat, “take care of this need for a bride or a dead person after Shabbat”, even though the performance of these activities is prohibited on Shabbat itself. Hence, if one needs to leave town after Shabbat to take care of the arrangements for a marriage or funeral/burial, one may do so. [Remember Abba Shaul’s rule: anything one can say, one can also go to the Shabbat border to do immediately after Shabbat.] This includes bringing a coffin or shrouds in which to bury the dead.", + "If a non-Jew brings reed-pipes on Shabbat, one must not bewail an Israelite with them, unless they came from a near place. In mishnaic times it was customary for pipes to be used at a funeral to bewail the dead. If a non-Jew brought them to a Jew for the Jew to use them on Saturday evening, the Jew may not use them because this is benefiting from the work a non-Jew did for a Jew on Shabbat. However, if the pipes came from a near place, within the Shabbat border, the Jew may use them immediately after Shabbat because even if the non-Jew had not brought them, the Jew would have been able to bring them for a funeral right after Shabbat. A Jew is prohibited from benefiting only if the non-Jew does something that the Jew was not allowed to do.", + "If he made a coffin for himself or dug a grave for himself, an israelite may be buried in it. But if [he made it] for the sake of an Israelite, [the Israelite] may never be buried in it. If a non-Jew made a coffin or dug a grave for non-Jewish use on Shabbat, and then decided to sell the coffin or grave to a Jew, a Jew may use it. This is because the intent was not to do work for a Jew on Shabbat. However, if the non-Jew made the coffin or grave on Shabbat for a specific Jew, that Jew may never be buried in that coffin or grave. This is because the grave or coffin was made in violation of the Shabbat with that Jew in mind. On the other hand, the grave and coffin may be used for another Jew as long as they wait between the end of Shabbat and the burial the time it would take to build a coffin and dig a grave. This waiting period is to avoid deriving benefit from work that a non-Jew did on Shabbat." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn the previous mishnah we learned that a person may go on Shabbat to the Shabbat border to get a head start on preparations for a funeral after Shabbat. This mishnah deals with things that may be done on Shabbat itself, in order to prepare the body for burial or to preserve it.", + "The mishnah lists things which may be done for a dead person on Shabbat itself.", + "One may perform all the needs of the dead:
One may anoint him with oil and wash him, provided that no limb of his is moved. One may anoint the body with oil (done for the purposes of cleansing) and wash the body. However, the body itself may not be moved because it is muktzeh. The reason it is muktzeh is that there is no use for the body on Shabbat, and all things which have no use may not be moved.", + "One may remove the pillow from under him, and [thereby] place him on sand, in order that he should be better preserved. One may remove the pillow/mattress upon which the dead body lies in order that it should be on the ground. This was considered a better means for preserving the body and preventing deterioration and the accompanying smell.", + "One may tie up the jaw, not in order that it should close but that it should not further [open]. One may tie the dead body’s jaw so that the mouth does not gape open further than it already is at the point of death. However, it is forbidden to close the jaw because it is forbidden to move even a limb of the body. One may preserve the state that the body is currently in, but not change that state.", + "And likewise, if a beam is broken, one may support it with a bench or bed posts, not in order that it [the break] should close up, but that it should go [open] no further. This section is loosely connected to that in the previous section. If a beam supporting the ceiling breaks on Shabbat, one may put something beneath it to support it so that it does not break any more. However, one may not put something underneath it so that the break closes up.", + "One may not close [the eyes of] a corpse on Shabbat, nor on weekdays when he is about to die, and he who closes the eyes [of a dying person] at the point of death is a murderer. If a person dies with his/her eyes open, one may not close the eyes because it is forbidden to move a limb of the body. The mishnah adds that even during the week it is prohibited to close the eyes of a dying person because this may cause death to arrive more speedily. This is indeed a primary source used by halakhic authorities who wish to prohibit euthanasia. One may not do anything to make death come faster. However, we should remember that it is nearly impossible to learn what halakhah has to say on any given topic from one single source, especially one as sensitive and controversial as euthanasia." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses a person who was traveling on Friday and did not arrive at her destination before Shabbat.", + "One for whom it becomes dark while on the road, he may give his purse to a non-Jew; And if there is no non-Jew with him, he places it on a donkey. Once it becomes dark the Jew must not carry her purse, since it is prohibited to carry in the public domain. However, she may give the purse to a non-Jew. The rabbis permitted this because if they had been strict a person may be so attached to her possessions that she would herself carry on Shabbat. Since it is less problematic to give the purse to the non-Jew than for the Jew herself to carry, giving it away is preferable. However, we should remember that generally it is forbidden to ask a non-Jew to do work on Shabbat on behalf of a Jew. If there is no non-Jew with her, then she may place the purse on a donkey and allow the donkey to carry it back to the city. However it is preferable to give the purse to the non-Jew because Jews are supposed to let their animals rest on Shabbat as well, but a Jew is not commanded to ensure that the non-Jew rest on Shabbat.", + "When he reaches the outermost courtyard, he removes the objects which may be handled on Shabbat. As for those which may not be handled on Shabbat, he unties the cords and the sacks fall off automatically. When the traveler who has put her purse (or other goods) on a donkey reaches the outermost courtyard of the city, she may no longer allow them to remain on the donkey, since they have now reached a safe point. Therefore, those objects that she may handle on Shabbat, she must remove and stow them somewhere safe. Those objects that may not be handled, she must undo the straps which attach them to the donkey and they will fall to the ground on their own. We should note that the “city” to which the mishnah refers is one in which everybody knows each other, and therefore people can leave their private belongings in a public area without much fear of their being stolen. This reminds me of the situation in a kibbutz, or perhaps a summer camp, but it is certainly different from the situation in our cities." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah teaches how one feeds one’s animals on Shabbat.", + "One may untie bundles of hay in front of cattle and one may spread out large sheaves, but not small hardened twigs. There are several different explanations for this section, but I will explain according to Albeck’s explanation, which differs from that given in other commentaries. The general principle which we learn in this mishnah is that a person is allowed to do something which turns food which cannot be eaten by the animal into food which can be eaten. Bundles of hay must be untied before they can be eaten, and large sheaves must be spread out before they may be eaten by the animal. However, the small hardened twigs cannot be eaten by the animal even after they are spread out. Hence, one may not untie or spread out a bundle of this type of twigs.", + "One may not chop up unripe grain or carobs before cattle, whether small or large. Rabbi Judah permits it in the case of carobs for small beasts. Chopping up unripe grain and carobs is a lot of work and animals will eat unripe grain and carobs. Since this work is not necessary and it is not easily performed it is forbidden on Shabbat. Rabbi Judah holds that it is permitted to chop up carobs for small animals (sheep and goats) since they cannot eat the carobs until they are chopped up. It is only forbidden for large animals which can eat unripe grain and carobs without them being chopped up." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to deal with feeding animals on Shabbat.", + "One may not stuff a camel [with food] nor cram [food into its mouth], but one may put food into its mouth. It was customary to stuff a camel with enough food to last several days before setting out on a journey. In this way it wouldn’t be necessary to feed the camel while on the road. [Note: this unfortunately does not work for humans.] Since this is a lot of work, and is also preparing on Shabbat for after Shabbat, it is not permitted. However, if the camel does not want to eat at all, it is permitted to put food into its mouth.", + "And one may not force feed calves, but one may put food into their mouth. The same rule holds true for calves one may put food into their mouths but not force feed them.", + "And one may put food into one’s hands for chickens and one may put water into bran, but not mix it [into a mass]. Mixing water into a mass of bran is considered too much work to do on Shabbat, and it is not strictly necessary. The chicken will be fine without the bran/water combination having been mixed. Therefore, mixing is prohibited. However, merely feeding the chickens by hand or putting water into a bowl of bran for them to eat is permitted.", + "And one may not put water in front of bees or in front of doves in a dove-cote, but one may put [water] in front of geese, chickens and Rhodesian doves. Bees and doves fly long distances and should be able to find their own water. Therefore, since is no need to put water out for them on Shabbat it is prohibited to do so. However, geese, chickens and certain types of doves do not fly far from their owner’s homes and hence one may put water out for them on Shabbat. The general principle which we again see illustrated is that something that is necessary to feed animals on Shabbat is permitted, while unnecessary actions are prohibited." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with giving food on Shabbat to animals in cases where the food was not “prepared” for them on the eve of Shabbat. “Prepared” here means that before Shabbat this food was not designated to eventually become animal food. “Prepared” is the opposite of “muktzeh”.", + "One may cut up gourds in front of beasts, and a carcass in front of dogs. Rabbi Judah says: if it was not carcass by the eve of Shabbat it is forbidden, because it was not prepared. Gourds are normally eaten by human beings and are too expensive to be given to animals. Nevertheless, the mishnah rules that if one has gourds one may cut them up and give them to one’s beasts. The mishnah refers to a carcass of an animal that was alive when Shabbat began and became a carcass on Shabbat itself. In such a case it was certainly not “prepared” before Shabbat to be given as dog food on Shabbat. According to the first opinion, it is nevertheless permitted to give the carcass to the dogs. Rabbi Judah disagrees and holds that the carcass is “muktzeh” and may therefore not be handled at all on Shabbat." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe final mishnah of Shabbat begins by discussing annulling and releasing vows and continues with a story about measuring things on Shabbat to see if they are pure or impure, fit or not fit.", + "They may annul vows on Shabbat, and they may be asked [to release vows] when these are necessary for Shabbat. It is permitted for a husband to annul his wife’s vows and for a father to annul his daughter’s vow on Shabbat, since these vows may only be annulled on the day upon which they are heard (Numbers 30: 6, 9). If they had to wait until after Shabbat was over to annul them, the vows could no longer be annulled. Similarly, sages may be asked to release a vow on Shabbat, but only if there is some reason to release the vow on Shabbat itself and not wait until Shabbat is over. Such would be the case if for instance the vow was not to eat on Shabbat. If the vow was not going to impact Shabbat, then they must wait until Shabbat is over. For more on how Sages release vows and how husbands and fathers annul vows see Nedarim 9-11.", + "One may close up a skylight, and measure a rag and a ritual bath. The issue of closing up a skylight/window was discussed above in 17:7. There we saw that the sages allowed one to put a board back into a window frame to close out the light. One is allowed to measure a rag on Shabbat to see if it is three handbreadths by three handbreadths, the minimum measurement required for it to be susceptible to impurity. It is also permissible to measure a ritual bath to see if it contains the required 40 seah of water. These two measurements are allowed because they are connected to mitzvot. Other measurements would be forbidden.", + "And it once happened in the days of Rabbi Zadok’s father and the days of Abba Shaul ben Botnit that they closed up the window with a small clay vessel and tied a [clay] pot to a string to ascertain whether there was the opening of a handbreadth or not in the barrel. And from their words we learn that we may close [a skylight] and measure and tie on Shabbat. The Talmud explains what exactly happened in this story. There were two houses which shared a wall and there was a window in the wall. In the window was a cracked barrel with a large hole in it. On a certain Shabbat a person died in one of the houses and they wanted to know if there was a handbreadth’s gap in the pitcher, such that the impurity from one house would be transmitted to the other house. First they closed up the skylight with a small clay vessel so that the priests could go up to the roof without becoming impure. They then wanted to measure the crack in the barrel but couldn’t reach it from the roof. So they tied an earthenware pot the size of one handbreadth by one handbreadth to a string and lowered it to the hole of the barrel. From these actions (which were certainly creative) we learn that it is permitted to close up a gap, to measure things to know whether they are impure and to make certain types of knots on Shabbat. Congratulations! We have finished Shabbat. It is a tradition at this point to thank God for helping us to finish learning the tractate and to commit ourselves to going back and relearning it, so that we may not forget it and so that its lessons will stay with us for all of our lives. Shabbat was the longest tractate we have covered so far, so an extra “yasher koah” to all who stuck it through. Admittedly, many of the details were quite difficult and the halakhot truly dictated exactly what is and is not permitted on Shabbat. I hope that learning this tractate will enrich your own Shabbat experience, and that you will find in the details of halakhah a system which forces a person to examine each and everyone one of her actions and to withdraw somewhat from the hustle bustle of the world for one day a week. Shabbat is a day dedicated to holy activities, worship of God, study, reflection, eating and drinking and non-creativity. The halakhot of Shabbat are meant to ensure that these lofty ideals can be achieved. May you have the strength and time to keep on learning more Mishnah! Tomorrow we begin Eruvin, a tractate which is actually quite connected to Shabbat." + ] + ] + ] + }, + "schema": { + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה שבת", + "enTitle": "English Explanation of Mishnah Shabbat", + "key": "English Explanation of Mishnah Shabbat", + "nodes": [ + { + "heTitle": "הקדמה", + "enTitle": "Introduction" + }, + { + "heTitle": "", + "enTitle": "" + } + ] + } +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Moed/English Explanation of Mishnah Shabbat/English/merged.json b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Moed/English Explanation of Mishnah Shabbat/English/merged.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..cd620f8b597734995a24d56a427cd732154feb02 --- /dev/null +++ b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Moed/English Explanation of Mishnah Shabbat/English/merged.json @@ -0,0 +1,891 @@ +{ + "title": "English Explanation of Mishnah Shabbat", + "language": "en", + "versionTitle": "merged", + "versionSource": "https://www.sefaria.org/English_Explanation_of_Mishnah_Shabbat", + "text": { + "Introduction": [ + "Most of tractate Shabbat goes into great detail as to what type of work is prohibited on Shabbat. There is not a lot of information about this in the Torah itself. Indeed the only four activities specifically prohibited in the Torah are plowing and reaping (Exodus 34:21), fire (Exodus 35:3) and gathering wood (Numbers 15:32). The paucity of verses and the volume of rabbinic halakhah led the rabbis to conclude that “the laws of Shabbat are like mountains hanging by a thread” (Hagigah 1:8). There is a little bit of information in the prophets about the observance of Shabbath, but this does not add up to much. However, from the literature that remains from the Second Temple period it seems that Jews were very stringent about the observance of the Sabbath. From Josephus and the books of the Maccabees we learn that some Jews did not even want to engage in battle on Shabbat, and rather than do so gave up their lives, until Mattathias taught them that engaging in battle to save one’s life was permitted. The Book of Jubilees, a rewritten version of Genesis popular among certain groups of Second Temple Jews is very stringent on Sabbath observance. So too were the groups that composed the Dead Sea scrolls. However, in this period the concept of prohibited “work” on the Sabbath was somewhat ill-defined. In contrast, the Rabbis define “work” in great detail. There are 39 categories of work, and anything that is considered to be prohibited from the Torah must fit somehow into one of these categories. These will not be listed until chapter 7, mishnah two. These are called “avot” or arch-categories of work. Anything derived from one of these arch-categories is either an arch-category in and of itself or is a “toldah”, a derivative. Anything that does not fit into one of these categories, and yet is still prohibited is considered to only be prohibited from “rabbinic law”—derabbanan— and not from “toraitic law”—deoraita. I should emphasize that a law’s being “derabbanan” does not necessarily make it less important. It only means that the rabbis could not somehow tie it into one of the 39 categories. These laws are also called “shvut” which means “rest”. The rabbis prohibited certain activities so that a person would be able to rest on Shabbat. ", + "There are some terms we should know before we begin learning. 1. Liable—this means that a person who does a certain activity has transgressed a biblical prohibition. S/he is liable to either bring a sacrifice if the transgression was done without intention, or for the death penalty if done with intention. We should not get ourselves caught up with “did this really happen/did the rabbis execute people for Shabbat infractions?” The point of “liable” is merely to define what the prohibitions are. Their enforcement is a totally different issue. 2. Exempt—this almost always means that the activity is prohibited but that one who has done so has not transgressed a biblical prohibition. 3. Permitted—this means that an activity is completely permissible. ", + "A couple of words of warning before we begin learning. Shabbat observance still plays a major role in the life of observant Jews. The prohibitions that we learn about in the Mishnah are the foundations of an incredibly complex system of halakhah that is codified throughout the ages. The system is perhaps the most complex areas of halakhah still observed today. Learning the Mishnah is not equivalent to learning how halakhah is observed, certainly not in its minutae of detail. Halakhah is not derived directly from the Mishnah, but rather from the Talmud and from its codifiers. Hence, while learning the Mishnah we should refrain from expecting a direct correlation to how the Shabbat is observed today. Furthermore, I am not a “posek” an arbitrator of Jewish law. I will try not to answer many questions of modern halakhah in this forum and instead will refer you to other sources and especially to your local rabbi. Second, I realize that people reading this commentary have different levels of observance. However, this realization will not impact my commentary on the mishnah, at least not regularly. Whether you personally “keep Shabbat” or don’t, the rabbis of the Mishnah firmly believed it to be mandatory. Thirdly, the Conservative movement has in the past made certainly leniencies regarding Shabbat observance, most famously allowing under certain circumstances driving to synagogue on Shabbat. This teshuvah (responsa) will not be relevant to our learning of the Mishnah. Even those rabbis who supported this responsa would agree that a simple reading of the sources would lead to prohibiting driving on the Sabbath, mostly because of the prohibition of fire. Fourthly, we should remember that “work” has a specific legal definition. It is not a nebulous idea but carefully defined through exhaustive definitions. A person who says that driving to the golf course and enjoying a game of golf, or going shopping, is not breaking Shabbat because to him/her these activities are not “work” may be stating a subjective truth, but it is a truth that does not fit into the more objective and impersonal halakhic system. The famous example is that you can lift a heavy piece of furniture in your house and you have not performed a prohibited labor, but if you lift a feather outside and carry it four cubits you have. Finally, the Mishnah talks almost exclusively of prohibitions. It is my firm belief that the rabbis did not see the Sabbath only as a day of prohibitions, but also as an opportunity—an opportunity to pray, to study, to rejoice and to be with the people who one wants to be with. These other aspects just were not as fruitful for halakhic material and hence are rarely discussed in the Mishnah. Nevertheless, if Shabbat is to be an integral part of one’s life, it must be regarded not only as a day of things one can’t do, but a day of wonderful opportunities. It is a time to refrain and thereby allow ourselves to experience the joy of just being. " + ], + "": [ + [ + [ + "Introduction\nTractate Shabbat begins with a formulaic teaching about the prohibition of carrying. The remainder of the chapter discusses preparations before Shabbat, but it seems that the Mishnah’s editors wanted to begin with a mishnah that contains the formula “two which are four”. This is the same way that tractate Shevuoth began, and it seems that this type of opening was often preferred by the Mishnah. Indeed, Abraham Goldberg (whose Hebrew critical commentary on Shabbat I will use from time to time published by the Jewish Theological Seminary of America) notes that about half of the tractates of the Mishnah begin with numbers or an issue related to numbers. Goldberg also believes that opening the tractate with a mishnah concerning carrying something from one domain to another was intended as a polemic against the Sadducees who did not agree with the Pharisees in all of the details of these laws.\nThe prohibition of carrying will be further discussed later on in chapter five and will continue to be discussed through chapter eleven.", + "The mishnah lists eight slightly different scenarios in which an object is brought from outside in the public domain to inside the house, the private domain. These scenarios can be divided twice. In the first four examples a person has performed a complete action, taking something from one domain and bringing into another and is therefore liable. In two of these cases the object is brought in and in two it is taken out. In the second four cases, the two people share in bringing the object in or taking it out and hence they are both exempt (remember that this does not mean that this is permitted.) These cases can also be divided into two subcategories. The mishnah probably uses the example of a poor person standing outside and a householder inside because this is a realistic situation and it will be easier to remember.", + "The carryings out of Shabbat are two which are four from the inside, and two which are four from the outside. How is this so? The poor man stands outside and the householder stands inside:
If the poor man reaches his hand inside and places [something] into the hand of the householder, The poor man is liable because he took something from the public domain and brought it in.", + "or if he takes [something] from it and carries it out, the poor man is liable, and the householder is exempt. The poor man is liable because he took something out. In both cases the householder has not done anything and hence he is exempt.", + "If the householder reaches his hand outside and places [an object] in the poor man's hand, The householder has brought something out and is liable.", + "or takes [something] and carries it in, the master is liable, while the poor man is exempt. The householder brought something in.", + "If the poor man reaches his hand inside and the master takes [an object] from it, The poor man brought something in, but is not liable because he didn’t put it down in the private domain. Rather the householder took it out of his hands. Both are exempt even though together they have performed a forbidden act of work. We now learn that in order to be liable the person must uproot something from one domain and put it down in another domain. One is not liable for half of an activity.", + "or places [an object] in it and he carries it out, both are exempt; The poor man didn’t pick the object up so he’s not liable and the householder didn’t bring it out so he’s not liable. Both are exempt.", + "If the householder stretches his hand outside and the poor man takes [an object] from it, The householder picks up an object and brings his hand out of the house but the poor man takes the object out of his hand. Both have performed half of a forbidden labor and both are exempt.", + "or places [an article] in it and he carries it inside, both are exempt. Finally, the poor man puts the object in the householder’s hand and the householder brings it inside, so again both have performed half of a forbidden labor and again both are exempt." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nAfter an introductory mishnah, the Mishnah continues with laws relevant to the day before Shabbat. Our mishnah deals with things that one shouldn’t do once the time for the afternoon prayer, minhah, has arrived. The problem is that if one becomes engaged with one of these activities, he may become swept away and forget to pray minhah.\nThese laws apply not only to the day before Shabbat, but to any day of the week.\nThe minhah referred to here is from the time of 9 1/2 hours, the day being divided into 12 daylight hours. So on a day where daylight begins at 6 AM and ends at 6 PM, minhah is from 3:30 in the afternoon. In the Northern Hemisphere the hours will be longer in the summer months and shorter during the winter. We should note that one can also pray minhah at an earlier time of day, from 6 1/2 hours.", + "One may not sit down before a barber near Minhah until he has prayed. One shouldn’t begin to get a hair cut right before Minhah, lest the hair cut take a long time and he forget that he must pray his minhah prayers. After the sun has set, he will not be able to pray minhah.", + "One may not enter the baths or a tannery, or [sit down] to eat or [begin] a court case. Similarly, a person shouldn’t begin any of these activities close to minhah time, lest he forget to pray. A tannery is an example of any type of work which is somewhat complicated and may cause him to forget that the time to pray has arrived.", + "But if they began, they need not break off. However, if he began one of these things, then he need not stop in order to pray. Rather he may complete his haircut, etc. and then pray afterwards.", + "One must break off for the reading of the Shema, but not for prayer. This section explains that one must stop what he is doing to recite the Shema but one doesn’t have to stop for “prayer”, otherwise known as the Shmoneh Esreh, or the Amidah. The reason is that the obligation to say Shema is from the Torah whereas the obligation to recite the Shmoneh Esreh is only derabbanan, of rabbinic origin." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe mishnah continues to deal with laws that are concerned with the day before the Sabbath. However, through associative thought, this mishnah also includes one law that is not concerned with the Sabbath eve and one law that is concerned with another topic altogether.", + "A tailor must not go out with his needle near nightfall, lest he forget and go out. Nor a scribe with his quill. On the Sabbath itself, it will be prohibited for the tailor to carry his needle around (or anything else). Therefore, even as nightfall draws near, he should take his needle out of his coat where he typically stores it, lest he forget and accidentally carry it on the Sabbath. Similarly, a scribe should not go out on the Sabbath eve with his quill. Both of these things, the scribe’s quill and the tailor’s needle are small items that can easily be carried without a person knowing. Therefore, he should make sure he puts them away before the Sabbath. In essence, this is part of his Shabbat preparation.", + "And one may not search his garments [for lice or fleas], nor read by the light of a lamp. This halakhah is concerned not with the eve of Shabbat but with Shabbat itself. It is brought here because the nature of the halakhah is similar to the nature of the other halakhot. They are all “gezerot” that is prohibitions created to prevent a situation which might cause a person to transgress. A person should not check his clothes for lice or fleas or read by candlelight on Shabbat lest he tilt the candle to bring more oil to the wick an activity considered to be prohibited due to the prohibition of lighting a fire.", + "In truth it was said, the hazzan may see where the children are reading from, but he himself must not read. Although a person shouldn’t read by candlelight, children may do so because their teacher will stop them from tilting the candle. The Palestinian Talmud explains that children want the candle to go out so that they won’t have to read anymore, hence they won’t tilt it. Their teacher, the hazzan (today the word is used to refer to the cantor, but in the Mishnah it has a different meaning), may also help them read with the candlelight. However, he must not use the candle for his own reading. A note on the phrase “in truth” be’emet: According to Goldberg, this phrase is used to introduce an exception to the previous rule which was taught above. The Talmud claims that this phrase means that the law was given directly to Moses on Sinai.", + "Similarly, a zav must not eat together with a zavah, because it may lead to sin. This section contains another “gezerah” a prohibition meant to keep a person from transgressing. A zav and a zavah are a man and woman who have abnormal genital flows. They are both impure. A pure person should not eat together with a zav or a zavah because the zav or zavah will cause the food they share to become impure. Seemingly, there should be no problem with a zav eating with a zavah, because they are both impure. However, in order to prevent people from becoming accustomed to eating with zavim, even this is prohibited." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah does not actually teach any halakhah. Rather it places the halakhot which we learned above in an historical context.", + "And these are of halakhot which they stated in the upper chamber of Hananiah ben Hezekiah ben Gurion, when they went up to visit him. They took a count, and Bet Shammai outnumbered Beth Hillel and on that day they enacted eighteen measures. This mishnah begins by teaching that the halakhot which were taught in the previous several mishnayot were stated on a famous, somewhat legendary and obscure, day in the history of the rabbis when the Sages visited the upper chamber of Hananiah ben Hezekiah ben Gurion. According to the Rambam, the “eighteen measures” mentioned in section two refer to eighteen halakhot stated from the beginning of the tractate until this point. According to this interpretation, these were eighteen prohibitions about which Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel agreed. Mishnah 1 lists eight things, and there are five in both mishnayot 2 and 3 (these could be counted in different ways). The Rambam holds that on that day they made eighteen enactments, which are not listed in our mishnah. They also disagreed over eighteen issues, and thirteen of these will be listed in the upcoming mishnayot. The remainder of the disagreements are listed elsewhere. There are several other ways to understand this mishnah, but the Rambam’s seems to be straightforward. Some explain that the mishnah does not refer to those things halakhoth that are found in the above mishnayot but that it refers to a list preserved in the Talmud. However, we understand the mishnah, we should note how unusual it is. Rarely do mishnayoth provide us with information about where or when they were taught. Although we cannot be sure of what happened on that day in the upper chamber, it certainly was a day that became legendary in the mind of the rabbis." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe next four mishnayot contain disputes between Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel over things that can be done before the Sabbath.\nMost of the disputes revolve around one central issue: can a person’s vessels perform work for them on the Sabbath? It is clear that a person herself cannot perform a forbidden act of work on the Sabbath; the debate is whether a person can set in motion a process which will cause work to be done on the Sabbath. Today it is clear to us that this is permitted. For instance, I can set a timer on my clock and it can go on on Shabbat and light my house. Bet Shammai, however, would say that such an act is forbidden.\nWe should note, the it seems that the sect of Jews who lived in Qumran and produced the Dead Sea Scrolls probably held like Bet Shammai. According to this understanding, work may not be done for a Jew on the Sabbath. The verse from the Ten Commandments which reads, “Six days you shall labor and do all your work” (Exodus 20:9) is interpreted to mean that all of a person’s work must be done within six day. In contrast, the Hillelites would hold that a Jew may not perform work on the Sabbath. They interpret the verse to mean that a person can do work for only six days, not that all of a person’s work must be done in six days. Although these positions might seem similar, they are based on different understandings of the Sabbath and indeed of halakhah in general.", + "Beth Shammai says: ink, dyes and vetch may not be soaked [on Friday afternoon] unless they can be fully soaked while it is yet day; And Bet Hillel permits it. Inks, dyes and vetch (a legume soaked and then used as animal food) are all processed by soaking a plant in water to soften it. According to Bet Shammai it is forbidden to start such a process on Friday unless the person can sure that she can complete the process before Shabbat. As we learned above in the introduction, Bet Shammai forbids a person from having her “things” work for her on Shabbat. Bet Hillel permits this." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah contains two more debates between Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel over whether work may be begun on Friday before Shabbat, if that work will continue on its own throughout Shabbat.", + "Beth Shammai says: bundles of wet flax may not be placed in an oven unless they can begin to steam while it is still day, nor wool in the dyer’s kettle unless it can [absorb the color] such that [the color] is visible. But Bet Hillel permits it. Bet Shammai prohibits putting flax in the oven or wool in the dyer’s kettle if the work will continue to be performed on Shabbat. If the essential part of drying the flax or dying the wool has been done before Shabbat, then she may leave her things over Shabbat. But if not, Bet Shammai prohibits. Bet Hillel again permits this.", + "Bet Shammai says: traps for wild beasts, fowl, and fish may not be spread unless they can be caught while it is still day; But Bet Hillel permits it. This is in essence the same debate as above. The one innovation is that Bet Hillel permits even though the whole work might end up being done on the Shabbat, as opposed to the other cases where the work began on Friday. Similarly, Bet Shammai forbids this, even though there is no certainty that the traps will catch anything on Shabbat." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is related to the last couple of mishnayot in that again Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel debate and yet the subject is different. In this mishnah a Jew gives something to a non-Jew before Shabbat for the non-Jew to carry away on Shabbat.", + "Bet Shammai says: one must not sell [something] to a non-Jew, or help him to load [a donkey], or lift up [an article] upon him unless he can reach a near place [before Shabbat]. But Bet Hillel permits it. Bet Shammai holds that one shouldn’t create a situation where it will look like the non-Jew is doing forbidden work for the Jew on Shabbat. A non-Jew may not perform work for a Jew on Shabbat. Despite the prevalence of the “shabbes goy”, a non-Jew who does things for a Jew on Shabbat that the Jew cannot herself do, this is actually prohibited. Bet Shammai says that if a Jew sells something to a non-Jew on Friday or helps the non-Jew load up a donkey or the non-Jew himself, it will look as if the non-Jew is setting out to do the Jew’s work. Therefore, it is prohibited. In order for it to be permitted, he must arrive either at his own home (according to one opinion in the Talmud) or at least to his home city (according to another opinion). Bet Hillel is not concerned with creating such an appearance, and hence this is permitted." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis is the final debate between Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel over work that is begun on Friday.", + "Bet Shammai says: hides must not be given to a [non-Jewish] tanner, nor clothing to a non-Jewish launderer, unless they can be done while it is yet day; But in all these [cases] Bet Hillel, permits as long as the sun is still shining. Like yesterday’s mishnah, this mishnah continues to deal with a Jew giving things to a gentile with which the gentile will work on the Sabbath. In the case of today’s mishnah we might have thought that Bet Hillel would prohibit because it looks like the non-Jew will be doing work for the Jew on the Sabbath. The last part of the mishnah refers to all of the debates above. In all of these cases, Bet Hillel permits the Jew to set the motion in process as long as the sun has not yet set. The addition of “as long as the sun is still shining” also signals that this is the end of the series of debates." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first section of this mishnah is a continuation of the previous mishnayot. Here we learn that Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel’s house behaved like Bet Shamma and refrained from doing work on Friday if that work would continue onto Shabbat.\nThe second section begins to list things that may be done on Friday, even according to Bet Shammai.", + "Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel said: My father’s house was accustomed to giving white clothing to a non-Jewish launderer three days before Shabbat. The custom of Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel’s house was that of Bet Shammai. In the Tosefta (a text from the same time period as the Mishnah) it is related that they would give colored laundry on Friday, because colored laundry is easier to clean than white laundry.", + "And these and these agree that they lay down an olive press beams and wine press rollers. Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel agree that one can begin the process of pressing olives and grapes on Friday, even though the work will continue on Shabbat. Since as soon as she lays down the beams, most of the good juices will come out and the grapes and olives are crushed, the continuation of such a process is not considered to be work forbidden by the Torah on Shabbat. Therefore, Bet Shammai allows this. Even on Shabbat, crushing already crushed grapes and already pressed olives is not considered to be work forbidden by the Torah, but rather only prohibited by rabbinic law derabbanan." + ], + [ + "Meat, onion[s], and egg[s] may not be roasted unless they can be [fully] roasted while it is still day.
Bread may not be put into an oven just before nightfall, nor a cake upon coals, unless its surface can form a crust while it is still day. Rabbi Elazar says: there must be time for the bottom to form a crust.
In today’s mishnah we learn that Bet Hillel agrees with Bet Shammai that food may not be put into an oven on Friday in order for it to cook on Shabbat, unless it has already been fully cooked before Shabbat begins.
Note that in yesterday’s mishnah we learned of a case where Bet Shammai agrees with Bet Hillel and in today’s mishnah we learn of a case where Bet Hillel agrees with Bet Shammai.
We can explain both of these sections together, since they are both in essence the same halakhah. Bet Hillel does not allow food to be left in the oven if the food is uncooked lest someone rakes the coals in the oven in order to increase the heat and cook the food faster. Since unlike the items in the previous mishnayot, the person will want her food on the Shabbat itself there is a fear that she will do something to hurry the food’s cooking. Raking the coals is forbidden on Shabbat under the category of lighting a fire. Hence, to “keep one away from sin” it is prohibited to even have uncooked food in the fire.
Cooking cakes or bread involved placing them on the sides of ovens. The bottom would crust before the top. Rabbi Elazar is therefore more lenient. He allows leaving the bread in the oven as long as the bottom has already crusted over, which will be before the top." + ], + [ + "Introduction This mishnah continues to discuss lighting fires in ovens on Friday so that they will stay lit over Shabbat. Since the prohibition of putting something into an oven on Friday was only “derabbanan”—of rabbinic origin—and intended to prevent a person from committing a transgression of biblical law, there are cases where this prohibition may be suspended. This is generally the case with rabbinic law—it is more flexible than toraitic law. ", + " The passover sacrifice may be lowered into the oven just before nightfall; In yesterday’s mishnah we learned that one is not allowed to put meat into an oven on Friday unless it will already be cooked before Shabbat begins. Today’s mishnah relates an exception to this rule: the Passover sacrifice. The reason that one is not allowed to put meat into an oven is that we are concerned lest on Shabbat itself she come to rake the coals in order to speed up the cooking, which is prohibited on Shabbat. However, in this case, since people eat the passover sacrifice in a group setting, we are not concerned that one of them will rake the coals, because others will stop her. These people are engaged in fulfilling a commandment and it is unlikely that they would transgress a commandment at this time. In addition, because of the quantity of people who had to sacrifice their passover sacrifices, not everybody could roast theirs before the Shabbat began. Hence the usual restrictions did not apply.", + "And the fire may be lighted in the fireplace of the Chamber of the Hearth. The Chamber of the Hearth was where the fire was kept constantly lit in the Temple. The priests would gather around there to keep warm. Hence, they could add to the fire there on Friday without fear that someone would stoke the fire, since the priests would make sure that would not happen. ", + "But in the provinces there must be time for the fire to take hold of its greater part. Outside of the Temple it is forbidden to light a fire on Friday unless it the fire has time to take hold before the Shabbat. Small fires need to be stoked, and therefore the fire must be fully lit before Shabbat begins.", + "Rabbi Judah says: in the case of charcoal, just a little [is sufficient]. Rabbi Judah adds in a leniency concerning lighting coals on Friday. Once coals are lit, they will stay lit and therefore there is little fear that he will stoke them. Hence it is permitted to light them on Friday afternoon as long as they will be at least a little bit lit before Shabbat begins." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis chapter deals with candle lighting on Friday eve before Shabbat. Candle lighting is part of the joy that we are commanded to experience on Shabbat. Today, with electric lights in abundance we no longer appreciate the function of a simple candle on Friday eve. In the time of the Mishnah, on most nights people would have gone to sleep at nightfall. It was just too expensive to use up oil for light on normal occasions. On Friday night they lit candles, stayed up late, ate a festive meal and studied Torah.\nMost of the chapter deals with the technical details of lighting wicks, oils, lamps, etc.", + "With what may they kindle [the Shabbat light] and with what may they not kindle them?
They may not kindle with cedar fiber, uncarded flax, a raw silk, a desert wick, or seaweed, The list in this section is of material which may not be used for wicks in lighting the Sabbath candles. The reason that we do not light with these types of wicks is that they don’t absorb the oil well, and someone might tilt the lamp on Shabbat to try to get more oil on the wick. Such tilting is prohibited because it is like lighting a fire. Also, since they are not good wicks they might go out, forcing the family to sit in the dark.", + "And not with pitch, wax, castor oil, [terumah] oil [which must be] burnt, tail fat, or tallow. Nahum the Mede says: they may kindle with melted tallow. And the sages say: whether melted or not, they may not kindle with it. The same reason that the above-mentioned wicks were prohibited is why most of these types of oil are also prohibited. The exception is terumah oil which must be burned. This refers to terumah oil which has been made impure and therefore has to be burned. It is prohibited to burn unclean sacrifices or terumah on Shabbat and on holidays. The final debate is on whether all types of tallow are prohibited or just tallow that has not been melted." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to discuss oils which may be used for lighting the Shabbat lights.", + "They may not kindle [the Shabbat light] with [terumah] oil [which must be] burnt on festivals. This section deals with festivals. Of all of the forbidden oils listed at the end of yesterday’s mishnah, this is the only one prohibited on festivals. The other oils are permitted. They are prohibited on Shabbat because they don’t light well and someone might come to tilt the lamp. Tilting the lamp is prohibited on Shabbat but not on festivals. Hence, on festivals there is no reason to prohibit these types of oils.", + "Rabbi Ishmael says: they may not light with tar, because of the honor of the Shabbat. Rabbi Ishmael says that tar may not be used because it smells bad. Furthermore, if the smell is really bad the person might extinguish it, which is prohibited on Shabbat.", + "But the sages permit with all oils: with sesame oil, nut oil, radish oil, fish oil, gourd oil, tar and naphtha. The sages allow the use of any type of oil, even tar and naphta. It seems that the reason that most of the sages were so lenient is to keep the costs down, especially in places where good olive oil is not abundant.", + "Rabbi Tarfon says: they don’t light with anything but olive oil. Olive oil is the best type of oil for lighting a lamp. That is why it is customary to use olive oil on Hannukah (despite our modern custom of using wax candles). Rabbi Tarfon demands only the best for Shabbat. In the Talmud the Sages respond by asking Rabbi Tarfon what people in lands outside of Israel who don’t have access to olive oil do." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah returns to discussing what may be used as wicks for Shabbat lights.", + "Whatever comes from a tree they may not light [the Shabbat light] except for flax. The only type of material which comes from a tree which may be used as a wick is flax, which is used to make linen. Although we would not consider flax to be a tree, it is called a tree in Joshua 2:6.", + "And whatever comes from a tree cannot be defiled with tent-uncleanness except linen. There is a connection between what type of material can be used as a Shabbat candle wick and what type of material contracts tent-uncleanness. If a corpse or piece thereof is under a tent and something else is under the tent is well, the corpse transmits its impurity to the other thing under the tent. Any type of material except linen which covers both the corpse and the other thing will carry the impurity but it itself will remain pure. A tent made of linen not only causes the impurity to go from the corpse to the other thing but it itself becomes impure.", + "A wick made of cloth which was twisted but not singed: Rabbi Eliezer says: it is unclean, and one may not light with it; Rabbi Akiva says: it is clean and one may light with it. They would make wicks by twisting cloth and then singing them. Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiba debate the status of twisted cloth that has not been singed. According to Rabbi Eliezer it is still considered to be a cloth and hence it can still receive impurities. Since it has not been singed it should not however be used as a wick. Rabbi Akiva holds that since it has been twisted it is no longer considered cloth, but even though it has not been singed one may light with it." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah teaches that it is forbidden to set up a lamp such that someone might take away some of its oil. Taking away oil is like extinguishing it because it will cause it to go out earlier. Extinguishing, like kindling, is a labor prohibited by the Torah.", + "One may not pierce an egg shell, fill it with oil, and place it over the mouth of a lamp, in order that it should drip, and even if it is of clay. And Rabbi Judah permits it. But if the potter connects it beforehand it is permitted, because it is one utensil. This section describes a person who fills an egg shell or piece of clay with oil and pierces a tiny hole in the bottom so that it should drip into the lamp. We should note that he does this before Shabbat; during Shabbat it would clearly be strictly forbidden since this is considered to be the forbidden work of “kindling”. The problem is that since this is a vessel separate from the lamp itself, a person may think that it is permitted to take from it and use the oil. However, the oil is “muktzeh” set aside for the use in the lamp and may not be used for other purposes. It is also considered to be extinguishing the lamp, because by taking oil away he is causing the light to go out early. “Muktzeh” is a broad category which usually means that something may not be used or even touched on Shabbat. We will learn more about muktzeh throughout the tractate. Rabbi Judah is not concerned lest someone take the oil from the external vessel and hence permits this. If the egg shell or external clay vessel was attached to the lamp (before Shabbat) then it is permitted. We are only concerned lest someone take the oil from an external vessel, reasoning that she is not really taking it from the lamp itself. People know that it is forbidden to take oil out of a lamp and hence will not do this.", + "One may not fill a dish of oil, place it at the side of a lamp, and put the wick end in it in order that it should draw. And Rabbi Judah permits it. In this case a person has a wick which has several ends. She puts the lit end into one lamp and then the other end extends out of the lamp into another vessel so that it can draw more oil. This is prohibited for the same reason as above. Since the other vessel is external, a person might think that it is okay to take oil from it. Again, the problem is that the other oil is muktzeh and by taking it away she is causing the lamp to go out early. As above, Rabbi Judah is not concerned lest she take away from the oil." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah introduces an abstract concept called “work which is not needed for its own sake.” This refers to someone who performs a prohibited labor on Shabbat but does not need the results of the labor itself but a side result. The tannaim debate whether someone who does this activity is liable for having transgressed the Shabbat. We shall see an illustration of this in the mishnah.\nThe immediate topic is laws concerning extinguish lamps.", + "One who extinguishes the lamp because he is afraid of non-Jews, robbers, or an evil spirit, or so that a sick person may sleep, he is exempt. Extinguishing a fire is forbidden on Shabbat. However, saving a life always takes precedence over the laws of Shabbat. Hence, any of the activities listed in this mishnah are permitted. We should note that the mishnah states “exempt.” Exempt usually means that one who does such a thing is not liable for a penalty, but the activity is still not permitted. This mishnah is an exception exempt means that it is totally permitted. The sick person referred to in this mishnah is someone with a potentially life-threatening disease. It is forbidden to extinguish a lamp for someone who only has a slight headache, or similar non life-threatening illness.", + "If [he does so because] he wants to spare the lamp, the oil, or the wick, he is liable. Rabbi Yose exempts in all cases, except for the wick, because he makes charcoal. According to the first opinion, if a person puts out a lamp not because she wants it to be dark, but because she wants to save the material used in the lamp she is still liable. This is “a work not needed for its own sake.” According to this opinion a person who does this type of work is liable. Rabbi Yose holds that one who performs “a work not needed for its own sake” is generally exempt. The exemption is one who puts out a lamp because she wants to singe the wick. Singing the wick makes it into a type of charcoal and therefore this is no longer “work not needed for its own sake” but rather work for its own sake and hence she would be liable." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah provides a quite strongly worded exhortation to women to be scrupulous in the observation of three mitzvoth with which they are strongly associated: lighting Shabbat candles, separating hallah (a percentage of dough which has to be taken from all bread) and niddah menstrual purity. The mishnah says that women die in childbirth for not observing these mitzvoth correctly.\nI should add a personal note. Loss of life is always difficult, and a woman’s death while giving birth is probably one of the most difficult losses a husband and his and her family could experience. Thankfully, the number of women who die in childbirth is drastically lower in the modern western world than it was in the past. In the time of the Mishnah, it would have been fairly common. The rabbis were struggling to understand why so many women died while giving birth. This must have been especially difficult for them since having children was on of their most important values. While we may have difficulties with their answer, and I don’t think that we should go around saying that people die for non-observance of commandments, we nevertheless can appreciate the difficult theological problem with which the rabbis were trying to cope.\nFinally, lest you think that the rabbis “had it out for women” the Talmud discusses at great length all types of travails that afflict the world and why they come to the world. The idea that people are punished for sins is normative biblical theology, with no special connection to women.", + "For three sins women die in childbirth: because they are not observant of [the laws of] niddah, hallah, and the kindling of the [Shabbat] lights. A midrash connects this mishnah with the sin of Eve. Eve caused Adam’s blood to be spilled (by bringing death into the world), therefore she is commanded in the laws of niddah. By sinning she extinguished the light of the world and therefore she is commanded in lighting the Shabbat candles. She lost the “hallah” of the world by causing the death of Adam, who was the “hallah” of the Garden of Eden; therefore she is commanded in the laws of hallah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe final mishnah of this chapter discusses what last minute preparations should be double-checked right before Shabbat begins. The mishnah then proceeds to discuss what things may be done during twilight, a time which the rabbis were unsure whether to consider night or not.", + "A person must say three things in his house on the eve of Shabbat just before night: Have you separated tithes? Have you prepared the ‘eruv? Kindle the [Shabbat] lamp. There are three things a person should check before Shabbat begins. The first is that his food has been tithed. Tithes may not be separated on Shabbat and therefore food which has not been tithed will not be able to be eaten on Shabbat. He should also ask if the “eruv” has been set up. There are two types of eruvin (the plural of eruv): one which allows a person to go further out of the city than he would otherwise be allowed to go and one which allows a person to carry things in places where it would normally be prohibited. The tractate which follows Shabbat is tractate Eruvin so we will reserve in-depth discussion of these issues until later. Setting up both types of eruvin is an important part of Shabbat preparation. When all other preparations have been made, he tells his wife to light the Shabbat candles.", + "If it is doubtful, whether it is night or not, they do not tithe that which is certainly [untithed], they do not immerse utensils, and they do not kindle the lights. The mishnah now begins to discuss what things may be done during twilight, the period after sunset before it is completely dark. It is forbidden to tithe produce which we know has not been tithed. Tithes are part of a forbidden labor called “completing” something’s preparation (metaken). Similarly, immersing an impure vessel in a mikveh is considered completing its preparation and is forbidden. Finally, if the candles have not yet been lit, they do not light them. All three of these activities are prohibited by the Torah (deoraita) and hence cannot be done even during twilight.", + "But they can tithe doubtfully tithed produce, and they can set up an eruv, and they can store hot food. However, the following three activities are permitted. It is permitted to tithe doubtfully tithed produce (demai) because according to Torah law he doesn’t even need to separate tithes from demai in the first place. Since the entire obligation is only a rabbinic stringency, the rabbis allowed it to be done during twilight, although not on Shabbat. One can still set up an eruv. Finally, it is permitted to cover hot food with something that will maintain the food’s warmth. On Shabbat it is forbidden to do so lest by doing so she cooks, an activity which is prohibited. This last clause also functions as a transition to the next chapter which is devoted to the important prohibition of cooking on Shabbat." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nYesterday’s mishnah ended with a halakhah concerning covering hot food before Shabbat so that it would stay hot during Shabbat. Our mishnah continues to discuss halakhot of a similar nature.\nThis mishnah refers to leaving a dish of cooked food on a stove during Shabbat in a case where it was put there before Shabbat. The potential problem here is not the prohibited labor of cooking, since the dish is already cooked. Rather the problem is that he might rake the coals to make them get hotter and raking coals is prohibited because it lights a fire.", + "If a double stove was heated with stubble or straw, they may put a cooked dish on it. If a dish of cooked food was put on a stove before Shabbat it is permitted to leave it on the stove during Shabbat as long as the stove was heated with stubble or straw. Since stubble and straw do not become coals, there is no fear that a person may come to rake coals.", + "If it was heated with peat or wood, one may not place [a dish on it] until he sweeps it out or covers it with ashes. If the stove was heated with peat or wood, then the dish may not be left on it during Shabbat. Peat is refuse left over from olive production and it was used in cooking. Both peat and wood turn into coals and therefore if she doesn’t do some sort of preparation to the stove before Shabbat we are concerned lest she come to rake them on Shabbat, a prohibited act. What she needs to do is either remove the coals or cover them with ashes so that they will cool down and she will not come to rake them on Shabbat.", + "Bet Shammai says: hot water, but not a dish; And Bet Hillel says: both hot water and a dish. The debates in this section and in the next refer to cases where it is permitted to leave food on the stove. Bet Shammai says it is permitted to leave only hot water but not a dish of cooked food. Bet Shammai holds that since people really want their food to be cooked the halakhah is more stringent for food than it is for water. Bet Hillel says that the halakhah is the same for both food and water.", + "Bet Shammai says: one may remove it, but not put it back; But Bet Hillel says: one may even put it back. Bet Shammai says that it is permitted to leave the water on the stove but if she takes it off she may not put it back. Bet Shammai thinks that putting it back on the stove looks too much like cooking. Bet Hillel holds that it is permitted even to put the water or food back." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn yesterday’s mishnah we learned about leaving a cooked dish on a double stove during Shabbat. Today’s mishnah discusses ovens and single stoves. To understand these mishnayot we need to understand a little bit about how these things were made. Double stoves are as wide on top as they are below and therefore they do not preserve heat particularly well. Ovens are wider below than they are up top and are the best at preserving heat. Single stoves have only one opening up top they are hotter than double stoves but cooler than ovens.", + "If an oven was heated with stubble or straw, one may not place [a dish] either inside or on top. Since the heat of an oven is greater than that of a stove, it is forbidden to leave anything in or on top of an oven. Even if there is only a little fire, we are concerned lest she come to rake the coals on Shabbat. The mishnah states that this is prohibited when the oven is lit with stubble or straw; all the more so it is prohibited if the oven is lit with peat or wood.", + "If a single stove was heated with stubble or straws, it is like a double stove; With peat or wood, it is like an oven. If a single stove is heated with stubble or straw then we can treat it like the double stove and leave a dish on it on Shabbat. However, if it was heated with peat or wood then it is like an oven and it is forbidden to leave dishes both on top and inside. The Talmud adds that even if the coals had been removed or covered with ash it is still prohibited." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses cooking eggs in ways that might not be considered to really be cooking.", + "They may not place an egg at the side of a boiler for it to be lightly roasted and one must not break it into a [hot] cloth. And Rabbi Yose permits it. Placing an egg next to a hot boiler will not suffice to really cook the egg, but it can lightly roast it, perhaps like a soft-boiled egg. Similarly, putting the egg into a hot cloth can make it lightly cooked. The first opinion in the mishnah holds that these actions are considered cooking and are therefore prohibited. Rabbi Yose holds that this is not cooking and is hence permitted.", + "And one may not put it away in hot sand or road dust for it to be roasted. Burying the egg in hot sand or dust will really cook it and hence even Rabbi Yose agrees that it is prohibited." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses heating water on Shabbat.", + "It once happened that the people of Tiberias conducted a pipe of cold water through an arm of the hot springs. The sages said to them: if this happened on the Shabbat, it is like hot water heated on the Shabbat, and is forbidden both for washing and for drinking; If on a festival, it is like water heated on a festival, which is forbidden for washing but permitted for drinking. In Tiberias before Shabbat the people set up a pipe of cold water to flow through the hot springs so that the water in the pipe would heat up on Shabbat and they would have hot water for drinking and bathing. This is not actually cooking because there is no fire, but it is similar enough to cooking such that this is prohibited on Shabbat. Therefore on Shabbat it is forbidden to use this water for either cooking or washing. On festivals (Yom Tov) it is permitted to cook in order to eat. Therefore, if they did this on the festival they may use the water for drinking, but not for washing. It is not permitted to heat water for washing on a festival.", + "A miliarum which is cleared of its ashes--they may drink from it on Shabbat. A miliarum is a clay vessel for water which has a pipe in it in which they would put hot coals to heat water. One can drink the water from a milarium only if the coals were removed before Shabbat.", + "An antiki even if its ashes have been cleared--they may not drink from it. An antiki is a copper pot which has a large place to put coals in it so that the water would get very hot. It retains its heat better than a mililarum. Since it retains its heat so well, it is forbidden to use it on Shabbat even if the coals have been removed before Shabbat." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe previous mishnayot dealt with leaving things on the fire. Today’s mishnah deals with things that are prohibited because they are considered cooking, even if the dish has been taken off the fire.", + "A kettle which was removed [from the fire]: one may not pour cold water into it so that it should warm up, but one may pour it [water] into or into a cup in order to temper it. This section discusses a hot water kettle which has been removed from the fire. It is forbidden to pour a small amount of water into the kettle because the hot water that it is in the kettle will cook the water which is put in. However, she may put a large quantity of cold water into the kettle because this will not cause the cold water to be cooked but rather the hot water to be cooled down. If the water from the hot water kettle has been poured into a cup she may also put in cold water in order to cool the hot water down.", + "The pan or pot which was removed [from the fire] while it is boiling, one must not put spices into it, but one may put [spices] into a dish or a tureen. This section discusses a pan or pot with boiling hot contents which was removed from the fire right before Shabbat began. On Shabbat it is forbidden to put spices directly into the pan or pot because in this way the spices will be cooked. However, if she moves the contents of the pan into a dish or tureen which is not on the fire, then she may put into the dish anything she wants. Once the contents have been moved from their original pan, they will not cook any spices put into them.", + "Rabbi Judah says: he may put [spices] into anything except what contains vinegar or brine. Rabbi Judah holds that she may put spices into any dish, even one that is boiling and was just removed from the fire. The only thing that is prohibited is putting something into a dish with vinegar or brine. According to Rabbi Judah, the spiciness of the vinegar and brine aid in cooking the food in the dish. [I must admit that I have a wish to say fish in dish, but that is probably because I have been reading Dr. Seuss to my children.]" + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with the concept of “muktzeh” things set aside that cannot be used on Shabbat. It is forbidden to move anything that is muktzeh on Shabbat. The opposite of muktzeh is “mukhan”, things which are prepared to be used on Shabbat. As an aside, we should note that the laws of Shabbat are intimately connected with the intentions of the person performing the act. The same activity has different consequences depending on what intention the activity was performed with. This also shows us that these mishnayot are addressed to audiences who already “buy into the system” that is to say they are not looking to get away with things that are actually forbidden on Shabbat. Otherwise, a person could always lie about her intention or about what actually happened. This is an important point that in my opinion applies to a large percentage of halakhah.", + "They may not place a vessel under a lamp to catch the oil. But if it was placed there before sunset it is permitted. Yet one may not benefit from it because it is not prepared (. The oil that was in the lamp is “muktzeh” since it had been set aside for lighting the lamp. While the oil is in the lamp she could not take any. Once the muktzeh oil falls into the vessel the vessel itself also becomes muktzeh. Anything that holds something that is muktzeh is itself muktzeh. Hence putting the vessel there to catch the oil is forbidden for she will be holding something which is muktzeh. However, she may put the vessel there before Shabbat and we are not concerned lest she take oil from the vessel or move the vessel itself on Shabbat. Even in a case where it was permitted to put the vessel under the lamp it is still forbidden to use the oil on Shabbat because the oil itself is always muktzeh.", + "They may handle a new lamp but not an old one. Rabbi Shimon says: all lamps may be handled, except a lamp [actually] burning on Shabbat. It is permitted to handle a new, unused lamp on Shabbat. Such a lamp is not muktzeh. However, an old lamp may not be handled on Shabbat even if it is not lit because it is muktzeh. The reason that it is muktzeh is that it is repulsive. An old lamp may be caked with oil and shmutz and hence people will not like handling it. Repulsive things are muktzeh on Shabbat because people don’t intend to handle them. Rabbi Shimon does not hold that things which are “muktzeh” may not be handled on Shabbat. Therefore in his opinion an old lamp may be handled. The only type of lamp that may not be handled is one that it is already lit lest by carrying it he causes it to go out.", + "A vessel may be placed under a lamp to catch the sparks, but one must not pour water into it, because he extinguishes [them]. Above we learned that it is forbidden to put a vessel under a lamp to catch the oil. Here we learn that it is permitted to put a vessel under a lamp to catch the sparks that might fly out of the lamp. The rabbis considered the sparks to not be “material” and therefore they are not muktzeh and they do not make the vessel muktzeh. However, it is forbidden to put water into the vessel since this extinguishes the sparks and extinguishing is prohibited on Shabbat." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis brief chapter deals with covering up hot food with something that will preserve its heat. The general rule is that the rabbis allowed storage in something that would preserve the heat but not in something that would increase the heat. The reason is that if this were allowed she might store the food in hot coals and then rake the coals to make them hotter. Raking coals is prohibited. When storage is prohibited it is prohibited even if she stores the dish before Shabbat begins.", + "In what things may they cover up [food], and in what things may they not cover it up?
They may not cover up [food] in peat, compost, salt, lime, or sand, whether moist or dry; The material in this section adds heat to the dish whether it is moist or dried out.", + "Nor in straw, grape-skins, rags or grasses, when they are moist; but they may cover up [food] in them when they are dry. The material in this section adds heat if it is still moist but not when it is dry. Hence it is permitted to cover up food with these things when they are dry.", + "They may cover up [food] in garments, produce, doves’ wings, carpenters’ sawdust and thoroughly beaten flax. Rabbi Judah forbids [storing] in fine [flax], but permits [it] in coarse [flax]. The material in this section does not add heat and only preserves it. Hence it is permitted to cover up food with these things. Rabbi Judah holds that fine beaten flax adds heat and it is therefore forbidden to cover up food with it." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe second (and last) mishnah of this brief chapter teaches that sometimes one may use certain material to cover up food to preserve its heat and yet the material is “muktzeh” and hence cannot be handled on Shabbat.", + "They may cover up [food] with hides, and they may be handled; Hides only preserve heat and do not add heat and therefore they may be used to cover up food on Shabbat. The hides also can be used as mats for sitting or lying down. Since they can be used on Shabbat they are not muktzeh and they may be handled.", + "[They may cover up food] with wool shearings, but they may not be handled. Wool shearings may be used for covering up food but they may not be handled. Normally wool shearings are used for spinning wool and making cloth, an activity prohibited on Shabbat. Hence, they are muktzeh.", + "What then is done? The lid [of the pot] is lifted, and they [the shearings] fall off of their own accord. The mishnah now addresses the problem of a pot that was covered with wool shearings before Shabbat: how does she get to the pot when it is covered by material which is muktzeh? The answer is that she may simply pick up the lid and allow the wool shearings to fall by the side.", + "Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah says: the basket [holding the pot] he turns on its side and [the food] is removed, lest one lift [the lid of the pot] and is unable to replace it. But the Sages say: one may take [out the pot] and replace [it]. This section refers to a situation where a person put a pot into a basket. The basket was filled with material (wool shearing in this case) to preserve the heat of the pot. She made space in the shearings so that the pot could fit in. The problem is that if she removes the pot she won’t be able to make space in the basket so that it can be returned. Rabbi Elazar says that she tilts the basket to the side and takes directly from the pot while it is in the basket. She is not allowed to remove the pot lest she move the muktzeh wool shearings in order to return it. The Sages hold that we are not concerned lest there not be space to return the pot and therefore she may take it out. However, if she takes it out and there is no space to return it, she may not move aside the wool shearings in order to return it.", + "If he did not cover it [a pot] while it was yet day, it may not be covered after nightfall. If it was covered but became uncovered, it may be recovered. It was permitted to cover up food only before Shabbat began. Once Shabbat has begun covering up is prohibited lest someone find that her food has grown cold and come to actually cook it on Shabbat. However, it is permitted to return food to where it had been covered and therefore if the covering comes off, it is also permitted to return the covering.", + "One may fill a jug with [cold water] and place it under a pillow or blanket [to keep it cool]. There is no prohibition to cover cold things in order to preserve their coolness on Shabbat. The entire prohibition of “covering up” only referred to hot foods because of the concern that someone might come to cook on Shabbat." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nExodus 23:12 reads, “Six days you shall do your work and on the seventh day you shall cease, in order that your ox and donkey will rest.” From here we see that on Shabbat a Jew may not have his animals do work on her behalf. Just as it is forbidden for a person to carry things in the public domain, so too it is forbidden for a Jew’s animal to carry things for the Jew. Our chapter deals with things that an animal may carry or wear. Anything needed to guard the animal is permitted, as is anything needed for the animal’s own protection from heat or cold. However, anything which is not really necessary for the animal itself (such as loading up a donkey with one’s personal belongings) may not be placed on an animal on Shabbat.", + "With what may an animal go out [on Shabbat], and with what may it not go out?
A camel may go out with a bit, a female camel with its nose-ring, a Libyan donkey with an iron bridle, a horse with its chain, and all chain-wearing animals may go out with their chains and be led by their chains. All of the things in this section are normally worn by animals and they are used to lead the animals around. Therefore, the animal may wear them on Shabbat. In a sense they are to the animal like clothes are to human beings. By carrying them the animal is not performing a labor for someone else. Rather they are part of the animal’s normal gear.", + "And they may sprinkle upon them [with purifying waters], and they may be immersed in their place. This section is an aside about the chains mentioned in the previous section. If these chains become impure they can be made pure without removing them from the animal. If they become impure with corpse impurity, they can sprinkle purifying waters on the chains while they are in their place. If they contract a lesser impurity, the chains may be immersed while still on the animal." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is a continuation of yesterday’s mishnah.", + "A donkey may go out with its saddle-cloth if it is tied to it. If the saddle is put on the donkey before Shabbat, the donkey may go out on Shabbat with it on its back and it is not considered carrying but rather “wearing” which is permitted on Shabbat.", + "Rams may go out with hides tied to them. Some explain that these hides were put on the rams’ chests to protect them. Others explain that they were put on their genitals, also for protection.", + "Ewes may go out with their tails tied up, tied down, or covered. If the ewe’s tail was tied up, that is so males can mount them. If the tail was tied down it was so males could not mount them (there has to be some humor in this, but I won’t be the one to try). The tail was covered for general protection.", + "Goats may go out [with their udders] tied up. The goats’ udders were sometimes covered up in order to dry them up and sometimes covered up in order to preserve their milk.", + "Rabbi Yose forbids in all these cases, save ewes that are covered. Rabbi Yose forbids all of the above cases except covering the ewes because all of the rest of them are for human benefit and not for the benefit of the animal. If the covering was for human benefit then the animal may not go out with that covering on Shabbat.", + "Rabbi Judah says: goats may go out [with their udders] tied in order to dry them up, but not to save their milk. Rabbi Judah is slightly more lenient than Rabbi Yose but less so than the first opinion. He adds that goats’ udders may be tied up in order to dry them up because that is for the sake of the animal. However, if the intent is to preserve their milk, that is for the sake of the goats’ owners and it is therefore considered carrying on Shabbat." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn the previous two mishnayoth we saw cases where t was permitted for an animal to carry certain things on Shabbat. In today’s mishnah and tomorrow’s we see examples where it is forbidden.", + "And with what may it not go out?
A camel may not go out with a pad The pad referred to her is put on top of its hump. Sometimes it was tied underneath its tail so that it wouldn’t scratch the camel’s skin. The reason that it is forbidden is that these often fall and we are concerned lest the pad falls off the camel and the owner carries the pad herself.", + "Or with forelegs bound together or with hind legs bound together; And the same is true for other animals. One is not allowed to tie the animal’s legs together on Shabbat because this is considered overly cautious protection. While it is permitted to offer reasonable protection so that the animal doesn’t run away, tying its legs together is beyond normal and hence this is considered “carrying.” This prohibition applies not only to camels but to all animals.", + "One should not tie camels together and pull [one of them]. But one may take the cords in his hand and pull [them] providing he does not twist them together. Tying camels together and pulling them together makes it look like they are going to market. To prevent this appearance it is forbidden to do so on Shabbat. However, if she just takes the cords of several camels together in her hand and leads them together it is permitted because it doesn’t look like they are going to the market." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe final mishnah of this chapter continues to provide examples of things that an animal may not carry on Shabbat.", + "A donkey may not go out with a saddle-cloth, when it is not tied to it, If the saddle-cloth is not tied to the donkey, we are concerned lest it fall off and the owner picks it up on Shabbat. Above in mishnah two we learned that if it is tied to the donkey, it is permitted.", + "or with a bell, even if it is plugged, Putting the bell on the donkey makes it look as if its owner is bringing it to the market to sell it. Hence, even if the bell is plugged up and doesn’t make a sound it is prohibited.", + "or with a ladder[-shaped yoke] around its neck, This yoke was placed on the donkey when it had sores on its back. The yoke prevents the donkey from biting its sores.", + "or with a strap around its foot. If the donkey’s legs rub each other when it walks they would place a thong around its feet to keep the legs apart.", + "Fowls may not go out with ribbons, The ribbons were placed on its legs so that people could tell their fowl apart from those of others.", + "or with straps on their legs. Straps were placed on their legs to prevent them from hopping too far and damaging other people’s things.", + "Rams may not go out with a wagon under their tails. These little wagons were placed under their tails to keep them from dragging on the ground.", + "Ewes may not go out with a hanun. According to the Talmud a “hanun” was a certain herb that they would place in the nose of female sheep so that the worms would come out (sounds like Vick’s vapor rub for sheep!). Since males butt each other and the worms will come out when they do so, they don’t need this herb. Hence it is forbidden to place this herb on a ram.", + "A calf may not go out with a small yoke. They would place a small yoke on the calf to accustom it to being yoked.", + "Or a cow with the skin of a hedgehog, They would attach the skin of a hedgehog to the udders of a cow to prevent other animals from suckling from the cow when she is asleep.", + "or with the strap between its horns. Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah’s cow used to go out with a strap between its horns, not with the approval of the rabbis. The strap was purely decorative. Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah let his cow go out with this strap, meaning that this is permitted. All of these are prohibited because putting them on an animal is considered carrying or because we are concerned that the thing will fall and someone will pick it up on Shabbat." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nAs we learned in the first mishnah to the tractate, it is forbidden for a person to carry something from the private domain to the public domain or vice versa. However, people are obviously allowed to wear clothing and thereby “carry” their clothing through the public domain. Wearing jewelry on Shabbat would not be considered carrying and therefore it should be permitted. However, the sages were concerned lest the jewelry fall or lest someone remove the jewelry to show others so they prohibited it. Our mishnah deals with jewelry which a woman may not wear out of her home on Shabbat.", + "With what may a woman go out and with what may she not go out?
A woman may not go out with wool ribbons, linen ribbons, or straps around her head; The words “around her head” refer to all of the ribbons or straps in this section. With all of them we are afraid that they may fall off her head and that she may thereby come to carry them on the Shabbat.", + "Nor may she immerse while wearing them, until she loosens them. This halakhah is an aside which does not deal directly with Shabbat. It teaches that when a woman immerses in a mikveh if she has a ribbon on her head she must loosen it. Otherwise the ribbon will prevent the water from having direct contact with her head. The Talmud connects this small discursion to the previous section’s prohibition. Since a woman who goes to the mikveh on Shabbat will have to loosen her ribbons, she might forget to tie them back tightly and therefore they might drop off her head on Shabbat.", + "[She may not go out] with frontlets or head-bangles if they are not sewn, Frontlets or head-bangles are types of tiaras which go on her forehead. She can’t go out with them if they are not tied to her head covering because they might fall off.", + "Or with a hair-net into the public domain, A hair-net would be placed under the frontlets or head-bangles. According to Maimonides the words “into the public domain” refer to all of the prohibitions above. While she may not go out into the public domain, she may go out to her courtyard.", + "Or with a golden city, or with a necklace or with ear-rings, or with a finger-ring [even if it has] no signet, or with a needle [even if it] is unpierced. The things in this section are all jewelry. She may not go out with them lest she take them off to show them to someone else or lest they fall off and she carry them in the public domain. By the way, “city of gold” is where the phrase “Jerusalem of gold” or “Yerushalayim shel zahav” originally comes from.", + "But if she goes out with these, she is not liable to a sin-offering. The prohibition of going out with any of the things listed in this mishnah is only a rabbinic (derabbanan) prohibition. Therefore, even if she does go out with one of them she is not liable to bring a sin-offering, as she would be if she carried something in the public domain that was biblically prohibited (deoraita). In other words, going out wearing any of these things is not considered to be “carrying”, and therefore she is not liable if she does so." + ], + [ + "A man may not go out with a nail-studded sandal,
Nor with a single [sandal] if he has no wound on his foot;
Nor with tefillin,
Nor with an amulet, if it is not from an expert;
Nor with a breastplate,
Nor with a helmet;
Nor with iron boots.
Yet if he goes out with these, he is not liable for a sin-offering.
In yesterday’s mishnah we learned that a woman may not go out into the public domain wearing certain types of jewelry, but that if she does she has not transgressed a biblical commandment. Today we learn the parallel laws for a man.
Section one: Albeck suggests that nail-studded sandals were part of a soldier’s gear and therefore just as the mishnah forbids breastplates, helmets and iron boots, so too it forbids nail-studded sandals. Interestingly, Josephus, Wars of the Jews Book VI, I, VI, refers to soldiers wearing such sandals.
Section two: He shouldn’t go out with one sandal because people will think that he is holding the other sandal. However, if he has a wound on his other foot everyone will see that he is wearing one sandal because of his wound. Therefore, if he has a wound on one foot he may go out with one sandal. In both talmuds they debate whether he wears the sandal on his wounded or healthy foot.
Section three: The sages debated whether or not tefillin are worn on Shabbat (today we don’t wear tefillin on Shabbat). For those who held that tefillin are not worn on Shabbat it was obvious that he can’t wear them out into the public domain. Since they are prohibited there is no reason to wear them around. However, even for the sages who hold that tefillin are worn on Shabbat, he should not wear them in the public domain lest he need to remove them and thereby come to carry them. He would need to remove them if he needed to relieve himself or if he came into a dirty place.
Section four: The sages believed in the efficacy of amulets, but only if they were made by expert amulet-makers. If an amulet was made by an expert then a person could wear it around on Shabbat, but if it was not made by an expert it is useless and forbidden to wear in the public domain. We should note that there are many descriptions of amulets in the Talmud and that many manuscripts describing amulet formulas and how to make amulets exist in ancient, medieval and even modern Jewish literature.
Sections 5-7: Anything that is clothing specifically designed for war may not be worn out into the public domain on Shabbat. Since he shouldn’t be going out to war (except in self-defense) on Shabbat, there is no need to wear these types of clothing and hence wearing them is considered carrying.
Section eight: The prohibition of wearing all of these things is only from the sages (derabbanan). From the Torah wearing them is not prohibited and hence if he wears one of the above listed things he is not liable to bring a sin-offering." + ], + [ + "A woman may not go out with a needle that is pierced,
Nor with a ring bearing a signet,
Nor with a cochlea brooch,
Nor with a spice tie,
Nor with a perfume vial; And if she does go out, she is liable to a sin-offering, the words of Rabbi Meir. But the sages say that she is not liable in the case of a spice tie and a perfume vial.
The previous two mishnayot listed things which it was permitted according to Torah law to wear into the public domain but which the sages nevertheless prohibited for various reasons. Today’s mishnah lists things which are prohibited even according to Torah law.
Section one: A pierced needle is one which is used for sewing, an activity which is prohibited on Shabbat. Therefore it is prohibited from the Torah for a woman (or a man, for that matter) to go out carrying one on Shabbat.
Section two: A ring with a signet is for signing, which is prohibited from the Torah on Shabbat.
Section three: This is a type of crown not commonly worn. Since it is not common attire, carrying it is considered “carrying” and not “wearing.”
Sections 4-5: Spice ties and perfume vials are only worn by women with extraordinarily bad smells. Rabbi Meir says that since most women don’t wear these things, they are considered “carrying” and hence prohibited by the Torah. The sages disagree and hold that the spice tie and perfume vial are not really carrying and hence there is only a rabbinic prohibition to carry them into the public domain." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first section of our mishnah contains a fascinating debate concerning carrying weapons of war on Shabbat. The second section discusses garters used to hold up hose worn on legs.", + "A man may not go out with a sword, bow, shield, club, or spear, and if he does go out, he incurs a sin-offering. Rabbi Eliezer says: they are ornaments for him. But the sages say, they are nothing but a disgrace, as it is said, “And they shall beat their swords into plowshares, and their spears into pruning hooks: nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more” (Isaiah 2:4). According to the sages weapons are disgraceful to a human being. While the sages would not deny that weapons are necessary in times of war, they should not be worn as mere decorations, meant to make a person look tougher. The sages derive this opinion from the famous messianic vision in Isaiah. As an aside, it seems to me that this is an approach deeply emblematic of Judaism war and it accoutrements are necessary evils not to be celebrated during times of peace. On the other hand, Rabbi Eliezer holds that weapons are ornaments for men. The word “ornaments” is the same word in Hebrew as “jewelry” for women. Just as women may wear jewelry for its intent is to improve their image, so too men may wear their weapons.", + "A garter is clean, and they go out [wearing] it on Shabbat. Knee-bands are unclean, and they may not go out with them on Shabbat. A garter is worn on the thighs to hold up the hose (socks). “It is clean” means that it is not receptive to impurities. The reason is that it is not considered an article of clothing in and of itself; rather it is part of another piece of clothing. Since it is not itself an article of clothing it cannot receive impurity. It may be worn on Shabbat since it is necessary to hold up a person’s hose. “Knee-bands” refers to chains attached to the garter to keep the legs from spreading to far apart. According to the Talmud these were typically worn by women. Since they have chains, they are considered to be in and of themselves an article of clothing and hence susceptible to impurity. They may not be worn on Shabbat lest the woman wearing them takes the chain off and carries them in the public domain." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nMost of this mishnah is the opposite of the first mishnah of this chapter. There we learned what things a woman may not wear into the public domain. Here we learn things that she may wear.", + "A woman may go out with ribbons made of hair, whether they are of her own hair or her friend’s, or an animal’s; In the first mishnah we learned that a woman may not go out with ribbons of wool or flax since she might take them off and carry them in the public domain. Also, since she had to remove them before immersing in a mikveh we feared that she may remove them on Shabbat in order to immerse. Here we learn that she may wear ribbons of hair, since she need not remove them when immersing.", + "And with frontlets or head-bangles if they are sewn, Since these are sewn to her hair-net, she may wear them out on Shabbat and we are not concerned lest she remove them.", + "And with a hair-net and with a wig into a courtyard; She may wear her wig and hair-net into a courtyard but not into the public domain.", + "And with wool in her ear, with wool in her sandals, and with wool which she prepared for her menstruation; She may go out with pieces of wool cloth in her ear (to keep in the puss from an infection), in her sandal (if her feet are sore) and as a tampon. Since these are necessary and we are not concerned that she will remove them in the public domain, she may go out with them.", + "With a peppercorn, with a lump of salt and anything that is placed in her mouth, providing that she does not put it in her mouth in the first place on Shabbat, And if it falls out, she may not put it back. People put peppercorns in their mouths to improve their breath and salt to heal a wound. The mishnah teaches that a woman may go out with these things in her mouth on Shabbat and it is not considered “carrying.” However, she may not put them in her mouth on Shabbat itself because they are like medicines. As we shall learn, taking medicine was prohibited on Shabbat lest someone come to grind their own drugs. Grinding is a labor prohibited by the Torah. Furthermore, even if it was in her mouth before Shabbat and then fell out, she may not put it back in.", + "A false tooth or a gold tooth: Rabbi permits but the sages forbid it. According to the sages, she may not wear false teeth lest her friends laugh at her or admire them and she removes them to show her friends. Rabbi is not concerned with this possibility and hence permits wearing false teeth.", + "With a peppercorn, with a lump of salt and anything that is placed in her mouth, providing that she does not put it in her mouth in the first place on Shabbat, And if it falls out, she may not put it back. Sections five and six are addressed to women (as is the entire mishnah) but it is likely that the same rules would also apply to men. The reason that these sections are addressed to women is probably that these things were more customarily done by women." + ], + [ + "She may go out with the sela on a callus.
Young girls may go out with threads, and even with chips in their ears.
Arabian women may go out veiled.
Medean women may go out with their cloaks thrown over their shoulders.
Indeed, all people [may do likewise] but that the sages spoke of prevailing custom.
This mishnah continues to list things which may be worn on Shabbat.
Section one: They would put a coin on a callus to help heal it. Since it was tied to the foot, the rabbis were not concerned lest it be removed and the owner carry it in the public domain.
Section two: Threads and chips were used in piercing girls’ ears. After the initial piercing, they would put a thread in to begin the hole and eventually they would put in a wood chip to widen the hole. When the hole was large enough they would put in an earring. Since the strings and chips are not regularly removed, they may be worn in the public domain.
Sections 3-4: These sections refer to the customs of certain women from certain origins. Women from Arab lands would wear veils and those from Medea (Persia) would wear cloaks over their shoulders (like capes). The straps of the cloaks were connected by a tie with a nut, coin or small stone.
Section five: Although sections three and four single out Arabian and Medean women, anyone may wear these things. The only reason that these women were singled out is that these were commonly worn by certain women." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nAt the end of yesterday’s mishnah we learned that a Medean woman may wear her cloak on Shabbat. We explained that these cloaks were tied with a stone, nut or coin. Today’s mishnah is based on that ruling.", + "A woman may weight [her cloak] with a stone, nut, or coin, providing that she does not attach the weight in the first place on Shabbat. As we learned yesterday, a woman may wear a cloak that is tied with one of these things. However, she may not attach the weight itself on Shabbat. The Talmud explains that this prohibition refers only to the coin. Since coins may not be handled on Shabbat (they are muktzeh) she may not tie her cloak with one. However, if the tie was made before Shabbat she may wear the cloak. According to the Talmud she may make the tie with a nut or stone even on Shabbat." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nMost of this mishnah deals with a person lacking a leg going out on Shabbat with his stump. This stump was not really an artificial leg rather a support for his stump leg. The mishnah also uses this opportunity to discuss a few other laws concerning artificial legs and arms.", + "A crippled person [lacking a leg] may go out with his wooden stump, the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yose forbids it. According to Rabbi Meir, a wooden stump made for a crippled person is like his shoe and hence the person lacking a leg may go out with it on Shabbat. Rabbi Yose holds that the crippled person doesn’t really use the stump like a shoe; rather he relies mostly on his crutches. Hence the stump is considered to be “carrying” and it is prohibited.", + "And if it has a receptacle for pads, it is unclean. If the stump has a hollow place inside not only for his stump leg but pads, then it can receive impurity. Generally speaking, wooden things which have receptacles are susceptible to impurity.", + "His supports are unclean through midras, and one may go out with them on Shabbat, and enter the Temple court while wearing them. “Supports” are like crutches. They can receive impurity through “midras”, which means pressure by a zav (a person with unusual genital discharge). If a zav sits, leans or lies on them they are impure. Anything which is meant to be stepped on is susceptible to this type of impurity. He may go out with them on Shabbat since they are like his shoes. It is forbidden to enter the Temple while wearing shoes. However, the crippled person’s supports are not included in the category of “shoes” as far as entering the Temple is concerned.", + "His chair and its supports are unclean through midras, and one may not go out with them on Shabbat, and one may not enter the Temple court with them. Similarly, a crippled person’s chair and its supports (this is kind of like a walker) are all susceptible to midras impurity, since they are made for sitting and leaning. According to talmudic commentators it is prohibited for him to go out on Shabbat with the supports, since the chair itself is sufficient. He may, however, go out with the special chair on Shabbat. If he has a chair he shouldn’t enter the Temple court with his supports since in this case they are like shoes.", + "An artificial arm is clean, but one may not go out with it [on Shabbat]. An artificial arm is not susceptible to impurity since it is not considered to be a vessel. It is forbidden to go out with it on Shabbat. Others explain that the word for artificial arm here (ankatmin) refers to a piece of equipment which clowns use." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah teaches things that young boys may wear out on Shabbat.", + "Boys may go out with garlands and children of royalty children may go out with bells, and all people [may do likewise], but the sages spoke of the usual practice. Boys may go out with garlands, which according to the Talmud were made to protect them from evil. Children of royalty may go out with bells. The mishnah adds that anyone may go out with a bell. The mishnah mentioned royalty because they were the ones who typically did so." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe final mishnah of chapter six deals with carrying things which were believed to have healing powers.", + "One may go out with a locust’s egg, a fox’s tooth, and a nail from [the cross of] a crucified convict for purposes of healing, the words of Rabbi Meir’s view. But the sages say: even on weekdays this is forbidden on account of “the ways of the Amorite” [which Israelites are forbidden from adopting]. The three things listed in this mishnah were believed to have healing powers. The locust’s egg was believed to aid in healing the ear, the fox’s tooth helped people who slept too much and the nail was believed to heal wounds. According to Rabbi Meir a person can carry these items on Shabbat since they were used for healing. Wearing them is therefore not considered “carrying.” The sages don’t really disagree that wearing these things is not considered “carrying.” Rather, the sages say that it is always forbidden to use these things because they are “the ways of the Amorite.” This refers to Leviticus 18:3 according to which Israelites should not imitate the nations that occupied Canaan. The Rambam explains that anything which doctors state has medicinal value cannot be prohibited because of the “the ways of the Amorite.” The only things that are prohibited are things which doctors say have not medicinal value but are believed by other nations to aid in healing. We should note that in the ancient world, the distinction between medicine and superstition was far less clear than is the distinction today (and even today the line between the two is not always so clear.)" + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nIn the introduction to Shabbat we explained that a person who performs a forbidden labor on Shabbat intentionally is liable for the death penalty (if they warned him) and for karet extirpation (if unwarned). For accidental performance of a forbidden labor, one must bring a sin-offering. Our mishnah asks a frequently-asked rabbinic question: how do we know how many sin-offerings a person is liable for? Asked another way, what constitutes one performance of a forbidden labor?", + "A great principle they stated in respect to Shabbat: anyone who forgets the fundamental law of Shabbat and performs many labors on many Shabbatot, is liable for only one sin-offering. The mishnah begins by referring to a person who doesn’t remember that work is prohibited on Shabbat. Such a person has in essence only transgressed once, no matter how many Shabbatot she performed the forbidden labor and no matter how many labors she performed. For instance, a person who never learned about Shabbat and then later in life learned that it was forbidden to work on Shabbat, would only be liable for one sin-offering.", + "One who knows the fundamental law of Shabbat and performs many labors on many Shabbatot is liable for a sin-offering for each and every Shabbat. This section refers to a person who knows that it is forbidden to work on Shabbat but doesn’t know which day of the week is Shabbat. All of the forbidden labors which she performs on any given Shabbat are considered one transgression. Therefore she brings one sin-offering for every Shabbat which she forgot was Shabbat, no matter how many forbidden labors she performed.", + "One who knows that it is Shabbat and performs many labors on many Shabbatot, is liable for every primary labor. This person knows which day is Shabbat and knows that it is forbidden to perform work on Shabbat but doesn’t know which labors are prohibited. Such a person is liable for every primary labor. As we shall see in tomorrow’s mishnah, there are thirty-nine categories of prohibited labor. Each category is a “primary labor.” Within each category there are derived labors, prohibitions which are similar enough to the primary labor to also be prohibited. Derived labors” are as prohibited as “primary labors” (they are all in the category of “deoraita” toraitic prohibitions.) The only difference is that if one performs several different “primary labors” she is liable for a sin-offering for each primary labor. However, if she performs a primary labor and several derived labors from the same category, she is only liable for one sin-offering. Furthermore, in the case in this section since the person didn’t know that such a labor was prohibited on Shabbat, she is only liable for one sin-offering no matter how many Shabbatot she performed the labor.", + "One who performs many labors belonging to the same category is obligated for only one sin-offering. In this case the person knows pretty much everything (that labor is prohibited on Shabbat, which labor is prohibited and which day is Shabbat). She is liable for every primary labor she performs on each Shabbat. However, if she also performs derived labors that are under the same category, she is liable for only one sin-offering for each category of labor she performs." + ], + [ + "Introduction This mishnah lists the thirty-nine primary labors. As can be easily seen there are three main lists in the mishnah: 1) the work involved in baking bread; 2) the work involved in making clothing; 3) the work involved in writing. These are the first three lists. The fourth section contains six more labors that are also prohibited but do not easily fit into the other lists. The Talmud states that these labors were all learned from the juxtaposition of the laws of building the Tabernacle with the prohibition of work on Shabbat (Exodus 31:35). Since the Torah had to state not to break Shabbat to build the Temple, it must be that any work which was done in building the Temple is prohibited on Shabbat. Much of the rest of the tractate will explain these labors, so we will be brief here.", + "The primary labors are forty less one:
sowing, plowing, reaping, binding sheaves, threshing, winnowing, selecting, grinding, sifting, kneading, baking, These are the labors involved in making bread, from the beginning to the very end. Personally, I am happy that for me baking bread involves going to the store, plunking down a few shekels and taking a loaf home.", + "shearing wool, bleaching, hackling, dyeing, spinning, weaving, the making of two loops, weaving two threads, dividing two threads, tying and untying, sewing two stitches, tearing in order to sew two stitches, These are all of the labors involved in making clothing. One interesting thing to note is that many commentators hold that tearing is prohibited only if the tear is made in order to sew new stitches. Only constructive, purposeful work is prohibited “deoraita” on Shabbat. Tearing in a destructive manner with no other purpose is still prohibited but only “derabbanan” a rabbinic prohibition. “Hackling” refers to separating strands of wool.", + "capturing a deer, slaughtering, or flaying, or salting it, curing its hide, scraping it [of its hair], cutting it up, writing two letters, erasing in order to write two letters [over the erasure], These are the labors involved in writing a scroll. Most of the work is making the parchment on which to write the scroll.", + "building, tearing down, extinguishing, kindling, striking with a hammer, These are all labors which are involved in building and in creating the material needed to build. We should make a couple of important notes. Tearing down is only considered a primary labor if it is performed with the intent of rebuilding. Extinguishing is also only prohibited deoraita if it makes charcoal (like extinguishing a candle.) “Striking with a hammer” is sort of a code-name for the completion of any piece of work. When finished with a metal project the silversmith would strike it with a hammer to complete it. That is why it is called “striking with a hammer.”", + "[and] carrying out from one domain to another, These are the forty primary labors less one. Carrying from one domain to another is a labor unlike any of the others for instead of altering the nature of an object, it alters its location." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nFrom here until the beginning of chapter eleven the mishnah discusses the labor of carrying. Our mishnah introduces a general principle related to carrying.", + "They also stated another general principle: whatever is fit to store and people generally store things like it, and one carries it out on Shabbat, he is liable for a sin-offering on its account. But whatever is not fit to store and people do not [generally] store things like it, and one carries it out on Shabbat, only he that stores it is liable. A person is only obligated for carrying something from one domain to another if the object which she carries is one that is important enough that people store it and guard it. The object has to be one put to use by people. For instance keys are something that people are generally careful about, whereas a pebble is not. It also has to be of the size that people are generally careful with and will store. A loaf of bread would have such a size but a few small crumbs would not. If one carries something from one domain to another that has this size and is of a nature that people store it to protect it, then the person is obligated to bring a sin-offering. If it is not something about which people generally care, then only a person who does care about it is liable for it. For instance if most people are not careful with a tiny piece of bread and a person who is not careful with such a piece of bread carries it from one domain to another, she is not liable. However, if a person is careful with a small piece of bread and does take care of it, she would be liable for carrying it from one domain to another." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses how much food a person must carry on Shabbat to be liable for carrying. The mishnah is divided into two sections: the first half deals with animal food and the second half deals with human food.", + "He who carries out a cow’s mouthful of straw, a camel’s mouthful of bean stalks, a lamb’s mouthful of clover, a goat’s mouthful of grasses, moist leaves of garlic or moist leaves of onion the size of a dried fig, [or] a goat’s mouthful of dry [leaves], [is liable]. And they do not combine with each other, because they are not alike in their standards. The general rule is that a person is liable for carrying an amount of animal food equal to a mouthful of the animal that eats that type of food. Cows eat straw, so if he carries a mouthful of straw he is liable. Moist leaves of garlic and onion are fit for human consumption. Therefore one who carries an amount the size of a dried fig is liable. Goats eat dried leaves of onion and garlic, therefore to be liable for carrying these he must carry a goat’s mouthful. These are listed in this section probably because they are more normally eaten by goats. If a person carries a combination of these things each of which is less than the prohibited amount, they do not add up to create a prohibited amount. For instance, if he carries half a cow’s mouthful of straw and half a camel’s mouthful of bean stubble he is not liable. Since all of the amounts are different and one is for one type of animal and another for other types of animal, they do not add up together.", + "He who carries out [human] food the size of a dried fig is liable, And they combine with each other, because they are equal in their standards, except their shells, kernels, stalks, husks and coarse bran. Rabbi Judah said: excluding the shells of lentils, because they are boiled together with them. To be liable for carrying human food the amount need only be the size of a dried fig. If a person carries two different types of food, they add up. So if one carries half a fig’s worth of raisins and half a fig’s worth of peanuts, she is liable for carrying. This is because there is one standard amount for all human food. When figuring out the size of a piece of food, the non-edible parts are not considered. Rabbi Judah says that the shells of lentils are edible and hence they count in considering how much is being carried." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses how much liquid one must carry in order to be liable.", + "One who carries out: [unmixed] wine, [is liable if it is] enough for the mixing of a cup; milk, as much as is swallowed at a time; honey, as much as is placed on a scab; oil, as much as is required to rub on a small limb; water, enough to rub with it collyrium; and all other liquids, a revi’it; and all waste water, a revi’it. The amount for which one is liable for carrying these liquids is dependent upon the minimal amount that is useful. Wine was mixed with water to dilute it. Therefore, if one carries unmixed wine, she is liable if she carries enough to mix a cup. For carrying milk, she is liable if she carries the amount normally swallowed at one time. Honey was evidently used to heal wounds. Oil was used like lotion and therefore she is liable if she carries enough to oil up a small limb, for instance a finger. Water was mixed with collyrium, an eye ointment. Although there are certainly other uses for water, this is the smallest amount that has any use. All other liquids and even waste water must be a revi’it (less than 100 cl, or 3 oz.)", + "Rabbi Shimon says: all of them are a revi’it, they stated all of these measures only in respect of those who put them away. Rabbi Shimon disagrees with the previous opinion. He holds that all liquids have the same measure a revi’it. These measures have a different relevance with regard to liquid, one which relates back to that which we learned in 7:3. There we learned that if someone cares enough about an object to store it, she is liable if she carries it from domain to domain on Shabbat. Rabbi Shimon adds that the object also has to have a minimum measure. Our mishnah provides, according to Rabbi Shimon, the minimum measure for liquids. If a person is one who “stores” these liquids then the minimum measure to be liable for carrying is as listed above in section one. However, if a person is not careful about these liquids than she is liable only if she carries a revi’it." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah teaches how much rope or paper a person must carry in order to be liable for carrying on Shabbat. Again, in each case she is liable if she carries an amount that can be put to some use.", + "One who carries out rope, as much as is required for making a handle for a basket; A small amount of rope could be used to make a handle for a basket. Therefore she is liable if she carries this small amount of rope.", + "A reed cord: as much as is required for making a hanger for a sifter or a sieve. Rabbi Judah says: as much as is required for taking the measure of a child's shoe. A reed cord might be used to make a hanger for a sieve or sifter; hence the minimum amount for which a person is liable is this amount.", + "Paper, in order to write a tax-collector’s receipt on it. And one who carries out a tax-collector’s receipt is liable. The smallest paper document would be a tax-collector’s receipt. Therefore, if one carries paper which is this size she is liable. Furthermore, if one carries out a tax-collector’s receipt written on something else such as parchment for which the minimum measure is normally larger (as we will learn in tomorrow’s mishnah), she is also liable. According to the Talmud, the tax-collector would write only two letters on such a receipt.", + "Erased paper, as much as is required to wrap round a small vial of perfume. Erased paper is used paper which is no longer fit for use. One of its uses was as a wrap around bottles, the smallest of which would have been a small vial of perfume. Therefore, even if she carries such a small amount of erased paper, she is liable. We should note that this amount is larger than the size mentioned in section three." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe mishnah continues to list the minimum amount of various items which must be carried in order for one to be liable. Again, the rule of thumb is the smallest amount that has practical use will make one liable.", + "[One who carries] animal hide: as much as is required for making an amulet; Animal hide was used to make small amulets. Therefore, one who carries enough to make such an amulet is liable.", + "Parchment, for writing on it the shortest passage of the tefillin, which is “Sh’ma Yisrael”: Parchment is used for writing tefillin. The smallest passage that goes on one piece of parchment in the tefillin is the Sh’ma.", + "Ink, for writing two letters; As we saw in yesterday’s mishnah, the shortest document, that of the tax collector, had two letters. Therefore, one who carries enough ink to write such a document is liable.", + "Eye shadow, for painting one eye. Usually women would paint both eyes, but sometimes women would paint only one. Therefore, one who carries enough eye-shadow to paint one eye is liable." + ], + [ + "Paste, for putting on the top of a lime twig.
Pitch and sulfur, for making a small hole.
Wax, for putting over a small hole.
Clay, for making a hole in a gold refiner’s pot. Rabbi Judah says: for making a [tripod’s] leg.
Bran, for putting on the mouth of a gold refiner’s pot.
Lime, for smearing the smallest of girls. Rabbi Judah says: enough to take off the hair on the temples. Rabbi Nehemiah says: enough to take the hair of the forehead.
This mishnah discusses minimum measurements for carrying various pastes and mixtures. Some of these references are quite obscure and it is hard to tell exactly what the mishnah is referring to.
Section one: This paste was used to trap birds. The birds would sit on a branch and if the branch was smeared with paste, the bird would get stuck.
Sections two and three: To “make” a hole means to plug up a hole. Pitch, sulfur and wax were all used for this purpose.
Section four: Clay was used to plug up a hole in a gold refiner’s pot. Rabbi Judah disagrees and holds that the minimum amount is enough to fix the leg of a tripod, used to hold up small stoves.
Section five: Bran was not regularly eaten by people (see 7:4). Rather it was used to plug holes on the mouth of a gold refiner’s pot.
Section six: Lime was used to remove hair on women. The Talmud explains that the amount referred to here is enough to remove the hair from a small girl’s finger.
Rabbi Judah and Rabbi Nehemiah provide slightly different measures for lime than does the first opinion." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nAnd even more minimum measurements for which a person is liable for carrying!\nOne interesting thing to note is that as we reach the end of the chapter, there are more and more debates between the sages. According to Abraham Goldberg, the editor of the Mishnah intentionally saves debates for latter portions of the discussion in order not to confuse the reader at an earlier point. In other words, the redaction of the mishnah serves the pedagogic purpose of making the material clearer. This is probably one of the unique attributes of the Mishnah that make it the best-edited work in the entire corpus of rabbinic literature.", + "Red earth, as much as is required for a seal on merchandise bags, the words of Rabbi Akiva. But the sages say: as much as is required for the seal on letters. Red earth was used for making seals. According to Rabbi Akiva, the minimum amount of red earth which causes a person to be liable for carrying is enough to make a seal on a merchandise bag. The sages disagree and set an even smaller amount the amount used to make a seal on a letter.", + "Manure, or thin sand, as much as is required for fertilizing a cabbage stalk, the words of Rabbi Akiva. But the sages say: for fertilizing one leek plant. Manure and thin sand were used to fertilize vegetables. Rabbi Akiva sets the minimum amount at enough to fertilize a cabbage stalk, whereas the sages set the minimum amount at enough to fertilize a leek plant. In both this section and the above Rabbi Akiva is more lenient than the sages.", + "Thick sand, as much as is required for putting on a full plaster trowel. Lime plasterers would mix thick sand with their lime. The measure of thick sand for which one is obligated for carrying on Shabbat is enough to fill one plasterer’s trowel so that the sand can be mixed with lime. This is the minimum amount of thick sand that has practical use.", + "Reed, as much as is required for making a pen. But if it is thick or crushed, as much as is required for boiling the lightest of eggs beaten up and placed in a stew pot. Reeds were often used to make pens. If the reed was usable for making pens, then the minimum amount is enough to make one pen. This would be a very small amount. If it was not possible to use the reed to make a pen, for instance the reed was too thick or it was crushed, then they would burn it in the fire. With regard to carrying such types of reed, the minimum amount is enough to make a fire which would fry a small egg. This would obviously be a much larger amount than above." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with harder materials: bone, glass, pebbles and stones.", + "Bone, is as much as is required for making a spoon. Rabbi Judah says: enough for making a tooth [of a key] with it; According to the first opinion, the minimum amount of bone for which one is liable for carrying must be enough to make a large spoon. Rabbi Judah sets a smaller amount enough to make part of a key which was typically made from bone.", + "Glass, enough for scraping the end of a shuttle. A small piece of glass would be used to scrape the end of the spinning shuttle (used in weaving). Therefore, one who carries a piece of glass large enough for this purpose is liable.", + "A pebble or a stone, large enough to throw at a bird; Rabbi Elazar ben Yaakov says: large enough to throw at an animal. Pebbles and stones were used to kill birds and small animals (although for Jews these animals would not be edible.) According to the first opinion the pebble or stone need only be large enough to throw at a bird, whereas Rabbi Elazar ben Yaakov holds that it needs to be large enough to throw at an animal." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe final mishnah of our chapter is about the minimum size of a shard for which a person is liable for carrying.", + "A shard, as much as is needed for placing between one board and another, the words of Rabbi Judah. A small shard would be placed between building pillars used in making a house, if there were gaps between the pillars or boards. According to Rabbi Judah this is the measure of the type of shard one is liable for carrying on Shabbat. This is the smallest of the measures given in the mishnah.", + "Rabbi Meir says: enough to scoop out the coals with it. Rabbi Meir sets a slightly larger amount. The shard must be enough to scoop out coals from a fire. This is the largest measure of the three that are in the mishnah.", + "Rabbi Yose says: large enough to contain a revi’it. Rabbi Yose holds that the shard must only be large enough to hold a revi’it of water, which is about 3 oz.", + "Rabbi Meir said: even though there is no proof of the matter, there is a hint: “So that no shard is left in its breakage to scoop coals from a brazier” (Isaiah 30:1. Rabbi Yose said to him: proof [of my view] is from there [as well]: “Or to take ladle water from a puddle” (. In this section Rabbi Meir tries to prove from a verse in Isaiah that shards were used for scooping out coals. Rabbi Yose responds that if that verse is going to be used, why not look to the end of the verse which proves that shards were also used to ladle water. Therefore, a shard that is large enough to use to draw water is already large enough such that one who carries it is liable for carrying on Shabbat." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nIn the last chapter of mishnah eight Rabbi Meir brought a proof for his halakhah from the book of Isaiah. The proof was more of a “support” than an actual proof. This phenomenon is called an “asmakhta” in rabbinic parlance. The first four mishnayoth in our chapter all contain Biblical prooftexts of this nature.", + "Rabbi Akiva said: From where do we know that an idol defiles by being carried like a menstruant? Because it is said, “You shall cast them [the idols] away as a menstruous woman. Out! You will say to them” (Isaiah 30:22): just as a menstruant defiles by being carried, so does an idol defile by being carried. Rabbi Akiva holds that a person who carries an idol is defiled by the idol, even if he doesn’t touch it and only carries it. He derives this halakhah from a comparison that Isaiah makes between idols and a menstruant. In his exhortation against idolatry Isaiah states that the people of Israel will cast out their idols like a menstruous woman. Leviticus 15:22 teaches that a menstruous woman defiles things not just by touching them but even by sitting on them. From here the rabbis derive that she transmits impurity also by being carried. Rabbi Akiva learns from Isaiah that idols transmit impurity in the same way." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThere are two more midrashim in this mishnah which are both based on passages that are not from the Torah.", + "How do we know that a ship is clean? Because it is said, “The way of a ship is in the midst of the sea” (Proverbs 30:19). A ship cannot contract ritual impurity (uncleanness). This is derived from Proverbs 30:19: just as the sea cannot become impure, so too a ship cannot become impure.", + "How do we know that if a furrow is six handbreadths by six handbreadths, they may sow in it five kinds of seeds, four on the four sides, and one in the middle? Because it is said, “For as the earth brings forth her growth, and as the garden causes its seeds to spring forth” (Isaiah 61:11) not its seed, but its seeds is stated. This section has to do with the laws of forbidden mixtures of seeds. The mishnah teaches a way that five different species can be planted in a six by six handbreadth furrow. This would look like the table below (this is my first graphic, so here goes): Since no seeds are actually next to each other, this is not considered “kilayim” a forbidden mixture of seeds. Eventually when we learn tractate Kilayim we will learn more about this halakhah. The mishnah derives this halakhah from the plural use of the word “seeds” in Isaiah. The verse implies that one garden can make five different kinds of seeds come up at the same time. We should note, however, that the verse does not teach that five is possible and that six is not." + ], + [ + "How do we know that if one [a woman] discharges semen on the third day she is unclean? Because it is said, “Be ready for the third day” (Exodus 19:15). Semen imparts ritual impurity. A woman who discharges semen up until three days after having intercourse is made unclean by this semen. This is why Moses told the people of Israel not to have intercourse for three days before receiving the Torah. If the woman would have a discharge of semen after the third day, the semen would no longer transmit impurity.", + "How do we know that one who has been circumcised may be bathed on the third day [after circumcision] which falls on Shabbat? Because it is said, “And it came to pass on the third day, when they were in pain” (Genesis 34:25). It is permitted to warm water (but not to light a fire) in order to bathe someone who has just been circumcised. The mishnah assumes that we know that it is permitted to do so on the first and second days after the circumcision. It is permitted up until the third day. This is derived from what it says about the people of Shechem who were still in pain three days after their circumcision.", + "How do we know that a crimson-colored strap is tied to the head of the goat that is sent [to Azazel]? Because it is said, “If your sins be as scarlet, they shall be as white as snow” (Isaiah 1:18). According to rabbinic sources, (see Yoma 6:6) the priests would tie a crimson ribbon to the horns of the goat sent to Azazel on Yom Kippur. If the ribbon turned white, it was a sign that the children of Israel’s sins had been forgiven. This is connected in our mishnah to the verse from Isaiah." + ], + [ + "How do we know that anointing is the same as drinking on Yom Kippur? Though there is no proof of this, yet there is a suggestion of it, for it is said, “And it came into his inward parts like water, and like oil into his bones” (Psalms 109:18). Two of the prohibitions on Yom Kippur are anointing (rubbing oil on oneself) and drinking. Our mishnah teaches that both are similarly prohibited (although their punishments are different). Their similarity is derived from the verse in Psalms which compares water with anointing with oil. We should note that according to most commentators the phrase, “though there is no proof of this, yet there is a suggestion of it” refers to all of the “proofs” in the above three mishnayot as well. None of them are true “proofs” but rather “suggestions.”" + ], + [ + "If one carries out wood, as much as is required for boiling a light egg; For carrying wood, one is liable if she carries enough to fuel the boiling of a light egg.", + "Spices, as much as is required for seasoning a light egg, and they combine with each other. For carrying spices, it must be enough to season an egg. If she carries different types of spices, they all join together to equal one measure.", + "Nutshells, pomegranate peel, woad and madder, as much as is required for dyeing a small piece of cloth the size of a hairnet. These things were all used as dyes. Woad was used to make blue dye and madder made red dye. She is liable if she carries enough of these things to dye a small piece of cloth the size of a woman’s hairnet.", + "Urine, baking soda, lye, cimolian earth, and lion’s leaf, as much as is required for washing a small piece of cloth the size of a hairnet. Rabbi Judah says: as much as is required for removing the stain. These materials were all used in laundering (sounds yucky doesn’t it? aren’t you glad you use Tide!). Therefore, she is liable if she carries enough to wash a small piece of cloth the size of a hairnet. Rabbi Judah says that it must be enough to remove “the stain.” This refers to a situation where a stain was found on a woman’s clothing and it is unclear whether or not the stain is menstrual blood. They would wash it with the above five materials as well as two others (see Mishnah Nidah 9:6). If the stain didn’t come out, then they knew it was dye and not blood. The amount of each type for which one is liable on Shabbat is the amount that they used to put on the cloth to see if the stain would come out." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with things for which one is liable for carrying even the smallest amount. The reason in the first three sections is that even the smallest quantity of these things is usable. In the final two sections, the reason why one is liable for carrying even the smallest amount is that the objects are holy and when worn out, may not be thrown away.", + "[If one carries out] pepper, in whatever quantity. Since even the tiniest amount of pepper can be used to spice up a dish or for other purposes, one is liable for carrying even the tiniest amount.", + "Olive-refuse, in whatever quantity. Small amounts of olive-refuse were used to heal headaches.", + "Various kinds of spices and various kinds of metal, in whatever quantity. This section refers to spices which were not used for cooking but for perfumes. Since even the smallest amount might be used, one would be liable for even a tiny amount. Metal was quite precious and even small amounts would be preserved.", + "[Pieces] of the stones of the altar or the earth from the altar, worn-out pieces of scrolls or their worn-out covers, in whatever quantity, because they are stored away in order to hide them. When pieces of the altar needed to be removed or parts of holy scrolls or their covers needed to be replaced, the old material must be put into a “genizah”, a place to hide them and protect them. The word “genizah” indeed means “to be stored away.” They may not be thrown into the garbage. Since even the smallest amounts are important enough to forbid their being thrown away, one is liable for carrying even the smallest amount.", + "Rabbi Judah says: also he who carries out the service vessels of idols, in whatever quantity, [is liable], for it is said, “Let nothing that has been doomed stick to your hand” (Deuteronomy 13:18). Rabbi Judah thinks that even for carrying things used in idol worship, if one carries even the smallest amount one is liable. This is because of the verse “let nothing...” The Torah considers even the smallest amount to be forbidden due to the prohibition of idolatry. Rabbi Judah learns from here that even the smallest amount has “importance” and therefore one who carries such an amount is liable." + ], + [ + "If one carries out a peddler’s basket, even though it contains many types of things, he is liable for only one sin-offering. A peddler’s basket contains a variety of goods. We might have thought that one who carries such a basket full of different things from one domain to another would be liable for several sin-offerings, one for each thing in the basket. Therefore, the mishnah teaches that she is liable for only one, for the basket joins them together.", + "Garden seeds, less than the size of a dried fig; Rabbi Judah ben Batera ruled: five. Cucumber seed, two. Gourd seed, two. Egyptian bean seed, two. This section refers to seeds which will be used for planting. The mishnah lists the minimum amount of seeds of certain types of vegetables which would be planted in one furrow. With regard to garden-seeds, the first opinion holds that there must be a total amount of seeds equal to the size of a dried fig. Rabbi Judah ben Batera connects this rule with that which we learned above in mishnah two a person is allowed to plant five different kinds of seeds in one 6 by 6 handbreadth furrow.", + "A live clean locust, whatever its size. Dead, the size of a dried fig. The bird of the vineyards, whether live or dead, whatever its size, because they store it for a medicine. Rabbi Judah says: even one who carries out a live unclean locust, whatever its size, [is liable], because they store it away for a child to play with. The Torah teaches that some locusts are clean and may be eaten and some are unclean and are forbidden. According to the first opinion, one is liable for carrying a live clean locust of any size because they would put it aside for a child to play with. They would not give unclean locusts to children because if the locust died the child might eat it. Rabbi Judah at the end of this mishnah holds that even unclean locusts are stored away for children to play with and therefore one is liable also for carrying them. For dead clean locusts which are edible everyone agrees that the minimum is the same as it is for other foods (7:4). One would not be liable at all for carrying dead unclean locusts since they have no practical use. Due to its inclusion in this section, it seems likely the “bird of the vineyards” is actually a type of locust. Since even the smallest amount is used for medicinal purposes, one is liable for carrying even a small one, whether live or dead." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah connects back to what we learned above in 7:3. If a person cares enough to store a certain something away, that means that that thing is important to her. Therefore, if she carries it from domain to domain on Shabbat, she is liable no matter what its size is. However, others who do not store such a thing, are only liable if they carry the minimum measure mentioned above.", + "If one stores something for planting, for a sample, or for medicine, and [then] carries it out on Shabbat, he is liable no matter the size. But all others are not liable except for its standard measure. If a person stores a single seed in order to plant it, to show it to someone else or to use it for medicinal purposes, that person is liable for carrying it, even if it is of a minimal measure. However, if another person carries that same seed, she is liable only if she carries a measure equal to that mentioned in yesterday’s mishnah.", + "If he carries it back again, he is liable only for its standard measure. If after carrying this minimum measure of seed, the person who stored it carries it again, she is only liable if she carries a minimum measure. The fact that she previously stored it away was only relevant for the first time she carried it. If she carries it again and doesn’t again store it away, she is treated like all other people, and is liable only if she carries a minimum measure." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah teaches two things: 1) a person is not liable unless she takes something from the public domain and puts it into the private domain or vice verse. A domain that is neither public nor private does not count. 2) A person is not liable for performing one act of forbidden labor if the act is performed in two steps.", + "If one carries out food and places it on the threshold, whether he [himself] subsequently carries it out [into the street] or another does so, he is not liable, because the [whole] act was not performed at once. The threshold of a person’s house is considered to be neither the public domain nor the private domain. While it is forbidden to bring something from inside the house and place it on the threshold, one who does so is not liable for carrying on Shabbat. Our mishnah teaches that if the person divides carrying something from within the house to outside into two separate actions, first taking the object and putting it on the threshold and then picking it back up and carrying it out, she is not liable because she did not perform the entire forbidden act at once.", + "[If one carries out] a basket which is full of produce and places it on the outer threshold, though most of the produce is outside of the threshold, he is not liable unless he carries out the whole basket. This section builds upon the previous one. The person has a basket of produce, which as we learned in 9:7 is treated as one item. She places it on the threshold such that most of the produce that is within the basket is in the public domain. Nevertheless, because the entire basket is not in the public domain, she is not liable. Note that had she carried the food outside of the basket, she would have been liable." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah teaches that in order for a person to be liable for carrying she must carry in a way that is normal for carrying. If she carries in an unusual manner, she is not liable.", + "If one carries something out, whether with his right or with his left hand, in his lap or on his shoulder, he is liable, because this the way of the carrying of the children of Kohat (Numbers 7:9). According to Numbers 7:9, the children of Kohat carried the Tabernacle with their shoulders. Since we learn many of the principles of forbidden labor from the work in the Tabernacle, we can derive that carrying with one’s shoulders causes one to be liable for carrying on Shabbat. By extension, any normal form of carrying makes one liable.", + "In a backhanded manner, with his foot, in his mouth, with his elbow, in his ear, in his hair, in his belt with its opening downwards, between his belt and his shirt, in the hem of his shirt, in his shoes or sandals, he is not liable, because he has not carried [it] out as people [generally] carry out. If the person carries something out in an unusual manner, she is not liable. All of the ways mentioned in this section are unusual ways of carrying. We should note that it is not permitted to carry in such a way. When the mishnah says it is not liable it means that it is forbidden to do so, but if one does so, she is not liable." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah discusses the difference between carrying things in front of oneself, the way they are normally carried (picture the way you carry dishes) and carrying things behind oneself, a way of carrying that in most cases (but not all) is unusual and less effective.", + "If one intends to carry out [an object] in front of him, but it comes around behind him, he is not liable. In this case the person intended to carry the object out in front of her, but somehow the object came around to the other side of her body and she carried it behind her. Had her intentions been fulfilled, she would have been liable. However, since she ended up carrying it behind her, in a way that does not make a person liable, she is not liable for carrying. The central idea is that her intention was not fulfilled, so she is not liable.", + "Behind him, but it comes around in front of him, he is liable. This is the opposite scenario: she intended to carry it behind her in which case she would have been exempt. When the object comes around to her front, it is now in a more protected position, one which she would normally be happy about. Therefore, she is liable. The idea is that she would want the object to be more protected, and therefore she is liable for carrying. In other words, her intention is actually fulfilled.", + "In truth they said: a woman who wraps herself with an apron whether in front of her or behind her, is liable, because it is normal for it to reverse itself. From the above two sections we can see that normally, when a person carries something behind themselves, they are exempt. This section brings up an exception the woman’s apron. It is normal for a woman’s apron, in which she carries things, to reverse itself. Since this is normal and she can anticipate that the apron will reverse itself and that the object she is carrying may end up in front of her or behind her, she is liable in all cases.", + "Rabbi Judah said: also those who receive notes. Rabbi Judah adds an additional category of people who are liable whether they carry the object in front or behind those who receive notes. These are messengers who would carry their bags on poles, either in front or behind them. Since the messenger could anticipate that the object might go in front or behind, he is liable in either case." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah teaches two main things. First of all, if two people jointly perform a forbidden labor that could be performed by one person, they are both exempt.\nSecondly, when we consider what a person is liable for carrying, we only consider the main thing and not those things that are ancillary to it.", + "If one carries out a loaf into the public domain, he is liable. If two carry it out, both are exempt. If one could not carry it out and two carry it out, they are liable; But Rabbi Shimon exempts [them]. Here we learn that if two people jointly perform a forbidden labor that could have been performed by one person, both are exempt. In the Talmud this is derived from Leviticus 4:27, “If one person should unintentionally sin,” if one person does the entire labor for which one must bring a sin offering, she is liable, but if two people perform the labor together, they are both exempt. Again, we should emphasize that “exempt” does not mean that it is permitted. This is forbidden but nevertheless both are exempt from bringing a sin-offering. However, if the labor was something that one person couldn’t perform alone, for instance carrying a large table, then both are liable because both are performing as much of a forbidden labor that one person can perform. Rabbi Shimon disagrees and holds that two people can never be liable for one jointly performed labor.", + "If one carries out less than the standard quantity of food in a utensil, he is not liable for the utensil, because the utensil is secondary to the [food]. This section discusses situations where a person takes out two things, one of them being the main thing and the other being secondary. For instance, a person takes out food in a vessel. The intention is to bring the food out and the vessel is merely a means to transport the food. If the food is less than the minimum measurement for which one incurs liability (usually the size of a dried fig) then she is exempt even for carrying out the vessel. This is because her intention was to carry out the food, and the vessel was secondary. Had she carried just the vessel, she would be liable, but since she carries the food as well, it becomes obvious that her intention was to carry the food.", + "[If one carries out] a living person on a bed, he is not liable even in respect of the bed, because the bed is secondary to him. A corpse in a bed, he is liable. We learn two things in this section. First of all, the rabbis believed that a living thing “carries itself.” This means that one does not incur liability for carrying a living thing, at least one that can walk on its own. So if a person carries out a living person on a bed, she is not liable for carrying the person. She is also exempt for carrying the bed since the reason that she carried the bed was to carry the person. However, if she carries a dead body on a bed (the word for bed is the same word as that for bier) she is liable for carrying the dead body.", + "And similarly [if one carries out] the size of an olive of a corpse, the size of an olive of a nevelah, or the size of a lentil of a [dead] creeping thing, he is liable. But Rabbi Shimon exempts him. In the above section we learned that a person is liable for carrying a dead body. Similarly, according to the first opinion in this section, a person is liable for carrying parts of a dead body, as long as they have a minimum measure. The minimum measures here are the minimum amounts that transmit impurity. Rabbi Shimon exempts one who carries parts of a dead body because this is “work not needed for its own sake.” That is to say, when she carries out these parts she is not doing so because she wants to do something with them outside in the public domain; rather she wants to clear them from the house. Therefore, she is exempt." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is not concerned with carrying as are the preceding and following mishnayot. It is here because at the end of this mishnah Rabbi Shimon has a debate with the other sages as he did in yesterday’s mishnah.", + "If one pares his nails with each other or with his teeth, likewise [if one plucks] his hair, likewise his mustache, likewise his beard; And likewise if [a woman] braids [her hair], likewise if she paints [her eyelids] likewise if she puts rouge on [her face]: Rabbi Eliezer makes them liable, But the rabbis forbid [these actions] because of “shevuth.” According to Rabbi Eliezer all of these actions are derivatives of forbidden labors and hence one who performs them is liable. Cutting nails and hair is a derivative of “shearing.” Braiding is a derivative of “building.” Painting body parts is a derivative of “writing” or “dyeing.” The rabbis say that these things are forbidden but they are not considered true derivatives of prohibited labors since they are not done in the way that those labors are usually performed. However, they are still prohibited because of “shevut” which means desisting. This means that a person should desist from things that are similar enough to forbidden labors. However, the level of prohibition is only “derabbanan”, of rabbinic origin.", + "If one picks [something] from a perforated pot, he is liable. If it is unperforated, he is exempt. Rabbi Shimon exempts in both cases. A perforated pot contains plants whose roots are attached to the ground. Hence, one who plucks something from such a pot has performed the forbidden act of reaping. However, if the pot has no hole in its bottom than he is exempt because reaping is defined as detaching a plant or part thereof from the ground. Rabbi Shimon says that in both cases the one who plucks is exempt because we don’t consider even a perforated pot as being attached to the ground." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nAfter having learned the laws of carrying from one domain to another, this chapter teaches laws concerning throwing something from one domain to another.", + "If one throws from the private domain into the public domain [or] from the public domain into the private domain, he is liable. Throwing is considered to be like carrying and hence one who throws from one domain to another is liable.", + "From one private domain to another private domain, and the public domain lies between: Rabbi Akiva makes him liable, But the sages exempt him. Rabbi Akiva treats the object which flies over the public domain as if it had actually landed in the public domain. Therefore, in his opinion this person has taken something from the private domain and brought it out to the public domain. The sages, however, rule that he is exempt because the object never actually landed in public domain." + ], + [ + "How so?
If there are two balconies facing each other in the public domain, he who reaches over or throws [an article] from one to the other is exempt.
If both are on the same row, he who reaches over is liable, while he who throws is exempt, for thus was the service of the Levites.
Two wagons, this one behind this one in the public domain, [and] they reached over the boards from one to another, but they did not throw.
[As for] he borders of a cistern, and a rock, which are ten [handbreadths] high and four in breath, if one removes [something] from them or places [something] upon them, his is liable; If less than this, he is exempt.
This mishnah explicates yesterday’s mishnah in which we learned that one who throws something from one private domain to another private domain and there lies a public domain in the middle, is exempt.
Section one: In this case two balconies are on opposite sides of the public domain. One who throws from one balcony to the other, or one who reaches something over from one to the other is exempt (according to the sages, see yesterday’s mishnah). As we shall see below, the reason is that this type of labor was not performed in the construction of the Tabernacle.
Sections two and three: Here the two balconies are on the same side of the street, lying adjacent to one another. In this case the sages agree that one who reaches something over from one balcony to the other is liable, for this is how the Levites worked in the construction and deconstruction of the Tabernacle in the desert. As we learn in the next section, the Levites had wagons which were placed one behind the other and they would pass boards from one to the other. The wagons are considered to be private domains and that which lay in between them is the public domain. Therefore, you have a case of people passing things from one public domain to another and a private domain lying in between. However, the Levites did not throw the boards for that would not have been respectful of the inherent holiness of the parts of the Tabernacle. Again, the principle is that anything that Levites did in the building of the Tabernacle is considered forbidden on Shabbat. Since they didn’t throw, today people are not liable for throwing from one domain to another. And since they only passed from wagons which were placed one behind the other, today people are not liable if they pass things across the public domain, as we learned in the previous section.
Section four: If the border of a cistern is ten handbreadths high and four handbreadths wide, it is considered to be a private domain and one who takes something from the public domain and puts it on this border or vice versa is liable. If the borders are smaller than this measure, one who does so is exempt. The same would be true if there was a rock in the public domain. If it is four handbreadths wide and ten tall, then one who puts something on it or takes something off is liable. If not he is exempt." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIt is forbidden to carry something four cubits in the public domain. Our mishnah deals with someone who throws something four cubits in the public domain and some nuances concerning this halakhah.", + "One who throws [something] four cubits on to a wall: if [the wall] is above ten handbreadths, it is as if he throws it into the air; if below, it is as if it he throws it on to the ground. ( And one who throws [something] four cubits on the ground is liable. According to the rabbis, above ten handbreadths is no longer the public domain, but neither is it a private domain. It is called a “makom patur”, a place that is exempt from the laws of carrying. Therefore, one who throws something onto a wall that is higher than ten handbreadths is exempt. However, if she throws it and it goes four cubits and lands on a wall lower than ten cubits, it is as if the object landed on the ground and she is liable. This is because someone who throws something four cubits on the ground is liable.", + "If one threw [something] within four cubits and it rolled beyond four cubits, he is exempt; [If one threw something] beyond four cubits and it rolled within four cubits, he is liable. This section deals with throwing something that afterwards rolls. If she throws the object less than four cubits and it rolls further, she is exempt. This is because she did not intend to throw something four cubits. Alternatively, she is exempt because the object didn’t at first land the necessary four cubits away. However, if she threw something four cubits and then it rolled back she is still liable because it did land four cubits from where she threw it." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with throwing in bodies of water.", + "If one throws in the sea four cubits, he is exempt. The sea is considered a “karmelit”, a place which is neither a public nor a private domain. That means that one is not liable for carrying or throwing in the sea.", + "If there is a pool of water and a public road crosses it, and one throws [an object] four cubits in it, he is liable. And how deep is a pool of water? Less than ten handbreadths. [For] if there is a pool of water and a public road crosses it, and one throws [an object] four cubits in it, he is liable. This section deals with a pool of water that lies in the public domain. If, the pool of water is less than ten handbreadths deep then one who throws an object four cubits into it is liable. The reason is that if it is less than ten handbreadths, then it is considered to be part of the public domain and one who throws or carries in it is liable. However, if the pool of water is more than ten handbreadths deep then it is no longer considered to be the public domain and one who throws in it she is exempt. We should note that the Talmud questions why section two seems to repeat itself at the end. From this repetition the talmud derives additional laws." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with throwing from either the sea to dry land (or the opposite) or from ships to the sea or other ships.", + "If one throws [somethign] from the sea to dry land, or from dry land to the sea, from the sea to a ship or from a ship to the sea or from one ship to another, he is exempt. As we mentioned earlier, the sea is considered a “karmelit” a place that is neither the public domain nor the private domain. Hence, one who throws from dry land (the public domain) to the sea or vice versa is exempt. One is liable only for moving something from the public domain to the private domain or vice versa. A ship is considered a private domain. Hence, if one throws from the sea to a ship or from a ship to the sea, she is also exempt, for this is throwing from a “karmelit” to a private domain. Finally, one who throws from one ship to another is exempt, just as one who throws from one private domain to another private domain with the public domain lying in-between is exempt (see mishnah 11:1). In this case, it would seem that even Rabbi Akiva would exempt the thrower because what lies in-between is not a public domain but the sea (a karmelit).", + "If ships are tied together, one may carry from one to another. In this case the two ships are tied together and lying adjacent to one another. According to Albeck, who explains the mishnah according to the Yerushalmi (the Palestinian Talmud) since there is no karmelit lying between the ships, one can carry from one to the other. In the Babylonian Talmud, this section is explained as referring to boats owned by two different people. They may carry from one to the other if they set up an eruv, a concept about which we learn in the next tractate.", + "If they are not tied together, even though they lie close [to each other], one may not carry from one to another. If the ships are not tied together, one may not carry from one to the other, even if they lie adjacent to each other. Since the two boats may become separate, thereby forming a karmelit between them, the halakhah is more stringent in this case." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah teaches and illustrates the rule that in order for a person to be liable to bring a sin-offering, the entire forbidden act must be performed unwittingly. If part of the act is performed intentionally, then no sin-offering is brought.", + "If one throws [something] and remembers [that it is Shabbat] after it leaves his hand, and another catches it, or a dog catches it or it is burnt, he is not liable. If someone throws something not remembering that it is the Sabbath and then, while the object is still in the air, she remembers that it is the Sabbath, it turns out that in the beginning of her forbidden activity she was an unintentional sinner and at the end she was already an intentional sinner. She is not liable, for as we learn later in the mishnah, in order for one to be liable to bring a sin-offering the entire action from beginning to end must be performed unwittingly. This section also includes several other cases where someone throws something and she is nevertheless exempt. If the object is caught by a dog or by another person or is burnt up before it lands, it turns out that she uprooted the object but she didn’t cause it to be put down. Therefore, she is exempt. Note, that this does not mean that one is allowed to throw things to one’s fellow in the public domain or from one domain to the other. Rather, one who does so is not liable.", + "If one throws [something] in order to inflict a wound whether to a person or a beast, and he remembers [that it is Shabbat] before the wound is inflicted he is not liable. Putting a wound into somebody is a derivative of one of the forbidden labors on Shabbat. In this case the person throws something at another person or at an animal while not knowing that it is Shabbat but remembers before the thrown object wounds the other person or animal. Similar to above, the beginning of the act was performed unwittingly and at the end the act was intentional. Hence the thrower is exempt.", + "This is the general principle: all who are liable to sin-offerings are liable only if the beginning and the end [of the forbidden action] are unwitting. If their beginning is unwitting while their end is intentional, if their beginning is intentional while their end is unwitting, they are not liable, unless their beginning and end are intentional. This section states explicitly the general rule that stood behind the previous two sections." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nAfter completing its explication of the various aspects of “carrying”, the Mishnah now turns its attention to various other prohibited labors mentioned above in 7:2. Today’s mishnah deals with building.", + "One who builds: how much must he build to be liable? He who builds any amount, and he who chisels, and he who strikes with a hammer or with an axe, and he who bores [a hole] of any size, is liable. There is no minimum measure for building. Any act of building, no matter how insignificant, can cause the builder to be liable. Building, as we see includes various aspects of construction such as chiseling, striking with a hammer and boring a hole. “Striking with a hammer” also can be understood as referring to the completion of labor.", + "This is the general principle: whoever does work and his work endures on Shabbat, he is liable. There are two explanations for this section. The first is that it means that the person performs work which will be left in its current situation on Shabbat. In other words, even if the work is not complete and will be added to after Shabbat, if it is sufficiently complete such that one would leave it that way on Shabbat, the person is liable. The second explanation is that the clause refers to a person who does work on Shabbat that is actually complete, meaning no one will add to it later on.", + "Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: even one who strikes with a hammer on the anvil at the completion of his work is liable, because he is as one who improves his work. At the end of their work, metalworkers would strike their hammers on the anvil. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says that this causes them to be liable, even though they don’t strike a blow to the vessel which they are making. The reason is that this blow actually improves the anvil and is therefore considered to be a forbidden labor." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with plowing, reaping and binding sheaves.", + "He who plows any amount, or who weeds, or who prunes [trees], or who cuts off young shoots, no matter the amount, is liable. Plowing is one of the categories of forbidden labor mentioned in 7:2. Weeding, pruning or cutting off young shoots are not listed in that mishnah. According to some commentators, these are prohibited because they are similar to “plowing”. According to others they are similar to “planting” because they are means by which a person helps her plants grow. In all of these cases, a person is liable no matter how much work they perform.", + "He who gathers wood: if in order to effect an improvement, [he is liable] for any amount; if for lighting a fire, as much as is required for boiling a light egg. Gathering wood is considered by commentators to be forbidden because of “binding sheaves”, a forbidden labor listed in 7:2. If she gathers wood from a tree in order to improve the tree, then she is liable for any amount, similar to those labors listed above. However, if she gathers wood in order to light a stove, she is only liable if she gathers enough wood to light a fire sufficient to cook an egg (see above, 8:5).", + "He who collects grasses: if to effect an improvement, [he is liable] for any amount; if for an animal, as much as fits in a kid’s mouth. If a person gathers grasses in order to improve the land, then she is liable for “plowing” and she is therefore liable for any amount. However, if she does so in order to feed an animal, then she needs to collect enough to fill the mouth of a kid (a young goat, as in “had gadya”). As above, she is liable because of “binding sheaves.”" + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah deals with the prohibition of writing, which is one of the labors prohibited in 7:2.", + "He who writes two letters, whether with his right hand or with his left hand, whether the same letter or two different letters or in two pigments, in any language, is liable. For one to be liable for “writing” she must write two letters. It matters not if she writes with her right or left hand. She is liable even if she writes the same letter twice. The letters can be written with different pigments or in different languages. In all cases, writing two letters makes one liable.", + "Rabbi Jose said: they made one liable for writing two letters only because [he makes] a mark, since this is how they would write on each board of the tabernacle, to know which its companion was. Rabbi Yose holds that even one who makes a mark is liable for writing, since this is how the work was done in the construction of the Tabernacle. They would make marks (scratch marks or impressions) on the wood to know which piece went with which other piece. Therefore, when one writes one is really liable for the indentation they make on whatever they are writing.", + "Rabbi Judah said: we find a short name [forming part] of a long name: “Shem” as part of “Shimon” or “Shmuel”, “Noah” as part of “Nahor”, “Dan” as part of “Daniel”, “Gad” as part of “Gaddiel”. According to Rabbi Judah, merely writing any two letters is not sufficient to incur liability unless the two letters are a complete word. However, the two letters do not have to be the complete word which she intended to write. If she intends to write a longer word, for instance “Shimon” but then writes “Shem” (Noah’s son) which in Hebrew consists of the first two letters in Shimon, she is liable. This is because Shem is in and of itself a full word. However, if the two letters she writes are not a complete word, she is exempt. We should note that according to the Talmud, a person is not liable if they write with their weak hand. They explain the mishnah as referring to an ambidextrous person." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to deal with the prohibition of writing on Shabbat.", + "He who writes two letters in one state of unawareness is liable. If one wrote two letters and in-between writing the two she did not realize that she had transgressed, she is liable. This rule shall be contrasted later in mishnah six.", + "He who writes with ink, arsenic, red chalk, gum, sulphate of copper or with anything that leaves a mark, One is liable for writing with any type of ink that leaves a mark. This list is the same as the list we saw in Gittin 2:3, where the mishnah listed inks which may be used in writing a divorce document.", + "on the angle of two walls, or on the two leaves of a ledger, and they [the two letters] are read together, is liable. If one writes two letters on two different walls but writes them in the place where the two walls meet, she is liable. Similarly, if she writes them on two pages of a ledger, if the two letters are read together, she is liable. We shall see the opposite case in tomorrow’s mishnah.", + "He who writes on his flesh, he is liable. One is liable for writing one’s flesh. According to the Rambam, the reason is that flesh is similar to parchment, which is made from animal flesh.", + "He who scratches a mark on his flesh: Rabbi Eliezer declares him liable to a sin-offering; But the sages exempt him. One who scratches marks onto her skin is liable, according to Rabbi Eliezer. The other sages say that she is exempt since this is not a normal way of writing." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah lists cases in which a person is not liable for writing.", + "If he wrote with liquids, or with fruit juice, on the dust of the road, or on writer’s powder, or with anything that cannot endure, he is exempt. In all of these cases, she is exempt because she didn’t write with an ink that will last, or she didn’t write on something that will last. Today, this would mean that writing with pencil does not make one liable on Shabbat. Similarly, writing something on the sand on the beach would not make one liable. Again, this doesn’t mean that these things are permitted; it only means that one who does so does not incur liability.", + "[If he wrote] with the back of his hand, with his foot, with his mouth, or with his elbow; In this case, the person wrote with a part of her body not typically used in writing. She is therefore exempt.", + "If he wrote one letter near [other] writing, She is exempt because she didn’t write two letters, even though she wrote next to an already existent letter.", + "If he wrote on top of other writing; Here, she wrote on top of already existing letters. She is not liable because the letters existed before she wrote them. Even though she may have added to them, she is still exempt.", + "If he intended to write a cheth but wrote two zayyinin; Here she intended to write the Hebrew letter chet, but instead of joining the two parts together, she left the top empty and it turned out that she had twice written the letter zayin. Since she did not intend to write two letters, she is exempt.", + "[If he wrote] one [letter] on the ground and another on a beam; If he wrote on two walls of the house, or on two leaves of a ledger which are not read together, he is exempt. In all three of these cases she did not write the two letters next to each other. Therefore she is exempt.", + "If he wrote one letter as an abbreviation: Rabbi Joshua ben Bathyra declares him liable, But the sages exempt him. In Hebrew sometimes one letter can be an abbreviation for a full word. For instance a resh with an apostrophe can be used to mean Rabbi. According to Rabbi Judah ben Batera, one who writes one letter as an abbreviation is liable. The sages say that she is exempt because she only wrote one letter." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe final mishnah in this chapter finishes our discussion of writing on Shabbat.", + "He who writes two letters in two states of unawareness, one in the morning and one in the evening: Rabban Gamaliel declares him liable; But the sages exempt him. The case is one where someone wrote two letters adjacent to one another, but she wrote them at different times, having remembered in-between that it was forbidden to write on Shabbat. For example, she wrote the first letter in the morning, then remembered that it was forbidden to write on Shabbat and then she wrote another letter towards evening, again having forgotten that writing is forbidden on Shabbat. Rabban Gamaliel says that she is liable. He holds that finding out that something is forbidden in the midst of performing one forbidden labor (writing two letters) does not count as “finding out” in order to separate these into two distinct acts. [In contrast, if she wrote two letters in the morning and then remembered that it was Shabbat, and then wrote two letters later in the day, she would be liable for two sin offerings. The knowledge in-between separates it into two different acts. If she did not remember in the middle she would be liable for only one sin offering.] The rabbis hold that since these were two different states of unawareness, they do not join together and she is exempt." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis chapter deals with the work involved in making clothes. Today’s mishnah deals with the prohibited labor of weaving.", + "Rabbi Eliezer says: he who weaves three threads at the beginning or one [thread] added to woven stuff is liable; But the sages say: whether at the beginning or at the end, the standard [for liability] is two threads. According to Rabbi Eliezer, there are two different standards for how much weaving causes one to be liable, depending on when the weaving is performed. When beginning to weave cloth, one is liable only if she weaves three threads. This is because without three threads the cloth has not really been begun. However, if she weaves part of something that has already been started, she is liable even for one thread. Even one thread contributes to an already-started cloth. The sages, whose opinion was already stated in 7:2, provide one standard measure, no matter when the weaving was done. Liability is always for two threads, no matter at the beginning or in the middle." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first part of the mishnah explains the prohibited labor of “making two loops.” The second part deals with sewing.", + "He who makes two loops, on either the cross-pieces [nirim] or one the slips [keros], or in a sifter, sieve, or basket, is liable. We need not fully understand how the ancient loom worked to understand that making two loops, no matter where or how they are done, is considered labor prohibited by the Torah. One is also liable if she makes two loops while weaving a sifter (for sifting flour), a sieve (for separating kernels of grain) or a basket.", + "And he who sews two stitches, and he who tears in order to sew two stitches [is liable]. In order to be liable for sewing one needs to sew two stitches. Tearing makes one liable only if the tearing was done with a constructive purpose in mind. If one tears in order to sew up the garment, then one is liable. If the purpose is only destructive, there is no liability." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is a continuation of yesterday’s mishnah where we learned that one is liable for tearing only if she tears in order to sew two stitches.", + "He who tears in his anger or [in mourning] for his dead, and all who damage are exempt. According to this mishnah, one who tears his clothes in anger or as a sign of mourning over the dead is not liable, for there is no constructive purpose to such tearing. However, the Talmud notes that when one is liable for rending one’s clothes as a sign of mourning for one’s dead, for instance over a close relative (parent, sibling, child or spouse), then there is constructive purpose to such tearing it fulfills the commandment to tear. Therefore, when a person is obligated to tear and she tears on Shabbat, she is liable. However, if one is exempt from tearing and nevertheless does so, she is exempt. There is also an interesting note on tearing in anger. According to the Rambam, despite what the mishnah says, one is usually liable for tearing in anger because by such tearing one cools down. Again, this makes the tearing constructive and therefore carries with it liability. However, other commentators argue with the Rambam and say, based on a passage in the Talmud, that destroying things out of anger is akin to idol worship, because both are submissions to one’s evil inclination. If a person’s evil inclination dictates that they destroy something, and they submit, they have begun down a slippery slope which will eventually lead to total demise which is symbolized in the Talmud by idol worship. Since such tearing is ultimately not productive, there is no incurred liability. Similarly, any forbidden labor which is performed with only destructive intentions, does not cause one to be liable.", + "But he who damages in order to repair, his measure [for liability] is as for repairing. As noted, a person is liable for destructive acts only if such acts are performed with constructive intent. If they are performed with such intent, then the measure for liability is the same as the measure for the positive act. For instance, one is liable for erasing only if it is with the intent of writing. Since to be liable for writing one must write two letters, so too with erasing she must erase two letters in order to be liable." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with minimum measures in processing wool and flax.", + "The minimum measure for bleaching, hackling, dyeing or spinning is a full double sit. These are all forbidden labors mentioned above in 7:2. The minimum measure for which one incurs liability is double a “sit” the length between one’s thumb and finger, as far as they can be spread.", + "And he who weaves two threads together, the minimum meausure is a full sit. If one weaves two threads together on a loom, the minimum measure for liability is half of that above, meaning one “sit”." + ], + [ + "Rabbi Judah says: he who hunts a bird into a tower trap, or a deer into a house, is liable;
But the sages say: [he who hunts] a bird into a tower trap, and a deer into a house, courtyard or corral.
Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: not all corrals are the same.
This is the general principle: if it lacks further work of hunting, he is exempt. If it does not lack further work of hunting, he is liable.
This mishnah deals with hunting. We should note that hunting is not exactly what we think of it today going out and killing an animal. Hunting refers to trapping an animal such that it remains alive. Killing an animal is a different, yet still prohibited labor.
Section one: According to Rabbi Judah, once one traps a bird in a tower trap, which was a box in the shape of a tower, she has sufficiently trapped the animal such that she is liable for hunting. Similarly, if she traps a deer in a house she is liable. However, if she traps a bird in a house she is exempt because it will still require further trapping in order to get the bird. Furthermore, the bird can escape the house and therefore, the bird is not really trapped. Also, if the deer is trapped into a larger space, then she is not liable.
Section two: The sages agree with Rabbi Judah with regard to the bird but disagree with him with regard to the trapping of the deer. Even if she traps the deer into a courtyard or corral she is still liable.
Section three: Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel notes that liability depends on the size of the corral into which the deer has been trapped. We can’t just state unequivocally that trapping into all corrals makes one liable. If catching the deer requires no further worth of hunting (meaning it can be caught easily) than it has already been hunted and she is liable. However, if catching the deer will require further work, then the one who catches it in the corral is not liable.
It is interesting to note that Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says that not all corrals are the same. It may be that in contrast, most houses and courtyards were the same, meaning they were similarly built and of similar size." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is similar to 10:5 above, where we learned that if two people jointly perform a labor that could have been performed by one person, they are exempt. If they jointly perform a work that required two people, the sages say that both are liable and Rabbi Shimon exempts them both.", + "If a deer enters a house and one person shuts [the door] before it, he is liable. By closing the door, she is liable, even though she didn’t actually cause the deer to come into the house.", + "If two shut it, they are exempt. If one could not shut it, and both shut it, they are liable. Rabbi Shimon exempts them. If two shut the door, both are exempt because they have both performed only half a labor. However, if the door was so large (or the people so small!) that they could only close it together, they are both liable. Rabbi Shimon exempts them, because he holds that two people can never be liable for one jointly performed labor." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe final mishnah of this chapter continues to deal with hunting (trapping).", + "If one sat down in the doorway but did not fill it, and a second sat down and filled it, the second is liable. If there is a deer in the house and a person sits down and with her body closes the opening of the house, she is liable for hunting. If she doesn’t fill the opening with her body, and a second person comes and fills the opening, the second person has closed the house and has thereby trapped the deer. Therefore, the second person is liable and the first person is exempt.", + "If the first sat down in the doorway and fills it, and a second came and sat down at his side, even if the first [then] rises and goes away, the first is liable and the second is exempt. To what is this similar? To one who shuts his house to guard it, and a deer is found to be guarded in it. Once the first person sits in the doorway and thereby traps the deer, the first person is liable. What the second person does is really irrelevant, because the first person has already trapped the animal. Even if the first person gets up and leaves, and the second person is now keeping the animal in the house, the second person is not liable because she did not perform the labor herself. The mishnah compares this to a case where a person closes her door to guard it from thieves and then finds that a deer is trapped inside. There is nothing wrong in such a situation with keeping an already trapped deer inside the house." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to deal with hunting (trapping) the topic covered in the last chapter. It also begins to discuss wounding animals.", + "The eight creeping things which are mentioned in the Torah: he who hunts them or wounds them [on Shabbat] is liable; The Torah lists eight creeping things which are impure. According to our mishnah, one who hunts one of these things is liable, for it is was normal to hunt them in order to use their hide. Furthermore, one who wounds them is also liable, a forbidden labor derived from the prohibition against slaughtering. Other commentators explain that “wounding” is derived not from slaughtering but from dyeing, since when the blood comes out it colors the hide. Maimonides explains that “wounding” is derived from “threshing” both are activities which separate one thing from another. In wounding, blood is separated from the body.", + "But [as for] other abominations and creeping things, he who wounds them is exempt. Other “creeping things” do not have hides and hence one who wounds them is not liable. In order to be liable for something like slaughtering the animal must have a hide for on the hide a permanent scar would be life.", + "He who hunts them for need is liable; Not for need, he is exempt. With regard to hunting, if she hunts them to use them for a specific purpose, such as medicine, she is liable. However, it is not normal to hunt these things and therefore if she hunts them for no specific purpose, she is not liable.", + "A beast or a chicken in one’s own domain, he who hunts them is exempt. He who wounds them is liable. If a beast (a domesticated) or chicken is already on one’s domain, then they need not be further trapped, and therefore one who does trap them is exempt. Cows, sheep, goats and chickens, the domesticated animals, are already trapped by their very domesticated nature. Therefore, further hunting (trapping) of them does not apply. However, since they (according to the rabbis) have hides one who wounds them is liable." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with preparing pickling brine on Shabbat. According to commentators, this is similar to processing hides because both change the nature of something by soaking it in a mixture.", + "They do not prepare [pickling] brine on Shabbat, but he may prepare salt water and dip his bread into it or put it into a cooked dish. Pickling brine is “hilmi” in Hebrew. “Hilmi” was a mixture of water, salt and a little bit of oil. It was used to pickle vegetables. Making “hilmi” is prohibited but making “salt water” is allowed (note that she is not merely “exempt” rather this is allowed.) Albeck explains (based on the Palestinian Talmud) that making “hilmi” is the work of a professional and was therefore prohibited. “Salt water” is made by non-professionals and hence is prohibited. The Babylonian Talmud explains that “hilmi” was a large mixture, whereas as “salt water” is the same mixture but a smaller amount.", + "Rabbi Yose said: but that is brine, whether [one prepares] much or little? Rather what is the salt water that is permitted? Oil is first put into the water or into the salt. Rabbi Yose says that even “salt water” can be considered “hilmi” and therefore it too should be forbidden. According to the Babylonian Talmud’s explanation, Rabbi Yose says that if we allow the making of salt water which is a small amount of “hilmi” people will think that small amounts of work are permitted but larger amounts are prohibited. Therefore, if she wishes to make salt water, she should first put the oil either into the water or into the salt, and only afterwards put in the water. In this way she weakens the salt, making it dissimilar enough to “hilmi” that it is permitted. No one will think that she is making a solution that will pickle the vegetables." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah discusses taking medicine or performing acts of healing on Shabbat. If there is any danger to a person’s life, even a potential danger, all medicines and acts of healing are permitted. Indeed they are mandated. However, the sages forbade the use of medicines which are for aches, pains, etc. that are not life-threatening. According to most commentators, the reason for this prohibition is that most drugs were made by grinding roots or other parts of plants. Grinding roots is prohibited as a derivative of grinding wheat. However, in the Palestinian Talmud the reason that healing is prohibited on Shabbat is so that a person should distinguish between Shabbat and the week.", + "They do not eat Greek hyssop on Shabbat, because it is not the food of healthy people. Greek hyssop is eaten only by sick people. When one eats this type of hyssop everyone knows that the person is eating it for medicinal purposes. Hence, it is prohibited, as we explained above.", + "But he may eat yo’ezer and drink abuv ro’eh. Yo’ezer and abuv ro’eh are types of plants that are often used for medicinal purposes, but they are also eaten or drunk in potions by healthy people. Since, when a person eats or drinks these things, it won’t be recognized that she is taking medicine, it is permitted. It is only prohibited to eat or drink something for medicinal purposes if everyone observing will see that she is doing so for healing.", + "A man may eat any kind of food as medicine, and drink any liquid, except water of palm trees and a potion of roots, because they are for jaundice. Foods may always be eaten and liquids may always be imbibed even if the person intends to use them for medicinal purposes. Since healthy people also eat these foods or drink these drinks, it will not be recognizable that she is doing anything for medicinal purposes. The only exception to this rule is water of palm trees and a potion of roots which were used for jaundice. Since the face of the person drinking these things is yellow, it will be recognized that she is drinking them for medicinal purposes. Hence, a person who has jaundice is not allowed to drink these things.", + "But he may drink water of palm trees for his thirst and rub himself with oil of roots for a non-medical purpose. However, a person who does not have jaundice and is merely thirsty may drink these things. Since she looks healthy, no one will think she is taking medicine on Shabbat. She may also rub herself with oil of roots, as long as she does so for comfort and not for medicinal purposes." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to deal with acts of healing on Shabbat.", + "He who feels pain in his teeth may not sip vinegar through them, but he may dip [his bread in vinegar] in the usual manner, and if he is cured, he is cured. Vinegar was used as an ailment for toothaches. Therefore, one who has a toothache is not allowed to sip vinegar through his teeth, since this is obviously for healing purposes. However, he may dip his bread in vinegar in a manner which is done typically during the week. Since this is a normal activity performed not only for healing, it is permitted. If by doing so he is cured, so be it.", + "He who feels pain in his hips may not rub them with wine or vinegar, but he may anoint them with oil but not rose oil. The children of royalty may anoint their wounds with rose oil, since it is their practice to anoint themselves thus on weekdays. Rabbi Shimon said: all Israel are royal children. Vinegar or wine was evidently rubbed on a person’s hips to cure pains (backache? arthritis?). Since this is the only reason that they would be rubbed on one’s body, it is forbidden to do so on Shabbat. However, oil may be rubbed on a person’s body for a variety of other reasons and therefore it is permitted to rub oil for medicinal purposes as well. When one does so it will not be recognized by others that she is healing herself. Nevertheless, rose oil is forbidden since normal people don’t rub expensive rose oil on themselves except for medicinal purposes. Again, this rule suffers one exception. Children of royalty may anoint themselves with rose oil since they do so on the weekdays. The rule is consistent: a person may perform an act of healing on Shabbat if she regularly performs that same act for purposes other than healing. Finally, on a more poetic note, Rabbi Shimon states that all Jews are to be considered as the children of royalty, and therefore they all may anoint themselves with oil, regardless of their actual wealth. We might delay for a moment on the philosophy that lies behind Rabbi Shimon’s words. Differences in wealth do not create essential distinctions between Jews and therefore the halakhah must (at least in this case) treat them equally. Their value stems from their having accepted the Torah and is irregardless of their actual monetary wealth." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah and the following one deal with the prohibited labors of tying and untying. As we shall see in the mishnah, one is liable only if the knot is one that is intended to last.", + "These are the knots for which a person is liable? Camel-drivers’ knots and sailors’ knots. And just as one is guilty for tying them, so one is guilty for untying them. Rabbi Meir says: any knot which one can untie with one hand they are not liable for it. Camel-drivers would tie ropes to their camels’ noses and the ropes would remain permanently attached to the camels. Similarly, sailors would permanently tie their ropes to their ships. Since these knots are intended to remain in their place for good, one who ties are unties such a knot is liable. Rabbi Meir states a different criterion for determining whether a given knot entails liability. If one can untie the knot with one hand it is not a knot which entails a liability, even if it is intended to remain permanently in its place. It is interesting to note that according to the first opinion, what determines liability is intent if it is intended that the knot remain forever then one is liable. In contrast, the physical nature of the knot is, according to Rabbi Meir, what determines liability. This is a debate we have often noted in the Mishnah is the halakhah determined by the physical nature of an act or by the intention with which the act was performed." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is a direct continuation of yesterday’s mishnah.", + "You have some knots for which one is not liable like [one is] for camel-drivers’ knots and sailors’ knots. The mishnah explains that there are some knots for which one is not liable and yet it is still prohibited to tie or untie them. These knots are somewhat like camel drivers’ and sailors’ knots and yet they are different. The mishnah itself does not explain what these knots are. The Babylonian Talmud explains that these are semi-permanent knots, ones which remain in place for some time but are not meant to be permanent. Since these remain in place for a long time, it is forbidden to tie or untie them. However, since they are not truly permanent, one who does tie or untie them is not liable.", + "A woman may tie up the opening of her chemise, the strings of her hair-net and of her belt, the laces of her shoes or sandals, leather-bottles of wine and oil, and a meat dish. Now the mishnah lists knots which one is completely permitted to tie and untie on Shabbat. These are all impermanent knots and therefore they entail no liability.", + "Rabbi Elazar ben Ya’akov says: one may tie [a rope] in front of an animal, that it should not go out. According to Rabbi Elazar ben Ya’akov it is permitted to tie a rope across the pen of an animal so that the animal will not escape.", + "One may tie a bucket [over a well] with a belt but not with a rope; Rabbi Judah permits it. Rabbi Judah stated a general rule: any knot that is not permanent one is not liable for it. According to the sages, it is forbidden to tie a bucket over a well with a rope because sometimes these ropes are left there permanently. However, it is permitted with a belt because the belt won’t be left there for very long. Rabbi Judah however, permits one to tie a bucket over a well even with a rope because the bucket will not be left there permanently. In the last clause of the mishnah, Rabbi Judah explains that as long as the knot is not permanent, one cannot be liable for it. This is the same opinion as the sages in the previous mishnah, but it differs from Rabbi Meir in that mishnah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nSince yesterday’s mishnah dealt briefly with clothing (a woman tying her clothing on Shabbat) today’s mishnah also deals with clothing.", + "One may fold clothing even four or five times, and spread the sheets on the beds on the Shabbat evening for [use on] Shabbat, but not on Shabbat for [use on] the day after Shabbat. This mishnah deals with preparing things on Shabbat for use either on Shabbat or after Shabbat. The first section teaches that one may fold clothing and spread sheets on a bed as long as the clothing or bed will be used on Shabbat itself. It is forbidden to fold clothes or spread sheets on a bed if they will not be used until after Shabbat. We may deduce from here that in general it is prohibited to prepare things on Shabbat that will not be used until after Shabbat.", + "Rabbi Yishmael says: one may fold clothing and spread the sheets on the beds on Yom Kippur for [use on] Shabbat, and the fat pieces of the Shabbat offering may be offered on Yom Kippur. Rabbi Yishmael allows preparing things on Yom Kippur which will not be used until Shabbat, since the sanctity of Yom Kippur is less than that of Shabbat. [Note, in today’s calendar which is fixed Yom Kippur cannot fall on Friday. In the time of the Mishnah the calendar was not fixed and hence this was possible.] Furthermore, if Yom Kippur falls on Sunday [this also can’t happen according to our fixed calendar] then Shabbat offerings that hadn’t been fully offered on Shabbat may be offered on Yom Kippur. However, if Yom Kippur were to fall on Friday, the Yom Kippur offerings could not be offered on Shabbat because Shabbat’s holiness is higher than that of Yom Kippur. On Shabbat only sacrifices that must be offered on Shabbat can be sacrificed.", + "Rabbi Akiva says: those of Shabbat may not be offered on Yom Kippur, nor may those of Yom Kippur be offered on Shabbat. Rabbi Akiva thinks that the sanctity of Shabbat and Yom Kippur is equivalent. Therefore the offerings of one day cannot be offered on the other. All the more so would it be forbidden to fold clothes or spread bed sheets on one of these days in preparation for the other." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis entire chapter deals with fires that have broken out on Shabbat. The rabbis forbade saving things from being destroyed by a fire lest a person come to extinguish the fire, an activity which is prohibited on Shabbat. Nevertheless there are some things which may be saved from fires on Shabbat.", + "All sacred writings may be saved from a fire, whether we read from them or not [on Shabbat]. Any scroll which contains part of the Bible (the “sacred writings”) may be saved from a fire on Shabbat, irregardless of whether that scroll is used on Shabbat. Some commentators explain that the mishnah refers to scrolls which were not read publicly on Shabbat. Others explain that the mishnah refers to scrolls that were not even read in private.", + "And even if they are written in any language, they must be stored. As an aside, the mishnah notes that scrolls containing the sacred writings must be put into a genizah (a place of storage) no matter what language they are written in. According to the Yerushalmi, these scrolls also must be saved from the fire.", + "And why do we not read them? Because of the neglect of the study house. The mishnah now asks the obvious question: why are there are scrolls from which we don’t read on Shabbat? The answer is that these scrolls are not read from lest the reader come to neglect the study sessions that occur in the study hall on Shabbat. On Shabbat the sages would teach the people halakhah in the study house. The problem was that often the people would find it more interesting to read what was in the Bible than to listen to these lectures. To prevent people from reading the Bible and thereb yneglecting the halakhic lectures of the sages, the sages forbade reading these scrolls on Shabbat. According to the Talmud, this prohibition only refers to the time when the lecture was actually taking place.", + "One may save the container of a scroll together with the scroll, and the container of tefillin together with the tefillin, even if it [also] contains money. Just as it is permitted to save sacred writings and tefillin (which contain scrolls of sacred writings) from fires, so too it is permitted to save their containers.", + "And to where may one rescue them? Into a closed alley. Ben Batera says: even into an open one. The mishnah now asks to where these scrolls may be saved. They certainly may not be removed from the private domain to the public domain, for that would in and of itself be a forbidden labor. According to the first opinion, they may be removed to a closed alley, which means one that it is not open on both ends. Ben Batera says it even may be removed to an alley which is open from both ends." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with how much food may be saved from a fire on Shabbat.", + "Food for three meals may be saved, that which is fit for a person, for a person, that which is fit for a beast, for a beast. If a fire breaks out and threatens to destroy food, one may save only enough food for Shabbat itself. It is forbidden to save food that will not be used until after Shabbat. It is permitted to save three meals for a person if the food is fit for a person and sufficient food for animals, if the food is fit for animals.", + "How is this so? If a fire breaks out on the eve of Shabbat, food for three meals may be saved. If in the morning, food for two meals may be saved. If at [the time of] minhah, food for one meal. The mishnah now illustrates when three meals may be saved. The principle is simple: one can save food for as many meals as will be eaten on Shabbat, assuming that a person will eat three meals. Therefore, if the fire breaks out before the evening meal, then three meals may be saved. If in the morning, then two meals may be saved and if at minhah time (in the afternoon) then only enough for one meal may be saved.", + "Rabbi Yose says: at all times we may save food for three meals. Rabbi Yose holds that the measure of food which may be saved remains the same no matter when the fire breaks out." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah continues to deal with saving food from a fire on Shabbat.", + "One may save a basket full of loaves, even if it contains [enough for] a hundred meals, and a round cake of pressed figs, and a barrel of wine. In yesterday’s mishnah we learned that a person may save only enough for three meals on Shabbat. Today we learn that if a lot of food is bundled into one package, she may save the entire package even though there is more than enough for three meals. Since the food is all packaged together, it is treated as if she is only saving one thing and therefore it is permissible.", + "And he [the owner] may say to others, “Come and save for yourselves.” And if they are clever, they make an account with him after Shabbat. The mishnah now tries to arrange a “legal fiction” whereby a person can save more than enough for three meals. If she sees that her food will be destroyed by the fire, she may say to her neighbors, “Come and save this food for yourselves.” In this way, everyone may save three meals. This is permitted since people normally invite over guests on Shabbat. Furthermore, if the neighbors are clever they may realize that her intention is not really to give the food away but rather recover it for herself. The mishnah permits them to come back to her after Shabbat so that the original owners may pay to get it back. According to Albeck, the people who saved the food will actually pay for the food they used. According to the Talmud, those whose food was saved pay them for their troubles. .", + "To where may they be saved? Into a courtyard which has an eruv. Ben Batera says: even into a courtyard which does not have an eruv. The mishnah now asks where the food can be removed to. It obviously cannot be removed to the public domain, for that would constitute carrying from one domain to another. According to the first opinion, it can only be removed to a courtyard in which carrying is allowed, that is to say one which already has an eruv. Ben Batera is slightly more lenient, as he was in the first mishnah of this chapter. He allows the food to be removed even to a courtyard which does not have an eruv. In any case the halakhah is more stringent here than it was with regard to the Holy Scriptures in mishnah one." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses saving clothing from the fire on Shabbat.", + "And to there he may carry out all his utensils; She may also save any utensils that he will need on that Shabbat. She may bring them out to the courtyard mentioned in yesterday’s mishnah.", + "And he may wear all that he can wear and wrap himself in all that he can wrap himself. Rabbi Yose says: [only] eighteen pieces of clothing. She may also put on as much clothing as she wishes in order to wear it out into the courtyard, and thereby prevent it from being destroyed by the fire. Rabbi Yose does not allow this. He limits the amount of clothing to eighteen articles, which according to the Talmud, is what people would normally wear during the week.", + "Then he may go back in and put on [more clothes] and carry them out. The mishnah allows her to keep going back into the house to wear more clothing. This is another legal fiction meant to allow one to save more than just one set of clothing.", + "And he may say to others, “Come and save with me.” The person whose clothing is threatened by the fire may invite other people to come wear her clothing, and thereby save them from the fire. The “fiction” is that she is only inviting people to wear her clothing, wherein reality it is obvious that they are saving for her. Indeed, unlike the case of food in the previous mishnah, here she actually says, “Come and save with me.” Above she said, “For you.”" + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah introduces means which may be used to keep the fire from spreading.", + "Rabbi Shimon ben Nannas says: one may spread a goat skin over a box, chest, or trunk which has caught fire, because he singes. Rabbi Shimon ben Nannas allows one to spread a goat’s hide over various types of boxes since the hide won’t burn but will only become singed. The will serve as an effective barrier from the fire.", + "And one may make a barrier with all vessels, whether full [of water] or empty, that the fire should not travel onward. Rabbi Yose forbids in the case of new earthen vessels filled with water, because since they cannot stand the heat, they will burst and extinguish the fire. Other barriers may also be erected, and one may fill vessels even with water to prevent the fire from traveling onward. Even though this will almost surely cause the fire to go out, since the fire is being put out indirectly it is permitted in a case such as this where there is a fear of financial loss. Rabbi Yose, however, prohibits setting up new vessels filled with water to stop the fire since these will certainly break. Rabbi Yose holds that it is forbidden to indirectly cause a fire to be extinguished, even if this will cause a loss." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with a non-Jew or minor, both of whom are not obligated to observe the commandments, who want to extinguish the fire.", + "If a non-Jew comes to extinguish, they do not say to him, “extinguish it” or “do not extinguish,” because his resting is not their obligation. One may not ask a non-Jew to perform a forbidden labor on behalf of a Jew on Shabbat. Even though people often think that this is permitted, talmudic literature and subsequent halakhic authorities clearly prohibit it. However, if the non-Jew comes on his own accord to extinguish the fire, Jews are not obligated to stop her from doing so. A Jew is not obligated to make a non-Jew rest on Shabbat. Therefore, if the non-Jew wishes to, she may put out the fire.", + "But if a minor comes to extinguish, they must not listen to him, because his resting is their obligation. If a minor comes to extinguish the fire the Jew must stop the minor from doing so, because the Jew has an obligation to make sure that the minor ceases performing forbidden labors on Shabbat. The fact that the minor doesn’t really know that what she is doing is forbidden does not mean that she is allowed to do forbidden work on Shabbat, or that we may allow her to do such work. We should note that according to the Talmud Jews do not have to stop minors from doing forbidden things such as eating non-kosher food, or performing forbidden labors on Shabbat. The mishnah refers to a case where the minor knows that the father wants to put the fire out and hence is doing so on her father’s behalf. In such a case, other Jews are required to stop the minor from doing so." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe mishnah teaches that sometimes one may cover certain things with a dish on Shabbat in order to avoid undesirable results.", + "One may turn a dish over a lamp so that the beams should not catch [fire], and over an infant’s excrement, and over a scorpion so that it should not bite. Rabbi Judah said: an incident came before Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai in Arabia and he said, “I fear that he may be liable for a sin-offering.” Again, the mishnah teaches that one can do certain things to prevent a fire from spreading on Shabbat. In the case mentioned here, if the fire were to catch the beams which hold up the roof, it could cause significant damage. Hence, it is permitted to turn a dish over it to prevent it from spreading. The mishnah continues to list other instances in which one can overturn a dish on Shabbat. The first is over the excrement of an infant, which itself cannot be moved because it is muktzeh (off-limits). It is muktzeh because it is disgusting. So even though it is muktzeh, one may carry a vessel to cover it. The second thing is covering a scorpion with a dish so that it will not bite. Although this may be seen as trapping/hunting, since she does so not for her own need (i.e. to use the scorpion) but rather to prevent it from causing damage, it is permitted. However, R. Yohanan ben Zakkai thinks that one who turns a dish over a scorpion is dangerously close to being liable to bring a sin-offering on Shabbat, i.e. this may be prohibited. The problem is that if she covers the scorpion to catch it and then use it for medicinal purposes, she would be liable (see Eduyot 2:5). When this incident came before R. Yohanan ben Zakkai he didn’t outright rule that the person was liable, but neither did he say that it was fully permissible." + ], + [ + "If a Gentile lights a lamp, an Israelite may make use of its light. But if [he does it] for the sake of the Israelite, it is forbidden.
If he draws water to give his own animal to drink, an Israelite may water his [animal] after him. But if [he draws it] for the Israelite’s sake, it is forbidden.
If a Gentile makes a plank to descend [off a ship by] it, an Israelite may descend after him; But if on the Israelite’s account, it is forbidden. It once happened that Rabban Gamaliel and the elders were traveling in a ship, when a Gentile made a plank for getting off, and Rabban Gamaliel, and the elders descended by it.
The central point of this mishnah is that if a Gentile does a prohibited labor on Shabbat for his own benefit, then an Israelite may make use of what the Gentile did. However, if the Gentile does on the Israelite’s behalf, it is prohibited for the Jew to benefit from it. A Jew can certainly not tell a non-Jew to perform for the Jew on Shabbat an activity which the Jew himself may not perform. According to the mishnah, even if the Gentile did it without being told, if he did it on the Jew’s behalf it is forbidden.
Section two: The reason that drawing water is prohibited is that the cistern from which the water is drawn is considered a “private domain” and the cistern itself is found in the public domain. Taking water out of the cistern is therefore prohibited because of “carrying.”
Section three: Laying down the plank is forbidden because it is considered “building.” Rabban Gamaliel and the other elders descended because the Gentile had made the plank for his own use, or at least for his own use as well as the use of others." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThere are certain objects which it is forbidden to carry or move on Shabbat and they are called in Hebrew, “muktzeh” which literally means “set aside.” There are several reasons why the rabbis prohibited carrying certain types of vessels on Shabbat, but the most basic reason is to preserve the character of Shabbat as distinct from all other days. In other words, even though certain activities may be technically permitted, they are opposed to the “spirit” of Shabbat, and hence the sages did all that they could to keep a person away from such activities or even from the appearance of performing such activities. Another reason is that if one is allowed to touch a vessel which is used to perform prohibited work, one might come to perform the work itself.\nAs a general rule, if a vessel is used for activities which are permitted on Shabbat, then one can carry the vessel on Shabbat. An example of such a vessel would be a cup or a plate. If the vessel is used for things prohibited on Shabbat, then it is still permissible to carry the vessel as long as the intention is not to use it to perform a prohibited labor. It can be carried to perform a permitted labor and it also may be carried because the person simply doesn’t want it to be where it currently is.\nThis chapter will teach the details of the laws of muktzeh.\nA note on translation: the Hebrew word for vessel is “keli.” This word can be used to refer to things that we commonly call utensils, and it can also refer to clothes. It would include most anything made by people with the exception of things attached to the ground such as homes. The article also must be used as an instrument to do something else a book or a document is not a “keli.”", + "All utensils may be carried on Shabbat and their doors with them, even if they became detached on Shabbat, for they are not like the doors of a house, which are not set aside for use. All vessels that have doors and which are used for permitted activities on Shabbat, may be carried with their doors. An example would be a trunk which has a door on its top. Furthermore, one may carry the doors on Shabbat even if the doors become detached from their vessels. This is true even if the doors became detached before Shabbat. The mishnah compares these doors with those of a house. House doors may not be carried on Shabbat because they are not normally carried around; rather they are attached to the house which is attached to the ground. Something may be carried only if it is an item that is normally carried. This is true with regard to doors of a vessel which are in normal situations carried with as part of their vessels." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah teaches that one may carry a vessel that is normally used to perform prohibited labor provided that the intent is to use it for something permitted on Shabbat.", + "A man may take a hammer to split nuts, an axe to cut a cake of pressed figs, a saw for sawing cheese, a rake to scoop up dried figs, a winnowing shovel and a pitchfork to place [food] upon it for a child, a reed or a shuttle to stick [food], a small needle to remove a thorn, and a sack [needle] to open a door. There are several types of utensils mentioned in this mishnah: a hammer, an axe, a saw, a rake, a shovel or pitchfork, a reed or shuttle (both used in sewing), a needle and a sack needle. All of these things are normally used to perform forbidden labors. However, this mishnah teaches that a person may use them for permitted labors on Shabbat. In all of these cases, the vessel listed is not the one normally used for such a labor. Nevertheless, since the vessel can be used for said purpose, it is permitted. For instance, if a person lost the key to a door, she may use a needle to try to pick a lock." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses a “reed for olives.” This is a vessel used in the process of making olive oil. They would put the olives in a large container so that they would heat up, start to soften and the juice would flow out. The container would be flipped over by using the “reed for olives.” When they flipped the container they would check the reed to see if it was moist. If it was they would know that the olives were soft and that they could begin to press them. Our mishnah teaches two laws with regard to this reed: its susceptibility to impurity and whether it may be carried on Shabbat. Both laws depend on whether or not the reed is considered to be a “vessel.”", + "A reed for olives, if it has a knot on its top, is susceptible to impurity; if not, it is not susceptible to impurity. Sometimes they would make a small knot on top of the reed. This knot would serve as a small receptacle for the olive oil and it would make it easier to check if the olives were ready. If the reed has such a knot then it is susceptible to impurity and if not, then it is not susceptible. Wooden vessels are generally only susceptible to impurity if they have a receptacle.", + "In both cases it may be handled on Shabbat. Since this is a vessel, it is permitted to carry it on Shabbat either to use it to do something permitted, or to move it because she needs to use the space it occupies. In other words, with regard to receiving impurity, this is not a vessel unless it has a knot, but when it comes to Shabbat, it is considered a vessel with or without the knot. Had it not been considered a vessel, it would have been prohibited to carry it on Shabbat for any reason." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah provides some general rules concerning which vessels may be carried on Shabbat and when they may be carried.", + "Rabbi Yose says: all vessels may be carried, except a large saw and the pin of a plough. The reason that one may not carry a large saw or the pin of a plough is that people are very careful not to ruin these things. Since they are so careful with these things, they won’t use them for other purposes, and since the normal use of these things is prohibited on Shabbat, they may not be carried at all.", + "All vessels may be carried whether required or not required. Rabbi Nehemiah says: they may be handled only for what is required. According to the first opinion in the mishnah, all vessels may be carried whether there is a need for them or not. In the Talmud there is a debate what it means when the mishnah says they are “not required.” According to one explanation, “not required” means that the person doesn’t want to use the vessel itself, but rather wants to move it away from its current place. For instance, I might want to move a knife not to use the knife to cut something but to keep it away from my child. According to this explanation, there must be some purpose to moving the knife. Another explanation is that “not required” means that the person is carrying it for no reason whatsoever. Our explanation of this clause will impact our explanation of Rabbi Nehemiah’s debate. According to the first explanation, Rabbi Nehemiah forbids carrying the object unless the object itself is needed. For instance, a knife may be carried only if one wants to use the knife itself. According to the second explanation, Rabbi Nehemiah would allow carrying the knife even if one only wants to move it to clear it from its current place. He would forbid moving the vessel only if there was truly no purpose to doing so." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is concerned with carrying the fragments of vessels on Shabbat.", + "All vessels which may be carried on Shabbat, their broken pieces may be carried with them, as long as they can perform something in the nature of work. [Thus]: the fragments of a kneading trough [can be used] to cover the mouth of a barrel, [and] the fragments of glass [can be used] to cover the mouth of a flask. Broken pieces of vessels may still be carried on Shabbat as long as the broken pieces can be used for some purpose. The mishnah illustrates what this means. According to the first opinion, the shard need no longer fill any function related to the purpose of the vessel from which it came. Rather it needs only to have some minimal amount of use.", + "Rabbi Judah says: as long as they can perform something in the nature of their own work; [Thus:] the fragments of a kneading trough, to pour into them a thick mixture; and [the fragments] of a glass, to pour into them oil. Rabbi Judah says that the vessel must still have a use related to the function of the vessel of which it was originally a part. Thus a piece of a kneading trough must still be large enough to hold a thick mixture, a usage similar to its original usage. The Talmud explains that Rabbi Judah is referring to a case where the vessel broke on Shabbat itself. In such a case, since when Shabbat began the vessel was intended for a specific purpose (such as kneading) no part of it can be used for something else on Shabbat. By breaking on Shabbat and being used for something else it would be like a new vessel, one that was in essence made on Shabbat. However, if the vessel was broken before Shabbat its pieces can be carried for other purposes on Shabbat, because when Shabbat began they were already capable of fulfilling other purposes." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with certain unusual contraptions used to draw water from a well.", + "A stone in a dried-out pumpkin: If one can draw [water] in it and it [the stone] does not fall out, one may draw [water] in it; if not, one may not draw water in it. They would use the dried-out pumpkin to draw water from a cistern or well. Because the pumpkin would float, they would place a stone in it to weigh the pumpkin down and submerge it in the water. If the stone was attached well to the pumpkin, such that the stone would not fall out when submerged, one can use this contraption to draw water on Shabbat. In such a case the stone is part of the vessel and it is not muktzeh. However, if the stone is not attached well then one can’t use it, just as one cannot pick up other non-useful stones on Shabbat. Such stones are muktzeh because they have no practical use.", + "A vine-branch tied to a pitcher: one may draw [water] with it on Shabbat. The pitcher was attached to a vine in order to lower it down into the well. The mishnah rules that one may use such a contraption on Shabbat and that the vine is not muktzeh. Were the vine not to have a practical use, it would be muktzeh." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses window-shutters. These shutters were not always attached to the frame of the house as they are today. Rather, they were sometimes attached and sometimes totally detached.", + "A window-shutter: Rabbi Eliezer says: when it is connected and suspended, one may close [the window] with it; if not, one may not close [the window] with it. But the sages say: in both cases one may close [the window] with it. According to Rabbi Eliezer, it is permitted to close the window with the shutter only if the shutter is already connected to the frame of the house. If it is not connected, then closing the window with it would be prohibited because it is similar to “building.” In essence by closing the window it is as if he is adding another plank to the structure of the house. However, if the shutter is attached and suspended from the house, then it is already part of the house and closing it is no different from closing the door of a house, which is of course permitted. The sages say that it is permitted to close the window whether or not the shutter is attached to the house. It is not considered “building” because the shutter is not permanently going to become part of the house." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with carrying lids on Shabbat.", + "All lids of utensils which have a handle may be carried on Shabbat. Since the lids have handles, they may be carried on Shabbat independent of the vessels which they cover. Indeed, they themselves are considered vessels/utensils, since they have handles.", + "Rabbi Yose said: in reference to what is that said? In the case of lids which cover the ground, but lids of vessels may in any case be carried on Shabbat. Rabbi Yose limits the application of the rule stated above. That rule applies only to lids used to cover holes in the ground. These may only be carried on Shabbat if they have handles. If they don’t have handles, it looks like one is using them to permanently cover a hole in the ground, in which case this would be too similar to “building.” If they have handles, then it is clear that they will not be used to permanently cover the hole. However, lids of vessels (i.e. pots and pans) may be carried whether or not they have handles. It is clear that such lids are only temporary and that they are part of the vessel which they cover." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with clearing food away in order to make room for other things. Even though it is permitted to carry foods (both those for animals and those for people), the sages did not permit this if it was a lot of trouble to do so. Under certain circumstances, it was permitted even if moving the food required a lot of work.", + "One may clear away even four or five baskets of straw or produce to make room for guests or on account of the neglect of the study hall, but not the storehouse. Under normal circumstances, it would be forbidden to move large portions of straw and produce on Shabbat. Moving large baskets is a lot of work, and so to preserve the character of Shabbat as a day of rest, the sages said that this was forbidden. Therefore, moving baskets out of a storehouse is forbidden. However, if moving baskets is done in order to make room for guests or in order to clear out the study hall so that people can sit and learn, it is permitted. These are two important mitzvot (welcoming guests and studying Torah) and therefore the sages allowed one to do things for their sake that would normally be prohibited.", + "One may clear away pure terumah, doubtfully tithed produce, the first tithe whose terumah has been separated, redeemed second tithe and sanctified things, and dry lupinus, because it is food for goats. But [one may] not [clear away] untithed produce, first tithe whose terumah has not been taken, unredeemed second tithe and sanctified things, luf or mustard. Rabbi Shimon b. Gamaliel permits [it] in the case of luf, because it is food for ravens. The mishnah now deals with which foods one is allowed to move and which foods one is not allowed to move on Shabbat. The first list is mostly of foods that may be eaten on Shabbat, even if not everyone can eat them. Pure terumah may be eaten by priests, so it may be carried even by Israelites. In contrast, impure terumah cannot be eaten by anyone and therefore it cannot be carried. Doubtfully-tithed produce may be eaten by poor people. The first tithe is eaten by Levites, but only once terumah has been separated from it. Second tithe and sanctified things are redeemed with money and then one brings the money to Jerusalem and uses it there. The produce and sanctified things then become non-sacred and one may eat them, hence they can be carried. Lupinus is a type of bean and since it is eaten by goats, it may be carried on Shabbat. [Note that printed editions of the mishnah state that lupinus is eaten by poor people. Albeck says that this is a mistake.] The second list is of things which may not be eaten on Shabbat and hence cannot be carried. These include most of the opposites to the previous list. Note, terumah and tithes may not be separated on Shabbat such that un-tithed produce cannot be “fixed” by tithing it until after Shabbat. Mustard seed is not eaten until it is processed. Since it can’t be processed on Shabbat, the raw seeds cannot be carried either [you may carry your Grey Poupon as long as it has a heksher ☺. “Luf” is a type of onion. According to the first opinion, it is not eaten it can’t be carried on Shabbat. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel disagrees and holds that since luf is eaten by ravens, it is food and can be carried on Shabbat. The Talmud explains that rich people and kings would raise ravens and give them luf to eat. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says that all Jews are considered to be like kings and therefore all Jews can carry luf on Shabbat. The other sages hold that since people don’t normally raise ravens, food for ravens cannot be carried on Shabbat." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe mishnah begins by discussing things which were prepared to be given as fodder to animals. The remainder of the mishnah deals with other laws concerning animals on Shabbat.", + "Bundles of straw, bundles of twigs, or bundles of young shoots, if they were prepared as animal food, they may be carried; if not, they may not be carried. It is permissible to carry animal food on Shabbat, so if these bundles of various things were prepared for this purpose they may be carried. However, if they weren’t specifically prepared to be animal food then we can assume that they were prepared to be used in lighting a stove or oven, an act prohibited on Shabbat. Therefore, they may not be carried for they are muktzeh.", + "One may overturn a basket before young birds, so that they will get up and then get down. The young birds themselves are muktzeh since there is nothing that one can do with them on Shabbat. However, the mishnah holds that one may nevertheless move a basket in front of them so that they will get up onto the basket and then get off of it.", + "A chicken which has run away, they may push her until she re-enters. Again, it is forbidden to hold the chicken itself because it is muktzeh. However, if it runs away one may push it back to its place. This is assumedly allowed to prevent the loss of the chicken, just as activities normally prohibited on Shabbat were allowed to prevent loss of property from fire.", + "One may make calves and foals walk in the public domain. And a woman may make her son walk. Rabbi Judah says: when is this so? If he lifts one [foot] and places [another] down; but if he drags them it is forbidden. One can help small animals or toddlers walk around on Shabbat and we need not be concerned that the mother or the one helping the animal will pick the animal up, which is forbidden. Rabbi Judah limits this permission to a child who can at least walk a little bit on his own. But if the child is only “dragging its feet”, then one can’t help it walk on Shabbat, lest one come to pick it up and thereby carry it." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nMost of this mishnah discusses assisting an animal and a woman in giving birth on Shabbat and festivals. The final clause begins to discuss circumcision, a topic which will more fully be covered in chapter nineteen.", + "One may not deliver an animal [in giving birth] on a festival, but one may assist it. It is forbidden for a Jew to deliver an animal’s newborn on a festival, because this is considered to be too much work for a Jew to do on a festival. Although it may not violate any specific prohibited labor (no pun intended) it is too great of a labor (now, pun intended) to be permitted on a festival or on Shabbat. By “delivering”, the Mishnah means to put one’s hand into the womb and remove the newborn. However, one may assist the animal in giving birth by receiving it as it comes out so that it doesn’t just fall to the floor. Since this is a lesser amount of work, it is permitted. This may only be done on the festival; on Shabbat even assisting the animal is forbidden.", + "One may deliver a woman [in giving birth] on Shabbat, summon a midwife for her from place to place, desecrate Shabbat on her account, and tie up the umbilical cord. Rabbi Yose says: one may cut it too. When it comes to aiding a woman in delivering her baby, any work is permitted on festivals and on Shabbat, even activities which are not directly connected to the birth. A midwife may be summoned from a far, even if this means she must travel to get there. Shabbat may be in all ways desecrated because the woman’s health is in danger and according to halakhah saving a life supersedes the laws of Shabbat. There is a debate about whether or not the umbilical cord may be cut. The first opinion holds that it may not be cut, since there is no real danger in leaving it connected until the end of Shabbat. Rabbi Yose holds that it may be cut, and the halakhah rules in accordance with his opinion.", + "And all the requirements of circumcision may be done on Shabbat. Anything connected with circumcision may be done on Shabbat. Leviticus 12:3 states that the child shall be circumcised on the eighth day and the rabbis read this to mean that he must be circumcised even if the eighth day falls on Shabbat. We will learn more about circumcision on Shabbat in the proceeding chapter." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses desecrating Shabbat in order to circumcise a child on Shabbat. While the tannaim do not debate that the circumcision itself is done on Shabbat, the question is what preparations for the circumcision may be done.", + "Rabbi Eliezer says: if one did not bring an instrument [with which to circumcise] on the eve of Shabbat, he must bring it on Shabbat uncovered; but in [times of] danger he hides it on the testimony of witnesses. Obviously, a knife is needed to perform the circumcision. According to Rabbi Eliezer, if one forgot to bring the knife he may bring it on Shabbat eve, even if this entails violating the prohibition of carrying on Shabbat. In normal times, the knife should be carried openly so that people will learn that the Shabbat is violated in order to perform the circumcision on Shabbat. However, in a time when the Roman authorities forbade circumcision (the Hadrianic persecutions, leading up to and following the Bar Kochba revolt) the knife should be hidden so as to avoid danger. The witnesses are needed to testify that the reason that he is carrying is only in order to perform a circumcision. In other words, they are for his protection.", + "Rabbi Eliezer said further: one may cut wood to make charcoal to make an iron instrument. Rabbi Eliezer goes to an even greater extreme. Even if one does not have any knife with which to circumcise, one may cut down wood to heat up iron to make a knife. It seems unlikely that one would actually find oneself in such a situation. Rabbi Eliezer’s statement is meant to have polemical value anything may be done so that the circumcision may be carried out on Shabbat.", + "Rabbi Akiva stated a general principle: any [manner of] work which could be performed on the eve of Shabbat does not supersede Shabbat; but that which could not be performed on the eve of Shabbat does supersede Shabbat. Rabbi Akiva disagrees with Rabbi Eliezer and holds that only activities that cannot be performed before Shabbat can be done on Shabbat itself. This would include the circumcision itself, as we shall learn in tomorrow’s mishnah. However, preparatory activities such as making the knife and carrying it to where the circumcision will be performed must be performed before Shabbat begins. The reason that Rabbi Akiva’s statement is phrased as a general rule is that it applies to several other halakhot as well (see Pesahim 6:2 and Menahot 11:3)." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah lists what aspects of circumcision may be performed on Shabbat according to Rabbi Akiva.", + "They may perform all the necessities of circumcision on Shabbat: circumcising, uncovering [the corona], sucking [the wound], and placing a compress and cumin upon [the wound]. The main necessities for performing the actual circumcision may all be performed on Shabbat, since these obviously cannot be performed prior to Shabbat. This includes the two main parts of the circumcision itself the cut and the tearing of the membrane which covers the corona. “Sucking the wound” was believed to have certain health benefits and hence was considered to be an essential part of the circumcision. Indeed the Talmud states that any mohel who doesn’t suck the wound is to be removed from his job. In our day, due to our knowledge of orally transmitted diseases, this part of the ritual has become very controversial. Some groups do not do this at all, claiming that there is no health benefit and that even in the Talmud it was not considered to be as essential as the “cutting and tearing”. Since the 19th century some mohels have been using various other contraptions to do the sucking, including a sponge and a glass tube. Some ultraorthodox groups still suck by direct contact with the mouth. The compress and cumin mixture were placed on the wound to aid in the healing. I do not know of any group that still uses cumin although compresses are still used by all.", + "If one did not grind [the cumin] on the eve of Shabbat, he may chew [it] with his teeth and apply [it to the wound]. On Shabbat itself, since grinding is a forbidden labor, it would be forbidden to grind the cumin in order to put it on the wound. If he hasn’t prepared the cumin before Shabbat while he may not grind it, he may chew it up in his mouth and then put it on the wound. Again, they didn’t know about germs in the days of the Talmud.", + "If he did not beat up wine and oil on the eve of Shabbat, he should apply each separately. They would also put a mixture of wine and oil on the wound. This mixture was beaten before Shabbat. If he hadn’t prepared the wine and oil before Shabbat, he cannot beat them on Shabbat but he may place the wine and oil in a bowl without vigorously beating them and then put them together on the wound.", + "They may not make a cloak for it in the first place, but he may wrap a rag about it. They would also make a special bandage called by the Mishnah a “cloak” which would be used to cover the head of the penis. This “cloak” should not be made on Shabbat. So if he didn’t make it before Shabbat, what he may do is temporarily wrap a small rag around the penis.", + "If this was not prepared from the eve of Shabbat, he may wind it about his finger and bring it, and even from another courtyard. If he didn’t bring the small rag to the place of the circumcision before Shabbat, he may not simply carry it, for that would be an outright violation of Shabbat. However, he may wrap the rag around his finger and carry it. This way it is as if he is wearing the rag (which is permitted) and not just carrying it. The mishnah allows it to be carried even from another courtyard. The commentators debate whether this implies that it also may be carried through the public domain." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first part of this mishnah discusses bathing the child on Shabbat before and after his circumcision. The second part of the mishnah deals with circumcision of a child on Shabbat if something about his status is doubtful.", + "They bathe the infant both before and after the circumcision, and sprinkle [warm water] over him by hand but not with a vessel. It is permitted to bathe the infant with hot water on Shabbat both before and after the circumcision. The mishnah now proceeds to explain that this bathing is not a full bath as is usually done when it is not Shabbat but rather just sprinkling him with water by hand. Some commentators explain that before he is circumcised the hot water may not be heated on Shabbat, but that after he is circumcised, when the bath is more crucial for his recovery, the water may be heated even on Shabbat.", + "R. Elazar ben Azaryah says: they may bathe an infant on the third day [of circumcision] which falls on the Shabbat, as it is said, “And it came to pass on the third day, when they were sore” (Genesis 34:25). Rabbi Elazar ben Azaryah disagrees with the previous opinion in two ways. First of all, he holds that the child may be bathed in a normal manner and not just by sprinkling on him. Secondly, the child may be bathed even if Shabbat falls on the third day after his circumcision, and not just on the day of the circumcision itself. This Rabbi Elazar ben Azaryah learns from the story of Shechem’s circumcision where we see that he and the people from his city were still hurting on the third day. Talmudic commentators debate whether this means that the infant may be bathed up until the third day, and also on the first and second day after the circumcision, or just the third day, but not the first two days. It seems to me that the first position is more reasonable. According to the latter position we would have to say that for some reason the pain is worse on the third day.", + "For one who about whom it is doubtful, and a hermaphrodite, they may not desecrate Shabbat But Rabbi Judah permits [it] in the case of a hermaphrodite. If a child is born at twilight it is considered doubtful whether he was born on the previous day or on the following day. Such a child can never be circumcised on Shabbat. For instance, let’s say he was born on twilight between Friday and Shabbat. His circumcision will end up being on Sunday. It can’t be on Friday, lest he was born on Shabbat and Friday is only the seventh day. It can’t be on Shabbat lest he was born on Friday and Shabbat would be the ninth day. Circumcision overrides the rules of Shabbat only if it is on the eighth day. Therefore the circumcision is pushed off until Sunday (we shall learn more about this below in mishnah five.) I should note that others explain the mishnah differently. This explanation goes according to Albeck. A hermaphrodite has signs of being both male and female. He is circumcised but his circumcision cannot take place on Shabbat. This is because we are not sure of his halakhic status as male and hence it could be that he doesn’t really need to be circumcised. His circumcision is “doubtful” and therefore it doesn’t override Shabbat. Rabbi Judah considers a hermaphrodite to be a male and therefore his circumcision overrides Shabbat." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses a case where there are two infants, one who should be circumcised on Shabbat and the other who should not be circumcised on Shabbat. The question is what happens if the babies get switched and someone circumcises on Shabbat the one who should have been circumcised on a different day.", + "If a man has two infants, one to circumcise after Shabbat and the other to circumcise on Shabbat, and he forgets and circumcises the one who should be circumcised after Shabbat on the Shabbat, he is liable. In the first case the mohel (the circumciser) ends up circumcising a baby on Shabbat who should have been circumcised after Shabbat. In other words, he desecrated Shabbat to circumcise a boy who had not yet reached his eighth day. This child was not yet obligated to be circumcised. Hence the circumciser is liable to bring a sin-offering for accidentally desecrating Shabbat.", + "[If he has] one to circumcise on the eve of Shabbat and another to circumcise on Shabbat, and he forgets and circumcises the one who should be circumcised on the eve of Shabbat on Shabbat: Rabbi Eliezer holds [him] liable to a sin-offering, but Rabbi Joshua exempts [him]. In this case it turns out that he circumcised a boy on Shabbat who should have been circumcised on Friday. Rabbi Eliezer maintains that he is still liable since he did, after all, circumcise on Shabbat in a case where he should not have done so. Only circumcision on the eighth day overrides Shabbat (this we learned in yesterday’s mishnah and we will learn again in tomorrow’s mishnah). Rabbi Joshua holds that since the child had already passed his eighth day and had therefore become obligated to be circumcised, the circumciser has fulfilled the commandment and is not liable. Note that Rabbi Joshua agrees that it is forbidden to circumcise a child on Shabbat on any other day but the eighth day. He only holds that if someone mistakenly did so to a child who was already obligated for circumcision, he is not liable." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nAs we have already mentioned, circumcision is done on Shabbat only if it is done on the eighth day. If it is done on any other day besides the eighth, then the circumcision must wait until after Shabbat. Our mishnah shows that sometimes this will delay the circumcision by several days.", + "An infant is circumcised on the eighth, ninth, tenth, eleventh, and twelfth [days], neither before nor later. How so?
In the normal situation, on the eighth. Normally, a child is circumcised on the eighth day.", + "If he is born at twilight, on the ninth; Twilight is a halakhically doubtful time we don’t know whether to consider it still the previous day or the day after. Therefore, if a boy is born at twilight, he is circumcised on what might be the ninth day. In other words we act as if he was born on the next day.", + "At twilight on the eve of Shabbat, on the tenth. If he is born on twilight on the eve of Shabbat, he can’t be circumcised on Shabbat because only circumcision on the eighth day overrides Shabbat, and Shabbat may be the ninth day. Therefore he is circumcised on Sunday, the tenth day.", + "If a festival follows Shabbat, on the eleventh. If Sunday is a festival, we must delay his circumcision until the eleventh day. Just as circumcision does not override Shabbat unless it is the eighth day, so too it does not override a festival unless it is on the eighth day.", + "If the two days of Rosh Hashanah [follow Shabbat], on the twelfth. Finally, if the two days of Rosh Hashanah follow Shabbat, then he will be circumcised on the twelfth day. We should note that even in the land of Israel Rosh Hashanah was observed for two days. In the Diaspora the same would hold true for the second day of festivals.", + "An infant who is sick is not circumcised until he recovers. Healthy infants can be circumcised on the eighth through twelfth days, but sick infants must wait until they recover from their illness to be circumcised. Their health overrides their need to be circumcised." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah talks about some of the physical aspects of circumcision.", + "These are the shreds which invalidate circumcision: flesh that covers the greater part of the corona; and he may not eat terumah. If there are little pieces of skin left after the foreskin was circumcised, they must be removed if they cover the greater part of the corona. If they are not removed the child is not considered circumcised and if he is a priest, he may not eat terumah, just as any non-circumcised priest may not eat terumah.", + "And if he is chubby, he must repair it for appearance sake. If the circumcision was done correctly, but due to the child’s chubby appearance it looks as if he was not circumcised, the mohel should repair the circumcision so that it looks like he was circumcised. Otherwise people will say that the child was not circumcised.", + "If one circumcises but does not uncover the circumcision, it is as though he has not circumcised. As we learned in mishnah two, an essential part of the circumcision is the tearing of the membrane underneath the corona. If this is not done, the circumcision is invalid. Note, that other aspects of the circumcision are less essential, including the sucking. The mishnah does not say that if the mohel did not suck the wound, the circumcision is invalid. This left room for some authorities to say that we don’t need to suck the wound, or at least that it need not be sucked through direct mouth to mouth contact." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with pouring wine through a strainer on festivals and Shabbat. They would suspend or sort of stretch the strainer over the mouth of a vessel and the unstrained wine would be poured through it.\nIn order to understand the mishnah we must remember that on festivals food may be prepared, even if this requires a labor normally prohibited such as slaughtering an animal or cooking a dish. The issue discussed here is can one prepare vessels with which to prepare food if these vessels could have been done prepared before the festival.\nOn Shabbat there are two issues involved in this mishnah: 1) the preparation of food; 2) the making of a vessel.", + "R. Eliezer says: one may suspend a strainer on festivals, and pour [wine] through a suspended [strainer] on Shabbat. According to Rabbi Eliezer, even though she could have set up the strainer the day before the festival, since the strainer is set up in order to prepare food, which is permitted on festivals, she may also suspend it on top of the vessel on the festival itself. She obviously may pour wine through it. On Shabbat, she cannot suspend the strainer for this is considered similar to making a tent, because she is placing the strainer on top of the vessel. However, Rabbi Eliezer holds that it is permitted to pour the wine through the strainer if it is already suspended and this is not considered an act of “selecting” (see 7:2). “Selecting” is separating the pebbles from the kernels and this is not similar enough to be forbidden.", + "But the sages say: one may not suspend a strainer on festivals, nor pour [wine] through a suspended [strainer] on Shabbat, but one may pour [it] through a suspended [strainer] on festivals. The sages disagree with Rabbi Eliezer on both issues. Since she could have prepared the strainer before the festival, it is forbidden to do so on the festival itself. This is the same opinion as Rabbi Akiva’s in 19:1 vessels which can be prepared before Shabbat or a festival cannot be prepared on Shabbat or a festival. Secondly, the sages hold that pouring the wine over the strainer is an act similar enough to “selecting” that it is prohibited on Shabbat. This is only permitted on festivals since on festivals food preparation is permitted." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to deal with straining things on Shabbat.", + "One may pour water over lees in order to clarify them; There are two explanations for this section. The first is that the lees of the wine are on the bottom of the strainer and that one may pour water over them so that the wine will flow through the strainer. While pouring the unfilterd wine over the strainer was forbidden, this is permitted. The second explanation is that the lees are on the bottom of a jug. One may pour water into the jug so that the lees will mix with the water and make a weak wine mixture.", + "and one may strain wine through cloths and through a basket made of palm twigs; This section allows wine to be passed through either a special cloth or basket to help clarify it. The question which we must ask is what makes this different from the previous mishnah where the sages were more stringent regarding pouring wine through a strainer? According to some commentators, this cloth or basket was already set up before Shabbat. Furthermore, there is no problem of “selecting” here because this wine is drinkable even if it isn’t passed through these secondary strainers. Others explain that this is permitted because it is not the usual way of straining and things are often more permissible if they are done differently on Shabbat.", + "and one may place an egg in a mustard strainer; This refers to breaking an egg into a strainer which has mustard already in it. This is done so that the mustard will receive some of the color from the egg. It is not a prohibited act of “selecting” because even though the yoke will remain in the strainer, it is still edible. “Selecting” refers to taking waste away from edible parts and not separating a food into two different edible parts.", + "and one may make anumlin on Shabbat. Rabbi Judah says: on Shabbat [it may only be made] in a cup; on festivals, in a jug; and on the intermediate days of festivals in a barrel. Rabbi Zadok says: it all depends on the [number of] guests. “Anumlin” is a mixture of wine, honey and pepper. This mixture can be made on Shabbat because there is no prohibited labor involved in preparing it. However, the rabbis debate how much can be made. According to Rabbi Judah, on Shabbat she can prepare only a cup’s worth at a time, because more than that is considered to be too much labor to do on Shabbat. On a festival she can make slightly more, a jug’s worth and on the intermediate days of the festival, when work is most permitted, she can make a barrel’s worth. For Rabbi Judah the operative criterion is how much work is involved. In contrast, for Rabbi Zadok the operative criterion is how many guests are in attendance. No matter what the day, she can only make enough anumlin for the guests who are there. She may not prepare anything to be used at some later date." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe mishnah deals with food preparations that may not be done in a normal manner on Shabbat but may be performed by doing them slightly differently.", + "One may not soak hiltith in warm water, but he may put it into vinegar. Hiltith is an herb which was used both as a spice and as medicine. It is forbidden to soak it in warm water on Shabbat, but one may put it in vinegar and dip her food in it. The prohibition is explained in either of two ways: 1) it looks like something that is only done during the week; 2) it is medicinal and therefore prohibited.", + "And one may not soak leeks, nor rub them, but he may put them into a sieve or a basket. Above in 1:5 Bet Hillel allowed one to begin soaking leeks before Shabbat and leave them to soak over Shabbat. Here we see that all agree that they may not be soaked on Shabbat itself, and according to commentators, even putting water over them is prohibited. The prohibition is “separating” putting water over them causes the waste parts to float and separate from the leeks. Similarly, they may not be rubbed in order to remove the inedible parts. This is prohibited under the category of “threshing” separating the wheat from the chaff. However, one may put them into a sieve or basket, even though this also will sometimes cause the separation of the inedible parts. The difference is that in this case these parts separate on their own, and hence she has not performed a forbidden act.", + "One may not sift straw through a sieve, nor put it on a high place, for the chaff to drop down, but one may take it up in a sieve and put it into the trough. One may not sift stubble through a sieve; sifting is one of the 39 prohibited labors listed in 7:2. Even though that mishnah is dealing with separating the wheat from the chaff, and here we are dealing with separating straw for an animal from dirt, it is still essentially the same activity. One also may not put the stubble in a high place so that the dirt blows away, because this is “separating”. However, one may pick up a bunch of straw with a sieve and put it in front of an animal’s trough, even though this may also cause the dirt to separate. The key difference is that this is not the direct intention of the activity." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses cleaning out a trough for an animal on Shabbat. The mishnah is placed here due to the end of yesterday’s mishnah which also discussed a trough.", + "One may rake out [the trough] for a stall ox, and move [the remnants] aside for the sake of a grazing [ox], the words of Rabbi Dosa. But the sages prohibit it. One may sweep out the trough of the remnants that are left over after the a previous feeding so that the old food the ox would not eat before doesn’t become mixed with the food given to it in the current feeding. A “stall ox” is one that is being fattened up by giving it high quality food. Since it is rather “fussy”, Rabbi Dosa allows its trough to be cleaned out on Shabbat. A “grazing” ox is less fussy and used to dirtier food and hence one may not completely rake out the trough on its behalf. However, one may move the remnants to the side so that they don’t get mixed up with the next feeding. The sages prohibit both of these things because of sweeping and raking on Shabbat. The problem is that by sweeping or raking one may come to fill up a hole, an activity prohibited on Shabbat.", + "One may take [food] from one animal and place it before another animal on Shabbat. One may move food from one trough to another on Shabbat. We might have thought that this is prohibited because it is carrying without purpose. However, since one animal will generally eat food which has already been put in front of another animal, this is not considered “carrying without a purpose” and it is permitted." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first section of this mishnah discusses clearing things off one’s bed in order to sleep on it. The second section deals with removing clothes from a “clothes press.” A “clothes press” was made by placing a piece of clothing between two boards and then fastening them together.", + "The straw [lying] upon a bed one may not move it with his hand, but he may move it with his body. Straw is usually used for lighting a stove and hence it is muktzeh. If this straw is on her bed she can’t just remove it with her hand. However, she may move the bed with her body and thereby cause the straw to fall off. “Carrying” with the side of one’s body is not considered carrying and therefore this is permitted.", + "But if it is animal feed, or a pillow or a sheet was upon it [on the eve of Shabbat], he may move it with his hand. If the straw had been designated to serve as animal feed, then it is not muktzeh and she may remove it by hand. We see here that something is defined to be that which it is intended to be used for if it is intended to be used for something permitted on Shabbat, then it is not muktzeh. Furthermore, if she set the bed aside for sleeping (as opposed to using it to store things) by placing on it a pillow or sheet, then she may move the straw even though it was set aside to light a fire. It was only forbidden if it was unclear whether the bed was going to be used for storage or for sleeping.", + "A householder’s clothes press one may undo it, but not force it down. But a launderer’s [press] one may not touch it. Rabbi Judah says: if it was undone before Shabbat, one may unfasten the whole and remove it. A “householder’s clothes press” is not an item used by a professional. Therefore, one may undo it, meaning take the clothes out, but not put the clothes in. Putting clothes in the clothes press is considering “fixing” them, and “fixing” is forbidden on Shabbat. A launderer’s press is a professional piece of equipment. Hence one may not touch it at all on Shabbat. This is forbidden because of “tearing down” by taking it apart it is as if she is “tearing down.” Rabbi Judah, however, is more lenient. If the launderer’s press was already somewhat unfastened before Shabbat, she may take the rest of the press apart and take the clothes out. Since it was already not fully closed up, this is not considered “tearing down.”" + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with picking up something that is muktzeh (forbidden to be touched on Shabbat) with something which a person is allowed to carry on Shabbat.", + "A man may pick up his son while he has a stone in his hand or a basket with a stone in it. One can carry a child on Shabbat; a child is not “muktzeh.” However, the stone which the child is holding is muktzeh (because there is no purpose to it on Shabbat). The mishnah teaches that the parent can pick up the child even though she has a stone in her hand. Similarly, one can pick up a basket (not muktzeh) with a stone in it, even though the stone is muktzeh.", + "And one may carry impure terumah together with pure [terumah] or with non-sacred produce. Impure terumah cannot be eaten and therefore it can’t be used on Shabbat. This makes it muktzeh. Nevertheless, if the impure terumah is in the same container as either pure terumah or non-sacred produce (hullin), both of which can be used on Shabbat, then it may be carried. The Talmud explains that this is so only if the pure terumah cannot be taken off the top. If however, the pure terumah can be removed without touching the impure terumah then the impure terumah should not be touched.", + "Rabbi Judah said: one may also remove the mixture [of terumah in non-sacred produce] when one [part is neutralized] in a hundred [parts]. If terumah becomes mixed with non-terumah (hullin) then the whole mixture takes on the status of terumah and it may only be eaten by priests. However, if there are more than one hundred parts hullin to one part terumah than one may take up one part out of the one hundred and one parts, give that part to terumah and the remainder reverts to being hullin, edible by non-priests. Rabbi Judah teaches that on Shabbat one can carry a mixture of one part terumah and one hundred parts hullin and even take out the one part on Shabbat in order to make it edible by non-priests." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with retrieving things that have on them something that is muktzeh.", + "If a stone is on the mouth of a cask [of wine], one tilts it to its side and it falls off. She can’t just pick up the stone because it is muktzeh. However, she can tilt the cask of wine and thereby cause the stone to fall off.", + "If it [the cask] is [standing] among [other] casks, he lifts it up, tilts it on its side, and it falls off. In this case she is afraid that if she tilts the cask the stone may fall off and break the other cask. Alternatively, there may not be room to tilt the cask to the side. In such a case she can pick the cask up and then let the stone fall off.", + "If money is lying on a cushion, one shakes the cushion, and it falls off. Money is muktzeh since it cannot be used on Shabbat. As an aside, the reason that it can’t be used on Shabbat is lest one write a receipt or an account of the money spent. To move the money one merely tilts the cushion and the money falls off. Again, we see that if something which is “muktzeh” rests on something that is not muktzeh, the bottom item may be moved to get the muktzeh item to fall off.", + "If snot is on it, one wipes it off with a rag; “Snot” may alternately be translated as “feces”, or some other type of disgusting material. This “snot” is on a cushion which she wants to use. To clean it off she must wipe it with a rag. She can’t pour water over it because this is prohibited due to “laundering.”", + "If it is on leather, one pours water over it until it disappears. However, if the snot is on leather, she may pour water over it, because putting water over leather is not considered “laundering”. However, to actually launder the leather is prohibited." + ], + [ + "Bet Shammai says: one may remove bones and nutshells from the table; But Beth Hillel says: one must remove the whole board and shake it off.
One may remove from the table crumbs less than the size of an olive and the husks of beans and lentils, because they are food for animals.
A sponge, if it has a handle, one may wipe [the board] with it;
If not, one may not wipe [the board] with it.
The sages say: in either case it may be handled on Shabbat and it is not susceptible to defilement.
This mishnah deals with clearing the table at the end of a meal on Shabbat.
Section one: Bet Shammai does not hold that the bones and nutshells left over on the table after the meal are muktzeh even though they have no use. Hence one may remove them. Bet Hillel disagrees and holds that these are muktzeh. Hence, if she wishes to remove them, she must remove the board from the table (a sort of personal tray placed in front of one or several diners) and shake it off. In the Talmud they bring a source according to which these two opinions should be reversed, Bet Hillel holding the more lenient opinion and Bet Shammai the stricter one.
Section two: Animal food is not muktzeh. Since crumbs and husks of beans and lentils may be used for animal food, they are not muktzeh and it is permitted to remove them from the table on Shabbat.
Section three: This section discusses the problem of sponges. Squeezing water or liquids out of something is prohibited. Its prohibition is derived from the prohibited labor of “laundering”, since squeezing water out of clothes is part of the laundering process. One can’t use a sponge that does not have a handle because by doing so one might squeeze water from the sponge.
The sages say that whether or not it has a handle it may be carried on Shabbat because it is a vessel and all vessels may be carried on Shabbat. However, it is not the type of vessel that can receive impurity.
Some manuscripts read differently in the concluding clause. Some read, “and the sages say: in any case he may use it for wiping.” According to this version, the sages disagree with the previous opinion, according to which wiping with a sponge without a handle is forbidden. Other versions skip the words “and the sages say” and rather read the final point as a point of agreement between all. All agree that even though you can’t use the sponge to wipe things, it still may be carried." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThe first section of this mishnah deals with a cask of wine which broke on Shabbat and the owner wishes to save as much wine as possible.\nThe remainder of the mishnah discusses the prohibition of squeezing juice or other liquids out of something.", + "A cask [of wine] which was broken, one may save from it the requirements for three meals. And he [the owner] may say to others, “come and save for yourselves”, provided that it is not sponged up. Above in 16:2 the mishnah taught that one can rescue from a fire food sufficient for three meals, the standard number of meals eaten on Shabbat. In our explanation there we explained that the reason that a person was not allowed to rescue more than that was lest she come to extinguish the fire. However, here it is less clear what the concern is. The commentators explain that if they let her rescue more than three meals she may carry them in the public domain. Alternatively, she may come to fix the casket. An alternative explanation which I would suggest is that more than three meals is muktzeh since it won’t be eaten on Shabbat. As above, she is allowed to say to other people, “come save the wine for yourselves.” However, no one is allowed to rescue the wine by sponging it up. The fear is that if they sponge it up they may squeeze the sponge out afterwards, and as we have already learned and will continue to learn below, squeezing liquids out of something is prohibited.", + "One may not squeeze fruit in order to get out their juices, and if they exude of their own accord they are prohibited. Rabbi Judah says: if [the fruit is meant] to be food, that which exudes from it is permitted, but if [is meant to be] juice, that which exudes from it is prohibited. Squeezing juice out of fruit is considered to be a prohibited labor derived from the prohibited labor of “threshing”. Just as “threshing” separates the desirable wheat from the undesirable chaff, so too squeezing separates the juice from the fruit. The mishnah teaches that even if the juice exudes without being squeezed by a person. The fear is that if this juice is allowed people will become confused and think it is permitted to actually squeeze the juice out. Rabbi Judah distinguishes between fruit that is intended to be eaten and fruit that is intended to be used for juice. If the juice exudes from fruit which is intended to be eaten, then it is permitted because a person doesn’t want the juice to come out of this fruit. A person won’t come to squeeze such a fruit. However, if the fruit is intended for juice then Rabbi Judah too is strict and rules that even the juice that exudes is forbidden.", + "Honeycombs which crushed on the eve of Shabbat and it [the honey] exudes on its own, it is forbidden; But Rabbi Eleazar permits it. In this section a person has crushed honeycombs before Shabbat in order to start the process of extracting the honey from them. If honey exudes from them on Shabbat, such honey may not be eaten. Again the fear is that if they permit such honey people will think that the honeycombs may be squeezed on Shabbat itself. Rabbi Elazar is not concerned with such a possibility and hence he allows this honey to be eaten on Shabbat." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with soaking food in hot water on Shabbat.", + "Whatever was put into hot water before Shabbat, may be soaked in hot water on Shabbat; Things that are already cooked cannot be again “cooked”, since the definition of “cooking” is using heat to turn something raw into something not raw. Therefore, if something was already cooked before Shabbat, it can be put back in hot water on Shabbat without this being considered “cooking.” In other words, “there is no cooking something that has already been cooked.”", + "But whatever was not put into hot water before Shabbat may [only] be rinsed with hot water on Shabbat, except old salted fish, small salted fish, and Spanish colius, because their rinsing completes their preparation. If it was not cooked in hot water before Shabbat, then it may not be soaked in hot water on Shabbat, because that would be cooking. However, it still may be rinsed in hot water because rinsing is generally not considered to be cooking. The mishnah lists a few exceptions to this rule. These are all small fish which have thin skins and can be cooked by merely rinsing them in hot water. Since “their rinsing completes their preparation” they may not even be rinsed in hot water." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah teaches that one may break open a container to get food out of it, but one may not break open the container in such a way that the container becomes a vessel. Making a vessel is prohibited on Shabbat but ruining vessels is permitted, so long as there is a purpose to ruining them, like getting the food out.", + "A man may break open a cask in order to eat dried figs from it, provided that he does not intend to make the cask into a vessel. Since breaking the ceramic cask ruins it, she may break it open in order to get out the figs (or whatever else may be inside). However, she may not break it open and leave a nice opening in such a way that the cask becomes a vessel.", + "And one may not perforate the stopper of a cask, the words of Rabbi Judah. But the sages permit it. Rabbi Judah holds that one may not perforate the ceramic stopper which is on the top of a cask because that is considered making a vessel. What she should do is remove the stopper altogether. The sages allow it because this is not a normal way of making a vessel.", + "And one may not pierce it at its side; All agree that one cannot pierce it at its side. In the Talmud there is a debate whether this refers to the side of the cask or the side of the stopper.", + "And if it is already perforated one may not place wax upon it, because he smoothes it out. Rabbi Judah said: a case came before Rabbi Yohanan ben Zakkai in Arav and he said, “I fear [that he may be liable] to a sin-offering.” If the cask/stopper is already perforated she may not spread wax upon it in order to close it up. The problem is that when she pours wax she will also need to smooth it out. The rabbis thought that smoothing out wax was like “erasing” which is prohibited. Rabbi Judah relates a case where a person who perforated a cask/stopper at its side came in front of R. Yohanan ben Zakai and R. Yohanan said that he might be obligated to bring a sin-offering for having unwittingly transgressed Shabbat." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first half of this mishnah deals with preserving the coolness or heat of cooked dishes or water. The second half deals with someone whose clothes got wet and how she may dry them without transgressing the prohibition of squeezing out the water.", + "One may place a cooked dish in a pit for it to be guarded; One can put a cooked dish into the ground in order to protect it from the heat (the ground will keep the dish cool). The Talmud explains that the point of the mishnah is to teach us that we are not concerned lest she come to fill a hole in the ground, an activity which would be prohibited on Shabbat.", + "And good water into foul water for it to be cooled; or cold water in the sun for it to be heated. If one has a pitcher of good warm water and a larger container (tub, perhaps) of warm foul water, one may place the pitcher in the tub so that the good water will cool off. It is obvious that this is permitted since this isn’t in any way cooking. The mishnah teaches the first section to introduce the next clause in which we learn that one can place a pitcher of cool water in the sun in order for the water to warm up. Other versions of the mishnah read that one may place a pitcher of cold water into a larger container of hot water. The point of the mishnah is to teach that we are not concerned lest this leads a person to think that it is permitted to cook on Shabbat.", + "One whose clothes fell into water on the road may walk in them without concern. When he reaches the outer courtyard he may spread them out in the sun, but not in sight of the people. If a person’s clothes become wet while walking on the road on Shabbat, she may not just squeeze the water out of them because squeezing water out of something is prohibited on Shabbat. The mishnah teaches that she may continue to wear the clothes and if by walking or sitting she causes the water to be squeezed out then it is a by-product of normal activity and it is not forbidden. Others explain that the mishnah teaches that she need not be concerned lest others think she laundered her clothes on Shabbat. However, once she reaches the outer courtyard of the city, meaning the first courtyard she finds, she should take off her wet clothes (obviously not if this will leave her naked in public) and she may spread them out so that they may dry. She shouldn’t spread them out so that others see what she is doing lest others think that she did her laundry on Shabbat." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses drying oneself off with a towel after bathing and the potential problem involved in wringing the towel.", + "One who bathes in the water of a pit or in the waters of Tiberias and dries himself even with ten towels, he must not bring them [back] in his hand. After the bather has dried herself, she may not bring the towel back to her home, lest in doing so she wrings it in order to squeeze out the water. This is true even if she uses ten towels to dry herself and the last one has almost no water in it and doesn’t need to be wrung out. It too may not be carried back to her home.", + "But ten men may dry their faces, hands, and feet on one towel and they may bring it [back] in their hands. However, a towel which has been shared by a large group of people, and has therefore become very wet, may nevertheless be carried by the group. Since there are many people together, they will remind each other that it is forbidden to wring a towel on Shabbat and they won’t come to transgress. Note how the mishnah purposely exaggerates each section. In the first section the tenth towel is barely wet, and nevertheless, it may not be carried. In the second section the towel is soaked and nevertheless it may be carried." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with acts that are similar to healing in that they manipulate the body in some way. As we have learned above in 14:3, healing is prohibited on Shabbat.", + "One may oil and [lightly] massage [the body] but not step on [the body] or scrape [the skin]. One may lightly rub oil or massage one’s body (or another person’s body) on Shabbat, but not do so vigorously by stepping on a person or roughly scraping off skin. Most commentators say that this is too much like an act of healing and it is forbidden to heal a person on Shabbat. Furthermore, all of these things were done in the bathhouse and the rabbis may have wanted to keep people from fully engaging in bathhouse activities on Shabbat.", + "One may not go down to a piloma, I have adopted a reading of this section in accordance with manuscripts and Albeck’s suggestion. A piloma is a place where a person takes a mud bath. There are a host of different explanations for this section. Albeck’s seems most convincing. At a piloma one would engage in the activities prohibited in section one. Hence one shouldn’t even go into a piloma.", + "And one may not drink an epiktvizin [to induce vomiting]; An epiktvizin was a potion used to induce vomiting. This was forbidden because it was like healing.", + "And one may not straighten an infant[‘s limbs]. If an infant’s limbs were crooked, they would manipulate them in order to straighten them out. This may not be done on Shabbat because it is similar to the prohibited labor of “building.”", + "And one may not set a broken bone. Similarly, one may not set the broken bone of an adult.", + "If one's hand or foot is dislocated, he must not agitate it violently in cold water but he may bathe it in the usual way, and if it heals, it heals. If one separated a limb, such as a hand or foot and it needs to be put back into its place, one shouldn’t vigorously shake it in cold water because everyone will see that this is an act of healing. However, if one wishes to wash in a more normal manner, one may do so and if by doing so the separated limb is healed, then nothing wrong has been done." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses borrowing food items on Shabbat with the intent of paying the person back after Shabbat.", + "A man may borrow pitchers of wine and pitchers of oil from his neighbor, provided he does not say to him, “lend [them] to me”; It is permitted for a person to borrow things from another person on Shabbat as long as he doesn’t say “lend to me.” There are actually two words in Hebrew for “lend” one which implies money or something that will be paid back, and the other which implies returning the object itself. Using the first verb sounds too much like doing business and it is therefore prohibited on Shabbat. This is the verb in our mishnah. However, the second verb is not problematic. For instance, if the borrowed object was a book which itself will be returned, there is no problem.", + "And similarly a woman [may borrow] loaves from her neighbor. Just as a man may ask his neighbor to borrow pitchers of wine and oil, so too a woman may ask her neighbor to borrow loaves of bread.", + "If he does not trust him he may leave his cloak with him [as a pledge] and squares up with him after Shabbat. The mishnah now provides a means by which the lender may guarantee that he receives compensation for his loan. The borrower cannot merely pay the lender, nor can they write down an amount or even state how much is owed. What they can do is have the borrower leave his cloak with the lender as a pledge. After Shabbat they can square up and the borrower can pay the lender back.", + "Similarly, if the eve of Passover in Jerusalem falls on Shabbat, he may leave his cloak with him [the vendor] and take his paschal lamb and squares up with him after the festival. This section deals with a situation where a person had not bought his pesach sacrifice (the paschal lamb) before Shabbat which fell the day before Pesach. He may do what the person in section one did to buy wine and oil he leaves his cloak with the merchant selling lambs, buys his lamb and then on Monday he can settle up how much he owes." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah has to do with reckoning certain types of accounts on Shabbat.", + "A man may count his guests and his appetizers/desserts by word, but not from writing. A host may want to count his guests or his food before or while the meal is being served. He may do so but he may not count them from a written list. The Tosefta explains that this is forbidden because it is acting on Shabbat the way one acts during the week. In the Talmud they explain that if he reads from a written list and sees that someone is not there or hears that they are not coming, he may erase their name from the list, a prohibited activity on Shabbat. Alternatively, he may grow accustomed to reading bills, lists and other types of business documents that a person should not read on Shabbat.", + "A man may cast lots with his sons and the members of his household on the table, provided that he does not make a large portion against a small one, because of gambling. This section deals with casting lots for who will get to choose his portion of meat first and who will get the largest portion. We should note that this was an important issue in eating customs at the time and we hear a lot from contemporary sources about people complaining that they didn’t get a good portion. The head of the household or any other person may cast lots on Shabbat for who gets what portion, but he should not make the portions a disparate size to begin with, hoping that he will get the bigger portion, because this is a type of gambling. Gambling is always problematic according to Jewish law, but it certainly shouldn’t be done on Shabbat.", + "And [priests] may cast lots for sacrifices on festivals, but not for the portions. The priests could cast lots over who would get which sacrifice of the sacrifices offered on a festival. However, they may not cast lots on the festival over the sacrifices offered the day before, since they could have cast the lots then. As we have learned many times, anything that could be done before the holiday may not be done on the holiday itself." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first section of the mishnah deals with hiring laborers on Shabbat.\nThe remaining portions of the mishnah deal with going out to the Shabbat border in order to perform an activity after Shabbat that may not be performed on Shabbat itself. The “Shabbat border” is the limit which a person is allowed to walk out of town on Shabbat. This border is two thousand cubits outside of the city.\nThe commonality between these two subjects (hiring workers and going out to the border) is that both are connected to Isaiah 58:13, “If you honor [the Sabbath] and do not do your business, nor look to your affairs, nor make statements [then you can seek the favor of the Lord]”. This translation tries to capture the spirit of how the rabbis understand the verse. Isaiah speaks of activities that are not necessarily forbidden by the Torah but nevertheless are activities which turn Shabbat into an ordinary day. As an aside, I should mention my belief that preserving the spirit of Shabbat is as important as observing the halakhic details. Shabbat must be a day set aside from work and from many normal daily activities, even if the performance of such work is not a technical violation of Shabbat.", + "One may not hire laborers on Shabbat, nor say to his fellow to hire laborers for him. Hiring laborers on Shabbat to do work after Shabbat is not technically a violation of one of the 39 prohibited labors. However, it is clearly against the “spirit of Shabbat” as is described in the verse from Isaiah above. One shouldn’t even say to one’s friend to hire laborers.", + "One may not go to the Shabbat border to await nightfall in order to hire laborers or bring in produce; but one may do so in order to watch [his field] and [then] he can bring produce [back] with him. One is allowed to go on Shabbat up until the Shabbat border, 2000 cubits outside the city. However, one should not do so in order to get a jump start on performing an activity prohibited on Shabbat. This is again a violation of the spirit of Shabbat and it is using time on Shabbat to prepare for the performance of work after Shabbat. However, one may go out to the Shabbat border before Shabbat is over to perform an activity, such as guarding produce, which is permitted on Shabbat. In such a case, the only thing preventing her from guarding her fields is that they lie outside of the Shabbat border (as fields usually do). If she goes out to guard her fields (a permitted activity), she may also bring back produce with her when she returns (an activity permitted on Shabbat). What is prohibited is going to wait at the border specifically to perform a prohibited activity.", + "Abba Shaul stated a general principle: whatever I have a right to say [that it be done], I am permitted to go to await nightfall, for it [at the border]. Abba Shaul does not disagree with the previous opinion, but rather summarizes that opinion using a general principle. Anything that a person may ask another person to do on Shabbat, such as guard fruit, one may also go out to the Shabbat border in order to perform the activity at nightfall. This would include watching fruit and also those activities which will be listed in the following mishnah. Put in other words, if the activity is not prohibited on Shabbat, nor in violation of the spirit of Shabbat, one may go out to the border in order to perform the activity right after Shabbat." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses exceptions to the rule in the previous mishnah, that one should not go out on Shabbat to the Shabbat border in order to go beyond the border after Shabbat to perform an activity prohibited on Shabbat.", + "One may go to the Shabbat border before nightfall in order to attend to the affairs of a bride or of a corpse to bring him a coffin and shrouds. Arranging a marriage and arranging proper burial are two of the highest values in Judaism, competing perhaps only with the study of Torah. One may therefore say to a fellow Jew on Shabbat, “take care of this need for a bride or a dead person after Shabbat”, even though the performance of these activities is prohibited on Shabbat itself. Hence, if one needs to leave town after Shabbat to take care of the arrangements for a marriage or funeral/burial, one may do so. [Remember Abba Shaul’s rule: anything one can say, one can also go to the Shabbat border to do immediately after Shabbat.] This includes bringing a coffin or shrouds in which to bury the dead.", + "If a non-Jew brings reed-pipes on Shabbat, one must not bewail an Israelite with them, unless they came from a near place. In mishnaic times it was customary for pipes to be used at a funeral to bewail the dead. If a non-Jew brought them to a Jew for the Jew to use them on Saturday evening, the Jew may not use them because this is benefiting from the work a non-Jew did for a Jew on Shabbat. However, if the pipes came from a near place, within the Shabbat border, the Jew may use them immediately after Shabbat because even if the non-Jew had not brought them, the Jew would have been able to bring them for a funeral right after Shabbat. A Jew is prohibited from benefiting only if the non-Jew does something that the Jew was not allowed to do.", + "If he made a coffin for himself or dug a grave for himself, an israelite may be buried in it. But if [he made it] for the sake of an Israelite, [the Israelite] may never be buried in it. If a non-Jew made a coffin or dug a grave for non-Jewish use on Shabbat, and then decided to sell the coffin or grave to a Jew, a Jew may use it. This is because the intent was not to do work for a Jew on Shabbat. However, if the non-Jew made the coffin or grave on Shabbat for a specific Jew, that Jew may never be buried in that coffin or grave. This is because the grave or coffin was made in violation of the Shabbat with that Jew in mind. On the other hand, the grave and coffin may be used for another Jew as long as they wait between the end of Shabbat and the burial the time it would take to build a coffin and dig a grave. This waiting period is to avoid deriving benefit from work that a non-Jew did on Shabbat." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn the previous mishnah we learned that a person may go on Shabbat to the Shabbat border to get a head start on preparations for a funeral after Shabbat. This mishnah deals with things that may be done on Shabbat itself, in order to prepare the body for burial or to preserve it.", + "The mishnah lists things which may be done for a dead person on Shabbat itself.", + "One may perform all the needs of the dead:
One may anoint him with oil and wash him, provided that no limb of his is moved. One may anoint the body with oil (done for the purposes of cleansing) and wash the body. However, the body itself may not be moved because it is muktzeh. The reason it is muktzeh is that there is no use for the body on Shabbat, and all things which have no use may not be moved.", + "One may remove the pillow from under him, and [thereby] place him on sand, in order that he should be better preserved. One may remove the pillow/mattress upon which the dead body lies in order that it should be on the ground. This was considered a better means for preserving the body and preventing deterioration and the accompanying smell.", + "One may tie up the jaw, not in order that it should close but that it should not further [open]. One may tie the dead body’s jaw so that the mouth does not gape open further than it already is at the point of death. However, it is forbidden to close the jaw because it is forbidden to move even a limb of the body. One may preserve the state that the body is currently in, but not change that state.", + "And likewise, if a beam is broken, one may support it with a bench or bed posts, not in order that it [the break] should close up, but that it should go [open] no further. This section is loosely connected to that in the previous section. If a beam supporting the ceiling breaks on Shabbat, one may put something beneath it to support it so that it does not break any more. However, one may not put something underneath it so that the break closes up.", + "One may not close [the eyes of] a corpse on Shabbat, nor on weekdays when he is about to die, and he who closes the eyes [of a dying person] at the point of death is a murderer. If a person dies with his/her eyes open, one may not close the eyes because it is forbidden to move a limb of the body. The mishnah adds that even during the week it is prohibited to close the eyes of a dying person because this may cause death to arrive more speedily. This is indeed a primary source used by halakhic authorities who wish to prohibit euthanasia. One may not do anything to make death come faster. However, we should remember that it is nearly impossible to learn what halakhah has to say on any given topic from one single source, especially one as sensitive and controversial as euthanasia." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses a person who was traveling on Friday and did not arrive at her destination before Shabbat.", + "One for whom it becomes dark while on the road, he may give his purse to a non-Jew; And if there is no non-Jew with him, he places it on a donkey. Once it becomes dark the Jew must not carry her purse, since it is prohibited to carry in the public domain. However, she may give the purse to a non-Jew. The rabbis permitted this because if they had been strict a person may be so attached to her possessions that she would herself carry on Shabbat. Since it is less problematic to give the purse to the non-Jew than for the Jew herself to carry, giving it away is preferable. However, we should remember that generally it is forbidden to ask a non-Jew to do work on Shabbat on behalf of a Jew. If there is no non-Jew with her, then she may place the purse on a donkey and allow the donkey to carry it back to the city. However it is preferable to give the purse to the non-Jew because Jews are supposed to let their animals rest on Shabbat as well, but a Jew is not commanded to ensure that the non-Jew rest on Shabbat.", + "When he reaches the outermost courtyard, he removes the objects which may be handled on Shabbat. As for those which may not be handled on Shabbat, he unties the cords and the sacks fall off automatically. When the traveler who has put her purse (or other goods) on a donkey reaches the outermost courtyard of the city, she may no longer allow them to remain on the donkey, since they have now reached a safe point. Therefore, those objects that she may handle on Shabbat, she must remove and stow them somewhere safe. Those objects that may not be handled, she must undo the straps which attach them to the donkey and they will fall to the ground on their own. We should note that the “city” to which the mishnah refers is one in which everybody knows each other, and therefore people can leave their private belongings in a public area without much fear of their being stolen. This reminds me of the situation in a kibbutz, or perhaps a summer camp, but it is certainly different from the situation in our cities." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah teaches how one feeds one’s animals on Shabbat.", + "One may untie bundles of hay in front of cattle and one may spread out large sheaves, but not small hardened twigs. There are several different explanations for this section, but I will explain according to Albeck’s explanation, which differs from that given in other commentaries. The general principle which we learn in this mishnah is that a person is allowed to do something which turns food which cannot be eaten by the animal into food which can be eaten. Bundles of hay must be untied before they can be eaten, and large sheaves must be spread out before they may be eaten by the animal. However, the small hardened twigs cannot be eaten by the animal even after they are spread out. Hence, one may not untie or spread out a bundle of this type of twigs.", + "One may not chop up unripe grain or carobs before cattle, whether small or large. Rabbi Judah permits it in the case of carobs for small beasts. Chopping up unripe grain and carobs is a lot of work and animals will eat unripe grain and carobs. Since this work is not necessary and it is not easily performed it is forbidden on Shabbat. Rabbi Judah holds that it is permitted to chop up carobs for small animals (sheep and goats) since they cannot eat the carobs until they are chopped up. It is only forbidden for large animals which can eat unripe grain and carobs without them being chopped up." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to deal with feeding animals on Shabbat.", + "One may not stuff a camel [with food] nor cram [food into its mouth], but one may put food into its mouth. It was customary to stuff a camel with enough food to last several days before setting out on a journey. In this way it wouldn’t be necessary to feed the camel while on the road. [Note: this unfortunately does not work for humans.] Since this is a lot of work, and is also preparing on Shabbat for after Shabbat, it is not permitted. However, if the camel does not want to eat at all, it is permitted to put food into its mouth.", + "And one may not force feed calves, but one may put food into their mouth. The same rule holds true for calves one may put food into their mouths but not force feed them.", + "And one may put food into one’s hands for chickens and one may put water into bran, but not mix it [into a mass]. Mixing water into a mass of bran is considered too much work to do on Shabbat, and it is not strictly necessary. The chicken will be fine without the bran/water combination having been mixed. Therefore, mixing is prohibited. However, merely feeding the chickens by hand or putting water into a bowl of bran for them to eat is permitted.", + "And one may not put water in front of bees or in front of doves in a dove-cote, but one may put [water] in front of geese, chickens and Rhodesian doves. Bees and doves fly long distances and should be able to find their own water. Therefore, since is no need to put water out for them on Shabbat it is prohibited to do so. However, geese, chickens and certain types of doves do not fly far from their owner’s homes and hence one may put water out for them on Shabbat. The general principle which we again see illustrated is that something that is necessary to feed animals on Shabbat is permitted, while unnecessary actions are prohibited." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with giving food on Shabbat to animals in cases where the food was not “prepared” for them on the eve of Shabbat. “Prepared” here means that before Shabbat this food was not designated to eventually become animal food. “Prepared” is the opposite of “muktzeh”.", + "One may cut up gourds in front of beasts, and a carcass in front of dogs. Rabbi Judah says: if it was not carcass by the eve of Shabbat it is forbidden, because it was not prepared. Gourds are normally eaten by human beings and are too expensive to be given to animals. Nevertheless, the mishnah rules that if one has gourds one may cut them up and give them to one’s beasts. The mishnah refers to a carcass of an animal that was alive when Shabbat began and became a carcass on Shabbat itself. In such a case it was certainly not “prepared” before Shabbat to be given as dog food on Shabbat. According to the first opinion, it is nevertheless permitted to give the carcass to the dogs. Rabbi Judah disagrees and holds that the carcass is “muktzeh” and may therefore not be handled at all on Shabbat." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe final mishnah of Shabbat begins by discussing annulling and releasing vows and continues with a story about measuring things on Shabbat to see if they are pure or impure, fit or not fit.", + "They may annul vows on Shabbat, and they may be asked [to release vows] when these are necessary for Shabbat. It is permitted for a husband to annul his wife’s vows and for a father to annul his daughter’s vow on Shabbat, since these vows may only be annulled on the day upon which they are heard (Numbers 30: 6, 9). If they had to wait until after Shabbat was over to annul them, the vows could no longer be annulled. Similarly, sages may be asked to release a vow on Shabbat, but only if there is some reason to release the vow on Shabbat itself and not wait until Shabbat is over. Such would be the case if for instance the vow was not to eat on Shabbat. If the vow was not going to impact Shabbat, then they must wait until Shabbat is over. For more on how Sages release vows and how husbands and fathers annul vows see Nedarim 9-11.", + "One may close up a skylight, and measure a rag and a ritual bath. The issue of closing up a skylight/window was discussed above in 17:7. There we saw that the sages allowed one to put a board back into a window frame to close out the light. One is allowed to measure a rag on Shabbat to see if it is three handbreadths by three handbreadths, the minimum measurement required for it to be susceptible to impurity. It is also permissible to measure a ritual bath to see if it contains the required 40 seah of water. These two measurements are allowed because they are connected to mitzvot. Other measurements would be forbidden.", + "And it once happened in the days of Rabbi Zadok’s father and the days of Abba Shaul ben Botnit that they closed up the window with a small clay vessel and tied a [clay] pot to a string to ascertain whether there was the opening of a handbreadth or not in the barrel. And from their words we learn that we may close [a skylight] and measure and tie on Shabbat. The Talmud explains what exactly happened in this story. There were two houses which shared a wall and there was a window in the wall. In the window was a cracked barrel with a large hole in it. On a certain Shabbat a person died in one of the houses and they wanted to know if there was a handbreadth’s gap in the pitcher, such that the impurity from one house would be transmitted to the other house. First they closed up the skylight with a small clay vessel so that the priests could go up to the roof without becoming impure. They then wanted to measure the crack in the barrel but couldn’t reach it from the roof. So they tied an earthenware pot the size of one handbreadth by one handbreadth to a string and lowered it to the hole of the barrel. From these actions (which were certainly creative) we learn that it is permitted to close up a gap, to measure things to know whether they are impure and to make certain types of knots on Shabbat. Congratulations! We have finished Shabbat. It is a tradition at this point to thank God for helping us to finish learning the tractate and to commit ourselves to going back and relearning it, so that we may not forget it and so that its lessons will stay with us for all of our lives. Shabbat was the longest tractate we have covered so far, so an extra “yasher koah” to all who stuck it through. Admittedly, many of the details were quite difficult and the halakhot truly dictated exactly what is and is not permitted on Shabbat. I hope that learning this tractate will enrich your own Shabbat experience, and that you will find in the details of halakhah a system which forces a person to examine each and everyone one of her actions and to withdraw somewhat from the hustle bustle of the world for one day a week. Shabbat is a day dedicated to holy activities, worship of God, study, reflection, eating and drinking and non-creativity. The halakhot of Shabbat are meant to ensure that these lofty ideals can be achieved. May you have the strength and time to keep on learning more Mishnah! Tomorrow we begin Eruvin, a tractate which is actually quite connected to Shabbat." + ] + ] + ] + }, + "versions": [ + [ + "Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp", + "http://learn.conservativeyeshiva.org/mishnah/" + ] + ], + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה שבת", + "categories": [ + "Mishnah", + "Modern Commentary on Mishnah", + "English Explanation of Mishnah", + "Seder Moed" + ], + "schema": { + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה שבת", + "enTitle": "English Explanation of Mishnah Shabbat", + "key": "English Explanation of Mishnah Shabbat", + "nodes": [ + { + "heTitle": "הקדמה", + "enTitle": "Introduction" + }, + { + "heTitle": "", + "enTitle": "" + } + ] + } +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Moed/English Explanation of Mishnah Shekalim/English/Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp.json b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Moed/English Explanation of Mishnah Shekalim/English/Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..7bc97ddcf539d20030934374d3f2c79c9dd938f4 --- /dev/null +++ b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Moed/English Explanation of Mishnah Shekalim/English/Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp.json @@ -0,0 +1,366 @@ +{ + "language": "en", + "title": "English Explanation of Mishnah Shekalim", + "versionSource": "http://learn.conservativeyeshiva.org/mishnah/", + "versionTitle": "Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp", + "status": "locked", + "license": "CC-BY", + "shortVersionTitle": "Dr. Joshua Kulp", + "actualLanguage": "en", + "languageFamilyName": "english", + "isBaseText": true, + "isSource": true, + "isPrimary": true, + "direction": "ltr", + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה שקלים", + "categories": [ + "Mishnah", + "Modern Commentary on Mishnah", + "English Explanation of Mishnah", + "Seder Moed" + ], + "text": { + "Introduction": [ + "In Exodus 30:11:16 God tells Moses that when he counts the children of Israel, he shouldn’t do a simple head count but rather each person should donate half a shekel. The simple meaning of these verses is that the half-shekel is a one time donation, or at most a donation that is given only when a census is taken. ", + "However, the rabbis understood the half-shekel to be an annual donation given to the Temple for the Temple’s upkeep, and for the purchase of the daily tamid and other offerings. These offerings had to be paid for with public money. Individuals could not buy them in order to donate them to the Temple. It is possible that the custom of collecting an annual “tax” from every Israelite already existed in the First Temple period (see II Kings 12:5 and II Chronicles 6:9; see also Nehemiah 10:33, where they give a third of a shekel). We should note that the Sadducees vehemently disagreed with this halakhah. They held that an individual could donate the tamid offering and they denied that there was a yearly half-shekel tax. ", + "The value of a “half-shekel” might vary from time to time, because the half-shekel which they are referring to is a Torah half-shekel. In the Mishnah they assume that a shekel is worth a “sela”, which is four dinars (a Roman currency). Therefore, half a shekel is assumed to be two dinars. This two dinars is usually called a “shekel”. Hence, throughout the tractate when the mishnah says “shekel” it is referring to the half-shekel (I realize that this is confusing). ", + "According to the Mishnah, they began to remind people to donate the half-shekel in the beginning of the month of Adar. This is where the custom, observed to this day, developed to read “Parshat Shekalim”, the above mentioned passage in Exodus, on the first Shabbat of Adar of every year. ", + "Our tractate deals with many of the details of these laws, how the half-shekel was collected, what was done with it and who handles Temple funds. There is a lot of information in this tractate about the financing of the Temple, so perhaps it will be interesting to any accountants out there! The Babylonian Talmud does not contain a commentary on this tractate, as it does for all of the other tractates in Seder Moed. This is assumedly because none of the tractate was practically applicable after the destruction of the Temple. However, there is commentary in the Palestinian Talmud (the Yerushalmi). ", + "Good luck learning Shekalim!" + ], + "": [ + [ + [ + "Introduction\nIn the introduction to the tractate I explained what the half-shekel is and what it was used for. Our mishnah teaches that on the first of Adar they would make public announcements telling people to start preparing their half-shekels. The mishnah also teaches other public events that occur in Adar.", + "On the first of Adar they make a public announcement about the shekels and concerning kilayim. On the first of Adar, the month before Nisan (the month in which Pesah falls) they begin to make announcements reminding people to bring their shekels, or more specifically half-shekels. They also announce that people should go out to their fields and vineyards to uproot any “kilayim” that may have sprung up. “Kilayim” are diverse seeds which have sprung up in the same area.", + "On the fifteenth: they read the Megillah [Esther] in walled cities, and they fix the roads and the streets and the ritual water baths, and they perform all public duties, and they mark the graves, and [messengers] go forth also concerning kilayim. The mishnah now begins to teach things that occur, or begin to occur on the fifteenth of the month. The first thing is that on the fifteenth of the month, people in walled cities read the book of Esther, the Megillah. We will learn much more about this when we learn Tractate Megillah. The reason that the mishnah mentions the date upon which it was read in walled cities is that this date coincides with the other things done in the continuation of the mishnah. The second thing is that they begin to fix the public roads and ritual baths because Pesah is coming in one month. People would need to travel to Jerusalem and purify themselves in order to take part in the pesah sacrifice. Also, Adar is the beginning of the dry season (actually, it can still rain in Adar). It would have been difficult to fix the roads when the rains were still coming down. In addition they performed all sorts of other public duties that could not be done during the rainy season. They would mark graves with lime so that priests could see where the graves were and avoid them. During the winter the lime would wash away. Therefore, during Adar, once the rains had stopped they would reapply the plaster. Above we learned that on the first of Adar they would announce to people that they should go out and check to make sure that there were no kilayim in their fields. On the fifteenth, they would send out messengers to make sure that this had been done. We can see that this was an issue of great importance to them. The rabbis seem to have been especially concerned about kilayim because one cannot tell from looking at picked grain or grapes whether they grew in a field that had kilayim in it. This is true of other food-related problems as well." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nAt the end of yesterday’s mishnah we learned that on the fifteenth of Adar the court would send out agents to uproot kilayim, shoots that have grown from mixed seeds. In today’s mishnah we learn how this was done.", + "Rabbi Judah said: at first they used to uproot [the kilayim], and throw them down before them. [But] when transgressors increased in number, they used to uproot them and throw them on the roads. [Finally], they decreed that they should make the whole field ownerless. At first the court would merely uproot the kilayim plants to prevent them from continuing to grow. They didn’t bother throwing them away, but would just uproot them and leave them in their place. The problem with this was that people would use the plants that the court’s agents had uprooted. If they were not fit for human consumption they would feed them to their animals. This is prohibited because it is prohibited to derive any benefit from kilayim. To remedy this, they began to throw the plants out onto the roads where anyone could take them. However, even this was not sufficient. People did not seem to care that the court’s agents would come around and uproot their plants. Indeed, they may have even thanked the court for doing their weeding for them! Therefore the court had to decree that if they found kilayim in someone’s field, they would declare the entire field ownerless. Basically this is penalizing the person by making him lose his field. This was a far more effective measure; since people knew they might lose their field they were far more cautious about allowing kilayim to grow." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah returns to dealing with the half-shekel.", + "On the fifteenth of [Adar] they would set up tables [of money changers] in the provinces. The half-shekel had to be given in Israeli currency. In order to help people exchange their currency they would set up money changer tables in the provinces to change money. The money changers could also exchange large currency for smaller coins.", + "On the twenty-fifth they set them up in the Temple. As the first of Nisan approached, the time when they would begin to use the shekalim collected from the previous year, they would stop having money changers throughout the land and limit their presence to the Temple.", + "When [the tables] were set up in the Temple, they began to exact pledges [from those who had not paid]. At this point, they would begin to take pledges from people who had not yet paid. A “pledge” means that they would take something away from the person and only return it when the half-shekel had been paid.", + "From whom did they exact pledges? From Levites and Israelites, converts and freed slaves, but not women or slaves or minors. Pledges were not taken from everyone, but rather only from free adult Jewish men (excluding priests, as we shall see below), those who are obligated to give the half-shekel. They didn’t take pledges from women, slaves or minors because women, slaves and minors are exempt from the half-shekel. Women are exempt because Exodus 30:12 states, “each man (ish) shall pay a ransom for himself” the word “man” is understood as exempting women. Slaves are usually in the same category as women so they too are exempt. Exodus 30 explicitly excludes minors under the age of 20 (Ex. 30:14).", + "Any minor on whose behalf his father has begun to pay the shekel, may not discontinue it again. Sometimes fathers would begin to donate the half-shekel on behalf of their sons, even though they were not obligated to do so. The mishnah teaches that if they had begun to give the half-shekel, in subsequent years they must continue to do so.", + "But they did not exact pledges from the priests, because of the ways of peace. The only category of free adult male from whom they did not exact a pledge is the priest. They didn’t do so in order to avoid fights. Albeck explains that the priests thought that they were exempt from the half-shekel. Although they are indeed obligated, the court seems not to have wanted to get into a fight with them over the subject. Tomorrow’s mishnah will deal with the priests obligation to pay the shekel. We might note that if many of the priests were Sadducees and the Sadducees seem to have rejected the whole practice of giving the yearly half-shekel, then we have here evidence of the Pharisees not wanting to provoke a fight with the Sadducees." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn this mishnah we see two early tannaim arguing over whether or not a priest donates the half-shekel.", + "Rabbi Judah said: Ben Bukri testified at Yavneh that a priest who paid the shekel is not a sinner. Ben Bukri assumes that a priest is exempt from the shekel offering. The midrash which explains this appears below, in section two. His testimony is that despite the fact that the priest need not donate the half-shekel, if he does donate it he has not transgressed. We might have thought that person who is not liable to pay the half-shekel may not donate it. The problem with a voluntary donation of the half-shekel is that public sacrifices must come from the entire public, meaning from the half-shekel. A voluntary donation may be seen as an individual paying for a public sacrifice. Ben Bukri testifies that we don’t perceive of the priest’s half-shekel in that way. Rather it is a gift to the community, which belongs to the community as a whole. As such it may be used to purchase public sacrifices.", + "But Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai said to him: not so, but rather a priest who did not pay the shekel was guilty of a sin, only the priests expounded this verse for their own benefit: “And every meal-offering of the priest shall be wholly burnt, it shall not be eaten” (Leviticus 6:16), since the omer and the two loaves and the showbread are [brought] from our [contributions], how can they be eaten? Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai reasons the exact opposite from Ben Bukri. He holds that the priest is liable to donate the half-shekel and if he doesn’t do so, he transgresses in much the same way that any person who doesn’t give the half-shekel transgresses. The priests tried to use some midrashic reasoning to get out of giving the half-shekel. The Torah states that any minhah, a meal-offering, given by a priest, must be wholly burnt. The half-shekel is used to purchase certain meal offerings, namely the omer (the barley offering brought between Pesah and Shavuot), the two loaves brought on Shavuot, and the weekly showbread. All of these are eaten by priests and not burnt. The priests claim that the fact that these are eaten proves that the priests did not pay for any of them, for had they paid for them they would have had to have been wholly burnt. Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai says that the priests’ midrash is mistaken. Only individual minhah offerings of the priest are wholly burnt. Public minhah offerings paid for partly by priests may be eaten. Hence the priests are liable to pay the half-shekel. We should note that aside from the technical aspects of this debate, there may be an underlying social/religious issue. The question is, are the priests a part of the people or are they a separate class, with their own unique relationship to God? This might be an interesting way of examining Jewish religious leadership in general are leaders a part of the Jewish people, or are they a class on their own. Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai’s answer would seem to be clear the priests must give their half-shekel, they are part of the Jewish people and not above, or even truly separate from the rest." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nMost of this mishnah deals with Gentiles who wish to make donations to the Temple. We should note that this was a sensitive and realistic issue in the Second Temple Period. There were some groups of Jews, notably the Dead Sea Sect, which adamantly opposed accepting donations from the Gentiles. A quote from the book of Ezra which we will see below also seems to express this approach. In contrast, the rabbis are more open to Gentile donations. In fact, I don’t believe that they were opposed in principle. Rather they felt that when their understanding of the Torah allowed such donations, it was sanctioned. The rabbis seem to be trying to walk a fine line to make Jews responsible for the ultimate upkeep of the Temple and yet to not totally exclude Gentiles from participating in what they may have perceived as worship to the one, true, God.", + "Even though they said, “they don’t exact pledges from women, slaves or minors, [yet] if they paid the shekel it is accepted from them. We learned in mishnah three that women, slaves and minors are exempt from paying the half-shekel, and hence pledges are not taken from them to get them to pay their shekels. In our mishnah we learn that shekels are accepted from them. As we stated above with regard to the priest, as long as they give the shekel with the intent of it becoming a communal possession, the shekels can be used to buy public sacrifices. The only problem would be if they gave it thinking that they were making an individual donation for a public sacrifice. In such a case, their shekels would have to be rejected, since public sacrifices must come from only public money.", + "If a non-Jew or a Samaritan paid the shekel they do not accept it from them. In contrast, shekels given by non-Jews or Samaritans are rejected. This is so that the public sacrifices, which come to afford atonement for the entire Jewish people, should paid for by the Jewish people themselves. As we shall see below, other sacrifices are accepted from non-Jews.", + "And they do not accept from them the bird-offerings of zavin or bird-offerings of zavot or bird-offerings of women after childbirth, This section refers to sacrifices which a person must bring at the end of their period of impurity. The Yerushalmi explains that the mishnah here teaches that Samaritans, who are in some matters considered Jews, do not bring these sacrifices. Assumedly the reason is that they do not count the period of their impurity correctly, and hence they bring the sacrifices at the wrong time. Gentiles cannot bring these sacrifices because they are not obligated for them.", + "Or sin-offerings or guilt-offerings. There are two different versions of this mishnah and the two differ with regard to whether sin and guilt offerings are accepted. According to one version they are not accepted from Gentiles or Samaritans because these are sacrifices cannot be donated (see below). Rather these are two types of atonement offerings incurred by people for various sins, and these laws govern only Jews. The other version says that guilt and sin offerings are accepted. According to this version, the line refers only to Samaritans, from whom these offerings are accepted in the hope that they will repent and return to being “real Jews.”", + "But vow-offerings and freewill-offerings they do accept from them. This is the general rule: all offerings which can be made as a vow-offering or a freewill-offering they do accept from them, but offerings which cannot be made as a vow-offering or a freewill-offering they do not accept from them. A “vow offering” is when one says, “I vow to bring an offering.” A “free-will offering” is when one says, “I vow to bring this animal.” Both types of sacrifices are accepted from Gentiles and Samaritans. This halakhah is derived midrashically from Leviticus 22:18, which twice uses the word “ish” (man). The double appearance is taken to mean that these offerings are accepted from both Jews and Gentiles alike.", + "And thus it is explicitly stated by Ezra, as it is said: “You have nothing to do with us to build a house unto our God” (Ezra 4:3). In the preceding verses in Ezra some enemies of the Jews come to Zerubbabel and the chiefs of the clans and say, “Let us build with you, since we too worship your God.” The Jewish leaders respond, “It is not for you and us to build a House to our God, but we alone will build it to the Lord God of Israel.” From here the rabbis conclude that non-Jews may not participate in the funding of the public sacrifices. However, as we noted above, other types of sacrifices are accepted from them." + ], + [ + "Introduction The rabbis added onto the half-shekel a surcharge which is called a “kalbon.” Rabbi Meir and the other rabbis disagree over the nature of the kalbon and therefore over who has to pay it. According to Rabbi Meir everyone who gives the shekel has to pay the kalbon. Rabbi Meir reasons that the kalbon is a surcharge because they coin he is giving is probably not as pure as the coin demanded by the Torah. Hence, there is always an obligation to give the kalbon. The other sages understand the kalbon to be a surcharge because when he gives a coin they will have to exchange it with a moneychanger. Therefore they hold that anyone who gives his half-shekel in one coin to the Temple need not give the kalbon, because there is no exchange. If two together give one shekel then the two must add one kalbon, because had they split their coin into two, they would have had to pay the moneychanger. The sages decreed that the money saved by not giving it to the moneychanger should go to the Temple. In our mishnah and in the following one we learn some details about who pays the kalbon.", + "The following are liable [to pay] the kalbon (surcharge): Levites and Israelites and converts and freed slaves; but not priests or women or slaves or minors. This is the same list that appeared above in mishnah three with regard to taking pledges. The kalbon was paid only by those from whom they took pledges in order to collect the half-shekel. The kalbon was not taken from those who don’t owe the half-shekel in the first place. The one exception may be the priests, whom according to our mishnah do not pay the kalbon. Albeck explains that the priests were lenient on themselves. Another explanation might be that this mishnah goes according to Ben Bukri in mishnah four who said that priests do not have to give the half-shekel. Finally, there are some manuscripts that do not have the word “priest” in this mishnah.", + "If a man paid the shekel on behalf of a priest, or on behalf of a woman, or on behalf of a slave, or on behalf of a minor, he is exempt. Since the person for whom the shekel is being paid is exempt, the one who pays it on their behalf is also exempt.", + "If a man paid the shekel on his own behalf and on behalf of his fellow he is liable for one kalbon. Rabbi Meir says: two kalbons. The first opinion is that of the sages, which I explained in the introduction. They are only liable for one kalbon because only one exchange was made. Rabbi Meir holds that everyone is always individually liable for a kalbon. Hence, if one person pays on behalf of him and another person, he must add two kalbons.", + "If one gave a sela and received a shekel, he is liable to pay two kalbons. In this case a person gives the Temple treasurer a sela, which is the value of a Torah shekel. This is twice the amount he needs to give. He takes back in change a “mishnaic shekel”, which is a Torah half-shekel. In this case he must pay a kalbon for the shekel he gave and for the shekel he took, since both exchanges carry surcharges. We see from here that high banking fees are no modern invention!" + ], + [ + "If one paid the shekel on behalf of a poor man or on behalf of his neighbor or on behalf of his fellow-townsman, he is exempt [from the kalbon]. But if he loaned [it] to them he is liable.
Brothers who are partners who are obligated for the kalbon are exempt from the tithe of beasts.
But when they are liable to the tithe of beasts they are exempt from the surcharge.
And how much is the kalbon? A silver ma'ah, the words of Rabbi Meir. But the sages say: half a ma'ah.
This mishnah continues to discuss the kalbon, the extra surcharge paid with the shekel.
Section one: If someone pays the shekel for a friend as a gift, the rabbis did not make him pay the kalbon as well. The same is true, as we shall see below, if a father pays the kalbon on behalf of his son. However, one who pays the shekel on someone else’s behalf as a loan does have to pay the kalbon.
Section two: This section refers to two different types of partnerships between brothers who have inherited from their father. The first type is when they have already divided up the inheritance and then pooled their money together to form a business partnership. In such a case they are liable for the kalbon as are all partners who pay each other’s kalbon, but they are exempt from paying the tithe on beasts (domesticated animals) since partners do not pay this tithe on their shared animals. The second partnership is one in which they have not yet divided up the inheritance. In such a case the money is treated as if it still belonged to one person, their father. They are liable for the tithe but they are exempt from the kalbon, since this is similar to as case in which a father pays the shekel on his son’s behalf.
Section three: Rabbi Meir holds that the kalbon is a ma’ah, which is 1/12 of a half-shekel. This matches Rabbi Meir’s understanding of the kalbon as compensation for the non-pure elements which are customarily put into silver coins. This ma’ah is supposed to increase the silver of the shekel so that it now reaches the value of the Torah’s half-shekel. The sages, however, hold that the kalbon is in place of a fee paid to the moneychanger. The fee is a lesser amount, only half a ma’ah." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah contains several laws about the journey that the shekalim will make from the provinces from where they are collected to the Temple in Jerusalem.", + "They may change shekels into darics because of the load of the journey. If people don’t want to shlepp their individual shekels all the way to the Temple, they may pool them together and turn them into larger coins called “darics.” “Darics” are mentioned in Ezra 8:27 and I Chronicles 1:29.", + "Just as there were shofar-shaped chests in the Temple so there were shofar-shaped chests in the provinces. When the shekels were brought to their deposit points, they were put into chests that were shaped like a shofar, wide at the bottom and thin at the top. This was to prevent people from being able to pull coins out (like mailboxes, for those of you who remember when we used to send real letters). Just as they had these types of chests in the Temple, they also had them outside the Temple in the provinces. This made collection much easier.", + "The townspeople who had sent their shekels and they were stolen or lost: If the appropriation had already been made [the messengers] swear an oath to the treasurers; But if the appropriation had not yet been made they swear to the townspeople, and the townspeople must pay [new] shekels in the place of the [lost] shekels. [If the lost shekels] were found, or if the thieves restored them, then both [the first shekels and their substitutes] are [sacred] shekels and they cannot be credited [to the account] of the coming year. The mishnah now discusses a scenario in which people’s shekels get lost on their way to the Temple. Three times a year the Temple treasurers would count up the shekels that had already been collected and they would start spending them on buying sacrifices (see below 3:1). When reckoning the shekels, they would also count shekels which they knew were on their way from the provinces (called creative accounting). So if the messenger loses the shekels after this appropriation has already been made, the townspeople who sent their money get credit. The messenger then must make an oath to the treasurers that he did not steal the money himself. However, if the money is lost or stolen before the appropriation is made then the townspeople do not get credit and they must send new shekels. In this case, the messenger swears to them that he did not steal the money himself. If the coins are found or if the thieves are found and return the stolen coins, both the new coins and the original coins go to the Temple. The townspeople who twice had to send shekels do not get credit for the following year." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with various scenarios in which a person paid his shekel from money which did not belong to him.", + "One who gave his shekel to his fellow to pay it on his behalf, but [his fellow] paid it on behalf of himself: if the appropriation had already been made [his fellow] is guilty of sacrilege. A person received a shekel from his friend to pay his friend’s shekel but then used this money to pay his own shekel. If the shekel had already been counted in the Temple’s appropriation (and an animal purchased with that money and sacrificed, see below), then he is guilty of sacrilege. Sacrilege means that one has misappropriated funds or property which belongs to the Temple. Since this shekel had already been counted as belonging to the Temple and indeed had already been used, his action counts as sacrilege. He must now bring a special sacrifice and restore the value of that which he misappropriated (a shekel) plus another fifth.", + "One who paid his shekel out of money belonging to the sanctuary: If the appropriation had already been made and an animal [bought out of the appropriation] had already been offered, he is guilty of sacrilege. In this case the person had in his possession money which he had previously donated to the Temple. He then tried to use that money to pay his shekel. Again the mishnah teaches that if the appropriation had already been made and if the shekel had been used to buy a sacrifice then he is guilty of sacrilege. We should note that according to the Talmud, in the previous section as well an animal had to have been sacrificed for it to be considered sacrilege.", + "[If he paid his shekel with] money that had been used to redeem the second tithe or the value of seventh year produce, he must eat food equal to its value. Second tithe is usually redeemed with money and then the money is brought to Jerusalem and used there to buy food. If one sells seventh year produce, the proceeds from the sale have the same rules and restrictions that the produce itself has any food which is purchased from this money must be used before seventh year produce must be removed from one’s house (which is when that type of food is no longer found in the field). In the case in this mishnah someone uses this money (second tithe or seventh year produce proceeds) to pay his shekel. What he must now do is take another shekel and use it as if it was second tithe or seventh year produce money. This is sufficient to restore the shekel that he used to pay his shekel tax." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses various scenarios in which a person set aside some money to use for his shekel or for another sacrifice and after he counted up the money he had set aside there was a surplus. The question is whether or not the surplus money is sacred and therefore must be used for a free-will offering.", + "One who gathered some coins and said: “Behold, these are for my shekel.” Bet Shammai say: the surplus [is used to purchase] freewill-offerings. But Bet Hillel say: the surplus is non-sacral property. The person gathered some coins together and declared that he would use them to bring his shekel. It turned out that there was more than a shekel’s worth of coins there. Bet Shammai say that since they had been set aside to give to the Temple, they are sacred and therefore they must be used to purchase free-will offerings. Bet Hillel, on the other hand, hold that the surplus is not sacred because when he collected the money his intention was that only a shekel’s worth of the coins should be given to the Temple.", + "[If he said:] “From them I shall bring my shekel,” they agree that the surplus is non-sacral property. In this case, instead of saying “These are for my shekel” he says “From them I shall bring my shekel”. It is clear that his intention is to use only whatever adds up to a shekel and therefore Bet Shammai agree that the surplus is not sacred.", + "[If he said]: “These [coins] are for a sin-offering, they agree that the surplus [goes to the chests of] freewill-offerings. In this case Bet Hillel agree with Bet Shammai that the surplus is sacred. Tomorrow’s mishnah will explain the difference between shekels and sin-offerings such that Bet Hillel agrees in the case of the latter.", + "[If he said]: “From these I shall bring a sin-offering, they agree that the surplus is non-sacral property. This is the same rule as in section two as long as he says “From these I will bring ….” the surplus is not sacred." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah explains the difference between shekels and a sin-offering such that Bet Hillel holds that the surplus of coins set aside for a sin-offering are sacred whereas the surplus of coins set aside for a shekel are not.", + "Rabbi Shimon says: what is the difference between shekels and a sin-offering? Shekels have a fixed value, but a sin-offering has no fixed value. Shekels have a fixed value. Hence one who says, “These coins are for my shekel” intends to make sacred only the value of a shekel. On the other hand, a sin-offering has no fixed value and therefore, one who says, “These coins are for a sin-offering” may have intended for all of the coins to be sacred, even the surplus.", + "Rabbi Judah says: shekels also have no fixed value. For when the Israelites came up out of the diaspora they used to pay the shekel in darics, then they paid the shekel in selas, then they paid it in tibs, and finally they wanted to pay it in dinars. Rabbi Judah says that the shekel also doesn’t have a fixed value. When the people of Israel first returned from the Babylonian exile they brought coins called “darics” (see above, mishnah one). A daric is a Persian coin worth four shekels. They then began to bring selas, which are worth two shekels. They then began to bring tibs, which are worth a shekel, which is equivalent to the half-shekel of the Torah. Finally, the people wanted to pay in dinars. According to the Talmud, the rabbis did not let them pay in dinars because this is less than the mandated half-shekel of the Torah. It seems like we have in this mishnah a record of different coins that were in use in different periods. According to one commentary, in each period they would give half of the coin that was commonly used. In any case, since the value of the shekel changed over time, Rabbi Judah says that the shekel too has no fixed value.", + "But Rabbi Shimon said: nevertheless they are all of the same value for everyone, whereas [in the case of] a sin-offering one man may bring it of the value of one sela, another may bring it of the value of two selas, and another in the value of three selas. Rabbi Shimon responds that when he said that the shekel has a fixed value he meant that at any given time everyone brings the same value, and not that that value could not change over time. If people were bringing darics, everyone brought the same daric. In contrast, people can bring animals worth different amounts as sin-offerings. This explains Bet Hillel in the previous mishnah." + ], + [ + "The surplus of [money set aside for] shekels is non-sacred property.
The surplus of [money set aside for the] tenth of the ephah, and the surplus of [money set aside for] bird-offerings of zavim, for bird-offerings of zavot, for bird-offerings of women after childbirth, and sin-offerings and guilt-offerings, their surplus [is used to purchase] freewill-offerings. This is the general rule: all [money set aside] for a sin-offering or for a guilt-offering, the surplus [is used to purchase] freewill-offerings.
The surplus of [money set aside for] a burnt-offering [must be used] for a burnt-offering.
The surplus of [money set aside for] a meal-offering [must be used] for a meal-offering.
The surplus of [money set aside for] a peace-offering [must be used] for a peace-offering.
The surplus of [money set aside for] a pesach [must be used] for a wellbeing offering.
The surplus of [money set aside for] the offerings of nazirites [must be used] for the offerings of other nazirites. The surplus of [money set aside for] the offerings of a [particular] nazirite [is used to purchase] freewill-offerings.
The surplus of [money raised for] the poor [must be used] for other poor. The surplus of [money raised for] a [particular] poor person [must be given] to that [poor person].
The surplus of [money raised for the ransom of] captives [must be used] for [the ransom of other] captives. The surplus of [money raised for the ransom of] a [particular] captive [must be given] to that captive.
The surplus of [the money raised for the burial of] the dead [must be used] for [the burial of other] dead. The surplus of [the money raised for the burial of] a [particular] dead person [must be given] to his heirs. Rabbi Meir says: the surplus of [money raised for the burial of] a [particular] dead person must be laid aside until Elijah comes. Rabbi Natan says: the surplus of [money raised for the burial of] a [particular] dead person [must be used] for building a monument for him over his grave.
In the previous mishnayot we dealt with the subject of what surplus money is used for. This mishnah discusses surpluses left over from money set aside for various other uses, mostly sacrifices or charity.
Section one: This halakhah is according to Bet Hillel’s opinion in mishnah three.
Section two: The tenth of the ephah (a measure of grain) is the sin-offering of a poor person. The bird-offerings mentioned here are brought by men or women who have had abnormal genital discharge (zavim and zavot, see above 1:5) or by women after childbirth. Money set aside for any of these offerings or for a sin-offering or a guilt-offering must be used to purchase freewill offerings. They can’t be used for other bird-offerings, sin-offerings or guilt-offerings because these can only be purchased for the sake of a specific sin or abnormal discharge. However, the surplus is still sacred because these offerings don’t have a fixed amount (see above mishnah 2).
Sections three-five: In all of these cases the extra money is used to buy another of the same type of sacrifice.
Section six: The extra money which was set aside for a pesah cannot be used as a pesah, because the surplus is only created when the holiday is already over. Rather the surplus is used to buy a wellbeing offering. In Pesahim we saw that the pesah is a type of wellbeing offering (see Pesahim 9:6-7).
Section seven: If charity collectors set aside money to buy nazirite offerings for nazirites who cannot afford to pay their offerings, then the surplus is used to buy other nazirite offerings. However, if the money is set aside for a specific nazirite it cannot be used to buy an offering for a different nazirite. Rather the surplus is used to purchase freewill offerings.
Section eight: Obviously, surplus charity should be used for more charity. However, if there is money set aside for a particular poor person, and there is surplus from that money, it too must go to that poor person. The charity collector may not say to himself, “That poor person doesn’t need all of that money. I’ll give the rest to someone else.” Rather, if the donor directed it to one person, the entire amount must be given to that person.
Section nine: Surplus from money collected to redeem captives is used to redeem other captives. However, if money was collected to redeem a specific captive, the surplus goes directly to that captive.
Section ten: Surplus money collected to bury the dead is used to bury other dead people. However, if the money was collected to bury a specific dead person there are three different opinions as to what to do with it. According to the first opinion, the money goes to the dead person’s inheritors. According to Rabbi Meir, it is forbidden to use it at all it must go untouched until Elijah comes. Finally, Rabbi Natan says it is used to build a tombstone over his grave." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah teaches that three times a year they would take the gathered shekels out of the chamber in the Temple and appropriate them to buy public sacrifices. This time is connected to the period in which animals are tithed. In the remainder of the mishnah there are two other opinions as to when animals are tithed, and therefore as to when the shekels are appropriated.", + "At three periods of the year the appropriation is made [from the shekels] in the chamber: Half a month before Pesah, half a month before Shavuot, and half a month before Sukkot, and these are also the threshing floors [the seasons] for the tithe of beasts, the words of Rabbi Akiva. According to Rabbi Akiva the shekels are appropriated at the same time of year that animals are tithed. I have translated “A half-month before” based on the Talmud. The mishnah itself says only “Before”, but uses a word which implies that this must occur at least a half-month before. The word “threshing floors” is borrowed from tithes for grain. The meaning is that in these three periods it becomes forbidden to eat any animal until every tenth animal has been tithed. The tithed animal still belongs to its owners, but its blood must be sprinkled on the altar and its meat eaten in Jerusalem. It seems likely to me that Rabbi Akiva said that animals were tithed before the holidays so that people would bring them to Jerusalem when they made their festival pilgrimages.", + "Ben Azzai says: on the twenty-ninth of Adar, and on the first of Sivan, and on the twenty-ninth of Av. The remaining sages disagree as to when animals are tithed. Ben Azzai gives dates that are more precise and slightly differ from those given by Rabbi Akiva. The twenty-ninth of Adar is basically the same, as it is half a month before Pesah. The first of Sivan is only 7 days before Shavuot. He seems to give more time because there is not a lot of time between Pesah and Shavuot in which animals might be born. The third tithe is at the end of Av, because Ben Azai holds that animals born in Elul are tithed separately.", + "Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon say: on the first of Nisan, on the first of Sivan, and on the twenty-ninth of Elul. Why did they say, “On the twenty-ninth of Elul and not on the first of Tishre? Because the first of Tishre is a holy day, and it is not permitted to tithe on a festival, therefore they moved it up to the twenty-ninth of Elul. Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon that the animals are tithed on the first of Nissan, which is similar to both Rabbi Akiva and one day after Ben Azai’s time. The second tithing period is on the first of Sivan, the same as Ben Azai. The third tithing period is on the twenty-ninth of Elul. The mishnah explains that they would have said the first of Tishre but one can’t tithe on the first of Tishre because it is a holiday, namely Rosh Hashanah. It seems that in this case he basically agrees with Rabbi Akiva who said half a month before Sukkot." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah begins to teach how the appropriation of the shekels was made.", + "In three baskets each of [the capacity of] three seahs they make the appropriation [of shekels] from the chamber. There were three baskets in the chamber, each containing enough space for three seahs worth of coins. This means that altogether in the year they expected 27 seahs worth of coins. If you’re wondering, a seah is about 8 liters, so we’re talking about 216 liters of volume of coins. I don’t know exactly how many coins this is.", + "And on them was inscribed: Aleph, Beth, Gimmel. Rabbi Ishmael says: Greek was inscribed on them, alpha, beta, gamla. The baskets were numbered, so that whichever one filled up first would be used first to buy public sacrifices. The sages debate whether the writing was in Greek or in Hebrew. It seems that one opinion demanded Hebrew because this is the Temple and Hebrew is the “lashon hakodesh” the holy language. Rabbi Ishmael allowed Greek because Greek may have been the more official business language of the time.", + "The one who made the appropriation did not enter the chamber wearing either a bordered cloak or shoes or sandals or tefillin or an amulet, lest if he became poor people might say that he became poor because of a sin committed in the chamber, or if he became rich people might say that he became rich from the appropriation in the chamber. For it is one’s duty to seem be free of blame before others as before God, as it is said: “And you shall be guiltless before the Lord and before Israel” (Numbers 32:22), and it says: “And you will find favor and good understanding in the eyes of God and man” (Proverbs 3:4). The person who went in to count the coins and make the appropriation could not wear any piece of clothing that would cause others to suspect that he might have stolen something. This could only lead to bad results if he grew poor they would suspect him of being punished for having stolen the shekels, if he grew rich they would suspect of being rich because of the stolen money. The mishnah finishes with an important moral note. A person must carefully guard his public reputation, even if in his heart he knows that he is not sinning and even if he knows that in God’s all-seeing eyes he is not sinning. This is especially true of a person with a position of public responsibility. It is not enough to just be honest, one must also give the outward appearance of honesty as well. I believe that this is an important life’s lesson. A person’s reputation of honesty is important both for the moral character of that person himself and for the proper functioning of society." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to teach how the appropriation of the shekels was actually performed.", + "[The members] of Rabban Gamaliel’s household used to enter [the chamber] with their shekel between their fingers, and throw it in front of him who made the appropriation, while he who made the appropriation purposely pressed it into the basket. The mishnah reads “….of Rabban Gamaliel’s household.” I have interpreted this as “the members” but it also may be interpreted to refer to an agent who brings the shekels from his household. In any case, the purpose of the arrangement described here is to get the shekel immediately into the basket so that it can count toward the next appropriation. The person bringing the shekel to the chamber would arrive on the day upon which the appropriation was made and would arrange so that the shekel was not just left in the chamber for a while but rather was put right into the basket.", + "He who made the appropriation did not make it until he first said to them: “Should I make the appropriation?” And they say to him three times: “Make the appropriation! Make the appropriation! Make the appropriation!” The ceremony described here was probably intended as a polemic against those groups of Second Temple Jews, perhaps Sadducees, who opposed the institution of the yearly shekel donation. In order to make it loud and clear that the shekels are being appropriated and that the public sacrifices will be bought from this money, they made public declarations and affirmations that the appropriation was being done with the consent of the people." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah concludes the description of how the appropriation was made.", + "[After] he made the first appropriation, he covers [what is left] with leather covers. [After he made the] second appropriation, he covers [what is left] with leather covers. [But after] the third appropriation he would not cover [what was left]. [And why would he cover?] Lest he should forget and make a [fresh] appropriation from shekels from which had already been appropriated. After the first appropriation, done at Pesah time, he would cover the left over shekels so that they would not be used for the next appropriation. The new shekels that were collected during the next period would be placed on top of the leather coverings. Similarly, after the second appropriation, he would cover the remaining already appropriated shekels with a leather covering and new shekels would go on top. However, after the third appropriation, done at Sukkot time, he would not cover the shekels. The mishnah then explains why he would cover after each appropriation. The reason is that we don’t want shekels that have already been counted in one appropriation to count towards another appropriation. Doing so would be an ancient version of “cooking the books.” The leather covers were placed there to prevent this from happening. Since there is no appropriation after the third one, there was no need to cover the remaining coins. A different explanation is offered by the Rambam. He holds that there were three large baskets in the chamber from which they would fill three smaller baskets, Aleph, Bet and Gimmel. At the first appropriation they would fill up the small basket with the Aleph on it from the first large basket and then cover the first large basket. They would then fill the small basket with the letter Bet on it from the second large basket and cover the second large basket. They would then fill the third basket from the third large basket but they would not cover that basket so that when the next appropriation time would arrive (fifteen days before Shavuot), they would know to begin filling the small basket with the Aleph from the third large basket. In this way, in the space of the year, each small basket would be filled from each larger basket. There is yet another explanation, one which Albeck prefers. That is that the question is not “and why would he cover [the first two]” but rather “why didn’t he cover the third?” The answer is that they would leave the third uncovered because the third appropriation is not really finished until the end of the year. They would leave the remaining coins uncovered to remind themselves to continue to appropriate from them and from new ones that would come in after Sukkot and not the coins underneath which had already been appropriated.", + "He would make the first appropriation on behalf of the Land of Israel, and the second on behalf of the surrounding cities, and the third on behalf of Babylon and on behalf of Medea and on behalf of [other] distant countries. Each appropriation was symbolically attributed to different regions where Jews lived. The one performing the appropriation would at the first appropriation say, “Behold this appropriation is from the Land of Israel for all of Israel” and similarly for the next two. The order is the order of proximity to Jerusalem. It can be assumed that the people who live in Israel will get their shekels to the Temple first, the people who live in the bordering areas will come next and finally those living in Babylonian and Persia will bring their shekels." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah begins to discuss what they did with the money from the appropriation.", + "What did they do with the appropriation? They bring with it the daily burnt-offerings ( and the additional burnt-offerings ( and their libations, the omer and the two loaves and the showbread and all the other public offerings. This section contains a list of some of the public offerings that were purchased from the appropriation. Tamidim see Exodus 29:38, Numbers 28:3; musafim see Numbers 28:9 ff.; the omer Leviticus 23:10-11; the two loaves Leviticus 23:16-17; the showbread Leviticus 24:5-9.", + "Those who guard the aftergrowths of the seventh year take their wages out of the appropriation from the chamber. Rabbi Yose says: [if a man wished] he could volunteer to watch without payment. But they said to him: you too admit that they can only be offered out of public funds. While it is forbidden to work the land during the seventh year, it is permitted to eat produce that grows on its own. This produce was necessary for the omer, the grain brought between Pesah and Shavuot, and the two loaves, brought on Shavuot, because these both had to come from newly harvested produce. To make sure that there was some grain in the fields the Temple would hire guards to watch the aftergrowths. These guards took their salary from the shekels. Rabbi Yose says that if an individual wishes to guard the fields without pay, he is free to do so. The other sages respond that his opinion is problematic. Rabbi Yose agrees that public sacrifices, those listed in section one, must come from public funds and not from individual donations. If one were to volunteer to watch the aftergrowths, he would by law become their owner and it would turn out that the omer and the two loaves would be coming from private donations. Therefore, individuals must take payment in return for guarding the fields." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to discuss what was done with the appropriation of the chamber and then what surplus money was used for.", + "The [red] heifer and the scapegoat and the strip of scarlet came out of the appropriation of the chamber. The red heifer (Numbers 19:2 ff.) and the Yom Kippur scapegoat (Leviticus 16:21) were both purchased with the appropriation money. There are two ceremonies in which the Torah prescribes that a strip of scarlet should be used: 1) the red heifer (Numbers 19:6); 2) and the leper purification (Leviticus 14:4). This strip of scarlet was purchased with the appropriation money.", + "The ramp for the [red] heifer and the ramp for the scapegoat and the strip of scarlet which was between its horns, and [the maintenance of] the pool of water and the wall of the city and its towers and all the needs of the city came out of the remainder in the chamber. This section lists things which were paid for with money which was left over after the three yearly appropriations were made. We can immediately notice that none of the things on this list are sacrifices. Rather most of them are general issues of upkeep. I will explain each separately. The ramp for the [red] heifer: they would build a ramp to lead the red heifer to the Mount of Olives (this is mentioned in Mishnah Parah 3:6). The ramp for the scapegoat: this was used to get the scapegoat out of the city (see Mishnah Yoma 3:6). And the strip of scarlet which was between its horns: they would take a strip of scarlet and place it between the horns of the scapegoat. We will learn more about this when we learn Yoma 6:4. The remaining items on the list are all maintenance for the major structures of the Temple and Jerusalem. I assume that the shekels were not sufficient for all upkeep, and the mishnah does not say that they were. All that the Mishnah states is that the extra shekels would go to this upkeep.", + "Abba Shaul says: the ramp for the [red] cow the high priests made out of their own [means]. Abba Shaul states that the ramp for the red heifer did not come from money left over from the appropriation but rather from the high priests. According to the Tosefta and the Yerushalmi, whenever a red heifer was burnt, the officiating high priest would build a new ramp rather than use a ramp built by a previous high priest." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to deal with money that was left over after all of the needs in the previous mishnah had been taken care of.", + "What did they do with the surplus of the remainder in the chamber?
They would buy with it wines, oils and fine flours, and the profit belonged to the Temple, the words of Rabbi Ishmael. According to Rabbi Ishmael, the money left over in the chamber was used to buy wine, oil and fine flour, which they would then sell to people who needed to bring these items for offerings. The profit would then go to the Temple’s treasury.", + "Rabbi Akiva says: one may not make a profit with the property of the Temple, nor with the property of the poor. Rabbi Akiva says that this is not allowed and that it is potentially disgraceful to turn sacred items or charity into a profit. Furthermore, there is a potential problem of the Temple or poor people losing money on the deal. Rabbi Akiva doesn’t state what he thinks should be done with the extra money. According to one interpretation of the mishnah, the money is used for those things listed in mishnah two, above. According to the Rambam, the money is used for those things listed below in mishnah four." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nWhereas in yesterday’s mishnah we learned what they did with the surplus from the shekels which remained in the chamber after the appropriation had been made, today’s mishnah teaches what they would do with the surplus of the appropriation itself. For instance, when the first of Nisan comes along they would begin to buy public sacrifices with a new appropriation, so what did they do with money left over from the old appropriation?", + "What was done with the surplus of the appropriation?
[They would buy] plates of gold for covering the interior of the Holy of Holies. According to the first opinion, the extra money from the appropriation would be used to buy plates of gold to cover the walls and ceiling of the Holy of Holies.", + "Rabbi Ishmael says: the surplus [from the sale] of the produce was used for the altar’s ‘dessert’, and the surplus of the appropriation was used for the ministering vessels. Rabbi Ishmael says that the surplus from the appropriation was used to buy ministering vessels. He holds that since this money was intended to be used for sacrifices it can also be used to buy the vessels which are used in offering the sacrifices. In yesterday’s mishnah we learned that with the money left in the chamber Rabbi Ishmael said they should buy wines, oils and flours and sell them for a profit. Here he says that the profit is used for the altar’s “dessert.” This refers to wholly burnt offerings that they would offer on the altar when there were no other sacrifices to be offered. This is like a “dessert” for the hungry altar.", + "Rabbi Akiba says: the surplus of the appropriation was used for the altar’s ‘dessert’, and the surplus of the libations was used for the ministering vessels. Rabbi Akiva says that “dessert” for the Temple comes from the surplus of the appropriation. The ministering vessels, on the other hand, were bought from the surplus of libations. This refers to extra flour and wine which were bought to make libations. The “extra” can happen when merchants promise to provide three seahs worth of flour for a sela (a coin). If the price of flour goes down to four seahs for a sela, the merchants have to bring four seahs, even though only three seahs are to be consecrated as libations. The Temple’s treasurers can sell the extra seah and with the profit pay for the ministering vessels.", + "Rabbi Hananiah the chief of the priests says: the surplus of the libations was used for the altar’s ‘dessert’, and the surplus of the appropriation was used for the ministering vessels. Rabbi Hananiah, the chief of priests, has yet another opinion about what to do with the extra money (doesn’t everyone love extra money!). His opinion is an opposite version of Rabbi Akiva’s. I find it interesting that we have here a priest, someone who would seemingly have known very well what went on in the Temple, and yet his opinion does not count any more than any of the other rabbi’s opinion.", + "Neither of these [two sages] allowed [a profit from the sale of] the produce. The mishnah ends by noting that both Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Hananiah agree that they don’t use the shekels to buy produce and then sell it to make a profit, as was the opinion of Rabbi Ishmael. It seems that the editor of the mishnah strongly disagrees with Rabbi Ishmael and hence wishes to emphasize that all of the other sages disagree with him." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with the extra incense. Every day there were two incense offerings, one in the morning and one in the evening (Exodus 30:7-8). The incense for 365 days and for three extra incense offerings on Yom Kippur was prepared ahead of time. The lunar year is only 354 years, so the extra incense was to be saved up for the leap year, when they would add a month. The problem is that from the first of Nisan the incense had to be offered using the new shekels. Our mishnah describes a way in which they could save the incense for the following year and yet still pay for it with new shekels.", + "What was done with the surplus of the incense?
They would separate from it the wages of the craftsmen, and they would exchange it for the wages of the craftsmen, and they would give it to the craftsmen as their wages, and then they would buy it back again out of a new appropriation. This is how they would turn the incense for the previous year into incense for the following year. First they would separate an amount of incense that would be used to pay the wages of those who make the incense. Then they would redeem that incense with money set aside to pay those craftsmen. The money then would become sacred and the incense would be non-sacred. They then would give the non-sacred incense to the craftsmen as their wages and then they would buy back the incense with new shekels. The craftsmen would have their wages, and the incense was bought with new shekels. They could have done all this in a much simpler way they could simply sell the old incense and then buy it back with new money. However, the rabbis thought that the arrangement of using it for the craftsmen’s wages was more appropriate for sacred money.", + "If the new month had arrived in time they would bring it with the new appropriation, but if not, they from the old one. If the first of Nisan came on time, meaning that Adar had only twenty-nine days, then they would immediately begin to use the new appropriation to buy the incense and all of the public sacrifices. However, if Nisan did not come on time, meaning Adar had thirty days, they would bring it from the incense bought with the old shekels." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with a person who dedicates some of his possessions to the Temple and among them are things which can be used as public sacrifices but not as individual sacrifices. This would include, for instance, the ingredients for making the incense. We should note that these cannot just simply be used for public sacrifices because as we have learned on several occasions, public sacrifices must be paid for with public money and not individual donations.", + "If one dedicated his possessions to the Temple, and there was among them things which was fit for public offerings, they should be given to the craftsmen as their wages; the words of Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Akiva says that if among the dedicated property there are things which can be used for public offerings, those things should go as payment to the craftsmen. Rabbi Akiva holds that things which are dedicated to the Temple can become regular non-sacred items if they are used in payment for work done for the Temple.", + "Ben Azzai said to him: this method is not correct. Rather, they separate from them the wages of the craftsmen, and then they exchange them for the money due to the craftsmen, and then they give them to the craftsmen as their wages, and then they buy them back again out of a new appropriation. Ben Azzai says that Rabbi Akiva’s halakhah is incorrect, because he treats this incense differently from the way in which the extra incense was treated above in mishnah five. Ben Azzai holds that the cases are similar and should therefore be treated in the same way. He also disagrees with Rabbi Akiva about things becoming non-sacred by being used to pay for work done in the Temple. Accordingly, Ben Azzai says that the same procedure described in yesterday’s mishnah should be performed here as well. First they separate from the dedicated property an amount equal to the wages owed to the craftsmen. Then they redeem this property with coins that are to go to the craftsmen. They then give the incense to the craftsmen as their wages and then buy the incense back with money from the new appropriation. This is the exact same procedure described above, in yesterday’s mishnah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nYesterday’s mishnah discussed what is done with things dedicated to the Temple that can be used as public sacrifices but not as individual sacrifices. Today’s mishnah discusses things dedicated to the Temple that can be used for individual sacrifices.", + "The case under discussion is one in which a person dedicated his possessions to the Temple and these possessions included animals which could be offered as individual sacrifices, and not public sacrifices as was the case in yesterday’s mishnah. The question is: what is to be done with these animals? The main debate in the mishnah is over what was the man’s intention that the animals should be completely put on the altar, meaning they should be burnt offerings, which are completely burnt on the altar, or that all of his property should go to the Temple for its upkeep.", + "One who dedicated his possessions to the Temple and there was among them an animal fit for the altar, males or females,
Rabbi Eliezer says: males should be sold for the use of burnt-offerings and females should be sold for the use of offerings of wellbeing, and the proceeds should be lumped together with the rest of the possessions for the repair of the temple. Rabbi Eliezer holds that the male animals should be sold to people who wish to offer a burnt offering whereas the female animals, which cannot be used for burnt offerings, should be sold to people who wish to offer an offering of wellbeing. The proceeds from the sales and any of other dedicated property are used for the repairs and upkeep of the Temple. Rabbi Eliezer holds that unspecified dedications to the Temple are directed at paying for the upkeep of the Temple.", + "Rabbi Joshua says: the males themselves should be offered as burnt-offerings and the females should be sold for the use of offerings of wellbeing, and with the proceeds burnt offerings should be brought, and the other possessions should go to the repair of the temple. Rabbi Joshua says that the male animals should be sacrificed as burnt offerings and not sold. Rabbi Joshua holds that when the person dedicated to the Temple animals which can be sacrificed he intended them to be whole burnt offerings and not that they should pay for the upkeep of the Temple. The female animals are sold to become wellbeing offerings and then the money is used to purchase more burnt offerings which are offered on the altar. They aren’t offered as wellbeing offerings, because parts of the wellbeing offerings are eaten and Rabbi Joshua says the intention was that all of the animal would go to the altar. The other property is used for the upkeep of the Temple.", + "Rabbi Akiva says: I prefer the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer over the opinion of Rabbi Joshua, for Rabbi Eliezer applied a uniform rule, but Rabbi Joshua differentiated. Rabbi Akiva says that Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion is preferable because he is consistent both the males and females are sold and the proceeds from both sales go to the repair of the Temple, as does the other property which was dedicated to the Temple. In contrast, Rabbi Joshua said that the animals fit for the altar are used either as whole burnt offering or are sold to buy other whole burnt offerings, whereas the other dedicated property is used for the upkeep. Rabbi Akiva prefers the consistent of Rabbi Eliezer and hence rules accordingly. We should note that this preference for consistency is a function of Rabbi Akiva’s own logic, and not of a received tradition. In other words, in the absence of any foreknowledge of who is correct, he tries his best to determine the correct halakhah from the opinions of his two teachers.", + "Rabbi Papias said: I have heard [a tradition in accordance] with both of their opinions: that one who dedicates to the Temple with explicitness, it is according to the words of Rabbi Eliezer, but one who dedicates to the Temple without specifying it is according to the opinion of Rabbi Joshua. In contrast, Rabbi Papias says that he has a received tradition, one which mediates between Rabbi Eliezer’s position and Rabbi Joshua’s. When one specifies that his dedication is for the upkeep of the Temple, the law follows Rabbi Eliezer. However, if he doesn’t specify then the tradition is according to Rabbi Joshua." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with a person who dedicated his belongings to the Temple and there were among them things which could be offered on the altar, but they were not animal sacrifices, as was the case in mishnah 7.", + "One who dedicated his possessions to the Temple and there were among them things fit for the altar, [such as] wines, oils, and birds: Rabbi Elazar says: they should be sold for the use of [offerings of] each particular kind, and they should bring with the proceeds burnt offerings, and the other possessions should go to the repair of the Temple. Rabbi Elazar says that the wines, oils and birds should be sold to people who need to bring wines for libations, oils to accompany minhah (grain) offerings or various bird offerings. The proceeds from the sale should be used to buy burnt offerings, and then, as is standard, all of the other dedicated possessions should go to the upkeep of the Temple. The Rambam explains how this situation differs from the situation in mishnah seven, where Rabbi Eliezer said that animals dedicated to the Temple should be sold to people who need them for sacrifices and the proceeds go to the repair of the Temple. That mishnah discussed animals and not wines, oils and birds as does our mishnah. Animals dedicated as sacrifices can be, under certain circumstances, redeemed. If the animal becomes blemished, it is redeemed with money and the money becomes sacred and is used to buy another sacrifice. Since the money becomes sacred, when these animals are sold it is as if the mitzvah has been already performed and the money can be used for the repair of the Temple. In contrast, wine, oil and birds cannot be redeemed with money. Therefore, when they are sold the money itself does not become holy. Since the money is not holy, the mitzvah has not been performed and therefore the money must be used to buy burnt offerings, through which the mitzvah can be performed." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah teaches how prices were fixed on behalf of the Temple such that the Temple would always get the better of the deal, should there be price changes.", + "Once in thirty days prices were fixed [on behalf of] the chamber. Once every thirty days the prices of oil, fine flour and wine were set so that the Temple (the chamber) would be able to buy at that price for the entire month. This means that if the market price went up, the Temple could still buy at the lower rate. However, if the market price of these items went down, the Temple could buy the items at the new lower rate. The mishnah shall now illustrate.", + "Anyone who had accepted upon himself to supply fine flours at four [se'ahs for a sela] and they now stood at three [se'ahs for a sela] he must [still] supply four. If a merchant agreed to sell flour at four se’ahs (a measure of volume) for a sela (a coin) and then the price went up to three se’ahs for a sela, the merchant takes the loss. The Temple can still give him a coin and get four se’ahs.", + "[If he had accepted to supply fine flours] at three [se'ahs for a sela] and they now stood at four, he must [also] supply at four, for the sanctified property has the upper hand. However, if the price was three se’ahs for a sela and it went down to four se’ahs for a sela, he must provide four se’ahs. The mishnah notes that the Temple (i.e. the sanctified property) always has the upper hand.", + "If the fine flour became worm-eaten the loss is his; if the wine became sour the loss is his. For he is not entitled to his money until the altar has accepted [the offering]. If the Temple buys some produce but before the produce is offered it goes bad, the merchant must replace the produce. This is because the money is not considered to belong to the merchant until the flour, wine or oil has actually been offered. Since the money is not yet his, he must replace the ruined product in order to keep the money which the Temple’s treasurers gave him." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "These were the officers in the Temple:
Yohanan the son of Pinchas was over the seals.
Ahiyah over the libations.
Mattityah the son of Shmuel over the lots.
Petahiah over the bird-offering. (Petahiah was Mordecai. Why was his name called Petahiah? Because he ‘opened’ matters and expounded them, and he understood the seventy tongues.)
The son of Ahijah over the sickness of the bowels.
Nehuniah, the digger of ditches.
Gevini, the crier.
The son of Gever over the locking of the gates.
The son of Bevai over the strips [for lighting the menorah].
The son of Arza over the cymbal.
Hugras the son of Levi over the song.
The house of Garmu over the making of the showbread.
The house of Avtinas over the preparing of the frankincense.
Elazar over the curtains.
And Pinchas over the priestly vestments.
This mishnah lists and names fifteen officers who performed various services in the Temple. There are various interpretations as to the names. Albeck explains that in every generation the officers who filled these functions were called by these names. Another explanation is that this is the list of the names of those who served in the Temple at the time when this mishnah was composed.
1) Yohanan the son of Pinchas was over the seals: This will be explained below in mishnayot 3-5.
2) Ahiyah over the libations: This too will be explained in mishnayot 3-5.
3) Mattityah the son of Shmuel over the lots: Lots were cast between the priests in order to determine who got to offer which sacrifice.
4) Petahiah over the bird-offering. (Petahiah was Mordecai. Why was his name called Petahiah? Because he ‘opened’ matters and expounded them, and he understood the seventy tongues): Petahiah sold bird-offerings to those who needed to bring them. The section in parentheses is a late addition to the mishnah that is missing from most manuscripts. Petahiah comes from the word “petach” which means to open and can refer to the opening of a midrashic sermon.
5) The son of Ahiyah over the sickness of the bowels: Many priests had gastrointestinal ailments. This is probably due to their frequent contact with raw meat and infected water. The son of Ahiyah was responsible for the medicines and other cures for these illnesses.
6) Nehuniah, the digger of ditches: Nehuniah oversaw the digging of wells, cisterns and irrigation channels.
7) Gevini, the announcer: Gevini would cry out each morning, “Rise up priests to your worship (avodah), Levites to your stands and Israelites to your stations (maamadot).”
8) The son of Gever over the locking of the gates: He would close the gates in the evening.
9) The son of Bevai over the strips: these were the wicks used in lighting the menorah.
10) The son of Arza over the cymbal: The cymbal was used to signal to the Levites to begin to sing.
11) Hugras the son of Levi over the song: he conducted the Levites in their daily songs.
12) The house of Garmu over the making of the showbread: this house of priests was responsible for baking the twelve loaves that were on the table throughout the week.
13) The house of Avtinas over the preparing of the frankincense: they crushed the herbs and prepared the mixture.
14) Elazar over the curtains: he sewed the curtains and then maintained them.
15) And Pinchas over the priestly vestments: he made the vestments, put them on the priests and then took them off when their service was completed." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with two other offices in the Temple. The difference between today’s mishnah and yesterday’s is that since the offices described have responsibility to deal with money they were filled by more than one person to prevent dishonesty.", + "They did not have less than three treasurers. The treasures were responsible for the Temple’s finances. One of their important functions was to redeem sanctified property so that they could use the money for necessary projects. (Sort of like selling Temple stock!)", + "Or less than seven superintendents. The seven superintendents held the seven keys to the Temple courtyard. They each needed to be there before the Temple courtyard could be opened. When the doors were opened the treasurers could gain entrance.", + "Nor create positions of authority over the public in matters of money [with] less than two [officers], except [in the case] of the son of Ahiyah who was over the sickness of the bowels and Elazar who was over the veil, for these had been accepted by the majority of the public. In all positions of monetary authority it was necessary to appoint at least two officers. This seems to be a way of limiting the possibilities of dishonesty and fraud. The only exceptions are the two single officers in the Temple, the son of Ahiyah and Elazar, who had monetary authority over the public (to buy spices and materials for the curtains). This was acceptable because the public had trusted and allowed them to fill these positions as individuals." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nAbove in mishnah one we learned that Yohanan the son of Pinchas was responsible for the seals and that Ahiyah was responsible for the libations. In today’s mishnah and in tomorrow’s we will learn what their responsibilities are.\nThe libations refers to grain offerings which include flour mixed with oil and a libation of wine. These grain offerings accompany certain animal sacrifices: an offering of well-being, a burnt offering and the sin and guilt offerings of a leper. The amount of grain, oil and wine would vary depending upon the animal used in the sacrifice. The following chart should be helpful:\nFlour\nOil\nWine\nSheep or goat (one year old)\n1/10 of a measure\n1/4 hin\n1/4 hin\nRam (two years old)\n2/10\n1/3 hin\n1/3 hin\nCow or calf\n3/10\n1/2 hin\n1/2 hin\nSomeone who needed to bring a libation (a grain offering) with his/her sacrifice could buy the exact amount of flour, oil and wine directly from the Temple. This would ensure that the offering was pure. He would pay the money to Yochanan ben Pinchas who would give him a note with a stamp on it. He would then take the note to Ahiyah who would give him the correct amount of flour, oil and wine.", + "There were four seals in the Temple, and on them was inscribed [respectively]: ‘calf’, ‘ram’, ‘kid’, ‘sinner’. According to the first opinion there were four seals, one for each of the three types of animals described above in the chart and one inscribed with the word “sinner”, for the leper who brings three offerings, a guilt offering, a sin offering and a burnt offering, each of which come from various types of sheep (see Leviticus 14). Since the leper brings three sheep he therefore brings three times the amount of flour, oil and water that is brought for one sheep (see the chart). In addition he brings one extra log (a small measure=1/12 of a hin) of oil which was placed on his right earlobe, right thumb and right big toe (Leviticus 14:15-18). Each seal would signify that he has paid for that amount of libation flour, oil and wine.", + "Ben Azzai says: there were five and on them was inscribed in Aramaic [respectively]” ‘calf’, ‘ram’, ‘kid’, ‘poor sinner’, and ‘rich sinner’. Ben Azzai has two disagreements with the previous opinion. First of all, he holds that the inscriptions were in Aramaic and not in Hebrew, since Aramaic was the language with which most people were more familiar. Secondly, he says that there were two types of inscriptions for the leper, one for the poor sinner who only brings one sheep and its libations (Lev. 14:21-31), and the one extra log of oil described above. The other for the rich sinner who brings three sheep, as described above. The opinion in section one according to which there was only one inscription for the leper holds that the poor leper, who brings one sheep, buys the libations of a sheep and brings the extra log of oil from his home.", + "[The seal inscribed] ‘calf’ served for the libations of cattle, both large and small, male and female. The mishnah now explains what each seal is for. “Calf” is for all cattle, meaning cows and bulls, whether they are male which are used as whole burnt offerings or females used as offerings of wellbeing.", + "[The seal inscribed] ‘kid’ served for the libations of flock animals, both large and small, male and female, with the exception of rams. The seal of the kid was used to buy libations for all flock offerings (sheep and goats) as long as they were a year or less old. From thirteen months and older the sheep is considered to be a ram.", + "[The one inscribed] ‘ram’ served for the libations of rams alone. The seal of the ram was used to buy libations for the ram only.", + "[The one inscribed] ‘sinner’ served for the libations of the three animals [offered] by lepers. The seal upon which was inscribed the word “sinner” was used to buy the libations for the three animals that a leper brings, plus the additional log as we described in section one." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah explains how a person would buy libation offerings, meaning the flour, oil and wine which we described in yesterday’s mishnah.", + "If one required libations he would go to Yohanan who was the officer over the seals, and give him money and receive from him a seal. Then he would go to Ahiyah who was the officer over the libations, and give him the seal, and receive from him the libations. This is the process through which a person could buy his libation offerings.", + "And in the evening these two [officers] would come together, and Ahiyah would bring out the seals and receive money for their value. And if there was more [than their value] the surplus belonged to the sanctuary, but if there was less [than their value] Yohanan would pay [the loss] out of his own pocket; for the Temple has the upper hand. Here we get an early description of Jewish accounting! In the evening, after the day’s work at the Temple was done, the two officers would get together to check the accounts. Ahiyah would take out the seals which he had received and collect the money from Yohanan. If there was extra money then that money belonged to the Temple. However, if there was not enough money to cover the seals, then Yohanan would have to make up the difference from his own pocket. The mishnah notes that the Temple’s treasury has the upper hand it can gain from someone’s mistake but not lose. As they say it’s good to be the Temple." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah describes what happens if someone loses his seal, meaning he claims that he gave the money to Yohanan but by the time he got to Ahiyah to buy his libations the seal was lost.", + "If one lost his seal his case they wait [to deal] with him until the evening. If he lost his seal, then they tell him to wait until evening when they reckon the accounts.", + "If they found [money left over] to the value of his lost seal, they give [it] to him and if not he gets nothing. If they find extra money equivalent to the amount his seal is worth, then they give him back the money or give him the flour, oil and wine for the libations he needs to bring. But if there is no extra money then he gets nothing, since it is possible that he is lying.", + "On the seals was inscribed the name of the day because of the defrauders. They would put dates on the seals to stop fraud, or at least make it more difficult. The dates would prevent a person from claiming that he lost his seal and waiting until the end of the day in the hopes that Yohanan would have extra money. In such a case the person could get his money back and then take out the seal and get the libations from Ahiyah. By putting on dates this particular form of fraud became impossible." + ], + [ + "There were two chambers in the Temple, one the chamber of secret gifts and the other the chamber of the vessels.
The chamber of secret gifts: sin-fearing persons used to put their gifts there in secret, and the poor who were descended of the virtuous were secretly supported from them.
The chamber of the vessels: whoever offered a vessel as a gift would throw it in, and once in thirty days the treasurers opened it; and any vessel they found in it that was of use for the repair of the temple they left there, but the others were sold and their price went to the chamber of the repair of the temple.
This mishnah discusses how people could give charity in secret either to the Temple or to the poor. We should note that in the Rambam’s discussion of charity he states that the second best form in which to give tzedakah is neither for the giver to know the receiver nor for the receiver to know the giver. The only way which is preferred over secrecy is to help a person earn his own living.
The mishnah is clear and doesn’t seem to need any explanation. However, I will offer some historical commentary.
The Temple in Jerusalem was clearly a repository of wealth, as were most Temples in the ancient world. When Josephus describes how Antiochus came to pillage Jerusalem (the events that preceded the Hasmonean revolution) he writes (Antiquities of the Jews XII, chapter 5, section four:
“The king came up to Jerusalem, and, pretending peace, he got possession of the city by treachery; at which time he spared not so much as those that admitted him into it, on account of the riches that lay in the temple; but, led by his covetous inclination, (for he saw there was in it a great deal of gold, and many ornaments that had been dedicated to it of very great value,) and in order to plunder its wealth, he ventured to break the league he had made. So he left the temple bare, and took away the golden candlesticks, and the golden altar [of incense], and table [of shew-bread], and the altar [of burnt-offering]; and did not abstain from even the veils, which were made of fine linen and scarlet. He also emptied it of its secret treasures, and left nothing at all remaining.”
The secret treasures referred to here may be similar to that which Josephus describes. What interests me, beyond the sheer parallel between the Mishnah and Josephus, is that the rabbis assume that some of these treasures must have gone to tzedakah. According to the rabbis, the Temple must have at least partially functioned as a repository where people could give money secretly. In the rabbinic mind, the Temple’s treasures could not just have been designated to make its leaders wealthier or to pay for more ornament decorations. The money must have gone to the poor as well. I do not know if this is historically accurate but to me it makes no difference. What the Mishnah is telling us is that our religious centers, be it the Temple or the synagogue, must also be points of tzedakah, and not just tzedakah for the organization itself, but tzedakah for the poor. The Temple/synagogue is the exchange center by which Jews can give charity secretly." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah describes certain physical features of the Temple. Fans of the Raiders of the Lost Ark series will enjoy this mishnah, as well as tomorrow’s.", + "There were in the Temple thirteen chests, thirteen tables and thirteen prostrations. There were thirteen chests in the Temple to collect money for various items. These will be explained below in mishnah five. There were thirteen tables, which will be explained below in mishnah four. Finally, there were thirteen places in which people would prostrate themselves and these will be explained in mishnah three. Notice the chiastic order chests, tables and prostrations and below we will see prostrations, tables and chests.", + "[Members] of the household of Rabban Gamaliel and of Rabbi Hananiah the chief of the priests used would prostrate fourteen [times. And where was the additional [prostration]? In front of the wood storage yard, for they had a tradition from their forefathers that the Ark was hidden there. The people of the household of Rabban Gamaliel and Rabbi Hananiah the chief of the priests would do an extra prostration. They would do this extra prostration in front of the wood storage yard, the place where the wood that was used to fuel the altar was stored. They prostrated there because they had a tradition that that was where the Ark of the Covenant was buried. There are two main traditions concerning the fate of the Ark in rabbinic literature. The first holds that King Josaiah buried it in the Temple and the second holds that it was carried off to Babylonia when the Temple was destroyed. The third holds that it is sitting in a storehouse in Washington D.C. (just kidding)." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to discuss the hidden location of the Ark of the Covenant.", + "It once happened that a priest who was busy [there] noticed that the floor [of the wood storage area] was different from the others. He went and told it to his friend but before he had time to finish his words his soul departed. Then they knew for certain that there the Ark was hidden. In this legendary tale a priest is busy chopping wood in the wood storage area of the Temple when he notices that the floor looks a little different. He rushes off to tell his friend about what he saw but before he can get the words out of his mouth, he dies (I hope his face didn’t start to melt off. Indy should have told him to just close his eyes!). From this the other priests knew for certain that the Ark was hidden there." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah teaches that the thirteen prostrations mentioned in mishnah one above were made in front of the thirteen gates in the Temple. The mishnah proceeds to name the gates. The commentators explain that the prostrations were to thank God for the glory of the Temple.", + "And where did they make the prostrations? Four [times] in the north, four [times] in the south, three [times] in the east, and twice in the west, in front of the thirteen gates. This section teaches where in the Temple the thirteen gates were located.", + "The southern gates close to the west [side were]: the Upper Gate, the Fuel Gate, the Gate of the Firstborn [Animals], and the Water Gate. Why was it called the Water Gate? Because through it was brought in the flask of water for the libation on Sukkot. Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov says: through it the waters trickle forth and in the time to come “they will come forth from under the threshold of the Temple” (Ezekiel 47:1). The Upper Gate was on the southwestern side, which was the highest point of the Temple. The Fuel Gate was used to bring in the wood used to fuel the altar’s fires. The firstborn animals were brought in through the Firstborn Animal’s Gate (should be obvious, but still..). The mishnah offers two explanations for why the Water Gate was called as such. The first explanation is that this is where the water libation, offered on Sukkot (we will learn this eventually in Sukkah 4:9), was brought into the Temple. The second is that in the future, when clean living water flows out of the Temple and cleanses the salty water of the Dead Sea, the water will begin to trickle forth from this gate (see Ezekiel 47). There is no Nixon connection.", + "On the opposite side in the north close to the west were: Jechoniah’ Gate, the Gate of the Offerings, the Gate of the Women, and the Gate of Song. And why was it called the Jechoniah’ Gate? Because through it Jechoniah went out into his captivity. On the opposite side, in the North, there were four more gates. Jechoniah’s Gate was named after the King Jechoniah who was taken captive and put into exile by Nebuchadnezzar (see II Kings 24:15). Sacrifices, which were slaughtered in the northern part of the Temple, were brought in through the Offerings Gate. The Woman’s Gate was a special entrance for women when they brought their sacrifices. The Gate of Song was used to bring in the musical instruments which the Levites used.", + "In the east was the Nicanor’s Gate, and it had two small gates, one to the right and one to the left. In the east was Nicanor’s Gate, named after Nicanor who according to legend brought the gates from Egypt. Nicanor’s gates were surrounded by two smaller gates that were included in the tally of thirteen gates.", + "There were also two gates in the west which had no name. The western gates were infrequently used and hence had no special name." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah lists the thirteen tables mentioned in mishnah one.", + "There were thirteen tables in the Temple:
Eight of marble in the place of slaughtering and on them they would rinse the entrails. In the slaughtering section of the Temple there were eight marble tables upon which they would rinse out the entrails of the sacrificial animals.", + "And two to the west of the ramp [which ascends the altar], one of marble and one of silver; on that of marble they would place the limbs [of the offerings], and on that of silver the ministering vessels. To the west of the ramp used to ascend to the altar were two more tables, one of marble and one of silver. They would put the limbs of the sacrifices on the marble table where they would wait until they were offered on the altar. The marble was cool and hence slowed down the deterioration of the meat. On the silver table they would place the ministering vessels. These were 93 vessels which were brought out each morning and which would be used in worship during the day.", + "And there were two tables in the Porch on the inside of the entrance to the Temple, one of marble and the other of gold; on that of marble they would place the showbread placed when it was brought in, and on that of gold [they would place the showbread] when it was taken out, because things sacred may be raised [in honor] but not lowered. The Porch was the open section of the Temple right outside the Sanctuary. There were two tables there, one of marble and one of gold. Both of these tables were used for the showbread. When the bread was baked on Friday it would be placed on the marble table so that it wouldn’t begin to mold before it was brought into the Sanctuary on Shabbat. When it was taken out of the Sanctuary on the following Shabbat, it was placed on the golden table before it was divvied up to the priests. The mishnah notes that this follows an important halakhic rule sacred things such as the showbread should rise up in holiness and not be lowered down. Since it was on a golden table inside the Sanctuary, it had to be on a golden table when it was brought out. The most famous application of this rule is that on Hannukah we add a candle each night because we are to increase in holiness and not decrease.", + "And there was one [table] of gold on the inside of the Sanctuary on which the showbread lay continually. During the week, the showbread was placed on a golden table, as we mentioned above." + ], + [ + "There were thirteen chests in the Temple and on them was inscribed [respectively]:
“new shekels”;
“New shekels” those for each year;
“old shekels”;
“Old shekels” whoever has not paid his shekel in the past year may pay it in the coming year;
“bird-offerings”;
“Bird-offerings” these are turtle-doves;
“young pigeons for burnt-offerings”;
“Young pigeons for burnt-offerings” these are young pigeons.
“wood”;
“frankincense”;
“gold for the kapporet”;
and on six, “freewill offerings”. Both [these two chests] are for burnt-offerings, the words of Rabbi Judah. But the sages say: “bird-offerings” one [half] is for sin-offerings and the other [half] for burnt-offerings, but “young pigeons for burnt-offerings” all goes to burnt-offerings.
This mishnah describes the thirteen chests that were in the Temple, as we learned above in mishnah one. We should note that the mishnah first lists all of the chests, and then below it explains more fully four of them. I shall explain them all in my explanation of the first section.
Section one: The “new shekels” chest was for shekels that were collected during each year. From this chest the shekels would later be brought into the chamber.
Section two: The “old shekels” chest was for people who failed to bring their shekels during the year.
Sections three and four: The “bird-offerings” are turtledoves (sorry, no partridge in a pear tree). The “young pigeons for burnt offerings” are, as might be obvious young pigeons. The sages dispute what these bird offerings are used for. According to Rabbi Judah both the bird-offerings and the young pigeons are used for burnt offerings. He holds that people who put money into both of these chests are bringing voluntary offerings, and voluntary bird offerings are only offered as burnt offerings. If someone needed to bring a mandated bird offering (such as a leper or a woman after childbirth) she didn’t put the money in the box but rather gave the offering directly to a priest.
The other sages agree that the box marked “young pigeons for burnt-offerings” goes exclusively for burnt offerings. This box, and only this box, was where people who wanted to make voluntary bird offerings put their money. The box marked “bird offerings” is intended for those who are obligated to bring a pair of birds, one for a sin offering and one for a burnt offering. There is actually an entire tractate (Tractate Kinim) about these bird offerings.
Section five: This was for people who wished to donate wood to fuel the altar.
Section six: For people who wished to donate the frankincense.
Section seven: One who said, “Behold I am donating gold” would bring golden dinarim (a type of coin) and put them in this box. The dinarim would then be used to buy gold to make various coverings for the Holy of Holies. The word “kapporet” in the Torah refers to the cover of the Ark, but here in this mishnah it refers to all golden coverings.
Section eight: There were six other chests upon which was inscribed “freewill offerings.” This was parallel to the six things listed above in 2:5 whose surplus goes to freewill offerings. See there for an explanation as to what these six things were." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first half of our mishnah explains what one who volunteers to bring wood, frankincense or gold, three of the chests mentioned in yesterday’s mishnah (sections 5-7), must bring.\nThe second half of the mishnah deals with the eighth section of yesterday’s mishnah, which mentions the six boxes upon which was inscribed “for freewill offerings.”", + "One who says: “Behold, I am obligated to bring wood”, he may not bring less than two logs. [If he says: “Behold, I am obligated to bring] frankincense”, he may not bring less than a handful of it. [If he says: “Behold, I am obligated to bring] gold”, he may not bring less than a gold denar. This section spells out how much wood, frankincense or gold one must bring if one makes a vow to bring one of these items without specifying how much he will bring. If he specifies how much he will bring, then he brings that amount.", + "“On six [was inscribed] “for freewill-offerings”: What was done with the freewill-offerings? They would buy with them burnt-offerings, the flesh [of which] was for the name [of God] and the hides for the priests. As we learned yesterday, on six of the chests was inscribed “freewill offerings.” The mishnah now teaches that this money was used to buy burnt offerings. The flesh of the offering would be completely burnt on the altar but the hides would go to the priests.", + "The following is the midrash which was expounded by Yehoyada the high priest: “It is a guilt-offering; it is a guilt offering, it goes to the Lord” (Leviticus 5:19). This is the general rule: anything which is brought because of a sin or because of guilt, they should purchase with it burnt offerings, the flesh [of which] was for the name [of God] and the hides for the priests. Thus the two verses are fulfilled: a guilt offering for the Lord and a guilt offering for the priests, and it says: “Money brought as a guilt offering or as a sin offering was not deposited in the House of the Lord; it went to the priests” (II Kings 12:17). In this section we read a midrash which explains how we derive the halakhah in the previous section, that the priests receive the hides and the flesh is totally burnt. This is justified through a midrashic reading of Leviticus 5:19, which I have translated to facilitate its midrashic understanding. This verse seems to state that a guilt offering goes to God like a burnt offering, whereas we know from other places that the guilt offering goes to the priests. Yehoyada solves this riddle by stating that any surplus from money dedicated to purchasing a sin or guilt offering is used to buy burnt offerings, the flesh goes to the altar and the hides go to the priest. This is the now the interpretation of the verse in II Kings 12 which contains an extended explanation of how Yehoyada would collect money for the Temple. Verse 17 states that “Money brought as a guilt offering or as a sin offering was not deposited in the House of the Lord; it went to the priests.” This cannot be explained to simply mean that money set aside to purchase guilt or sin offerings went directly to the priests, since they had to buy the sacrifices. Rather the explanation is that if money was left over after the requisite sacrifices were purchased, they would buy with it burnt-offerings as voluntary offerings, and they would keep the hides for themselves." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThe first mishnah of this chapter deals with the status of coins found in between the money chests that were in the Temple (see above, chapter 6:5). The three mishnayot which follow will also deal with various items found in a certain place in which their status is uncertain. The rabbis seem to be enamored with this type of discussion how do we determine the status of something whose status is doubtful?", + "The general rule for this mishnah is found only at the end, but since it applies to the entire mishnah, I shall explain it now. If coins are found between two other groups of coins, they are considered to be of the status of the coins to which they are closest. This is true even if that creates a leniency, as we shall see as we proceed. However, if they are found equidistant between the two, then they go to the coins which are treated with greater stringency. In essence, this mishnah becomes a statement about which of two items is “more important” or at least which has to be dealt with with greater stringency.", + "Coins which were found between the [chest inscribed] “shekels” and the [chests inscribed] “freewill-offerings: Nearer to [the chest inscribed] “shekels”, they go to the shekels; [Nearer to the chests inscribed] “freewill-offerings”, they go to freewill-offerings; Half way in between, they go to freewill-offerings. In this case “freewill offerings” is more stringent since these coins go to purchase burnt offerings. Therefore, only if the coins fall closer to the “shekalim” chest, whose shekels are used for various purposes (see above 4:1-2), are the coins considered “shekalim.”", + "[Coins which were found] between [the chest inscribed] “wood” and [the chest inscribed] “frankincense”: Nearer to [the chest inscribed] “wood”, they go to the wood; [Nearer to the chest inscribed] “frankincense”, they go to frankincense; Half way in between, they go to frankincense. “Frankincense” is considered more stringent, or in this case important, than “wood” because the frankincense is itself a type of sacrifice while the wood is only an instrument used to burn other sacrifices.", + "[Coins which were found] between [the chest inscribed] “bird-offerings” and [the chest inscribed] “young pigeons for burnt-offerings”: Nearer to [the chest inscribed] “bird-offerings” they go to bird-offerings; [Nearer to the chest inscribed] “young pigeons for burnt-offerings”, they go to young pigeons for burnt-offerings; Half way in between, they go to young pigeons for burnt-offerings. The chest for “young pigeons for burnt offerings” is considered more stringent because all of the money in this chest goes for burnt offerings. In contrast, the money in the chest inscribed with “bird offerings” goes partly for burnt offerings and partly for sin offerings, as was the opinion of the sages above in 6:5. Since only part goes for burnt offerings, money found halfway in between the two chests goes to the chest marked “young pigeons for burnt offerings.”", + "[Coins which were found] between non-sacred [money] and [second] tithes [money]: Nearer to the non-sacred [money], they go to common [money]; Nearer to the [second] tithes [money], they go to [second] tithes; Half way in between, they are considered [second] tithes. This section has nothing to do with the chests in the Temple. The mishnah is now beginning to expand the discussion to general cases of money whose status is doubtful. If one has a pile of money that is not sacred and a pile of money that is “second tithe”, meaning that it is money which was used to redeem second tithe produce, coins which are found in between the two piles go to whichever pile they are closer to. If they are halfway in between then they go to second tithe because the rules governing second tithe are more stringent it can be used only in Jerusalem and only to buy food products.", + "This is the general rule: the go to that which is nearer [even if this] is lenient; but if half way in between, [they must go] to that which is the more stringent. This is the general rule that governs all of the previous sections of the mishnah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nYesterday’s mishnah dealt with money found in between the money chests of the chamber in the Temple. This mishnah continues to deal with money found in various places, and with how to determine its status.", + "Money which was found in front of animal dealers [in Jerusalem], it is always [second] tithes [money]; The money that is derived from second tithes must be used to buy food products in Jerusalem. One common use of this money was to buy an animal and offer it as wellbeing offering. Most of the animals purchased in Jerusalem throughout the entire year, and not just at festival time, are purchased through second tithes money. Hence, if money is found in front of an animal dealer in Jerusalem we must be concerned lest it is second tithe money, and it therefore must be treated as if it is.", + "[If it was found] on the Temple Mount it is non-sacred [money]. Non-priests who come to the Temple Mount do not generally bring money with them, therefore this money can be assumed to have come from a priest or Levite while they were working there and not from one of the pilgrims during a festival. This money is considered to be non-sacred even during a festival. Although people do bring second tithe money to Jerusalem, they don’t generally bring it to the Temple Mount.", + "[If it was found] in Jerusalem during the time of a festival, it is [second] tithes [money]. Money found anywhere in Jerusalem (except for the Temple Mount) during a festival is deemed to be second tithe money because most of the money that people bring with them on their pilgrimage is second tithe money. Since Jerusalem is full of pilgrims at this time of year it can be assumed that the money is not from the smaller number of residents.", + "But all the rest of the year it is non-sacred [money]. During the rest of the year it can be assumed that the money fell from one of the residents of Jerusalem and not from a pilgrim. Hence it is not deemed second tithe and it may be treated as non-sacred." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with meat found in various places and how a person should treat that meat do we assume that it comes from a sacrifice? Is it kosher?", + "Meat which was found in the Temple courtyard: Limbs: [they must be treated as belonging to] whole burnt-offerings; Pieces: [they must be treated as belonging to] sin-offerings. Burnt-offerings are cut up into limbs before they are brought up to the altar. Therefore, if one finds whole limbs in the Temple courtyard, one must assume that they belong to burnt-offerings. Sin-offerings are eaten by the priests and therefore they are cut up into pieces. If one finds a piece of meat in the Temple courtyard, he therefore must assume that it is a sin-offering.", + "[Meat which was found] in Jerusalem, [must be treated as belonging to] wellbeing-offerings. Wellbeing offerings can be eaten anywhere in Jerusalem. Therefore, if meat is found outside of the Temple but within Jerusalem, it must be treated as if it was a wellbeing offering.", + "In both cases it must be left to become disqualified and must then go out to the place of burning. In all of the cases in the above two sections, the meat cannot be eaten lest it is impure or “remnant” sacrificial meat which should have already been eaten. It also cannot be burned lest it be fully pure and not remnant and it is prohibited to burn sacrificial meat which can be eaten. What they must do is wait until the meat becomes disqualified from being eaten, one day and night for a sin-offering and two days and one nigh for a wellbeing offering. Then it may be burned outside of the Temple where they burn disqualified meat.", + "[Meat which was] found within the borders [of Israel but outside of Jerusalem]: Limbs: [they must be treated as] carrion; Pieces: they are permitted. But [if found] during the time of a festival, when meat is abundant, it is permitted [to eat it] even when cut up in limbs. If it is found outside of Jerusalem, then it is not assumed to be sacrificial meat. If it is in limbs, meaning not cut into proper pieces, then it must be assumed that the animal was not slaughtered properly and that the owner intended to cast the meat to the dogs. This meat cannot be eaten. If it is cut into pieces than we can assume that the meat is kosher, because people don’t bother cutting the meat into proper pieces if it cannot be eaten. However, in the time of the festival when many people eat meat and meat is in abundance even found limbs may be eaten. They may have come from a kosher animal and someone may have had just so much meat that they didn’t bother to cut it properly." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with beasts (cattle) found in proximity to Jerusalem. Since many animals around Jerusalem may be escaped sacrifices (probably lost, but escaped sounds more interesting) we must treat them as if they were sacrifices.", + "Beasts which were found in Jerusalem as far as Migdal Eder and within the same distance in any direction: The exact location of Migdal Eder is no longer known. It is mentioned in Genesis 35:21 and in Micah 4:8. It is very close to Jerusalem.", + "Males are [considered as] burnt-offerings; Males found in this area are treated as burnt-offerings. This is the most stringent of the offerings that the male animal might be. It is also true that the majority of male animals are burnt-offerings. The Talmud Yerushalmi explains that there was a special decree in Jerusalem that all lost male animals are to be treated as burnt offerings.", + "Females are [considered as] peace-offerings. Female animals are treated as peace-offerings, since they cannot be offered as burnt offerings. Most female animals in Jerusalem are peace-offerings which were purchased with second tithe money (see above mishnayot 2-3).", + "Rabbi Judah says: that which is fit for a pesach offering, is [considered as] a pesach-offerings [when found] within thirty days before the pilgrimage [of Pesach]. Rabbi Judah explains that if the animal was fit to be a pesah offering, that is it is a year-old goat or sheep, and it is found within thirty days before Pesah, it is to be treated as a pesah offering. Thirty days is the period of time before Pesah in which the sages began to teach the laws of Pesah and hence at this time people began to set aside animals for use as a pesah offering. One who finds such an animal may use it as his own personal pesah sacrifice. If the owners come and claim the animal, then he must pay them its value but he may keep the animal." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is a direct continuation of yesterday’s.", + "In olden times they used to take a pledge from any one who had found such a [stray] animal, until he brought its libation-offerings. Then people would leave the animal and run away. So the court decreed that its libation-offerings should come from public funds. In yesterday’s mishnah we learned that one who finds an animal in close proximity to Jerusalem must treat it as if it were a sacrifice, usually either a burnt offering or a wellbeing offering. These sacrifices also require libations to be brought with them (oil, grain and wine, see above 5:3). At first they used to force the people who found the animals to bring the libations as well. They would enforce this by taking collateral from those who found the animal and holding on to the collateral until they brought the necessary libations. This caused a problem people would leave the animal and run away rather than admit that they had found an animal near Jerusalem. Therefore, the court decreed that the libations should come from public money. We should note that the mishnah has an interesting approach to that which people might be expected to do. It does not expect that people will take the animal home and treat it as if it was theirs. In other words, the Mishnah expects that people will do the right thing and admit that they found the animal near Jerusalem. However, people will not do the “right thing” if by doing so they will have to pay money out of their own pocket. Note again, the people leave the animal and run away they do not take it for themselves. People seem to respect the fact that this animal might indeed be a sacrifice but they are not willing to go broke in dealing with it." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nAccording to Rabbi Shimon, the decree of the court that appeared at the end of yesterday’s mishnah was one of seven things that the court decreed. The first two are similar to the decree mentioned yesterday.", + "Rabbi Shimon said: there were seven things that the court decree and that was one of them. [The others were the following:]
A non-Jew who sent a burnt-offering from overseas and he sent with it its libation-offerings, they are offered out of his own; But if [he did] not [send its libation-offerings], they should be offered out of public funds. If a non-Jew sent a sacrifice from overseas and he sent with it the proper libation offerings or money with which to purchase these offerings, then the libations are offered from what he sent. However, if he didn’t send the libation offerings, and it is difficult to reach him in order to ask him to do so, the libations are made with public funds. If this was a Jew who had sent an offering from overseas, evidently they would chase after him and not offer the sacrifice until he had sent the libations, or money to cover the costs. We should also note that the idea of gentiles sending sacrifices to the Temple in Jerusalem is an interesting phenomenon, and one that is described in other places. These may have been admirers of Jews, or perhaps pluralistic idol-worshippers who wished to “cover all of their bets” and therefore offered sacrifices to all sorts of Gods, including the God of the Jews.", + "So too [in the case of] a convert who had died and left sacrifices, if he had also left its libation-offerings they are offered out of his own; But if not, they should be offered out of public funds. When a convert dies and does not have any subsequent children, he/she dies without any heirs. In other words, his relatives from before he converted do not inherit his estate. If he dies and he leaves a sacrifice and libations, then the libations are offered with the sacrifice. However, if he doesn’t leave money for the libations, the libations are provided for by public funds. If the person who died had inheritors, as do all Jews, then the inheritors are liable to provide the funds for the libations.", + "It was also a condition laid down by the court in the case of a high priest who had died that his minhah should be offered out of public funds. Rabbi Judah says: [it was offered out] of the property of his heirs, And had to be offered of the whole [tenth]. The High Priest offers a daily minhah (grain) sacrifice of a tenth of an ephah (see Leviticus 6:13), half in the morning and half in the night. If the High Priest dies and they have not yet appointed a new High Priest to take his place, this grain offering is provided for by public funds. Rabbi Judah disagrees and holds that the offering comes from the money that the High Priest’s inheritors get from him. Both Rabbi Judah and the other sages agree that in this case an entire ephah is sacrificed in the morning and evening, instead of the usual half-ephah. This is discussed in greater depth in Mishnah Menahot 4:5." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah contains the final three of the seven decrees mentioned by Rabbi Shimon in yesterday’s mishnah.", + "[They further decreed] concerning the salt and the wood that the priests may benefit from them. The court decreed that salt and wood which had been donated to the Temple could be used by the priests to salt and cook the sacrificial meat. However, they could not use this salt or wood to salt or cook non-sacrificial meat.", + "And concerning the [red] heifer that using its ashes is not considered sacrilege. The red heifer, used in the ritual to purify people from corpse-impurity, was paid for by the shekels collected in the chamber (see above 4:2). Furthermore, the heifer is called a “sin-offering” in Numbers 19:9. Nevertheless, one who makes non-sacred use of this heifer’s ashes has not committed sacrilege (illicit use of sacred property). The ashes are not considered to be like the sin-offering, only the live animal is, and therefore only one who makes illicit use of the live cow itself has committed sacrilege.", + "And concerning bird-offerings which had become unfit [for sacrifice], that [others] should be offered [in their place] out of public funds. Rabbi Yose says: the one who supplied the bird-offerings was bound to supply [those which had to be offered in the place of] those which had become unfit. The last decree of the court was that if bird offerings purchased with public funds (see above 6:5) should become unfit for sacrifice, their replacements should come from public funds as well. Rabbi Yose holds that the merchant who supplied the birds is obligated to supply replacements. It’s not that it is the merchant’s fault that they became unfit. Rather, the Temple had an agreement with him that if the birds become unfit, he would supply a replacement." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to deal with scenarios in which we determine the status of something based on a majority, a topic which we began discussing in the beginning of chapter seven.\nThe specific topic is spit found in the streets of Jerusalem. If such spit comes from an impure person than the spit is unclean.", + "Any spit found in Jerusalem is clean except that which is [found] in the upper market, the words of Rabbi Meir. According to Rabbi Meir, we can assume that all spit found in Jerusalem is clean except spit found in the upper marketplace. In most areas people who are unclean are extra cautious since they know that in Jerusalem people need to be extra careful about issues of purity and impurity. This is because in Jerusalem many people eat sacred food, which needs to be eaten in purity. In contrast, outside of Jerusalem we must be concerned lest the spit is unclean. The only exception within Jerusalem is the upper market, towards the southwest of Jerusalem, where non-Jews and unclean persons used to congregate. There, found spit is considered to be unclean.", + "Rabbi Yose says: at other times of the year [spit found] in the middle [of the road] is unclean but [spit found] at the sides [of the road] is clean; but at festivals time [spit found] in the middle [of the road] is clean, while [that which is found] at the sides [of the road] is unclean, since they are few in number, they remove themselves to the sides of the road. Rabbi Yose distinguishes between times of the year and places in the road in his determining whether we must consider the spit to be unclean. During non-festival times, most of the people of Jerusalem are impure, just as they are in other cities. At these times the pure people walk on the sides of the road to avoid the impure people who are walking in the middle of the road. Hence, spit found in the middle of the road is impure whereas spit found on the sides is pure. The opposite is true during the time of the festivals, when most people are pure. They walk in the middle of the road and the impure people walk on the sides of the road (this seems quite courteous of theme). Hence, only spit found on the sides of the road is considered impure." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nYesterday’s mishnah dealt with the purity of spit found in Jerusalem; today’s mishnah deals with the purity of vessels found in Jerusalem.", + "All vessels found in Jerusalem on the way going down to the place of immersion are unclean, [but those found] on the way going up [from the place of immersion] are clean; for the way down is not the same as the way up, the words of Rabbi Meir. The place of immersion was a place below the Temple Mount where people could go to immerse themselves and their vessels (you can visit there today and still see many mikvaot). According to Rabbi Meir, there was one path to go down and a different path to go up. Furthermore, they would also carry the vessels down in a different way than they would carry them up. Hence, it was possible to distinguish between a vessel making its way down and one making its way up. Obviously, one making its way down is assumed to be unclean and one making its way back up to the Temple Mount was assumed to be clean.", + "Rabbi Yose says: they are all clean, except the basket and the shovel or pick which are specially connected with [work in] cemeteries. Rabbi Yose says that in Jerusalem people are extra careful to make sure that they don’t leave unclean vessels lying in the streets. Therefore all vessels are unclean except for vessels which were most likely to have been used in cemeteries. The basket referred to here was one in which bones were put into and moved to an ossuary. The shovel was used to collect them and the pick was used to dig graves. Since these almost certainly came into contact with a corpse or with bones, they have to be assumed to be unclean." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with a knife found in Jerusalem around the time of Pesah when many people will need to slaughter their pesach sacrifices. The question is: can he rely on the fact that the knife is pure or must he immerse it before he slaughters with it?", + "A [slaughtering] knife which was found on the fourteenth [of Nisan] he may slaughter with it immediately. [If it was found] on the thirteenth [of Nisan] he must immerse it again. If the slaughtering knife is found on the fourteenth of Nisan, he may use it to slaughter his pesah immediately, without bringing it to be immersed. In this case we assume that its owners immersed it on the thirteenth, knowing that it would need to be pure the following day, the day on which the pesah is slaughtered. However, if it was found on the thirteenth we must assume that it has not yet been immersed and therefore is unclean. Even though we established in the previous mishnah that all vessels (which includes knives) are assumed to be pure, when it comes to a vessel which will be used with a sacrifice we must be more stringent.", + "But a chopping knife whether [found] on the fourteenth or on the thirteenth, he must immerse it again. If the fourteenth fell on Shabbat, he may slaughter with it immediately. [If found] on the fifteenth, he may slaughter with it immediately. The knife described here is not used for slaughtering but for cutting meat and bones of an already slaughtered animal. The mishnah uses the word “slaughter” with regard to this knife as well, but the intention is not slaughter but to chop. This type of knife will be used during the festival, already on the fifteenth, but it will not be used on the fourteenth. Since we cannot assume that this type of knife was immersed on the thirteenth of Nisan, it must be immersed on the fourteenth in order to use it on the fifteenth and during the remainder festival. If it was found on the fourteenth of Nisan which fell on Shabbat, then we can assume that it was immersed on the thirteenth because it is forbidden to immerse vessels on Shabbat. They would have immersed it on the thirteenth so that they could use it to chop meat and bones on the fifteenth and during the remainder of the festival. If he found it on the fifteenth, he can assume that it was immersed on the fourteenth. Therefore he may use it without immersing it again.", + "If [the chopping knife] was found tied to a [slaughtering] knife it may be treated as the knife. Finally, if he finds the chopping knife tied to the slaughtering knife, he should treat the chopping knife the same way he treats the slaughtering knife." + ], + [ + "Introduction This mishnah discusses the impurity of the curtain which separated the Holy of Holies from the remainder of the Temple.", + "If the curtain [separating the Holy of Holies from the rest of the Temple] was defiled by a derived uncleanness, they immerse it within [the precincts of the Temple] and they bring it back in again. This section discusses a case where the curtain (parochet) was made unclean by a “derived uncleanness”. This term refers to something that has become unclean by virtue of its contact with something that is a “principal uncleanness”. From the Torah (deoraita), only liquids which come into contact with “derived uncleanness” are made unclean. “Derived uncleannesses” do not cause things or people to become unclean. Therefore, the curtain in this case has been made impure with only a low level of impurity, one that is considered to be “derabbanan” of rabbinic origin. The rabbis nevertheless required that it be immersed but they allowed it to be immersed in the mikveh (ritual pool) that was in the precincts of the Temple. Furthermore, it could be brought back again immediately. If it had contracted “deoraita” toraitic impurity, it could not be used again until nightfall, as we shall see in the next clause.", + "But if it was defiled by a principal uncleanness, they immerse it outside and spread out in the Hel. If it was new it was spread out on the roof of the colonnade, so that the people might behold its workmanship which is beautiful. If it came into contact with a principal uncleanness, for instance a zav or zavah (people with unusual genital discharge), or with a sheretz (a creeping animal) then it must be taken out of the Temple to be immersed. There in an area known as the “Hel”, which was inside the gates of the outer walls but outside the “Ezrat Nashim” (the women’s courtyard) it is let out to dry. If the curtain was new, they would spread it out in a place where people could see it from far off for it was very beautiful. In its normal place, right in front of the Holy of Holies, few people would have the chance to see this magnificent work." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah describes the curtain in all of its glory. Interestingly, Josephus (Wars of the Jews, Book V, Chapter Five, four) also describes the curtain in exceedingly glorious terms. He writes:\n“But then this house, as it was divided into two parts, the inner part was lower than the appearance of the outer, and had golden doors of fifty-five cubits altitude, and sixteen in breadth; but before these doors there was a veil of equal largeness with the doors. It was a Babylonian curtain, embroidered with blue, and fine linen, and scarlet, and purple, and of a contexture that was truly wonderful. Nor was this mixture of colors without its mystical interpretation, but was a kind of image of the universe; for by the scarlet there seemed to be enigmatically signified fire, by the fine flax the earth, by the blue the air, and by the purple the sea; two of them having their colors the foundation of this resemblance; but the fine flax and the purple have their own origin for that foundation, the earth producing the one, and the sea the other. This curtain had also embroidered upon it all that was mystical in the heavens, excepting that of the [twelve] signs, representing living creatures.”", + "Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says in the name of Rabbi Shimon the son of the chief [of the priests]: the curtain was a handbreadth in thickness and was woven on seventy-two cords, and on each cord there were twenty-four threads. Obviously the curtain was simply a tremendous piece of work. There is a description of the Tabernacle’s curtain in Exodus 26:1. There we learn that it is made of four types of thread: blue, purple, scarlet and fine linen (see also Josephus above). Each type had six strings, which means that there were twenty-four threads on each cord.", + "It was forty cubits long and twenty cubits broad, and was made by eighty-two young girls. The entrance to the hall of the Temple which this curtain hung in front of was forty cubits long and twenty cubits broad. It took 82 young girls to weave the curtain. We should note that this explanation is according to a certain version of the text. According to another textual reading, the curtain was made up of 820,000 strings.", + "Two curtains were made every year, and three hundred priests were needed to immerse it. According to the Tosefta’s explanation of this clause, there were two curtains in the Temple, one spread out to cover the doors and one folded up. If the spread out one became impure they would spread out the folded up one and purify the other (see yesterday’s mishnah). On the eve of Yom Kippur they would bring in a new curtain and take out the old one. Because of its great thickness and weight, it required three hundred priests to immerse the curtain outside of the Temple and to spread it out in the Hel (see yesterday’s mishnah). The Talmud admits that three hundred may be an exaggeration, but it still lets us know what a massive undertaking this must have been." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses “most holy” sacrifices such as burnt-offerings, guilt offerings or sin offerings which were defiled either within the Temple or outside of it. That these sacrifices must be burnt is clear and agreed to by all. However, Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel disagree whether the sacrifice is burned inside or outside of the Temple.", + "Meat of most holy things which was defiled, whether by a principal uncleanness or by a derived uncleanness, whether inside or outside [the precincts of the temple]:
Bet Shammai say: it must all be burnt within, except when defiled outside by a principal uncleanness. According to Bet Shammai all of these unclean sacrifices must be burned within the Temple precincts, in the place within the courtyard where the ashes were placed (called the “Place of the Ashes”). The only exception is a sacrifice which was defiled by a principal uncleanness while it was outside of the Temple. Since this sacrifice acquired a more serious form of uncleanness it is not brought into the Temple. However, if it had only become unclean through contact with a derived uncleanness, it is brought in and burned in the Temple.", + "But Bet Hillel say: it must all be burnt outside, except that which was defiled by a derived uncleanness within. Bet Hillel hold that all of these sacrifices are burned outside of the Temple. Anything that was made unclean outside the Temple is not brought inside. Furthermore, they hold that if it came into contact with a serious form of uncleanness within the Temple, it must be brought out and burned outside of the Temple. The only exception to their rule is that if one of the “most holy” sacrifices became impure with a light form of purity within the Temple, it need not be removed and may be burned within the Temple." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues the topic begun in yesterday’s mishnah sacrificial “holy of holies” meat which became unclean either within or outside the Temple.", + "Rabbi Eliezer says: [Sacrificial meat] which was defiled by a principal uncleanness, whether inside or outside [the Temple precincts], must be burned outside [the Temple]. [Sacrificial meat] which was defiled with a derived uncleanness whether inside or outside the Temple, is burned inside the Temple. According to Rabbi Eliezer, the operative distinction is only the level of uncleanness of the sacrifice. If it has a high level of uncleanness it must be burned outside the Temple. This is in order to distance seriously unclean things from the Temple. However, if its uncleanness is of a lower level then it may be burned within the Temple, even if it became unclean outside of the Temple.", + "Rabbi Akiva says: where it was defiled there it is burned. According to Rabbi Akiva the operative distinction is where the meat became unclean. In order to expedite burning the unclean sacrifice, it should be burned wherever the the impurity was incurred." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first half of this last mishnah teaches where the limbs of certain sacrificial animals were placed before they were burned on the altar. We should note that it is quite uncertain as to why this mishnah is placed here.\nThe second half teaches that the laws of shekels and first fruits were only in force when the Temple in Jerusalem still stood.", + "The limbs of the daily burnt-offering were placed on the half of the ramp [to the altar] downwards on the west side. On the southern side of the altar there was a ramp, 32 cubits long and 16 cubits wide. When the priests would bring the sacrifices up to the altar, they would not bring them all up at once. Rather they would bring them half way up, place them on the west side of the altar, go back down, read the shema and then they would bring them all the way up to the top of the altar.", + "Those of the additional offering ( were placed on the half of the ramp downwards on the east side. The limbs of the additional offering were placed on the east side so as not to confuse them with those of the daily offerings.", + "While those of the new moon offerings were placed on top of the rim of the altar. Again, in order to distinguish between the different sacrifices, they put the limbs of the new moon offerings on a rim that went around the altar, instead of on the ramp.", + "[The laws of] the shekels and of the first-fruit are in force only when the Temple stands, but [the laws of] the tithe of grain and of the tithe of cattle and of the firstborn are in force both when the Temple exists and when the Temple does not exist. The first fruits (bikkurim) and the shekels must be brought to the Temple. Hence, when the Temple no longer stands, these laws are no longer in force. In contrast, tithes of grain, cattle and the first-born of animals are given to priests and Levites and hence these laws remain in force even when the Temple no longer stands. The cattle tithe and first-born animals cannot be eaten immediately. Rather they wait until the animal becomes somehow flawed and thereby unfit for sacrifice. Then it may be eaten. We should note that according to the Talmud, the rabbis said that the laws of animal tithes are no longer in force, lest someone eats them before they become flawed.", + "One who dedicates shekels or first-fruits [when the Temple does not exist], they are holy. Rabbi Shimon says: one who says “the first-fruit be holy,” they are not holy. This section deals with someone who dedicates shekels or first fruits to the Temple at a time when the Temple no longer stands. According to the first opinion, the shekels or first-fruits are holy. They therefore both become prohibited for common usage. The shekels must be buried and the fruits are left until they rot. Alternatively, they may be thrown into the Dead Sea or some other place where no one will derive any benefit from them. Rabbi Shimon holds that since the Temple no longer stands, he can’t even dedicate the first fruits to the Temple. His statement is therefore meaningless. Congratulations! We have finished Shekalim. It is a tradition at this point to thank God for helping us to finish learning the tractate and to commit ourselves to going back and relearning it, so that we may not forget it and so that its lessons will stay with us for all of our lives. Shekalim is a tractate dedicated to the financial operation of the Temple in Jerusalem. It is interesting that the Mishnah sees this subject as being as worthy of study as any other topic, including the holidays, Shabbat, marital law etc. The financial support of the Temple is a commandment, one to be fulfilled properly and with a sense of its great import. Indeed, by financially supporting the Temple, Jews throughout the world were able to participate in its services. I am not USCJ’s fundraiser, but I would be amiss if I did not use this brief opportunity to thank those who support the Mishnah Yomit project and the other projects of the USCJ. May you continue to show your support by learning and by continuing to help others to learn as well. Most importantly, congratulations on learning another tractate of Mishnah. May you have the strength and time to keep on learning more! Tomorrow we begin Yoma." + ] + ] + ] + }, + "schema": { + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה שקלים", + "enTitle": "English Explanation of Mishnah Shekalim", + "key": "English Explanation of Mishnah Shekalim", + "nodes": [ + { + "heTitle": "הקדמה", + "enTitle": "Introduction" + }, + { + "heTitle": "", + "enTitle": "" + } + ] + } +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Moed/English Explanation of Mishnah Shekalim/English/merged.json b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Moed/English Explanation of Mishnah Shekalim/English/merged.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..590db972c52e4ba432c6e6065ad6446878bd8407 --- /dev/null +++ b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Moed/English Explanation of Mishnah Shekalim/English/merged.json @@ -0,0 +1,363 @@ +{ + "title": "English Explanation of Mishnah Shekalim", + "language": "en", + "versionTitle": "merged", + "versionSource": "https://www.sefaria.org/English_Explanation_of_Mishnah_Shekalim", + "text": { + "Introduction": [ + "In Exodus 30:11:16 God tells Moses that when he counts the children of Israel, he shouldn’t do a simple head count but rather each person should donate half a shekel. The simple meaning of these verses is that the half-shekel is a one time donation, or at most a donation that is given only when a census is taken. ", + "However, the rabbis understood the half-shekel to be an annual donation given to the Temple for the Temple’s upkeep, and for the purchase of the daily tamid and other offerings. These offerings had to be paid for with public money. Individuals could not buy them in order to donate them to the Temple. It is possible that the custom of collecting an annual “tax” from every Israelite already existed in the First Temple period (see II Kings 12:5 and II Chronicles 6:9; see also Nehemiah 10:33, where they give a third of a shekel). We should note that the Sadducees vehemently disagreed with this halakhah. They held that an individual could donate the tamid offering and they denied that there was a yearly half-shekel tax. ", + "The value of a “half-shekel” might vary from time to time, because the half-shekel which they are referring to is a Torah half-shekel. In the Mishnah they assume that a shekel is worth a “sela”, which is four dinars (a Roman currency). Therefore, half a shekel is assumed to be two dinars. This two dinars is usually called a “shekel”. Hence, throughout the tractate when the mishnah says “shekel” it is referring to the half-shekel (I realize that this is confusing). ", + "According to the Mishnah, they began to remind people to donate the half-shekel in the beginning of the month of Adar. This is where the custom, observed to this day, developed to read “Parshat Shekalim”, the above mentioned passage in Exodus, on the first Shabbat of Adar of every year. ", + "Our tractate deals with many of the details of these laws, how the half-shekel was collected, what was done with it and who handles Temple funds. There is a lot of information in this tractate about the financing of the Temple, so perhaps it will be interesting to any accountants out there! The Babylonian Talmud does not contain a commentary on this tractate, as it does for all of the other tractates in Seder Moed. This is assumedly because none of the tractate was practically applicable after the destruction of the Temple. However, there is commentary in the Palestinian Talmud (the Yerushalmi). ", + "Good luck learning Shekalim!" + ], + "": [ + [ + [ + "Introduction\nIn the introduction to the tractate I explained what the half-shekel is and what it was used for. Our mishnah teaches that on the first of Adar they would make public announcements telling people to start preparing their half-shekels. The mishnah also teaches other public events that occur in Adar.", + "On the first of Adar they make a public announcement about the shekels and concerning kilayim. On the first of Adar, the month before Nisan (the month in which Pesah falls) they begin to make announcements reminding people to bring their shekels, or more specifically half-shekels. They also announce that people should go out to their fields and vineyards to uproot any “kilayim” that may have sprung up. “Kilayim” are diverse seeds which have sprung up in the same area.", + "On the fifteenth: they read the Megillah [Esther] in walled cities, and they fix the roads and the streets and the ritual water baths, and they perform all public duties, and they mark the graves, and [messengers] go forth also concerning kilayim. The mishnah now begins to teach things that occur, or begin to occur on the fifteenth of the month. The first thing is that on the fifteenth of the month, people in walled cities read the book of Esther, the Megillah. We will learn much more about this when we learn Tractate Megillah. The reason that the mishnah mentions the date upon which it was read in walled cities is that this date coincides with the other things done in the continuation of the mishnah. The second thing is that they begin to fix the public roads and ritual baths because Pesah is coming in one month. People would need to travel to Jerusalem and purify themselves in order to take part in the pesah sacrifice. Also, Adar is the beginning of the dry season (actually, it can still rain in Adar). It would have been difficult to fix the roads when the rains were still coming down. In addition they performed all sorts of other public duties that could not be done during the rainy season. They would mark graves with lime so that priests could see where the graves were and avoid them. During the winter the lime would wash away. Therefore, during Adar, once the rains had stopped they would reapply the plaster. Above we learned that on the first of Adar they would announce to people that they should go out and check to make sure that there were no kilayim in their fields. On the fifteenth, they would send out messengers to make sure that this had been done. We can see that this was an issue of great importance to them. The rabbis seem to have been especially concerned about kilayim because one cannot tell from looking at picked grain or grapes whether they grew in a field that had kilayim in it. This is true of other food-related problems as well." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nAt the end of yesterday’s mishnah we learned that on the fifteenth of Adar the court would send out agents to uproot kilayim, shoots that have grown from mixed seeds. In today’s mishnah we learn how this was done.", + "Rabbi Judah said: at first they used to uproot [the kilayim], and throw them down before them. [But] when transgressors increased in number, they used to uproot them and throw them on the roads. [Finally], they decreed that they should make the whole field ownerless. At first the court would merely uproot the kilayim plants to prevent them from continuing to grow. They didn’t bother throwing them away, but would just uproot them and leave them in their place. The problem with this was that people would use the plants that the court’s agents had uprooted. If they were not fit for human consumption they would feed them to their animals. This is prohibited because it is prohibited to derive any benefit from kilayim. To remedy this, they began to throw the plants out onto the roads where anyone could take them. However, even this was not sufficient. People did not seem to care that the court’s agents would come around and uproot their plants. Indeed, they may have even thanked the court for doing their weeding for them! Therefore the court had to decree that if they found kilayim in someone’s field, they would declare the entire field ownerless. Basically this is penalizing the person by making him lose his field. This was a far more effective measure; since people knew they might lose their field they were far more cautious about allowing kilayim to grow." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah returns to dealing with the half-shekel.", + "On the fifteenth of [Adar] they would set up tables [of money changers] in the provinces. The half-shekel had to be given in Israeli currency. In order to help people exchange their currency they would set up money changer tables in the provinces to change money. The money changers could also exchange large currency for smaller coins.", + "On the twenty-fifth they set them up in the Temple. As the first of Nisan approached, the time when they would begin to use the shekalim collected from the previous year, they would stop having money changers throughout the land and limit their presence to the Temple.", + "When [the tables] were set up in the Temple, they began to exact pledges [from those who had not paid]. At this point, they would begin to take pledges from people who had not yet paid. A “pledge” means that they would take something away from the person and only return it when the half-shekel had been paid.", + "From whom did they exact pledges? From Levites and Israelites, converts and freed slaves, but not women or slaves or minors. Pledges were not taken from everyone, but rather only from free adult Jewish men (excluding priests, as we shall see below), those who are obligated to give the half-shekel. They didn’t take pledges from women, slaves or minors because women, slaves and minors are exempt from the half-shekel. Women are exempt because Exodus 30:12 states, “each man (ish) shall pay a ransom for himself” the word “man” is understood as exempting women. Slaves are usually in the same category as women so they too are exempt. Exodus 30 explicitly excludes minors under the age of 20 (Ex. 30:14).", + "Any minor on whose behalf his father has begun to pay the shekel, may not discontinue it again. Sometimes fathers would begin to donate the half-shekel on behalf of their sons, even though they were not obligated to do so. The mishnah teaches that if they had begun to give the half-shekel, in subsequent years they must continue to do so.", + "But they did not exact pledges from the priests, because of the ways of peace. The only category of free adult male from whom they did not exact a pledge is the priest. They didn’t do so in order to avoid fights. Albeck explains that the priests thought that they were exempt from the half-shekel. Although they are indeed obligated, the court seems not to have wanted to get into a fight with them over the subject. Tomorrow’s mishnah will deal with the priests obligation to pay the shekel. We might note that if many of the priests were Sadducees and the Sadducees seem to have rejected the whole practice of giving the yearly half-shekel, then we have here evidence of the Pharisees not wanting to provoke a fight with the Sadducees." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn this mishnah we see two early tannaim arguing over whether or not a priest donates the half-shekel.", + "Rabbi Judah said: Ben Bukri testified at Yavneh that a priest who paid the shekel is not a sinner. Ben Bukri assumes that a priest is exempt from the shekel offering. The midrash which explains this appears below, in section two. His testimony is that despite the fact that the priest need not donate the half-shekel, if he does donate it he has not transgressed. We might have thought that person who is not liable to pay the half-shekel may not donate it. The problem with a voluntary donation of the half-shekel is that public sacrifices must come from the entire public, meaning from the half-shekel. A voluntary donation may be seen as an individual paying for a public sacrifice. Ben Bukri testifies that we don’t perceive of the priest’s half-shekel in that way. Rather it is a gift to the community, which belongs to the community as a whole. As such it may be used to purchase public sacrifices.", + "But Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai said to him: not so, but rather a priest who did not pay the shekel was guilty of a sin, only the priests expounded this verse for their own benefit: “And every meal-offering of the priest shall be wholly burnt, it shall not be eaten” (Leviticus 6:16), since the omer and the two loaves and the showbread are [brought] from our [contributions], how can they be eaten? Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai reasons the exact opposite from Ben Bukri. He holds that the priest is liable to donate the half-shekel and if he doesn’t do so, he transgresses in much the same way that any person who doesn’t give the half-shekel transgresses. The priests tried to use some midrashic reasoning to get out of giving the half-shekel. The Torah states that any minhah, a meal-offering, given by a priest, must be wholly burnt. The half-shekel is used to purchase certain meal offerings, namely the omer (the barley offering brought between Pesah and Shavuot), the two loaves brought on Shavuot, and the weekly showbread. All of these are eaten by priests and not burnt. The priests claim that the fact that these are eaten proves that the priests did not pay for any of them, for had they paid for them they would have had to have been wholly burnt. Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai says that the priests’ midrash is mistaken. Only individual minhah offerings of the priest are wholly burnt. Public minhah offerings paid for partly by priests may be eaten. Hence the priests are liable to pay the half-shekel. We should note that aside from the technical aspects of this debate, there may be an underlying social/religious issue. The question is, are the priests a part of the people or are they a separate class, with their own unique relationship to God? This might be an interesting way of examining Jewish religious leadership in general are leaders a part of the Jewish people, or are they a class on their own. Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai’s answer would seem to be clear the priests must give their half-shekel, they are part of the Jewish people and not above, or even truly separate from the rest." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nMost of this mishnah deals with Gentiles who wish to make donations to the Temple. We should note that this was a sensitive and realistic issue in the Second Temple Period. There were some groups of Jews, notably the Dead Sea Sect, which adamantly opposed accepting donations from the Gentiles. A quote from the book of Ezra which we will see below also seems to express this approach. In contrast, the rabbis are more open to Gentile donations. In fact, I don’t believe that they were opposed in principle. Rather they felt that when their understanding of the Torah allowed such donations, it was sanctioned. The rabbis seem to be trying to walk a fine line to make Jews responsible for the ultimate upkeep of the Temple and yet to not totally exclude Gentiles from participating in what they may have perceived as worship to the one, true, God.", + "Even though they said, “they don’t exact pledges from women, slaves or minors, [yet] if they paid the shekel it is accepted from them. We learned in mishnah three that women, slaves and minors are exempt from paying the half-shekel, and hence pledges are not taken from them to get them to pay their shekels. In our mishnah we learn that shekels are accepted from them. As we stated above with regard to the priest, as long as they give the shekel with the intent of it becoming a communal possession, the shekels can be used to buy public sacrifices. The only problem would be if they gave it thinking that they were making an individual donation for a public sacrifice. In such a case, their shekels would have to be rejected, since public sacrifices must come from only public money.", + "If a non-Jew or a Samaritan paid the shekel they do not accept it from them. In contrast, shekels given by non-Jews or Samaritans are rejected. This is so that the public sacrifices, which come to afford atonement for the entire Jewish people, should paid for by the Jewish people themselves. As we shall see below, other sacrifices are accepted from non-Jews.", + "And they do not accept from them the bird-offerings of zavin or bird-offerings of zavot or bird-offerings of women after childbirth, This section refers to sacrifices which a person must bring at the end of their period of impurity. The Yerushalmi explains that the mishnah here teaches that Samaritans, who are in some matters considered Jews, do not bring these sacrifices. Assumedly the reason is that they do not count the period of their impurity correctly, and hence they bring the sacrifices at the wrong time. Gentiles cannot bring these sacrifices because they are not obligated for them.", + "Or sin-offerings or guilt-offerings. There are two different versions of this mishnah and the two differ with regard to whether sin and guilt offerings are accepted. According to one version they are not accepted from Gentiles or Samaritans because these are sacrifices cannot be donated (see below). Rather these are two types of atonement offerings incurred by people for various sins, and these laws govern only Jews. The other version says that guilt and sin offerings are accepted. According to this version, the line refers only to Samaritans, from whom these offerings are accepted in the hope that they will repent and return to being “real Jews.”", + "But vow-offerings and freewill-offerings they do accept from them. This is the general rule: all offerings which can be made as a vow-offering or a freewill-offering they do accept from them, but offerings which cannot be made as a vow-offering or a freewill-offering they do not accept from them. A “vow offering” is when one says, “I vow to bring an offering.” A “free-will offering” is when one says, “I vow to bring this animal.” Both types of sacrifices are accepted from Gentiles and Samaritans. This halakhah is derived midrashically from Leviticus 22:18, which twice uses the word “ish” (man). The double appearance is taken to mean that these offerings are accepted from both Jews and Gentiles alike.", + "And thus it is explicitly stated by Ezra, as it is said: “You have nothing to do with us to build a house unto our God” (Ezra 4:3). In the preceding verses in Ezra some enemies of the Jews come to Zerubbabel and the chiefs of the clans and say, “Let us build with you, since we too worship your God.” The Jewish leaders respond, “It is not for you and us to build a House to our God, but we alone will build it to the Lord God of Israel.” From here the rabbis conclude that non-Jews may not participate in the funding of the public sacrifices. However, as we noted above, other types of sacrifices are accepted from them." + ], + [ + "Introduction The rabbis added onto the half-shekel a surcharge which is called a “kalbon.” Rabbi Meir and the other rabbis disagree over the nature of the kalbon and therefore over who has to pay it. According to Rabbi Meir everyone who gives the shekel has to pay the kalbon. Rabbi Meir reasons that the kalbon is a surcharge because they coin he is giving is probably not as pure as the coin demanded by the Torah. Hence, there is always an obligation to give the kalbon. The other sages understand the kalbon to be a surcharge because when he gives a coin they will have to exchange it with a moneychanger. Therefore they hold that anyone who gives his half-shekel in one coin to the Temple need not give the kalbon, because there is no exchange. If two together give one shekel then the two must add one kalbon, because had they split their coin into two, they would have had to pay the moneychanger. The sages decreed that the money saved by not giving it to the moneychanger should go to the Temple. In our mishnah and in the following one we learn some details about who pays the kalbon.", + "The following are liable [to pay] the kalbon (surcharge): Levites and Israelites and converts and freed slaves; but not priests or women or slaves or minors. This is the same list that appeared above in mishnah three with regard to taking pledges. The kalbon was paid only by those from whom they took pledges in order to collect the half-shekel. The kalbon was not taken from those who don’t owe the half-shekel in the first place. The one exception may be the priests, whom according to our mishnah do not pay the kalbon. Albeck explains that the priests were lenient on themselves. Another explanation might be that this mishnah goes according to Ben Bukri in mishnah four who said that priests do not have to give the half-shekel. Finally, there are some manuscripts that do not have the word “priest” in this mishnah.", + "If a man paid the shekel on behalf of a priest, or on behalf of a woman, or on behalf of a slave, or on behalf of a minor, he is exempt. Since the person for whom the shekel is being paid is exempt, the one who pays it on their behalf is also exempt.", + "If a man paid the shekel on his own behalf and on behalf of his fellow he is liable for one kalbon. Rabbi Meir says: two kalbons. The first opinion is that of the sages, which I explained in the introduction. They are only liable for one kalbon because only one exchange was made. Rabbi Meir holds that everyone is always individually liable for a kalbon. Hence, if one person pays on behalf of him and another person, he must add two kalbons.", + "If one gave a sela and received a shekel, he is liable to pay two kalbons. In this case a person gives the Temple treasurer a sela, which is the value of a Torah shekel. This is twice the amount he needs to give. He takes back in change a “mishnaic shekel”, which is a Torah half-shekel. In this case he must pay a kalbon for the shekel he gave and for the shekel he took, since both exchanges carry surcharges. We see from here that high banking fees are no modern invention!" + ], + [ + "If one paid the shekel on behalf of a poor man or on behalf of his neighbor or on behalf of his fellow-townsman, he is exempt [from the kalbon]. But if he loaned [it] to them he is liable.
Brothers who are partners who are obligated for the kalbon are exempt from the tithe of beasts.
But when they are liable to the tithe of beasts they are exempt from the surcharge.
And how much is the kalbon? A silver ma'ah, the words of Rabbi Meir. But the sages say: half a ma'ah.
This mishnah continues to discuss the kalbon, the extra surcharge paid with the shekel.
Section one: If someone pays the shekel for a friend as a gift, the rabbis did not make him pay the kalbon as well. The same is true, as we shall see below, if a father pays the kalbon on behalf of his son. However, one who pays the shekel on someone else’s behalf as a loan does have to pay the kalbon.
Section two: This section refers to two different types of partnerships between brothers who have inherited from their father. The first type is when they have already divided up the inheritance and then pooled their money together to form a business partnership. In such a case they are liable for the kalbon as are all partners who pay each other’s kalbon, but they are exempt from paying the tithe on beasts (domesticated animals) since partners do not pay this tithe on their shared animals. The second partnership is one in which they have not yet divided up the inheritance. In such a case the money is treated as if it still belonged to one person, their father. They are liable for the tithe but they are exempt from the kalbon, since this is similar to as case in which a father pays the shekel on his son’s behalf.
Section three: Rabbi Meir holds that the kalbon is a ma’ah, which is 1/12 of a half-shekel. This matches Rabbi Meir’s understanding of the kalbon as compensation for the non-pure elements which are customarily put into silver coins. This ma’ah is supposed to increase the silver of the shekel so that it now reaches the value of the Torah’s half-shekel. The sages, however, hold that the kalbon is in place of a fee paid to the moneychanger. The fee is a lesser amount, only half a ma’ah." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah contains several laws about the journey that the shekalim will make from the provinces from where they are collected to the Temple in Jerusalem.", + "They may change shekels into darics because of the load of the journey. If people don’t want to shlepp their individual shekels all the way to the Temple, they may pool them together and turn them into larger coins called “darics.” “Darics” are mentioned in Ezra 8:27 and I Chronicles 1:29.", + "Just as there were shofar-shaped chests in the Temple so there were shofar-shaped chests in the provinces. When the shekels were brought to their deposit points, they were put into chests that were shaped like a shofar, wide at the bottom and thin at the top. This was to prevent people from being able to pull coins out (like mailboxes, for those of you who remember when we used to send real letters). Just as they had these types of chests in the Temple, they also had them outside the Temple in the provinces. This made collection much easier.", + "The townspeople who had sent their shekels and they were stolen or lost: If the appropriation had already been made [the messengers] swear an oath to the treasurers; But if the appropriation had not yet been made they swear to the townspeople, and the townspeople must pay [new] shekels in the place of the [lost] shekels. [If the lost shekels] were found, or if the thieves restored them, then both [the first shekels and their substitutes] are [sacred] shekels and they cannot be credited [to the account] of the coming year. The mishnah now discusses a scenario in which people’s shekels get lost on their way to the Temple. Three times a year the Temple treasurers would count up the shekels that had already been collected and they would start spending them on buying sacrifices (see below 3:1). When reckoning the shekels, they would also count shekels which they knew were on their way from the provinces (called creative accounting). So if the messenger loses the shekels after this appropriation has already been made, the townspeople who sent their money get credit. The messenger then must make an oath to the treasurers that he did not steal the money himself. However, if the money is lost or stolen before the appropriation is made then the townspeople do not get credit and they must send new shekels. In this case, the messenger swears to them that he did not steal the money himself. If the coins are found or if the thieves are found and return the stolen coins, both the new coins and the original coins go to the Temple. The townspeople who twice had to send shekels do not get credit for the following year." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with various scenarios in which a person paid his shekel from money which did not belong to him.", + "One who gave his shekel to his fellow to pay it on his behalf, but [his fellow] paid it on behalf of himself: if the appropriation had already been made [his fellow] is guilty of sacrilege. A person received a shekel from his friend to pay his friend’s shekel but then used this money to pay his own shekel. If the shekel had already been counted in the Temple’s appropriation (and an animal purchased with that money and sacrificed, see below), then he is guilty of sacrilege. Sacrilege means that one has misappropriated funds or property which belongs to the Temple. Since this shekel had already been counted as belonging to the Temple and indeed had already been used, his action counts as sacrilege. He must now bring a special sacrifice and restore the value of that which he misappropriated (a shekel) plus another fifth.", + "One who paid his shekel out of money belonging to the sanctuary: If the appropriation had already been made and an animal [bought out of the appropriation] had already been offered, he is guilty of sacrilege. In this case the person had in his possession money which he had previously donated to the Temple. He then tried to use that money to pay his shekel. Again the mishnah teaches that if the appropriation had already been made and if the shekel had been used to buy a sacrifice then he is guilty of sacrilege. We should note that according to the Talmud, in the previous section as well an animal had to have been sacrificed for it to be considered sacrilege.", + "[If he paid his shekel with] money that had been used to redeem the second tithe or the value of seventh year produce, he must eat food equal to its value. Second tithe is usually redeemed with money and then the money is brought to Jerusalem and used there to buy food. If one sells seventh year produce, the proceeds from the sale have the same rules and restrictions that the produce itself has any food which is purchased from this money must be used before seventh year produce must be removed from one’s house (which is when that type of food is no longer found in the field). In the case in this mishnah someone uses this money (second tithe or seventh year produce proceeds) to pay his shekel. What he must now do is take another shekel and use it as if it was second tithe or seventh year produce money. This is sufficient to restore the shekel that he used to pay his shekel tax." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses various scenarios in which a person set aside some money to use for his shekel or for another sacrifice and after he counted up the money he had set aside there was a surplus. The question is whether or not the surplus money is sacred and therefore must be used for a free-will offering.", + "One who gathered some coins and said: “Behold, these are for my shekel.” Bet Shammai say: the surplus [is used to purchase] freewill-offerings. But Bet Hillel say: the surplus is non-sacral property. The person gathered some coins together and declared that he would use them to bring his shekel. It turned out that there was more than a shekel’s worth of coins there. Bet Shammai say that since they had been set aside to give to the Temple, they are sacred and therefore they must be used to purchase free-will offerings. Bet Hillel, on the other hand, hold that the surplus is not sacred because when he collected the money his intention was that only a shekel’s worth of the coins should be given to the Temple.", + "[If he said:] “From them I shall bring my shekel,” they agree that the surplus is non-sacral property. In this case, instead of saying “These are for my shekel” he says “From them I shall bring my shekel”. It is clear that his intention is to use only whatever adds up to a shekel and therefore Bet Shammai agree that the surplus is not sacred.", + "[If he said]: “These [coins] are for a sin-offering, they agree that the surplus [goes to the chests of] freewill-offerings. In this case Bet Hillel agree with Bet Shammai that the surplus is sacred. Tomorrow’s mishnah will explain the difference between shekels and sin-offerings such that Bet Hillel agrees in the case of the latter.", + "[If he said]: “From these I shall bring a sin-offering, they agree that the surplus is non-sacral property. This is the same rule as in section two as long as he says “From these I will bring ….” the surplus is not sacred." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah explains the difference between shekels and a sin-offering such that Bet Hillel holds that the surplus of coins set aside for a sin-offering are sacred whereas the surplus of coins set aside for a shekel are not.", + "Rabbi Shimon says: what is the difference between shekels and a sin-offering? Shekels have a fixed value, but a sin-offering has no fixed value. Shekels have a fixed value. Hence one who says, “These coins are for my shekel” intends to make sacred only the value of a shekel. On the other hand, a sin-offering has no fixed value and therefore, one who says, “These coins are for a sin-offering” may have intended for all of the coins to be sacred, even the surplus.", + "Rabbi Judah says: shekels also have no fixed value. For when the Israelites came up out of the diaspora they used to pay the shekel in darics, then they paid the shekel in selas, then they paid it in tibs, and finally they wanted to pay it in dinars. Rabbi Judah says that the shekel also doesn’t have a fixed value. When the people of Israel first returned from the Babylonian exile they brought coins called “darics” (see above, mishnah one). A daric is a Persian coin worth four shekels. They then began to bring selas, which are worth two shekels. They then began to bring tibs, which are worth a shekel, which is equivalent to the half-shekel of the Torah. Finally, the people wanted to pay in dinars. According to the Talmud, the rabbis did not let them pay in dinars because this is less than the mandated half-shekel of the Torah. It seems like we have in this mishnah a record of different coins that were in use in different periods. According to one commentary, in each period they would give half of the coin that was commonly used. In any case, since the value of the shekel changed over time, Rabbi Judah says that the shekel too has no fixed value.", + "But Rabbi Shimon said: nevertheless they are all of the same value for everyone, whereas [in the case of] a sin-offering one man may bring it of the value of one sela, another may bring it of the value of two selas, and another in the value of three selas. Rabbi Shimon responds that when he said that the shekel has a fixed value he meant that at any given time everyone brings the same value, and not that that value could not change over time. If people were bringing darics, everyone brought the same daric. In contrast, people can bring animals worth different amounts as sin-offerings. This explains Bet Hillel in the previous mishnah." + ], + [ + "The surplus of [money set aside for] shekels is non-sacred property.
The surplus of [money set aside for the] tenth of the ephah, and the surplus of [money set aside for] bird-offerings of zavim, for bird-offerings of zavot, for bird-offerings of women after childbirth, and sin-offerings and guilt-offerings, their surplus [is used to purchase] freewill-offerings. This is the general rule: all [money set aside] for a sin-offering or for a guilt-offering, the surplus [is used to purchase] freewill-offerings.
The surplus of [money set aside for] a burnt-offering [must be used] for a burnt-offering.
The surplus of [money set aside for] a meal-offering [must be used] for a meal-offering.
The surplus of [money set aside for] a peace-offering [must be used] for a peace-offering.
The surplus of [money set aside for] a pesach [must be used] for a wellbeing offering.
The surplus of [money set aside for] the offerings of nazirites [must be used] for the offerings of other nazirites. The surplus of [money set aside for] the offerings of a [particular] nazirite [is used to purchase] freewill-offerings.
The surplus of [money raised for] the poor [must be used] for other poor. The surplus of [money raised for] a [particular] poor person [must be given] to that [poor person].
The surplus of [money raised for the ransom of] captives [must be used] for [the ransom of other] captives. The surplus of [money raised for the ransom of] a [particular] captive [must be given] to that captive.
The surplus of [the money raised for the burial of] the dead [must be used] for [the burial of other] dead. The surplus of [the money raised for the burial of] a [particular] dead person [must be given] to his heirs. Rabbi Meir says: the surplus of [money raised for the burial of] a [particular] dead person must be laid aside until Elijah comes. Rabbi Natan says: the surplus of [money raised for the burial of] a [particular] dead person [must be used] for building a monument for him over his grave.
In the previous mishnayot we dealt with the subject of what surplus money is used for. This mishnah discusses surpluses left over from money set aside for various other uses, mostly sacrifices or charity.
Section one: This halakhah is according to Bet Hillel’s opinion in mishnah three.
Section two: The tenth of the ephah (a measure of grain) is the sin-offering of a poor person. The bird-offerings mentioned here are brought by men or women who have had abnormal genital discharge (zavim and zavot, see above 1:5) or by women after childbirth. Money set aside for any of these offerings or for a sin-offering or a guilt-offering must be used to purchase freewill offerings. They can’t be used for other bird-offerings, sin-offerings or guilt-offerings because these can only be purchased for the sake of a specific sin or abnormal discharge. However, the surplus is still sacred because these offerings don’t have a fixed amount (see above mishnah 2).
Sections three-five: In all of these cases the extra money is used to buy another of the same type of sacrifice.
Section six: The extra money which was set aside for a pesah cannot be used as a pesah, because the surplus is only created when the holiday is already over. Rather the surplus is used to buy a wellbeing offering. In Pesahim we saw that the pesah is a type of wellbeing offering (see Pesahim 9:6-7).
Section seven: If charity collectors set aside money to buy nazirite offerings for nazirites who cannot afford to pay their offerings, then the surplus is used to buy other nazirite offerings. However, if the money is set aside for a specific nazirite it cannot be used to buy an offering for a different nazirite. Rather the surplus is used to purchase freewill offerings.
Section eight: Obviously, surplus charity should be used for more charity. However, if there is money set aside for a particular poor person, and there is surplus from that money, it too must go to that poor person. The charity collector may not say to himself, “That poor person doesn’t need all of that money. I’ll give the rest to someone else.” Rather, if the donor directed it to one person, the entire amount must be given to that person.
Section nine: Surplus from money collected to redeem captives is used to redeem other captives. However, if money was collected to redeem a specific captive, the surplus goes directly to that captive.
Section ten: Surplus money collected to bury the dead is used to bury other dead people. However, if the money was collected to bury a specific dead person there are three different opinions as to what to do with it. According to the first opinion, the money goes to the dead person’s inheritors. According to Rabbi Meir, it is forbidden to use it at all it must go untouched until Elijah comes. Finally, Rabbi Natan says it is used to build a tombstone over his grave." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah teaches that three times a year they would take the gathered shekels out of the chamber in the Temple and appropriate them to buy public sacrifices. This time is connected to the period in which animals are tithed. In the remainder of the mishnah there are two other opinions as to when animals are tithed, and therefore as to when the shekels are appropriated.", + "At three periods of the year the appropriation is made [from the shekels] in the chamber: Half a month before Pesah, half a month before Shavuot, and half a month before Sukkot, and these are also the threshing floors [the seasons] for the tithe of beasts, the words of Rabbi Akiva. According to Rabbi Akiva the shekels are appropriated at the same time of year that animals are tithed. I have translated “A half-month before” based on the Talmud. The mishnah itself says only “Before”, but uses a word which implies that this must occur at least a half-month before. The word “threshing floors” is borrowed from tithes for grain. The meaning is that in these three periods it becomes forbidden to eat any animal until every tenth animal has been tithed. The tithed animal still belongs to its owners, but its blood must be sprinkled on the altar and its meat eaten in Jerusalem. It seems likely to me that Rabbi Akiva said that animals were tithed before the holidays so that people would bring them to Jerusalem when they made their festival pilgrimages.", + "Ben Azzai says: on the twenty-ninth of Adar, and on the first of Sivan, and on the twenty-ninth of Av. The remaining sages disagree as to when animals are tithed. Ben Azzai gives dates that are more precise and slightly differ from those given by Rabbi Akiva. The twenty-ninth of Adar is basically the same, as it is half a month before Pesah. The first of Sivan is only 7 days before Shavuot. He seems to give more time because there is not a lot of time between Pesah and Shavuot in which animals might be born. The third tithe is at the end of Av, because Ben Azai holds that animals born in Elul are tithed separately.", + "Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon say: on the first of Nisan, on the first of Sivan, and on the twenty-ninth of Elul. Why did they say, “On the twenty-ninth of Elul and not on the first of Tishre? Because the first of Tishre is a holy day, and it is not permitted to tithe on a festival, therefore they moved it up to the twenty-ninth of Elul. Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon that the animals are tithed on the first of Nissan, which is similar to both Rabbi Akiva and one day after Ben Azai’s time. The second tithing period is on the first of Sivan, the same as Ben Azai. The third tithing period is on the twenty-ninth of Elul. The mishnah explains that they would have said the first of Tishre but one can’t tithe on the first of Tishre because it is a holiday, namely Rosh Hashanah. It seems that in this case he basically agrees with Rabbi Akiva who said half a month before Sukkot." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah begins to teach how the appropriation of the shekels was made.", + "In three baskets each of [the capacity of] three seahs they make the appropriation [of shekels] from the chamber. There were three baskets in the chamber, each containing enough space for three seahs worth of coins. This means that altogether in the year they expected 27 seahs worth of coins. If you’re wondering, a seah is about 8 liters, so we’re talking about 216 liters of volume of coins. I don’t know exactly how many coins this is.", + "And on them was inscribed: Aleph, Beth, Gimmel. Rabbi Ishmael says: Greek was inscribed on them, alpha, beta, gamla. The baskets were numbered, so that whichever one filled up first would be used first to buy public sacrifices. The sages debate whether the writing was in Greek or in Hebrew. It seems that one opinion demanded Hebrew because this is the Temple and Hebrew is the “lashon hakodesh” the holy language. Rabbi Ishmael allowed Greek because Greek may have been the more official business language of the time.", + "The one who made the appropriation did not enter the chamber wearing either a bordered cloak or shoes or sandals or tefillin or an amulet, lest if he became poor people might say that he became poor because of a sin committed in the chamber, or if he became rich people might say that he became rich from the appropriation in the chamber. For it is one’s duty to seem be free of blame before others as before God, as it is said: “And you shall be guiltless before the Lord and before Israel” (Numbers 32:22), and it says: “And you will find favor and good understanding in the eyes of God and man” (Proverbs 3:4). The person who went in to count the coins and make the appropriation could not wear any piece of clothing that would cause others to suspect that he might have stolen something. This could only lead to bad results if he grew poor they would suspect him of being punished for having stolen the shekels, if he grew rich they would suspect of being rich because of the stolen money. The mishnah finishes with an important moral note. A person must carefully guard his public reputation, even if in his heart he knows that he is not sinning and even if he knows that in God’s all-seeing eyes he is not sinning. This is especially true of a person with a position of public responsibility. It is not enough to just be honest, one must also give the outward appearance of honesty as well. I believe that this is an important life’s lesson. A person’s reputation of honesty is important both for the moral character of that person himself and for the proper functioning of society." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to teach how the appropriation of the shekels was actually performed.", + "[The members] of Rabban Gamaliel’s household used to enter [the chamber] with their shekel between their fingers, and throw it in front of him who made the appropriation, while he who made the appropriation purposely pressed it into the basket. The mishnah reads “….of Rabban Gamaliel’s household.” I have interpreted this as “the members” but it also may be interpreted to refer to an agent who brings the shekels from his household. In any case, the purpose of the arrangement described here is to get the shekel immediately into the basket so that it can count toward the next appropriation. The person bringing the shekel to the chamber would arrive on the day upon which the appropriation was made and would arrange so that the shekel was not just left in the chamber for a while but rather was put right into the basket.", + "He who made the appropriation did not make it until he first said to them: “Should I make the appropriation?” And they say to him three times: “Make the appropriation! Make the appropriation! Make the appropriation!” The ceremony described here was probably intended as a polemic against those groups of Second Temple Jews, perhaps Sadducees, who opposed the institution of the yearly shekel donation. In order to make it loud and clear that the shekels are being appropriated and that the public sacrifices will be bought from this money, they made public declarations and affirmations that the appropriation was being done with the consent of the people." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah concludes the description of how the appropriation was made.", + "[After] he made the first appropriation, he covers [what is left] with leather covers. [After he made the] second appropriation, he covers [what is left] with leather covers. [But after] the third appropriation he would not cover [what was left]. [And why would he cover?] Lest he should forget and make a [fresh] appropriation from shekels from which had already been appropriated. After the first appropriation, done at Pesah time, he would cover the left over shekels so that they would not be used for the next appropriation. The new shekels that were collected during the next period would be placed on top of the leather coverings. Similarly, after the second appropriation, he would cover the remaining already appropriated shekels with a leather covering and new shekels would go on top. However, after the third appropriation, done at Sukkot time, he would not cover the shekels. The mishnah then explains why he would cover after each appropriation. The reason is that we don’t want shekels that have already been counted in one appropriation to count towards another appropriation. Doing so would be an ancient version of “cooking the books.” The leather covers were placed there to prevent this from happening. Since there is no appropriation after the third one, there was no need to cover the remaining coins. A different explanation is offered by the Rambam. He holds that there were three large baskets in the chamber from which they would fill three smaller baskets, Aleph, Bet and Gimmel. At the first appropriation they would fill up the small basket with the Aleph on it from the first large basket and then cover the first large basket. They would then fill the small basket with the letter Bet on it from the second large basket and cover the second large basket. They would then fill the third basket from the third large basket but they would not cover that basket so that when the next appropriation time would arrive (fifteen days before Shavuot), they would know to begin filling the small basket with the Aleph from the third large basket. In this way, in the space of the year, each small basket would be filled from each larger basket. There is yet another explanation, one which Albeck prefers. That is that the question is not “and why would he cover [the first two]” but rather “why didn’t he cover the third?” The answer is that they would leave the third uncovered because the third appropriation is not really finished until the end of the year. They would leave the remaining coins uncovered to remind themselves to continue to appropriate from them and from new ones that would come in after Sukkot and not the coins underneath which had already been appropriated.", + "He would make the first appropriation on behalf of the Land of Israel, and the second on behalf of the surrounding cities, and the third on behalf of Babylon and on behalf of Medea and on behalf of [other] distant countries. Each appropriation was symbolically attributed to different regions where Jews lived. The one performing the appropriation would at the first appropriation say, “Behold this appropriation is from the Land of Israel for all of Israel” and similarly for the next two. The order is the order of proximity to Jerusalem. It can be assumed that the people who live in Israel will get their shekels to the Temple first, the people who live in the bordering areas will come next and finally those living in Babylonian and Persia will bring their shekels." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah begins to discuss what they did with the money from the appropriation.", + "What did they do with the appropriation? They bring with it the daily burnt-offerings ( and the additional burnt-offerings ( and their libations, the omer and the two loaves and the showbread and all the other public offerings. This section contains a list of some of the public offerings that were purchased from the appropriation. Tamidim see Exodus 29:38, Numbers 28:3; musafim see Numbers 28:9 ff.; the omer Leviticus 23:10-11; the two loaves Leviticus 23:16-17; the showbread Leviticus 24:5-9.", + "Those who guard the aftergrowths of the seventh year take their wages out of the appropriation from the chamber. Rabbi Yose says: [if a man wished] he could volunteer to watch without payment. But they said to him: you too admit that they can only be offered out of public funds. While it is forbidden to work the land during the seventh year, it is permitted to eat produce that grows on its own. This produce was necessary for the omer, the grain brought between Pesah and Shavuot, and the two loaves, brought on Shavuot, because these both had to come from newly harvested produce. To make sure that there was some grain in the fields the Temple would hire guards to watch the aftergrowths. These guards took their salary from the shekels. Rabbi Yose says that if an individual wishes to guard the fields without pay, he is free to do so. The other sages respond that his opinion is problematic. Rabbi Yose agrees that public sacrifices, those listed in section one, must come from public funds and not from individual donations. If one were to volunteer to watch the aftergrowths, he would by law become their owner and it would turn out that the omer and the two loaves would be coming from private donations. Therefore, individuals must take payment in return for guarding the fields." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to discuss what was done with the appropriation of the chamber and then what surplus money was used for.", + "The [red] heifer and the scapegoat and the strip of scarlet came out of the appropriation of the chamber. The red heifer (Numbers 19:2 ff.) and the Yom Kippur scapegoat (Leviticus 16:21) were both purchased with the appropriation money. There are two ceremonies in which the Torah prescribes that a strip of scarlet should be used: 1) the red heifer (Numbers 19:6); 2) and the leper purification (Leviticus 14:4). This strip of scarlet was purchased with the appropriation money.", + "The ramp for the [red] heifer and the ramp for the scapegoat and the strip of scarlet which was between its horns, and [the maintenance of] the pool of water and the wall of the city and its towers and all the needs of the city came out of the remainder in the chamber. This section lists things which were paid for with money which was left over after the three yearly appropriations were made. We can immediately notice that none of the things on this list are sacrifices. Rather most of them are general issues of upkeep. I will explain each separately. The ramp for the [red] heifer: they would build a ramp to lead the red heifer to the Mount of Olives (this is mentioned in Mishnah Parah 3:6). The ramp for the scapegoat: this was used to get the scapegoat out of the city (see Mishnah Yoma 3:6). And the strip of scarlet which was between its horns: they would take a strip of scarlet and place it between the horns of the scapegoat. We will learn more about this when we learn Yoma 6:4. The remaining items on the list are all maintenance for the major structures of the Temple and Jerusalem. I assume that the shekels were not sufficient for all upkeep, and the mishnah does not say that they were. All that the Mishnah states is that the extra shekels would go to this upkeep.", + "Abba Shaul says: the ramp for the [red] cow the high priests made out of their own [means]. Abba Shaul states that the ramp for the red heifer did not come from money left over from the appropriation but rather from the high priests. According to the Tosefta and the Yerushalmi, whenever a red heifer was burnt, the officiating high priest would build a new ramp rather than use a ramp built by a previous high priest." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to deal with money that was left over after all of the needs in the previous mishnah had been taken care of.", + "What did they do with the surplus of the remainder in the chamber?
They would buy with it wines, oils and fine flours, and the profit belonged to the Temple, the words of Rabbi Ishmael. According to Rabbi Ishmael, the money left over in the chamber was used to buy wine, oil and fine flour, which they would then sell to people who needed to bring these items for offerings. The profit would then go to the Temple’s treasury.", + "Rabbi Akiva says: one may not make a profit with the property of the Temple, nor with the property of the poor. Rabbi Akiva says that this is not allowed and that it is potentially disgraceful to turn sacred items or charity into a profit. Furthermore, there is a potential problem of the Temple or poor people losing money on the deal. Rabbi Akiva doesn’t state what he thinks should be done with the extra money. According to one interpretation of the mishnah, the money is used for those things listed in mishnah two, above. According to the Rambam, the money is used for those things listed below in mishnah four." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nWhereas in yesterday’s mishnah we learned what they did with the surplus from the shekels which remained in the chamber after the appropriation had been made, today’s mishnah teaches what they would do with the surplus of the appropriation itself. For instance, when the first of Nisan comes along they would begin to buy public sacrifices with a new appropriation, so what did they do with money left over from the old appropriation?", + "What was done with the surplus of the appropriation?
[They would buy] plates of gold for covering the interior of the Holy of Holies. According to the first opinion, the extra money from the appropriation would be used to buy plates of gold to cover the walls and ceiling of the Holy of Holies.", + "Rabbi Ishmael says: the surplus [from the sale] of the produce was used for the altar’s ‘dessert’, and the surplus of the appropriation was used for the ministering vessels. Rabbi Ishmael says that the surplus from the appropriation was used to buy ministering vessels. He holds that since this money was intended to be used for sacrifices it can also be used to buy the vessels which are used in offering the sacrifices. In yesterday’s mishnah we learned that with the money left in the chamber Rabbi Ishmael said they should buy wines, oils and flours and sell them for a profit. Here he says that the profit is used for the altar’s “dessert.” This refers to wholly burnt offerings that they would offer on the altar when there were no other sacrifices to be offered. This is like a “dessert” for the hungry altar.", + "Rabbi Akiba says: the surplus of the appropriation was used for the altar’s ‘dessert’, and the surplus of the libations was used for the ministering vessels. Rabbi Akiva says that “dessert” for the Temple comes from the surplus of the appropriation. The ministering vessels, on the other hand, were bought from the surplus of libations. This refers to extra flour and wine which were bought to make libations. The “extra” can happen when merchants promise to provide three seahs worth of flour for a sela (a coin). If the price of flour goes down to four seahs for a sela, the merchants have to bring four seahs, even though only three seahs are to be consecrated as libations. The Temple’s treasurers can sell the extra seah and with the profit pay for the ministering vessels.", + "Rabbi Hananiah the chief of the priests says: the surplus of the libations was used for the altar’s ‘dessert’, and the surplus of the appropriation was used for the ministering vessels. Rabbi Hananiah, the chief of priests, has yet another opinion about what to do with the extra money (doesn’t everyone love extra money!). His opinion is an opposite version of Rabbi Akiva’s. I find it interesting that we have here a priest, someone who would seemingly have known very well what went on in the Temple, and yet his opinion does not count any more than any of the other rabbi’s opinion.", + "Neither of these [two sages] allowed [a profit from the sale of] the produce. The mishnah ends by noting that both Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Hananiah agree that they don’t use the shekels to buy produce and then sell it to make a profit, as was the opinion of Rabbi Ishmael. It seems that the editor of the mishnah strongly disagrees with Rabbi Ishmael and hence wishes to emphasize that all of the other sages disagree with him." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with the extra incense. Every day there were two incense offerings, one in the morning and one in the evening (Exodus 30:7-8). The incense for 365 days and for three extra incense offerings on Yom Kippur was prepared ahead of time. The lunar year is only 354 years, so the extra incense was to be saved up for the leap year, when they would add a month. The problem is that from the first of Nisan the incense had to be offered using the new shekels. Our mishnah describes a way in which they could save the incense for the following year and yet still pay for it with new shekels.", + "What was done with the surplus of the incense?
They would separate from it the wages of the craftsmen, and they would exchange it for the wages of the craftsmen, and they would give it to the craftsmen as their wages, and then they would buy it back again out of a new appropriation. This is how they would turn the incense for the previous year into incense for the following year. First they would separate an amount of incense that would be used to pay the wages of those who make the incense. Then they would redeem that incense with money set aside to pay those craftsmen. The money then would become sacred and the incense would be non-sacred. They then would give the non-sacred incense to the craftsmen as their wages and then they would buy back the incense with new shekels. The craftsmen would have their wages, and the incense was bought with new shekels. They could have done all this in a much simpler way they could simply sell the old incense and then buy it back with new money. However, the rabbis thought that the arrangement of using it for the craftsmen’s wages was more appropriate for sacred money.", + "If the new month had arrived in time they would bring it with the new appropriation, but if not, they from the old one. If the first of Nisan came on time, meaning that Adar had only twenty-nine days, then they would immediately begin to use the new appropriation to buy the incense and all of the public sacrifices. However, if Nisan did not come on time, meaning Adar had thirty days, they would bring it from the incense bought with the old shekels." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with a person who dedicates some of his possessions to the Temple and among them are things which can be used as public sacrifices but not as individual sacrifices. This would include, for instance, the ingredients for making the incense. We should note that these cannot just simply be used for public sacrifices because as we have learned on several occasions, public sacrifices must be paid for with public money and not individual donations.", + "If one dedicated his possessions to the Temple, and there was among them things which was fit for public offerings, they should be given to the craftsmen as their wages; the words of Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Akiva says that if among the dedicated property there are things which can be used for public offerings, those things should go as payment to the craftsmen. Rabbi Akiva holds that things which are dedicated to the Temple can become regular non-sacred items if they are used in payment for work done for the Temple.", + "Ben Azzai said to him: this method is not correct. Rather, they separate from them the wages of the craftsmen, and then they exchange them for the money due to the craftsmen, and then they give them to the craftsmen as their wages, and then they buy them back again out of a new appropriation. Ben Azzai says that Rabbi Akiva’s halakhah is incorrect, because he treats this incense differently from the way in which the extra incense was treated above in mishnah five. Ben Azzai holds that the cases are similar and should therefore be treated in the same way. He also disagrees with Rabbi Akiva about things becoming non-sacred by being used to pay for work done in the Temple. Accordingly, Ben Azzai says that the same procedure described in yesterday’s mishnah should be performed here as well. First they separate from the dedicated property an amount equal to the wages owed to the craftsmen. Then they redeem this property with coins that are to go to the craftsmen. They then give the incense to the craftsmen as their wages and then buy the incense back with money from the new appropriation. This is the exact same procedure described above, in yesterday’s mishnah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nYesterday’s mishnah discussed what is done with things dedicated to the Temple that can be used as public sacrifices but not as individual sacrifices. Today’s mishnah discusses things dedicated to the Temple that can be used for individual sacrifices.", + "The case under discussion is one in which a person dedicated his possessions to the Temple and these possessions included animals which could be offered as individual sacrifices, and not public sacrifices as was the case in yesterday’s mishnah. The question is: what is to be done with these animals? The main debate in the mishnah is over what was the man’s intention that the animals should be completely put on the altar, meaning they should be burnt offerings, which are completely burnt on the altar, or that all of his property should go to the Temple for its upkeep.", + "One who dedicated his possessions to the Temple and there was among them an animal fit for the altar, males or females,
Rabbi Eliezer says: males should be sold for the use of burnt-offerings and females should be sold for the use of offerings of wellbeing, and the proceeds should be lumped together with the rest of the possessions for the repair of the temple. Rabbi Eliezer holds that the male animals should be sold to people who wish to offer a burnt offering whereas the female animals, which cannot be used for burnt offerings, should be sold to people who wish to offer an offering of wellbeing. The proceeds from the sales and any of other dedicated property are used for the repairs and upkeep of the Temple. Rabbi Eliezer holds that unspecified dedications to the Temple are directed at paying for the upkeep of the Temple.", + "Rabbi Joshua says: the males themselves should be offered as burnt-offerings and the females should be sold for the use of offerings of wellbeing, and with the proceeds burnt offerings should be brought, and the other possessions should go to the repair of the temple. Rabbi Joshua says that the male animals should be sacrificed as burnt offerings and not sold. Rabbi Joshua holds that when the person dedicated to the Temple animals which can be sacrificed he intended them to be whole burnt offerings and not that they should pay for the upkeep of the Temple. The female animals are sold to become wellbeing offerings and then the money is used to purchase more burnt offerings which are offered on the altar. They aren’t offered as wellbeing offerings, because parts of the wellbeing offerings are eaten and Rabbi Joshua says the intention was that all of the animal would go to the altar. The other property is used for the upkeep of the Temple.", + "Rabbi Akiva says: I prefer the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer over the opinion of Rabbi Joshua, for Rabbi Eliezer applied a uniform rule, but Rabbi Joshua differentiated. Rabbi Akiva says that Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion is preferable because he is consistent both the males and females are sold and the proceeds from both sales go to the repair of the Temple, as does the other property which was dedicated to the Temple. In contrast, Rabbi Joshua said that the animals fit for the altar are used either as whole burnt offering or are sold to buy other whole burnt offerings, whereas the other dedicated property is used for the upkeep. Rabbi Akiva prefers the consistent of Rabbi Eliezer and hence rules accordingly. We should note that this preference for consistency is a function of Rabbi Akiva’s own logic, and not of a received tradition. In other words, in the absence of any foreknowledge of who is correct, he tries his best to determine the correct halakhah from the opinions of his two teachers.", + "Rabbi Papias said: I have heard [a tradition in accordance] with both of their opinions: that one who dedicates to the Temple with explicitness, it is according to the words of Rabbi Eliezer, but one who dedicates to the Temple without specifying it is according to the opinion of Rabbi Joshua. In contrast, Rabbi Papias says that he has a received tradition, one which mediates between Rabbi Eliezer’s position and Rabbi Joshua’s. When one specifies that his dedication is for the upkeep of the Temple, the law follows Rabbi Eliezer. However, if he doesn’t specify then the tradition is according to Rabbi Joshua." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with a person who dedicated his belongings to the Temple and there were among them things which could be offered on the altar, but they were not animal sacrifices, as was the case in mishnah 7.", + "One who dedicated his possessions to the Temple and there were among them things fit for the altar, [such as] wines, oils, and birds: Rabbi Elazar says: they should be sold for the use of [offerings of] each particular kind, and they should bring with the proceeds burnt offerings, and the other possessions should go to the repair of the Temple. Rabbi Elazar says that the wines, oils and birds should be sold to people who need to bring wines for libations, oils to accompany minhah (grain) offerings or various bird offerings. The proceeds from the sale should be used to buy burnt offerings, and then, as is standard, all of the other dedicated possessions should go to the upkeep of the Temple. The Rambam explains how this situation differs from the situation in mishnah seven, where Rabbi Eliezer said that animals dedicated to the Temple should be sold to people who need them for sacrifices and the proceeds go to the repair of the Temple. That mishnah discussed animals and not wines, oils and birds as does our mishnah. Animals dedicated as sacrifices can be, under certain circumstances, redeemed. If the animal becomes blemished, it is redeemed with money and the money becomes sacred and is used to buy another sacrifice. Since the money becomes sacred, when these animals are sold it is as if the mitzvah has been already performed and the money can be used for the repair of the Temple. In contrast, wine, oil and birds cannot be redeemed with money. Therefore, when they are sold the money itself does not become holy. Since the money is not holy, the mitzvah has not been performed and therefore the money must be used to buy burnt offerings, through which the mitzvah can be performed." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah teaches how prices were fixed on behalf of the Temple such that the Temple would always get the better of the deal, should there be price changes.", + "Once in thirty days prices were fixed [on behalf of] the chamber. Once every thirty days the prices of oil, fine flour and wine were set so that the Temple (the chamber) would be able to buy at that price for the entire month. This means that if the market price went up, the Temple could still buy at the lower rate. However, if the market price of these items went down, the Temple could buy the items at the new lower rate. The mishnah shall now illustrate.", + "Anyone who had accepted upon himself to supply fine flours at four [se'ahs for a sela] and they now stood at three [se'ahs for a sela] he must [still] supply four. If a merchant agreed to sell flour at four se’ahs (a measure of volume) for a sela (a coin) and then the price went up to three se’ahs for a sela, the merchant takes the loss. The Temple can still give him a coin and get four se’ahs.", + "[If he had accepted to supply fine flours] at three [se'ahs for a sela] and they now stood at four, he must [also] supply at four, for the sanctified property has the upper hand. However, if the price was three se’ahs for a sela and it went down to four se’ahs for a sela, he must provide four se’ahs. The mishnah notes that the Temple (i.e. the sanctified property) always has the upper hand.", + "If the fine flour became worm-eaten the loss is his; if the wine became sour the loss is his. For he is not entitled to his money until the altar has accepted [the offering]. If the Temple buys some produce but before the produce is offered it goes bad, the merchant must replace the produce. This is because the money is not considered to belong to the merchant until the flour, wine or oil has actually been offered. Since the money is not yet his, he must replace the ruined product in order to keep the money which the Temple’s treasurers gave him." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "These were the officers in the Temple:
Yohanan the son of Pinchas was over the seals.
Ahiyah over the libations.
Mattityah the son of Shmuel over the lots.
Petahiah over the bird-offering. (Petahiah was Mordecai. Why was his name called Petahiah? Because he ‘opened’ matters and expounded them, and he understood the seventy tongues.)
The son of Ahijah over the sickness of the bowels.
Nehuniah, the digger of ditches.
Gevini, the crier.
The son of Gever over the locking of the gates.
The son of Bevai over the strips [for lighting the menorah].
The son of Arza over the cymbal.
Hugras the son of Levi over the song.
The house of Garmu over the making of the showbread.
The house of Avtinas over the preparing of the frankincense.
Elazar over the curtains.
And Pinchas over the priestly vestments.
This mishnah lists and names fifteen officers who performed various services in the Temple. There are various interpretations as to the names. Albeck explains that in every generation the officers who filled these functions were called by these names. Another explanation is that this is the list of the names of those who served in the Temple at the time when this mishnah was composed.
1) Yohanan the son of Pinchas was over the seals: This will be explained below in mishnayot 3-5.
2) Ahiyah over the libations: This too will be explained in mishnayot 3-5.
3) Mattityah the son of Shmuel over the lots: Lots were cast between the priests in order to determine who got to offer which sacrifice.
4) Petahiah over the bird-offering. (Petahiah was Mordecai. Why was his name called Petahiah? Because he ‘opened’ matters and expounded them, and he understood the seventy tongues): Petahiah sold bird-offerings to those who needed to bring them. The section in parentheses is a late addition to the mishnah that is missing from most manuscripts. Petahiah comes from the word “petach” which means to open and can refer to the opening of a midrashic sermon.
5) The son of Ahiyah over the sickness of the bowels: Many priests had gastrointestinal ailments. This is probably due to their frequent contact with raw meat and infected water. The son of Ahiyah was responsible for the medicines and other cures for these illnesses.
6) Nehuniah, the digger of ditches: Nehuniah oversaw the digging of wells, cisterns and irrigation channels.
7) Gevini, the announcer: Gevini would cry out each morning, “Rise up priests to your worship (avodah), Levites to your stands and Israelites to your stations (maamadot).”
8) The son of Gever over the locking of the gates: He would close the gates in the evening.
9) The son of Bevai over the strips: these were the wicks used in lighting the menorah.
10) The son of Arza over the cymbal: The cymbal was used to signal to the Levites to begin to sing.
11) Hugras the son of Levi over the song: he conducted the Levites in their daily songs.
12) The house of Garmu over the making of the showbread: this house of priests was responsible for baking the twelve loaves that were on the table throughout the week.
13) The house of Avtinas over the preparing of the frankincense: they crushed the herbs and prepared the mixture.
14) Elazar over the curtains: he sewed the curtains and then maintained them.
15) And Pinchas over the priestly vestments: he made the vestments, put them on the priests and then took them off when their service was completed." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with two other offices in the Temple. The difference between today’s mishnah and yesterday’s is that since the offices described have responsibility to deal with money they were filled by more than one person to prevent dishonesty.", + "They did not have less than three treasurers. The treasures were responsible for the Temple’s finances. One of their important functions was to redeem sanctified property so that they could use the money for necessary projects. (Sort of like selling Temple stock!)", + "Or less than seven superintendents. The seven superintendents held the seven keys to the Temple courtyard. They each needed to be there before the Temple courtyard could be opened. When the doors were opened the treasurers could gain entrance.", + "Nor create positions of authority over the public in matters of money [with] less than two [officers], except [in the case] of the son of Ahiyah who was over the sickness of the bowels and Elazar who was over the veil, for these had been accepted by the majority of the public. In all positions of monetary authority it was necessary to appoint at least two officers. This seems to be a way of limiting the possibilities of dishonesty and fraud. The only exceptions are the two single officers in the Temple, the son of Ahiyah and Elazar, who had monetary authority over the public (to buy spices and materials for the curtains). This was acceptable because the public had trusted and allowed them to fill these positions as individuals." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nAbove in mishnah one we learned that Yohanan the son of Pinchas was responsible for the seals and that Ahiyah was responsible for the libations. In today’s mishnah and in tomorrow’s we will learn what their responsibilities are.\nThe libations refers to grain offerings which include flour mixed with oil and a libation of wine. These grain offerings accompany certain animal sacrifices: an offering of well-being, a burnt offering and the sin and guilt offerings of a leper. The amount of grain, oil and wine would vary depending upon the animal used in the sacrifice. The following chart should be helpful:\nFlour\nOil\nWine\nSheep or goat (one year old)\n1/10 of a measure\n1/4 hin\n1/4 hin\nRam (two years old)\n2/10\n1/3 hin\n1/3 hin\nCow or calf\n3/10\n1/2 hin\n1/2 hin\nSomeone who needed to bring a libation (a grain offering) with his/her sacrifice could buy the exact amount of flour, oil and wine directly from the Temple. This would ensure that the offering was pure. He would pay the money to Yochanan ben Pinchas who would give him a note with a stamp on it. He would then take the note to Ahiyah who would give him the correct amount of flour, oil and wine.", + "There were four seals in the Temple, and on them was inscribed [respectively]: ‘calf’, ‘ram’, ‘kid’, ‘sinner’. According to the first opinion there were four seals, one for each of the three types of animals described above in the chart and one inscribed with the word “sinner”, for the leper who brings three offerings, a guilt offering, a sin offering and a burnt offering, each of which come from various types of sheep (see Leviticus 14). Since the leper brings three sheep he therefore brings three times the amount of flour, oil and water that is brought for one sheep (see the chart). In addition he brings one extra log (a small measure=1/12 of a hin) of oil which was placed on his right earlobe, right thumb and right big toe (Leviticus 14:15-18). Each seal would signify that he has paid for that amount of libation flour, oil and wine.", + "Ben Azzai says: there were five and on them was inscribed in Aramaic [respectively]” ‘calf’, ‘ram’, ‘kid’, ‘poor sinner’, and ‘rich sinner’. Ben Azzai has two disagreements with the previous opinion. First of all, he holds that the inscriptions were in Aramaic and not in Hebrew, since Aramaic was the language with which most people were more familiar. Secondly, he says that there were two types of inscriptions for the leper, one for the poor sinner who only brings one sheep and its libations (Lev. 14:21-31), and the one extra log of oil described above. The other for the rich sinner who brings three sheep, as described above. The opinion in section one according to which there was only one inscription for the leper holds that the poor leper, who brings one sheep, buys the libations of a sheep and brings the extra log of oil from his home.", + "[The seal inscribed] ‘calf’ served for the libations of cattle, both large and small, male and female. The mishnah now explains what each seal is for. “Calf” is for all cattle, meaning cows and bulls, whether they are male which are used as whole burnt offerings or females used as offerings of wellbeing.", + "[The seal inscribed] ‘kid’ served for the libations of flock animals, both large and small, male and female, with the exception of rams. The seal of the kid was used to buy libations for all flock offerings (sheep and goats) as long as they were a year or less old. From thirteen months and older the sheep is considered to be a ram.", + "[The one inscribed] ‘ram’ served for the libations of rams alone. The seal of the ram was used to buy libations for the ram only.", + "[The one inscribed] ‘sinner’ served for the libations of the three animals [offered] by lepers. The seal upon which was inscribed the word “sinner” was used to buy the libations for the three animals that a leper brings, plus the additional log as we described in section one." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah explains how a person would buy libation offerings, meaning the flour, oil and wine which we described in yesterday’s mishnah.", + "If one required libations he would go to Yohanan who was the officer over the seals, and give him money and receive from him a seal. Then he would go to Ahiyah who was the officer over the libations, and give him the seal, and receive from him the libations. This is the process through which a person could buy his libation offerings.", + "And in the evening these two [officers] would come together, and Ahiyah would bring out the seals and receive money for their value. And if there was more [than their value] the surplus belonged to the sanctuary, but if there was less [than their value] Yohanan would pay [the loss] out of his own pocket; for the Temple has the upper hand. Here we get an early description of Jewish accounting! In the evening, after the day’s work at the Temple was done, the two officers would get together to check the accounts. Ahiyah would take out the seals which he had received and collect the money from Yohanan. If there was extra money then that money belonged to the Temple. However, if there was not enough money to cover the seals, then Yohanan would have to make up the difference from his own pocket. The mishnah notes that the Temple’s treasury has the upper hand it can gain from someone’s mistake but not lose. As they say it’s good to be the Temple." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah describes what happens if someone loses his seal, meaning he claims that he gave the money to Yohanan but by the time he got to Ahiyah to buy his libations the seal was lost.", + "If one lost his seal his case they wait [to deal] with him until the evening. If he lost his seal, then they tell him to wait until evening when they reckon the accounts.", + "If they found [money left over] to the value of his lost seal, they give [it] to him and if not he gets nothing. If they find extra money equivalent to the amount his seal is worth, then they give him back the money or give him the flour, oil and wine for the libations he needs to bring. But if there is no extra money then he gets nothing, since it is possible that he is lying.", + "On the seals was inscribed the name of the day because of the defrauders. They would put dates on the seals to stop fraud, or at least make it more difficult. The dates would prevent a person from claiming that he lost his seal and waiting until the end of the day in the hopes that Yohanan would have extra money. In such a case the person could get his money back and then take out the seal and get the libations from Ahiyah. By putting on dates this particular form of fraud became impossible." + ], + [ + "There were two chambers in the Temple, one the chamber of secret gifts and the other the chamber of the vessels.
The chamber of secret gifts: sin-fearing persons used to put their gifts there in secret, and the poor who were descended of the virtuous were secretly supported from them.
The chamber of the vessels: whoever offered a vessel as a gift would throw it in, and once in thirty days the treasurers opened it; and any vessel they found in it that was of use for the repair of the temple they left there, but the others were sold and their price went to the chamber of the repair of the temple.
This mishnah discusses how people could give charity in secret either to the Temple or to the poor. We should note that in the Rambam’s discussion of charity he states that the second best form in which to give tzedakah is neither for the giver to know the receiver nor for the receiver to know the giver. The only way which is preferred over secrecy is to help a person earn his own living.
The mishnah is clear and doesn’t seem to need any explanation. However, I will offer some historical commentary.
The Temple in Jerusalem was clearly a repository of wealth, as were most Temples in the ancient world. When Josephus describes how Antiochus came to pillage Jerusalem (the events that preceded the Hasmonean revolution) he writes (Antiquities of the Jews XII, chapter 5, section four:
“The king came up to Jerusalem, and, pretending peace, he got possession of the city by treachery; at which time he spared not so much as those that admitted him into it, on account of the riches that lay in the temple; but, led by his covetous inclination, (for he saw there was in it a great deal of gold, and many ornaments that had been dedicated to it of very great value,) and in order to plunder its wealth, he ventured to break the league he had made. So he left the temple bare, and took away the golden candlesticks, and the golden altar [of incense], and table [of shew-bread], and the altar [of burnt-offering]; and did not abstain from even the veils, which were made of fine linen and scarlet. He also emptied it of its secret treasures, and left nothing at all remaining.”
The secret treasures referred to here may be similar to that which Josephus describes. What interests me, beyond the sheer parallel between the Mishnah and Josephus, is that the rabbis assume that some of these treasures must have gone to tzedakah. According to the rabbis, the Temple must have at least partially functioned as a repository where people could give money secretly. In the rabbinic mind, the Temple’s treasures could not just have been designated to make its leaders wealthier or to pay for more ornament decorations. The money must have gone to the poor as well. I do not know if this is historically accurate but to me it makes no difference. What the Mishnah is telling us is that our religious centers, be it the Temple or the synagogue, must also be points of tzedakah, and not just tzedakah for the organization itself, but tzedakah for the poor. The Temple/synagogue is the exchange center by which Jews can give charity secretly." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah describes certain physical features of the Temple. Fans of the Raiders of the Lost Ark series will enjoy this mishnah, as well as tomorrow’s.", + "There were in the Temple thirteen chests, thirteen tables and thirteen prostrations. There were thirteen chests in the Temple to collect money for various items. These will be explained below in mishnah five. There were thirteen tables, which will be explained below in mishnah four. Finally, there were thirteen places in which people would prostrate themselves and these will be explained in mishnah three. Notice the chiastic order chests, tables and prostrations and below we will see prostrations, tables and chests.", + "[Members] of the household of Rabban Gamaliel and of Rabbi Hananiah the chief of the priests used would prostrate fourteen [times. And where was the additional [prostration]? In front of the wood storage yard, for they had a tradition from their forefathers that the Ark was hidden there. The people of the household of Rabban Gamaliel and Rabbi Hananiah the chief of the priests would do an extra prostration. They would do this extra prostration in front of the wood storage yard, the place where the wood that was used to fuel the altar was stored. They prostrated there because they had a tradition that that was where the Ark of the Covenant was buried. There are two main traditions concerning the fate of the Ark in rabbinic literature. The first holds that King Josaiah buried it in the Temple and the second holds that it was carried off to Babylonia when the Temple was destroyed. The third holds that it is sitting in a storehouse in Washington D.C. (just kidding)." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to discuss the hidden location of the Ark of the Covenant.", + "It once happened that a priest who was busy [there] noticed that the floor [of the wood storage area] was different from the others. He went and told it to his friend but before he had time to finish his words his soul departed. Then they knew for certain that there the Ark was hidden. In this legendary tale a priest is busy chopping wood in the wood storage area of the Temple when he notices that the floor looks a little different. He rushes off to tell his friend about what he saw but before he can get the words out of his mouth, he dies (I hope his face didn’t start to melt off. Indy should have told him to just close his eyes!). From this the other priests knew for certain that the Ark was hidden there." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah teaches that the thirteen prostrations mentioned in mishnah one above were made in front of the thirteen gates in the Temple. The mishnah proceeds to name the gates. The commentators explain that the prostrations were to thank God for the glory of the Temple.", + "And where did they make the prostrations? Four [times] in the north, four [times] in the south, three [times] in the east, and twice in the west, in front of the thirteen gates. This section teaches where in the Temple the thirteen gates were located.", + "The southern gates close to the west [side were]: the Upper Gate, the Fuel Gate, the Gate of the Firstborn [Animals], and the Water Gate. Why was it called the Water Gate? Because through it was brought in the flask of water for the libation on Sukkot. Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov says: through it the waters trickle forth and in the time to come “they will come forth from under the threshold of the Temple” (Ezekiel 47:1). The Upper Gate was on the southwestern side, which was the highest point of the Temple. The Fuel Gate was used to bring in the wood used to fuel the altar’s fires. The firstborn animals were brought in through the Firstborn Animal’s Gate (should be obvious, but still..). The mishnah offers two explanations for why the Water Gate was called as such. The first explanation is that this is where the water libation, offered on Sukkot (we will learn this eventually in Sukkah 4:9), was brought into the Temple. The second is that in the future, when clean living water flows out of the Temple and cleanses the salty water of the Dead Sea, the water will begin to trickle forth from this gate (see Ezekiel 47). There is no Nixon connection.", + "On the opposite side in the north close to the west were: Jechoniah’ Gate, the Gate of the Offerings, the Gate of the Women, and the Gate of Song. And why was it called the Jechoniah’ Gate? Because through it Jechoniah went out into his captivity. On the opposite side, in the North, there were four more gates. Jechoniah’s Gate was named after the King Jechoniah who was taken captive and put into exile by Nebuchadnezzar (see II Kings 24:15). Sacrifices, which were slaughtered in the northern part of the Temple, were brought in through the Offerings Gate. The Woman’s Gate was a special entrance for women when they brought their sacrifices. The Gate of Song was used to bring in the musical instruments which the Levites used.", + "In the east was the Nicanor’s Gate, and it had two small gates, one to the right and one to the left. In the east was Nicanor’s Gate, named after Nicanor who according to legend brought the gates from Egypt. Nicanor’s gates were surrounded by two smaller gates that were included in the tally of thirteen gates.", + "There were also two gates in the west which had no name. The western gates were infrequently used and hence had no special name." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah lists the thirteen tables mentioned in mishnah one.", + "There were thirteen tables in the Temple:
Eight of marble in the place of slaughtering and on them they would rinse the entrails. In the slaughtering section of the Temple there were eight marble tables upon which they would rinse out the entrails of the sacrificial animals.", + "And two to the west of the ramp [which ascends the altar], one of marble and one of silver; on that of marble they would place the limbs [of the offerings], and on that of silver the ministering vessels. To the west of the ramp used to ascend to the altar were two more tables, one of marble and one of silver. They would put the limbs of the sacrifices on the marble table where they would wait until they were offered on the altar. The marble was cool and hence slowed down the deterioration of the meat. On the silver table they would place the ministering vessels. These were 93 vessels which were brought out each morning and which would be used in worship during the day.", + "And there were two tables in the Porch on the inside of the entrance to the Temple, one of marble and the other of gold; on that of marble they would place the showbread placed when it was brought in, and on that of gold [they would place the showbread] when it was taken out, because things sacred may be raised [in honor] but not lowered. The Porch was the open section of the Temple right outside the Sanctuary. There were two tables there, one of marble and one of gold. Both of these tables were used for the showbread. When the bread was baked on Friday it would be placed on the marble table so that it wouldn’t begin to mold before it was brought into the Sanctuary on Shabbat. When it was taken out of the Sanctuary on the following Shabbat, it was placed on the golden table before it was divvied up to the priests. The mishnah notes that this follows an important halakhic rule sacred things such as the showbread should rise up in holiness and not be lowered down. Since it was on a golden table inside the Sanctuary, it had to be on a golden table when it was brought out. The most famous application of this rule is that on Hannukah we add a candle each night because we are to increase in holiness and not decrease.", + "And there was one [table] of gold on the inside of the Sanctuary on which the showbread lay continually. During the week, the showbread was placed on a golden table, as we mentioned above." + ], + [ + "There were thirteen chests in the Temple and on them was inscribed [respectively]:
“new shekels”;
“New shekels” those for each year;
“old shekels”;
“Old shekels” whoever has not paid his shekel in the past year may pay it in the coming year;
“bird-offerings”;
“Bird-offerings” these are turtle-doves;
“young pigeons for burnt-offerings”;
“Young pigeons for burnt-offerings” these are young pigeons.
“wood”;
“frankincense”;
“gold for the kapporet”;
and on six, “freewill offerings”. Both [these two chests] are for burnt-offerings, the words of Rabbi Judah. But the sages say: “bird-offerings” one [half] is for sin-offerings and the other [half] for burnt-offerings, but “young pigeons for burnt-offerings” all goes to burnt-offerings.
This mishnah describes the thirteen chests that were in the Temple, as we learned above in mishnah one. We should note that the mishnah first lists all of the chests, and then below it explains more fully four of them. I shall explain them all in my explanation of the first section.
Section one: The “new shekels” chest was for shekels that were collected during each year. From this chest the shekels would later be brought into the chamber.
Section two: The “old shekels” chest was for people who failed to bring their shekels during the year.
Sections three and four: The “bird-offerings” are turtledoves (sorry, no partridge in a pear tree). The “young pigeons for burnt offerings” are, as might be obvious young pigeons. The sages dispute what these bird offerings are used for. According to Rabbi Judah both the bird-offerings and the young pigeons are used for burnt offerings. He holds that people who put money into both of these chests are bringing voluntary offerings, and voluntary bird offerings are only offered as burnt offerings. If someone needed to bring a mandated bird offering (such as a leper or a woman after childbirth) she didn’t put the money in the box but rather gave the offering directly to a priest.
The other sages agree that the box marked “young pigeons for burnt-offerings” goes exclusively for burnt offerings. This box, and only this box, was where people who wanted to make voluntary bird offerings put their money. The box marked “bird offerings” is intended for those who are obligated to bring a pair of birds, one for a sin offering and one for a burnt offering. There is actually an entire tractate (Tractate Kinim) about these bird offerings.
Section five: This was for people who wished to donate wood to fuel the altar.
Section six: For people who wished to donate the frankincense.
Section seven: One who said, “Behold I am donating gold” would bring golden dinarim (a type of coin) and put them in this box. The dinarim would then be used to buy gold to make various coverings for the Holy of Holies. The word “kapporet” in the Torah refers to the cover of the Ark, but here in this mishnah it refers to all golden coverings.
Section eight: There were six other chests upon which was inscribed “freewill offerings.” This was parallel to the six things listed above in 2:5 whose surplus goes to freewill offerings. See there for an explanation as to what these six things were." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first half of our mishnah explains what one who volunteers to bring wood, frankincense or gold, three of the chests mentioned in yesterday’s mishnah (sections 5-7), must bring.\nThe second half of the mishnah deals with the eighth section of yesterday’s mishnah, which mentions the six boxes upon which was inscribed “for freewill offerings.”", + "One who says: “Behold, I am obligated to bring wood”, he may not bring less than two logs. [If he says: “Behold, I am obligated to bring] frankincense”, he may not bring less than a handful of it. [If he says: “Behold, I am obligated to bring] gold”, he may not bring less than a gold denar. This section spells out how much wood, frankincense or gold one must bring if one makes a vow to bring one of these items without specifying how much he will bring. If he specifies how much he will bring, then he brings that amount.", + "“On six [was inscribed] “for freewill-offerings”: What was done with the freewill-offerings? They would buy with them burnt-offerings, the flesh [of which] was for the name [of God] and the hides for the priests. As we learned yesterday, on six of the chests was inscribed “freewill offerings.” The mishnah now teaches that this money was used to buy burnt offerings. The flesh of the offering would be completely burnt on the altar but the hides would go to the priests.", + "The following is the midrash which was expounded by Yehoyada the high priest: “It is a guilt-offering; it is a guilt offering, it goes to the Lord” (Leviticus 5:19). This is the general rule: anything which is brought because of a sin or because of guilt, they should purchase with it burnt offerings, the flesh [of which] was for the name [of God] and the hides for the priests. Thus the two verses are fulfilled: a guilt offering for the Lord and a guilt offering for the priests, and it says: “Money brought as a guilt offering or as a sin offering was not deposited in the House of the Lord; it went to the priests” (II Kings 12:17). In this section we read a midrash which explains how we derive the halakhah in the previous section, that the priests receive the hides and the flesh is totally burnt. This is justified through a midrashic reading of Leviticus 5:19, which I have translated to facilitate its midrashic understanding. This verse seems to state that a guilt offering goes to God like a burnt offering, whereas we know from other places that the guilt offering goes to the priests. Yehoyada solves this riddle by stating that any surplus from money dedicated to purchasing a sin or guilt offering is used to buy burnt offerings, the flesh goes to the altar and the hides go to the priest. This is the now the interpretation of the verse in II Kings 12 which contains an extended explanation of how Yehoyada would collect money for the Temple. Verse 17 states that “Money brought as a guilt offering or as a sin offering was not deposited in the House of the Lord; it went to the priests.” This cannot be explained to simply mean that money set aside to purchase guilt or sin offerings went directly to the priests, since they had to buy the sacrifices. Rather the explanation is that if money was left over after the requisite sacrifices were purchased, they would buy with it burnt-offerings as voluntary offerings, and they would keep the hides for themselves." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThe first mishnah of this chapter deals with the status of coins found in between the money chests that were in the Temple (see above, chapter 6:5). The three mishnayot which follow will also deal with various items found in a certain place in which their status is uncertain. The rabbis seem to be enamored with this type of discussion how do we determine the status of something whose status is doubtful?", + "The general rule for this mishnah is found only at the end, but since it applies to the entire mishnah, I shall explain it now. If coins are found between two other groups of coins, they are considered to be of the status of the coins to which they are closest. This is true even if that creates a leniency, as we shall see as we proceed. However, if they are found equidistant between the two, then they go to the coins which are treated with greater stringency. In essence, this mishnah becomes a statement about which of two items is “more important” or at least which has to be dealt with with greater stringency.", + "Coins which were found between the [chest inscribed] “shekels” and the [chests inscribed] “freewill-offerings: Nearer to [the chest inscribed] “shekels”, they go to the shekels; [Nearer to the chests inscribed] “freewill-offerings”, they go to freewill-offerings; Half way in between, they go to freewill-offerings. In this case “freewill offerings” is more stringent since these coins go to purchase burnt offerings. Therefore, only if the coins fall closer to the “shekalim” chest, whose shekels are used for various purposes (see above 4:1-2), are the coins considered “shekalim.”", + "[Coins which were found] between [the chest inscribed] “wood” and [the chest inscribed] “frankincense”: Nearer to [the chest inscribed] “wood”, they go to the wood; [Nearer to the chest inscribed] “frankincense”, they go to frankincense; Half way in between, they go to frankincense. “Frankincense” is considered more stringent, or in this case important, than “wood” because the frankincense is itself a type of sacrifice while the wood is only an instrument used to burn other sacrifices.", + "[Coins which were found] between [the chest inscribed] “bird-offerings” and [the chest inscribed] “young pigeons for burnt-offerings”: Nearer to [the chest inscribed] “bird-offerings” they go to bird-offerings; [Nearer to the chest inscribed] “young pigeons for burnt-offerings”, they go to young pigeons for burnt-offerings; Half way in between, they go to young pigeons for burnt-offerings. The chest for “young pigeons for burnt offerings” is considered more stringent because all of the money in this chest goes for burnt offerings. In contrast, the money in the chest inscribed with “bird offerings” goes partly for burnt offerings and partly for sin offerings, as was the opinion of the sages above in 6:5. Since only part goes for burnt offerings, money found halfway in between the two chests goes to the chest marked “young pigeons for burnt offerings.”", + "[Coins which were found] between non-sacred [money] and [second] tithes [money]: Nearer to the non-sacred [money], they go to common [money]; Nearer to the [second] tithes [money], they go to [second] tithes; Half way in between, they are considered [second] tithes. This section has nothing to do with the chests in the Temple. The mishnah is now beginning to expand the discussion to general cases of money whose status is doubtful. If one has a pile of money that is not sacred and a pile of money that is “second tithe”, meaning that it is money which was used to redeem second tithe produce, coins which are found in between the two piles go to whichever pile they are closer to. If they are halfway in between then they go to second tithe because the rules governing second tithe are more stringent it can be used only in Jerusalem and only to buy food products.", + "This is the general rule: the go to that which is nearer [even if this] is lenient; but if half way in between, [they must go] to that which is the more stringent. This is the general rule that governs all of the previous sections of the mishnah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nYesterday’s mishnah dealt with money found in between the money chests of the chamber in the Temple. This mishnah continues to deal with money found in various places, and with how to determine its status.", + "Money which was found in front of animal dealers [in Jerusalem], it is always [second] tithes [money]; The money that is derived from second tithes must be used to buy food products in Jerusalem. One common use of this money was to buy an animal and offer it as wellbeing offering. Most of the animals purchased in Jerusalem throughout the entire year, and not just at festival time, are purchased through second tithes money. Hence, if money is found in front of an animal dealer in Jerusalem we must be concerned lest it is second tithe money, and it therefore must be treated as if it is.", + "[If it was found] on the Temple Mount it is non-sacred [money]. Non-priests who come to the Temple Mount do not generally bring money with them, therefore this money can be assumed to have come from a priest or Levite while they were working there and not from one of the pilgrims during a festival. This money is considered to be non-sacred even during a festival. Although people do bring second tithe money to Jerusalem, they don’t generally bring it to the Temple Mount.", + "[If it was found] in Jerusalem during the time of a festival, it is [second] tithes [money]. Money found anywhere in Jerusalem (except for the Temple Mount) during a festival is deemed to be second tithe money because most of the money that people bring with them on their pilgrimage is second tithe money. Since Jerusalem is full of pilgrims at this time of year it can be assumed that the money is not from the smaller number of residents.", + "But all the rest of the year it is non-sacred [money]. During the rest of the year it can be assumed that the money fell from one of the residents of Jerusalem and not from a pilgrim. Hence it is not deemed second tithe and it may be treated as non-sacred." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with meat found in various places and how a person should treat that meat do we assume that it comes from a sacrifice? Is it kosher?", + "Meat which was found in the Temple courtyard: Limbs: [they must be treated as belonging to] whole burnt-offerings; Pieces: [they must be treated as belonging to] sin-offerings. Burnt-offerings are cut up into limbs before they are brought up to the altar. Therefore, if one finds whole limbs in the Temple courtyard, one must assume that they belong to burnt-offerings. Sin-offerings are eaten by the priests and therefore they are cut up into pieces. If one finds a piece of meat in the Temple courtyard, he therefore must assume that it is a sin-offering.", + "[Meat which was found] in Jerusalem, [must be treated as belonging to] wellbeing-offerings. Wellbeing offerings can be eaten anywhere in Jerusalem. Therefore, if meat is found outside of the Temple but within Jerusalem, it must be treated as if it was a wellbeing offering.", + "In both cases it must be left to become disqualified and must then go out to the place of burning. In all of the cases in the above two sections, the meat cannot be eaten lest it is impure or “remnant” sacrificial meat which should have already been eaten. It also cannot be burned lest it be fully pure and not remnant and it is prohibited to burn sacrificial meat which can be eaten. What they must do is wait until the meat becomes disqualified from being eaten, one day and night for a sin-offering and two days and one nigh for a wellbeing offering. Then it may be burned outside of the Temple where they burn disqualified meat.", + "[Meat which was] found within the borders [of Israel but outside of Jerusalem]: Limbs: [they must be treated as] carrion; Pieces: they are permitted. But [if found] during the time of a festival, when meat is abundant, it is permitted [to eat it] even when cut up in limbs. If it is found outside of Jerusalem, then it is not assumed to be sacrificial meat. If it is in limbs, meaning not cut into proper pieces, then it must be assumed that the animal was not slaughtered properly and that the owner intended to cast the meat to the dogs. This meat cannot be eaten. If it is cut into pieces than we can assume that the meat is kosher, because people don’t bother cutting the meat into proper pieces if it cannot be eaten. However, in the time of the festival when many people eat meat and meat is in abundance even found limbs may be eaten. They may have come from a kosher animal and someone may have had just so much meat that they didn’t bother to cut it properly." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with beasts (cattle) found in proximity to Jerusalem. Since many animals around Jerusalem may be escaped sacrifices (probably lost, but escaped sounds more interesting) we must treat them as if they were sacrifices.", + "Beasts which were found in Jerusalem as far as Migdal Eder and within the same distance in any direction: The exact location of Migdal Eder is no longer known. It is mentioned in Genesis 35:21 and in Micah 4:8. It is very close to Jerusalem.", + "Males are [considered as] burnt-offerings; Males found in this area are treated as burnt-offerings. This is the most stringent of the offerings that the male animal might be. It is also true that the majority of male animals are burnt-offerings. The Talmud Yerushalmi explains that there was a special decree in Jerusalem that all lost male animals are to be treated as burnt offerings.", + "Females are [considered as] peace-offerings. Female animals are treated as peace-offerings, since they cannot be offered as burnt offerings. Most female animals in Jerusalem are peace-offerings which were purchased with second tithe money (see above mishnayot 2-3).", + "Rabbi Judah says: that which is fit for a pesach offering, is [considered as] a pesach-offerings [when found] within thirty days before the pilgrimage [of Pesach]. Rabbi Judah explains that if the animal was fit to be a pesah offering, that is it is a year-old goat or sheep, and it is found within thirty days before Pesah, it is to be treated as a pesah offering. Thirty days is the period of time before Pesah in which the sages began to teach the laws of Pesah and hence at this time people began to set aside animals for use as a pesah offering. One who finds such an animal may use it as his own personal pesah sacrifice. If the owners come and claim the animal, then he must pay them its value but he may keep the animal." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is a direct continuation of yesterday’s.", + "In olden times they used to take a pledge from any one who had found such a [stray] animal, until he brought its libation-offerings. Then people would leave the animal and run away. So the court decreed that its libation-offerings should come from public funds. In yesterday’s mishnah we learned that one who finds an animal in close proximity to Jerusalem must treat it as if it were a sacrifice, usually either a burnt offering or a wellbeing offering. These sacrifices also require libations to be brought with them (oil, grain and wine, see above 5:3). At first they used to force the people who found the animals to bring the libations as well. They would enforce this by taking collateral from those who found the animal and holding on to the collateral until they brought the necessary libations. This caused a problem people would leave the animal and run away rather than admit that they had found an animal near Jerusalem. Therefore, the court decreed that the libations should come from public money. We should note that the mishnah has an interesting approach to that which people might be expected to do. It does not expect that people will take the animal home and treat it as if it was theirs. In other words, the Mishnah expects that people will do the right thing and admit that they found the animal near Jerusalem. However, people will not do the “right thing” if by doing so they will have to pay money out of their own pocket. Note again, the people leave the animal and run away they do not take it for themselves. People seem to respect the fact that this animal might indeed be a sacrifice but they are not willing to go broke in dealing with it." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nAccording to Rabbi Shimon, the decree of the court that appeared at the end of yesterday’s mishnah was one of seven things that the court decreed. The first two are similar to the decree mentioned yesterday.", + "Rabbi Shimon said: there were seven things that the court decree and that was one of them. [The others were the following:]
A non-Jew who sent a burnt-offering from overseas and he sent with it its libation-offerings, they are offered out of his own; But if [he did] not [send its libation-offerings], they should be offered out of public funds. If a non-Jew sent a sacrifice from overseas and he sent with it the proper libation offerings or money with which to purchase these offerings, then the libations are offered from what he sent. However, if he didn’t send the libation offerings, and it is difficult to reach him in order to ask him to do so, the libations are made with public funds. If this was a Jew who had sent an offering from overseas, evidently they would chase after him and not offer the sacrifice until he had sent the libations, or money to cover the costs. We should also note that the idea of gentiles sending sacrifices to the Temple in Jerusalem is an interesting phenomenon, and one that is described in other places. These may have been admirers of Jews, or perhaps pluralistic idol-worshippers who wished to “cover all of their bets” and therefore offered sacrifices to all sorts of Gods, including the God of the Jews.", + "So too [in the case of] a convert who had died and left sacrifices, if he had also left its libation-offerings they are offered out of his own; But if not, they should be offered out of public funds. When a convert dies and does not have any subsequent children, he/she dies without any heirs. In other words, his relatives from before he converted do not inherit his estate. If he dies and he leaves a sacrifice and libations, then the libations are offered with the sacrifice. However, if he doesn’t leave money for the libations, the libations are provided for by public funds. If the person who died had inheritors, as do all Jews, then the inheritors are liable to provide the funds for the libations.", + "It was also a condition laid down by the court in the case of a high priest who had died that his minhah should be offered out of public funds. Rabbi Judah says: [it was offered out] of the property of his heirs, And had to be offered of the whole [tenth]. The High Priest offers a daily minhah (grain) sacrifice of a tenth of an ephah (see Leviticus 6:13), half in the morning and half in the night. If the High Priest dies and they have not yet appointed a new High Priest to take his place, this grain offering is provided for by public funds. Rabbi Judah disagrees and holds that the offering comes from the money that the High Priest’s inheritors get from him. Both Rabbi Judah and the other sages agree that in this case an entire ephah is sacrificed in the morning and evening, instead of the usual half-ephah. This is discussed in greater depth in Mishnah Menahot 4:5." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah contains the final three of the seven decrees mentioned by Rabbi Shimon in yesterday’s mishnah.", + "[They further decreed] concerning the salt and the wood that the priests may benefit from them. The court decreed that salt and wood which had been donated to the Temple could be used by the priests to salt and cook the sacrificial meat. However, they could not use this salt or wood to salt or cook non-sacrificial meat.", + "And concerning the [red] heifer that using its ashes is not considered sacrilege. The red heifer, used in the ritual to purify people from corpse-impurity, was paid for by the shekels collected in the chamber (see above 4:2). Furthermore, the heifer is called a “sin-offering” in Numbers 19:9. Nevertheless, one who makes non-sacred use of this heifer’s ashes has not committed sacrilege (illicit use of sacred property). The ashes are not considered to be like the sin-offering, only the live animal is, and therefore only one who makes illicit use of the live cow itself has committed sacrilege.", + "And concerning bird-offerings which had become unfit [for sacrifice], that [others] should be offered [in their place] out of public funds. Rabbi Yose says: the one who supplied the bird-offerings was bound to supply [those which had to be offered in the place of] those which had become unfit. The last decree of the court was that if bird offerings purchased with public funds (see above 6:5) should become unfit for sacrifice, their replacements should come from public funds as well. Rabbi Yose holds that the merchant who supplied the birds is obligated to supply replacements. It’s not that it is the merchant’s fault that they became unfit. Rather, the Temple had an agreement with him that if the birds become unfit, he would supply a replacement." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to deal with scenarios in which we determine the status of something based on a majority, a topic which we began discussing in the beginning of chapter seven.\nThe specific topic is spit found in the streets of Jerusalem. If such spit comes from an impure person than the spit is unclean.", + "Any spit found in Jerusalem is clean except that which is [found] in the upper market, the words of Rabbi Meir. According to Rabbi Meir, we can assume that all spit found in Jerusalem is clean except spit found in the upper marketplace. In most areas people who are unclean are extra cautious since they know that in Jerusalem people need to be extra careful about issues of purity and impurity. This is because in Jerusalem many people eat sacred food, which needs to be eaten in purity. In contrast, outside of Jerusalem we must be concerned lest the spit is unclean. The only exception within Jerusalem is the upper market, towards the southwest of Jerusalem, where non-Jews and unclean persons used to congregate. There, found spit is considered to be unclean.", + "Rabbi Yose says: at other times of the year [spit found] in the middle [of the road] is unclean but [spit found] at the sides [of the road] is clean; but at festivals time [spit found] in the middle [of the road] is clean, while [that which is found] at the sides [of the road] is unclean, since they are few in number, they remove themselves to the sides of the road. Rabbi Yose distinguishes between times of the year and places in the road in his determining whether we must consider the spit to be unclean. During non-festival times, most of the people of Jerusalem are impure, just as they are in other cities. At these times the pure people walk on the sides of the road to avoid the impure people who are walking in the middle of the road. Hence, spit found in the middle of the road is impure whereas spit found on the sides is pure. The opposite is true during the time of the festivals, when most people are pure. They walk in the middle of the road and the impure people walk on the sides of the road (this seems quite courteous of theme). Hence, only spit found on the sides of the road is considered impure." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nYesterday’s mishnah dealt with the purity of spit found in Jerusalem; today’s mishnah deals with the purity of vessels found in Jerusalem.", + "All vessels found in Jerusalem on the way going down to the place of immersion are unclean, [but those found] on the way going up [from the place of immersion] are clean; for the way down is not the same as the way up, the words of Rabbi Meir. The place of immersion was a place below the Temple Mount where people could go to immerse themselves and their vessels (you can visit there today and still see many mikvaot). According to Rabbi Meir, there was one path to go down and a different path to go up. Furthermore, they would also carry the vessels down in a different way than they would carry them up. Hence, it was possible to distinguish between a vessel making its way down and one making its way up. Obviously, one making its way down is assumed to be unclean and one making its way back up to the Temple Mount was assumed to be clean.", + "Rabbi Yose says: they are all clean, except the basket and the shovel or pick which are specially connected with [work in] cemeteries. Rabbi Yose says that in Jerusalem people are extra careful to make sure that they don’t leave unclean vessels lying in the streets. Therefore all vessels are unclean except for vessels which were most likely to have been used in cemeteries. The basket referred to here was one in which bones were put into and moved to an ossuary. The shovel was used to collect them and the pick was used to dig graves. Since these almost certainly came into contact with a corpse or with bones, they have to be assumed to be unclean." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with a knife found in Jerusalem around the time of Pesah when many people will need to slaughter their pesach sacrifices. The question is: can he rely on the fact that the knife is pure or must he immerse it before he slaughters with it?", + "A [slaughtering] knife which was found on the fourteenth [of Nisan] he may slaughter with it immediately. [If it was found] on the thirteenth [of Nisan] he must immerse it again. If the slaughtering knife is found on the fourteenth of Nisan, he may use it to slaughter his pesah immediately, without bringing it to be immersed. In this case we assume that its owners immersed it on the thirteenth, knowing that it would need to be pure the following day, the day on which the pesah is slaughtered. However, if it was found on the thirteenth we must assume that it has not yet been immersed and therefore is unclean. Even though we established in the previous mishnah that all vessels (which includes knives) are assumed to be pure, when it comes to a vessel which will be used with a sacrifice we must be more stringent.", + "But a chopping knife whether [found] on the fourteenth or on the thirteenth, he must immerse it again. If the fourteenth fell on Shabbat, he may slaughter with it immediately. [If found] on the fifteenth, he may slaughter with it immediately. The knife described here is not used for slaughtering but for cutting meat and bones of an already slaughtered animal. The mishnah uses the word “slaughter” with regard to this knife as well, but the intention is not slaughter but to chop. This type of knife will be used during the festival, already on the fifteenth, but it will not be used on the fourteenth. Since we cannot assume that this type of knife was immersed on the thirteenth of Nisan, it must be immersed on the fourteenth in order to use it on the fifteenth and during the remainder festival. If it was found on the fourteenth of Nisan which fell on Shabbat, then we can assume that it was immersed on the thirteenth because it is forbidden to immerse vessels on Shabbat. They would have immersed it on the thirteenth so that they could use it to chop meat and bones on the fifteenth and during the remainder of the festival. If he found it on the fifteenth, he can assume that it was immersed on the fourteenth. Therefore he may use it without immersing it again.", + "If [the chopping knife] was found tied to a [slaughtering] knife it may be treated as the knife. Finally, if he finds the chopping knife tied to the slaughtering knife, he should treat the chopping knife the same way he treats the slaughtering knife." + ], + [ + "Introduction This mishnah discusses the impurity of the curtain which separated the Holy of Holies from the remainder of the Temple.", + "If the curtain [separating the Holy of Holies from the rest of the Temple] was defiled by a derived uncleanness, they immerse it within [the precincts of the Temple] and they bring it back in again. This section discusses a case where the curtain (parochet) was made unclean by a “derived uncleanness”. This term refers to something that has become unclean by virtue of its contact with something that is a “principal uncleanness”. From the Torah (deoraita), only liquids which come into contact with “derived uncleanness” are made unclean. “Derived uncleannesses” do not cause things or people to become unclean. Therefore, the curtain in this case has been made impure with only a low level of impurity, one that is considered to be “derabbanan” of rabbinic origin. The rabbis nevertheless required that it be immersed but they allowed it to be immersed in the mikveh (ritual pool) that was in the precincts of the Temple. Furthermore, it could be brought back again immediately. If it had contracted “deoraita” toraitic impurity, it could not be used again until nightfall, as we shall see in the next clause.", + "But if it was defiled by a principal uncleanness, they immerse it outside and spread out in the Hel. If it was new it was spread out on the roof of the colonnade, so that the people might behold its workmanship which is beautiful. If it came into contact with a principal uncleanness, for instance a zav or zavah (people with unusual genital discharge), or with a sheretz (a creeping animal) then it must be taken out of the Temple to be immersed. There in an area known as the “Hel”, which was inside the gates of the outer walls but outside the “Ezrat Nashim” (the women’s courtyard) it is let out to dry. If the curtain was new, they would spread it out in a place where people could see it from far off for it was very beautiful. In its normal place, right in front of the Holy of Holies, few people would have the chance to see this magnificent work." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah describes the curtain in all of its glory. Interestingly, Josephus (Wars of the Jews, Book V, Chapter Five, four) also describes the curtain in exceedingly glorious terms. He writes:\n“But then this house, as it was divided into two parts, the inner part was lower than the appearance of the outer, and had golden doors of fifty-five cubits altitude, and sixteen in breadth; but before these doors there was a veil of equal largeness with the doors. It was a Babylonian curtain, embroidered with blue, and fine linen, and scarlet, and purple, and of a contexture that was truly wonderful. Nor was this mixture of colors without its mystical interpretation, but was a kind of image of the universe; for by the scarlet there seemed to be enigmatically signified fire, by the fine flax the earth, by the blue the air, and by the purple the sea; two of them having their colors the foundation of this resemblance; but the fine flax and the purple have their own origin for that foundation, the earth producing the one, and the sea the other. This curtain had also embroidered upon it all that was mystical in the heavens, excepting that of the [twelve] signs, representing living creatures.”", + "Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says in the name of Rabbi Shimon the son of the chief [of the priests]: the curtain was a handbreadth in thickness and was woven on seventy-two cords, and on each cord there were twenty-four threads. Obviously the curtain was simply a tremendous piece of work. There is a description of the Tabernacle’s curtain in Exodus 26:1. There we learn that it is made of four types of thread: blue, purple, scarlet and fine linen (see also Josephus above). Each type had six strings, which means that there were twenty-four threads on each cord.", + "It was forty cubits long and twenty cubits broad, and was made by eighty-two young girls. The entrance to the hall of the Temple which this curtain hung in front of was forty cubits long and twenty cubits broad. It took 82 young girls to weave the curtain. We should note that this explanation is according to a certain version of the text. According to another textual reading, the curtain was made up of 820,000 strings.", + "Two curtains were made every year, and three hundred priests were needed to immerse it. According to the Tosefta’s explanation of this clause, there were two curtains in the Temple, one spread out to cover the doors and one folded up. If the spread out one became impure they would spread out the folded up one and purify the other (see yesterday’s mishnah). On the eve of Yom Kippur they would bring in a new curtain and take out the old one. Because of its great thickness and weight, it required three hundred priests to immerse the curtain outside of the Temple and to spread it out in the Hel (see yesterday’s mishnah). The Talmud admits that three hundred may be an exaggeration, but it still lets us know what a massive undertaking this must have been." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses “most holy” sacrifices such as burnt-offerings, guilt offerings or sin offerings which were defiled either within the Temple or outside of it. That these sacrifices must be burnt is clear and agreed to by all. However, Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel disagree whether the sacrifice is burned inside or outside of the Temple.", + "Meat of most holy things which was defiled, whether by a principal uncleanness or by a derived uncleanness, whether inside or outside [the precincts of the temple]:
Bet Shammai say: it must all be burnt within, except when defiled outside by a principal uncleanness. According to Bet Shammai all of these unclean sacrifices must be burned within the Temple precincts, in the place within the courtyard where the ashes were placed (called the “Place of the Ashes”). The only exception is a sacrifice which was defiled by a principal uncleanness while it was outside of the Temple. Since this sacrifice acquired a more serious form of uncleanness it is not brought into the Temple. However, if it had only become unclean through contact with a derived uncleanness, it is brought in and burned in the Temple.", + "But Bet Hillel say: it must all be burnt outside, except that which was defiled by a derived uncleanness within. Bet Hillel hold that all of these sacrifices are burned outside of the Temple. Anything that was made unclean outside the Temple is not brought inside. Furthermore, they hold that if it came into contact with a serious form of uncleanness within the Temple, it must be brought out and burned outside of the Temple. The only exception to their rule is that if one of the “most holy” sacrifices became impure with a light form of purity within the Temple, it need not be removed and may be burned within the Temple." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues the topic begun in yesterday’s mishnah sacrificial “holy of holies” meat which became unclean either within or outside the Temple.", + "Rabbi Eliezer says: [Sacrificial meat] which was defiled by a principal uncleanness, whether inside or outside [the Temple precincts], must be burned outside [the Temple]. [Sacrificial meat] which was defiled with a derived uncleanness whether inside or outside the Temple, is burned inside the Temple. According to Rabbi Eliezer, the operative distinction is only the level of uncleanness of the sacrifice. If it has a high level of uncleanness it must be burned outside the Temple. This is in order to distance seriously unclean things from the Temple. However, if its uncleanness is of a lower level then it may be burned within the Temple, even if it became unclean outside of the Temple.", + "Rabbi Akiva says: where it was defiled there it is burned. According to Rabbi Akiva the operative distinction is where the meat became unclean. In order to expedite burning the unclean sacrifice, it should be burned wherever the the impurity was incurred." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first half of this last mishnah teaches where the limbs of certain sacrificial animals were placed before they were burned on the altar. We should note that it is quite uncertain as to why this mishnah is placed here.\nThe second half teaches that the laws of shekels and first fruits were only in force when the Temple in Jerusalem still stood.", + "The limbs of the daily burnt-offering were placed on the half of the ramp [to the altar] downwards on the west side. On the southern side of the altar there was a ramp, 32 cubits long and 16 cubits wide. When the priests would bring the sacrifices up to the altar, they would not bring them all up at once. Rather they would bring them half way up, place them on the west side of the altar, go back down, read the shema and then they would bring them all the way up to the top of the altar.", + "Those of the additional offering ( were placed on the half of the ramp downwards on the east side. The limbs of the additional offering were placed on the east side so as not to confuse them with those of the daily offerings.", + "While those of the new moon offerings were placed on top of the rim of the altar. Again, in order to distinguish between the different sacrifices, they put the limbs of the new moon offerings on a rim that went around the altar, instead of on the ramp.", + "[The laws of] the shekels and of the first-fruit are in force only when the Temple stands, but [the laws of] the tithe of grain and of the tithe of cattle and of the firstborn are in force both when the Temple exists and when the Temple does not exist. The first fruits (bikkurim) and the shekels must be brought to the Temple. Hence, when the Temple no longer stands, these laws are no longer in force. In contrast, tithes of grain, cattle and the first-born of animals are given to priests and Levites and hence these laws remain in force even when the Temple no longer stands. The cattle tithe and first-born animals cannot be eaten immediately. Rather they wait until the animal becomes somehow flawed and thereby unfit for sacrifice. Then it may be eaten. We should note that according to the Talmud, the rabbis said that the laws of animal tithes are no longer in force, lest someone eats them before they become flawed.", + "One who dedicates shekels or first-fruits [when the Temple does not exist], they are holy. Rabbi Shimon says: one who says “the first-fruit be holy,” they are not holy. This section deals with someone who dedicates shekels or first fruits to the Temple at a time when the Temple no longer stands. According to the first opinion, the shekels or first-fruits are holy. They therefore both become prohibited for common usage. The shekels must be buried and the fruits are left until they rot. Alternatively, they may be thrown into the Dead Sea or some other place where no one will derive any benefit from them. Rabbi Shimon holds that since the Temple no longer stands, he can’t even dedicate the first fruits to the Temple. His statement is therefore meaningless. Congratulations! We have finished Shekalim. It is a tradition at this point to thank God for helping us to finish learning the tractate and to commit ourselves to going back and relearning it, so that we may not forget it and so that its lessons will stay with us for all of our lives. Shekalim is a tractate dedicated to the financial operation of the Temple in Jerusalem. It is interesting that the Mishnah sees this subject as being as worthy of study as any other topic, including the holidays, Shabbat, marital law etc. The financial support of the Temple is a commandment, one to be fulfilled properly and with a sense of its great import. Indeed, by financially supporting the Temple, Jews throughout the world were able to participate in its services. I am not USCJ’s fundraiser, but I would be amiss if I did not use this brief opportunity to thank those who support the Mishnah Yomit project and the other projects of the USCJ. May you continue to show your support by learning and by continuing to help others to learn as well. Most importantly, congratulations on learning another tractate of Mishnah. May you have the strength and time to keep on learning more! Tomorrow we begin Yoma." + ] + ] + ] + }, + "versions": [ + [ + "Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp", + "http://learn.conservativeyeshiva.org/mishnah/" + ] + ], + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה שקלים", + "categories": [ + "Mishnah", + "Modern Commentary on Mishnah", + "English Explanation of Mishnah", + "Seder Moed" + ], + "schema": { + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה שקלים", + "enTitle": "English Explanation of Mishnah Shekalim", + "key": "English Explanation of Mishnah Shekalim", + "nodes": [ + { + "heTitle": "הקדמה", + "enTitle": "Introduction" + }, + { + "heTitle": "", + "enTitle": "" + } + ] + } +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Moed/English Explanation of Mishnah Sukkah/English/Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp.json b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Moed/English Explanation of Mishnah Sukkah/English/Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e5cd153d2202c696951145ee725aff746db525d6 --- /dev/null +++ b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Moed/English Explanation of Mishnah Sukkah/English/Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp.json @@ -0,0 +1,349 @@ +{ + "language": "en", + "title": "English Explanation of Mishnah Sukkah", + "versionSource": "http://learn.conservativeyeshiva.org/mishnah/", + "versionTitle": "Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp", + "status": "locked", + "license": "CC-BY", + "shortVersionTitle": "Dr. Joshua Kulp", + "actualLanguage": "en", + "languageFamilyName": "english", + "isBaseText": true, + "isSource": true, + "isPrimary": true, + "direction": "ltr", + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה סוכה", + "categories": [ + "Mishnah", + "Modern Commentary on Mishnah", + "English Explanation of Mishnah", + "Seder Moed" + ], + "text": { + "Introduction": [ + "Tractate Sukkah can be divided into several sections. The first two chapters deal with the laws of the sukkah, how one builds a sukkah and how one observes the commandment of dwelling in a sukkah.", + "The third chapter deals with the laws of the lulav, the four species that one picks up every day during the holiday. ", + "The fourth and fifth chapters deal with several ceremonies or rituals connected to Sukkot that were observed in the time of the Temple. They are the beating of the willows, the water libation, and the celebration known as “simhat bet hashoevah.” We will discuss these in greater detail when we come across them.", + "Sukkah is perhaps the tractate in Seder Moed whose halakhot most directly correspond to halakhah as it is observed today. Jews still build sukkot and still take up a lulav, willow (aravah), myrtle (hadas) and etrog every year on Sukkot. While there are, as always, many differences between the precise manner in which we observe halakhah today and the way it was observed during the time of the Mishnah, they are, in my opinion, lesser in this area of halakhah than in others. This makes Sukkah a somewhat easier tractate to learn—we can more often picture what they are doing." + ], + "": [ + [ + [ + "Introduction Tractate Sukkah begins with a mishnah that is remarkably similar to the first mishnah of Eruvin. It states the maximum and minimum height of a sukkah. We should note that the word “sukkah” in the mishnah sometimes refers to the “skhakh”, the dead branches used to make the sukkah’s roof. The mishnah pays far more attention to the roof of the sukkah than to its walls. The second half of the mishnah deals with an old sukkah, one which was not built to be a sukkah for the festival of Sukkot, but was built to serve as shade in general. In the Middle East many farmers build such structures in order to provide shade from the hot sun.", + "A sukkah which is more than twenty cubits high is not valid. Rabbi Judah validates it. The roof of the sukkah cannot be more than 20 cubits higher than the ground. This is about 10 meters, which would make a very high sukkah. There are several reasons provided for this in the Talmud. At such a great height, one would not notice the skhakh, and noticing that one is sitting under skhakh is part of the experience of sitting in the sukkah. Another possibility is that if the skhakh is above twenty cubits one will be sitting in the shade of the walls and not the shade of the skhakh. Finally, a sukkah that is higher than twenty cubits will of necessity have to be built stronger. As it becomes more permanent, it becomes less like a sukkah and more like a house. As Rabbi Judah did with regard to the “post and beam” in Eruvin (see the intro to Eruvin, and the first mishnah) so too with regard to the sukkah he sets no limit as to a sukkah’s height.", + "One which is not ten handbreadths high, or which does not have three walls, or which has more sun than shade, is not valid. The second section of the mishnah provides three requirements that everyone agrees with. First of all, the sukkah must be 10 handbreadths high. This is equivalent to about a meter high, still quite small. Were the sukkah smaller than ten handbreadths a person could not even sit inside it. Secondly, the sukkah must have three walls. Finally, the skhakh must provide more shade than the amount of sun it allows in.", + "An old sukkah: Bet Shammai invalidates it and Bet Hillel validates it. What is an “old sukkah”? Any one which he made thirty days before the festival; but if he made it for the purpose of the festival, even at the beginning of the year, it is valid. Bet Hillel allows a person to use an old sukkah. For Bet Hillel the intention that went in to building the sukkah is not critical, what is critical is the use of the sukkah. In contrast, for Bet Shammai an old sukkah, one that was not made with the intent to use it on the festival, is invalid, even if it matches all of the other halakhic criteria. However, Beth Shammai agrees that any sukkah that was made thirty days before the festival is valid, since we can assume that he made it knowing that he might use it on Sukkot. The only debate is over a sukkah that was made more than thirty days before Sukkot without the intention of using it on Sukkot." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with a person who makes a valid sukkah (we will learn more about what a valid sukkah is later) but then something is placed on top of his sukkah that does not count as valid skhakh. This causes the otherwise valid sukkah to be invalid.", + "One who makes his sukkah under a tree, it is as if he made it within the house. A tree while still attached to the ground cannot be used for skhakh, the roofing of the sukkah. Skhakh must come from a natural source, but it must be detached from the ground. Therefore, if one puts his sukkah underneath a tree it is invalid, just as it would be invalid if one built a sukkah inside a house with the ceiling as his roof.", + "One [who makes] a sukkah on top of another sukkah, the upper one is valid but the lower is invalid. Rabbi Judah says: if there are no occupants in the upper one, the lower one is valid. If a person builds one sukkah on top of another, it turns out that the skhakh of the bottom sukkah is the floor of the top sukkah. Even if the skhakh meets all other halakhic requirements it is still invalid because the fact that someone is living above makes it again similar to a person who builds his sukkah inside a house. Rabbi Judah holds that if there is no one who is living in the upper one, than the bottom one is valid. The upper sukkah is not considered to be living quarters unless someone is actually living there." + ], + [ + "If he spread a sheet over it because of the sun or beneath it because of falling [leaves];
Or if he spread [a sheet] over the frame of a four-post bed, [the sukkah] is invalid.
But he may spread it over the frame of a two-post bed.
This mishnah teaches that if there is a roof-like structure underneath or above the sukkah it invalidates the skhakh.
Section one: If he spread a sheet on top of the sukkah to keep out the sun, or a sheet underneath the skhakh to keep out the falling leaves, the sheet invalidates the sukkah. This is because a sheet cannot be used for skhakh, so in essence he is using invalid skhakh to form his sukkah.
Section two: Similarly, if he spreads a sheet over a four-post bed, the sheet invalidates his skhakh, because the sheet forms a roof. However, the sheet does not invalidate the skhakh if it was spread over a two-post bed. This is because the sheet forms a tent-like structure, one that slopes to the sides and is not considered a roof. Since there is no roof made of a sheet, the only roof is the skhakh and the sukkah is valid." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah teaches a few general rules regarding what can be used as skhakh, the covering on top of the sukkah.", + "If he trained a vine or a gourd or ivy over [the sukkah] and put skhakh on top of it, it is not valid. But if the skhakh is more than them, or if he cut them, it is valid. In this section we learn several important rules governing skhakh. The first is that the skhakh must be detached from the ground. If one takes living vines and trains them on top of his sukkah, the sukkah is invalid. This is true even if he put some valid skhakh on top of the vines that were still attached to the ground. The sukkah becomes valid only if he puts more valid skhakh than the invalid attached vines, or if he cuts down the vines. This is an important point. The only thing that makes the vines invalid is that they are still attached to the ground.", + "This is the general rule: whatever is susceptible to [ritual] impurity and does not grow from the ground may not be used for skhakh, but whatever is not susceptible to [ritual] impurity and does grow from ground soil may be used for skhakh. There are two general rules presented here. The first is that the skhakh has to be something that cannot receive ritual impurity. This means that clothing, chairs, tables, dishes, sheets, etc. cannot be used as skhakh. Basically, this includes most things that have been “made” or “fashioned” by human hands. Branches of trees cannot become impure and hence can be used for skhakh. Secondly, it has to be something that originally grew from the ground. This rules out metal, stone, clay, plastic etc. Interestingly, these two rules, and that in the previous section, are in a sense foils for one another. The skhakh must be dead, but it must be something that was once alive. Something has to have been done to it by human hands it has to be cut from the ground, but not too much can be done with it humans can’t turn it into useful instruments. The skkakh is then “liminal” it mediates between the natural world and the humanly created world. So too it is above us, mediating between God and humanity." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with material that fits all of the criteria brought up in yesterday’s mishnah it comes from the ground, it is detached from the ground and it is not receptive to impurity and yet still cannot be used as skhakh.", + "Bundles of straw, bundles of wood, and bundles of brushwood they do not use them as skhakh. The Talmud Yerushalmi explains that these bundles cannot be used as skhakh because it might look as if he is putting them up there for storage or to dry them out and not to use them for shade.", + "But all of them, if he untied them, are valid. However, if he unties them, it no longer looks like he put them up there to dry or to store them and therefore the sukkah is valid.", + "And they are all valid for the walls. Everything that is invalid for the skhakh is valid for the walls. When it comes to the walls all we are concerned about is that there are walls we are not at all concerned with the material of the walls. We should note that the word “sukkah” itself means “to cover” and the word “skhakh” is from the same root as the word for “sukkah.” A “sukkah” is defined by its skhakh but not by its walls." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to discuss things that meet the requirements for skhakh as listed in mishnayot 3-4 (comes from the ground, is detached from the ground and is not receptive to impurity) but are still not valid to use as skhakh.", + "They may make skhakh out of wooden planks, the words or Rabbi Judah. Rabbi Meir forbids. Rabbi Judah holds that one can use wooden planks whereas Rabbi Meir holds that these cannot be used. In the Talmud they debate how wide these planks are some say that they are four handbreaths wide and others say that they are only three handbreadths wide. All agree that planks thinner than three handbreadths can be used. In any case, Rabbi Meir rejects the use of broad wooden planks because the sukkah will look too much like a house. Rabbi Judah accepts them and seems to simply be unconcerned if the sukkah looks like a house. We have seen that Rabbi Judah allows very strong and stable structures to be valid sukkot above in mishnah one he allowed a sukkah that was over 20 cubits high. We shall also see Rabbi Judah with a similar type of opinion in 2:2.", + "If one places on top of [the sukkah] a plank four handbreadths wide, it is valid provided that he does not sleep under it. This section goes according to Rabbi Meir who forbids using wooden planks. Rabbi Meir admits that one wooden plank, even if it were wide, would not invalidate the entire sukkah, just the area that it actually covers. Therefore, he shouldn’t sleep (or eat) underneath this plank, but he may utilize other areas of the sukkah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nRoofs were usually made by first putting on a layer of wooden planks and then covering them with plaster to seal out the rain. Plaster on a roof would render the sukkah invalid because it does not come from vegetation. This mishnah discusses a house that has a roof made of wood but there is no plaster on top of it.", + "A [wooden] roof that has no plastering: Rabbi Judah says: Bet Shammai say that he should loosen [the planks] and remove one from between each two. And Bet Hillel say he should either loosen [the planks] or remove one from between two. Rabbi Judah relates here the opinions of Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel. Bet Shammai holds that in order to make this roof valid he must do two things. First of all, he must pick up every plank, loosen it and only then put it back down in its place. This seems to be a demonstrative act to show that this is a sukkah and not a house. He must also remove every other plank so that it also looks like a sukkah and not a house. Bet Hillel is more lenient and allows one to do either he either loosens the planks by picking them up or he removes one from between two. He need not do both acts.", + "Rabbi Meir says, he removes one from between two, but he does not loosen [the planks]. Rabbi Meir rules differently. Assumedly, he believes that this is what Bet Hillel actually said and not as Rabbi Judah related. According to Rabbi Meir, the symbolic act of loosening the planks is not necessary nor does it help. Rather, he must remove one out of every two planks so that the sukkah does not look like a house. This is in line and somewhat modifies that which Rabbi Meir said in yesterday’s mishnah wooden planks may not be used. Here we see that they can be used, but they must not be placed right next to each other. Rather there must be gaps equal to their thickness. Assumedly, he will fill in these gaps with other, less controversial, types of skhakh." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first section of this mishnah is concerned with someone who uses metal objects as skhakh. The second section deals with the strange case of one who carves out room in a haystack to make a sukkah.", + "One who roofs his sukkah with iron spits or with bedposts, if the space between them equals them, it is valid. Neither iron spits nor bedposts can be used as skhakh because they are both made of metal. However, they can be put on top of the sukkah as long as there is valid skhakh between the posts or spits and the valid skakhah is of great quantity than the metal.", + "One who hollows out a haystack to make for himself a sukkah, it is not a valid sukkah. In this case a person does not make a sukkah but rather the sukkah is made by his hollowing out a hole in a haystack. This is not valid because instead of making a sukkah, the sukkah has been made on its own. In other words, one must make his sukkah by taking skhakh and putting it on top of a framework of walls. The one who hollows out the haystack has made an absence of space, a negative act, but not the positive act of creating a sukkah. Hence the sukkah is not valid." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses the height of the walls as well as the proximity of the skhakh to the walls.", + "If he hangs walls down from above to below, if they are higher than three handbreadths from the ground, it is invalid. The walls of the sukkah must be ten handbreadths high. However, there is a special rule according to which a gap of less than three handbreadths is not considered sufficient to render a sukkah invalid. Therefore, if he suspends the walls on a pole above the ground and the walls do not fully reach the ground but they are less than three handbreadths from the ground, the sukkah is valid. In other words, we look at those three handbreadths as if they don’t exist. Of course, the total height of the walls must be ten handbreadths, as we learn in the next section. But if the gap is larger than three handbreadths, then we can't count the walls as having reached the ground.", + "If he raises them from the bottom to the top, if they are ten handbreadths high, it is valid. If he raises the walls from the ground upwards, the walls do not have to go all the way up to reach the skhakh. It is sufficient for the walls to be ten handbreadths high, when measured from the ground. Ten handbreadths is about one meter high. This is the standard minimum height for matters which require a wall.", + "Rabbi Yose says: just as from the bottom to the top ten handbreadths [suffices] so from the top to the bottom ten handbreadths [suffice]. Rabbi Yose disagrees with the opinion in section one. He says that the same rule concerning raising the walls from the floor to the skhakh applies if he suspends the walls from the skhakh. As long as the walls are ten handbreadths they are valid, even if they don’t reach within three handbreadths of the ground. To reiterate: the debate between Rabbi Yose and the other sages is with regard to a ten handbreadth wall hanging down from the skhakh (assumedly from a pole upon which the skhakh rests) which does not reach to within three handbreadths of the ground. Rabbi Yose says this is valid whereas the other sages say it is not. According to the sages it must reach within three handbreadths of the ground.", + "If he distances the skhakh three handbreadths from the walls, it is invalid. This section discusses how close the walls must be horizontally to the skhakh; the previous discussions were about their vertical distance from the skhakh. The walls must be no less than three handbreadths from the skhakh. Otherwise there is a three handbreadth gap in the roof of the sukkah, which would mean that that wall could count as one of the walls of the sukkah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn yesterday’s mishnah we learned that if there is a three handbreadth horizontal gap between the skhakh and the walls the sukkah is invalid. Today we learn that this is only true if there is a gap. If there is material in this gap separating the wall from the skhakh and the material is not valid for skhakh, then the sukkah is invalid only if the invalid skhakh is greater than four cubits.", + "If [the roof of] a house is opened, and he placed skhakh over it, if there is a distance of four cubits from the wall to the covering, it is invalid. In this case a person opened a hole in the roof of his house and covered the hole with valid skhakh. This is a valid sukkah as long as the hole is less than four cubits from the walls. This space between the walls and skhakh is not open, but rather has a regular roof (plaster and wood). The roof is considered as if it is part of the walls, at least for a distance of four cubits. As an aside, I have heard of people who actually do this. They have a retractable roof, less than four cubits from the walls and they open it up on Sukkot and have a sukkah in their house!", + "Similarly in the case of a courtyard which is surrounded by columns. The mishnah notes another possible circumstance in which this halakhah is applicable. A courtyard is surrounded by a section of columns and covered with a roof. In such a case, the open space is slightly removed from the walls. If he covers the open space with valid skhakh and the walls are no more than four cubits from the skhakh, then the sukkah is valid.", + "A large sukkah which was surrounded with material which is invalid for skhakh, if there is a space of four cubits beneath it, it is invalid. This final case is pretty much the same halakhic situation as that in the first two. Again, a person has a sukkah in which there is some distance from the skhakh in the middle to the walls on the side. If he fills in this gap with material that is invalid for a sukkah (perhaps he does not have enough kosher material which he can use) than the sukkah is valid. Obviously, in all three cases in the mishnah, when he goes to sit or dwell in the sukkah, he must sit underneath valid skhakh." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah contains two debates between Rabbi Eliezer and the other sages. The first concerns one who makes his sukkah by leaning one wall against the other. The second concerns the validity of reed mats as skhakh.", + "One who makes his sukkah like a cone-shaped hut or leans it against a wall: Rabbi Eliezer invalidates it since it has no roof, But the sages declare it valid. In this case a person made a sukkah in a cone-shape, somewhat like a teepee. It seems that the upper sections of the walls must have been made of valid skhakh. Alternatively, he leaned a wall made of skhakh against another wall not made of skhakh, somewhat like a lean-to. Rabbi Eliezer rules that this is invalid since a sukkah needs to have a roof. The sages rule that it is valid. In the Talmud, they claim that the positions should be reversed, Rabbi Eliezer ruling that it is inivalid and the sages that it is invalid. The halakhah is that these types of sukkot are invalid.", + "A large reed mat: if made for lying upon it is susceptible to [ritual] uncleanliness and is invalid as skhakh. If made for a skhakh, it may be used for skhakh and is not susceptible to uncleanliness. This section requires a few words of introduction concerning the susceptibility of objects to impurity. Objects are susceptible to impurities if they are “vessels”. This halakhic category includes most objects that have been fashioned to be of use for people, but not things that are used for building. For instance a cup is susceptible to impurity but a brick is not. In the case under discussion here, a reed mat made to be sat upon is susceptible to impurities whereas a reed mat made to be used as skhakh is not. According to the sages, all small mats may have been made to be sat upon and hence they are all susceptible to impurity. We learned above in mishnah four that anything that is receptive to impurity cannot be used as skhakh. Hence, small reed mats cannot be used for skhakh. A large reed mat may have been made either to sit upon or to use as skhakh. Hence, its susceptibility to impurity and its validity as skhakh depend upon the intent in which it was made. If it was made to be used for sitting it cannot be used as skhakh, but if it was made to be used as skhakh then it is valid.", + "Rabbi Eliezer says, whether small or large: if it was made for reclining upon, it is susceptible to uncleanliness and is invalid as skhakh; if made for a covering, it is valid as a skhakh and is not susceptible to uncleanliness. Rabbi Eliezer says that the size of the skhakh does not matter. All that matters is whether the mat was made for sitting or for skhakh. As long as it was made for skhakh it can be used as such, no matter its size." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah teaches that a person who sleeps underneath a bed inside the sukkah has not fulfilled his obligation to dwell in the sukkah. This is because the bed, which is not valid skhakh acts as a barrier between him and the valid skhakh above.\nWe should note that in mishnaic and talmudic times it was clearly customary and obligatory to sleep inside the sukkah. The practice of not sleeping in the sukkah has its origins in cold medieval Europe where a person would truly suffer by sleeping in the sukkah.", + "He who sleeps under a bed in the sukkah has not fulfilled his obligation. The problem with sleeping under a bed inside a sukkah is that there is a covering which creates a barrier over the person so that the skhakh is not what is covering him. In the Talmud they restrict this halakhah to a bed that is ten handbreadths high, the minimum height of a sukkah. Sleeping under such a bed would be akin to sleeping in an invalid sukkah inside a valid sukkah. However, one may sleep under a smaller bed and still fulfill one’s obligation to dwell in the sukkah. Note that this is what allows one to sleep under a blanket in the sukkah. The blanket is less than ten handbreadths from the body.", + "Rabbi Judah said: we had the custom to sleep under a bed in the presence of the elders, and they didn’t say anything to us. Rabbi Judah holds that the bed does not serve as a barrier between him and the sukkah and hence one who sleeps under a bed has fulfilled his obligation. Interestingly, Rabbi Judah notes that this was actually their custom. It might be that students visiting their rabbis on Sukkot, which seems to have been a norm on festivals, found the sukkot quite crowded. Hence, some people would sleep under the beds, causing the question to arise: is this legitimate behavior?", + "Rabbi Shimon said: it happened that Tabi, the slave of Rabba Gamaliel, used to sleep under the bed. And Rabban Gamaliel said to the elders, “Have you seen Tabi my slave, who is a scholar, and knows that slaves are exempt from [the law of] a sukkah, therefore he sleep under the bed.” And incidentally we learned that he who sleeps under a bed has not fulfilled his obligation. Rabbi Shimon agrees with the sages in section one and he brings a story to illustrate his point. Rabban Gamaliel owned a famous slave named Tabi. In tractate Berakhot 2:7 that Rabban Gamaliel respected his slave, and that when Tabi died he even mourned for him. In this mishnah, Tabi exemplifies his knowledge of halakhah by sleeping under the bed in the sukkah. He knew that he was exempt from the sukkah, as are all slaves, so he did a demonstrative act to let others know that one who sleeps under the bed has not fulfilled his sukkah obligation." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThere are two completely separate topics addressed in this mishnah. The first deals with a person who supports his sukkah on bedposts.\nThe second deals with the necessary thickness and orderliness of the skhakh.", + "One who supports his sukkah with the posts of a bed, it is valid. Rabbi Judah says: if it cannot stand on its own, it is invalid. In this case a person used his bedposts to support his sukkah. The bedposts served as the poles upon which the skhakh rested. The sages say that it is valid but Rabbi Judah requires a structure that cannot be carried around and hence he invalidates it. We should note that on several occasions we have seen that Rabbi Judah validates permanent like structures for a sukkah (see 1:1, 1:7). Here we see that he invalidates portable sukkot.", + "A disorderly sukkah (and whose shade is more than its sun is valid. There are two readings of this mishnah. According to the reading which has the words “and one,” the mishnah discusses two matters: 1) a disorderly sukkah and 2) a sukkah whose skhakh provides more shade than the sun that it allows in. A disorderly sukkah according to this explanation is a sukkah whose skhakh looks disorganized. Some of it is poking up and some of it is sticking down. As long as there is more shade than sun, this sukkah is valid. According to the other explanation and reading of the mishnah the words “and one” are not part of the mishnah. Rather the mishnah refers to a sukkah without a lot of skhakh. Such a sukkah is valid as long as the shade is more than the sun.", + "One whose [skhakh] is thick like [the roof] of a house is valid, even though the stars cannot be seen through it. Despite common belief, the skhakh of a sukkah can be so thick that one cannot even see anything through it. However, the halakhah is that although such a sukkah is valid, it is not desirable. One should strive to have skhakh that is not quite this thick." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThere are two interrelated subjects in this mishnah: 1) building a sukkah in a strange place; 2) entering the sukkah on the festival. As background we should note that on a festival or Shabbat it is forbidden to climb a tree, lest one break off a branch, which is prohibited on Shabbat and a festival. It is also forbidden to ride on an animal on a festival or Shabbat.\nThe mishnah uses the language “go up into” the sukkah because sukkot were often built on the flat roofs of their homes. Nevertheless, not all of these mishnayot describe actually going up into a sukkah.", + "One who makes his sukkah on the top of a wagon, or on the deck of a ship, it is valid and one may go up into it on the festival. One can build a sukkah on a wagon or on a ship and one can enter into it on Shabbat. The Talmud explains that the sukkah has to be strong enough to stand up to a wind of common strength. One who builds such a sukkah can enter into on the festival because there is no prohibition of getting onto a ship or a wagon on the festival. Indeed, there is a well-known story in the Talmud of rabbis traveling on Sukkot and making a sukkah on the ship. Assumedly, Rabbi Judah who in yesterday’s mishnah stated that a sukkah made using a bed’s bedposts is invalid, would also invalidate a sukkah made on a wagon or ship.", + "If he made it on the top of a tree, or on the back of a camel, it is valid, but one may not go up into it on the festival. A sukkah made on top of a tree or on the back of a camel is also a valid sukkah (I have actually seen such a thing in Neot Kedumim, near where we live in Israel). However, since it is forbidden to climb a tree or ride on an animal on Shabbat or a festival, these sukkot could only be used during Hol Hamoed, the non-festival days of Sukkot.", + "If the tree [formed] two [walls] and one was made by the hands of man, or if two were made by the hands of man and one was formed by the tree, it is valid, but one may not go up into it on the festival. In this and the next section the person doesn’t make his sukkah in a tree but rather he uses a tree to support the roof of his sukkah. A tree can be used to support the sukkah’s wall even though the leaves may not count as skhakh when they are attached to the tree. A sukkah must have at least three walls, so if he uses a tree to support even one these three walls he cannot enter the sukkah on the festival because that would be considered using the tree.", + "If three walls were made by the hands of man and one was formed by the tree, it is valid and one may go up into it on the festival. This is the general rule: in any case in which if the tree was removed the [sukkah] could stand on its own, it is valid and one may go up into it on the festival. If, however, he has four walls and only one supported by the tree then the sukkah would be valid and would be able to stand even without the tree. Hence, he may enter this sukkah on the festival because by doing so he is not actually using the tree. The tree-wall is superfluous. The mishnah now summarizes this rule citing a general principle." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first section of this mishnah continues to discuss walls used as trees for the sukkah.\nThe second section begins to discuss a new topic: when a person is obligated to be in the sukkah and what a person is obligated to do there. This will be the topic of the remainder of the chapter of the mishnah. Up until now all of the discussions have been about the structure of the sukkah itself.", + "If one makes his sukkah between trees, so that the trees form its walls, it is valid. In this case a person uses a tree for all of the sukkah’s walls, not as support for the walls but rather as the walls themselves. This might easily happen if there were some bushy trees that could block him on at least three sides. He supports the skhakh with poles and not with the trees. The sukkah is valid and he may even use it on the festival, since the sukkah is not actually resting on the trees.", + "Those who are agents to perform a mitzvah are exempt from [the obligations of] sukkah. People who are busy performing a mitzvah and find it difficult to eat or sleep in a sukkah are exempt from the sukkah. This is due to the general rule that one who is engaged in one mitzvah is exempt from performing another mitzvah. However, this is only true if by eating or sleeping in the sukkah he would be unable or distracted from performing the other mitzvah he set out to perform. If he could perform both at the same time, then he must do so.", + "People who are sick and their attendants are exempt from [the obligations of] sukkah. People who are sick enough so that being in the sukkah would be a discomfort for them, are not obligated for the laws of the sukkah. Being in the sukkah is not supposed to be painful and therefore, one who would be pained by being in the sukkah is exempt. Note, that the mishnah is not addressed to those who might “fake” being sick in order to get out of sleeping or eating in the sukkah. It is addressed to those who are so zealous about keeping the commandments that they would risk injury or at least illness to do so. The rabbis tell such a person to get out of the sukkah the sukkah is not supposed to cause one pain.", + "One may eat and drink casually outside the sukkah. Meals must be eaten in the sukkah. However, snacking may be done outside of the sukkah. According to the Rambam, while one can snack outside of the sukkah, one who strives to only eat and drink in the sukkah is praiseworthy." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is a continuation of yesterday’s mishnah, dealing with whether a person may snack outside of the sukkah.", + "It once happened that they brought a dish to Rabbi Yohanan ben Zakkai to taste, and two dates and a pail of water to Rabban Gamaliel and they said, “Bring them up to the sukkah.” The mishnah tells a story of two rabbis who refused to eat anything outside of the sukkah, even a couple of dates, water or the taste of a dish. It seems that these rabbis were acting “beyond the letter of the law.” Although they could have eaten outside of the sukkah as we learned in the end of yesterday’s mishnah, they chose to be strict and ordered their servants to bring the food up to the sukkah.", + "And when they gave Rabbi Zadok food less than the bulk of an egg, he took it in a napkin, ate it outside the sukkah and did not say a blessing after it. Rabbi Zadok on the other hand does not tell his servant to bring the small amount of food, less than an egg’s worth, up to the sukkah. He eats it outside the sukkah. He also performs a few more acts from which we can learn halakhah. First of all, he takes the food in a napkin and does not wash his hands, as was customary during this period. Secondly, he does not say a blessing afterwards. Rabbi Zadok holds that one recites a blessing after eating only an egg’s worth of food." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn this mishnah the sages and Rabbi Eliezer debate how many and which meals a person must eat in the sukkah during the festival.", + "Rabbi Eliezer says: a man is obligated to eat fourteen meals in the sukkah, one on each day and one on each night. But the sages say: there is no fixed number, except on the first night of the festival alone. Rabbi Eliezer says that a person must eat fourteen meals in the sukkah, two each day, one during the day and one at night. In other words, eating in the sukkah is a positive commandment on each and every day. Just as one normally eats two meals a day, so too one is commanded to eat two meals a day in the sukkah. The sages disagree and hold that one is only obligated to eat in the sukkah on the first night of sukkot. On all other days, he may skip meals. Of course, if he wants to eat a meal he must do so in the sukkah. This is similar to the obligation to eat matzah. A person must eat matzah on the first night of Pesah. However, on every subsequent day one need not eat matzah, there is only a prohibition from eating bread.", + "Furthermore Rabbi Eliezer said: if one did not eat in the sukkah on the first night of the festival, he may make up for it on the last night of the festival. But the sages say: there is no compensation for this, and of this was it said: “That which is crooked cannot be made straight, and that which is lacking cannot be counted” (Ecclesiastes 1:15). Rabbi Eliezer holds that one who did not eat in the sukkah on the first night may make up the missed meal by eating a festive meal on the last night of the festival, on the eve of Shmini Atzeret, the eighth day. Although this festive meal is not eaten in the sukkah, it still counts as a replacement for the meal he missed on the first day. In the Talmud, they question Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion. Didn’t he say that one has to eat in the sukkah two meals every day? If so, why does only the first meal need to be made up? The answer seems to be that Rabbi Eliezer agrees with the other sages that the first meal is the most important one, even though the others are obligatory as well. There is also a question as to how one can make up a meal that was supposed to have been eaten in the sukkah, by eating a meal outside of the sukkah, where one eats on Shemini Atzeret. The answer to this seems to be that when it comes to Sukkot, Rabbi Eliezer counts the evening as following the day. Thus what we would call the first meal of Shemini Atzeret is really to Rabbi Eliezer the last meal of Sukkot. The sages respond to Rabbi Eliezer that a missed meal cannot be made up. They quote an often cited verse from Ecclesiastes which shows, according to its midrashic meaning, that some commandments, when not fulfilled in their proper time, cannot be made up." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe main topic of this mishnah is how much of a person’s body must be within the sukkah while he is eating.", + "One whose head and the greater part of his body were within the sukkah and his table within the house: Bet Shammai say: it is invalid and Bet Hillel say it valid. If someone has a small sukkah, one that is not capable of fitting his entire body, but only his head and most of his body, Bet Shammai declare the sukkah invalid and Bet Hillel say it is valid. Similarly, if one has a large sukkah, a sukkah sufficient to fit his entire body, but he sat with only his head and most of his body in the sukkah, while the rest of his body was out of the sukkah, he would not have fulfilled his obligation according to Bet Hillel. We should note that the terminology of this mishnah is ambiguous. At first it sounds like the mishnah is discussing where the person sits, regardless of the size of the sukkah. However, the words “valid” and “invalid” at the end of section one describe the validity of the sukkah based on its size. Hence, in my explanation I have tried to incorporate both elements. According to Bet Shammai the sukkah must be large enough to encompass his entire body and he must sit with his whole body in the sukkah. Bet Hillel say that the sukkah need only hold his head and most of his body and when sitting in the sukkah, only his head and most of his body need be inside. The table may be outside of the sukkah.", + "Bet Hillel said to Bet Shammai: Did it not in fact happen that the elders of Bet Shammai and the elders of Bet Hillel went to visit Rabbi Yohanan ben HaHoroni and found him sitting with his head and the greater part of his body within the sukkah and his table within the house, and they didn’t say anything to him? Bet Shammai said to them: From there [you bring] proof? Indeed they said to him, “If this is your custom, then you have never in your whole life fulfilled the commandment of the sukkah. This story illustrates the argument between Bet Hillel and Bet Shammai. As an aside, we can note from this story and the discussion in 2:1 that space in sukkot might have been tight. This might reflect the reality in the Second Temple period in Jerusalem when many people came to make their pilgrimage. Alternatively, it may reflect the cramped housing and living spaces of 2nd century towns in the land of Israel." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nMost of this mishnah is concerned with the obligation of children to observe the commandment of dwelling in the sukkah.", + "Women, slaves and minors are exempt from the [commandment] of the sukkah. A minor who no longer relies on his mother is obligated in the [commandment] of the sukkah. Dwelling in the sukkah is a positive time-bound commandment, similar to hearing the shofar. As such, women and slaves are exempt. Children are also exempt, as long as they rely on their mothers and need to be with them most of the time. According to the Talmud, a child who wakes up in the middle of the night and still cries for his mother is not obligated to dwell in the sukkah. Such a child sleeps where his mother sleeps outside of the sukkah. But if he wakes up and doesn't need his mother, then he is obligated to sleep in the sukkah.", + "It happened that the daughter-in-law of Shammai the elder gave birth and he opened up the ceiling and put skhakh on top of the bed[posts] on behalf of the minor. In this fascinating story, Shammai the elder opens up a hole in the roof of his house so that his newborn grandson can sleep in the sukkah. Shammai obviously disagrees with the halakhah in the previous section. Shammai the elder is also known to have made his son fast on Yom Kippur, far before he would have understood the meaning of fasting. It seems that Shammai’s concept of commandment is not that one must perform an act with intent in order to affect one’s inner life (what we call “kavvanah”), rather the act must be performed regardless of whether one understands what one is doing. Children must perform mitzvot despite the fact the fact that they clearly don’t understand what they are doing." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis is the final mishnah in tractate Sukkah which deals with the topic of the sukkah. It discusses some of the essential rules of how and when one must live in the sukkah.", + "All seven days [of the festival] a man must make the sukkah his permanent residence and his house his temporary residence. The essential commandment of the sukkah is that one should live in it during Sukkot as one lives in a permanent home the rest of the year. In the time of the Mishnah and Talmud this meant that one would sleep and eat in the sukkah. It also meant that they would bring their regular belongings, beds, mattresses, pillows, blankets, etc. out into the Sukkah. Today it means that any activity that one can do with comfort in the sukkah, should be done there. It means inviting over company and sitting there instead of inside in the living room. It means playing games with the children in the sukkah. It means reading there, if the lights are good enough. It means striving to spend as much time in the sukkah as possible and not turning it into just a dining room.", + "If rain fell, when may one be permitted to leave it? When the porridge becomes spoiled. They made a parable. To what can this be compared? To a slave who comes to fill the cup for his master, and he poured a pitcher over his face. Nevertheless, one is not commanded to sit in the sukkah if it is raining. Once the rain is heavy enough to drip through the skhakh and ruin the porridge (a thick soup-like mixture) then one may leave the sukkah, indeed one should leave the sukkah. Just as one would not sit inside his house underneath a leak, so too one should not sit outside in the sukkah while it is raining. The mishnah now illustrates this as a parable. The Jew who has made a sukkah is like a slave who has prepared something with which to serve his master. Instead of accepting the water (the sukkah) the master (God) pours a pitcher of water (the rain) over the slave’s face. This parable is fascinating for its simplicity and intricacy. The sukkah is in its essence a prayer for rain after all, Sukkot is the beginning of the rainy season. Yet we don’t want rain while sitting in the sukkah. Hence early rain is perceived as an insult and not as a blessing. We can see from the parable just how sensitive the issue of rain was, and still is, to those living in the land of Israel." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThe third chapter of Sukkah deals with the four species, which are together called the “Lulav.” These four species are described in Leviticus 23:40, “On the first day you shall take the product of ‘hadar’ trees, branches of palm trees, boughs of leafy trees and willows of the brook, and you shall rejoice before the Lord your God seven days.” The four species are identified by the rabbis as 1) the etrog or citron; 2) the lulav or palm-branch; 3) the hadas or myrtle; 4) the arava or willow. I will refer to them by their Hebrew names.\nThe Torah does not say exactly what one is to do with these four species and this led to different interpretations among ancient groups of Jews. In Nehemiah 8:14-18 we see Israelites using them, or more precisely, something similar to them, to build their sukkot. Other groups of ancient Jews used them strictly in the Temple to walk around the altar. For the rabbis the mitvah of the lulav was incumbent upon every Jew, whether at the Temple or outside of it. The rabbis explain that each Jew must simply pick these four species up once a day on Sukkot and wave them in each direction. This remains our custom to this day.\nThe first seven mishnayot deal with the physical attributes of the four species. To this day, observant Jews are extremely cautious to make sure that the four species look like they are supposed to look, or in Hebrew are “mehudar”, adorned.\nYou can find many interesting pictures and information about the four species by googling them and looking at the images.", + "A stolen or a dried up lulav is invalid. There are two potential reasons why a stolen lulav is invalid. First of all, the Torah states, “And you shall take for yourselves (lachem) on the first day…” The extra word “lachem (for yourselves)” is understood to mean that a person’s lulav must be their own and not one that was stolen or even borrowed. Secondly, performing a mitzvah with a stolen item is considered a “commandment that derives from a transgression” and such an act is invalid. A dried up lulav is invalid because it is not “adorned”, meaning it does not look good.", + "One [that came] from an asherah tree or from a condemned city is invalid. An asherah is a tree used for idol worship. Since it is forbidden to use anything from this kind of tree, its palm-branch cannot be used to fulfill the mitvah of lulav. A “condemned city” refers to an idolatrous city which must be utterly destroyed, according to Deuteronomy 13:13-18. Everything in the idolatrous city must be burned. Hence it is impossible to use a lulav that comes from such a city.", + "If its top was broken off or its leaves were detached, it is invalid. The lulav must not be broken off at its top and its leaves must still be attached to the spine, the middle leaf that goes through all lulavim.", + "If its leaves are spread apart it is valid. Rabbi Judah says he should tie it at the top. If the leaves are still attached but they are spread apart, the lulav is still valid. Rabbi Judah says that if the leaves are still attached one should tie the lulav (just the palm-branch) together at the top. We shall learn more about tying all four species together in mishnah eight.", + "The thorny palms of the iron mountain are valid. The “iron mountains” are identified in Josephus, Wars of the Jews 4, 8, 2 as being mountains north of Moab, on the other side of the Jordan river. From our mishnah we see that the palm trees that grew there seem to have been a slightly different type of palm. Their leaves are shorter and do not grow on the whole length of the spine. Nevertheless, they are valid for the mitzvah of lulav.", + "A lulav which is three handbreadths in length, long enough to wave, is valid. The lulav must be three handbreadths, long enough so that one can wave it. The Talmud explains that the lulav must actually be three handbreadths long, like the hadas and aravah, and then an additional handbreadth so that it can be waved. We will learn more about waving the lulav and other four species in mishnah nine." + ], + [ + "A stolen or withered hadas is invalid.
One [that came from] an asherah or a condemned city is invalid.
If its tip was broken off, or its leaves were detached, or its berries were more numerous than its leaves, it is invalid. But if he diminished them it is valid. But he may not diminish them on the festival.
This mishnah deals with the hadas, the myrtle. Many of the details of this mishnah are the same as those in yesterday’s mishnah concerning the lulav. I will comment only on aspects of the hadas that differ from those of the lulav.
Sections one and two: See sections one and two of yesterday’s mishnah.
Section three: The first two rules of this section are the same as that in section three of yesterday’s mishnah. The third is unique to the hadas. Some hadasim have berries attached to them. While hiking last week I think I actually saw a wild hadas that had many berries (I’m not a botanist, so I’m not sure it really was a hadas). They weren’t really berries as much as little black things that looked liked capers. In any case, too many of these berries renders the otherwise valid hadas invalid. However, the hadas is invalid only if the berries are still on the branch. If he removes the berries, the hadas again becomes valid. Finally, the mishnah states that he may not remove the berries on the festival itself. This is because it is forbidden to “make a vessel” on a festival or on Shabbat and by making an invalid hadas valid, he is making a vessel." + ], + [ + "A stolen or withered aravah is invalid.
One [take from an] asherah or from a condemned city is invalid.
One whose tip was broken off or whose leaves were detached, or a tzatzefah is invalid.
One that was shriveled or had lost some of its leaves, or one grown in a rain-watered soil, is valid.
This mishnah deals with the aravah, the willow.
Sections one and two: See mishnah one.
Section three: The first two details are again the same as in mishnah one. The third is unique to the aravah. The Torah specifies that an aravah that grows on a brook, or a wadi, is the type of aravah that should be used. According to the mishnah, this rules out the species of aravah called the “tzaftzefah”, which grows in the mountains and whose leaves are a different shape than the brook-aravah.
Section four: Of the four species, the aravah is the one that most easily dries out. Hence, the mishnah rules that if it is shriveled or lost some, but not most of its leaves, it is still valid.
The Torah states that the aravah is to be one that grows on a brook. The mishnah expands this to include an aravah that grows on a field watered by rain. The important thing is that the species of aravah is the same as that which grows on a brook. It is valid even if it is not actually found on the brook. This contrasts with the tzaftzefah, which is of a different species and does not look like a brook-aravah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn this mishnah the sages debate how many of each of the species he must take.", + "Rabbi Ishmael says: three hadasim, two aravot, one lulav and one etrog, even if two [of the hadasim] have their tips broken off and [only] one is whole. According to Rabbi Ishmael, one takes three hadas branches, two branches of aravot, one lulav and one etrog. He probably derives these numbers midrashically from the verses. However, the hadasim need not all be perfect. Two of them may have their tips broken off, as long as the third one does not. The Talmud questions this addendum to Rabbi Ishmael, wondering if a hadas with its tip cut off is valid. If it is, then why must the third one have its tip intact, and if it is not, then why bring two invalid hadasim?", + "Rabbi Tarfon says: even if all three have their tips broken off. Rabbi Tarfon agrees with Rabbi Ishmael regarding the numbers of each species that must be brought, but he disagrees concerning the tips of the hadasim. He holds that a lulav with its tip broken off is valid.", + "Rabbi Akiva says: just as there is one lulav and one etrog, so too only one hadas and one aravah. Rabbi Akiva disagrees with Rabbi Ishmael concerning the number of each species. According to Rabbi Akiva one must only bring one of each species. The accepted halakhah with regard to the number of each species is according to Rabbi Ishmael." + ], + [ + "An etrog which is stolen or withered is invalid.
One from an asherah or a condemned city is invalid.
Of orlah or of unclean terumah it is invalid.
Of clean terumah, he should not take it, but if he did take it, it is valid.
Of demai (doubtfully-: Bet Shammai says it invalid, And Bet Hillel says it valid.
Of second tithe, it should not be taken [even] in Jerusalem, but if he took it, it is valid.
This mishnah deals with what makes an etrog invalid. Of the four species, only the etrog is a food and hence only an etrog is subject to the normal agricultural laws tithes, terumah, and orlah. The mishnah therefore focuses on these subjects.
Sections one and two: See mishnah one.
Section three: Orlah is fruit grown from a tree less than three years old. It is forbidden to eat such fruit or derive any benefit from it. Hence an etrog that is from an orlah tree cannot be used. Similarly, it is forbidden to eat or derive any benefit from unclean (impure) terumah. Therefore it too cannot be used in the performance of the mitzvah.
Section four: A pure terumah etrog should not be used to perform the mitzvah, although if it is used it is valid. In the Talmud they debate why it should not be used. The core of the reasoning seems to be that by using it he may ruin it from being a food and terumah is supposed to be eaten. Alternatively, by using a terumah etrog with the lulav he may cause the etrog to get wet and thereby susceptible to impurity [produce is susceptible to impurity only after it has been in contact with liquid].
Section five: Demai is doubtfully-tithed produce, produce that was purchased from someone who is suspected of not separating tithes. There is a frequent debate between Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel over the use of demai produce in the performance of a mitzvah. The talmudic explanation is that demai can be eaten by the poor. Since anyone can renounce ownership over all his possessions and thereby become poor, Bet Hillel holds that anyone can use demai to perform a mitzvah. In other words, every person is potentially a poor person. Bet Shammai holds that since it cannot be eaten by anyone but the poor it cannot be used as part of the lulav.
Section six: Second tithe must be brought to Jerusalem and eaten there. Nevertheless, the mishnah says that even in Jerusalem he should not use a second tithe etrog as part of his mitzvah. The reasoning is the same as that in section four concerning pure terumah. However, if he did use it he has performed the mitzvah, again the same rule as with terumah." + ], + [ + "If a rash spread out on a majority of it, or if its pitom is removed, if it is peeled, split, or perforated so that any part is missing, it is invalid.
If a rash spread out on a lesser part of it, if its stem was missing, or if it is perforated but no part of it is missing, it is valid.
An etrog [which is black] as an Ethiopian is invalid.
An etrog which is green as a leek: Rabbi Meir declares it valid And Rabbi Judah declares it invalid.
The Torah says calls an etrog “the beautiful fruit of the tree” or “the fruit of the beautiful tree.” Due to the mention of the word “beautiful (hadar)\" the rabbis were more demanding regarding the physical perfection of the etrog than of the other three species. Indeed, to this day people are very concerned that they should have a beautiful “mehudar” etrog. An extreme example of this is the man who paid one thousand dollars for an etrog in the movie “Ushpizin,” a movie which I recommend.
Sections one and two: If there is a rash, which might refer to some discoloration, or things like warts (not just bumps, which are considered desirable in an etrog) on a majority of the etrog, than it is invalid. The pitom is the funny looking mushroom which sticks out of the ends of some etrogim (Google pitom and etrog and you can find some nice pictures). I should note that not all etrogim have a pitom. An etrog without a pitom is valid, indeed in some ways it is preferable because it is less likely to become invalid. The etrog is invalid only if the pitom was there and was then removed. However, if its stem, the part of it which attached it to the tree is removed, it is still valid. The stem is basically not part of the etrog.
Likewise it is invalid if it is peeled, split or any part of it is missing.
Section three: A black etrog is invalid.
Section four: There is a debate over the green etrog, Rabbi Meir declaring it valid and Rabbi Judah invalidating it. In Israel one sees many green etrogim, which never fails to surprise my family (as does the pitom-less etrog)." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah teaches the minimum and maximum size for an etrog.", + "The minimum size of an etrog: Rabbi Meir says: the size of a nut. Rabbi Judah says: the size of an egg. Rabbi Meir sets the minimum size of an etrog at that of a nut, assumedly something about the size of a walnut. I have never seen an actual etrog this size, but I suppose that if they are picked early from the tree one can find them this size. Rabbi Judah sets the minimum size at that of an egg.", + "The maximum [size] is such that two can be held in one hand, the words of Rabbi Judah. Rabbi Yose says, even one that can only be held with his two hands. In this section they argue about the maximum size of the etrog. According to Rabbi Judah (who is the stricter sage in both parts of the mishnah), it must be small enough so that one could hold two with one hand. The reason is that sometimes a person might need to hold the lulav and the etrog in one hand. If the etrog is too big he might drop the etrog which might ruin it by disfiguration. Rabbi Yose disagrees and says that the etrog can be so big that one needs both hands to hold it. In the Talmud, Rabbi Yose tells a story of Rabbi Akiva who came to the synagogue with an etrog so large that he had to carry it on his shoulder! In Israel, I have seen very large etrogim, ones that look like they would be difficult to carry with one hand." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nAccording to some sages, three of the species (all except the etrog) must be bound together. Our mishnah debates whether the cord used to bind the three together must be from the same species as one of the three species. The problem with it being from another type of tree is that when he picks up the lulav, he will be carrying five species the four mandated ones and the one from which he made his cord. This might be a violation of the prohibition of adding on to the Torah’s commandments. The Torah says four species it would be prohibited to add a fifth.", + "They may not bind the lulav except with [strands of] its own species, the words of Rabbi Judah. Rabbi Judah holds that the lulav must be bound together. The consequence of this rule is that the binding is an integral part of the lulav without it one cannot perform the mitzvah. Since the binding is integral to the lulav, it must be made from one of the four species. Assumedly, this would be from a string made from a palm tree.", + "Rabbi Meir says: it may be bound even with a cord. In contrast, Rabbi Meir holds that the lulav need not be bound together. Since the binding is unnecessary, it is not part of the lulav. Therefore, it can come from any species.", + "Rabbi Meir said: it happened that the men of Jerusalem used to bind their lulavs with strands of gold. They answered him: but they bound it with [strands of] its own species underneath [the strands of gold]. Rabbi Meir defends his opinion by relating a story in which the people of Jerusalem bound their lulavs with strands of gold. This proves that the binding need not be from the same type of material as the four species. The other sages admit that those lulavs were bound with gold, but they claim that underneath the gold there was a layer of binding that was made of one of the four species. Since this was the layer that affected the binding, only it must be from one of the four species. An alternative explanation is that “underneath” means at the bottom of the lulav. The lulav needs to be bound only at the bottom and the men of Jerusalem bound their lulavs with gold only at the top." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first part of this mishnah deals with when during the Hallel (Psalms 113-118) one waives the lulav.\nThe second part of the mishnah deals with when during the day one should perform the mitzvah of taking the lulav.", + "And where [in the service] do they wave [the lulav]? At “Give thanks to the Lord” (Psalm 118), at the beginning and at the end, and at “O Lord, deliver us” (118:25), the words of Bet Hillel. Bet Shammai say: also at “O Lord, let us prosper.” Rabbi Akiva says: I was watching Rabban Gamaliel and Rabbi Joshua, and while all the people were waving their lulavs [at “O Lord, let us prosper”] they waved them only at “O Lord deliver us.” The mitzvah of taking the lulav involves waving it in six directions to the directions of the four winds and up and down. The custom was and still is to waive the lulav the first time one takes it up, and then to waive it again in the synagogue at various points during the recitation of Hallel at the morning service. This is the background to our mishnah. Here we see that there is a debate about one of these wavings. According to all of the sages, one waves at the beginning of Psalm 118 and at the end, a Psalm that begins and ends with “Give thanks to the Lord.” Everyone agrees that there is also a waving in the middle of this Psalm, but they disagree as to the extent of the waving. Bet Hillel says that one waves during the first half of verse 25, “O Lord, deliver us”, but not during the second half, “O Lord, let us prosper.” Bet Shammai says that one also waves during the second half of the verse. Rabbi Akiva, who lived long after Bet Hillel and Bet Shammai were no longer really in existence, testifies that he saw all of the people waving at “O Lord, let us prosper” as Bet Shammai stated, while Rabban Gamaliel and Rabbi Joshua, two of Rabbi Akiva’s elders, waived only at “O Lord, deliver us,” as Bet Hillel posited. The halakhah is according to Bet Hillel. As an aside, while it is typical for the rabbis to follow Bet Hillel, it is interesting to note that in this case most of the people acted like Bet Shammai.", + "One who was on a journey and had no lulav to take, when he enters his house he should take it [even if he is] at his table. If he did not take the lulav in the morning, he should take it at any time before dusk, since the whole day is valid for [taking] the lulav. It is preferable to take up the lulav first thing in the morning before one eats. This is usually done today during the morning prayer service, right before Hallel. However, one can fulfill the mitzvah any time during the day. If one is returning from a trip and he didn’t have a lulav with him, he should take one as soon as he gets into his house. Even if he is in the middle of a meal and then remembers that he hasn’t performed the mitzvah of taking the lulav, he should put aside his meal and take the lulav. One can perform the mitzvah all the way through dusk." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn the time of the Mishnah not every person in the synagogue would recite the Hallel on his own, as we normally do today. Rather, the leader would recite part, or perhaps most of the verse and the rest of the congregation would respond with the second half of the verse, or with “Halleluyah.” In this way, the leader would aid the congregation in fulfilling their obligation to recite Hallel.\nIn this mishnah we learn that slaves, women and minors cannot aid a free adult male in his recitation of the Hallel because they themselves are not obligated to recite Hallel. This fits in with two general rules: 1) women and slaves are exempt from positive time-bound commandments; 2) a person who is not obligated for something cannot fulfill that obligation on behalf of someone who is.", + "One who has a slave, a woman, or a minor read [the Hallel] to him, he must repeat after them what they say, and a curse be upon him. The mishnah describes an adult man who doesn’t know how to recite Hallel and therefore needs someone else to recite it for him. Usually, this would be done by another free adult male, but for some reason, this person cannot find another free adult male who knows how to recite the Hallel. He therefore turns to a slave, a woman or a minor who does know how to recite Hallel. This is allowed, except unlike a normal case where the person would only answer “Halleluyah” (as is the case in section two), in this case he must repeat the entire verse after the slave, woman or minor. In this way, he fulfills the obligation himself and they do not fulfill it on his behalf. It is interesting to note that it sounds like the rabbis had to confront the possibility that a slave, woman or minor would be more educated, at least religiously, than a free man. It is hard to know how realistic this situation was or how often it might arise. Nevertheless, it is at least a theoretical possibility. The mishnah is clearly disturbed by the man’s lack of knowledge and hence it says that a man who allows this situation to happen should be cursed.", + "If an adult recited to him, he repeats after him [only] Halleluyah. This is the normal way in which Hallel was recited during the time of the Mishnah and Talmud." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first half of this mishnah continues to deal with the recitation of Hallel. The second half contains another rule regarding the lulav and etrog.", + "In a place where the custom is to repeat [verses], he should repeat; [Where the custom is] to say them only once, he should say them once. Today it is our custom to recite certain verses of Hallel twice, specifically from Psalm 118:21 till the end of the Psalm. In the time of the Mishnah not everyone had this custom. The mishnah states that when it comes to this issue, one should follow whatever is his local custom.", + "[Where the custom is] to recite a blessing afterwards, he should recite the blessing afterwards. Everything is dependent on local custom. Similarly, there were different customs regarding reciting a blessing after Hallel some recited the blessing and some did not. Today our custom is to recite a blessing after Hallel on all occasions, even on those occasions where Hallel is only a custom and is not mandated (such as Rosh Hodesh and the last six days of Pesah).", + "One who purchases a lulav from his fellow in the sabbatical year, [the latter] should give him the etrog as a gift, since one is not permitted to purchase it in the sabbatical year. On the sabbatical year all produce must be removed from one’s house and destroyed once it no longer grows in the field. A person can harvest the etrog and use it, but once etrogim are no longer found in the trees he must get rid of the etrogim in his house. When a person sells an etrog (or any other produced) which grew on the sabbatical year, the money retains the status of the etrog (or other produce) itself. That is to say, when there are no more etrogim in the field he must get rid of the money as well. The person in our mishnah is purchasing the four species from someone he fears does business in produce grown in the sabbatical year. He shouldn’t buy from him the etrog lest the seller not get rid of the money when he is supposed to. A person shouldn’t aid another in transgressing the commandment of observing the sabbatical year. To avoid this problem and still obtain a lulav, he should pay for the lulav (the palm) which is not subject to the laws of the sabbatical year (because it sprouted in the previous year) and have the price of the etrog included in the price of the lulav. He receives the etrog as a present when he buys the lulav. In this way the money used to buy the etrog need not be removed from the seller's house when etrogim are no longer found on trees." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nLeviticus 23:40 reads, “On the first day you shall take...and you shall rejoice before the Lord your God seven days.” The beginning of the verse states “on the first day” and the end of the verse says, “seven days.” From here the rabbis derived that the mitzvah of taking the lulav is for a different amount of time in different places. They read the second half of the verse as applying to the Temple, “before the Lord your God.” Hence, the lulav should be taken up for seven days in the Temple. Outside of the Temple, or according to other commentaries, outside of Jerusalem, the lulav need be taken for only one day.", + "In earlier times the lulav was taken for seven days in the Temple, and in the provinces for one day only. When the Temple still stood the lulav was taken in the Temple (or in Jerusalem) for seven days and outside of the Temple for only one day, as explained in the introduction.", + "When the temple was destroyed, Rabbi Yohanan ben Zakkai decreed that the lulav should be taken in the provinces for seven days in memory of the Temple, However, when the Temple was destroyed, there was a problem. If people only observed the commandment for one day, they would soon forget that originally the commandment was observed for seven days, at least in some places. Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai, one of the leading rabbinic figures after the destruction of the Temple, decreed therefore that the lulav should be taken up for seven days in all places, in memory of the Temple.", + "[He also decreed] that on the whole of the day of waving it be forbidden [to eat the new produce]. Having related one of the decrees that Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai made after the destruction of the Temple, the mishnah now relates another, similar decree. We need to note a little bit of background to understand this. On the second day of Pesah, when the Temple still stood, the Omer offering of barley was harvested and brought to the Temple and waved by a priest. After this day, it was permitted to eat from the new grain harvest (see Leviticus 23:9-14). Since people outside of Jerusalem would not know precisely when the Omer had been offered, they would wait at least half of the day before they would eat from the new harvest. When the Temple was destroyed and they could no longer offer the Omer, the rabbis derived from the Torah that the new produce could be eaten as soon as the second day of Pesah began. In other words, without an Omer sacrifice the day itself allowed the new harvest. Again, Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai perceived a problem. If people would eat from the new harvest immediately on the 16th of Nissan, when the Temple is rebuilt they would forget that they need to wait until the Omer is offered. Therefore he decreed that the new produce could not be eaten for the entire day. It is interesting to note that the rabbis who lived close to the destruction of the Temple believed that it would speedily be rebuilt. Just as they began working on the rebuilding of the First Temple only 70 years after its destruction, rabbis who lived in the first and early second century probably assumed that their Temple would also be rebuilt in a short time. However, after the Bar Kokhba revolt was crushed, it probably began to dawn on many that the realistic chances of the Temple being speedily rebuilt were not good. The hopes of course never died, but this type of legislative activity making decrees lest the Temple be rebuilt quickly, were more characteristic of the pre Bar Kokhba period." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday we don’t take the lulav on Shabbat. However, in the time of the Mishnah if the first day of the festival fell on Shabbat, they would take the lulav, because as we learned in mishnah twelve, the taking of the lulav on the first day of Sukkot is mandatory even outside of the Temple. Our mishnah teaches how they avoided the problem of carrying the lulav to the synagogue on Shabbat, which is clearly a transgression.", + "If the first day of the festival falls on Shabbat, all the people bring their lulavim to the synagogue [on Friday]. In order to avoid the problem of carrying on Shabbat, the people would bring their lulavim to the synagogue on Friday and leave them there for the next day.", + "The next day they arise early [and come to the synagogue] and each one recognizes his own [lulav] and takes it, since the sages said “one cannot fulfill his obligation on the first day of the festival with his friend’s lulav.” The only problem with this is that a person needs to use his own lulav on the first day of the festival, because the Torah says “and you shall take for yourselves on the first day” understood to mean that the lulav must belong to the person taking it. If all of the lulavim were heaped together in the synagogue a person might not know which lulav is his own. Therefore the mishnah says that everyone must be able to recognize his own lulav.", + "But on the other days of the festival one may fulfill his obligation with the lulav of his fellow. The verse which implies that the lulav must belong to the person taking it refers only to the first day of the festival. After this day a person may fulfill his obligation with someone else’s lulav. The result is that if Shabbat falls on another day of the festival, not on the first day, they need not recognize which lulav belongs to them. They therefore would bring their lulav to the synagogue on Friday but they wouldn't have to worry about recognizing their own lulav." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is a continuation of yesterday’s mishnah which discussed taking the lulav on the first day of the festival which falls on Shabbat.", + "Rabbi Yose says: if the first day of the festival fell on Shabbat, and he forgot and carried out his lulav into the public domain, he is not liable, since he brought it out while under the influence [of a religious act]. According to Rabbi Yose, since a person is supposed to take the lulav on Shabbat if it is also the first day of the festival, he is not obligated if he mistakenly carries it out into the public domain. In other words, since he was allowed to take it in the first place, he is excused for making the mistake of carrying it outside. However, if he did this on another day of the festival, meaning if another day of the festival fell on Shabbat, he would be liable since he should not have taken it at all. If he carries it outside into the public domain intentionally he is always liable" + ], + [ + "Introduction\nAs anybody who has ever fulfilled the commandment of lulav knows, or for that matter, as anybody who has ever dealt with cut flowers knows, they tend to dry up over time. This is especially true for the aravah and the hadas they simply won’t last when they are taken out of water. Our mishnah deals with putting the lulav back into water on Shabbat and on the festival.", + "A woman may receive [a lulav] from her son or from her husband and put it back in water on Shabbat. This section really teaches two things. The first is that putting a lulav back in water on Shabbat is permitted. This is not similar to watering plants which is prohibited because the plants are still attached to the ground. Secondly, the mishnah teaches that a woman may handle a lulav on Shabbat even though she is not liable to take the lulav. We might have thought that since she is exempt from the laws of lulav, that the lulav is muktzeh to her (forbidden for her to handle). The mishnah teaches that since a man is obligated to take the lulav on Shabbat (if it is the first day of the festival), then the woman may handle it as well.", + "Rabbi Judah says: on Shabbat they may be put it back [into the water in which they were previously kept], on a festival day [water] may be added, and on the intermediate days [of the festival the water] may also be changed. Rabbi Judah expands on the previous opinion. He agrees that on Shabbat one may put the lulav back into the water. However, he is not allowed to add new water. On a festival he can even add new water, but he may not completely switch the water. That he may do only on the intermediate days of the festival (hol hamoed).", + "A minor who knows how to shake [the lulav] is obligated [to take] the lulav. Once a child has reached an age where he is big enough to hold the lulav (all four species) and shake them properly, he is obligated to do so. The Talmud Bavli and subsequent commentators interpret this to mean that at this age his father has an obligation to teach him how to shake the lulav. His real obligation does not begin until his bar mitzvah, at age 13." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is an introduction to the remainder of the tractate Sukkot. On Sukkot there are some mitzvot that are observed for the full eight days (seven days of Sukkot and one day of Shmini Atzeret) and there are other mitzvot that are observed for a lesser number of days, either because they are not observed on Shabbat or because they do not apply to Shmini Atzeret.\nUp until now the mishnah has spent two chapters discussing the sukkah and one chapter discussing the lulav. In the upcoming mishnayot we will learn more about these other mitzvot including some fascinating rituals observed in the Temple.", + "[The rituals of] the lulav and the aravah are for six or seven [days]; The lulav and the special mitzvah of the aravah are observed for either six days or seven days. We will learn why in mishnayot two and three. The mitzvah of the aravah refers to circling the altar with the aravah, a mitzvah described in detail in mishnah five.", + "The Hallel and the rejoicing are for eight [days]; The full Hallel is recited for all eight days of Sukkot and Shmini Atzeret. Similarly, there is a mitzvah to rejoice on all eight days of the festival. Both of these are referred to in mishnah eight.", + "The sukkah and the water libation are for seven [days]; The mitvah to sit in a sukkah is for only seven days. On Shmini Atzeret one does not sit in the sukkah. The water libation was a special libation of water poured onto the altar only on Sukkot. It is described in mishnah nine. Here we learn that they would perform this special water libation for all seven days of the festival, even on Shabbat.", + "The flute is for five or six [days]. The flute is played at a special celebration that occurred in the Temple called “Simchat Bet Hashoeva.” This celebration does not take place on Shabbat, the first day of the festival (Yom Tov) or on Shmini Atzeret. Hence the flute is played for only five or six days, depending on whether the first day of the festival is on Shabbat. Simchat Bet Hashoeva is described at length in chapter five." + ], + [ + "“The lulav for seven.” How so? If the first day of the festival fell on Shabbat, the lulav [is taken for] seven days; on any other day, [it is taken] for six.
As we have learned before, outside of Jerusalem it is a mitzvah from the Torah to take the lulav only on the first day of the festival. Hence, if the first day of the festival falls on Shabbat, one still performs the mitzvah of the lulav. We saw this described above in 3:13. In such a case the lulav will be taken for seven days one day in which the mitzvah is “deoraita” from the Torah, and the rest of the days it is “derabbanan” from the rabbis.
However, if Shabbat falls on another day besides the first day of the festival, then since the mitzvah is only of rabbinic origin, it is not observed. In other words, the derabanan mitzvah of the lulav does not override the Shabbat. In such a case the mitzvah is observed for only six days.
Since the time of the Babylonian Talmud it has become customary not to take the lulav on Shabbat, even if it falls on the first day of the festival. However, this is not the custom reflected in the mishnah." + ], + [ + "“The aravah seven days.” How is this? If the seventh day of [the ritual of] the aravah fell on Shabbat, [it lasts] seven days; if it fell on any other day, [it lasts only] six.
The only difference between this mishnah and the previous mishnah concerning the lulav is that the lulav is taken on Shabbat if Shabbat is the first day of the festival, whereas the aravah (the willow) is taken on Shabbat if Shabbat falls on the seventh day of the festival. If Shabbat falls on one of the other days, the aravah ritual is not performed on that day and it will turn out that the aravah ritual happens on only six days. In mishnah five we will learn more about the aravah ritual as it was performed in the Temple. The reason that only the seventh day supersedes Shabbat is that the seventh day is the climax of the ritual." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn 3:13 we learned how the mitzvah of lulav was performed in the synagogue on Shabbat and how they managed to get their lulavs to the synagogue while avoiding the prohibition of carrying. In today’s mishnah we see how the same problem was addressed when the Temple still stood and the people were bringing their lulav not to the synagogue but to the Temple.", + "The mitzvah of the lulav how was it carried out? The question is not really how the mitzvah of lulav was in general performed, but rather how the mitzvah was performed so as to avoid the problem while avoiding certain halakhic problems that would arise on Shabbat.", + "If the first day of the festival fell on Shabbat, they brought their lulavim to the Temple Mount, and the attendants would receive them and arrange them on top of the portico, and the elders laid theirs in the chamber. And they would teach the people to say, “Whoever gets my lulav in his hand, let it be his as a gift.” The problem of taking the lulav in the Temple on Shabbat is twofold. First of all it is forbidden to carry a lulav through the public domain on Shabbat, so they would have to bring their lulavim to the Temple Mount on Friday. Secondly, one has to be able to recognize his own lulavim because one can fulfill one's obligation only with one's own lulav. In 3:13 we read that in the synagogue everyone recognized their lulav. In the Temple there were just too many lulavim to hope that everyone would recognize which was theirs. Therefore the leaders in the Temple trained everyone to say that if someone else took their lulav, then that lulav should belong to them. In this way everyone would own the lulav that they actually ended up with.", + "The next day they got up early, and came [to the Temple Mount] and the attendants threw down [their lulavim] before them, and they snatched at them, and so they used to come to blows with one another. While this solution resolved the halakhic problem, it created a social problem people were still jostling each other over who gets which lulav. It might have been that everyone was trying to get their own lulav, despite what they had said the previous day. Equally likely in my opinion, is that everyone wanted to take the nicest looking lulav they could find, even if the one that they had brought was not the best. In any case, the mad scramble for lulavim led to brawls. This seems to be another case of people allowing their religious zeal to go overboard causing them to neglect the welfare of their fellow human being.", + "When the court saw that they reached a state of danger, they instituted that each man should take [his lulav] in his own home. The court was quick to put an end to this situation and ruled that it is better for people just to stay at home then to potentially harm each other over the taking of the lulav. I think it is essential to notice how far the court was willing to go to ensure the safety of the people and to prevent religious zealotry from becoming a dominant force. Better that the opportunity to join together in fulfilling the mitzvah of the lulav should be lost than that it should bring violent results." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah teaches how the special mitzvah of the aravah (the willow) was performed in the Temple. This ritual is not mentioned at all in the Torah and according to the majority opinion in the Talmud it is either an ancient halakhah, a prophetic enactment or a custom. However, others derive the mitzvah of the aravah from the Torah by using a midrash.\nIt seems likely that the Sadducees, a group that rivaled the Pharisees while the Temple stood, did not believe that this was indeed a mitzvah. There is a story in the Talmud that one time the Baytusim (the name of a sect possibly synonymous with the Sadducees) covered the aravot with a heap of rocks to prevent the mitzvah from being performed. The fact that other sects of Jews opposed this mitzvah explains why it was performed with so many verbal demonstrative acts (recitations and shofar blasts). This was a way to demonstrate that this mitzvah should be performed and a way to convince others to do so.\nAfter the destruction of the Temple, the custom developed to circle around the synagogue one time each day of the week while holding the lulav and seven times on Hoshanah Rabbah, the last day of Sukkot.", + "The mitzvah of the aravah how was it [performed]?
There was a place below Jerusalem called Moza. They went down there and gathered tall branches of aravot and then they came and stood them up at the sides of the altar, and their tops were bent over the altar. They then sounded a teki’ah [long blast], a teru’ah [staccato blast] and again a teki’ah. Most of this ritual is self-explanatory. The aravot would need to be about 11 cubits high (more than five meters) so that their tops would go over the altar which was ten meters high. The shofar blasts were meant to give the ritual great publicity and great authority. They were also a sign of rejoicing.", + "Every day they went round the altar once, saying, “O Lord, save us, O Lord, make us prosper” (Psalms 118: 25). While circling the altar the people would recite Psalms 118:25, which is a plea to God to save us and bring us prosperity. Since Sukkot is the holiday on which we pray for the beginning of the rainy season, it is likely that the prosperity which they were praying for was rain.", + "Rabbi Judah says: “Ani vaho, save us.” According to Albeck, Rabbi Judah pronounced the beginning of this verse differently. Whereas we pronounce it “ana adonay”, he would pronounce it “ani vaho.” However, the meaning of “ani vaho” is not clear. Others read “ani vehu” which would mean “I and God”, meant to express the idea that God also participates in the sorrows and sufferings of His people Israel.", + "On that day they went round the altar seven times. On the seventh day they would circle the altar seven times. This is the origins of “Hoshanah Rabbah”, the last day of Sukkot on which we circle the Torah, which is placed in the middle of the synagogue, seven times.", + "When they departed, what did they say? “O altar, beauty is to you! O altar, beauty is to you!” Rabbi Eliezer said: [they would say,] “To the Lord and to you, O altar, to the Lord and to you, O altar.” The end of this seven day ritual was also accompanied by recitations, again meant to emphasize the importance of the aravah ritual and our sadness that the joyous occasion is completed. The people are actually paying homage, in a sense, to the altar. Through the altar the people of Israel receive atonement and hence it is desirable for us to praise it. We should note that we often think of Judaism as an anti-iconic religion God is transcendent, has no body or image, and we therefore deemphasize religious artifacts and emphasize intentions, emotions and our intellect. While this is not the space to enter into a thorough examination of these issues, it does seem to me that this is largely a Maimonidean concept of Judaism. In our mishnah we see that most rabbis had no problem directly speaking to the altar itself. Rabbi Eliezer adds that the praise should not go only to the altar, but to God as well." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first section of this mishnah teaches how the aravah ritual was performed on Shabbat. In the second section we see that at least one rabbi thought that this was not an aravah ritual but a ritual performed with palm branches.", + "As was its performance on a weekday, so was its performance on Shabbat, except that they would gather them on the eve of Shabbat and place them in golden basins so that they would not become wilted. The mishnah emphasizes that when this ritual was done on Shabbat (if it fell on the seventh day) it was done in the exact same way that it was done during the week. This seems to be an emphasis of the rabbis in several places certain holiday rituals are indeed carried out on Shabbat. This is another area of halakhah in which the rabbis/Pharisees deeply disagreed with the Sadducees and the sect from the Dead Sea. Indeed, according to the solar calendar used by the Dead Sea Sect, the holidays mostly began on Wednesdays. They thought that holiday ritual never superseded Shabbat and they shaped their calendar accordingly. In contrast the Pharisees/rabbis said that on certain occasions, it did.", + "Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka says: they used to bring palm branches and they would beat them on the ground at the sides of the altar, and that day was called “[the day of] the beating of the palm branches.” In this section we learn that Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka disagrees with all of the previous mishnayot. He holds that the entire ritual was done with palm branches and not with aravot. At the end of the rituals they would beat whatever had been carried around the altar for seven days (the palm branches according to Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka, and aravot according to the other sages). That day was called “the day of the beating of the palm branches/aravot.” To this day beating the aravot on Hoshanah Rabbah is still customary. Other commentators explain that Rabbi Yohanan’s debate with the other sages is only concerning the seventh day. On that day one takes palm branches and aravot. On the other days he agrees that he takes only aravot." + ], + [ + "Immediately after beating the willows (or palm branches) the children undo their lulavs and eat their etrogim. Once the ritual of the aravah was completed, children would immediately undo the ties binding their lulavim together and would immediately eat the etrogim. This seems to encompass two concrete ways of demonstrating that the mitzvah was utterly completed. Once the lulav is untied it is no longer really a lulav it is now just a palm branch, a willow and a myrtle branch. Once the etrog has a bite taken out of it, it can no longer be used on Sukkot." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first section of this mishnah deals with the recitation of Hallel and “rejoicing”, two mitzvoth which one fulfills on all eight days of the festival. The second section deals with the sukkah in which one dwells for seven days but not on Shmini Atzeret, the eighth day of Sukkot.", + "The Hallel and rejoicing are on all eight days: How is this so? This teaches that one is obligated for the Hallel, for rejoicing and for honoring the festival on the last day, just as he is on all the other days of the festival. On all eight days of Sukkot and Shmini Atzeret the full Hallel is recited. This is different from Pesah on which a full Hallel is recited on the first day only. “Rejoicing” has a general meaning in that one is supposed to be happy on the festival, as it says in Leviticus 23:40, “And you shall rejoice before the Lord your God seven days.” Despite the fact that the Torah specifies “seven days” the rabbis expanded this to include Shmini Atzeret. “Rejoicing” also has a more specific ritual sense during the festival one should bring sacrifices and eat them because eating meat, a much rarer luxury in mishnaic times than it is now, was considered one of the consummate signs of rejoicing.", + "The sukkah is for seven days. How so? Once he finished eating [his meal on the seventh day], he should not untie his sukkah, but he removes its contents from the time of minhah and onwards in honor of the last day of the festival. While the Hallel and rejoicing are for the full eight days, one sits in the sukkah for only seven days. Shmini Atzeret is distinguished by the fact that we do not sit in the sukkah. The mishnah teaches that one should eat his last meal in the sukkah for lunch on the seventh day of Sukkot and then start to bring his nice things, his dishes, his bed, his couch etc., into the house as a sign of respect for Shmini Atzeret. However, he should not undo his sukkah because he might still need to eat in there if he wants to eat again before the day is over. Taking the sukkah down before Sukkot is completely over might also be perceived as a sign of disrespect for Sukkot. It might make it look like he couldn’t wait to take down his sukkah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nAnother one of the unique ceremonies performed at the Temple on Sukkot was the water libation. During the year libations, that is pouring liquid onto the altar, were always performed with wine. The water libation is unique and was vehemently opposed by the Sadducees, as we shall see at the end of the Mishnah.\nThe water libation functioned as a supplication to God to bring rain in the upcoming season. As I have emphasized in other places, the rainy season in Israel is from Sukkot to Pesah. If enough rain does not fall in this period people’s lives would have been in serious danger. In the Temple they would pour water onto the altar to ask God to bring rain from the heavens to fill the cisterns and underground aquifers below.", + "How was the water libation [performed]? A golden flask holding three logs was filled from the Shiloah. When they arrived at the water gate, they sounded a teki'ah [long blast], a teru'ah [a staccato note] and again a teki'ah. [The priest then] went up the ascent [of the altar] and turned to his left where there were two silver bowls. Rabbi Judah says: they were of plaster [but they looked silver] because their surfaces were darkened from the wine. They had each a hole like a slender snout, one being wide and the other narrow so that both emptied at the same time. The one on the west was for water and the one on the east for wine. If he poured the flask of water into the bowl for wine, or that of wine into that for water, he has fulfilled his obligation. Rabbi Judah says: with one log he performed the ceremony of the water-libation all eight days. To [the priest] who performed the libation they used to say, “Raise your hand”, for one time, a certain man poured out the water over his feet, and all the people pelted him with their etrogs. The water libation ritual would begin with a procession from the Shiloah, the stream that empties out at the base of the Temple Mount. As we shall see when we learn the fifth chapter, this procession would begin in the morning after Simchat Bet Hashoevah (to be explained below). The people would make their way up to the Temple and enter through a designated gate called “the water gate.” [Made much more famous about 2,000 years later!] Just as we saw with the aravah ritual, here too they blew three shofar blasts. Again, this seems to have been a way of highlighting the event and emphasizing its importance in light of the fact that others disagreed with its fulfillment. They would then pour the water into a special bowl that had a hole in it. The water would go down to a cistern underneath the altar called “shitin”, where according to legend it would cause the waters of the deep to rise and nourish the earth. The wine libation was done simultaneously. Rabbi Judah disagrees with the first opinion in the mishnah concerning two matters: 1) the libation was done with a log and not with three logs. Secondly, he holds that the water libation was for all eight days and not just on the seven days of Sukkot. In the final story a priest, identified in the Talmud as a Sadducee, pours the water onto the floor of the Temple rather than pouring it onto the altar. In response, the people pelt him with their etrogs. There are several fascinating aspects to this story. First of all, although the Sadducean priest disagreed with the water libation, he was still working in the Temple and he ended up with the water flask in his hand. If the Sadducees controlled the Temple why did he have the water flask such that he had to cast it down? Why would they have bothered bringing the water up from the Shiloah in the first place? And if the Pharisees controlled the Temple, why would they have let a Sadducean priest perform a ritual that they surely knew he disagreed with? Another interesting point is that the people’s sentiments clearly lie with the rabbis/Pharisees. Finally, there is a very similar story in Josephus, Antiquities of the Jews, Book 13, Chapter 13: “As to Alexander, his own people were seditious against him; for at a festival which was then celebrated, when he stood upon the altar, and was going to sacrifice, the nation rose upon him, and pelted him with citrons [which they then had in their hands, because] the law of the Jews required that at the feast of tabernacles every one should have branches of the palm tree and citron tree; which thing we have elsewhere related.” This event occurred during the Hasmonean reign, meaning sometime in the early 1st century B.C.E. Alexander Yannai was king and high priest and was known to have had Sadducean leanings. However, there is nothing in Josephus about a water libation. The people pelt him with etrogs (citrons) because they oppose him as king and high priest. It is hard to know if the story in the Mishnah is related to this story from Josephus, either historically or literarily, but one thing we can know for sure if you’re a Sadducee in the Temple on Sukkot, you’d better watch your head!" + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah teaches how they would perform the water libation on Shabbat and yet avoid the problem of having to carry the water up from the Shiloah.", + "As it was performed on weekdays, so was it was performed on Shabbat, save that on the eve of Shabbat he would fill a non-sanctified golden barrel from the Shiloah, and place it in the chamber. Importantly, the mishnah emphasizes that the water libation was performed on Shabbat just as it was performed during the week. I believe that this is frequently one of the ways in which the rabbis emphasized the importance of controversial rituals. It is as if to say that the water libation is so crucial that it is even done on Shabbat. However, they had to make sure that the water was not carried through the public domain on Shabbat. In order to do this they would bring the water up on Friday before Shabbat and leave it in the chamber until the next morning. However, this posed another problem. Water or any other liquid left overnight in a sanctified vessel becomes unfit for use in the Temple. Therefore they would use a golden barrel that had not been consecrated.", + "If it was poured away or uncovered, he would refill it from the laver, for wine or water which has become uncovered is invalid for the altar. If the water was poured away (perhaps by the Sadducean priest we met yesterday) then it obviously can’t be used. Similarly, if it was left uncovered it also can’t be used. Liquids left uncovered overnight are forbidden for anyone to drink for fear that a snake put venom in them. Since exposed liquids can’t be drunk by people, it is also forbidden to use them on the altar. If the water that they had brought up the day before could not be used, then they would just use water from the laver that was in the Temple." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThe first four mishnayot of the final chapter of Sukkah are about a Sukkot ritual called “Simchat Bet Hashoevah”, which is usually translated as the “Celebration of the Water-Drawing.” The water-drawing refers to the drawing of the water from the Shiloah in order to perform the water-libation, described above in chapter four. At the end of the all-night Simchat Bet Hashoevah ceremony, early in the morning, they would leave the Temple, go down to the Shiloah and draw the water.\nIt seems that the function of the ceremony was twofold. First of all it highlighted the importance of the water-libation, which as we saw before, was controversial. Secondly, it allowed non-priests a chance to participate in the Sukkot ritual in the Temple. This seems to be one of the major differences between the Pharisees and Sadducees the former encouraged the participation of non-priests in Temple ritual as much as was possible, whereas the Sadducees seemed to have abhorred it.", + "The flute was for five or six days. This refers to the flute at the Bet Hashoevah [the place of the water-drawing] which does not override Shabbat or the festival day. The mishnah refers to a flute that was played during the Simchat Bet Hashoevah. This celebration would only take place on five or six days because it did not override Shabbat or the festival day. So if the first day of Sukkot and Shabbat coincided, then it would happen for six days; if not for only five. Interestingly, in the descriptions of the Bet Hashoevah that follow, the flute is no longer present. I do not have a good answer for this absence.", + "They said: he who has not seen the Simchat Bet Hashoevah has never seen rejoicing in his life. The Simchat Bet Hashoevah was supposed to have been the most joyous, celebratory occasion in the Jewish calendar. Indeed, to this day in our tefillot we call Sukkot “the time of our rejoicing (z’man simchatenu)”." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah begins to describe the Simchat Bet Hashoevah ritual. The ritual seems to be centered around fire, which has led some scholars to suggest the Simchat Bet Hashoevah really means “The Celebration of Fire.”", + "At the conclusion of the first festival day of Sukkot they descended to the Women’s Court (Ezrat and they would make there a great enactment. As we learned in yesterday’s mishnah, they did not celebrate the Simchat Bet Hashoevah on either Shabbat or on the festival. They would not begin until after the first festival day was completed. The celebration would start with the people going into the “Women’s Court.” This was a section in the Temple into which both men and women could enter, but it was as far as women could go in the Temple. Hence it was called the “Women’s Court.” The mishnah says that they would make their a “great enactment” but does not explain what this was. The Talmud explains that they separated the men and women, putting the men below and the women up into the balcony so that they wouldn’t mix. The fear was that in the midst of such a raucous occasion the mixture of men and women together could lead to transgression. Hence they separated between the sexes. However, on normal occasions men and women seem to have been together in the Women’s Court.", + "And golden candlesticks were there, and four golden bowls on the top of each of them and four ladders to each, and four youths drawn from the young priests, and in their hands there were jars of oil containing one hundred and twenty logs which they poured into the bowls. The first thing they would do was light an enormous menorah. On each candlestick there were four golden bowls according to tomorrow’s mishnah, there was enough light to light up all of Jerusalem! Children would climb ladders to light the menorah and they would use 120 logs of oil, which is the equivalent of fifteen liters of oil. This works out to about half a liter of oil for each bowl." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah continues the description of the incredible light which shone from the menorah at the Simchat Bet Hashoevah.", + "From the worn-out pants and belts of the priests they made wicks and with them they kindled the lamps. The wicks that they used to light the candles were not made from any old ordinary material. They used the worn-out pants and belts the priests, which they wore in their Temple service. This teaches us that once something has been used for one mitzvah it is fitting that it should be used in another mitzvah as well.", + "And there was not a courtyard in Jerusalem that was not illuminated by the light of the Bet Hashoevah. The light from the menorah was so great that according to the mishnah it lit up all of Jerusalem." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah describes the Simchat Bet Hashoevah.", + "Men of piety and good deeds used to dance before them with lighted torches in their hands, and they would sing songs and praises. After having lit the menorah, the party kicks off with dancing, singing and the playing of musical instruments. The first participants mentioned are the “Hasidim” or the men of piety and men whom are known for their good deeds. This group’s participation is unusual and noteworthy for these were men chosen based on their deeds and not on their lineage. In my opinion this was indeed one of the functions of the Simchat Bet Hashoevah, to give a greater role to those who are not of the priestly or Levitical clans. It is these people whose dancing, songs and praise would probably have stood out the most. This dancing and singing took place in the Court of the Women.", + "And Levites with innumerable harps, lyres, cymbals and trumpets and other musical instruments stood upon the fifteen steps leading down from the Court of the Israelites to the Court of the Women, corresponding to the fifteen songs of ascents in the Psalms, and it was on these [steps] that the Levites stood with their musical instruments and sang their songs. The second group is the Levites who would arrange themselves on the fifteen steps leading up from the Court of the Women to the Court of the Israelites. The mishnah notes that these fifteen steps correlate with the fifteen Psalms which begin “A Song of Ascents (Shir Hamaalot)” (Psalms 120-134). One can only imagine how beautiful, indeed sublime, their music must have been.", + "Two priests stood by the upper gate which leads down from the Court of the Israelites to the Court of the Women, with two trumpets in their hands. When the cock crowed they sounded a teki'ah [drawn-out blast], a teru'ah [staccato note] and again a teki'ah. When they reached the tenth step they sounded a teki'ah, a teru'ah and again a teki'ah. When they reached the Court [of the Women] they sounded a teki'ah, a teru'ah and again a teki'ah. They would sound their trumpets and proceed until they reached the gate which leads out to the east. The third group involved is the priests. The priests begin the ceremony standing above everyone else, up in the Court of the Israelites. When the cock crows at the crack of dawn they begin a process of descending and blowing shofar blasts at set stages. Eventually this leads them down through the women’s court and out to the eastern gate.", + "When they reached the gate which leads out to the east, they turned their faces from east to west and said, “Our fathers who were in this place ‘their backs were toward the Temple of the Lord, and their faces toward the east, and they worshipped the sun toward the east’, but as for us, our eyes are turned to the Lord.” Rabbi Judah said: they used to repeat [the last words] and say “We are the Lord’s and our eyes are turned to the Lord.” When they get to the eastern gate they are facing the sun. They turn around so that their backs are to the sun and use this opportunity to profess their faith in God and their denial of the worship of the sun. They quote from Ezekiel 8:16 in order to highlight that the sin of sun-worship is not just something that “others” or Greeks were engaged in, but something that Israelites themselves were accused of by Ezekiel. It seems to me likely that there is also a polemic here against other contemporary Jewish groups who had a solar calendar. A calendar based on the sun and actual worship of the sun could probably have been associated. Certainly it would make sense that the Pharisees/rabbis would claim that their rivals, the Essenes and perhaps the Sadducees, were not just basing their calendar on the sun but were worshipping the sun as well. We have already seen on a number of occasions that Sukkot was a holiday full of strife between the various sects of ancient Judaism. The mishnah ends its procession at this point, but it is quite clear that it was not actually over at this moment but that from the eastern gate they would make their way down to the Shiloah spring in order to draw water for the water-libation." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nSince the previous mishnah mentioned the extra shofar blasts that were sounded during Sukkot, today’s mishnah discusses how many shofar blasts were sounded on other occasions in the Temple. As we shall see, more shofar blasts were blown on the eve of Shabbat during Sukkot than at any other time during the year.", + "They never have less than twenty-one blasts in the Temple, and never more than forty-eight. This is an introduction to the rest of the mishnah. We should remember that each tekiah (unbroken sound) and each teruah (staccato sound) counts as one blast. The blasts always come in sets of three, first a tekiah, then a teruah and then another tekiah. Sometimes this order is repeated and sometimes it is performed three times.", + "Every day there were twenty-one blasts in the Temple, three at the opening of the gates, nine at the morning tamid sacrifice, and nine at the evening tamid sacrifice. On normal days there were twenty-one blasts. There were three blasts in the morning to announce the opening of the Temple gates, and then nine blasts at each of the two daily sacrifices, the morning tamid and the afternoon tamid.", + "At the musafim (additional they would add another nine. On the festivals and on Shabbat there were an extra nine blasts for the musaf offerings. The Talmud explains that no matter how many musaf offerings were offered on that day, nine and only nine blasts were sounded. Thus even on Shabbat during the festival, when there were musaf offerings for Shabbat and for the festival, there were still only nine.", + "And on the eve of Shabbat they would add another six, three as a sign to the people to stop working and three to mark a distinction between the holy and the profane. On the eve of Shabbat there were six other blasts, whose function was not connected to sacrifices or to Temple procedures but rather to Shabbat. There were three blasts that let people know that Shabbat was approaching and that they needed to stop working. And then there were another three blasts to let people know that Shabbat had begun. Interestingly, there was a stone from the ruins of the Temple found in Jerusalem that had written on it \"bet hatekiah lehav…\" which means \"the house of blasting to distinguish.\" Probably, the reference is to the practice in this very mishnah. This stone was once part of the section in the Temple where they blew shofar blasts to distinguish between kodesh (Shabbat) and hol (non-Shabbat). To this day in Jerusalem and in a few other cities in Israel as well they sound a warning to let people know that Shabbat has begun. It turns out therefore, that on the eve of Shabbat during Pesah or on Shavuot, there would be thirty-six blasts 21 for the normal occasions, 9 for musaf, and 6 for the eve of Shabbat.", + "On the eve of Shabbat in the intermediate days of the [Sukkoth] festival, there were [therefore] forty-eight blasts: three at the opening of the gates, three at the upper gate, three at the lower gate, three at the water-drawing, three at the altar, nine at the daily morning sacrifice, nine at the daily evening sacrifice, nine at the additional sacrifices, three as a sign to the people to cease from work, and three to mark a distinction between the holy and the profane. In the previous mishnah we learned that there were nine additional blasts for the Simchat Bet Hashoevah, in 4:9 we learned of three blasts for the water-libation and in 4:5 there were three blasts for the aravah ritual. Therefore, on the eve of Shabbat during Sukkot (but not on the first day) there should have been 51 blasts 36 from section four and 15 additional blasts which were special to Sukkot. However, our mishnah teaches that there were only 48 blasts. The best explanation for this discrepancy seems to be that this mishnah skips the three blasts that were done on the tenth step leading down to the Court of the Women during the Simchat Bet Hashoevah. Explained this way, when our mishnah says the upper gate, it refers to the first three blasts at the Simchat Bet Hashoevah. The lower gate refers to those sounded when they reached the Court of the Women. The three at the water-drawing refers to those mentioned in 4:9, and the three at the altar refers to the three at the aravah ritual (4:6). Commentators also note another problem with this mishnah. There were even more blasts sounded on Pesah when the passover offering was being sacrificed. These could reach 27 blasts (three each time the Hallel was sung, three potential groups, each singing the Hallel three times). If Pesah fell on the eve of Shabbat that there could be 54 blasts, more than the 48 mentioned in our mishnah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe priests were divided into twenty-four watches, each watch serving for a week at the Temple. During a watch’s week the priests of that watch kept all of the sacrificial meat and any other part of the sacrifice that they were allowed to use. However, during pilgrimage festivals all twenty-four watches equally divided the sacrifices that were offered on account of the festival. Our mishnah teaches how the numerous Sukkot offerings were divvied up.", + "On the first festival day of Sukkot there were thirteen bulls, two rams and one goat. Fourteen lambs remained for the other eight priestly watches.
On the first day, six [watches] offered two each and the remaining [two] one each. On the first day of Sukkot there were thirty animals sacrificed: thirteen bulls, two rams, one goat (for a sin-offering) and fourteen lambs (Numbers 29:13-16). This means that 16 priestly watches could take one animal each, leaving fourteen animals for the other eight watches. On the first day of the festival, six watches would sacrifice two lambs and the other two watches would get one lamb each.", + "On the second day five offered two each and the remaining [four] one each. On the second day there was one less bull, so the total number of animals was only 29. Fifteen watches would take the fifteen non-lamb animals, leaving nine watches to split 14 lambs. Five would take two lambs, leaving four to each take one.", + "On the third day four offered two each and the remaining [six] one each. On the third day there were 11 bulls, for a total of 28 animals. Fourteen watches would take the fourteen non-lamb animals, leaving ten watches to split 14 lambs. Four would take two lambs, leaving six to each take one.", + "On the fourth day three offered two each and the remaining [eight] one each. On the fourth day there were only 10 bulls, for a total of 27 animals. Thirteen watches would take the thirteen non-lamb animals, leaving 11 watches to split 14 lambs. Three would take two lambs, leaving eight to each take one.", + "On the fifth day two offered two each and the remaining [ten] one each. On the fifth day there were only 9 bulls, for a total of 26 animals. Twelve watches would take the twelve non-lamb animals, leaving 12 watches to split 14 lambs. Two would take two lambs, leaving ten to each take one.", + "On the sixth day one offered two and the remaining [twelve] one each. On the sixth day there were only 8 bulls, for a total of 25 animals. Eleven watches would take the eleven non-lamb animals, leaving 13 watches to split 14 lambs. One would take two lambs, leaving 12 to each take one.", + "On the seventh day all were equal. On the seventh day there were 24 animals for 24 watches each watch got one.", + "On the eighth day they again cast lots as on the other festivals. On Shmini Atzeret there were only 10 animals sacrificed, one bull, one ram, one goat and seven lambs (Numbers 29:35-38). The watches would then cast lot to see who received what (see Yoma 2:1).", + "They said: the [watch] that offered bulls on one day should not offer them on the next, but that they should take their turns in rotation. It is obviously better to receive a large meaty bull than a small goat. It wouldn’t have been fair for one watch to monopolize the larger animals. Therefore a watch that got a bull one day would not get a bull the next day. Without going through all the math, with a total of 70 bulls offered over the seven days of Sukkot, 22 of the watches would have been able to offer 3 bulls and two would have had to suffice with only 2 bulls. I think they should put this mishnah as a word problem (everyone's favorite) on a math exam!" + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn yesterday’s mishnah we learned that the twenty-four priestly watches equally divided the sacrifices that were offered on account of the festival. Our mishnah now discusses the ownership over the other sacrifices that would have been offered on the three festivals.", + "At three periods in the year all the priestly watches shared equally in the festival sacrifices and in the division of the showbread. This is a reference to the previous mishnah. On all three festivals all of the watches shared equally in all of the sacrifices that came on account of the festival. This would include the musafim mentioned yesterday, but also the “hagigah” and other special sacrifices that individuals would bring on account of the festival. They also divided the showbread equally, despite the fact that the showbread is not really a sacrifice that comes on account of the festival.", + "On Shavuot they used to say to the priest, “Here is matzah for you, here is chametz for you.” On Shavuot there were both the matzot of the showbread and leavened bread (chametz) from the two special loaves on Shavuot. Therefore they could amusingly say to the priest coming to take his share: here’s your matzah, here’s your chametz.", + "A watch whose period of service was fixed [for that festival week] offered the tamid, vow-offerings and freewill-offerings and all other public offerings; and it offered them all. The watch whose week fell on the week upon which there was a festival would get the offerings that were brought not on account of the festival. They would get the tamid, the daily offerings. They also received the individual voluntary offerings vow offerings and free-will offerings. They also received other public offerings not listed in the previous mishnah. This would include the Shabbat musaf offerings. Finally, they would get any offering that was brought for some reason other than the festival. This would include first-born animals and tithes. We should note that despite the fact that the festival offerings were divided up equally among the different watches, it surely would have been a bonus to have one’s watch fall on the festival for the simple reason that more people came to the Temple at these times. It was at these times of the year that people would have brought their voluntary offerings, their first-born animals, their animal tithes and other offerings. Hence, it was probably quite lucrative to have your watch fall during the festival.", + "A festival which fell next to Shabbat, either before or after it, all the watches shared equally in the distribution of the showbread. If Shabbat fell either on the day before the festival or the day after, all of the watches would receive an equal portion of the showbread. If it fell before the festival, they would have to get to Jerusalem before Shabbat, a day earlier than if the festival had fallen during the week. If it fell after the festival, they would have to stay a day later. Since they had to be there anyway, they received a portion of the showbread even though Shabbat was not on the festival." + ], + [ + "Introduction The final mishnah of Sukkah is a continuation of yesterday’s mishnah which dealt with the division of the showbread.", + "If one day intervened between them [Shabbat and Yom Tov], the watch whose time of service was fixed [for that week] took ten [of the] loaves, while they that were detained took two. Yesterday we learned that if Shabbat fell next to Yom Tov (the first or last day of the festival) then all of the watches divided the showbread evenly. Today we learn that if there was one day in between Shabbat and Yom Tov, the watch whose week it was would get most of the showbread but not all. Since some of the watches might not be able to begin their way back home because they lived too far away to make it in one day, or might need to get to Jerusalem before Shabbat, they were compensated by getting at least a little bit of the showbread.", + "On all other days of the year the incoming watch took six loaves and the outgoing watch six. Rabbi Judah said, the incoming watch took seven and the outgoing five. At all other times of the year the incoming and outgoing watches would split the showbread evenly. The watches would actually switch their service on Shabbat. The new watch would arrange the new showbread and the two would split the showbread from the previous week. Rabbi Judah says that this division was not completely equal.", + "The incoming watch divided it in the north, and the outgoing in the south. In order that the watches should not get confused, the incoming watch would divide the showbread in the northern section of the Temple and the outgoing watch would divide in the south.", + "[The watch of] Bilgah always divided it in the south; their ring was fixed and their alcove was blocked up. Bilgah is the name of one of the watches (see I Chronicles 24:14). According to the mishnah and other rabbinic sources they were punished for the sins committed by Miriam, the daughter of one of the priests. Miriam committed apostasy and married a Greek soldier, and when the Greeks entered the Temple during the time of the Maccabees she came in with him and acted in a disrespectful manner to the Temple. As a collective punishment for the whole watch they always divided in the south, as if to say that even when they were entering their service, it is as if they are on their way out. Alternatively, the Talmud says that Bilgah may have been punished because they were constantly late in arriving to serve in the Temple. In the Temple there were twenty-four rings, one for each watch. When skinning a sacrifice they could put the animal’s neck through the ring and have it held up while they skinned it. Bilgah’s ring was closed up so that they couldn’t use it. In addition, every watch had its own alcove in which they could store their knives. Bilgah’s was closed up, again as a punishment for their misdeeds." + ] + ] + ] + }, + "schema": { + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה סוכה", + "enTitle": "English Explanation of Mishnah Sukkah", + "key": "English Explanation of Mishnah Sukkah", + "nodes": [ + { + "heTitle": "הקדמה", + "enTitle": "Introduction" + }, + { + "heTitle": "", + "enTitle": "" + } + ] + } +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Moed/English Explanation of Mishnah Sukkah/English/merged.json b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Moed/English Explanation of Mishnah Sukkah/English/merged.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ab8f8379ec56a9437de1017027d1e08df4ebc7f3 --- /dev/null +++ b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Moed/English Explanation of Mishnah Sukkah/English/merged.json @@ -0,0 +1,346 @@ +{ + "title": "English Explanation of Mishnah Sukkah", + "language": "en", + "versionTitle": "merged", + "versionSource": "https://www.sefaria.org/English_Explanation_of_Mishnah_Sukkah", + "text": { + "Introduction": [ + "Tractate Sukkah can be divided into several sections. The first two chapters deal with the laws of the sukkah, how one builds a sukkah and how one observes the commandment of dwelling in a sukkah.", + "The third chapter deals with the laws of the lulav, the four species that one picks up every day during the holiday. ", + "The fourth and fifth chapters deal with several ceremonies or rituals connected to Sukkot that were observed in the time of the Temple. They are the beating of the willows, the water libation, and the celebration known as “simhat bet hashoevah.” We will discuss these in greater detail when we come across them.", + "Sukkah is perhaps the tractate in Seder Moed whose halakhot most directly correspond to halakhah as it is observed today. Jews still build sukkot and still take up a lulav, willow (aravah), myrtle (hadas) and etrog every year on Sukkot. While there are, as always, many differences between the precise manner in which we observe halakhah today and the way it was observed during the time of the Mishnah, they are, in my opinion, lesser in this area of halakhah than in others. This makes Sukkah a somewhat easier tractate to learn—we can more often picture what they are doing." + ], + "": [ + [ + [ + "Introduction Tractate Sukkah begins with a mishnah that is remarkably similar to the first mishnah of Eruvin. It states the maximum and minimum height of a sukkah. We should note that the word “sukkah” in the mishnah sometimes refers to the “skhakh”, the dead branches used to make the sukkah’s roof. The mishnah pays far more attention to the roof of the sukkah than to its walls. The second half of the mishnah deals with an old sukkah, one which was not built to be a sukkah for the festival of Sukkot, but was built to serve as shade in general. In the Middle East many farmers build such structures in order to provide shade from the hot sun.", + "A sukkah which is more than twenty cubits high is not valid. Rabbi Judah validates it. The roof of the sukkah cannot be more than 20 cubits higher than the ground. This is about 10 meters, which would make a very high sukkah. There are several reasons provided for this in the Talmud. At such a great height, one would not notice the skhakh, and noticing that one is sitting under skhakh is part of the experience of sitting in the sukkah. Another possibility is that if the skhakh is above twenty cubits one will be sitting in the shade of the walls and not the shade of the skhakh. Finally, a sukkah that is higher than twenty cubits will of necessity have to be built stronger. As it becomes more permanent, it becomes less like a sukkah and more like a house. As Rabbi Judah did with regard to the “post and beam” in Eruvin (see the intro to Eruvin, and the first mishnah) so too with regard to the sukkah he sets no limit as to a sukkah’s height.", + "One which is not ten handbreadths high, or which does not have three walls, or which has more sun than shade, is not valid. The second section of the mishnah provides three requirements that everyone agrees with. First of all, the sukkah must be 10 handbreadths high. This is equivalent to about a meter high, still quite small. Were the sukkah smaller than ten handbreadths a person could not even sit inside it. Secondly, the sukkah must have three walls. Finally, the skhakh must provide more shade than the amount of sun it allows in.", + "An old sukkah: Bet Shammai invalidates it and Bet Hillel validates it. What is an “old sukkah”? Any one which he made thirty days before the festival; but if he made it for the purpose of the festival, even at the beginning of the year, it is valid. Bet Hillel allows a person to use an old sukkah. For Bet Hillel the intention that went in to building the sukkah is not critical, what is critical is the use of the sukkah. In contrast, for Bet Shammai an old sukkah, one that was not made with the intent to use it on the festival, is invalid, even if it matches all of the other halakhic criteria. However, Beth Shammai agrees that any sukkah that was made thirty days before the festival is valid, since we can assume that he made it knowing that he might use it on Sukkot. The only debate is over a sukkah that was made more than thirty days before Sukkot without the intention of using it on Sukkot." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with a person who makes a valid sukkah (we will learn more about what a valid sukkah is later) but then something is placed on top of his sukkah that does not count as valid skhakh. This causes the otherwise valid sukkah to be invalid.", + "One who makes his sukkah under a tree, it is as if he made it within the house. A tree while still attached to the ground cannot be used for skhakh, the roofing of the sukkah. Skhakh must come from a natural source, but it must be detached from the ground. Therefore, if one puts his sukkah underneath a tree it is invalid, just as it would be invalid if one built a sukkah inside a house with the ceiling as his roof.", + "One [who makes] a sukkah on top of another sukkah, the upper one is valid but the lower is invalid. Rabbi Judah says: if there are no occupants in the upper one, the lower one is valid. If a person builds one sukkah on top of another, it turns out that the skhakh of the bottom sukkah is the floor of the top sukkah. Even if the skhakh meets all other halakhic requirements it is still invalid because the fact that someone is living above makes it again similar to a person who builds his sukkah inside a house. Rabbi Judah holds that if there is no one who is living in the upper one, than the bottom one is valid. The upper sukkah is not considered to be living quarters unless someone is actually living there." + ], + [ + "If he spread a sheet over it because of the sun or beneath it because of falling [leaves];
Or if he spread [a sheet] over the frame of a four-post bed, [the sukkah] is invalid.
But he may spread it over the frame of a two-post bed.
This mishnah teaches that if there is a roof-like structure underneath or above the sukkah it invalidates the skhakh.
Section one: If he spread a sheet on top of the sukkah to keep out the sun, or a sheet underneath the skhakh to keep out the falling leaves, the sheet invalidates the sukkah. This is because a sheet cannot be used for skhakh, so in essence he is using invalid skhakh to form his sukkah.
Section two: Similarly, if he spreads a sheet over a four-post bed, the sheet invalidates his skhakh, because the sheet forms a roof. However, the sheet does not invalidate the skhakh if it was spread over a two-post bed. This is because the sheet forms a tent-like structure, one that slopes to the sides and is not considered a roof. Since there is no roof made of a sheet, the only roof is the skhakh and the sukkah is valid." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah teaches a few general rules regarding what can be used as skhakh, the covering on top of the sukkah.", + "If he trained a vine or a gourd or ivy over [the sukkah] and put skhakh on top of it, it is not valid. But if the skhakh is more than them, or if he cut them, it is valid. In this section we learn several important rules governing skhakh. The first is that the skhakh must be detached from the ground. If one takes living vines and trains them on top of his sukkah, the sukkah is invalid. This is true even if he put some valid skhakh on top of the vines that were still attached to the ground. The sukkah becomes valid only if he puts more valid skhakh than the invalid attached vines, or if he cuts down the vines. This is an important point. The only thing that makes the vines invalid is that they are still attached to the ground.", + "This is the general rule: whatever is susceptible to [ritual] impurity and does not grow from the ground may not be used for skhakh, but whatever is not susceptible to [ritual] impurity and does grow from ground soil may be used for skhakh. There are two general rules presented here. The first is that the skhakh has to be something that cannot receive ritual impurity. This means that clothing, chairs, tables, dishes, sheets, etc. cannot be used as skhakh. Basically, this includes most things that have been “made” or “fashioned” by human hands. Branches of trees cannot become impure and hence can be used for skhakh. Secondly, it has to be something that originally grew from the ground. This rules out metal, stone, clay, plastic etc. Interestingly, these two rules, and that in the previous section, are in a sense foils for one another. The skhakh must be dead, but it must be something that was once alive. Something has to have been done to it by human hands it has to be cut from the ground, but not too much can be done with it humans can’t turn it into useful instruments. The skkakh is then “liminal” it mediates between the natural world and the humanly created world. So too it is above us, mediating between God and humanity." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with material that fits all of the criteria brought up in yesterday’s mishnah it comes from the ground, it is detached from the ground and it is not receptive to impurity and yet still cannot be used as skhakh.", + "Bundles of straw, bundles of wood, and bundles of brushwood they do not use them as skhakh. The Talmud Yerushalmi explains that these bundles cannot be used as skhakh because it might look as if he is putting them up there for storage or to dry them out and not to use them for shade.", + "But all of them, if he untied them, are valid. However, if he unties them, it no longer looks like he put them up there to dry or to store them and therefore the sukkah is valid.", + "And they are all valid for the walls. Everything that is invalid for the skhakh is valid for the walls. When it comes to the walls all we are concerned about is that there are walls we are not at all concerned with the material of the walls. We should note that the word “sukkah” itself means “to cover” and the word “skhakh” is from the same root as the word for “sukkah.” A “sukkah” is defined by its skhakh but not by its walls." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to discuss things that meet the requirements for skhakh as listed in mishnayot 3-4 (comes from the ground, is detached from the ground and is not receptive to impurity) but are still not valid to use as skhakh.", + "They may make skhakh out of wooden planks, the words or Rabbi Judah. Rabbi Meir forbids. Rabbi Judah holds that one can use wooden planks whereas Rabbi Meir holds that these cannot be used. In the Talmud they debate how wide these planks are some say that they are four handbreaths wide and others say that they are only three handbreadths wide. All agree that planks thinner than three handbreadths can be used. In any case, Rabbi Meir rejects the use of broad wooden planks because the sukkah will look too much like a house. Rabbi Judah accepts them and seems to simply be unconcerned if the sukkah looks like a house. We have seen that Rabbi Judah allows very strong and stable structures to be valid sukkot above in mishnah one he allowed a sukkah that was over 20 cubits high. We shall also see Rabbi Judah with a similar type of opinion in 2:2.", + "If one places on top of [the sukkah] a plank four handbreadths wide, it is valid provided that he does not sleep under it. This section goes according to Rabbi Meir who forbids using wooden planks. Rabbi Meir admits that one wooden plank, even if it were wide, would not invalidate the entire sukkah, just the area that it actually covers. Therefore, he shouldn’t sleep (or eat) underneath this plank, but he may utilize other areas of the sukkah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nRoofs were usually made by first putting on a layer of wooden planks and then covering them with plaster to seal out the rain. Plaster on a roof would render the sukkah invalid because it does not come from vegetation. This mishnah discusses a house that has a roof made of wood but there is no plaster on top of it.", + "A [wooden] roof that has no plastering: Rabbi Judah says: Bet Shammai say that he should loosen [the planks] and remove one from between each two. And Bet Hillel say he should either loosen [the planks] or remove one from between two. Rabbi Judah relates here the opinions of Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel. Bet Shammai holds that in order to make this roof valid he must do two things. First of all, he must pick up every plank, loosen it and only then put it back down in its place. This seems to be a demonstrative act to show that this is a sukkah and not a house. He must also remove every other plank so that it also looks like a sukkah and not a house. Bet Hillel is more lenient and allows one to do either he either loosens the planks by picking them up or he removes one from between two. He need not do both acts.", + "Rabbi Meir says, he removes one from between two, but he does not loosen [the planks]. Rabbi Meir rules differently. Assumedly, he believes that this is what Bet Hillel actually said and not as Rabbi Judah related. According to Rabbi Meir, the symbolic act of loosening the planks is not necessary nor does it help. Rather, he must remove one out of every two planks so that the sukkah does not look like a house. This is in line and somewhat modifies that which Rabbi Meir said in yesterday’s mishnah wooden planks may not be used. Here we see that they can be used, but they must not be placed right next to each other. Rather there must be gaps equal to their thickness. Assumedly, he will fill in these gaps with other, less controversial, types of skhakh." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first section of this mishnah is concerned with someone who uses metal objects as skhakh. The second section deals with the strange case of one who carves out room in a haystack to make a sukkah.", + "One who roofs his sukkah with iron spits or with bedposts, if the space between them equals them, it is valid. Neither iron spits nor bedposts can be used as skhakh because they are both made of metal. However, they can be put on top of the sukkah as long as there is valid skhakh between the posts or spits and the valid skakhah is of great quantity than the metal.", + "One who hollows out a haystack to make for himself a sukkah, it is not a valid sukkah. In this case a person does not make a sukkah but rather the sukkah is made by his hollowing out a hole in a haystack. This is not valid because instead of making a sukkah, the sukkah has been made on its own. In other words, one must make his sukkah by taking skhakh and putting it on top of a framework of walls. The one who hollows out the haystack has made an absence of space, a negative act, but not the positive act of creating a sukkah. Hence the sukkah is not valid." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses the height of the walls as well as the proximity of the skhakh to the walls.", + "If he hangs walls down from above to below, if they are higher than three handbreadths from the ground, it is invalid. The walls of the sukkah must be ten handbreadths high. However, there is a special rule according to which a gap of less than three handbreadths is not considered sufficient to render a sukkah invalid. Therefore, if he suspends the walls on a pole above the ground and the walls do not fully reach the ground but they are less than three handbreadths from the ground, the sukkah is valid. In other words, we look at those three handbreadths as if they don’t exist. Of course, the total height of the walls must be ten handbreadths, as we learn in the next section. But if the gap is larger than three handbreadths, then we can't count the walls as having reached the ground.", + "If he raises them from the bottom to the top, if they are ten handbreadths high, it is valid. If he raises the walls from the ground upwards, the walls do not have to go all the way up to reach the skhakh. It is sufficient for the walls to be ten handbreadths high, when measured from the ground. Ten handbreadths is about one meter high. This is the standard minimum height for matters which require a wall.", + "Rabbi Yose says: just as from the bottom to the top ten handbreadths [suffices] so from the top to the bottom ten handbreadths [suffice]. Rabbi Yose disagrees with the opinion in section one. He says that the same rule concerning raising the walls from the floor to the skhakh applies if he suspends the walls from the skhakh. As long as the walls are ten handbreadths they are valid, even if they don’t reach within three handbreadths of the ground. To reiterate: the debate between Rabbi Yose and the other sages is with regard to a ten handbreadth wall hanging down from the skhakh (assumedly from a pole upon which the skhakh rests) which does not reach to within three handbreadths of the ground. Rabbi Yose says this is valid whereas the other sages say it is not. According to the sages it must reach within three handbreadths of the ground.", + "If he distances the skhakh three handbreadths from the walls, it is invalid. This section discusses how close the walls must be horizontally to the skhakh; the previous discussions were about their vertical distance from the skhakh. The walls must be no less than three handbreadths from the skhakh. Otherwise there is a three handbreadth gap in the roof of the sukkah, which would mean that that wall could count as one of the walls of the sukkah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn yesterday’s mishnah we learned that if there is a three handbreadth horizontal gap between the skhakh and the walls the sukkah is invalid. Today we learn that this is only true if there is a gap. If there is material in this gap separating the wall from the skhakh and the material is not valid for skhakh, then the sukkah is invalid only if the invalid skhakh is greater than four cubits.", + "If [the roof of] a house is opened, and he placed skhakh over it, if there is a distance of four cubits from the wall to the covering, it is invalid. In this case a person opened a hole in the roof of his house and covered the hole with valid skhakh. This is a valid sukkah as long as the hole is less than four cubits from the walls. This space between the walls and skhakh is not open, but rather has a regular roof (plaster and wood). The roof is considered as if it is part of the walls, at least for a distance of four cubits. As an aside, I have heard of people who actually do this. They have a retractable roof, less than four cubits from the walls and they open it up on Sukkot and have a sukkah in their house!", + "Similarly in the case of a courtyard which is surrounded by columns. The mishnah notes another possible circumstance in which this halakhah is applicable. A courtyard is surrounded by a section of columns and covered with a roof. In such a case, the open space is slightly removed from the walls. If he covers the open space with valid skhakh and the walls are no more than four cubits from the skhakh, then the sukkah is valid.", + "A large sukkah which was surrounded with material which is invalid for skhakh, if there is a space of four cubits beneath it, it is invalid. This final case is pretty much the same halakhic situation as that in the first two. Again, a person has a sukkah in which there is some distance from the skhakh in the middle to the walls on the side. If he fills in this gap with material that is invalid for a sukkah (perhaps he does not have enough kosher material which he can use) than the sukkah is valid. Obviously, in all three cases in the mishnah, when he goes to sit or dwell in the sukkah, he must sit underneath valid skhakh." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah contains two debates between Rabbi Eliezer and the other sages. The first concerns one who makes his sukkah by leaning one wall against the other. The second concerns the validity of reed mats as skhakh.", + "One who makes his sukkah like a cone-shaped hut or leans it against a wall: Rabbi Eliezer invalidates it since it has no roof, But the sages declare it valid. In this case a person made a sukkah in a cone-shape, somewhat like a teepee. It seems that the upper sections of the walls must have been made of valid skhakh. Alternatively, he leaned a wall made of skhakh against another wall not made of skhakh, somewhat like a lean-to. Rabbi Eliezer rules that this is invalid since a sukkah needs to have a roof. The sages rule that it is valid. In the Talmud, they claim that the positions should be reversed, Rabbi Eliezer ruling that it is inivalid and the sages that it is invalid. The halakhah is that these types of sukkot are invalid.", + "A large reed mat: if made for lying upon it is susceptible to [ritual] uncleanliness and is invalid as skhakh. If made for a skhakh, it may be used for skhakh and is not susceptible to uncleanliness. This section requires a few words of introduction concerning the susceptibility of objects to impurity. Objects are susceptible to impurities if they are “vessels”. This halakhic category includes most objects that have been fashioned to be of use for people, but not things that are used for building. For instance a cup is susceptible to impurity but a brick is not. In the case under discussion here, a reed mat made to be sat upon is susceptible to impurities whereas a reed mat made to be used as skhakh is not. According to the sages, all small mats may have been made to be sat upon and hence they are all susceptible to impurity. We learned above in mishnah four that anything that is receptive to impurity cannot be used as skhakh. Hence, small reed mats cannot be used for skhakh. A large reed mat may have been made either to sit upon or to use as skhakh. Hence, its susceptibility to impurity and its validity as skhakh depend upon the intent in which it was made. If it was made to be used for sitting it cannot be used as skhakh, but if it was made to be used as skhakh then it is valid.", + "Rabbi Eliezer says, whether small or large: if it was made for reclining upon, it is susceptible to uncleanliness and is invalid as skhakh; if made for a covering, it is valid as a skhakh and is not susceptible to uncleanliness. Rabbi Eliezer says that the size of the skhakh does not matter. All that matters is whether the mat was made for sitting or for skhakh. As long as it was made for skhakh it can be used as such, no matter its size." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah teaches that a person who sleeps underneath a bed inside the sukkah has not fulfilled his obligation to dwell in the sukkah. This is because the bed, which is not valid skhakh acts as a barrier between him and the valid skhakh above.\nWe should note that in mishnaic and talmudic times it was clearly customary and obligatory to sleep inside the sukkah. The practice of not sleeping in the sukkah has its origins in cold medieval Europe where a person would truly suffer by sleeping in the sukkah.", + "He who sleeps under a bed in the sukkah has not fulfilled his obligation. The problem with sleeping under a bed inside a sukkah is that there is a covering which creates a barrier over the person so that the skhakh is not what is covering him. In the Talmud they restrict this halakhah to a bed that is ten handbreadths high, the minimum height of a sukkah. Sleeping under such a bed would be akin to sleeping in an invalid sukkah inside a valid sukkah. However, one may sleep under a smaller bed and still fulfill one’s obligation to dwell in the sukkah. Note that this is what allows one to sleep under a blanket in the sukkah. The blanket is less than ten handbreadths from the body.", + "Rabbi Judah said: we had the custom to sleep under a bed in the presence of the elders, and they didn’t say anything to us. Rabbi Judah holds that the bed does not serve as a barrier between him and the sukkah and hence one who sleeps under a bed has fulfilled his obligation. Interestingly, Rabbi Judah notes that this was actually their custom. It might be that students visiting their rabbis on Sukkot, which seems to have been a norm on festivals, found the sukkot quite crowded. Hence, some people would sleep under the beds, causing the question to arise: is this legitimate behavior?", + "Rabbi Shimon said: it happened that Tabi, the slave of Rabba Gamaliel, used to sleep under the bed. And Rabban Gamaliel said to the elders, “Have you seen Tabi my slave, who is a scholar, and knows that slaves are exempt from [the law of] a sukkah, therefore he sleep under the bed.” And incidentally we learned that he who sleeps under a bed has not fulfilled his obligation. Rabbi Shimon agrees with the sages in section one and he brings a story to illustrate his point. Rabban Gamaliel owned a famous slave named Tabi. In tractate Berakhot 2:7 that Rabban Gamaliel respected his slave, and that when Tabi died he even mourned for him. In this mishnah, Tabi exemplifies his knowledge of halakhah by sleeping under the bed in the sukkah. He knew that he was exempt from the sukkah, as are all slaves, so he did a demonstrative act to let others know that one who sleeps under the bed has not fulfilled his sukkah obligation." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThere are two completely separate topics addressed in this mishnah. The first deals with a person who supports his sukkah on bedposts.\nThe second deals with the necessary thickness and orderliness of the skhakh.", + "One who supports his sukkah with the posts of a bed, it is valid. Rabbi Judah says: if it cannot stand on its own, it is invalid. In this case a person used his bedposts to support his sukkah. The bedposts served as the poles upon which the skhakh rested. The sages say that it is valid but Rabbi Judah requires a structure that cannot be carried around and hence he invalidates it. We should note that on several occasions we have seen that Rabbi Judah validates permanent like structures for a sukkah (see 1:1, 1:7). Here we see that he invalidates portable sukkot.", + "A disorderly sukkah (and whose shade is more than its sun is valid. There are two readings of this mishnah. According to the reading which has the words “and one,” the mishnah discusses two matters: 1) a disorderly sukkah and 2) a sukkah whose skhakh provides more shade than the sun that it allows in. A disorderly sukkah according to this explanation is a sukkah whose skhakh looks disorganized. Some of it is poking up and some of it is sticking down. As long as there is more shade than sun, this sukkah is valid. According to the other explanation and reading of the mishnah the words “and one” are not part of the mishnah. Rather the mishnah refers to a sukkah without a lot of skhakh. Such a sukkah is valid as long as the shade is more than the sun.", + "One whose [skhakh] is thick like [the roof] of a house is valid, even though the stars cannot be seen through it. Despite common belief, the skhakh of a sukkah can be so thick that one cannot even see anything through it. However, the halakhah is that although such a sukkah is valid, it is not desirable. One should strive to have skhakh that is not quite this thick." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThere are two interrelated subjects in this mishnah: 1) building a sukkah in a strange place; 2) entering the sukkah on the festival. As background we should note that on a festival or Shabbat it is forbidden to climb a tree, lest one break off a branch, which is prohibited on Shabbat and a festival. It is also forbidden to ride on an animal on a festival or Shabbat.\nThe mishnah uses the language “go up into” the sukkah because sukkot were often built on the flat roofs of their homes. Nevertheless, not all of these mishnayot describe actually going up into a sukkah.", + "One who makes his sukkah on the top of a wagon, or on the deck of a ship, it is valid and one may go up into it on the festival. One can build a sukkah on a wagon or on a ship and one can enter into it on Shabbat. The Talmud explains that the sukkah has to be strong enough to stand up to a wind of common strength. One who builds such a sukkah can enter into on the festival because there is no prohibition of getting onto a ship or a wagon on the festival. Indeed, there is a well-known story in the Talmud of rabbis traveling on Sukkot and making a sukkah on the ship. Assumedly, Rabbi Judah who in yesterday’s mishnah stated that a sukkah made using a bed’s bedposts is invalid, would also invalidate a sukkah made on a wagon or ship.", + "If he made it on the top of a tree, or on the back of a camel, it is valid, but one may not go up into it on the festival. A sukkah made on top of a tree or on the back of a camel is also a valid sukkah (I have actually seen such a thing in Neot Kedumim, near where we live in Israel). However, since it is forbidden to climb a tree or ride on an animal on Shabbat or a festival, these sukkot could only be used during Hol Hamoed, the non-festival days of Sukkot.", + "If the tree [formed] two [walls] and one was made by the hands of man, or if two were made by the hands of man and one was formed by the tree, it is valid, but one may not go up into it on the festival. In this and the next section the person doesn’t make his sukkah in a tree but rather he uses a tree to support the roof of his sukkah. A tree can be used to support the sukkah’s wall even though the leaves may not count as skhakh when they are attached to the tree. A sukkah must have at least three walls, so if he uses a tree to support even one these three walls he cannot enter the sukkah on the festival because that would be considered using the tree.", + "If three walls were made by the hands of man and one was formed by the tree, it is valid and one may go up into it on the festival. This is the general rule: in any case in which if the tree was removed the [sukkah] could stand on its own, it is valid and one may go up into it on the festival. If, however, he has four walls and only one supported by the tree then the sukkah would be valid and would be able to stand even without the tree. Hence, he may enter this sukkah on the festival because by doing so he is not actually using the tree. The tree-wall is superfluous. The mishnah now summarizes this rule citing a general principle." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first section of this mishnah continues to discuss walls used as trees for the sukkah.\nThe second section begins to discuss a new topic: when a person is obligated to be in the sukkah and what a person is obligated to do there. This will be the topic of the remainder of the chapter of the mishnah. Up until now all of the discussions have been about the structure of the sukkah itself.", + "If one makes his sukkah between trees, so that the trees form its walls, it is valid. In this case a person uses a tree for all of the sukkah’s walls, not as support for the walls but rather as the walls themselves. This might easily happen if there were some bushy trees that could block him on at least three sides. He supports the skhakh with poles and not with the trees. The sukkah is valid and he may even use it on the festival, since the sukkah is not actually resting on the trees.", + "Those who are agents to perform a mitzvah are exempt from [the obligations of] sukkah. People who are busy performing a mitzvah and find it difficult to eat or sleep in a sukkah are exempt from the sukkah. This is due to the general rule that one who is engaged in one mitzvah is exempt from performing another mitzvah. However, this is only true if by eating or sleeping in the sukkah he would be unable or distracted from performing the other mitzvah he set out to perform. If he could perform both at the same time, then he must do so.", + "People who are sick and their attendants are exempt from [the obligations of] sukkah. People who are sick enough so that being in the sukkah would be a discomfort for them, are not obligated for the laws of the sukkah. Being in the sukkah is not supposed to be painful and therefore, one who would be pained by being in the sukkah is exempt. Note, that the mishnah is not addressed to those who might “fake” being sick in order to get out of sleeping or eating in the sukkah. It is addressed to those who are so zealous about keeping the commandments that they would risk injury or at least illness to do so. The rabbis tell such a person to get out of the sukkah the sukkah is not supposed to cause one pain.", + "One may eat and drink casually outside the sukkah. Meals must be eaten in the sukkah. However, snacking may be done outside of the sukkah. According to the Rambam, while one can snack outside of the sukkah, one who strives to only eat and drink in the sukkah is praiseworthy." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is a continuation of yesterday’s mishnah, dealing with whether a person may snack outside of the sukkah.", + "It once happened that they brought a dish to Rabbi Yohanan ben Zakkai to taste, and two dates and a pail of water to Rabban Gamaliel and they said, “Bring them up to the sukkah.” The mishnah tells a story of two rabbis who refused to eat anything outside of the sukkah, even a couple of dates, water or the taste of a dish. It seems that these rabbis were acting “beyond the letter of the law.” Although they could have eaten outside of the sukkah as we learned in the end of yesterday’s mishnah, they chose to be strict and ordered their servants to bring the food up to the sukkah.", + "And when they gave Rabbi Zadok food less than the bulk of an egg, he took it in a napkin, ate it outside the sukkah and did not say a blessing after it. Rabbi Zadok on the other hand does not tell his servant to bring the small amount of food, less than an egg’s worth, up to the sukkah. He eats it outside the sukkah. He also performs a few more acts from which we can learn halakhah. First of all, he takes the food in a napkin and does not wash his hands, as was customary during this period. Secondly, he does not say a blessing afterwards. Rabbi Zadok holds that one recites a blessing after eating only an egg’s worth of food." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn this mishnah the sages and Rabbi Eliezer debate how many and which meals a person must eat in the sukkah during the festival.", + "Rabbi Eliezer says: a man is obligated to eat fourteen meals in the sukkah, one on each day and one on each night. But the sages say: there is no fixed number, except on the first night of the festival alone. Rabbi Eliezer says that a person must eat fourteen meals in the sukkah, two each day, one during the day and one at night. In other words, eating in the sukkah is a positive commandment on each and every day. Just as one normally eats two meals a day, so too one is commanded to eat two meals a day in the sukkah. The sages disagree and hold that one is only obligated to eat in the sukkah on the first night of sukkot. On all other days, he may skip meals. Of course, if he wants to eat a meal he must do so in the sukkah. This is similar to the obligation to eat matzah. A person must eat matzah on the first night of Pesah. However, on every subsequent day one need not eat matzah, there is only a prohibition from eating bread.", + "Furthermore Rabbi Eliezer said: if one did not eat in the sukkah on the first night of the festival, he may make up for it on the last night of the festival. But the sages say: there is no compensation for this, and of this was it said: “That which is crooked cannot be made straight, and that which is lacking cannot be counted” (Ecclesiastes 1:15). Rabbi Eliezer holds that one who did not eat in the sukkah on the first night may make up the missed meal by eating a festive meal on the last night of the festival, on the eve of Shmini Atzeret, the eighth day. Although this festive meal is not eaten in the sukkah, it still counts as a replacement for the meal he missed on the first day. In the Talmud, they question Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion. Didn’t he say that one has to eat in the sukkah two meals every day? If so, why does only the first meal need to be made up? The answer seems to be that Rabbi Eliezer agrees with the other sages that the first meal is the most important one, even though the others are obligatory as well. There is also a question as to how one can make up a meal that was supposed to have been eaten in the sukkah, by eating a meal outside of the sukkah, where one eats on Shemini Atzeret. The answer to this seems to be that when it comes to Sukkot, Rabbi Eliezer counts the evening as following the day. Thus what we would call the first meal of Shemini Atzeret is really to Rabbi Eliezer the last meal of Sukkot. The sages respond to Rabbi Eliezer that a missed meal cannot be made up. They quote an often cited verse from Ecclesiastes which shows, according to its midrashic meaning, that some commandments, when not fulfilled in their proper time, cannot be made up." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe main topic of this mishnah is how much of a person’s body must be within the sukkah while he is eating.", + "One whose head and the greater part of his body were within the sukkah and his table within the house: Bet Shammai say: it is invalid and Bet Hillel say it valid. If someone has a small sukkah, one that is not capable of fitting his entire body, but only his head and most of his body, Bet Shammai declare the sukkah invalid and Bet Hillel say it is valid. Similarly, if one has a large sukkah, a sukkah sufficient to fit his entire body, but he sat with only his head and most of his body in the sukkah, while the rest of his body was out of the sukkah, he would not have fulfilled his obligation according to Bet Hillel. We should note that the terminology of this mishnah is ambiguous. At first it sounds like the mishnah is discussing where the person sits, regardless of the size of the sukkah. However, the words “valid” and “invalid” at the end of section one describe the validity of the sukkah based on its size. Hence, in my explanation I have tried to incorporate both elements. According to Bet Shammai the sukkah must be large enough to encompass his entire body and he must sit with his whole body in the sukkah. Bet Hillel say that the sukkah need only hold his head and most of his body and when sitting in the sukkah, only his head and most of his body need be inside. The table may be outside of the sukkah.", + "Bet Hillel said to Bet Shammai: Did it not in fact happen that the elders of Bet Shammai and the elders of Bet Hillel went to visit Rabbi Yohanan ben HaHoroni and found him sitting with his head and the greater part of his body within the sukkah and his table within the house, and they didn’t say anything to him? Bet Shammai said to them: From there [you bring] proof? Indeed they said to him, “If this is your custom, then you have never in your whole life fulfilled the commandment of the sukkah. This story illustrates the argument between Bet Hillel and Bet Shammai. As an aside, we can note from this story and the discussion in 2:1 that space in sukkot might have been tight. This might reflect the reality in the Second Temple period in Jerusalem when many people came to make their pilgrimage. Alternatively, it may reflect the cramped housing and living spaces of 2nd century towns in the land of Israel." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nMost of this mishnah is concerned with the obligation of children to observe the commandment of dwelling in the sukkah.", + "Women, slaves and minors are exempt from the [commandment] of the sukkah. A minor who no longer relies on his mother is obligated in the [commandment] of the sukkah. Dwelling in the sukkah is a positive time-bound commandment, similar to hearing the shofar. As such, women and slaves are exempt. Children are also exempt, as long as they rely on their mothers and need to be with them most of the time. According to the Talmud, a child who wakes up in the middle of the night and still cries for his mother is not obligated to dwell in the sukkah. Such a child sleeps where his mother sleeps outside of the sukkah. But if he wakes up and doesn't need his mother, then he is obligated to sleep in the sukkah.", + "It happened that the daughter-in-law of Shammai the elder gave birth and he opened up the ceiling and put skhakh on top of the bed[posts] on behalf of the minor. In this fascinating story, Shammai the elder opens up a hole in the roof of his house so that his newborn grandson can sleep in the sukkah. Shammai obviously disagrees with the halakhah in the previous section. Shammai the elder is also known to have made his son fast on Yom Kippur, far before he would have understood the meaning of fasting. It seems that Shammai’s concept of commandment is not that one must perform an act with intent in order to affect one’s inner life (what we call “kavvanah”), rather the act must be performed regardless of whether one understands what one is doing. Children must perform mitzvot despite the fact the fact that they clearly don’t understand what they are doing." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis is the final mishnah in tractate Sukkah which deals with the topic of the sukkah. It discusses some of the essential rules of how and when one must live in the sukkah.", + "All seven days [of the festival] a man must make the sukkah his permanent residence and his house his temporary residence. The essential commandment of the sukkah is that one should live in it during Sukkot as one lives in a permanent home the rest of the year. In the time of the Mishnah and Talmud this meant that one would sleep and eat in the sukkah. It also meant that they would bring their regular belongings, beds, mattresses, pillows, blankets, etc. out into the Sukkah. Today it means that any activity that one can do with comfort in the sukkah, should be done there. It means inviting over company and sitting there instead of inside in the living room. It means playing games with the children in the sukkah. It means reading there, if the lights are good enough. It means striving to spend as much time in the sukkah as possible and not turning it into just a dining room.", + "If rain fell, when may one be permitted to leave it? When the porridge becomes spoiled. They made a parable. To what can this be compared? To a slave who comes to fill the cup for his master, and he poured a pitcher over his face. Nevertheless, one is not commanded to sit in the sukkah if it is raining. Once the rain is heavy enough to drip through the skhakh and ruin the porridge (a thick soup-like mixture) then one may leave the sukkah, indeed one should leave the sukkah. Just as one would not sit inside his house underneath a leak, so too one should not sit outside in the sukkah while it is raining. The mishnah now illustrates this as a parable. The Jew who has made a sukkah is like a slave who has prepared something with which to serve his master. Instead of accepting the water (the sukkah) the master (God) pours a pitcher of water (the rain) over the slave’s face. This parable is fascinating for its simplicity and intricacy. The sukkah is in its essence a prayer for rain after all, Sukkot is the beginning of the rainy season. Yet we don’t want rain while sitting in the sukkah. Hence early rain is perceived as an insult and not as a blessing. We can see from the parable just how sensitive the issue of rain was, and still is, to those living in the land of Israel." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThe third chapter of Sukkah deals with the four species, which are together called the “Lulav.” These four species are described in Leviticus 23:40, “On the first day you shall take the product of ‘hadar’ trees, branches of palm trees, boughs of leafy trees and willows of the brook, and you shall rejoice before the Lord your God seven days.” The four species are identified by the rabbis as 1) the etrog or citron; 2) the lulav or palm-branch; 3) the hadas or myrtle; 4) the arava or willow. I will refer to them by their Hebrew names.\nThe Torah does not say exactly what one is to do with these four species and this led to different interpretations among ancient groups of Jews. In Nehemiah 8:14-18 we see Israelites using them, or more precisely, something similar to them, to build their sukkot. Other groups of ancient Jews used them strictly in the Temple to walk around the altar. For the rabbis the mitvah of the lulav was incumbent upon every Jew, whether at the Temple or outside of it. The rabbis explain that each Jew must simply pick these four species up once a day on Sukkot and wave them in each direction. This remains our custom to this day.\nThe first seven mishnayot deal with the physical attributes of the four species. To this day, observant Jews are extremely cautious to make sure that the four species look like they are supposed to look, or in Hebrew are “mehudar”, adorned.\nYou can find many interesting pictures and information about the four species by googling them and looking at the images.", + "A stolen or a dried up lulav is invalid. There are two potential reasons why a stolen lulav is invalid. First of all, the Torah states, “And you shall take for yourselves (lachem) on the first day…” The extra word “lachem (for yourselves)” is understood to mean that a person’s lulav must be their own and not one that was stolen or even borrowed. Secondly, performing a mitzvah with a stolen item is considered a “commandment that derives from a transgression” and such an act is invalid. A dried up lulav is invalid because it is not “adorned”, meaning it does not look good.", + "One [that came] from an asherah tree or from a condemned city is invalid. An asherah is a tree used for idol worship. Since it is forbidden to use anything from this kind of tree, its palm-branch cannot be used to fulfill the mitvah of lulav. A “condemned city” refers to an idolatrous city which must be utterly destroyed, according to Deuteronomy 13:13-18. Everything in the idolatrous city must be burned. Hence it is impossible to use a lulav that comes from such a city.", + "If its top was broken off or its leaves were detached, it is invalid. The lulav must not be broken off at its top and its leaves must still be attached to the spine, the middle leaf that goes through all lulavim.", + "If its leaves are spread apart it is valid. Rabbi Judah says he should tie it at the top. If the leaves are still attached but they are spread apart, the lulav is still valid. Rabbi Judah says that if the leaves are still attached one should tie the lulav (just the palm-branch) together at the top. We shall learn more about tying all four species together in mishnah eight.", + "The thorny palms of the iron mountain are valid. The “iron mountains” are identified in Josephus, Wars of the Jews 4, 8, 2 as being mountains north of Moab, on the other side of the Jordan river. From our mishnah we see that the palm trees that grew there seem to have been a slightly different type of palm. Their leaves are shorter and do not grow on the whole length of the spine. Nevertheless, they are valid for the mitzvah of lulav.", + "A lulav which is three handbreadths in length, long enough to wave, is valid. The lulav must be three handbreadths, long enough so that one can wave it. The Talmud explains that the lulav must actually be three handbreadths long, like the hadas and aravah, and then an additional handbreadth so that it can be waved. We will learn more about waving the lulav and other four species in mishnah nine." + ], + [ + "A stolen or withered hadas is invalid.
One [that came from] an asherah or a condemned city is invalid.
If its tip was broken off, or its leaves were detached, or its berries were more numerous than its leaves, it is invalid. But if he diminished them it is valid. But he may not diminish them on the festival.
This mishnah deals with the hadas, the myrtle. Many of the details of this mishnah are the same as those in yesterday’s mishnah concerning the lulav. I will comment only on aspects of the hadas that differ from those of the lulav.
Sections one and two: See sections one and two of yesterday’s mishnah.
Section three: The first two rules of this section are the same as that in section three of yesterday’s mishnah. The third is unique to the hadas. Some hadasim have berries attached to them. While hiking last week I think I actually saw a wild hadas that had many berries (I’m not a botanist, so I’m not sure it really was a hadas). They weren’t really berries as much as little black things that looked liked capers. In any case, too many of these berries renders the otherwise valid hadas invalid. However, the hadas is invalid only if the berries are still on the branch. If he removes the berries, the hadas again becomes valid. Finally, the mishnah states that he may not remove the berries on the festival itself. This is because it is forbidden to “make a vessel” on a festival or on Shabbat and by making an invalid hadas valid, he is making a vessel." + ], + [ + "A stolen or withered aravah is invalid.
One [take from an] asherah or from a condemned city is invalid.
One whose tip was broken off or whose leaves were detached, or a tzatzefah is invalid.
One that was shriveled or had lost some of its leaves, or one grown in a rain-watered soil, is valid.
This mishnah deals with the aravah, the willow.
Sections one and two: See mishnah one.
Section three: The first two details are again the same as in mishnah one. The third is unique to the aravah. The Torah specifies that an aravah that grows on a brook, or a wadi, is the type of aravah that should be used. According to the mishnah, this rules out the species of aravah called the “tzaftzefah”, which grows in the mountains and whose leaves are a different shape than the brook-aravah.
Section four: Of the four species, the aravah is the one that most easily dries out. Hence, the mishnah rules that if it is shriveled or lost some, but not most of its leaves, it is still valid.
The Torah states that the aravah is to be one that grows on a brook. The mishnah expands this to include an aravah that grows on a field watered by rain. The important thing is that the species of aravah is the same as that which grows on a brook. It is valid even if it is not actually found on the brook. This contrasts with the tzaftzefah, which is of a different species and does not look like a brook-aravah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn this mishnah the sages debate how many of each of the species he must take.", + "Rabbi Ishmael says: three hadasim, two aravot, one lulav and one etrog, even if two [of the hadasim] have their tips broken off and [only] one is whole. According to Rabbi Ishmael, one takes three hadas branches, two branches of aravot, one lulav and one etrog. He probably derives these numbers midrashically from the verses. However, the hadasim need not all be perfect. Two of them may have their tips broken off, as long as the third one does not. The Talmud questions this addendum to Rabbi Ishmael, wondering if a hadas with its tip cut off is valid. If it is, then why must the third one have its tip intact, and if it is not, then why bring two invalid hadasim?", + "Rabbi Tarfon says: even if all three have their tips broken off. Rabbi Tarfon agrees with Rabbi Ishmael regarding the numbers of each species that must be brought, but he disagrees concerning the tips of the hadasim. He holds that a lulav with its tip broken off is valid.", + "Rabbi Akiva says: just as there is one lulav and one etrog, so too only one hadas and one aravah. Rabbi Akiva disagrees with Rabbi Ishmael concerning the number of each species. According to Rabbi Akiva one must only bring one of each species. The accepted halakhah with regard to the number of each species is according to Rabbi Ishmael." + ], + [ + "An etrog which is stolen or withered is invalid.
One from an asherah or a condemned city is invalid.
Of orlah or of unclean terumah it is invalid.
Of clean terumah, he should not take it, but if he did take it, it is valid.
Of demai (doubtfully-: Bet Shammai says it invalid, And Bet Hillel says it valid.
Of second tithe, it should not be taken [even] in Jerusalem, but if he took it, it is valid.
This mishnah deals with what makes an etrog invalid. Of the four species, only the etrog is a food and hence only an etrog is subject to the normal agricultural laws tithes, terumah, and orlah. The mishnah therefore focuses on these subjects.
Sections one and two: See mishnah one.
Section three: Orlah is fruit grown from a tree less than three years old. It is forbidden to eat such fruit or derive any benefit from it. Hence an etrog that is from an orlah tree cannot be used. Similarly, it is forbidden to eat or derive any benefit from unclean (impure) terumah. Therefore it too cannot be used in the performance of the mitzvah.
Section four: A pure terumah etrog should not be used to perform the mitzvah, although if it is used it is valid. In the Talmud they debate why it should not be used. The core of the reasoning seems to be that by using it he may ruin it from being a food and terumah is supposed to be eaten. Alternatively, by using a terumah etrog with the lulav he may cause the etrog to get wet and thereby susceptible to impurity [produce is susceptible to impurity only after it has been in contact with liquid].
Section five: Demai is doubtfully-tithed produce, produce that was purchased from someone who is suspected of not separating tithes. There is a frequent debate between Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel over the use of demai produce in the performance of a mitzvah. The talmudic explanation is that demai can be eaten by the poor. Since anyone can renounce ownership over all his possessions and thereby become poor, Bet Hillel holds that anyone can use demai to perform a mitzvah. In other words, every person is potentially a poor person. Bet Shammai holds that since it cannot be eaten by anyone but the poor it cannot be used as part of the lulav.
Section six: Second tithe must be brought to Jerusalem and eaten there. Nevertheless, the mishnah says that even in Jerusalem he should not use a second tithe etrog as part of his mitzvah. The reasoning is the same as that in section four concerning pure terumah. However, if he did use it he has performed the mitzvah, again the same rule as with terumah." + ], + [ + "If a rash spread out on a majority of it, or if its pitom is removed, if it is peeled, split, or perforated so that any part is missing, it is invalid.
If a rash spread out on a lesser part of it, if its stem was missing, or if it is perforated but no part of it is missing, it is valid.
An etrog [which is black] as an Ethiopian is invalid.
An etrog which is green as a leek: Rabbi Meir declares it valid And Rabbi Judah declares it invalid.
The Torah says calls an etrog “the beautiful fruit of the tree” or “the fruit of the beautiful tree.” Due to the mention of the word “beautiful (hadar)\" the rabbis were more demanding regarding the physical perfection of the etrog than of the other three species. Indeed, to this day people are very concerned that they should have a beautiful “mehudar” etrog. An extreme example of this is the man who paid one thousand dollars for an etrog in the movie “Ushpizin,” a movie which I recommend.
Sections one and two: If there is a rash, which might refer to some discoloration, or things like warts (not just bumps, which are considered desirable in an etrog) on a majority of the etrog, than it is invalid. The pitom is the funny looking mushroom which sticks out of the ends of some etrogim (Google pitom and etrog and you can find some nice pictures). I should note that not all etrogim have a pitom. An etrog without a pitom is valid, indeed in some ways it is preferable because it is less likely to become invalid. The etrog is invalid only if the pitom was there and was then removed. However, if its stem, the part of it which attached it to the tree is removed, it is still valid. The stem is basically not part of the etrog.
Likewise it is invalid if it is peeled, split or any part of it is missing.
Section three: A black etrog is invalid.
Section four: There is a debate over the green etrog, Rabbi Meir declaring it valid and Rabbi Judah invalidating it. In Israel one sees many green etrogim, which never fails to surprise my family (as does the pitom-less etrog)." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah teaches the minimum and maximum size for an etrog.", + "The minimum size of an etrog: Rabbi Meir says: the size of a nut. Rabbi Judah says: the size of an egg. Rabbi Meir sets the minimum size of an etrog at that of a nut, assumedly something about the size of a walnut. I have never seen an actual etrog this size, but I suppose that if they are picked early from the tree one can find them this size. Rabbi Judah sets the minimum size at that of an egg.", + "The maximum [size] is such that two can be held in one hand, the words of Rabbi Judah. Rabbi Yose says, even one that can only be held with his two hands. In this section they argue about the maximum size of the etrog. According to Rabbi Judah (who is the stricter sage in both parts of the mishnah), it must be small enough so that one could hold two with one hand. The reason is that sometimes a person might need to hold the lulav and the etrog in one hand. If the etrog is too big he might drop the etrog which might ruin it by disfiguration. Rabbi Yose disagrees and says that the etrog can be so big that one needs both hands to hold it. In the Talmud, Rabbi Yose tells a story of Rabbi Akiva who came to the synagogue with an etrog so large that he had to carry it on his shoulder! In Israel, I have seen very large etrogim, ones that look like they would be difficult to carry with one hand." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nAccording to some sages, three of the species (all except the etrog) must be bound together. Our mishnah debates whether the cord used to bind the three together must be from the same species as one of the three species. The problem with it being from another type of tree is that when he picks up the lulav, he will be carrying five species the four mandated ones and the one from which he made his cord. This might be a violation of the prohibition of adding on to the Torah’s commandments. The Torah says four species it would be prohibited to add a fifth.", + "They may not bind the lulav except with [strands of] its own species, the words of Rabbi Judah. Rabbi Judah holds that the lulav must be bound together. The consequence of this rule is that the binding is an integral part of the lulav without it one cannot perform the mitzvah. Since the binding is integral to the lulav, it must be made from one of the four species. Assumedly, this would be from a string made from a palm tree.", + "Rabbi Meir says: it may be bound even with a cord. In contrast, Rabbi Meir holds that the lulav need not be bound together. Since the binding is unnecessary, it is not part of the lulav. Therefore, it can come from any species.", + "Rabbi Meir said: it happened that the men of Jerusalem used to bind their lulavs with strands of gold. They answered him: but they bound it with [strands of] its own species underneath [the strands of gold]. Rabbi Meir defends his opinion by relating a story in which the people of Jerusalem bound their lulavs with strands of gold. This proves that the binding need not be from the same type of material as the four species. The other sages admit that those lulavs were bound with gold, but they claim that underneath the gold there was a layer of binding that was made of one of the four species. Since this was the layer that affected the binding, only it must be from one of the four species. An alternative explanation is that “underneath” means at the bottom of the lulav. The lulav needs to be bound only at the bottom and the men of Jerusalem bound their lulavs with gold only at the top." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first part of this mishnah deals with when during the Hallel (Psalms 113-118) one waives the lulav.\nThe second part of the mishnah deals with when during the day one should perform the mitzvah of taking the lulav.", + "And where [in the service] do they wave [the lulav]? At “Give thanks to the Lord” (Psalm 118), at the beginning and at the end, and at “O Lord, deliver us” (118:25), the words of Bet Hillel. Bet Shammai say: also at “O Lord, let us prosper.” Rabbi Akiva says: I was watching Rabban Gamaliel and Rabbi Joshua, and while all the people were waving their lulavs [at “O Lord, let us prosper”] they waved them only at “O Lord deliver us.” The mitzvah of taking the lulav involves waving it in six directions to the directions of the four winds and up and down. The custom was and still is to waive the lulav the first time one takes it up, and then to waive it again in the synagogue at various points during the recitation of Hallel at the morning service. This is the background to our mishnah. Here we see that there is a debate about one of these wavings. According to all of the sages, one waves at the beginning of Psalm 118 and at the end, a Psalm that begins and ends with “Give thanks to the Lord.” Everyone agrees that there is also a waving in the middle of this Psalm, but they disagree as to the extent of the waving. Bet Hillel says that one waves during the first half of verse 25, “O Lord, deliver us”, but not during the second half, “O Lord, let us prosper.” Bet Shammai says that one also waves during the second half of the verse. Rabbi Akiva, who lived long after Bet Hillel and Bet Shammai were no longer really in existence, testifies that he saw all of the people waving at “O Lord, let us prosper” as Bet Shammai stated, while Rabban Gamaliel and Rabbi Joshua, two of Rabbi Akiva’s elders, waived only at “O Lord, deliver us,” as Bet Hillel posited. The halakhah is according to Bet Hillel. As an aside, while it is typical for the rabbis to follow Bet Hillel, it is interesting to note that in this case most of the people acted like Bet Shammai.", + "One who was on a journey and had no lulav to take, when he enters his house he should take it [even if he is] at his table. If he did not take the lulav in the morning, he should take it at any time before dusk, since the whole day is valid for [taking] the lulav. It is preferable to take up the lulav first thing in the morning before one eats. This is usually done today during the morning prayer service, right before Hallel. However, one can fulfill the mitzvah any time during the day. If one is returning from a trip and he didn’t have a lulav with him, he should take one as soon as he gets into his house. Even if he is in the middle of a meal and then remembers that he hasn’t performed the mitzvah of taking the lulav, he should put aside his meal and take the lulav. One can perform the mitzvah all the way through dusk." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn the time of the Mishnah not every person in the synagogue would recite the Hallel on his own, as we normally do today. Rather, the leader would recite part, or perhaps most of the verse and the rest of the congregation would respond with the second half of the verse, or with “Halleluyah.” In this way, the leader would aid the congregation in fulfilling their obligation to recite Hallel.\nIn this mishnah we learn that slaves, women and minors cannot aid a free adult male in his recitation of the Hallel because they themselves are not obligated to recite Hallel. This fits in with two general rules: 1) women and slaves are exempt from positive time-bound commandments; 2) a person who is not obligated for something cannot fulfill that obligation on behalf of someone who is.", + "One who has a slave, a woman, or a minor read [the Hallel] to him, he must repeat after them what they say, and a curse be upon him. The mishnah describes an adult man who doesn’t know how to recite Hallel and therefore needs someone else to recite it for him. Usually, this would be done by another free adult male, but for some reason, this person cannot find another free adult male who knows how to recite the Hallel. He therefore turns to a slave, a woman or a minor who does know how to recite Hallel. This is allowed, except unlike a normal case where the person would only answer “Halleluyah” (as is the case in section two), in this case he must repeat the entire verse after the slave, woman or minor. In this way, he fulfills the obligation himself and they do not fulfill it on his behalf. It is interesting to note that it sounds like the rabbis had to confront the possibility that a slave, woman or minor would be more educated, at least religiously, than a free man. It is hard to know how realistic this situation was or how often it might arise. Nevertheless, it is at least a theoretical possibility. The mishnah is clearly disturbed by the man’s lack of knowledge and hence it says that a man who allows this situation to happen should be cursed.", + "If an adult recited to him, he repeats after him [only] Halleluyah. This is the normal way in which Hallel was recited during the time of the Mishnah and Talmud." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first half of this mishnah continues to deal with the recitation of Hallel. The second half contains another rule regarding the lulav and etrog.", + "In a place where the custom is to repeat [verses], he should repeat; [Where the custom is] to say them only once, he should say them once. Today it is our custom to recite certain verses of Hallel twice, specifically from Psalm 118:21 till the end of the Psalm. In the time of the Mishnah not everyone had this custom. The mishnah states that when it comes to this issue, one should follow whatever is his local custom.", + "[Where the custom is] to recite a blessing afterwards, he should recite the blessing afterwards. Everything is dependent on local custom. Similarly, there were different customs regarding reciting a blessing after Hallel some recited the blessing and some did not. Today our custom is to recite a blessing after Hallel on all occasions, even on those occasions where Hallel is only a custom and is not mandated (such as Rosh Hodesh and the last six days of Pesah).", + "One who purchases a lulav from his fellow in the sabbatical year, [the latter] should give him the etrog as a gift, since one is not permitted to purchase it in the sabbatical year. On the sabbatical year all produce must be removed from one’s house and destroyed once it no longer grows in the field. A person can harvest the etrog and use it, but once etrogim are no longer found in the trees he must get rid of the etrogim in his house. When a person sells an etrog (or any other produced) which grew on the sabbatical year, the money retains the status of the etrog (or other produce) itself. That is to say, when there are no more etrogim in the field he must get rid of the money as well. The person in our mishnah is purchasing the four species from someone he fears does business in produce grown in the sabbatical year. He shouldn’t buy from him the etrog lest the seller not get rid of the money when he is supposed to. A person shouldn’t aid another in transgressing the commandment of observing the sabbatical year. To avoid this problem and still obtain a lulav, he should pay for the lulav (the palm) which is not subject to the laws of the sabbatical year (because it sprouted in the previous year) and have the price of the etrog included in the price of the lulav. He receives the etrog as a present when he buys the lulav. In this way the money used to buy the etrog need not be removed from the seller's house when etrogim are no longer found on trees." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nLeviticus 23:40 reads, “On the first day you shall take...and you shall rejoice before the Lord your God seven days.” The beginning of the verse states “on the first day” and the end of the verse says, “seven days.” From here the rabbis derived that the mitzvah of taking the lulav is for a different amount of time in different places. They read the second half of the verse as applying to the Temple, “before the Lord your God.” Hence, the lulav should be taken up for seven days in the Temple. Outside of the Temple, or according to other commentaries, outside of Jerusalem, the lulav need be taken for only one day.", + "In earlier times the lulav was taken for seven days in the Temple, and in the provinces for one day only. When the Temple still stood the lulav was taken in the Temple (or in Jerusalem) for seven days and outside of the Temple for only one day, as explained in the introduction.", + "When the temple was destroyed, Rabbi Yohanan ben Zakkai decreed that the lulav should be taken in the provinces for seven days in memory of the Temple, However, when the Temple was destroyed, there was a problem. If people only observed the commandment for one day, they would soon forget that originally the commandment was observed for seven days, at least in some places. Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai, one of the leading rabbinic figures after the destruction of the Temple, decreed therefore that the lulav should be taken up for seven days in all places, in memory of the Temple.", + "[He also decreed] that on the whole of the day of waving it be forbidden [to eat the new produce]. Having related one of the decrees that Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai made after the destruction of the Temple, the mishnah now relates another, similar decree. We need to note a little bit of background to understand this. On the second day of Pesah, when the Temple still stood, the Omer offering of barley was harvested and brought to the Temple and waved by a priest. After this day, it was permitted to eat from the new grain harvest (see Leviticus 23:9-14). Since people outside of Jerusalem would not know precisely when the Omer had been offered, they would wait at least half of the day before they would eat from the new harvest. When the Temple was destroyed and they could no longer offer the Omer, the rabbis derived from the Torah that the new produce could be eaten as soon as the second day of Pesah began. In other words, without an Omer sacrifice the day itself allowed the new harvest. Again, Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai perceived a problem. If people would eat from the new harvest immediately on the 16th of Nissan, when the Temple is rebuilt they would forget that they need to wait until the Omer is offered. Therefore he decreed that the new produce could not be eaten for the entire day. It is interesting to note that the rabbis who lived close to the destruction of the Temple believed that it would speedily be rebuilt. Just as they began working on the rebuilding of the First Temple only 70 years after its destruction, rabbis who lived in the first and early second century probably assumed that their Temple would also be rebuilt in a short time. However, after the Bar Kokhba revolt was crushed, it probably began to dawn on many that the realistic chances of the Temple being speedily rebuilt were not good. The hopes of course never died, but this type of legislative activity making decrees lest the Temple be rebuilt quickly, were more characteristic of the pre Bar Kokhba period." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday we don’t take the lulav on Shabbat. However, in the time of the Mishnah if the first day of the festival fell on Shabbat, they would take the lulav, because as we learned in mishnah twelve, the taking of the lulav on the first day of Sukkot is mandatory even outside of the Temple. Our mishnah teaches how they avoided the problem of carrying the lulav to the synagogue on Shabbat, which is clearly a transgression.", + "If the first day of the festival falls on Shabbat, all the people bring their lulavim to the synagogue [on Friday]. In order to avoid the problem of carrying on Shabbat, the people would bring their lulavim to the synagogue on Friday and leave them there for the next day.", + "The next day they arise early [and come to the synagogue] and each one recognizes his own [lulav] and takes it, since the sages said “one cannot fulfill his obligation on the first day of the festival with his friend’s lulav.” The only problem with this is that a person needs to use his own lulav on the first day of the festival, because the Torah says “and you shall take for yourselves on the first day” understood to mean that the lulav must belong to the person taking it. If all of the lulavim were heaped together in the synagogue a person might not know which lulav is his own. Therefore the mishnah says that everyone must be able to recognize his own lulav.", + "But on the other days of the festival one may fulfill his obligation with the lulav of his fellow. The verse which implies that the lulav must belong to the person taking it refers only to the first day of the festival. After this day a person may fulfill his obligation with someone else’s lulav. The result is that if Shabbat falls on another day of the festival, not on the first day, they need not recognize which lulav belongs to them. They therefore would bring their lulav to the synagogue on Friday but they wouldn't have to worry about recognizing their own lulav." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is a continuation of yesterday’s mishnah which discussed taking the lulav on the first day of the festival which falls on Shabbat.", + "Rabbi Yose says: if the first day of the festival fell on Shabbat, and he forgot and carried out his lulav into the public domain, he is not liable, since he brought it out while under the influence [of a religious act]. According to Rabbi Yose, since a person is supposed to take the lulav on Shabbat if it is also the first day of the festival, he is not obligated if he mistakenly carries it out into the public domain. In other words, since he was allowed to take it in the first place, he is excused for making the mistake of carrying it outside. However, if he did this on another day of the festival, meaning if another day of the festival fell on Shabbat, he would be liable since he should not have taken it at all. If he carries it outside into the public domain intentionally he is always liable" + ], + [ + "Introduction\nAs anybody who has ever fulfilled the commandment of lulav knows, or for that matter, as anybody who has ever dealt with cut flowers knows, they tend to dry up over time. This is especially true for the aravah and the hadas they simply won’t last when they are taken out of water. Our mishnah deals with putting the lulav back into water on Shabbat and on the festival.", + "A woman may receive [a lulav] from her son or from her husband and put it back in water on Shabbat. This section really teaches two things. The first is that putting a lulav back in water on Shabbat is permitted. This is not similar to watering plants which is prohibited because the plants are still attached to the ground. Secondly, the mishnah teaches that a woman may handle a lulav on Shabbat even though she is not liable to take the lulav. We might have thought that since she is exempt from the laws of lulav, that the lulav is muktzeh to her (forbidden for her to handle). The mishnah teaches that since a man is obligated to take the lulav on Shabbat (if it is the first day of the festival), then the woman may handle it as well.", + "Rabbi Judah says: on Shabbat they may be put it back [into the water in which they were previously kept], on a festival day [water] may be added, and on the intermediate days [of the festival the water] may also be changed. Rabbi Judah expands on the previous opinion. He agrees that on Shabbat one may put the lulav back into the water. However, he is not allowed to add new water. On a festival he can even add new water, but he may not completely switch the water. That he may do only on the intermediate days of the festival (hol hamoed).", + "A minor who knows how to shake [the lulav] is obligated [to take] the lulav. Once a child has reached an age where he is big enough to hold the lulav (all four species) and shake them properly, he is obligated to do so. The Talmud Bavli and subsequent commentators interpret this to mean that at this age his father has an obligation to teach him how to shake the lulav. His real obligation does not begin until his bar mitzvah, at age 13." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is an introduction to the remainder of the tractate Sukkot. On Sukkot there are some mitzvot that are observed for the full eight days (seven days of Sukkot and one day of Shmini Atzeret) and there are other mitzvot that are observed for a lesser number of days, either because they are not observed on Shabbat or because they do not apply to Shmini Atzeret.\nUp until now the mishnah has spent two chapters discussing the sukkah and one chapter discussing the lulav. In the upcoming mishnayot we will learn more about these other mitzvot including some fascinating rituals observed in the Temple.", + "[The rituals of] the lulav and the aravah are for six or seven [days]; The lulav and the special mitzvah of the aravah are observed for either six days or seven days. We will learn why in mishnayot two and three. The mitzvah of the aravah refers to circling the altar with the aravah, a mitzvah described in detail in mishnah five.", + "The Hallel and the rejoicing are for eight [days]; The full Hallel is recited for all eight days of Sukkot and Shmini Atzeret. Similarly, there is a mitzvah to rejoice on all eight days of the festival. Both of these are referred to in mishnah eight.", + "The sukkah and the water libation are for seven [days]; The mitvah to sit in a sukkah is for only seven days. On Shmini Atzeret one does not sit in the sukkah. The water libation was a special libation of water poured onto the altar only on Sukkot. It is described in mishnah nine. Here we learn that they would perform this special water libation for all seven days of the festival, even on Shabbat.", + "The flute is for five or six [days]. The flute is played at a special celebration that occurred in the Temple called “Simchat Bet Hashoeva.” This celebration does not take place on Shabbat, the first day of the festival (Yom Tov) or on Shmini Atzeret. Hence the flute is played for only five or six days, depending on whether the first day of the festival is on Shabbat. Simchat Bet Hashoeva is described at length in chapter five." + ], + [ + "“The lulav for seven.” How so? If the first day of the festival fell on Shabbat, the lulav [is taken for] seven days; on any other day, [it is taken] for six.
As we have learned before, outside of Jerusalem it is a mitzvah from the Torah to take the lulav only on the first day of the festival. Hence, if the first day of the festival falls on Shabbat, one still performs the mitzvah of the lulav. We saw this described above in 3:13. In such a case the lulav will be taken for seven days one day in which the mitzvah is “deoraita” from the Torah, and the rest of the days it is “derabbanan” from the rabbis.
However, if Shabbat falls on another day besides the first day of the festival, then since the mitzvah is only of rabbinic origin, it is not observed. In other words, the derabanan mitzvah of the lulav does not override the Shabbat. In such a case the mitzvah is observed for only six days.
Since the time of the Babylonian Talmud it has become customary not to take the lulav on Shabbat, even if it falls on the first day of the festival. However, this is not the custom reflected in the mishnah." + ], + [ + "“The aravah seven days.” How is this? If the seventh day of [the ritual of] the aravah fell on Shabbat, [it lasts] seven days; if it fell on any other day, [it lasts only] six.
The only difference between this mishnah and the previous mishnah concerning the lulav is that the lulav is taken on Shabbat if Shabbat is the first day of the festival, whereas the aravah (the willow) is taken on Shabbat if Shabbat falls on the seventh day of the festival. If Shabbat falls on one of the other days, the aravah ritual is not performed on that day and it will turn out that the aravah ritual happens on only six days. In mishnah five we will learn more about the aravah ritual as it was performed in the Temple. The reason that only the seventh day supersedes Shabbat is that the seventh day is the climax of the ritual." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn 3:13 we learned how the mitzvah of lulav was performed in the synagogue on Shabbat and how they managed to get their lulavs to the synagogue while avoiding the prohibition of carrying. In today’s mishnah we see how the same problem was addressed when the Temple still stood and the people were bringing their lulav not to the synagogue but to the Temple.", + "The mitzvah of the lulav how was it carried out? The question is not really how the mitzvah of lulav was in general performed, but rather how the mitzvah was performed so as to avoid the problem while avoiding certain halakhic problems that would arise on Shabbat.", + "If the first day of the festival fell on Shabbat, they brought their lulavim to the Temple Mount, and the attendants would receive them and arrange them on top of the portico, and the elders laid theirs in the chamber. And they would teach the people to say, “Whoever gets my lulav in his hand, let it be his as a gift.” The problem of taking the lulav in the Temple on Shabbat is twofold. First of all it is forbidden to carry a lulav through the public domain on Shabbat, so they would have to bring their lulavim to the Temple Mount on Friday. Secondly, one has to be able to recognize his own lulavim because one can fulfill one's obligation only with one's own lulav. In 3:13 we read that in the synagogue everyone recognized their lulav. In the Temple there were just too many lulavim to hope that everyone would recognize which was theirs. Therefore the leaders in the Temple trained everyone to say that if someone else took their lulav, then that lulav should belong to them. In this way everyone would own the lulav that they actually ended up with.", + "The next day they got up early, and came [to the Temple Mount] and the attendants threw down [their lulavim] before them, and they snatched at them, and so they used to come to blows with one another. While this solution resolved the halakhic problem, it created a social problem people were still jostling each other over who gets which lulav. It might have been that everyone was trying to get their own lulav, despite what they had said the previous day. Equally likely in my opinion, is that everyone wanted to take the nicest looking lulav they could find, even if the one that they had brought was not the best. In any case, the mad scramble for lulavim led to brawls. This seems to be another case of people allowing their religious zeal to go overboard causing them to neglect the welfare of their fellow human being.", + "When the court saw that they reached a state of danger, they instituted that each man should take [his lulav] in his own home. The court was quick to put an end to this situation and ruled that it is better for people just to stay at home then to potentially harm each other over the taking of the lulav. I think it is essential to notice how far the court was willing to go to ensure the safety of the people and to prevent religious zealotry from becoming a dominant force. Better that the opportunity to join together in fulfilling the mitzvah of the lulav should be lost than that it should bring violent results." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah teaches how the special mitzvah of the aravah (the willow) was performed in the Temple. This ritual is not mentioned at all in the Torah and according to the majority opinion in the Talmud it is either an ancient halakhah, a prophetic enactment or a custom. However, others derive the mitzvah of the aravah from the Torah by using a midrash.\nIt seems likely that the Sadducees, a group that rivaled the Pharisees while the Temple stood, did not believe that this was indeed a mitzvah. There is a story in the Talmud that one time the Baytusim (the name of a sect possibly synonymous with the Sadducees) covered the aravot with a heap of rocks to prevent the mitzvah from being performed. The fact that other sects of Jews opposed this mitzvah explains why it was performed with so many verbal demonstrative acts (recitations and shofar blasts). This was a way to demonstrate that this mitzvah should be performed and a way to convince others to do so.\nAfter the destruction of the Temple, the custom developed to circle around the synagogue one time each day of the week while holding the lulav and seven times on Hoshanah Rabbah, the last day of Sukkot.", + "The mitzvah of the aravah how was it [performed]?
There was a place below Jerusalem called Moza. They went down there and gathered tall branches of aravot and then they came and stood them up at the sides of the altar, and their tops were bent over the altar. They then sounded a teki’ah [long blast], a teru’ah [staccato blast] and again a teki’ah. Most of this ritual is self-explanatory. The aravot would need to be about 11 cubits high (more than five meters) so that their tops would go over the altar which was ten meters high. The shofar blasts were meant to give the ritual great publicity and great authority. They were also a sign of rejoicing.", + "Every day they went round the altar once, saying, “O Lord, save us, O Lord, make us prosper” (Psalms 118: 25). While circling the altar the people would recite Psalms 118:25, which is a plea to God to save us and bring us prosperity. Since Sukkot is the holiday on which we pray for the beginning of the rainy season, it is likely that the prosperity which they were praying for was rain.", + "Rabbi Judah says: “Ani vaho, save us.” According to Albeck, Rabbi Judah pronounced the beginning of this verse differently. Whereas we pronounce it “ana adonay”, he would pronounce it “ani vaho.” However, the meaning of “ani vaho” is not clear. Others read “ani vehu” which would mean “I and God”, meant to express the idea that God also participates in the sorrows and sufferings of His people Israel.", + "On that day they went round the altar seven times. On the seventh day they would circle the altar seven times. This is the origins of “Hoshanah Rabbah”, the last day of Sukkot on which we circle the Torah, which is placed in the middle of the synagogue, seven times.", + "When they departed, what did they say? “O altar, beauty is to you! O altar, beauty is to you!” Rabbi Eliezer said: [they would say,] “To the Lord and to you, O altar, to the Lord and to you, O altar.” The end of this seven day ritual was also accompanied by recitations, again meant to emphasize the importance of the aravah ritual and our sadness that the joyous occasion is completed. The people are actually paying homage, in a sense, to the altar. Through the altar the people of Israel receive atonement and hence it is desirable for us to praise it. We should note that we often think of Judaism as an anti-iconic religion God is transcendent, has no body or image, and we therefore deemphasize religious artifacts and emphasize intentions, emotions and our intellect. While this is not the space to enter into a thorough examination of these issues, it does seem to me that this is largely a Maimonidean concept of Judaism. In our mishnah we see that most rabbis had no problem directly speaking to the altar itself. Rabbi Eliezer adds that the praise should not go only to the altar, but to God as well." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first section of this mishnah teaches how the aravah ritual was performed on Shabbat. In the second section we see that at least one rabbi thought that this was not an aravah ritual but a ritual performed with palm branches.", + "As was its performance on a weekday, so was its performance on Shabbat, except that they would gather them on the eve of Shabbat and place them in golden basins so that they would not become wilted. The mishnah emphasizes that when this ritual was done on Shabbat (if it fell on the seventh day) it was done in the exact same way that it was done during the week. This seems to be an emphasis of the rabbis in several places certain holiday rituals are indeed carried out on Shabbat. This is another area of halakhah in which the rabbis/Pharisees deeply disagreed with the Sadducees and the sect from the Dead Sea. Indeed, according to the solar calendar used by the Dead Sea Sect, the holidays mostly began on Wednesdays. They thought that holiday ritual never superseded Shabbat and they shaped their calendar accordingly. In contrast the Pharisees/rabbis said that on certain occasions, it did.", + "Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka says: they used to bring palm branches and they would beat them on the ground at the sides of the altar, and that day was called “[the day of] the beating of the palm branches.” In this section we learn that Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka disagrees with all of the previous mishnayot. He holds that the entire ritual was done with palm branches and not with aravot. At the end of the rituals they would beat whatever had been carried around the altar for seven days (the palm branches according to Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka, and aravot according to the other sages). That day was called “the day of the beating of the palm branches/aravot.” To this day beating the aravot on Hoshanah Rabbah is still customary. Other commentators explain that Rabbi Yohanan’s debate with the other sages is only concerning the seventh day. On that day one takes palm branches and aravot. On the other days he agrees that he takes only aravot." + ], + [ + "Immediately after beating the willows (or palm branches) the children undo their lulavs and eat their etrogim. Once the ritual of the aravah was completed, children would immediately undo the ties binding their lulavim together and would immediately eat the etrogim. This seems to encompass two concrete ways of demonstrating that the mitzvah was utterly completed. Once the lulav is untied it is no longer really a lulav it is now just a palm branch, a willow and a myrtle branch. Once the etrog has a bite taken out of it, it can no longer be used on Sukkot." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first section of this mishnah deals with the recitation of Hallel and “rejoicing”, two mitzvoth which one fulfills on all eight days of the festival. The second section deals with the sukkah in which one dwells for seven days but not on Shmini Atzeret, the eighth day of Sukkot.", + "The Hallel and rejoicing are on all eight days: How is this so? This teaches that one is obligated for the Hallel, for rejoicing and for honoring the festival on the last day, just as he is on all the other days of the festival. On all eight days of Sukkot and Shmini Atzeret the full Hallel is recited. This is different from Pesah on which a full Hallel is recited on the first day only. “Rejoicing” has a general meaning in that one is supposed to be happy on the festival, as it says in Leviticus 23:40, “And you shall rejoice before the Lord your God seven days.” Despite the fact that the Torah specifies “seven days” the rabbis expanded this to include Shmini Atzeret. “Rejoicing” also has a more specific ritual sense during the festival one should bring sacrifices and eat them because eating meat, a much rarer luxury in mishnaic times than it is now, was considered one of the consummate signs of rejoicing.", + "The sukkah is for seven days. How so? Once he finished eating [his meal on the seventh day], he should not untie his sukkah, but he removes its contents from the time of minhah and onwards in honor of the last day of the festival. While the Hallel and rejoicing are for the full eight days, one sits in the sukkah for only seven days. Shmini Atzeret is distinguished by the fact that we do not sit in the sukkah. The mishnah teaches that one should eat his last meal in the sukkah for lunch on the seventh day of Sukkot and then start to bring his nice things, his dishes, his bed, his couch etc., into the house as a sign of respect for Shmini Atzeret. However, he should not undo his sukkah because he might still need to eat in there if he wants to eat again before the day is over. Taking the sukkah down before Sukkot is completely over might also be perceived as a sign of disrespect for Sukkot. It might make it look like he couldn’t wait to take down his sukkah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nAnother one of the unique ceremonies performed at the Temple on Sukkot was the water libation. During the year libations, that is pouring liquid onto the altar, were always performed with wine. The water libation is unique and was vehemently opposed by the Sadducees, as we shall see at the end of the Mishnah.\nThe water libation functioned as a supplication to God to bring rain in the upcoming season. As I have emphasized in other places, the rainy season in Israel is from Sukkot to Pesah. If enough rain does not fall in this period people’s lives would have been in serious danger. In the Temple they would pour water onto the altar to ask God to bring rain from the heavens to fill the cisterns and underground aquifers below.", + "How was the water libation [performed]? A golden flask holding three logs was filled from the Shiloah. When they arrived at the water gate, they sounded a teki'ah [long blast], a teru'ah [a staccato note] and again a teki'ah. [The priest then] went up the ascent [of the altar] and turned to his left where there were two silver bowls. Rabbi Judah says: they were of plaster [but they looked silver] because their surfaces were darkened from the wine. They had each a hole like a slender snout, one being wide and the other narrow so that both emptied at the same time. The one on the west was for water and the one on the east for wine. If he poured the flask of water into the bowl for wine, or that of wine into that for water, he has fulfilled his obligation. Rabbi Judah says: with one log he performed the ceremony of the water-libation all eight days. To [the priest] who performed the libation they used to say, “Raise your hand”, for one time, a certain man poured out the water over his feet, and all the people pelted him with their etrogs. The water libation ritual would begin with a procession from the Shiloah, the stream that empties out at the base of the Temple Mount. As we shall see when we learn the fifth chapter, this procession would begin in the morning after Simchat Bet Hashoevah (to be explained below). The people would make their way up to the Temple and enter through a designated gate called “the water gate.” [Made much more famous about 2,000 years later!] Just as we saw with the aravah ritual, here too they blew three shofar blasts. Again, this seems to have been a way of highlighting the event and emphasizing its importance in light of the fact that others disagreed with its fulfillment. They would then pour the water into a special bowl that had a hole in it. The water would go down to a cistern underneath the altar called “shitin”, where according to legend it would cause the waters of the deep to rise and nourish the earth. The wine libation was done simultaneously. Rabbi Judah disagrees with the first opinion in the mishnah concerning two matters: 1) the libation was done with a log and not with three logs. Secondly, he holds that the water libation was for all eight days and not just on the seven days of Sukkot. In the final story a priest, identified in the Talmud as a Sadducee, pours the water onto the floor of the Temple rather than pouring it onto the altar. In response, the people pelt him with their etrogs. There are several fascinating aspects to this story. First of all, although the Sadducean priest disagreed with the water libation, he was still working in the Temple and he ended up with the water flask in his hand. If the Sadducees controlled the Temple why did he have the water flask such that he had to cast it down? Why would they have bothered bringing the water up from the Shiloah in the first place? And if the Pharisees controlled the Temple, why would they have let a Sadducean priest perform a ritual that they surely knew he disagreed with? Another interesting point is that the people’s sentiments clearly lie with the rabbis/Pharisees. Finally, there is a very similar story in Josephus, Antiquities of the Jews, Book 13, Chapter 13: “As to Alexander, his own people were seditious against him; for at a festival which was then celebrated, when he stood upon the altar, and was going to sacrifice, the nation rose upon him, and pelted him with citrons [which they then had in their hands, because] the law of the Jews required that at the feast of tabernacles every one should have branches of the palm tree and citron tree; which thing we have elsewhere related.” This event occurred during the Hasmonean reign, meaning sometime in the early 1st century B.C.E. Alexander Yannai was king and high priest and was known to have had Sadducean leanings. However, there is nothing in Josephus about a water libation. The people pelt him with etrogs (citrons) because they oppose him as king and high priest. It is hard to know if the story in the Mishnah is related to this story from Josephus, either historically or literarily, but one thing we can know for sure if you’re a Sadducee in the Temple on Sukkot, you’d better watch your head!" + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah teaches how they would perform the water libation on Shabbat and yet avoid the problem of having to carry the water up from the Shiloah.", + "As it was performed on weekdays, so was it was performed on Shabbat, save that on the eve of Shabbat he would fill a non-sanctified golden barrel from the Shiloah, and place it in the chamber. Importantly, the mishnah emphasizes that the water libation was performed on Shabbat just as it was performed during the week. I believe that this is frequently one of the ways in which the rabbis emphasized the importance of controversial rituals. It is as if to say that the water libation is so crucial that it is even done on Shabbat. However, they had to make sure that the water was not carried through the public domain on Shabbat. In order to do this they would bring the water up on Friday before Shabbat and leave it in the chamber until the next morning. However, this posed another problem. Water or any other liquid left overnight in a sanctified vessel becomes unfit for use in the Temple. Therefore they would use a golden barrel that had not been consecrated.", + "If it was poured away or uncovered, he would refill it from the laver, for wine or water which has become uncovered is invalid for the altar. If the water was poured away (perhaps by the Sadducean priest we met yesterday) then it obviously can’t be used. Similarly, if it was left uncovered it also can’t be used. Liquids left uncovered overnight are forbidden for anyone to drink for fear that a snake put venom in them. Since exposed liquids can’t be drunk by people, it is also forbidden to use them on the altar. If the water that they had brought up the day before could not be used, then they would just use water from the laver that was in the Temple." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThe first four mishnayot of the final chapter of Sukkah are about a Sukkot ritual called “Simchat Bet Hashoevah”, which is usually translated as the “Celebration of the Water-Drawing.” The water-drawing refers to the drawing of the water from the Shiloah in order to perform the water-libation, described above in chapter four. At the end of the all-night Simchat Bet Hashoevah ceremony, early in the morning, they would leave the Temple, go down to the Shiloah and draw the water.\nIt seems that the function of the ceremony was twofold. First of all it highlighted the importance of the water-libation, which as we saw before, was controversial. Secondly, it allowed non-priests a chance to participate in the Sukkot ritual in the Temple. This seems to be one of the major differences between the Pharisees and Sadducees the former encouraged the participation of non-priests in Temple ritual as much as was possible, whereas the Sadducees seemed to have abhorred it.", + "The flute was for five or six days. This refers to the flute at the Bet Hashoevah [the place of the water-drawing] which does not override Shabbat or the festival day. The mishnah refers to a flute that was played during the Simchat Bet Hashoevah. This celebration would only take place on five or six days because it did not override Shabbat or the festival day. So if the first day of Sukkot and Shabbat coincided, then it would happen for six days; if not for only five. Interestingly, in the descriptions of the Bet Hashoevah that follow, the flute is no longer present. I do not have a good answer for this absence.", + "They said: he who has not seen the Simchat Bet Hashoevah has never seen rejoicing in his life. The Simchat Bet Hashoevah was supposed to have been the most joyous, celebratory occasion in the Jewish calendar. Indeed, to this day in our tefillot we call Sukkot “the time of our rejoicing (z’man simchatenu)”." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah begins to describe the Simchat Bet Hashoevah ritual. The ritual seems to be centered around fire, which has led some scholars to suggest the Simchat Bet Hashoevah really means “The Celebration of Fire.”", + "At the conclusion of the first festival day of Sukkot they descended to the Women’s Court (Ezrat and they would make there a great enactment. As we learned in yesterday’s mishnah, they did not celebrate the Simchat Bet Hashoevah on either Shabbat or on the festival. They would not begin until after the first festival day was completed. The celebration would start with the people going into the “Women’s Court.” This was a section in the Temple into which both men and women could enter, but it was as far as women could go in the Temple. Hence it was called the “Women’s Court.” The mishnah says that they would make their a “great enactment” but does not explain what this was. The Talmud explains that they separated the men and women, putting the men below and the women up into the balcony so that they wouldn’t mix. The fear was that in the midst of such a raucous occasion the mixture of men and women together could lead to transgression. Hence they separated between the sexes. However, on normal occasions men and women seem to have been together in the Women’s Court.", + "And golden candlesticks were there, and four golden bowls on the top of each of them and four ladders to each, and four youths drawn from the young priests, and in their hands there were jars of oil containing one hundred and twenty logs which they poured into the bowls. The first thing they would do was light an enormous menorah. On each candlestick there were four golden bowls according to tomorrow’s mishnah, there was enough light to light up all of Jerusalem! Children would climb ladders to light the menorah and they would use 120 logs of oil, which is the equivalent of fifteen liters of oil. This works out to about half a liter of oil for each bowl." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah continues the description of the incredible light which shone from the menorah at the Simchat Bet Hashoevah.", + "From the worn-out pants and belts of the priests they made wicks and with them they kindled the lamps. The wicks that they used to light the candles were not made from any old ordinary material. They used the worn-out pants and belts the priests, which they wore in their Temple service. This teaches us that once something has been used for one mitzvah it is fitting that it should be used in another mitzvah as well.", + "And there was not a courtyard in Jerusalem that was not illuminated by the light of the Bet Hashoevah. The light from the menorah was so great that according to the mishnah it lit up all of Jerusalem." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah describes the Simchat Bet Hashoevah.", + "Men of piety and good deeds used to dance before them with lighted torches in their hands, and they would sing songs and praises. After having lit the menorah, the party kicks off with dancing, singing and the playing of musical instruments. The first participants mentioned are the “Hasidim” or the men of piety and men whom are known for their good deeds. This group’s participation is unusual and noteworthy for these were men chosen based on their deeds and not on their lineage. In my opinion this was indeed one of the functions of the Simchat Bet Hashoevah, to give a greater role to those who are not of the priestly or Levitical clans. It is these people whose dancing, songs and praise would probably have stood out the most. This dancing and singing took place in the Court of the Women.", + "And Levites with innumerable harps, lyres, cymbals and trumpets and other musical instruments stood upon the fifteen steps leading down from the Court of the Israelites to the Court of the Women, corresponding to the fifteen songs of ascents in the Psalms, and it was on these [steps] that the Levites stood with their musical instruments and sang their songs. The second group is the Levites who would arrange themselves on the fifteen steps leading up from the Court of the Women to the Court of the Israelites. The mishnah notes that these fifteen steps correlate with the fifteen Psalms which begin “A Song of Ascents (Shir Hamaalot)” (Psalms 120-134). One can only imagine how beautiful, indeed sublime, their music must have been.", + "Two priests stood by the upper gate which leads down from the Court of the Israelites to the Court of the Women, with two trumpets in their hands. When the cock crowed they sounded a teki'ah [drawn-out blast], a teru'ah [staccato note] and again a teki'ah. When they reached the tenth step they sounded a teki'ah, a teru'ah and again a teki'ah. When they reached the Court [of the Women] they sounded a teki'ah, a teru'ah and again a teki'ah. They would sound their trumpets and proceed until they reached the gate which leads out to the east. The third group involved is the priests. The priests begin the ceremony standing above everyone else, up in the Court of the Israelites. When the cock crows at the crack of dawn they begin a process of descending and blowing shofar blasts at set stages. Eventually this leads them down through the women’s court and out to the eastern gate.", + "When they reached the gate which leads out to the east, they turned their faces from east to west and said, “Our fathers who were in this place ‘their backs were toward the Temple of the Lord, and their faces toward the east, and they worshipped the sun toward the east’, but as for us, our eyes are turned to the Lord.” Rabbi Judah said: they used to repeat [the last words] and say “We are the Lord’s and our eyes are turned to the Lord.” When they get to the eastern gate they are facing the sun. They turn around so that their backs are to the sun and use this opportunity to profess their faith in God and their denial of the worship of the sun. They quote from Ezekiel 8:16 in order to highlight that the sin of sun-worship is not just something that “others” or Greeks were engaged in, but something that Israelites themselves were accused of by Ezekiel. It seems to me likely that there is also a polemic here against other contemporary Jewish groups who had a solar calendar. A calendar based on the sun and actual worship of the sun could probably have been associated. Certainly it would make sense that the Pharisees/rabbis would claim that their rivals, the Essenes and perhaps the Sadducees, were not just basing their calendar on the sun but were worshipping the sun as well. We have already seen on a number of occasions that Sukkot was a holiday full of strife between the various sects of ancient Judaism. The mishnah ends its procession at this point, but it is quite clear that it was not actually over at this moment but that from the eastern gate they would make their way down to the Shiloah spring in order to draw water for the water-libation." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nSince the previous mishnah mentioned the extra shofar blasts that were sounded during Sukkot, today’s mishnah discusses how many shofar blasts were sounded on other occasions in the Temple. As we shall see, more shofar blasts were blown on the eve of Shabbat during Sukkot than at any other time during the year.", + "They never have less than twenty-one blasts in the Temple, and never more than forty-eight. This is an introduction to the rest of the mishnah. We should remember that each tekiah (unbroken sound) and each teruah (staccato sound) counts as one blast. The blasts always come in sets of three, first a tekiah, then a teruah and then another tekiah. Sometimes this order is repeated and sometimes it is performed three times.", + "Every day there were twenty-one blasts in the Temple, three at the opening of the gates, nine at the morning tamid sacrifice, and nine at the evening tamid sacrifice. On normal days there were twenty-one blasts. There were three blasts in the morning to announce the opening of the Temple gates, and then nine blasts at each of the two daily sacrifices, the morning tamid and the afternoon tamid.", + "At the musafim (additional they would add another nine. On the festivals and on Shabbat there were an extra nine blasts for the musaf offerings. The Talmud explains that no matter how many musaf offerings were offered on that day, nine and only nine blasts were sounded. Thus even on Shabbat during the festival, when there were musaf offerings for Shabbat and for the festival, there were still only nine.", + "And on the eve of Shabbat they would add another six, three as a sign to the people to stop working and three to mark a distinction between the holy and the profane. On the eve of Shabbat there were six other blasts, whose function was not connected to sacrifices or to Temple procedures but rather to Shabbat. There were three blasts that let people know that Shabbat was approaching and that they needed to stop working. And then there were another three blasts to let people know that Shabbat had begun. Interestingly, there was a stone from the ruins of the Temple found in Jerusalem that had written on it \"bet hatekiah lehav…\" which means \"the house of blasting to distinguish.\" Probably, the reference is to the practice in this very mishnah. This stone was once part of the section in the Temple where they blew shofar blasts to distinguish between kodesh (Shabbat) and hol (non-Shabbat). To this day in Jerusalem and in a few other cities in Israel as well they sound a warning to let people know that Shabbat has begun. It turns out therefore, that on the eve of Shabbat during Pesah or on Shavuot, there would be thirty-six blasts 21 for the normal occasions, 9 for musaf, and 6 for the eve of Shabbat.", + "On the eve of Shabbat in the intermediate days of the [Sukkoth] festival, there were [therefore] forty-eight blasts: three at the opening of the gates, three at the upper gate, three at the lower gate, three at the water-drawing, three at the altar, nine at the daily morning sacrifice, nine at the daily evening sacrifice, nine at the additional sacrifices, three as a sign to the people to cease from work, and three to mark a distinction between the holy and the profane. In the previous mishnah we learned that there were nine additional blasts for the Simchat Bet Hashoevah, in 4:9 we learned of three blasts for the water-libation and in 4:5 there were three blasts for the aravah ritual. Therefore, on the eve of Shabbat during Sukkot (but not on the first day) there should have been 51 blasts 36 from section four and 15 additional blasts which were special to Sukkot. However, our mishnah teaches that there were only 48 blasts. The best explanation for this discrepancy seems to be that this mishnah skips the three blasts that were done on the tenth step leading down to the Court of the Women during the Simchat Bet Hashoevah. Explained this way, when our mishnah says the upper gate, it refers to the first three blasts at the Simchat Bet Hashoevah. The lower gate refers to those sounded when they reached the Court of the Women. The three at the water-drawing refers to those mentioned in 4:9, and the three at the altar refers to the three at the aravah ritual (4:6). Commentators also note another problem with this mishnah. There were even more blasts sounded on Pesah when the passover offering was being sacrificed. These could reach 27 blasts (three each time the Hallel was sung, three potential groups, each singing the Hallel three times). If Pesah fell on the eve of Shabbat that there could be 54 blasts, more than the 48 mentioned in our mishnah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe priests were divided into twenty-four watches, each watch serving for a week at the Temple. During a watch’s week the priests of that watch kept all of the sacrificial meat and any other part of the sacrifice that they were allowed to use. However, during pilgrimage festivals all twenty-four watches equally divided the sacrifices that were offered on account of the festival. Our mishnah teaches how the numerous Sukkot offerings were divvied up.", + "On the first festival day of Sukkot there were thirteen bulls, two rams and one goat. Fourteen lambs remained for the other eight priestly watches.
On the first day, six [watches] offered two each and the remaining [two] one each. On the first day of Sukkot there were thirty animals sacrificed: thirteen bulls, two rams, one goat (for a sin-offering) and fourteen lambs (Numbers 29:13-16). This means that 16 priestly watches could take one animal each, leaving fourteen animals for the other eight watches. On the first day of the festival, six watches would sacrifice two lambs and the other two watches would get one lamb each.", + "On the second day five offered two each and the remaining [four] one each. On the second day there was one less bull, so the total number of animals was only 29. Fifteen watches would take the fifteen non-lamb animals, leaving nine watches to split 14 lambs. Five would take two lambs, leaving four to each take one.", + "On the third day four offered two each and the remaining [six] one each. On the third day there were 11 bulls, for a total of 28 animals. Fourteen watches would take the fourteen non-lamb animals, leaving ten watches to split 14 lambs. Four would take two lambs, leaving six to each take one.", + "On the fourth day three offered two each and the remaining [eight] one each. On the fourth day there were only 10 bulls, for a total of 27 animals. Thirteen watches would take the thirteen non-lamb animals, leaving 11 watches to split 14 lambs. Three would take two lambs, leaving eight to each take one.", + "On the fifth day two offered two each and the remaining [ten] one each. On the fifth day there were only 9 bulls, for a total of 26 animals. Twelve watches would take the twelve non-lamb animals, leaving 12 watches to split 14 lambs. Two would take two lambs, leaving ten to each take one.", + "On the sixth day one offered two and the remaining [twelve] one each. On the sixth day there were only 8 bulls, for a total of 25 animals. Eleven watches would take the eleven non-lamb animals, leaving 13 watches to split 14 lambs. One would take two lambs, leaving 12 to each take one.", + "On the seventh day all were equal. On the seventh day there were 24 animals for 24 watches each watch got one.", + "On the eighth day they again cast lots as on the other festivals. On Shmini Atzeret there were only 10 animals sacrificed, one bull, one ram, one goat and seven lambs (Numbers 29:35-38). The watches would then cast lot to see who received what (see Yoma 2:1).", + "They said: the [watch] that offered bulls on one day should not offer them on the next, but that they should take their turns in rotation. It is obviously better to receive a large meaty bull than a small goat. It wouldn’t have been fair for one watch to monopolize the larger animals. Therefore a watch that got a bull one day would not get a bull the next day. Without going through all the math, with a total of 70 bulls offered over the seven days of Sukkot, 22 of the watches would have been able to offer 3 bulls and two would have had to suffice with only 2 bulls. I think they should put this mishnah as a word problem (everyone's favorite) on a math exam!" + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn yesterday’s mishnah we learned that the twenty-four priestly watches equally divided the sacrifices that were offered on account of the festival. Our mishnah now discusses the ownership over the other sacrifices that would have been offered on the three festivals.", + "At three periods in the year all the priestly watches shared equally in the festival sacrifices and in the division of the showbread. This is a reference to the previous mishnah. On all three festivals all of the watches shared equally in all of the sacrifices that came on account of the festival. This would include the musafim mentioned yesterday, but also the “hagigah” and other special sacrifices that individuals would bring on account of the festival. They also divided the showbread equally, despite the fact that the showbread is not really a sacrifice that comes on account of the festival.", + "On Shavuot they used to say to the priest, “Here is matzah for you, here is chametz for you.” On Shavuot there were both the matzot of the showbread and leavened bread (chametz) from the two special loaves on Shavuot. Therefore they could amusingly say to the priest coming to take his share: here’s your matzah, here’s your chametz.", + "A watch whose period of service was fixed [for that festival week] offered the tamid, vow-offerings and freewill-offerings and all other public offerings; and it offered them all. The watch whose week fell on the week upon which there was a festival would get the offerings that were brought not on account of the festival. They would get the tamid, the daily offerings. They also received the individual voluntary offerings vow offerings and free-will offerings. They also received other public offerings not listed in the previous mishnah. This would include the Shabbat musaf offerings. Finally, they would get any offering that was brought for some reason other than the festival. This would include first-born animals and tithes. We should note that despite the fact that the festival offerings were divided up equally among the different watches, it surely would have been a bonus to have one’s watch fall on the festival for the simple reason that more people came to the Temple at these times. It was at these times of the year that people would have brought their voluntary offerings, their first-born animals, their animal tithes and other offerings. Hence, it was probably quite lucrative to have your watch fall during the festival.", + "A festival which fell next to Shabbat, either before or after it, all the watches shared equally in the distribution of the showbread. If Shabbat fell either on the day before the festival or the day after, all of the watches would receive an equal portion of the showbread. If it fell before the festival, they would have to get to Jerusalem before Shabbat, a day earlier than if the festival had fallen during the week. If it fell after the festival, they would have to stay a day later. Since they had to be there anyway, they received a portion of the showbread even though Shabbat was not on the festival." + ], + [ + "Introduction The final mishnah of Sukkah is a continuation of yesterday’s mishnah which dealt with the division of the showbread.", + "If one day intervened between them [Shabbat and Yom Tov], the watch whose time of service was fixed [for that week] took ten [of the] loaves, while they that were detained took two. Yesterday we learned that if Shabbat fell next to Yom Tov (the first or last day of the festival) then all of the watches divided the showbread evenly. Today we learn that if there was one day in between Shabbat and Yom Tov, the watch whose week it was would get most of the showbread but not all. Since some of the watches might not be able to begin their way back home because they lived too far away to make it in one day, or might need to get to Jerusalem before Shabbat, they were compensated by getting at least a little bit of the showbread.", + "On all other days of the year the incoming watch took six loaves and the outgoing watch six. Rabbi Judah said, the incoming watch took seven and the outgoing five. At all other times of the year the incoming and outgoing watches would split the showbread evenly. The watches would actually switch their service on Shabbat. The new watch would arrange the new showbread and the two would split the showbread from the previous week. Rabbi Judah says that this division was not completely equal.", + "The incoming watch divided it in the north, and the outgoing in the south. In order that the watches should not get confused, the incoming watch would divide the showbread in the northern section of the Temple and the outgoing watch would divide in the south.", + "[The watch of] Bilgah always divided it in the south; their ring was fixed and their alcove was blocked up. Bilgah is the name of one of the watches (see I Chronicles 24:14). According to the mishnah and other rabbinic sources they were punished for the sins committed by Miriam, the daughter of one of the priests. Miriam committed apostasy and married a Greek soldier, and when the Greeks entered the Temple during the time of the Maccabees she came in with him and acted in a disrespectful manner to the Temple. As a collective punishment for the whole watch they always divided in the south, as if to say that even when they were entering their service, it is as if they are on their way out. Alternatively, the Talmud says that Bilgah may have been punished because they were constantly late in arriving to serve in the Temple. In the Temple there were twenty-four rings, one for each watch. When skinning a sacrifice they could put the animal’s neck through the ring and have it held up while they skinned it. Bilgah’s ring was closed up so that they couldn’t use it. In addition, every watch had its own alcove in which they could store their knives. Bilgah’s was closed up, again as a punishment for their misdeeds." + ] + ] + ] + }, + "versions": [ + [ + "Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp", + "http://learn.conservativeyeshiva.org/mishnah/" + ] + ], + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה סוכה", + "categories": [ + "Mishnah", + "Modern Commentary on Mishnah", + "English Explanation of Mishnah", + "Seder Moed" + ], + "schema": { + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה סוכה", + "enTitle": "English Explanation of Mishnah Sukkah", + "key": "English Explanation of Mishnah Sukkah", + "nodes": [ + { + "heTitle": "הקדמה", + "enTitle": "Introduction" + }, + { + "heTitle": "", + "enTitle": "" + } + ] + } +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Moed/English Explanation of Mishnah Taanit/English/Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp.json b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Moed/English Explanation of Mishnah Taanit/English/Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..a2eda144d397aa92acf12e6e7497ff0e16784dcb --- /dev/null +++ b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Moed/English Explanation of Mishnah Taanit/English/Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp.json @@ -0,0 +1,235 @@ +{ + "language": "en", + "title": "English Explanation of Mishnah Taanit", + "versionSource": "http://learn.conservativeyeshiva.org/mishnah/", + "versionTitle": "Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp", + "status": "locked", + "license": "CC-BY", + "shortVersionTitle": "Dr. Joshua Kulp", + "actualLanguage": "en", + "languageFamilyName": "english", + "isBaseText": true, + "isSource": true, + "isPrimary": true, + "direction": "ltr", + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה תענית", + "categories": [ + "Mishnah", + "Modern Commentary on Mishnah", + "English Explanation of Mishnah", + "Seder Moed" + ], + "text": { + "Introduction": [ + "Tractate Taanit is about the practice of fasting and offering special prayers in times of trouble, especially during a drought. The Bible is full of examples of the Israelites fasting, praying and engaging in other forms of supplication in order to entreat God to respond to their needs. The most famous of these cases is probably Esther who calls for a three-day fast to ensure her success and safety when entering in to speak to the king. See also Joel 1:14; Jeremiah 14:11-12; Jonah 3:5-8; Nehemiah 9:1; Daniel 9:3 and others. ", + "Numbers 10:9 was used by the rabbis as toraitic proof for this concept. The verse states, “And when you come into battle in your land against the foe who assails you, you shall let out a long blast with the trumpets and be remembered before the Lord your God and be rescued from your enemies.” According to the rabbis the specific example of blowing trumpets in times of war is a paradigm for all times of trouble. There is a positive commandment in the Torah to cry out to God in all times of trouble, to blow shofars and to fast as well. The days of fast described in our mishnah were accompanied by special prayers, by trumpet and shofar blasts and sometimes by work-stoppages. ", + "As we study the tractate we shall constantly note how important rain was in the land of Israel in mishnaic times. Rain is still critical to the well-being of those who live in this arid region, although modern technology has to a certain measure alleviated short-term crises. In ancient times, a season with no or little rain would have been an utter disaster. Crops would have failed, livestock would have died or been in danger of dying, and people would not have had enough water to drink. By the sheer amount of material that the rabbis devote to this subject, we can see just how important this was for their lives." + ], + "": [ + [ + [ + "Introduction\nDuring the rainy season during the second part of the Amidah, in the paragraph about God’s power, we add in the words “He causes the wind to blow and the rain to fall.” In our mishnah Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Joshua debate when we begin to say this phrase.", + "From when do they mention the powers of [bringing] rain? Rabbi Eliezer says: from the first day of the Festival [of Sukkot]. Rabbi Joshua says: on the last day of the Festival [of Sukkot]. This is the question that is debated in this mishnah when do we begin to mention that God has the power to bring rain? Both sages agree that we begin during Sukkot they argue over whether we begin mentioning rain on the first or on the last day of Sukkot.", + "Rabbi Joshua said to him: Since rain on the Festival is nothing but a sign of [God’s] curse why should he mention it? Rain on Sukkot is considered to be a rebuke by God (see Sukkah 2:9) because it prevents one from being able to dwell (eat and sleep) in the Sukkah. Therefore, Rabbi Joshua argues, it does not make sense to mention God’s rain-giving powers at this time.", + "Rabbi Eliezer said to him: I also did not say to request [rain] but to make mention, “He causes the wind to blow and the rain to fall” in its due season. Rabbi Eliezer agrees that rain on Sukkot is a curse. However, he responds that he was not suggesting that we ask for rain at the beginning of Sukkot, but rather that we just mention that God has the power to bring rain in its due season. We ask for rain in the ninth blessing of the Amidah when we say, “And provide dew and rain (ten tal umatar).”", + "He replied to him: if so one should at all times make mention of it. Rabbi Joshua responds that if all we are doing in this prayer is mentioning rain, why not mention it all throughout the year. The fact that Rabbi Eliezer agrees that we only mention it during the rainy season means that he too agrees that it is connected with actual rain. If so, then he should also agree that we shouldn’t mention it until the time when we hope that the rainy season will actually begin, that is at the end of Sukkot when we are done sitting in the sukkah. The halakhah is according to Rabbi Joshua." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe previous mishnah discussed the concept of “mentioning rain.” This mishnah adds in a discussion of the subject of “asking for rain.” This refers to the addition of the words “and give dew and rain (veten tal umatar)” in the ninth blessing of the Amidah, which is called “The Blessing of the Years.”", + "They don’t pray for rain except close to the rainy season. In Israel there is a clearly defined rainy season, which lasts roughly from Sukkot to Pesah. It does not rain in the summer in Israel. The mishnah teaches that we request rain only in the season in which it is normal for it to rain. There are probably two reasons for this. First of all, rain in the wrong season can destroy crops, so one shouldn’t ask for something if it will cause damage. Secondly, we ask God for nature to perform in a predictable and stable fashion, for it to run its course. We do not ask God for miracles, nor do we rely on them or expect them.", + "Rabbi Judah says: One who goes down before the ark on the last day of Sukkot the last one mentions [rain], the first does not; on the first day of Pesah, the first mentions, the last does not. This section returns to discuss the “mentioning of rain” that comes during the second blessing of the Amidah. In yesterday’s mishnah Rabbi Joshua said that we begin to mention rain on the last day of Sukkot. Rabbi Judah in our mishnah agrees and merely points out that there are two prayer leaders on a festival, one for Shacharit and one for Mussaf. On the last day of Sukkot the prayer leader, one who “goes down before the ark” for Mussaf begins to mention rain. The prayer leader for Shacharit does not. The opposite is true at the other end of the spectrum. On the first day of Pesah, the prayer leader for Shacharit still mentions the rain, but the prayer leader for Mussaf does not. In other words, at both times the change is made during Mussaf. This means that there is almost no point in the festival during which rain is mentioned rather dew is basically mentioned all of the time. This is because dew, which falls during the summer months, is a blessing during the festival because it doesn’t disrupt people’s travel. While rain is good for the land, we all still love a bright sun shiny day!", + "Up until when do they request rain? Rabbi Judah says: Until Pesah is over. Rabbi Meir says: Until Nissan is over, as it says, “Now He makes the rain fall in the first month, early rain and late rain” (Joel 2:23). In this section two sages disagree with regard to how long in the season we ask for rain. Rabbi Judah says that we ask until Pesah is over. We should note that Rabbi Judah’s opinion in this section seems to disagree with what he said before, that we stop mentioning rain on the first day of Pesah. The Talmud resolves this problem by saying that there are two different versions of Rabbi Judah’s opinion within this mishnah. Rabbi Meir says that we ask for rain until the entire month of Nissan is over. He uses the verse from Joel as a prooftext that rain is a blessing in the entire first month, the month of Nissan." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah teaches when we begin to ask for rain in the ninth blessing of the Amidah. We should note that at the very beginning of the rainy season we begin to mention rain but we do not yet ask for it. Later, when the rainy season should really begin in full force, we begin to ask for rain. In our prayers we slowly build up to really petitioning God for rain.", + "On the third of Marheshvan they [begin to] ask for rain. The third of Marheshvan (today called Heshvan), the second month of the year, is when we begin to ask for rain. This is when the rainy season is supposed to begin.", + "Rabban Gamaliel says: on the seventh, fifteen days after the Festival [of Sukkot] so that the last of the Jews reaches the river Euphrates. Rabban Gamaliel delays asking for rain until the seventh of Marheshvan, which gives pilgrims who were making their way back from Israel time to reach the river Euphrates in Babylonia. It would not be appropriate to begin to ask for rain while Jews were still returning from performing the important mitzvah of making a pilgrimage to the land of Israel and to the Temple in Jerusalem." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah proceeds chronologically from the last mishnah. There we learned that on either the third or seventh of Marheshvan they add into the Amidah a request for rain. If that prayer has not been answered by the seventeenth of Marheshvan, then a series of progressively more stringent fasts begins.", + "If the seventeenth of Marheshvan came and no rain fell, individuals begin to fast three fasts. The first set of fasts is not observed by the entire community, but rather only by individuals, probably rabbis and other public figures.", + "They eat and drink after it gets dark and they are permitted to do work, to bathe, to anoint themselves with oil, to wear shoes, and to have marital relations. The lightness of the fasts is expressed in the fact that the night before the fast they can eat the fast only begins in the morning. Furthermore, the only prohibition that they take upon themselves is eating and drinking. All of the other prohibitions that sometimes apply on fast days do not apply here. The idea of progressively making the fasts more stringent is an interesting idea. We relate to God as we would to another human being. If we really want something, but it is something that we are going to need frequently, we don’t pull out all of the stops immediately." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues with the next series of fasts.", + "If Rosh Hodesh Kislev came and no rain fell the court ordains upon the community three fasts; they may eat and drink while it is still dark and it is permissible to do work, to bathe, to anoint oneself with oil, to wear shoes, and to have marital relations. The only difference between these fasts and the previous three is that these are observed by the entire community. Other than that, everything is still the same. They eat and drink the night before, and only eating and drinking is prohibited." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues with the series of increasingly more stringent fasts.", + "If these passed and there was no answer, the court decrees three more fasts on the community. If after the first three communal fasts there is still no rain, then the court decrees another set of three fasts on the community.", + "They may eat and drink [only] while it is still day; they may not work, bathe, anoint themselves with oil, wear shoes, or have marital, relations. And the bathhouses are closed. These fasts are stricter because they begin the night before. The mishnah refers to the day before the fast and rules that one can eat only while it is still day. On these fasts all of the major prohibitions apply. These are the same prohibitions that apply on Yom Kippur. The bathhouses are closed because there is no need for them to be open. Also, this is a very public sign of mourning.", + "If these passed and there was no answer the court decrees upon the community a further seven, making a total of thirteen. If these three fasts are not effective, then another seven are decreed, bringing the total number of communal fasts to thirteen.", + "These are greater than the first, for on these they blast the shofar and they lock the shops. All of the prohibitions from the previous three fasts still apply and new practices are added. They blow the shofar as a sign of distress (on this practice see the introduction to the tractate). They also close the shops as a further sign of communal mourning and distress.", + "On Mondays the shutters [of the shops] are opened a little when it gets dark, but on Thursdays they are permitted [the whole day] because of the Shabbat. The problem with closing the stores is that people need to buy supplies for the next day. Therefore they allow the stores to open their shutters a little bit towards the end of the day on Monday. On Thursday the stores are allowed to be opened all day because people need to buy food for Shabbat. We can see a value statement being made here. As important as it is to pray for rain and as dire as the situation of drought may be, people must remember and be able to honor the Shabbat." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn the final mishnah of this chapter we learn what the community would do if all of their fasts had not worked and God still had not sent rain.", + "If these passed and there was [still] no answer then they restrict engaging in business, and in building, planting, betrothal and marriage, and in greeting one another, as if they were people undesirable to God. By this point, it seems that the fasts just aren’t going to be effective. They therefore go into a state of semi-mourning. They cut back on the normal creative activities of life, perhaps as a symbol that all around them there is death. By this point, the crops have probably died, many animals have probably died and people’s health and wellbeing is in great danger. Indeed, it seems that God has rejected the entire community; it is as if He put them into a state of excommunication. The community is in despair and until things are set aright, they make few plans for the future.", + "The individuals go back to fasting anew until the end of Nisan. The community no longer takes upon itself more fasts. Only those individual leaders, those who began fasting at the outset, go back to fasting. These are people whose merit was supposed to help bring rain in the first place. In essence, the failure to achieve rain is partially seen as being their fault.", + "If Nisan passes and then rain falls this is a sign of a curse, as it is written, “It is the season of the wheat harvest. [I will pray to the Lord and He will send thunder and rain; then you will take thought and realize what a wicked thing you did in the sight of the Lord when you asked for a king” (I Samuel 12:17). If Nisan, the last rainy month passes, and then it rains, this too is perceived as a curse. Rain in Nisan in the land of Israel will further damage the crops. It is if God is being particularly cruel, not giving rain at the proper time and then giving it at the improper time. The prooftext demonstrates quite clearly that rain at the improper time is a way of God rebuking the people of Israel." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction In the previous chapter we learned about the series of fast days declared in order to petition God for rain. In this chapter we learn the rituals that were observed on those days.", + "What is the order [of service] for fast days?
They take the ark out to the open space of the city. They bring the ark with the Torah or Torahs outside to the open space where they will have a very public ceremony. This is part of their attempt to achieve as broad of a spectrum of involvement as possible.", + "And they put ashes on the ark and on the head of the Nasi and on the head of the head of the court (av bet din). The leaders of the community ceremonially put ashes on the heads of the two main leaders of the community and on the ark as well. It seems that by putting ashes on the ark, it is as if they were putting ashes on God’s head as well. Perhaps they might even be trying to show that God is sharing in Israel’s distress. Theologically, this creates somewhat of a paradox we are praying to God for rain, rain that God is withholding, and yet at the same time we believe and we demonstrate that God is sharing in our distress. The image is one of a parent, punishing a child and yet at the same time feeling the child’s pain.", + "And everyone [else] puts ashes on his own head. Everyone else puts ashes on their own heads. The ritual application of the ashes is performed only for the two leaders and for the ark.", + "The elder among them says in front of them words of admonition, “Brothers, it does not say of the people of Nineveh, ‘And God saw their sackcloth and their fasting,’ but, ‘And God saw their deeds, for they turned from their evil way. (Jonah 3:10)’ And in the prophets it says, ‘And rend your heart and not your garments” (Joel 2:13). The elder among the people now reminds them that the external motions are meant to invoke inner teshuvah, repentance. When God sees that Nineveh has repented, He says that He has seen their deeds and not that He has seen their external signs. Similarly, Joel tells the people that they should rend their hearts, meaning tear their hearts so that they repent, and not merely their external garments. Note that the mishnah emphasizes this message at the very point at which they are describing the intricate ritual of the Taanit. It is as if they wish to warn us of the danger of slipping into “ritualism” a fixation on the external at the expense of the more important internal." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah continues to set the scene for the prayers recited on the special fast days.", + "[When] they stand up to pray they bring down before the ark an old man conversant [with the prayers], one who has children and whose house is empty [of food], so that his heart is complete prayer. This section describes the shaliah tzibbur, the prayer leader. It is critical for the success of the community’s prayers for them to choose a qualified shaliah tzibbur. Their prayers will be mediated through him so as a community this is a consequential choice. The person chosen is not one who sings the best, but one whose prayers will be the most heart felt and who knows the liturgy. The person has to be old, one who has gone through many of life’s experience and is therefore wiser. The person has to have children. A man who has children will pray even harder during a drought because he knows that without rain he will not be able to provide food for them. As hard as it is for a person to suffer, it is even harder for one to watch his/her children suffer. Finally, his house must be empty, for if his house were full, his prayers would be less personal. In short, they would find an old poor person who has children.", + "He recites before them twenty-four benedictions, the eighteen recited daily, to which he adds six. This section begins to describe the contents of the prayers themselves. The Amidah for fast days is made up of the 18 benedictions that are recited every week day, plus another six special blessings, which shall be enumerated in the following mishnah." + ], + [ + "These are they [the six additional benedictions: There are six additional benedictions listed in our mishnah. Our mishnah provides the scriptural verses that are recited as part of these benedictions. In the following mishnah we will learn the additional liturgy attached to each benedictions, liturgy based on verses but composed by the rabbis.", + "Zikhronot, “If there is famine in the land, if there is pestilence” (I Kings 8:37). Shofarot, “The word of the Lord which came to Jeremiah concerning the droughts” (Jeremiah 14). The first two benedictions are the same as two of the three benedictions recited on Rosh Hashanah zikhronot, remembrances and shofarot. These are appropriate for fast days because we are asking God to remember us and deliver us rain and we blow the shofar. Malkhuyot, kingship, the other special benediction for Rosh Hashanah would not be appropriate for a fast day.", + "“In my distress I called to the Lord and He answered me” (Psalm 120). “I turn my eyes to the mountains” (Psalm 121). “Out of the depths I call you, O Lord” (Psalm 130). “A prayer of lowly man when he is faint” (Psalm 102). The other four benedictions consist of Psalms. While the mishnah only mentions the first verse, the meaning is that the entire Psalm is recited.", + "Rabbi Judah says: he need not recite the zikhronot and shofarot, but instead he should recite [the following]: Rabbi Judah disagrees with the recitation of the zikhronot and shofarot and instead offers two other appropriate biblical verses.", + "And he ends each [of the additional six] sections with its appropriate concluding benediction. Each section is ended with an appropriate concluding benediction. These are explicated in tomorrow’s mishnah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah provides liturgical conclusions to the six additional benedictions for the Taanit Amidah. Each conclusion here correlates with one of the seven benedictions in the previous mishnah.\nThe basic structure of this liturgy is quite simple. After having read a Psalm or other biblical passage, the benediction concludes by reminding God of another incident in which He answered Israel’s prayers. It then ends with a concluding benediction.\nThere are actually seven benedictions in our mishnah, but only six are additional. The first “who redeems Israel” is the seventh benediction in every weekday Amidah. The following six are additional.", + "For the first he says: He who answered Abraham on Mt. Moriah, He shall answer you and hear the voice of your cry on this day. Blessed are You Lord who redeems Israel. This first benediction is part of the weekday Amidah. It refers to the binding of Isaac.", + "For the second he says: He who answered our fathers at the Sea of Reeds, He shall answer you and hear the voice of your cry on this day. Blessed are You Lord who remembers all forgotten things. This is the additional benediction called “zikhronot”, remembrances, in the previous mishnah. It refers to the splitting of the Sea of Reeds.", + "For the third he says: He who answered Joshua in Gilgal, He shall answer you and hear the voice of your cry on this day. Blessed are You Lord who hears a blast. This is the additional benediction called “shofarot”. The reference is to Joshua 6-7, when he blew shofarot to destroy the walls of Jericho. In Joshua 5:10 we learn that the Israelites were encamped in Gilgal.", + "For the fourth he says: He who answered Shmuel in Mitzpah, He shall answer you and hear the voice of your cry on this day. Blessed are You Lord who listens to cries. This is a reference to I Samuel 7:5-9 where Shmuel leads the people to a decisive victory over the Philistines.", + "For the fifth he says: He who answered Elijah on Mt. Carmel, He shall answer you and hear the voice of your cry on this day. Blessed are You Lord who hears prayer. This refers to I Kings 18:26-39 where Elijah challenges the false prophets and God sends a fire from heaven to demonstrate that He is the true and only God. Since this episode takes place on Mt. Carmel, it is appropriate for Psalm 121 which begins, “I lift my eyes up to the hills” (Psalms 121). This Psalm is the heart of this benediction, as we learned in yesterday’s mishnah.", + "For the sixth he says: He who answered Jonah in the belly of the fish, He shall answer you and hear the voice of your cry on this day. Blessed are You Lord who answers in time of trouble. A reference to Jonah in the belly of the whale is appropriate to Psalm 130 used in this fifth benediction, since it begins, “Out of the depths I called to You Lord”.", + "For the seventh he says: He who answered David and Shlomo his son in Jerusalem, He shall answer you and hear the voice of your cry on this day. Blessed are You Lord Who has mercy upon the land. God rescued David in a time of famine (II Samuel 21: 1-14). Shlomo prays to God for rain (I Kings 8:35) and to stop a famine (ibid, 37) and God answers him (ibid 9:3). The liturgist mentions David and Shlomo at the end because they were answered in the very type of occasion in which this liturgy was being recited famine or drought. Had the benedictions gone in simple chronological order, David and Shlomo should have been before Elijah and Jonah. The concluding formula, “Who has mercy on the land” is appropriate because Psalm 102 which is part of the benediction includes the verse, “You will surely arise and have mercy on Zion” (v. 14)." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah relates a story in which some people used slightly different liturgy than was dictated in yesterday’s mishnah, and the rabbis objected to this liturgy.", + "It happened in the days of Rabbi Halafta and Rabbi Hanina ben Tradyon that a man passed before the ark [as shaliah tzibbur] and completed the entire benediction and they did not respond, “amen.” [The hazzan called out]: Sound a tekiah, priests, sound a tekiah. [The shaliah tzibbur continued]: He who answered Abraham on Mt. Moriah, He shall answer you and hear the voice of your cry on this day. Then [the hazzan called out]: Sound a teru'ah, sons of Aaron, sound a teru'ah. [The shaliah tzibbur continued]: He who answered our fathers at the Sea of Reeds, He shall answer you and hear the voice of your cry on this day. There seem to be several differences between the customs mentioned here and those in the previous mishnah. First of all the people did not answer “Amen.” According to the Talmud they answered “Blessed is the name of His Kingship forever and ever” instead (this is the line we say after the first line of the Shema). Another difference, according to some commentators, is that they blew the shofar after every benediction, instead of blowing once at the end of the entire Amidah.", + "And when the matter came up before the sages, they said: they only practiced in this way at the eastern gates on the Temple Mount. When the sages heard the report about these practices, they objected. Note that they didn’t say that this practice was completely illegitimate, just that now that the Temple has been destroyed, our practice has changed slightly. To me this seems very typical of rabbinic activity they preserve many earlier practices, but modify them slightly to denote the radical change in the world that occurred during the destruction of the Second Temple." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe priests were divided into twenty-four guards called “mishmarot.” Each guard served in the Temple for one week. Each guard was divided into subsections by the father’s house, and on each day a different father’s house would serve in the Temple. Our mishnah deals with how these guards and father’s houses would act on fast days decreed because of rain.", + "On the first three fasts the men of the guard fast but do not complete their fast, and the men of the father’s house do not fast at all. On the second three fasts the men of the guard fast and complete their fast and the men of the father’s house fast but do not complete their fast. On the last seven both fast and complete their fast, the words of Rabbi Joshua. The fasts are divided into three sets, each set of fasts more serious than the previous one (see above 1:5). The general principle in the mishnah is clear. The “men of the guard” fast less than normal people. Thus during the first three fasts, while other people complete their fast, meaning they fast until the end of the day, the men of the guard end their fast early. The reason is that since they are serving in the Temple, the day is somewhat of a personal holiday for them. However, according to Rabbi Joshua, by the second set of fasts they are already acting like all other people. The “men of the father’s house” are those who are actually serving in the Temple on that day. Since they are actually working, it is an even greater day of celebration for them. To denote this, they don’t fast at all during the first three fasts, they semi-fast during the second set and only begin to fully fast during the last seven fasts.", + "The sages say: on the first three fasts neither fast at all. On the second three, the men of the guard fast but do not complete their fast, and the men of the father’s house do not fast at all. On the last seven, the men of the guard fast and complete their fast and the men of the father’s house fast but do not complete their fast. The sages agree with the general principles of Rabbi Joshua, they are just more lenient than he is at every stage. For instance, on the first three fasts, even the men of the guard don’t fast at all. And even on the last seven, the men of the father’s house don’t fully fast. Assumedly, the other sages hold that serving in the Temple is a greater celebration than Rabbi Joshua thinks." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn the previous mishnah we learned that the men of the guard have to fast more on a Taanit then the “men of the father’s house.” Today’s mishnah teaches another distinction between the two groups, one that has nothing to do with fast days.", + "The men of the guard are permitted to drink wine in the evenings but not during the day, but the men of the father’s house may not [drink wine] either on the day or on the preceding evening. A kohen may not be drunk while serving in the Temple. Our mishnah discusses when during his week of service in the Temple a priest may drink. The men not serving in the Temple on a given day may drink at night. Since there is little work to be done in the Temple at night, they are allowed to drink. However, during the day they may not drink. This is because these kohanim may be asked to replace or supplement those members of the father’s house who are serving on that day. Since they might end up serving in the Temple, they may not drink. The men of the father’s house, who are actually serving in the Temple may not drink either at night or in the day. Even though there is not much work to be done at night, there may be some work so they may not drink.", + "Both the men of the guard and the men of the ma'amad may not cut their hair nor wash their clothes, but on Thursday they may [do so] in honor of Shabbat. Corresponding to the twenty-four divisions of priests, there were twenty-four divisions of Israelites who would offer up special prayers while their corresponding division of priests were serving in the Temple. These groups are called ma’amadim or a ma’amad. The purpose of this set-up is to allow all of Israel to take part in the sacrificial service. This week is special holiday-like time for each group. In order to encourage the men of the ma’amad to cut their hair and wash their clothes before their week, they are not allowed to do so during this week. As an aside, we should note that this is similar to the laws concerning the intermediate days of the festival (we shall learn these when we learn Tractate Moed Katan). However, they may cut their hair and wash their clothes on Thursday in preparation for the coming of Shabbat. Again we see what an important place Shabbat played in their lives." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn mishnaic times there existed a scroll called “Megillat Taanit”, which literally translates as “Scroll of Fasts.” Despite its name, the scroll does not contain a list of fasts but rather a list of days on which it is forbidden to eulogize at funerals and/or fast. Most of these days were commemorations of various military victories that occurred throughout the Second Temple period, from the Hasmonean period in the mid-second century B.C.E. through the Roman period in the subsequent centuries. By Talmudic times these days were mostly forgotten and neglected. The only two that were still observed were Hannukah and Purim.", + "[With regard to every day] about which it is written in the Scroll of Fasts (Megillat “One may not eulogize” on the preceding day it is prohibited but on the following day it is permitted. Rabbi Yose says: it is forbidden [to mourn] both on the preceding day and on the following day. Concerning some of the days listed in Megillat Taanit, it says that one may not eulogize because eulogies are a sign of mourning. For these days it is prohibited to eulogize also on the previous day, but not on the subsequent day. Rabbi Yose holds that for these days one may not offer a eulogy on the preceding or on the following day.", + "[On days about which it is written], “One may not fast” on the preceding day and on the following day it is permitted. Rabbi Yose says: on the preceding day it is forbidden but on the following day it is permitted. Days concerning which it is written “One may not fast” are somewhat lesser than days concerning which it is written “One may not eulogize.” Therefore, for these days one may fast on both the preceding and following days. Rabbi Yose is again slightly stricter and allows fasting only on the following day but not on the preceding day." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses on what day the series of fasts can begin.", + "They do not decree upon the community a fast to begin on a Thursday in order not to cause a rise in the market prices. There are several explanations as to why the market prices will rise if a series of fasts is decreed on Thursday. One explanation is that if the store owners see people buying big meals on a Thursday, a meal for the end of the fast and large meals for Shabbat, they will think that a famine has struck and they will raise the prices. This is not a problem on Monday which is not next to Shabbat and so people are buying less food. Another explanation is that fasting so close to Shabbat will cause the storeowners to think that there will be a great panic and they will raise the prices. Yet another explanation is that since the villagers bring the food to sell in the market on Thursday, and they will not know that there is a fast ahead of time, they will not bring enough food for the Shabbat and the break-fast meal and the great demand will cause a rise in the prices. What I find interesting is that in times of crisis the rabbis were cautious not to impose additional financial hardships by decreeing fasts.", + "Rather the first three fasts are held [in this order], Monday, Thursday, and Monday; the second three, Thursday, Monday, and Thursday. Rabbi Yose says: just as the first three [fasts] should not begin on a Thursday so too neither the second [three] nor the last [seven]. According to the first opinion, while the first three fasts do not begin on Thursday, the second set does. Since the second set is not the beginning of the entire series but rather just a continuation of it, they need not fear that starting on Thursday will cause prices to rise. Rabbi Yose holds that none of the series of fasts begins on Thursday." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with fast days that come into conflict with other various holidays.", + "They do not ordain upon the community a fast on Rosh Hodesh, on Hanukkah, or on Purim, but if they had already begun [a series of fasts and one of these days intervened] they do not interrupt [their fasts], the words of Rabban Gamaliel. According to Rabban Gamaliel, the court may not decree that a series of fast days begins on any of these holidays. However, if a series of fast days had begun and then one of these holidays landed on a Monday or Thursday on which people were supposed to fast, they do indeed fast.", + "Rabbi Meir said: even though Rabban Gamaliel said that the [fasts] should not be interrupted he agrees that they should not complete their fasts. Rabbi Meir says that when Rabban Gamaliel said that Rosh Hodesh, Hannukah and Purim do not interrupt if the series of fasts had already begun, he nevertheless agrees that on these days they should not complete their fasts until the evening. In this way people will signify in at least some way that the day still has some celebratory character to it.", + "And the same applies to the Ninth of Av should it fall on Friday. In the days in which the monthly calendar was not predetermined, the Ninth of Av (Tisha B’av) could fall on Friday. Today this cannot happen. If this happens they do not complete the fast, due to the honor accorded to Shabbat, so that they shouldn’t begin Shabbat with ravenous hunger. Another reason seems to be that there is a mitzvah to add on to Shabbat at both the beginning and at the end. If one fasts during this period he is diminishing the joy of a time of day when he should already be celebrating." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah teaches that sometimes we skip the order of fasts that was taught in the previous two chapters and we proceed straight to the last set of fasts, when we blow the shofar and fast for the entire day.", + "The order of public fasts mentioned above is enacted because of [lack of] the first rain, but if the crops have undergone [an unusual] change they sound a blast immediately. If it doesn’t rain during the first season in which rain should come, then we begin the series of fasts that was described in the previous two chapters. However, if the crops start to look as if they are going bad, then the situation is obviously more serious. In such a case we skip the first two sets of fasts and go right to the third set, the set where we blast the shofar. The change of the crops appearance is far more serious and therefore it calls for an immediate sounding of the alarm.", + "Similarly, if the rain has stopped for forty days between one rainfall and the next, they sound a blast immediately, because it is a plague of drought. Another case in which we skip immediately to blowing the shofar and fasting for the entire day is a situation in which it began to rain but then stopped raining for forty days. Such a situation foreshadows drought and therefore it is especially dangerous." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to discuss situations in which they would immediately skip to the latter stages of fasting.", + "If [rain] falls for crops but not for the trees, for the trees but not for crops, for both of these but not for cisterns, ditches and caves they sound a blast immediately. Light rain is good for the crops because crops don’t need the rain to penetrate deep into the land. However, it is not good for the trees. Heavy rain is good for the trees but not good for the crops. Finally, it requires very heavy rain to fill up the cisterns, ditches and caves so that people will have drinking water. According to the mishnah if it rains but there is not sufficient or appropriate rain for every one of these categories, they skip the first stage and go immediately to the stage of more serious fasting, as we described in yesterday’s mishnah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah teaches that if the drought was local, then the fasts are only performed locally as well.", + "And so too a city, upon which no rain has fallen as it is written, “And I caused it to rain upon one city, and I caused it not to rain upon another city; one piece was rained upon…” (Amos 4:7) that city fasts and they sound a blast, but those [in the places] around it fast but do not sound the alarm. Rabbi Akiva says: they sound the alarm but do not fast. The quote from Amos shows that droughts can be localized and that God can send a drought upon one city, but not upon another. In such a case that city fasts and performs the entire ritual. The surrounding cities partially join in the fast as a show of support. However they do not fully join in, because it is, after all, raining in their city. It seems that partial fasting/sounding the shofar is to show both their empathy for their fellow Israelites and yet at the same time show their gratitude to God for causing it to rain on their town. The sages and Rabbi Akiva debate concerning which part of the fasting ritual is observed by those in the neighboring town. The sages say that they fast but do not blow the shofar whereas Rabbi Akiva holds the opposite." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to discussed localized fasts, the topic begun in yesterday’s mishnah.", + "And so too a city which has a plague or [its buildings] collapse that city fasts and they sound a blast, but those [in the places] around it fast but do not sound the alarm. Rabbi Akiva says: they sound the alarm but do not fast. This section is basically the same as yesterday’s mishnah, it just mentions plagues and building collapse as opposed to rain. Just as Rabbi Akiva and the sages debated what the surrounding cities do in the case of drought, so too they debate these cases.", + "What constitutes a plague? If in a city that can supply five hundred foot-soldiers and three deaths occurred on three consecutive days, behold this constitutes a plague, less than this is not a plague. This section differentiates between a plague and isolated instances of death. For something to be a plague a certain percentage of the people of a town must die within a certain amount of time. The mishnah’s answers its question by stating that if the town is large enough to send out 500 foot-soldiers, meaning 500 men who are at an age capable of fighting in the army, and three people die of disease in three days, then they can declare an official plague and observe a fast. If less people die then it is not a plague and they need not fast. We should note that it is not clear if the law would be different if the city could produce 1,000 soldiers, or 10,000 soldiers. Would more people have to die in the same time period in order for it to be a plague? Can a plague be declared in a town with fewer people? These questions are not directly addressed by the mishnah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn the previous mishnayot we learned of situations in which the people of the town effected by the plague fast and sound the shofar and the people in the neighboring towns do not fully participate. In our mishnah we learn for certain plagues, not only the people of the town directly effected participate, but also the people of all the surrounding towns as well.", + "For these they sound a blast in all places: for the drying up of crops (shidafon), for plant disease, for locusts, and for the hasil (a type of locust), for wild beasts and for the sword they sound a blast for these are plagues likely to spread. All of these plagues are likely to spread; therefore, even though they may have directly effected only one part of the region, everyone must fast and sound the shofar." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah gives two concrete cases in which sages decreed fasts.", + "It once happened that elders went down from Jerusalem to their own cities and ordered a fast because there was seen in Ashkelon a shidafon which affected as much grain as would fill an oven [with loaves]. A shidafon is a drying up of the crops, an event referred to in the previous mishnah. This story teaches that the amount of shidafon-effected crops necessary to justify decreeing a fast is enough grain to bake sufficient loaves to fill an oven. While I do not know exactly how much grain this is, it does not seem to be a particularly large amount.", + "They also decreed a fast because wolves devoured two children on the other side of the Jordan. Rabbi Yose says: not because they devoured [the children] but [merely] because they were seen. This is another case addressed by yesterday’s mishnah a plague of wild beasts. There is a debate about whether the wolves were merely seen or whether they actually devoured two children." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nGenerally, one does not fast or sound a shofar blast in alarm on Shabbat. However, sometimes disaster is so imminent that they sound a blast even on Shabbat.\nWe should note that there is a debate concerning whether they fast on Shabbat.", + "For these matters they sound a blast even on Shabbat: if a city is besieged by Gentile [troops] or a river, or if a ship is foundering on the sea. The impending disasters referred to here are so immediate that they would blow the shofar even on Shabbat. However, on all other occasions they would wait until after Shabbat to begin blowing the shofar and fasting.", + "Rabbi Yose says: [they sound a blast] for help but not for an outcry (for the sake of. Rabbi Yose says that they blow the shofar so that people will come and help but that they don’t blow the shofar on Shabbat as part of a prayer ritual. Accordingly, the special prayers are not added on Shabbat.", + "Shimon the Yemenite says: also for a plague, but the sages did not agree with him. Rabbi Yose says that a plague should also belong on this list. However, the other sages do not agree with him. According to their opinion, a plague is less of an imminent danger and hence they mention it above in mishnah four." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah contains the famous story of Honi the circle drawer, who demanded that God bring rain and his prayers were effective.", + "For every trouble that should not come upon the community they sound a blast except on account of too much rain. It happened that they said to Honi the circle drawer: “Pray for rain to fall.” He replied: “Go and bring in the pesah ovens so that they do not dissolve.” He prayed and no rain fell. What did he do? He drew a circle and stood within it and exclaimed before Him: “Master of the universe, Your children have turned their faces to me because I am like one who was born in Your house. I swear by Your great name that I will not move from here until You have mercy upon Your children.” Rain then began to drip, and he exclaimed: “I did not request this but rain [which can fill] cisterns, ditches and caves. The rain then began to come down with great force, and he exclaimed: “I did not request this but pleasing rain of blessing and abudance.” Rain then fell in the normal way until the Jews in Jerusalem had to go up Temple Mount because of the rain. They came and said to him: “In the same way that you prayed for [the rain] to fall pray [now] for the rain to stop.” He replied: “Go and see if the stone of people claiming lost objects has washed away.” Rabbi Shimon ben Shetah sent to him: “Were you not Honi I would have excommunicated you, but what can I do to you, for you are spoiled before God and he does your will like a son that is spoiled before his father and his father does his request. Concerning you it is written, “Let your father and your mother rejoice, and let she that bore you rejoice” (Proverbs 23:25). “That should not come upon the community” is a euphemism. The mishnah is actually referring to troubles that do come upon the community. An overabundance of rain is not a blessing and can actually destroy the crops and endanger people’s lives. However, since rain is usually a blessing and is so scarce in the land of Israel, one doesn’t pray for rain to stop. It’s as if we don’t want to risk God’s anger by asking him to stop the rain, after having already asked for it to begin to rain. The story itself probably needs little explaining. The people turn to Honi the circle maker, so named because in order to bring rain he would draw a circle around himself and not move until rain came. Assumedly, Honi was famous as a rainmaker, a well-known profession in pre-modern societies dependant upon rainfall. Honi responds with exaggerated confidence, telling them that he will bring so much rain that even the ovens used to roast the pesah offerings, the strongest ovens that they usually had, would begin to melt. Honi proceeds to draw his circle and demand that God bring rain. God answers his call, but then Honi refines his request and demands proper rain, rain which is not too weak and not too strong (but just right!). Eventually, the necessary type of rain does begin to fall and continues to fall until the people must abandon the lower places in Jerusalem and flee to the Temple Mount for safety. Heeding the halakhah with which this mishnah began, Honi refuses to pray for rain to stop until a famous stone has dissolved, which is an exaggerated way of saying that he will not pray for the rain to stop, even though it is endangering their lives. This is a key point in the mishnah. Even though Honi is a miracle worker, someone who seems to be outside the normal circle of rabbis, he still obeys the halakhah and there is a limit to what even he will ask for. Rabbi Shimon ben Shetah’s rebuke to Honi is probably even more telling as to the point of this mishnah than Honi’s prayer itself. Indeed, in my opinion the rebuke is the reason that the mishnah is here in the first place. In the beginning of this mishnah we learned that people should not act with chutzpah when asking for rain. Honi, who God treats like a son, is somewhat of an exception. He can have that chutzpah in front of God, because God spoils Honi like a son. We often let our children get away with things that we won’t allow others to get away with. Others who would act like Honi will probably not have their requests answered and may indeed be rebuked for their presumptuous behavior. One might go so far as to say that the message of this mishnah is one of simultaneous nearness and distance. Certain human beings do have the possibility of drawing close enough to God that God will heed their every request. Humanity as a whole can achieve true closeness to God. However, such a relationship cannot be expected or presumed. As individuals we should not look at ourselves as being on the level of Honi. For most of us, we must respect the fact that there is a vast distance separating us from God and that if we were to make a demand, it might very well be ignored. Indeed, the entire tractate has been consistently cognizant with the fact that prayers are often simply not answered." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses what happens if they begin to fast and then it rains on the fast day.", + "If while they are fasting rain falls: If before sunrise they do not complete the fast, If after sunrise, they do complete the fast. The fast actually begins at sunrise. Therefore if it rains before sunrise then the rain has begun before the fast and there is no reason to fast. However, if it rains after sunrise they must continue and complete the fast.", + "Rabbi Eliezer says: if before noon they do not complete the fast, if after noon they do complete it. Noon is when most people eat their mid-day meal, the main meal of the day. One who does not eat until noon is not really fasting, even though he may not have eaten. Therefore, according to Rabbi Eliezer, if it rains before noon it is as if they have not yet begun the fast and they do not have to complete it. If it rains after noon they must complete the fast.", + "It happened that the rabbis decreed a fast in Lod and rain fell before noon. Rabbi Tarfon said to them: go, eat and drink and make a holiday. They went and ate and drank and observed the day as a holiday and at evening time they came and recited the Hallel Hagadol. In this section we have a story that illustrates Rabbi Eliezer’s halakhah and goes even further. Not only did they end their fast, but they went out and celebrated the arrival of the rain. In the evening they recited Hallel Hagadol, which is Psalm 136, which contains the line “He provides food for all living creatures”, a line especially significant on the day when it begins to rain." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nDuring regular weekday prayers, the priests offer a priestly benediction as part of the Amidah. This consists of their lifting up their hands and reciting Numbers 6:24-26. The priestly benediction is normally done only during Shacharit, the morning service and not at Minhah. On Shabbatot and holidays that have a Mussaf service, it is also done during Mussaf. It is not normally done during Minhah because it is feared that the kohen may have drunk some wine during the day and it is forbidden to recite the priestly blessing while drunk. Such a concern does not exist on fast days, when the priests would not be drinking wine.\nThe mishnah also teaches that on fast days another service is added, Neilah, which means “closing [of the gates].” This service is added as a special additional supplication.", + "On three occasions during the year, on fast days, on ma’amadot, and on Yom Kippur the priests lift up their hands to bless [the people] four times during the day--at Shaharit, at Mussaf, at Minhah and at Neilah. Ma’amadot is an institution that was mentioned in passing above in 2:7 and will be explained in greater detail in tomorrow’s mishnah. On these three types of days the priests offer the priestly blessing every time there is a prayer service. According to the Babylonian Talmud, the mishnah is not entirely accurate since there is no Mussaf service on fast days or on ma’amadot. What the mishnah means to say is that every time there is a prayer service, the priests lift up their hands four times on Yom Kippur and three times on the other occasions. However, other sources seem to hold that there is a Mussaf service on fast days and on ma’amadot." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah explains what the “ma’madot” were and their origins.", + "What are the ma’amadot? Since it is said, “Command the children of Israel and say to them: My offering, My food” (Numbers 28:2). Now how can a man’s offering be offered and he is not present? [Therefore] the former prophets instituted twenty-four mishmarot (guards). For each mishmar there was a ma’amad [at the Temple] in Jerusalem consisting of priests, Levites and Israelites. When the time came for the mishmar to go up [to Jerusalem] the priests and Levites went up to Jerusalem and the Israelites of that mishmar assembled in their cities and read the story of creation. Numbers 28:2 states, “Command the Children of Israel saying: Of my near-offering, my food, as my fire-offerings, my soothing savor, you are to be in charge, bringing it near to me at its appointed time” (this translation is from Everett Fox, who translates very literally.) This verse is said in reference to the tamid offering. The verse seems to imply that each Israelite is to offer the tamid and yet it is obviously impossible for all of Israel to be personally responsible for one offering. The ma’amadot are a means through which all of Israel is able participate in the tamid, the one offering that is offered twice every day. The ma’amadot correspond to the mishmarot, the twenty-four groups of priests each of which serves one week in the Temple. It is not entirely clear what made up the maamad. According to one interpretation the maamad a group of priests and Levites who were not serving in the Temple together with some Israelites who would go to Jerusalem. According to another interpretation the priests and Levites were part of the mishmar and the Israelites were part of the maamad. When time came for the mishmar to go to Jerusalem, the priests and Levites would go to Jerusalem and the Israelites from that mishmar, those who were not part of the maamad, would gather together in their cities and begin to read the story of the creation of the world, as we shall learn tomorrow. We should note just how foundational this institution may have been in rabbinic thought. The sacrificial service is the most elitist element in Judaism in order to participate one must be a kohen; even Levites can only partially participate. Since one can only be born a kohen, there is no way for most of Israel to participate in this most central aspect of Judaism. By instituting the “ma’amadot” the rabbis seem to have found a way to make Judaism far more egalitarian. While it is still true that Israelites are limited as to what they can do, they are allowed to take part in this type of worship of God and it seems that their participation is not considered less significant than that of the kohanim themselves." + ], + [ + "The men of the maamad fasted on four days of that week, from Monday to Thursday; they did not fast on Friday out of respect for Shabbat or on Sunday in order not to switch from the rest and delight [of Shabbat] to weariness and fasting and [thereby] die.
On Sunday [they read], “In the beginning,” and, “Let there be a firmament;”
On Monday, “Let there be a firmament,” and, “Let the waters be gathered together;”
On Tuesday, “Let the waters be gathered together,” and, “Let there be lights;”
On Wednesday, “Let there be lights,” and, “Let the waters swarm;”
On Thursday, “Let the waters swarm,” and, “Let the earth bring forth;”
On Friday, “Let the earth bring forth,” and, “And the heavens [and the earth] were completed.”
For a long section two people read and for a short section one person. [This is how they would read] at Shacharit and Mussaf.
And at minhah they assemble and read the section by heart, as they recite the Shema.
On Friday at minhah they did not assemble out of respect for Shabbat.
This mishnah mostly discusses what portions of the Torah were read during the maamad.
Section one: The men of the maamad fasted most of the week every day from Monday through Thursday. They only fasted from the morning until the night. Fasting on Friday was not considered to be respectful to Shabbat because they that would cause them enter Shabbat with a ravenous appetite. They didn’t fast on Sunday because it was considered dangerous to eat a lot on Shabbat and then fast on Sunday.
Sections two-seven: Every day of the week they would read two portions concerning the creation. This allowed them to read about all seven days within six days.
Section eight: A long section, one with more than three verses is read by two people, but a portion of only three verses is read by one person. Every day there were three aliyot to the Torah. If the first section was more than three verses, let’s say it was five verses, the first person would read the entire section and then the second person would read the third through the sixth verse. This way there would always be three aliyot and never an aliyah of less three verses.
Section nine: At minhah (the afternoon service) they would assemble but they would read by heart without using a Torah scroll.
Section ten: On Friday at minhah they wouldn’t gather together because people were getting ready for Shabbat." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah teaches that on certain days they wouldn’t do the special maamad prayers at certain services.", + "On any day when there is Hallel there was no maamad at Shaharit; [On the day when] there is a Musaf-offering, there was no [maamad] at Ne'ilah. [On the day of] the wood-offering, there was no [maamad] at Minhah, the words of Rabbi Akiva. According to Rabbi Akiva, on days when there is Hallel but no Musaf, such as Hannukah, they wouldn’t do the maamad at Shacharit, but they would do it at Minhah and Neilah. On days when there is a Musaf offering, they wouldn’t do the maamad at Neilah. This is understood to mean that even at Neilah they wouldn’t do the service, all the more so at Shacharit, Musaf and Minhah. Most commentators explain that this mishnah refers to those people of the maamad who were in Jerusalem. They were so busy on these days that they didn’t have time to take care of their duties and recite all of the maamad prayers. The previous mishnah, according to which maamad prayers were recited on days which have Musaf, refers to those people of the maamad who were outside of Jerusalem. The wood-offering refers to the bringing of wood to the Temple by certain families who would volunteer to do so. On this day they would offer a special sacrifice and they would make it into a holiday. According to Rabbi Akiva on these special days there was no maamad at Minhah but there was at Neilah. The next mishnah will discuss this at greater length.", + "Ben Azzai said to him: Thus did Rabbi Joshua learn: [On the day when] there is a Musaf-offering, there was no [maamad] at Minhah; [On the day of] the wood-offering, there was no [maamad] at Ne’ilah. Rabbi Akiva retracted and learned like Ben Azzai. Ben Azzai tells Rabbi Akiva that Rabbi Joshua disagrees with him concerning two of the three halakhot which he stated. On days with Musaf, there is no maamad at Minhah but there is at Neilah. However, on days when there was a wood-offering, there was no maamad even at Neilah. Upon hearing Rabbi Joshua’s tradition, Rabbi Akiva retracted his statement." + ], + [ + "The times of the wood of the priests and the people was nine:
On the first of Nisan the family Arah of Yehudah.
On the twentieth of Tammuz the family of David of Yehudah.
On the fifth of Av the family of Parosh of Yehudah.
On the seventh of the same month, the family of Yonadav of Rechav.
On the tenth of the same month, the family of Snaah of Benjamin.
On the fifteenth of the same month, the family of Zattu of Yehudah, and with them were the priests and Levites and all those who were not certain of their tribe and the family of Gonve Eli and the family of Kotze Ketizot.
On the twentieth of the same month the family of Pahat Moav of Yehudah.
On the twentieth of Elul the family of Adin of Yehudah.
On the first of Tevet the family of Parosh of Yehudah [offered] a second time.
On the first of Tevet there was no maamad for there was Hallel, Musaf and the wood-festival.
This mishnah teaches that there were nine fixed dates during the year upon which certain families would bring wood to the altar. The mishnah seems to relate and expand upon what is stated in Nehemiah 10:35 by those who returned to the land of Israel after the first exile, “We have cast lots [among] the priests, the Levites and the people, to bring the wood-offering to the House of our God by clans annually at set times in order to provide fuel for the altar of the Lord our God, as is written in the Teaching.” The name for these donations, “The wood of the priests and the people” comes from the beginning of this verse. The Talmud teaches that even if there was already enough wood in the Temple, the wood donated by these families took priority, and would be used first.
We might also note that the very idea of celebrating and commemorating the bringing of wood to the Temple attests to how valuable and scarce wood was at those times in the land of Israel. It remains to this day a relatively scarce commodity.
Section one: This family is mentioned in Ezra 2:5 and Nehemiah 7:10.
Section three: Mentioned in Ezra 2:3, Nehemiah 7:5.
Section four: The “Rechavites” seem to have been some sort of separatist sect that existed during the First Temple period and continued to exist as a family in the Second Temple period. Jeremiah 35 is mostly about this sect. For more information you can look up the article on them in the Encyclopedia Judaica.
Section five: Mentioned in Ezra 2:35; Nehemiah 7:38.
Section six: Zattu is mentioned in Ezra 2:8 and Nehemiah 7:13. On this day other priests and Levites brought wood as well as anyone who didn’t know what tribe they were from. There were also two other families who donated wood on that day.
Section seven: Mentioned in Ezra 2:6; Nehemiah 7:11.
Section eight: Ezra 2:15; Nehemiah 7:20.
Section nine: This is the same family that already gave on the fifth of Av.
Section ten: The first of Tevet is both Rosh Hodesh and Hannukah. Because of Hallel (recited because of Hannukah) there was no maamad during Shacharit, as we learned in yesterday’s mishnah. The Mussaf and wood-offerings meant that there would be no other maamad either. This seems to be the only day during the year that could have both a wood-offering, mussaf and a full Hallel. Note that during those days Hallel was not recited on Rosh Hodesh. Today half a Hallel is recited." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah lists events that occurred and are therefore commemorated on two fast days the seventeenth of Tammuz and the ninth of Av. There are two connections between this mishnah and the rest of the tractate. First of all, this is tractate Taanit, so it is a natural place for the mishnah to discuss fast days. Secondly, the previous mishnah dealt with the importance of specific dates.", + "There were five events that happened to our ancestors on the seventeenth of Tammuz and five on the ninth of Av.
On the seventeenth of Tammuz: The tablets were shattered; The tamid ( offering was cancelled; The [walls] of the city were breached; And Apostomos burned the Torah, and placed an idol in the Temple. There were five events that occurred on the seventeenth of Tammuz, which is considered a “minor” fast day, because the fast begins only at sunrise and the only prohibition is eating and drinking. 1) Moshe broke the first set of tablets. 2) On the seventeenth of Tammuz, shortly before the Second Temple was destroyed, they ran out of sheep to sacrifice and hence they had to cancel the tamid, the daily offering. 3) The Romans breached the walls of the city of Jerusalem. 4) Apostomos, an unidentified Greek or Roman burned a Torah scroll and 5) placed an idol in the Temple. The placing of an idol in the Temple by foreign rulers happened on several occasions throughout both the First and teh Second Temple period and hence it is impossible to identify with precision who Apostomos was. Indeed, according to the Yerushalmi it was not Apostomos who put the idol in the Templ but rather Menashe, the king of Israel see II Kings 21:7.", + "On the ninth of Av It was decreed that our ancestors should not enter the land, The Temple was destroyed the first And the second time, Betar was captured, And the city was plowed up. There were five events that occurred on the ninth of Av, which besides Yom Kippur is the only major fast in the Jewish calendar. 1) After the people of Israel believed the bad report of the ten spies over that of Joshua and Caleb, God decreed that no one over the age of twenty would make it into the land of Canaan (see Numbers 14:29). 2 +3) Both Temples were destroyed, the first by the Babylonians in 586 B.C.E. and the second by the Romans in 70 C.E. The first Temple was set aflame on the ninth and burnt on the Tenth see Jeremiah 52:12-13. 4) Betar, an important Jewish stronghold during the Bar-Kochba revolt fell to the Romans. 5) After the Bar Kochba rebellion was defeated, the Romans plowed over the city, destroying any remaining buildings and quashing any hopes that the Temple would be rebuilt.", + "When Av enters, they limit their rejoicing. Av is the counterpart to Adar. When the month of Adar begins we increase our celebration, in anticipation of Purim, a holiday of salvation. When the month of Av enters, we decrease celebrations, on account of Tisha B’av, the greatest day of mourning on the Jewish calendar. In tomorrow’s mishnah we will learn of some mourning practices customary during the first nine days of Av." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah talks about the week which leads up to Tisha B’av and the day before.", + "During the week in which the ninth of Av falls it is forbidden to cut the hair and to wash clothes but on Thursday it is permitted in honor of Shabbat. Starting in the week in which Tisha B’av falls one begins to mourn by not cutting hair (this includes shaving) or washing clothes. However, if Tisha B’av falls on Friday then it is permitted to cut one’s hair and wash one’s clothes on Thursday in preparation for Shabbat. In today’s calendar Tisha B’av can never fall on Friday or on Shabbat. We should also note that in Ashkenazi tradition these prohibitions begin with the seventeenth of Tammuz, three weeks before Tisha B’av.", + "On the eve of the ninth of Av one should not eat a meal of two cooked dishes, nor should he eat meat or drink wine. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: one should make change [his diet.] The meal before Tisha B’av is supposed to be a simple meal, one that does not consist of two cooked dishes, nor meat or wine. This sharply contrasts with Yom Kippur, before which one is mandated to have a large meal in celebration of the coming holiday. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel is more flexible with regard to this meal. He just mandates that one change his normal eating habits. If one normally has two cooked dishes, one should have only one. If one normally eats a lot of meat, one should just have a little.", + "Rabbi Judah obligated turning over the bed, but the sages did not agree with him. Turning over the bed is a sign of mourning. In the time of the mishnah it was the custom of mourners to turn over their beds as a sign of the overturning of their worlds which occurred when they lost a relative. Rabbi Judah says that on Tisha B’av everyone should turn over their beds as a sign of the collective mourning of the people. However, the other sages disagree with him." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nTractate Taanit, a sad tractate which deals with drought and other distressful events and the fasts that Jews take upon themselves to ask for forgiveness from their sins, ends with a mishnah about the two happiest days in the Jewish calendar, the fifteenth of Av and Yom Kippur.", + "Section one: Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel said: There were no days of joy in Israel greater than the fifteenth of Av and Yom Kippur. Section two: On these days the daughters of Jerusalem would go out in borrowed white garments in order not to shame any one who had none. All these garments required immersion. The daughters of Jerusalem come out and dance in the vineyards. What would they say? Young man, lift up your eyes and see what you choose for yourself. Do not set your eyes on beauty but set your eyes on the family. “Grace is deceitful, and beauty is vain, but a woman that fears the Lord, she shall be praised” (Proverbs 31:30). And it further says, “Give her of the fruit of her hands; and let her works praise her in the gates” (ibid, 31:31). Section three: Similarly it says, “O maidens of Zion, go forth and gaze upon King Solomon wearing the crown that his mother gave him on his wedding day, on the day of the gladness of his heart” (Song of Songs 3:11). “On his wedding day”: this refers to Matan Torah (the Giving of the Torah). “And on the day of the gladness of his heart”: this refers to the building of the Temple; may it be rebuilt speedily in our days, Amen. There are several reasons why the fifteenth of Av became a day of celebration. First of all, as we learned in mishnah five above, this is the date when most families would have made their wood donation. The Talmud provides several other reasons. One of these is that on this day people from different tribes were allowed to intermarry. Another explanation is that on this day the Israelites in the desert who were to die before they entered into the land of Israel stopped dying. Anyone who made it through this day in the fortieth year in the desert knew that he was going to make it to the land of Canaan. Yom Kippur is a day of celebration for on it Jews receive atonement for their sins. Yom Kippur, in sharp contrast with Tisha B’av, is not a day of mourning, but rather a day of celebration. Furthermore, according to tradition, the second set of the Tablets were given to Israel on Yom Kippur, which is in essence collective forgiveness for the sin of the golden calf.", + "These two days were like an ancient Sadie Hawkins day (if you don’t know what this is, you can google it to find out), except instead of the girls chasing the boys, the girls would go out to the field and let the boys come and chase them. The girls would go out to the field in white clothes and dance and let the boys choose for themselves brides. These clothes were borrowed so that girls who could not afford a nice white garment would not be embarrassed. The garments would be immersed before they were worn so that they would be pure. The whole ceremony seems to be geared towards encouraging the boys to choose their girls not based on their looks or wealth but based on their families and piety. In mishnaic times, and indeed in many traditional cultures, “yihus” being from a good family was probably the most important consideration in arranging marriages.", + "Taanit ends with a midrash which which was originally not part of the mishnah as it is missing in manuscripts. It was probably added to the end of Taanit as a prayer for the restoration of the Temple, and to end a depressing tractate on an upbeat note of hope and consolation. It connects to the previous section because of its reference to girls going out. Furthermore, the day under discussion in this midrash is understood to be Yom Kippur, the day on which the second set of Tablets was given. Yom Kippur commemorates the past, and gives us hope for the future as well, for a time in which the Temple will be rebuilt. Congratulations! We have finished Taanit. It is a tradition at this point to thank God for helping us finish learning the tractate and to commit ourselves to going back and relearning it, so that we may not forget it and so that its lessons will stay with us for all of our lives. Taanit is perhaps one of the most “theological” of tractates for it is all about how God responds to our misdeeds and how we respond to God’s rebuking. One can look at the fasts as a way for Jews to remind themselves that they constantly need to be checking their own behavior, to looking at how we relate to each other and to the rest of the world and that our actions have an effect on our world. While it is probably hard for us to share an overly simplistic theology we do bad things, God punishes us directly and immediately, we pray and fast and things get better the deeper message of the tractate seems to be a push for our own atonement and for our own sensitivity to crisis in the world. According to the tractate there is meaning in history and events and it is up to humans to learn how to respond properly. There is also a lot in the tractate about the cycles of rejoicing and mourning. As always, congratulations on learning another tractate of Mishnah. Tomorrow we begin Megillah. " + ] + ] + ] + }, + "schema": { + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה תענית", + "enTitle": "English Explanation of Mishnah Taanit", + "key": "English Explanation of Mishnah Taanit", + "nodes": [ + { + "heTitle": "הקדמה", + "enTitle": "Introduction" + }, + { + "heTitle": "", + "enTitle": "" + } + ] + } +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Moed/English Explanation of Mishnah Taanit/English/merged.json b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Moed/English Explanation of Mishnah Taanit/English/merged.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..18efa857f93f1003530341c218d25d6044569c3f --- /dev/null +++ b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Moed/English Explanation of Mishnah Taanit/English/merged.json @@ -0,0 +1,232 @@ +{ + "title": "English Explanation of Mishnah Taanit", + "language": "en", + "versionTitle": "merged", + "versionSource": "https://www.sefaria.org/English_Explanation_of_Mishnah_Taanit", + "text": { + "Introduction": [ + "Tractate Taanit is about the practice of fasting and offering special prayers in times of trouble, especially during a drought. The Bible is full of examples of the Israelites fasting, praying and engaging in other forms of supplication in order to entreat God to respond to their needs. The most famous of these cases is probably Esther who calls for a three-day fast to ensure her success and safety when entering in to speak to the king. See also Joel 1:14; Jeremiah 14:11-12; Jonah 3:5-8; Nehemiah 9:1; Daniel 9:3 and others. ", + "Numbers 10:9 was used by the rabbis as toraitic proof for this concept. The verse states, “And when you come into battle in your land against the foe who assails you, you shall let out a long blast with the trumpets and be remembered before the Lord your God and be rescued from your enemies.” According to the rabbis the specific example of blowing trumpets in times of war is a paradigm for all times of trouble. There is a positive commandment in the Torah to cry out to God in all times of trouble, to blow shofars and to fast as well. The days of fast described in our mishnah were accompanied by special prayers, by trumpet and shofar blasts and sometimes by work-stoppages. ", + "As we study the tractate we shall constantly note how important rain was in the land of Israel in mishnaic times. Rain is still critical to the well-being of those who live in this arid region, although modern technology has to a certain measure alleviated short-term crises. In ancient times, a season with no or little rain would have been an utter disaster. Crops would have failed, livestock would have died or been in danger of dying, and people would not have had enough water to drink. By the sheer amount of material that the rabbis devote to this subject, we can see just how important this was for their lives." + ], + "": [ + [ + [ + "Introduction\nDuring the rainy season during the second part of the Amidah, in the paragraph about God’s power, we add in the words “He causes the wind to blow and the rain to fall.” In our mishnah Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Joshua debate when we begin to say this phrase.", + "From when do they mention the powers of [bringing] rain? Rabbi Eliezer says: from the first day of the Festival [of Sukkot]. Rabbi Joshua says: on the last day of the Festival [of Sukkot]. This is the question that is debated in this mishnah when do we begin to mention that God has the power to bring rain? Both sages agree that we begin during Sukkot they argue over whether we begin mentioning rain on the first or on the last day of Sukkot.", + "Rabbi Joshua said to him: Since rain on the Festival is nothing but a sign of [God’s] curse why should he mention it? Rain on Sukkot is considered to be a rebuke by God (see Sukkah 2:9) because it prevents one from being able to dwell (eat and sleep) in the Sukkah. Therefore, Rabbi Joshua argues, it does not make sense to mention God’s rain-giving powers at this time.", + "Rabbi Eliezer said to him: I also did not say to request [rain] but to make mention, “He causes the wind to blow and the rain to fall” in its due season. Rabbi Eliezer agrees that rain on Sukkot is a curse. However, he responds that he was not suggesting that we ask for rain at the beginning of Sukkot, but rather that we just mention that God has the power to bring rain in its due season. We ask for rain in the ninth blessing of the Amidah when we say, “And provide dew and rain (ten tal umatar).”", + "He replied to him: if so one should at all times make mention of it. Rabbi Joshua responds that if all we are doing in this prayer is mentioning rain, why not mention it all throughout the year. The fact that Rabbi Eliezer agrees that we only mention it during the rainy season means that he too agrees that it is connected with actual rain. If so, then he should also agree that we shouldn’t mention it until the time when we hope that the rainy season will actually begin, that is at the end of Sukkot when we are done sitting in the sukkah. The halakhah is according to Rabbi Joshua." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe previous mishnah discussed the concept of “mentioning rain.” This mishnah adds in a discussion of the subject of “asking for rain.” This refers to the addition of the words “and give dew and rain (veten tal umatar)” in the ninth blessing of the Amidah, which is called “The Blessing of the Years.”", + "They don’t pray for rain except close to the rainy season. In Israel there is a clearly defined rainy season, which lasts roughly from Sukkot to Pesah. It does not rain in the summer in Israel. The mishnah teaches that we request rain only in the season in which it is normal for it to rain. There are probably two reasons for this. First of all, rain in the wrong season can destroy crops, so one shouldn’t ask for something if it will cause damage. Secondly, we ask God for nature to perform in a predictable and stable fashion, for it to run its course. We do not ask God for miracles, nor do we rely on them or expect them.", + "Rabbi Judah says: One who goes down before the ark on the last day of Sukkot the last one mentions [rain], the first does not; on the first day of Pesah, the first mentions, the last does not. This section returns to discuss the “mentioning of rain” that comes during the second blessing of the Amidah. In yesterday’s mishnah Rabbi Joshua said that we begin to mention rain on the last day of Sukkot. Rabbi Judah in our mishnah agrees and merely points out that there are two prayer leaders on a festival, one for Shacharit and one for Mussaf. On the last day of Sukkot the prayer leader, one who “goes down before the ark” for Mussaf begins to mention rain. The prayer leader for Shacharit does not. The opposite is true at the other end of the spectrum. On the first day of Pesah, the prayer leader for Shacharit still mentions the rain, but the prayer leader for Mussaf does not. In other words, at both times the change is made during Mussaf. This means that there is almost no point in the festival during which rain is mentioned rather dew is basically mentioned all of the time. This is because dew, which falls during the summer months, is a blessing during the festival because it doesn’t disrupt people’s travel. While rain is good for the land, we all still love a bright sun shiny day!", + "Up until when do they request rain? Rabbi Judah says: Until Pesah is over. Rabbi Meir says: Until Nissan is over, as it says, “Now He makes the rain fall in the first month, early rain and late rain” (Joel 2:23). In this section two sages disagree with regard to how long in the season we ask for rain. Rabbi Judah says that we ask until Pesah is over. We should note that Rabbi Judah’s opinion in this section seems to disagree with what he said before, that we stop mentioning rain on the first day of Pesah. The Talmud resolves this problem by saying that there are two different versions of Rabbi Judah’s opinion within this mishnah. Rabbi Meir says that we ask for rain until the entire month of Nissan is over. He uses the verse from Joel as a prooftext that rain is a blessing in the entire first month, the month of Nissan." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah teaches when we begin to ask for rain in the ninth blessing of the Amidah. We should note that at the very beginning of the rainy season we begin to mention rain but we do not yet ask for it. Later, when the rainy season should really begin in full force, we begin to ask for rain. In our prayers we slowly build up to really petitioning God for rain.", + "On the third of Marheshvan they [begin to] ask for rain. The third of Marheshvan (today called Heshvan), the second month of the year, is when we begin to ask for rain. This is when the rainy season is supposed to begin.", + "Rabban Gamaliel says: on the seventh, fifteen days after the Festival [of Sukkot] so that the last of the Jews reaches the river Euphrates. Rabban Gamaliel delays asking for rain until the seventh of Marheshvan, which gives pilgrims who were making their way back from Israel time to reach the river Euphrates in Babylonia. It would not be appropriate to begin to ask for rain while Jews were still returning from performing the important mitzvah of making a pilgrimage to the land of Israel and to the Temple in Jerusalem." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah proceeds chronologically from the last mishnah. There we learned that on either the third or seventh of Marheshvan they add into the Amidah a request for rain. If that prayer has not been answered by the seventeenth of Marheshvan, then a series of progressively more stringent fasts begins.", + "If the seventeenth of Marheshvan came and no rain fell, individuals begin to fast three fasts. The first set of fasts is not observed by the entire community, but rather only by individuals, probably rabbis and other public figures.", + "They eat and drink after it gets dark and they are permitted to do work, to bathe, to anoint themselves with oil, to wear shoes, and to have marital relations. The lightness of the fasts is expressed in the fact that the night before the fast they can eat the fast only begins in the morning. Furthermore, the only prohibition that they take upon themselves is eating and drinking. All of the other prohibitions that sometimes apply on fast days do not apply here. The idea of progressively making the fasts more stringent is an interesting idea. We relate to God as we would to another human being. If we really want something, but it is something that we are going to need frequently, we don’t pull out all of the stops immediately." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues with the next series of fasts.", + "If Rosh Hodesh Kislev came and no rain fell the court ordains upon the community three fasts; they may eat and drink while it is still dark and it is permissible to do work, to bathe, to anoint oneself with oil, to wear shoes, and to have marital relations. The only difference between these fasts and the previous three is that these are observed by the entire community. Other than that, everything is still the same. They eat and drink the night before, and only eating and drinking is prohibited." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues with the series of increasingly more stringent fasts.", + "If these passed and there was no answer, the court decrees three more fasts on the community. If after the first three communal fasts there is still no rain, then the court decrees another set of three fasts on the community.", + "They may eat and drink [only] while it is still day; they may not work, bathe, anoint themselves with oil, wear shoes, or have marital, relations. And the bathhouses are closed. These fasts are stricter because they begin the night before. The mishnah refers to the day before the fast and rules that one can eat only while it is still day. On these fasts all of the major prohibitions apply. These are the same prohibitions that apply on Yom Kippur. The bathhouses are closed because there is no need for them to be open. Also, this is a very public sign of mourning.", + "If these passed and there was no answer the court decrees upon the community a further seven, making a total of thirteen. If these three fasts are not effective, then another seven are decreed, bringing the total number of communal fasts to thirteen.", + "These are greater than the first, for on these they blast the shofar and they lock the shops. All of the prohibitions from the previous three fasts still apply and new practices are added. They blow the shofar as a sign of distress (on this practice see the introduction to the tractate). They also close the shops as a further sign of communal mourning and distress.", + "On Mondays the shutters [of the shops] are opened a little when it gets dark, but on Thursdays they are permitted [the whole day] because of the Shabbat. The problem with closing the stores is that people need to buy supplies for the next day. Therefore they allow the stores to open their shutters a little bit towards the end of the day on Monday. On Thursday the stores are allowed to be opened all day because people need to buy food for Shabbat. We can see a value statement being made here. As important as it is to pray for rain and as dire as the situation of drought may be, people must remember and be able to honor the Shabbat." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn the final mishnah of this chapter we learn what the community would do if all of their fasts had not worked and God still had not sent rain.", + "If these passed and there was [still] no answer then they restrict engaging in business, and in building, planting, betrothal and marriage, and in greeting one another, as if they were people undesirable to God. By this point, it seems that the fasts just aren’t going to be effective. They therefore go into a state of semi-mourning. They cut back on the normal creative activities of life, perhaps as a symbol that all around them there is death. By this point, the crops have probably died, many animals have probably died and people’s health and wellbeing is in great danger. Indeed, it seems that God has rejected the entire community; it is as if He put them into a state of excommunication. The community is in despair and until things are set aright, they make few plans for the future.", + "The individuals go back to fasting anew until the end of Nisan. The community no longer takes upon itself more fasts. Only those individual leaders, those who began fasting at the outset, go back to fasting. These are people whose merit was supposed to help bring rain in the first place. In essence, the failure to achieve rain is partially seen as being their fault.", + "If Nisan passes and then rain falls this is a sign of a curse, as it is written, “It is the season of the wheat harvest. [I will pray to the Lord and He will send thunder and rain; then you will take thought and realize what a wicked thing you did in the sight of the Lord when you asked for a king” (I Samuel 12:17). If Nisan, the last rainy month passes, and then it rains, this too is perceived as a curse. Rain in Nisan in the land of Israel will further damage the crops. It is if God is being particularly cruel, not giving rain at the proper time and then giving it at the improper time. The prooftext demonstrates quite clearly that rain at the improper time is a way of God rebuking the people of Israel." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction In the previous chapter we learned about the series of fast days declared in order to petition God for rain. In this chapter we learn the rituals that were observed on those days.", + "What is the order [of service] for fast days?
They take the ark out to the open space of the city. They bring the ark with the Torah or Torahs outside to the open space where they will have a very public ceremony. This is part of their attempt to achieve as broad of a spectrum of involvement as possible.", + "And they put ashes on the ark and on the head of the Nasi and on the head of the head of the court (av bet din). The leaders of the community ceremonially put ashes on the heads of the two main leaders of the community and on the ark as well. It seems that by putting ashes on the ark, it is as if they were putting ashes on God’s head as well. Perhaps they might even be trying to show that God is sharing in Israel’s distress. Theologically, this creates somewhat of a paradox we are praying to God for rain, rain that God is withholding, and yet at the same time we believe and we demonstrate that God is sharing in our distress. The image is one of a parent, punishing a child and yet at the same time feeling the child’s pain.", + "And everyone [else] puts ashes on his own head. Everyone else puts ashes on their own heads. The ritual application of the ashes is performed only for the two leaders and for the ark.", + "The elder among them says in front of them words of admonition, “Brothers, it does not say of the people of Nineveh, ‘And God saw their sackcloth and their fasting,’ but, ‘And God saw their deeds, for they turned from their evil way. (Jonah 3:10)’ And in the prophets it says, ‘And rend your heart and not your garments” (Joel 2:13). The elder among the people now reminds them that the external motions are meant to invoke inner teshuvah, repentance. When God sees that Nineveh has repented, He says that He has seen their deeds and not that He has seen their external signs. Similarly, Joel tells the people that they should rend their hearts, meaning tear their hearts so that they repent, and not merely their external garments. Note that the mishnah emphasizes this message at the very point at which they are describing the intricate ritual of the Taanit. It is as if they wish to warn us of the danger of slipping into “ritualism” a fixation on the external at the expense of the more important internal." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah continues to set the scene for the prayers recited on the special fast days.", + "[When] they stand up to pray they bring down before the ark an old man conversant [with the prayers], one who has children and whose house is empty [of food], so that his heart is complete prayer. This section describes the shaliah tzibbur, the prayer leader. It is critical for the success of the community’s prayers for them to choose a qualified shaliah tzibbur. Their prayers will be mediated through him so as a community this is a consequential choice. The person chosen is not one who sings the best, but one whose prayers will be the most heart felt and who knows the liturgy. The person has to be old, one who has gone through many of life’s experience and is therefore wiser. The person has to have children. A man who has children will pray even harder during a drought because he knows that without rain he will not be able to provide food for them. As hard as it is for a person to suffer, it is even harder for one to watch his/her children suffer. Finally, his house must be empty, for if his house were full, his prayers would be less personal. In short, they would find an old poor person who has children.", + "He recites before them twenty-four benedictions, the eighteen recited daily, to which he adds six. This section begins to describe the contents of the prayers themselves. The Amidah for fast days is made up of the 18 benedictions that are recited every week day, plus another six special blessings, which shall be enumerated in the following mishnah." + ], + [ + "These are they [the six additional benedictions: There are six additional benedictions listed in our mishnah. Our mishnah provides the scriptural verses that are recited as part of these benedictions. In the following mishnah we will learn the additional liturgy attached to each benedictions, liturgy based on verses but composed by the rabbis.", + "Zikhronot, “If there is famine in the land, if there is pestilence” (I Kings 8:37). Shofarot, “The word of the Lord which came to Jeremiah concerning the droughts” (Jeremiah 14). The first two benedictions are the same as two of the three benedictions recited on Rosh Hashanah zikhronot, remembrances and shofarot. These are appropriate for fast days because we are asking God to remember us and deliver us rain and we blow the shofar. Malkhuyot, kingship, the other special benediction for Rosh Hashanah would not be appropriate for a fast day.", + "“In my distress I called to the Lord and He answered me” (Psalm 120). “I turn my eyes to the mountains” (Psalm 121). “Out of the depths I call you, O Lord” (Psalm 130). “A prayer of lowly man when he is faint” (Psalm 102). The other four benedictions consist of Psalms. While the mishnah only mentions the first verse, the meaning is that the entire Psalm is recited.", + "Rabbi Judah says: he need not recite the zikhronot and shofarot, but instead he should recite [the following]: Rabbi Judah disagrees with the recitation of the zikhronot and shofarot and instead offers two other appropriate biblical verses.", + "And he ends each [of the additional six] sections with its appropriate concluding benediction. Each section is ended with an appropriate concluding benediction. These are explicated in tomorrow’s mishnah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah provides liturgical conclusions to the six additional benedictions for the Taanit Amidah. Each conclusion here correlates with one of the seven benedictions in the previous mishnah.\nThe basic structure of this liturgy is quite simple. After having read a Psalm or other biblical passage, the benediction concludes by reminding God of another incident in which He answered Israel’s prayers. It then ends with a concluding benediction.\nThere are actually seven benedictions in our mishnah, but only six are additional. The first “who redeems Israel” is the seventh benediction in every weekday Amidah. The following six are additional.", + "For the first he says: He who answered Abraham on Mt. Moriah, He shall answer you and hear the voice of your cry on this day. Blessed are You Lord who redeems Israel. This first benediction is part of the weekday Amidah. It refers to the binding of Isaac.", + "For the second he says: He who answered our fathers at the Sea of Reeds, He shall answer you and hear the voice of your cry on this day. Blessed are You Lord who remembers all forgotten things. This is the additional benediction called “zikhronot”, remembrances, in the previous mishnah. It refers to the splitting of the Sea of Reeds.", + "For the third he says: He who answered Joshua in Gilgal, He shall answer you and hear the voice of your cry on this day. Blessed are You Lord who hears a blast. This is the additional benediction called “shofarot”. The reference is to Joshua 6-7, when he blew shofarot to destroy the walls of Jericho. In Joshua 5:10 we learn that the Israelites were encamped in Gilgal.", + "For the fourth he says: He who answered Shmuel in Mitzpah, He shall answer you and hear the voice of your cry on this day. Blessed are You Lord who listens to cries. This is a reference to I Samuel 7:5-9 where Shmuel leads the people to a decisive victory over the Philistines.", + "For the fifth he says: He who answered Elijah on Mt. Carmel, He shall answer you and hear the voice of your cry on this day. Blessed are You Lord who hears prayer. This refers to I Kings 18:26-39 where Elijah challenges the false prophets and God sends a fire from heaven to demonstrate that He is the true and only God. Since this episode takes place on Mt. Carmel, it is appropriate for Psalm 121 which begins, “I lift my eyes up to the hills” (Psalms 121). This Psalm is the heart of this benediction, as we learned in yesterday’s mishnah.", + "For the sixth he says: He who answered Jonah in the belly of the fish, He shall answer you and hear the voice of your cry on this day. Blessed are You Lord who answers in time of trouble. A reference to Jonah in the belly of the whale is appropriate to Psalm 130 used in this fifth benediction, since it begins, “Out of the depths I called to You Lord”.", + "For the seventh he says: He who answered David and Shlomo his son in Jerusalem, He shall answer you and hear the voice of your cry on this day. Blessed are You Lord Who has mercy upon the land. God rescued David in a time of famine (II Samuel 21: 1-14). Shlomo prays to God for rain (I Kings 8:35) and to stop a famine (ibid, 37) and God answers him (ibid 9:3). The liturgist mentions David and Shlomo at the end because they were answered in the very type of occasion in which this liturgy was being recited famine or drought. Had the benedictions gone in simple chronological order, David and Shlomo should have been before Elijah and Jonah. The concluding formula, “Who has mercy on the land” is appropriate because Psalm 102 which is part of the benediction includes the verse, “You will surely arise and have mercy on Zion” (v. 14)." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah relates a story in which some people used slightly different liturgy than was dictated in yesterday’s mishnah, and the rabbis objected to this liturgy.", + "It happened in the days of Rabbi Halafta and Rabbi Hanina ben Tradyon that a man passed before the ark [as shaliah tzibbur] and completed the entire benediction and they did not respond, “amen.” [The hazzan called out]: Sound a tekiah, priests, sound a tekiah. [The shaliah tzibbur continued]: He who answered Abraham on Mt. Moriah, He shall answer you and hear the voice of your cry on this day. Then [the hazzan called out]: Sound a teru'ah, sons of Aaron, sound a teru'ah. [The shaliah tzibbur continued]: He who answered our fathers at the Sea of Reeds, He shall answer you and hear the voice of your cry on this day. There seem to be several differences between the customs mentioned here and those in the previous mishnah. First of all the people did not answer “Amen.” According to the Talmud they answered “Blessed is the name of His Kingship forever and ever” instead (this is the line we say after the first line of the Shema). Another difference, according to some commentators, is that they blew the shofar after every benediction, instead of blowing once at the end of the entire Amidah.", + "And when the matter came up before the sages, they said: they only practiced in this way at the eastern gates on the Temple Mount. When the sages heard the report about these practices, they objected. Note that they didn’t say that this practice was completely illegitimate, just that now that the Temple has been destroyed, our practice has changed slightly. To me this seems very typical of rabbinic activity they preserve many earlier practices, but modify them slightly to denote the radical change in the world that occurred during the destruction of the Second Temple." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe priests were divided into twenty-four guards called “mishmarot.” Each guard served in the Temple for one week. Each guard was divided into subsections by the father’s house, and on each day a different father’s house would serve in the Temple. Our mishnah deals with how these guards and father’s houses would act on fast days decreed because of rain.", + "On the first three fasts the men of the guard fast but do not complete their fast, and the men of the father’s house do not fast at all. On the second three fasts the men of the guard fast and complete their fast and the men of the father’s house fast but do not complete their fast. On the last seven both fast and complete their fast, the words of Rabbi Joshua. The fasts are divided into three sets, each set of fasts more serious than the previous one (see above 1:5). The general principle in the mishnah is clear. The “men of the guard” fast less than normal people. Thus during the first three fasts, while other people complete their fast, meaning they fast until the end of the day, the men of the guard end their fast early. The reason is that since they are serving in the Temple, the day is somewhat of a personal holiday for them. However, according to Rabbi Joshua, by the second set of fasts they are already acting like all other people. The “men of the father’s house” are those who are actually serving in the Temple on that day. Since they are actually working, it is an even greater day of celebration for them. To denote this, they don’t fast at all during the first three fasts, they semi-fast during the second set and only begin to fully fast during the last seven fasts.", + "The sages say: on the first three fasts neither fast at all. On the second three, the men of the guard fast but do not complete their fast, and the men of the father’s house do not fast at all. On the last seven, the men of the guard fast and complete their fast and the men of the father’s house fast but do not complete their fast. The sages agree with the general principles of Rabbi Joshua, they are just more lenient than he is at every stage. For instance, on the first three fasts, even the men of the guard don’t fast at all. And even on the last seven, the men of the father’s house don’t fully fast. Assumedly, the other sages hold that serving in the Temple is a greater celebration than Rabbi Joshua thinks." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn the previous mishnah we learned that the men of the guard have to fast more on a Taanit then the “men of the father’s house.” Today’s mishnah teaches another distinction between the two groups, one that has nothing to do with fast days.", + "The men of the guard are permitted to drink wine in the evenings but not during the day, but the men of the father’s house may not [drink wine] either on the day or on the preceding evening. A kohen may not be drunk while serving in the Temple. Our mishnah discusses when during his week of service in the Temple a priest may drink. The men not serving in the Temple on a given day may drink at night. Since there is little work to be done in the Temple at night, they are allowed to drink. However, during the day they may not drink. This is because these kohanim may be asked to replace or supplement those members of the father’s house who are serving on that day. Since they might end up serving in the Temple, they may not drink. The men of the father’s house, who are actually serving in the Temple may not drink either at night or in the day. Even though there is not much work to be done at night, there may be some work so they may not drink.", + "Both the men of the guard and the men of the ma'amad may not cut their hair nor wash their clothes, but on Thursday they may [do so] in honor of Shabbat. Corresponding to the twenty-four divisions of priests, there were twenty-four divisions of Israelites who would offer up special prayers while their corresponding division of priests were serving in the Temple. These groups are called ma’amadim or a ma’amad. The purpose of this set-up is to allow all of Israel to take part in the sacrificial service. This week is special holiday-like time for each group. In order to encourage the men of the ma’amad to cut their hair and wash their clothes before their week, they are not allowed to do so during this week. As an aside, we should note that this is similar to the laws concerning the intermediate days of the festival (we shall learn these when we learn Tractate Moed Katan). However, they may cut their hair and wash their clothes on Thursday in preparation for the coming of Shabbat. Again we see what an important place Shabbat played in their lives." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn mishnaic times there existed a scroll called “Megillat Taanit”, which literally translates as “Scroll of Fasts.” Despite its name, the scroll does not contain a list of fasts but rather a list of days on which it is forbidden to eulogize at funerals and/or fast. Most of these days were commemorations of various military victories that occurred throughout the Second Temple period, from the Hasmonean period in the mid-second century B.C.E. through the Roman period in the subsequent centuries. By Talmudic times these days were mostly forgotten and neglected. The only two that were still observed were Hannukah and Purim.", + "[With regard to every day] about which it is written in the Scroll of Fasts (Megillat “One may not eulogize” on the preceding day it is prohibited but on the following day it is permitted. Rabbi Yose says: it is forbidden [to mourn] both on the preceding day and on the following day. Concerning some of the days listed in Megillat Taanit, it says that one may not eulogize because eulogies are a sign of mourning. For these days it is prohibited to eulogize also on the previous day, but not on the subsequent day. Rabbi Yose holds that for these days one may not offer a eulogy on the preceding or on the following day.", + "[On days about which it is written], “One may not fast” on the preceding day and on the following day it is permitted. Rabbi Yose says: on the preceding day it is forbidden but on the following day it is permitted. Days concerning which it is written “One may not fast” are somewhat lesser than days concerning which it is written “One may not eulogize.” Therefore, for these days one may fast on both the preceding and following days. Rabbi Yose is again slightly stricter and allows fasting only on the following day but not on the preceding day." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses on what day the series of fasts can begin.", + "They do not decree upon the community a fast to begin on a Thursday in order not to cause a rise in the market prices. There are several explanations as to why the market prices will rise if a series of fasts is decreed on Thursday. One explanation is that if the store owners see people buying big meals on a Thursday, a meal for the end of the fast and large meals for Shabbat, they will think that a famine has struck and they will raise the prices. This is not a problem on Monday which is not next to Shabbat and so people are buying less food. Another explanation is that fasting so close to Shabbat will cause the storeowners to think that there will be a great panic and they will raise the prices. Yet another explanation is that since the villagers bring the food to sell in the market on Thursday, and they will not know that there is a fast ahead of time, they will not bring enough food for the Shabbat and the break-fast meal and the great demand will cause a rise in the prices. What I find interesting is that in times of crisis the rabbis were cautious not to impose additional financial hardships by decreeing fasts.", + "Rather the first three fasts are held [in this order], Monday, Thursday, and Monday; the second three, Thursday, Monday, and Thursday. Rabbi Yose says: just as the first three [fasts] should not begin on a Thursday so too neither the second [three] nor the last [seven]. According to the first opinion, while the first three fasts do not begin on Thursday, the second set does. Since the second set is not the beginning of the entire series but rather just a continuation of it, they need not fear that starting on Thursday will cause prices to rise. Rabbi Yose holds that none of the series of fasts begins on Thursday." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with fast days that come into conflict with other various holidays.", + "They do not ordain upon the community a fast on Rosh Hodesh, on Hanukkah, or on Purim, but if they had already begun [a series of fasts and one of these days intervened] they do not interrupt [their fasts], the words of Rabban Gamaliel. According to Rabban Gamaliel, the court may not decree that a series of fast days begins on any of these holidays. However, if a series of fast days had begun and then one of these holidays landed on a Monday or Thursday on which people were supposed to fast, they do indeed fast.", + "Rabbi Meir said: even though Rabban Gamaliel said that the [fasts] should not be interrupted he agrees that they should not complete their fasts. Rabbi Meir says that when Rabban Gamaliel said that Rosh Hodesh, Hannukah and Purim do not interrupt if the series of fasts had already begun, he nevertheless agrees that on these days they should not complete their fasts until the evening. In this way people will signify in at least some way that the day still has some celebratory character to it.", + "And the same applies to the Ninth of Av should it fall on Friday. In the days in which the monthly calendar was not predetermined, the Ninth of Av (Tisha B’av) could fall on Friday. Today this cannot happen. If this happens they do not complete the fast, due to the honor accorded to Shabbat, so that they shouldn’t begin Shabbat with ravenous hunger. Another reason seems to be that there is a mitzvah to add on to Shabbat at both the beginning and at the end. If one fasts during this period he is diminishing the joy of a time of day when he should already be celebrating." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah teaches that sometimes we skip the order of fasts that was taught in the previous two chapters and we proceed straight to the last set of fasts, when we blow the shofar and fast for the entire day.", + "The order of public fasts mentioned above is enacted because of [lack of] the first rain, but if the crops have undergone [an unusual] change they sound a blast immediately. If it doesn’t rain during the first season in which rain should come, then we begin the series of fasts that was described in the previous two chapters. However, if the crops start to look as if they are going bad, then the situation is obviously more serious. In such a case we skip the first two sets of fasts and go right to the third set, the set where we blast the shofar. The change of the crops appearance is far more serious and therefore it calls for an immediate sounding of the alarm.", + "Similarly, if the rain has stopped for forty days between one rainfall and the next, they sound a blast immediately, because it is a plague of drought. Another case in which we skip immediately to blowing the shofar and fasting for the entire day is a situation in which it began to rain but then stopped raining for forty days. Such a situation foreshadows drought and therefore it is especially dangerous." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to discuss situations in which they would immediately skip to the latter stages of fasting.", + "If [rain] falls for crops but not for the trees, for the trees but not for crops, for both of these but not for cisterns, ditches and caves they sound a blast immediately. Light rain is good for the crops because crops don’t need the rain to penetrate deep into the land. However, it is not good for the trees. Heavy rain is good for the trees but not good for the crops. Finally, it requires very heavy rain to fill up the cisterns, ditches and caves so that people will have drinking water. According to the mishnah if it rains but there is not sufficient or appropriate rain for every one of these categories, they skip the first stage and go immediately to the stage of more serious fasting, as we described in yesterday’s mishnah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah teaches that if the drought was local, then the fasts are only performed locally as well.", + "And so too a city, upon which no rain has fallen as it is written, “And I caused it to rain upon one city, and I caused it not to rain upon another city; one piece was rained upon…” (Amos 4:7) that city fasts and they sound a blast, but those [in the places] around it fast but do not sound the alarm. Rabbi Akiva says: they sound the alarm but do not fast. The quote from Amos shows that droughts can be localized and that God can send a drought upon one city, but not upon another. In such a case that city fasts and performs the entire ritual. The surrounding cities partially join in the fast as a show of support. However they do not fully join in, because it is, after all, raining in their city. It seems that partial fasting/sounding the shofar is to show both their empathy for their fellow Israelites and yet at the same time show their gratitude to God for causing it to rain on their town. The sages and Rabbi Akiva debate concerning which part of the fasting ritual is observed by those in the neighboring town. The sages say that they fast but do not blow the shofar whereas Rabbi Akiva holds the opposite." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to discussed localized fasts, the topic begun in yesterday’s mishnah.", + "And so too a city which has a plague or [its buildings] collapse that city fasts and they sound a blast, but those [in the places] around it fast but do not sound the alarm. Rabbi Akiva says: they sound the alarm but do not fast. This section is basically the same as yesterday’s mishnah, it just mentions plagues and building collapse as opposed to rain. Just as Rabbi Akiva and the sages debated what the surrounding cities do in the case of drought, so too they debate these cases.", + "What constitutes a plague? If in a city that can supply five hundred foot-soldiers and three deaths occurred on three consecutive days, behold this constitutes a plague, less than this is not a plague. This section differentiates between a plague and isolated instances of death. For something to be a plague a certain percentage of the people of a town must die within a certain amount of time. The mishnah’s answers its question by stating that if the town is large enough to send out 500 foot-soldiers, meaning 500 men who are at an age capable of fighting in the army, and three people die of disease in three days, then they can declare an official plague and observe a fast. If less people die then it is not a plague and they need not fast. We should note that it is not clear if the law would be different if the city could produce 1,000 soldiers, or 10,000 soldiers. Would more people have to die in the same time period in order for it to be a plague? Can a plague be declared in a town with fewer people? These questions are not directly addressed by the mishnah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn the previous mishnayot we learned of situations in which the people of the town effected by the plague fast and sound the shofar and the people in the neighboring towns do not fully participate. In our mishnah we learn for certain plagues, not only the people of the town directly effected participate, but also the people of all the surrounding towns as well.", + "For these they sound a blast in all places: for the drying up of crops (shidafon), for plant disease, for locusts, and for the hasil (a type of locust), for wild beasts and for the sword they sound a blast for these are plagues likely to spread. All of these plagues are likely to spread; therefore, even though they may have directly effected only one part of the region, everyone must fast and sound the shofar." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah gives two concrete cases in which sages decreed fasts.", + "It once happened that elders went down from Jerusalem to their own cities and ordered a fast because there was seen in Ashkelon a shidafon which affected as much grain as would fill an oven [with loaves]. A shidafon is a drying up of the crops, an event referred to in the previous mishnah. This story teaches that the amount of shidafon-effected crops necessary to justify decreeing a fast is enough grain to bake sufficient loaves to fill an oven. While I do not know exactly how much grain this is, it does not seem to be a particularly large amount.", + "They also decreed a fast because wolves devoured two children on the other side of the Jordan. Rabbi Yose says: not because they devoured [the children] but [merely] because they were seen. This is another case addressed by yesterday’s mishnah a plague of wild beasts. There is a debate about whether the wolves were merely seen or whether they actually devoured two children." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nGenerally, one does not fast or sound a shofar blast in alarm on Shabbat. However, sometimes disaster is so imminent that they sound a blast even on Shabbat.\nWe should note that there is a debate concerning whether they fast on Shabbat.", + "For these matters they sound a blast even on Shabbat: if a city is besieged by Gentile [troops] or a river, or if a ship is foundering on the sea. The impending disasters referred to here are so immediate that they would blow the shofar even on Shabbat. However, on all other occasions they would wait until after Shabbat to begin blowing the shofar and fasting.", + "Rabbi Yose says: [they sound a blast] for help but not for an outcry (for the sake of. Rabbi Yose says that they blow the shofar so that people will come and help but that they don’t blow the shofar on Shabbat as part of a prayer ritual. Accordingly, the special prayers are not added on Shabbat.", + "Shimon the Yemenite says: also for a plague, but the sages did not agree with him. Rabbi Yose says that a plague should also belong on this list. However, the other sages do not agree with him. According to their opinion, a plague is less of an imminent danger and hence they mention it above in mishnah four." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah contains the famous story of Honi the circle drawer, who demanded that God bring rain and his prayers were effective.", + "For every trouble that should not come upon the community they sound a blast except on account of too much rain. It happened that they said to Honi the circle drawer: “Pray for rain to fall.” He replied: “Go and bring in the pesah ovens so that they do not dissolve.” He prayed and no rain fell. What did he do? He drew a circle and stood within it and exclaimed before Him: “Master of the universe, Your children have turned their faces to me because I am like one who was born in Your house. I swear by Your great name that I will not move from here until You have mercy upon Your children.” Rain then began to drip, and he exclaimed: “I did not request this but rain [which can fill] cisterns, ditches and caves. The rain then began to come down with great force, and he exclaimed: “I did not request this but pleasing rain of blessing and abudance.” Rain then fell in the normal way until the Jews in Jerusalem had to go up Temple Mount because of the rain. They came and said to him: “In the same way that you prayed for [the rain] to fall pray [now] for the rain to stop.” He replied: “Go and see if the stone of people claiming lost objects has washed away.” Rabbi Shimon ben Shetah sent to him: “Were you not Honi I would have excommunicated you, but what can I do to you, for you are spoiled before God and he does your will like a son that is spoiled before his father and his father does his request. Concerning you it is written, “Let your father and your mother rejoice, and let she that bore you rejoice” (Proverbs 23:25). “That should not come upon the community” is a euphemism. The mishnah is actually referring to troubles that do come upon the community. An overabundance of rain is not a blessing and can actually destroy the crops and endanger people’s lives. However, since rain is usually a blessing and is so scarce in the land of Israel, one doesn’t pray for rain to stop. It’s as if we don’t want to risk God’s anger by asking him to stop the rain, after having already asked for it to begin to rain. The story itself probably needs little explaining. The people turn to Honi the circle maker, so named because in order to bring rain he would draw a circle around himself and not move until rain came. Assumedly, Honi was famous as a rainmaker, a well-known profession in pre-modern societies dependant upon rainfall. Honi responds with exaggerated confidence, telling them that he will bring so much rain that even the ovens used to roast the pesah offerings, the strongest ovens that they usually had, would begin to melt. Honi proceeds to draw his circle and demand that God bring rain. God answers his call, but then Honi refines his request and demands proper rain, rain which is not too weak and not too strong (but just right!). Eventually, the necessary type of rain does begin to fall and continues to fall until the people must abandon the lower places in Jerusalem and flee to the Temple Mount for safety. Heeding the halakhah with which this mishnah began, Honi refuses to pray for rain to stop until a famous stone has dissolved, which is an exaggerated way of saying that he will not pray for the rain to stop, even though it is endangering their lives. This is a key point in the mishnah. Even though Honi is a miracle worker, someone who seems to be outside the normal circle of rabbis, he still obeys the halakhah and there is a limit to what even he will ask for. Rabbi Shimon ben Shetah’s rebuke to Honi is probably even more telling as to the point of this mishnah than Honi’s prayer itself. Indeed, in my opinion the rebuke is the reason that the mishnah is here in the first place. In the beginning of this mishnah we learned that people should not act with chutzpah when asking for rain. Honi, who God treats like a son, is somewhat of an exception. He can have that chutzpah in front of God, because God spoils Honi like a son. We often let our children get away with things that we won’t allow others to get away with. Others who would act like Honi will probably not have their requests answered and may indeed be rebuked for their presumptuous behavior. One might go so far as to say that the message of this mishnah is one of simultaneous nearness and distance. Certain human beings do have the possibility of drawing close enough to God that God will heed their every request. Humanity as a whole can achieve true closeness to God. However, such a relationship cannot be expected or presumed. As individuals we should not look at ourselves as being on the level of Honi. For most of us, we must respect the fact that there is a vast distance separating us from God and that if we were to make a demand, it might very well be ignored. Indeed, the entire tractate has been consistently cognizant with the fact that prayers are often simply not answered." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses what happens if they begin to fast and then it rains on the fast day.", + "If while they are fasting rain falls: If before sunrise they do not complete the fast, If after sunrise, they do complete the fast. The fast actually begins at sunrise. Therefore if it rains before sunrise then the rain has begun before the fast and there is no reason to fast. However, if it rains after sunrise they must continue and complete the fast.", + "Rabbi Eliezer says: if before noon they do not complete the fast, if after noon they do complete it. Noon is when most people eat their mid-day meal, the main meal of the day. One who does not eat until noon is not really fasting, even though he may not have eaten. Therefore, according to Rabbi Eliezer, if it rains before noon it is as if they have not yet begun the fast and they do not have to complete it. If it rains after noon they must complete the fast.", + "It happened that the rabbis decreed a fast in Lod and rain fell before noon. Rabbi Tarfon said to them: go, eat and drink and make a holiday. They went and ate and drank and observed the day as a holiday and at evening time they came and recited the Hallel Hagadol. In this section we have a story that illustrates Rabbi Eliezer’s halakhah and goes even further. Not only did they end their fast, but they went out and celebrated the arrival of the rain. In the evening they recited Hallel Hagadol, which is Psalm 136, which contains the line “He provides food for all living creatures”, a line especially significant on the day when it begins to rain." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nDuring regular weekday prayers, the priests offer a priestly benediction as part of the Amidah. This consists of their lifting up their hands and reciting Numbers 6:24-26. The priestly benediction is normally done only during Shacharit, the morning service and not at Minhah. On Shabbatot and holidays that have a Mussaf service, it is also done during Mussaf. It is not normally done during Minhah because it is feared that the kohen may have drunk some wine during the day and it is forbidden to recite the priestly blessing while drunk. Such a concern does not exist on fast days, when the priests would not be drinking wine.\nThe mishnah also teaches that on fast days another service is added, Neilah, which means “closing [of the gates].” This service is added as a special additional supplication.", + "On three occasions during the year, on fast days, on ma’amadot, and on Yom Kippur the priests lift up their hands to bless [the people] four times during the day--at Shaharit, at Mussaf, at Minhah and at Neilah. Ma’amadot is an institution that was mentioned in passing above in 2:7 and will be explained in greater detail in tomorrow’s mishnah. On these three types of days the priests offer the priestly blessing every time there is a prayer service. According to the Babylonian Talmud, the mishnah is not entirely accurate since there is no Mussaf service on fast days or on ma’amadot. What the mishnah means to say is that every time there is a prayer service, the priests lift up their hands four times on Yom Kippur and three times on the other occasions. However, other sources seem to hold that there is a Mussaf service on fast days and on ma’amadot." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah explains what the “ma’madot” were and their origins.", + "What are the ma’amadot? Since it is said, “Command the children of Israel and say to them: My offering, My food” (Numbers 28:2). Now how can a man’s offering be offered and he is not present? [Therefore] the former prophets instituted twenty-four mishmarot (guards). For each mishmar there was a ma’amad [at the Temple] in Jerusalem consisting of priests, Levites and Israelites. When the time came for the mishmar to go up [to Jerusalem] the priests and Levites went up to Jerusalem and the Israelites of that mishmar assembled in their cities and read the story of creation. Numbers 28:2 states, “Command the Children of Israel saying: Of my near-offering, my food, as my fire-offerings, my soothing savor, you are to be in charge, bringing it near to me at its appointed time” (this translation is from Everett Fox, who translates very literally.) This verse is said in reference to the tamid offering. The verse seems to imply that each Israelite is to offer the tamid and yet it is obviously impossible for all of Israel to be personally responsible for one offering. The ma’amadot are a means through which all of Israel is able participate in the tamid, the one offering that is offered twice every day. The ma’amadot correspond to the mishmarot, the twenty-four groups of priests each of which serves one week in the Temple. It is not entirely clear what made up the maamad. According to one interpretation the maamad a group of priests and Levites who were not serving in the Temple together with some Israelites who would go to Jerusalem. According to another interpretation the priests and Levites were part of the mishmar and the Israelites were part of the maamad. When time came for the mishmar to go to Jerusalem, the priests and Levites would go to Jerusalem and the Israelites from that mishmar, those who were not part of the maamad, would gather together in their cities and begin to read the story of the creation of the world, as we shall learn tomorrow. We should note just how foundational this institution may have been in rabbinic thought. The sacrificial service is the most elitist element in Judaism in order to participate one must be a kohen; even Levites can only partially participate. Since one can only be born a kohen, there is no way for most of Israel to participate in this most central aspect of Judaism. By instituting the “ma’amadot” the rabbis seem to have found a way to make Judaism far more egalitarian. While it is still true that Israelites are limited as to what they can do, they are allowed to take part in this type of worship of God and it seems that their participation is not considered less significant than that of the kohanim themselves." + ], + [ + "The men of the maamad fasted on four days of that week, from Monday to Thursday; they did not fast on Friday out of respect for Shabbat or on Sunday in order not to switch from the rest and delight [of Shabbat] to weariness and fasting and [thereby] die.
On Sunday [they read], “In the beginning,” and, “Let there be a firmament;”
On Monday, “Let there be a firmament,” and, “Let the waters be gathered together;”
On Tuesday, “Let the waters be gathered together,” and, “Let there be lights;”
On Wednesday, “Let there be lights,” and, “Let the waters swarm;”
On Thursday, “Let the waters swarm,” and, “Let the earth bring forth;”
On Friday, “Let the earth bring forth,” and, “And the heavens [and the earth] were completed.”
For a long section two people read and for a short section one person. [This is how they would read] at Shacharit and Mussaf.
And at minhah they assemble and read the section by heart, as they recite the Shema.
On Friday at minhah they did not assemble out of respect for Shabbat.
This mishnah mostly discusses what portions of the Torah were read during the maamad.
Section one: The men of the maamad fasted most of the week every day from Monday through Thursday. They only fasted from the morning until the night. Fasting on Friday was not considered to be respectful to Shabbat because they that would cause them enter Shabbat with a ravenous appetite. They didn’t fast on Sunday because it was considered dangerous to eat a lot on Shabbat and then fast on Sunday.
Sections two-seven: Every day of the week they would read two portions concerning the creation. This allowed them to read about all seven days within six days.
Section eight: A long section, one with more than three verses is read by two people, but a portion of only three verses is read by one person. Every day there were three aliyot to the Torah. If the first section was more than three verses, let’s say it was five verses, the first person would read the entire section and then the second person would read the third through the sixth verse. This way there would always be three aliyot and never an aliyah of less three verses.
Section nine: At minhah (the afternoon service) they would assemble but they would read by heart without using a Torah scroll.
Section ten: On Friday at minhah they wouldn’t gather together because people were getting ready for Shabbat." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah teaches that on certain days they wouldn’t do the special maamad prayers at certain services.", + "On any day when there is Hallel there was no maamad at Shaharit; [On the day when] there is a Musaf-offering, there was no [maamad] at Ne'ilah. [On the day of] the wood-offering, there was no [maamad] at Minhah, the words of Rabbi Akiva. According to Rabbi Akiva, on days when there is Hallel but no Musaf, such as Hannukah, they wouldn’t do the maamad at Shacharit, but they would do it at Minhah and Neilah. On days when there is a Musaf offering, they wouldn’t do the maamad at Neilah. This is understood to mean that even at Neilah they wouldn’t do the service, all the more so at Shacharit, Musaf and Minhah. Most commentators explain that this mishnah refers to those people of the maamad who were in Jerusalem. They were so busy on these days that they didn’t have time to take care of their duties and recite all of the maamad prayers. The previous mishnah, according to which maamad prayers were recited on days which have Musaf, refers to those people of the maamad who were outside of Jerusalem. The wood-offering refers to the bringing of wood to the Temple by certain families who would volunteer to do so. On this day they would offer a special sacrifice and they would make it into a holiday. According to Rabbi Akiva on these special days there was no maamad at Minhah but there was at Neilah. The next mishnah will discuss this at greater length.", + "Ben Azzai said to him: Thus did Rabbi Joshua learn: [On the day when] there is a Musaf-offering, there was no [maamad] at Minhah; [On the day of] the wood-offering, there was no [maamad] at Ne’ilah. Rabbi Akiva retracted and learned like Ben Azzai. Ben Azzai tells Rabbi Akiva that Rabbi Joshua disagrees with him concerning two of the three halakhot which he stated. On days with Musaf, there is no maamad at Minhah but there is at Neilah. However, on days when there was a wood-offering, there was no maamad even at Neilah. Upon hearing Rabbi Joshua’s tradition, Rabbi Akiva retracted his statement." + ], + [ + "The times of the wood of the priests and the people was nine:
On the first of Nisan the family Arah of Yehudah.
On the twentieth of Tammuz the family of David of Yehudah.
On the fifth of Av the family of Parosh of Yehudah.
On the seventh of the same month, the family of Yonadav of Rechav.
On the tenth of the same month, the family of Snaah of Benjamin.
On the fifteenth of the same month, the family of Zattu of Yehudah, and with them were the priests and Levites and all those who were not certain of their tribe and the family of Gonve Eli and the family of Kotze Ketizot.
On the twentieth of the same month the family of Pahat Moav of Yehudah.
On the twentieth of Elul the family of Adin of Yehudah.
On the first of Tevet the family of Parosh of Yehudah [offered] a second time.
On the first of Tevet there was no maamad for there was Hallel, Musaf and the wood-festival.
This mishnah teaches that there were nine fixed dates during the year upon which certain families would bring wood to the altar. The mishnah seems to relate and expand upon what is stated in Nehemiah 10:35 by those who returned to the land of Israel after the first exile, “We have cast lots [among] the priests, the Levites and the people, to bring the wood-offering to the House of our God by clans annually at set times in order to provide fuel for the altar of the Lord our God, as is written in the Teaching.” The name for these donations, “The wood of the priests and the people” comes from the beginning of this verse. The Talmud teaches that even if there was already enough wood in the Temple, the wood donated by these families took priority, and would be used first.
We might also note that the very idea of celebrating and commemorating the bringing of wood to the Temple attests to how valuable and scarce wood was at those times in the land of Israel. It remains to this day a relatively scarce commodity.
Section one: This family is mentioned in Ezra 2:5 and Nehemiah 7:10.
Section three: Mentioned in Ezra 2:3, Nehemiah 7:5.
Section four: The “Rechavites” seem to have been some sort of separatist sect that existed during the First Temple period and continued to exist as a family in the Second Temple period. Jeremiah 35 is mostly about this sect. For more information you can look up the article on them in the Encyclopedia Judaica.
Section five: Mentioned in Ezra 2:35; Nehemiah 7:38.
Section six: Zattu is mentioned in Ezra 2:8 and Nehemiah 7:13. On this day other priests and Levites brought wood as well as anyone who didn’t know what tribe they were from. There were also two other families who donated wood on that day.
Section seven: Mentioned in Ezra 2:6; Nehemiah 7:11.
Section eight: Ezra 2:15; Nehemiah 7:20.
Section nine: This is the same family that already gave on the fifth of Av.
Section ten: The first of Tevet is both Rosh Hodesh and Hannukah. Because of Hallel (recited because of Hannukah) there was no maamad during Shacharit, as we learned in yesterday’s mishnah. The Mussaf and wood-offerings meant that there would be no other maamad either. This seems to be the only day during the year that could have both a wood-offering, mussaf and a full Hallel. Note that during those days Hallel was not recited on Rosh Hodesh. Today half a Hallel is recited." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah lists events that occurred and are therefore commemorated on two fast days the seventeenth of Tammuz and the ninth of Av. There are two connections between this mishnah and the rest of the tractate. First of all, this is tractate Taanit, so it is a natural place for the mishnah to discuss fast days. Secondly, the previous mishnah dealt with the importance of specific dates.", + "There were five events that happened to our ancestors on the seventeenth of Tammuz and five on the ninth of Av.
On the seventeenth of Tammuz: The tablets were shattered; The tamid ( offering was cancelled; The [walls] of the city were breached; And Apostomos burned the Torah, and placed an idol in the Temple. There were five events that occurred on the seventeenth of Tammuz, which is considered a “minor” fast day, because the fast begins only at sunrise and the only prohibition is eating and drinking. 1) Moshe broke the first set of tablets. 2) On the seventeenth of Tammuz, shortly before the Second Temple was destroyed, they ran out of sheep to sacrifice and hence they had to cancel the tamid, the daily offering. 3) The Romans breached the walls of the city of Jerusalem. 4) Apostomos, an unidentified Greek or Roman burned a Torah scroll and 5) placed an idol in the Temple. The placing of an idol in the Temple by foreign rulers happened on several occasions throughout both the First and teh Second Temple period and hence it is impossible to identify with precision who Apostomos was. Indeed, according to the Yerushalmi it was not Apostomos who put the idol in the Templ but rather Menashe, the king of Israel see II Kings 21:7.", + "On the ninth of Av It was decreed that our ancestors should not enter the land, The Temple was destroyed the first And the second time, Betar was captured, And the city was plowed up. There were five events that occurred on the ninth of Av, which besides Yom Kippur is the only major fast in the Jewish calendar. 1) After the people of Israel believed the bad report of the ten spies over that of Joshua and Caleb, God decreed that no one over the age of twenty would make it into the land of Canaan (see Numbers 14:29). 2 +3) Both Temples were destroyed, the first by the Babylonians in 586 B.C.E. and the second by the Romans in 70 C.E. The first Temple was set aflame on the ninth and burnt on the Tenth see Jeremiah 52:12-13. 4) Betar, an important Jewish stronghold during the Bar-Kochba revolt fell to the Romans. 5) After the Bar Kochba rebellion was defeated, the Romans plowed over the city, destroying any remaining buildings and quashing any hopes that the Temple would be rebuilt.", + "When Av enters, they limit their rejoicing. Av is the counterpart to Adar. When the month of Adar begins we increase our celebration, in anticipation of Purim, a holiday of salvation. When the month of Av enters, we decrease celebrations, on account of Tisha B’av, the greatest day of mourning on the Jewish calendar. In tomorrow’s mishnah we will learn of some mourning practices customary during the first nine days of Av." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah talks about the week which leads up to Tisha B’av and the day before.", + "During the week in which the ninth of Av falls it is forbidden to cut the hair and to wash clothes but on Thursday it is permitted in honor of Shabbat. Starting in the week in which Tisha B’av falls one begins to mourn by not cutting hair (this includes shaving) or washing clothes. However, if Tisha B’av falls on Friday then it is permitted to cut one’s hair and wash one’s clothes on Thursday in preparation for Shabbat. In today’s calendar Tisha B’av can never fall on Friday or on Shabbat. We should also note that in Ashkenazi tradition these prohibitions begin with the seventeenth of Tammuz, three weeks before Tisha B’av.", + "On the eve of the ninth of Av one should not eat a meal of two cooked dishes, nor should he eat meat or drink wine. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: one should make change [his diet.] The meal before Tisha B’av is supposed to be a simple meal, one that does not consist of two cooked dishes, nor meat or wine. This sharply contrasts with Yom Kippur, before which one is mandated to have a large meal in celebration of the coming holiday. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel is more flexible with regard to this meal. He just mandates that one change his normal eating habits. If one normally has two cooked dishes, one should have only one. If one normally eats a lot of meat, one should just have a little.", + "Rabbi Judah obligated turning over the bed, but the sages did not agree with him. Turning over the bed is a sign of mourning. In the time of the mishnah it was the custom of mourners to turn over their beds as a sign of the overturning of their worlds which occurred when they lost a relative. Rabbi Judah says that on Tisha B’av everyone should turn over their beds as a sign of the collective mourning of the people. However, the other sages disagree with him." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nTractate Taanit, a sad tractate which deals with drought and other distressful events and the fasts that Jews take upon themselves to ask for forgiveness from their sins, ends with a mishnah about the two happiest days in the Jewish calendar, the fifteenth of Av and Yom Kippur.", + "Section one: Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel said: There were no days of joy in Israel greater than the fifteenth of Av and Yom Kippur. Section two: On these days the daughters of Jerusalem would go out in borrowed white garments in order not to shame any one who had none. All these garments required immersion. The daughters of Jerusalem come out and dance in the vineyards. What would they say? Young man, lift up your eyes and see what you choose for yourself. Do not set your eyes on beauty but set your eyes on the family. “Grace is deceitful, and beauty is vain, but a woman that fears the Lord, she shall be praised” (Proverbs 31:30). And it further says, “Give her of the fruit of her hands; and let her works praise her in the gates” (ibid, 31:31). Section three: Similarly it says, “O maidens of Zion, go forth and gaze upon King Solomon wearing the crown that his mother gave him on his wedding day, on the day of the gladness of his heart” (Song of Songs 3:11). “On his wedding day”: this refers to Matan Torah (the Giving of the Torah). “And on the day of the gladness of his heart”: this refers to the building of the Temple; may it be rebuilt speedily in our days, Amen. There are several reasons why the fifteenth of Av became a day of celebration. First of all, as we learned in mishnah five above, this is the date when most families would have made their wood donation. The Talmud provides several other reasons. One of these is that on this day people from different tribes were allowed to intermarry. Another explanation is that on this day the Israelites in the desert who were to die before they entered into the land of Israel stopped dying. Anyone who made it through this day in the fortieth year in the desert knew that he was going to make it to the land of Canaan. Yom Kippur is a day of celebration for on it Jews receive atonement for their sins. Yom Kippur, in sharp contrast with Tisha B’av, is not a day of mourning, but rather a day of celebration. Furthermore, according to tradition, the second set of the Tablets were given to Israel on Yom Kippur, which is in essence collective forgiveness for the sin of the golden calf.", + "These two days were like an ancient Sadie Hawkins day (if you don’t know what this is, you can google it to find out), except instead of the girls chasing the boys, the girls would go out to the field and let the boys come and chase them. The girls would go out to the field in white clothes and dance and let the boys choose for themselves brides. These clothes were borrowed so that girls who could not afford a nice white garment would not be embarrassed. The garments would be immersed before they were worn so that they would be pure. The whole ceremony seems to be geared towards encouraging the boys to choose their girls not based on their looks or wealth but based on their families and piety. In mishnaic times, and indeed in many traditional cultures, “yihus” being from a good family was probably the most important consideration in arranging marriages.", + "Taanit ends with a midrash which which was originally not part of the mishnah as it is missing in manuscripts. It was probably added to the end of Taanit as a prayer for the restoration of the Temple, and to end a depressing tractate on an upbeat note of hope and consolation. It connects to the previous section because of its reference to girls going out. Furthermore, the day under discussion in this midrash is understood to be Yom Kippur, the day on which the second set of Tablets was given. Yom Kippur commemorates the past, and gives us hope for the future as well, for a time in which the Temple will be rebuilt. Congratulations! We have finished Taanit. It is a tradition at this point to thank God for helping us finish learning the tractate and to commit ourselves to going back and relearning it, so that we may not forget it and so that its lessons will stay with us for all of our lives. Taanit is perhaps one of the most “theological” of tractates for it is all about how God responds to our misdeeds and how we respond to God’s rebuking. One can look at the fasts as a way for Jews to remind themselves that they constantly need to be checking their own behavior, to looking at how we relate to each other and to the rest of the world and that our actions have an effect on our world. While it is probably hard for us to share an overly simplistic theology we do bad things, God punishes us directly and immediately, we pray and fast and things get better the deeper message of the tractate seems to be a push for our own atonement and for our own sensitivity to crisis in the world. According to the tractate there is meaning in history and events and it is up to humans to learn how to respond properly. There is also a lot in the tractate about the cycles of rejoicing and mourning. As always, congratulations on learning another tractate of Mishnah. Tomorrow we begin Megillah. " + ] + ] + ] + }, + "versions": [ + [ + "Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp", + "http://learn.conservativeyeshiva.org/mishnah/" + ] + ], + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה תענית", + "categories": [ + "Mishnah", + "Modern Commentary on Mishnah", + "English Explanation of Mishnah", + "Seder Moed" + ], + "schema": { + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה תענית", + "enTitle": "English Explanation of Mishnah Taanit", + "key": "English Explanation of Mishnah Taanit", + "nodes": [ + { + "heTitle": "הקדמה", + "enTitle": "Introduction" + }, + { + "heTitle": "", + "enTitle": "" + } + ] + } +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Moed/English Explanation of Mishnah Yoma/English/merged.json b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Moed/English Explanation of Mishnah Yoma/English/merged.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..c560c2db94a8d35a2522519829f4e27f4ded7d6f --- /dev/null +++ b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Moed/English Explanation of Mishnah Yoma/English/merged.json @@ -0,0 +1,398 @@ +{ + "title": "English Explanation of Mishnah Yoma", + "language": "en", + "versionTitle": "merged", + "versionSource": "https://www.sefaria.org/English_Explanation_of_Mishnah_Yoma", + "text": { + "Introduction": [ + "Tractate “Yoma”, which is Aramaic for “The Day” (the tractate was also called “Kippurim” or “Yom HaKippurim”), teaches the laws of Yom Kippur. However, seven of the eight chapters of the tractate deal with high priest’s worship in the Temple and only one of the chapters, the last one, deals with the laws of fasting and the issue of atonement. In other words, after the destruction of the Temple only one of these chapters is of immediate halakhic relevance. This is somewhat similar to the previous two tractates we have learned, Pesahim and Shekalim, which also contained large portions pertinent only to a time when the Temple still stood. ", + "The description of the high priest’s worship is found in Leviticus 16:1-34 and we shall make frequent reference to these verses. The Mishnah in large part explicates these verses, although not in a midrashic fashion, following the order of the verses, but rather in “mishnaic” fashion, following the order in which these actions are done. ", + "Interestingly, there are very few debates between different sages in these mishnayot. There are a few but they are mostly concerning the details and some of these concern the sacrificial procedures followed during the remainder of the year and not just on Yom Kippur. Albeck therefore concludes that the core of this tractate is early, and existed when the Temple still stood. It was transmitted by sages in later generation and these sages added in a few of their own comments, but left most of it in the way they received it. ", + "For those of you who pay close attention to the Yom Kippur service, you may remember a section called “Avodah” which is recited towards the end of Mussaf. The description of the high priest’s service described there is based on our Mishnah and on the accompanying Talmud, so when you get to shul (in little more than a month!)—pay attention and note the similarities. " + ], + "": [ + [ + [ + "Introduction\nTractate Yoma begins with preparations made seven days before Yom Kippur falls. This whole chapter deals with the week before Yom Kippur and how the sages instruct the High Priest so that he will be able to correctly perform the Yom Kippur service.", + "Seven days before Yom HaKippurim they remove the high priest from his house to the chamber of the counselors and they set up another priest to take his place lest something should occur to him to disqualify him [from being able to worship]. Seven days before Yom Kippur they isolate the High Priest so that he doesn’t become impure. Part of the purpose of this separation was to keep him away from his wife, lest his wife become a menstruant and he have intercourse with her and thereby be defiled. If he contracted a serious form of impurity he would not be able to perform the service in the Temple. The idea of a seven day period of separation is also learned from the Torah which also speaks of a seven day separation period, albeit not before Yom Kippur. In Leviticus 8:33 Moses instructs Aaron and the other priests not to leave the Tent of Meeting for the seven days before the Tabernacle is initially consecrated. This separation period is seen by the Talmud as a precedent for the separation of the high priest before Yom Kippur.", + "Rabbi Judah said: they even prepare another wife for him in case his wife should die, as it says “And he shall make atonement for himself and for his house” (Leviticus 16:6): “his house” this refers to his wife. They said to him: if so there would be no end to the matter. The Torah states that the High Priest makes atonement “for his house”, and the word “house” is understood by the rabbis to refer to his wife. This means that in order to be a high priest who can perform the Yom Kippur service, he needs to be married. Hence, Rabbi Judah says that they set up for him an alternative wife, lest his first wife dies right before Yom Kippur thereby preventing him from fulfilling the biblical verse. The rabbis respond that if we start worrying about such far-fetched possibilities, there will be no end to the matter. We will need to worry lest both the first wife and the second wife should die. Since the random death of his wife is unlikely, we don’t need to find him a second wife. However, the possibility that he should become defiled is not so unlikely, and hence he does need to be separated from his home a week before Yom Kippur. I should note that there are some interesting implications from this Mishnah on the rabbinic views of marriage. It is interesting that the rabbis demand that the “holiest” person in Judaism, the person responsible for the holiest service, must be married when he performs that service. This may be a statement somewhat directed against those Jewish groups who advocated celibacy, at least for their religious leaders. However, we should also note that during the week before his service, he is separated from his wife. In other words, there is some ambiguity here. He needs to be married, for the rabbis generally looked favorably upon procreation and upon sexual pleasure. However, they may have seen marital life as partially distracting and hence dictated a separation during this brief but intense period." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah teaches that during the seven days before Yom Kippur the high priest performs regularly duties which he may or may not perform during the rest of the year.", + "All seven days he sprinkles the blood and burns the incense and cleans lamps and offers the head and the leg; “Sprinkling the blood” refers to the blood of the daily tamid offerings which are offered in the morning and the evening. The incense is mentioned in Exodus 30:1-8. It is offered daily on the golden altar. “Cleaning the lamps” means cleaning them from the accumulated ashes, waste-oil and putting in them new oil and wicks. This task also includes lighting the new flame. Finally, the “head and the leg” are the partsof the two daily tamid offerings which were put first onto the altar. The point of this mishnah is that parts of the service and other Temple duties that he could take part in during the rest of they year, but did not have to if he did not want to, become obligatory for him during the week before Yom Kippur. This is so that he becomes more accustomed to working in the Temple. In other words, this is a warm up.", + "And on all other days if he wants he offers, for the high priest is first in offering a portion and has first place in taking a portion. During the rest of the year, he need perform these tasks only if he wishes to do so. The mishnah points out that any part of the sacrificial service that the high priest wishes to perform he may do so. His right trumps that of any ordinary priest, even those whose shifts are currently serving in the Temple. He also is the first to choose whichever part of the sacrifice he wishes, even if he wasn’t the one to offer it. As they say, “it’s good to be the high priest!”" + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah describes how the elders educated the high priest during the week that preceded Yom Kippur. We can easily note that the rabbis anticipate that the high priest will be completely uneducated in Torah and in the proper ways of the Temple service. Indeed, they don’t think that he even knows how to identify common sacrificial animals! According to the traditional understanding of this mishnah, the high priests that served in the Second Temple period were appointed by the kings out of political considerations and not for their expertise in Temple practice or for their personal piety. This is largely corroborated out by other descriptions of the high priests in such writings as Josephus and other historical works. However, the rabbis’ description of the high priest’s utter ignorance may be exacerbated by the Second Temple rivalry between the Pharisees, the rabbis’ spiritual forefathers and the Sadducees, a sect to which many high priests belonged.\nAnother interesting way of understanding this mishnah is to note the tension between the genealogically transmitted priesthood and the Torah which is transmitted from teacher to pupil and not necessarily from father to son. The rabbis generally favored the relationship of teacher to pupil even over that of father to son but also realized that the priesthood was genealogical. In the high priest who must serve in the Temple’s most critical service even though he was an ignoramus these two values distinctly clash.", + "They delivered to him elders from the elders of the court and they read before him [throughout the seven days] from the order of the day. And they say to him, “Sir, high priest, you read it yourself with your own mouth, lest you have forgotten or lest you have never learned.” During the week that precedes Yom Kippur the elders read to the high priest from Leviticus 16 so that he will understand how to perform the service. Even if he professes to know what to do, they tell him to read it himself, or perhaps to repeat what they say to him, lest he might have forgotten it or lest he never read the portion in the first place.", + "On the eve of Yom HaKippurim in the morning they place him at the eastern gate and pass before him oxen, rams and sheep, so that he may recognize and become familiar with the service. On the eve of Yom Kippur they show him various animals so that he will know which ones are which and which ones are offered for which sacrifice." + ], + [ + "All seven days they did not withhold food or drink from him. On the eve of Yom HaKippurim near nightfall they would not let him eat much because food brings about sleep.
This mishnah teaches that they didn’t let the High Priest drink or eat a lot on the eve of Yom Hakippurim because they thought that eating a big meal would make him sleepy and they didn’t want him to sleep that night. The reason that he wasn’t allowed to sleep was lest he have a nocturnal emission which would make him impure and thereby prevent him from serving in the Temple the next day. Since seminal emissions cause one to be impure for only one day, they only needed to prevent him from eating on the eve of Yom Kippur. During the rest of the week he was allowed to eat and drink in a normal fashion." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nAs I stated in my commentary to mishnah two and in my introduction to the tractate, many of the high priests were Sadducees, or perhaps more accurately, had Sadducean leanings. The Sadducees debated with the Pharisees the proper form of the Yom Kippur ritual, as I explain below. In the mishnah’s eyes, the elders spend a week teaching the high priest how to perform the service in the proper Pharisaic manner. Our mishnah describes the parting words between the elders and the high priest, where they remind him to act like a Pharisee and not a Sadducee.", + "The elders of the court handed him over to the elders of the priesthood and they took him up to the upper chamber of the house of Avtinas. On the eve of Yom Kippur the elders would give him over to the elders of the priesthood. He would go up to the house of Avtinas where the incense was normally made. There he would learn how to make the incense that he was going to make on Yom Kippur within the Holy of Holies.", + "They adjured him and then left. And they said to him [when leaving]: “Sir, high priest, we are messengers of the court and you are our messenger and the messenger of the court. We adjure you by the one that caused His name dwell in this house that you do not change anything of what we said to you.” When the elders of the court depart from him they recite to him the following oath, reminding him that he must do whatever they have taught him to do. The Talmud explains that there was the following debate between the Sadducees and the Pharisees. The Sadducees held that the high priest would put the incense into the incense pan outside of the Holy of Holies and then go inside, whereas the Pharisees held that this was done inside.", + "He turned aside and wept and they turned aside and wept. In the climactic conclusion to the mishnah, both the high priest and the elders end up crying (this would make a good movie). He cries because they suspected him of being a Sadducee and they cry because reality forced them to suspect him. Alternatively, they cry because the situation in their time had deteriorated so badly that they had to force a high priest to take an oath that he would not act like a Sadducee." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe mishnah has now reached the night before Yom Kippur is to begin. As we learned in mishnah four, he had to stay up all night. Our mishnah teaches that in order to keep himself awake he would study Torah all night (this never seems to work for me, but I’m not a high priest, not even a priest).", + "If he was a sage he would expound, and if not, the disciples of the sages would expound before him. If the high priest was a sage, then he would expound upon the Torah all night. But if he didn’t know how to interpret the Torah, then disciples of the sages would do this in front of him, thereby helping to keep him awake.", + "If he was familiar with reading [the Scriptures] he would read, if not they would read before him. If he could read the Tanakh, then he himself would read. But again, if he couldn’t even read, then the disciples of the sages would read in front of him. Note again how the mishnah takes into consideration the possibility that the high priest would not even know how to read from the Bible. The Talmud again reminds us that in the Second Temple period high priests were often positions appointed by the king based on political considerations and were not given to the most knowledgeable of the priests.", + "From what would they read before him? From Job, Ezra and Chronicles. Zechariah ben Kv’utal says: I have often read before him from Daniel. The sections that they would read to him from were sections that were considered particularly interesting and that would help keep him awake. Job and Daniel are compelling stories. Daniel and Ezra are partly in Aramaic, which may have made them easier to comprehend for a high priest who didn’t even understand Hebrew. I am not sure what the attraction of Chronicles is. Note that all four books are from “K’tuvim”, the last portion of the Hebrew Bible." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah shows how the young priests would keep the high priest awake all night on the eve before Yom Kippur.", + "If he wished to sleep, young priests would snap their middle finger before him and say: “Sir high priest, stand up and drive the sleep away by standing once on this [cold] floor. There were two things that the young priests, those with the strength to stay up all night, would do to keep the high priest awake. First they would snap their fingers at him and then they would tell him to stand on the cold floor. The rabbis believed that standing on a cold floor would wake up a tired person. If you’re not sure, try this yourself.", + "They would keep him busy until the time for the slaughtering [of the daily morning offering] would arrive. Finally, they made sure to keep him busy all night so that he wouldn’t fall asleep." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah teaches that on Yom Kippur Temple work which was usually left for the beginning of the day was moved up and done in the night so that the day would be free to do other things.", + "Every day they would remove [the ashes from] the altar at the cock’s crow or close to that time, either before or after. On most days they would remove the old ashes from the altar at the time when the rooster crows, which is at the time when it begins to get light outside, before sunrise. The removal of the ashes is referred to in Leviticus 6:3 and in tractate Tamid, which is in Seder Kodashim (hopefully we will learn this, but not for a few more years). I should note that in the Talmud there is a debate over the meaning of the phrase that I have translated as “the cock’s crow”. Some interpret this to mean an announcement made by a man, who said, “Priests get up for your word.” In Hebrew the word for “cock” and the word for “man” is the same. I will not comment on this.", + "But on Yom HaKippurim from midnight, and on the festivals at the [end of the] first watch; However, on Yom Kippur they began to clean out the old ashes at midnight, hours before it got light outside. The Talmud explains that this was because the high priest himself would clean out the ashes and they wanted to give him some time between this work and the rest of the day’s work. Others explain that they did the cleaning of the ashes early so that they wouldn’t have to delay beginning the real work of the day which would come later. On festivals they cleaned out the ashes even earlier, at the end of the first watch, which means one-third into the night. On festivals there are a lot of sacrifices and therefore there a lot of ashes, so that had to start cleaning out early.", + "And the cock’s crow would not arrive before the Temple court was full of Israelites. Finally, on Yom Kippur and on festivals the Temple’s courtyard would be full of Israelites already by the time the cock crowed, meaning before sunrise. People were so enthusiastic for the day’s service that they would get there even before the sunrise." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nAt the end of the first chapter we learned that the high priest removes the ashes from the altar on Yom Kippur. On other days any priest could do this. Our mishnah teaches how it was originally decided who would remove the ashes and tomorrow we will learn the terrible problems that this system caused.", + "Originally anyone who wished to remove [the ashes from] the altar did so. “Originally” in this mishnah refers to the situation which will be contrasted with the decree mentioned in tomorrow’s mishnah. Here we learn that originally any priest that wished to could remove the ashes from the altar and they didn’t draw lots to decide who would have this privilege. The other labors in the Temple were decided by drawing lots. However, because one had to get up so early in the morning to remove the ashes, they feared that if they decided who was to do so by lot, few would want to do so. Therefore, they opened it up to free competition.", + "When they were many, they would run up the ramp [of the altar] and he that came first within four cubits won the privilege. If there was more than one priest who wished to remove the ashes, they would compete by having a race up the ramp of the altar. The first priest who came within four cubits of the altar won the privilege of removing the ashes. In tomorrow’s mishnah we will see what problems this system caused.", + "If two were even, the officer would say to them [all:] raise the finger! And how many did they put out? One or two but one does not put out a thumb in the Temple. If it was a tie getting to the top of the ramp, they would play an ancient form of “eenie, meenie miney mo” (I have no idea if I spelled this right). Every priest would stick out one or two fingers and an officer of the priests would call out a number much larger than the number of priests present. He then would begin counting fingers and the person whose finger was counted last would win. However, thumbs didn’t count because of cheaters who would claim that their thumb was either out or not out so that the count would end with them. To avoid this problem they disallowed sticking out the thumbs and having them counted. As an aside, the mention of the thumb somewhat introduces the concept of cheating in order to perform a religious duty. This is a small form of cheating, one which doesn’t harm others. Nevertheless, it shows how religious zeal to perform a ritual might lead a person to unethical behavior. The unethical behavior which we will see in yesterday’s mishnah is far worse." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn today’s mishnah we see that religious zeal can lead to violence. There is no doubt in my mind that the mishnah is a warning against such a phenomenon, and it would seem that this is a lesson that could be more carefully heeded in our time as well.", + "Section one: It once happened that two were even as they ran up the ramp, and one of them pushed his fellow who fell and broke his leg. When the court saw that they incurred danger, they decreed that they would remove the ashes from only by a count. Section two: There were four counts. This is the first count. The event of one priest pushing another priest in order to be the one who would perform an act seemingly as ordinary and trivial as removing the ashes from the altar was such a traumatic experience that the court decreed an end to the races up the ramp. Henceforth, the decision who would remove the ashes would be decided by a count, as was described in yesterday’s mishnah. There is an interesting parallel to this mishnah, one which is far more extreme. The following source can be found on Yoma 23a: Our Rabbis taught: It once happened that two priests were even as they ran up the ramp and when one of them came first within four cubits of the altar, the other took a knife and thrust it into his heart. Rabbi Zadok stood on the steps of the Hall and said: Brothers of the House of Israel, listen! Behold it says: “If a body is found slain in the land... then your elders and judges shall come forth …” (Deuteronomy 21:1): On whose behalf shall we bring the calf whose neck is to be broken, on behalf of the city or on behalf of the Temple Courts? All the people burst out weeping. The father of the young man came and found him still in convulsions. He said: “May he be an atonement for you. My son is still having convulsions and the knife has not become unclean.” This comes to teach you that the cleanness of their vessels was of greater concern to them even than the shedding of blood. In this fascinating and horrific story, instead of causing his rival priest merely to fall down and break his leg, one priest takes out a knife and stabs his fellow priest. Rabbi Zadok ironically asks who brings the calf, whose neck is broken in a case where an unidentified dead body is found (see the quote from Deuteronomy), the city or the Temple courts. Finally, in the ultimate point of religious zeal, the father of the son poignantly remarks to the other priests that at least he has removed the knife before it is defiled by his son’s dead body. The source demonstrates well that the priests of that time had gone so astray that the issue of the purity of their vessels was more important to them then the most heinous sin of shedding blood. This mishnah and the accompanying Talmudic story are strong lessons to us of the dangers of religious zeal which can lead to violence. As important as ritual procedure is, and don’t forget we are in the middle of a tractate which is nearly entirely dedicated to the performance of ritual, we are not to forget that morality and the proper relationship between human beings are supreme values as well. It is not that we must choose between commandments between God and human beings and those between humans and themselves. The two are only in conflict if we let them be, and that we must not.", + "This count is the first of four counts done in choosing who performs certain tasks in the Temple. The following two mishnayot will discuss the other two." + ], + [ + "The second count:
who slaughters [the daily regular offering],
who sprinkles [the blood],
who removes the ashes from the inner altar,
who removes the ashes from the candlestick, 5-10) Who takes the limbs [of the offering up to the ramp],
the head and the [right] hind-leg,
the two forelegs,
the tail and the [left] hind-leg,
the breast and the throat,
the two flanks,
the innards,
the fine flour,
the cakes
and the wine. Altogether thirteen priests merited a task.
Ben Azzai said before Rabbi Akiba in the name of Rabbi Joshua: [the daily offering] was offered up in the way it walks.
In yesterday’s mishnah we learned that the priest who won the first count would remove the ashes from the large outer altar. Today we learn about the second count. There were thirteen different tasks assigned through this one count. The first task would be performed by the person whose finger the counted ended on, and the next would be assigned to the person on his right and so on.
All of these tasks are connected to the “tamid”, the daily offering.
Some of these tasks are self-explanatory, so I shall not delay upon them. I will only discuss those which are not.
Section three: “who removes the ashes from the inner altar”: this is the incense altar.
Sections five-ten: “Who takes the limbs [of the offering up to the ramp]”: we learned in Shekalim 8:8 that the priests would take the limbs up to the middle of the ramp and then before they were brought to the altar, the priests would go read the Shema. The mishnah now lists the parts of the animal. The fifth through the tenth priests all take one of these parts up to the ramp.
Section eleven: “The fine flour” is referred to in Exodus 29:9 and Numbers 28:5.
Section twelve: “The cakes”: this refers to the high priest’s minhah offering, which was offered each day, half in the morning and half at night. These cakes were cooked on a griddle with oil (Leviticus 6:13-14).
Section thirteen: “And the wine”: the thirteenth priest would bring the wine libation (Exodus 29:40 and Numbers 28:7).
Section fourteen: Ben Azzai disputes the order in which the parts of the animal were brought up the ramp and put onto the altar. He holds that the parts of the animal are sacrificed from the front of the animal to the back. The Talmud explains that the order is: 1) head and right hind-leg: 2) the breast and throat; 3) the two forelegs; 4) the flanks; 5) the tail and the left hind-leg.
In contrast, the first opinion in the mishnah holds that they are sacrificed in order of their size, with the one exception that the head comes first because of Leviticus 1:12 which lists the head first." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah teaches what the third and fourth counts were for.", + "The third count: “New [priests] come up and submit to the count for the incense.” The chief of priests would make this statement, directed at the new priests who had never before had the chance to offer the incense. Offering the incense was considered by the priests to be the best task in the Temple because of Deuteronomy 33:10-11: “They shall offer You incense to savor…Bless, O Lord his substance and favor his undertakings.” The blessing and the favor went to the one who offered the incense. In other words, offering the incense would bring a person reward. Since this was so desirable, they let only the priests who had not already performed this task participate in this count.", + "The fourth count: “New and old priests, who will take up the limbs from the ramp to the altar.” The final count was open to both new and old priests alike. The count was to determine who would bring the limbs up and sacrifice them on the altar. Some commentators explain that nine priests would bring the nine items up (see the list in yesterday’s mishnah), while other commentators explain that one priest would bring all nine items up himself." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah teaches how many priests were necessary to offer the two tamid offerings, the one offered in the morning and the one in the evening.", + "The tamid was offered up by nine, ten, eleven or twelve [priests], neither by more, nor by less. How so? This section introduces the rest of the mishnah, using a format which will be easily remembered. It is very typical for mishnayot to open with such formulas.", + "[The offering] itself by nine; In mishnah three we learned that it took nine priests to carry the various parts of the tamid offering up the ramp and then afterwards from the ramp to the altar. This referred to the morning tamid offering. As we shall see below in section four, the evening tamid required two more priests.", + "At the festival [of Sukkot] in the hand of one a flask of water, behold there were ten. On Sukkot at the morning tamid they would also offer a water libation. We shall learn more about this water libation when we study Tractate Sukkah.", + "In the evening by eleven: [The offering] itself by nine and in the hands of two men were two logs of wood. The evening tamid, offered at dusk, required eleven priests. Nine to carry the offering itself and two to carry about two logs of wood to add to the altar’s fires. They also added wood in the morning, but in the morning the wood was added by the priest who cleaned out the old ashes (see above mishayot 1-2). This was done before the tamid was offered.", + "On Shabbat by eleven: [The offering] itself by nine, in the hands of two men two handfuls of incense for the showbread. On Shabbat the morning tamid also required eleven priests. Nine to offer the sacrifice itself and two to carry the incense which was offered every Shabbat in honor of the outgoing showbread (see Leviticus 24:6-7).", + "And on Shabbat which fell during the festival of Sukkot one man carried in his hand a flask of water. On Shabbat morning during Sukkot they needed the eleven as is the case in a normal Shabbat and one more to carry the flask of water." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah teaches how many priests were necessary to offer a ram, meaning a sheep that is two years old. There are more needed than there are for the tamid which is a sheep in its first year, and therefore lighter.", + "A ram was offered by eleven: the flesh by five, the innards, the fine flour, and the wine by two each. The flesh is offered by five just like the tamid, which is a young sheep (see above mishnah three). However, the innards which were heavier required two priests to carry them up the ramp and then to the altar. There was more flour and wine (see Numbers 15:4-7), therefore two priests carried the flour and two the wine instead of one each, as is the case for the tamid." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe final mishnah of this chapter teaches that sacrificial bulls, who were far larger than the rams and young sheep mentioned in the previous mishayot, and whose sacrifice required more flour and wine, were offered by twenty-four priests, instead of the nine for a sheep and eleven for a ram.", + "A bull was offered by twenty-four: The head and [right] hind-leg: the head by one and the [right] hind-leg by two. The tail and [left] hind-leg: the tail by two and the [left] hind-leg by two. The breast and neck: the breast by one and the neck by three. The two fore-legs by two, The two flanks by two. The innards, the fine flour, and the wine by three each. This section delineates how the twenty-four priests divided up the offering of the bull.", + "To what does this refer? To communal offerings. But individual offerings, if a single priest wants to offer [all], he may do so. This section refers to all of the above mishnayot in which priests divide the task of offering various parts of a young sheep, a ram or a bull. The mishnah now teaches that this division refers to public offerings, such as the tamid or the musaf (the additional offering). However, if any of these animals are brought by individuals a single priest may perform all of the tasks himself. Assumedly, although the mishnah does not state this, the individual who brings the sacrifice is the same one who is allowed to decide which or how many priests offer it.", + "But as to the flaying and dismembering [of both communal and individual sacrifices] the same regulations apply. When it comes to the flaying and cutting up (dismembering) of both communal and individual sacrifices, the same rules apply. This refers to the fact that both of these tasks may be performed by non-priests and do not require any priestly count." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah begins to describe the services performed in the Temple on Yom Kippur. The first thing done was to establish that it was light enough outside to slaughter the morning tamid (daily offering). This procedure was followed every day as well.", + "The officer said to them: “Go out and see whether the time for slaughtering [the morning sacrifice] has arrived.” If it had arrived then he who saw it said: “It is daylight!” After the second count, the first thing done was that the officer of the priests would tell another priest to go out and see if dawn had broken. The priest would stand on a high point in the Temple, look out and see if it had yet gotten light. The tamid offering can be offered as soon as it starts to get light, even before sunrise.", + "Matitya ben Shmuel says: “The whole east is light.” Even unto Hebron? And he answered “Yes.” Matitya ben Shmuel was the officer in charge of the counts done in the Temple (see Shekalim 5:1). He would further interrogate the one who claimed to have seen daybreak. He wanted to know that a substantial portion of the sky had started to become light. The Talmud Yerushalmi explains that he mentions Hebron because that is where the patriarchs and matriarchs are buried. They would begin the day, therefore, by reminding God of the merit accrued to them by virtue of their being descendents of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, as well as Sarah, Rivkah and Leah (Rachel was buried elsewhere)." + ], + [ + "Introduction The first half of this mishnah is a continuation of yesterday’s mishnah where we learned how cautious the priests were to ensure that dawn had truly broken before they slaughtered the morning tamid sacrifice. The second half of the mishnah proceeds with the descriptions of the Temple service.", + "And why was all that necessary? Because once the light of the moon rose and they thought that the east was lit up and slaughtered the continual offering, [and afterwards] they had to take it out to the place of burning. The reason for all of the strict procedures which we learned in yesterday’s mishnah was that one time it happened that the moonlight was particularly strong and the priests thought that it was dawn. They then sacrificed the morning tamid before they realized their error. Since the tamid was slaughtered at night it was unfit and had to be burned at the “place of burning” where they would burn unfit sacrifices. They would then have been liable to offer another tamid sacrifice.", + "They led the high priest down to the place of immersion. On Yom Kippur before they offered the tamid they would lead the high priest down to immerse himself, a requirement of which we will read more in mishnah three.", + "This was the rule in the Temple: whoever covers his feet required an immersion, and whoever passed water required sanctification [by washing] his hands and feet. “Covers his feet” is a euphemism for defecating (See Judges 3:24). A priest who defecates must fully immerse himself before serving again in the Temple. However, urinating only requires him to sanctify himself by washing his hands and feet and not his whole body." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah teaches a general principle with regard to immersing before service in the Temple.", + "A man may not enter the Temple courtyard or to worship even if he was clean until he immerses himself. There are actually two requirements in this section. The first is that one may not enter into the Temple courtyard unless he first immerses himself in a mikveh. The second is that one who is already in the courtyard may not begin to perform the Temple service until he immerses himself.", + "Five immersions and ten sanctifications did the high priest perform on that day. The high priest will change his clothing from his normal priestly wear to special golden clothes and then back again five times during Yom Kippur. For each change he would need to sanctify his hands and feet by washing them, making a total of ten hand and feet-washings.", + "And all in sanctity in the Bet Haparvah with the exception of this one alone. All of these washings were done in an immersion pool which was on top of a chamber called the “Bet Haparvah”. The “Bet Haparvah” was within the Temple courtyard. The one exception was the first immersion which we learned about yesterday. Since this immersion was done before he began the service it was done outside of the Temple courtyard." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah proceeds to outline the precise order of the day’s worship. We need to remember that on this day the high priest must basically perform all of the work himself. Hence we will feel throughout this description a sense of his being hurried; after all there is a lot to do.", + "They spread out a linen sheet between him and the people. For modesty’s sake, when he got undressed they would spread out a linen sheet between him and the rest of the people. The Talmud explains that the reason for the sheet being of linen is to remind him that when performing services that are done only on Yom Kippur he will need to wear all white clothes from linen. The rest of the year he wears eight garments, four of which are made of gold (as we shall explain below).", + "He stripped off [his clothes], went down and immersed himself, came up and dried himself. Now that the sheet is up, he can remove his clothes and go and immerse himself for the first time during the day. He then dries off and is ready to get dressed.", + "They brought him the golden garments, he put them on and sanctified his hands and feet. The first clothes he wears are the same clothes that he wears all year long, the “golden garments”. The garments are: “a breastpiece, an ephod, a robe, a fringed tunic, a headdress and a sash (Exodus 28:4) and a “frontlet” (v. 36) and “breeches” (v. 42). In three of them there was some gold, in the breastpiece, the ephod, and the robe (it had golden bells) and the frontlet was made totally of gold. However, before he puts on his clothes he again washes his hands. Note however that when he removed his previous clothing he did not wash his hands because at that time he was just wearing his own clothes. From this point until the day’s worship is completed, he will wash his hands both when putting on new clothes and taking off the old ones.", + "They brought him the tamid. After he has put on the clothes, they bring him the lamb to slaughter as the morning tamid offering.", + "He made the required cut and some one else finished it for him. He received the blood and sprinkled it. The high priest begins the slaughtering process by slicing the animal’s neck in a means that renders it “kosher” fit for consumption. This means he cuts the windpipe and the gullet. Since there is a lot of service to be done, the high priest immediately receives the blood and sprinkles it. Someone else completes the slaughtering process so that the priest can be free to do other things.", + "He went inside to smoke the morning incense and to trim the lamps; Having slaughtered the tamid, the high priest now turns his attention to the incense. He enters into the Temple (the Ulam) where the golden altar is found and turns the incense into smoke (see Exodus 30:7). At the same time he removes the ashes from the menorah (ibid, and see above mishnah 2:3).", + "And to offer up the head and the limbs and the griddle cakes and the wine. He now must bring the head and limbs of the tamid sacrifice up to the altar (above 2:3). He must also offer his own daily minhah offering, which consists of griddle cakes (Leviticus 6:13-14). Finally, he must offer the wine that always accompanies the tamid offering (see above 2:3). The mishnah does not mention offering the tamid minhah (grain offering). Perhaps it is included in the “griddle cakes”, which also come from grain although they are prepared differently." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe mishnah now makes a note about the precise timing of the morning and dusk incense.", + "The morning incense was offered up between the blood and the limbs, The morning incense is, as we learned yesterday, offered up after the blood of the tamid has been sprinkled on the altar and before the limbs have been offered.", + "The dusk [incense was offered] between the limbs and the drink-offerings. The incense which is offered at dusk (Exodus 30:8) is offered after the limbs of the dusk tamid have been put onto the altar but before the wine of this tamid is offered.", + "If the high priest was either old or of delicate health warm water they would heat some water for him and pour into the cold [water], to temper its coldness. If the high priest cannot handle the frequent immersions because the water is just too cold, they heat up some water on the day before Yom Kippur and put it into the cold water to temper its coldness. The Talmud explains that they would put some iron rods into the fire on the day before Yom Kippur and then on Yom Kippur put them into the water to heat it up. We should note that doing this outside of the Temple would be prohibited because of “sh’vut” rabbinic Shabbat prohibitions. However, in the Temple such prohibitions are waived." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe tamid offering is now complete and the high priest continues on with the day’s worship.", + "They brought him to the Bet Haparvah, which was on holy ground. They spread a sheet of linen between him and the people. All of the day’s immersions except for the first one were done in a place called “Bet Haparvah” which was in the Temple courtyard (above, mishnah 3). As he prepares to strip in order to enter the mikveh, they again spread a linen sheet between him and the people.", + "He sanctified his hands and his feet and stripped. Rabbi Meir says: he stripped [and then] sanctified his hands and his feet. According to the first opinion, he first sanctifies his hands and feet by washing them and then strips off the gold clothes that he has been wearing. According to this opinion, the sanctification is for the sake of the clothes which he is removing. Rabbi Meir, on the other hand, holds that the sanctification is for the clothes which he is going to put on. Therefore, he first strips off the golden garments and then he sanctifies his hands and feet.", + "He went down and immersed himself, came up and dried himself. Now he goes to the mikveh, comes up dries himself off.", + "Afterwards they brought him white garments. He put them on and sanctified his hands and his feet. Finally, he puts on the special white garments worn on Yom Kippur. They are “a sacral linen tunic, linen breeches, a linen sash and a linen turban” (Leviticus 16:4). After having put them on he sanctifies his feet and hands again by washing them. This sanctification is certainly in honor of the clothes that he is now putting on." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses just how expensive were the special linen garments which the high priest wore on Yom Kippur. Thinking of the high priest wearing very expensive white clothing on Yom Kippur brings to mind the white dress worn by a bride on her wedding day.", + "In the morning he would wear Pelusian linen worth twelve minas (1200 dinar/; at dusk Indian linen worth eight hundred zuz, the words of Rabbi Meir. According to Rabbi Meir the linen clothes that the high priest wore in the morning came from the city Pelusium in Egypt. This city was in the northern end of the Nile, where the Nile ends and one turns east on route to ancient Palestine or Syria (plug “Pelusium” into Google and you’ll find this info as well!). The Targum (the Aramaic translation of the Tanakh) translates Ramses into Pelusium. The linen that the high priest wore at dusk was from India and it was slightly less expensive.", + "The sages say: in the morning he would wear [garments] worth eighteen minas and at dusk [garments] worth twelve minas, altogether thirty minas. The sages say that the high priest’s garments were even more expensive than that, the morning garments being worth 1800 dinars/zuz and the dusk garments worth 1200. We should note that both agree that the morning clothes were worth more than those worn at dusk.", + "These [costs] were at the charge of the community and if he wanted to add, he adds more out of his own pocket. The mishnah now teaches that if the high priest should wish to buy even more expensive clothing, he may do so but it must come out of his own pocket. His “expense account” which comes from the Temple funds is either 20 mina (2000 zuz), according to Rabbi Meir, or 30 mina (3000 zuz) according to the sages. Should he wish to spend more he must use his own funds." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe priest is now wearing his special Yom Kippur linen and is prepared to offer the first of the Yom Kippur sacrifices, the bull which atones for the high priest and his house. This is mentioned in Leviticus 16:6, and then again in verse 11.", + "He came to his bull and his bull was standing between the Ulam and the altar, its head to the south and its face to the west. The bull was standing on the northern side of the Temple courtyard, between the Ulam, which is the outermost portion of the sanctuary (the Hechal) and the outer altar, which is to the east of the Ulam. The head of the bull was facing south but they would turn its face west towards the sanctuary. In the Talmud they explain that they would put the bull here because some of its blood would need to be sprinkled inside the Holy of Holies and this was as close as they could bring the bull.", + "And the priest stands on the eastside facing the west. The priest would stand on the east side of the bull, with his back to the altar and facing the sanctuary.", + "And he lays both his hands upon it and confesses. The priest would lay his hands on the animal, a practice done for all sin-offerings (see Leviticus 4:29, 33) and then offer up the confession, alluded to in Leviticus 16:6.", + "And thus he would say: “Please, ‘Hashem’! I have done wrong, I have transgressed, I have sinned before You, I and my house. Please, ‘Hashem’! Forgive the wrongdoings, the transgressions, the sins which I have committed and transgressed and sinned before You, I and my house, as it is written in the torah of Moses Your servant: “For on this day shall atonement be made for you [to cleanse you of all your sins; you shall be clean before the Lord”] (Leviticus 16:30). The language of the confession does not appear in the Torah and indeed it is not clear at all in the Torah whether the “atonement” mentioned in Leviticus 16:6 is an atonement achieved solely through sacrifice or through a verbal confession. In any case, the rabbis explain that a verbal confession was made. During this confession the high priest would explicitly state God’s four letter name (the tetragrammaton) but due to its extreme caution in stating God’s name the mishnah only writes “Hashem” which means “the name.” We should note that the way we pronounce this name now is not the way it was originally pronounced. The original pronunciation has probably been lost. “Yehovah” is certainly not the original pronunciation as it is based on the vowels from the word “Adonay”.", + "And they answered after him: “Blessed be the name of His glorious kingdom for ever and ever!” When the people heard the explicit pronunciation of God’s name they would respond by blessing God’s holy name. We shall see this ritual of confession and response repeated several times throughout the remainder of the tractate. Indeed, on Yom Kippur, if you’re still in shul, try to follow along in the “Avodah” service, which comes at the end of Mussaf. You will see many of the elements of these mishnayot incorporated into the service." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe high priest now proceeds to the two goats, one which will eventually be sacrificed and one which will be sent to Azazel.", + "He then went to the east of the Temple court, to the north of the altar, the deputy high priest at his right and the head of the [priestly] family [ministering that week] at his left. The high priest now turns to the east of the courtyard, to the northern side of the outer altar. With him are the deputy high priest and the head of the priestly family whose turn it is to serve in the Temple. The priests were divided up into 24 priestly families, and each served a week in the Temple. Each division was divided into families, and each family would take one day of the week. The mishnah refers to the head of the family whose luck it was to have Yom Kippur fall on their day.", + "There were two goats and an urn was there, and in it were two lots. Waiting for the high priest were two goats, as mentioned in Leviticus 16:5 and onwards. They will figure prominently in the day’s service and are perhaps its most famous element. Next to the two goats was an urn with two lots in it, as mentioned in 16:8. The lots will be used to determine which goat is sacrificed and which goat goes to Azazel.", + "They were of box-wood and Ben Gamala made them of gold and they would mention his name in praise. The lots were originally made of box-wood until Ben Gamala, who was a high priest, made them of gold." + ], + [ + "Ben Katin made twelve spigots for the laver, for there had been before only two. He also made a mechanism for the laver, in order that its water should not become unfit by remaining overnight.
King Monbaz had all the handles of all the vessels used on Yom HaKippurim made of gold.
His mother Helena made a golden candelabrum over the opening of the Hekhal. She also made a golden tablet, on which the portion concerning the suspected adulteress was inscribed.
For Nicanor miracles happened to his doors.
And they were all mentioned for praise.
Since at the end of yesterday’s mishnah we learned that Ben Gamala made the lots out of gold and he was praised for it, today’s mishnah teaches other ornaments that were donated by individuals and for which they were praised. You can think of this mishnah as an ancient dedication plaque!
Section one: Ben Katin, who was also a high priest, made twelve spigots for the Temple’s laver, a fancy word for sink (see Exodus 30:18-21). The Talmud explains that this was so each of the twelve priests who were offering the tamid (see above, mishnayot 2-3) could have their own spigot.
Ben Katin is also credited with another improvement in the Temple, this one also connected to issue of water. He made a wheel that went into the water cistern which would cause the water in the laver to be connected to the water in the cistern. The reason for this is that any water left out overnight in a vessel in the Temple is rendered unfit. Without this wheel, the water left over in the laver would need to be emptied out every morning.
Section two: King Monbaz was king of Adiabene, which is north of Israel, and is now part of Turkey. He, as well as his brother and mother, are mentioned as converts in Josephus. They ruled in the first century C.E., slightly before the destruction of the Temple. According to the mishnah, he paid to make the handles of vessels out of gold, in cases such as a knife, where the vessel itself could not be made of gold.
Section three: Monbaz’s mother, who is also mentioned in Nazir 3:6, made a golden candelabrum to stand at the entrance to the Hekhal.
Helene also made a golden tablet on which to write the chapter of the Sotah (Numbers 5:11 ff.) From here the priest could copy the words when he needed to perform the sotah (suspected adulteress) ritual (see v. 23).
Section four: Finally, the mishnah obliquely mentions Nikanor’s doors and the miracles that happened to them. The Talmud (Yoma 38a) explains: “What miracles happened to his doors? They say that when Nicanor had gone to bring doors from Alexandria of Egypt, on his return a storm arose in the sea to drown him. They took one of his doors and cast it into the sea and yet the sea would not stop its rage. They wanted to cast the other into the sea. He rose and clung to it, saying: ‘Cast me in with it!’ The sea immediately stopped its raging. He was deeply grieved about the other [door]. When he arrived at the harbor of Acco, it broke through and came up from under the sides of the boat. Others say: A monster of the sea swallowed it and spat it out on the dry land.”" + ], + [ + "Introduction\nAlas, along with those who were remembered for praise, there were those who were remembered for shame as well. Interestingly, all of those who were remembered for shame were denounced for the same transgression they refused to teach their secrets to outsiders, thereby preserving for themselves monopolies over how certain things in the Temple were run. It is clear that the rabbis were incensed by the preservation of such secrets; both for practical and I believe ideological reasons as well. Practically, their trade was in constant danger of being lost. Ideologically, it seems to me that the rabbis stood for a certain democratization of knowledge. With the exception of certain esoteric subjects, the rabbis believed that people should know the oral tradition. Those who kept its various aspects to themselves were condemning the tradition to be unjustly monopolized and even worse, forgotten.", + "And these they mentioned to their shame:
Those of the House of Garmu did not want to teach anything about the preparation of the showbread. The trick with the showbread, according to the Talmud, was to take it off the sides of the oven, where bread was cooked (as is pita today) without it breaking apart due to its size. The House of Garmu (probably not related to “gourmet” but who knows!) knew how to do this but did not want to teach others.", + "Those of the House of Avtinas did not teach to anything about the preparation of the incense. The incense was a complicated mixture of spices and some other materials which caused it to turn into thick smoke. The House of Avtinas did not want to teach others how they made the incense.", + "Hugros, a Levite knew a chapter [concerning] the song but did not want to teach it. Hugros knew certain tricks on how to improve one’s voice, but to his discredit, did not wish to teach others.", + "Ben Kamtzar did not want teach anyone his art of writing. According to legend, Ben Kamtzar could take four styluses in one hand and write four letters at the same time.", + "Concerning the former it is said: “The memory of the righteous shall be for a blessing” (Proverbs 10:7); concerning the others it is said: “But the name of the wicked shall rot.” Concerning those listed in mishnah ten for praise we say “The memory of the righteous shall be for a blessing” but concerning those in our mishnah we say, “But the name of the wicked shall rot”, meaning let their memory be forgotten." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "He shook the urn and brought up the two lots. On one was inscribed: “For the Name”, and on the other: “For Azazel.”
The deputy high priest was at his right hand, the head of the [ministering] family at his left.
If the lot “For the Name” came up in his right hand, the deputy high priest would say to him: “Sir, high priest, raise your right hand!” And if the lot “For the Name” came up in his left hand, the head of the family would say: “Sir high priest, raise your left hand!”
Then he placed them on the two goats and said: “A sin-offering for the Lord!” Rabbi Ishmael said: he did not need to say, “a sin-offering”, but just “for the Lord.”
And they answered after him: “Blessed be the name of His glorious kingdom for ever and ever!”
After a brief digression, the mishnah returns to discuss the main subject at hand the Yom Kippur procedure. We left off in mishnah nine with the high priest standing next to the urn in which were placed the two lots for the two goats.
Section one: The high priest would then shake the urn to mix up the two lots. The reason to mix them up was that it was considered good luck for the lot on which was written God’s name to come up in his right hand. On one of the lots was inscribed God’s name, but the mishnah chooses again to use “the Name” instead of God’s four letter name. This goat would be sacrificed. The other lot had written on it “For Azazel” this goat would be sent to the wilderness.
Section two: This was already described above in 3:9.
Section three: Whoever was on the hand of the high priest which had brought up the lot “For the Name” would tell the High Priest to raise that hand so that the people would know which goat was going where.
Section four: Then he would place the lots on the two goats. He would place he lot which came up in his right hand on the goat on the right and the one in his left hand on the goat on the left. When placing the lot upon which was inscribed “For the Name” he would call out “A sin-offering to the Lord”, or according to Rabbi Ishmael just “For the Lord.” Upon hearing God’s holy name the priests and Israelites observing the ceremony would cry out “Blessed be the name of His glorious kingdom for ever and ever” the same response we saw above in 3:8." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nAfter having drawn the lots to determine which goat would be slaughtered and which sent away, the day’s ceremonies continue.", + "He bound a thread of crimson wool on the head of the goat which was to be sent away, and he placed it at the gate where it was later to be sent away, and on the goat that was to be slaughtered [he placed a thread of crimson wool on its neck] at the place of the slaughtering. After determining the goats, the priest would tie a piece of crimson wool on the sacrificial goat between its horns and then set it near the gate from where it will be later sent into the wilderness. He would also tie a thread around the neck of the goat which will later be slaughtered. We have actually already mentioned this piece of wool in Shabbat 9:3 and Shekalim 4:2 and we shall discuss it and its function again in Yoma 6:6, and 6:8. The Talmud on this mishnah explains that the purpose of these threads was to make sure that these goats didn’t get mixed up with others. They placed the threads in different places so that these two could be distinguished from one another.", + "He came to his bull a second time, pressed his two hands upon it and made confession. And thus he would say: “Please, ‘Hashem’! I have done wrong, I have transgressed, I have sinned before You, I and my house and the sons of Aaron Your holy people. Please, ‘Hashem’! Forgive the wrongdoings, the transgressions, the sins which I have committed and transgressed and sinned before You, I and my house and the sons of Aaron Your holy people, as it is written in the torah of Moses Your servant: “For on this day shall atonement be made for you [to cleanse you of all your sins; you shall be clean before the Lord”] (Leviticus 16:30). And they answered after him: “Blessed be the name of His glorious kingdom for ever and ever!” He now comes back to the bull (he was already there at mishnah 3:8) and offers up another confession. This time the confession is not only for him and his household but for all of the other priests as well. The words of the confession are the same as those in 3:8 above, except here he adds “and the sons of Aaron Your holy people.”" + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn this mishnah the bull is slaughtered and the high priest begins to make preparations for the incense offering.", + "He killed it [the bull] and received its blood in a bowl, and he gave it to the one who stirs it up on the fourth terrace within the sanctuary so that it should not congeal. After making the second confession, he slaughters the second bull and receives its blood in a bowl. The blood will later be taken to the altar and sprinkled on it. In order that it shouldn’t congeal until that point, another priest stirs the blood continuously. This priest is standing on the fourth terrace. Between the outer altar and the Ulam, which was the entrance to the Hekhal (Sanctuary) there were twelve steps, divided into four groups of three. The third step of each group was made of specially paved stones and it was called a terrace. The fourth terrace was the uppermost one, and it was adjacent to the Ulam.", + "He took the coal-pan and went up to the top of the altar, and cleared the coals to both sides, and took a panful of the inner glowing cinders, and he came down and placed the coal-pan on the fourth terrace in the Temple Court. The priest would then take a coal-pan in which he would later turn the incense into smoke. He would get the ashes from the outer altar in the courtyard. First he would push the upper layer of ashes aside and take the hot burning cinders. Then he would come down off the altar and bring the coal-pan with the hot burning cinders up to the fourth terrace, the same place where the blood was waiting." + ], + [ + "On other days he would take out [the cinders] with a silver coal-pan, and empty it into one of gold, but this day he took them out with a golden coal-pan and in it he brought them [into the Hekhal].
On other days he would take them up with a coal-pan containing four kabs, and empty it into one containing three kabs, but this day he took them out with one containing three kabs, and in it he brought them in. Rabbi Yose says: on other days he would take them out with a coal-pan containing one se’ah, and empty it into one containing three kabs, this day he took them out with one containing three kabs, and in it he brought them in.
On other days the pan was heavy, today it was light.
On other days its handle was short, today it was long.
On other days it was of yellowish gold, today of reddish gold, the words of Rabbi Menahem.
On other days he would offer half a mina in the morning and half a mina in the afternoon, today he adds also his two hands full.
On other days [the incense] was finely ground, but today it was the most finely ground possible.
Our mishnah teaches seven differences between how the incense was offered on Yom Kippur and how it was offered every other day. Many of these changes were done to make the work on Yom Kippur easier for the high priest. The others were done to highlight the importance of the day.
Section one: On other days he would take the cinders off the altar with a silver coal-pan and then transfer them into a gold coal-pan. This was done in order to preserve the gold coal-pan because putting it directly into the fire would damage it. The Talmud demonstrates from here that the Torah has mercy on Israel’s money and doesn’t require them to consistently make the most expensive expenditures possible (a lesson that I think we would do well to take to heart). However, on Yom Kippur in order to make things less complicated for the high priest, the coals were removed with gold-pan itself and brought into the Hekhal and later into the Holy of Holies in the same gold-pan.
Section two: On other days he would remove the coals with a coal-pan that held four kav (about 8 liters) of coals and then transfer the coals to a slightly smaller pan which held on three kav. The extra kav of coals would spill out and they would sweep them away into the water channel in the Temple courtyard. On Yom Kippur since only one pan was being used he only removed three kav. Rabbi Yose says that on other days he would remove one seah, which is an equivalent of six kav of coals. He agrees that on Yom Kippur he would remove only three kav.
Sections three and four: Both of these changes from the daily routine would make the removal of the coals easier for the high priest.
Section five: Red gold was considered more valuable than greenish gold. Therefore it was used on Yom Kippur but not during the rest of the year.
Section six: Every other day the high priest would make two incense offerings, each of incense weighing half a mina, the weight of fifty dinars in coins. These two incense offerings were done on the incense altar in the Hekhal. On Yom Kippur because there was a third offering inside the Holy of Holies, he would have to add two handfuls.
Section seven: The daily incense was finely ground but the special incense for Yom Kippur, that which will be brought into the Holy of Holies was ground even finer. This is because Leviticus 16:12, the chapter concerning Yom Kippur, emphasizes that the incense must be ground fine, which is understood to mean that it must be ground even finer than the regular incense mentioned in Exodus 30:36 which also must be ground fine." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe mishnah continues to outline the differences between certain procedures during the rest of the year and on Yom Kippur. The two in today’s mishnah are both related to special practices done to enhance the honor of the high priest.", + "On other days the priests would go up on the east side of the ramp and come down on the west side, but this day the high priest goes up in the middle and comes down in the middle. Rabbi Judah says: the high priest always goes up in the middle and comes down in the middle. The ramp was on the south side of the altar. The priests would walk up on the east side and walk down on the west side so that they wouldn’t run into each other. On Yom Kippur in order to emphasize his honor, the high priest would walk up the middle of the ramp. Other versions of the mishnah read “they would go up the middle and come down the middle”, in which case it refers to the high priest and those other priests who accompany him. Rabbi Judah says that when the high priest goes up and comes down the ramp, he always does so in the middle. Rabbi Judah here and in the next section seems to be emphasizing that the honor of the high priest is no less during the rest of the year than it is on Yom Kippur. We might even be able to suppose that for Rabbi Judah the high priest’s import is inherent in his position and perhaps even in his very genes. He is the high priest and therefore he is honored with special practices. In contrast, for the first opinion in the mishnah the high priest’s import is related to the unique rituals he performs. Since these are mostly on Yom Kippur, his honorific practices are only on Yom Kippur as well.", + "On other days the high priest sanctified his hands and feet from the laver, but this day from a golden ladle. Rabbi Judah says: the high priest always sanctifies his hands and feet from a golden ladle. Usually the high priest would wash his hands from the laver, but on Yom Kippur he used a special golden ladle, again to emphasize his honor and the significance of the day. Again, Rabbi Judah holds that the high priest does so every day." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe final mishnah of the chapter continues to deal with differences between Yom Kippur and other days.", + "On other days there were four wood-piles there, but on this day five, the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yose says: on other days three, but on this day four. Rabbi Judah says: on other days two, but on this day three. The topic of this mishnah is how many piles of burning wood were on the outer altar on normal days and on Yom Kippur as well. Rabbi Meir holds that there were normally four wood-piles. The Talmud explains that each pile had its own function. The first was a large pile on which the tamid and its remnants were offered. The second was the pile from which cinders were taken to burn the daily incense offering. The third was to keep an eternal flame (see Leviticus 6:5). The fourth was to burn the limbs of sacrifices that they had not succeeded in burning during the night. On Yom Kippur they added one more wood-pile from which the high priest would collect the cinders to burn the special incense which he will bring into the Holy of Holies. Rabbi Yose holds that there was no special wood-pile for the limbs that had not been burned during the night. Rabbi Judah holds that there wasn’t a special wood-pile to preserve an eternal flame. Evidently, the other wood-piles were sufficient to ensure that there would always be a flame." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah picks up where we left off in 4:3 above. The last thing he did there was take the cinders off the altar and rest the coal-pan on the highest terrace leading up from the courtyard to the Hekhal.", + "They brought out to him the ladle and the pan and he took two hands full [of incense] and put it into the ladle, a large [high priest] according to his size, a small one according to his size and thus was its measure. After putting the coal-pan down on the fourth terrace they would give him a ladle in which to bring the incense into the Holy of Holies and a pan in which there was a preparation of incense, made in the house of Avtinas (see 1:5; 3:11). He would take two handfuls of the incense from the pan and put it into the ladle. It didn’t matter whether he was large and would therefore take large handfuls or small and therefore would take small handfuls. The measure of two handfuls was set by Leviticus 16:12.", + "He took the pan in his right hand and the ladle in his left hand. He walked through the Hechal until he came to the place between the two curtains which separated the Holy from the Holy of Holies; between them was [a space of] one cubit. Rabbi Yose says: there was but one curtain, as it is said: “And the curtain shall serve you as a partition between the Holy and the Holy of Holies” (Exodus 26:33). He would then pick up the coal-pan with the burning embers and begin to walk through the Hekhal until he got to the curtains which separated the Holy (the Hekhal) from the Holy of Holies. Rabbi Yose says that there was only one curtain. In any case, the mishnah continues according to the opinion that there were two.", + "The outer curtain was looped on the south side and the inner curtain on the north side. He walked along between them until he reached the north side. When he reached the north side he turned round to the south and went on along the curtain, to his left, until he reached the Ark. The curtains were folded back on opposite sides; the outer curtain was folded back and held with loops so that it was open on the south while the inner curtain was folded back and open on the north side. He would enter on the south side and walk to the north, and enter the Holy of Holies and then walk to the south until he got to the Ark. We should note that there was no Ark in the Second Temple, as we shall see in the next mishnah. Therefore this mishnah and other references to the ark in the Mishnah are understood by the Talmud as referring to the place where the Ark would have been in the First Temple. In other words, the mishnah refers to the ark as if it is still there even though it knows that it was not.", + "When he reached the Ark he put the pan of burning coals between the two poles. He heaped up the incense upon the coals and the whole house became full with smoke. Upon reaching the Ark he would place the coal-pan upon its two poles and then pour out the incense onto the coals until the entire Holy of Holies was filled up with smoke.", + "He came out by the way he entered and in the outer house he uttered a short prayer. He did not make the prayer long so as not to frighten Israel. He would then walk out of the Holy of Holies, never turning his back on it out of reverence for the place. In the Hekhal he would offer a short prayer. The prayer itself is recorded in the Talmud (Taanit 24b) and it is mostly is concerned with rain and sustenance for the coming year. Interestingly, the mishnah notes that he would not recite a long prayer so as not to frighten Israel into thinking that something had happened to him in the Holy of Holies. This was a moment extremely fraught with tension and fear and it seems that the well-being of the high priest was considered a portent for things to come to Israel in the coming year." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah teaches where the high priest would put the coal-pan in the Second Temple period when there was no longer an Ark.\nWith regard to the Ark, we have already learned in Shekalim 6:1-2 that there was a tradition that it was buried somewhere underneath the Temple floor. Other sages hold that the Ark was taken to Babylonian during the first exile in 586 B.C.E.", + "After the Ark had been taken away, there was a stone from the days of the earlier prophets, called “shtiyah”, three fingers above the ground, on which he would place [the pan of burning coals]. When the Ark was removed, there was a stone in the Holy of Holies that was there from the time of the early prophets. According to the Talmud, this stone was there from the time of Samuel and David, before the Temple was even built. “Shtiyah” is usually interpreted as the “foundation stone” for according to Jewish understanding, the world was founded from this point, either physically or spiritually. The stone was only three fingers high off the ground, but this was sufficient in order to put the coal-pan on it and then turn the incense into smoke." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn this mishnah the high priest takes the blood from the slaughtered bull and sprinkles the blood within the Holy of Holies.", + "He would take the blood from the one who was stirring it, and enter [again] into the place where he had entered, and stand [again] on the place on which he had stood, and sprinkle once upwards and seven times downwards, and he wouldn’t intend to sprinkle either upwards nor downwards but rather like one who cracks a whip. The high priest now took the bull’s blood from the person who was stirring it to keep it from congealing (see above 4:3). He then went back into the Holy of Holies and stood in the same place. Leviticus 16:14 reads: “He shall take some of the blood of the bull and sprinkle it with his finger over the cover (caporet) on the east side; and in front of the cover he shall sprinkle some of the blood with his finger seven times.” The rabbis did not interpret this verse to mean that he sprinkled the blood directly onto the cover of the ark, the caporet. Rather “over the cover” meant one sprinkle was directed up and the seven that were “in front of the cover” were sprinkled downwards. The blood from all of the sprinkles was supposed to land on the ground. The way in which the high priest did this is described as being “like one who cracks a whip.” This means that the first sprinkling was done by the hand beginning below and cracking upwards and the seven other sprinklings were done with the hand beginning above and moving in a sharp direction below (pretend like you are cracking a whip and you will understand immediately what this means.)", + "And thus would he count: one, one and one, one and two, one and three, one and four, one and five, one and six, one and seven. The first “one” refers to the upwards sprinkling. When counting the lower seven sprinklings, he would count with each of them the one that he had done above. This was done so that he wouldn’t make a mistake and count the upwards sprinkling with the downwards ones and thereby come up short by one sprinkling.", + "Then he would go out and put it on the golden stand in the sanctuary. When done sprinkling the blood he would leave the Holy of Holies and take the bowl with the blood out and put it on a golden stand made especially for this purpose." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn this mishnah the high priest slaughters the goat and then sprinkle the blood of the goat inside the Holy of Holies and the blood of both the goat and the bull on the curtain outside the Holy of Holies.", + "They would bring him the goat. He would slay it and receive its blood in a bowl. This is the goat which was determined by lot to be “For Hashem” as we read in 4:2 above. He slaughters it and receives its blood in a bowl.", + "He entered [again] into the place where he had entered, and stood [again] on the place on which he had stood, and sprinkled once upwards and seven times downwards, and he wouldn’t intend to sprinkle either upwards or downwards but rather like one who cracks a whip. And thus would he count: one, one and one, one and two, one and three, one and four, one and five, one and six, one and seven. Then he would go out and place it on the second [golden] stand in the Hekhal. Rabbi Judah said: there was only one golden stand there. He then brings the blood of the goat into the Holy of Holies and does the same type of sprinkling that he did with the bull’s blood (see 5:3). This is mentioned in Leviticus 16:15. There is a debate in the mishnah between the first opinion and Rabbi Judah concerning how many special stands were prepared to hold bowls with blood.", + "He would take the blood of the bull and put down the blood of the goat, and sprinkle from it upon the curtains facing the Ark outside, once upwards, seven times downward, aiming to sprinkle neither upwards nor downwards, and he wouldn’t intend to sprinkle either upwards or downwards but rather like one who cracks a whip. Thus would he count [as above]. Then he would take the blood of the goat, and put down the blood of the bull, and sprinkle from it upon the curtain facing the ark outside once upwards, seven times downwards [as above]. The beginning of this section goes according to Rabbi Judah who holds that there was only one special stand. He says that first the high priest picks up the bowl with the bull’s blood in it and then puts down the bowl with the goat’s blood. According to the first opinion, the high priest first puts down the goat’s blood on its own stand and then picks up the bull’s blood.", + "He would take the blood of the bull and put down the blood of the goat, and sprinkle from it upon the curtains facing the Ark outside, once upwards, seven times downward, aiming to sprinkle neither upwards nor downwards, and he wouldn’t intend to sprinkle either upwards or downwards but rather like one who cracks a whip. Thus would he count [as above]. Then he would take the blood of the goat, and put down the blood of the bull, and sprinkle from it upon the curtain facing the ark outside once upwards, seven times downwards [as above]. The next task at hand is to sprinkle blood on the curtain, opposite the place where the ark is (or used to be) in the Holy of Holies. He does this while standing in the Hekhal, outside of the Holy of Holies. This is referred to in the second half of Leviticus 16:16. The same order is followed; first he sprinkles the bull’s blood and then he sprinkles the goat’s blood.", + "Then he would pour the blood of the bull into the blood of the goat emptying the full vessel into the empty one. Leviticus 16:18 states, “he shall take some of the blood of the bull and of the goat and apply it to each of the horns of the altar.” The rabbis understand this to mean that he mixes the two bloods together. Therefore he first pours the bull’s blood into the bowl with the goat’s blood and then pours the whole mixture back into the other bowl to ensure that they are mixed well." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nAfter having sprinkled the blood of the goat and bull inside the Holy of Holies and onto the curtain separating the Hekhal from the Holy of Holies, the priest now turns his attention to the golden altar that is inside the Hekhal.", + "“And he shall go out to the altar that is before the Lord” (Leviticus 16:18): that is the golden altar. The mishnah identifies the altar mentioned in v. 18 with the golden altar inside the Hekhal, upon which the incense is offered. This is explicit in Exodus 30:10 which in reference to this golden incense altar states, “Once a year Aaron shall perform purification upon its horns with blood of the sin offering of purification; purification shall be performed upon it once a year throughout the ages. It is most holy to the Lord.”", + "He then began to purify [the altar by sprinkling] in downward motion. From where does he begin? From the northeast horn [of the altar], then the northwest, then the southwest, then the southeast. From the place where he begins [sprinkling when offering] a sin-offering on the outer altar, there he completes [sprinkling] on the inner altar. He now begins to purify the altar by sprinkling blood upon its four horns (corners), going counter-clockwise and starting at the northeast corner. The mishnah notes that he completes his sprinkling on the southeast corner, the same corner where he begins to sprinkle blood when offering a sin-offering on the outer altar. This is a sort of mnemonic used by the mishnah to remember which corner is last on Yom Kippur.", + "Rabbi Eliezer says: he remained in his place and sprinkled. And on every horn he would sprinkle from below upwards, with the exception of the horn at which he was standing, which he would sprinkle from above downwards. Rabbi Eliezer disagrees with the notion that he walks around the altar while sprinkling on the four horns. Rather, he remains in his spot. The whole altar was only one cubit by one cubit wide so sprinkling while standing in place would not have been difficult at all. On all of the other corners he would reach over and sprinkle with an upward motion. The exception was the corner where he was standing where for practical considerations he would sprinkle with a downwards motion." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to discuss the sprinkling of the blood on the altar and then teaches what is to be done with the leftover blood.", + "Then he sprinkled the top of the altar seven times. Leviticus 16:19 states, “And the rest of the blood he shall sprinkle on it with his finger seven times.” This means, according to the mishnah, that he sprinkles the blood on the top of the altar.", + "And he would pour out the remainder of the blood at the western base of the outer altar. The remainder of the blood is poured out on the western base of the altar. This is the same place that the blood of the high priest’s bull (not a Yom Kippur sacrifice) is poured out according to Leviticus 4:7.", + "And [the remainder of the blood sprinkled] on the outer altar he poured out at the southern base. There are other sacrifices that are offered on Yom Kippur on the outer altar (see Numbers 28:7-11). The blood of these sacrifices is spilled on the southern base of that altar.", + "Both mingled in the aqueduct and flowed into Nahal Kidron, and they were sold to gardeners as manure and by using them one transgresses the law of trespass (. The extra blood from all of the altars flows into the aqueduct that runs through the Temple and then the blood flows out to Nahal Kidron (Wadi Kidron). The blood, assumedly mixed with some water by this time, would be sold to gardeners to use to fertilize their fields and the proceeds would go to the Temple. The mishnah notes that one who benefits from this blood without paying for it is guilty of trespassing, which means illegal use of Temple property. The blood retains its holiness even after having flowed out of the Temple." + ], + [ + "Concerning every act of Yom Hakippurim mentioned in the prescribed order [in the mishnah]: if he performed one [later] act before an [earlier] one, it is as if it had not been done at all.
If he dealt with the blood of the goat before the blood of the bull, he must start over again, and sprinkle the blood of the goat after the blood of the bull.
If before he had finished the sprinklings within [the Holy of Holies] the blood was poured away, he must bring other blood, and start over again and sprinkle again within [the Holy of Holies]. Similarly, in the Hekhal and the golden altar, since they are each a separate act of atonement.
Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon say: wherever he stopped, there he may begin again.
This mishnah basically completes the sacrificial aspects of the Yom Kippur service. It teaches that the order in which the acts must be performed is precise one act cannot be moved up in front of another. The mishnah then discusses the consequences if one act is moved up before another.
Section one: The mishnah is adamant that all of the acts that were described in the previous sections be performed in the order in which they were prescribed. The remainder of the mishnah now explains what he must do if the high priest performed one of the acts out of order.
Section two: If he sprinkled the goat’s blood before he sprinkled the bull’s blood he must start over again and sprinkle the bull’s blood and then the goat’s blood. The Talmud explains that this refers to the sprinkling done in the Hekhal. If he sprinkled the goat’s blood inside the Holy of Holies before the bull’s blood, he must sacrifice a new goat because he must sprinkle the bull’s blood inside before he even slaughters the goat.
Section three: If the blood was poured out before he finished sprinkling inside the Holy of Holies, he must go back and slaughter another animal, be it the bull or the goat. This is true even if he already sprinkled six out of the seven times. In other words, all of the sprinklings must be done with the blood of the same animal. However, if he finished sprinkling inside and was sprinkling in the Hekhal when the blood spilled, he need not go back and redo the inside sprinklings. The same holds true with regard to the sprinkling on the golden altar in the Hekhal. Each of these sets of sprinklings is considered independent, such that if one is interrupted the earlier one need not be redone.
Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon go a step further. If the blood is spilled in the middle of a set of sprinklings, he must slaughter a new animal but his earlier sprinklings count. He begins exactly where he left off. For Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon each sprinkling is its own entity and hence a sprinkling that has already been performed correctly need not be redone, even if the subsequent ones are done with the blood of a different animal." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nMost of this chapter deals with the goat whose lot was cast “For Azazel” that will be sent out into the wilderness. However, before the mishnah begins to deal specifically with that goat, it introduces the topic with some general laws concerning the acquisition of the two goats and what happens if one of the goats dies during the day.", + "The two goats of Yom Hakkippurim: it is a requirement that they be alike in appearance, in size, in value, and that they be bought at the same time. But if they are not alike they are still valid. If he bought one today and the other tomorrow, they are valid. The mishnah teaches that the goats should be the same in appearance, cost the same and should be purchased the same day. In other words, they should be basically indistinguishable from one another. However, this is only a preference if they are not the same in appearance or they were not purchased on the same day, they are still valid.", + "If one of them died before the lot was cast another one is bought for the second one. The mishnah now discusses various scenarios in which one of the goats dies before it has served its ritual purpose. If one dies before the lots are cast, then the situation is easily remedied by purchasing a new goat.", + "But [if one of them died] after the lot was cast another pair must be bought and he must cast lots for them over again. If the one that ‘For Hashem’ died, he [the high priest] should say: “This one upon which the lot ‘For Hashem’ has fallen stands in its stead.” And if the one that was ‘For Azazel’ died he should say: “This one upon which the lot ‘For Azazel’ has fallen stands in its stead.” The more complicated scenario is where one dies after the lots have been cast. In such a case they cannot just buy another goat, because that goat would automatically take the place of the old goat without it ever going through the lottery process. Rather they buy a new pair of goats and cast lots for them over again. Then the new goat takes the place of the lost goat if the goat “For Hashem” died, then the new goat which drew the lot “For Hashem” takes its place, and the same if the goat “For Azazel” died.", + "The other one is left to pasture until it becomes blemished and it is to be sold and its value goes to the [chest for] voluntary offerings, for the sin-offering of the congregation is not be left to die. Rabbi Judah says: it is left to die. The mishnah now discusses what to do with the second goat of the new pair. This goat has no function because its place is taken by the living goat from the first pair. This goat has the status of a sin-offering (see Leviticus 16:5) that cannot be sacrificed. Usually a sin-offering that cannot be sacrificed is left to die. This situation arises when a person sets aside an animal to be a sin-offering, it is lost, he offers a new one in its place and then the old one is found. Such an animal is left to die. Our mishnah teaches that this is only true with regard to the sin-offering of an individual. The goat in our mishnah is communal and therefore it can go out to pasture until it becomes blemished, at which point it can no longer be sacrificed. Then it is sold and the proceeds go to the Temple. Rabbi Judah disagrees and holds that just as an individually owned sin-offering that can’t be offered is left to die, so too is a communally owned one.", + "Furthermore Rabbi Judah said: if the blood was poured away, the goat which is to be sent away is left to die. If the goat to be sent away died the blood is poured. The mishnah now points out that Rabbi Judah goes even further. If the blood of the goat “For Hashem” is spilled and therefore can’t be used, and all the more so if the goat dies, the other goat designated “For Azazel” must die as well. Similarly, if the goat to be sent out to the wilderness dies, the blood of the other goat, the one “For Hashem” must be spilled out. If the “For Hashem” goat has not yet been slaughtered, it must be left to die. In other words, Rabbi Judah disagrees with the halakhah in section four which says that if one goat dies then the other may still be used. He holds that if one dies, the other dies as well. You might say that their “lots” are inextricably linked!" + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn this mishnah the high priest comes to the scapegoat and makes another confession. This confession, which is referred to in Leviticus 16:21, is for the sins of the entire people of Israel.", + "He then came to the scapegoat and laid his two hands upon it and he made confession. And thus he would say: “Please, ‘Hashem’! They have done wrong, they have transgressed, they have sinned before You, Your people the House of Israel. Please, in the name of Hashem (! Forgive the wrongdoings, the transgressions, the sins which your people, the House of Israel, have committed and transgressed and sinned before You, as it is written in the torah of Moses Your servant: “For on this day shall atonement be made for you [to cleanse you of all your sins; you shall be clean before the Lord”] (Leviticus 16:30). The high priest comes to the goat, lays his hands on it and then makes a similar confession to that which he has already made over the goat “For Hashem” and the bull. There is however, one difference here. In the second recitation of “Please…” instead of saying “Please Hashem” and reciting the four letter name of God, he says, “Please in the name of Hashem” using the preposition “in” before God’s name.", + "And the priests and the people standing in the courtyard, when they would hear God’s name explicated coming out of the high priest’s mouth, would bend their knees, bow down and fall on their faces and say “Blessed be the name of His glorious kingdom for ever and ever!” The response to this confession is described more vividly than in the previous two confessions. However, all commentators say that this same response is also to be done for the other confessions as well. Indeed, in the Yom Kippur liturgy, this response is placed not only after the third (and final) confession, but after the first two as well." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe mishnah now begins to describe what was done with the goat “For Azazel.”", + "They handed it over to him who was to lead it away. All were fit to lead it away, but the priests made a fixed rule not to permit an Israelite to lead it away. Rabbi Yose said: it once happened that Arsela led it away, although he was an Israelite. Whereas the Torah simply states, “And the goat shall be set free in the wilderness” (Leviticus 16:22), the rabbis put forth an elaborate description of the process. The first thing is that the goat is handed over to someone. This person can be anyone, even a non-priest, but the high priests established the practice that only other priests should be honored with this privilege. On the other hand, Rabbi Yose testifies that one time someone named Arsela lead the goat away and he wasn’t a priest." + ], + [ + "Introduction This mishnah describes the goat leaving the Temple.", + "And they made a ramp for him because of the Babylonians, who would pull its hair, shouting to it: “Take it and go out, take it and go out.” The mishnah describes a ramp on which the goat would leave the Temple courtyard and make his way out of Jerusalem. They had to make this ramp because Babylonians on a pilgrimage to Jerusalem would pull at the hair of the person appointed to lead the goat out of the city in an attempt to hurry him on his way. The ramp kept the priest leading the goat at a safe distance from the rowdy pilgrims.", + "Some of the important people of Jerusalem used to go with him up to the first booth. There were ten booths from Jerusalem to Tzuk [a distance of] ninety ris, seven and a half of which make a mil. The mishnah mentions ten booths that were set up on the way from Jerusalem to Tzuk, the rock where the goat’s journey will end (as we will see below). On the way to Tzuk, which was ninety ris from Jerusalem (equivalent to 90 mil, or in our terms about 12 km) there were ten booths (sukkot). The important people from Jerusalem would accompany the goat to the first sukkah, and from that sukkah others would accompany it to the next sukkah and so on until it reached Tzuk. Between each sukkah was one mil, equivalent to two thousand cubits, the limit which one may walk on Shabbat. Between the last sukkah and Tzuk were two mil." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to describe the process of people accompanying the goat on its way to the wilderness.", + "At every booth they would say to him: here is food and here is water. The task of accompanying the goat to Zuk was considered so important that they allowed the person accompanying the goat to eat or drink on Yom Kippur. It seems that this was likely to have been only a gesture, one meant to emphasize the importance of the task. In reality, the Talmud says that no one ever took them up on their offer. Furthermore, it is hard to imagine that someone entrusted with such a prestigious religious task would risk his reputation by accepting the offer. In any case, even in a theoretical sense, this is an incredible allowance by the rabbis.", + "And they went with him from booth to booth, except the last one, who would not go with him up to Zuk, but rather stand from afar, and see what he was doing. The people from each booth would walk with the person accompanying the goat on his way to the next booth. The one exception was the people from the last booth. Since Zuk was two mils (4000 cubits) from the last booth and one is allowed to walk only 2000 cubits on Shabbat because of the Shabbat border limit, the people from the last booth would accompany the goat only halfway to Zuk. It is interesting to note that in section one the rabbis let the one accompanying the goat eat and drink on Yom Kippur, an obvious infraction of the biblical commandment. In contrast, when it came to those who walked from booth to booth, they seem to have forbade even the rabbinic prohibition (as it is usually understood) of walking beyond 2000 cubits on Shabbat." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah concludes the epic saga of the goat sent out to the wilderness. Alas, it will not end well for the goat (so gentle souls imagining the goat being set free to find its family be warned). However, hopefully the goat’s demise will not be in vain and it will aid in bringing atonement to the children of Israel.", + "What did he do? He divided the thread of crimson wool, and tied one half to the rock, the other half between its horns, and pushed it from behind, and it went rolling down and before it had reached half its way down hill it broken into limbs. When he would reach Zuk, the priest accompanying the goat would divide the crimson wool which was tied to the goat’s horn (see above 4:2) into two sections. One side he would tie to the goat’s horns and the other side he would tie to the rock. Mishnah eight below will explain that there was a tradition that when the goat reached the wilderness the crimson wool would turn white, to symbolize God’s cleansing of Israel of its sins. The Talmud explains that he would tie the thread to the rock so that he could see it turn white. After having tied the thread to the rock, the priest would push the goat off the cliff, where it would die rather quickly.", + "He came back and sat down under the last booth until it grew dark. The priest now finds himself at Zuk with a Shabbat border limit of only 2000 cubits, not enough to reach the last sukkah. Nevertheless, since it was considered dangerous to remain in the wilderness alone, the rabbis allowed him to walk the 4000 cubits back to the last sukkah. However, he can’t go any further than that until Yom Kippur is over.", + "And from when are his clothes unclean? From the moment he has gone outside the walls of Jerusalem. Rabbi Shimon says: from the moment he pushes it into Zuk. Leviticus 16:26 says that the one who sent the goat to Azazel must wash his clothes and bathe his body. This implies that his clothes were rendered impure. Our mishnah asks when is this so and it provides two opinions. The first opinion is that the clothes are impure from the time he leaves the walls of Jerusalem. This might imply that the goat has in a certain sense fulfilled its function at this early stage. Rabbi Shimon holds that the clothes are not impure until the goat has been pushed off of Zuk." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn this mishnah the high priest returns to the bull and the goat that have already been slaughtered and offers up their sacrificial parts on the altar.", + "He [the high priest] came to the bull and the goat that were to be burnt. He cut them open and took out the sacrificial portions and put them on a tray, and them burned them on the altar. He twisted them around carrying poles and took them out to the place of burning. The priest now finishes the sacrificing of the bull and goat. He cuts them open, takes out the fats that must offered on the altar, and then he takes the rest of the carcasses out to the “place of burning” where they are completely burnt.", + "And from when are his clothes unclean? After they have gone outside the walls of the Temple courtyard. Rabbi Shimon says: from the moment the fire has taken hold of most of them. Leviticus 16:28 states that he who burned the remnants of the sacrifices must wash his clothes and body because they are impure. As did yesterday’s mishnah, our mishnah again asks when they become impure. Again, the first opinion is that once the carcasses have been taken out of the walls (this time the Temple walls), the clothes of the person who is taking them have become impure. Rabbi Shimon again gives a later time from the time the fire on the altar has taken hold of most of the carcass." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah takes us back to the Temple, where the high priest was waiting to hear if the goat had reached the wilderness and Israel’s sins had been forgiven. The mishnah", + "They said to the high priest: the goat has reached the wilderness. And how did they know that the goat had reached the wilderness?
They used to set up scouts and they would wave scarves, and they would know that the goat had reached the wilderness. According to the first opinion in the mishnah, they knew when the goat reached the wilderness through scouts who would signal back to Jerusalem with scarves that the goat had been pushed off of Zuk by the priests who accompanied him.", + "Rabbi Judah said: but did they not have a great sign? From Jerusalem to Bet Hidudo was three mils. They could walk a mil, return the mil, then wait the time it takes to walk a mil, and thus know that the goat had reached the wilderness. Rabbi Judah says that they didn’t need to rely on scouts; rather they relied on a system of timing how long it would take the goat to get to the wilderness. Bet Hidudo was the beginning of the wilderness and once the goat had reached this point Rabbi Judah considered the mitzvah of sending the goat to the wilderness to have been fulfilled. Since Bet Hidudo was only three mils from Jerusalem, all they needed to do was time how long it would take to walk three mils. What they would do is walk a mil (which is to the end of the Shabbat border limit), then turn around and walk back the mil and then wait the amount of time it would take to walk a mil.", + "Rabbi Ishmael said: but did they not have another sign! A thread of crimson wool was tied to the door of the Temple, and when the goat reached the wilderness the thread turned white, as it is written, “Though your sins be as scarlet they shall be as white as snow” (Isaiah 1:18). Rabbi Ishmael says that there is a more symbolic, perhaps even magical way of knowing when the goat had reached the wilderness. They would tie a crimson thread (similar to the thread tied to the goat’s horns) to the opening of the Temple and when the goat would reach the wilderness the thread would turn white in a literal (perhaps overly literal) fulfillment of the verse from Isaiah in which God promises the people of Israel that he will turn their sins white as snow. We should note that good manuscripts of the mishnah do not contain Rabbi Ishmael’s words; it is likely that this is an addition to the Mishnah from the Talmud." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nAfter having sent the goat away, the Yom Kippur rituals continue with the priest reading various verses from the Torah concerning Yom Kippur and reciting some blessings.", + "The high priest [then] came to read. The next step was for the high priest to read the portions of the Torah concerning Yom Kippur. This is not mentioned in the biblical description of Yom Kippur. It seems to me that the point of this part of the ritual was to emphasize to both the participants and the observers that everything that the high priest had done was according to the prescriptions of the Torah. It may also have been intended to make a statement about the importance of the Yom Kippur ritual vis a vis Torah. It is as if to say that the ritual’s significance is in the fact that it is anchored in Torah.", + "If he wished to read in linen garments, he reads, and if not he reads in his own white cloak. While reading, the high priest can wear either his special linen clothes (see above 3:6) or he may wear a different cloak. Since the reading is not prescribed by the Torah and is not considered an “avodah” part of the day’s service he need not wear the special garments.", + "The synagogue attendant would take a Torah scroll and give it to the head of the synagogue, and the head of the synagogue gives it to deputy high priest, and the deputy high priest gives it to the high priest, and the high priest stands and receives it, and reads, [section] beginning] “After the death …” (Leviticus 16:1-34) and “But on the tenth…” (Leviticus 23:26-32). There is a ceremonial passing of the Torah scroll which occurs before the high priest reads it. The first to take it is the synagogue attendant (chazzan). As an aside, this mishnah is an interesting reference to a synagogue that was actually adjacent to the Temple Mount. In 1913 archaeologists found an inscription (see below) on the southern part of the Temple mount which shows that there was a synagogue there while the Temple still stood. The synagogue attendant passes the Torah on to the head of the synagogue (a position referred to in the inscription). The head of the synagogue passes it to the deputy high priest, the second in command, who finally passes it up to the high priest. This procession is clearly meant to pay homage to the high priest. The high priest then reads from the two portions in Leviticus that deal with Yom Kippur.", + "Then he would roll up the Torah scroll and put it in his bosom and say, “More than what I have read out before you is written here.” And “On the tenth …” (Numbers 29:7-11) which is in the Book of Numbers he recites by heart. The high priest then rolls up the Torah scroll and states to the people that there is more in the Torah about Yom Kippur then that which he has just read. This declaration allows them to know that the passage that he is about to read to them from Numbers is also in the Torah, lest they think he is making it up. He recites the passage from Numbers by heart in order to avoid having to roll from Leviticus until Numbers. Although he did have to roll between the two parts of Leviticus, this was less problematic because the portions are close to one another.", + "And he recites on it eight benedictions: “For the law”, “For the Temple service,” “For thanksgiving,” “For the forgiveness of sins” and “For the Temple” on its own, and “For Israel” on its own and “For Jerusalem” on its own, “For the priests” on their own and “For the rest of the prayer.” Finally, he recites eight blessings. The full version of the blessings is not found here; rather the mishnah makes only short references to these blessings. Some of these are familiar because they are still recited today. “For the Torah” is the blessing recited before reading the Torah today. “For the Temple service” is part of the Amidah (the 17th blessing). “For thanksgiving” is also part of the Amidah (the 18th blessing). “For forgiveness of sins” is similar to that which is also recited in today’s Amidah (6th blessing). The other four blessings are unique to the Yom Kippur ritual. In case you might be interested, the following is a translation of the inscription found at the Temple Mount (I found this on the web): “Theodotus, son of Vettanos, a priest and an archisynagogos, son of an archisynagogos grandson of an archisynagogos, built the synagogue for the reading of Torah and for teaching the commandments; furthermore, the hostel, and the rooms, and the water installation for lodging needy strangers. Its foundation stone was laid by his ancestors, the elders, and Simonides.”" + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah notes that those who were in the Temple courtyard watching the priest reading the verses was too far from the bull and goat which were being burned outside of Jerusalem.", + "He who sees the high priest when he reads does not see the bull and the goat that are being burned, and he that sees the bull and the goat that are being burned does not see the high priest when he reads, not because he was not permitted but because the distance apart was great and both rites were performed at the same time. The mishnah notes that a person is allowed leave the bull and goat and go and listen to the high priest. The only thing that prevents this is that it is not practical they were both occurring in different places but at the same time. We might have thought that it would be forbidden to go from one to the other because a person should generally not abandon performing one mitzvah in order to go perform another. However, in this case this would not be forbidden because those watching the mitzvah being performed are not in the same category as those actually performing it." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah deals with the sacrifices that have not yet been offered. So far only three sacrifices have been offered: the morning tamid, one bull and one goat. There are still many sacrifices yet left to perform.", + "If he read in the garments of linen, he would then sanctify his hands and feet, strip off his clothes, go down and immerse himself, come up and dry himself. If he read in garments of linen, then he must now wash his hands and feet, undress and go to the mikveh and then put on new clothes. However, if he read the verses in his own cloak (see mishnah one) then he would have already had to wash his hands and feet before removing the linen clothes and putting on the cloak. At this point he would need only take off his cloak and go immerse in the mikveh.", + "They brought him the golden clothes, he put them on, sanctified his hands and feet, went out, offered up his own ram and the ram of the people, and the seven unblemished, one-year-old-lambs, the words of Rabbi Eliezer. Rabbi Akiba said: these were offered up together with the morning tamid of the morning, He now puts on the golden garments, the clothes that the high priest would wear during the remainder of the year (see above 3:4). After putting on the new clothes he must again wash his hands and feet. The mishnah now makes reference to Leviticus 16:24, “Then he shall come out and offer his burnt offering and the burnt offering of the people, making expiation for himself and for the people.” This is the ram referred to in our mishnah. According to Rabbi Eliezer he now offers the seven unblemished lambs mentioned in Numbers 29:8, all of which are additional (musaf) offerings. Rabbi Eliezer holds that these lambs are sacrificed before the bull which is also mentioned in Numbers 29:8, even though in the verse the bull comes first. This verse also mentions a ram. Our mishnah identifies this ram with the ram in Leviticus 16:5, which is the “ram of the people.” In other words, these are not two separate rams, which would bring our total to three, but rather two rams, one which is his (Leviticus 16:3) and one which is the people’s (v. 5). These are the two mentioned in v. 24 as well. Rabbi Akiva holds that the seven lambs were sacrificed with the morning tamid and not later in the day, as Rabbi Eliezer claims.", + "The bull for the whole burnt offering and the goat which is offered up outside were offered up together with the dusk tamid. The bull for a burnt offering (Numbers 29:9) and the goat which is a sin-offering (v. 11) are the next to be sacrificed. This goat is called “done outside” in order to distinguish it from the other sin-offering goat whose blood is spilled inside the Holy of Holies. These sacrifices are offered before the dusk tamid, which is always the final sacrifice of the day." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis is the final mishnah that discusses the Yom Kippur ritual. As we have already noted many times, every time he takes off his clothes he must wash his hands and and immerse in the mikveh. When he puts on new clothes he has to wash his hands and feet again.", + "He then sanctified his hands and feet, stripped off his clothes, went down and immersed himself, came up and dried himself. They brought him the white clothes, he put them on and sanctified his hands and his feet. Then he went in to bring out the ladle and the fire-pan. He now changes his clothes in order to put on the white clothes, which are the special clothes special for Yom Kippur, because he needs to go back into the Holy of Holies to get the ladle with the incense that he left there in 5:1. It was left there until all of the incense had been burned up.", + "He then sanctified his hands and feet, stripped off his clothes, went down and immersed himself, came up and dry himself. They brought him the golden clothes, he put them on, sanctified his hands and feet, and went in to burn up the dusk incense, and takes care of the lamp. He now puts back on the golden clothes so that he can offer the daily dusk incense offering. This incense offering was mentioned above in 3:5. He also takes care of the lamp, a daily chore which we learned about in 1:2. We should note that some commentators debate whether he offers the dusk tamid sacrifice before or after the dusk incense offering.", + "He sanctified his hands and feet and stripped, went down, immersed himself, came up and dried himself. They brought him his own clothes and he put them on. Finally, the high priest’s exhausting day is over and he may put on his own clothes and go home.", + "And they would accompany him to his house. And he would make a day of festivity for his friends whenever he came out of the Holy [of Holies] in peace. The day doesn’t end with the high priest just walking home alone. The other priests accompany him to his house and there he makes a big party to celebrate his having successfully entered the Holy of Holies, the closest one can get to God’s presence, and having come out alive. As we have mentioned on many occasions, this was an event that was perceived to be very dangerous and hence the high priest must have been relieved to have survived. [Perhaps this was the first break-fast! Did they have lox and bagels back then?]" + ], + [ + "The high priest performs the service in eight pieces of clothing, and the common priest in four: in tunic, breeches, a headdress, and a sash.
The high priest adds the breastpiece, the ephod, the robe and the frontlet.
In these were the Urim and Tummim inquired of. But they were not inquired of except by the king, by the head of the court or by one whom the community needs.
This mishnah completes the first seven chapters of Yoma, all of which dealt with the Temple Yom Kippur ritual.
Sections one and two: The first two sections of the mishnah outline the difference between the clothes that the high priest wore on normal occasions throughout the year (not on Yom Kippur), and the clothes that a normal priest wore. The high priest has eight pieces of clothing (see above 3:4) whereas the normal priest has only four pieces. These are all discussed in Exodus 28
Section three: The Urim and Tummim, the oracular stones used in the First Temple, are only asked questions when the high priest is wearing his eight pieces of clothing. And not anyone can ask a question of the Urim and Tummim. Only the king, the head of the court or other high officials of the community may ask questions. For more information about the Urim and Tummim, how they are understood by modern biblical scholars and how they are understood in the aggadah, I suggest consulting the Encyclopedia Judaica." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThe eighth chapter of Yoma is the chapter that is still relevant in halakhah today. It discusses how we understand the biblical command to “afflict oneself” (see Leviticus 16:29-31; 23:26-32) as well as the rules and concepts regarding atonement.\nOur mishnah begins this discussion by teaching the five/six prohibitions that all fit under the category of “afflictions.”", + "[On] Yom HaKippurim it is forbidden to eat, to drink, to wash, to anoint oneself, to put on sandals, or to have intercourse. According to the Babylonian Talmud there are five prohibitions (eating and drinking is considered only one prohibition), which are derived from the fact that the root for “afflict oneself” appears five times in the Torah in connection with Yom Kippur. However, the Yerushalmi understands these as six prohibitions and does not connect them directly with the verses. These are just how the rabbis understood the meaning of “afflict oneself.” “Putting on sandals” refers to wearing leather shoes, whether they are sandals or closed shoes.", + "A king or bride may wash their face, and a woman after childbirth may put on sandals, the words of Rabbi Eliezer. But the sages forbid it. In this section we learn that there are some exceptions to the general prohibitions. A king or a bride may wash their face. The king must look good in order to garner the respect of his people so we want him to look clean. The rabbis want the bride to look beautiful for her husband, in order to help solidify the marriage. They considered the first few days of marriage to be critical and to a certain extent were willing to relax some other prohibitions. In our case, they allowed her to wash her face. The woman after childbirth will be bothered by walking on the cold floor and therefore she is allowed to wear sandals. Although the sages dispute these exceptions, the halakhah is like Rabbi Eliezer. We should note that the mishnah does not allow any exceptions for eating/drinking. Some commentators derive from here that the prohibitions of eating/drinking are weightier than the others and hence cannot be waived under any circumstance (with the exception of issues of health)." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah teaches the minimum amount of food or liquid that one needs to eat or drink in order to be liable on Yom Kippur. The mishnah is not saying that one is allowed to eat or drink a lesser amount, just that one who does eat a lesser amount is not liable for having transgressed a biblical commandment.", + "If one eats [an amount] the size of a large date, like it and its seed, or if he drank [an amount equivalent to a] mouthful, he is liable. When the Torah prohibits eating and drinking on Yom Kippur it uses the language “afflict” and not the word “eat” or “drink.” According to the rabbis this means that one has violated the biblical commandment only if one eats or drinks an amount of food that satisfies, at least in a minimal way, an average person. The rabbis hold that this amount of food is the size of a date with its seed, or in the case of liquids, a mouthful. We should note that normally one is liable for eating an olive’s amount of food (a smaller amount) or a revi’it of liquid (more than a mouthful). For Yom Kippur the issue is not “what is food” but rather what satisfies.", + "All foods add up to make an amount equivalent to a date, and all the liquids add up to make a mouthful. Food and drink do not add up. If one eats two different kinds of foods or two different kinds of liquids they do add up to a date/mouthful. For instance if I eat half of a date’s worth of a cracker and half of a date’s worth of cream cheese, I am liable. However, food and drink do not add up, so that if I eat half a date’s worth of a cracker and drink half of a mouthful of juice I am not liable" + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with how many sin-offerings one would be liable for if he ate or drank on Yom Kippur. The sin-offering is the sacrifice brought for an inadvertent sin. We have seen a similar type of mishnah in the beginning of the seventh chapter of Shabbat. As I might have explained there, this is the way that the rabbis define just how many sins a person has committed.", + "If he ate and drank in one state of unawareness, he is not obligated to bring more than one sin-offering. If a person didn’t know that the day was Yom Kippur or he didn’t know that it was prohibited to eat or drink on Yom Kippur and he ate or drank many times during the day, he is only liable for one sin-offering. This is one sin, since eating and drinking are two aspects of the same prohibitions the commandment to afflict oneself on Yom Kippur.", + "But if he ate and performed labor while in one state of unawareness he is obligated for two sin-offerings. Eating/drinking and performing labor are two different prohibitions. Therefore if someone does both on Yom Kippur, even in one state of unawareness (for instance, not knowing that it is Yom Kippur) he is still liable for two sin-offerings.", + "If he ate foods unfit for eating, or drank liquids unfit for drinking, or drank fish-brine or fish pickling liquid, he is not liable. In order to be liable for eating or drinking, that which one eats must be food that is fit for eating or liquid that is fit for drinking. Otherwise, one is not liable. Note, the mishnah does not say that one is allowed to do so, just that doing so does not incur liability for transgressing a Torah law. It is still prohibited." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah teaches the rules regarding children fasting on Yom Kippur.", + "[With regard to] children: they do not “afflict” them at all on Yom HaKippurim. Children are not to fast on Yom Kippur. Note that the mishnah does not say that they are not obligated, but uses stronger language, saying that it is prohibited to make them fast. In the Tosefta we see that Shammai (the eponymous founder of Bet Shammai) actually wanted his son to fast and the other sages forced him to feed his son. I do not think that Shammai was crueler than the other sages, nor was he endangering his young son’s life. One day without food will be discomforting but is unlikely to cause any physical damage. Rather I think that Shammai had a different concept of the observance of the commandments. For Shammai the Torah commands us to “afflict ourselves” on Yom Kippur and the goal is therefore physical affliction. Such an affliction can be achieved on a small child, even an infant. In contrast, the sages understood the affliction as being more inwardly oriented, and hence applicable only to those who know what is going on. A child can feel hunger, they all do, but a small child won’t know that his hunger is a form of religious observance. He’ll just scream or if he’s a little older, perhaps whine. In order to demonstrate that the point of the day is to affect our inner lives and not our physical hunger, the other sages forced Shammai to feed his son.", + "But they train them a year or two before in order that they become accustomed to the commandments. One or two years before a child becomes mature (today we consider this to be at the age of Bar/Bat Mitzvah) the child starts to fast, at least for a part of the day. At this point the child is beginning to understand the meaning of the day and therefore it is applicable for him to fast." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nAs important as Yom Kippur may be, the value of life precedes the observance of all mitzvot. Our mishnah teaches that if fasting might cause danger to a person’s life, that person must eat. I should note that the mishnah is not addressed to the person looking to “cheat the system” by feigning illness and eating on Yom Kippur. With God watching one can’t really cheat the system. The mishnah is addressing the religious fanatic who might risk his/her own life in order to observe the fast. The mishnah is not allowing someone to eat it is forbidding them from fasting.", + "If a pregnant woman smelled [food on Yom Kippur], they feed her until she feels restored. Pregnant women are obligated to fast on Yom Kippur, unless they are told by a doctor that they may not. Contrary to what some people seem to think, there is no blanket exemption. However, if a pregnant woman gets a craving to eat something because she smelled a certain food, they must feed her until she is satisfied. Her cravings are seen to be potential matters of life and death.", + "A sick person is fed at the word of experts. And if no experts are there, they feed him upon his own request until he says: enough. A sick person should check with a doctor/expert before he eats or drinks on Yom Kippur. If they say he must drink or eat than he must do so, even if he doesn’t want to. The Talmud notes that if the experts say he does not need to eat or drink but he believes that if he doesn’t his life might be endangered, he must eat. In other words, his own word trumps that of the experts if he wants to eat and they don’t think it is necessary. However, if he doesn’t want to eat and they think he should, he must eat. In this case, their words trump his. If there are no experts around, then we take him at his word and we must feed him or give him water until he says that he has had enough." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nAfter teaching in the previous mishnah that serious health concerns override the observance of Yom Kippur, our mishnah expands this message to include other prohibitions as well if a person’s health is in danger he may do things otherwise prohibited.", + "If one is seized by a ravenous hunger, they feed him even unclean things until his eyes light up [and he returns to health]. Here we learn that if a person is overtaken by a ravenous hunger, one that if not satisfied might put him into physical danger, they may feed him anything, even non-kosher food. As I said in yesterday’s mishnah, this mishnah is addressed to the religious fanatic who would rather endanger his life or the life of another rather than transgress the commandments. The mishnah is saying that this is prohibited because the value of life is greater than that of the commandments.", + "If one was bit by a mad dog, they do not feed him the lobe of its liver. But Rabbi Matia ben Harash permits it. Here the mishnah expresses a limit to the previous principle. Evidently, there was a belief in the time of the Mishnah that if one was bitten by a rabid dog, eating its liver-lobe would serve as a cure. Most rabbis didn’t believe that this “cure” really worked and hence they should not give him the liver-lobe to eat. Saving a life overrides the commandments, but only if that which is done really has a chance of working. However, Rabbi Matia permits even this. There are two different explanations for his opinion. The first is that Rabbi Matia holds that eating the liver of the rabid dog is really an effective cure. [1 Julius Preuss, Biblical and Talmudic Medicine, p. 196, writes, “To treat the bite of a mad dog, the heathen physicians of antiquity, in general, as well as many primitive peoples today, gave the patient certain pieces of the liver of the mad dog to eat.” Preuss refers to a number of Greco-Roman authors. If you wish to try this at home, know that most of them recommend the liver be roasted. Chopped liver is not recommended. ] The other, in my opinion more convincing explanation is that since the bit person thinks this cure is effective, the fact that it offers him psychological relief is enough for Rabbi Matia to permit it.", + "Moreover Rabbi Matia ben Harash said: if one has pain in his throat, they may drop medicine into his mouth on Shabbat, because it is a possibility of danger to human life and every potential danger to human life overrides Shabbat. Rabbi Matia goes a step further and says that anyone who feels pain on Shabbat, and who thinks that the pain might be an issue of life and death, others must give him medicine on Shabbat. As we learned frequently when we studied Shabbat, medicine is prohibited on Shabbat. Here we learn that this is true only if it is not a potential threat to a person’s life. If there is danger to one’s life, then it is permitted, and indeed mandated to heal the person on Shabbat." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nMishnah seven continues to teach that Shabbat laws are suspended in order to even potentially save someone’s life.", + "If an avalanche fell on someone, and it is doubtful whether or not he is there, or whether he is alive or dead, or whether he is an Israelite or a non-Jew, they remove the debris from above him [even on Shabbat]. If we knew that the person was truly under the avalanche, and that he was alive, and that he was Jewish, it would obviously be permitted to remove the debris on Shabbat in order to save him. Our mishnah teaches that even if we don’t know that these three things are true, we do remove the debris in an attempt to save his life. This is because, as we learned in yesterday’s mishnah, even the potential to save a life overrides Shabbat. As you may have noted, according to the mishnah, if we knew that the person was not Jewish, we would not save his life on Shabbat. I will not deny that the mishnah discriminates against non-Jews, but I think that this has to be understood as a reflection of the times. Jews and Gentiles often did not get along, and Jews experienced a lot of persecution. Furthermore, the idea of treating all of humanity as equal was not a common idea. All peoples of the ancient world discriminated against others. We should not expect ancient rabbis to express the same exact liberal values that we (hopefully) espouse today.", + "If they find him alive they remove the debris, but if dead they should leave him there [until Shabbat is over]. If they find that he is alive, they remove all of the debris and do all they can to save his life. However, if they find that he is dead they must stop the removal and let his body stay there until Shabbat is over. The saving of a life overrides Shabbat, but removing a dead body from some debris does not." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses how a person can get atonement. We should note that the Mishnah makes a seamless transition from how atonement was effected when the Temple still stood through sacrifices, to how it is effected after the destruction through atonement and Yom HaKippurim. In Temple times, Yom HaKippurim itself did not effect atonement; rather Yom HaKippurim was the day upon which atoning sacrifices were offered. By including repentance with the sacrifices, the Mishnah makes the strong ideological statement that repentance (teshuvah) is as effective as sacrifice, and would work even when sacrifices were no longer possible. This was certainly a monumental statement for post-Second Temple Jews, one that would have given them great comfort.\nAccordingly, we should note that the Torah doesn’t speak at all about repentance in connection with Yom Kippur. Our modern conception of Yom Kippur as a day of repentance was shaped by the rabbis. Without their brilliant foresight, Yom Kippur, would probably have been lost.", + "The sin-offering and the certain guilt-offering effect atonement. A “certain guilt-offering” is an “asham” sacrifice offered when a person knows that he has committed a certain type of sin, for instance he denied having stolen something and took a false oath over it. An “uncertain guilt-offering” is brought when a person thinks he might have done something which he would be liable for karet if he did it intentionally, but isn’t sure if he really did it. For instance, if he had relations with a woman and he doesn’t know if she was a menstruant or not, he brings an “uncertain guilt offering.” This type of sacrifice doesn’t effect full atonement, because if he finds out that she really was a menstruant, meaning that he really did transgress, he will have to bring another sacrifice. The rabbis understand that the sacrifice causes the person who brings it to regret his sin and to make up his mind not to sin again. In other words, sacrifices are like repentance. Hence they effect atonement.", + "Death and Yom HaKippurim effect atonement together with repentance. Both death and Yom Kippur effect atonement, but only if the person repents either before his death or on Yom Kippur. This is why convicted criminals who are about to be executed are given a chance to repent before their deaths. For the rest of us who don’t usually know when we are going to die, we need to repent consistently.", + "Repentance effects atonement for light transgressions: [the transgression of] positive commandments and negative commandments. And for severer transgressions [repentance] suspends [the divine punishment], until Yom HaKippurim arrives and effects atonement. Repentance alone effects atonement for lighter sins, either positive or negative commandments. For more serious sins, meaning those punishable by karet or by death, repentance alone is not sufficient but rather must be accompanied by Yom Kippur." + ], + [ + "Introduction The last chapter of the tractate continues to deal with the laws of teshuvah.", + "One who says: I shall sin and repent, sin and repent, they do not afford him the opportunity to repent. [If one says]: I shall sin and Yom HaKippurim will atone for me, Yom HaKippurim does not effect atonement. Atonement is granted only to those whose repentance is genuine. A person who says that he is going to sin and then repent is not granted atonement because this person is trying to “trick” the system. Similarly, one who says that he is going to sin and then he intends for Yom Kippur to give atone for his sins, does not get atonement.", + "For transgressions between man and God Yom HaKippurim effects atonement, but for transgressions between man and his fellow Yom HaKippurim does not effect atonement, until he has pacified his fellow. This was expounded by Rabbi Elazar b. Azariah: “From all your sins before the Lord you shall be clean” (Leviticus 16:30) for transgressions between man and God Yom HaKippurim effects atonement, but for transgressions between man and his fellow Yom HaKippurim does not effect atonement, until he has pacified his fellow.. The second lesson in our mishnah is perhaps the most important one in the tractate. Yom Kippur is a ritual through which we repair our relationship with God. It simply does not work the same way when it comes to our relationship with our fellow human beings. With other human beings we must repair our relationship, ask for their forgiveness and appease their anger at our mistakes. Only after we have done this does the divinely granted day of Yom Kippur effect atonement for our sins.", + "Rabbi Akiva said: Happy are you, Israel! Who is it before whom you become pure? And who is it that purifies you? Your Father who is in heaven, as it is said: “And I will sprinkle clean water upon you and you shall be clean” (Ezekiel 36:25). And it further says: “O hope ( of Israel, O Lord” (Jeremiah 17:13--just as a mikveh purifies the unclean, so too does he Holy One, blessed be He, purify Israel. As is typical, the tractate concludes with some words of “aggadah.” Rabbi Akiva gives a message of hope to all of Israel, telling us how blessed we are that God cleanses us of our sins. The verses in Ezekiel talk about God’s redemption of the people of Israel, what we usually call the Messianic age. Rabbi Akiva seems to be alluding to this ultimate cleansing of sin, one in which God will give us a “new heart” (v. 26). Rabbi Akiva also makes a pun on the word “mikveh” in Jeremiah the word in its context means hope, but means “ritual bath” in other places. God acts as a purifier for Israel, cleansing us both in the here and now and in the redemptive future for which we long. Congratulations! We have finished Yoma. It is a tradition at this point to thank God for helping us finish learning the tractate and to commit ourselves to going back and relearning it, so that we may not forget it and so that its lessons will stay with us for all of our lives. If you’ve been following along with the Mishnah Yomit schedule then you have just completed Yom Kippur and in a couple of days Sukkot will begin. We could not have asked for better timing this year! Yoma contained a long description of how the day’s ritual was carried out in the Temple and it concluded by hinting at a message central to the world of the rabbis. We no longer have a Temple, but through repentance, through prayer, through study, through acts of loving kindness and through the observance of the commandments we can maintain and repair our relationship with God. I can’t think of any message more relevant to this time of year. As always, congratulations on learning another tractate of Mishnah. May you have the strength and time to keep on learning more! Tomorrow we begin Sukkah." + ] + ] + ] + }, + "versions": [ + [ + "Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp", + "http://learn.conservativeyeshiva.org/mishnah/" + ] + ], + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה יומא", + "categories": [ + "Mishnah", + "Modern Commentary on Mishnah", + "English Explanation of Mishnah", + "Seder Moed" + ], + "schema": { + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה יומא", + "enTitle": "English Explanation of Mishnah Yoma", + "key": "English Explanation of Mishnah Yoma", + "nodes": [ + { + "heTitle": "הקדמה", + "enTitle": "Introduction" + }, + { + "heTitle": "", + "enTitle": "" + } + ] + } +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Nashim/English Explanation of Mishnah Gittin/English/Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp.json b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Nashim/English Explanation of Mishnah Gittin/English/Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..70ca4acfce3e7ce02cf9d844ffb0809e72d09a1c --- /dev/null +++ b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Nashim/English Explanation of Mishnah Gittin/English/Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp.json @@ -0,0 +1,484 @@ +{ + "language": "en", + "title": "English Explanation of Mishnah Gittin", + "versionSource": "http://learn.conservativeyeshiva.org/mishnah/", + "versionTitle": "Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp", + "status": "locked", + "license": "CC-BY", + "shortVersionTitle": "Dr. Joshua Kulp", + "actualLanguage": "en", + "languageFamilyName": "english", + "isBaseText": true, + "isSource": true, + "isPrimary": true, + "direction": "ltr", + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה גיטין", + "categories": [ + "Mishnah", + "Modern Commentary on Mishnah", + "English Explanation of Mishnah", + "Seder Nashim" + ], + "text": { + "Introduction": [ + "The laws of divorce are taught in only four verses in Deuteronomy 24:1-4, verses which directly deal with the prohibition of remarriage. Interestingly, the Torah addresses the issue of divorce almost as an aside, something which everyone would know without a description. ", + "The first two verses read, “When a man takes a wife and has relations with her, and if she does not find favor in his eyes because he finds something obnoxious about her, and he writes her a bill of divorcement, hands it to her, and sends her away from his house; and she leaves his household and becomes the wife of another man…” From here the rabbis learn that divorce must be performed with a document, called a “get” which is Aramaic for document (and not connected to the English word, as in “get out of my house!). Divorce without a properly written document is invalid. Most of the laws of this tractate deal with how this document must be written and given. The rules can be quite strict, and to this day, gittin (the plural of get) are written by professional scribes. ", + "In Jewish law, the man must give the divorce document to his wife; she may not write a “get” and give it to him. However, under certain circumstances, many of which were discussed in Ketuboth, the court may force the husband to give his wife a get. ", + "The grounds for divorce, while a very important issue in divorce law, are not discussed until the last mishnah of the tractate. ", + "We should note that the issue of divorce was an issue of controversy among different groups of Jews in this period. As is well-known, Jesus, according to one of the gospels, took a strong stance against divorce. Less well-known is the fact that the Dead Sea sect also, in all likelihood, opposed divorce. The rabbis were in general quite lenient on divorce. How easy divorce should be, is something about which we can argue. Some may say too-easy divorce will lead to instability in marriage, while others may claim that easily attainable divorce is desirable, since a bad marriage is worse than a broken marriage. I should point out something that is not usually mentioned in these arguments. In the time of the Mishnah (and indeed until recently) marriages were typically arranged by the parents of the couple, while divorce was a decision taken by those married (or at least by the man). Those who allow for divorce provide more autonomy for the feelings of the couple than do those who forbid or put severe restrictions on divorce. Allowing divorce is in a sense saying that staying married is a decision based on the feelings of the couple themselves, be they feelings of love or security. Forbidding divorce causes the parents’ decision to become permanent, allowing no or little expression for the couple themselves. ", + "Finally, we should note two an important change in divorce law that was legislated around the year 1000 C.E. Rabbenu Gershom, a leading German rabbi, made a decree that men could not divorce their wives against their consent. This was an important balance to his other famous decree that prohibited bigamy. However, during the mishnaic and talmudic periods bigamy was permitted and men could divorce their wives against their will. \n" + ], + "": [ + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah teaches that messengers who deliver divorce documents from abroad must declare that the document was written and signed in their presence. In the Talmud there are two explanations for this requirement. The first is that if the husband comes to protest the get, saying that he did not send it, the people who heard the messenger testify that he saw it written and signed will be able to disregard a husband’s potential appeal. This is especially important if his wife had already remarried and had children. If her get is invalidated, her subsequent children would become mamzerim. The reason why the testimony of the messenger is only necessary if he comes from abroad is that in such a case it would be more difficult to find the original witnesses. Furthermore, in the ancient world travel was often dangerous, and the original witnesses could not always travel to testify concerning the validity of the get. The testimony of the messenger makes it easier to uphold the validity of the get, in essence a service for the woman. The other opinion in the Talmud, which is really an additional opinion, is that outside of the Land of Israel they were not knowledgeable in writing gittin. Therefore, someone who came from abroad had to testify that it was written properly. Those which were written in the Land of Israel did not need such testimony.", + "One who brings a get from abroad [to the Land of Israel] must declare, “In my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed.” This section was explained in the introduction.", + "Rabban Gamaliel says: even one who brings it from Rekem or from Heger. Rabbi Eleazar says: even one who brings it from Kefar Ludim to Lud. The sages, however, say: declaration “In my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed” is required only from one who brings a get from abroad or who takes it there. The tannaim in this section, Rabban Gamaliel, Rabbi Elazar and the other sages disagree with regard to the applicability of the halakhah in section one. According to Rabban Gamaliel, even if a messenger brings a get from towns such as Rekem or Heger which lie on the border, he must recite the formula. This is either because it is hard to bring the witnesses from these towns to testify, or because people who live on the border do not know how to properly write gittin. Rabbi Elazar adds that even if the two cities lie adjacent but one is in the land of Israel and one is not, such as Kefar Ludim, which is outside and Lud which is inside, one must still recite the formula. However, the sages disagree and hold that the formula must be recited only by one who brings a get from abroad, or one who brings one back from there. The reason that someone bringing a get from Israel to a different land must recite the formula is lest the original witnesses cannot be found in order to uphold the get.", + "One who brings [a get] from one province to another province in foreign lands is also required to declare, “In my presence it was written, and in my presence it was signed.” Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: even from one hegemony to another hegemony. Just as the messenger must make the declaration that the get was written and signed in his presence when bringing the get to and from Israel, so too must he make the declaration when bringing the get to and from provinces outside of the land. The reason is that the original witnesses may be difficult to find if there is a need to uphold the get. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel adds that even within one province, if he is switching hegemonies, places ruled by different governors, all within the Roman empire, he must make the declaration." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn this mishnah the tannaim continue to debate the definitions of what is inside the land of Israel and what is considered “abroad”, such that a messenger who brings a get from there must state, “In my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed.” Whereas in the previous mishnah, Rabban Gamaliel and Rabbi Eliezer debated the borders, in this mishnah Rabbi Judah and Rabbi Meir, who lived two generations later, debate.\nWe should note that the Hebrew word for “abroad” is literally translated, “the province of the sea.” This may mean a place accessible by sea travel but it may also mean coastal towns contiguous with the land of Israel. Often people would travel to coastal towns by sea, so there would be difficulty in bringing witnesses from there to the hinterland. Furthermore, these towns were usually more populated by Greek speakers, who settled on the coasts to control the trade. Jews, or at least Aramaic speaking, less Hellenistic Jews, tended to live inlands. Hence, the rabbis feared that those who live on the coast, “abroad”, do not know how to properly write a divorce document.", + "Rabbi Judah says: From Rekem eastwards, Rekem being like the east; from Ashkelon southwards, Ashkelon being like the south; and from Acco northwards, Acco being like the north. Rabbi Meir says: Acco counts as the land of Israel in the matter of bills of divorce. Rabbi Judah defines cities that he considers outside of the land of Israel, at least for issues of divorce. Rabbi Meir disagrees with him concerning Acco." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to deal with which messengers must recite the formula “In my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed.”", + "One who brings a get within the land of Israel need not declare, “In my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed.” If there are those who protest [its validity] it must be established through the signatures. A messenger who brings a get from one place within the land of Israel to another place need not say the formula “In my presence” etc. The formula is only mandatory for cases where it will be difficult to locate witnesses to validate the get. Within the borders of the land of Israel this will not be difficult. Furthermore, it was only people outside of the land who did not know how to write and sign gittin, and therefore the messenger had to testify to its validity. Within the land there was no such concern. If someone should come and protest the get, saying that it is false, the court could summons the witnesses.", + "If one who brings a get from abroad is not able to declare “In my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed”, if there are witnesses on it, its validity can be established through its signatures. This section discusses a messenger who did not see the get written and signed, and therefore cannot state, “In my presence…” In such a case, the default procedure is to validate the get through the witnesses who have signed on it. In this case the woman receiving the get cannot remarry until its validity has been proven. In contrast, in the above case, if the get is brought within Israel, she may remarry without validating the get. She only needs to validate if others protest its validity." + ], + [ + "Introduction Today’s mishnah begins to compare the laws concerning bills of divorce with those concerning writs of emancipation for slaves. These comparisons will continue until the end of the chapter. In Aramaic the word “get” means document and not necessarily just a divorce document. The word can refer to either divorce or emancipation documents, as well as other documents. Furthermore, there is some similarity to the two situations (marriage in the ancient world and slavery) and between the ways that the two documents (divorce and emancipation) are written. However, we should not think that the comparison between divorce and emancipation is complete. The major difference is that a man may sell his slave but he may of course not sell his wife.", + "Both bills of divorce and writs of emancipation are similar [concerning a messenger] who takes them [abroad from the land of Israel] to one who brings them [from abroad to the land of Israel]. The rules which we learned above concerning the declaration that a messenger must make upon presenting a get also apply to a messenger delivering a writ of emancipation. Whether he brings the get from Israel to a foreign land or brings it to Israel, the messenger bringing either document must say “In my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed.”", + "This is one of the ways in which bills of divorce are similar to writs of emancipation. This section introduces the similarities between the two documents which will be discussed in the following mishnayoth." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first section of this mishnah deals with documents whose signators are Samaritans. The Samaritans were a Jewish splinter group whose history is somewhat blurry. For more information on the Samaritans, see the introduction to Nedarim 3:10.\nThe second section of the mishnah deals with documents pertaining to Jews which were validated in non-Jewish courts. This was certainly a common phenomenon in the mishnaic periods. The Greco-Roman court system was well-developed, as were their laws. As subjects, if not always citizens, of the Roman Empire, Jews would have had some legal recourse to Roman courts and justice. Therefore, the rabbis had to discuss the validity of documents which were upheld in these courts.", + "Any document which has upon it the signature of a Samaritan is invalid, except for bills of divorce or a writ of emancipation. It happened that a bill of divorce was once brought before Rabban Gamaliel at Kefar Otnai and its witnesses were Samaritan, and he declared it valid. The mishnah teaches that all documents which have upon them signatures of people known to be Samaritans are invalid, except for bills of divorce or writs of emancipation. According to Albeck, Samaritans were suspected by the rabbis of lying with regard to issues of money, and therefore they could not serve as witnesses for matters such as loans and acquisitions. However, they were evidently not suspected of lying in matters of divorce or emancipation and hence they could serve as witnesses in these matters. Furthermore, they were assumed to be knowledgeable enough in matters of divorce and emancipation. Indeed, according to the mishnah, Rabban Gamaliel once allowed even two Samaritans to serve as witnesses on a get. This occurred at Kefar Otnai, in the southern Galilee.", + "All documents which are accepted in the courts of non-Jew, even if those who signed on the documents are non-Jews, are valid except bills of divorce and of writs of emancipation. Rabbi Shimon says: these also are valid; they were only pronounced [to be invalid] when done by ordinary persons. This section of the mishnah deals with documents that were upheld by non-Jewish courts or even signed by non-Jews. In this case, these documents are generally valid with the exception of divorce and emancipation documents. Monetary documents are valid, because non-Jews are trustworthy to adjudicate monetary matters. However, since they do not know the laws of Jewish divorce and emancipation, bills of divorce and writs of emancipation could not be upheld in non-Jewish courts, nor could those who signed them be non-Jewish. Rabbi Shimon partially disagrees with the opinion in the previous clause. According to him, the earlier opinion that said that divorce and emancipation documents done in non-Jewish courts are invalid, referred only to those done by courts which lack knowledge of the laws. However, if the court was an expert court, they may even draw up divorce and emancipation documents, even though they are not Jewish." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe topic of this mishnah is a man who instructs a messenger to give a get to his wife, or a writ of emancipation to his slave, and then changes his mind or dies before the document is delivered.", + "If a man says: “Give this get to my wife or this writ of emancipation to my slave”, if he wants he may change his mind on either document, the words of Rabbi Meir. The Sages say: he may change his mind in the case of the get but not in the case of the writ of emancipation, since a benefit may be conferred on a person not in his presence but a disability may be imposed on him only in his presence; for if he does not want to maintain his slave he is permitted, but if he does not want to maintain his wife he is not permitted. Rabbi Meir said to them: behold, he disqualifies his slave from eating terumah [by emancipating him] in the same way that he disqualifies his wife [by divorcing her]? They said to him: [the slave is disqualified] because he is the priest’s property. According to Rabbi Meir, the husband may change his mind after instructing an agent to give a get to his wife or a writ of emancipation to his slave. The Sages disagree and say that he may change his mind only with regard to the get. He may not change his mind with regard to the freeing of the slave. The reason is that there is a principle that one may confer benefit on another person not in that person’s presence, but one may not confer a disability on a person not in that person’s presence. In our situation, the woman/slave is not in the husband/master’s presence at the moment and that is why the husband is instructing a messenger. For the woman, divorce is a considerable disability for she loses her guaranteed source of income. Should the husband not want to provide maintenance for his wife (food, clothing etc.) he does not have the right to do so. He may not say to her, take whatever income you make and use it for your own maintenance. In contrast, the slave has no such guarantee. A master may say to his slave that he must provide his own maintenance. Note that a master may not tell his slave to work for the master and the master will not provide maintenance. The master may only stop providing maintenance, if he allows the slave to work for his own maintenance. Nevertheless, the slave’s income is not guaranteed as is that of the wife, therefore it is a total disability for him not to be freed. Since this is so, the master may not retract freeing his slave once he has told a messenger to do so. Rabbi Meir responds that in some ways freeing a slave is a disability and therefore, just as he can retract in giving the slave his manumission, so too he can retract from divorcing his wife. The disability for the slave is that if he was owned by a priest, he could eat terumah. Upon emancipation, he loses such a right. The sages respond that the slave’s eating terumah is not a “benefit”; rather it is something he is allowed to do because the master owns him. Indeed, the priest could sell his slave to an Israelite and thereby disqualify him from eating terumah without freeing him. Therefore, loss of terumah is not truly a disability to the slave.", + "If a man says, “Give this get to my wife or this writ of emancipation to my slave”, and dies [before they are given], they do not give [the documents] after his death. [If he said], “Give a maneh to so-and-so” and died, the money should be given after his death. In this case, the husband/master dies before the document is given. The mishnah teaches that in cases of divorce and emancipation, the messenger should not give the document after the husband/master’s death. A get and a writ of manumission do not go into effect until they are given. Since a dead man cannot divorce his wife or free his slave, the documents cannot be given after his death. In contrast, when a dying person gives a present, his mere statement transfers ownership. Therefore, the present should be given even after the giver’s death." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah returns to discussing one who delivers a get from abroad and is obligated to say, “In my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed.” Today’s mishnah deals with one who can only recite part of the formula.\nI should note that the Talmud provides a very complicated explanation for this mishnah. I have tried to explain according to the words of the mishnah without the Talmudic explanation.", + "If one brings a get from abroad and declares: “It was written in my presence” but not, “It was signed in my presence”; “It was signed in my presence” but not “It was written in my presence”; “All of it was written in my presence and in my presence but only one of the witnesses signed in my presence”; “Half was written in my presence but both witnesses signed in my presence”; [in all these cases] the get is invalid. In all of these cases one person brings the get, and he cannot recite the full formula. Even if he can recite nearly the whole formula but cannot honestly say that the entire get was written and fully signed by two witnesses in his presence, the get is invalid. As we learned above in 1:3, that this get is invalid means that in order for the woman to use this get to remarry, the witnesses themselves must verify their signatures or two witnesses must testify that they recognize both signatures. The testimony of the one who brought the get is not sufficient in and of itself.", + "If one says “It was written in my presence” and another says, “It was signed in my presence”, the get is invalid. In this case, one messenger testifies that the get was written in his presence but cannot say that it was signed in his presence, and the other person with him says that the get was signed in his presence but cannot say that the get was also written in his presence. Since there is no complete declaration made by any one messenger, the get is not valid. Again, this means that it remains invalid until its signatures are validated.", + "If two say, “It was written in our presence” and another says, “It was signed in my presence”, it is invalid. Rabbi Judah declares it valid. In this case two people bring the get and both can testify that the get was written in their presence, but neither can say that it was signed in their presence. A third person says that it was signed in his presence. The first opinion states that the get is still invalid, and still needs to be upheld by validating the signatures. Rabbi Judah holds that the get is already valid since there is full testimony by two witnesses on the writing. To Rabbi Judah, the writing is the essential part of the making of the get and if two testify that the writing was done properly, the get is valid. This is not through their being deliverers of the get, but rather through their being witnesses. However, one person saying that the writing was done properly is not valid, because one person is not full testimony in Jewish law.", + "If one says, “It was written in my presence” and two say, “It was signed in our presence”, it is valid. In this case two testify that they saw the get signed. This is essentially upholding the signatures on the get and it always makes the get valid. Again, these two function as witnesses." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIt is necessary to write the date inside a get. Our mishnah deals with a cases where the get was written on one day but signed on the night that follows, which is considered the following day according to the Jewish way of reckoning days and nights. In this case, the get’s date will not match the date upon which it is finalized.", + "If [a get was] written by day and signed on the [same] day, written by night and signed on the [same] night, written by night and signed on the day [following], it is valid. In all of these cases the get is valid since it was written and signed on the same day. Since the day follows the night in Jewish counting of days, if it was written at night and signed the following day, this still counts as being written and signed on the same day.", + "If it was written by day and signed on the night [following], it is invalid. Rabbi Shimon validates it, for Rabbi Shimon used to say that all documents written by day and signed on the [following] night are invalid except bills of divorce. However, if it was written by day and then later signed that night, the date written in the get does not match the actual date on which it was signed. The reason why documents must be written and signed on the same day is that documents can be used to collect collateral. A debt document creates a lien on another person’s property. For instance, if Reuven borrows 1,000 dollars from Shimon on the first of the month of Av, Shimon now has a lien on all the property that Reuven owned on that date. If Reuven subsequently gives or sells property to a third party and then defaults on his loan, Shimon may collect from the third party. However, Shimon’s lien takes priority only over other debts created after Shimon loaned the money. For this reason, documents whose dates precede their finalization, done in their signing, are invalid, lest someone try to defraud a third party. Since all other documents whose dates precede their finalization are invalid, divorce documents are as well. According to Rabbi Shimon, money is never collected based on the date written in the get. A woman collects her ketubah based on the date written in the ketubah. Therefore, the get which was written during the day but only signed at night is valid. Even though other documents whose date precedes their signing are invalid, gittin are valid." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first section of this mishnah discusses what can be used to write a get. The second section deals with what gittin may be written on.", + "They write [a get] with any material, with ink, with arsenic, with red chalk, with gum or with sulfate of copper or with anything which is lasting. It may not be written with liquids or with fruit juice or with anything that is not lasting. The writing materials in the first part of this section are lasting and those in the second part are not lasting. The get should not be written with something that can easily be erased. We should note that since parchment and paper were scarce and expensive in the ancient world, people often reused paper, scratching off the previous layer and starting afresh.", + "They write [a get] on anything: on an olive leaf, on the horn of an ox and he must give her the ox, or on the hand of a slave--and he must give her the slave. Rabbi Yose the Galilean says: they do not write [a get] on anything living or on food. The get need not be written only on a scroll, as seems to be prescribed in the Deuteronomy 24:1. Rather it can be written on nearly any material. The one condition is that there must be no step between the writing of the get and its being given to the woman. This is the reason that if the get is written on the horn of an ox, he must give her the ox, or if on the hand of the slave, he must give her the slave. He cannot cut the ox’s horn off and give it to her, for that would be an added step. This halakhah is derived from the verse “And he writes her a bill of divorcement and puts it in her hand” (Deuteronomy 24:1). The writing must lead directly to the giving. Rabbi Yose the Galilean says it may not be written on anything that is still alive (like the horn of an ox or the hand of a slave) or is food. The Torah says it should be written on a scroll. While Rabbi Yose the Galilean does not require it to be written on a scroll, he says that it must be somewhat similar to a scroll, which is neither alive nor serves as food." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to deal with what a get may be written on.", + "They do not write [a get] on something still attached to the ground. As we explained in yesterday’s mishnah, there can be no steps done to the get in between it’s having been completed and its being given to the woman. In yesterday’s mishnah that meant that if written on the horn of a cow, the husband has to give her the cow. Cutting off the cow’s horn and giving her the horn would not be valid. Today we learn that the get cannot be written on something still attached to the ground, for then the husband would have to cut it down in order to give it to his wife. He cannot give her the land to which the get is attached, because land cannot be transferred from hand to hand.", + "If he wrote it on something still attached, and then detached and signed and given to the wife, it is valid. Rabbi Judah invalidates it until it is both written and signed on something detached from the ground. In this case, he wrote the get on something that was still attached to the ground, but then he detached it before he gave it to her. According to the first opinion, the signing of the get is the essential part, and therefore, as long as it was done on something detached from the ground, the get is valid. Rabbi Judah, however, holds that it is invalid unless it is written and signed on something which is already detached from the ground.", + "Rabbi Judah ben Batera says: they do not write [a get] on a sheet from which writing has been erased nor on semi-finished parchment, for it can be faked. But the sages validate [such a get]. As I stated in yesterday’s mishnah, in the ancient world paper/parchment was scarce and expensive. Therefore they would reuse paper. There were types of materials which were rough and meant for reuse. Rabbi Judah ben Batera invalidates such writing materials for gittin, since they can be forged. Someone might erase one person’s name and write in another’s and the forgery would not be recognizable. However, the Sages say that we are not concerned about forgeries in the writing of the get. The Talmud explains that it is the witnesses who see the get being given to the woman who are critical. They will read the get when it is given to the woman and if afterwards someone tries to forge the get, these witnesses will be able to testify as to what was really written on it." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first section of this mishnah deals with who may write a get, and the second section with who may deliver a get.", + "All are qualified to write a get, even a deaf-mute, an imbecile and a minor. A woman may write her own get and a man his own receipt [for the ketubah], since the document is upheld only by its signatures. Anyone can write a get including people who were categorically considered not to have “awareness”. These people can write a get even though they would not even understand what they are doing (remember that in the ancient world deaf people were wrongly considered to lack intelligence), because as we see below, the critical issue with the get is that it is signed by valid witnesses. Similarly, a woman may write her own get (this would make for an interesting scenario), and a man may write his own receipt for having paid the ketubah to his wife. Since the get is upheld not by checking who wrote it but who signed it, it matters not who does the writing. Although the woman has written her own get, the witnesses will not sign it unless they are sure that it was written upon the husband’s directive. Similarly, witnesses will not sign a receipt for payment unless they know that the husband paid the money to the wife.", + "All are qualified to bring a get except a deaf-mute, an imbecile, a minor, a blind person and a non-Jew. Almost anybody can deliver a get from a husband to his wife. The exceptions are again those people who categorically do not have awareness. In all areas of halakhah, someone who does not have “awareness” cannot act as someone else’s agent. A blind person can also not deliver a get, even though blind people were not considered to lack “awareness”. The Talmud explains this to mean that he cannot deliver a get from abroad to Israel because he cannot say “In my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed.” Note that blind people were considered to have “awareness”, unlike deaf-mutes who could not really communicate. Non-Jews cannot marry or divorce Jews and therefore cannot serve as agents for delivering a get." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is a continuation of the end of yesterday’s mishnah which discussed those categories of people who are disqualified from delivering a get.", + "If the minor had received the get [in order to deliver it] and then became of age; or the deaf-mute [received the get and then] his speech was restored; or the blind person [received the get and then] his sight was restored; or the imbecile [received the get and then] his reason returned; or the Gentile [received the get and then] converted, [the get] is invalid. In this case a person received the get while disqualified to deliver it (see yesterday’s mishnah) and then his/her status changed to one who is qualified to deliver the get before he/she delivered it. Since the person was disqualified when receiving the get in order to deliver it, the delivery is invalid, even though by the time the get was actually delivered the person was in a valid category.", + "But if a person of sound senses [received the get] and then became a deaf-mute and then recovered his speech; or one with sight [received the get and then] became blind and then recovered his sight; or one who was sane [received the get and then] went insane and then recovered his reason, [the get] is valid. The general principle is that anyone who begins and finishes [his mission] in full possession of his mental faculties is qualified. In this case the person was qualified to deliver the get when it was received and when it was delivered but while in the process he/she briefly entered a status of one who is disqualified. As explained at the end of the mishnah, since the person was qualified at the two critical moments, the reception of the get from the husband and the delivery to the wife, the delivery is valid. The fact that the person was temporarily invalid in-between is immaterial. Note that this section cannot include a person who was Jewish and then apostatized to another religion and then returned to Judaism for in the eyes of Jewish law, a Jew cannot legally convert to another religion." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah makes reference to Yevamoth 15:4. That mishnah teaches that some women may not testify that another woman’s husband has died. The fear is that these women will intentionally lie in order to trick the woman into remarrying while her husband is still alive, thereby causing an irreparable rupture in their marriage. In our mishnah we learn that although these women are not trusted to testify regarding the death of the husband, they are trusted to deliver a get.", + "Even the women who are not trusted to say “Her husband died,” are trusted to bring her get: her mother-in-law, the daughter of her mother-in-law, her rival wife, her sister-in-law (husband’s brother’s and the daughter of her husband. These five women may dislike or even hate a wife and therefore cannot testify that her husband died (see Yevamoth 15:4). As stated in the introduction, these women may nevertheless deliver a get to a wife, thereby showing to her that she is divorced and allowed to remarry.", + "What is the difference between the get and death? The writing [on the get] proves [that she is divorced.] In this section the mishnah questions why these women can deliver a get but not testify regarding a husband’s death. The answer is that the get’s validity is ultimately proved by those who wrote and signed the get, and not by the person who delivered it. Although an agent delivering a get is under certain circumstances required to declare “In my presence it was signed and in my presence it was delivered”, this is not truly testimony, but rather a means of allowing the get to be accepted without checking its validity. This is why those who are not allowed to testify can still deliver a get and make the above declaration. In contrast, testifying that a husband has died is truly testimony. Therefore, since we fear that these women may lie, they are not trusted. [Note that women in general are allowed to testify regarding a husband’s death in order to lessen the problem of wives not knowing if their husbands have died.]", + "A woman may bring her own get but she must say, “In my presence it was signed and in my presence it was delivered.” Theoretically speaking a woman could even bring her own get and this would not be considered testifying about herself, since the writing on the get proves its validity. However, she is still required to state, “In my presence it was signed and in my presence it was delivered”, the statement that is always required when a get is brought from abroad to the land of Israel. This situation could happen if the husband gave her the get outside of Israel but told her that he didn’t want the divorce to be enacted until she reached Israel. A truly Zionist husband!" + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah teaches that a get must be written with the express intention to divorce the specific woman to whom it will eventually be given. This rule is derived from a midrash on Deuteronomy 24:1, “And he writes for her”. The words “for her” are interpreted to mean that the get must be written specifically for her. Our mishnah will illustrate this principle.", + "Any get which is not written [expressly] for the woman [for whom it is intended] is invalid. How is this so? This mishnah introduces the halakhah mentioned in the introduction, according to which a get must be expressly written for the woman who will be divorced with it. The rest of this mishnah will illustrate this principle.", + "If a man was passing through the street and heard the voice of a scribe dictating “So-and-so divorces so-and-so from such and such a place” and he says “that is my name and that is the name of my wife”, it is not a valid [document] with which to divorce his wife. In this scenario, a scribe was teaching his students to practice writing divorce documents. These documents were probably always written by scribes, as they require great skill and precision. A man walking by heard the scribe and noticed that the names being used matched those of his and his wife. It dawned on him, wow, I could use this to divorce my wife (I believe that this is intentionally humorous, so you are permitted to chuckle.) The document was only for practice and was not written to be used at all, and therefore certainly cannot be considered as having been written for a specific woman.", + "Moreover: if he wrote [a get] with which to divorce his wife and changed his mind and a person found him and said to him, “My name is the same as yours and my wife’s name the same as your wife's”, it is not a valid [document with which the second] may divorce his wife. In this case, the document was written to be used to divorce, but not to be used by this husband to divorce this wife, but rather for different people who happen to have the same name. Since it was not written for this man’s wife, he may not use it, even though the names are appropriate.", + "Moreover: if he had two wives with the same name and wrote a get with which to divorce the elder, he may not use it to divorce the younger. In this case, the correct husband wrote the get, but he wrote it with the intention to divorce one of his wives and now he wants to divorce the other. Since the get was not written to be given to the younger wife, he may not use it to divorce her. As an aside, you can imagine how interesting family life must have been for the family in which a husband married to two women with the same name! If you think Jacob had problems with Leah and Rachel, think of this family. (Again, I think this is supposed to make you crack a smile, so feel free).", + "Moreover: if he said to the scribe, “Write [a get] and I will divorce whichever I choose,” it is not a valid [document] with which to divorce his wife. Finally, a husband cannot tell a scribe to write out a get, leave the name of the woman blank, and then the husband will later decide which wife he wishes to divorce. In this case, the “correct” husband wrote the get, and he did not actively intend to give it to a different wife. Nevertheless, the positive intention to give it to a specific wife is lacking and hence the get is invalid." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThere are two parts of any document, called in Hebrew the “tofes” and the “toref”. The “tofes” is the general formula which is used in all of these types of documents. The “toref” is the place where the names of the parties involved, the amount of money involved and the time and place where the matter referred to in the document was performed.\nIn the previous mishnah we learned that a divorce document must be written expressly for the woman to whom it will be given. Our mishnah deals with the validity of divorce documents whose “tofes” was written without this specific intention.", + "[A scribe] who writes out formulas of bills of divorce must leave blank spaces for the name of the man and the name of the woman and the date. [A scribe who writes] loan documents must leave blank spaces for the name of the lender, the name of the borrower, the amount of money and the date. [A scribe who writes] sale documents must leave blank spaces for the name of the seller, the name of the purchaser, the amount of money, the property and the date; [These spaces must be left blank] because of the “takkanah” (. According to the first opinion in this mishnah, a scribe may write out document formulas before he knows who or under what circumstances the documents will be used, but he must leave the “toref”, the details, blank. The mishnah lists three types of documents: divorce, loan and sale. The reason that these spaces must be left blank in a divorce document is that if they are not, the get will not have been written expressly for the woman to whom it will be given. This is according to the halakhah which we learned in yesterday’s mishnah. The loan and sales documents do not have such a requirement. Nevertheless, according to this opinion they too cannot be fully filled out beforehand because if the rabbis allow this, scribes will do the same with divorce documents. This is called a “fence around the Torah”, a stringency meant to prevent people from doing that which is truly problematic. The rabbis forbade filling out all documents lest divorce documents were also fully written out. The mishnah cryptically explains that these must be left blank “because of the takkanah”, or “enactment”, without explain what the “takkanah” is. There are several explanations for this, each of which is not without its problems. One explanation is that the “takkanah” was that scribes may write the formulas ahead of time so that when people request a certain document that document would be readily available. The problem with this explanation is that the mishnah seems to state that the “takkanah” was that the spaces should be left blank and not that scribes might write the formulas. A second explanation is that the “takkanah” was that they shouldn’t write out the entire document, so that people would not be rash in selling their property or borrowing money. This is a decent explanation for the sales and lending documents, but does not explain well the issue of the divorce documents, which are invalid if fully written out even without a special “takkanah.”", + "Rabbi Judah disqualifies all of them. Rabbi Judah disqualifies all of these documents. According to the Talmud, he forbids writing the formula (“tofes”) of the get, lest the scribe come to also write the specifics, which according to the midrash must be written for the specific woman. He also disqualifies loan and sales documents whose formulas were pre-written lest a scribe pre-write a divorce document. We can see that he is doubly strict, creating many “fences” around what is actually prohibited (pre-writing the details of the get).", + "Rabbi Elazar validates all of them valid except divorce documents, as it says, “He writes for her” (Deut 24:1), expressly for her. Rabbi Elazar partially agrees with Rabbi Judah. He agrees that pre-writing the divorce formula is forbidden, and this he derives from the midrash. According to his interpretation, the entire get must be written with a specific woman in mind, and not just the “tofes”. However, he agrees with the opinion in section one that the formulas of other documents may be written ahead of time. He is not concerned that if the halakhah allows the scribe to pre-write these documents, the scribe might pre-write divorce documents as well." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first half of this mishnah deals with a get that was temporarily lost on its way from the husband to the wife.\nThe second half deals with a sick or old husband who sent a get to his wife. The question is whether or not the one bringing it can assume that the husband is still alive when he (the one bringing the get) arrives at the wife?", + "One who brings a get and loses it on the way: If he finds it immediately it is valid, and if not it is not valid. If he finds it in a small bag or in a folder if he recognizes it, it is valid. If a messenger loses a get, we fear that the get that he finds is not the same get that he lost, and therefore the get will not have been written for that specific woman. Note that the names written on the found get have to be the same as those on the lost get, otherwise it will be clear that it is not the same get. However, as we learned in previous mishnayoth, similar names may not have been so uncommon. If the get is immediately found, it is still valid. But if time elapses we are concerned that the one bringing the get found a different get, even though the names are the same. Furthermore, if he recognizes the bag or folder which he was using to carry the get, and the get is still inside, the get is valid even if it was found after time had elapsed. The likelihood that a get with the same names as the lost get would get into a bag that looks exactly the same as the lost bag is too remote for concern.", + "If one brings a get and left [the husband] when [the husband] was an old man or sick, he should deliver it to her on the presumption that he is still alive. A woman may not be divorced from her husband after he died. The importance of this halakhah is in the realm of levirate marriage. A woman whose husband died before he had offspring is liable for yibbum (levirate marriage), whereas a woman who was divorced is not. Since a get goes into effect the moment that the woman receives it, and not when given to the messenger to deliver, it is important to know if the husband was alive when the get was delivered to the woman. Nevertheless, the mishnah states that the person delivering the get should not be concerned lest the husband died after he (the one delivering the get) received it. He may deliver it to the wife even if the husband was an old or sick man and presume that the husband is still alive.", + "If the daughter of an ordinary Israelite is married to a priest and her husband goes abroad, she continues eating terumah on the presumption that he is still alive. The mishnah now brings two halakhot which employ a similar principle, that is we assume that a person is still alive until it is known that he has died. A woman who eats terumah because she is married to a priest can continue to do so even if her husband went on a long trip and she no longer knows if he is alive.", + "If a man sends a sin-offering from abroad they sacrifice it on the presumption that he is still alive. Similarly, the priests at the Temple may offer up a sin-offering which was sent from abroad under the assumption that its owner who sent it is still alive. Had they known that the owner had died, the animal would not be able to be sacrificed." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn yesterday’s mishnah we learned that one who delivers a get from a husband to his wife may assume that the husband is alive, even if the husband was old or sick. The mishnah followed with two other cases where we can act as if a certain person is still alive. Our mishnah deals with three statements made by Rabbi Elazar ben Parta which deal with assuming that a person is still alive.", + "Three statements were made by Rabbi Elazar ben Parta before the Sages, and they upheld his words. Rabbi Elazar ben Parta spoke about three different situations, each of which can be divided into two different possibilities. The other Sages in front of whom he spoke accepted his reasoning.", + "About [people in] a besieged town; And about [people on] a ship listing at sea; And a person who has been brought to court [in a capital case] that they are presumed to be alive. We may presume that a person in a besieged town, or a person on a ship listing at sea and threatening to sink, or a person who is being tried in a capital case is still alive. This presumption may be made even if we don’t know for sure that the person is still alive. Therefore, if the man is a priest, his Israelite wife may continue to eat terumah under the assumption that he is still alive. If the man is an Israelite and his wife is the daughter of a priest, she may not eat terumah because we assume that her husband is still alive.", + "[However, concerning people] in a besieged town which has been captured; Or [people in] a ship which has been lost at sea; Or a person who has been led out to execution we put upon them all of the stringencies of their being alive and all of the stringencies of their being dead. The daughter of an Israelite who has married a priest or the daughter of a priest who has married an Israelite may not eat of the terumah. In these cases we cannot assume that the person is still alive, but neither can we be sure that he/she is dead. Rabbi Elazar ben Parta says that it is likely enough that the person is dead that we cannot continue to act as if he/she is alive. Therefore, we have to rule strictly in either case. If a husband in one of these situations was a priest and he had a wife who was the daughter of an Israelite she can no longer eat terumah because her husband may be dead. If she was the daughter of a priest married to an Israelite she still cannot eat terumah because her husband may still be alive." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with a person who becomes sick while delivering a get inside the land of Israel. In tomorrow’s mishnah we shall deal with a person who becomes sick while bringing a get from abroad.", + "If one bringing a get in the land of Israel becomes sick, he can send it with another. As we learned in chapter one, a person who delivers a get within the land of Israel need not state, “In my presence it was written and signed.” Therefore, there is no problem with giving the get to another person, should the original person not be able to complete the delivery due to sickness.", + "But if [the husband] said to him, “Take for me from her such-and-such an object”, he may not send it [the get] with another, since the husband may not want his deposit in the hand of another. In this case, the husband told his agent to do two things: 1) bring the get; 2) retrieve something from his wife. While we can assume that the husband will not mind someone else delivering the get, he may not trust a different person to recover his belonging. Therefore, the agent cannot even send the get with another person, since that other person cannot retrieve the object." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah discusses a person who is delivering a get from abroad and cannot complete his delivery.", + "If one bringing a get from abroad becomes sick, he may arrange a court of law and send him [on with the get,] declaring before them, “In my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed.” Generally, the person who was charged to bring the get should bring it himself. If he cannot because he becomes sick on the way, he cannot merely give it to another messenger because the husband did not give him permission to do so. In order to deliver the get to the wife, he will need to set up a court of law consisting of three judges and make his declaration in front of them. The court may then, on the husband’s behalf, appoint an agent to deliver the get.", + "And the last agent is not required to say, “In my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed”, rather he declares, “I am the messenger of a court.” The agent sent from the court obviously cannot say, “In my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed”, which the person delivering the get usually needs to say, because that would not be true. Upon delivering the get, what he can say is “I am the messenger of the court.” We can trust that the court would not have sent him had the get not been executed properly. As an aside, by calling him “the last agent” the mishnah alludes to the fact that this may not be the original agent sent by the court. The passing of the get from one agent to the other may happen many times." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to deal with situations in which we assume that a person is still alive even though we cannot be sure that he is.", + "If a man lends money to a priest or a levite or a poor man on condition that he can may separate [terumah or tithes] from their portion, he may do so, in the presumption that they are still alive, and he need be concerned that the priest or the levite may have died or the poor man may have become rich. In this scenario a person loans money to a priest, Levite or poor person with the agreement that the debt will be worked off by the person withholding terumah (given to the priest), first tithe (to the Levite) or poor tithe (the poor person) which he would have given to them. In such a case, the person will harvest his produce and separate terumah and tithes as he normally does. The terumah he must sell to another priest but he may keep the money for himself as payment for his debt. Note that he may not eat the terumah since terumah is strictly forbidden to non-priests. The tithes he may eat himself, since non-Levites and people who are not poor may eat tithes. The person paying off his debt need not be concerned that the priest or Levite died or that the poor person is no longer poor. As we learned in the previous mishnayoth, we can assume that a person is still alive until we have strong reason to believe otherwise.", + "If they died, he must obtain the permission of the heirs. If he made the loan in the presence of the court, he need not obtain permission from the heirs. If the lender knows that the priest, Levite or poor person died, he may not continue the arrangement without obtaining permission from the heirs. Since the heirs may prefer to pay back the debt, the lender must let them know what about the arrangement. Assumedly they will find the arrangement acceptable. Furthermore, if the arrangement was made in the presence of the court, he need not obtain their permission. The court has the power to finalize the debt such that the debtor may not preemptively pay it back." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe previous several mishnayoth taught that a person need not be concerned lest someone might have died. Our mishnah teaches that a person need not be concerned lest some produce that he set aside has spoiled.", + "If a man sets aside produce in order to count it as terumah and tithe, or money in order to count it as second tithe, he may continue to count it as such in the presumption that they still exist. The person here set aside some produce in another place for it to count as tithe so that he could eat other produce without tithing it. Or he set aside some money to count it as the redemption money for second tithe. This redemption money will eventually be brought to Jerusalem and consumed there. He may continue to eat his produce, assuming that the things he set aside still exist.", + "If they are lost, he must be concerned from time period to time period, the words of Rabbi Elazar ben Shammua. Rabbi Judah says: at three seasons they check the wine: when the east wind begins to blow at the end of Sukkot, when the buds first appear [on the vine], and when the juice begins to form in the grapes. According to R. Elazar b. Shammua, if he comes back and discovers that the produce is lost, meaning it has gone bad, he must assume that it was lost within the last 24 hours. This means that he had unwittingly eaten untithed produce for the last 24 hours, and will have to repay that amount to the priests. R. Judah says that they check the wine at only three seasons to ensure that it has not gone bad. Thus he would have to assume that any wine he had left over in order for it to count as tithes and terumah had spoiled some time between the last check and the current period." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThe fourth chapter of Gittin begins by discussing a husband who sends a get to his wife and then attempts to annul the get. The general rule is that as long as the get has not yet gotten to her hand, he may annul the get.", + "If man sends a get to his wife and then catches up with the messenger, or sends a messenger after the original messenger, and says to him, “The get which I gave you is annulled”, then it is annulled. In this case after sending the get to his wife with a messenger, the husband either catches up with the original messenger or sends a second messenger to catch up with the first and one of them tells the original messenger that the get is cancelled. The mishnah rules that the get is cancelled. Since the woman is not divorced until she receives the get, the husband may cancel it any time until this point.", + "If the husband arrives at his wife before [the messenger] or sends a messenger to her and says, “The get which I sent to you is annulled”, then it is annulled. In this case, the husband or his agent does not chase after the original messenger but rather the husband or his agent arrives at the wife before the messenger does. Again, since she has not yet received the get, the get is annulled. In both of these cases, even if the messenger should subsequently give her the get she is not divorced.", + "Once the get has reached her hand, he cannot annul it. However, once she has received the get she is no longer his wife and there isn’t anything he can do about it." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first section of our mishnah continues to discuss a husband who attempts to cancel his get after he has already sent it to his wife. In this section, a “takkanah” of Rabban Gamaliel is mentioned. “Takkanah” literally means “a fixing”, and it refers to a rabbinic decree which remedies a problematic situation. The remainder of this chapter and the next chapter contain lists of “takkanot”, made because of “tikkun olam” fixing the world or other related reasons. Today this concept has come to mean good deeds such as charity done in order to make the world a better place. In the Mishnah its meaning was more specific and it usually refers to correct either problems created because of marital laws or economic injustices.\nThroughout the Mishnah I will leave the term “tikkun olam” untranslated, as there is no word that precisely captures its meaning. I also think that the best way to understand the mishnaic meaning of “tikkun olam” is through the examples used by the Mishnah itself.", + "Originally, a husband would bring together a court wherever he was and annul the get. Rabban Gamaliel the Elder established that this should not be done, because of “tikkun olam”. In yesterday’s mishnah we learned that if a husband catches up with someone delivering a get to his wife or arrives at his wife before the messenger gets there and delivers the get, he may annul the get. Today we learn that in older times the husband could gather together a court and in front of them annul the get i without getting to his messenger or his wife. This would be extremely problematic for the wife because she might not know that her husband had annulled the get. If she were to assume that the get was valid and that she was divorced, she might remarry and have children. In such a scenario, her second marriage would be illegitimate and her children with her new husband would be mamzerim, because she is still married. Another problem would be that women receiving gittin by messenger would not know if the get was valid, because their husbands may have annulled it. To avoid problems they wouldn’t remarry. To prevent these complications Rabban Gamaliel the Elder who lived during the time of the Second Temple established that people should not do this.", + "Originally the husband would change his name, or his wife’s name, or the name of his town or of his wife’s town. Rabban Gamaliel the Elder established that he should write, “The man so-and-so or any name that he has,”; “the woman so-and-so or any name that she has,” because of “tikkun olam.” In mishnaic times people evidently would have several different names, names which may have been used in different regions or perhaps by speakers of different languages (i.e. a Greek name and a Hebrew name). The problem arose in identifying the get who was the husband or who was the wife. This is what the mishnah means “change his name” etc. The husband would write only one of his names, or his wife’s names or his town’s name and then he would claim that the get was not his and thereby annul it. Rabban Gamaliel established that the husband should write “The man so-and-so or any name that he has” so that annulling the get after the wife has received it would be impossible. Some commentators interpret this to mean that this formula itself should be written in the get, whereas other commentators hold this to mean that inside the get the husband must list all of the names that he goes by." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah contains three different “takkanot”, decrees meant to remedy situations. The first was made by Rabban Gamaliel the Elder, as were those in yesterday’s mishnah. The second is anonymous and the third was made by Hillel.", + "A widow is paid back [her kethubah] from the property of orphans only by taking an oath. [When the court] refrained from imposing an oath on her, Rabban Gamaliel the Elder established that she could take any vow which the orphans wanted and collect her kethubah. We learned this law in Ketuboth 9:7-8. If a widow wants to collect her ketubah money from her husband’s orphans, she must take an oath that she has not already collected. In our mishnah we learn that at some point courts began to refrain from imposing an oath upon her, for fear that she would swear falsely. It is not that she would lie but that she would think that the money she had collected from her husband’s estate was not really her ketubah but payment for helping take care of her husband’s children. If the court would not impose an oath upon her then she could not collect the ketubah and she would be left without any money. In order to fix this problem the rabbis said that the widow could circumvent the court by taking any vow that the orphans so choose. The vow would be something like, “Let such and such an object become forbidden to me if I have already collected my ketubah.” This change in the law also kept the court from being involved in potentially false oaths.", + "Witnesses sign their names on a get because of tikkun olam. According to the letter of the law (contrasted with “takkanot”), a get is valid even if the witnesses had not signed on it. As long as they saw that it was written by the directive of the husband and given to the wife, the get is valid. However, without witnesses written on the get it will be more difficult to validate. Therefore the rabbis established that the get should be signed. We can see that the “tikkun olam” here was done in order to make it easier to validate a get, something that would have been in the best interests of the woman.", + "Hillel instituted the prosbul because of tikkun olam. The third takkanah of our mishnah is the famous takkanah of the prozbul. I shall explain this takkanah briefly. According to the Torah all debts are remitted in the seventh year. While this may be thought of as a benefit for the borrower (and in a perfect society perhaps it would be), in reality it could work against him. If lenders see that their loans will be erased in the seventh year they might not lend money, thereby making it difficult for those in need to take out loans. In order to remedy this problem Hillel established that a creditor could write out a document through which he transmits all debts to the court. According to the rabbis’ interpretation of the Torah, debts to the court are not remitted in the seventh year. In this way the creditor’s loans are not erased and the interests of those who need to borrow money (i.e. farmers) are also served." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThese two mishnayoth discuss the emancipation of slaves.", + "A [non-Jewish] slave [of a Jew] was taken captive and then ransomed [by a third party]: If [he is ransomed] to be a slave he goes back to slavery, If [he is ransomed] as a free man he does not go back to slavery. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: in either case he goes back to slavery. If a non-Jewish slave is taken captive and held for ransom and then his ransom is paid, according to the first opinion in the mishnah his return to slavery depends upon the intent of the one who paid his ransom. Since the original master didn’t offer up the ransom himself, he loses the ability to decide whether the slave remains a slave. According to another source, if the person who paid the ransom decides that he should remain a slave to his former master, the master must pay back the ransom money. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel holds that in any case the slave returns to his previous owner. The Yerushalmi explains that this is in order to prevent the slave from running away. Another explanation is that the first opinion in the mishnah holds that there is no commandment to redeem slaves. Therefore, by paying his ransom the redeemer has in essence purchased the slave and may do with him as he wishes. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel holds that there is a commandment to redeem slaves owned by Jews. Since the redeemer fulfilled a commandment he did not acquire the slave and the slave returns to his owner. We should note that there are several other explanations of this mishnah.", + "If a man makes his slave a pledge [for a debt] to another man and then he emancipates him, according to the “letter of the law” the slave is not liable to do anything. But because of tikkun olam we force his [second] master to emancipate him and he [the slave] writes a document for his purchase price. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says that the slave does not write the document but rather the one who emancipates him. In this case Reuven loans Shimon money, and as a pledge (like pawning) for his loan, Reuven takes Shimon’s slave. Shimon still owns the slave and therefore can free the slave despite the loan. In such a case, according to the letter of the law the slave is totally free and need not do anything. However, to protect the slave from an angry Reuven, the court forces Reuven to write out an emancipation document, as if he too has freed the slave. The slave then writes out a document stating how much he is worth, and with this document Reuven can try to recover his loan from Shimon. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says that the original owner (Shimon) writes out the document for he is the one who damaged the lender’s lien on his assets by freeing the pledged slave. If the debtor writes the document, the creditor is more likely to recoup his loss." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with a person who is half a slave and half free. This could happen if he was owned jointly by two masters and one of his masters freed him but not the other.", + "One who is half a slave and half free works for his master one day and for himself one day, the words of Beth Hillel. Beth Hillel seems to make a reasonable suggestion for what to do in this situation. The half-slave splits his time between working for his master and working for himself.", + "Beth Shammai said to them: you have set things right for the master but you have not set things right for the slave. He cannot marry a female slave because he is already half free, and he cannot marry a free woman because he is half a slave. Shall he then decease [from having children]? But wasn’t the world only made to be populated, as it says, “He did not create it as a waste, he formed it to be inhabited” (Isaiah 45:18)? Rather because of tikkun olam we compel his master to emancipate him and he writes a document for half his purchase price. Beth Shammai responds in what is in my opinion one of the more remarkable statements in the Mishnah. Beth Hillel’s solution for the half slave is beneficial to his master but leaves the half slave in an untenable position. Slaves and free people cannot marry. Since this person is a half slave, he can marry neither a slave nor a free woman. However, the commandment of having children “be fruitful and multiply” applies to everyone, even slaves and half slaves. The halakhah cannot allow a situation where a person has no one to marry. The world, after all, was formed by God for it to be inhabited, and not for it to lay desolate of human beings. Therefore, because of tikkun olam, his master is forced to free him, thereby allowing him to marry a free woman. The slave merely writes a document for half of his value and owes that amount to the owner.", + "Beth Hillel retracted [their opinion and] ruled like Beth Shammai. Indeed, Beth Shammai’s argument was so compelling that Beth Hillel changed their opinion and ruled like Beth Shammai." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThere are four sections to our mishnah. The first deals with selling slaves to Gentiles or to an owner who lives outside the land of Israel. The last three clauses deal with redeeming captives or sacred objects taken captive.\nUnfortunately, I should note that as I write these lines (many months before you read them) the issue of captives and the price we pay to redeem them is terribly relevant, both in Israel and in the entire world. Muslim extremists are regularly taking captives (often innocent bystanders and not soldiers) and threatening them with beheading in order to force the political hands of countries with whom they are at war. In Israel a hotly debated topic is whether to exchange live prisoners for the bodies of Israeli soldiers killed in battle or even for knowledge of the whereabouts of their bodies. While the mishnah seems to have simple answers for the question of how to deal with these situations, we should note that real life situations are complex, involve people’s families and political forces that differ from situation to situation. One thing which I think all can agree upon is to pray that our leaders have the wisdom to deal with these situations as best as possible, to when possible redeem captured soldiers, journalists and others, to prevent others from being taken captive in the future, and to put a stop to the terrible people who commit these crimes.", + "If a man sells his slave to a Gentile or [to someone living] outside the land [of Israel] the slave goes free. According to halakhah, a slave owned by a Jew is obligated to observe most of the commandments. If a slave-owner sells a slave to a non-Jew he has put a person obligated in the commandments into a position where he will not be able to observe the commandments. Therefore, the halakhah demands that such a slave go free. Whether or not the non-Jew will observe the halakhah is a different question. The mishnah seems to be presuming a situation of Jewish political sovereignty. Secondly, we learned in Ketuboth 13:11 that a husband cannot force his wife to leave the land of Israel (neither can a wife force her husband). Here we see that a master cannot force even his slave to be sold to someone living outside of the land.", + "Captives should not be redeemed for more than their value, because of tikkun olam. Redeeming captives for more than their price will obviously encourage captors to continue to take and ransom innocent people and to charge exorbitant prices for their return. Therefore this practice is forbidden. Note that the rabbis do not forbid redeeming captives and paying ransoms, but those ransoms must not be exorbitant. It seems to me that the rabbis are searching for the middle road, somewhere between respect for the life of the person taken captive and fear that paying a ransom will encourage further capturing.", + "Captives should not be helped to escape, because of tikkun olam. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says [that the reason is] to prevent the ill-treatment of fellow captives. According to the first opinion, rescuing captives, while effective in the present, may encourage future captors to take more drastic measures to keep their captives under lock. Saving one person now may cause many others in the future to be treated in a very harsh manner. Therefore, they should not be rescued. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says we are not concerned about future captives but rather about those currently being held. If we rescue some captives, those that remain in captivity will be ill-treated, and perhaps even killed. However, if there are no other captives and we can successfully rescue all those that are currently under captivity, we should make such an attempt. Again, we should note exactly what the rabbis were trying to accomplish the safe return of current captives while at the same time the prevention of harm to future captives. While their means may not be directly applicable today, their goals seem to me to be the same as ours should be.", + "Torah scrolls of the law, tefillin and mezuzoth are not bought from Gentiles at more than their value, because of tikkun olam. Evidently, Gentiles knew well what was valuable to Jews. From the mishnah it seems that they would capture religious items and ransom them back. Again, the mishnah forbids paying more than they are worth. At least with things it is easier to establish a value than with human beings. After all, how much is a human being worth." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with a man who divorces his wife either because a rumor went out that she had committed adultery or because of a vow that she took.", + "If a man divorces his wife because of ill-repute, he cannot remarry her. If a man divorces his wife because he believes that she committed adultery he may not remarry her. The fear is that after he divorces her he may find out that the rumor was false. When he discovers that the rumor was false he may regret divorcing her and say, “Had I known that the rumor was false, I would never have divorced her.” Since the divorce was based on a false assumption, the get is invalidated and any children which she had from a subsequent marriage are considered mamzerim. To prevent this problematic situation (in other words for tikkun olam), when the husband divorces they say to him that he must know that his divorce is final and irrevocable, even if the rumor for which he divorces her proves to be false. In this way, he will in his mind divorce her completely and he cannot later claim that the divorce was mistaken.", + "If because of a vow, he cannot remarry her. The same holds true for a husband who divorces his wife because she took a vow that disrupted their marriage in some way. In such a case he may later discover that he could have had the vow released and then regret divorcing her, thereby annulling the get. To prevent this he is told that if he divorces her because of a vow, he can never remarry her.", + "Rabbi Judah says: [if he divorces her] for vows which she made in front of many people, he may not remarry her, but if for vows which she did not make in front of many people, he may remarry her. The following sages argue over which types of vows the previous section was referring to. According to Rabbi Judah, if the vow was public he cannot remarry her, but if the vow was not public he may remarry her. The Talmud explains that Rabbi Judah believes that the rule husbands may not remarry their wives if they divorced them because of a rumor of adultery or because of a vow is a punishment for the wife. Therefore, if she vows privately such that others don’t know that she took a vow, then she is not punished and her husband may remarry her.", + "Rabbi Meir says: [if he divorces her] for a vow which requires the investigation of a sage, he may not remarry her, but if for one which does not require the investigation of a sage, he may remarry her. Rabbi Eliezer says: they only forbid that one because of that one . Rabbi Meir makes a different distinction. According to Rabbi Meir he cannot remarry her if the vow required the investigation of a sage in order to release the vow. If it did not require even the investigation of the sage for the vow to be released then it must have been a mistaken vow. Such a vow can obviously be released and everyone should know this. Therefore, he cannot later claim, “Had I known that the vow could be released I would not have divorced her.” Since he cannot make this claim, we do not need to prevent him from remarrying her. Rabbi Elazar reasons completely opposite. The reason that they made it forbidden for him to remarry her for a vow that does require the investigation of a sage is because he may regret divorcing her for making a vow that does not require the investigation of a sage.", + "Rabbi Yose son of Rabbi Judah said: a case happened in Sidon of a man who said to his wife, “Konam, if I do not divorce you”, and he did divorce her, and the Sages permitted him to remarry her because of tikkun olam. The final section deals with a case where a husband vowed to divorce his wife. In this case, we might have thought that in order to encourage men not to hastily vow to divorce their wives the law would have been that if he does so he cannot remarry her. However, the Sages ruled that he can nevertheless remarry her. The only reason that in other cases they prohibited him from remarrying her was lest he state “Had I known that the vow could be broken I would not have divorced her.” This prohibition was made because of tikkun olam protecting the wife from a husband who makes such a statement. However, if the husband vows there is no reason to prevent him from remarrying her." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses a husband who divorces his wife because she turns out to be an “aylonit.” An aylonit is a female who does not develop physical signs of sexual maturity, but is clearly a female. By definition, she cannot have children. If later on she has children then it turns out that she is not an aylonit.", + "A man divorces his wife because she is an aylonit: Rabbi Judah says he may not remarry her, But the sages say that he may remarry her. The reason that Rabbi Judah says that he may not remarry a wife that he divorced because she was an “aylonit” is similar to the reasons we learned in yesterday’s mishnah why men who divorce for certain reasons may not remarry their wives. If he divorces her because she is an “aylonit” and then she remarries and has children from her next husband the first husband might say, “Had I known that she was not an aylonit, I would not have divorced her.” This statement would annul the divorce and her children would become mamzerim. To prevent this, Rabbi Judah rules that we tell him when he divorces her that he will never be able to remarry her, and in that way he will divorce her with complete conviction. However, in this case the Sages do not agree, for they are not concerned lest such a scenario arise. Perhaps they thought it unlikely for a woman who was assumed to be an aylonit to later have children.", + "She marries someone else and has children from him and then demands her ketubah settlement [from her first husband]: Rabbi Judah said, they say to her, “Your silence is better than your speaking.” When a woman is divorced because she is an aylonit, her husband does not have to pay her ketubah (see Ketuboth 11:6). When this woman who was divorced because she was thought to be an aylonit has children in her subsequent marriage, it turns out that she wasn’t really an aylonit. Hence she could make a valid claim that her first husband owes her a ketubah. However, Rabbi Judah says that she would do better not to make such a claim, for if she does her husband might attempt to annul the divorce and thereby make her children mamzerim and forbid her to her new husband because she is an adulteress (albeit an unintentional one.)" + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe two sections of this mishnah deal with a person who sold either himself, his children or his fields to a Gentile.", + "If a man sells himself and his children to a Gentile, he is not to be redeemed but his children are to be redeemed after the death of their father. If the Jewish community were to redeem a man who sold himself to a Gentile, others in the future would be encouraged to do so in order to raise money, and eventually it would become a serious financial burden. Therefore, the community is not allowed to redeem such a person. However, his children were sold through no fault of their own. In order to prevent them from being lost to the Jewish community they are redeemed after their father’s death. However, while he is still alive even they are not redeemed so that the father will not be encouraged to sell them again.", + "If a man sells his field to a Gentile, and an Israelite bought it back, he has to bring, the purchaser must bring first fruits from it, because of tikkun olam. There are two versions to this section, the one that I translated above, and another version which Rashi used. I will explain both. When a Gentile acquires land in Israel, the land still retains its holiness and therefore the first fruits (bikkurim) which grow from this land must be brought to Jerusalem, as is the rule with all first fruits. However, the person who buys the land from the Gentile might think that since the fruits grew while owned by the Gentile, he need not bring first fruits. To prevent this situation, the rabbis stated that the one who bought the land from the Gentile must bring first fruits. Note that according to this interpretation something done because of tikkun olam is also a “toraitic” law (deoraita). This is unusual and hence makes this interpretation tentative. The Talmud adds further complicated wrinkles to this mishnah to solve this problem. Rashi’s version reads, “If one sells his land to a Gentile, he must buy the first fruits and bring them.” This is easier to understand. The Gentile will obviously not do so himself and therefore if the Jew doesn’t go back and buy the first fruits, they will not be brought. Furthermore, this is a penalty on the person for selling his land to a Gentile." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah teaches what type of land must be used in order to repay debts. Its connection to “tikkun olam” is that the sages shaped some of these laws using “tikkun olam” type criteria. That is to say they tried to take into social needs when making these rules.", + "Damages are paid out of [property of] the best quality; The rule that damage payments are made out of the best of one’s land is seemingly stated in Exodus 22:4, “When a man lets his livestock loose to graze in another’s land, and so allows a field or vineyard to be grazed bare, he must repay the best of his field and the best of his vineyard.” However, there is a debate over this issue. Rabbi Akiva interpreted this to mean that the damager must pay back from the best of his (the damager’s) land and Rabbi Ishmael interpreted it to mean that the damager must pay back with land equivalent to the best of the other person’s land. If this mishnah goes according to Rabbi Ishmael than the “tikkun olam” is that although the Torah does not demand that the damager pay back from the best of his own land, the rabbis demanded that he do so in order to deter people from being negligent and causing damage. If the mishnah goes according to Rabbi Akiva, then the Torah itself ruled because of tikkun olam. Although tikkun olam usually implies a rabbinic enactment, this is not always the case.", + "A creditor pays out of land of medium quality, According to the Talmud, Torah law dictates that when a debtor collects land in payment of his debt, he collects from the debtor’s worst property. Seemingly this would be good for debtors, certainly a noble goal. The problem with this is that it might end up deterring lenders and thereby make it difficult for people to get the loans they need (especially if they are farmers.) People will be hesitant to lend money if they know that if the debtor defaults they will collect from lousy land. In order to encourage people to lend money (remember it was without interest, so lending was a form of charity), the rabbis enacted that if a debtor defaults the creditor collects from property of medium quality.", + "And a ketubah is paid out of land of the poorest quality. Rabbi Meir says that a ketubah is also paid out of medium quality land. There is a debate over what type of land a woman receives upon collecting her ketubah. Collecting a ketubah is like collecting any debt the husband (or his estate) is a debtor to the woman. Therefore Rabbi Meir holds that just as usual debts are collected from middle quality land, so too is the ketubah debt. However, the first opinion in this mishnah holds that normal debts are not totally analogous to ketubot. With regard to a normal debt, the rabbis ruled that it is collected from middle quality land in order to encourage people to loan money. No such encouragement is needed with regard to ketubot, for women will marry whether they will collect their ketubah from middle or poor quality land. Since there is no special reason that the woman should collect her ketubah from middle quality land, she collects from poor quality land, as is the Torah’s rule for all debts." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues the topic which was begun in yesterday’s mishnah which type of land is used to pay off debts.", + "Payment cannot be recovered from mortgaged property where there free property is available, even if it is only of the lowest quality. Payment can be recovered from orphans only from land of the lowest quality. As we learned yesterday, generally debts are repaid with middle quality land. When a person takes out a loan, all of his currently owned land automatically becomes collateral for the loan. If the creditor should come to collect, and the debtor only has poor quality land, but at the time of the loan he had middle quality land and subsequent to the loan he sold or gave it away, the creditor collects from the poor quality land. This is a case of conflicting values. We want the creditor to be able to collect from better property in order to encourage people to lend. However, the collection of debts from third parties is terribly disruptive to the economic system. Therefore, in order to prevent losses to the third party in other words for tikkun olam the creditor can only collect from the poor quality land in the debtor’s actual possession.", + "If a creditor is collecting from the orphan of the debtor, he can only collect from the poor quality land. Again this is because of tikkun olam and to make things easier for the orphans." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first section of this mishnah continues the topic of collecting debts from mortgaged properties. The second section deals with returning lost objects.", + "[Creditors] do not collect from mortgaged property for produce consumed, for the improvement of property, [and payment] for the maintenance of a widow and daughters, because of tikkun olam. There are three types of repayments mentioned in this section. In each of these cases when a creditor collects his debt he can only collect from unmortgaged property, meaning property that is actually in the hands of the debtor. The first category is “produce consumed.” This refers to a situation where someone illegally obtained land, for instance he stole it. He then eats the produce on the land and sells the land to another person. When the original owner comes to claim the land he extracts the land from the person who purchased it from the thief and he can extract the value of the produce from the thief himself. However, he can only exact this payment from the thief from unmortgaged property and not from property which the thief sold or gave away to others. In this same situation, the one who purchased the property from the thief and then had to restore it to its original owner collects from the thief the original purchase price. He also may collect from the thief any money he spent to improve the property, but this amount he may collect only from unmortgaged property. This is what the mishnah means by “improvement of property.” When a man dies one of the ketubah stipulations is that his widow and daughters are to be provided for from his estate until they are married. However, they are only provided for from the dead husband’s unmortgaged property. The “tikkun olam” here is that these amounts are not fixed. Therefore, one who buys from a person who might be in this situation will never know how much debt that person is really in and he won’t be able to be cautious lest he buy property that has a lien on it. To protect these purchasers, these amounts cannot be collected from them.", + "The finder of a lost article is not required to take an oath, because of tikkun olam. If a person returns a lost object to another person, and the person receiving the lost object suspects that the one returning it has kept part of the object for himself he cannot make the one returning the object take an oath that he has returned it all. If such an oath could be enforced, people might be hesitant to return lost objects, because people did not want to take oaths even if they were true. In order to encourage people to fulfill the mitzvah of returning lost objects, in other words for tikkun olam, such oaths were not enforced." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first two sections of this mishnah deal with certain responsibilities that guardians have in taking care of orphans. The final section deals with damages that are done to food or sacrifices that cannot be seen.", + "If orphans relied on a householder or if their father appointed a guardian for them, he must tithe their produce. A guardian has the responsibility to tithe the produce of orphans who are relying on him to manage their lives. This clause is here to introduce the next sections of the mishnah.", + "A guardian who was appointed by the father of the orphans is required to take an oath. [A guardian who was] appointed by the court does not need to take an oath. Abba Shaul says that the rule is the reverse. When the orphans grow up, according to the law they can make the guardian swear that he did not misappropriate any of their money (see Shevuoth 7:8). According to the first opinion in this section, the orphans have such power only when they were appointed by the father. If the court appointed the guardian, he is not liable for such an oath. This is because the court forced him to be a guardian, and he didn’t necessarily receive any satisfaction. If the halakhah were to force him to take an oath, people would refuse to become guardians. However, if the father appointed him, the guardian has the satisfaction of helping out the father who was assumedly his friend. Since he has that satisfaction, he will accept becoming a guardian even though he might eventually have to take an oath. We can see here that the “tikkun olam” is to exempt guardians from taking oaths if the oath would deter them from accepting such appointments in the first place. Abba Shaul reasons that the exact opposite is true. If the father appoints him he need not swear since he was only doing a favor for the father. According to Abba Shaul, if guardians appointed by the father were forced to swear they would not want to become guardians. However, when the court appoints someone to be a guardian he gets the added benefit of the community knowing that the court believes that he is a trustworthy man. Since he receives this added benefit, he will not refuse becoming a guardian even if it might cause him to take an oath.", + "One who renders impure [someone else’s pure food] or mixes terumah [with someone else’s non-terumah produce] or makes a libation [with someone else’s wine], if he does so inadvertently, he is exempt, but if intentionally he is liable. Priests who intentionally made someone else’s sacrifice piggul in the Temple are liable. There are three types of invisible damage mentioned in this first clause. If one causes someone else’s terumah to become impure, it has to be thrown away. If someone mixes in terumah with another person’s normal produce it must be sold to priests at the price of terumah which is lower than the price of normal produce. Finally, if someone makes an idolatrous libation with someone else’s wine, the wine must be thrown away. Similarly, if one mixes already libated wine with non-libated wine it must all be thrown away. In all of these cases the damage is done but the object has not physically changed at all. The bottom line halakhah holds that damage that cannot be seen is not considered damage. Therefore, if any of these things were done intentionally, the damager need not make restitution. However, had he done so intentionally he must pay because of “tikkun olam” to prevent people from intentionally damaging other’s property. “Piggul” is a sacrifice offered by a priest who has intends to eat it at a time when that sacrifice may no longer be eaten. “Piggul” cannot be put onto the altar and it does not bring about the intended result of a sacrifice (for instance atonement). This is again a case of invisible damage, and as above, if a priest intentionally causes such damage he is liable." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis same exact mishnah appears in Eduyoth 7:9. It is brought here because it contains two “takkanot” (in sections three and four).", + "Rabbi Nehunia ben Gudgada testified concerning a deaf-mute whose father had given her in marriage, that she could be sent away with a bill of divorcement; As we have learned in other places, the Rabbis considered a deaf-mute to lack intelligence, because in their time the deaf-mute had little way of communicating with the outside world. Usually a person who lacks intelligence, such a deaf-mute, minor or insane person, cannot enter into legally binding contracts, because they don’t understand their ramifications. However, as Rabbi Nehunia testifies, a deaf-mute can be divorced. (She was married off by her father). The reason is that divorce is not dependent upon the woman’s acquiescence; she can be divorced against her will. Since her will is irrelevant, even one who lacks awareness can be divorced. Although this might sound harsh, as if the Rabbis are going out of their way to allow a deaf-mute to be divorced, it may have also worked in her benefit. If men couldn’t divorce deaf-mutes, perhaps they might refrain from marrying them. By allowing a “way out” the Rabbis might actually be encouraging their marriage.", + "And concerning a minor, daughter of an Israelite who married a priest, that she could eat terumah, and if she died her husband inherited from her; This section deals with an orphaned minor girl of a non-priestly, Israelite family, who marries a priest. Generally this type of marriage is considered to be valid only rabbinically (derabanan) and not valid through Torah law (deoraita). Deoraita a minor can only be married off by her father. Only when she reaches majority she can marry herself off without her father’s aid. Despite the fact that this is really only a “derabanan” marriage, Rabbi Nehunya testifies that it is sufficient for her to be allowed to eat terumah and for her husband to inherit her, should she die. Even though these are usually rights only given to a valid “deoraita” marriage, Rabbi Nehunya testifies that the husband does receive these rights.", + "And concerning a stolen beam that had been built into a palace, that it might be restored by the payment of its value, because of the enactment to encourage repentance. Usually one who steals an item must return the actual stolen item, as long as the item still exists. If one stole a beam and then used it in the foundation of a castle, legally he is bound to take down the castle and return the beam. Obviously this will discourage people from admitting that they stole. This admission is an essential part of making atonement for their crime. To allow people to more easily make atonement, the robber is allowed to pay back the value of the beam.", + "And concerning a sin-offering that had been stolen, and this was not known to many, that it caused atonement because of the welfare of the altar. If it were forbidden to use animals that might have been stolen as sacrifices, the priests would never sacrifice an animal, lest it be stolen. Therefore, the mishnah rules that stolen animals can be used as sin-offerings, and that they do procure atonement for the one bringing them, as long as the theft is not publicly known. This mishnah is not permission to steal an animal and bring it as a sacrifice. Rather it is permission to use an animal without being concerned that it is stolen property. The mishnah teaches that if it was stolen property and the person who brought it did not know that it was stolen, that it is effective in bringing atonement." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with “sicaricon”, which refers to the illegal, governmental expropriation of land from its rightful owners. Specifically we are talking about land taken from Jews by Romans during the Second Temple and mishnaic periods. The word “sicaricon” can refer to either the Roman who expropriated the property (in this case I shall capitalize the word); the rule governing land taken in such a faction; a person who came into land by buying it from a sicaricon.", + "There was no sicaricon in Judea for those killed in war. During the Great Revolt from 67-70 C.E. which culminated in the destruction of the Temple, the rule of sicaricon was not applied. Practically what this meant was that land expropriated by the Romans was considered to legally belong to the Romans. Therefore, a Jew who subsequently bought the land did not need to return anything to the original owner. This was to encourage people to buy back the land in order that it should not remain Roman in perpetuity.", + "After the war’s slaughter ended there is sicaricon there. How so? If a man buys a field from the Sicaricon and then buys it again from the original owner, his purchase is void, but if he buys it first from the original owner and then from the sicaricon it is valid. After the war the rule of sicaricon was enforced. What this meant was that a Jew who bought the land from the Roman and then went and asked to buy the land from the Sicaricon had not legally acquired the land. This is because we can assume that the original owner only agreed to sell the land out of fear were he not to sell the land the Romans who had already sold it might lose their sale. However, if the purchaser acquired it first from the original owner and then from the Sicaricon the sale is valid.", + "If a man buys [a piece of a married woman’s property] from the husband and then buys it from the wife, the purchase is void, but if he buys it first from the wife and then from the husband it is valid. This section does not have to do with the rules of sicaricon and is brought here because of its similarity to the previous section. When a man marries a woman the woman retains ownership over her property but her husband has the right to use the property. Neither of them may sell the property without the other’s permission. If someone buys the property first from the husband and then from the woman (who agrees), the sale is not valid. The problem is that the woman may have sold under duress, being pressured by her husband. However, if he buys from the woman first, we can assume that the woman sold of her own free will. If the husband also agrees to the sale, the sale is valid.", + "This was [the ruling] of the first mishnah. The court that came after them said if a man buys property from the Sicaricon he had to give the original owner a quarter [of the value]. When is this so? When the original owners cannot buy it themselves, but if they can they have preemption over everyone else. The problem with this system may have been that people would have been afraid to buy land from the Sicaricon. This might have left large pieces of Jewish land in Roman control. Therefore, a later court made a new rule. If a person buys from a Sicaricon, he must give one quarter of the sale price to the original owners. This way people would buy the land and the original owners would get at least some of their money back. However, if the original owners have the money to buy back their land, they still have the first shot at doing so.", + "Rabbi assembled a court and they decided by vote that if the property had been in the hands of the Sicaricon twelve months, whoever purchased it first acquired the title, but he had to give a quarter [of the price] to the original owner. Rabbi Judah Hanasi and his court enacted a further change in this law. If the land remained with the Sicaricon 12 months, and it didn’t look like anyone was going to buy it, the first person to purchase it has legally acquired it. In other words, a purchaser need not worry that the original owners would preempt him. However, the purchaser must still pay compensation to the original owners." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah has to do with transactions done by two categories of people considered to legally lack “da’at”, intelligence minors and deaf-mutes. As we see from this mishnah, the rabbis seem well aware that well deaf-mutes had great difficulties communicating, they nevertheless could make their wishes known.", + "A deaf-mute can gesture and be gestured at [and thereby conduct transactions]. Ben Betera says that he may make lip-motions, if the transaction is of movable property. If a deaf-mute wishes to sell or purchase an object he may do so by gesturing or by being gestured at. People who can speak must verbalize their commands. Since this is impossible for a deaf-mute, gestures are sufficient. Ben Betera is more lenient and even allows even lip-motions, as long as the transaction is only with movable property, i.e. not land. To buy or sell land he would need to make a full gesture.", + "The purchase or sale done by young children in movable property is valid. Young children can sell or purchase movable property. The Talmud explains that this is a form of “tikkun olam”. If children could not sell or buy things they would not be able to earn their keep, and until modern times children had to work to help support their families (in good situations) or support themselves (in much worse situations)." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah teaches rules that were made in order to keep peace between people. These “ways of peace” are a subcategory of “tikkun olam”. Whereas many of the other enactments made because of “tikkun olam” had a strong economic element, these rules are more concerned with interpersonal relations.", + "These were the rules they laid down because of the ways of peace:
A priest is called up first to read the Torah and after him a Levite and then an Israelite, because of the ways of peace. The custom of the Kohen receiving the first aliyah to the Torah and the Levite the second and only then the rest of the congregation was enacted because of the ways of peace. [Quite frankly, it seems that this hasn’t worked all that well and synagogue-goers will just find something else to argue about but that’s another story.]", + "An “eruv” is placed in the room where it has always been placed, because of the ways of peace. An “eruv” is made by enclosing an area (done today with twine or something similar) and by putting a symbolically communal meal in one house in the area. This is a legal fiction to turn a large community into a “home” so that people can carry on Shabbat within this area. The mishnah teaches that this meal is put in the same house every week. If it were to move around from week to week people might argue where it should be put. Alternatively, people might not trust that the eruv was set properly because they didn’t know where it is. Therefore, it is left in the same house week after week.", + "The cistern which is nearest to the channel is filled first, because of the ways of peace. To irrigate cisterns channels were made from the river. The mishnah teaches that the first cistern on the channel is allowed to fill up first and the other cistern owners cannot tell the owner of the closest cistern that he should periodically close his up so that they can fill up first. Rather the cisterns are always filled up in the same order to avoid fights.", + "[Taking of] beasts, birds and fishes from traps [set by others] is robbery, because of the ways of peace. Rabbi Yose says that it is actual robbery. The mishnah now begins with a list of three things the taking of which is not considered to be true robbery. Rather, taking these things is prohibited only because of the “ways of peace”. In each of these cases, Rabbi Yose holds that it is prohibited not because of the “ways of peace” but because taking them is truly robbery as defined by the Torah. The first case is taking animals from traps. Since these animals have not yet come into the physical possession of the trap-setters, taking from them is not technically robbery. However, it is still prohibited because of the “ways of peace.” Rabbi Yose holds that although they have not yet come into the physical possession of the trap-setters, the trap-setters have acquired them and therefore taking them is full “robbery.”", + "[Taking away] anything found by a deaf-mute, an idiot or a minor is robbery, because of the ways of peace. Rabbi Yose says that it is actual robbery. According to the first opinion, a deaf-mute, imbecile or child do not legally acquire things that they find. Therefore, technically speaking when one takes something that they found away from them, he is not robbing them. However, for many obvious reasons, this is prohibited because of “the ways of peace.” Again, Rabbi Yose considers this to be full robbery.", + "If a poor man strikes [down olives] on top of an olive tree, [taking the fruit] that is beneath him is robbery. Rabbi Yose says that it is actual robbery. There are three things that a poor person can take 1) the corners of the field; 2) things which the harvester forgot to take; 3) grain that fell out of the harvesters’ hands. In our mishnah a poor person is on top of an olive tree, beating the tree so that the olives fall below so that he can collect them. Technically, the olives which fall below are not his until he gathers them into his possession. Therefore, if someone else takes them before he gathers them he has not technically stolen them. However, because of “the ways of peace” it is forbidden. Again, Rabbi Yose holds that this is “full robbery.”", + "Poor Gentiles are not prevented from gathering gleanings, forgotten sheaves, and the corners of the field, because of the ways of peace. The agricultural products left in the field are meant to be for poor Jews. However, in the interest of peace Jews are supposed to allow non-Jews to take them as well. I should note that this obviously is an important issue for modern Jews, both in the Diaspora and in Israel." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe final mishnah of chapter five completes the examples of enactments made because “of the ways of peace.”\nThis mishnah demonstrates that in the Second Temple period Jews of different levels religiosity lived in the same communities and shared their things with one another. While people who were more observant of certain ritual requirements had to be careful in certain areas, they did not cease living together.", + "A woman may lend to another woman who is suspected of not observing the sabbatical year a fan or a sieve or a handmill or a stove, but she should not sift or grind with her. It is forbidden to keep sabbatical year produce in one’s house after it no longer exists in the field. The woman suspected of not observing the sabbatical year may have such produce in her house. Nevertheless, another woman may still lend various vessels, even though those vessels will used to commit transgressions. However, the woman should not physically help her neighbor commit a transgression.", + "The wife of a “haver” may lend to the wife of an “am ha-aretz” a fan or a sieve and may winnow and grind and sift with her, but once she has poured water over the flour she should not touch anything with her, because we do not assist those who commit a transgression. A “haver”, literally friend, or perhaps better translated as “member”, is one who is careful about purity laws and about tithing. An “am ha-aretz” an ignoramus is not careful about such laws. The wife of the “haver” may work with grain with the “am ha-aretz” even though the latter is impure. However, once the flour has become wet, it is now susceptible to impurity. At this point since we are discussing flour that belongs to an am haaretz, terumah and tithes have assumedly not been taken out of the flour. Therefore the am-ha-aretz will be rendering the terumah impure and this is forbidden. Since this is forbidden, the wife of the haver may not help her.", + "All these rules were only said because of the ways of peace. The permissions granted in the first two sections were because of “the ways of peace.” Communities of people with varying degrees of religiosity need to learn to be able to live together.", + "Gentiles may be wished luck in the Sabbatical year but not Israelites and greeting may be given to them, because of the ways of peace. It is forbidden to work fields during the Sabbatical year. If Gentiles own a field in the land of Israel one may wish them luck in their endeavors, even though the field should not be worked. However, one shouldn’t wish luck to Jews who are engaging in a prohibited activity. One may also greet a Gentile in order to increase peace between Jews and Gentiles. It seems that there is an underlying fear in this section. If Jews do not wish Gentiles luck, or greet them properly, they may cause danger to the Jewish community. Alternatively, one could see a more positive message here. It is important for Jews and Gentiles to get along and therefore, to increase peace, Jews should wish them well." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nAfter a two chapter digression, the Mishnah returns to the main topic of the tractate divorce law. Most of this chapter deals with men and women appointing agents to deliver or to receive the get. As we shall see, a husband can tell the agent to bring the get and a woman may make an agent to receive or bring a get. The difference between the two has to do with when the woman is considered to be divorced and up until what point the husband may change his mind.", + "If a man says, “Receive this get on behalf of my wife”, or, “Carry this get to my wife”, if he desires to retract [before the wife receives it] he may do so. A man can appoint an agent to bring a get to his wife, but he cannot appoint an agent to accept the get on behalf of his wife. A agent who is empowered to legally accept the get can only be appointed by the wife, since she is the one who has to receive the get in order for it to be valid. Therefore, it does not matter what language the husband uses, when he sends an agent with a get she is not divorced until she receives the get. Even if he says to the agent, “Receive this get…”, the get is not valid until the agent hands it over to the woman. Therefore, the husband may change his mind and annul the get until she actually receives it.", + "If a woman says, “Receive the get on my behalf”, [and he does so], if [the husband] wants to retract he may not do so. In contrast, a woman has the right to appoint an agent to receive a get on her behalf. Once this agent has received the get, the woman is fully divorced. If after giving it to an agent empowered to receive the get the husband wishes to retract, he may not do so.", + "Therefore if the husband said to him, “I do not want you to receive it on her behalf, but rather carry it and give it to her”, then if he wishes to retract he may do so. This section teaches that the husband may change the appointment of the agent from one of “receiving” to one of “carrying.” The husband authorizes the agent to bring the get to the woman but not to receive it on her behalf. The woman is divorced only when she receives the get and therefore the husband may retract until that moment.", + "Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: even if the wife says “Take for me”, [and he does so] the husband may not retract. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel deals with a woman who says, “Take for me…” instead of “Carry to me…” or “Receive for me…” He rules that “Take for me” is equivalent to “Receive for me” and therefore the woman is divorced as soon as the agent receives the get; after that point the husband may no longer retract." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first part of this mishnah continues to discuss a woman’s appointing an agent to receive her get. The second part deals with the divorce of a betrothed girl who has not yet reached majority age.", + "A woman who said [to an agent], “Receive my get for me” requires two sets of witnesses, two to say, “In our presence she told him”, and two to say, “In our presence he received [the get] and tore it”. Even if the first set are the same [witnesses] as the latter set or if there was one in the first set and one in the second, and one joined with them [for both testimonies]. If a woman appointed an agent to receive her get she will need two sets of witnesses to execute her divorce, one to witness her appointment of the agent and the second to witness the agent receive the get. However, there can be full or partial overlap between the two sets.", + "If a young girl is betrothed, both she and her father may receive her get. Rabbi Judah said that two [different] hands cannot take possession as one. Rather her father alone may receive her get. A young girl (defined as being between the ages of 12 and 12 1/2) who is betrothed is in an “in-between” situation. On the one hand, she is neither fully married nor mature and hence her father retains some control over her. However, she is no longer a minor and therefore has some of her own legal rights. Were she being divorced after being married or having reached maturity, she alone would have the legal right to receive her get. However, in this “in-between” situation, the first opinion in the mishnah rules that either she or her father can receive her get. Rabbi Judah disagrees. It would be legally too ambiguous for both to be able to receive the get. Therefore, only her father may receive the get.", + "One who is not able to keep her get is not capable of being divorced. This section refers to a minor who is not yet capable of receiving her get. At such a young age she cannot be divorced, even if her father were to receive the get. Since she is too young to even know the meaning of being divorced, the husband must wait until she is of majority age to divorce her. [I should note that the husband is not a particularly salutary fellow (to say the least). We should remember that we are dealing with legal rights not with what seems to be ethically acceptable.]" + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first part of this mishnah deals with a minor girl’s legal ability to receive a get and to be divorced. The second section deals with instructions that a wife or husband might give to an agent who is to bring or receive the get and the implications that those instructions can have on the validity of the get.", + "If a young girl says, “Receive my get for me”, it is not a get until the get reaches her hand. Therefore, if [the husband] wishes to retract, he may retract, since a minor cannot appoint an agent. But if her father said to him, “Go and receive a get for my daughter”, the husband may not retract. A minor may be divorced since divorce does not require her consent, consent which she would statutorily lack. However, she cannot appoint an agent since minors do not have such legal authority. Hence, even if she says “Receive my get for me”, the agent is not authorized to receive it on her behalf. She is not divorced until the get reaches her hand. In such a case the husband is able to retract until she receives the get. In contrast, the father has the ability to appoint an agent to act on his daughter’s behalf, as long as she is still a minor and was never fully married. This mishnah refers to a case where she was only betrothed (see yesterday’s mishnah). If the father appoints an agent to receive the get on behalf of his daughter, she is divorced from the moment the agent receives the get. If she had been fully married, the father may no longer receive her get or appoint an agent to do so.", + "If a man says, “Give this get to my wife in such-and-such a place” and he gives it to her in another place, [the get is] invalid. [If he says,] “She is in such-and-such a place”, and he gives it to her in another place, [it is] valid. In the following two sections, a husband or a wife appoints an agent and gives the agent instructions as to where to deliver/receive the get. If the husband tells the agent to give his wife the get in a certain place, she is not divorced if the agent gives the get to her in another place. In such a case we can assume that the husband wanted the get delivered specifically in that place. However, if the husband merely tells the agent where to find his wife, the husband does not necessarily care if she is really somewhere else. He was only helping the agent locate her. Therefore the get is valid no matter where the gives it to her.", + "If a woman says, “Receive my get in such-and-such a place” and he receives it for her in another place, [it is] invalid. Rabbi Elazar says it valid. [If she says,] “Bring me my get from such-and-such a place” and he brings it from somewhere else, [it is] valid. The same is true if the woman tells her agent to receive the get in a certain place. The get is not valid unless he receives it in that place. However, in this case Rabbi Elazar disagrees. He holds that since the woman can be divorced without her consent, even when she said, “Receive it for me in such-and-such a place” she only meant to tell the agent where her husband was. If she appoints an agent to bring her a get and not to receive it on her behalf, she doesn’t care where he gets the document. Even if she tells him to bring it from a certain place and he brings it from somewhere else, she is divorced." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with a woman married to a priest. As long as she is married she may eat terumah. However, once she is divorced she loses this right. The mishnah deals with such a woman who appoints an agent to receive or bring her get.", + "[If a woman says to an agent], “Bring me my get”, she may eat terumah until the get reaches her hand. Since she appointed the agent to bring her the get, she is not divorced until she actually receives the get. She may continue to eat terumah until this point.", + "[If she says,] “Receive for me my get”, she is forbidden to eat terumah immediately. [If she says,] “Receive for me my get in such-and-such a place”, she can eat terumah until the get reaches that place. However, if she appoints an agent to receive the get, she must cease eating terumah immediately. Since the agent might receive the get on her behalf at any moment, we must be concerned lest she is divorced immediately and hence she immediately loses her right to eat terumah.", + "Rabbi Elazar says that she is forbidden immediately. If she tells the agent to receive the get in a certain place, then according to the first opinion she is not divorced unless the agent receives the get at that place. Hence she may estimate how long it will take the agent to arrive at that place and she may continue to eat terumah until that point. However, Rabbi Elazar disagrees. Since, as we learned yesterday, he holds that the agent can validly receive the get anywhere, she can be divorced immediately. Hence he holds that also in this situation she must cease eating terumah immediately." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with the specific words that a husband must state to a scribe or other agents in order for them to be empowered to write a get and give it to his wife.\nAs a general rule, the husband must use language that clearly implies that he intends to divorce his wife, and not just write a get which he may or may not want to use. He must instruct his agent to write the get and to give it to her. However, there are extenuating circumstances where instructions to write the get are sufficient to empower the agent to also deliver the get.", + "If a man says, “Write a get and give it to my wife”, [or] “Divorce her”, [or] “Write a letter and give it to her”, then they should write it and give it to her. The language which the husband employs in this section is sufficiently clear and precise that the agents are empowered to write out a get on the husband’s behalf and to give it to the woman.", + "If he said, “Release her”, [or] “Provide for her”, [or] “Do for her as the law dictates”, [or] “Do the proper thing for her”, he has not said anything. The language in this section is too ambiguous and although it may imply that he wishes to divorce his wife, it is not certain that that is his intention. Hence, an agent who hears the husband make one of these statements is not empowered to write a get and deliver it to his wife.", + "Originally they said that if a man was being led out to execution and said, “Write a get for my wife”, they may write a get and give [it to her]. Later they said, even if he were leaving for a sea voyage or for a caravan journey. Rabbi Shimon Shezuri says: even if he were dangerously ill. Usually a husband must state that he wishes the get to be written and give to the woman. However, in extenuating circumstances where the husband seems to have been facing immanent death, it is highly unlikely that when he instructed someone to write a get, he wanted the get to be written but not given to his wife. After all, why else would he want a get at this point? Therefore, one who hears the husband says “Write a get for my wife” may write it and also give it to her. At first the category of people facing immanent death included only a person being led out to execution. Later, they expanded the category to include one leaving for a sea voyage or a caravan journey. These men would have wanted to write out a get that would go into effect should they not return, not an unlikely scenario. This would prevent their wives from being left as “agunot” a woman who doesn’t know if her husband is alive or dead and therefore cannot remarry. Rabbi Shimon Shezuri added that an agent who hears such a statement from a dangerously ill person may also write and give the get. This man may want to divorce his wife in order to exempt her from levirate marriage (if he was to do childless and with a brother she would have to undergo yibbum or halitzah). Again, it is very unlikely that a dying man would want to write a get but not give it to his wife, and therefore we are not concerned with such a possibility. " + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to discuss cases in which a man instructed someone to write a get for his wife, but did not specify that he was also to give it to her.", + "If a man had been thrown into a pit and cried out, “Whoever hears his voice should write a get for his wife”, those who hear should write a get and give it to her. The man in this case clearly fears that he will die in the pit leaving his wife subject to levirate marriage. As in the cases in yesterday’s mishnah, there is again no reason that he would want to write a get but not have it given to his wife. Therefore, someone who hears him scream out his name and his wife’s name may write out the get and give it to his wife. Note that the person screaming is referring to himself in the third person. This way people hear him state his name.", + "If a healthy man says, “Write a get for my wife”, his intention is merely to play with her. However, one who hears a healthy man say to write a get but not say to give the get is not allowed to write out the get. The fear is that the husband wants to use the get only to “play with his wife”, which I take to mean mentally cause her pain. He wants to use the get as a threat (alternatively if she wants to be divorced, perhaps it is a tease). Therefore, not only should those who hear these instructions not give her the get, they shouldn’t even write one out. Note that what the mishnah probably wishes to avoid is gittin that are written out but not intended to be given.", + "It once happened that a man in good health said, “Write a get for my wife”, and then went up on to a roof and fell and died, and Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel said that the Sages said: if he had thrown himself down this is a get, but if the wind had blown him over it was not a get. In this case a seemingly healthy person told someone to write out a get. Although the person should not have written the get and given it to his wife, he did so anyway. If afterwards, the husband intentionally commits suicide, this proves that he was sick at the time he instructed someone to write the get. Since he was about to die, he definitely intended to divorce his wife and not “to play with her.” However, if the wind pushed him off the roof it is not suicide, he was not sick and therefore the get is invalid. In such a case this woman is a widow and not a divorcee, and may be subject to levirate marriage." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe final mishnah of chapter six teaches that if the husband made his agents into a court (consisting of three), they may appoint a scribe to write the get. However, if he did not constitute a court to take care of the get, then his agents must write the get themselves. Assumedly this would have been difficult, if not nearly impossible since writing divorce documents is complicated and is usually the work of a professional.\nThe final section teaches that sometimes all those who hear the instructions to write a get must sign the get, and sometimes only some must sign the get. It depends on the precise words of the husband.", + "If a man said to two people, “Give a get to my wife”, or to three people, “Write a get and give it to my wife”, they must write it and give it. In the first case, the husband’s agents themselves must write the get and give it to his wife, since two people cannot constitute a court. [Note that since he said “Give” and not just “Write” they are at least empowered to write and give the get themselves.] If he instructed three people to write a get and give it to his wife, they must write the get themselves. Even though three people are sufficient to constitute a court, since he specified that they should write the get, they are not empowered to tell someone else to do so.", + "If he said to three persons, “Give a get to my wife”, they may tell others to write the get because he has made them into a court, the words of Rabbi Meir. And this is the halakhah which Rabbi Hanina a man of Ono brought from prison: “I have received a tradition that if a man says to three persons, ‘Give a get to my wife’, they may tell others to write it, because he has made them into a court. Rabbi Yose said: We said to the messenger, we also have a tradition that even were he to say to the great court in Jerusalem, ‘Give a get to my wife’, they must learn [to write] and write the get and give it. If he told three people to give his wife a get but did not tell them to write the get, he has made them into a court and empowered them to tell a scribe to write the get. This is Rabbi Meir’s opinion. This halakhah of Rabbi Meir is supported by a tradition which Rabbi Hanina a man of Ono (a place) brought from prison. The commentators explain that he received the tradition from Rabbi Akiva who had been imprisoned during the Bar Kokhba revolt. Rabbi Yose disagrees with the tradition brought from the prison and with Rabbi Meir. He says that he too has a tradition that even if one instructs the greatest court that exists, the court that in Jerusalem, to give a get to his wife, the court must write the get themselves. Even if they must learn to write, they may not appoint others in their place. They are empowered to appoint a scribe only if he specifically tells them that they may do so.", + "If a man says to ten persons, “Write a get”, one writes, and two sign as witnesses. [If he said,] “All of you write”, one writes and all sign. Therefore, if one of them dies, the get is invalid. If a husband tells a group of ten people to write a get (and give it to his wife), it is sufficient for one of them to write the get and two of them to sign. They need not all sign the get. However, if he says to them “All of you write”, they must all participate in the writing of the get, one writing and nine signing. Should one of them die before he signs the get, the group will not be able to execute the get since they will not be able to fulfill the husband’s command." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is about a husband who is gripped by some sort of mental illness and hence may not be in his right mind when he decides to divorce his wife.\nThe second section is about a mute husband’s ability to divorce his wife.", + "If a man is gripped by the kordiakos illness and says, “Write a get for my wife”, he has not said anything. If he says, “Write a get for my wife”, and is then gripped by kordiakos and then says, “Do not write it”, his latter words are of no effect. “Kordiakos” is evidently some sort of mental illness. If a husband is gripped by this illness, his instructions to others to divorce his wife do not have any legal validity. Similarly, if a healthy person instructs others to divorce his wife, and then is gripped by “kordiakos” and then wishes to retract, his retraction is meaningless. In short, the instructions of a mentally sick person do not have legal validity.", + "If he becomes mute, and they say to him, “Should we write a get for your wife”, and he nods his head, he is tested three times. If he answers ‘no’ and ‘yes’ properly each time, then they should write the get. A mute person is not considered someone who lacks “da’at” awareness or intelligence. Hence he can legally divorce his wife. However, since he cannot speak, it is a slightly more difficult to ascertain whether he wants to divorce. The mishnah rules that he may answer questions with head gestures. Those asking the questions must be certain what these gestures mean and therefore they test him with other questions. For instance, if his name is Reuven, they can say, “Is your name Reuven?” If he nods, that means that nodding signifies an affirmative answer. They would repeat this test three times." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah returns to the subject taught in 6:7, that if a husband instructs people to write a get, they themselves must write the get. They may have a scribe write the get only if he tells them that they may do so.", + "They said to him, “Shall we write a get for your wife”, and he said to them, “Write!”, and they then told a scribe and he wrote and witnesses and they signed even if they wrote it and signed it and gave it back to him and he gave it to her, the get is void until he himself says to the scribe “Write” and to the witnesses, “Sign”. In this mishnah’s scenario the husband told others to write a get for his wife. The people whom he told then went and had a scribe write the get and other witnesses signed. This invalidates the get since the husband did not tell them that others could write the get. Even if after the scribe writes it they give the get back to the husband and the husband gives it to the wife, thereby tacitly agreeing to what they had done, the get is still invalid. Since he did not tell them beforehand that they could have a scribe write the get, his consent ex post facto cannot revalidate the get." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOn several occasions we have noted that husbands may have divorced their wives right before their death (the husband’s, that is) in order to prevent their wives from having to undergo levirate marriage or halitzah (release from levirate marriage). An obvious problem is that a person does not know when they will die. Our mishnah deals with a husband who tries to remedy this problem by making the divorce conditional upon his death.", + "[If a husband says], “This is your get if I die”, [or] “This is your get if I die from this illness”, [or] “This is your get after my death”, he has not said anything. The stipulations that the husband makes in this section cause it to be impossible for the get to be valid, because by the time the get would become valid the husband is already dead. A dead husband cannot divorce, and therefore when this husband dies his wife’s legal status is that of a widow and not a divorcee.", + "[If he says, “This is your get] from today if I die”, [or “This is your get] from now if I die”, the get is valid. In this case, the stipulation is effective. When the husband dies, the get will become retroactively effective to the day that he actually gave her the get. This language may have been effective for a husband going off to war, or a husband who has gotten sick and looks like he will die soon. If he returns from war or recovers from illness he can retract the get. However, it would be problematic for a husband who is home and healthy because the minute he says this, he is potentially ending his marriage. This problem shall be dealt with in tomorrow’s mishnah.", + "[If he says, “This is your get] from today and after [my] death”, it is both a get and not a get. If he dies [without offspring] she must perform halizah but she cannot marry the husband’s brother. In this case the husband used ambiguous language. We don’t know whether he intended the get to be valid after his death or beforehand. Therefore, the status of the get is doubtful and the halakhah must rule stringently. Should he die without children, she cannot remarry without halitzah, lest the get was not valid and she has a connection to the brother-in-law. However, she cannot have yibbum (levirate marriage) lest she is a divorcee, in which case yibbum is strictly forbidden.", + "[If he said], “This is your get from today if I die from this illness”, and he then got up and went about and fell sick and died, we estimate [the probable cause of his death]; if he died from the first illness, the get is valid, but otherwise not. In this case, the husband made his divorce conditional upon his dying from his current illness. If he seems to recover and then gets sick and dies, doctors or other qualified people would need to estimate whether he died of the original illness or of another cause. If he died of the original illness she is divorced; if not, she is a widow. If it is doubtful then she is a doubtful widow/divorcee. Again, she would be required to do halitzah and forbidden from contracting yibbum, as we learned in the previous section." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe previous mishnah discussed a person who conditioned his wife’s divorce upon his subsequently dying. For this to work, he must state that the divorce would retroactively be effective from the time he gave her the get. However, until he dies she is not divorced because the get is conditional upon his death. Our mishnah discusses her status between the time he gives her the get and the time that he dies, thereby finalizing her divorce.", + "She should not be alone with him except in the presence of witnesses, even a slave or a handmaid [any witness is sufficient] except for her own female slave, since she can take liberties in front of her own handmaid. Once the husband gives her the conditional get, she will retroactively be divorced from that moment onward. Therefore, he is not allowed to have sexual relations with her. Furthermore, as we shall learn in a later mishnah (8:4), sexual relations with her at this point, renders the get invalid. In order to avoid the possibility that they would engage in sexual relations, they are not even allowed to be secluded together. Seclusion is defined as being totally alone. The presence of anyone else in the room means that they are not secluded. The one exception is her handmaid. Since she would not be embarrassed at having sexual relations in front of her own handmaid, the handmaid’s presence is not sufficient to prevent seclusion.", + "What is her status during those days? Rabbi Judah says that she is regarded as a married woman in every respect. Rabbi Yose says that she is both divorced and not divorced. The mishnah now asks what her status is in-between the time that the divorce was given and the husband dies. According to Rabbi Judah, she is fully married. Rabbi Judah seemingly disagrees with the previous clause and holds that when the husband dies the get is retroactively effective to a point a moment before he died. It is not retroactively effective to the time when he gave her the get. Therefore, she can continue to live with him as a married woman. Rabbi Yose disagrees and holds that the get is retroactively effective to the point at which he gave it to her. Therefore, she is both married and not married. This means that she could not have relations with him and not eat terumah if he was a priest. However, she could not marry anyone else and if she did have relations with someone else, it might have the status of adultery." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe remainder of chapter seven discusses conditional divorces. Today’s mishnah discusses someone who divorces his wife on the condition that she pay him a large sum of money.", + "[If a husband says], “This is your get on condition that you give me two hundred zuz”, she is divorced and she has to give [him the money]. In this case, the divorce is effective immediately and she must give him the two hundred zuz. If she elects not to give him the two hundred zuz, then the get is invalid.", + "[If he says], “On condition that you give [the money to] within thirty days from now, if she gives him within thirty days she is divorced, but if not she is not divorced. In this case, the husband wisely set a time limit for her to pay the divorce money. If she wishes to be divorced, she must give him the money immediately. If she does not do so, the get is invalid. I should note that the amount of 200 zuz is probably not accidental. This is the amount of money that the husband would have to pay her for her ketubah if he divorces her. What we may have here is a husband who wants to divorce his wife, and perhaps a wife who wants to be divorced, but he cannot afford to pay her the ketubah. He is in essence saying that he wants to divorce her without paying her marriage settlement. She has a right to forego her ketubah, should she wish to be divorced.", + "Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: “It happened in Sidon that a man said to his wife, “This is your get on condition that you give me my robe”, and his robe was lost, and the Sages said that she should give him its value in money. In the case that happened in Sidon (on the coast of modern Lebanon), a husband wanted to retrieve his robe from his wife. However, the robe was lost and therefore the question arose whether the wife could fulfill the get’s condition by returning to him the value of the robe. The Sages answered that she could. In essence, the husband was not asking for the robe back but for the value of the robe." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn this mishnah, instead of conditioning the get upon her paying him money, the husband stipulates that to be divorced she must continue to look after his father. We can easily see the social situation reflected in this stipulation. The husband no longer wishes to remain married, but the wife has performed an important function in the family. The mishnah discusses when we consider the stipulation fulfilled.\nI should make an important note when discussing these situations. The Mishnah does not generally provide an opinion whether a husband, or really any person, has done something “virtuous”. The Mishnah is often interested in the technical, legal details and implications of things that can potentially occur. These mishnayoth are not providing approval of a husband’s essentially blackmailing his wife. Rather, they admit that such action is legally possible and hence its implications must be discussed.", + "[If a husband says], “This is your get on condition that you look after my father”, [or] “On condition that you nurse my child” How long must she nurse? Two years. Rabbi Judah says, eighteen months. In this scenario, the husband made the get conditional upon his wife’s continuing to look after his father or to nurse his child. The time limit for looking after the father is the remainder of the father’s life. However, the wife need only nurse the child for two years, the standard length of time in which an average child nursed in mishnaic times. Rabbi Judah says she need nurse only for eighteen months, which was probably the minimum amount of time that children nursed in this time period.", + "If the child dies or the father dies, the get is valid. When the husband said that she must continue to take care of his father or child, his intention was that she should do so as long as the father or child was alive. Should they die, she has fulfilled the stipulation on the get and it is valid.", + "[If he says], “This is your get on condition that you look after my father for two years”, [or] “On condition that you nurse my child for two years”, if the child dies or if the father says, “I don't want you to look after me”, even though she has not caused him to complain, the get is invalid. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: something like this is a get. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel said a general rule: wherever the obstacle does not arise from her side, the get is valid. In this the husband stipulates a limit of two years to her having to take care of his father or child. The mishnah takes this to mean that she must take care of the father or nurse the child for a full two years no matter what happens. Therefore, in this case if the father or child dies, she has not fulfilled the stipulation. Furthermore, if the father decides he no longer wants her to wait on him, she still hasn’t fulfilled the stipulation. This is certainly true if she gave him reason to “fire” her, but according to the first mishnah, even if she was not at all at fault, she still has not fulfilled the condition. However, Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel disagrees with this. He holds that if she was not the obstacle which prevented the fulfillment of the stipulation, then the get is valid. Therefore, if the father gets angry at her and she was not at fault, she is divorced." + ], + [ + "IntroductionIn this mishnah a man conditions the validity of his get upon his arrival at a certain place or lack of return within thirty days. The idea would be that if he arrived at his destination and did not return, he either was never intending on returning or something else had occurred to him, preventing his return and thereby validating the get.", + " [If a husband says,] \"This is your get if I do not return within thirty days\", and he was going from Judea to Galilee, if he got as far as Antipatras and then returned, his condition is broken. [If he says,] \"This is your get if I do not return within thirty days\", and he was going from Galilee to Judea, if he got as far as Kefar Otnai and then returned, the condition is broken. [If he said,] \"This is your get if I do not return within thirty days\", and he was going into foreign parts, if he got as far as Acco and then returned his condition is broken. All three of these sections have identical structures, so we will explain them together. According to the Talmud explains that in each case the husband made two conditions: 1) if he were to arrive at his destination the get would become effective immediately; 2) if he did not return within thirty days the get would come into effect. [I should note that there are other explanations of this mishnah, and its language is actually quite difficult and open to various interpretations.] In all three scenarios, he does not arrive at his destination and he returns within thirty days. Antipatras is on the border between Judea and the Galilee, but it is still in Judea. Kefar Otnai is still in the Galilee. Acco, while almost being considered outside the land of Israel (however, compare Gittin 1:2). ", + "[If he said,] \"This is your get as long as I shall keep away from you for thirty days\", even though he came and went and came and went, since he was not secluded with her, the get is valid. In this case, the husband conditions the validity of the get upon his staying away from his wife’s presence for thirty days. The mishnah teaches that his intention was that he should not be secluded with his wife for thirty days. Therefore, even if he comes and goes but they are not secluded together, she is divorced." + ], + [ + "[If a husband says,] “This is your get if I do not return within twelve months”, and he dies within twelve months, it is not a get.
[If he says,] “This is your get from now if I do not return within twelve months”, and he dies within twelve months, it is a get.
In today’s mishnah, a husband conditions his get upon is return home within twelve months. The mishnah discusses the validity of the get should he die within that time.
As we learned in mishnah three, there can be no divorce after death. In the first section, the wife is a widow because the get could not become valid until after twelve months. At the point when the get could become valid, the husband was already dead. In contrast, in the second section the husband says “From now…”, meaning that the get will become retroactively valid to the point at which it was given. When he fails to return after twelve months, she is considered a divorcee and not a widow. An interesting question asked, but not solved, in the Talmud, is whether or not she may remarry after he dies but before the twelve months are up. On the one hand, in the future she will be considered a divorcee at the point of the giving of the get. On the other hand, she has still not reached that point. [This is sort of a mishnaic time warp, and I love time warp scenarios]." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn the last mishnah of the chapter, the mishnah discusses a husband who conditioned his get upon his return within twelve months, but unlike yesterday’s mishnah, he told agents to write and deliver the get rather than giving it directly to his wife.", + "[If a husband says,] “If I do not come back within twelve months, write a get and give it to my wife”, and they wrote a get before twelve months had passed and gave it to her after, it is not a get. In this scenario, the husband stipulated that his agents should not even write the get until twelve months had passed. Even though we could have interpreted his words to mean only that they should give the get after twelve months, the rabbis were quite strict in the interpretation of the language of gittin and in instructions given to deliver a get. Therefore, the get is invalid.", + "[If he said,] “Write a get and give it to my wife if I do not come back within twelve months”, and they wrote it before the twelve months had passed and gave it after, it is no get. Rabbi Yose says: like this is a get. In this case, the husband was not as clear as to when he wanted the get written. He said “Write a get…” before he said “If I do not come back within twelve months.” Hence, there is room to debate the validity of the get. The first opinion is that the get is invalid, for his intention may have been the same as it was in the previous section. However, here R. Yose disputes and says that in this case, the get is valid.", + "If they wrote it after twelve months and delivered it after twelve months and he died, if the delivery of the get preceded his death the get is valid, but if his death preceded the delivery of the get it is not valid. If it is not known which was first, this is the woman about whom they said, “[She is] divorced and not divorced.” If the husband’s agents faithfully fulfilled his instructions and wrote and delivered the get, then the only question left is whether or not the husband died before or after twelve months. If it is doubtful, then this woman is doubtfully divorced. In other words, she might be a widow but she also might be a divorcee. Therefore, should she be in a situation which would require yibbum (her husband left no children and had a brother) she could only do halitzah (yibbum would be prohibited lest she is a divorcee, and her brother-in-law be prohibited to her as her husband’s brother). On the other hand, without halitzah she could not remarry, lest she is a widow and obligated for yibbum." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThe first three mishnayoth of this chapter discuss a husband who throws his get to his wife. While a woman need not consent to being divorced, the husband must deliver the get into her possession and make her aware of the fact that she is being divorced. These mishnayoth define what it takes to fulfill these two requirements.", + "If a husband throws a get to his wife, and she is in her house or in her courtyard, she is divorced. The Torah states that the husband “puts the get in her hand” (Deuteronomy 24:1). The rabbis expand this requirement and allow the husband to put the get into any place which is in her possession.", + "If he throws it to her in his house or in his courtyard, even though it is with her on the same bed, she is not divorced. In this case, she is on his property and hence he cannot just throw the get at her. This is true even if the husband puts the get into her bed, if the bed belongs to the husband, she is not divorced.", + "If he throws it into her lap or into her basket, she is divorced. If he puts the get into her lap or into her basket she is divorced. This is true even if she is standing on his property. Since her lap and basket belong to her, it is sufficient if he delivers the get to one of these places." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first section of this mishnah deals with a husband who tries to sneak a get to his wife by telling her it is a different type of document or by giving it to her while she is asleep. Perhaps he wishes to avoid a face to face confrontation. The mishnah will teach us that he must state to her “Here is your get” in order for her to be divorced.\nThe second section returns to the subject of a husband who throws a get to his wife.", + "If he said to her, “Take in this debt document”, or if she found it behind him and read it and it turned out to be her get, it is not a get, until he says to her, “Here is your get.” In this case the husband tries to sneak the get to his wife either by telling her it was a debt document, or by hiding what it was until she picked it up. In either case the get is invalid unless he affirmatively states to her “Here is your get.”", + "If he put it into her hand while she was asleep and when she woke up she read it and found it was her get, it is not a get until he says to her, “Here is your get.” Similarly, he may not place the get in her hand while she is sleeping and then just let her wake up and read it. Although he can divorce her against her will, he must at least tell her that she is being divorced.", + "If she was standing in the public domain and he threw it to her, if it lands near her she is divorced, but if it lands near him she is not divorced. If it lands midway, she is divorced and not divorced. In this case she is standing on neutral ground, in the public domain which is neither his nor her property. According to the mishnah if the get lands close to her, it counts as if he actually gave it to her and she is divorced. The Talmud explains that in order for the get to be considered “close to her”, it must be within four amot (cubits). If it is in-between the two of them, let’s say two amot from her and two amot from him, then she is doubtfully divorced. In such a case, she would need another get in order to remarry." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first section of the mishnah is a direct continuation of yesterday’s mishnah. It teaches that the laws concerning a husband throwing a get to his wife are the same as the laws of a man throwing betrothal money or a betrothal document to a woman or a borrower repaying his debt by throwing money at the creditor.\nThe second half of the mishnah deals with a husband who is on a roof and throws a get down to his wife or is below and she is on the roof and he throws the get up to her.", + "Similarly with betrothals and similarly with a debt. If a man’s creditor said to him, “Throw me my debt”, and he threw it to him, if it lands nearer to the creditor, the borrower is credited [with paying back his debt]; if it lands nearer to the borrower, the borrower is still obligated [to repay the money]; if it lands midway, they divide. The laws concerning throwing a get are the same when it comes to throwing betrothal money or documents or repaying monetary debts. The remainder of the mishnah illustrates the principle with regard to repaying debts. Note that the one difference between debts and divorce/betrothal is that in the latter case, if the document lands halfway, the woman is doubtfully divorced or doubtfully betrothed. There is no possibility of a woman being half divorced or betrothed. In contrast, when it comes to debts, people can split money. Therefore, if the money lands halfway between the two parties they split it and the borrower owes half the debt.", + "If she was standing on a roof and he threw it up to her, as soon as it reaches the airspace of the roof, she is divorced. If he was above and she below and he threw it to her, once it has left the space of the roof, [even were it to be immediately] erased or burnt, she is divorced. When the husband is standing below and she is standing on the roof, the get must reach the level of the roof for she to be divorced. In other words, her domain only begins at roof-level. Similarly, if he is standing on the roof, her domain begins at the level of the roof. If he drops the get, she is divorced as soon as the get enters her domain, which is below the level of the roof. Even if it briefly enters her domain and then is somehow erased (severe case of bird droppings?) or burnt (by a lightning bolt) she was divorced as soon as the get entered her domain." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn this mishnah Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel disagree over whether or not a get is valid if after its being written but before its being given the husband was secluded with his wife.", + "Bet Shammai says: a man may divorce his wife with an old get, But Bet Hillel forbids this. What is meant by an old get? One where he was secluded with her after he wrote it. Bet Hillel forbids a man to use an “old get” to divorce his wife. Bet Hillel is concerned lest while secluded the couple has sexual relations, she becomes pregnant and people think that the child was conceived after she was divorced, assuming that the divorce occurred only on the date written on the get. For instance, let’s say he had the get written in November, continued to live with her and she became pregnant in February, and he gave her the document in March before they knew that she was pregnant. People will think that he divorced her in November, the date written on the get, and that the kid was conceived after she was divorced. Therefore, Bet Hillel prohibits the use of an “old get.” Bet Shammai does not assume that just because they were secluded, they had sex. Therefore, he allows the husband to use the get so long as they were only secluded but did not actually have sex. We shall see at the end of the tractate, that Bet Shammai rules that a husband may divorce his wife only on the grounds of adultery. Since divorce is possible only under such circumstances, it is unlikely, and indeed forbidden, for the couple to have relations after he writes out a get." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIf the get was not written precisely the way that the rabbis prescribed it to be written, it is invalid. Our mishnah mentions mistakes in writing the get which cause it to be invalid. If she were to remarry with such a get, she is considered an adulteress, because she was never divorced from her first husband. This is analogous to a situation where she thought her husband was dead, she remarried and then it turned out that he was still alive. Hence, all of the consequences that were described in Yevamoth 10:1 are again listed here.", + "If the get was dated by an unfit kingship, by the empire of Medea, by the empire of Greece, by the building of the Temple or by the destruction of the Temple, Or if being in the east he wrote “in the west”, or being in the west he wrote “in the east”, She must leave this one and that one, and she also requires a get from this one and that one. She has no ketubah, no usufruct, no support money or worn clothes, neither from this one nor from that one. If she has taken anything from this one or that one, she must return it. The child from this one or that one is a mamzer. Neither this one nor that one may impurify himself for her. Neither this one and that one has a claim to whatever she may find, nor what she makes with her hands, nor to invalidate her vows. If she was the daughter of an Israelite, she becomes disqualified from marrying a priest; if the daughter of a Levite, from the eating of tithe; and if the daughter of a priest, from the eating of terumah. Neither the heirs of this one nor the heirs of that one are entitled to inherit her ketubah. And if [the husbands] die, the brother of the one and the brother of the other must perform halitzah, but may not contract yibbum. There are two potential problems with the writing of the get in this section. The first is that he dated the get to the wrong kingship. Documents used to be dated to the ruling empire, so in the Roman period, it would be invalid to date a get with dates from the Medean (Persian) or Greek empires. Furthermore, the rabbis ruled that even dating a document to the building or the destruction of the Temple is forbidden and invalidates the get. The second problem is that he wrote the wrong place. Although this would seemingly be a trivial point in writing the get, the rabbis were adamant that any deviation from the precise truth invalidates the get. As stated above, if this woman now remarries, she is an accidental adulteress and all of the following consequences apply. For further information, you can look back at Yevamoth 10:1. She must leave this one and that one, and she also requires a get from this one and that one: She must be divorced from each of them, for she is forbidden to each. She also needs a get from each of them. According to the talmudic interpretation, the get from the second husband is only of rabbinic origin, for according to biblical law, she is not married to the second man. She has no ketubah, no usufruct, no support money or worn clothes, neither from this one nor from that one: She does not receive any of the financial benefits that she would have accrued from her husband. If she has taken anything from this one or that one, she must return it: If she had taken any of these things to which she is not entitled, she must return them. Some times, in cases of doubt, possession is enough for a person not to have to return something. However, in this case, her possession is considered truly illegal and she must return what she took. The child from this one or that one is a mamzer: The child from the second husband is a mamzer because she gave birth to him while married to the first husband. Should she return to the first husband, the subsequent child will also be a mamzer. Neither this one nor that one may impurify himself for her: A priest is allowed to impurify himself to bury his wife. In this case, if either husband is a priest and she dies, they may not impurify themselves for her. Neither this one and that one has a claim to whatever she may find, nor what she makes with her hands, nor to invalidate her vows: These are all rights given to a husband during marriage. Since the marriage is now invalid, he loses all these rights. Invalidating vows is discussed in Numbers 30. If she was the daughter of an Israelite, she becomes disqualified from marrying a priest; if the daughter of a Levite, from the eating of tithe; and if the daughter of a priest, from the eating of terumah: The illicit marriage to the second husband disqualifies her from all rights that might be accrued from either kohanic or levitical status. The result is that she could no longer marry a priest nor eat tithe if her father was a Levite, nor eat terumah if her father was a priest. Neither the heirs of this one nor the heirs of that one are entitled to inherit her ketubah: According to a ketubah clause which we will see in chapter four of tractate Ketuboth, a woman’s male children inherit her ketubah. However, in this case they too are penalized and lose their inheritance. And if [the husbands] die, the brother of the one and the brother of the other must perform halitzah, but may not contract yibbum: Since both marriages were invalid, the brothers cannot perform yibbum. Note that according to the talmudic interpretation, the halitzah of the brother of the second husband is only of rabbinic origin, since according to Torah law the second marriage was not valid.", + "If his name or her name or the name of his town or the name of her town was wrongly given, she must leave both husbands and all the above consequences apply to her. If he made a mistake in writing his name, her name, his or her place of residence the get is invalid and all of the consequences mentioned in the previous section apply to her." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nTo understand this mishnah we must remind ourselves of the first chapter of Yevamoth, and especially mishnah four. There we learned that if a man was married to two women, and he died childless, and one of those women was forbidden to his brother, for instance the brother was married to that woman’s sister, not only is the prohibited woman herself exempt (a man may not marry two sisters) from yibbum/halitzah (Levirate marriage and release thereof) but her rival wives are also exempt.", + "With regard to all of the near relatives concerning whom they said “their rivals are permitted to marry [without halitzah]”: If the rival wives went and married and it was then found that this one (the near relative) was an aylonit, [the rival wife who married] must leave both husbands and all these consequences apply to her. In our mishnah, a man was married to a woman who is prohibited to the yavam (brother-in-law) and he is also married to other women. When he dies, since one wife is prohibited to the yavam, all of her rival wives are exempt from yibbum and halitzah. The rival wives therefore remarry without halitzah. If it turns out that widow who was prohibited to the yavam was an aylonit, a woman who never reaches physical maturity, then her marriage to her first husband was invalid and her rival wives should have had halitzah with the brother-in-law before remarrying. Therefore, the remarried rival wives may not remain with their current husbands nor may they marry the yavam either. All of the above consequences also apply to them. This mishnah regards the child of a woman who did not undergo halitzah as a mamzer. However, the halakhah is not according to this mishnah and the child is not considered a mamzer." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is quite similar to yesterday’s mishnah. Mishnah Seven", + "If a man marries his sister-in-law and her rival wife goes and marries another man and it was found that the first is an aylonit, the other must leave both husbands and all these consequences apply to her. In today’s mishnah Reuven was married to two women, Rachel and Leah. When Reuven dies, Rachel marries Shimon, Reuven’s brother, thereby fulfilling the mitzvah of yibbum. Leah is free to marry an outsider, so she marries David. When it turns out that Rachel is an aylonit, her yibbum marriage to Shimon is invalidated. Leah has therefore married an outsider without halitzah, which according to our mishnah (but not the accepted halakhah), renders her marriage invalid and her child with her new husband a mamzer. She may not remain married to her husband, nor have yibbum with Shimon, and all of the consequences listed in mishnah five apply to her." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first half of the mishnah deals with a situation where a scribe wrote a get for a husband to give to his wife and a receipt for payment of the ketubah for the wife to give to her husband. He accidentally switched the documents, giving the get to the wife and the receipt to the husband, whereupon the husband divorced his wife using a ketubah receipt. The problem is that this wife never received her get.\nThe second half of the mishnah contains a debate between Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel over a husband who writes out a get to give to his wife but does not give it to her.", + "If a scribe wrote a get for the husband and a receipt for the wife and by mistake gave the get to the wife and the receipt to the husband and the two exchanged them and after some time the get came out of the hands of the man and the receipt out of the hands of the woman, she must leave both husbands and all these things apply to her. Rabbi Elazar says: if [it comes out of her hands] immediately, it is not a get, but if [it comes out of her hands] after some time, it is a get; it is not in the power of the first to render void the right of the second. According to the first opinion in this section, since the wife never received her get she was never divorced. Hence her second marriage is invalid, and all of the consequences that applied in the previous mishnayot apply to her as well. Rabbi Elazar says that the get is invalid only in a case where she immediately noticed that she had received a ketubah receipt and not a get. If she only discovered that she had never received the get at a later time, she is considered divorced. The reason that she is considered divorced is that we fear that the husband and the wife may have made a deal in order to disrupt the second marriage. By her giving him back the get and his giving her back the receipt, they can make it look like she was never divorced. The first husband does not have the authority to ruin the second husband’s marriage.", + "If a man wrote a get with which to divorce his wife and then changed his mind, Bet Shammai says that he has disqualified her from marrying a priest. Bet Hillel says that even if he gave it to her with a certain stipulation, if the condition was not fulfilled, he has not disqualified her for marrying a priest. A priest cannot marry a divorced woman. According to Bet Shammai, even if a woman’s husband writes a get but does not give it to her, he has already disqualified her from subsequently marrying a priest. In contrast, Bet Hillel holds that even if he gives her the get with a condition (for instance, “here is your get if I don’t return within 12 months) and the condition is not fulfilled and the get is invalid, she is still not disqualified from marry a priest. The Yerushalmi (Palestinian Talmud) connects this Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel debate with their debate that appears in the last mishnah of the tractate. Since Bet Shammai says that a husband can divorce only on grounds of adultery, the very fact that the husband suspected her of adultery and therefore wrote out a get, disqualifies her from marrying a priest. In contrast, Bet Hillel allows divorce on nearly all grounds, and therefore does not see a disqualified get as disqualifying a woman from the priesthood." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first section of the mishnah deals with a man who is suspected of having sexual relations with his divorcee. The second section deals with a “bald get”, one that does not have the proper number of signatures.", + "A man divorces his wife and then stays with her over night in an inn: Bet Shammai says: she does not require from him a second get, But Beth Hillel say she does require a second get from him. When is this so? When she was divorced after marriage. And [Beth Hillel] agrees that if she is divorced after betrothal, she does not require a second get from him, because he would not [yet] take liberties with her. If a divorced woman is secluded with her ex-husband, Bet Hillel suspects that they may have had sexual relations and through the sexual act he betrothed her again (we shall learn about how betrothal is performed in the beginning of Kiddushin). Since they may have remarried, she requires another get from him. Bet Shammai is not suspicious that they had sexual relations and therefore does not require another get. Again, this debate may be connected with their debate over the grounds for divorce. Since Bet Shammai holds that divorce can only be a result of adultery (or at least suspected adultery), it is less likely that the couple will again engage in sexual relations. Bet Hillel holds that a man may divorce his wife for almost no reason and therefore there is a greater chance at reconciliation. However, Bet Hillel suspects that the divorced couple may have sex only if they were already married and assumedly had already had sexual relations while married. In this case, their prior intimacy increases the likelihood that when secluded they will again become intimate. If the divorce occurred after their betrothal but before they were ever married, since they had never been intimate before, it is less likely that they will now engage in sex. Therefore, in such a situation she does not require a second get.", + "If a man marries a [divorced] woman through a “bald” get, she must leave both husbands and all the above-mentioned consequences apply to her. A “bald get” is a “sewn document”, as described in Bava Batra 10:1-2. There we learned that to protect forgeries people would sew several folds into their documents, having people sign on each fold. A “bald get” is one where there are more folds than signatures. It is “bald” because it is missing signatures and is therefore invalid. Since it is invalid, she was not properly divorced from her first husband when she married her second husband and all of the consequences which were discussed in mishnah five (and mentioned in 6-8) apply to her as well." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nAt the end of yesterday’s mishnah we learned that a woman who was divorced with a “bald get” is not divorced. Our mishnah explains what a “bald get” is and how it can be fixed.", + "A “bald” get anyone can complete its signatures, the words of Ben Nannas. But Rabbi Akiva says that it may be completed only by relatives who are qualified to testify elsewhere. What is a “bald” get? One which has more folds than signatures. It would be helpful to explain this mishnah backwards. The end of the mishnah clarifies that a “bald get” is one which has more folds than signatures. As I explained yesterday, some documents were folded and sewn on the folds to prevent forgeries. One person would sign on each fold, and there could be many folds. If there are any folds without signatures, then the document/get is invalid. However, in order to validate this get, it need not have perfectly acceptable witnesses sign. According to Ben Nannas, if at least two valid witnesses have already signed all that is needed is an additional signature for each fold and, that signature may be from a person who normally disqualified from testifying. This would include relatives and gamblers. Rabbi Akiva restricts the leniency to relatives who would otherwise be allowed to testify, but would not normally be allowed to in this case. Gamblers and others who are always invalid could not complete the “bald get.”" + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with a man who tried to divorce his wife but at the same time restrict her from subsequently marrying a certain man. Generally speaking divorce frees a woman to marry almost anyone who she wishes to marry (except priests and anyone related to her previous husband). The background to this case is probably that the husband is divorcing his wife because he suspects that she has committed adultery with a certain man. By divorcing her, he does not want to allow her to go marry the very man whom he suspects.", + "If a man divorces his wife and said to her, “You are free to marry any man but so-and-so”, Rabbi Eliezer permits her [to marry on the strength of this get], but the rabbis forbid her. Rabbi Eliezer allows the woman to remarry on the strength of this get. She can marry anyone save the person whom her husband stated she was not allowed to marry. The remainder of the sages declared this get to be invalid. In the Talmud, there is recorded a story of four sages who gathered together to refute Rabbi Eliezer after his death. Indeed the opposition to this opinion of Rabbi Eliezer is among the most vehement in the Talmud. Evidently, the rabbis believed that for divorce to work it must totally sever the legal relationship between the man and woman. Any retention of his control over her undermines the entire validity of divorce.", + "What should he do? He should take it back from her and give it to her again saying, “You are free to marry any man.” If he wrote [the restriction] in the get, even though he went back and erased it, it is invalid. In this section we learn how the husband can fix the situation so that his wife is legally divorced. If he has not written the words “but so-and-so” in the get, he need merely take the get back from her and restate the divorce formula correctly. However, if he has written the invalidating words in the get, the document itself is irreparably invalid." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is a continuation of yesterday’s mishnah. Again, while divorcing his wife, the husband attempts to restrict her from subsequently marrying a certain man. Yesterday we learned that the sages consider such a get to be invalid. Today, the mishnah discusses what would happen if the man to whom the husband tried to restrict his wife was in any case prohibited to her.", + "[If he said,] “You are permitted to any man but my father, your father, my brother, your brother, a slave, a Gentile, or anyone to whom she is incapable of being betrothed,” the get is valid. In this section the husband tells his wife that she may not subsequently marry someone whom she couldn’t subsequently marry in any case. All of the men in this list cannot possibly contract marriage with her. In other words his restrictions on the divorce were in essence meaningless, because she couldn’t marry any of them in any case. Hence, the get is valid.", + "[If he said,] “You are permitted to anyone but (supposing she was a a high priest, or, (supposing she was a divorcee or a an ordinary priest, or, (supposing she was a mamzeret or a a regular Israelite, or (supposing she was an a mamzer or a natin, or anyone who is capable of betrothing her even in transgression, the get is invalid. In this section, the husband restricts his wife from marrying someone who would be prohibited to her, but to whom she could possibly be betrothed. The marriages listed in this section are possible even though they carry with them a transgression. For instance, his wife was a mamzeret and he says “You are permitted to any but to so-and-so the Israelite”. In such cases, the get is invalid because his restriction was not meaningless. We should note that the list in this section is a stock list, since not all of these categories are relevant in this situation. The woman whom he is divorcing will in any case be prohibited to a priest, as are all divorcees. However, this is a stock list and hence it appears in all places as an entirety." + ], + [ + "The body of the get is: “Behold you are permitted to any man.” Rabbi Judah says: [he must add] “And this shall be to you from me a writ of divorce and a letter of release and a bill of dismissal, with which you may go and marry any man that you wish.”
The body of a writ of emancipation is: “Behold you are a free woman”, “Behold you belong to yourself.”
This mishnah provides the wording for the standard parts of divorce documents and documents which free slaves.
The mishnah is straightforward and doesn’t require any explanation. One thing to note is that Rabbi Judah’s addition to the get is in Aramaic. Documents in this period were in Aramaic (or Greek), the lingua franca(s) of Palestine during the mishnaic and talmudic periods. Rabbi Judah may have insisted that the get be in Aramaic so that everyone would understand it." + ], + [ + "There are three gittin which are invalid but if a woman marries [on the strength of one of them] the child is fit:
If the husband wrote it with his own hand but there are no witnesses on it.
If there are witnesses on it but no date.
If it has a date but only one witness. These are three gittin which are invalid but if a woman marries [on the strength of one of them] the child is fit. Rabbi Elazar says even though there are no witnesses on it, as long as he gave it to her in the presence of witnesses it is valid, [and on the strength of it] she may collect her ketubah [even] from mortgaged property, since the witnesses only sign on the get because of tikkun olam.
This mishnah teaches that there are three gittin which are invalid, but nevertheless if a woman were to remarry on the strength of one of them, a child from the subsequent marriage is not a mamzer, as he would be were the get to be completely invalid. In other words, “lechatchilah” ab initio the woman should not remarry based on one of these gittin. However, “bediavad” ex post facto if she has married using one of these gittin, her subsequent marriage is not considered adulterous. Another way of putting this is that the get is kosher “deoraitta” according to Torah law, but the rabbis declared it invalid “derabanan” from rabbinic authority.
Get #1: If the husband wrote the get in his own hand, it will be easy to verify that he wrote the get through comparison of his handwriting. Therefore, the get is valid, at least bediavad/deoraita. However, witnesses are always preferable and considered to be more conclusive. Therefore, the rabbis said that the get was invalid and that “lechatchilah” a woman should not remarry using it.
Get #2: The rabbis declared that a get without a date is invalid. We learned above in mishnah 2:2, that without a date we fear that the woman may improperly collect her ketubah from mortgaged property. However, the get is not completely invalid and if she uses it to remarry, her subsequent child is not a mamzer.
Get #3: In this case, there is only one witness, and not the two that are normally required. Again, the get is invalid, at least derabbanan, but nevertheless if she does use it to remarry the subsequently born child is not a mamzer.
Rabbi Elazar goes even further than does the previous opinion and claims that even if there are no witnesses on the get, the get is completely valid and may even be used to collect the ketubah from the husband’s mortgaged property. Certainly she can remarry, according to Rabbi Elazar, on the strength of this get. Rabbi Elazar holds that the witnesses who are essential in the divorce process are not those who sign on the get, but rather those who witness the husband transfer the get to the wife. The only reason that witnesses sign on the get is for “tikkun olam” the improvement of the world. It will be easier for the woman to certify the validity of her get using the signatures on the get, and hence they sign for her benefit. If she decides to remarry without such benefit, it is her right. That witnesses sign because of tikkun olam was also learned above in mishnah 4:3." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first section of this mishnah is about two men with the same name who both send a get to their wives, who also share the the same name, and the one delivering the gittin mixes the two of them up. (You can imagine what kind of mail problems they must have had!)\nThe final two sections are about five men who try to combine their gittin into one document, perhaps in an attempt to save the costs of the parchment and the scribe.", + "Two men sent two identical gittin [to their wives] and they became mixed up they give both of them to this wife and both of them to this wife. Therefore, if one of them was lost the other is void. Since we don’t know which get belongs to which woman, both gittin must be given to each woman. If one of the two mixed-up gittin is lost, then neither woman can be divorced because we don’t know if she is receiving the get from her husband. This requirement is related to the halakhah which we learned in chapter three that a get must be written specifically for the wife being divorced. Although both gittin are exactly the same, they both have to be given to the right woman.", + "If five men wrote jointly in the same get, “So-and-so divorces so-and-so and so-and-so [divorces] so-and-so and the witnesses [signed] below, all are valid and the get is to be given to each [of the women]. The mishnah teaches that multiple men can divorce their wives with the same document. In order for the get to be valid for all of the wives, they must write the names of the divorcing men and their wives before the formula. This way it is clear that the formula refers to all five husbands and that the witnesses are signing on all five gittin. In addition, the get must be given to each woman, since a woman is not divorced until she receives the get in her hand.", + "If the scribe wrote out the formula for each one and the witnesses signed below, only the one with which the signatures are read is valid. In this case, the scribe writes out what is essentially a separate get for each man, complete with a divorce formula for each one. Therefore, it may look as if the witnesses who signed on the bottom of the get are only attesting to the last get. This is “the one with which the signatures are read.” Hence, only this get is valid." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses the validity of two gittin written side by side on one sheet of paper, with one set of witnesses testifying (or appearing to testify) to the validity of both of them.", + "If two gittin are written [on the same sheet] side by side and the signatures of two witnesses in Hebrew [stretch] from under one to under the other and then signatures of two witnesses in Greek [stretch] from under one get to under the other, the one with which the two first signatures are read is valid. The question in this mishnah is, are the witnesses testifying to the validity of both or only of the gittin, or perhaps can we not consider them as testifying to either. Hebrew is written from right to left. Hence, if the first two witnesses signed in Hebrew, their own names will be under the get on the right side, and their father’s names under the get on the left side, since people signed “so-and-so son of so-and-so.” Since the get on the right side has the witnesses actual name it is valid. However, we cannot be sure that the Greek witnesses are testifying to either get, since there is a break between their signatures and the get itself. Hence, only the get on the right side is valid. Had the Greek witnesses signed first, the left get would have been valid, since Greek is written from left to right.", + "If there is one signature in Hebrew and one in Greek and then another signature in Hebrew and a signature in Greek [stretching] from under one [get] to under the other, both are invalid. In this case, the signatures alternate between Hebrew and Greek. This is problematic, because the Hebrew signatures can only work for the get on the right side and the Greek signatures can only work for the get on the left side. If the first signature is in Hebrew, it counts for the right get. The next signature in Greek counts for the left get. The third signature, which is in Hebrew, is for the right get but it cannot be counted together with the first signature because the second signature interferes. Similarly, the fourth signature, which is in Greek, cannot count with the second signature, for the third interferes. Hence, neither the left nor right get is valid." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses scenarios where due to the way in which the writing of the get is found on the paper, it is somewhat doubtful whether the witnesses are testifying to the get.", + "If he left over some of the get [from the first sheet] and he wrote the rest of the get on the next column and the witnesses [sign] below, [the get is] valid. A scribe folds a piece of parchment in half and begins to write the get on the right hand column. He doesn’t have room to complete the get, so he continues on the top of the left hand column. If the witnesses signed below the left hand column, the get is valid. We can assume that they were testifying also to what is written in the right column.", + "If the witnesses have signed at the top of the sheet or at the side or on the back of a simple get, it is invalid. A simple get is one that is not folded. It is simply written and usually signed below. Signing on the back of such a get is not valid. Signing on top or on the side is never valid because the signatures are not read with the text. It could be that the signatures were originally on something else on that piece of paper, and then the person cut it off, thereby creating a forgery. The signatures must always be directly below the text of the get.", + "If he connected the top of one get to the top of another and the witnesses’ signatures are between the two, both of them are invalid. In the following three sections, two gittin were written on one page, in one column, each containing a separate divorce formula. If the two tops meet in the middle and the signatures are in the middle as well, then neither get is valid because the signatures do not read with either get. In other words, the signatures are above each get and hence they are both invalid.", + "If the end of one is connected to the end of the other and the witnesses’ signatures are between, the one with which the witnesses’ signatures reads is valid. Here the scribe placed the gittin with the two bottoms connected to each other and the witnesses signed in between. The get which is read in the same direction as the witnesses is valid and the other is not.", + "If the top of one is connected to the bottom of the other and the witnesses’ signatures are in the middle, the one with which the witnesses’ signatures reads is valid. Here he simply wrote two gittin in a row and the witnesses signed in the middle. The top one has signatures which read with it, and therefore is valid. The bottom one has signatures above it and hence is invalid." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first section of the mishnah discusses gittin written in languages different from the language in which the witnesses signed.\nThe second section deals with how witnesses sign a get.\nThe third section deals with the way in which the husband and wife’s names may be written.\nThe fourth and final section deals with husbands whom the court forces to divorce their wives. This last issue is obviously a crucial one, and I will discuss it at somewhat greater length below.", + "A get which was written in Hebrew and whose signatures are in Greek, or was written in Greek and whose signatures are in Hebrew, or which has one Hebrew signature and one Greek signature, or which was written by a scribe and signed by one witness, is valid. In all of these cases we might have feared that since the person signed a language different from that in which the get was written, the signer did not actually understand the document. The mishnah nevertheless rules that these gittin are valid, relying on people’s good faith not to sign documents unless they know what is written in them. This section also teaches that the scribe himself may sign the get. His role as scribe and his role as witness are independent, and therefore he can act as both.", + "[If a man signs], “So-and-so, witness,” it is valid. [If he signs,] “Son of so-and-so, witness, it is valid. [If he signs,] “So-and-so son of so-and-so” and he didn’t write “witness”, it is valid. Normally, people would sign, “So-and-so, son of so-and-so, witness.” The mishnah teaches that while this is the normal custom, it is not necessary for the signature to be effective. A signature can be valid without one’s personal name, or without one’s family name or without the word “witness.” I should note that printed editions contain the line “And this is how the scrupulous in Jerusalem would do” at this point, and not as it appears in manuscripts, as part of the next section. According to this, the scrupulous in Jerusalem did not write the word “witness.” The manuscript version is clearly correct, as the line makes little sense here.", + "If he wrote his own family name and hers, the get is valid. And this is how the scrupulous in Jerusalem would do. Usually the scribe would write the husband and wife’s personal names. However, if he wrote their family names, which were not surnames as we now use but rather some sort of personal nicknames, the get is valid. Indeed, since these names are sometimes more precise, the practice of writing nicknames was common among the “scrupulous people of Jerusalem.”", + "A get given imposed by court: in the case of a Jewish court is valid, and in the case of a Gentile court is invalid. And with regard to Gentiles, if they beat him and say to him, “Do what the Israelites say to you,” (and it is. Perhaps the most controversial issue in Jewish law today is the problem of the “agunah”, a woman who cannot obtain a divorce. Often (although not always) this is the result of the husband’s refusal to divorce his wife. The mishnah states quite clearly that if an Israelite court forces him to divorce his wife and he divorces her under duress, the divorce is nevertheless valid. Only if the coercion is done by a Gentile court, not acting according to Jewish law, is the get invalid. Even if Gentiles beat the recalcitrant husband, telling him to do what the Israelite court has told him to do (divorce his wife) the get is valid so long as the Gentiles are enforcing Jewish law. Gentile coercion invalidates the get only if it comes without the request of an Israelite court. After reading this mishnah, one might wonder why, if the Mishnah states that husbands may be compelled to divorce their wives, do women today find it often difficult to get a court to actually do so. I cannot answer this question fully in this forum but we should make three notes. First of all, it is not clear that this mishnah would apply in all cases. The question still needs to be asked; upon what grounds a court might force a husband to divorce his wife. The most important issue of all: what if the wife merely no longer wants to remain married to her husband, without any formal, specific grounds? Secondly, from the 12th century and onwards, rabbis became increasingly hesitant about compelling men to divorce. Hence, our modern problem is not so new. Thirdly, it seems to me that the modern problem is not one of halakhah, but rather of rabbis being overly hesitant in using halakhic authority. It is more of a sociological issue than a halakhic one. Rabbis could solve the problem, and many have made various suggestions of how to do so. They are often unwilling to solve the problem for sociological reasons. However, the subject is too important and complex to be dealt with fully here." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses a case where a rumor went around that a certain woman was either betrothed, and hence forbidden to marry anyone else, or divorced and permitted to remarry. Without full testimony regarding either status, her status would seem to be uncertain. Nevertheless, the mishnah generally relies on the rumors. We should remember that in mishnaic times they didn’t have the systems of verification and documentation that are available today and hence people would inevitably have to at least occasionally rely on rumors.", + "If a report goes out in the town: “[A certain woman is] betrothed,” she is regarded as betrothed; [If a report goes out in the town: “A certain woman is] divorced,” she is regarded as divorced. The mishnah regards either rumor as being true. The Talmud explains that a rumor alone would not be enough to create a legal assumption that a woman is married. Rather, physical signs of a marriage must have been observed. For instance, women seemed to be celebrating with her, saying “she’s married.” With regard to the rumor of divorce, the Talmud explains that this clause refers to the woman who was regarded as married based on a rumor. Since the assumption of her being married was not based on evidence but on a rumor, a rumor of divorce is sufficient to allow her to remarry. In contrast, a woman who was known to be married cannot be assumed to be divorced based on a rumor. Rather, she must bring evidence, either witnesses who saw her divorced or the document itself.", + "[This is only the case] provided the report has no qualification. What is meant by a qualification? [If the report is,] “So-and-so divorced his wife with a stipulation” [or], “He threw her the betrothal money, but it is uncertain whether it landed nearer to her or nearer to him” this is a qualification. If there is a “qualification” to the report, then it is not regarded as true. The “qualification” is something that would cause us to disbelieve the rumor. For instance, her husband attempted to divorce her, but the divorce came with a stipulation that was not fulfilled. Or he attempted to betroth her by throwing the betrothal money at her, but we’re not sure if it landed closer to her (in which case she is married) or closer to him (in which case she is not). In both of these cases, since there was a qualification to the rumor, the rumor is not accepted." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe final mishnah of the tractate is perhaps the most important and basic mishnah in the entire tractate. In it Bet Shammai, Bet Hillel and Rabbi Akiva dispute the grounds which justify divorce. Part of the basis for this dispute is exegetical how do we understand Deuteronomy 24:1, whose language is admittedly difficult and part of the debate is certainly based on ideology.\nWe should remember that divorce was a hotly debated by Jews in the first century. Jesus and Paul were quite stringent in their opposition to divorce and the Dead Sea sect also probably prohibited divorce, or at least disallowed remarriage after divorce. The rabbis, with Bet Hillel and Rabbi Akiva at the fore, were more open to allowing people to divorce. This is not the proper forum for debating this issue but I will offer a couple of potential explanations for why rabbis were more open to divorce than were other sects of Jews. First of all, most rabbis took a much more positive attitude toward sexuality and procreation than did early Christians. Divorce allows a dysfunctional couple to fulfill their procreative and sexual desires elsewhere. Although divorce can be damaging and abused, it can also be beneficial, at least in rabbinic perspective. Secondly, the rabbis rarely used the Adam and Eve story as a source of halakhah. This story contains a strong monogamous ideal and was used by both Jesus and the Dead Sea sect as grounds for prohibiting divorce. Finally, divorce is clearly permitted by the Torah. Hence, rabbinic openness to divorce may be seen as at least partially stemming from a simple understanding that God allows divorce. However, this last reason is less convincing for whereas the Torah certainly allows divorce, it is unclear whether it is allowed in all occasions. The Torah leaves room for multiple interpretations as we shall see in our mishnah.\nWhile reading this mishnah and understanding this debate, I think we would do well to keep in mind that divorce can be a painful trauma. While the rabbis may advocate allowing divorce, they recognized well the human pain involved for both the man and the woman. Furthermore, we are dealing here with general principles. These principles and ideals would apply differently in individual people’s lives and marriages, each with their own nuances. By talking about the grounds for a husband to divorce his wife, we should not be callous to the real pain that real people feel in such situations.", + "Bet Shammai says: a man should not divorce his wife unless he has found her guilty of some unseemly conduct, as it says, “Because he has found some unseemly thing in her.” Bet Hillel says [that he may divorce her] even if she has merely burnt his dish, since it says, “Because he has found some unseemly thing in her.” Rabbi Akiva says, [he may divorce her] even if he finds another woman more beautiful than she is, as it says, “it cometh to pass, if she find no favour in his eyes. The three positions in this mishnah are all based on differing interpretations of Deuteronomy 24:1 which states, “If a man takes a wife and possesses her, and she fails to please him because he finds something unseemly in her…” Bet Shammai interprets the verse to mean that he may only divorce her if he finds something “unseemly” in her. The word “unseemly” in Hebrew can also mean a forbidden sexual act. Therefore, Bet Shammai interprets the verse to mean that divorce is prohibited only if the husband suspects his wife of adultery. Bet Hillel focuses not on the word “unseemly” but on the word “thing.” The husband may divorce his wife if he finds any “thing” wrong with her, even something seemingly as trivial as burning his dish. Rabbi Akiva focuses upon the earlier part of the verse “she fails to please him” as separate grounds for divorce. Even if she has done nothing wrong, he may divorce her if he desires another woman more. We should note that Rabbi Akiva assumes that he won’t want to or be able to marry another woman while still married to his first wife. It could be that while polygamy was permitted, it wasn’t always so practical, for economic and social reasons. There are other versions which imply that Rabbi Akiva thinks that a husband may not stay married to one woman while he desires another. Rabbi Akiva’s ideal of marriage is one of love and such love cannot thrive when the husband desires another woman. Congratulations! We have finished Gittin. It is a tradition at this point to thank God for helping us to finish learning the tractate and to commit ourselves to going back and relearning it, so that we may not forget it and so that its lessons will stay with us for all of our lives. One of the most memorable parts of Gittin was the two middle chapters which discussed the concept of “tikkun olam” repairing the world. As we saw, “tikkun olam” means remedying economic, social and legal injustices in an attempt to make the world a more livable place. “Tikkun Olam” is always about going beyond the letter of the law. This is something we would do well to remember in general while learning rabbinic literature. Often what we are learning are the basic laws obligations and penalties. Clearly for the Jews and the rest of the world to have a just society, individuals must do more than just keep the law (although that would be a good start). They must look at each individual and individual situation and attempt to figure out what actions would aid in improving people’s lives and in avoiding conflict and pain, both now and in the future. Congratulations on making it through another tractate. May you have the strength and time to keep on learning more Mishnah! Tomorrow we begin the final tractate of Seder Nashim, tractate Kiddushin." + ] + ] + ] + }, + "schema": { + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה גיטין", + "enTitle": "English Explanation of Mishnah Gittin", + "key": "English Explanation of Mishnah Gittin", + "nodes": [ + { + "heTitle": "הקדמה", + "enTitle": "Introduction" + }, + { + "heTitle": "", + "enTitle": "" + } + ] + } +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Nashim/English Explanation of Mishnah Gittin/English/merged.json b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Nashim/English Explanation of Mishnah Gittin/English/merged.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..eb622a5b193b2cec57385bda9dd0259d35a07cd4 --- /dev/null +++ b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Nashim/English Explanation of Mishnah Gittin/English/merged.json @@ -0,0 +1,481 @@ +{ + "title": "English Explanation of Mishnah Gittin", + "language": "en", + "versionTitle": "merged", + "versionSource": "https://www.sefaria.org/English_Explanation_of_Mishnah_Gittin", + "text": { + "Introduction": [ + "The laws of divorce are taught in only four verses in Deuteronomy 24:1-4, verses which directly deal with the prohibition of remarriage. Interestingly, the Torah addresses the issue of divorce almost as an aside, something which everyone would know without a description. ", + "The first two verses read, “When a man takes a wife and has relations with her, and if she does not find favor in his eyes because he finds something obnoxious about her, and he writes her a bill of divorcement, hands it to her, and sends her away from his house; and she leaves his household and becomes the wife of another man…” From here the rabbis learn that divorce must be performed with a document, called a “get” which is Aramaic for document (and not connected to the English word, as in “get out of my house!). Divorce without a properly written document is invalid. Most of the laws of this tractate deal with how this document must be written and given. The rules can be quite strict, and to this day, gittin (the plural of get) are written by professional scribes. ", + "In Jewish law, the man must give the divorce document to his wife; she may not write a “get” and give it to him. However, under certain circumstances, many of which were discussed in Ketuboth, the court may force the husband to give his wife a get. ", + "The grounds for divorce, while a very important issue in divorce law, are not discussed until the last mishnah of the tractate. ", + "We should note that the issue of divorce was an issue of controversy among different groups of Jews in this period. As is well-known, Jesus, according to one of the gospels, took a strong stance against divorce. Less well-known is the fact that the Dead Sea sect also, in all likelihood, opposed divorce. The rabbis were in general quite lenient on divorce. How easy divorce should be, is something about which we can argue. Some may say too-easy divorce will lead to instability in marriage, while others may claim that easily attainable divorce is desirable, since a bad marriage is worse than a broken marriage. I should point out something that is not usually mentioned in these arguments. In the time of the Mishnah (and indeed until recently) marriages were typically arranged by the parents of the couple, while divorce was a decision taken by those married (or at least by the man). Those who allow for divorce provide more autonomy for the feelings of the couple than do those who forbid or put severe restrictions on divorce. Allowing divorce is in a sense saying that staying married is a decision based on the feelings of the couple themselves, be they feelings of love or security. Forbidding divorce causes the parents’ decision to become permanent, allowing no or little expression for the couple themselves. ", + "Finally, we should note two an important change in divorce law that was legislated around the year 1000 C.E. Rabbenu Gershom, a leading German rabbi, made a decree that men could not divorce their wives against their consent. This was an important balance to his other famous decree that prohibited bigamy. However, during the mishnaic and talmudic periods bigamy was permitted and men could divorce their wives against their will. \n" + ], + "": [ + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah teaches that messengers who deliver divorce documents from abroad must declare that the document was written and signed in their presence. In the Talmud there are two explanations for this requirement. The first is that if the husband comes to protest the get, saying that he did not send it, the people who heard the messenger testify that he saw it written and signed will be able to disregard a husband’s potential appeal. This is especially important if his wife had already remarried and had children. If her get is invalidated, her subsequent children would become mamzerim. The reason why the testimony of the messenger is only necessary if he comes from abroad is that in such a case it would be more difficult to find the original witnesses. Furthermore, in the ancient world travel was often dangerous, and the original witnesses could not always travel to testify concerning the validity of the get. The testimony of the messenger makes it easier to uphold the validity of the get, in essence a service for the woman. The other opinion in the Talmud, which is really an additional opinion, is that outside of the Land of Israel they were not knowledgeable in writing gittin. Therefore, someone who came from abroad had to testify that it was written properly. Those which were written in the Land of Israel did not need such testimony.", + "One who brings a get from abroad [to the Land of Israel] must declare, “In my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed.” This section was explained in the introduction.", + "Rabban Gamaliel says: even one who brings it from Rekem or from Heger. Rabbi Eleazar says: even one who brings it from Kefar Ludim to Lud. The sages, however, say: declaration “In my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed” is required only from one who brings a get from abroad or who takes it there. The tannaim in this section, Rabban Gamaliel, Rabbi Elazar and the other sages disagree with regard to the applicability of the halakhah in section one. According to Rabban Gamaliel, even if a messenger brings a get from towns such as Rekem or Heger which lie on the border, he must recite the formula. This is either because it is hard to bring the witnesses from these towns to testify, or because people who live on the border do not know how to properly write gittin. Rabbi Elazar adds that even if the two cities lie adjacent but one is in the land of Israel and one is not, such as Kefar Ludim, which is outside and Lud which is inside, one must still recite the formula. However, the sages disagree and hold that the formula must be recited only by one who brings a get from abroad, or one who brings one back from there. The reason that someone bringing a get from Israel to a different land must recite the formula is lest the original witnesses cannot be found in order to uphold the get.", + "One who brings [a get] from one province to another province in foreign lands is also required to declare, “In my presence it was written, and in my presence it was signed.” Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: even from one hegemony to another hegemony. Just as the messenger must make the declaration that the get was written and signed in his presence when bringing the get to and from Israel, so too must he make the declaration when bringing the get to and from provinces outside of the land. The reason is that the original witnesses may be difficult to find if there is a need to uphold the get. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel adds that even within one province, if he is switching hegemonies, places ruled by different governors, all within the Roman empire, he must make the declaration." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn this mishnah the tannaim continue to debate the definitions of what is inside the land of Israel and what is considered “abroad”, such that a messenger who brings a get from there must state, “In my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed.” Whereas in the previous mishnah, Rabban Gamaliel and Rabbi Eliezer debated the borders, in this mishnah Rabbi Judah and Rabbi Meir, who lived two generations later, debate.\nWe should note that the Hebrew word for “abroad” is literally translated, “the province of the sea.” This may mean a place accessible by sea travel but it may also mean coastal towns contiguous with the land of Israel. Often people would travel to coastal towns by sea, so there would be difficulty in bringing witnesses from there to the hinterland. Furthermore, these towns were usually more populated by Greek speakers, who settled on the coasts to control the trade. Jews, or at least Aramaic speaking, less Hellenistic Jews, tended to live inlands. Hence, the rabbis feared that those who live on the coast, “abroad”, do not know how to properly write a divorce document.", + "Rabbi Judah says: From Rekem eastwards, Rekem being like the east; from Ashkelon southwards, Ashkelon being like the south; and from Acco northwards, Acco being like the north. Rabbi Meir says: Acco counts as the land of Israel in the matter of bills of divorce. Rabbi Judah defines cities that he considers outside of the land of Israel, at least for issues of divorce. Rabbi Meir disagrees with him concerning Acco." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to deal with which messengers must recite the formula “In my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed.”", + "One who brings a get within the land of Israel need not declare, “In my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed.” If there are those who protest [its validity] it must be established through the signatures. A messenger who brings a get from one place within the land of Israel to another place need not say the formula “In my presence” etc. The formula is only mandatory for cases where it will be difficult to locate witnesses to validate the get. Within the borders of the land of Israel this will not be difficult. Furthermore, it was only people outside of the land who did not know how to write and sign gittin, and therefore the messenger had to testify to its validity. Within the land there was no such concern. If someone should come and protest the get, saying that it is false, the court could summons the witnesses.", + "If one who brings a get from abroad is not able to declare “In my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed”, if there are witnesses on it, its validity can be established through its signatures. This section discusses a messenger who did not see the get written and signed, and therefore cannot state, “In my presence…” In such a case, the default procedure is to validate the get through the witnesses who have signed on it. In this case the woman receiving the get cannot remarry until its validity has been proven. In contrast, in the above case, if the get is brought within Israel, she may remarry without validating the get. She only needs to validate if others protest its validity." + ], + [ + "Introduction Today’s mishnah begins to compare the laws concerning bills of divorce with those concerning writs of emancipation for slaves. These comparisons will continue until the end of the chapter. In Aramaic the word “get” means document and not necessarily just a divorce document. The word can refer to either divorce or emancipation documents, as well as other documents. Furthermore, there is some similarity to the two situations (marriage in the ancient world and slavery) and between the ways that the two documents (divorce and emancipation) are written. However, we should not think that the comparison between divorce and emancipation is complete. The major difference is that a man may sell his slave but he may of course not sell his wife.", + "Both bills of divorce and writs of emancipation are similar [concerning a messenger] who takes them [abroad from the land of Israel] to one who brings them [from abroad to the land of Israel]. The rules which we learned above concerning the declaration that a messenger must make upon presenting a get also apply to a messenger delivering a writ of emancipation. Whether he brings the get from Israel to a foreign land or brings it to Israel, the messenger bringing either document must say “In my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed.”", + "This is one of the ways in which bills of divorce are similar to writs of emancipation. This section introduces the similarities between the two documents which will be discussed in the following mishnayoth." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first section of this mishnah deals with documents whose signators are Samaritans. The Samaritans were a Jewish splinter group whose history is somewhat blurry. For more information on the Samaritans, see the introduction to Nedarim 3:10.\nThe second section of the mishnah deals with documents pertaining to Jews which were validated in non-Jewish courts. This was certainly a common phenomenon in the mishnaic periods. The Greco-Roman court system was well-developed, as were their laws. As subjects, if not always citizens, of the Roman Empire, Jews would have had some legal recourse to Roman courts and justice. Therefore, the rabbis had to discuss the validity of documents which were upheld in these courts.", + "Any document which has upon it the signature of a Samaritan is invalid, except for bills of divorce or a writ of emancipation. It happened that a bill of divorce was once brought before Rabban Gamaliel at Kefar Otnai and its witnesses were Samaritan, and he declared it valid. The mishnah teaches that all documents which have upon them signatures of people known to be Samaritans are invalid, except for bills of divorce or writs of emancipation. According to Albeck, Samaritans were suspected by the rabbis of lying with regard to issues of money, and therefore they could not serve as witnesses for matters such as loans and acquisitions. However, they were evidently not suspected of lying in matters of divorce or emancipation and hence they could serve as witnesses in these matters. Furthermore, they were assumed to be knowledgeable enough in matters of divorce and emancipation. Indeed, according to the mishnah, Rabban Gamaliel once allowed even two Samaritans to serve as witnesses on a get. This occurred at Kefar Otnai, in the southern Galilee.", + "All documents which are accepted in the courts of non-Jew, even if those who signed on the documents are non-Jews, are valid except bills of divorce and of writs of emancipation. Rabbi Shimon says: these also are valid; they were only pronounced [to be invalid] when done by ordinary persons. This section of the mishnah deals with documents that were upheld by non-Jewish courts or even signed by non-Jews. In this case, these documents are generally valid with the exception of divorce and emancipation documents. Monetary documents are valid, because non-Jews are trustworthy to adjudicate monetary matters. However, since they do not know the laws of Jewish divorce and emancipation, bills of divorce and writs of emancipation could not be upheld in non-Jewish courts, nor could those who signed them be non-Jewish. Rabbi Shimon partially disagrees with the opinion in the previous clause. According to him, the earlier opinion that said that divorce and emancipation documents done in non-Jewish courts are invalid, referred only to those done by courts which lack knowledge of the laws. However, if the court was an expert court, they may even draw up divorce and emancipation documents, even though they are not Jewish." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe topic of this mishnah is a man who instructs a messenger to give a get to his wife, or a writ of emancipation to his slave, and then changes his mind or dies before the document is delivered.", + "If a man says: “Give this get to my wife or this writ of emancipation to my slave”, if he wants he may change his mind on either document, the words of Rabbi Meir. The Sages say: he may change his mind in the case of the get but not in the case of the writ of emancipation, since a benefit may be conferred on a person not in his presence but a disability may be imposed on him only in his presence; for if he does not want to maintain his slave he is permitted, but if he does not want to maintain his wife he is not permitted. Rabbi Meir said to them: behold, he disqualifies his slave from eating terumah [by emancipating him] in the same way that he disqualifies his wife [by divorcing her]? They said to him: [the slave is disqualified] because he is the priest’s property. According to Rabbi Meir, the husband may change his mind after instructing an agent to give a get to his wife or a writ of emancipation to his slave. The Sages disagree and say that he may change his mind only with regard to the get. He may not change his mind with regard to the freeing of the slave. The reason is that there is a principle that one may confer benefit on another person not in that person’s presence, but one may not confer a disability on a person not in that person’s presence. In our situation, the woman/slave is not in the husband/master’s presence at the moment and that is why the husband is instructing a messenger. For the woman, divorce is a considerable disability for she loses her guaranteed source of income. Should the husband not want to provide maintenance for his wife (food, clothing etc.) he does not have the right to do so. He may not say to her, take whatever income you make and use it for your own maintenance. In contrast, the slave has no such guarantee. A master may say to his slave that he must provide his own maintenance. Note that a master may not tell his slave to work for the master and the master will not provide maintenance. The master may only stop providing maintenance, if he allows the slave to work for his own maintenance. Nevertheless, the slave’s income is not guaranteed as is that of the wife, therefore it is a total disability for him not to be freed. Since this is so, the master may not retract freeing his slave once he has told a messenger to do so. Rabbi Meir responds that in some ways freeing a slave is a disability and therefore, just as he can retract in giving the slave his manumission, so too he can retract from divorcing his wife. The disability for the slave is that if he was owned by a priest, he could eat terumah. Upon emancipation, he loses such a right. The sages respond that the slave’s eating terumah is not a “benefit”; rather it is something he is allowed to do because the master owns him. Indeed, the priest could sell his slave to an Israelite and thereby disqualify him from eating terumah without freeing him. Therefore, loss of terumah is not truly a disability to the slave.", + "If a man says, “Give this get to my wife or this writ of emancipation to my slave”, and dies [before they are given], they do not give [the documents] after his death. [If he said], “Give a maneh to so-and-so” and died, the money should be given after his death. In this case, the husband/master dies before the document is given. The mishnah teaches that in cases of divorce and emancipation, the messenger should not give the document after the husband/master’s death. A get and a writ of manumission do not go into effect until they are given. Since a dead man cannot divorce his wife or free his slave, the documents cannot be given after his death. In contrast, when a dying person gives a present, his mere statement transfers ownership. Therefore, the present should be given even after the giver’s death." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah returns to discussing one who delivers a get from abroad and is obligated to say, “In my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed.” Today’s mishnah deals with one who can only recite part of the formula.\nI should note that the Talmud provides a very complicated explanation for this mishnah. I have tried to explain according to the words of the mishnah without the Talmudic explanation.", + "If one brings a get from abroad and declares: “It was written in my presence” but not, “It was signed in my presence”; “It was signed in my presence” but not “It was written in my presence”; “All of it was written in my presence and in my presence but only one of the witnesses signed in my presence”; “Half was written in my presence but both witnesses signed in my presence”; [in all these cases] the get is invalid. In all of these cases one person brings the get, and he cannot recite the full formula. Even if he can recite nearly the whole formula but cannot honestly say that the entire get was written and fully signed by two witnesses in his presence, the get is invalid. As we learned above in 1:3, that this get is invalid means that in order for the woman to use this get to remarry, the witnesses themselves must verify their signatures or two witnesses must testify that they recognize both signatures. The testimony of the one who brought the get is not sufficient in and of itself.", + "If one says “It was written in my presence” and another says, “It was signed in my presence”, the get is invalid. In this case, one messenger testifies that the get was written in his presence but cannot say that it was signed in his presence, and the other person with him says that the get was signed in his presence but cannot say that the get was also written in his presence. Since there is no complete declaration made by any one messenger, the get is not valid. Again, this means that it remains invalid until its signatures are validated.", + "If two say, “It was written in our presence” and another says, “It was signed in my presence”, it is invalid. Rabbi Judah declares it valid. In this case two people bring the get and both can testify that the get was written in their presence, but neither can say that it was signed in their presence. A third person says that it was signed in his presence. The first opinion states that the get is still invalid, and still needs to be upheld by validating the signatures. Rabbi Judah holds that the get is already valid since there is full testimony by two witnesses on the writing. To Rabbi Judah, the writing is the essential part of the making of the get and if two testify that the writing was done properly, the get is valid. This is not through their being deliverers of the get, but rather through their being witnesses. However, one person saying that the writing was done properly is not valid, because one person is not full testimony in Jewish law.", + "If one says, “It was written in my presence” and two say, “It was signed in our presence”, it is valid. In this case two testify that they saw the get signed. This is essentially upholding the signatures on the get and it always makes the get valid. Again, these two function as witnesses." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIt is necessary to write the date inside a get. Our mishnah deals with a cases where the get was written on one day but signed on the night that follows, which is considered the following day according to the Jewish way of reckoning days and nights. In this case, the get’s date will not match the date upon which it is finalized.", + "If [a get was] written by day and signed on the [same] day, written by night and signed on the [same] night, written by night and signed on the day [following], it is valid. In all of these cases the get is valid since it was written and signed on the same day. Since the day follows the night in Jewish counting of days, if it was written at night and signed the following day, this still counts as being written and signed on the same day.", + "If it was written by day and signed on the night [following], it is invalid. Rabbi Shimon validates it, for Rabbi Shimon used to say that all documents written by day and signed on the [following] night are invalid except bills of divorce. However, if it was written by day and then later signed that night, the date written in the get does not match the actual date on which it was signed. The reason why documents must be written and signed on the same day is that documents can be used to collect collateral. A debt document creates a lien on another person’s property. For instance, if Reuven borrows 1,000 dollars from Shimon on the first of the month of Av, Shimon now has a lien on all the property that Reuven owned on that date. If Reuven subsequently gives or sells property to a third party and then defaults on his loan, Shimon may collect from the third party. However, Shimon’s lien takes priority only over other debts created after Shimon loaned the money. For this reason, documents whose dates precede their finalization, done in their signing, are invalid, lest someone try to defraud a third party. Since all other documents whose dates precede their finalization are invalid, divorce documents are as well. According to Rabbi Shimon, money is never collected based on the date written in the get. A woman collects her ketubah based on the date written in the ketubah. Therefore, the get which was written during the day but only signed at night is valid. Even though other documents whose date precedes their signing are invalid, gittin are valid." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first section of this mishnah discusses what can be used to write a get. The second section deals with what gittin may be written on.", + "They write [a get] with any material, with ink, with arsenic, with red chalk, with gum or with sulfate of copper or with anything which is lasting. It may not be written with liquids or with fruit juice or with anything that is not lasting. The writing materials in the first part of this section are lasting and those in the second part are not lasting. The get should not be written with something that can easily be erased. We should note that since parchment and paper were scarce and expensive in the ancient world, people often reused paper, scratching off the previous layer and starting afresh.", + "They write [a get] on anything: on an olive leaf, on the horn of an ox and he must give her the ox, or on the hand of a slave--and he must give her the slave. Rabbi Yose the Galilean says: they do not write [a get] on anything living or on food. The get need not be written only on a scroll, as seems to be prescribed in the Deuteronomy 24:1. Rather it can be written on nearly any material. The one condition is that there must be no step between the writing of the get and its being given to the woman. This is the reason that if the get is written on the horn of an ox, he must give her the ox, or if on the hand of the slave, he must give her the slave. He cannot cut the ox’s horn off and give it to her, for that would be an added step. This halakhah is derived from the verse “And he writes her a bill of divorcement and puts it in her hand” (Deuteronomy 24:1). The writing must lead directly to the giving. Rabbi Yose the Galilean says it may not be written on anything that is still alive (like the horn of an ox or the hand of a slave) or is food. The Torah says it should be written on a scroll. While Rabbi Yose the Galilean does not require it to be written on a scroll, he says that it must be somewhat similar to a scroll, which is neither alive nor serves as food." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to deal with what a get may be written on.", + "They do not write [a get] on something still attached to the ground. As we explained in yesterday’s mishnah, there can be no steps done to the get in between it’s having been completed and its being given to the woman. In yesterday’s mishnah that meant that if written on the horn of a cow, the husband has to give her the cow. Cutting off the cow’s horn and giving her the horn would not be valid. Today we learn that the get cannot be written on something still attached to the ground, for then the husband would have to cut it down in order to give it to his wife. He cannot give her the land to which the get is attached, because land cannot be transferred from hand to hand.", + "If he wrote it on something still attached, and then detached and signed and given to the wife, it is valid. Rabbi Judah invalidates it until it is both written and signed on something detached from the ground. In this case, he wrote the get on something that was still attached to the ground, but then he detached it before he gave it to her. According to the first opinion, the signing of the get is the essential part, and therefore, as long as it was done on something detached from the ground, the get is valid. Rabbi Judah, however, holds that it is invalid unless it is written and signed on something which is already detached from the ground.", + "Rabbi Judah ben Batera says: they do not write [a get] on a sheet from which writing has been erased nor on semi-finished parchment, for it can be faked. But the sages validate [such a get]. As I stated in yesterday’s mishnah, in the ancient world paper/parchment was scarce and expensive. Therefore they would reuse paper. There were types of materials which were rough and meant for reuse. Rabbi Judah ben Batera invalidates such writing materials for gittin, since they can be forged. Someone might erase one person’s name and write in another’s and the forgery would not be recognizable. However, the Sages say that we are not concerned about forgeries in the writing of the get. The Talmud explains that it is the witnesses who see the get being given to the woman who are critical. They will read the get when it is given to the woman and if afterwards someone tries to forge the get, these witnesses will be able to testify as to what was really written on it." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first section of this mishnah deals with who may write a get, and the second section with who may deliver a get.", + "All are qualified to write a get, even a deaf-mute, an imbecile and a minor. A woman may write her own get and a man his own receipt [for the ketubah], since the document is upheld only by its signatures. Anyone can write a get including people who were categorically considered not to have “awareness”. These people can write a get even though they would not even understand what they are doing (remember that in the ancient world deaf people were wrongly considered to lack intelligence), because as we see below, the critical issue with the get is that it is signed by valid witnesses. Similarly, a woman may write her own get (this would make for an interesting scenario), and a man may write his own receipt for having paid the ketubah to his wife. Since the get is upheld not by checking who wrote it but who signed it, it matters not who does the writing. Although the woman has written her own get, the witnesses will not sign it unless they are sure that it was written upon the husband’s directive. Similarly, witnesses will not sign a receipt for payment unless they know that the husband paid the money to the wife.", + "All are qualified to bring a get except a deaf-mute, an imbecile, a minor, a blind person and a non-Jew. Almost anybody can deliver a get from a husband to his wife. The exceptions are again those people who categorically do not have awareness. In all areas of halakhah, someone who does not have “awareness” cannot act as someone else’s agent. A blind person can also not deliver a get, even though blind people were not considered to lack “awareness”. The Talmud explains this to mean that he cannot deliver a get from abroad to Israel because he cannot say “In my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed.” Note that blind people were considered to have “awareness”, unlike deaf-mutes who could not really communicate. Non-Jews cannot marry or divorce Jews and therefore cannot serve as agents for delivering a get." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is a continuation of the end of yesterday’s mishnah which discussed those categories of people who are disqualified from delivering a get.", + "If the minor had received the get [in order to deliver it] and then became of age; or the deaf-mute [received the get and then] his speech was restored; or the blind person [received the get and then] his sight was restored; or the imbecile [received the get and then] his reason returned; or the Gentile [received the get and then] converted, [the get] is invalid. In this case a person received the get while disqualified to deliver it (see yesterday’s mishnah) and then his/her status changed to one who is qualified to deliver the get before he/she delivered it. Since the person was disqualified when receiving the get in order to deliver it, the delivery is invalid, even though by the time the get was actually delivered the person was in a valid category.", + "But if a person of sound senses [received the get] and then became a deaf-mute and then recovered his speech; or one with sight [received the get and then] became blind and then recovered his sight; or one who was sane [received the get and then] went insane and then recovered his reason, [the get] is valid. The general principle is that anyone who begins and finishes [his mission] in full possession of his mental faculties is qualified. In this case the person was qualified to deliver the get when it was received and when it was delivered but while in the process he/she briefly entered a status of one who is disqualified. As explained at the end of the mishnah, since the person was qualified at the two critical moments, the reception of the get from the husband and the delivery to the wife, the delivery is valid. The fact that the person was temporarily invalid in-between is immaterial. Note that this section cannot include a person who was Jewish and then apostatized to another religion and then returned to Judaism for in the eyes of Jewish law, a Jew cannot legally convert to another religion." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah makes reference to Yevamoth 15:4. That mishnah teaches that some women may not testify that another woman’s husband has died. The fear is that these women will intentionally lie in order to trick the woman into remarrying while her husband is still alive, thereby causing an irreparable rupture in their marriage. In our mishnah we learn that although these women are not trusted to testify regarding the death of the husband, they are trusted to deliver a get.", + "Even the women who are not trusted to say “Her husband died,” are trusted to bring her get: her mother-in-law, the daughter of her mother-in-law, her rival wife, her sister-in-law (husband’s brother’s and the daughter of her husband. These five women may dislike or even hate a wife and therefore cannot testify that her husband died (see Yevamoth 15:4). As stated in the introduction, these women may nevertheless deliver a get to a wife, thereby showing to her that she is divorced and allowed to remarry.", + "What is the difference between the get and death? The writing [on the get] proves [that she is divorced.] In this section the mishnah questions why these women can deliver a get but not testify regarding a husband’s death. The answer is that the get’s validity is ultimately proved by those who wrote and signed the get, and not by the person who delivered it. Although an agent delivering a get is under certain circumstances required to declare “In my presence it was signed and in my presence it was delivered”, this is not truly testimony, but rather a means of allowing the get to be accepted without checking its validity. This is why those who are not allowed to testify can still deliver a get and make the above declaration. In contrast, testifying that a husband has died is truly testimony. Therefore, since we fear that these women may lie, they are not trusted. [Note that women in general are allowed to testify regarding a husband’s death in order to lessen the problem of wives not knowing if their husbands have died.]", + "A woman may bring her own get but she must say, “In my presence it was signed and in my presence it was delivered.” Theoretically speaking a woman could even bring her own get and this would not be considered testifying about herself, since the writing on the get proves its validity. However, she is still required to state, “In my presence it was signed and in my presence it was delivered”, the statement that is always required when a get is brought from abroad to the land of Israel. This situation could happen if the husband gave her the get outside of Israel but told her that he didn’t want the divorce to be enacted until she reached Israel. A truly Zionist husband!" + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah teaches that a get must be written with the express intention to divorce the specific woman to whom it will eventually be given. This rule is derived from a midrash on Deuteronomy 24:1, “And he writes for her”. The words “for her” are interpreted to mean that the get must be written specifically for her. Our mishnah will illustrate this principle.", + "Any get which is not written [expressly] for the woman [for whom it is intended] is invalid. How is this so? This mishnah introduces the halakhah mentioned in the introduction, according to which a get must be expressly written for the woman who will be divorced with it. The rest of this mishnah will illustrate this principle.", + "If a man was passing through the street and heard the voice of a scribe dictating “So-and-so divorces so-and-so from such and such a place” and he says “that is my name and that is the name of my wife”, it is not a valid [document] with which to divorce his wife. In this scenario, a scribe was teaching his students to practice writing divorce documents. These documents were probably always written by scribes, as they require great skill and precision. A man walking by heard the scribe and noticed that the names being used matched those of his and his wife. It dawned on him, wow, I could use this to divorce my wife (I believe that this is intentionally humorous, so you are permitted to chuckle.) The document was only for practice and was not written to be used at all, and therefore certainly cannot be considered as having been written for a specific woman.", + "Moreover: if he wrote [a get] with which to divorce his wife and changed his mind and a person found him and said to him, “My name is the same as yours and my wife’s name the same as your wife's”, it is not a valid [document with which the second] may divorce his wife. In this case, the document was written to be used to divorce, but not to be used by this husband to divorce this wife, but rather for different people who happen to have the same name. Since it was not written for this man’s wife, he may not use it, even though the names are appropriate.", + "Moreover: if he had two wives with the same name and wrote a get with which to divorce the elder, he may not use it to divorce the younger. In this case, the correct husband wrote the get, but he wrote it with the intention to divorce one of his wives and now he wants to divorce the other. Since the get was not written to be given to the younger wife, he may not use it to divorce her. As an aside, you can imagine how interesting family life must have been for the family in which a husband married to two women with the same name! If you think Jacob had problems with Leah and Rachel, think of this family. (Again, I think this is supposed to make you crack a smile, so feel free).", + "Moreover: if he said to the scribe, “Write [a get] and I will divorce whichever I choose,” it is not a valid [document] with which to divorce his wife. Finally, a husband cannot tell a scribe to write out a get, leave the name of the woman blank, and then the husband will later decide which wife he wishes to divorce. In this case, the “correct” husband wrote the get, and he did not actively intend to give it to a different wife. Nevertheless, the positive intention to give it to a specific wife is lacking and hence the get is invalid." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThere are two parts of any document, called in Hebrew the “tofes” and the “toref”. The “tofes” is the general formula which is used in all of these types of documents. The “toref” is the place where the names of the parties involved, the amount of money involved and the time and place where the matter referred to in the document was performed.\nIn the previous mishnah we learned that a divorce document must be written expressly for the woman to whom it will be given. Our mishnah deals with the validity of divorce documents whose “tofes” was written without this specific intention.", + "[A scribe] who writes out formulas of bills of divorce must leave blank spaces for the name of the man and the name of the woman and the date. [A scribe who writes] loan documents must leave blank spaces for the name of the lender, the name of the borrower, the amount of money and the date. [A scribe who writes] sale documents must leave blank spaces for the name of the seller, the name of the purchaser, the amount of money, the property and the date; [These spaces must be left blank] because of the “takkanah” (. According to the first opinion in this mishnah, a scribe may write out document formulas before he knows who or under what circumstances the documents will be used, but he must leave the “toref”, the details, blank. The mishnah lists three types of documents: divorce, loan and sale. The reason that these spaces must be left blank in a divorce document is that if they are not, the get will not have been written expressly for the woman to whom it will be given. This is according to the halakhah which we learned in yesterday’s mishnah. The loan and sales documents do not have such a requirement. Nevertheless, according to this opinion they too cannot be fully filled out beforehand because if the rabbis allow this, scribes will do the same with divorce documents. This is called a “fence around the Torah”, a stringency meant to prevent people from doing that which is truly problematic. The rabbis forbade filling out all documents lest divorce documents were also fully written out. The mishnah cryptically explains that these must be left blank “because of the takkanah”, or “enactment”, without explain what the “takkanah” is. There are several explanations for this, each of which is not without its problems. One explanation is that the “takkanah” was that scribes may write the formulas ahead of time so that when people request a certain document that document would be readily available. The problem with this explanation is that the mishnah seems to state that the “takkanah” was that the spaces should be left blank and not that scribes might write the formulas. A second explanation is that the “takkanah” was that they shouldn’t write out the entire document, so that people would not be rash in selling their property or borrowing money. This is a decent explanation for the sales and lending documents, but does not explain well the issue of the divorce documents, which are invalid if fully written out even without a special “takkanah.”", + "Rabbi Judah disqualifies all of them. Rabbi Judah disqualifies all of these documents. According to the Talmud, he forbids writing the formula (“tofes”) of the get, lest the scribe come to also write the specifics, which according to the midrash must be written for the specific woman. He also disqualifies loan and sales documents whose formulas were pre-written lest a scribe pre-write a divorce document. We can see that he is doubly strict, creating many “fences” around what is actually prohibited (pre-writing the details of the get).", + "Rabbi Elazar validates all of them valid except divorce documents, as it says, “He writes for her” (Deut 24:1), expressly for her. Rabbi Elazar partially agrees with Rabbi Judah. He agrees that pre-writing the divorce formula is forbidden, and this he derives from the midrash. According to his interpretation, the entire get must be written with a specific woman in mind, and not just the “tofes”. However, he agrees with the opinion in section one that the formulas of other documents may be written ahead of time. He is not concerned that if the halakhah allows the scribe to pre-write these documents, the scribe might pre-write divorce documents as well." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first half of this mishnah deals with a get that was temporarily lost on its way from the husband to the wife.\nThe second half deals with a sick or old husband who sent a get to his wife. The question is whether or not the one bringing it can assume that the husband is still alive when he (the one bringing the get) arrives at the wife?", + "One who brings a get and loses it on the way: If he finds it immediately it is valid, and if not it is not valid. If he finds it in a small bag or in a folder if he recognizes it, it is valid. If a messenger loses a get, we fear that the get that he finds is not the same get that he lost, and therefore the get will not have been written for that specific woman. Note that the names written on the found get have to be the same as those on the lost get, otherwise it will be clear that it is not the same get. However, as we learned in previous mishnayoth, similar names may not have been so uncommon. If the get is immediately found, it is still valid. But if time elapses we are concerned that the one bringing the get found a different get, even though the names are the same. Furthermore, if he recognizes the bag or folder which he was using to carry the get, and the get is still inside, the get is valid even if it was found after time had elapsed. The likelihood that a get with the same names as the lost get would get into a bag that looks exactly the same as the lost bag is too remote for concern.", + "If one brings a get and left [the husband] when [the husband] was an old man or sick, he should deliver it to her on the presumption that he is still alive. A woman may not be divorced from her husband after he died. The importance of this halakhah is in the realm of levirate marriage. A woman whose husband died before he had offspring is liable for yibbum (levirate marriage), whereas a woman who was divorced is not. Since a get goes into effect the moment that the woman receives it, and not when given to the messenger to deliver, it is important to know if the husband was alive when the get was delivered to the woman. Nevertheless, the mishnah states that the person delivering the get should not be concerned lest the husband died after he (the one delivering the get) received it. He may deliver it to the wife even if the husband was an old or sick man and presume that the husband is still alive.", + "If the daughter of an ordinary Israelite is married to a priest and her husband goes abroad, she continues eating terumah on the presumption that he is still alive. The mishnah now brings two halakhot which employ a similar principle, that is we assume that a person is still alive until it is known that he has died. A woman who eats terumah because she is married to a priest can continue to do so even if her husband went on a long trip and she no longer knows if he is alive.", + "If a man sends a sin-offering from abroad they sacrifice it on the presumption that he is still alive. Similarly, the priests at the Temple may offer up a sin-offering which was sent from abroad under the assumption that its owner who sent it is still alive. Had they known that the owner had died, the animal would not be able to be sacrificed." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn yesterday’s mishnah we learned that one who delivers a get from a husband to his wife may assume that the husband is alive, even if the husband was old or sick. The mishnah followed with two other cases where we can act as if a certain person is still alive. Our mishnah deals with three statements made by Rabbi Elazar ben Parta which deal with assuming that a person is still alive.", + "Three statements were made by Rabbi Elazar ben Parta before the Sages, and they upheld his words. Rabbi Elazar ben Parta spoke about three different situations, each of which can be divided into two different possibilities. The other Sages in front of whom he spoke accepted his reasoning.", + "About [people in] a besieged town; And about [people on] a ship listing at sea; And a person who has been brought to court [in a capital case] that they are presumed to be alive. We may presume that a person in a besieged town, or a person on a ship listing at sea and threatening to sink, or a person who is being tried in a capital case is still alive. This presumption may be made even if we don’t know for sure that the person is still alive. Therefore, if the man is a priest, his Israelite wife may continue to eat terumah under the assumption that he is still alive. If the man is an Israelite and his wife is the daughter of a priest, she may not eat terumah because we assume that her husband is still alive.", + "[However, concerning people] in a besieged town which has been captured; Or [people in] a ship which has been lost at sea; Or a person who has been led out to execution we put upon them all of the stringencies of their being alive and all of the stringencies of their being dead. The daughter of an Israelite who has married a priest or the daughter of a priest who has married an Israelite may not eat of the terumah. In these cases we cannot assume that the person is still alive, but neither can we be sure that he/she is dead. Rabbi Elazar ben Parta says that it is likely enough that the person is dead that we cannot continue to act as if he/she is alive. Therefore, we have to rule strictly in either case. If a husband in one of these situations was a priest and he had a wife who was the daughter of an Israelite she can no longer eat terumah because her husband may be dead. If she was the daughter of a priest married to an Israelite she still cannot eat terumah because her husband may still be alive." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with a person who becomes sick while delivering a get inside the land of Israel. In tomorrow’s mishnah we shall deal with a person who becomes sick while bringing a get from abroad.", + "If one bringing a get in the land of Israel becomes sick, he can send it with another. As we learned in chapter one, a person who delivers a get within the land of Israel need not state, “In my presence it was written and signed.” Therefore, there is no problem with giving the get to another person, should the original person not be able to complete the delivery due to sickness.", + "But if [the husband] said to him, “Take for me from her such-and-such an object”, he may not send it [the get] with another, since the husband may not want his deposit in the hand of another. In this case, the husband told his agent to do two things: 1) bring the get; 2) retrieve something from his wife. While we can assume that the husband will not mind someone else delivering the get, he may not trust a different person to recover his belonging. Therefore, the agent cannot even send the get with another person, since that other person cannot retrieve the object." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah discusses a person who is delivering a get from abroad and cannot complete his delivery.", + "If one bringing a get from abroad becomes sick, he may arrange a court of law and send him [on with the get,] declaring before them, “In my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed.” Generally, the person who was charged to bring the get should bring it himself. If he cannot because he becomes sick on the way, he cannot merely give it to another messenger because the husband did not give him permission to do so. In order to deliver the get to the wife, he will need to set up a court of law consisting of three judges and make his declaration in front of them. The court may then, on the husband’s behalf, appoint an agent to deliver the get.", + "And the last agent is not required to say, “In my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed”, rather he declares, “I am the messenger of a court.” The agent sent from the court obviously cannot say, “In my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed”, which the person delivering the get usually needs to say, because that would not be true. Upon delivering the get, what he can say is “I am the messenger of the court.” We can trust that the court would not have sent him had the get not been executed properly. As an aside, by calling him “the last agent” the mishnah alludes to the fact that this may not be the original agent sent by the court. The passing of the get from one agent to the other may happen many times." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to deal with situations in which we assume that a person is still alive even though we cannot be sure that he is.", + "If a man lends money to a priest or a levite or a poor man on condition that he can may separate [terumah or tithes] from their portion, he may do so, in the presumption that they are still alive, and he need be concerned that the priest or the levite may have died or the poor man may have become rich. In this scenario a person loans money to a priest, Levite or poor person with the agreement that the debt will be worked off by the person withholding terumah (given to the priest), first tithe (to the Levite) or poor tithe (the poor person) which he would have given to them. In such a case, the person will harvest his produce and separate terumah and tithes as he normally does. The terumah he must sell to another priest but he may keep the money for himself as payment for his debt. Note that he may not eat the terumah since terumah is strictly forbidden to non-priests. The tithes he may eat himself, since non-Levites and people who are not poor may eat tithes. The person paying off his debt need not be concerned that the priest or Levite died or that the poor person is no longer poor. As we learned in the previous mishnayoth, we can assume that a person is still alive until we have strong reason to believe otherwise.", + "If they died, he must obtain the permission of the heirs. If he made the loan in the presence of the court, he need not obtain permission from the heirs. If the lender knows that the priest, Levite or poor person died, he may not continue the arrangement without obtaining permission from the heirs. Since the heirs may prefer to pay back the debt, the lender must let them know what about the arrangement. Assumedly they will find the arrangement acceptable. Furthermore, if the arrangement was made in the presence of the court, he need not obtain their permission. The court has the power to finalize the debt such that the debtor may not preemptively pay it back." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe previous several mishnayoth taught that a person need not be concerned lest someone might have died. Our mishnah teaches that a person need not be concerned lest some produce that he set aside has spoiled.", + "If a man sets aside produce in order to count it as terumah and tithe, or money in order to count it as second tithe, he may continue to count it as such in the presumption that they still exist. The person here set aside some produce in another place for it to count as tithe so that he could eat other produce without tithing it. Or he set aside some money to count it as the redemption money for second tithe. This redemption money will eventually be brought to Jerusalem and consumed there. He may continue to eat his produce, assuming that the things he set aside still exist.", + "If they are lost, he must be concerned from time period to time period, the words of Rabbi Elazar ben Shammua. Rabbi Judah says: at three seasons they check the wine: when the east wind begins to blow at the end of Sukkot, when the buds first appear [on the vine], and when the juice begins to form in the grapes. According to R. Elazar b. Shammua, if he comes back and discovers that the produce is lost, meaning it has gone bad, he must assume that it was lost within the last 24 hours. This means that he had unwittingly eaten untithed produce for the last 24 hours, and will have to repay that amount to the priests. R. Judah says that they check the wine at only three seasons to ensure that it has not gone bad. Thus he would have to assume that any wine he had left over in order for it to count as tithes and terumah had spoiled some time between the last check and the current period." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThe fourth chapter of Gittin begins by discussing a husband who sends a get to his wife and then attempts to annul the get. The general rule is that as long as the get has not yet gotten to her hand, he may annul the get.", + "If man sends a get to his wife and then catches up with the messenger, or sends a messenger after the original messenger, and says to him, “The get which I gave you is annulled”, then it is annulled. In this case after sending the get to his wife with a messenger, the husband either catches up with the original messenger or sends a second messenger to catch up with the first and one of them tells the original messenger that the get is cancelled. The mishnah rules that the get is cancelled. Since the woman is not divorced until she receives the get, the husband may cancel it any time until this point.", + "If the husband arrives at his wife before [the messenger] or sends a messenger to her and says, “The get which I sent to you is annulled”, then it is annulled. In this case, the husband or his agent does not chase after the original messenger but rather the husband or his agent arrives at the wife before the messenger does. Again, since she has not yet received the get, the get is annulled. In both of these cases, even if the messenger should subsequently give her the get she is not divorced.", + "Once the get has reached her hand, he cannot annul it. However, once she has received the get she is no longer his wife and there isn’t anything he can do about it." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first section of our mishnah continues to discuss a husband who attempts to cancel his get after he has already sent it to his wife. In this section, a “takkanah” of Rabban Gamaliel is mentioned. “Takkanah” literally means “a fixing”, and it refers to a rabbinic decree which remedies a problematic situation. The remainder of this chapter and the next chapter contain lists of “takkanot”, made because of “tikkun olam” fixing the world or other related reasons. Today this concept has come to mean good deeds such as charity done in order to make the world a better place. In the Mishnah its meaning was more specific and it usually refers to correct either problems created because of marital laws or economic injustices.\nThroughout the Mishnah I will leave the term “tikkun olam” untranslated, as there is no word that precisely captures its meaning. I also think that the best way to understand the mishnaic meaning of “tikkun olam” is through the examples used by the Mishnah itself.", + "Originally, a husband would bring together a court wherever he was and annul the get. Rabban Gamaliel the Elder established that this should not be done, because of “tikkun olam”. In yesterday’s mishnah we learned that if a husband catches up with someone delivering a get to his wife or arrives at his wife before the messenger gets there and delivers the get, he may annul the get. Today we learn that in older times the husband could gather together a court and in front of them annul the get i without getting to his messenger or his wife. This would be extremely problematic for the wife because she might not know that her husband had annulled the get. If she were to assume that the get was valid and that she was divorced, she might remarry and have children. In such a scenario, her second marriage would be illegitimate and her children with her new husband would be mamzerim, because she is still married. Another problem would be that women receiving gittin by messenger would not know if the get was valid, because their husbands may have annulled it. To avoid problems they wouldn’t remarry. To prevent these complications Rabban Gamaliel the Elder who lived during the time of the Second Temple established that people should not do this.", + "Originally the husband would change his name, or his wife’s name, or the name of his town or of his wife’s town. Rabban Gamaliel the Elder established that he should write, “The man so-and-so or any name that he has,”; “the woman so-and-so or any name that she has,” because of “tikkun olam.” In mishnaic times people evidently would have several different names, names which may have been used in different regions or perhaps by speakers of different languages (i.e. a Greek name and a Hebrew name). The problem arose in identifying the get who was the husband or who was the wife. This is what the mishnah means “change his name” etc. The husband would write only one of his names, or his wife’s names or his town’s name and then he would claim that the get was not his and thereby annul it. Rabban Gamaliel established that the husband should write “The man so-and-so or any name that he has” so that annulling the get after the wife has received it would be impossible. Some commentators interpret this to mean that this formula itself should be written in the get, whereas other commentators hold this to mean that inside the get the husband must list all of the names that he goes by." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nToday’s mishnah contains three different “takkanot”, decrees meant to remedy situations. The first was made by Rabban Gamaliel the Elder, as were those in yesterday’s mishnah. The second is anonymous and the third was made by Hillel.", + "A widow is paid back [her kethubah] from the property of orphans only by taking an oath. [When the court] refrained from imposing an oath on her, Rabban Gamaliel the Elder established that she could take any vow which the orphans wanted and collect her kethubah. We learned this law in Ketuboth 9:7-8. If a widow wants to collect her ketubah money from her husband’s orphans, she must take an oath that she has not already collected. In our mishnah we learn that at some point courts began to refrain from imposing an oath upon her, for fear that she would swear falsely. It is not that she would lie but that she would think that the money she had collected from her husband’s estate was not really her ketubah but payment for helping take care of her husband’s children. If the court would not impose an oath upon her then she could not collect the ketubah and she would be left without any money. In order to fix this problem the rabbis said that the widow could circumvent the court by taking any vow that the orphans so choose. The vow would be something like, “Let such and such an object become forbidden to me if I have already collected my ketubah.” This change in the law also kept the court from being involved in potentially false oaths.", + "Witnesses sign their names on a get because of tikkun olam. According to the letter of the law (contrasted with “takkanot”), a get is valid even if the witnesses had not signed on it. As long as they saw that it was written by the directive of the husband and given to the wife, the get is valid. However, without witnesses written on the get it will be more difficult to validate. Therefore the rabbis established that the get should be signed. We can see that the “tikkun olam” here was done in order to make it easier to validate a get, something that would have been in the best interests of the woman.", + "Hillel instituted the prosbul because of tikkun olam. The third takkanah of our mishnah is the famous takkanah of the prozbul. I shall explain this takkanah briefly. According to the Torah all debts are remitted in the seventh year. While this may be thought of as a benefit for the borrower (and in a perfect society perhaps it would be), in reality it could work against him. If lenders see that their loans will be erased in the seventh year they might not lend money, thereby making it difficult for those in need to take out loans. In order to remedy this problem Hillel established that a creditor could write out a document through which he transmits all debts to the court. According to the rabbis’ interpretation of the Torah, debts to the court are not remitted in the seventh year. In this way the creditor’s loans are not erased and the interests of those who need to borrow money (i.e. farmers) are also served." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThese two mishnayoth discuss the emancipation of slaves.", + "A [non-Jewish] slave [of a Jew] was taken captive and then ransomed [by a third party]: If [he is ransomed] to be a slave he goes back to slavery, If [he is ransomed] as a free man he does not go back to slavery. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: in either case he goes back to slavery. If a non-Jewish slave is taken captive and held for ransom and then his ransom is paid, according to the first opinion in the mishnah his return to slavery depends upon the intent of the one who paid his ransom. Since the original master didn’t offer up the ransom himself, he loses the ability to decide whether the slave remains a slave. According to another source, if the person who paid the ransom decides that he should remain a slave to his former master, the master must pay back the ransom money. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel holds that in any case the slave returns to his previous owner. The Yerushalmi explains that this is in order to prevent the slave from running away. Another explanation is that the first opinion in the mishnah holds that there is no commandment to redeem slaves. Therefore, by paying his ransom the redeemer has in essence purchased the slave and may do with him as he wishes. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel holds that there is a commandment to redeem slaves owned by Jews. Since the redeemer fulfilled a commandment he did not acquire the slave and the slave returns to his owner. We should note that there are several other explanations of this mishnah.", + "If a man makes his slave a pledge [for a debt] to another man and then he emancipates him, according to the “letter of the law” the slave is not liable to do anything. But because of tikkun olam we force his [second] master to emancipate him and he [the slave] writes a document for his purchase price. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says that the slave does not write the document but rather the one who emancipates him. In this case Reuven loans Shimon money, and as a pledge (like pawning) for his loan, Reuven takes Shimon’s slave. Shimon still owns the slave and therefore can free the slave despite the loan. In such a case, according to the letter of the law the slave is totally free and need not do anything. However, to protect the slave from an angry Reuven, the court forces Reuven to write out an emancipation document, as if he too has freed the slave. The slave then writes out a document stating how much he is worth, and with this document Reuven can try to recover his loan from Shimon. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says that the original owner (Shimon) writes out the document for he is the one who damaged the lender’s lien on his assets by freeing the pledged slave. If the debtor writes the document, the creditor is more likely to recoup his loss." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with a person who is half a slave and half free. This could happen if he was owned jointly by two masters and one of his masters freed him but not the other.", + "One who is half a slave and half free works for his master one day and for himself one day, the words of Beth Hillel. Beth Hillel seems to make a reasonable suggestion for what to do in this situation. The half-slave splits his time between working for his master and working for himself.", + "Beth Shammai said to them: you have set things right for the master but you have not set things right for the slave. He cannot marry a female slave because he is already half free, and he cannot marry a free woman because he is half a slave. Shall he then decease [from having children]? But wasn’t the world only made to be populated, as it says, “He did not create it as a waste, he formed it to be inhabited” (Isaiah 45:18)? Rather because of tikkun olam we compel his master to emancipate him and he writes a document for half his purchase price. Beth Shammai responds in what is in my opinion one of the more remarkable statements in the Mishnah. Beth Hillel’s solution for the half slave is beneficial to his master but leaves the half slave in an untenable position. Slaves and free people cannot marry. Since this person is a half slave, he can marry neither a slave nor a free woman. However, the commandment of having children “be fruitful and multiply” applies to everyone, even slaves and half slaves. The halakhah cannot allow a situation where a person has no one to marry. The world, after all, was formed by God for it to be inhabited, and not for it to lay desolate of human beings. Therefore, because of tikkun olam, his master is forced to free him, thereby allowing him to marry a free woman. The slave merely writes a document for half of his value and owes that amount to the owner.", + "Beth Hillel retracted [their opinion and] ruled like Beth Shammai. Indeed, Beth Shammai’s argument was so compelling that Beth Hillel changed their opinion and ruled like Beth Shammai." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThere are four sections to our mishnah. The first deals with selling slaves to Gentiles or to an owner who lives outside the land of Israel. The last three clauses deal with redeeming captives or sacred objects taken captive.\nUnfortunately, I should note that as I write these lines (many months before you read them) the issue of captives and the price we pay to redeem them is terribly relevant, both in Israel and in the entire world. Muslim extremists are regularly taking captives (often innocent bystanders and not soldiers) and threatening them with beheading in order to force the political hands of countries with whom they are at war. In Israel a hotly debated topic is whether to exchange live prisoners for the bodies of Israeli soldiers killed in battle or even for knowledge of the whereabouts of their bodies. While the mishnah seems to have simple answers for the question of how to deal with these situations, we should note that real life situations are complex, involve people’s families and political forces that differ from situation to situation. One thing which I think all can agree upon is to pray that our leaders have the wisdom to deal with these situations as best as possible, to when possible redeem captured soldiers, journalists and others, to prevent others from being taken captive in the future, and to put a stop to the terrible people who commit these crimes.", + "If a man sells his slave to a Gentile or [to someone living] outside the land [of Israel] the slave goes free. According to halakhah, a slave owned by a Jew is obligated to observe most of the commandments. If a slave-owner sells a slave to a non-Jew he has put a person obligated in the commandments into a position where he will not be able to observe the commandments. Therefore, the halakhah demands that such a slave go free. Whether or not the non-Jew will observe the halakhah is a different question. The mishnah seems to be presuming a situation of Jewish political sovereignty. Secondly, we learned in Ketuboth 13:11 that a husband cannot force his wife to leave the land of Israel (neither can a wife force her husband). Here we see that a master cannot force even his slave to be sold to someone living outside of the land.", + "Captives should not be redeemed for more than their value, because of tikkun olam. Redeeming captives for more than their price will obviously encourage captors to continue to take and ransom innocent people and to charge exorbitant prices for their return. Therefore this practice is forbidden. Note that the rabbis do not forbid redeeming captives and paying ransoms, but those ransoms must not be exorbitant. It seems to me that the rabbis are searching for the middle road, somewhere between respect for the life of the person taken captive and fear that paying a ransom will encourage further capturing.", + "Captives should not be helped to escape, because of tikkun olam. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says [that the reason is] to prevent the ill-treatment of fellow captives. According to the first opinion, rescuing captives, while effective in the present, may encourage future captors to take more drastic measures to keep their captives under lock. Saving one person now may cause many others in the future to be treated in a very harsh manner. Therefore, they should not be rescued. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says we are not concerned about future captives but rather about those currently being held. If we rescue some captives, those that remain in captivity will be ill-treated, and perhaps even killed. However, if there are no other captives and we can successfully rescue all those that are currently under captivity, we should make such an attempt. Again, we should note exactly what the rabbis were trying to accomplish the safe return of current captives while at the same time the prevention of harm to future captives. While their means may not be directly applicable today, their goals seem to me to be the same as ours should be.", + "Torah scrolls of the law, tefillin and mezuzoth are not bought from Gentiles at more than their value, because of tikkun olam. Evidently, Gentiles knew well what was valuable to Jews. From the mishnah it seems that they would capture religious items and ransom them back. Again, the mishnah forbids paying more than they are worth. At least with things it is easier to establish a value than with human beings. After all, how much is a human being worth." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with a man who divorces his wife either because a rumor went out that she had committed adultery or because of a vow that she took.", + "If a man divorces his wife because of ill-repute, he cannot remarry her. If a man divorces his wife because he believes that she committed adultery he may not remarry her. The fear is that after he divorces her he may find out that the rumor was false. When he discovers that the rumor was false he may regret divorcing her and say, “Had I known that the rumor was false, I would never have divorced her.” Since the divorce was based on a false assumption, the get is invalidated and any children which she had from a subsequent marriage are considered mamzerim. To prevent this problematic situation (in other words for tikkun olam), when the husband divorces they say to him that he must know that his divorce is final and irrevocable, even if the rumor for which he divorces her proves to be false. In this way, he will in his mind divorce her completely and he cannot later claim that the divorce was mistaken.", + "If because of a vow, he cannot remarry her. The same holds true for a husband who divorces his wife because she took a vow that disrupted their marriage in some way. In such a case he may later discover that he could have had the vow released and then regret divorcing her, thereby annulling the get. To prevent this he is told that if he divorces her because of a vow, he can never remarry her.", + "Rabbi Judah says: [if he divorces her] for vows which she made in front of many people, he may not remarry her, but if for vows which she did not make in front of many people, he may remarry her. The following sages argue over which types of vows the previous section was referring to. According to Rabbi Judah, if the vow was public he cannot remarry her, but if the vow was not public he may remarry her. The Talmud explains that Rabbi Judah believes that the rule husbands may not remarry their wives if they divorced them because of a rumor of adultery or because of a vow is a punishment for the wife. Therefore, if she vows privately such that others don’t know that she took a vow, then she is not punished and her husband may remarry her.", + "Rabbi Meir says: [if he divorces her] for a vow which requires the investigation of a sage, he may not remarry her, but if for one which does not require the investigation of a sage, he may remarry her. Rabbi Eliezer says: they only forbid that one because of that one . Rabbi Meir makes a different distinction. According to Rabbi Meir he cannot remarry her if the vow required the investigation of a sage in order to release the vow. If it did not require even the investigation of the sage for the vow to be released then it must have been a mistaken vow. Such a vow can obviously be released and everyone should know this. Therefore, he cannot later claim, “Had I known that the vow could be released I would not have divorced her.” Since he cannot make this claim, we do not need to prevent him from remarrying her. Rabbi Elazar reasons completely opposite. The reason that they made it forbidden for him to remarry her for a vow that does require the investigation of a sage is because he may regret divorcing her for making a vow that does not require the investigation of a sage.", + "Rabbi Yose son of Rabbi Judah said: a case happened in Sidon of a man who said to his wife, “Konam, if I do not divorce you”, and he did divorce her, and the Sages permitted him to remarry her because of tikkun olam. The final section deals with a case where a husband vowed to divorce his wife. In this case, we might have thought that in order to encourage men not to hastily vow to divorce their wives the law would have been that if he does so he cannot remarry her. However, the Sages ruled that he can nevertheless remarry her. The only reason that in other cases they prohibited him from remarrying her was lest he state “Had I known that the vow could be broken I would not have divorced her.” This prohibition was made because of tikkun olam protecting the wife from a husband who makes such a statement. However, if the husband vows there is no reason to prevent him from remarrying her." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses a husband who divorces his wife because she turns out to be an “aylonit.” An aylonit is a female who does not develop physical signs of sexual maturity, but is clearly a female. By definition, she cannot have children. If later on she has children then it turns out that she is not an aylonit.", + "A man divorces his wife because she is an aylonit: Rabbi Judah says he may not remarry her, But the sages say that he may remarry her. The reason that Rabbi Judah says that he may not remarry a wife that he divorced because she was an “aylonit” is similar to the reasons we learned in yesterday’s mishnah why men who divorce for certain reasons may not remarry their wives. If he divorces her because she is an “aylonit” and then she remarries and has children from her next husband the first husband might say, “Had I known that she was not an aylonit, I would not have divorced her.” This statement would annul the divorce and her children would become mamzerim. To prevent this, Rabbi Judah rules that we tell him when he divorces her that he will never be able to remarry her, and in that way he will divorce her with complete conviction. However, in this case the Sages do not agree, for they are not concerned lest such a scenario arise. Perhaps they thought it unlikely for a woman who was assumed to be an aylonit to later have children.", + "She marries someone else and has children from him and then demands her ketubah settlement [from her first husband]: Rabbi Judah said, they say to her, “Your silence is better than your speaking.” When a woman is divorced because she is an aylonit, her husband does not have to pay her ketubah (see Ketuboth 11:6). When this woman who was divorced because she was thought to be an aylonit has children in her subsequent marriage, it turns out that she wasn’t really an aylonit. Hence she could make a valid claim that her first husband owes her a ketubah. However, Rabbi Judah says that she would do better not to make such a claim, for if she does her husband might attempt to annul the divorce and thereby make her children mamzerim and forbid her to her new husband because she is an adulteress (albeit an unintentional one.)" + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe two sections of this mishnah deal with a person who sold either himself, his children or his fields to a Gentile.", + "If a man sells himself and his children to a Gentile, he is not to be redeemed but his children are to be redeemed after the death of their father. If the Jewish community were to redeem a man who sold himself to a Gentile, others in the future would be encouraged to do so in order to raise money, and eventually it would become a serious financial burden. Therefore, the community is not allowed to redeem such a person. However, his children were sold through no fault of their own. In order to prevent them from being lost to the Jewish community they are redeemed after their father’s death. However, while he is still alive even they are not redeemed so that the father will not be encouraged to sell them again.", + "If a man sells his field to a Gentile, and an Israelite bought it back, he has to bring, the purchaser must bring first fruits from it, because of tikkun olam. There are two versions to this section, the one that I translated above, and another version which Rashi used. I will explain both. When a Gentile acquires land in Israel, the land still retains its holiness and therefore the first fruits (bikkurim) which grow from this land must be brought to Jerusalem, as is the rule with all first fruits. However, the person who buys the land from the Gentile might think that since the fruits grew while owned by the Gentile, he need not bring first fruits. To prevent this situation, the rabbis stated that the one who bought the land from the Gentile must bring first fruits. Note that according to this interpretation something done because of tikkun olam is also a “toraitic” law (deoraita). This is unusual and hence makes this interpretation tentative. The Talmud adds further complicated wrinkles to this mishnah to solve this problem. Rashi’s version reads, “If one sells his land to a Gentile, he must buy the first fruits and bring them.” This is easier to understand. The Gentile will obviously not do so himself and therefore if the Jew doesn’t go back and buy the first fruits, they will not be brought. Furthermore, this is a penalty on the person for selling his land to a Gentile." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah teaches what type of land must be used in order to repay debts. Its connection to “tikkun olam” is that the sages shaped some of these laws using “tikkun olam” type criteria. That is to say they tried to take into social needs when making these rules.", + "Damages are paid out of [property of] the best quality; The rule that damage payments are made out of the best of one’s land is seemingly stated in Exodus 22:4, “When a man lets his livestock loose to graze in another’s land, and so allows a field or vineyard to be grazed bare, he must repay the best of his field and the best of his vineyard.” However, there is a debate over this issue. Rabbi Akiva interpreted this to mean that the damager must pay back from the best of his (the damager’s) land and Rabbi Ishmael interpreted it to mean that the damager must pay back with land equivalent to the best of the other person’s land. If this mishnah goes according to Rabbi Ishmael than the “tikkun olam” is that although the Torah does not demand that the damager pay back from the best of his own land, the rabbis demanded that he do so in order to deter people from being negligent and causing damage. If the mishnah goes according to Rabbi Akiva, then the Torah itself ruled because of tikkun olam. Although tikkun olam usually implies a rabbinic enactment, this is not always the case.", + "A creditor pays out of land of medium quality, According to the Talmud, Torah law dictates that when a debtor collects land in payment of his debt, he collects from the debtor’s worst property. Seemingly this would be good for debtors, certainly a noble goal. The problem with this is that it might end up deterring lenders and thereby make it difficult for people to get the loans they need (especially if they are farmers.) People will be hesitant to lend money if they know that if the debtor defaults they will collect from lousy land. In order to encourage people to lend money (remember it was without interest, so lending was a form of charity), the rabbis enacted that if a debtor defaults the creditor collects from property of medium quality.", + "And a ketubah is paid out of land of the poorest quality. Rabbi Meir says that a ketubah is also paid out of medium quality land. There is a debate over what type of land a woman receives upon collecting her ketubah. Collecting a ketubah is like collecting any debt the husband (or his estate) is a debtor to the woman. Therefore Rabbi Meir holds that just as usual debts are collected from middle quality land, so too is the ketubah debt. However, the first opinion in this mishnah holds that normal debts are not totally analogous to ketubot. With regard to a normal debt, the rabbis ruled that it is collected from middle quality land in order to encourage people to loan money. No such encouragement is needed with regard to ketubot, for women will marry whether they will collect their ketubah from middle or poor quality land. Since there is no special reason that the woman should collect her ketubah from middle quality land, she collects from poor quality land, as is the Torah’s rule for all debts." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues the topic which was begun in yesterday’s mishnah which type of land is used to pay off debts.", + "Payment cannot be recovered from mortgaged property where there free property is available, even if it is only of the lowest quality. Payment can be recovered from orphans only from land of the lowest quality. As we learned yesterday, generally debts are repaid with middle quality land. When a person takes out a loan, all of his currently owned land automatically becomes collateral for the loan. If the creditor should come to collect, and the debtor only has poor quality land, but at the time of the loan he had middle quality land and subsequent to the loan he sold or gave it away, the creditor collects from the poor quality land. This is a case of conflicting values. We want the creditor to be able to collect from better property in order to encourage people to lend. However, the collection of debts from third parties is terribly disruptive to the economic system. Therefore, in order to prevent losses to the third party in other words for tikkun olam the creditor can only collect from the poor quality land in the debtor’s actual possession.", + "If a creditor is collecting from the orphan of the debtor, he can only collect from the poor quality land. Again this is because of tikkun olam and to make things easier for the orphans." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first section of this mishnah continues the topic of collecting debts from mortgaged properties. The second section deals with returning lost objects.", + "[Creditors] do not collect from mortgaged property for produce consumed, for the improvement of property, [and payment] for the maintenance of a widow and daughters, because of tikkun olam. There are three types of repayments mentioned in this section. In each of these cases when a creditor collects his debt he can only collect from unmortgaged property, meaning property that is actually in the hands of the debtor. The first category is “produce consumed.” This refers to a situation where someone illegally obtained land, for instance he stole it. He then eats the produce on the land and sells the land to another person. When the original owner comes to claim the land he extracts the land from the person who purchased it from the thief and he can extract the value of the produce from the thief himself. However, he can only exact this payment from the thief from unmortgaged property and not from property which the thief sold or gave away to others. In this same situation, the one who purchased the property from the thief and then had to restore it to its original owner collects from the thief the original purchase price. He also may collect from the thief any money he spent to improve the property, but this amount he may collect only from unmortgaged property. This is what the mishnah means by “improvement of property.” When a man dies one of the ketubah stipulations is that his widow and daughters are to be provided for from his estate until they are married. However, they are only provided for from the dead husband’s unmortgaged property. The “tikkun olam” here is that these amounts are not fixed. Therefore, one who buys from a person who might be in this situation will never know how much debt that person is really in and he won’t be able to be cautious lest he buy property that has a lien on it. To protect these purchasers, these amounts cannot be collected from them.", + "The finder of a lost article is not required to take an oath, because of tikkun olam. If a person returns a lost object to another person, and the person receiving the lost object suspects that the one returning it has kept part of the object for himself he cannot make the one returning the object take an oath that he has returned it all. If such an oath could be enforced, people might be hesitant to return lost objects, because people did not want to take oaths even if they were true. In order to encourage people to fulfill the mitzvah of returning lost objects, in other words for tikkun olam, such oaths were not enforced." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first two sections of this mishnah deal with certain responsibilities that guardians have in taking care of orphans. The final section deals with damages that are done to food or sacrifices that cannot be seen.", + "If orphans relied on a householder or if their father appointed a guardian for them, he must tithe their produce. A guardian has the responsibility to tithe the produce of orphans who are relying on him to manage their lives. This clause is here to introduce the next sections of the mishnah.", + "A guardian who was appointed by the father of the orphans is required to take an oath. [A guardian who was] appointed by the court does not need to take an oath. Abba Shaul says that the rule is the reverse. When the orphans grow up, according to the law they can make the guardian swear that he did not misappropriate any of their money (see Shevuoth 7:8). According to the first opinion in this section, the orphans have such power only when they were appointed by the father. If the court appointed the guardian, he is not liable for such an oath. This is because the court forced him to be a guardian, and he didn’t necessarily receive any satisfaction. If the halakhah were to force him to take an oath, people would refuse to become guardians. However, if the father appointed him, the guardian has the satisfaction of helping out the father who was assumedly his friend. Since he has that satisfaction, he will accept becoming a guardian even though he might eventually have to take an oath. We can see here that the “tikkun olam” is to exempt guardians from taking oaths if the oath would deter them from accepting such appointments in the first place. Abba Shaul reasons that the exact opposite is true. If the father appoints him he need not swear since he was only doing a favor for the father. According to Abba Shaul, if guardians appointed by the father were forced to swear they would not want to become guardians. However, when the court appoints someone to be a guardian he gets the added benefit of the community knowing that the court believes that he is a trustworthy man. Since he receives this added benefit, he will not refuse becoming a guardian even if it might cause him to take an oath.", + "One who renders impure [someone else’s pure food] or mixes terumah [with someone else’s non-terumah produce] or makes a libation [with someone else’s wine], if he does so inadvertently, he is exempt, but if intentionally he is liable. Priests who intentionally made someone else’s sacrifice piggul in the Temple are liable. There are three types of invisible damage mentioned in this first clause. If one causes someone else’s terumah to become impure, it has to be thrown away. If someone mixes in terumah with another person’s normal produce it must be sold to priests at the price of terumah which is lower than the price of normal produce. Finally, if someone makes an idolatrous libation with someone else’s wine, the wine must be thrown away. Similarly, if one mixes already libated wine with non-libated wine it must all be thrown away. In all of these cases the damage is done but the object has not physically changed at all. The bottom line halakhah holds that damage that cannot be seen is not considered damage. Therefore, if any of these things were done intentionally, the damager need not make restitution. However, had he done so intentionally he must pay because of “tikkun olam” to prevent people from intentionally damaging other’s property. “Piggul” is a sacrifice offered by a priest who has intends to eat it at a time when that sacrifice may no longer be eaten. “Piggul” cannot be put onto the altar and it does not bring about the intended result of a sacrifice (for instance atonement). This is again a case of invisible damage, and as above, if a priest intentionally causes such damage he is liable." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis same exact mishnah appears in Eduyoth 7:9. It is brought here because it contains two “takkanot” (in sections three and four).", + "Rabbi Nehunia ben Gudgada testified concerning a deaf-mute whose father had given her in marriage, that she could be sent away with a bill of divorcement; As we have learned in other places, the Rabbis considered a deaf-mute to lack intelligence, because in their time the deaf-mute had little way of communicating with the outside world. Usually a person who lacks intelligence, such a deaf-mute, minor or insane person, cannot enter into legally binding contracts, because they don’t understand their ramifications. However, as Rabbi Nehunia testifies, a deaf-mute can be divorced. (She was married off by her father). The reason is that divorce is not dependent upon the woman’s acquiescence; she can be divorced against her will. Since her will is irrelevant, even one who lacks awareness can be divorced. Although this might sound harsh, as if the Rabbis are going out of their way to allow a deaf-mute to be divorced, it may have also worked in her benefit. If men couldn’t divorce deaf-mutes, perhaps they might refrain from marrying them. By allowing a “way out” the Rabbis might actually be encouraging their marriage.", + "And concerning a minor, daughter of an Israelite who married a priest, that she could eat terumah, and if she died her husband inherited from her; This section deals with an orphaned minor girl of a non-priestly, Israelite family, who marries a priest. Generally this type of marriage is considered to be valid only rabbinically (derabanan) and not valid through Torah law (deoraita). Deoraita a minor can only be married off by her father. Only when she reaches majority she can marry herself off without her father’s aid. Despite the fact that this is really only a “derabanan” marriage, Rabbi Nehunya testifies that it is sufficient for her to be allowed to eat terumah and for her husband to inherit her, should she die. Even though these are usually rights only given to a valid “deoraita” marriage, Rabbi Nehunya testifies that the husband does receive these rights.", + "And concerning a stolen beam that had been built into a palace, that it might be restored by the payment of its value, because of the enactment to encourage repentance. Usually one who steals an item must return the actual stolen item, as long as the item still exists. If one stole a beam and then used it in the foundation of a castle, legally he is bound to take down the castle and return the beam. Obviously this will discourage people from admitting that they stole. This admission is an essential part of making atonement for their crime. To allow people to more easily make atonement, the robber is allowed to pay back the value of the beam.", + "And concerning a sin-offering that had been stolen, and this was not known to many, that it caused atonement because of the welfare of the altar. If it were forbidden to use animals that might have been stolen as sacrifices, the priests would never sacrifice an animal, lest it be stolen. Therefore, the mishnah rules that stolen animals can be used as sin-offerings, and that they do procure atonement for the one bringing them, as long as the theft is not publicly known. This mishnah is not permission to steal an animal and bring it as a sacrifice. Rather it is permission to use an animal without being concerned that it is stolen property. The mishnah teaches that if it was stolen property and the person who brought it did not know that it was stolen, that it is effective in bringing atonement." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with “sicaricon”, which refers to the illegal, governmental expropriation of land from its rightful owners. Specifically we are talking about land taken from Jews by Romans during the Second Temple and mishnaic periods. The word “sicaricon” can refer to either the Roman who expropriated the property (in this case I shall capitalize the word); the rule governing land taken in such a faction; a person who came into land by buying it from a sicaricon.", + "There was no sicaricon in Judea for those killed in war. During the Great Revolt from 67-70 C.E. which culminated in the destruction of the Temple, the rule of sicaricon was not applied. Practically what this meant was that land expropriated by the Romans was considered to legally belong to the Romans. Therefore, a Jew who subsequently bought the land did not need to return anything to the original owner. This was to encourage people to buy back the land in order that it should not remain Roman in perpetuity.", + "After the war’s slaughter ended there is sicaricon there. How so? If a man buys a field from the Sicaricon and then buys it again from the original owner, his purchase is void, but if he buys it first from the original owner and then from the sicaricon it is valid. After the war the rule of sicaricon was enforced. What this meant was that a Jew who bought the land from the Roman and then went and asked to buy the land from the Sicaricon had not legally acquired the land. This is because we can assume that the original owner only agreed to sell the land out of fear were he not to sell the land the Romans who had already sold it might lose their sale. However, if the purchaser acquired it first from the original owner and then from the Sicaricon the sale is valid.", + "If a man buys [a piece of a married woman’s property] from the husband and then buys it from the wife, the purchase is void, but if he buys it first from the wife and then from the husband it is valid. This section does not have to do with the rules of sicaricon and is brought here because of its similarity to the previous section. When a man marries a woman the woman retains ownership over her property but her husband has the right to use the property. Neither of them may sell the property without the other’s permission. If someone buys the property first from the husband and then from the woman (who agrees), the sale is not valid. The problem is that the woman may have sold under duress, being pressured by her husband. However, if he buys from the woman first, we can assume that the woman sold of her own free will. If the husband also agrees to the sale, the sale is valid.", + "This was [the ruling] of the first mishnah. The court that came after them said if a man buys property from the Sicaricon he had to give the original owner a quarter [of the value]. When is this so? When the original owners cannot buy it themselves, but if they can they have preemption over everyone else. The problem with this system may have been that people would have been afraid to buy land from the Sicaricon. This might have left large pieces of Jewish land in Roman control. Therefore, a later court made a new rule. If a person buys from a Sicaricon, he must give one quarter of the sale price to the original owners. This way people would buy the land and the original owners would get at least some of their money back. However, if the original owners have the money to buy back their land, they still have the first shot at doing so.", + "Rabbi assembled a court and they decided by vote that if the property had been in the hands of the Sicaricon twelve months, whoever purchased it first acquired the title, but he had to give a quarter [of the price] to the original owner. Rabbi Judah Hanasi and his court enacted a further change in this law. If the land remained with the Sicaricon 12 months, and it didn’t look like anyone was going to buy it, the first person to purchase it has legally acquired it. In other words, a purchaser need not worry that the original owners would preempt him. However, the purchaser must still pay compensation to the original owners." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah has to do with transactions done by two categories of people considered to legally lack “da’at”, intelligence minors and deaf-mutes. As we see from this mishnah, the rabbis seem well aware that well deaf-mutes had great difficulties communicating, they nevertheless could make their wishes known.", + "A deaf-mute can gesture and be gestured at [and thereby conduct transactions]. Ben Betera says that he may make lip-motions, if the transaction is of movable property. If a deaf-mute wishes to sell or purchase an object he may do so by gesturing or by being gestured at. People who can speak must verbalize their commands. Since this is impossible for a deaf-mute, gestures are sufficient. Ben Betera is more lenient and even allows even lip-motions, as long as the transaction is only with movable property, i.e. not land. To buy or sell land he would need to make a full gesture.", + "The purchase or sale done by young children in movable property is valid. Young children can sell or purchase movable property. The Talmud explains that this is a form of “tikkun olam”. If children could not sell or buy things they would not be able to earn their keep, and until modern times children had to work to help support their families (in good situations) or support themselves (in much worse situations)." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah teaches rules that were made in order to keep peace between people. These “ways of peace” are a subcategory of “tikkun olam”. Whereas many of the other enactments made because of “tikkun olam” had a strong economic element, these rules are more concerned with interpersonal relations.", + "These were the rules they laid down because of the ways of peace:
A priest is called up first to read the Torah and after him a Levite and then an Israelite, because of the ways of peace. The custom of the Kohen receiving the first aliyah to the Torah and the Levite the second and only then the rest of the congregation was enacted because of the ways of peace. [Quite frankly, it seems that this hasn’t worked all that well and synagogue-goers will just find something else to argue about but that’s another story.]", + "An “eruv” is placed in the room where it has always been placed, because of the ways of peace. An “eruv” is made by enclosing an area (done today with twine or something similar) and by putting a symbolically communal meal in one house in the area. This is a legal fiction to turn a large community into a “home” so that people can carry on Shabbat within this area. The mishnah teaches that this meal is put in the same house every week. If it were to move around from week to week people might argue where it should be put. Alternatively, people might not trust that the eruv was set properly because they didn’t know where it is. Therefore, it is left in the same house week after week.", + "The cistern which is nearest to the channel is filled first, because of the ways of peace. To irrigate cisterns channels were made from the river. The mishnah teaches that the first cistern on the channel is allowed to fill up first and the other cistern owners cannot tell the owner of the closest cistern that he should periodically close his up so that they can fill up first. Rather the cisterns are always filled up in the same order to avoid fights.", + "[Taking of] beasts, birds and fishes from traps [set by others] is robbery, because of the ways of peace. Rabbi Yose says that it is actual robbery. The mishnah now begins with a list of three things the taking of which is not considered to be true robbery. Rather, taking these things is prohibited only because of the “ways of peace”. In each of these cases, Rabbi Yose holds that it is prohibited not because of the “ways of peace” but because taking them is truly robbery as defined by the Torah. The first case is taking animals from traps. Since these animals have not yet come into the physical possession of the trap-setters, taking from them is not technically robbery. However, it is still prohibited because of the “ways of peace.” Rabbi Yose holds that although they have not yet come into the physical possession of the trap-setters, the trap-setters have acquired them and therefore taking them is full “robbery.”", + "[Taking away] anything found by a deaf-mute, an idiot or a minor is robbery, because of the ways of peace. Rabbi Yose says that it is actual robbery. According to the first opinion, a deaf-mute, imbecile or child do not legally acquire things that they find. Therefore, technically speaking when one takes something that they found away from them, he is not robbing them. However, for many obvious reasons, this is prohibited because of “the ways of peace.” Again, Rabbi Yose considers this to be full robbery.", + "If a poor man strikes [down olives] on top of an olive tree, [taking the fruit] that is beneath him is robbery. Rabbi Yose says that it is actual robbery. There are three things that a poor person can take 1) the corners of the field; 2) things which the harvester forgot to take; 3) grain that fell out of the harvesters’ hands. In our mishnah a poor person is on top of an olive tree, beating the tree so that the olives fall below so that he can collect them. Technically, the olives which fall below are not his until he gathers them into his possession. Therefore, if someone else takes them before he gathers them he has not technically stolen them. However, because of “the ways of peace” it is forbidden. Again, Rabbi Yose holds that this is “full robbery.”", + "Poor Gentiles are not prevented from gathering gleanings, forgotten sheaves, and the corners of the field, because of the ways of peace. The agricultural products left in the field are meant to be for poor Jews. However, in the interest of peace Jews are supposed to allow non-Jews to take them as well. I should note that this obviously is an important issue for modern Jews, both in the Diaspora and in Israel." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe final mishnah of chapter five completes the examples of enactments made because “of the ways of peace.”\nThis mishnah demonstrates that in the Second Temple period Jews of different levels religiosity lived in the same communities and shared their things with one another. While people who were more observant of certain ritual requirements had to be careful in certain areas, they did not cease living together.", + "A woman may lend to another woman who is suspected of not observing the sabbatical year a fan or a sieve or a handmill or a stove, but she should not sift or grind with her. It is forbidden to keep sabbatical year produce in one’s house after it no longer exists in the field. The woman suspected of not observing the sabbatical year may have such produce in her house. Nevertheless, another woman may still lend various vessels, even though those vessels will used to commit transgressions. However, the woman should not physically help her neighbor commit a transgression.", + "The wife of a “haver” may lend to the wife of an “am ha-aretz” a fan or a sieve and may winnow and grind and sift with her, but once she has poured water over the flour she should not touch anything with her, because we do not assist those who commit a transgression. A “haver”, literally friend, or perhaps better translated as “member”, is one who is careful about purity laws and about tithing. An “am ha-aretz” an ignoramus is not careful about such laws. The wife of the “haver” may work with grain with the “am ha-aretz” even though the latter is impure. However, once the flour has become wet, it is now susceptible to impurity. At this point since we are discussing flour that belongs to an am haaretz, terumah and tithes have assumedly not been taken out of the flour. Therefore the am-ha-aretz will be rendering the terumah impure and this is forbidden. Since this is forbidden, the wife of the haver may not help her.", + "All these rules were only said because of the ways of peace. The permissions granted in the first two sections were because of “the ways of peace.” Communities of people with varying degrees of religiosity need to learn to be able to live together.", + "Gentiles may be wished luck in the Sabbatical year but not Israelites and greeting may be given to them, because of the ways of peace. It is forbidden to work fields during the Sabbatical year. If Gentiles own a field in the land of Israel one may wish them luck in their endeavors, even though the field should not be worked. However, one shouldn’t wish luck to Jews who are engaging in a prohibited activity. One may also greet a Gentile in order to increase peace between Jews and Gentiles. It seems that there is an underlying fear in this section. If Jews do not wish Gentiles luck, or greet them properly, they may cause danger to the Jewish community. Alternatively, one could see a more positive message here. It is important for Jews and Gentiles to get along and therefore, to increase peace, Jews should wish them well." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nAfter a two chapter digression, the Mishnah returns to the main topic of the tractate divorce law. Most of this chapter deals with men and women appointing agents to deliver or to receive the get. As we shall see, a husband can tell the agent to bring the get and a woman may make an agent to receive or bring a get. The difference between the two has to do with when the woman is considered to be divorced and up until what point the husband may change his mind.", + "If a man says, “Receive this get on behalf of my wife”, or, “Carry this get to my wife”, if he desires to retract [before the wife receives it] he may do so. A man can appoint an agent to bring a get to his wife, but he cannot appoint an agent to accept the get on behalf of his wife. A agent who is empowered to legally accept the get can only be appointed by the wife, since she is the one who has to receive the get in order for it to be valid. Therefore, it does not matter what language the husband uses, when he sends an agent with a get she is not divorced until she receives the get. Even if he says to the agent, “Receive this get…”, the get is not valid until the agent hands it over to the woman. Therefore, the husband may change his mind and annul the get until she actually receives it.", + "If a woman says, “Receive the get on my behalf”, [and he does so], if [the husband] wants to retract he may not do so. In contrast, a woman has the right to appoint an agent to receive a get on her behalf. Once this agent has received the get, the woman is fully divorced. If after giving it to an agent empowered to receive the get the husband wishes to retract, he may not do so.", + "Therefore if the husband said to him, “I do not want you to receive it on her behalf, but rather carry it and give it to her”, then if he wishes to retract he may do so. This section teaches that the husband may change the appointment of the agent from one of “receiving” to one of “carrying.” The husband authorizes the agent to bring the get to the woman but not to receive it on her behalf. The woman is divorced only when she receives the get and therefore the husband may retract until that moment.", + "Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: even if the wife says “Take for me”, [and he does so] the husband may not retract. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel deals with a woman who says, “Take for me…” instead of “Carry to me…” or “Receive for me…” He rules that “Take for me” is equivalent to “Receive for me” and therefore the woman is divorced as soon as the agent receives the get; after that point the husband may no longer retract." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first part of this mishnah continues to discuss a woman’s appointing an agent to receive her get. The second part deals with the divorce of a betrothed girl who has not yet reached majority age.", + "A woman who said [to an agent], “Receive my get for me” requires two sets of witnesses, two to say, “In our presence she told him”, and two to say, “In our presence he received [the get] and tore it”. Even if the first set are the same [witnesses] as the latter set or if there was one in the first set and one in the second, and one joined with them [for both testimonies]. If a woman appointed an agent to receive her get she will need two sets of witnesses to execute her divorce, one to witness her appointment of the agent and the second to witness the agent receive the get. However, there can be full or partial overlap between the two sets.", + "If a young girl is betrothed, both she and her father may receive her get. Rabbi Judah said that two [different] hands cannot take possession as one. Rather her father alone may receive her get. A young girl (defined as being between the ages of 12 and 12 1/2) who is betrothed is in an “in-between” situation. On the one hand, she is neither fully married nor mature and hence her father retains some control over her. However, she is no longer a minor and therefore has some of her own legal rights. Were she being divorced after being married or having reached maturity, she alone would have the legal right to receive her get. However, in this “in-between” situation, the first opinion in the mishnah rules that either she or her father can receive her get. Rabbi Judah disagrees. It would be legally too ambiguous for both to be able to receive the get. Therefore, only her father may receive the get.", + "One who is not able to keep her get is not capable of being divorced. This section refers to a minor who is not yet capable of receiving her get. At such a young age she cannot be divorced, even if her father were to receive the get. Since she is too young to even know the meaning of being divorced, the husband must wait until she is of majority age to divorce her. [I should note that the husband is not a particularly salutary fellow (to say the least). We should remember that we are dealing with legal rights not with what seems to be ethically acceptable.]" + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first part of this mishnah deals with a minor girl’s legal ability to receive a get and to be divorced. The second section deals with instructions that a wife or husband might give to an agent who is to bring or receive the get and the implications that those instructions can have on the validity of the get.", + "If a young girl says, “Receive my get for me”, it is not a get until the get reaches her hand. Therefore, if [the husband] wishes to retract, he may retract, since a minor cannot appoint an agent. But if her father said to him, “Go and receive a get for my daughter”, the husband may not retract. A minor may be divorced since divorce does not require her consent, consent which she would statutorily lack. However, she cannot appoint an agent since minors do not have such legal authority. Hence, even if she says “Receive my get for me”, the agent is not authorized to receive it on her behalf. She is not divorced until the get reaches her hand. In such a case the husband is able to retract until she receives the get. In contrast, the father has the ability to appoint an agent to act on his daughter’s behalf, as long as she is still a minor and was never fully married. This mishnah refers to a case where she was only betrothed (see yesterday’s mishnah). If the father appoints an agent to receive the get on behalf of his daughter, she is divorced from the moment the agent receives the get. If she had been fully married, the father may no longer receive her get or appoint an agent to do so.", + "If a man says, “Give this get to my wife in such-and-such a place” and he gives it to her in another place, [the get is] invalid. [If he says,] “She is in such-and-such a place”, and he gives it to her in another place, [it is] valid. In the following two sections, a husband or a wife appoints an agent and gives the agent instructions as to where to deliver/receive the get. If the husband tells the agent to give his wife the get in a certain place, she is not divorced if the agent gives the get to her in another place. In such a case we can assume that the husband wanted the get delivered specifically in that place. However, if the husband merely tells the agent where to find his wife, the husband does not necessarily care if she is really somewhere else. He was only helping the agent locate her. Therefore the get is valid no matter where the gives it to her.", + "If a woman says, “Receive my get in such-and-such a place” and he receives it for her in another place, [it is] invalid. Rabbi Elazar says it valid. [If she says,] “Bring me my get from such-and-such a place” and he brings it from somewhere else, [it is] valid. The same is true if the woman tells her agent to receive the get in a certain place. The get is not valid unless he receives it in that place. However, in this case Rabbi Elazar disagrees. He holds that since the woman can be divorced without her consent, even when she said, “Receive it for me in such-and-such a place” she only meant to tell the agent where her husband was. If she appoints an agent to bring her a get and not to receive it on her behalf, she doesn’t care where he gets the document. Even if she tells him to bring it from a certain place and he brings it from somewhere else, she is divorced." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with a woman married to a priest. As long as she is married she may eat terumah. However, once she is divorced she loses this right. The mishnah deals with such a woman who appoints an agent to receive or bring her get.", + "[If a woman says to an agent], “Bring me my get”, she may eat terumah until the get reaches her hand. Since she appointed the agent to bring her the get, she is not divorced until she actually receives the get. She may continue to eat terumah until this point.", + "[If she says,] “Receive for me my get”, she is forbidden to eat terumah immediately. [If she says,] “Receive for me my get in such-and-such a place”, she can eat terumah until the get reaches that place. However, if she appoints an agent to receive the get, she must cease eating terumah immediately. Since the agent might receive the get on her behalf at any moment, we must be concerned lest she is divorced immediately and hence she immediately loses her right to eat terumah.", + "Rabbi Elazar says that she is forbidden immediately. If she tells the agent to receive the get in a certain place, then according to the first opinion she is not divorced unless the agent receives the get at that place. Hence she may estimate how long it will take the agent to arrive at that place and she may continue to eat terumah until that point. However, Rabbi Elazar disagrees. Since, as we learned yesterday, he holds that the agent can validly receive the get anywhere, she can be divorced immediately. Hence he holds that also in this situation she must cease eating terumah immediately." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with the specific words that a husband must state to a scribe or other agents in order for them to be empowered to write a get and give it to his wife.\nAs a general rule, the husband must use language that clearly implies that he intends to divorce his wife, and not just write a get which he may or may not want to use. He must instruct his agent to write the get and to give it to her. However, there are extenuating circumstances where instructions to write the get are sufficient to empower the agent to also deliver the get.", + "If a man says, “Write a get and give it to my wife”, [or] “Divorce her”, [or] “Write a letter and give it to her”, then they should write it and give it to her. The language which the husband employs in this section is sufficiently clear and precise that the agents are empowered to write out a get on the husband’s behalf and to give it to the woman.", + "If he said, “Release her”, [or] “Provide for her”, [or] “Do for her as the law dictates”, [or] “Do the proper thing for her”, he has not said anything. The language in this section is too ambiguous and although it may imply that he wishes to divorce his wife, it is not certain that that is his intention. Hence, an agent who hears the husband make one of these statements is not empowered to write a get and deliver it to his wife.", + "Originally they said that if a man was being led out to execution and said, “Write a get for my wife”, they may write a get and give [it to her]. Later they said, even if he were leaving for a sea voyage or for a caravan journey. Rabbi Shimon Shezuri says: even if he were dangerously ill. Usually a husband must state that he wishes the get to be written and give to the woman. However, in extenuating circumstances where the husband seems to have been facing immanent death, it is highly unlikely that when he instructed someone to write a get, he wanted the get to be written but not given to his wife. After all, why else would he want a get at this point? Therefore, one who hears the husband says “Write a get for my wife” may write it and also give it to her. At first the category of people facing immanent death included only a person being led out to execution. Later, they expanded the category to include one leaving for a sea voyage or a caravan journey. These men would have wanted to write out a get that would go into effect should they not return, not an unlikely scenario. This would prevent their wives from being left as “agunot” a woman who doesn’t know if her husband is alive or dead and therefore cannot remarry. Rabbi Shimon Shezuri added that an agent who hears such a statement from a dangerously ill person may also write and give the get. This man may want to divorce his wife in order to exempt her from levirate marriage (if he was to do childless and with a brother she would have to undergo yibbum or halitzah). Again, it is very unlikely that a dying man would want to write a get but not give it to his wife, and therefore we are not concerned with such a possibility. " + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to discuss cases in which a man instructed someone to write a get for his wife, but did not specify that he was also to give it to her.", + "If a man had been thrown into a pit and cried out, “Whoever hears his voice should write a get for his wife”, those who hear should write a get and give it to her. The man in this case clearly fears that he will die in the pit leaving his wife subject to levirate marriage. As in the cases in yesterday’s mishnah, there is again no reason that he would want to write a get but not have it given to his wife. Therefore, someone who hears him scream out his name and his wife’s name may write out the get and give it to his wife. Note that the person screaming is referring to himself in the third person. This way people hear him state his name.", + "If a healthy man says, “Write a get for my wife”, his intention is merely to play with her. However, one who hears a healthy man say to write a get but not say to give the get is not allowed to write out the get. The fear is that the husband wants to use the get only to “play with his wife”, which I take to mean mentally cause her pain. He wants to use the get as a threat (alternatively if she wants to be divorced, perhaps it is a tease). Therefore, not only should those who hear these instructions not give her the get, they shouldn’t even write one out. Note that what the mishnah probably wishes to avoid is gittin that are written out but not intended to be given.", + "It once happened that a man in good health said, “Write a get for my wife”, and then went up on to a roof and fell and died, and Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel said that the Sages said: if he had thrown himself down this is a get, but if the wind had blown him over it was not a get. In this case a seemingly healthy person told someone to write out a get. Although the person should not have written the get and given it to his wife, he did so anyway. If afterwards, the husband intentionally commits suicide, this proves that he was sick at the time he instructed someone to write the get. Since he was about to die, he definitely intended to divorce his wife and not “to play with her.” However, if the wind pushed him off the roof it is not suicide, he was not sick and therefore the get is invalid. In such a case this woman is a widow and not a divorcee, and may be subject to levirate marriage." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe final mishnah of chapter six teaches that if the husband made his agents into a court (consisting of three), they may appoint a scribe to write the get. However, if he did not constitute a court to take care of the get, then his agents must write the get themselves. Assumedly this would have been difficult, if not nearly impossible since writing divorce documents is complicated and is usually the work of a professional.\nThe final section teaches that sometimes all those who hear the instructions to write a get must sign the get, and sometimes only some must sign the get. It depends on the precise words of the husband.", + "If a man said to two people, “Give a get to my wife”, or to three people, “Write a get and give it to my wife”, they must write it and give it. In the first case, the husband’s agents themselves must write the get and give it to his wife, since two people cannot constitute a court. [Note that since he said “Give” and not just “Write” they are at least empowered to write and give the get themselves.] If he instructed three people to write a get and give it to his wife, they must write the get themselves. Even though three people are sufficient to constitute a court, since he specified that they should write the get, they are not empowered to tell someone else to do so.", + "If he said to three persons, “Give a get to my wife”, they may tell others to write the get because he has made them into a court, the words of Rabbi Meir. And this is the halakhah which Rabbi Hanina a man of Ono brought from prison: “I have received a tradition that if a man says to three persons, ‘Give a get to my wife’, they may tell others to write it, because he has made them into a court. Rabbi Yose said: We said to the messenger, we also have a tradition that even were he to say to the great court in Jerusalem, ‘Give a get to my wife’, they must learn [to write] and write the get and give it. If he told three people to give his wife a get but did not tell them to write the get, he has made them into a court and empowered them to tell a scribe to write the get. This is Rabbi Meir’s opinion. This halakhah of Rabbi Meir is supported by a tradition which Rabbi Hanina a man of Ono (a place) brought from prison. The commentators explain that he received the tradition from Rabbi Akiva who had been imprisoned during the Bar Kokhba revolt. Rabbi Yose disagrees with the tradition brought from the prison and with Rabbi Meir. He says that he too has a tradition that even if one instructs the greatest court that exists, the court that in Jerusalem, to give a get to his wife, the court must write the get themselves. Even if they must learn to write, they may not appoint others in their place. They are empowered to appoint a scribe only if he specifically tells them that they may do so.", + "If a man says to ten persons, “Write a get”, one writes, and two sign as witnesses. [If he said,] “All of you write”, one writes and all sign. Therefore, if one of them dies, the get is invalid. If a husband tells a group of ten people to write a get (and give it to his wife), it is sufficient for one of them to write the get and two of them to sign. They need not all sign the get. However, if he says to them “All of you write”, they must all participate in the writing of the get, one writing and nine signing. Should one of them die before he signs the get, the group will not be able to execute the get since they will not be able to fulfill the husband’s command." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is about a husband who is gripped by some sort of mental illness and hence may not be in his right mind when he decides to divorce his wife.\nThe second section is about a mute husband’s ability to divorce his wife.", + "If a man is gripped by the kordiakos illness and says, “Write a get for my wife”, he has not said anything. If he says, “Write a get for my wife”, and is then gripped by kordiakos and then says, “Do not write it”, his latter words are of no effect. “Kordiakos” is evidently some sort of mental illness. If a husband is gripped by this illness, his instructions to others to divorce his wife do not have any legal validity. Similarly, if a healthy person instructs others to divorce his wife, and then is gripped by “kordiakos” and then wishes to retract, his retraction is meaningless. In short, the instructions of a mentally sick person do not have legal validity.", + "If he becomes mute, and they say to him, “Should we write a get for your wife”, and he nods his head, he is tested three times. If he answers ‘no’ and ‘yes’ properly each time, then they should write the get. A mute person is not considered someone who lacks “da’at” awareness or intelligence. Hence he can legally divorce his wife. However, since he cannot speak, it is a slightly more difficult to ascertain whether he wants to divorce. The mishnah rules that he may answer questions with head gestures. Those asking the questions must be certain what these gestures mean and therefore they test him with other questions. For instance, if his name is Reuven, they can say, “Is your name Reuven?” If he nods, that means that nodding signifies an affirmative answer. They would repeat this test three times." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah returns to the subject taught in 6:7, that if a husband instructs people to write a get, they themselves must write the get. They may have a scribe write the get only if he tells them that they may do so.", + "They said to him, “Shall we write a get for your wife”, and he said to them, “Write!”, and they then told a scribe and he wrote and witnesses and they signed even if they wrote it and signed it and gave it back to him and he gave it to her, the get is void until he himself says to the scribe “Write” and to the witnesses, “Sign”. In this mishnah’s scenario the husband told others to write a get for his wife. The people whom he told then went and had a scribe write the get and other witnesses signed. This invalidates the get since the husband did not tell them that others could write the get. Even if after the scribe writes it they give the get back to the husband and the husband gives it to the wife, thereby tacitly agreeing to what they had done, the get is still invalid. Since he did not tell them beforehand that they could have a scribe write the get, his consent ex post facto cannot revalidate the get." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOn several occasions we have noted that husbands may have divorced their wives right before their death (the husband’s, that is) in order to prevent their wives from having to undergo levirate marriage or halitzah (release from levirate marriage). An obvious problem is that a person does not know when they will die. Our mishnah deals with a husband who tries to remedy this problem by making the divorce conditional upon his death.", + "[If a husband says], “This is your get if I die”, [or] “This is your get if I die from this illness”, [or] “This is your get after my death”, he has not said anything. The stipulations that the husband makes in this section cause it to be impossible for the get to be valid, because by the time the get would become valid the husband is already dead. A dead husband cannot divorce, and therefore when this husband dies his wife’s legal status is that of a widow and not a divorcee.", + "[If he says, “This is your get] from today if I die”, [or “This is your get] from now if I die”, the get is valid. In this case, the stipulation is effective. When the husband dies, the get will become retroactively effective to the day that he actually gave her the get. This language may have been effective for a husband going off to war, or a husband who has gotten sick and looks like he will die soon. If he returns from war or recovers from illness he can retract the get. However, it would be problematic for a husband who is home and healthy because the minute he says this, he is potentially ending his marriage. This problem shall be dealt with in tomorrow’s mishnah.", + "[If he says, “This is your get] from today and after [my] death”, it is both a get and not a get. If he dies [without offspring] she must perform halizah but she cannot marry the husband’s brother. In this case the husband used ambiguous language. We don’t know whether he intended the get to be valid after his death or beforehand. Therefore, the status of the get is doubtful and the halakhah must rule stringently. Should he die without children, she cannot remarry without halitzah, lest the get was not valid and she has a connection to the brother-in-law. However, she cannot have yibbum (levirate marriage) lest she is a divorcee, in which case yibbum is strictly forbidden.", + "[If he said], “This is your get from today if I die from this illness”, and he then got up and went about and fell sick and died, we estimate [the probable cause of his death]; if he died from the first illness, the get is valid, but otherwise not. In this case, the husband made his divorce conditional upon his dying from his current illness. If he seems to recover and then gets sick and dies, doctors or other qualified people would need to estimate whether he died of the original illness or of another cause. If he died of the original illness she is divorced; if not, she is a widow. If it is doubtful then she is a doubtful widow/divorcee. Again, she would be required to do halitzah and forbidden from contracting yibbum, as we learned in the previous section." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe previous mishnah discussed a person who conditioned his wife’s divorce upon his subsequently dying. For this to work, he must state that the divorce would retroactively be effective from the time he gave her the get. However, until he dies she is not divorced because the get is conditional upon his death. Our mishnah discusses her status between the time he gives her the get and the time that he dies, thereby finalizing her divorce.", + "She should not be alone with him except in the presence of witnesses, even a slave or a handmaid [any witness is sufficient] except for her own female slave, since she can take liberties in front of her own handmaid. Once the husband gives her the conditional get, she will retroactively be divorced from that moment onward. Therefore, he is not allowed to have sexual relations with her. Furthermore, as we shall learn in a later mishnah (8:4), sexual relations with her at this point, renders the get invalid. In order to avoid the possibility that they would engage in sexual relations, they are not even allowed to be secluded together. Seclusion is defined as being totally alone. The presence of anyone else in the room means that they are not secluded. The one exception is her handmaid. Since she would not be embarrassed at having sexual relations in front of her own handmaid, the handmaid’s presence is not sufficient to prevent seclusion.", + "What is her status during those days? Rabbi Judah says that she is regarded as a married woman in every respect. Rabbi Yose says that she is both divorced and not divorced. The mishnah now asks what her status is in-between the time that the divorce was given and the husband dies. According to Rabbi Judah, she is fully married. Rabbi Judah seemingly disagrees with the previous clause and holds that when the husband dies the get is retroactively effective to a point a moment before he died. It is not retroactively effective to the time when he gave her the get. Therefore, she can continue to live with him as a married woman. Rabbi Yose disagrees and holds that the get is retroactively effective to the point at which he gave it to her. Therefore, she is both married and not married. This means that she could not have relations with him and not eat terumah if he was a priest. However, she could not marry anyone else and if she did have relations with someone else, it might have the status of adultery." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe remainder of chapter seven discusses conditional divorces. Today’s mishnah discusses someone who divorces his wife on the condition that she pay him a large sum of money.", + "[If a husband says], “This is your get on condition that you give me two hundred zuz”, she is divorced and she has to give [him the money]. In this case, the divorce is effective immediately and she must give him the two hundred zuz. If she elects not to give him the two hundred zuz, then the get is invalid.", + "[If he says], “On condition that you give [the money to] within thirty days from now, if she gives him within thirty days she is divorced, but if not she is not divorced. In this case, the husband wisely set a time limit for her to pay the divorce money. If she wishes to be divorced, she must give him the money immediately. If she does not do so, the get is invalid. I should note that the amount of 200 zuz is probably not accidental. This is the amount of money that the husband would have to pay her for her ketubah if he divorces her. What we may have here is a husband who wants to divorce his wife, and perhaps a wife who wants to be divorced, but he cannot afford to pay her the ketubah. He is in essence saying that he wants to divorce her without paying her marriage settlement. She has a right to forego her ketubah, should she wish to be divorced.", + "Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: “It happened in Sidon that a man said to his wife, “This is your get on condition that you give me my robe”, and his robe was lost, and the Sages said that she should give him its value in money. In the case that happened in Sidon (on the coast of modern Lebanon), a husband wanted to retrieve his robe from his wife. However, the robe was lost and therefore the question arose whether the wife could fulfill the get’s condition by returning to him the value of the robe. The Sages answered that she could. In essence, the husband was not asking for the robe back but for the value of the robe." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn this mishnah, instead of conditioning the get upon her paying him money, the husband stipulates that to be divorced she must continue to look after his father. We can easily see the social situation reflected in this stipulation. The husband no longer wishes to remain married, but the wife has performed an important function in the family. The mishnah discusses when we consider the stipulation fulfilled.\nI should make an important note when discussing these situations. The Mishnah does not generally provide an opinion whether a husband, or really any person, has done something “virtuous”. The Mishnah is often interested in the technical, legal details and implications of things that can potentially occur. These mishnayoth are not providing approval of a husband’s essentially blackmailing his wife. Rather, they admit that such action is legally possible and hence its implications must be discussed.", + "[If a husband says], “This is your get on condition that you look after my father”, [or] “On condition that you nurse my child” How long must she nurse? Two years. Rabbi Judah says, eighteen months. In this scenario, the husband made the get conditional upon his wife’s continuing to look after his father or to nurse his child. The time limit for looking after the father is the remainder of the father’s life. However, the wife need only nurse the child for two years, the standard length of time in which an average child nursed in mishnaic times. Rabbi Judah says she need nurse only for eighteen months, which was probably the minimum amount of time that children nursed in this time period.", + "If the child dies or the father dies, the get is valid. When the husband said that she must continue to take care of his father or child, his intention was that she should do so as long as the father or child was alive. Should they die, she has fulfilled the stipulation on the get and it is valid.", + "[If he says], “This is your get on condition that you look after my father for two years”, [or] “On condition that you nurse my child for two years”, if the child dies or if the father says, “I don't want you to look after me”, even though she has not caused him to complain, the get is invalid. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: something like this is a get. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel said a general rule: wherever the obstacle does not arise from her side, the get is valid. In this the husband stipulates a limit of two years to her having to take care of his father or child. The mishnah takes this to mean that she must take care of the father or nurse the child for a full two years no matter what happens. Therefore, in this case if the father or child dies, she has not fulfilled the stipulation. Furthermore, if the father decides he no longer wants her to wait on him, she still hasn’t fulfilled the stipulation. This is certainly true if she gave him reason to “fire” her, but according to the first mishnah, even if she was not at all at fault, she still has not fulfilled the condition. However, Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel disagrees with this. He holds that if she was not the obstacle which prevented the fulfillment of the stipulation, then the get is valid. Therefore, if the father gets angry at her and she was not at fault, she is divorced." + ], + [ + "IntroductionIn this mishnah a man conditions the validity of his get upon his arrival at a certain place or lack of return within thirty days. The idea would be that if he arrived at his destination and did not return, he either was never intending on returning or something else had occurred to him, preventing his return and thereby validating the get.", + " [If a husband says,] \"This is your get if I do not return within thirty days\", and he was going from Judea to Galilee, if he got as far as Antipatras and then returned, his condition is broken. [If he says,] \"This is your get if I do not return within thirty days\", and he was going from Galilee to Judea, if he got as far as Kefar Otnai and then returned, the condition is broken. [If he said,] \"This is your get if I do not return within thirty days\", and he was going into foreign parts, if he got as far as Acco and then returned his condition is broken. All three of these sections have identical structures, so we will explain them together. According to the Talmud explains that in each case the husband made two conditions: 1) if he were to arrive at his destination the get would become effective immediately; 2) if he did not return within thirty days the get would come into effect. [I should note that there are other explanations of this mishnah, and its language is actually quite difficult and open to various interpretations.] In all three scenarios, he does not arrive at his destination and he returns within thirty days. Antipatras is on the border between Judea and the Galilee, but it is still in Judea. Kefar Otnai is still in the Galilee. Acco, while almost being considered outside the land of Israel (however, compare Gittin 1:2). ", + "[If he said,] \"This is your get as long as I shall keep away from you for thirty days\", even though he came and went and came and went, since he was not secluded with her, the get is valid. In this case, the husband conditions the validity of the get upon his staying away from his wife’s presence for thirty days. The mishnah teaches that his intention was that he should not be secluded with his wife for thirty days. Therefore, even if he comes and goes but they are not secluded together, she is divorced." + ], + [ + "[If a husband says,] “This is your get if I do not return within twelve months”, and he dies within twelve months, it is not a get.
[If he says,] “This is your get from now if I do not return within twelve months”, and he dies within twelve months, it is a get.
In today’s mishnah, a husband conditions his get upon is return home within twelve months. The mishnah discusses the validity of the get should he die within that time.
As we learned in mishnah three, there can be no divorce after death. In the first section, the wife is a widow because the get could not become valid until after twelve months. At the point when the get could become valid, the husband was already dead. In contrast, in the second section the husband says “From now…”, meaning that the get will become retroactively valid to the point at which it was given. When he fails to return after twelve months, she is considered a divorcee and not a widow. An interesting question asked, but not solved, in the Talmud, is whether or not she may remarry after he dies but before the twelve months are up. On the one hand, in the future she will be considered a divorcee at the point of the giving of the get. On the other hand, she has still not reached that point. [This is sort of a mishnaic time warp, and I love time warp scenarios]." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn the last mishnah of the chapter, the mishnah discusses a husband who conditioned his get upon his return within twelve months, but unlike yesterday’s mishnah, he told agents to write and deliver the get rather than giving it directly to his wife.", + "[If a husband says,] “If I do not come back within twelve months, write a get and give it to my wife”, and they wrote a get before twelve months had passed and gave it to her after, it is not a get. In this scenario, the husband stipulated that his agents should not even write the get until twelve months had passed. Even though we could have interpreted his words to mean only that they should give the get after twelve months, the rabbis were quite strict in the interpretation of the language of gittin and in instructions given to deliver a get. Therefore, the get is invalid.", + "[If he said,] “Write a get and give it to my wife if I do not come back within twelve months”, and they wrote it before the twelve months had passed and gave it after, it is no get. Rabbi Yose says: like this is a get. In this case, the husband was not as clear as to when he wanted the get written. He said “Write a get…” before he said “If I do not come back within twelve months.” Hence, there is room to debate the validity of the get. The first opinion is that the get is invalid, for his intention may have been the same as it was in the previous section. However, here R. Yose disputes and says that in this case, the get is valid.", + "If they wrote it after twelve months and delivered it after twelve months and he died, if the delivery of the get preceded his death the get is valid, but if his death preceded the delivery of the get it is not valid. If it is not known which was first, this is the woman about whom they said, “[She is] divorced and not divorced.” If the husband’s agents faithfully fulfilled his instructions and wrote and delivered the get, then the only question left is whether or not the husband died before or after twelve months. If it is doubtful, then this woman is doubtfully divorced. In other words, she might be a widow but she also might be a divorcee. Therefore, should she be in a situation which would require yibbum (her husband left no children and had a brother) she could only do halitzah (yibbum would be prohibited lest she is a divorcee, and her brother-in-law be prohibited to her as her husband’s brother). On the other hand, without halitzah she could not remarry, lest she is a widow and obligated for yibbum." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThe first three mishnayoth of this chapter discuss a husband who throws his get to his wife. While a woman need not consent to being divorced, the husband must deliver the get into her possession and make her aware of the fact that she is being divorced. These mishnayoth define what it takes to fulfill these two requirements.", + "If a husband throws a get to his wife, and she is in her house or in her courtyard, she is divorced. The Torah states that the husband “puts the get in her hand” (Deuteronomy 24:1). The rabbis expand this requirement and allow the husband to put the get into any place which is in her possession.", + "If he throws it to her in his house or in his courtyard, even though it is with her on the same bed, she is not divorced. In this case, she is on his property and hence he cannot just throw the get at her. This is true even if the husband puts the get into her bed, if the bed belongs to the husband, she is not divorced.", + "If he throws it into her lap or into her basket, she is divorced. If he puts the get into her lap or into her basket she is divorced. This is true even if she is standing on his property. Since her lap and basket belong to her, it is sufficient if he delivers the get to one of these places." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first section of this mishnah deals with a husband who tries to sneak a get to his wife by telling her it is a different type of document or by giving it to her while she is asleep. Perhaps he wishes to avoid a face to face confrontation. The mishnah will teach us that he must state to her “Here is your get” in order for her to be divorced.\nThe second section returns to the subject of a husband who throws a get to his wife.", + "If he said to her, “Take in this debt document”, or if she found it behind him and read it and it turned out to be her get, it is not a get, until he says to her, “Here is your get.” In this case the husband tries to sneak the get to his wife either by telling her it was a debt document, or by hiding what it was until she picked it up. In either case the get is invalid unless he affirmatively states to her “Here is your get.”", + "If he put it into her hand while she was asleep and when she woke up she read it and found it was her get, it is not a get until he says to her, “Here is your get.” Similarly, he may not place the get in her hand while she is sleeping and then just let her wake up and read it. Although he can divorce her against her will, he must at least tell her that she is being divorced.", + "If she was standing in the public domain and he threw it to her, if it lands near her she is divorced, but if it lands near him she is not divorced. If it lands midway, she is divorced and not divorced. In this case she is standing on neutral ground, in the public domain which is neither his nor her property. According to the mishnah if the get lands close to her, it counts as if he actually gave it to her and she is divorced. The Talmud explains that in order for the get to be considered “close to her”, it must be within four amot (cubits). If it is in-between the two of them, let’s say two amot from her and two amot from him, then she is doubtfully divorced. In such a case, she would need another get in order to remarry." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first section of the mishnah is a direct continuation of yesterday’s mishnah. It teaches that the laws concerning a husband throwing a get to his wife are the same as the laws of a man throwing betrothal money or a betrothal document to a woman or a borrower repaying his debt by throwing money at the creditor.\nThe second half of the mishnah deals with a husband who is on a roof and throws a get down to his wife or is below and she is on the roof and he throws the get up to her.", + "Similarly with betrothals and similarly with a debt. If a man’s creditor said to him, “Throw me my debt”, and he threw it to him, if it lands nearer to the creditor, the borrower is credited [with paying back his debt]; if it lands nearer to the borrower, the borrower is still obligated [to repay the money]; if it lands midway, they divide. The laws concerning throwing a get are the same when it comes to throwing betrothal money or documents or repaying monetary debts. The remainder of the mishnah illustrates the principle with regard to repaying debts. Note that the one difference between debts and divorce/betrothal is that in the latter case, if the document lands halfway, the woman is doubtfully divorced or doubtfully betrothed. There is no possibility of a woman being half divorced or betrothed. In contrast, when it comes to debts, people can split money. Therefore, if the money lands halfway between the two parties they split it and the borrower owes half the debt.", + "If she was standing on a roof and he threw it up to her, as soon as it reaches the airspace of the roof, she is divorced. If he was above and she below and he threw it to her, once it has left the space of the roof, [even were it to be immediately] erased or burnt, she is divorced. When the husband is standing below and she is standing on the roof, the get must reach the level of the roof for she to be divorced. In other words, her domain only begins at roof-level. Similarly, if he is standing on the roof, her domain begins at the level of the roof. If he drops the get, she is divorced as soon as the get enters her domain, which is below the level of the roof. Even if it briefly enters her domain and then is somehow erased (severe case of bird droppings?) or burnt (by a lightning bolt) she was divorced as soon as the get entered her domain." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn this mishnah Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel disagree over whether or not a get is valid if after its being written but before its being given the husband was secluded with his wife.", + "Bet Shammai says: a man may divorce his wife with an old get, But Bet Hillel forbids this. What is meant by an old get? One where he was secluded with her after he wrote it. Bet Hillel forbids a man to use an “old get” to divorce his wife. Bet Hillel is concerned lest while secluded the couple has sexual relations, she becomes pregnant and people think that the child was conceived after she was divorced, assuming that the divorce occurred only on the date written on the get. For instance, let’s say he had the get written in November, continued to live with her and she became pregnant in February, and he gave her the document in March before they knew that she was pregnant. People will think that he divorced her in November, the date written on the get, and that the kid was conceived after she was divorced. Therefore, Bet Hillel prohibits the use of an “old get.” Bet Shammai does not assume that just because they were secluded, they had sex. Therefore, he allows the husband to use the get so long as they were only secluded but did not actually have sex. We shall see at the end of the tractate, that Bet Shammai rules that a husband may divorce his wife only on the grounds of adultery. Since divorce is possible only under such circumstances, it is unlikely, and indeed forbidden, for the couple to have relations after he writes out a get." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIf the get was not written precisely the way that the rabbis prescribed it to be written, it is invalid. Our mishnah mentions mistakes in writing the get which cause it to be invalid. If she were to remarry with such a get, she is considered an adulteress, because she was never divorced from her first husband. This is analogous to a situation where she thought her husband was dead, she remarried and then it turned out that he was still alive. Hence, all of the consequences that were described in Yevamoth 10:1 are again listed here.", + "If the get was dated by an unfit kingship, by the empire of Medea, by the empire of Greece, by the building of the Temple or by the destruction of the Temple, Or if being in the east he wrote “in the west”, or being in the west he wrote “in the east”, She must leave this one and that one, and she also requires a get from this one and that one. She has no ketubah, no usufruct, no support money or worn clothes, neither from this one nor from that one. If she has taken anything from this one or that one, she must return it. The child from this one or that one is a mamzer. Neither this one nor that one may impurify himself for her. Neither this one and that one has a claim to whatever she may find, nor what she makes with her hands, nor to invalidate her vows. If she was the daughter of an Israelite, she becomes disqualified from marrying a priest; if the daughter of a Levite, from the eating of tithe; and if the daughter of a priest, from the eating of terumah. Neither the heirs of this one nor the heirs of that one are entitled to inherit her ketubah. And if [the husbands] die, the brother of the one and the brother of the other must perform halitzah, but may not contract yibbum. There are two potential problems with the writing of the get in this section. The first is that he dated the get to the wrong kingship. Documents used to be dated to the ruling empire, so in the Roman period, it would be invalid to date a get with dates from the Medean (Persian) or Greek empires. Furthermore, the rabbis ruled that even dating a document to the building or the destruction of the Temple is forbidden and invalidates the get. The second problem is that he wrote the wrong place. Although this would seemingly be a trivial point in writing the get, the rabbis were adamant that any deviation from the precise truth invalidates the get. As stated above, if this woman now remarries, she is an accidental adulteress and all of the following consequences apply. For further information, you can look back at Yevamoth 10:1. She must leave this one and that one, and she also requires a get from this one and that one: She must be divorced from each of them, for she is forbidden to each. She also needs a get from each of them. According to the talmudic interpretation, the get from the second husband is only of rabbinic origin, for according to biblical law, she is not married to the second man. She has no ketubah, no usufruct, no support money or worn clothes, neither from this one nor from that one: She does not receive any of the financial benefits that she would have accrued from her husband. If she has taken anything from this one or that one, she must return it: If she had taken any of these things to which she is not entitled, she must return them. Some times, in cases of doubt, possession is enough for a person not to have to return something. However, in this case, her possession is considered truly illegal and she must return what she took. The child from this one or that one is a mamzer: The child from the second husband is a mamzer because she gave birth to him while married to the first husband. Should she return to the first husband, the subsequent child will also be a mamzer. Neither this one nor that one may impurify himself for her: A priest is allowed to impurify himself to bury his wife. In this case, if either husband is a priest and she dies, they may not impurify themselves for her. Neither this one and that one has a claim to whatever she may find, nor what she makes with her hands, nor to invalidate her vows: These are all rights given to a husband during marriage. Since the marriage is now invalid, he loses all these rights. Invalidating vows is discussed in Numbers 30. If she was the daughter of an Israelite, she becomes disqualified from marrying a priest; if the daughter of a Levite, from the eating of tithe; and if the daughter of a priest, from the eating of terumah: The illicit marriage to the second husband disqualifies her from all rights that might be accrued from either kohanic or levitical status. The result is that she could no longer marry a priest nor eat tithe if her father was a Levite, nor eat terumah if her father was a priest. Neither the heirs of this one nor the heirs of that one are entitled to inherit her ketubah: According to a ketubah clause which we will see in chapter four of tractate Ketuboth, a woman’s male children inherit her ketubah. However, in this case they too are penalized and lose their inheritance. And if [the husbands] die, the brother of the one and the brother of the other must perform halitzah, but may not contract yibbum: Since both marriages were invalid, the brothers cannot perform yibbum. Note that according to the talmudic interpretation, the halitzah of the brother of the second husband is only of rabbinic origin, since according to Torah law the second marriage was not valid.", + "If his name or her name or the name of his town or the name of her town was wrongly given, she must leave both husbands and all the above consequences apply to her. If he made a mistake in writing his name, her name, his or her place of residence the get is invalid and all of the consequences mentioned in the previous section apply to her." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nTo understand this mishnah we must remind ourselves of the first chapter of Yevamoth, and especially mishnah four. There we learned that if a man was married to two women, and he died childless, and one of those women was forbidden to his brother, for instance the brother was married to that woman’s sister, not only is the prohibited woman herself exempt (a man may not marry two sisters) from yibbum/halitzah (Levirate marriage and release thereof) but her rival wives are also exempt.", + "With regard to all of the near relatives concerning whom they said “their rivals are permitted to marry [without halitzah]”: If the rival wives went and married and it was then found that this one (the near relative) was an aylonit, [the rival wife who married] must leave both husbands and all these consequences apply to her. In our mishnah, a man was married to a woman who is prohibited to the yavam (brother-in-law) and he is also married to other women. When he dies, since one wife is prohibited to the yavam, all of her rival wives are exempt from yibbum and halitzah. The rival wives therefore remarry without halitzah. If it turns out that widow who was prohibited to the yavam was an aylonit, a woman who never reaches physical maturity, then her marriage to her first husband was invalid and her rival wives should have had halitzah with the brother-in-law before remarrying. Therefore, the remarried rival wives may not remain with their current husbands nor may they marry the yavam either. All of the above consequences also apply to them. This mishnah regards the child of a woman who did not undergo halitzah as a mamzer. However, the halakhah is not according to this mishnah and the child is not considered a mamzer." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is quite similar to yesterday’s mishnah. Mishnah Seven", + "If a man marries his sister-in-law and her rival wife goes and marries another man and it was found that the first is an aylonit, the other must leave both husbands and all these consequences apply to her. In today’s mishnah Reuven was married to two women, Rachel and Leah. When Reuven dies, Rachel marries Shimon, Reuven’s brother, thereby fulfilling the mitzvah of yibbum. Leah is free to marry an outsider, so she marries David. When it turns out that Rachel is an aylonit, her yibbum marriage to Shimon is invalidated. Leah has therefore married an outsider without halitzah, which according to our mishnah (but not the accepted halakhah), renders her marriage invalid and her child with her new husband a mamzer. She may not remain married to her husband, nor have yibbum with Shimon, and all of the consequences listed in mishnah five apply to her." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first half of the mishnah deals with a situation where a scribe wrote a get for a husband to give to his wife and a receipt for payment of the ketubah for the wife to give to her husband. He accidentally switched the documents, giving the get to the wife and the receipt to the husband, whereupon the husband divorced his wife using a ketubah receipt. The problem is that this wife never received her get.\nThe second half of the mishnah contains a debate between Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel over a husband who writes out a get to give to his wife but does not give it to her.", + "If a scribe wrote a get for the husband and a receipt for the wife and by mistake gave the get to the wife and the receipt to the husband and the two exchanged them and after some time the get came out of the hands of the man and the receipt out of the hands of the woman, she must leave both husbands and all these things apply to her. Rabbi Elazar says: if [it comes out of her hands] immediately, it is not a get, but if [it comes out of her hands] after some time, it is a get; it is not in the power of the first to render void the right of the second. According to the first opinion in this section, since the wife never received her get she was never divorced. Hence her second marriage is invalid, and all of the consequences that applied in the previous mishnayot apply to her as well. Rabbi Elazar says that the get is invalid only in a case where she immediately noticed that she had received a ketubah receipt and not a get. If she only discovered that she had never received the get at a later time, she is considered divorced. The reason that she is considered divorced is that we fear that the husband and the wife may have made a deal in order to disrupt the second marriage. By her giving him back the get and his giving her back the receipt, they can make it look like she was never divorced. The first husband does not have the authority to ruin the second husband’s marriage.", + "If a man wrote a get with which to divorce his wife and then changed his mind, Bet Shammai says that he has disqualified her from marrying a priest. Bet Hillel says that even if he gave it to her with a certain stipulation, if the condition was not fulfilled, he has not disqualified her for marrying a priest. A priest cannot marry a divorced woman. According to Bet Shammai, even if a woman’s husband writes a get but does not give it to her, he has already disqualified her from subsequently marrying a priest. In contrast, Bet Hillel holds that even if he gives her the get with a condition (for instance, “here is your get if I don’t return within 12 months) and the condition is not fulfilled and the get is invalid, she is still not disqualified from marry a priest. The Yerushalmi (Palestinian Talmud) connects this Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel debate with their debate that appears in the last mishnah of the tractate. Since Bet Shammai says that a husband can divorce only on grounds of adultery, the very fact that the husband suspected her of adultery and therefore wrote out a get, disqualifies her from marrying a priest. In contrast, Bet Hillel allows divorce on nearly all grounds, and therefore does not see a disqualified get as disqualifying a woman from the priesthood." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first section of the mishnah deals with a man who is suspected of having sexual relations with his divorcee. The second section deals with a “bald get”, one that does not have the proper number of signatures.", + "A man divorces his wife and then stays with her over night in an inn: Bet Shammai says: she does not require from him a second get, But Beth Hillel say she does require a second get from him. When is this so? When she was divorced after marriage. And [Beth Hillel] agrees that if she is divorced after betrothal, she does not require a second get from him, because he would not [yet] take liberties with her. If a divorced woman is secluded with her ex-husband, Bet Hillel suspects that they may have had sexual relations and through the sexual act he betrothed her again (we shall learn about how betrothal is performed in the beginning of Kiddushin). Since they may have remarried, she requires another get from him. Bet Shammai is not suspicious that they had sexual relations and therefore does not require another get. Again, this debate may be connected with their debate over the grounds for divorce. Since Bet Shammai holds that divorce can only be a result of adultery (or at least suspected adultery), it is less likely that the couple will again engage in sexual relations. Bet Hillel holds that a man may divorce his wife for almost no reason and therefore there is a greater chance at reconciliation. However, Bet Hillel suspects that the divorced couple may have sex only if they were already married and assumedly had already had sexual relations while married. In this case, their prior intimacy increases the likelihood that when secluded they will again become intimate. If the divorce occurred after their betrothal but before they were ever married, since they had never been intimate before, it is less likely that they will now engage in sex. Therefore, in such a situation she does not require a second get.", + "If a man marries a [divorced] woman through a “bald” get, she must leave both husbands and all the above-mentioned consequences apply to her. A “bald get” is a “sewn document”, as described in Bava Batra 10:1-2. There we learned that to protect forgeries people would sew several folds into their documents, having people sign on each fold. A “bald get” is one where there are more folds than signatures. It is “bald” because it is missing signatures and is therefore invalid. Since it is invalid, she was not properly divorced from her first husband when she married her second husband and all of the consequences which were discussed in mishnah five (and mentioned in 6-8) apply to her as well." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nAt the end of yesterday’s mishnah we learned that a woman who was divorced with a “bald get” is not divorced. Our mishnah explains what a “bald get” is and how it can be fixed.", + "A “bald” get anyone can complete its signatures, the words of Ben Nannas. But Rabbi Akiva says that it may be completed only by relatives who are qualified to testify elsewhere. What is a “bald” get? One which has more folds than signatures. It would be helpful to explain this mishnah backwards. The end of the mishnah clarifies that a “bald get” is one which has more folds than signatures. As I explained yesterday, some documents were folded and sewn on the folds to prevent forgeries. One person would sign on each fold, and there could be many folds. If there are any folds without signatures, then the document/get is invalid. However, in order to validate this get, it need not have perfectly acceptable witnesses sign. According to Ben Nannas, if at least two valid witnesses have already signed all that is needed is an additional signature for each fold and, that signature may be from a person who normally disqualified from testifying. This would include relatives and gamblers. Rabbi Akiva restricts the leniency to relatives who would otherwise be allowed to testify, but would not normally be allowed to in this case. Gamblers and others who are always invalid could not complete the “bald get.”" + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with a man who tried to divorce his wife but at the same time restrict her from subsequently marrying a certain man. Generally speaking divorce frees a woman to marry almost anyone who she wishes to marry (except priests and anyone related to her previous husband). The background to this case is probably that the husband is divorcing his wife because he suspects that she has committed adultery with a certain man. By divorcing her, he does not want to allow her to go marry the very man whom he suspects.", + "If a man divorces his wife and said to her, “You are free to marry any man but so-and-so”, Rabbi Eliezer permits her [to marry on the strength of this get], but the rabbis forbid her. Rabbi Eliezer allows the woman to remarry on the strength of this get. She can marry anyone save the person whom her husband stated she was not allowed to marry. The remainder of the sages declared this get to be invalid. In the Talmud, there is recorded a story of four sages who gathered together to refute Rabbi Eliezer after his death. Indeed the opposition to this opinion of Rabbi Eliezer is among the most vehement in the Talmud. Evidently, the rabbis believed that for divorce to work it must totally sever the legal relationship between the man and woman. Any retention of his control over her undermines the entire validity of divorce.", + "What should he do? He should take it back from her and give it to her again saying, “You are free to marry any man.” If he wrote [the restriction] in the get, even though he went back and erased it, it is invalid. In this section we learn how the husband can fix the situation so that his wife is legally divorced. If he has not written the words “but so-and-so” in the get, he need merely take the get back from her and restate the divorce formula correctly. However, if he has written the invalidating words in the get, the document itself is irreparably invalid." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is a continuation of yesterday’s mishnah. Again, while divorcing his wife, the husband attempts to restrict her from subsequently marrying a certain man. Yesterday we learned that the sages consider such a get to be invalid. Today, the mishnah discusses what would happen if the man to whom the husband tried to restrict his wife was in any case prohibited to her.", + "[If he said,] “You are permitted to any man but my father, your father, my brother, your brother, a slave, a Gentile, or anyone to whom she is incapable of being betrothed,” the get is valid. In this section the husband tells his wife that she may not subsequently marry someone whom she couldn’t subsequently marry in any case. All of the men in this list cannot possibly contract marriage with her. In other words his restrictions on the divorce were in essence meaningless, because she couldn’t marry any of them in any case. Hence, the get is valid.", + "[If he said,] “You are permitted to anyone but (supposing she was a a high priest, or, (supposing she was a divorcee or a an ordinary priest, or, (supposing she was a mamzeret or a a regular Israelite, or (supposing she was an a mamzer or a natin, or anyone who is capable of betrothing her even in transgression, the get is invalid. In this section, the husband restricts his wife from marrying someone who would be prohibited to her, but to whom she could possibly be betrothed. The marriages listed in this section are possible even though they carry with them a transgression. For instance, his wife was a mamzeret and he says “You are permitted to any but to so-and-so the Israelite”. In such cases, the get is invalid because his restriction was not meaningless. We should note that the list in this section is a stock list, since not all of these categories are relevant in this situation. The woman whom he is divorcing will in any case be prohibited to a priest, as are all divorcees. However, this is a stock list and hence it appears in all places as an entirety." + ], + [ + "The body of the get is: “Behold you are permitted to any man.” Rabbi Judah says: [he must add] “And this shall be to you from me a writ of divorce and a letter of release and a bill of dismissal, with which you may go and marry any man that you wish.”
The body of a writ of emancipation is: “Behold you are a free woman”, “Behold you belong to yourself.”
This mishnah provides the wording for the standard parts of divorce documents and documents which free slaves.
The mishnah is straightforward and doesn’t require any explanation. One thing to note is that Rabbi Judah’s addition to the get is in Aramaic. Documents in this period were in Aramaic (or Greek), the lingua franca(s) of Palestine during the mishnaic and talmudic periods. Rabbi Judah may have insisted that the get be in Aramaic so that everyone would understand it." + ], + [ + "There are three gittin which are invalid but if a woman marries [on the strength of one of them] the child is fit:
If the husband wrote it with his own hand but there are no witnesses on it.
If there are witnesses on it but no date.
If it has a date but only one witness. These are three gittin which are invalid but if a woman marries [on the strength of one of them] the child is fit. Rabbi Elazar says even though there are no witnesses on it, as long as he gave it to her in the presence of witnesses it is valid, [and on the strength of it] she may collect her ketubah [even] from mortgaged property, since the witnesses only sign on the get because of tikkun olam.
This mishnah teaches that there are three gittin which are invalid, but nevertheless if a woman were to remarry on the strength of one of them, a child from the subsequent marriage is not a mamzer, as he would be were the get to be completely invalid. In other words, “lechatchilah” ab initio the woman should not remarry based on one of these gittin. However, “bediavad” ex post facto if she has married using one of these gittin, her subsequent marriage is not considered adulterous. Another way of putting this is that the get is kosher “deoraitta” according to Torah law, but the rabbis declared it invalid “derabanan” from rabbinic authority.
Get #1: If the husband wrote the get in his own hand, it will be easy to verify that he wrote the get through comparison of his handwriting. Therefore, the get is valid, at least bediavad/deoraita. However, witnesses are always preferable and considered to be more conclusive. Therefore, the rabbis said that the get was invalid and that “lechatchilah” a woman should not remarry using it.
Get #2: The rabbis declared that a get without a date is invalid. We learned above in mishnah 2:2, that without a date we fear that the woman may improperly collect her ketubah from mortgaged property. However, the get is not completely invalid and if she uses it to remarry, her subsequent child is not a mamzer.
Get #3: In this case, there is only one witness, and not the two that are normally required. Again, the get is invalid, at least derabbanan, but nevertheless if she does use it to remarry the subsequently born child is not a mamzer.
Rabbi Elazar goes even further than does the previous opinion and claims that even if there are no witnesses on the get, the get is completely valid and may even be used to collect the ketubah from the husband’s mortgaged property. Certainly she can remarry, according to Rabbi Elazar, on the strength of this get. Rabbi Elazar holds that the witnesses who are essential in the divorce process are not those who sign on the get, but rather those who witness the husband transfer the get to the wife. The only reason that witnesses sign on the get is for “tikkun olam” the improvement of the world. It will be easier for the woman to certify the validity of her get using the signatures on the get, and hence they sign for her benefit. If she decides to remarry without such benefit, it is her right. That witnesses sign because of tikkun olam was also learned above in mishnah 4:3." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first section of this mishnah is about two men with the same name who both send a get to their wives, who also share the the same name, and the one delivering the gittin mixes the two of them up. (You can imagine what kind of mail problems they must have had!)\nThe final two sections are about five men who try to combine their gittin into one document, perhaps in an attempt to save the costs of the parchment and the scribe.", + "Two men sent two identical gittin [to their wives] and they became mixed up they give both of them to this wife and both of them to this wife. Therefore, if one of them was lost the other is void. Since we don’t know which get belongs to which woman, both gittin must be given to each woman. If one of the two mixed-up gittin is lost, then neither woman can be divorced because we don’t know if she is receiving the get from her husband. This requirement is related to the halakhah which we learned in chapter three that a get must be written specifically for the wife being divorced. Although both gittin are exactly the same, they both have to be given to the right woman.", + "If five men wrote jointly in the same get, “So-and-so divorces so-and-so and so-and-so [divorces] so-and-so and the witnesses [signed] below, all are valid and the get is to be given to each [of the women]. The mishnah teaches that multiple men can divorce their wives with the same document. In order for the get to be valid for all of the wives, they must write the names of the divorcing men and their wives before the formula. This way it is clear that the formula refers to all five husbands and that the witnesses are signing on all five gittin. In addition, the get must be given to each woman, since a woman is not divorced until she receives the get in her hand.", + "If the scribe wrote out the formula for each one and the witnesses signed below, only the one with which the signatures are read is valid. In this case, the scribe writes out what is essentially a separate get for each man, complete with a divorce formula for each one. Therefore, it may look as if the witnesses who signed on the bottom of the get are only attesting to the last get. This is “the one with which the signatures are read.” Hence, only this get is valid." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses the validity of two gittin written side by side on one sheet of paper, with one set of witnesses testifying (or appearing to testify) to the validity of both of them.", + "If two gittin are written [on the same sheet] side by side and the signatures of two witnesses in Hebrew [stretch] from under one to under the other and then signatures of two witnesses in Greek [stretch] from under one get to under the other, the one with which the two first signatures are read is valid. The question in this mishnah is, are the witnesses testifying to the validity of both or only of the gittin, or perhaps can we not consider them as testifying to either. Hebrew is written from right to left. Hence, if the first two witnesses signed in Hebrew, their own names will be under the get on the right side, and their father’s names under the get on the left side, since people signed “so-and-so son of so-and-so.” Since the get on the right side has the witnesses actual name it is valid. However, we cannot be sure that the Greek witnesses are testifying to either get, since there is a break between their signatures and the get itself. Hence, only the get on the right side is valid. Had the Greek witnesses signed first, the left get would have been valid, since Greek is written from left to right.", + "If there is one signature in Hebrew and one in Greek and then another signature in Hebrew and a signature in Greek [stretching] from under one [get] to under the other, both are invalid. In this case, the signatures alternate between Hebrew and Greek. This is problematic, because the Hebrew signatures can only work for the get on the right side and the Greek signatures can only work for the get on the left side. If the first signature is in Hebrew, it counts for the right get. The next signature in Greek counts for the left get. The third signature, which is in Hebrew, is for the right get but it cannot be counted together with the first signature because the second signature interferes. Similarly, the fourth signature, which is in Greek, cannot count with the second signature, for the third interferes. Hence, neither the left nor right get is valid." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses scenarios where due to the way in which the writing of the get is found on the paper, it is somewhat doubtful whether the witnesses are testifying to the get.", + "If he left over some of the get [from the first sheet] and he wrote the rest of the get on the next column and the witnesses [sign] below, [the get is] valid. A scribe folds a piece of parchment in half and begins to write the get on the right hand column. He doesn’t have room to complete the get, so he continues on the top of the left hand column. If the witnesses signed below the left hand column, the get is valid. We can assume that they were testifying also to what is written in the right column.", + "If the witnesses have signed at the top of the sheet or at the side or on the back of a simple get, it is invalid. A simple get is one that is not folded. It is simply written and usually signed below. Signing on the back of such a get is not valid. Signing on top or on the side is never valid because the signatures are not read with the text. It could be that the signatures were originally on something else on that piece of paper, and then the person cut it off, thereby creating a forgery. The signatures must always be directly below the text of the get.", + "If he connected the top of one get to the top of another and the witnesses’ signatures are between the two, both of them are invalid. In the following three sections, two gittin were written on one page, in one column, each containing a separate divorce formula. If the two tops meet in the middle and the signatures are in the middle as well, then neither get is valid because the signatures do not read with either get. In other words, the signatures are above each get and hence they are both invalid.", + "If the end of one is connected to the end of the other and the witnesses’ signatures are between, the one with which the witnesses’ signatures reads is valid. Here the scribe placed the gittin with the two bottoms connected to each other and the witnesses signed in between. The get which is read in the same direction as the witnesses is valid and the other is not.", + "If the top of one is connected to the bottom of the other and the witnesses’ signatures are in the middle, the one with which the witnesses’ signatures reads is valid. Here he simply wrote two gittin in a row and the witnesses signed in the middle. The top one has signatures which read with it, and therefore is valid. The bottom one has signatures above it and hence is invalid." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first section of the mishnah discusses gittin written in languages different from the language in which the witnesses signed.\nThe second section deals with how witnesses sign a get.\nThe third section deals with the way in which the husband and wife’s names may be written.\nThe fourth and final section deals with husbands whom the court forces to divorce their wives. This last issue is obviously a crucial one, and I will discuss it at somewhat greater length below.", + "A get which was written in Hebrew and whose signatures are in Greek, or was written in Greek and whose signatures are in Hebrew, or which has one Hebrew signature and one Greek signature, or which was written by a scribe and signed by one witness, is valid. In all of these cases we might have feared that since the person signed a language different from that in which the get was written, the signer did not actually understand the document. The mishnah nevertheless rules that these gittin are valid, relying on people’s good faith not to sign documents unless they know what is written in them. This section also teaches that the scribe himself may sign the get. His role as scribe and his role as witness are independent, and therefore he can act as both.", + "[If a man signs], “So-and-so, witness,” it is valid. [If he signs,] “Son of so-and-so, witness, it is valid. [If he signs,] “So-and-so son of so-and-so” and he didn’t write “witness”, it is valid. Normally, people would sign, “So-and-so, son of so-and-so, witness.” The mishnah teaches that while this is the normal custom, it is not necessary for the signature to be effective. A signature can be valid without one’s personal name, or without one’s family name or without the word “witness.” I should note that printed editions contain the line “And this is how the scrupulous in Jerusalem would do” at this point, and not as it appears in manuscripts, as part of the next section. According to this, the scrupulous in Jerusalem did not write the word “witness.” The manuscript version is clearly correct, as the line makes little sense here.", + "If he wrote his own family name and hers, the get is valid. And this is how the scrupulous in Jerusalem would do. Usually the scribe would write the husband and wife’s personal names. However, if he wrote their family names, which were not surnames as we now use but rather some sort of personal nicknames, the get is valid. Indeed, since these names are sometimes more precise, the practice of writing nicknames was common among the “scrupulous people of Jerusalem.”", + "A get given imposed by court: in the case of a Jewish court is valid, and in the case of a Gentile court is invalid. And with regard to Gentiles, if they beat him and say to him, “Do what the Israelites say to you,” (and it is. Perhaps the most controversial issue in Jewish law today is the problem of the “agunah”, a woman who cannot obtain a divorce. Often (although not always) this is the result of the husband’s refusal to divorce his wife. The mishnah states quite clearly that if an Israelite court forces him to divorce his wife and he divorces her under duress, the divorce is nevertheless valid. Only if the coercion is done by a Gentile court, not acting according to Jewish law, is the get invalid. Even if Gentiles beat the recalcitrant husband, telling him to do what the Israelite court has told him to do (divorce his wife) the get is valid so long as the Gentiles are enforcing Jewish law. Gentile coercion invalidates the get only if it comes without the request of an Israelite court. After reading this mishnah, one might wonder why, if the Mishnah states that husbands may be compelled to divorce their wives, do women today find it often difficult to get a court to actually do so. I cannot answer this question fully in this forum but we should make three notes. First of all, it is not clear that this mishnah would apply in all cases. The question still needs to be asked; upon what grounds a court might force a husband to divorce his wife. The most important issue of all: what if the wife merely no longer wants to remain married to her husband, without any formal, specific grounds? Secondly, from the 12th century and onwards, rabbis became increasingly hesitant about compelling men to divorce. Hence, our modern problem is not so new. Thirdly, it seems to me that the modern problem is not one of halakhah, but rather of rabbis being overly hesitant in using halakhic authority. It is more of a sociological issue than a halakhic one. Rabbis could solve the problem, and many have made various suggestions of how to do so. They are often unwilling to solve the problem for sociological reasons. However, the subject is too important and complex to be dealt with fully here." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses a case where a rumor went around that a certain woman was either betrothed, and hence forbidden to marry anyone else, or divorced and permitted to remarry. Without full testimony regarding either status, her status would seem to be uncertain. Nevertheless, the mishnah generally relies on the rumors. We should remember that in mishnaic times they didn’t have the systems of verification and documentation that are available today and hence people would inevitably have to at least occasionally rely on rumors.", + "If a report goes out in the town: “[A certain woman is] betrothed,” she is regarded as betrothed; [If a report goes out in the town: “A certain woman is] divorced,” she is regarded as divorced. The mishnah regards either rumor as being true. The Talmud explains that a rumor alone would not be enough to create a legal assumption that a woman is married. Rather, physical signs of a marriage must have been observed. For instance, women seemed to be celebrating with her, saying “she’s married.” With regard to the rumor of divorce, the Talmud explains that this clause refers to the woman who was regarded as married based on a rumor. Since the assumption of her being married was not based on evidence but on a rumor, a rumor of divorce is sufficient to allow her to remarry. In contrast, a woman who was known to be married cannot be assumed to be divorced based on a rumor. Rather, she must bring evidence, either witnesses who saw her divorced or the document itself.", + "[This is only the case] provided the report has no qualification. What is meant by a qualification? [If the report is,] “So-and-so divorced his wife with a stipulation” [or], “He threw her the betrothal money, but it is uncertain whether it landed nearer to her or nearer to him” this is a qualification. If there is a “qualification” to the report, then it is not regarded as true. The “qualification” is something that would cause us to disbelieve the rumor. For instance, her husband attempted to divorce her, but the divorce came with a stipulation that was not fulfilled. Or he attempted to betroth her by throwing the betrothal money at her, but we’re not sure if it landed closer to her (in which case she is married) or closer to him (in which case she is not). In both of these cases, since there was a qualification to the rumor, the rumor is not accepted." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe final mishnah of the tractate is perhaps the most important and basic mishnah in the entire tractate. In it Bet Shammai, Bet Hillel and Rabbi Akiva dispute the grounds which justify divorce. Part of the basis for this dispute is exegetical how do we understand Deuteronomy 24:1, whose language is admittedly difficult and part of the debate is certainly based on ideology.\nWe should remember that divorce was a hotly debated by Jews in the first century. Jesus and Paul were quite stringent in their opposition to divorce and the Dead Sea sect also probably prohibited divorce, or at least disallowed remarriage after divorce. The rabbis, with Bet Hillel and Rabbi Akiva at the fore, were more open to allowing people to divorce. This is not the proper forum for debating this issue but I will offer a couple of potential explanations for why rabbis were more open to divorce than were other sects of Jews. First of all, most rabbis took a much more positive attitude toward sexuality and procreation than did early Christians. Divorce allows a dysfunctional couple to fulfill their procreative and sexual desires elsewhere. Although divorce can be damaging and abused, it can also be beneficial, at least in rabbinic perspective. Secondly, the rabbis rarely used the Adam and Eve story as a source of halakhah. This story contains a strong monogamous ideal and was used by both Jesus and the Dead Sea sect as grounds for prohibiting divorce. Finally, divorce is clearly permitted by the Torah. Hence, rabbinic openness to divorce may be seen as at least partially stemming from a simple understanding that God allows divorce. However, this last reason is less convincing for whereas the Torah certainly allows divorce, it is unclear whether it is allowed in all occasions. The Torah leaves room for multiple interpretations as we shall see in our mishnah.\nWhile reading this mishnah and understanding this debate, I think we would do well to keep in mind that divorce can be a painful trauma. While the rabbis may advocate allowing divorce, they recognized well the human pain involved for both the man and the woman. Furthermore, we are dealing here with general principles. These principles and ideals would apply differently in individual people’s lives and marriages, each with their own nuances. By talking about the grounds for a husband to divorce his wife, we should not be callous to the real pain that real people feel in such situations.", + "Bet Shammai says: a man should not divorce his wife unless he has found her guilty of some unseemly conduct, as it says, “Because he has found some unseemly thing in her.” Bet Hillel says [that he may divorce her] even if she has merely burnt his dish, since it says, “Because he has found some unseemly thing in her.” Rabbi Akiva says, [he may divorce her] even if he finds another woman more beautiful than she is, as it says, “it cometh to pass, if she find no favour in his eyes. The three positions in this mishnah are all based on differing interpretations of Deuteronomy 24:1 which states, “If a man takes a wife and possesses her, and she fails to please him because he finds something unseemly in her…” Bet Shammai interprets the verse to mean that he may only divorce her if he finds something “unseemly” in her. The word “unseemly” in Hebrew can also mean a forbidden sexual act. Therefore, Bet Shammai interprets the verse to mean that divorce is prohibited only if the husband suspects his wife of adultery. Bet Hillel focuses not on the word “unseemly” but on the word “thing.” The husband may divorce his wife if he finds any “thing” wrong with her, even something seemingly as trivial as burning his dish. Rabbi Akiva focuses upon the earlier part of the verse “she fails to please him” as separate grounds for divorce. Even if she has done nothing wrong, he may divorce her if he desires another woman more. We should note that Rabbi Akiva assumes that he won’t want to or be able to marry another woman while still married to his first wife. It could be that while polygamy was permitted, it wasn’t always so practical, for economic and social reasons. There are other versions which imply that Rabbi Akiva thinks that a husband may not stay married to one woman while he desires another. Rabbi Akiva’s ideal of marriage is one of love and such love cannot thrive when the husband desires another woman. Congratulations! We have finished Gittin. It is a tradition at this point to thank God for helping us to finish learning the tractate and to commit ourselves to going back and relearning it, so that we may not forget it and so that its lessons will stay with us for all of our lives. One of the most memorable parts of Gittin was the two middle chapters which discussed the concept of “tikkun olam” repairing the world. As we saw, “tikkun olam” means remedying economic, social and legal injustices in an attempt to make the world a more livable place. “Tikkun Olam” is always about going beyond the letter of the law. This is something we would do well to remember in general while learning rabbinic literature. Often what we are learning are the basic laws obligations and penalties. Clearly for the Jews and the rest of the world to have a just society, individuals must do more than just keep the law (although that would be a good start). They must look at each individual and individual situation and attempt to figure out what actions would aid in improving people’s lives and in avoiding conflict and pain, both now and in the future. Congratulations on making it through another tractate. May you have the strength and time to keep on learning more Mishnah! Tomorrow we begin the final tractate of Seder Nashim, tractate Kiddushin." + ] + ] + ] + }, + "versions": [ + [ + "Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp", + "http://learn.conservativeyeshiva.org/mishnah/" + ] + ], + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה גיטין", + "categories": [ + "Mishnah", + "Modern Commentary on Mishnah", + "English Explanation of Mishnah", + "Seder Nashim" + ], + "schema": { + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה גיטין", + "enTitle": "English Explanation of Mishnah Gittin", + "key": "English Explanation of Mishnah Gittin", + "nodes": [ + { + "heTitle": "הקדמה", + "enTitle": "Introduction" + }, + { + "heTitle": "", + "enTitle": "" + } + ] + } +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Nashim/English Explanation of Mishnah Nazir/English/Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp.json b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Nashim/English Explanation of Mishnah Nazir/English/Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..756040e940062d8025f7c16af46524f285d080b7 --- /dev/null +++ b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Nashim/English Explanation of Mishnah Nazir/English/Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp.json @@ -0,0 +1,373 @@ +{ + "language": "en", + "title": "English Explanation of Mishnah Nazir", + "versionSource": "http://learn.conservativeyeshiva.org/mishnah/", + "versionTitle": "Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp", + "status": "locked", + "license": "CC-BY", + "shortVersionTitle": "Dr. Joshua Kulp", + "actualLanguage": "en", + "languageFamilyName": "english", + "isBaseText": true, + "isSource": true, + "isPrimary": true, + "direction": "ltr", + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה נזיר", + "categories": [ + "Mishnah", + "Modern Commentary on Mishnah", + "English Explanation of Mishnah", + "Seder Nashim" + ], + "text": { + "Introduction": [ + "The Torah discusses the laws of becoming a nazirite in Numbers 6:1-21. There are three things prohibited to a nazirite: 1) drinking or eating anything that comes from grapes; 2) cutting hair; 3) contracting impurity from a dead body. The Torah provides rules for a nazirite who became impure by having someone die on or near him. Finally the Torah describes a ritual to be performed at the end of the term of naziriteship. He or she (women also can and did become nazirites) brings an offering, then the nazirite may cut his/her hair and the hair is also burnt on the altar. ", + "The other famous description of a nazirite in the Bible is Samson, whose mother made him a Nazirite for life. The rabbis discuss the difference between life-long nazirites such as Samson and temporary nazirites, as discussed in Numbers. ", + "It is often debated whether or not becoming a nazirite is a positive or negative step. According to Philo, a first century Jewish philosopher from Alexandria, a nazirite is holy like a priest. Just as a priest is prohibited from contracting impurity, so too is a nazirite. Amos 2:11 also compares nazirites to priests. Josephus testifies that when a person was sick, they would vow a nazirite vow as a prayer for well-being. From the Mishnah we will see that people frequently took vows of naziriteship, as a self-sacrifice to God. ", + "However, there were sages who looked askance at the institute of naziriteship, and called the nazirite a sinner, for the Torah mandates him to bring a sin offering. This opposition to naziriteship probably should be soon as part of the general rabbinic opposition toward asceticism. There are enough things already prohibited or mandated by the Torah. One need not take upon himself more prohibitions in order to become extra holy. ", + "To become a nazirite, one vows a vow. Hence this tractate is found in the Mishnah immediately after tractate Nedarim. \n" + ], + "": [ + [ + [ + "Introduction This mishnah is very similar to the first mishnah of nedarim, indeed the first line of our mishnah is quoted there. The mishnah discusses vow substitute formulas. People were afraid to mention the entire vow formula because of the awe they had in the power of a vow. Hence they used substitutes. The rabbis teach that substitutes are just as valid as the full formula. The mishnah continues to discuss other statements that make one into a nazir.", + "All the substitutes for vows have the validity of vows. This is an introduction to the rest of the mishnah. One need not state the full nazirite formula in order to become a nazirite.", + "If one says, “I shall be [one]” he is a nazirite. According to the simple reading of this section, all one needs to say to become a nazirite is “I shall be”, with the direct object “a nazirite” understood. The Talmud says that in order for this to be a valid nazirite formula, he must state it while a nazir is walking by.", + "I shall be comely. Nazirites, who grew their hair long, were considered to be comely. Therefore, one who says “I shall be comely” has taken a nazirite vow.", + "“A nazik”, “a naziah”, “a paziah”, he is a nazirite. These words all sound close enough to “nazir” that it is clear that by using them, the person intends to take a nazirite vow.", + "[If one says,] “Behold I shall be like this one,” or “Behold I shall curl [my hair]” or “Behold, I shall tend [my hair]” or “Behold, I shall grow my hair long,” he is a nazirite. The first statement “I shall be like this one” must have been made while a nazirite was walking by, as we explained in section two. The other statements, references to growing beautiful, long hair, are also references to becoming a nazir. As we can see, nazirites were distinguished by their growing their hair long.", + "[If one says] “Behold, I shall [bring] birds [as offerings]” Rabbi Meir says he is a nazirite, but the sages say he is not a nazirite. A nazirite who became impure must bring two birds as sacrifices (Numbers 6:10). According to Rabbi Meir, if one says, “I shall bring bird offerings”, his intention is to make himself a nazirite. The Sages hold that he has not vowed a nazirite vow. However, he would have to bring two birds as offerings." + ], + [ + "Introduction This first section of this mishnah teaches that if one accepts some of the prohibitions for which a nazirite is liable, he is obligated for all of the regulations. The second section deals with becoming a nazirite like Samson. The third section deals with the distinction between a nazirite like Samson and one who is a regular life-long nazirite.", + "[If one says,] “Behold I am a nazir [to abstain] from grape seeds, or from grape skins, or from shaving, or from [contracting] ritual defilement,” he is a nazirite and all the regulations of naziriteship apply to him. There are three nazirite prohibitions: eating things that come from grapes, shaving/cutting hair, and contracting impurity. If one takes a vow of naziriteship but tries to limit his prohibitions to one of these things, the nazirite vow if valid and all of the prohibitions apply, not just those that he mentioned. The mishnah uses the example of grape seeds and skins since they are mentioned in Numbers 6:4.", + "[If one says,] “Behold, I shall be like Samson”, “like the son of Manoah”, “like the husband of Delilah, or “like the one who uprooted the doors of Gaza,” or “like the one whose eyes the Philistines put out,” he is a nazirite like Samson. Samson, son of Manoah, husband of Delilah, who uprooted the doors of Gaza, and whose eyes were put out by the Philistines, was perhaps the most famous nazirite ever (see Judges 13). One who uses one of these aspects of Samson’s life to vow a nazirite vow is a nazirite like Samson.", + "What difference is there between a nazirite like Samson and a life-nazirite? A life-nazirite if his hair becomes burdensome, he may thin it with a razor and then offer three animal sacrifices. If he should be ritually defiled, he must offer the sacrifice [prescribed] for defilement. The nazirite like Samson if his hair becomes burdensome, he may not thin it. And if he becomes ritually defiled, he does not offer the sacrifice [prescribed] for defilement. This section explains the differences between a nazirite like Samson and a regular life-nazirite. A person can become a life long nazirite if he says, “Behold I am a life-nazirite” or “ “Behold, I am a nazirite all my life.” According to the Talmud, Absalom, son of David, was a life-long Nazirite. This assumption is made because of Absalom’s long hair (II Samuel 14:26) which was also his eventual undoing (II Samuel 18:9). As we shall see in tomorrow’s mishnah, if a person vows a nazirite vow but does not stipulate for how long his naziriteship is to last, he is a nazirite for only thirty days. There are two differences between Samson-nazirites and life-nazirites. If a life-long Nazirite wishes to lighten his heavy hair he may do so. This is derived from Absalom who, once a year when his hair became too heavy, cut it (II Samuel 14:26). However, if he chooses to cut his hair, he must bring three sacrificial animals: one for a sin offering, one for a burnt offering and one for an offering of well-being (Numbers 6:14). If a life-long nazirite becomes impure, he must bring an offering made as a result of impurity, as is mandated in Numbers 6:10-12. In contrast, a Samson-nazirite may never cut his hair, because Samson never cut his hair. However, if he becomes impure he does not bring a sacrifice, just as Samson did not bring a sacrifice when he became impure (Judges 14:19)." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nAs we explained above, the minimum period of naziriteship is thirty days. However, a person can accept upon himself more than one “naziriteship”, and thereby become a nazirite for 60 days, 90 days etc. In such a case, after each thirty day naziriteship he would bring the sacrifices, shave his head and then start a new, thirty day period of naziriteship. In addition, a person can certainly become a nazirite for longer than thirty days if he so specifies.", + "A nazirite vow of unspecified duration is for thirty days. If one says, “Behold, I am a nazirite for one long [period”], or “Behold, I am a nazirite for one short [period]”, or even [if he says, “[Behold, I am a nazirite for as long as it takes to go] from here to the end of the earth,” he is a nazirite for thirty days. If someone vows a nazirite vow but does not specify how long the naziriteship will last, the naziriteship will be thirty days. This is true even if he says that he wants to be a nazirite for a long time, or a nazirite for a short time, or even if he says he wants to be a nazirite for as long as it takes to walk from here to the end of the world, since he did not mention a specific period of time, he is a nazirite for only thirty days, no more and no less.", + "[If one says,] “Behold, I am a nazirite, plus one day,” or “Behold, I am a nazirite, plus one hour,” or “Behold, I am a nazirite, once and a half,” he becomes a nazirite for two [periods of naziriteship]. In the cases mentioned in this section, he vows one period of naziriteship, and then a partial second period. The mishnah treats this as if he has vowed two periods of naziriteship. The first one he expressed fully, and the second one, even though he only partially expressed, is obligates him for a full second naziriteship.", + "[If one says,] “Behold, I am a nazirite for thirty days plus an hour,” he becomes a nazirite for thirty-one days, since there is no naziriteship for hours. In this case he did not say “I am a nazirite” without specifying for how long, but rather, “I am a nazirite for thirty days plus one hour.” Since he mentioned thirty days he has only vowed one naziriteship that shall last thirty days plus one hour. However, one cannot be a nazirite for hours, and therefore he must observe a naziriteship of thirty-one days." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses a person who seemingly accepts upon himself an extremely large number of naziriteships. The question is, is he considered a life-nazirite, or one who is observing an endless series of naziriteships, who must shave his head between each period.", + "[If one says,] “Behold, I am a nazirite as the hairs of my head”, or “As the dust of the earth”, or “As the sands of the sea,” he becomes a life-nazirite, and shaves his head every thirty days. Rabbi says: this one does not shave his head every thirty days. According to the first opinion in this mishnah, this person has made an infinite number of nazirite vows, each one being without specified duration, and hence thirty days. Therefore, he observes one naziriteship, shaves his head, offers sacrifices, and then immediately begins to observe another naziriteship. According to Rabbi, this person’s intention was merely to be a life-nazirite. Therefore, he does not shave his head once every thirty days.", + "The one who shave his head every thirty days is the one who says, “Behold, upon me are naziriteships as the hair on my head”, or “As the dust of the earth”, or “As the sands of the sea.” This is a continuation of Rabbi’s words from the previous section. In order for him to be in the category of one who shaves his head every thirty days, he must specify that he is vowing many naziriteships. In this case he accepts upon himself distinct periods of naziriteship, shaving after each one is completed." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah introduces a situation in which it is unclear what type of nazirite vow a person took and in order to clarify the matter, they ask him to explain what his intention was. As we shall see, even after he explains his intention it is still somewhat unclear what he really meant, and hence we are forced to interpret his words.", + "[If he says,] “Behold, I am a nazirite as the capacity of this house”, or “as the capacity of this basket,” we check him. If he says “I vowed one long period of naziriteship”, he becomes a nazirite for thirty days. But if he says “I vowed without specification”, we regard the basket as though it were full of mustard seed, and he becomes a nazirite for life. It is unclear whether this person has taken one long, unspecified vow of naziriteship, as if he said “Behold, I am a nazirite from here until the end of the world” (see mishnah 3) or whether he intended to give a set time for his naziriteship, that it should be as long as the number of the things in a house or in a basket. In order to clarify, he is checked and the court asks him what his intention was. If he says that his intention was to vow one long period of naziriteship, he is treated like the person who stated “Behold, I am a nazirite from here until the end of the world”, and he is a nazirite for only thirty days. If however, he says he did not specify how long he wanted to be a nazirite, or that he doesn’t know what he really meant, it is treated as though he said that he wants to be a nazirite for as long as the things found in this basket. This would return us to the situation in the beginning of yesterday’s mishnah. According to Rabbi, he would be a nazirite forever, and he does not shave every thirty days. According to the majority opinion, he would serve an infinite number of naziriteships, shaving in between each one." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn mishnah three we learned that if one says “Behold I am a nazirite from here until the end of the world” he is a nazirite for only thirty days, because he did not specify the length of his vow. Our mishnah teaches that if he does specify the place to which he refers, he may be a nazirite for as long as it takes to get to such and such a place.", + "[If one says,] “Behold, I am a nazirite, as [long as it takes to get] from here to such and such a place,” we estimate the number of days [journey] from here to the place mentioned. If this is less than thirty days, he becomes a nazirite for thirty days; Otherwise he becomes a nazirite for that number of days. In this case, the court simply estimates how long it would take to get from the place where he vows to the place that he mentions. If it would take less than thirty days, then he is a nazirite for thirty days. As we have noted, one can never be a nazirite for less than thirty days. However, if it takes longer, then he is a nazirite for however many days it takes to get to that place." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nMishnah seven continues to teach that a person may make an extremely large number of nazirite vows, as we learned in mishnah four.", + "[If one says], “Behold I am a nazirite, as the number of days in a solar year” he must count as many naziriteships as there are days in the solar year. Rabbi Judah said: such a case once occurred, and when the man had completed [his naziriteships], he died. This person took a vow to keep 365 naziriteships, and not one naziriteship of 365 days. This is similar to the person who vowed to keep naziriteships like the hairs on his head. After each thirty days he can shave, bring the sacrifices and begin counting again. Rabbi Judah relates a story where this really happened, and after the 30 years of being a nazirite (365 times 30 days) the person died. The point of his statement seems to be that if you make a vow of so many naziriteships, you will die by the time they are completed." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah deals with a person who says that he is nazirite but says also that he will abstain from figs, which are normally permitted to a nazirite. The Talmud understands the tannaitic dispute on this debate to be about a larger issue of how to interpret self-contradictory language. When a person makes a statement where the two parts of his statement contradict one another, how are we to interpret his statement.", + "[If one says,] “Behold I am a nazirite [and abstain] from dried figs and pressed figs”: Beth Shammai says: he is an [ordinary] nazirite. Beth Hillel says: he is not a nazirite. Rabbi Judah said: even though Beth Shammai did say [that his formula is effective] they meant only one who says, “They are [forbidden] to me, as is a sacrifice.” Beth Shammai takes seriously the first part of this person’s statement “Behold I am a nazirite”, and therefore holds that this person has indeed taken a nazirite vow. Regarding the second half of his statement “and abstain from dried figs and pressed figs”, it is as if he tried to change his mind after he had already taken the vow. Beth Shammai considers this change of mind to be irrelevant and therefore he is a nazir. Beth Hillel considers his whole statement to be one integral statement, the end being inseparable from the beginning. Since figs are permitted to nazirites, he has not made a valid nazirite vow. Rabbi Judah reinterprets Beth Shammai’s statement. Beth Shammai does not hold that he is an ordinary nazirite. Rather, they meant that if he thought to himself that this was a valid way of prohibiting figs, just as saying “they are forbidden to me, as is a sacrifice”, is a valid way of prohibiting figs, then the prohibition works, and he is forbidden to eat figs. However, Beth Shammai would agree with Beth Hillel that if he intended by these words to take a regular nazirite vow, nothing is prohibited to him. He is neither a nazirite, nor prohibited from eating figs." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses a person who may have made a nazirite vow using an extremely strange formula.", + "If one says, “This cow is saying ‘Behold, I am a nazirite if I get up,” or “This door is saying ‘Behold, I am a nazirite if I open”: Bet Shammai says: he is a nazirite, But Bet Hillel says: he is not a nazirite. Rabbi Judah said: even though Beth Shammai did say [that his formula is effective] they meant only one who says, “This cow is [forbidden] to me, as is a sacrifice if it gets up.” The mishnah describes a person whose cow will not stand up or whose door will not open. The person says “This cow doesn’t want to get up. It is as if she is saying ‘Behold, I am a nazirite if I get up.’” Or “This door doesn’t want to open. It is as if it is saying ‘Behold, I am a nazirite if I open up.’” Beth Shammai holds that the person has actually made a nazirite vow, even though it seems that he was just using language to illustrate how difficult it is to get the cow to get up or the door to open. Albeck explains that according to Beth Shammai since the person said “Behold, I am a nazirite”, he is a nazirite even though he was saying it as if the cow or door was saying the words. A different explanation is offered by the Talmud, which interprets it as if he meant to say that he himself would be a nazirite if the cow wouldn’t get up or the door wouldn’t open. Beth Hillel holds that this person is not a nazirite, just as they did in the previous mishnah. Rabbi Judah again reinterprets Beth Shammai’s position. Beth Shammai did not mean to say that the person is a nazirite. Beth Shammai holds that if the person meant that he would be forbidden to eat the cow or use the door as if it was a sacrifice then the vow is effective." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with a person who tries to become a nazirite in regard to one cup of wine alone, without being a total nazirite.", + "If they mixed for him a cup of wine, and he said, “Behold, I am a nazirite in regard to it,” he becomes a nazirite. This section rules that the person did not intend to become a nazirite just from the cup of wine served to him. When he said “in regard to it” his intention may have been in regard to wine in general. We will learn in tomorrow’s mishnah that one cannot be a partial nazirite, being prohibited from wine and not from shaving, for example. Hence this person is a full nazirite.", + "It once happened that a woman was intoxicated and they mixed for her a cup of wine and she said, “Behold, I am a nazirite in regard to it.” The sages ruled that she only meant to forbid it to herself as a sacrifice. The fact that this woman was already intoxicated means that she did not intend to make all wine forbidden to her; she wanted only to forbid herself one more cup of wine. Therefore the sages interpret her to have meant that the cup of wine offered to her should be prohibited like a sacrifice." + ], + [ + "Introduction The first section of this mishnah deals with a person who tries to take upon himself a partial naziriteship. The second section deals with a person who vowed a nazirite vow but did not have full comprehension of the prohibitions involved.", + "[If one says,] “Behold, I am a nazirite, on condition that I can drink wine, or can have contact with the dead”, he becomes a nazirite, and all these things are forbidden him. This person makes a nazirite vow on condition that some of the prohibitions would not apply to him. There is a rule that a person may not make a condition against what is written in the Torah. Hence the condition is invalid and he is a full nazirite, forbidden to shave his hair, drink wine or have contact with the dead.", + "[If he says,] “I knew that there is such a thing as naziriteship but I did not know that a nazirite is forbidden to drink wine”, he is bound [to his vow]. Rabbi Shimon releases him. In this case, a person takes a nazirite vow and afterwards claims that he didn’t know that nazirites could not have wine. According to the Sages, his lack of knowledge does not exempt him and he is a full nazirite. Rabbi Shimon holds that he is not a nazirite because it was a mistaken vow. Alternatively, Rabbi Shimon holds that one is not a nazirite unless he accepts upon himself all of the minutiae of being a nazirite.", + "[If he says,] “I knew that a nazirite is forbidden to drink wine, but I imagined that the sages would give me permission, since I cannot do without wine”, or “since [my profession] is to bury the dead”, he is released. Rabbi Shimon binds him [to his vow]. In this case, when the person vowed he knew that wine and coming into contact with the dead were prohibited to a nazirites. Nevertheless, he thought that the sages would allow him to either drink because he can’t live without wine or bury the dead because that is his profession. The Sages consider his vow to be mistaken vow, and therefore he is released. Rabbi Shimon does not consider this a mistaken vow. Alternatively, Rabbi Shimon agrees that this was a mistaken vow, but holds that he must first ask to be released by a Sage." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nAt the end of his naziriteship a nazirite brings three offerings, a sin offering, a burnt offering and well-being offering, and shaves his hair (Numbers 30:13-18). Together these three offerings are called “the hair offering”, for they are accompanied by the shaving of the hair. Our mishnah deals with a person who takes a nazirite vow and also accepts upon himself to bring another person’s “hair offering”.", + "[If one says,] “Behold, I am a nazirite and I take it upon myself to bring the hair offering of another nazirite”, and his friend heard and said “I too, and I take it upon myself to bring the hair offering of another nazirite”, then, if they are clever they will bring the other’s hair offering; otherwise they must bring hair offerings on behalf of other nazirites. In this case two people both take nazirite vows and in addition take it upon themselves to bring another person’s hair offering. The mishnah teaches that each can bring each other’s offerings, and in that way each will have fulfilled all of his requirements without bringing more than one set of offerings. However, if they do not bring each other’s offerings, each will have to bring a different person’s offerings, as well as his own. This will end up costing them double." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is a continuation of yesterday’s mishnah. It deals with a situation in which a person vows that he will bring the offerings of half of a nazirite.", + "[If one says,] “I take it upon myself to bring the hair offering of half of another nazirite,” and his friend heard and said, “I too take it upon myself to bring the hair offering of half of another nazirite,” –, this one brings a full hair offering and this one brings a full hair offering, the words of Rabbi Meir. But the Sages say: each brings half a hair offering. The statement of these two people is strange and can be interpreted in two different ways. When they each say, “I take it upon myself to bring the hair offering of half of another nazirite”, they may have thought that there was such a thing as a half-nazirite. Since there is no such thing, Rabbi Meir says they both must bring a full hair-offering. In contrast, the Sages assume that what he meant to say was that he would bring half of the hair offering of a nazirite. Therefore, each pays for half of the offerings that one nazirite must bring, and the nazirite himself would be responsible for the remainder." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with a person who stipulates that he will be a nazirite if he has a son, or, alternatively, if he has a child. The question is, what is the definition of a son or child.\nAs an aside, we can see from this mishnah that people made nazirite vows as a way of thanking God for things God has given them. The same is true for vows in general.", + "[If one says,] “Behold, I am a nazirite when I shall have a son,” and son is born to him, he becomes a nazirite. If the child is a daughter, or a tumtum, or an hermaphrodite, he does not become a nazirite. A “tumtum” is a person who has no signs of being male or female. A hermaphrodite has both male and female genitalia. The mishnah teaches that when the person said “when I shall have a son”, his intention was specifically for a son and not for any of the other three genders, female, the gender-less tumtum or double-gendered. Note that the mishnah has to say this because sometimes the Hebrew word for son “ben” can mean “child.” This is how the word is interpreted in Deuteronomy 25:5, in the context of the laws of levirate marriage.", + "If he said, “When I shall have a child,” then even if it is a daughter, or a tumtum, or an hermaphrodite, he becomes a nazirite. However, if he says “child” any child is included, no matter the gender." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is a continuation of yesterday’s mishnah where a man vowed to be a nazirite if he had a child. Our mishnah deals with a case where his wife miscarries. The question is, do we consider the miscarriage to be a case where the child was viable while in the womb, and hence he had a child or not.", + "If his wife miscarries, he does not become a nazirite. Rabbi Shimon says: [in this case] he should say, “If it was a viable child, behold, I am a nazirite from obligation; otherwise behold, I am a voluntary nazirite.” According to the first opinion, if his wife miscarries he is not a nazirite. Although there is some doubt that the child might have reached viability before the miscarriage, in cases of doubtful naziriteships the ruling is lenient. Rabbi Shimon is more concerned with the possibility that the child reached viability. Therefore, the one who vowed is considered a doubtful nazirite. The way that one observes this doubtful naziriteship is by saying that if the child was viable, then he is now serving a mandatory naziriteship. If, however the child was not viable, then his naziriteship is just from doubt. In any case, he must observe a naziriteship.", + "If [his wife] later bears a child, he then becomes a nazirite. Rabbi Shimon says: he should say, “If the first was a viable child, the first [naziriteship] was obligatory, and this one is voluntary; otherwise, the first one was voluntary, and the present one is obligatory.” If after the first miscarriage his wife becomes again pregnant and this time has a child, according to the first opinion, he must now observe a naziriteship because he did not previously observe one. For Rabbi Shimon he cannot just simply observe another naziriteship because he may have fulfilled his vow when he previously served a naziriteship. However, if the first one was only voluntary, then he is still liable to serve an obligatory naziriteship for his original vow. Therefore, he again stipulates, that if the first naziriteship was obligatory (the fetus was viable), then the current one is only voluntary, but if the first one was voluntary (the fetus was not viable), then the current one is the obligatory naziriteship." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses a person who makes a nazirite vow on his own behalf and promises to serve another naziriteship if he has a son. The question is, if he has a son, in which order does he serve the naziriteships?", + "[If one says,] “Behold, I am a nazirite [now] and a nazirite when I shall have a son”, and begins to count his own [naziriteship] and then a son is born to him, he completes his own [naziriteship] and then counts the one on account of his son. In this case, the person first accepted upon himself to be a nazirite and then to be a nazirite when a son is born to him. He therefore immediately begins to serve his own naziriteship. If he has a son while he is still serving his own naziriteship, he nevertheless completes his own naziriteship and only then begins one on account of his having had a son. Since he mentioned his own naziriteship first, the naziriteship for his son does not begin until he has completed his own. In this case he will shave and bring sacrifices after his own naziriteship has been completed and then again when the naziriteship for his son is completed.", + "[If one says,] “Behold, I am a nazirite when I shall have a son, and a nazirite [on my own account]”, and begins to count his own [naziriteship] and then a son is born to him, he interrupts his own [naziriteship], counts the one on account of his son, and then complete his own. In this case, he stated first the naziriteship for his son and then his own. He starts to count his own immediately, because a son has not yet been born to him. If he has a son before his own naziriteship has been completed, he interrupts his own naziriteship and starts to count that which he is serving on account of his son. When he has completed his son’s naziriteship, he returns to complete his own. However, since he already started to serve his own, he does not shave and bring sacrifices for his son’s naziriteship. Rather he waits and at the end shaves and brings a double set of sacrifices." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe final mishnah of chapter two continues to deal with nazirite vows made on the condition that the one vowing will have a son.", + "[If one says] “Behold, I am a nazirite when I shall have a son, and I will be a nazirite for one hundred days [on my own account],”: if a son was born to him before the expiration of seventy days, he loses none of this period; but if after seventy days, it voids [anything over the] seventy days, since there can be no shaving for a period of less than thirty days. A person vows to serve a regular naziriteship of thirty days if he has a son, and he also vows to be a nazirite for 100 days. This situation is similar to that described at the end of yesterday’s mishnah. He begins to serve his own naziriteship immediately, as we learned yesterday. If his son is born before he serves seventy days of his own naziriteship, then he will lose nothing of the days that he has already served. What he will do in this case is serve a thirty day naziriteship for his son, and then go back and serve the remaining days of his own naziriteship. However, if his son is born after he has served seventy days, he will lose credit for some of the days which he has served towards his own 100 day naziriteship. In this case he will serve the thirty days for his son’s naziriteship and then complete his naziriteship with another thirty days. If he had previously served eighty days, he will serve a term of 110 days for his own naziriteship, thereby serving an extra ten days. This is because a term of naziriteship can never be less than thirty days. According to the Rambam, this mishnah clarifies the end of yesterday’s mishnah. There, when we learned that he goes back and counts his own naziriteship, the intention was that he must in all cases count at least thirty days." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nWe have already had several opportunities to mention that a nazirite vow of unspecified duration is thirty days. Our mishnah deals with two related rulings.", + "If one says, “Behold, I am a nazirite,” he shaves on the thirty-first day. If he shaved on the thirtieth day, he has fulfilled his obligation. One who takes an nazirite vow of unspecified duration should shave on the thirty-first day, after he has observed thirty full days of naziriteship. However, if he shaves on the thirtieth day, he has still fulfilled his obligation to complete his naziriteship. This is because observing part of the day is counted as if he had observed the full day. Since he observed part of the thirtieth as a nazirite, it can count. You might note the similarity between this rule and the customs of shiva (the seven days in which one mourns close relatives). The seventh day of shiva is only observed in the morning because of this principle, that part of the day is as the full day. After “sitting shiva” in the morning of the seventh day, people customarily end shiva.", + "[If, however, he says] “Behold, I am a nazirite for thirty days,” and shaves on the thirtieth day, he has not fulfilled his obligation. In this case he specifies that he will be a nazirite for thirty days. Since he said “thirty days” he must observe thirty full days. Should he shave on the thirtieth day he will not have fulfilled his obligation." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to illustrate the principle which we learned in yesterday’s mishnah, that observing part of the day as a nazirite counts as a full day’s observance. Yesterday we saw that this means that one who shaves on the thirtieth day has fulfilled his obligation.\nToday’s mishnah deals with one who has made two nazirite vows.", + "If a man vows two naziriteships, he shaves for the first one on the thirty-first day, and for the second on the sixty-first day. If he shaved for the first on the thirtieth day, he can shave for the second on the sixtieth day. If he shaved on the day before the sixtieth, he has fulfilled his obligation. If one vows two naziriteships, the best thing would be to shave on the thirty-first day, and then begin counting the second naziriteship that same day. If he does so, he will shave for the second naziriteship on the sixty-first day. However, if he shaved for the first naziriteship on the thirtieth day, he can shave for the second on the sixtieth day, and he could even shave on the fifty-ninth day. This would mean that he shaved for the first on the thirtieth day, and then began counting the second that very day, and twenty-nine days later shaved, counting part of the fifty-ninth day as the completion of the second naziriteship. Note that the thirtieth day is in all cases counted for both naziriteships.", + "For this was the testimony that Rabbi Papias testified concerning one who vows two naziriteships, that if he shaved for the first on the thirtieth day, he is to shave for the second on the sixtieth day. And if he shaved on the day before the sixtieth day, he has fulfilled his obligation, the thirtieth day counting towards the required number. This section is a mishnah in tractate Eduyoth 7:5. It states the same thing as we just learned. This is probably the older version of the way the halakhah was preserved. The halakhah was later developed into the above section." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nWhen a nazirite becomes impure he renders void the entire term of naziriteship that he has already observed. He must purify himself in the standard procedure, which takes seven days. He then shaves, brings a bird sacrifice and then he begins to count again (see Numbers 6:9-12). Our mishnah deals with one who has become impure on the thirtieth day of his nazirite period. This person has not yet brought the sacrifices which he brings at the end of his naziriteship.", + "If one says, “Behold, I am a nazirite,” and becomes impure on the thirtieth day, he renders void the whole period. Rabbi Eliezer says: only seven days are void. According to the first opinion, even though he has reached the thirtieth day, and thereby completed his nazirite vow of unspecified duration, since he has not yet brought his sacrifices, his becoming impure renders the whole period void. He now has to become pure, shave and bring sacrifices and then start counting again. Rabbi Eliezer holds that this does not void all of the days which he has already served. Rather he waits seven days, during which he purifies himself and then brings the end of naziriteship sacrifices. According to Rabbi Eliezer, since on the thirtieth day he could have offered his sacrifices before he became impure, it is as if he completed his naziriteship, he just can’t offer his sacrifices until he becomes pure.", + "[If one says,] “Behold, I am a nazirite for thirty days”, and becomes impure on the thirtieth day, the he renders void the whole period. However, if he vows to be a nazirite for thirty days, he must serve a full thirty days, as we learned in yesterday’s mishnah. In this case if he becomes impure on the thirtieth day, Rabbi Eliezer would agree that he has rendered the entire naziriteship void. He must become pure and then start counting again." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nYesterday’s mishnah contained a debate between Rabbi Eliezer and the Sages concerning a case in which a person who had made a nazirite vow of unspecified duration became impure on the thirtieth day, the last day of his naziriteship and the day on which he could shave. Today’s mishnah contains two debates over one who took a one hundred day nazirite vow and became impure on the one hundredth day. Note that when one specifies an amount of days, he can only shave the day after, in this case on the 101st day.", + "[If he says,] “Behold, I am a nazirite for one hundred days,” and becomes impure on the hundredth day, he renders void the whole period. Rabbi Eliezer says: only thirty days are void. The Sages (the first opinion) hold that if a nazirite becomes impure before he has completed his naziriteship, he voids all of the days he has already served and must start counting over after he becomes pure. This is true even if he has served longer than the minimum thirty days. Rabbi Eliezer holds that one who becomes impure on the day that his naziriteship is completed does not void his entire term, but rather only thirty days. In other words, he must go back and serve another naziriteship, but it need only be a naziriteship of minimal length. This is the same as his opinion in the second clause of yesterday’s mishnah, but in that case the Sages would have agreed because the vow was only for thirty days. In the first clause of yesterday’s mishnah he said that becoming impure renders void only seven days. The difference is that that was a case of a nazirite vow of unspecified duration and hence he could have brought his sacrifices on that very day.", + "If he becomes impure on the hundred and first day, thirty days are void. Rabbi Eliezer says: only seven days are void. If he becomes impure on the day after his naziriteship has been completed but before he brings the sacrifices, the Sages hold that he must become pure and then serve another thirty day naziriteship, the minimum length of any naziriteship. Because he served his full term, he need not serve the entire 100 days. Rabbi Eliezer again holds that since he has completed his full term, becoming impure before bringing the sacrifices doesn’t void anything. He need only wait seven days until he becomes pure, and then he may bring his nazirite sacrifices." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nAs we have already mentioned, if a nazirite becomes impure, he must bring a sacrifice and begin to recount his naziriteship. Our mishnah deals with a person who takes a nazirite vow while he is in a graveyard, a place of high impurity.", + "If one takes a nazirite vow while in a graveyard, then even if he remains there for thirty days, these do not count, and he does not have to bring the sacrifice [prescribed] for impurity. This person took a nazirite vow while standing in a place of impurity. Therefore he cannot even begin to count the days of his naziriteship. As long as he stays in the place of impurity he has not yet become a nazirite. Therefore, he also does not need to bring a sacrifice of impurity, which he would have been obligated for, had he been a nazirite and then became impure.", + "If he leaves it and re-enters, [the period] counts, and he must bring the sacrifice [prescribed] for impurity. Rabbi Eliezer says: not [if he re-enters] on the same day, for it says, “But the former days shall be void,” (Numbers 6:12) until there are former days. However, if he leaves the graveyard, and then becomes pure (which takes seven days) he now begins to count the days of naziriteship. If after he leaves he re-enters the graveyard, he is now a nazirite who has become impure and is obligated to bring the requisite sacrifices. Rabbi Eliezer holds that if he returns to the graveyard (or is otherwise made impure) the same day that he began to count his naziriteship, the day is not lost and he does not bring impurity sacrifices. After he becomes pure, he goes on counting from where he left off. This halakhah is derived by means of a midrash on the word “days”. In order to void that part of the naziriteship which was previously observed, there must have been full days which were observed." + ], + [ + "Introduction According to the Talmud, the Sages decreed that land outside of Israel is ritually impure, and therefore anyone who walks there or touches the earth is impure. However, this impurity is only considered “derabbanan”. In a sense then, taking a nazirite vow while outside of the land of Israel is like taking a nazirite vow while in a graveyard, the subject of yesterday’s mishnah. The difference is that, because the impurity of outside of Israel is only derabbanan, one who takes a nazirite vow outside of Israel must begin to observe his naziriteship immediately. However, when he comes to the land of Israel, according to the rabbis the only pure land, he must begin to observe his naziriteship over again. In our mishnah, Beth Shammai and Beth Hillel dispute over how much of his naziriteship he must re-observe. This mishnah contains a story about Queen Helena, who was the queen of Adiabene, a country in Asia Minor. There are several other stories about her and her sons Munbaz and Izates, who according to both Josephus and rabbinic literature converted to Judaism, several decades before the destruction of the Temple. One can read more about her in the Encyclopedia Judaica.", + "If one vows a long naziriteship of and completes his naziriteship and afterwards comes to the land [of Israel]: Beth Shammai says that he is a nazirite for thirty days, But Beth Hillel says that his naziriteship begins again. A person took a vow to observe a long naziriteship, meaning one longer than thirty days. After he completed his naziriteship he came to the land of Israel. According to Beth Shammai, after he purifies himself from the impurity contracted outside of the land of Israel, he need only observe another thirty days of naziriteship. According to the Talmud, Beth Shammai reasons that since the impurity outside Israel is only of “derabbanan” status, the Sages only penalize him by making him observe a minimum period of naziriteship. In contrast, Beth Hillel holds that he must re-observe his full term. The original term does not count at all.", + "It happened that Queen Helena, when her son went to war, said: “If my son returns in peace from the war, I shall be a nazirite for seven years.” Her son returned from the war, and she was a nazirite for seven years. At the end of the seven years, she went up to the land [of Israel] and Beth Hillel instructed her to be a nazirite for a further seven years. Towards the end of this seven years, she contracted ritual defilement, and so altogether she was a nazirite for twenty-one years. Rabbi Judah said: she was a nazirite only for fourteen years. This section contains the remarkable story of Queen Helena, who according to some accounts was a nazirite for twenty-one years! She took a nazirite vow that if her son would return safely from war, she would be a nazirite for seven years. When he returned safely, she observed a seven year naziriteship. Afterwards, she went to the land of Israel and observed another seven-year naziriteship, under the instruction of Beth Hillel. When she became impure at the end of her naziriteship, this voided all of her naziriteship, and she had to serve another seven years. With regard to this last fact, Rabbi Judah disagrees and holds that she served “only” fourteen years. Some explain, that according to Rabbi Judah, she did not become impure. Others explain that Rabbi Judah agrees with Rabbi Eliezer who holds that when one becomes impure one only voids thirty days. Therefore, Queen Helena did become impure at the end of her naziriteship, but only served another thirty days. Since these days are insignificant, Rabbi Judah rounds down to fourteen years of naziriteship, still an impressive amount of time, especially for a queen!" + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah, while ostensibly discussing nazirite laws, is really discussing the laws of testimony. Generally, when two sets of witnesses disagree, two saying one thing and two saying the other, the testimony is invalid. However, if one set says that the defendant owes two hundred, and the other set says he owes five hundred, there is a dispute whether the defendant is liable for the lower amount, based on the principle that all witnesses agree that he owes at least two hundred. Our mishnah deals with a similar case, except it uses naziriteships instead of money.", + "One who has two sets of witnesses testifying about him: one says that he vowed two [naziriteships] and the other that he vowed five: Beth Shammai says: the evidence is conflicting, and there is no naziriteship at all. But Beth Hillel says: “five” includes “two”, so that he becomes a nazirite for two [naziriteships]. According to Beth Shammai, the testimony is conflicting and therefore it is as if there is no testimony at all. However, Beth Hillel says that there is testimony from all sets regarding two naziriteships, and therefore he must observe two." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction This mishnah teaches that a person can become a nazirite by seeing his friend take a nazirite vow and saying “I too.” The Talmud teaches that in order for this to be effective he must state “I too” as soon as he hears his friend vow, for only in such a way is it clear that he has vowed.", + "One who said, “Behold, I am a nazirite”, and his friend overheard and said “I too,” [and another one said] “I too”, all are nazirites. If the first one is released [from his vow], all are released. If the last one is released, he alone is released, and the others remain bound [by their vows]. The mishnah teaches that it is effective to state “I too” when one hears another take a nazirite vow. In this case, each person who took a later vow is dependent upon the earlier vows. If the first person asks a sage to release him from his vow, a process which we learned about in chapter nine of Nedarim, the latter are also released from their vows. In contrast, if the latter nazirites are released, those who vowed earlier are not released.", + "If he said, “Behold, I am a nazirite”, and his companion overheard and said, “My mouth shall be as his mouth and my hair as his hair”, he becomes a nazirite. Besides saying “I too” he may also employ other hints that he wishes his status to be like that of the one who vowed. He may say that just as the other’s mouth cannot taste wine, so too my mouth cannot taste wine, or just as the other does not cut his hair, so too I won’t cut my hair. These are all clear enough statements in order to make him a nazirite.", + "[If he said,] “Behold, I am a nazirite,” and his wife overheard and said, “I too,” he can annul her vow, but his own remains binding. [If a woman says,] “Behold, I am a nazirite”, and her husband overhears and adds, “I too,” he cannot annul her vow. A wife can make her nazirite vow depend on her husband's by saying “I too.” He can annul her vow, since this is a vow that has in it the element of self-denial. If he annuls her vow, his is still valid because his does not depend on hers. However, if he makes his vow dependent on hers, he cannot annul her vow. This is because saying “I too” is a means of affirming her vow, and once a husband affirms his wife’s vow he can no longer annul it." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to deal with when a husband can annul his wife’s nazirite vow.", + "[If he says in conversation with his wife,] “Behold, I am a nazirite. What about you?” and she answers “Amen,” he can annul her vow, but his own remains binding. In this case, the husband has not confirmed his wife’s vow, but merely asked her if she would like to be a nazirite. The question itself cannot be construed as a confirmation of her vow because she has not yet vowed. Since he never confirmed her vow, he can annul it.", + "[But if she should say,] “Behold, I am a nazirite, what about you?” and he answers, “Amen,” he cannot annul her vow. However, if she says that she is a nazirite and then asks him if he too would like to be a nazirite and he says “Amen”, he has not only taken a nazirite vow, he has also confirmed her vow. By doing so he has relinquished the right to later annul her vow." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nA person who intentionally breaks their nazirite vow receives up to forty lashes, the same punishment received for breaking any negative commandment.\nThis mishnah deals with a woman who broke her nazirite vow but did not know that her husband had already annulled it.", + "If a woman takes a nazirite vow and then drinks wine or is defiled by a corpse, she receives forty [lashes]. This section simply states that a woman who breaks her nazirite vow is punished by up to forty lashes, as is anyone who breaks a nazirite vow. The Talmud explains that this is true even if her husband annuls the vow after she broke it. Since she broke it while the vow was still valid, she has transgressed and is therefore punished.", + "If her husband annuls [her vow] and she did not know that he annulled it, and she drinks wine or is defiled by a corpse, she does not receive the forty [lashes]. Rabbi Judah says: even though she does not receive the forty [lashes] she should receive lashes for disobedience. In this case, the husband annulled the vow before she broke it, but she did not know that he had annulled it. When she drank wine or defiled herself (intentionally) she thought that she was breaking her vow. The case is therefore one of a person who intended to sin but did not know that what they were actually doing was not sinful. According to the first opinion she receives no punishment. However, Rabbi Judah adds that although she is not punished with the regular lashes, she receives “lashes for disobedience”. These are “derabbanan” lashes, which the court can hand out whenever it sees fit. Since she intended to be sinful, she deserves to be punished, even though she did not actually break any vow." + ], + [ + "A woman takes a nazirite vow and sets aside the requisite animal [for the sacrifice] and then her husband subsequently annuls [her vow]: If the animal belonged to him, it can be put to pasture with the herd; If it belonged to her: the sin-offering is left to die, the burnt-offering is offered as an [ordinary] burnt-offering, and the peace-offering is offered as an [ordinary] peace-offering, and it may be eaten for one day [only], and it does not require loaves of bread.
If she has a lump sum of money [set aside for the purchase of these sacrifices] it is to be used for voluntary offerings;
If she has specified money: The money for the sin-offering is to be taken to the Dead Sea, the use of it is forbidden, but the laws of sacrilege do not apply; The money for the burnt-offering they bring a burnt-offering, and the laws of sacrilege do apply; The money for the peace-offering they bring a peace-offering, and it may be eaten for one day [only], and it does not require loaves of bread.
At the completion of a naziriteship a person must bring a sin-offering, a burnt-offering and a peace-offering (can also be translated as an offering of well-being. In Hebrew well-being, whole and peace are all from the same word “shalom”/“shalem”/“shlamim”). Our mishnah deals with a woman who took a nazirite vow and then either set aside the animals for her sacrifices or set aside money to be used to purchase those animals. This money may now be considered holy. The problem arises if the husband annuls her vow. The question is what to do with this money or with these animals.
Section one: If she set aside animals, the first question we must ask is to whom do the animals belong. If she set aside her husband’s animals, then when he annuls the vow none of the animals are considered sacred and they may all be returned to the herd. Since they were his animals, we know from the fact that he annulled her vow that he did not want her to use them as sacrifices and therefore they are not sacrifices.
However, if they were her animals, then they have become sacred, even though her vow was annulled. Therefore, the sin-offering is treated as are all sin-offerings whose owners have died. It must die. According to Rashi, in order to do so, it is put into a pen and starved to death. The burnt-offering is offered in its usual manner. The peace-offering is sacrificed. It must be eaten within one day, the same rule that applies to all peace-offerings for nazirites. However, unlike other peace-offerings by nazirites which are offered with loaves of bread, since she is not a nazirite she is not required to bring the usual loaves that accompany such offerings.
Section two: In this section she has set aside money. If she did not specify which coins would be used for which animal, then all of the coins are used to purchase voluntary offerings. The money is sacred so it must be used for sacrifices, but since nothing has been specified it can be used for what are basically generic offerings.
However, if the money has been set aside for each specific offering (i.e. these coins are for a sin-offering, etc.), then they are treated similarly to the way the animals were treated. The money for the sin-offering must be “killed”. The closest one can come to killing coins is by throwing them into the Dead Sea, where they will be of use to no one. One is not to benefit from these coins, but nevertheless, if one does, it is not considered sacrilege.
The money for the burnt-offering is used to buy a burnt-offering and the money for the peace-offering is used to buy the peace-offering. The rules here are the same as if she had already separated the animal itself." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to discuss the point until which a husband retains the right to annul his wife’s nazirite vow.", + "If one of the kinds of blood has been sprinkled on her behalf, [the husband] can no longer annul [the vow]. Rabbi Akiba says: even if one of the animals has been slaughtered on her behalf, he can no longer annul [the vow]. According to the first opinion, once the blood from one of the sacrifices which the woman set aside for the end of her naziriteship has been sprinkled on the altar, the husband can no longer annul her vow. In other words, whereas the previous mishnah stated that even though she had set aside her sacrifices, he could still annul the vow, our mishnah teaches that once their blood has been sprinkled, it is too late. Rabbi Akiva sets the limit on the husband’s right to annul his wife’s vow slightly earlier. Once the animal has been slaughtered, the husband may no longer annul the vow.", + "When is this true? If she is shaving [after observing the naziriteship] in purity, but if she is shaving after ritual defilement, he can [still] annul [the vow], because he can say, “I do not want a disgraced woman.” Rabbi says that he can annul [her vow] even if she is shaving [after observing the naziriteship] in purity, since he can say: “I do not want a woman who is shaved. This section limits that which was stated in the previous section. What was stated above was with regard to the sacrifices offered at the end of a naziriteship. However, if she was shaving and offering sacrifices after becoming impure, since she must go back and continue observing her naziriteship, he may still annul the vow. The reason that he has a right to annul this vow is that he may say that he does not want a woman who distorts her own beauty by becoming a nazirite, or in this case, by continuing to observe the nazirite restrictions. According to commentators, what makes her ugly is that she cannot drink wine or participate in many of life’s pleasures. Rabbi [Judah Hanasi] disagrees with the opinion in the beginning of section two, and also in section one. He holds that even after the sacrifices have been offered, the husband may continue to annul his wife’s vow because he may claim that he does not want her to shave her head. Only once she has shaven her head does he no longer have the right to annul the vow." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah teaches that a father may impose a nazirite vow on his son, but that the vow is valid only if the son or the relatives do not protest. Most of the mishnah discusses a case where the son or relatives protest, thereby voiding the vow, but the father has already set aside the animals for the sacrifices or has set aside money, with which to buy the sacrifices. The end of the mishnah is exactly the same as that found in mishnah four. To understand the rules regarding the sacrifices look back there.", + "A man may impose a nazirite vow on his son, but a woman cannot impose a nazirite vow on her son. How so? In theory a father can impose a nazirite vow on his son and then not cut his hair for the term of his naziriteship, prevent him from becoming impure or eating/drinking things which derive from grapes. A father can impose this vow only so long as his son is a minor. In contrast, a woman cannot impose a nazirite vow on her son.", + "[If the boy] shaves himself or is shaved by his relatives, or if he protests or his relatives protest on his behalf, Then if [the father] had set aside an animal [for the sacrifice]: the sin-offering is left to die, the burnt-offering is offered as an [ordinary] burnt-offering, and the peace-offering is offered as an [ordinary] peace-offering, and it may be eaten for one day [only], and it does not require loaves of bread. If he had a lump sum of money [set aside for the purchase of these sacrifices] it is to be used for voluntary offerings; If he had specified money: The money for the sin-offering is to be taken to the Dead Sea, the use of it is forbidden, but the laws of sacrilege do not apply; The money for the burnt-offering they bring a burnt-offering, and the laws of sacrilege do apply; The money for the peace-offering they bring a peace-offering, and it may be eaten for one day [only], and it does not require loaves of bread. However, the father’s imposed vow is only valid so long as the neither the son nor other relatives protest. If the relatives or the son protest, or if they perform an action which proves that they do not want the child to be a nazirite, the son is not a nazirite. In such a case a problem will be created if the father has already separated the requisite sacrifices. Since this is the same problem that exists should a husband annul his wife’s nazirite vow, the solutions are the same. For more detail, see the commentary to mishnah four." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn this mishnah we learn that under certain circumstances, a man may use for himself money that his father set aside to purchase his own nazirite sacrifices. However, a woman cannot do so, even though she can potentially inherit her father. This difference mirrors the difference in the previous mishnah, where a man can impose a nazirite vow on his son but a woman cannot do so.", + "A man can shave [with offerings set aside for] his father’s naziriteship but a woman cannot shave [with offerings set aside for] her father’s naziriteship. How so? The introduction to the mishnah establishes that a man may sometimes use money that was set aside by his father for his own nazirite offerings. This contrasts with the cases in mishnayoth four and six, in which the money which was set aside for sacrifices before the vow was annulled cannot be used by anyone else, but rather must be used for freewill offerings.", + "If a man’s father had been a nazirite, and had set apart a lump sum of money for [the sacrifices of] his naziriteship and died and [the son] said, “Behold, I am a nazirite on condition that I may shave with my father’s money.” The mishnah now explains how this can happen. If the father was a nazirite and set aside money to be used for his sacrifices, and then died before he completed his term of naziriteship, the son may use the money set aside, provided he stipulate that he will do so.", + "Rabbi Yose said: this money is to be used for freewill-offerings, this man cannot shave [with offerings set aside for] his father’s naziriteship. Who is the one who can shave [with offerings set aside for] his father’s naziriteship? He who was a nazirite together with his father, and whose father had set apart a lump sum of money for his nazirite [sacrifices] and died. This one can shave [with offerings set aside for] his father’s naziriteship. Rabbi Yose disagrees and holds that in such a case the money must be used for freewill-offerings, as was instructed in mishnayoth four and six, in cases where the money had not been directed toward specific sacrifices. The reason why this doesn’t work in this case is that the son was not a nazirite while the father was still alive. The only time that he can use his the money that his father had set aside is when his father and he were both nazirites at the same time." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis chapter deals with a person who made a nazirite vow based on a mistaken premise. The chapter is introduced by two mishnayoth which discuss cases where one mistakenly consecrated property to the Temple.", + "Beth Shammai says: something consecrated in error is consecrated; But Beth Hillel says: it is not consecrated. This section outlines the basic debate, which shall be illustrated in the next section, and in the following mishnah.", + "How is this so? If someone says, “The black bull that leaves my house first shall be consecrated,” and a white one comes out, Beth Shammai says: it is consecrated, But Beth Hillel says: it is not consecrated. According to Beth Shammai, the white bull is consecrated. When he said “the black bull” he meant the “first bull” but he assumed it would be a black one. Since “something consecrated in error is consecrated”, he must give the white bull to the Temple. Beth Hillel says that it is not consecrated, for he made a mistake in assuming that it would be a black bull." + ], + [ + "[If he says,] “The gold denar that comes into my hand first shall be consecrated”, and a silver denar came to his hand: Beth Shammai says: it is consecrated, Beth Hillel says: it is not consecrated.
[If he says,] “The cask of wine that comes into may hand first shall be consecrated,” and a cask of oil came into his hand: Beth Shammai says: it is consecrated, Beth Hillel says: it is not consecrated.
This mishnah is a continuation of yesterday’s mishnah, where we learned that Beth Shammai and Beth Hillel debate the status of something that was consecrated based on a mistaken premise. Today’s mishnah is very similar to yesterday’s and quite simple to understand. A question that we might ask is why the mishnah brings three examples to illustrate one principle rather than sufficing with one. I shall discuss this below.
As stated above, the mishnah is quite simple to understand, both cases dealing with a person who consecrated an item assuming that it would be different than it actually was.
One reason that the mishnah may have continued to bring examples of this debate is that the previous mishnah was about an ox, an animal that can be sacrificed on the altar, while section one of this mishnah is about money, which is not put directly onto the altar. We might have thought that the debate between Beth Shammai and Beth Hillel did not exist if the consecrated item was a denar, which must be used to purchase something which then can be sacrificed. The first section of our mishnah teaches that the debate exists even if the item consecrated is not sacrificable.
In the second case, the person thought that he was going to consecrate a cask of wine which is cheaper than a cask of oil. We might have thought that in this case, Beth Shammai would agree that the cask of oil is not consecrated since he surely did not intend to give something of this value to the Temple. The mishnah teaches that even so, the item is consecrated. According to Beth Shammai, people are generous in their gifts to the Temple, and are willing to give even a greater portion of their property than they might have stated. Whether this is wishful thinking on their part or not, the principle of Beth Shammai, that property consecrated under a mistaken principle is consecrated, still holds even in this case." + ], + [ + "If a man vowed to be a nazirite and then asked a sage [to be released from his vow] but [the sage] bound him [to his vow] he counts [the naziriteship] from the time that the vow was made.
If he asked a sage [to be released from his vow] and he released him, if he had an animal set aside [for a sacrifice], it goes forth to pasture with [the rest of] the herd.
Beth Hillel said to Beth Shammai: do you not admit that here where the consecration is in error, [the animal] goes forth to pasture with the herd?
Beth Shammai said to them: do you not admit that if a man in error calls the ninth [animal], the tenth, or the tenth the ninth, or the eleventh the tenth, each is consecrated?
Beth Hillel said to them: it is not the staff that makes these consecrated. For suppose that by mistake he placed the staff upon the eighth or upon the twelfth, would this have any effect? Rather Scripture which has consecrated the tenth, has also declared consecrated the ninth and the eleventh.
This whole mishnah contains an argument between Beth Shammai and Beth Hillel over consecration in error.
Section one: If a person makes a nazirite vow, he may ask a sage to be released from his vow, just as he can ask a sage to be released from any vow. However, if the sage refuses to release him from his vow, then he must observe his naziriteship, and the naziriteship is counted from the beginning.
Sections two and three: If he asked the sage and the sage released him, then his animal that he set aside to be used for his sacrifice, is not considered to be consecrated. Beth Hillel considers this to be a precedent for all cases of mistaken consecration. In this case the person made a nazirite vow and then separated an animal to be used as a sacrifice. Later, he told a sage that the vow was mistaken and the sage agreed. Hence the animal was consecrated also by mistake. The fact that it is not consecrated, and may go back and join the herd, proves to Beth Hillel that something consecrated by mistake is not consecrated.
Section four: Beth Shammai retorts with their own precedent to prove that something consecrated by mistake is consecrated. Animals must be tithed (like produce), every tenth animal going to the priest (Leviticus 27:32). This is done by passing all of the animals under a staff and counting them. The tenth animal that passes under the staff is consecrated. If a person accidentally calls the ninth animal the tenth, or the eleventh animal the tenth, both the ninth and eleventh animals are consecrated (as is the actual tenth animal). This proves that things consecrated by mistake are consecrated.
Section five: Beth Hillel refutes this proof. The staff placed on the animals is not what consecrates them in general, rather the Torah consecrates them, or dictates that the tenth animal is consecrated. To prove that the staff does not consecrate them, Beth Hillel points out that if one calls the eighth animal the tenth, or the twelfth animal the tenth, they are not consecrated. Rather the Torah stated that the tenth animal is consecrated, and also stated (through a midrash: do not look for this in the verse itself), that if one places the staff on the ninth or the eleventh, that they are consecrated. However, one should not use this as a precedent for other cases to prove that all things consecrated by mistake are consecrated." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with the concept that a vow, in this case a nazirite vow, may not be released by a sage based on something that occurred after the vow was taken. This concept was already taught by mishnah Nedarim 9:2, so look there for further reference. Our mishnah illustrates this principle using two cases.", + "If one vowed to be a nazirite and went to bring his animal [for the sacrifice] and found that it had been stolen: If he had taken the nazirite vow before his animal was stolen, he is [still] a nazirite. But if he had taken the nazirite vow after his animal was stolen, he is not a nazirite. If a person vowed a nazirite vow and then separated an animal to use as a sacrifice and then the animal was stolen, the sage may not release him from his vow, even though now that the animal was stolen he regrets having taken the vow. This is because the theft of the animal is something that happened after the vow, and therefore cannot be used as grounds for the vow’s release. However, if the animal was, unbeknownst to him, stolen before he vowed, and then he declared that the animal would be used as his nazirite sacrifice, and then discovered that it was stolen, the vow can be released. This is because at the time he made his vow, he was basing it on the mistaken premise that he would be able to use that animal as a sacrifice. This was already in error and hence the vow may be released.", + "It was this mistake that Nahum the Mede made. When nazirites arrived [in Jerusalem] from the Diaspora and found the Temple destroyed, Nahum the Mede said to them, “Had you known that the Temple would be destroyed, would you have become nazirites?” They answered, no, and Nahum the Mede released them [from their vow]. When the matter came before the sages they said to him: whoever vowed a nazirite vow before the destruction of the Temple is a nazirite, but if after the destruction of the temple, he is not a nazirite. The mishnah now relates an interesting story that happened right after the destruction of the Temple. A group of nazirites from the Diaspora, who had made their nazirite vows before the destruction of the Temple, came to Jerusalem to complete their naziriteship and to offer their sacrifices. When they saw that the Temple had been destroyed they came to Nahum the Mede to ask them what to do. He asked them if they would have still made their vows had they known that the Temple would be destroyed, to which they answered no. The reason why they clearly would answer no is that after the Temple was destroyed there was no way to end nazirite vows, and the person is stuck being a nazirite forever! Nahum the Mede mistakenly released them from their vow. The Sages pointed out to him that this was mistaken because at the time when they vowed the Temple still stood. Only people who make nazirite vows after the destruction of the Temple may be released from their vows using the Temple as grounds for the release." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah again deals with the debate between Beth Shammai and Beth Hillel over mistaken nazirite vows.", + "If [people] were walking along the road and [saw] someone coming towards them, and one said, “Behold, I am a nazirite if it is so-and-so,” and the other said, “Behold, I am a nazirite if it is not so-and-so,” [and a third said,] “Behold I am a nazirite if one of you is a nazirite,” [and a fourth said, “Behold I am a nazirite] if neither of you is a nazirite,” [and a fifth said, “Behold I am a nazirite] if both of you are nazirites,” [and a sixth said, “Behold I am a nazirite] if all of you are nazirites”: Beth Shammai says: all of them are nazirites. Beth Hillel says only those whose words were [not] fulfilled are nazirites. Rabbi Tarfon says: not one of them is a nazirite. Obviously, not all of the people who vowed these nazirite vows can be correct. For instance, if it is “so and so”, only the first and third people are correct. If it is not “so and so”, the second and third people are correct. Nevertheless, Beth Shammai holds that they are all nazirites, because even nazirite vows taken under a mistaken premise are binding. Beth Hillel says that only those whose words were actually fulfilled, that is whose words turn out to be correct, are nazirites. Note that the mishnah actually says “not fulfilled”. The Talmud emends the mishnah to read “fulfilled.” Albeck explains that either version leads to the same conclusion, for Beth Hillel holds that a nazirite vow made under a mistaken premise is not valid. Rabbi Tarfon holds that unclear nazirite vows are not binding. Even if it turns out that what he thought was indeed correct, a person must have full awareness of the facts at the time of his vow for his vow to be valid." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to discuss the scenario in yesterday’s mishnah, that of an unidentified man approaching and a group of people “gambling” nazirite vows over his identity. This mishnah discusses what is to occur if the person approaching turns away without being identified. The whole mishnah goes according to Beth Hillel, for according to Beth Shammai even had they been proven to be mistaken, they are still nazirites.", + "If [the person approaching] turned around suddenly [without being identified], he is not a nazirite. Rabbi Shimon says: he should say, “If it was as I said, behold I am a nazirite by obligation; and if not, behold I am a voluntary nazirite.” According to the first opinion, in such a case no one is a nazirite. The reason is that in cases of a doubtful nazirite vow, the ruling is lenient. When a person takes a nazirite vow with a stipulation, his intention is to be a nazirite only if his stipulation proves true. If it is not proven to be true, he does not intend to be a nazirite. Rabbi Shimon holds that in cases of a doubtful nazirite vow, the ruling must be more stringent and since his stipulation may actually have been true he must actually observe a naziriteship. However, he must again vow a naziriteship and say that if what he had said before really was true (i.e. it was or was not the person he thought it was), then he is a nazirite due to his obligation to observe that vow. If, however, it was not true, then he now makes a new nazirite vow, one not connected to the previous one. The reason why he cannot just observe a naziriteship is that one cannot bring nazirite sacrifices in cases of doubtful naziriteship. Therefore, he creates a situation in which no matter the identity of the original person, he has made a certain nazirite vow." + ], + [ + "Introduction In this mishnah nine (!) people “wager” their nazirite vows over whether a koy is a wild beast or a domesticated beast. Already by the Talmudic period they did not know exactly what animal a koy really was. Some said it was a wild ox, while others interpret it as a mix of different deer species. In any case, it was considered in some ways similar to a wild beast and some ways similar to a domesticated beast. Mishnah Bikkurim 2:8-10 discusses the halakhic nature of the matter, for there are halakhic differences between rules regarding domesticated and wild animals.", + "If he saw a koy and said, “Behold, I am a nazirite if this is a wild beast”, [and another] “Behold, I am a nazirite if that is not a wild beast,” [a third said] “Behold, I am a nazirite if that is a domesticated beast,” [and a fourth said,] “Behold, I am a nazirite if that is not a domesticated beast,” [a fifth said,] Behold, I am a nazirite if that is both a wild beast and a domesticated beast,” [and a sixth said,] “Behold, I am a nazirite if that is neither a wild beast nor a domesticated beast” [and a seventh said,] “Behold, I am a nazirite if one of you is a nazirite,” [and an eighth said,] Behold, I am a nazirite if one of you is not a nazirite,” [and a ninth said,] “Behold, I am a nazirite if you are all nazirites”, then all of them are nazirites. Some mishnaic commentators claim that in this case, Beth Hillel agrees with Beth Shammai that they are all nazirites. A koy is not an animal about which we have a doubt whether it is a domesticated or wild beast. Rather a koy is both a domesticated and a wild beast. This mishnah is different from the previous mishnayoth in that in this case there is no true identity to the koy, whereas regarding the person, he certainly has an identity, even if that identity is unknown. Others explain that Beth Hillel holds that they are all nazirites in doubt, the category mentioned at the end of yesterday’s mishnah. If so, the mishnah teaches that even if the status of the matter in question is by definition one of doubt, they are nazirites in doubt." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah first lists what is prohibited to a nazirite and then delineates the minimum amount of products that a nazirite must eat/drink to be considered liable.", + "Three things are forbidden to a nazirite: ritual defilement, shaving, and products of the vine. This section provides an overview of what is forbidden to the nazirite. Note that the prohibition of ritual defilement refers only to defilement contracted from dead bodies, and not other forms of defilement.", + "All products of the vine join together [to add up to a minimum measure], and he is not liable until he eats an olive’s worth of grapes. According to the earlier mishnah, until he drinks a quarter [of a log] of wine. Rabbi Akiba says: even if he soaked his bread in wine and it is enough to make an olive’s worth he is liable. As with most halakhot, the rabbis give a minimum measure beyond which a person has transgressed against the Torah. According to our mishnah, a mishnah which can be attributed to Rabbi Akiba, as we shall see below, a person is liable once he has eaten an olive’s worth of grapes. This olive’s worth can be composed of any grape products: juices, skins and seeds. In contrast, according to the earlier mishnah, he is not obligated unless he drinks a quarter log of wine, an amount that is about an eighth of a liter (a little less than one-third of a soda can). Rabbi Akiba disagrees with the earlier mishnah and holds that the minimum measure is an olive’s worth, an amount smaller than a quarter of a log. He also holds that if the wine is soaked up by something which is permitted to eat, then if together they add up to an olive’s worth, he is liable. So if the bread and wine together are an olive’s worth he is liable." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nNumbers 6:4 states: “Throughout his term as a nazirite, he may not eat anything that is obtained from the grapevine, even seeds (harzanim) or skin (zag).” Our mishnah discusses the meaning of this verse, and especially the meaning of the last two words.", + "He is liable for wine on its own, for grapes on their own, for grape-skins ( on their own and for seeds ( on their own. Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah said: there is no penalty unless he eats two grape-skins and one seed. The verse from Numbers above states clearly that a nazirite may not eat/drink anything which comes from grapevines. Our mishnah teaches that he need not eat/drink each part of the grape in order to become liable. Rather he is liable even if he just eats seeds, or just skins or just the grapes. Furthermore, if he eats all three, according to the Talmud he is liable for three transgressions and not merely one. Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah notes that the word “harzanim” is plural, whereas “zag” is singular. Therefore the Torah hints that in order to be liable he must eat two harzanim, which he interprets as seeds since grapes have more than one seed, and one zag, since each grape obviously only has one skin. This accords with Rabbi Yose’s interpretation in section two below. Note that in the introduction I have translated according to Rabbi Judah, as does JPS.", + "What are harzanim and what are zagim? Harzanim: those are the outer part, and the zagim are the inner part, according to Rabbi Judah. Rabbi Yose says: that you may not err, [think of] the zug [bell] of an animal, the outer part is called the zug [hood] and the inner part the inbal [clapper]. There are two interpretations for the words “harzanim” and “zagim”. According to Rabbi Judah the former are the skins and the latter are the seeds. Rabbi Yose reverses this and uses a mnemonic device to remember which is which. With a cow’s bell, the “zug” is the outer part and the inner part is called the “inbal”. What is important here is that the “zug” is the outer part. According to Jacob Milgrom in his JPS commentary on Numbers, these two words are unique; hence any suggestions as to their meaning is conjectural." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nAs we have already learned, a nazirite may not shave. This mishnah discusses what is included in the prohibition of shaving.", + "A nazirite vow of unspecified duration is for thirty days. This halakhah was already taught above 1:3. It is repeated here because of the halakhah in the following section.", + "If [the nazirite] shaved himself or bandits shaved him, it overturns thirty days. If the nazirite is shaved, even if others shave him against his will, he must count another thirty days until he is able to shave and bring his sacrifices. However, shaving overturns only thirty days. Thus if he made a sixty day nazirite vow, and already served 50 days and then shaved or was shaven, he must count another thirty days, but he doesn’t lose the first twenty days which he served.", + "A nazirite who shaves himself, whether with scissors or a razor, or who singes [the ends of his hair], even a minimal amount, is liable. It doesn’t matter how he cuts his hair he is liable and must count another thirty days. The word for “singes” is unclear and is also interpreted to mean “pull out a little bit of hair”, “pull hair out from its roots.” In any case, he is liable for all of these things.", + "A nazirite may shampoo [his hair] and part it [with his fingers] but may not comb it. Rabbi Ishmael says: he is not to cleanse it with dirt because it causes the hair to fall out. When one washes one’s hair, some of it sometimes falls out. [Personal confession: I remember this quite well when I went bald at the age of 20. I would have made a poor nazirite!] Nevertheless, the mishnah rules that a nazirite can wash his hair, since it is not certain that his hair will fall out. However, he may not comb his hair for then it is certain that some of his hair will be uprooted by the comb. Rabbi Ishmael rules that he may not wash his hair with dirt, which was a means in the ancient world to cleanse hair (things have certainly improved) for that too will certainly cause some hair to fall out. We see, therefore, that the issue is not one of intent but certainty. A nazirite may not do something that will certainly cause his hair to fall out, but he may do something that is likely to cause hair to fall out." + ], + [ + "A nazirite who drank wine all day long is liable for only a single penalty. If they said to him, “do not drink,” “do not drink” and he drank, he is liable for a penalty for each time [they warned him].
[A nazirite who was] shaving all day long is liable for only a single penalty. If they said to him, “do not shave,” “do not shave” and he shaved, he is liable for a penalty for each time [they warned him].
[A nazirite who was] defiling himself with the dead all day long is liable for only a single penalty. If they said to him, “do not be defiled,” “do not be defiled” and he was defiled, he is liable for a penalty for each time [they warned him].
Every time that a person breaks a commandment s/he incurs a penalty. A question can be asked about a prohibition that can be broken continuously for an extended period of time, such as the Sabbath. For instance, writing is prohibited on Shabbat. If I write a letter that has five hundred words, how many times have I broken the Shabbat? What if I do so in two sittings? What if I do so over two Shabbatot?
Our mishnah teaches that what divides actions into separate prohibitions is awareness of the prohibition itself. This awareness is established by another person relating to the transgressor that s/he is transgressing.
The ruling in all three sections is nearly identical. As long as he has not been warned by others that what he is doing, drinking wine, shaving or becoming defiled, is prohibited to a nazirite, he is considered as having transgressed once. In such a case he will receive one set of lashes, the punishment for breaking any negative commandment that is not punishable by death.
However, if after taking one sip of wine, or after cutting one hair or after defiling himself once, they warn him that what he has done is prohibited and he continues to do so, he is liable for each time he transgresses. In such a case he will receive multiple sets of lashes.
" + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah compares different stringencies that exist for each of the three nazirite prohibitions: ritual defilement, shaving and the consumption of things which come from the vine.", + "Three things are forbidden to a nazirite: ritual defilement, shaving and products of the vine. This section was taught above in mishnah one. It is repeated here as an introduction to the rest of this mishnah.", + "Defilement and shaving have a stringency that products of the vine do not have, in that defilement and shaving annul [the period of naziriteship already observed], whereas [partaking of] products of the vine does not do so. If a nazirite is defiled through contact with the dead, or shaves (intentionally or unintentionally) he annuls at least part of the period of naziriteship that he has already served. However, if a nazirite partakes of a product which comes from the vine, he does not annul any of the period of naziriteship which he has already served.", + "Products of the vine have a stringency that defilement or shaving do not have, in that products of the vine permit of no exception from the general prohibition, whereas defilement and shaving are allowed as exception from the general prohibition in the case where shaving is a religious duty, or where there is a neglected corpse. Under no circumstances may a nazirite eat of a product of the vine. Certainly he cannot drink wine for kiddush or havdalah, for these are both considered rabbinic commandments, whereas his nazirite obligations are toraitic in origin. Even if he swears to drink wine, thereby creating a toraitic obligation for him to drink wine, he may not do so. In contrast, under certain circumstances a nazirite may intentionally defile himself or cut his hair. A person with scale disease (tzaraat, often called leprosy) shaves as part of the ritual to complete his purification process (see Leviticus 14:9). If this person was also a nazirite, he is allowed to shave his hair. If a nazirite came across a corpse which no one else is taking care of in order to bury it, he is allowed to defile himself in order to bury the corpse. I should note that although I have translated the Hebrew into “neglected corpse”, a more literal translation would be “a commanded corpse”, meaning a corpse which all Jews, no matter their status, are commanded to bring to proper burial. From here we can see how important proper burial and respect for a person’s body is in Judaism.", + "And defilement has a stringency that shaving does not have, in that defilement annuls the whole [period of naziriteship already served], and [a nazirite who is defiled] is liable for a sacrifice, whereas shaving annuls only thirty days and he is not liable for a sacrifice. In section two the mishnah noted that both defilement and shaving one’s hair annul at least part of the term of naziriteship already served. Here the mishnah notes that defilement is more stringent in that a nazirite who is defiled must begin his entire naziriteship again, whereas a nazirite who shaves only loses thirty days of his term." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIf a nazirite contracts ritual impurity, he must count seven days, shave his head on the seventh, bring two sacrifices on the eighth day, one a sin offering and the other a burnt offering, and then begin to count his naziriteship again. This is spelled out in Number 6:9-12. Our mishnah describes this ritual.", + "Shaving on account of defilement: How was it done? He would sprinkle [with purification water] on the third and seventh days, shave on the seventh day and bring his sacrifices on the eighth day. Numbers 19:19 states that a person who has become ritually defiled by contact with a corpse must have purification water sprinkled on him on the third and seventh days. Our mishnah adds this information into the procedure clearly stated in Numbers 6, that a nazirite who has become impure shaves on the seventh day and brings his sacrifices on the eighth.", + "If he shaved on the eighth day, he would bring his sacrifices on that same day, the words of Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Tarfon said to him: what difference is there between this one and a person with scale disease? He said to him: the purification of this one depends on his days, whereas the purification of one with scale disease depends on his shaving, and he cannot bring a sacrifice unless the sun has set upon him [after his purification]. According to Rabbi Akiva, if he shaved on the eighth day, he may bring his sacrifices that very same day. Rabbi Akiva reasons that a nazirite may always bring his sacrifices the day after he has become pure, regardless of when he shaves. Rabbi Tarfon raises a difficulty on Rabbi Akiva. When a person with scale disease becomes pure, he too must shave on the seventh day and bring his sacrifices on the eighth day (see Leviticus 14:9-10). However, in that case, Rabbi Akiva agrees that if he shaves on the eighth day, he may not bring his sacrifices until the ninth. Rabbi Akiva responds that a nazirite’s purity depends on the seven days and not on his having shaved. This is demonstrated by the fact that the nazirite goes to the mikveh on the seventh day, even if he doesn’t shave until the eighth. Therefore, once he has become pure on the seventh day, he may bring his sacrifices on the eighth, even if he also shaves that day. In contrast, a person with scale disease cannot go to the mikveh, until he shaves. He cannot bring his sacrifice, therefore, until the sun sets on the day that he has become pure by going to the mikveh, which if he shaves on the eighth will not be until the ninth. Therefore, the person with scale disease is not analogous to the nazirite." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nYesterday’s mishnah dealt with a nazirite who had to shave because he had become ritually defiled. Today’s mishnah deals with a nazirite who has successfully completed his term of naziriteship, and is shaving as part of its completion, as is prescribed in Numbers 6. In our mishnah two sages dispute when exactly he shaves during this process.", + "Shaving in a case of purity: How was it done?
He would bring three animals, a sin-offering, a burnt-offering, and a well-being offering, slaughter the peace-offering and shave thereafter, the words of Rabbi Judah. Numbers 6:14 states that a nazirite upon completion of his naziriteship is to bring three sacrifices, as stated in the mishnah. Verse 16-18 then state: “The priest shall present them before the Lord and offer the sin offering and the burnt offering. He shall offer the ram of sacrifice of well-being…The nazirite shall then cut his hair.” Rabbi Judah therefore requires that all three sacrifices be offered before he cuts his hair. This is the literal interpretation of the verse.", + "Rabbi Elazar says: he shaves after the sin-offering, for in all cases [the sacrifice of] the sin-offering takes precedence. In contrast, Rabbi Elazar holds that the nazirite should shave after the sacrifice of the sin-offering, for the sin-offering always takes precedence (see Leviticus 5:8). To show that it takes precedence, Rabbi Elazar says that he should shave after its offering, before the other two sacrifices are offered.", + "But if he shaved after [the slaughter] of any one of the three he has fulfilled his obligation. Nevertheless, if he shaved after any of the other offerings, both sages agree that he has fulfilled his obligation." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first section of this mishnah teaches that although in general when bringing sacrifices, a person must specify which animal is for which sacrifice, the nazirite need not do so.\nThe second section of the mishnah teaches what a nazirite does with his hair once he has shaved it off.", + "Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: if he brought three animals without specifying [what they were for], the one suitable for a sin offering is sacrificed as a sin offering, for a burnt offering as a burnt offering, and for a well-being offering as a well-being offering. Generally speaking, when a nazirite brings his offerings he should state which is for a sin offering, which is for a burnt offering and which is for a well-being offering. However, since each offering is from a different type of animal, even if he did not do so, it is obvious which is for which. The female sheep is the sin offering, the male sheep is the burnt offering and the well being offering is a ram. These are all prescribed by Numbers 6:14.", + "He would then take the hair of his nazirite head and threw it under the cauldron. If he shaved in the province he [also] would throw it under the cauldron. Numbers 6:18 states, “The Nazirite shall then shave his consecrated hair, at the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, and take the locks of his consecrated hair and put them on the fire that is under the sacrifice of well-being.” Our mishnah adds that even if he shaved his hair in the province, which means in Jerusalem but outside the Temple, he still throws it under the cauldron.", + "With regard to what was this said? With regard to shaving in ritual purity, whereas in shaving [after] ritual defilement he does not throw it under the cauldron. Rabbi Meir says: all [nazirites] throw it under the cauldron, except for the defiled nazirite [who shaved] in the provinces. According to the first opinion, he only throws his hair under the cauldron if he is shaving at the end of his naziriteship. He does not do so if he is shaving due to his having been ritually defiled. In contrast, Rabbi Meir holds that even when shaving due to defilement, he throws it under the cauldron. The only one who does not do so is the nazirite who shaved due to defilement outside of the Temple. According to another mishnah (Temurah 7:4), the hair of a nazirite is buried." + ], + [ + "Introduction Numbers 6:17-20 read: “He shall offer the ram as a sacrifice of well-being to the Lord, together with the basket of unleavened cakes; the priest shall also offer the meal offerings and the libations. The nazirite shall then shave his consecrated hair…The priest shall take the shoulder of the ram when it has been boiled, one unleavened cake from the basket, and one unleavened wafer, and place them on the hands of the nazirite after he has shaved his consecrated hair. The priest shall wave them as a wave-offering before the Lord… After that the nazirite shall drink wine.” Our mishnah discusses this process and contains a dispute over exactly when the nazirrite shaves his head.", + "He would then boil or completely boil the peace-offering. To the biblical requirements quoted above, the mishnah adds that the well-being offering may either be boiled or completely boiled, such that the meat falls of the bone extremely easily.", + "The priest then took the boiled shoulder of the ram, an unleavened cake from the basket, and an unleavened wafer, placed them on the nazirite’s hands and waved them. These actions are prescribed by verse 19.", + "After this, the nazirite was allowed to drink wine and defile himself for the dead. Rabbi Shimon says: as soon as one kind of blood had been sprinkled on his behalf the nazirite could drink wine and defile himself for the dead. According to the first opinion, only after the priest has completed these actions can the nazirite drink wine and defile himself for the dead. This is a simple reading of the order of the activities prescribed in the above verses. Rabbi Shimon says that as soon as one of the sacrifices blood is sprinkled on the altar on behalf of the nazirite, he may drink wine and defile himself for the dead. This is so even though he has not yet shaved or offered the other sacrifices. In the Talmud midrashic proof is brought for Rabbi Shimon’s position." + ], + [ + "Introduction This mishnah deals with a person who offered one (or more) of his sacrifices, then shaved and then discovered that his sacrifice had been improperly offered. When offering a sacrifice, the priest must have the correct intention in mind. When offering a sin-offering he must intend to offer a sin-offering and follow all of that specific offering’s regulations. A wrong intention invalidates the sacrifice. It turns out that this person has shaved before he offered his sacrifice. Therefore, the shaving is invalid and he must add on another thirty days of naziriteship.", + "If he shaves after one of the sacrifices and the sacrifice is found to be invalid, his shaving is invalid and his sacrifices do not count: According to some commentators, after the sacrifice was offered he shaved, and then the sacrifice turned out to be in some way invalid. Rashi, however, explains that this section is an introduction to the next section, and in both it turns out that the sacrifice itself was valid, but that it was offered with improper intent. In any case, since it turns out that he shaved before he had offered any valid sacrifices, he must go back, serve another thirty days of naziriteship and then re-offer all of his sacrifices.", + "If he shaves after the sin-offering, which was not offered for its correct designation and then he brought the other sacrifices under their correct designations, his shaving is invalid and [none of] his sacrifices counts for him. A sin-offering must be offered with the proper intent. Since it was not, it is invalid, and again none of his sacrifices count.", + "[Similarly], if he shaves after the burnt-offering or the wellbeing offering, which have not been offered for their correct designation, and then he brought the other sacrifices under their correct designation, his shaving is invalid and [none of] his sacrifices counts for him. Rabbi Shimon says: that particular sacrifice does not count, but his other sacrifices do count. Unlike the sin-offering, the burnt offering and the wellbeing offering are valid, even if offered with improper intent. Nevertheless, they do not count as nazirite offerings and therefore, the nazirite has again shaved his hair before offering any of his mandatory sacrifices. Again, he must serve another thirty days of naziriteship and then offer all three sacrifices. Rabbi Shimon holds that since the burnt or wellbeing offerings are valid, even though it doesn’t count toward his nazirite obligations, they do not invalidate the offering of the other properly-offered sacrifices. He must merely bring another of the same type of sacrifice that did not count for him.", + "If he shaved after all three sacrifices and one of them was found to valid, his shaving is valid and he has [only] to bring the other sacrifices. If, however, he sacrificed all three sacrifices, and only then shaved, and only one of them was found to be valid, the shaving was not improper. As we learned above in mishnah seven, a nazirite can shave even after bringing one sacrifice. Therefore, all he must do in this case is bring another one of the sacrifices which was invalidated." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with a situation where a nazirite began to have his sacrifices offered and then during the process, he became impure through contact with a dead body. The question is, when he becomes clean, does he have to bring again the sacrifice(s) which was already offered.", + "If [a nazirite] on whose behalf one kind of blood has been sprinkled becomes unclean, Rabbi Eliezer says: everything is annulled. But the Sages say: he should bring his remaining sacrifices after purification. They said to him: it happened that Miriam the Tadmorite had one kind of blood sprinkled on her behalf, and they came and told her that her daughter was dangerously ill. She went and found her dead and the sages told her to offer her remaining sacrifices after purification. The topic of this mishnah is a nazirite who became impure after one of her sacrifices had been slaughtered and its blood sprinkled on the altar, but before the other sacrifices had undergone this process. According to Rabbi Eliezer, her becoming impure annuls all of her sacrifices, even the one whose blood had already been spilled. Therefore, she must wait seven days to become pure and then bring a new set of sacrifices. In contrast, the sages hold that the sacrifice whose blood had already been sprinkled counts and that after becoming pure, she need bring only the sacrifices that had not yet been offered. The sages prove their point by bringing a story of where this actually happened. As a side note, it is interesting that the two stories of nazirites which we have encountered, the story regarding Queen Helena and this one, involve women. While it may be imprudent to make any conclusions from such scanty evidence, perhaps taking nazirite vows was a form of religious expression common, at least relatively speaking, among women." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "A high priest and a nazirite may not defile themselves with their [dead] relatives, but they may defile themselves with a neglected corpse.
If they were walking on the path and found a neglected corpse: Rabbi Eliezer says: the high priest should defile himself but not the nazirite. But the Sages say: the nazirite should defile himself but not the high priest.
Rabbi Eliezer said to them: the priest should defile himself, for he does not offer a sacrifice for his defilement, and the nazirite should not defile himself, for he does offer a sacrifice on defilement. They said to him: the nazirite should defile himself, for his holiness is not permanent, and the priest should not defile himself, for his holiness is permanent.
Just as it is forbidden for nazirite to defile himself, even in order to take care of his relatives (Numbers 6:6), so too this is forbidden for a high priest (see Leviticus 21:11). An ordinary priest is allowed to take care of the burial of his close relatives, but he is forbidden from defiling himself for others.
In Nazir 6:5 we learned that the one exception to this rule for a nazirite is a “neglected corpse”, literally termed “a commanded corpse”. All Jews are commanded to take care of bringing this corpse to a proper burial, and this commandment overrides the prohibition of defilement. Our mishnah deals with a priest and a nazirite who are walking together and see a neglected corpse. Only one of them need defile himself; the question is which one.
Section one: As we stated in the introduction, even a high priest and a nazirite may defile themselves in order to take care of a neglected corpse.
Section two: In this situation one of them, either the priest or the nazirite, but not both of them must defile themselves in order to take care of the neglected corpse. Note that once one person is taking care of the corpse, it is no longer a “neglected corpse” and hence the other one is forbidden to defile himself.
Rabbi Eliezer says that the high priest/priest should defile himself. In the following section he provides his reasoning. A priest who defiles himself does not bring a sacrifice as atonement, but a nazirite does. Rabbi Eliezer reads the bringing of a sacrifice as a sign of the greater seriousness of the transgression. To avoid this, the priest, or even high priest, should take care of the corpse, and the nazirite should remain pure.
The Sages respond that the priest’s holiness is greater than that of the nazirite for his holiness is permanent, whereas the nazirite’s is temporary. This is indeed a different way of looking at holiness. Holiness is measured by the innate quality of having been born into a priestly family, and not by the “mitzvah” oriented idea that being liable to bring a sacrifice make’s one status holier.
As an aside, we might note in this mishnah that a nazirite’s vow in some ways is an attempt for him to become holy like the priest. While their prohibitions are different, there is enough similarity between the two that we may sense that one reason that a person might take a nazirite vow was to become holy in much the same way that a priest is holy." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThere are two categories of defilement with the dead that are relevant to nazirite laws. If he is defiled through actual contact with the dead, he loses his whole period of naziriteship and he must shave and begin to count his naziriteship over. This contact can occur either through touching, carrying or being overshadowed by contact with a dead body or part of a dead body. [Overshadowing refers to a case where an object overshadowed him and the part of the dead body. For instance, they were under the same roof.]\nIn tomorrow’s mishnah we will learn of cases where the nazirite is considered to be impure, but he has not contracted that impurity from direct contact with the dead. In such a case the nazirite does not shave, bring a sacrifice or lose the previously served part of his naziriteship. However, in such a case the days that he is impure do not count toward his naziriteship.", + "This mishnah lists the types of impurity through contact with the dead that obligate a nazirite to shave, bring sacrifices and start counting his entire term of naziriteship from the beginning.", + "For which types of defilement must the nazirite shave?
For [defilement contracted from] a corpse, or an olive’s bulk of [the flesh of] a corpse, or an olive’s bulk of corpse ooze, or a ladleful of corpse-mould; He is impure through contact with any piece of flesh, as long as it is of minimum size. There are different minimum measurements depending upon the state of this flesh. (Yes, I know this is a little on the ‘yucky’ side, especially the “corpse mould”. It just goes to show that in the ancient world death was probably less removed from their reality than it is in our world.)", + "Or the spinal column, or the skull, or any limb [severed] from a corpse, or any limb [severed] from a living body that is still properly covered with flesh, or a half-kav of bones, or a half-log of blood. This section lists mostly limbs, bones and at the end a minimum measurement of blood. Note that except for a “limb from a living body”, the rest of these come from a corpse.", + "Whether [the defilement was contracted] from contact with them, from carrying them, or from overshadowing them. The things listed in the first two sections transmit their impurity to the nazirite by contact, by being carried or through overshadowing. “Carrying” can cause impurity even if the impurity was not directly touched.", + "For [defilement contracted from] a barley-grain’s bulk of bone, whether by contact or carrying. In contrast, a minimum piece of bone, the size of a barley-grain, does not transmit impurity through overshadowing, but only through contact and carrying.", + "On account of these, a nazirite must shave and be sprinkled on the third and seventh days, and such [defilement] annuls the previously served period, and he does not begin to count a new [naziriteship] until he has become clean and brought his sacrifices. This section lists the rules for a nazirite who contracts such defilement. As stated above, he must shave, purify himself, bring a sacrifice and only after becoming pure can he begin to count his naziriteship again." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn yesterday’s mishnah we learned which types of defilement annul a nazirite’s previously served days of naziriteship, and make him liable to bring a sacrifice. Today we learn the opposite cases: defilement that does not force him to shave, does not annul his previously served days and does not make him liable for a sacrifice.", + "But for [defilement contracted by] overhanging branches, or protruding stones, or a field that may have once been a cemetery, or land of the Gentiles, or the stone which covers the tomb or the supporting stone of a tomb, or a quarter-log of blood, or a tent, or a quarter-kav of bones, or utensils that have been in contact with a corpse, or on account of the days of counting [after contracting scale disease] or the days during which he is certified unclean [because of scale disease]; All of the things listed here defile a person, but since they are not considered defilement coming directly from a corpse, they do not force the nazirite to annul his naziriteship. I shall explain each one at a time: Overhanging branches: this refers to a branches of a tree which hang over him and a doubtful piece of a dead body. Protruding stones: similarly, these are overhanging stones which may overshadow him and a doubtful piece of a dead body. A grave that has been plowed: this actually refers to the area around such a grave, which might have on it bones or pieces of bones. Land of the Gentiles: the sages declared that all land outside of Israel defiles (see above 3:6). The stone which covers the tomb or the supporting stone of a tomb: The former refers to a round stone, rolled in front of the tomb to seal it off. The latter refers to the stones surrounding this stone which supported it in its place. A quarter-log of blood: In yesterday’s mishnah we saw that a half-log was necessary for to force the nazirite to restart his counting and to bring a sacrifice. A quarter-log, therefore, transmits full impurity but does not count enough to annul his naziriteship. Or a tent: this refers to touching a tent in which a dead body is found. A quarter-kav of bones: In yesterday’s mishnah we saw that a half-kav was necessary to restart his counting and to bring a sacrifice. Similar to the case of blood, a smaller amount still causes impurity but doesn’t count as defilement from a corpse. Utensils that have been in contact with a corpse: These will cause impurity, but even though the impurity is indirectly from a corpse, since the nazirite was not defiled directly by the corpse, his naziriteship is not annulled. On account of the days of counting [after becoming a leper] or the days during which he is certified unclean; this refers to a nazirite who has become a leper (one with scale disease). Becoming a leper does not cause him to lose his term already served as a nazirite, neither the days in which he becomes clean, nor the days in which he is certified unclean.", + "For all these the nazirite is not required to shave, but they do sprinkle him on the third and seventh [days], and [the defilement] does not annul the formerly served period, and he begins to resume counting [his naziriteship] immediately [after purification] and there is no sacrifice. For all of these things he is considered to be defiled, and he must be sprinkled with hatat water on the third and seventh days. However, he does not shave, nor does he bring a sacrifice, nor does he lose his earlier served days. As soon as he becomes clean, he may begin to count again.", + "In fact they said: the days of [defilement of] a male or female sufferer from gonorrhea and the days that a leper is shut up as a leper count toward his [naziriteship]. This halakhah is even more radical than that in the previous section. If, while serving a naziriteship, he contracts gonorrhea (zav), or becomes a leper, not only does he not lose his previously served days, but these days also count toward his naziriteship. The only reason that a nazirite must shave and lose his previously served days is through contact with the dead. Other forms of impurity, as serious as they may be, do not have the same effect. Here we learn that they can even count as days served toward his naziriteship." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first section of our mishnah contains a discussion related to the categories of impurity explained in the previous two mishnayoth.\nThe second section contains a debate over whether a quarter-log of blood forces the nazirite to shave. This section contains an interesting insight into the tension between two primary sources of halakhah: tradition and logical reasoning.", + "Rabbi Elazar said in the name of Rabbi Joshua: for every defilement [conveyed] by a corpse on account of which a nazirite must shave, people are liable for entering the sanctuary, and for every defilement [conveyed] by a corpse on account of which a nazirite does not shave, people are not liable for one entering the sanctuary. Rabbi Meir said: such [defilement] should not be less serious than [defilement through] a dead creeping thing. Rabbi Elazar correlates the two categories of corpse defilement explained in the previous mishnah to another halakhah, that of entering the sanctuary while defiled, punishable by kareth if done intentionally or a sacrifice if done unintentionally. According to Rabbi Elazar, those categories of defilement for which a nazirite does not shave, a person is also not liable for entering the sanctuary while defiled by them. Rabbi Meir argues that defilement contracted through these things for which a nazirite does not shave should not be considered less serious than defilement contracted by contact with a dead creeping thing. Since a person who enters the sanctuary after contracting defilement from a dead creeping thing is liable (see Leviticus 5:2), so too is one who contracted defilement from one of the impurities in mishnah three above.", + "Rabbi Akiba said: I argued in the presence of Rabbi Eliezer: Now if on account of a barley-corn’s bulk of bone which does not defile a man by overshadowing, a nazirite shaves should he touch it or carry it, then surely a quarter-log of blood which defiles a man by overshadowing, should cause a nazirite to shave should he touch it or carry it? He replied: What is this Akiva! We do not make here an ‘all the more so’ (a kal argument. When I afterwards went and recounted these words to Rabbi Joshua, he said to me, “You spoke well, but thus they have ruled the halakhah.” This section deals with the teaching in mishnah three, according to which a nazirite who was defiled by contact with a quarter-log of blood does not have to shave. Rabbi Akiva argues against this position in front of Rabbi Eliezer, one of his teachers. Rabbi Akiva’s argument is based on the precedent of a barley corn’s bulk of bone. Such a small piece of bone does not defile through overshadowing, and yet nevertheless a nazirite who comes into contact with it or carries it must shave, bring a sacrifice and begin counting his naziriteship. If so, a quarter-log of blood, which does defile through overshadowing should all the more so make a nazirite shave, bring a sacrifice and start his naziriteship over. This type of formal argumentation is called an a “kal vehomer” in Hebrew, which I translate as an “all the more so” argument. Others use the term “a fortiori”. The reasoning here is that if a lesser thing (the tiny piece of bone) carries a certain power, all the more so should the greater thing (the small amount of blood). Rabbi Eliezer responds to Rabbi Akiva by telling him that we don’t make this type of argument here. Rabbi Eliezer is known as being an arch-conservative in halakhic matters. He typically rejects reason as a source of new halakhot, relying strictly on tradition. Rabbi Joshua, on the other hand, is known more typically as the innovator, ready to modify traditions if so persuaded. However, over here, he too does not feel able to modify the halakhah that a quarter-log of blood does not make a nazirite liable to shave. While he accepts Rabbi Akiva’s reason, he says that since the Sages ruled based on their traditions, this halakhah cannot be changed." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction This extremely long mishnah deals with the case of two nazirites, one of whom was defiled, but it is uncertain which one it was. The problem is that the one who was defiled must bring the sacrifices for defilement and shave, while the one who was not defiled must bring his sacrifices for completing a naziriteship in purity.", + "Two nazirites to whom someone says, “I saw one of you defiled, but I do not know which of you it was,” This section sets up the situation. Evidently, the nazirites themselves do not know which one was clean and which one was not.", + "[Both] must shave and [together] bring sacrifices for defilement and sacrifices [for completing a naziriteship] in purity, [and one of them] must say, “If I am unclean, the sacrifices for defilement are mine, and the sacrifices in purity are yours, whereas if I am the one who is clean, the sacrifices in purity are mine and the sacrifices for defilement are yours.” And they must then count thirty [more] days and bring sacrifices in purity and [one of them] must say, “If I am the one who was unclean, the sacrifices for defilement were mine, the sacrifices in purity were yours, and these are my sacrifices in purity, whereas if I was the one who was clean, the sacrifices in purity were mine, the sacrifices for defilement were yours, and these are your sacrifices in purity.” Immediately, both nazirites must shave and together they bring sacrifices of defilement and sacrifices of completing the naziriteship in purity (purity sacrifices). One of the two nazirites then declares that if he was the one defiled, the defilement sacrifices are his, but if the other was defiled, then the purity sacrifices are his and the sacrifices of defilement belong to the other. They then must count another thirty days, assuming that this was a naziriteship of unspecified duration. If it was a longer vow, then they must wait the entire period of the vow. This period is to allow the one who was not defiled time to serve out his naziriteship after he had just shaved. Then they make the same statement again. In this way it is certain that the defiled one surely has offered one sacrifice of defilement and one sacrifice of purity.", + "If one of them dies: Rabbi Joshua said that [the other] should request that someone from the marketplace take a nazirite vow together with him, and say: “If I am unclean, you are to be a nazirite immediately, but if I was clean, you are to become a nazirite at the end of thirty days.” They then count thirty days and bring sacrifices for defilement and sacrifices [for completing a naziriteship] in purity and [the first one] says, “If I am the one who was unclean, the sacrifices for defilement are mine and the sacrifices in purity are yours, whereas if I am the one who is clean, the sacrifices in purity are mine and the sacrifices for defilement are [sacrifices offered] in doubt.” They then count [another] thirty days and bring [one set of] the sacrifices in purity and [the first one] says, “If I am the one who was defiled, the sacrifice for defilement [offered previously] was mine and the sacrifice in purity was yours, and this is my sacrifice in purity, whereas if I was the one who was clean, the sacrifice in purity was mine and the sacrifice for defilement [was offered] in doubt and this is your sacrifice in purity.” The situation now gets much more complicated. One of the two nazirities dies and they don’t know whether the clean or unclean one died. Rabbi Joshua suggests a complicated solution. The remaining nazirite finds someone who is not a nazirite and asks him to take a nazirite vow, but not just a regular nazirite vow but rather a vow that will answer the needs of the nazirite who may be unclean. The potentially unclean nazirite then stipulates that if he really is unclean, the new person should be a nazirite immediately, but if he was clean, then the beginning of the other person’s naziriteship should wait thirty days. They then wait the thirty days and then together they bring sacrifices of purity and defilement and again the original nazirite makes a stipulation. If he was the unclean one, then this is his sacrifice of defilement and the sacrifice of purity belongs to the “new” nazirite, who is now completing his naziriteship. If he was the clean nazirite, then the sacrifice of purity is his, and the sacrifice of defilement has the status of a doubtful sacrifice. In practice this means that the sin offering of a bird cannot be eaten, but is nevertheless sacrificed. Note that the other nazirite now begins to serve his own naziriteship, as stated in the original stipulation. Therefore, they must wait another thirty days and then bring a sacrifice of purity. The original doubtfully unclean nazirite now states that if was the unclean one, then the previously brought sacrifice of defilement was his and the current sacrifice of purity belongs to the new nazirite. But, if the original nazirite was clean, the previously brought sacrifice of purity was his, and the previously brought sacrifice of defilement remains doubtful and the current sacrifice of purity is for the new nazirite.", + "Ben Zoma said to him: Who will listen to him and take a nazirite vow together with him? Rather he must bring a bird as a sin offering and an animal as a burnt offering and say, “If I was defiled, the sin offering is part of my obligation and the burnt offering is a voluntary offering, whereas if I remained clean, the burnt-offering is part of my obligation and the sin offering is [a sacrifice offered] in doubt.” ‘ He must then count thirty days and bring the sacrifices in purity and say, “If I was defiled, the former burnt offering was a voluntary offering and this is part of my obligation, whereas if I remained clean, the former burnt offering was part of my obligation and this is the voluntary one. And these are the rest of my sacrifices.” Ben Zoma, being a great Sage, has somehow managed to follow this quite complicated system, but nevertheless has a practical problem with its application. How is he going to find a volunteer willing to go through all of this trouble just to get him out of his problem? This does seem very unlikely. Therefore, Ben Zoma comes up with an alternative solution, one that doesn’t involve others. After one of the two doubtful nazirites dies, the living one brings a sin offering of a bird, which is one of the two sacrifices offered for nazirite defilement and a burnt offering of a beast, one of the three offerings upon completion of naziriteship in purity. He then states that if he was the unclean one, then the sin offering should count as his obligatory offering, and the burnt offering is voluntary. Note that the sacrifice of well-being is not brought, for it cannot be offered as a voluntary sacrifice. He continues to state that if he was the clean one, then the burnt offering counts as part of his obligatory sacrifices for the completion of his naziriteship and the sin offering is voluntary. He then waits another thirty days, again assuming that his original nazirite vow was thirty days. If it was longer, he must wait as long as the original vow was. At this point he brings the full set of purity sacrifices (sin, burnt and well-being offerings) and states that if he was the unclean one then his original burnt offering was voluntary and the one that he is currently bringing is the obligatory one. But if he was the clean one, the original burnt offering was obligatory and the current one is voluntary. In any case, he is now bringing the remainder of his sacrifices, meaning the sin offering and the well-being offering.", + "Rabbi Joshua said: the result is that he brings his sacrifices half at a time! But the Sages agreed with Ben Zoma. Rabbi Joshua now responds that according to Ben Zoma’s system the nazirite may end up bringing his purity sacrifices in two stages. If he was the clean nazirite, then he brought his burnt offering was brought first and the other two were brought thirty days later. Despite this, the Sages agree that Ben Zoma’s system is preferable." + ], + [ + "Introduction There is a good deal of background information that will help (some) in understanding this mishnah. The topic of the mishnah is someone who is not only a doubtfully defiled nazirite, but a doubtful metzorah, one who has scale disease (which I will, for convenience sake, call leprosy). The process of the “leper” is as follows. When the priest checks him and decides that he does have the disease, he sits outside of the camp for seven days. Afterwards, he offers two bird sacrifices, shaves and bathes, and then may enter the camp. On the seventh day he again shaves, then goes to the mikveh and on the eighth day brings more sacrifices. He may not eat consecrated food until he brings these last sacrifices. We have already learned two things regarding the leper and the nazirite. First of all, the nazirite is allowed to shave if he has to do so to be purified from leprosy. Second, if a nazirite becomes a leper the days of his leprosy do not count toward his naziriteship, but neither does his becoming a leper overturn his entire naziriteship. Our mishnah also holds that shaving for leprosy cannot at the same time count for shaving for a naziriteship.", + "A nazirite who was in doubt whether he had been defiled and in doubt whether he had been a confirmed leper, may eat consecrated food after sixty days, and drink wine and come into contact with the dead after one hundred and twenty days, since shaving on account of leprosy overrides [the prohibition against] the shaving of the nazirite only when [the leprosy] is certain, but when it is doubtful it does not override it. The mishnah explains what is to happen in this situation. First of all, he must wait thirty days after he has been purified from having potentially come into contact with the dead and then he may shave his first shaving for leprosy. He could not shave earlier for he may not have been a leper and he may have been a pure nazirite in which case the leprosy shaving would not override the prohibition for a nazirite to shave, as the mishnah states at the end. Then he counts another seven days at which point he normally could shave his second leprosy shaving, but he cannot for the same reason. If he is a pure nazirite, he would need to wait thirty days in between each shaving. His second leprosy shaving is therefore at sixty days. At this point he may eat consecrated food. However, he may still be a nazirite, for if he was really a leper then those days did not count towards his naziriteship and he has not served thirty days after shaving. Therefore he cannot drink wine or come into contact with the dead. Thirty days later he again shaves, but this shaving may be for becoming defiled as a nazirite, if he was indeed unclean, or it may be for completion of his naziriteship. Since he may still not have served a nazirite term in purity, even after this shaving, he waits another thirty days and shaves again, only then is he allowed to drink wine and come into contact with the dead. While this mishnah is difficult, one thing is sure: the barber will be getting a lot of work!" + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction This mishnah deals with the subjectivity to nazirite vows of three, typically somewhat marginal groups of people in rabbinic thought and society: Gentiles, women and slaves.", + "Gentiles are not subject [to the laws] of naziriteship. The opening verse of the passage in Numbers which deals with the nazirite laws states, “Speak to the children of Israel” (Numbers 6:2). From here the rabbis conclude that Gentiles are not subject to the Jewish nazirite laws.", + "Women and slaves are subject [to the laws] of naziriteship. In contrast, the children of Israel includes women and slaves (those working in Israelite households).", + "The nazirite vow is more stringent in the case of women than in the case of slaves, for a man can compel his slave [to break his vow] but he cannot compel his wife [to do so]. The mishnah now compares the situation of the woman/wife with that of the slave. Both are subject to the authority of their \"masters\", but in different ways. In one way the rules for the women are more stringent. A master can at any point come up to his slave and say that the slave can no longer keep his nazirite vow and that he must perform one of the prohibitions. This is not voiding the vow, but preventing the slave from observing a vow that he remains obligated to observe. In other words, the master has total control over the slave’s work life. A husband does not have this power over his wife, for she is certainly not his slave. Although, as we shall see below, a husband may annul his wife’s vow, once the vow has been confirmed, he cannot impede her nazirite observance.", + "[The nazirite vow] is more stringent in the case of slaves than in the case of women, for he can void the vows of his wife, but he cannot void the vows of his slaves. If he voids his wife’s [vow], it is void for ever, but if he voids his slave’s vow, [if] the slave becomes free he must complete his naziriteship. On the other hand, a husband can annul his wife’s nazirite vow (as he can all her vows) completely, such that she is no longer subject to the vow. In contrast, while he can prevent his slave from observing his vow, technically the vow is still valid and the slave is still obligated to observe a naziriteship. If he is freed, all of the sages agree that he must complete his naziriteship. The master did not void the naziriteship, he merely delayed its observance.", + "When [the slave] passes from [his master's] presence: Rabbi Meir says: he may not drink [wine]. Rabbi Yose says: he may drink [wine]. Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yose disagree over whether the slave must observe his naziriteship when not in the presence of the master. Rabbi Meir says that he must observe the naziriteship and not drink wine, even though in the master’s presence the master wants him to drink wine. Rabbi Yose disagrees and holds that as long as he is enslaved to his master, he must continue to fulfill his master’s wishes, in or out of his presence. As an aside note, it seems to me that this mishnah is demonstrating a key difference in the rabbinic perception of wives and slaves. Rabbinic ideology in this period was certainly patriarchal, as was that of all of their surrounding society. However, the rabbis don’t view the wife, despite her obligations to her husband, as a slave to him. The Torah gave the husband a right to void her vows, but the rabbis limit that to a formal process. They do not extrapolate and conclude that therefore a husband’s control over his wife is like that over his slave. Rather, the Torah-bequeathed power remains local, and perhaps of a different nature than that of a master’s control over his slave." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah deals with a type of corpse defilement known as “defilement of the depth.” This refers to a corpse found in a place where no one knew it had been. Figuratively, it is as if it came out of the depths. Our mishnah shall illustrate a case where it really is found in a deep place.", + "A nazirite shaves and then discovers that he was defiled: If the defilement was certain, it voids [the naziriteship], But if it is a defilement of the depth, it is not rendered void. If after having shaved at the completion of his naziriteship, the nazirite discovers that he had contracted corpse defilement while he was still a nazirite, if the defilement was certain, he loses his whole period of naziriteship. However, if the defilement was “defilement of the depth”, it does not void his naziriteship. This seems to be a leniency due to the nature of this type of defilement and the situation (he has already shaved).", + "[If he discovers that he was defiled] before shaving, in either case it voids [the naziriteship]. However, if he discovered that he had been defiled before he shaved for completing his naziriteship, either type of defilement voids his naziriteship. The leniency in the previous section no longer applies.", + "How is [the law regarding ‘defilement of the depth’]? If he goes down into a cavern to bathe, and a corpse is found floating at the mouth of the cavern, he is [definitely] unclean. If it is found embedded in the floor of the cavern, Then if he went in merely to cool himself off he remains clean, But if he went to purify himself after defilement through contact with the dead he remains unclean, Because the assumption concerning an unclean person is that he is unclean and the assumption concerning a clean person is that he is clean,. This section explains how “defilement of the depth” works. If he goes into a cavern to bathe and finds a corpse in the water, he is definitely unclean. If he is a nazirite, this will void the days of his naziriteship which he has already served. However, if he finds that a corpse that was embedded in the floor, this is “defilement of the depth”. In such a case there is one more question which must be asked before we can determine if he is considered unclean. If he went down just to cool off, and then later, after having shaved when completing his naziriteship, someone told him that a corpse was embedded in the floor of that cavern, he is still pure. However, if a nazirite went into the cavern to purify himself from corpse impurity, and then began to count his naziriteship again, and after completing his naziriteship and shaving, someone told him that there was a corpse in the floor of the cavern where he had earlier bathed, he is considered unclean and his naziriteship is voided. The mishnah explains that each person stays in his already-presumed status. The clean person who went into the cavern to cool off remains clean, despite having come into contact with “defilement of the depth”. But, the unclean person who used this cavern as his mikveh remains unclean, the status he was in when he came into contact with the corpse." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nYesterday’s mishnah ended with the phrase, “for there are grounds for such an assumption” (raglayim ledavar). This can be translated literally as “the matter has legs”, but it means that an assumption is probably correct. The following two mishnayoth are brought here in this tractate because they too contain that phrase.\nSpecifically, today’s mishnah deals with a person who finds a body or more than one body buried on his property. The question is, was his property a cemetery or not. Note that normally speaking Jewish law forbids the moving of a corpse. However, in certain circumstances it is permitted. In our mishnah the owner of the property wants to prevent his property from being unclean and therefore the mishnah allows him, under certain circumstances, to remove the body.", + "If a man finds a corpse for the first time lying in a typical position, he may remove it together with the soil that it occupies. A person finds a single corpse on his property and he has never found one there before. The corpse is lying in a position typical for the burial of Jews. If it had been a non-Jewish body, there would be no concern for impurity since non-Jewish corpses do not defile. The mishnah rules that he may move it, together with the soil surrounding it. The soil must be removed for it has soaked up some of his blood and moisture and hence may be impure.", + "[If he finds] two, he may remove them together with the ground they occupy. If he finds two bodies, he may proceed in the same manner. Two bodies is not enough for us to begin to be concerned about it being a cemetery.", + "If he finds three, then if the distance between the first and the last is from four to eight cubits, this is a graveyard site. He [must] check from that point twenty cubits in all directions. If he finds one twenty cubits away, he must check from it another twenty cubits, for there are grounds [that it is a graveyard]. For if he had found it at the outset he would have removed it and the soil that it occupies. However, if he finds three bodies and there are no more than eight cubits separating the two furthest apart, he must assume that he has stumbled upon a cemetery. In this case he cannot move the corpses. He must look around in a twenty cubit radius to see how large the cemetery is. If he finds another corpse even twenty cubits away, he must treat the entire area as a cemetery. He may not remove this single corpse, even though it is a large distance away from the others, for there are grounds (no pun intended) to assume that the entire area was used as a cemetery. In contrast, if he had found a single corpse there before finding others, it would not have been considered part of the cemetery, and he would have been allowed to remove it with its soil." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to bring cases that involve the concept of “there are grounds for the assumption.” The first section discusses doubtful skin afflictions. The second case involves doubtful cases of “zivah”, usually translated as flux, an unusual genital emission. The third case involves estimating the cause of death of a person struck by his fellow.", + "Any matter of doubt regarding [leprous affliction] at the outset is clean before a decision is made [to declare it] unclean. Once a decision has been made [to declare it] unclean, any matter of doubt is regarded as unclean. If something is seen on a person’s skin that may be the sign of an unclean skin affliction, he is still considered clean until the priests decide that it is an unclean skin affliction. However, once he has been declared to be unclean, any further doubtful matters are ruled as if they too render him unclean. In other words, he remains in his presumed assumption.", + "A person suffering from gonorrhea (a is examined regarding seven things, before it has been decided that it is gonorrhea: With regard to food, drink, carrying things, jumping, sickness, something seen, or an impure thought. Once gonorrhea is established, he is no longer examined. [Any flux resulting] from an accident to him, doubtful [flux] and his semen are unclean, for there are grounds for this assumption. For a person to be considered a full zav (one suffering a certain type of sexually transmitted disease), he must see flux (unusual genital emission) three times with no more than one day between each emission. After his first two emissions, he is still not a full zav. Furthermore, for the emission to be legally considered flux it must be from this disease and not as a result of something else. Therefore, after the first and second emissions he is checked to make sure the emission was not caused by something else. Our mishnah teaches the questions that he is asked. All of these were considered potential causes of emissions. However, once he has been declared a zav, a sufferer of this disease, he is not asked these questions concerning further emissions. Rather they are all considered to be flux. Again, the person remains in his currently assumed status unless it can be proven otherwise. The mishnah continues that even if he were to have his third emission as an accident resulting from one of the above causes, or there is a doubt whether he had a third emission, or it is unclear whether it was a seminal emission or a gonorrheal emission, he is still ruled to be a zav, for there are grounds to assume that after the first two emissions of flux, the third one is flux as well.", + "If a one strikes his fellow, and they expected him to die and he partially recovered and then grew worse and died [the other] is liable [for murder]. Rabbi Nehemiah exempts him, for there are grounds for this assumption. According to the first opinion, even though the injured person partially recovered and only after his recovery again grew ill and died, it is clear that he died from the blows of the first person. Hence the one who struck him is considered to be a murderer. Rabbi Nehemiah disagrees and holds that it can be presumed that he died of other causes, and therefore the one who struck him cannot be considered a murderer. Others interpret the final words of this mishnah “for there are grounds for this assumption” to relate to the words of the first opinion. Since there are solid grounds to assume that the person died from the blows, he is deemed to be a murderer." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe last mishnah of tractate Nazir deals with the question of whether Samuel, the biblical prophet, was a nazirite. It is very typical for tractates of Mishnah to end with words of aggadah, the non-halakhic parts of the rabbinic tradition.", + "Samuel was a nazirite, according to the words of Rabbi Nehorai, as it says, “And no razor [morah] shall come upon his head” (I Samuel 1:11). It says with reference to Samson, “And [no] razor [morah]” (Judges 13:5) and it says with reference to Samuel, “And [no] razor [morah]”, just as “razor [morah]” in the case of Samson [teaches that he was] a nazirite, so “razor [morah]” in the case of Samuel [teaches that he was] a nazirite. Rabbi Yose says: but does not “morah” refer to [fear] of flesh and blood? Rabbi Nehorai said to him: But does it not also say, “And Samuel said; ‘How can I go? If Saul will hear it he will kill me’” (I Samuel 16:2) [which shows] that he was afraid of flesh and blood? The case of Samuel is truly puzzling: was he or wasn’t he a nazirite? When Hana prays to God to give her a child, she promises that if she does have a male child, no “morah (razor) shall ever touch his head.” The obvious meaning seems to be that just as Samson’s mother was promised that he would have a child and that her boy was to become a nazirite and “no razor shall touch his head”, so too Samuel’s mother was promising that he would be a nazirite. This is the gist of Rabbi Nehorai’s argument. However, unlike Samson’s mother, Samuel’s mother does not promise the other two nazirite prohibitions, that her son will not become defiled through contact with the dead or eat/drink anything from the vine. Samuel is not subsequently referred to as a nazirite, nor does he seem to act as one. Therefore, Rabbi Yose interprets the Hebrew word “morah” to refer to fear. Samuel’s mother promises that he will not be afraid of anyone. While the word “morah” can mean fear, the simple meaning of the word in this verse seems to obviously be razor. Rabbi Yose interprets it to mean “fear” because it just doesn’t seem that Samuel is a nazirite. Rabbi Nehorai responds by pointing out that this interpretation also does not fit with the facts of Samuel’s life. Samuel did fear Saul, as is evident from the quote. Therefore, the word “morah” must refer to razor, and Samuel must have actually been a nazirite. Interestingly, in a fragmentary scroll of Samuel found in Qumran (the Dead Sea Scrolls), I Samuel 1:22, instead of reading, “[For when he has appeared before the Lord], he must remain there for good”, reads “he will be a nazirite for good, for all his life.” Ben Sira, a second century BCE book, writes that Samuel was a prophetic nazirite (46:3). The Septuagint, the third century BCE translation of the Bible into Greek adds to verse 11 “and he shall not drink wine or strong drink”. Josephus too states that Samuel didn’t drink wine. All of this proves that there was a strong trend in Second Temple Judaism to view Samuel as a nazirite. This view was shared by Rabbi Nehorai in our mishnah. Congratulations! We have finished Nazir. It is a tradition at this point to thank God for helping us to finish learning the tractate and to commit ourselves to going back and relearning it, so that we may not forget it and so that its lessons will stay with us for all of our lives. This last mishnah is an important close to tractate Nazir. We see here that in ancient times when women were grateful to God for having brought them a child, they dedicated their child to God by making the child a nazirite. As an aside, perhaps this is part of why we have seen such a strong connection to women in this tractate. In any case, today people can no longer become nazirites. However, becoming pregnant and having children is still, despite modern technology, very difficult. Although, as a token of gratitude to God we cannot make our children nazirites, we can make a resolution to raise them to a life of Torah and good deeds, to bring them closer to their Jewish roots, to the Jewish people and to the land of Israel. As a father, that is one of the lessons that I learn from this tractate. Congratulations on making it through another tractate. May you have the strength and time to keep on learning more Mishnah! Tomorrow we begin Sota." + ] + ] + ] + }, + "schema": { + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה נזיר", + "enTitle": "English Explanation of Mishnah Nazir", + "key": "English Explanation of Mishnah Nazir", + "nodes": [ + { + "heTitle": "הקדמה", + "enTitle": "Introduction" + }, + { + "heTitle": "", + "enTitle": "" + } + ] + } +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Nashim/English Explanation of Mishnah Nedarim/English/Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp.json b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Nashim/English Explanation of Mishnah Nedarim/English/Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..bc1b08ebb88a4ee9532b3899b99353c9cd7758d3 --- /dev/null +++ b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Nashim/English Explanation of Mishnah Nedarim/English/Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp.json @@ -0,0 +1,549 @@ +{ + "language": "en", + "title": "English Explanation of Mishnah Nedarim", + "versionSource": "http://learn.conservativeyeshiva.org/mishnah/", + "versionTitle": "Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp", + "status": "locked", + "license": "CC-BY", + "shortVersionTitle": "Dr. Joshua Kulp", + "actualLanguage": "en", + "languageFamilyName": "english", + "isBaseText": true, + "isSource": true, + "isPrimary": true, + "direction": "ltr", + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה נדרים", + "categories": [ + "Mishnah", + "Modern Commentary on Mishnah", + "English Explanation of Mishnah", + "Seder Nashim" + ], + "text": { + "Introduction": [ + "Tractate Nedarim deals with vows. It is found in Seder Nashim because the section of the Torah that deals most extensively with vows (Numbers 30:2-17) discusses a husband’s right to break his wife’s vows. ", + "Usually, the word “neder” or vow in the Bible refers to a voluntary sacrificial offering (see for instance Number 29:29). Vows were sometimes given on condition that something good happen to the giver (see Genesis 28:20-22 or Numbers 21:2). In that way they were similar to the way today a person might promise to give charity if something good happens, such as recovering from a disease. However, vows may have also been used in the Torah as a means by which a person prohibits something upon themselves. The way that this works is that a person says that something is forbidden to him/her like a voluntary sacrifice; in other words the object belongs to God and not to the person vowing. These types of vows may also be made with stipulations; for instance, if I don’t come to your house, may all bananas be like a sacrifice to me, and hence forbidden. Our mishnah discusses vows of this nature; a person says that a certain object will be to him a “korban”, a sacrifice.", + "In the ancient world vows were an important feature of a person’s religious life and people made them frequently. There were contradicting tendencies; both to make many vows, and to be fearful lest one break one’s vows. One result is that there developed a means of substituting other words for vows. For instance, instead of saying “qorban”, people would say “konam”. In this way a person could feel that he is not actually saying the vow. However, according to the mishnah, although these are only substitutes, their validity is the same as that of real phrasings of vows. ", + "The difference between a vow and an oath is that with a vow a person forbids an object to him/herself, whereas with an oath the person forbids himself to the object. A vow: “this bread is like a korban (a sacrifice) to me”. An oath: “I swear I will not eat this piece of bread”. However, it seems that people did not always keep straight the differences between vows and oaths.", + "Our tractate discusses women’s vows, who can break them (the husband or the father), when they can break them, and under what conditions. The breaking of women’s vows is mentioned by the Torah, and explicated by the Sages. ", + "According to the Torah only a woman’s vows may be broken by another, and only under certain circumstances. However, the Sages gave themselves the power to release people from their vows, at least under certain circumstances, usually if the vow was mistaken. This was probably one of the more important functions of the Sage in rabbinic times; to release people from vows which they no longer wanted to take. ", + "As a side note, that does not have to do strictly with the Mishnah, the custom of saying “Kol Nidre” on Yom Kippur is a later version of release from one’s vows. It was first recited in Geonic times (around the 10th century) and was meant to release a person from vows that they made that they may have forgotten. The popular idea that it is somehow related to persecuted Jews who were forced to convert does not have any basis, although it is a moving theory. There were Jewish leaders who attempted to abolish the Kol Nidre, including Orthodox leaders, but they were not successful. \n" + ], + "": [ + [ + [ + "Introduction\nNedarim begins by clarifying the validity of substitute words used for vows. Also mentioned in this mishnah are different types of vows, all of which are mentioned in the Torah. The second part of the mishnah deals with the validity of certain statements as oaths.", + "All the substitutes for vows have the validity of vows. Those for haramim have the validity of haramim, And those for oaths have the validity of oaths, And those for nazirite [vows] have the validity of nazirite [vows]. A substitute formula is just as effective at making a vow as is a regular vow formula. The mishnah lists several types of vows for which this is true. The first is a “neder”. The second is a “herem” (see Leviticus 27:28). The third is an oath (shevuah). The fourth are nazirite vows.", + "If one says to his fellow, “I am forbidden from you by a vow”; “I am separated from you”; “I am distanced from you”, “that I should eat from yours”, “that I should taste from yours”, he is prohibited. These are all valid vow formulas, even though he doesn’t formally say that the thing which he is forbidding upon himself would be like a sacrifice. In other words, a full formula would be “All of your food is like a sacrifice to me”. Instead he says one of the formulas in section 2, combined with one of the ones in section 2a and thus forms a vow. For instance he says, “I am forbidden from you by a vow that I should eat from yours”. Or “I am distanced from you that I should taste from yours”. In all such cases it is forbidden for the one taking a vow to subsequently eat from the other person’s food.", + "If he says: “I am banned to you”, Rabbi Akiba was inclined to rule stringently. This case is more questionable, whether the vow formula is valid. Rabbi Akiba rules that it is, but even he seems uncertain about his ruling.", + "[If one says] “As the vows of the wicked”, he has vowed in respect of being a nazirite, or a sacrifice, or an oath. [If he says] “As the vows of the fit”, he has said nothing. [But if he said] “As their freewill-offerings” he has vowed in respect of being nazirite and a sacrifice. If he says a regular vow formula and then tacks on at the end the words, “As the vows of the wicked” his vow is valid, whether it be a vow, a nazirite vow or an oath. Alternatively, there might be a nazirite walking by him and he says, “Behold I am like the vows of the wicked”, he is a nazirite. Or if he says, “Like the vows of the wicked I shall not eat from you”, he can’t eat from the person’s food. We can see here that vows are viewed negatively and those who vow frequently are considered to be wicked. However, if he says, “As the vows of the fit” his formula is not valid, since people who are “fit”, do not frequently make vows. We can certainly sense here that part of the intent of this mishnah is to relate a negative message about taking frequent vows. However, if he says, “like their free-will offerings”, then his vow is valid, because fit people do make vows to bring free-will offerings." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to discuss the various substitutes for vows. All of the cases here are words that sound like the normal word used for taking a vow, or a typical substitute.\nInterestingly, there is a debate in the Talmud over the source of these substitutes. R. Yochanan says that their source is the language of the Gentiles and Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says that the Sages invented them so that people would not actually say the real word.", + "One who says, “konam” “qonah” or “qonas”: these are the substitutes for korban. The normal substitute for “korban”, a sacrifice is “konam”. Our mishnah lists substitutes for “konam”. All are valid as vows.", + "“Herek” “herech” or “heref,” these are substitutes for herem. All of these are words that have just been slightly changed from the real word “herem” which we already saw in yesterday’s mishnah.", + "“Nazik” “naziah” “paziah” these are substitutes for nazirite vows. All of these are slight modifications of the word “nazir”, the Hebrew for nazirite.", + "“Shevuthah” “shekukah” or one who vows with the word “mota” these are substitutes for shevuah (an. The first two are slight modifications of “shevuah”, an oath. “Mota” is a modification of the Aramaic word, “momta”, which means oath. In all of these cases the substitution is effective." + ], + [ + "If one says “Not-unconsecrated food shall I not eat from you”, “Not fit”, or “Not pure”, “Clean” or “Unclean”, “Remnant” or “Piggul he is bound [by his vow].
[If one says, “May it be to me], as the lamb”, “As the Temple pens”, “As the wood [on the altar]”, “As the fire [on the altar]”, “As the altar”, “As the Temple” or “As Jerusalem”; [or] if one vowed by reference to the altar utensils, even though he did not mention “korban”, behold this one was vowed by a korban.
Rabbi Judah said: He who says “Jerusalem” has said nothing.
The normal way of making a prohibitive vow is for a person to say that a certain something is like a sacrifice, a “korban”, which is forbidden to him. Our mishnah talks about various ways in which a person can make a valid vow without actually saying the word “korban”. As we could see in the first two mishnayoth of Nedarim, people were hesitant to actually say the word “korban” and hence looked for substitutes.
Section one: In this section a person says something which is interpreted to mean “That which I eat from you should be to me like x”, and the “x” is prohibited to him and therefore he has prohibited the food upon himself. There are seven examples.
1) “Not-unconsecrated food”, meaning the food should be to the one swearing as if it were consecrated like a sacrifice.
2) “Not fit” interpreted to mean, not fit for people to eat but rather fit for sacrifice on the altar.
3) “Not pure” your food shall not be pure and permitted for me to eat, but rather set aside for sacrifice on the altar.
4) “Clean” your food shall be pure, as is a sacrifice, and hence not permitted to me.
5) “Unclean” your food shall be considered unclean to me, but clean for sacrifice on the altar.
(6+7) “Remnant” or “Piggul” your food shall be prohibited to me as remnant (sacrificial meat which has been kept too long after being sacrificed and is forbidden), or piggul (sacrificial meat prohibited because it was sacrificed with the wrong intent). Since both of these are forbidden, the vow is effective.
Section two: In this section the person swearing states that food that belongs to another should be to him like something in the Temple. Although he doesn’t say that the food is like a “korban”, these statements are sufficient to make the vow valid. The examples are 1) a sacrificial lamb; 2) pens in the Temple used to store the sacrifices; 3) the wood used to fuel the fire on the altar; 4) the fire itself; 5) the altar itself; 6) the Temple; 7) Jerusalem, which could be interpreted to refer to the sacrifices eaten in Jerusalem. A vow formula may also employ any of the utensils used at the altar. In all of these cases, even though he did not say that the food would be like a “korban”, the vow is valid and binding.
According to Rabbi Judah, saying that food should be “Jerusalem” is not sufficient because he may be referring to other things in Jerusalem besides the Temple. As we shall learn in the next mishnah, Rabbi Judah also holds that in order for the vow to be valid he has to say “Like x”, and not just “x” itself. Since he did not say “like Jerusalem”, the vow is not valid." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first three sections of this mishnah teach that instead of stating “korban” a person can name different types of sacrifices and his vow will still be effective.\nThe final section of the mishnah teaches that a person can make parts of his body forbidden to other people.", + "If one says “A korban”, “A wholly burnt-offering”, “A meal-offering”, “A sin-offering”, “A thanksgiving-offering”, “A peace-offering, should be that which I eat from you” he is bound [by his vow]. Rabbi Judah permitted [him]. In this section, instead of just stating “korban”, the person vowing names other types of sacrifices. The mishnah teaches that these are equally effective in forming vows. Rabbi Judah holds that since he didn’t say “like a …”, the vow is not valid.", + "[If he says] “The korban”, “like a korban”, “korban”, should be that which I eat from you he is bound [by his vow]. All of these ways of phrasing a vow are also valid.", + "If he says, “That which I shall not eat of yours should be a korban”, Rabbi Meir forbids [him]. In this case the person adds an additional negative to his statement. Instead of saying “that which I eat from you should be a korban”, he says “that which I shall not eat…”. Hence we might have interpreted the vow to meant that that which he doesn’t eat should be a korban, but that which he does eat should be permissible. Nevertheless Rabbi Meir rules that it is a valid vow, for the statement could also be interpreted to mean, “Your food is a korban to me, therefore I shall not eat from yours.”", + "If one says to his fellow, “Konam be my mouth which speaks with you”, “My hands which work for you” [or] “My feet which walk with you,’ he is forbidden. In these cases instead of stating that a certain object shall be prohibited, the person states that a certain part of his body shall not do something for his friend. Now usually one cannot make a prohibitive vow on an action. Prohibitive vows are only effective on things and not on intangibles. However, a person can make a prohibitive vow on a part of his body, since parts of bodies are things. For instance one can say “Konam be my mouth to you”, but not “Konam be my speech to you”; mouths have substance but speech does not." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "And these [vows] are not binding: [One who says] “What I eat of yours shall be unconsecrated”; “As the flesh of the swine”; “As an object of idolatrous worship”; “As hides pierced at the heart”; “As carrion”; “As terefoth”; “As abominations”; “As creeping things”; “As Aaron’s dough”; “As his terumah”--[in all these cases the vow is] not binding.
If one says to his wife, “Behold! You are like my mother to me”, he must be given an opening on other grounds, in order that he should not act lightly in such matters.
[If one says,] “Konam if I sleep”; “If I speak”; or “If I walk”; or if one says to his wife, “Konam if I cohabit with you,” he is liable to [the biblical prohibition] “he shall not break his word” (Numbers 30:.
[If he says,] “I swear] an oath not to sleep”, or, “talk,” or, “walk,” he is forbidden [to do so].
The first section of this mishnah deals with vows that are not binding. The second and third sections deal with vow that are semi-binding.
Section one: I shall explain each of these cases one at time.
“What I might eat of yours shall be unconsecrated”: Unconsecrated food is permitted, hence he has not stated that anything should be prohibited to him.
“As the flesh of the swine”: Vow formulas only work if the object used as a vow is something which can be vowed/dedicated to the Temple, such as an offering. While swine and the subsequent objects listed in this mishnah are forbidden, they cannot be offered to the Temple, and hence the vow is invalid.
“As an object of idolatrous worship”: This vow does not work for the same reason as above.
“As hides pierced at the heart”: These were used in idol worship.
“As carrion”; “As terefoth”; “As abominations”; “As creeping things”: These are all things which Jews may not eat. Carrion is an animal which was slaughtered improperly, “terefoth” are animals which died or would have died without being slaughtered. “Abominations and creeping things” are forbidden reptiles and other small animals, all of which are forbidden to eat. Again, the vow formula is ineffective because he didn’t vow using something which can be donated to the Temple.
“As Aaron’s dough”; “As his terumah”: These are both gifts that must be given to priests (Aaron’s sons). They are forbidden for consumption for non-priestly Jews. However, since one cannot offer them to the Temple, they cannot be used in vow formulas.
Section two: In this case, a husband attempts to forbid his wife to himself sexually, by stating that she should be to him like his mother, who is obviously prohibited to him (nothing Oedipal here). The vow does not work, since he didn’t use something that can be vowed as part of his vow formula. However, the rabbis did not want people to take these matters lightly and hence they said that he had to find an “opening” for breaking his vow. For this, he will need to see a Sage. We will learn more about how this is done towards the end of the tractate.
Section three: At the end of the previous chapter we learned that a vow does not work on something that has no substance. Therefore, when one says “Konam (a valid formula) that I should not do something” the vow is not valid, since actions do not have substance. However, our mishnah rules that the one who took such a vow should nevertheless keep his word. He still must follow the prohibition in Numbers 30:3, that a person must do all that he promised.
In contrast, oaths (shevuoth) can be made on actions, for an oath relates to the person and not to the object. Therefore, one who swears an oath not to do something is bound by Torah law to keep his word." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah compares vow formulas with oath formulas.", + "[If he says,] “A korban should be what I do not eat of yours”; “By a korban! If I eat of yours”; “What I do not eat of yours should not be a korban to me” the vow is not binding. I will explain each of these individually. “A korban should be what I do not eat of yours”: This is an ineffective vow, because he is not forbidding anything which he will eat. The only thing that is forbidden to him is that which he will not eat in any case. “By a korban! If I eat of yours”: This translation is based on an emendation to the mishnah, created by the Talmud. The mishnah itself states “A korban should be what I eat from you”. That should not be considered invalid formula. Therefore the Talmud suggests that the mishnah should read “By a korban! If I eat of yours.” He has not stated that the food should be forbidden, rather he has used the word “korban” to state that he will not eat from the other person. Such a formula is not valid in vows. “What I do not eat of yours should not be a korban to me”: We might have assumed that this double negative implies that what he doesn’t eat should not be a korban, but what he does eat should be a korban. However, this mishnah holds that we do not learn positive implications from negative statements. Saying that something will not be a korban does not mean that other things will.", + "[If he says], “An oath [that] I will not eat of yours”; “An oath that I eat of yours”; “No oath [that] I will not eat of yours” his oath is valid. All of the above formulas are valid if the word “shevuah” or oath is used instead of a vow. Again, I will explain them one at a time. [If he says], “An oath [that] I will not eat of yours”: This is a normal oath formula is certainly valid. “An oath that I will eat of yours”: It would seem that this statement should not cause him to be prohibited to eat from his fellow’s food. On the contrary it seems that he is saying that he will eat from his friend. The Talmud understands this to be referring to a case where Reuven is pressuring Shimon to eat at his house. Shimon says several times that he will not, and then finally blurts out “An oath that I will eat of yours”. The context of his saying makes it clear that Shimon’s intent was not to eat at Reuven’s home. However, in other contexts this is not an oath formula that would cause a prohibition. “No oath [that] I will not eat of yours”: We could deduce from here that although he has not made a prohibitive oath on that which he will not eat from his fellow, he has made a prohibitive oath on that which he will eat. Although above, in section one regarding vows we stated that we do not make positive deductions from negative statements, with regard to oaths we do.", + "In these instances oaths are more stringent than vows. There is [also] greater stringency in vows than in oaths. How so? If one says, “Konam be the sukkah that I make,”; “The lulav that I take”; “The tefillin that I put on”; as vows they are binding, but as oaths they are not, because one cannot swear to transgress the commandments. The mishnah now points out that since the vows made in section one were invalid whereas the oaths were valid, oaths are in some senses stricter than vows. However, in another matter vows are more strict. A person cannot take an oath not to observe a commandment, because he is already biblically obligated to observe the commandment. However, he could state that a given ritual object is forbidden to him with a “konam” vow. In such a case he is still obligated to perform the commandment. He just must perform it with another object." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to draw distinctions between vows and oaths.", + "There is a vow within a vow, but not an oath within an oath. This section teaches that there is an additional stringency in vows that does not exist for oaths. One can make two vows on the same thing but not two oaths. The mishnah will now explain how this can happen.", + "How is this so? If one declares, “Behold, I will be a nazir if I eat [this thing]”; “Behold, I will be a nazir if I eat [this thing]” and then he eats [it], he is liable for each and every one. “I swear that I will not eat [this thing]”, “I swear that I will not eat [this thing]” and then he eats [it], he is only liable for one oath. If a person said twice that he will be a nazir if he eats a certain thing, and then he eats that thing, he must be a nazir twice. Since an unspecified nazirite period is thirty days (we will learn more about this in the next tractate), this person must act as a nazir for sixty days. However, if he takes two oaths that he will not eat a certain thing, and then eats it, he is only liable for breaking one oath. If he breaks the oath intentionally he only receives one set of lashes, and if accidentally, he only brings one sacrifice." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with cases where it is unclear whether the person vowing used something which can be dedicated to the Temple in the vow formula, in which case the vow is binding, or whether he used something else, in which case the vow is not binding.", + "Unspecified vows are interpreted strictly, but if specified [they are interpreted] leniently. How so? This is an introductory rule which will guide the entire mishnah. If a person takes a vow and he himself is unclear what his intention was, whether it was to make a valid or invalid vow, we rule strictly and the vow is valid. However, if he states that his intention was to make an invalid vow, the vow is ruled invalid. The mishnah now lists several examples where it is unclear whether he made a valid vow by referring to something that may be donated to the Temple, or whether he referred to something which may not be donated to the Temple.", + "If one says, “Behold! This is to me as salted meat”; or “As wine of libation” If he vowed by that which is to Heaven, his vow is valid. If by that which is idolatrous, his vow is invalid. And if it was unspecified, his vow is valid. The first example is where a person says that a certain thing should either be to him like “salted meat” or “wine of libation”. Either could refer to something which could be put onto the altar. “Salted meat” could refer to a sacrifice and wine could refer to one of the libations offered at the Temple altar. Therefore, if his intention was to refer to something which was for “Heaven”, i.e. for the Temple, then his vow is valid. However, if his intention was that the object should be prohibited to him as is meat sacrificed for idols or wine offered to idols, his vow is invalid. As we have learned before, using a prohibited item in the vow formula does not make a vow work. If he didn’t know what his intention was, then the vow is ruled valid.", + "[If he says], “Behold! This is to me as herem” If as a herem to Heaven, his vow is valid; If as a herem to the priests, his vow is invalid. If it was unspecified, his vow is valid. A “herem” can either refer to an offering in the Temple, or it can refer to things that are given to the priests (see Numbers 18:14). If his intention was the former, the vow is valid, if the latter his vow is invalid. The reason is that once the “herem” was given to the priest, it is no longer forbidden for general consumption. Again, if he is unsure, the rule is strict.", + "“Behold! This is to me as a tithe” If he vowed, as tithes of beasts, his vow is valid. If as grain tithes, his vow is invalid. If unspecified, his vow is valid. There are several kinds of tithes. When a person vows that something should be like “tithe” to him, it could refer to animal tithes. If so, his vow is valid for animal tithes are sacrificed on the altar. However, if he refers to grain tithes, his vow is not valid, for anyone may eat grain tithes and they are not sacrificed but rather given to Levites.", + "“Behold! This is to me as terumah” If he vowed, as the terumah of the Temple-chamber, his vow is valid. If as the terumah of the threshing-floor, his vow is invalid. If unspecified, his vow is valid. The words of Rabbi Meir. There are several kinds of “terumah”. If he refers to “terumah of the Temple-chamber” his vow is invalid, for these were donations used to buy sacrifices. However, if he refers to the regular terumah given to priests, his vow is invalid, for this terumah is not offered to the Temple, but rather is for priests and forbidden to non-priests.", + "Rabbi Judah says: An unspecified reference to terumah in Judea is a valid vow, but not in Galilee, because the Galileans are unfamiliar with the terumah of the Temple-chamber. Unspecified references to haramim in Judea are not binding but in Galilee they are, because the Galileans are unfamiliar with priestly haramim. The previous section was according to Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Judah says that there are regional differences in our interpretation of vows. If he makes an unspecified vow using “terumah”, in Judea he may be referring to “terumah of the Temple-chamber”, and therefore his vow is valid. However, those of the Galilee, who live further away from the Temple, would not know as much about “terumah of the Temple-chamber” and hence we can assume that they were referring to the terumah given to priests. Similarly, unspecified vows using “herem” are interpreted leniently in Judea because they may refer to the “herem” of the priests, for many priests lived in Judea. In contrast, in the Galilee, “herem” would more typically refer to a sacrifice and therefore the vow is valid. We see here that Rabbi Judah assumes that the interpretation of the vow depends on the commonly used language of the one who vows. Since commonly used language will depend on geographical origin, it too must be taken into account." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with a person who makes a vow using language that would normally be valid for a vow, and then subsequently claims that he had an intention which would make the vow invalid. Most of these cases involve puns. In order to emphasize the puns, which are of course in Hebrew, I have transliterated many of the words.", + "If one vows by herem, and says, “I vowed only by a herem (a of the sea”; “Herem” can either refer to a type of vow, or to a fishing net. Obviously, if his intention was to the latter, then his vow is not valid.", + "[If he says] “By a korban”, and then says, “I vowed only by korbanot ( of kings”; The word “korban” usually means sacrifice, but it could mean gifts given to kings.", + "[If he says] “Behold! I myself ( am a korban”, and then says, “I vowed only by the etzem ( which I keep for the purpose of vowing”; Saying “I am a korban” is a way of obligating oneself to pay one’s worth to the Temple. The Torah lists how much each person is worth (see Leviticus 27). Therefore, saying “I am a korban” is a vow. However, one cannot vow with by using a bone, the same word as “I myself”.", + "[If he says,] “Konam be any benefit my wife has from me”, and then says, “I spoke only of my first wife, whom I have divorced” Usually when a husband refers to his wife, he refers to a wife to whom he is currently married. However, the word “wife” could refer to his previous wife.", + "Regarding none of these [vows] should they inquire [of a sage in order to break them], but if they inquire about them, they are punished and treated strictly, the words of Rabbi Meir. But the Sages say: they are given an opening on other grounds, in order that they should not act lightly with vows. The mishnah now provides the rule in all of these cases. All of these vows are not valid, for the person claims that his intention was not to make a vow. As we learned in yesterday’s mishnah, if a person vows and then explains that his intention was not to make a valid vow, his vow is not valid. Therefore, the person should not approach a sage to ask the sage to absolve him of his vow. However, if he nevertheless does approach the sage, Rabbi Meir says he should be punished and not absolved of his vow. This is because his very asking shows that he is an ignoramus, and Rabbi Meir holds that ignoramuses should not be allowed to get out of vows, so that they will not make more vows in the future. The Sages hold that the sage who is approached to dissolve the vow should find other grounds to dissolve the vow, for the Sages hold that such a vow is actually valid. Since the likelihood is that the person intended the vow to be valid, his claim that he intended something else is not accepted. If the sage wishes to dissolve the vow he can only do so on other grounds, the same way that he dissolves all vows. Furthermore, we teach him not to make frivolous vows, however he is not punished as Rabbi Meir says." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThe first four mishnayoth of this chapter deal with vows that use valid language but are nevertheless not valid because the person did not really intend for his vow to be valid. The first category is one who vowed in order to give himself or someone else more incentive to do something. This might be like today if someone says “I bet you a million dollars that I will do a certain thing”. If it doesn’t happen, no one expects the person to actually pay a million dollars. People say these things in order to give themselves more incentive.", + "Four types of vows the Sages have invalidated: Vows of incentive, vows of exaggeration, vows in error, and vows [broken] under pressure. The first section of the mishnah lists those vows which are not valid. The mishnah and the following mishnayoth will now bring examples of each.", + "Vows of incentive how so? If one was selling an article and said, “Konam that I will not reduce below a sela”; and the other replied, “Konam that I will not add above a shekel” both of them want [a price] of three denarii. In this scenario both the buyer and the seller make vows that they will not budge in their prices. One says he will not go above a shekel (two denarii) and the other says he won’t go below a sela (four denarii). Since their intention was for a price of three denarii, they may agree to that price.", + "Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob says: Also one who wishes to subject his friend to a vow to eat with him, may say: “Every vow which I may make in the future shall be void”, providing that he remembers this at the time of the vow. Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob says that one who wants to get his friend to eat at his place, and vows that if his friend does not do so all of his food will be forbidden to him, should say beforehand that all of his vows that he takes in the future shall be invalid, and then he need not keep his vow. However, when he makes the vow, he must remember that he made the original stipulation that his vows would not be valid. The above explanation of Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob’s statement is according to the words in our mishnah, where it seems as if he is stating one halakhah. However, the Talmud explains that Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob actually says two things. First of all, a vow taken to get another person to eat at one’s place, is a vow of incentive, and therefore need not be kept. Second, a person may state that all future vows will be invalid, and as long as he remembers this statement when he vows in the future, his vows will be invalid. By the way, the latter statement is one of the sources of the practice to nullify future vows at Kol Nidre on Yom Kippur." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first section of the mishnah illustrates vows of exaggeration and the second illustrates vows that were made in error.", + "Vows of exaggeration: If one says, “Konam if I did not see on this road as many as departed from Egypt”; “If I did not see a snake [as thick as the] the beam of an olive press. Vows of exaggeration need not be kept, because the person did not really intend to take a vow. His only intention was to exaggerate.", + "Vows in error: [If one says, “Konam,] if I ate or drank”, and then remembered that he had; “If I eat or drink” and then forgot [his vow] and ate or drank; “Konam be any benefit which my wife has from me, because she stole my purse or beat my child, and it was subsequently learnt that she had not beaten him nor stolen”; If one saw people eating [his] figs and said to them, “Let the figs be a korban to you,” and then discovered the people to be his father or his brothers. If others were with them: (1) Beth Shammai says: his father and brothers are permitted, but the rest are forbidden. (2) Beth Hillel says: all are permitted. This section teaches the important principle that vows made in error are invalid, and that a person has not broken his vow if he broke it in error. Furthermore, vows made based on false assumptions, such as that one’s wife stole something or beat one’s child, or the false presumption that people eating one’s figs should not be eating them, are also invalid. The final question in the mishnah is whether or not a vow can be half-valid, in other words valid with regard to some people and invalid with regard to others. In the case of the figs, both Beth Shammai and Beth Hillel agree that the brothers and father can eat, because the person who vowed intended to prohibit the figs only to strangers. However, Beth Shammai holds that the figs are prohibited to others who are there eating with them. Beth Hillel holds that since part of the vow isn’t valid, the whole vow is invalid." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah begins to discuss vows broken under pressure. There are actually two types of such vows. Our mishnah discusses the first type, whereby a person made a fully valid vow, but then due to circumstances beyond his control, was not able to keep the vow.", + "Vows [broken] under pressure: if one subjected his neighbor to a vow to eat with him, and then he or his son fell sick, or a river prevented him [from coming] such is a vow [broken] under pressure. In this case Reuven says to Shimon that Reuven’s things will be forbidden to Shimon if Shimon does not come over to eat at his house. Shimon intends to come but cannot due to his or his son’s sickness, or his inability to cross the river. The mishnah rules that when Reuven made the vow he did not intend for it to be valid if Shimon wanted to come but was prevented by circumstances beyond his control. His only intention was that his things should be prohibited to Shimon if Shimon did not come because he chose not to. Therefore, the vow is invalid." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses the second types of “forced vows”, those made under coercion. While all rabbis agree that one is allowed to make a false vow in order to protect oneself or one’s property, Beth Shammai and Beth Hillel disagree with regard to some of the details.", + "One may vow to murderers, robbers, or tax collectors that it [the produce which they demand] is terumah, even if it is not; [or] that it belongs to the royal house, even if it does not. One is allowed to make a false vow that one’s produce is terumah in order to prevent it from being taken away. What is strange here is that the mishnah assumes that while someone might be willing to murder, rob or illegitimately collect taxes, he will not take terumah. Indeed, this is truly hard to imagine; after all, what worse crime is there than murder. Albeck explains that the terumah vow refers only to tax collectors, who would not collect taxes from terumah. He refers to Josephus who says that the Romans allowed terumah to be exempt from taxes. The second false vow referred to is stating that the property belongs to the king. Indeed, it is easier to imagine a murderer or robber fearing taking property that belongs to the king.", + "Beth Shammai says: one may make any form of vow, except an oath; But Beth Hillel says: even an oath. The mishnah now begins a series of debates between Beth Shammai and Beth Hillel. Beth Shammai holds that since oaths are more consequential than vows, one may not make a false oath, even under this type of coercion. Beth Hillel says even false oaths may be made.", + "Beth Shammai says: he must not volunteer to vow; Beth Hillel says: he may do so. Beth Shammai says that one may not initiate taking the vow. If the murderer or robber did not ask the person to vow that the produce was terumah or belonged to the king, then he should not. Beth Hillel says even if not asked, he may take a vow.", + "Beth Shammai says: [he may vow] only as far as he makes him vow; Beth Hillel says: even in respect of what he does not make him vow. How so? If they said to him, say: “Konam be any benefit my wife has of me”, and he said, “Konam be any benefit my wife and children have of me,” (1) Beth Shammai says: his wife is permitted, but his children are forbidden; (2) Beth Hillel says: both are permitted. Beth Shammai says that the person should only vow exactly what was asked of him by the murderer/robber. If he, upon his own initiative, adds on to the vow, then that which he added has validity. Beth Hillel says he may add on, and just as his vow has no validity regarding that which the murderer/robber told to him to swear, so too the part he added has no validity." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with situations in which a person might attempt to take a vow to prevent either his saplings or his garment from being destroyed. In this case a person dedicates them to the Temple. Generally, when someone dedicates something to the Temple, if it can be sacrificed (such as a cow, sheep or grain) he may not redeem the item by giving money in its stead. However, if it cannot be sacrificed (a donkey, camel or bananas), then a person gives the worth of the item, and the item becomes non-sacred property.", + "[If one says,] “Behold these saplings are a korban if they are not cut down”; or, “This garment is a korban if it is not burnt”, they can be redeemed. If a person sees that something is about to happen to his saplings or to his garment, and he says that if the saplings are not cut down, or the garment is not burnt they should be a korban, they are dedicated to the Temple and they must be redeemed. We do not say that the vow was mistaken because he thought that the saplings would surely be cut down or that his garment would surely burn.", + "[If he says,] “Behold these saplings are a korban until they are cut down”; or, “This garment is a korban until it is burnt”, they cannot be redeemed. If he says that they are a korban “until they are cut down” he cannot redeem them, and if he does try to redeem them, they remain sanctified property. This is because he set a time for how long they are to remain a korban; until that time is up they cannot be taken out of that status. However, according to the Rambam, when the saplings are cut down, they are no longer a korban and he may use them as he wishes." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah and the remainder of the chapter deal with a person who vowed that he would not benefit from a certain type of person. These mishnayoth provide definitions who are those types of people.", + "He who vows [not to benefit] from seafarers, may benefit from land-dwellers; [But he who vows not to benefit] from land-dwellers, is forbidden [to benefit] even from seafarers, because seafarers are included in land-dwellers; not those who merely travel from Acco to Jaffa, but even those who sail away great distances [from land]. This mishnah teaches that the term “seafarers” does not include land-dwellers, and therefore if one vows not to benefit from seafarers he may derive benefit from land-dwellers. However, the term “land-dwellers” does include seafarers, because all seafarers occasionally come to land. This is obviously true for seafarers who make short journeys from Acco to Jaffa, but even for those who make long journeys. Therefore, if he makes a vow not to benefit from land-dwellers, he cannot derive benefit even from seafarers." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with a person who swears that he will not receive benefit from a type of people whom he calls “those who see the sun”.", + "He who vows [not to benefit] from those who see the sun, is forbidden [to benefit] even from the blind, because he meant those whom the sun sees. “Those who see the sun” does not only mean those who can see but can also mean those who live under the sun, i.e. everybody. Hence he may not benefit from anybody." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah teaches that one who vows not to benefit from “the black-haired” is forbidden to benefit from all men, but not from women and children.", + "He who vows [not to benefit] from the black-haired may not [benefit] from the bald or the gray-haired, but may [benefit] from women and children, because only men are called black-haired. The word “black-haired” is interpreted to be a reference to men, whether or not they have black hair, gray hair or no hair at all. Women are not called “black-haired” because they typically covered their hair. They were called “head-coverers”. Children were called “head revealers” because they went without a head covering. However, men were called “black-haired” because sometimes they covered their heads and sometimes they did not. Furthermore, nearly all men had black hair. Indeed, the only other hair color referred to in the mishnah is gray. No blondes or brunettes in Palestine in the Mishnaic period." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with someone who swore not to receive benefit either from those born or from those who are to be born.", + "One who vows [not to benefit] from those born may [benefit] from those to be born; from those to be born, he may not [benefit] from those born. Rabbi Meir permits [him to benefit] even from those to be born; But the Sages say: he meant all whose nature it is to be born. We will understand this mishnah better if we take note of the Hebrew. The word “those born” is “yilodim” and “those to be born” is “noladim”. The former term does not encompass the latter, and therefore, if one swears not to receive benefit from “yilodim” he may still receive benefit from those who are to be born, the “noladim”. However, the latter term does encompass the former, and therefore, one who swears not to receive benefit from “noladim” cannot benefit even from those who are already born. Rabbi Meir disagrees and holds that one who swears not to receive benefit from those who are to be born, the “noladim,” can receive benefit from those already born, the “yilodim”. To Rabbi Meir both terms are completely distinct. The Sages disagree. One who swears not to receive benefit from the “noladim” does not mean that he will not benefit from those who will be born, but rather from those whose nature it is to be born. This would encompass all of humanity." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nAccording to the Talmud, the Samaritans descend from a group of non-Jews brought to Samaria (the north of Israel) by the Assyrians, see II Kings 17. They are called by the rabbis Cutheans because many of them came from Cuta. There is a debate in the Talmud whether or not there conversion was sincere. They seem to have partially assimilated into Israel. The main difference between Samaritans and other Israelites is that their Temple was, and remains to this day, on Mt. Gerizim. They do not recognize Jerusalem as a place of importance. Besides this difference, they observed many commandments as did the other Israelites, certainly those in the Bible but even some not mentioned in the Bible. Our mishnah reflects these similarities and differences between Israelites and Samaritans. [For more information on the Samaritans see either the Encyclopedia Judaica, or check out The Jewish Encyclopedia, which can be found for free on-line at www.jewishencyclopedia.com.]", + "He who vows [not to benefit] from those who rest on the Sabbath, is forbidden [to benefit] both from Israelites and Samaritans (. Samaritans and Israelites both kept the Sabbath, and therefore one who swears not to receive benefit from “those who rest on the Sabbath” may benefit from neither. However, he may benefit from non-Jews who do not rest on the Sabbath.", + "If he vows [not to benefit] from garlic eaters, he may not benefit from Israelites and Samaritans (. According to most commentators, this refers to a custom to eat garlic on Friday evening in order to act as an aphrodisiac, for sexual relations, which are recommended on Friday night. Evidently, Samaritans observed this custom as well.", + "From those who go up to Jerusalem, he is forbidden [to benefit] from Israelites but from Samaritans ( he is permitted. As stated in the introduction, Samaritans did not worship in Jerusalem. Therefore, one who swears not to receive benefit from those who “go up to Jerusalem” may receive benefit from Samaritans." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis long mishnah actually contains several mishnayoth. The first part begins with a definition of the terms “Children of Noah” and “Children of Abraham”. The second part deals with vows not to benefit from Israelites and the third part deals with vows not to benefit from the uncircumcised or the circumcised. The mishnah ends with an ode to the importance of circumcision in Judaism.", + "[If one says,] “Konam that I do not benefit from the Children of Noah,” he may benefit from Israelites, and he is forbidden to benefit from the nations of the world. [If one says, “Konam] that I do not benefit from the seed of Abraham,” he is forbidden [to benefit] from Israelites, but permitted [to benefit] from the nations of the world. Technically speaking, all of humanity are the descendents of Noah, for only his family survived the flood. However, the term “Children of Noah” refers to non-Jews (Noahides, as in the “Noahide commandments”) and not to Jews. Similarly, the “Seed of Abraham” could refer to Ishmaelites, Edomites (descendents of Esau). However, it is taken as referring to Jews and not non-Jews. We should note that descent, both physical and spiritual from Abraham was a “hot” issue in Mishnaic times, and we often find it being debated in early Christian texts. In Christian texts we find Christian leaders telling Jews that although they are physical (carnal) descendents of Abraham, they are not his only spiritual descendents. In our mishnah we sees rabbis claiming that only Jews are Abraham’s descendents; non-Jews, although some of them may trace their roots to Abraham, are not actually his descendents. This polemic, which we may hear here between Jews and Christians, will sharpen at the end of this mishnah, which discusses the hottest topic between Jews and early Christians the importance of circumcision.", + "[If one says, “Konam] that I do not benefit from Israelites”, he may buy things from them for more [than their worth] and sell them for less. [If he says, “Konam] if Israelites benefit from me, he must buy from them for less and sell for more [than their worth], if they will listen to him. [If he says, “Konam] that I do not benefit from them, nor they from me”, he may benefit only from non-Jews. With regard to vows not to benefit from or give benefit to Israelites, the mishnah interprets these vows minimally. One who says that he will not benefit from Israelites is still allowed to buy from them, provided he pay more than the fair price, and sell to them, provided he buy at a higher price. Because he loses out, he is not considered as benefiting from them. One who says that he will not give benefit to Israelites, is still permitted to buy, but only at a price lower than the going rate, and sell, but only at a price higher than the going rate. Of course, in the latter case it will be more difficult to get someone to agree to do so with him. The only one who is totally prohibited from buying from or selling to Israelites is one who vows not to benefit from or give benefit to them. This person could only conduct business with non-Jews.", + "[If one says,] “Konam that I do not benefit from the uncircumcised”, he may benefit from uncircumcised Israelites but not from circumcised heathens”; [If one says, “Konam] that I do not benefit from the circumcised,” he is forbidden to benefit from uncircumcised Israelites but not from circumcised non-Jews, because “uncircumcised” is a term applicable only to non-Jews, as it says, “For all the nations are uncircumcised and all the house of Israel are uncircumcised in the heart” (Jeremiah 9:25). And it says, “And this uncircumcised Philistine shall be [as one of them]” (I Samuel 17:6). And it says, “Lest the daughters of the Philistines rejoice, lest the daughters of the uncircumcised exult” (II Samuel 1:20). Rabbi Eleazar ben Azariah says: The foreskin is loathsome, since it is a term of disgrace for the wicked, as it says, “For all the nations are uncircumcised”. Rabbi Ishmael says: Great is circumcision, since thirteen covenants were made upon it. Rabbi Yose says: Great is circumcision, for it overrides the Sabbath. Rabbi Joshua ben Karha says: Great is circumcision for Moses’s punishment for neglecting it was not suspended even for one hour. Rabbi Nehemiah says: Great is circumcision, since it overrides the laws of leprosy. Rabbi says: Great is circumcision, for despite all of the commandments which Abraham fulfilled he was not designated complete until he circumcised himself, as it says, “Walk before me, and be complete” (Genesis 17:1). Another explanation: “Great is circumcision, for were it not for it, the Holy One, Blessed Be He, would not have created the world, as it says, “Were it not for my covenant by day and night, I would not have appointed the ordinances of heaven and earth” (Jeremiah 33:35). The term “circumcised” refers to Jews, even to those Jews who are not circumcised, for either legitimate or illegitimate reasons. The term “uncircumcised” refers to non-Jews, even to those non-Jews who did circumcise (it is known that some non-Jews did practice circumcision, for instance Arabs and Egyptians). As a prooftext Jeremiah 9:25 is brought. According to this verse non-Jews are uncircumcised, no matter whom they are. Israelites, however, are circumcised in their foreskins, even if they are not always circumcised in their hearts. We should again note that there may exist a polemic in this mishnah with early Christianity. In Acts 7:51, Stephen says “You stiff-necked people, uncircumcised in heart”. In Romans 2:29, Paul says, “Rather, a real person is a Jew who is one inwardly, and real circumcision is a matter of the heart it is spiritual and not literal.” We can clearly see the distinction between the Jews and the Christians (who, of course, claimed at the time to be the true Jews). The Jews admit, based on Jeremiah, that they are not necessarily “uncircumcised of the heart”. A Jew still must strive to be better and to obey God’s commands. However, the validity of real circumcision (of the foreskin) is not lessened at all. Indeed, as a sign of God’s covenant, it is the primary commandment. It was certainly, the greatest distinguishing sign between Jew and non-Jew, both in the ancient world and to this day.", + "The mishnah now brings seven statements that emphasize the importance of circumcision. 1. The first of these statements connects to the verse used above from Jeremiah. This is the bridge to the rest of the mishnah. 2. In Genesis 17, the word “berith”, covenant, as in “berith milah”, the “covenant of circumcision”, is stated thirteen times. 3. Circumcision may be performed on the Sabbath, even though it involves the cutting of the flesh which is otherwise prohibited on the Sabbath. 4. In Exodus 4:24, on his way back to Egypt, despite Moses’s great merits, and despite the fact that God had just instructed him to lead the people out of Egypt, God almost kills him for not having circumcised his son. 5. Normally, one may not cut off a spot of leprosy (see Deuteronomy 24:8). However, if the spot of leprosy appears on the foreskin, it may be cut off. 6. Only after circumcision is Abraham called “complete”. 7. This verse mentions a covenant kept day and night. The midrash states that this must refer to circumcision, which exists on a person’s body both day and night. Indeed, were it not for this important commandment, God would not have created the world. There is little doubt in my mind that this long mishnah is aimed either at early Christians who denied the importance of physical circumcision, or at Hellenizing Jews, who refused to circumcise themselves, or “uncircumcised” themselves. Romans often forbade circumcision, and these statements, which may be slightly exaggerated, are meant to encourage Jews to maintain this commandment, one which would not have been easy, for both physical and social reasons, in the ancient world." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah and the subsequent mishnayoth discuss what is prohibited to a person who is under a vow not to benefit from his fellow. Note that these types of vows can be initiated by either party: Reuven may swear that Shimon may not benefit from Reuven’s property and Shimon may swear that he may not benefit from Reuven’s property.", + "The only difference between one who is under a vow not to benefit at all from his neighbor, and one who is under a vow prohibiting food benefit, is in respect of walking [on his property] and [the use of] utensils not employed in the preparation of food. There are two things which are permitted to one who is under a vow not to derive food benefit from his neighbor that are not permitted to one who may not benefit from his neighbor at all: walking on his property and the use of things not involved in the making of food. The next section of the mishnah will qualify this statement.", + "If a man is under a vow not to derive food benefit from his neighbor, he may not lend him a sifter, sieve, mill-stone or oven, but he may lend him a cloak, ring, garment, and earrings, and whatever is not employed in the preparation of food. In a place where things such as these are rented out, it is forbidden. A man who cannot derive food benefit from his neighbor may not borrow vessels which are involved in the making of food, but he may borrow things not involved in the making of food. However, if in such a place, the custom is to rent these things (a cloak etc.) then borrowing them is prohibited. For if the one who cannot receive benefit from his friend borrows these things without paying, he saves the money he would have otherwise had to spend. With that money he may now go and buy food. Indirectly, therefore, he has derived food benefit. Therefore, in such a place borrowing any item would be prohibited." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah and the remainder of the chapter teach what a person can do with/for his friend, even though he is under oath not to give any benefit to him.", + "If one is under a vow not to benefit from his neighbor, [his neighbor] may pay his shekel, pay off his debts, and return a lost article to him. Where payment is taken for this, the benefit should become sacred property. When the Temple still stood every Jew had to send a half shekel every year for the upkeep of the Temple. Even if Reuven cannot receive benefit from Shimon, Shimon may pay his half shekel. Similarly, Shimon may pay off Reuven’s debts. Both of these are permitted because Shimon is not giving money directly to Reuven. Shimon may also return a lost object to Reuven because he is only returning to Reuven what is already his. Furthermore, all Shimon is doing is fulfilling the mitzvah of returning lost objects. If people customarily offer financial rewards to someone who returns a lost object, Shimon may not turn down Reuven’s offer of a reward, because by doing so he would be giving financial benefit to Reuven. If Shimon does not want to just take the money, he may donate it to the Temple by making it sacred property. Other commentators explain that this last clause refers to a case where neither party may benefit from the other. They are still allowed to return each other’s lost property, for that is a mitzvah. However, if a reward is given it must go to charity. The one who returned the lost object cannot take the reward nor can the one who received it not give the reward, for in either case, someone would have received financial benefit." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to discuss what Shimon may do for Reuven who has sworn not to receive benefit from him. The first part of the mishnah discusses certain mitzvoth which might cost money. The second part deals with feeding those whom the person who cannot receive benefit has a responsibility to feed.", + "He may donate his terumah and his tithes with his consent. If Reuven cannot receive any benefit from Shimon, Shimon may still donate Reuven’s terumah and tithes, as long as Reuven consents. This could happen in two ways. First of all, Reuven could say that anyone who wants to donate his terumah or tithes may do so. Shimon may then take of Reuven’s produce and donate it. Alternatively, Shimon may donate of his own produce as if it was Reuven’s and thereby exempt Reuven from giving terumah or tithes. Reuven may not specifically tell Shimon to donate his terumah for then Shimon would be an agent of Reuven’s, which is forbidden.", + "He may offer up for him the bird sacrifices of zavim and zavoth and the bird sacrifices of women after childbirth, sin-offerings and guilt-offerings. When a person is purified from having been a zav or a zavah (some type of gonorrhea), s/he must bring bird sacrifices. Similarly, after having given birth, a woman must bring bird sacrifices. After sinning, a person must bring either a sin-offering or a guilt-offering, depending upon the sin. The mishnah teaches that if Shimon is a kohen, and Reuven cannot receive benefit from him, Shimon may still offer up his sacrifices, because kohanim are agents of God and are not considered the agents of those whose sacrifices they are offering.", + "He may teach him midrash, halakhoth and aggadoth, but not Scripture, yet he may teach his sons and daughters Scripture Shimon can teach Reuven midrash (explanation of Scripture), halakhah (mishnah) and aggadah (legends) because all of these are part of the oral Torah, and teachers of the oral Torah were not paid for their teaching. Therefore, Reuven is not receiving financial benefit. However, Shimon may not teach Reuven written Torah (Scripture) without receiving pay, because people customarily were paid for this. If Shimon forgoes his pay, Reuven will have received financial benefit. However, Shimon may teach Reuven’s sons and daughters Scripture, for this is a commandment placed upon the father. Shimon’s helping Reuven fulfill a commandment is not considered financial benefit, even though in reality, Reuven is saving money. Note, that this mishnah implies that a parent is obligated to teach his child Torah, more than he is obligated to learn Torah himself.", + "And he may support his wife and children, even though he is liable for their maintenance. Shimon may feed Reuven’s family, even though Reuven is obligated to do so. This is because Shimon is not giving anything to Reuven.", + "But he may not feed his beasts, whether clean or unclean. Rabbi Eliezer says: he may feed an unclean beast of his, but not a clean one. They said to him: what is the difference between an unclean and a clean beast? He replied to them, a clean beast, its life belongs to heaven, but its body is his own; but an unclean animal its body and life belongs to heaven. They said to him: The life of an unclean beast too belongs to heaven and the body is his own for if he wishes, he can sell it to a non-Jew or feed dogs with it. There is a debate whether or not Shimon may feed Reuven’s impure (unkosher) animal. All hold that he may not feed Reuven’s clean (kosher) animal, because that is giving Reuven money which he eventually might consume. However, the unkosher animal will not be eaten. Rabbi Eliezer argues that the impure animal’s flesh, when it dies, returns to God, just as its life-force does as well. Since the flesh doesn’t belong to its Jewish owner, Shimon may feed it and it is not considered direct benefit to Reuven. The other Sages argue that since Reuven may give the animal (its meat) to a non-Jew or feed it to a dog, by feeding it Shimon would be benefiting Reuven, and it is therefore prohibited." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe mishnah deals with several types of benefit that Shimon must refrain from giving Reuven who has sworn (or been sworn by Shimon) not to receive benefit from him.", + "If one is forbidden to benefit from his neighbor, and he pays him a visit [in sickness] he must stand, but not sit. Shimon may visit Reuven when he is sick, because that is a mitzvah. However, he shouldn’t sit with him for a long time, because that would be causing benefit to Reuven.", + "He may afford him a cure of life, but not a cure of money. The Talmud explains that Shimon may help cure Reuven for that is a commandment. However, he may not cure Reuven’s animal for that is a monetary benefit.", + "He may bathe together with him in a large bath, but not in a small one. If Shimon gets into a small bath with Reuven, he will raise the level of the bath water, and thereby benefit Reuven. Therefore he may not do so. However, he may get into a large bath with him where the water level will barely be raised.", + "He may sleep in a bed with him. Rabbi Judah said: in summer, but not in winter, because he thereby benefits him. He may [nevertheless] recline with him on a couch. He may sleep in bed with him, even though he warms up the bed. Rabbi Judah restricts this to the summer months, when it is warm anyway. However, even Rabbi Judah agrees that he may recline with him on the same couch, and we are not concerned lest he fall asleep.", + "[He may] eat at the same table with him but not out of the same bowl; but he may eat with him out of a bowl which returns. He may not eat with him out of the food trough put before laborers. Reuven may eat at the same table as Shimon, and we are not concerned lest Reuven eats from Shimon’s plate and thereby derives benefit. However, they may not eat out of the same communal bowl, lest Shimon intentionally leave the best part of the food for Reuven, and thereby cause him benefit. If the communal bowl was a “returning bowl” meaning one that was full of food, such that each person eating could eat his fill and still have leftovers, then they may share. In such a case, there is no concern that Shimon will leave food for Reuven because there is enough for everyone. They may not eat out of the same bowl put before laborers, because laborers are always hungry and there are never leftovers. Therefore, Shimon might eat less so that Reuven could eat more.", + "He may not work with him on the same furrow, the words of Rabbi Meir. But the Sages say: he may work at a distance from him. According to Rabbi Meir they may not work plowing the same furrow, since if Shimon works harder he will benefit Reuven by allowing him to work less. The Sages allow them to work in the same furrow, as long as they keep their distance." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nDuring the sabbatical (seventh) year, the produce that a person’s fields grow is legally ownerless and therefore anyone can enter anyone else’s fields and eat what he wishes.\nOur mishnah teaches about prohibitive vows and the sabbatical year.", + "He who is forbidden by vow to benefit from his neighbor, [if the vow was imposed] before the seventh year, may not enter his field, nor eat produce that hangs over [from the other’s property]. If Reuven takes a vow that Shimon shall not benefit from his property before the seventh year, Shimon may not enter Reuven’s field, because as we learned in mishnah one, when one is forbidden by vow to benefit from another, even walking in his field is forbidden. He may also not eat of the produce that hangs over from the field, even when in the seventh year. Although this produce is now ownerless, and Shimon is not benefiting from Reuven, since this produce was prohibited to Shimon, the seventh year does not make it permitted.", + "If [the vow was imposed] in the seventh year, he may not enter his field, but may eat of the produce that hangs over [from the other’s property]. If the vow was imposed in the seventh year, then Shimon still cannot go onto Reuven’s property. However, he may eat of the produce that hangs over the property line since Reuven did not own the produce when the vow was taken, such that he could forbidden it to Shimon.", + "If he was forbidden [merely] in respect of food, [and the vow was imposed] before the seventh year, he may enter his field, but may not eat of its fruits. If the vow was not prohibitive of all benefit, but just of food, then Shimon may enter Reuven’s property. However, if the vow was taken before the sabbatical year, then Shimon may still not eat the food.", + "But [if it was imposed] in the seventh year, he may enter [his field] and eat [of its fruits]. If the vow which only prohibited food was taken on the sabbatical year, Shimon may enter Reuven’s property and eat, for the produce was not Reuven’s to prohibit." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first section continues to discuss prohibitions applicable to a person who cannot derive benefit from another because of a vow. The second section is a digression from the topic of our chapter.", + "He who is forbidden by vow to benefit from his neighbor may not lend [objects] to him or borrow from him, lend [money] to him or receive from him a loan, sell to him or purchase from him. If Reuven cannot receive benefit from Shimon, he certainly may not borrow from him. Our mishnah teaches that he is prohibited even from lending to him, lest by doing so he also borrows. This fear of reciprocity is the reasoning that lies behind the following mutual prohibition as well. Obviously, Reuven cannot borrow money, but the mishnah teaches he may not even lend money to Shimon, lest he borrow as well. Reuven cannot sell or buy lest he benefit from either transaction.", + "One says to another, “Lend me your cow.” [The other] says, “It is not available.” [The first one] says, “Konam, if I ever plow my field with it’. If he generally plowed himself, he is forbidden, but others are permitted. But if he did not generally plow himself, he and others are forbidden. This section is not directly related to the larger topic of this chapter. It is brought here because it also has to do with lending and vowing. Reuven asks Shimon to borrow his cow to plow with it. Shimon responds that his cow is not available. Reuven, being somewhat impatient, takes a vow that he will never use Shimon’s cow to plow his field. The mishnah rules that if Reuven normally plows on his own, Shimon can lend him the cow and others can plow Reuven’s field with it. In other words, we interpret Reuven’s vow literally; Reuven cannot plow with it, but others can. However, if Reuven does not normally plow, then obviously when he said “Konam, if I ever plow my field with it”, then he meant “Konam, if my field is ever plowed with it.” Therefore, even others may not plow his field with Shimon’s cow." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with a situation in which Shimon is forbidden by a vow from receiving benefit from Reuven, yet is in need of financial help and Reuven wants to help him. The mishnah provides legal fictions by which Shimon may derive benefit from Reuven without actually transgressing his vow.", + "If one is forbidden by vow to benefit from his neighbor, and he has nothing to eat, he [the neighbor] can go to the shopkeeper and say, “So-and-so is forbidden by vow to benefit from me, and I do not know what to do.” The shopkeeper may then provide for him, and come and receive payment from him [the neighbor]. Shimon, who may not benefit at all from Reuven, has nothing to eat, and Reuven wishes to help him. Reuven cannot, of course, give directly to Shimon, but he may go to a shopkeeper and tell him that Shimon has nothing to eat, and that Reuven would like to do something. Reuven should not directly tell the shopkeeper to give food to Shimon, but rather should hint at it. The shopkeeper may then provide Shimon with food and receive payment from Reuven, without Shimon breaking his vow. The crucial factor here is that Reuven did not actually tell the shopkeeper to feed Shimon.", + "If he had to build his house, or his fence to set up, or his field to harvest, he [the neighbor] may go to laborers, and say, “So-and-so is forbidden by vow to benefit from me, and I do not know what to do.’ They may then work for him and come and receive wages from him [the neighbor]. In this case, Shimon had to (re)build his house, set up a fence, or harvest his field, but did not have any money to pay workers. Again, Reuven wants to help him (Reuven is quite a generous guy), but cannot do so directly because of the vow. As he did with the shopkeeper in the previous section, he may hint to laborers that Shimon needs work done for him, and that he would like to help Shimon, but doesn’t know what to do. The workers may then go to Shimon and afterwards collect their wages from Reuven. The mishnah needs to teach the second clause, even though the ruling should have been obvious after the first clause, in order to emphasize that this type of “legal fiction” is permitted even in cases not involving food. Since the case in section two is less likely to be a matter of life and death, we might have thought that in this case, the legal fiction would not be permitted. The mishnah therefore emphasizes that it is." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with a situation where Shimon who may not benefit from Reuven, is walking on the road with Reuven and Shimon runs out of food to eat. The question is, how can Reuven give food to Shimon without breaking the vow?", + "If they are walking together on the road, and he has nothing to eat, he can make a gift to a third person, and he is permitted [to eat] it. In this scenario, there is a third person walking on the road with Reuven and Shimon. Reuven may give the food to the third person, with the assumption that Shimon will take it from him. As long as Reuven does not give the food directly to Shimon, the vow has not been transgressed.", + "If there is no one else with them, he may put it on a stone or a wall and say, “This is free to whomever desires it”, and the other takes and eats it. Rabbi Yose prohibits this. According to the first opinion, if there is no third person walking with them, Reuven may put the food down and declare it legally ownerless and then Shimon may take it. Although it is obvious that Shimon is going to take the food, and no one has taken possession of it since Reuven had possession, this is still permitted. Rabbi Yose forbids this, and considers it to be no different than Reuven giving directly to Shimon." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nIn the time of the Mishnah, people’s homes opened into jointly possessed courtyards. The custom was to use the courtyard for various purposes, including cooking, grinding wheat and raising chickens. However, each resident could prevent the others from using the courtyard for such purposes.\nOur mishnah discusses a situation in which either both or one of the owners of the courtyard has taken a vow not to benefit from the other. The question is, can they still use the courtyard?", + "If joint owners [of a courtyard] made a vow not to benefit from one another, they may not enter the courtyard. Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob says: This one enters his own property and this one enters his own property. If both owners of the courtyard vowed not to benefit from the other, according to the first opinion neither may enter the courtyard at all. As we learned above (4:1), one who is not allowed by vow to benefit from another, may not walk on his property. Since the property is jointly owned, each one would be entering the other’s property. Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob holds that since in general both people can enter the courtyard, neither is really entering someone else’s property. At each point where he stands he could claim that this part is his. Therefore, both can enter the courtyard.", + "And both are forbidden to set up a mill-stone or an oven or raise chickens. Neither may use the courtyard for any of its normal uses. Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob would agree with this, since putting any of these things in the courtyard requires the neighbor’s permission, and in this case, permission cannot be granted.", + "If [only] one was forbidden by vow to benefit from the other, he may not enter the court. Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob says: He can say to the other, “I am entering into my own, and I am not entering into yours.’ If only one owner is prohibited by vow from benefiting from the other, he may not enter the courtyard. Again, Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob holds that this is permitted.", + "They force the one who vowed to sell his share [of the courtyard]. In such a case, the one who vowed must sell his share of the courtyard, lest he come to use the courtyard, which even Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob prohibits. However, this is only true if he himself swore not to benefit from his neighbor. If his neighbor swore that he should not benefit from him, he is not forced to sell his share of the courtyard." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is a continuation of yesterday’s mishnah. It again deals with the question of joint ownership of courtyards.", + "If a man from the street was forbidden by vow to benefit from one of them, he may not enter the courtyard. Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob says: He can say to him, “I am entering into your friend’s and not into yours.” Reuven and Shimon share a courtyard. Levi is prohibited by vow from benefiting from Reuven. According to the first opinion, Levi may not enter the courtyard, because by doing so, he would be benefiting from Reuven’s property. Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob says the same thing which he said in yesterday’s mishnah. Levi can enter the courtyard and tell Reuven that he is not benefiting from his property but rather from Shimon’s." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn the previous mishnayoth we learned rulings regarding entering a courtyard for someone who by vow is prohibited from receiving benefit from his neighbor. In this mishnah we learn the rules regarding other types of property: a bath-house, an olive press, a house and a field.", + "If one is forbidden by vow to benefit from his neighbor, and he owns a bath-house or an olive press which is leased to someone in the town, and he has an interest in them, he is forbidden [to make use of them]; If [he does] not [have an interest in them], he is permitted. Shimon is prohibited by vow from receiving benefit from Reuven, who owns a bath-house or an olive press. If Reuven rents the bath-house or olive press to a third party, but still retains an interest in them, for instance he gets a percentage of the profits or he did not rent out the whole thing, then Shimon may not enter them, for they are still partially Reuven’s property. However, if he retains no interest, and receives only a fixed sum as rent, then Shimon may enter. In the latter case when Shimon enters, he is entering a third person’s property, and it is therefore permitted.", + "If a man says to his neighbor, “Konam, if I enter your house”, or “[Konam] if I purchase your field”, and then [the owner] dies or sells it to another, he is permitted [to enter or buy it]; [But if he says] “Konam, if I enter this house”, or “[Konam] if I purchase this field”, and [the owner] dies or sells it to another, he is forbidden. If Shimon says to Reuven, “Konam if I enter your house” or “Konam if I purchase your field”, when Reuven dies or sells the property, Shimon may enter his house or buy his field, because it is no longer Reuven’s house or field. However, if he says “Konam, if I enter this house”, or “Konam, if I purchase this field”, he may not enter the house or buy the field even when they no longer belong to Reuven. In this case the house and the field itself are prohibited to him, no matter who owns them." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe point of this mishnah is to teach the status of people who may not benefit from one another vis a vis public property. There are two types of public property mentioned in our mishnah and explained in the following mishnah. The first is property which belongs to the people of a given city and the second is property which belongs to all of Israel. Included in the latter category are wells dug by pilgrims from Babylonia coming up to Jerusalem. Hence, the last category is called “things which belong to those who came up from Babylonia”.", + "[If a man says to his neighbor] “Behold, I am herem to you” the opposite party is forbidden [to derive benefit from the one who swore]. “Behold, you are herem to me” the one who swore is forbidden. “Behold, I am [herem] to you, and you are [herem] to me”, both are forbidden. The first section of the mishanh basically teaches an additional way in which people may prohibit others from benefiting from themselves, or prohibit themselves from benefiting from others. Each may declare himself “herem” forbidden property, to the other, or the other “herem” to himself. In such a way Reuven may prohibit Shimon from benefiting from him, and he may prohibit himself from benefiting from Shimon, or he may even do both in the same statement.", + "Both are permitted [to enjoy the use of] those things which belong to those who came up from Babylonia [to Jerusalem], but are forbidden [the use of] things that belong to that town. Although they may not benefit from each other, they may each still use “things which belong to those who came up from Babylonia [to Jerusalem]”. Each individual Jew is not considered an owner of these things, or even a partner in their ownership. Rather they belong collectively to the children of Israel. However, town property is owned in partnership by all of the members of the town. Therefore, it is treated like the common courtyard mentioned in mishnayoth one and two. If Reuven and Shimon cannot benefit from one another, then they may not use the commonly owned town property." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah explains the categories mentioned at the end of the previous mishnah. It also discusses how people can avoid some of the difficult consequences of being forbidden to derive benefit from one another.", + "What are the things that belong to those that came up from Babylonia [to Jerusalem]? For example the Temple Mount and the Temple courtyards and the well in the middle of the road. The things that belong to “those who came up from Babylonia” are mostly holy property, for example the Temple and the courtyards. Also included in this category are the wells dug for the pilgrims so that they would have water on their way over. Those who may not receive benefit from one another may still benefit from this type of property since individuals do not own shares in them, rather they are owned collectively.", + "What are the things that belong to that town? For example the public square, the bath-house, the synagogue, the ark, and the [sacred] scrolls. The city property includes most structures built specifically for a certain city, including the town square, synagogue, ark for keeping the scrolls and the scrolls themselves. Note that although these things are religious items, they still are jointly owned by the people of the city and not by all of Israel. Therefore, if people cannot benefit from one another, they may not benefit from this property as well.", + "And he should assign his portion to the Patriarch. Rabbi Judah says: it is the same whether he assigns it to the Patriarch or to a private individual. But what is the difference between one who assigns it to the Patriarch and one who assigns it to a private individual? If he assigns it to the Patriarch, he need not [formally] confer title. But the Sages say: both this and this require formal conferring of title, they mentioned the Patriarch in particular as this is usual. Rabbi Judah said: The Galileans need not assign [their portion], because their ancestors have already done so for them. This next section gives advice on how to deal with a situation in which Reuven cannot benefit from all municipal property because he cannot benefit from Shimon’s property and likewise Shimon may not benefit from municipal property because of Reuven’s partial ownership. After all, this could make life quite difficult. The solution is that both write out a document assigning their shares to the Patriarch, so that he owns their share of the municipal property. In this way, they will not be benefiting from each other’s property but from the Patriarch’s. Rabbi Judah says that they need not assign the property to the Patriarch but rather may assign it to any individual. The only difference between the two is that the transaction with the Patriarch does not require any formal transaction, whereas a transaction with an ordinary person does. The other Sages hold that no matter whom one assigns the property, a formal transaction is required. The only reason that the earlier halakhah mentioned assigning the property to the Patriarch was that this was the normal way of doing things. In other words, it is a suggestion and not mandatory. In contrast, Rabbi Judah would say that the halakhah mentions the Patriarch because it is easier to assign him property than to an ordinary individual. Nevertheless, he too would hold that this is not mandatory. Finally, Rabbi Judah says that in the Galilee the Patriarch is already the formal owner of all municipal property, and hence the entire problem will not arise." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses a subject already dealt with in 4:8, how a person who cannot benefit from another person may nevertheless derive benefit from him by there being a third party intermediary. Our mishnah teaches that when Reuven gives the property to Levi so that Shimon who cannot receive benefit from Reuven, may use the property, the gift needs to be complete. In reality, Levi need not do with the property as Reuven requested. A poignant story shall illustrate this.", + "If one is forbidden by vow to benefit from his neighbor and has nothing to eat, he may give it [the food] to a third party, and he is permitted to use it. This halakhah was basically taught above in mishnah 4:8. It is brought here as an introduction to the story.", + "It happened to one in Beth Horon that his father was forbidden to benefit from him. Now he [the son] was giving his son in marriage and he said to his neighbor, “The courtyard and the banquet are give to you as a gift, but they are yours only that my father may come and feast with us at the banquet.” He said to him, “If they are mine, let them be dedicated to heaven!” [The son] responded, “But I did not give you my property to dedicate it to heaven.” [The other] responded, “You gave me yours so that you and your father might eat and drink together and become reconciled to one another, while the sin [of a broken vow] should devolve upon his (i.e. head.” When the matter came before the Sages, they ruled: every gift which is not [so given] that if he [the recipient] dedicates it, it is dedicated, is no gift [at all]. The father could not enter his son’s courtyard or eat of his food, because he was forbidden by oath to benefit from his son. It is unclear how this situation arose, whether the father or the son initiated the vow. In any case, there was clearly strife in their past. Now that his own son is marrying, the son wants his father to be able to attend the wedding and join in the feast. To solve the problem he gives the courtyard and the food to a third party. However, the third party declares that it is all dedicated to the Temple, which would make it impossible to use for a feast. The Sages rule that since the son does not want the dedication to be valid, he did not really give it to the third party. Therefore it is still his, and his father may not come to the wedding. This is truly a sad situation, and it is clearly meant to demonstrate what disastrous results may arise from rashly-made vows taken against loved ones. Indeed, it may still ring as a warning in our ears, not to let our disagreements with family members cross the line of no return. It is a message that unfortunately too many families need." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nAs I previously explained, when we interpret what the one who swore intended by his vow, we interpret his words according to the normal way in which people talk. Our mishnah and those that follow explain how certain vows are to be interpreted based on this principle.", + "He who vows [not to eat] what is “cooked [mebushal] is permitted what is roasted or seethed. In Mishnaic Hebrew there are three types of cooking: boiling, roasting and seething. The latter refers to cooking something in water until it is really well-done (the way they used to serve vegetables in school lunches). Since people distinguish between these types of cooking, one who swears not to eat one type, is not prohibited from the other.", + "If he says, “Konam if I taste any cooked dish [tabshil]” he is forbidden [to eat] food loosely cooked in a pot, but is permitted [to eat] food solidly-cooked. He may also eat a lightly boiled egg and gourds put in ashes. If he says that he is forbidden to eat a “cooked dish”, “tabshil” in Hebrew, he may not eat food cooked loosely, such as food with a sauce. However, he may eat food cooked in a pot that comes out solid, such as cereals. Furthermore, the Talmud explains that “tabshil” refers to food eaten with bread, such as hummous or other spreads. Food not eaten with bread, such as hot cereal, is not called “tabshil”. He may eat a lightly-boiled egg and bitter gourds mixed with ashes which sweeten them since these are also not called “tabshil”. (This doesn’t really sound like it tastes so good, but then again, taste is culturally dependent.)" + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with a person who vows not to eat food which goes into a pot. The mishnah relates to two such types of food; 1) food that is totally boiled in the pot; 2) food that is lightly cooked in a pot and is finished cooking somewhere else, such as in a frying pan or in an oven.", + "He who vows abstinence from food prepared in a pot, is forbidden only from food boiled in a pot; If a person takes a vow forbidding himself from eating anything “prepared in a pot” he is only forbidden from eating things totally prepared in the pot, meaning that they were completely boiled in the pot. An example would be a grain dish, which in Talmudic times was boiled in water. He would still be permitted to eat things which had preliminary stages of their cooking in a pot and were later baked or fried.", + "But if he says, “Konam that I taste whatever goes down into a pot”, he is forbidden everything prepared in a pot. However, if he says “whatever goes down into a pot”, he is forbidden to eat anything that has at any time been in a pot." + ], + [ + "[He who vows abstinence] from what is pickled is forbidden only pickled vegetables; [If he says, “Konam,] if I taste anything pickled”, he is forbidden all pickled.
[He who vows abstinence] from what is seethed is forbidden only seethed meat; [If he says, “Konam,] if I taste anything seethed” he is forbidden every thing seethed.
[He who vows abstinence] from what is roasted is forbidden only roasted meat, the words of Rabbi Judah. [If he says, “Konam,] if I taste anything roasted” he is forbidden anything roasted.
[He who vows abstinence] from what is salted is forbidden only salted fish; [If he says, “Konam,] if I taste anything salted” he is forbidden anything salted.
In all of the clauses in this mishnah there is one type of food that is the typical example of food prepared in a certain way, yet there also exist other foods prepared in the same way. This is similar to the way we say “pickle” to refer to a pickled cucumber, or a “roast” to refer to roasted meat. There are other foods that are pickled but still no one says “I’ll have a pickled cucumber” because a pickle is a pickled cucumber.
The mishnah teaches whether a person who swears abstinence from a food prepared in a certain way is prohibited from all food prepared that way, or just the food that is usually referred to as being prepared in that way.
Section one: “Pickled” normally refers to pickled vegetables. Hence one who vows not to eat “what is pickled” is forbidden only to eat pickled vegetables. However, if he says “Konam if I taste anything pickled”, since he his statement applies that he wishes to forbid himself to anything pickled he may not eat anything “pickled”.
This same paradigm applies to all of the sections of the mishnah. “Seethed” (overly boiled) normally refers to seethed meat. “Roasted” normally refers to roasted meat. “Salted” normally refers to salted fish. All of these cases are exactly like the case of “pickled” as explained above." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses vows of abstinence from types of fish.", + "‘[Konam,] if I taste fish or fishes,” he is forbidden [to eat] them, whether large or small, salted or unsalted, raw or cooked. But he may eat chopped terith and brine. If one forbids himself to eat either “fish” or “fishes” he is forbidden to eat all kinds of fish. Since he used both plural and singular, he clearly intended to forbid himself from all fish. However he may eat chopped terith, because that is not called fish. Although I don’t know exactly what this was, I assume that it was so chopped up that people didn’t really think of it as fish. He may also eat the brine, the liquid that comes out of fish (sounds gross to me, but certain members of my family do seem to enjoy this).", + "He who vows [abstinence] from zahanah is forbidden chopped terith, but may eat brine and pickled fish brine. Zahanah is a foul-smelling mixture of different chopped fish, and hence one who vows not to eat zahanah, may also not eat chopped terith. However, he may still eat different types of brine.", + "He who vows [abstinence] from chopped terith may not eat of brine and pickled fish brine. Chopped terith includes in it brine and pickled fish brine. Therefore one who forbids himself from eating chopped terith may not eat any type of brine either." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses one who vows abstinence from different milk products.", + "He who vows [abstinence] from milk is permitted to eat curds. But Rabbi Yose forbids it. A person who vowed abstinence from milk may still eat curds, the water that remains after milk has been curdled into cheese. This is not called milk and hence is not forbidden. Rabbi Yose disagrees.", + "[He who vows abstinence] “from curds,” is permitted milk. Again, curds are not considered to be milk and hence one who forbids himself from eating curds may still drink milk.", + "Abba Shaul says: he who vows abstinence from cheese, is prohibited to eat [cheese], whether salted or unsalted. A vow of abstinence from cheese forbids one from eating any kind of cheese." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first part of our mishnah discusses what is prohibited when one vows to abstain from meat. The second part of the mishnah discusses the problem of a forbidden food (in this case forbidden through a vow) becoming mixed up with other permitted foods.", + "He who vows [abstinence] from meat may eat broth and meat sediment. But Rabbi Judah prohibits. One who vows not to eat meat, may still eat broth and the pieces of meat that stick to the pot (meat sediment) for those are not considered to be what the person intended when he vowed to abstain from “meat”. Rabbi Judah says that even the broth and meat sediment are prohibited.", + "Rabbi Judah said: it once happened that Rabbi Tarfon prohibited me from eating [even the] eggs boiled [with the meat]. They replied: That is so. When is this true? When he says “This meat is prohibited to me.” For if one vows [to abstain] from something, and it is mixed up with another thing, if there is a sufficient [amount of the prohibited food] to impart its taste [to the other] it is forbidden. To support his opinion, Rabbi Judah tells a story of how Rabbi Tarfon prohibited him from having even the eggs boiled with the meat. The reason is that the eggs had absorbed some of the taste of the meat. If even the eggs are prohibited, obviously the broth and the meat sediment should be prohibited as well. The Sages respond that the case where Rabbi Tarfon prohibited the eggs proves their point, for in that case the person said “This meat is prohibited to me” and not “Konam, the meat that I eat.” In the former case, he may not eat anything that has the taste of the prohibited meat, including the eggs cooked with it. However, in the latter case, his intention was to abstain only from things called “meat” and not from broth or meat sediments." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to illustrate the principle learned in yesterday’s mishnah. If one vows abstinence from a type of food, he may not eat anything which is called by that name. However, he may eat derivatives of the food as long as they are called by a different name. But, if one vows abstinence from a specific piece of food, i.e. “this piece of meat” or “this wine” he is forbidden to eat not only that piece of food but anything that has derived taste from it.\nThe mishnah discusses wine, grapes, olives and olive oil.", + "He who vows [abstinence] from wine, may eat food which contains the taste of wine. If he says, “Konam if I taste this wine”, and it falls into food, if it is sufficient to impart its taste [to the food] it is forbidden. If he vows to abstain from wine, he may still eat food that has wine in it, because it is not called “wine”. However, if he vows to abstain from “this wine” he may not eat anything which has received some taste from that specific wine.", + "He who vows [abstinence] from grapes is permitted wine; from olives, is permitted oil. If he says, “Konam if I taste these olives and grapes”, he is forbidden to eat them and [the liquids] that come out of them. Although grapes are generally made into wine and olives into olive oil, one who vows not to eat grapes or olives may still drink wine and use olive oil. However, if he forbids specific grapes or olives, he may not eat anything to which they impart their taste. Obviously, this would include wine made from the grapes or oil made from the olives." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nEmploying the example of dates and date honey, and winter grapes and winter grape vinegar, the mishnah discusses food derivatives that still partially retain the name of the foods from which they derive. An example today might be apples and apple juice. This differs from wine and oil (in the mishnah “oil” always refers to olive oil), which are not called “grape wine” or “olive oil”.", + "He who vows abstinence from dates is permitted date honey; from winter grapes, is permitted winter-grape vinegar. Rabbi Judah ben Bathyra said: if it bears the name of its origin, and he vows to abstain from it, he is forbidden [to benefit] from what comes from it. But the Sages permit it. He who vows abstinence from dates is permitted date honey; from winter grapes, is permitted winter-grape vinegar. Rabbi Judah ben Bathyra said: if it bears the name of its origin, and he vows to abstain from it, he is forbidden [to benefit] from what comes from it. But the Sages permit it. According to the sages, whose opinion is expressed here and at the end of the mishnah, although “date honey” and “winter grape vinegar” are called by the same name as “dates” and “winter grapes”, they are permitted to one who vowed to abstain from dates or winter grapes. [Winter grapes are a type of grape that ripens in late fall and are only used for making vinegar.] We assume that when he prohibited dates or winter grapes to himself, his intention was the dates or winter grapes themselves, and not anything that derives from them. Rabbi Judah ben Bathyra says that since they still retain the name of dates or winter-grapes, they are forbidden. This would be true in any case of a food which retains the name of the food from which it derives." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah teaches that if a person vows to abstain from a type of food, he may still eat another type of food that bears the same name, if that other food also has an accompanying name and is not called by the name itself. This rule will be clear from the examples.", + "He who vows abstinence from wine is permitted apple-wine; from oil, is permitted sesame oil; from honey, is permitted date honey; from vinegar, is permitted winter grape vinegar; from leeks, is permitted porrets; from vegetables, he is permitted field-vegetables, because it is an accompanying name. In all of the cases in this mishnah, a person vows abstinence from a certain food, but may still eat another food that has the same name, but also has an accompanying name. For instance, when a person vows to abstain from wine, his intention is grape wine and not apple wine. The same is true for honey, which is normally from bees and therefore date honey, which is not called “honey” is permitted. Porrets are a type of leek, but are not called “leeks”. Field-vegetables are vegetables that grow on their own in the fields. They are not called “vegetables”, whereas garden-grown vegetables are called “vegetables”." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn yesterday’s mishnah we learned that one who vows to abstain from certain foods may still have other foods that have the same name, if they also have an accompanying name. Today’s mishnah teaches that one who vows to abstain from certain other foods, may nevertheless also be prohibited from having foods which are in those foods.", + "[He who vows abstinence] from cabbage is forbidden asparagus; from asparagus, is permitted cabbage; From grits, is forbidden grits pottage; Rabbi Yose permits it; from grits pottage is permitted grits. From grits pottage, is forbidden garlic; Rabbi Yose permits it; from garlic, he is permitted grits pottage. From lentils, is forbidden lentil cakes; Rabbi Yose permits them; from lentil cakes, is permitted. In these cases one food includes other food, but the inclusion is not mutual. Cabbage (at least in Hebrew) includes asparagus. Therefore, one who vows not to have cabbage must also not have asparagus. However, asparagus does not include cabbage, and therefore one who vows not to have asparagus, may still have cabbage. “Grits pottage” is a dish that includes grits, oil and garlic. According to one opinion, since people sometimes call “grits pottage”, “grits”, one who vows not to have “grits pottage” may also not have “grits”. Rabbi Yose says that the two are usually called by different names. One who vows not to have “grits pottage” may also not have the garlic put into the pottage. Rabbi Yose disagrees and holds that by his vow he did not intend to include the garlic and therefore garlic is permitted. All agree that if he vowed to abstain from the garlic he may still have the pottage. One who vows not to have lentils may not have lentil cakes, for lentils are the prime ingredient of lentil cakes. Rabbi Yose again disagrees. However, all agree that if one vows not to have lentil cakes he may still have regular lentils. We can see a trend by now. One who vows not to have the main ingredient of a certain dish, may not eat the dish or the main ingredient separate from the dish. However, one who vows not to have the dish, may eat the main ingredient separate from the dish.", + "[If one says] “Konam, if I eat wheat [or] wheats,” he is forbidden both flour and bread. “If I eat grit [or], grits,” he is forbidden both raw and cooked. Rabbi Judah says: [If one says], “Konam, if I eat grits or wheat,” he may chew them raw. According to some commentators, the person vowing in this section used double language, and is therefore prohibited from wheat in any form. Others explain that the mishnah refers to a person who said “wheat” or “wheats” (which is proper diction in Hebrew), but not both. The same rule holds true for grit or grits. Rabbi Judah holds that one who vows not to have wheat or grits may still chew raw grains. “Wheat” refers to flour and “grits” refers to semi-processed kernels. Neither word is generally used to refer to raw, unprocessed kernels, and therefore they are still permitted to him." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah demonstrates one means by which the sages determined what a typical person’s intent might be when he prohibits to himself a specific food.", + "He who vows abstinence from vegetables is permitted gourds. Rabbi Akiba prohibits. They said to him: And does not a man say to his messenger “Bring me vegetables,” and he replies, “I could find only gourds.” He said to them: That is so! But would he say, “I could find only pulse?” For gourds are included in vegetables, while pulse is not. The argument in this mishnah is whether or not one who vows to abstain from vegetables must also abstain from gourds. In other words, are gourds a type of vegetable? The Sages argue that gourds are not included in vegetables, whereas Rabbi Akiva argues that they are. In order to prove their point, the sages point out to Rabbi Akiva that when a man sends his messenger to the market to buy vegetables, he might come back and say “I could find only gourds.” Gourds are not vegetables, and therefore he did not buy them. Rabbi Akiva responds that the messenger’s words prove his point. The messenger is asking if he should buy the gourds, because the gourds are included in vegetables. He would not say “I could find only pulse (legumes)” because pulse is different from vegetables. In summary, Rabbi Akiva finds the hypothetical response of the messenger to imply that gourds are included under the category of vegetables, whereas the rabbis find his reply to mean that they are not.", + "He is forbidden fresh Egyptian beans but permitted the dry species. Although the mishnah just stated that pulse is not included under the category of vegetables, wet Egyptian beans are." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nYesterday’s mishnah defined “vegetables”. Today’s mishnah defines two other terms: “produce” (tevuah) and “grain” (dagan). Note that the Hebrew words are not exactly equivalent to their English translations.", + "He who vows abstinence from grain is forbidden dry Egyptian beans, the words of Rabbi Meir. But the Sages say: only the five species of grain are forbidden him. According to Rabbi Meir “grain” includes dry Egyptian beans, which we learned yesterday were not included under the category of “vegetables”. The Sages disagree and say that “grain” refers only to one of the five species: wheat, barley, spelt, rye and oats.", + "Rabbi Meir says: He who vows abstinence from produce ( is forbidden only the five species; but one who vows abstinence from grain (, is forbidden all; yet he is permitted the fruits of the tree and vegetables. Whereas the Sages held that “grain” refers to the five species, Rabbi Meir holds that “produce” refers to the five species. Under the category of “grain” Rabbi Meir includes other things besides the five species, including pulse, as we learned in section one. The only thing not included in “produce” are fruits and vegetables." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nAfter having discussed at length vows of abstinence from food, the mishnah now discusses vows of abstinence from garments.", + "He who vows not to wear garments is permitted sack-cloth, curtain, and blanket wrapping. Sack-cloth, curtain and blanket-wrapping are not considered “garments”. Therefore, if one vows not to wear “garments”, he may still cover himself with these rough cloths.", + "If he says, “Konam, if wool comes upon me,” he may cover himself with wool shearings; [Konam] if flax comes upon me”, he may cover himself with stalks of flax. In this section we learn that if a person vows not to cover himself with a finished type of material, he may still wear the unfinished product. Thus, if he vows not to wear wool, he may still wear unprocessed wool shearings. If he vows not to wear flax (linen), he may still cover himself with unprocessed stalks of flax.", + "Rabbi Judah says: It all depends upon the person who vows, [thus:] if he was bearing a burden [with wool or flax] and perspires and had bad odor, and he said “Konam if wool or flax come upon me,” he may wear them, but not throw them [as a bundle] over his back. Rabbi Judah states a general rule applicable to the interpretation of vows; the situation in which the person vowed must be taken into account. Normally, when one vows that wool or flax should not come upon him, he means that he shall not wear them. However, if a person was carrying a heavy bundle of flax or wool, and sweating and emitting a foul odor because of his intense perspiration, and then said, “Konam, if wool or flax come upon me”, his intention was that he should not carry them. In such a situation, he may still wear them, but not throw them behind his back as a bundle." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses one who vows not to use a house or the upper story of a house.", + "One who vows not to benefit from a house is permitted the upper story, the words of Rabbi Meir. But the Sages say: the upper story is included in “house”. He who vows not to benefit from the upper story is permitted the use of the house. According to Rabbi Meir, when a person vows not to benefit from a “house” he may still make use of the upper story in that house. The Sages disagree and hold that the upper story is included in the house and therefore, one who vows not to use the house may also not use the upper story. However, one who vows not to use the upper story, may according to all opinions, still use the house. This is because the upper story is a specific part of the house, and hence one who vowed not to use it, certainly did not intend to prohibit upon himself the entire house." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nSection one of this mishnah deals with the definition of a bed and a couch. Section two deals with defining the borders of a city and a house, in cases where a person has vowed not to enter either.", + "One who vows abstinence from a bed is permitted a couch, the words of Rabbi Meir. But the Sages say: A couch is included in “bed”. If he vows abstinence from a couch, he is permitted the use of a bed. This section is similar to the yesterday’s mishnah and the dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Sages. Rabbi Meir holds that a couch and a bed are two separate items, and one who vows abstinence from one is permitted the other. The Sages hold that a “bed” is a collective name and includes couches. Therefore, one who vows abstinence from beds, is also prohibited from deriving benefit from couches. However, a “couch” is specific, and therefore one who vows not to derive benefit from couches may still derive benefit from beds.", + "One who vows not to benefit from a town, may enter the town’s [Shabbat] border but may not enter its outskirts. But one who vows not to benefit from a house, is forbidden [only] from the door-stop and inwards. This section deals with the border of areas which have been prohibited by a vow. One who vows not to enter a city, may still enter into the city’s Shabbat border. This is a perimeter around a city of 2000 amot, which is the distance a person can walk outside of the city on Shabbat. In Numbers 35:5, this area is referred to as “outside the city.” However, he may not enter its “outskirts”, a perimeter of 70 amot and four tefachim outside of the city. The Shabbat borders are measured from the end of the outskirts, and hence the outskirts are considered part of the city. In contrast, one who vows not to benefit from a house, may not enter from the place of the door and inwards. However, he may go onto the porch even though this area is similar to the “outskirts” of a city." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah teaches that sometimes, when a person prohibits a certain fruit to himself, he may not have that which grows from the fruit or that which is exchanged for the fruit. However, on other occasions only the actual fruit itself is prohibited.", + "[If one says] “Konam be these fruits to me”, “Konam they are for my mouth,” or “Konam they are to my mouth,” he is forbidden [to benefit] from what is exchanged for them or what grows from them. The three languages used in this section prohibit the one who vowed to receive any benefit from the fruit. This would include anything exchanged for that fruit or anything that grows from the fruit.", + "[If one says “Konam] if I eat or taste of them,” he is permitted [to benefit] from what is exchanged for them or what grows of them, if it is a thing of which the seed itself perishes, but if the seed does not perish, even that which grows out of that which [first] grew from it is forbidden. However, if he says “Konam if I eat or taste of these fruits”, he has only caused a prohibition on these fruits themselves. He has not created a blanket prohibition of receiving benefit from the fruits. Therefore, he may eat things that are exchanged for these fruits and he may eat things that grow from the seeds of the fruit. However, sometimes there is still a prohibition on deriving benefit from that which grows from the fruit. In order for what grows from the fruit to be permitted, the original seed must cease to exist. For instance, if one were to say “Konam if I eat this apple,” he may use the seed to grow a tree and eat the apples from the tree. However, if the seed doesn’t cease to exist, such as an onion (which they considered to be like a seed) he may not eat what grows from it, because the originally prohibited object still exists." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to teach when things which were exchanged for or grown from things prohibited by vow remain prohibited. The mishnah began to discuss this topic yesterday, and mishnah seven is largely the same as mishnah six. The difference is that today’s mishnah deals with the handiwork of a wife, which we learned in Ketuboth, belong to her husband. The husband can say that anything that she makes is “Konam”, i.e. prohibited to him.", + "If one says to his wife, “Konam be the work of your hands to me,” or ”Konam be they for my mouth, or “Konam be they to my mouth”, he is forbidden that which is exchanged for them or grown from them. Since in this case he has prohibited upon himself anything that is a result of what his wife does, he may not benefit even from what is exchanged for his wife’s handiwork, or what grows from it. “What grows from it” would refer to a case where she planted a tree. He may not benefit from the tree itself, nor from any trees that come from seeds produced by this tree.", + "[If he says “Konam] if I eat or taste [of what they produce],” he is permitted [to benefit] from what is exchanged for them or what grows of them, if it is a thing of which the seed itself perishes, but if the seed does not perish, even that which grows out of that which [first] grew from it is forbidden. In this case, he has prohibited upon himself only the food that his wife makes for him (I’m sure she will be quite insulted!). Therefore he may sell things that his wife makes for him and then use them to buy other things or he may use things grown from things his wife has made. Again, this is only true if there is nothing actually left over from the original; if the seed of the originally prohibited object still remains, the prohibition remains, as we explained yesterday." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to discuss a husband who forbids that which his wife produces. In the case in our mishnah he sets a time limit for the prohibition.", + "[If he says to his wife, “Konam that] what you will produce I will not eat from it until Pesach” or “That what you will produce, I will not wear until Pesach”, he may eat or wear after Pesach that which she produces before Pesach. In this section he vows not to eat of what she produces or wear things that she makes until Pesach. However, once Pesach passes he may eat anything she produced and wear anything she made, even before Pesach. The prohibition was on a time period and not on things made within that time period.", + "[If he says to his wife “Konam that] what you produce until Pesach I will not eat”, or “That what you produce until Pesach I will not wear”, what she produces before Pesach he may not eat after Pesach. In this case the prohibition was on anything made between the time of the vow and Pesach. In other words, the prohibition was not on the time period but on the objects themselves. Therefore, these things remain prohibited even after Pesach." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn this mishnah a husband make’s a vow that if his wife goes to her father’s house before a certain time, she shall not be able to benefit from him for a defined period of time.", + "[If he says, “Konam] be any benefit you have from me until Pesach, if you go to your father’s house until the festival [of Sukkot],” if she goes before Pesach she may not benefit from him until Pesach; if she goes after Pesach she is subject to, “he shall not break his word” (Numbers 30:3). The husband says to his wife after Sukkot that if she goes to her father’s house before the following Sukkot, she shall be forbidden to have any benefit from his (the husband's) things until Pesach. If she goes before Pesach to visit her father, she may not benefit from her husband until after Pesach. After Pesach the prohibitive vow has passed and she may derive benefit from his things. However, there is a problem if she goes to his house after Pesach for the time of prohibition created by the vow has already passed. Therefore the mishnah teaches that if she did benefit from him before Pesach, she should not go to her father’s house after Pesach. If she does go, she shall have broken the vow.", + "[If he says, “Konam] be any benefit you have from me until the festival [of Sukkot] if you go to your father’s house before Pesach”, if she goes before Pesach, she may not benefit from him until the festival [of Sukkot], but she is permitted to go after Pesach. If he vows that if she goes to her father’s house before Pesach, she shall not have any benefit from him until Sukkot, if she goes before Pesach she may not benefit from him until Sukkot. However, after Pesach it is permitted for her to go to her father’s house, for he vowed only that she shouldn’t go until Pesach." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with a person who sets a limit for his vow of a day, a week, a month, a year or a week of years (seven years, a sabbatical cycle). The mishnah teaches how long the vow is to last. As we shall see, this depends on how he expresses his vow, and when the set time is determined to expire.", + "[If one vows,] “Konam, if I taste wine today,” he is forbidden only until it gets dark. “Today” includes only the day time, and therefore by night the one who vowed not to drink wine may drink.", + "“This Sabbath,” he is forbidden the whole week and the Sabbath belongs to the past [week]; “Sabbath” in Mishnaic Hebrew can mean “week” and not just the Sabbath day itself. Therefore, one who vows not to drink wine on the Sabbath is prohibited from drinking all week. The Sabbath day which follows the week is counted with the previous week.", + "“This month,” he is forbidden the whole of that month, and the beginning of the [following] month belongs to the next month. The first of the new month counts as part of the subsequent month. Therefore, one who vows not to drink wine all month, may do so on the first of the next month.", + "“This year,” he is forbidden the whole year, and the beginning of the [following] year belongs to the next year. Similarly, the first day of the following year is counted with the following year.", + "“This week of years,” he is forbidden the whole of that week of years, and the [following] sabbatical year belongs to the past. In this section he prohibits himself from drinking wine for an entire cycle of sabbatical years, which is seven in number and is therefore called a week of years. The sabbatical year, like the Sabbath itself, is considered the last of the years in the cycle and therefore it belongs to the cycle which proceeds it.", + "But if he says, “One day,” “One Sabbath,” “One month,” “One year,” [or] “One week of years,” he is forbidden from day to day. In all of the above cases the one who vowed said, “Today”, “This Sabbath”, “This month” etc., which implies that the prohibition will last until the current day, week, month, etc., expires. However, if he says “One day”, “One week” etc., the vow must last the duration of the time he mentions. Therefore, no matter when he vows it will last as long as he said it would." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah discusses various ways one might phrase a vow when one’s intent is for the vow to be completed by or perhaps right after Pesach. The question asked is, does the language which the one who vowed used mean that the prohibition should include the seven days of the holiday or not?", + "[If one vows,] “Until Pesach,” he is forbidden until it arrives; If he says “Until Pesach” his intention is that the vow should last until Pesach begins. “Until” in the everyday speech of people means “until” but not including.", + "“Until it is [Pesach],” he is forbidden until it is completed. However, “Until it is Pesach” would include the entire holiday, because the entire holiday is still Pesach. Therefore, the vow lasts until Pesach is completed.", + "“Until before Pesach,”: Rabbi Meir says: he is forbidden until it arrives; Rabbi Yose says: he is forbidden until it is completed. There is a debate between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yose over the meaning of the phrase “Until before Pesach.” According to the former, this means before it arrives, whereas according to the latter this means until before the last hour of Pesach." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah provides a general rule for determining when time bound vows end.", + "[If he vows,] “Until the grain harvest, “Until the grape harvest”, or, “Until the olive harvest,” he is forbidden only until it arrives. As we shall learn in the second half of this mishnah, since harvests do not have set times, no matter how he vows, he will only be prohibited until the beginning of the harvest.", + "This is a general rule: Whatever has a fixed time and one vows, “Until it arrives,” he is forbidden until it arrives; if he says, “Until it be”, he is forbidden until it is over. But whatever has no fixed time, whether he says, “Until it be,” or “Until it arrives,” he is forbidden only until it arrives. The first half of this rule matches what we learned in yesterday’s mishnah. Since Pesach has a set time, if he said “Until it be” he is forbidden until Pesach is over. The second half of the rule matches what we learned in the above section. Since harvests have no set time, he is permitted as soon as the harvest begins, no matter how he vowed." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first section of the mishnah deals with a person who vows not to eat something until summer, which here is defined as referring to the summer harvest of figs, begins or ends. The second section teaches about someone who sets his vow to end at the beginning of the grain harvest.", + "[If he says,] “Until the summer,” or, “Until the summer shall be,” [he is forbidden] until people begin to bring [the figs] home in baskets. “Until the summer [harvest] is past,” [he is forbidden] until the knives are folded up [and put away]. The summer is the time of the harvest of figs. Since this is not a fixed time, it matters not whether he says “Until” or “Until it shall be”. In either case, the summer harvest is considered to begin when people begin to bring in figs in baskets. Merely bringing in a few loose figs would not be sufficient to consider the harvest as having begun. The harvest is considered over when the knives used to cut the figs, have been folded up and put away for the next season.", + "[If he vows,] “Until the harvest,” [he is forbidden] until the people begin reaping the wheat harvest, but not the barley harvest. If one vows not to eat something “Until the harvest”, he is assumed to be referring to the wheat harvest, which is “the” harvest, and not the barley harvest. Had he wished to refer to the barley harvest, he would have had to specify so.", + "It all depends on the place where he vowed: if in hill-country, the hill-country [harvest]; if in the valley, the valley harvest. The wheat harvest arrives at different times in different zones. Therefore, the beginning or end of his vow will depend upon the times of harvest typical in the zone in which he vows. If he was in the hill-country, the vow follows the harvest of the hill-country; if in the valley, it follows the harvest of the valley." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first two sections of our mishnah deal with a person who makes a vow which is to be completed either when the rains begin or when they end. It is important to remember that in Israel it only rains from the fall through the spring, roughly speaking from Sukkot until Pesach. In the late spring and summer it almost never rains, and even on the rare occasion that it does, such rain does not benefit the crops.\nThe third section deals with the problem of leap (intercalated) years. The Jewish year consists of twelve lunar months. To adjust the lunar calendar to the solar calendar, about once every three years an extra month is added. This month is called “second Adar”, for it falls after first Adar, the last month of the year (if we count from Nisan, as the Torah does).\nThe final section of the mishnah returns to the topic taken up above in mishnah 2, about when vows end if they were made “until Pesach.”", + "[If one vows,] “Until the rains,” [or], “Until the rains shall be”, [he is forbidden] until the second rainfall descends. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: until the [normal] time for the [second] rainfall is reached. According to the first opinion in the mishnah, if one vows “Until the rains,” or “Until the rains shall be,” the “rains” is understood to refer to the “second rainfall.” In ancient Israel they divided the rainfall into three seasons (all within the rainy season). In the Talmud they dispute when the second rainfall is; some say the seventh of Heshvan, some the 17th, and others the 23rd. Therefore, according to this opinion, he would have to wait for this date (according to whichever date is the accepted opinion) and then for it to rain. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says that the vow is over when the time is reached (whatever that date may be), even if it has not yet rained.", + "[If one vows,] “Until the rains cease,” [he is forbidden] until all of Nisan is completed, the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Judah says: Until Pesach is over. If he vows “Until the rains cease,”, Rabbi Meir holds that he must wait until Nisan is completed, for he holds that all of Nisan is still considered the rainy season. In contrast, Rabbi Judah considers the rainy season to have ended after Pesach, about a week before the end of Nisan.", + "[If one vows,] “Konam that I taste not wine for a year”, if the year is intercalated, he is forbidden during the year and its extension. [If one says,] “Until the beginning of Adar,” [he is forbidden] until the beginning of the first Adar; “Until the end of Adar,” until the end of the first Adar. If one vows not to have wine “this year”, if the Sages decide that the year must have an extra month added, he is prohibited during that month as well. The second month of Adar is considered part of the year. However, if he connects his vow to “Adar”, his intention was the first Adar, and therefore he is only prohibited until the beginning or end of Adar. This is probably because when he made his vow he did not know whether or not there would have even been a second Adar. Hence, his intention was clearly “first Adar”.", + "Rabbi Judah says: [If one vows, “Konam that I taste no wine until Pesach shall be,” he is forbidden only until Pesach night, for he meant until the hour when people usually drink wine. Rabbi Judah holds that “Until Pesach shall be” refers to right before Pesach night actually begins. Some commentators hold that Rabbi Judah disagrees with the opinion in mishnah two, according to which “Until Pesach shall be” refers to the end of Pesach, and therefore the vow lasts until Pesach is over. Other commentators hold that Rabbi Judah does not disagree with that opinion but rather the two mishnayoth refer to vows on two different vows, wine and other things. Rabbi Judah holds that if he says “Until Pesach shall be,” with regard to other prohibitions, his intention is until Pesach is over. However, with wine, since people drink wine on Pesach night, his intention was only until Pesach begins." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nAt the end of yesterday’s mishnah we learned that “Until Pesach shall be” refers to Pesach eve, for that is when people are accustomed to drinking wine at the Seder. Our mishnah lists other times of the year when people customarily eat certain things, namely meat on Yom Kippur eve and garlic on Friday eve.", + "If he vows, “Konam that I taste no meat until the fast [i.e., Yom Kippur] shall be,” he is forbidden only until the eve of the fast, for he merely meant until people usually eat meat. On the afternoon before the fast of Yom Kippur it is customary to eat meat. Therefore, one who vowed not to eat meat until Yom Kippur, meant that he will not eat meat until the eve of Yom Kippur, when people eat meat as their last meal before the fast.", + "Rabbi Yose, his son, says: “Konam, that I not taste garlic until the Sabbath,” he is forbidden only until Sabbath eve [i.e., Friday night], for he meant, until it is customary for people to eat garlic. As we learned in Nedarim 3:10, garlic was considered an aphrodisiac and hence was eaten by Jews on the Sabbath eve, a time considered proper for sexual relations. Therefore, one who vows not to eat garlic until the Sabbath, must have intended for garlic to be prohibited until Friday night, when people customarily eat garlic." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe final mishnah in chapter seven deals with cases where a person made a vow in order to spur someone or himself into doing something. The mishnah interprets his vows according to what their intent probably was.", + "If one says to his neighbor “Konam, what I benefit from you, if you do not come and take for your sons a kor of wheat and two barrels of wine,” the latter may annul his vow without the release of a sage, by declaring, “Did you vow for any other purpose but to honor me? This [refusal] is my honor.” The person vowing in this mishnah wanted to honor his friend by giving him wheat and wine for his son. It seems that the person receiving did not want to accept his generosity, so the person giving made a vow to urge him on. The mishnah teaches that this vow may be released even without the declaration of a sage, a process which we will learn about in chapter nine. The person receiving may in essence annul the vow by saying that since the vow was only intended for his own honor, he is honored by not accepting the gift.", + "Similarly, if one says to his neighbor, “Konam, what you benefit from me, if you do not give my son a kor of wheat and two barrels of wine”: Rabbi Meir says: he is forbidden until he gives; But the Sages say: he too can annul his vow without the release of a sage, by saying to him, “I regard it as though I have received it.” In this situation the one vowing wants his sons to receive a gift of wheat and wine from his friend. To urge his friend on, he makes a vow stating that if his friend does not give his sons such a gift, everything he owns will become prohibited to his friend. According to Rabbi Meir this vow stands and the friend cannot benefit from the one who vowed until he brings the wheat and wine. The Sages, however, rule that this vow too may be annulled without a sage’s intervention. The one who vowed may, if he regrets having made the vow, say that it is as if he has already received the goods and therefore the prohibition is void.", + "If they were urging him to marry his sister’s daughter, and he said, “Konam, what she benefits from me forever”; Likewise, if he is divorcing his wife and he said, “Konam, what my wife benefits from me forever,” they are permitted to benefit from him, because he meant only marriage. In these cases a man was being urged either to marry his sister’s daughter (a common phenomenon in mishnaic times, and not considered incestuous) or was divorcing his wife. In either case, he makes a vow that the woman should not benefit from him. The intent of the vow was to make sure this woman could not either become his wife or remain his wife. The mishnah rules that since the intent of the rule was merely to prevent himself in marriage to these women, they may still derive other types of benefit from him.", + "If he was urging his neighbor to eat at his house, and he replied, “Konam be your house which I do not enter,” or, “The drop of water that I do not drink,” he may enter his house and drink cold water because he only meant eating and drinking in general. In this case someone was urging his friend to eat over at his house. In order to increase the leverage on his friend, he said that if he didn’t come over to his house, the other’s house would be Konam (forbidden) to him, or that the other’s water would be Konam to him. Seemingly, as long as his friend doesn’t come to his house, he may not even enter his friend’s house, nor drink a simple cup of water. The mishnah, however, rules that his intent was to prohibit eating a full meal at his friend’s house. Therefore he may enter the house and drink water, although he may not sit down for a proper meal." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nIf a person makes a vow and then regrets his vow and wishes to be released from its prohibition, he may approach a Sage who has the power to release the vow. The Sage asks him questions and shows how the vow may have been mistaken and thereby annuls the vow. He also may go to a court of laypersons who also have the power to release vows. Our chapter deals with under what circumstances and how a Sage releases vows. The word for releasing vows in Hebrew is “patach”, to open. I have chosen to translate this as “release”, which in Hebrew would be “matir”, as in to permit.", + "Rabbi Eliezer says: They release a vow [by reference] to the honor of his father and mother but the Sages forbid. When one comes in front of a Sage to have his vows released, the Sage may ask him, “Had you known that by making such a vow you bring shame to your father and mother, would you have made such a vow?” If he shows regret, then the vow may be released. The Sages rule that such a technique is not valid, for he may lie in order not to let it be known that he would have taken such a vow in any case.", + "Rabbi Zadok said: Instead of releasing through the honor of his father and mother, they should release [by reference] to the honor of God. If so, there would be no vows! Rabbi Zadok also disagrees with Rabbi Eliezer. Were Sages allowed to use this technique to release vows, they might as well say, “Had you known that by making such a vow God considers you to be a disgrace, would you have made such a vow?” If such a technique were valid, there would be no more vows, because everyone could have them easily released.", + "But the Sages admit to Rabbi Eliezer that in a matter concerning himself and his father and mother one may release a vow [by reference] to the honor of his father and mother. The Sages agree though, that if the vow directly involved his father or mother, the Sage may make reference to their honor in order to release the vow. This might happen, if for instance, he vowed that his father or mother should not benefit from his property." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe debate in this mishnah is over whether or not a vow can be released if the one who vowed regrets his vow because of something that happened since the vow was made. The mishnah brings two examples of these types of situations. As in yesterday’s mishnah the Sages argue with Rabbi Eliezer.", + "Rabbi Eliezer also said: They release a vow by reference to a new fact; but the Sages forbid it. How is this so? If one said, “Konam that I will not benefit from so and so,” and he [the latter] then became a scribe, or was about to give his son in marriage, and he said, “Had I known that he would become a scribe or was about to give his son in marriage, I would not have vowed;” [Or if he said,] “Konam, is this house that I will not enter,” and it became a synagogue, and he declared, “Had I known that it would become a synagogue, I would not have vowed,” Rabbi Eliezer permits [the vow to be released],but the Sages forbid it. According to Rabbi Eliezer if something new happens since the vow was taken, the recent occurrence may be grounds to release the one who vowed from his vow. The mishnah illustrates this with two examples. In the first, a person vows that a certain so-and-so should not benefit from him, but then later on so-and-so either becomes a scribe, meaning a teacher of Bible, or is about to give his son in marriage. Similarly, one vows that he will not enter a certain house, and then it becomes a synagogue. The one who vowed claims that had he known these things would happen, he would not have made his vow. Rabbi Eliezer allows this new fact to be grounds for the release of the vow, but the sages do not. The Sages reason that since the new fact did not exist when he vowed, we cannot say that the vow was made by mistake. Rather the one who vowed did not take into account all future possibilities. That is not sufficient grounds for releasing the vow." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nWe learned above in mishnah 3:2 that if someone makes a vow based on a mistaken premise, he is not obligated to keep his vow, and he does not even need a sage to release the vow. Our mishnah discusses situations in which a person makes a vow that was not originally based on a mistaken premise, but the premise upon which the vow was based changes later. Rabbi Meir says that these are not really considered “new facts” (see previous mishnah) and therefore, the vow may be released using them as grounds. The sages disagree.", + "Rabbi Meir says: Some things are similar to a new fact, and yet are not [treated] as new; but the Sages do not agree with him. How so? If one says, “Konam that I do not marry so and so, because her father is wicked,” and [then] they say to him “He is dead,” or, “He has repented,”; “Konam is this house which I will not enter, because it contains a wild dog,” or, “because there is a snake in it,” and [then] they say to him, “The dog is dead,” or, “The serpent has been killed,” behold these are like new facts, yet actually not [treated] as new facts. But the sages do not agree with him. In both cases the person vowing states why he has made his vow and the premise was correct at the time of the vow. For instance, when he vowed not to marry the woman her father was wicked and alive. However, he subsequently died and therefore the reason for the vow ceased to exist. In the other case, when he vowed not to enter the house, the wild dog or snake was still alive and only died later. According to Rabbi Meir this is more similar to a vow based on a mistaken premise than to a new fact. Although the person did not say specifically, “Konam that I do not marry so and so as long as her wicked father is alive”, this was his intent. Therefore, although he is not automatically released from his vow (as he would have been if the premise had been mistaken) a sage may use this as a basis to release the vow. The Sages disagree and say that this too is a situation of a “new fact”, and as they said in the previous mishnah, so too here, a “new fact” cannot be used as the basis for the release of a vow." + ], + [ + "Rabbi Meir also said: They release [the vow] by using what is written in the Torah, and they say to him, “Had you known that you were violating [the prohibitions]:
“You shall not avenge” (Leviticus 19:18),
“You shall not bear a grudge” (ibid.),
“You shall not hate your kinsfolk in your heart (ibid., v. 17),
“Love your neighbor as yourself” (ibid., v. 18),
“Let him live by your side” (ibid. 25:37), for he might become poor and you would not be able to provide for him, [would you have vowed]?”. And should he reply, “Had I known that this is so, I would not have vowed,” he is permitted [the vow is absolved].
In this mishnah Rabbi Meir teaches that the Sages may tell a person that by making a vow prohibiting another person from using his things he has transgressed several commandments in the Torah, and if he expresses regret, they may use that regret as grounds for releasing the vow.
The type of vow being released in this mishnah is one in which a person prohibits his fellow Jew from benefiting from all or part of his property. This very act is actually a transgression of five separate commandments, four of which are found in Leviticus 19:17-18. The fifth commandment is that a Jew may not let his fellow become poor but rather they must live “side by side”, which is interpreted here to mean, that those who have means must aid those who do not. If the one who vows admits that had he known that his vow would cause him to transgress so many commandments he would not have vowed, he may be released from his vow.
In my opinion this mishnah is emblematic of Jewish social ethics. The mitzvot regarding concern for one’s neighbor and love for one’s fellow human being, are not merely ideals, left for individuals to pursue according to their own understanding. Rather they have real manifestations in this world and govern our everyday actions. Judaism is a religion in which ideals are translated into laws, which dictate precisely how a Jew is to live. The laws of “love” dictate that a vow which prohibits one’s property to another is a sinful vow which should be released." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIf a husband makes a vow that he shall not benefit from his wife he must divorce her and pay her ketubah. Our mishnah teaches that his vow may be released by reference to her ketubah.", + "They release a vow by reference to a wife’s kethubah. And it once happened that a man vowed not to benefit from his wife and her ketubah amounted to four hundred denarii. He went before Rabbi Akiva, who ordered him to pay her the ketubah [in full]. He said to him, “Rabbi! My father left eight hundred denarii, of which my brother took four hundred and I took four hundred. Isn’t it enough that she should receive two hundred and I two hundred?” Rabbi Akiva replied: even if you have to sell the hair of your head you must pay her her ketubah. He said to him, “Had I known that it is so, I would not have vowed.” And Rabbi Akiva released his vow. In this story the man must divorce his wife because he vowed not to receive benefit from her. There is no way that he can remain married without receiving some benefit from her because he is obligated to have sexual relations with her and would at that time receive benefit. However, when he divorces her he doesn’t want to pay her large ketubah. He goes in front of Rabbi Akiva to try to receive an exemption but Rabbi Akiva tells him he must pay the ketubah in full. He then complains that if he pays her entire ketubah he will be left with no inheritance. Rabbi Akiva, using illustrative language, tells him that even if he has to sell the hair on his head (assumedly he was not bald, or Rabbi Akiva was speaking tongue in cheek) he must pay her ketubah in full. The husband’s statement “Had I known that it is so, I would not have vowed” shows his regret and is therefore accepted as grounds for releasing the vow." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe specific topic of this mishnah is releasing a vow that a person made to fast on a day on which it is forbidden to fast. However, the second part of the mishnah discusses a rule of larger consequence: the overall validity of a vow when part of the vow has been released. The following two mishnayoth will continue to deal with this subject.", + "They release vows by reference to the sabbaths and festivals. If a person made a vow to fast on a day upon which it is forbidden to fast, for instance the Sabbath or one of the festivals, a sage may say to him, “If you had known that it was forbidden to fast on the Sabbath or on the festivals would you have still made your vow?” If he expresses regret the vow is released.", + "The earlier ruling was that for these days the vow is cancelled, but for others it is binding, until Rabbi Akiva came and taught: a vow which is partially released is entirely released. Originally, the rule was that the vow was released for the sabbath or festival days but if the vow to fast was for a longer period of time, then the vow retained its validity on the other days. Thus it would be forbidden for him to fast on the sabbath, but he would be obligated to fast the day before and the day after (depending on the length of his vow). This ruling was changed by Rabbi Akiva who said that a vow that had been partly released is entirely released. Note that we learned a similar principle above in 3:2. There we learned that if a vow is partially invalid, according to Beth Hillel it is entirely invalid. The principle of Rabbi Akiva in our mishnah continues from that Hillelian position. Rabbi Akiva says that just as a vow that was partially invalid from its inception is totally invalid, so too a vow that was later partially invalidated is completely invalidated." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah illustrates the principle taught by Rabbi Akiva at the end of yesterday’s mishnah, that a vow that has been partly released is entirely released.", + "How is this so?
If one says, “Konam that which I benefit from any of you,” if one [of those subject to the vow] was [subsequently] released, they are all released. If the one who vows groups a bunch of people collectively into his prohibitive vow, and then the vow is released for one of them, the vow is completely released. The vow could be released for one of them if for instance one of the group was his father and they asked the one who vowed, “Had you known that one of the group was your father, would you have vowed?” If he expresses regret, he is allowed to receive benefit not only from his father but from anyone else in the group as well.", + "[If he said, “Konam] that which I benefit from this one or this one”: if the first was released, all are released; if the last one was released, he is released, but the rest are forbidden. if the middle person was released, those [mentioned] after him are [also] released, but those [mentioned] before him are forbidden. In this case, he states the word “Konam” and then lists each individual person. If the vow to the first one was released, then they are all released. This is because the word “Konam” was attached to him, and it is as if the one who vowed made the entire vow dependent upon him. If the last one was released, then only he is released but the others are still prohibited. If the middle person was released, any one whose name follows him are also released, but those whose name preceded his are still forbidden. The reason that the general rule does not apply in this case is that since he mentioned each name specifically, it is as if they are separate vows. However, since the word “Konam” was only mentioned once, if one of the earlier people mentioned was released, anyone mentioned afterward will also always be released.", + "[If one says,] “Korban that which I benefit from this one, and from this one Korban,” they each require a separate release. In this section, the one vowing uses the word “Korban” (=Konam) with reference to each person. These are entirely separate vows, even though he only said one time “that which I benefit”. Therefore, they each require a separate release and even if one is released the others are still prohibited, both those before and those after." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to illustrate the principle that a vow that has been partially released is fully released.", + "“Konam is the one that I taste, because wine is damaging to the stomach.” They said to him, “But mature wine is beneficial to the stomach.” He is released in respect of mature wine, and not only in respect of mature wine, but of all wine. When the person vowed not to have wine, he stated that he is doing so because he believes that wine is bad for one’s stomach. People then pointed out to him that not all wine is bad for the stomach. Mature wine (aged at least three years) is not damaging for the stomach. [By the way, I don’t know if this is considered true today, so be on guard!] He then responded, “Had I known that mature wine is beneficial for the stomach, I would not have vowed.” The regret is sufficient to allow him to drink mature wine, and since the vow has been partially released, it is completely released.", + "“Konam the onions that I taste, because they are damaging to the heart.” They said to him, “But village onions are good for the heart,” He is released in respect of village onions, and not only of village onions, but of all onions. Such a case happened before Rabbi Meir, and he permitted all onions. This section basically teaches the same principle learned in the previous section. In addition, the mishnah relates that Rabbi Meir, a student of Rabbi Akiva’s, actually ruled this way in a case that came before him. We should note that in the eyes of the mishnah precedents are of extreme importance." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah returns to the central theme of the chapter, the release of vows. In the first mishnah we learned that vows cannot be released by reference to God, but that they may be released by reference to parents. Our mishnah discusses releasing the vow by reference to his own or to his children’s honor.", + "They release one’s vows [by reference] to his own honor and the honor of his children. They say to him, “Had you known that tomorrow they will say of you, ‘It is the regular habit of so-and-so to divorce his wife’; and concerning your daughters they will say, ‘They are the daughters of a divorced woman. What fault did he find in their mother to divorce her?’ If he replies, “Had I known that it is so, I would not have vowed,” he is released from his vow. The specific instance in this mishnah is one in which a man made a vow to divorce his wife. He then comes to the sage asking to be released from the vow. The sage says to him that after he divorces his wife, people will say things about him and his children behind his back. Of him they will say that he is a man who divorces frequently. Of his children they will say that they are the children of a divorced, and hence less than respectable woman. Their father would not have divorced her had he not found something wrong with her. If he expresses regret the sage may use this regret as grounds for releasing the vow. We should note that the attitude towards divorce expressed in this mishnah is probably not shared by most people today, nor was it shared by all in the time of the mishnah. According to some rabbis (and according to some early Christians), divorce was only permissible if the woman was adulterous. There were no other grounds for divorce. Most rabbis, including Beth Hillel and later Rabbi Akiva, were more lenient and allowed divorce more easily. For the former position, the children and indeed former husband of the divorced woman, were shamed. For Beth Hillel and Rabbi Akiva this was less so. Indeed, in American society, which was and still is to a certain extent dominated by Christian values, divorce is still considered by some to be a stain on one’s moral record. It is really only in the last few decades that attitudes toward divorce have changed. In Jewish law, while people may have looked askance at the children of divorced women, they were never really at a legal disadvantage." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah begins by describing another type of mistaken vow which is void. The second part of the mishnah tells a story with a quite poignant line from Rabbi Yishmael.\nBefore learning this mishnah we should note that in ancient Palestine light skin was considered more aesthetically pleasing than dark skin. This is probably explained simply by the fact that most people in this area of the world are dark-skinned. Light skin would be the rarer commodity, and as is typical, that which is unusual is held in greater esteem (after all, why are diamonds considered precious stones? Why are dandelions weeds and not flowers?). Furthermore, light skin is a sign of wealth, for fieldworkers do not have light skin. In any case, my point is that this attitude is geographically determined and is certainly not a statement on the inherent value of one skin color over another.", + "“Konam if I marry that ugly woman,” and she turns out to be beautiful; “That black-skinned woman,” and she turns out to be light-skinned; “That short woman,” and she turns out to be tall, he is permitted to marry her, not because she was ugly, and became beautiful, or black and became light-skinned, short and grew tall, but because the vow was made in error. The one who made the vow mistakenly thought the woman whom he did not want to marry was ugly, dark-skinned or short. When it turns out that she was beautiful, light-skinned or tall, the vow is released because it was mistaken. He need not even turn to a sage for this vow to be released.", + "And thus it happened with one who vowed not to benefit from his sister’s daughter, and she was taken into Rabbi Ishmael’s house and they made her beautiful. Rabbi Ishmael said to him, “My son! Did you vow not to benefit from this one!” He said, “No,” and Rabbi Ishmael permitted her [to him]. The story in this section is slightly different from the halakhah learned in the previous section. Here the ugly woman (his niece) actually was ugly and then was helped to become beautiful by those of the house of Rabbi Ishmael. This is a “new fact” (see mishnah two above), and Rabbi Ishmael holds that a “new fact” may be used to release a vow. When the man expresses regret from his vow, Rabbi Ishmael permits the woman to him.", + "In that hour Rabbi Ishmael wept and said, “The daughters of Israel are beautiful, but poverty disfigures them.” And when Rabbi Ishmael died, the daughters of Israel raised a lament, saying, “Daughters of Israel weep for Rabbi Ishmael.” And thus it is said too of Saul, “Daughters of Israel, weep for Saul” (II Samuel 1:24). After having beautified the woman, thereby permitting her to the man who had vowed, Rabbi Ishmael laments the state of Jewish women in his day. Rabbi Ishmael lived through and after the Bar Kochba revolt, a revolt that was quelled by the Romans in 135 and that may have been even more devastating than the destruction of the Temple. Rabbi Ishmael laments that the oppressive state in which they live prevents the inner beauty of Jewish women from being seen. We might add, that this oppressive state may have also made it more difficult for men to have seen through the women’s worn exteriors into the deeper layers of beauty. For such sentiments and recognition of the difficulties under which they live, and perhaps also for his outstanding abilities as a cosmetician (!), the daughters of Israel lament him at his death, just as they King Saul was lamented at his death." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThe final two chapters of Nedarim discuss a father’s and husband’s right to annul the vows of their daughters or wives. Whereas the release of vows, the topic of the previous chapter, is not mentioned in the Torah, chapter 30 of Numbers discusses the father/son’s right to annul vows at length. Indeed most of what we know about vows comes from the context of this chapter. Thus vs. 6 states, “But if her father restrains her on the day he finds out, none of her vows or self-imposed obligations shall stand.” Vs. 13 makes a similar statement concerning the husband.\nThere are several limits that the rabbis placed on this right of fathers/husbands. First of all, as we shall learn later in the chapter, not all vows may be annulled. Second, the father may annul his daughter’s vow only until she has reached what was considered majority age (12 ½). Beyond that age she was obligated, as are all people, to keep all her vows.\nOur mishnah discusses the betrothed young woman, one between the ages of 12 and 12 ½. This girl is still living in her father’s house and yet is already betrothed to another man. She is therefore a classic example of a borderline case, which as we have seen time and time again, is typically the focus of the Mishnah.", + "In the case of a betrothed young woman, her father and her betrothed husband annul her vows. If her father annulled [her vow] but not the husband, or if the husband annulled [it] but not the father, it is not annulled; and it goes without saying if one of them upheld [it]. The simple message of the mishnah is that since she is partly in her father’s domain, for she has not yet reached majority age and she is still living in his house, and partly in her betrothed husband’s domain, both parties must annul her vows. If either party does not annul the vow, or upholds the vow, the vow is not annulled." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to discuss the ability of fathers and husbands to annul their daughters’ or wives’ vows.", + "If the father dies, his authority does not pass over to the husband. If the husband dies, his authority passes over to the father. The mishnah is still discussing the betrothed young girl. Generally, both the father and husband must jointly annul her vows. If, while she is in this status, her father dies, her husband still cannot annul her vows on his own. This is because she is only betrothed and not fully married. A husband’s right to annul his wife’s vows on his own begins only at the point of marriage. In contrast, should her betrothed husband die, her father may annul her vows. This is because she was never fully married, nor has she reached majority age.", + "In this respect, the father’s power is greater than the husband’s. But in another respect, the husband’s power is greater than that of the father, for the husband can annul [her vows] when she is of majority age but the father cannot annul her vows when she is of majority age. After pointing out a way in which the father’s authority over his wife is greater than the husband’s, the mishnah now contrasts that with an example in which the husband’s ability to annul vows is greater. As we stated in yesterday’s mishnah, the father’s authority ends when his daughter reaches majority age. In contrast, the husband’s ability to annul his wife’s vows exists even when she is of majority age." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah teaches that while a full husband cannot annul vows his wife made before their marriage, a betrothed husband who annuls her vows jointly with her father has the ability to do so.", + "If one vowed as a betrothed woman, and then was divorced on that day and betrothed [again] on the same day, even a hundred times, her father and last betrothed husband can annul her vows. This is the general rule: as long as she has not passed out into her own control for even one hour, her father and last husband can annul her vows. If a woman takes a vow while she is betrothed and then on the same day is divorced and betrothed again to another man, the last husband and her father can still annul her vows. This all must occur on the same day, because as we shall learn in mishnah 8 and as is stated clearly in Numbers 30, the woman’s vows must be annulled that very day. The mishnah is teaching that although she vowed while betrothed to another man, the last betrothed husband may annul her previous vows because her father has continuously had the right to annul her vows. As is stated in the general rule at the end of the mishnah, should she be fully married or reach majority age, even for one hour and thereby leave her father’s control, her husband will not be able to annul her earlier vows." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nAs we mentioned in yesterday’s mishnah a father and husband jointly annul the vows of a betrothed girl who has not yet reached majority age. Furthermore, at this point the husband may annul vows that she took before she was betrothed. Once she is married, no one, neither her father nor her husband may annul the vows that she took before she was married.\nOur mishnah relates what Torah scholars would do in order to avoid this problem.", + "It is the practice of scholars, before the daughter of one of them departs from him, he says to her, “All the vows which you vowed in my house are annulled.” Likewise the husband, before she enters into his domain would say to her, “All the vows which you vowed before you entered my domain are annulled,” because once she enters into his domain he cannot annul them. Evidently husbands in general and husbands who are Torah scholars (and hence understand the halakhot) in particular did not want to be surprised to find out that they had married a woman who was restricted by vows. Furthermore, a father would not want his daughter to be caught by her husband with previously made restrictive vows, for that may be grounds for divorce without payment of the ketubah (see Ketuboth 7:7). Therefore, right before the girl would leave her father’s domain to enter her husband’s domain, both the father and husband would annul vows that she had previously taken. Once she enters his domain, the husband would no longer be able to annul previously taken vows. By the way, it seems likely that if we read between the lines of this mishnah, scholars married other scholars’ daughters. Rabbis formed a social class somewhat separate from other Jews and as a result, rabbis often married each others daughters." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn Mishnah Ketuboth 5:2 we learned that a girl who was betrothed and then reached majority age has 12 months during which she prepares herself for marriage. During this time he prepares himself and the wedding as well. A widow or a divorcee receives thirty days. If the betrothed husband does not marry her within this time, she receives her maintenance (cost of food) from him. In our mishnah, the Sages debate whether the husband also has the ability to annul her vows during this period.", + "[In the case of] a girl who has reached majority age who waited twelve months, or a widow [who waited] thirty days, Rabbi Eliezer says: since her [betrothed] husband is responsible for her maintenance, he may annul [her vows]. But the Sages say: the husband cannot annul [her vows] until she enters into his domain. Rabbi Eliezer holds that since he is responsible for her maintenance, in other words has financial responsibility for his betrothed wife’s well-being, he receives the right to annul her vows. In contrast, the Sages do not give him this right until she actually enters his domain. According to the Sages he should have married her after this time period had elapsed. Therefore, while he is penalized and liable to pay for her maintenance, he does not receive the right to annul her vows as would a full husband." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses a yavam’s rights to annul the vows of a woman who is awaiting yibbum or halitzah with him. To remind ourselves briefly, if a husband dies without children his wife is liable for either yibbum (levirate marriage) or halitzah (the release from levirate marriage) with his brother. Generally speaking, any brother may perform yibbum or halitzah.", + "If a woman waits for a yavam, whether for one or for two [yevamim]: Rabbi Eliezer says: he can annul [her vows]. Rabbi Joshua says: [only if she waits] for one, but not for two. Rabbi Akiva says: neither for one nor for two. There are three halakhic opinions in this section. According to Rabbi Eliezer, even if there are several brothers (yevamim) any one of them may annul her vows. According to Rabbi Joshua if there is only one yavam he may annul her vows but if there are more than one, neither may annul her vows. Rabbi Joshua believes that the connection between a yavam and his yevamah is strong enough that he may annul her vows but if there are two yevamim each prevents the other from doing so. Also, if there are two yevamim we don’t know who will end up performing yibbum and therefore neither may annul her vows. According to Rabbi Akiva a yavam never has the right to annul his yevamah’s vows.", + "Rabbi Eliezer said: if a man can annul the vows of a woman whom he himself acquired, isn’t it logical that can he annul those of a woman bequeathed to him by Heaven! Rabbi Akiva said to him: No! If you speak of a woman whom he himself acquires, that is because others have no rights in her; will you say [the same] of a woman given to him by Heaven, in whom others too have rights! Rabbi Joshua said to him: Akiva, your words apply to two yevamim; but what will you answer if there is only one yavam? He (Rabbi said to him (Rabbi: the yevamah is not as completely acquired to the yavam as a betrothed girl is to her [betrothed] husband. In this section the three rabbis argue out their respective positions. Rabbi Eliezer reasons that in a normal marriage a woman is acquired by the man himself (“acquisition” is one of the typical ways by which the mishnah refers to marriage) but in yibbum Heaven bequeaths the yevamah to the yavam. In other words the relation between the yavam and the yevamah is created at the moment of the brother’s death without any action by the yavam and therefore it is a stronger connection. If in the weaker acquisition the husband is allowed to annul vows, so too in the stronger acquisition. Rabbi Akiva responds by pointing out that the two situations are not truly analogous. If there are two or more yevamim then each has some rights in her, because any of them can perform yibbum or halitzah with her. However, in cases of normal marriage, only the betrothed husband has rights in her, for only he will be able to marry her. Rabbi Joshua points out that Rabbi Akiva’s refutation of Rabbi Eliezer holds true only if there is more than one yavam. If there is only one yavam he is the only one who has rights in her, and therefore he should be allowed to annul her vows. Why then does Rabbi Akiva say that he cannot. Rabbi Akiva responds again, this time with a more fundamental difference between normal marriage and yibbum. The union between a betrothed couple is stronger than the unity between a yavam and a yevamah (remember this is before yibbum has been performed; after yibbum she is his wife in all regards). A betrothed woman who has relations with a man other than her betrothed husband is an adulteress and is technically liable for the death penalty. In that sense Jewish betrothal works like marriage. In contrast, a yevamah who has relations with a man other than her yavam is not considered an adulteress and has merely broken a less severe commandment, one not punishable by death. From here we can deduce that the bond of betrothal is stronger and therefore a betrothed husband may annul his betrothed wife’s vows but a yavam may not do so for his yevamah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah discusses whether or not a husband can uphold or annul vows that his wife will take in the future.", + "If a man says to his wife, “All vows which you may vow from now until I return from such and such a place behold, they are upheld,” he has not said anything. Everyone agrees that the husband may not legally uphold vows that his wife has not yet taken. If, when he returns from the trip he hears that she has taken a vow and he wants to annul it, he still may do so, despite his earlier statement that her vows were upheld.", + "[If he said: All vows which you may vow from now until I return from such and such a place], behold, they are annulled,”: Rabbi Eliezer says: they are annulled; The Sages say: they are not annulled. Said Rabbi Eliezer: if he can annul vows which have already had the force of a prohibition, surely he can annul those which have not had the force of prohibition! They said to him: behold, it is said, “Her husband may uphold it, and her husband may annul it” (Numbers 30:14), that which has entered the category of upholding, has entered the category of annulment; but that which has not entered the category of upholding, has not entered the category of annulment. This section discusses the reverse situation, in which the husband wishes to annul vows that his wife takes while he is away. Rabbi Eliezer says this annulment is effective and the Sages say that it is not. Rabbi Eliezer argues that if a man can annul a vow that has already taken effect, he should be able to annul a vow before it has begun to be effective. A husband can annul vows on the day he hears them even though she vowed earlier (we will learn more about this tomorrow). In other words, even if she vowed earlier and therefore had to keep her vow before it was annulled, on the day that he hears of the vow he may still annul it. From here Rabbi Eliezer concludes that he certainly should be able to annul a vow that has not yet had a prohibitory force. The Sages respond with a midrash on a verse in Numbers. This verse compares upholding and annulling. Since, as we learned in section one, only a vow which has already been made can be upheld, so too only a vow that has already been made can be annulled. To the Sages their midrash is more authoritative and convincing than Rabbi Eliezer’s reasoning." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nNumbers 30:6, 9 imply that the husband or father must annul their wives’ or daughters’ vows on the day on which they heard of them. Our mishnah explains how this day is calculated.", + "The annulment of vows is the whole day. This may result in a stringency or in a leniency. How is this so? If she vowed on the eve of the Sabbath, he can annul on the eve of the sabbath and on the Sabbath day until nightfall. If she vowed just before nightfall, he can annul only until nightfall: for if night fell and he had not annulled it, he can no longer annul it. The period allotted for annulling vows is one whole day. That day is calculated by the calendar and not by counting 24 hours from the time the father/husband heard the vow. In other words, the vow must be annulled on the calendar day on which it was taken. Remember, the Jewish day is calculated from evening until evening. As the mishnah points out, sometimes this will result in a longer time and sometimes in a shorter time. For instance, if he hears of the vow on the eve of the Sabbath (late Friday afternoon, towards twilight), he has until nightfall the following night, when the Sabbath is over. This is because twilight is already considered part of the Sabbath and the Sabbath is not over until nightfall. However, if he hears of the vow just before nightfall on the Sabbath itself, he only has until nightfall. After that he may no longer annul the vow. The reason that the mishnah uses the example of the Sabbath and not any other day of the week is to teach that vows may be annulled on the Sabbath." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nNumbers 30:14 states, “Every vow and every sworn obligation of self-denial may be upheld by her husband or annulled by her husband.” From this verse the rabbis conclude that only vows which are of “self-denial” can be annulled. Furthermore, vs. 17 states, “These are the laws that the Lord commanded Moses between a man and his wife.” From this verse the rabbis learned that even if the vow is not one of self-denial, if it involves an issue between the woman and her husband, the man may annul the vow. This chapter discusses these issues.\nWe should note that by placing these limits on her vows, the rabbis limit the power the husband has over his wife. She has the ability to vow without his interference; only those things that will come in between their marriage or cause her to be denied something are subject to his approval.", + "And these are the vows which he can annul: vows which involve self-denial. [For instance:] “If I bathe” or “If I do not bathe;” “If I adorn myself,” or, “If I do not adorn myself.” Rabbi Yose says: these are not vows of self-denial. If the woman vows, “A certain something shall be konam (forbidden) to me if I bathe, but if I don’t bathe it shall be permitted to me,” the husband can annul her vow because not bathing or not adorning oneself is considered self-denial. Another interpretation of this mishnah is that the woman says, “Bathing is forbidden to me forever if I bathe today” or “A shevuah that I shall not bathe”. Again, since these are examples of self-denial the husband may annul the vow. Rabbi Yose does not believe that these are vows of self-denial. Rabbi Yose’s definition of vows self-denial will be brought up in the next mishnah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is the continuation of Rabbi Yose’s opinion, begun in yesterday’s mishnah. Yesterday Rabbi Yose said that if the wife vows not to adorn herself or not to bathe the husband cannot annul because these are not considered vows of self-denial. In our mishnah Rabbi Yose provides his definition of vows of self-denial.", + "But these are vows of self-denial:
If she says, “Konam be the produce of the [whole] world to me”, he can annul. If the woman forbids upon herself all produce everywhere the husband may annul the vow because this is certainly considered a vow of self-denial.", + "“Konam be the produce of this region to me,” he should bring her that of a different region. In this case he cannot annul the vow because he may bring her produce from another region.", + "“[Konam be] the produce of this shopkeeper to me”, he cannot annul. But if he can obtain his sustenance only from him, he can annul, the words of Rabbi Yose. Similarly, if she vows not to eat the produce of a certain shopkeeper, he may not break the vow because he may bring her produce from other shopkeepers. However, if the husband has a deal with the shopkeeper from whom she swore not to receive benefit, whereby the shopkeeper provides him with food on credit, then he may annul the vow. Since the husband will not be able to bring his wife food from the other shopkeepers who do not give to him on credit, he will not be able to provide her with food, and therefore her vow will be one of self-denial. The Sages disagree with Rabbi Yose and hold that even though she has sworn not to receive benefit only from one specific person and she could receive from others, this is still considered a vow of self-denial and the husband may annul it." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first section of the mishnah continues to discuss which vows a husband may annul. The second section of the mishnah discusses a person who swears that priests and Levites may not derive benefit from him.", + "[If she vows], “Konam, that which I benefit from mankind,” he cannot annul, and she can benefit from gleanings, forgotten sheaves, and the corners of the field. The husband cannot annul this vow because there are still people from whom she may receive benefit (food, clothing etc.). “Mankind” implies people other than her husband. Since her husband may still provide for her, this is not a vow of “self-denial”. Furthermore, she may still collect the produce which is mandated to be given to poor people from people’s fields. These do not actually belong to the owner of the field; rather they are considered ownerless. This includes “gleanings” which is the wheat which falls from people’s hands as they collect, forgotten sheaves, and the corners of fields.", + "[If one says], “Konam be the benefit which priests and Levites have from me”, they can take [from him] against his will. A person must give certain parts of his produce to priests and Levites. He must give terumah to priests and first tithe to Levites. If he vows that priests and Levites should not be able to derive benefit from him, they still may take terumah and tithe, because these do not actually belong to the one who vowed. The connection between this section and what we learned above is that just as things left for the poor do not actually belong to the owner of the field, so too terumah and tithes do not actually belong to the person who separates them to give them to the priests and Levites.", + "[But if he vows,] “Konam be the benefit these priests and Levites have from me,” other [priests and Levites] should take. In this case the one who vows does not prohibit all priests and Levites from benefiting from him, just certain priests or Levites. In this case the vow is effective and other priests and Levites should take the terumah or tithes. Although as we stated above the person does not own these, he has the right to choose to whom to give them. Therefore the vow is effective." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first part of the mishnah discusses a woman who vows not to provide benefit for either her own or her husband’s father or brother. The second part discusses a woman who vows not to provide benefit for her husband himself.", + "[If she vows,] “Konam that which I do for my father,” [or] “your father,” [or] “my brother,” [or] “your brother,” [the husband] cannot annul it. In all of these cases the woman vows that anything that she produces shall be forbidden to either her or her husband’s father or brother. Since none of these vows involves self-denial, the husband may not annul the vow.", + "[“Konam] “that which I do for you,” he need not annul it. Rabbi Akiva says: he should annul it, lest she make more than is fitting for him. Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri said: he should annul it, lest he divorce her and she thereby be forbidden to him. We learned in the fifth chapter of Ketuboth that a woman is obligated to perform certain duties for her husband and her handiwork belongs to him. Since she has this obligation, she may not vow that her husband may not benefit from her handiwork. In essence, she does not own her handiwork and therefore it is not hers to prohibit by vow. Rabbi Akiva points out that not all of the handiwork automatically goes to her husband. According to Ketuboth 5:9, she has a set amount of handiwork which she must do; anything over that amount she gets to keep. If so, the vow is potentially effective for this extra amount. Since if she does produce an extra amount, it will be difficult for a husband not to derive some benefit from it, he should annul the vow to avoid the potential problem. The reason that he has a right to annul the vow even though it is not a vow of self-denial is that this is something that comes between him and her. Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri points out that if the husband divorces his wife, the vow will become valid, since she is no longer obligated to provide him with her handiwork. Once divorced, he will also no longer be able to annul the vow. In such a case he would not be able to remarry her. To avoid this problem, Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri suggests that the husband annul the vow." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah teaches that if a husband/father annuls a vow of his wife/daughter but is mistaken with regard to who vowed, what type of vow they took or what was being prohibited, he must annul the vow again in order for it to be annulled.", + "If his wife vowed, and he thought that his daughter had vowed, or if his daughter vowed and he thought that his wife had vowed; In this case the husband/father was mistaken with regard to who vowed.", + "If she took the vow of a nazirite, and he thought that she had vowed by a korban, or if she vowed by a korban, and he thought that she vowed a nazirite vow; In this case the mistake was with regard to the type of prohibition. For instance, she vowed by a nazirite vow but her husband/father thought that the vow was a vow using a korban to prohibit wine (i.e. “wine is a korban to me”), or vice versa. Although in both cases she would be forbidden to have wine, the husband still annulled the wrong type of vow.", + "If she vowed [to abstain] from figs, and he thought that she vowed [to abstain] from grapes, or if she vowed [to abstain] from grapes and he thought that she vowed from figs, he must annul [the vow] again. In this case the husband was mistaken with regard to what was being prohibited, figs or grapes. In all three cases, since the husband did not have full grasp of who was vowing, what type of vow they were taking, or what they were prohibiting, he must annul the vow again. If he does not, the vow is valid." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah teaches that a vow that has been partially annulled is not annulled at all.\nWe should note that this is a different rule than that which we saw with regard to the releasing of vows done by a sage. There we saw that according to Rabbi Akiva a vow that has been partially released is fully released (9:6). According to the Talmud, Rabbi Akiva disagrees with our mishnah.", + "If she vows, “Konam these figs and grapes which I taste”, and he [the husband] confirms [the vow] in respect of figs, the whole [vow] is confirmed; In the cases in this mishnah, the woman vows not to have figs and grapes. If the husband confirms part of the vow, the whole vow is confirmed. After he has confirmed it, he can no longer annul it.", + "If he annuls it in respect of figs, it is not annulled, unless he annuls in respect of grapes too. However, if he annuls part of the vow, the whole vow is not annulled and she is still forbidden in respect to that which he annulled. In this case, she would be forbidden to have both figs and grapes. For the vow to be annulled he must annul the whole vow.", + "If she vows, “Konam the figs that I taste and these grapes that I taste”, they are two distinct vows. In this case the mishnah considers it as if she had taken two vows. Therefore, if he annuls the vow with respect to figs, that vow is annulled and she may have figs but she may not have grapes." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nYesterday we learned that if when the husband/father annulled his wife/daughter’s vow he did not have full comprehension of who vowed, what type of vow they took, or what they prohibited, he must annul it again.\nGenerally the vow may be annulled only on the day that the husband/father hears of the vow (see 10:5). However, in this case he may annul the vow when he learns the details, even though the day that he heard the vow has passed, because for him the day that he learns of the vows correct details is considered the day that he heard the vow.\nOur mishnah discusses a husband who did not know that he could annul the vow, or that there was even a vow to annul. The question is can he annul the vow when he learns that he has such a power, or that it was a vow.", + "[If the husband declares,] “I knew that there were vows, but I did not know that they could be annulled”, he may annul them [now]. In this case the husband/father knew that there was a vow, but did not know that he could annul the vow or that in general he can annul vows. The mishnah rules that he may annul the vow later when he learns that he has such a right. The day that he learns that he can annul vows is considered the “day that he heard the vow”.", + "[But if he says:] “I knew that I could annul them, but I did not know that this was a vow,” Rabbi Meir says: he cannot annul it, But the Sages say: he can annul. In this case the father/husband knew that he has the right to annul vows in general, but did not know that what his daughter/wife had said was considered a vow. Hence he did not annul the vow on the day that he heard the original remark. When he later learns that this was a vow, Rabbi Meir says he can no longer annul it. Since he knew on the day that he heard the vow that he can annul vows, he should have annulled what she had said in any case, even though he was not sure that it was a vow. The Sages, however, rule that he may still annul the vow when he learns that it was truly a vow. According to their opinion, this is the day that is actually called “the day that he heard the vow.”" + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses a situation in which a man is under a vow not to provide any benefit to his son-in-law. The mishnah teaches how the father may give money to his daughter without allowing his son-in-law to receive benefit.\nWe should note that this mishnah probably more properly belongs in chapter four where the mishnah discussed circumventing vows such as these. Assumedly, the mishnah is brought in this chapter because it mentions fathers and daughters.", + "If a man is under a vow that his son-in-law shall not benefit from him, and he wants to give money to his daughter, he must say to her, “This money is given to you as a gift, providing that your husband has no rights with it, [and it is only given to you] so that may put to your personal use.” If the father wants to give his daughter money he may make a stipulation that the son-in-law should have no rights to the money and that the only use for the money is for the personal use of the daughter. In this way, the father can circumvent the vow prohibiting his son-in-law from deriving benefit from him. Were the father not to make such a stipulation, the present would be a transgression of the vow because anything that the wife owns the husband has rights over as well." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe Torah states that a widow and a divorcee’s vows are binding. This ruling is seemingly obvious, for a widow and a divorcee do not have any husband who could possibly annul their vows. In order to prevent the Torah from being obvious, the mishnah finds situations in which the ruling is not so obvious.", + "After quoting the verse from Numbers, the mishnah proceeds to explain it in a way that it is not overly simple.", + "“But every vow of a widow and of a divorcee… shall be binding upon her” (Numbers 30:9).
How is this so? If she said, “Behold, I will be a nazirite after thirty days”, even if she married within the thirty days, he cannot annul it. In this case the woman vowed before she was married but vowed in such a way that the vow would not begin to take effect for another thirty days. During the thirty days before the vow takes effect, she was married. Although the vow begins to take effect when she is already married, her husband cannot annul it because she made the vow before she was married.", + "If she vows while in her husband’s domain, he can annul [the vow] for her. How is this so? If she said, “Behold, I will be a nazirite after thirty days,” [and her husband annulled it], even though she was widowed or divorced within the thirty days, it is annulled. This case is opposite to that in the previous section. Here the woman vows while still married, but stipulates that the vow will not take effect for another thirty days. While still married, before the vow takes effect, the husband annuls the vow. Even though by the time the vow took effect she was already divorced, since the husband annulled it while she was still married, the vow is annulled.", + "If she vowed on one day, and he divorced her on the same day and took her back on the same day, he cannot annul it. This is the general rule: once she has gone into her own domain [even] for a single hour, he cannot annul. In this case, she vowed while married, was then divorced and then remarried on the same day (seemingly a theoretical situation, or two people who have trouble making up their minds!). The mishnah teaches that the husband can no longer annul the vow that she took during their first marriage, even though the second marriage was on the very same day. In the last clause, containing the general rule, the mishnah explains that if she had gone out of her husband’s domain before he annulled the vow, he cannot subsequently annul the vow. This is what the Torah means when it states that a widow or divorcee must keep their vows. Sometimes they must keep them even though they made the vow when they were married." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nAt the end of the previous mishnah we learned that a girl who leaves her husband’s domain even for one moment does not return to have her vows annulled by this same husband. Our mishnah teaches that the same is true for a girl who leaves her father’s domain either by reaching majority age, by being married or by her father dying. The mishnah lists nine types of such women. The first three left their father’s domain by being married, the next three by their father dying and the final three by reaching majority age. Hence I have broken this mishnah down in three subsets of three.", + "Usually “young girl” refers to a girl who has not yet reached majority age (12 ½). However, here the term is used more loosely and includes even those girls who are already past 12 ½.", + "There are nine young girls whose vows stand: [1a] a girl who reached majority age who is [like] an orphan; [1b] a young girl [who vowed] and [then] reached majority age who is [like] an orphan; [1c] a young girl who has not yet reached majority age, who is [like] an orphan; [2a] a girl who reached majority age and whose father died; [2b] a young girl [who vowed] and [then] reached majority age and whose father died; [2c] a young girl who has not yet reached majority age and whose father died; [3a] a young girl whose father died, and after her father died she became of majority age; [3b] a girl who has reached majority age whose father is alive; [3c] a young girl who has reached majority age and whose father is alive. Rabbi Judah says: also one who married off his daughter while a minor, and she was widowed or divorced and returned to him [her father] and is still a young girl. The first section lists girls who were married off by their fathers when they were young (before 12 ½) and then were widowed or divorced. Since they were married, their fathers no longer have the ability to annul the vows. Halakhically they are considered “orphans during their father’s lifetime.” There are three types of girls in this category: 1) a girl who vowed after she had reached majority age; 2) a girl who vowed before reaching majority age and has now reached majority age; 3) a girl who is still considered a “young girl” (12-12 ½). Since all three of these girls have no husband and no father, their vows stand.", + "All three of these girls vowed after their fathers died and have never been married off. Since they have no husbands or fathers, their vows stand. The age categories are the same as in the previous section.", + "This section lists three girls whose fathers have no authority over them and therefore there is no one to annul their vows. In the first case the father is dead. In the second case she vowed after she had already reached majority age At this point the father may no longer annul her vows. In the third case she vowed before reaching 12 ½ but then reached majority age. According to one interpretation of the last section of this mishnah, Rabbi Judah adds a tenth girl to the list, the girl who was married off as a minor and then widowed or divorced and is still a young girl who has not reached 12 ½. Since she has been married, her father may no longer annul her vows, even though she is still a young girl." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah returns to discuss the category of vows made between the couple (“between him and her”) the type of vow that in general the husband has a right to annul.", + "[If she vows,] “Konam the benefit that I derive from my father or from your father if I make anything for you,” In the first case the wife says that she will not benefit from her or her husband’s father if she makes anything for her husband. Seemingly this is not the type of vow that the husband could annul because she could make something for him and then not benefit from her father or his father. This should not be considered a vow “between him and her”, the only type of vow that the husband can break.", + "Or, “Konam the benefit that I derive from you, if I make anything for my father or your father,” he can annul. Similarly this too is should not be a vow that the husband could annul because she could just refrain from making anything for her or her husband’s father. This also should not be considered a vow “between him and her.” Despite this, the mishnah rules that the husband may annul the vows. This is because the husband does not want work that his wife does for him to come between her and her father or his father. It is also disgraceful for him that she should not be allowed to do anything for her father or his father, lest she not be able to make anything for him. Therefore, in both cases he has the right to annul." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOne of the thorniest problems in halakhah is that a woman may not initiate divorce. If a woman is stuck in a bad marriage and wants to be divorced, it is difficult, if not impossible, for her to force her husband to divorce her and still receive her ketubah. We should however note that in talmudic times it was not impossible for a woman to force her husband to divorce her if she was willing to forego her ketubah. Unfortunately, today, even this is difficult.\nOur mishnah contains fascinating testimony regarding attempts that women made to force their husbands to divorce them. Originally, these attempts were effective, for the sages believed the woman’s claims. However, when they began to suspect these women of lying so that they could marry others, they changed the laws such that these claims would not be an effective means by which a woman could force her husband to give her a divorce and her ketubah.", + "
At first they would say that three women must be divorced and receive their ketubah: She who says: “I am defiled to you”; “Heaven is between me and you”; “I have been removed from the Jews.” The mishnah mentions three claims that used to work in forcing a husband to divorce his wife. 1) “I am defiled to you”. The Talmud explains that this claim is made by a priest’s wife who says that she has been raped. As we have learned, a priest may not stay married to his wife if she has had sexual intercourse with someone prohibited to her, even if the intercourse was against her consent. 2) “Heaven is between me and you”. Some commentators interpret this to be a veiled reference to the husband’s inability to perform the sexual act. She is saying, as distant as the heaven is from the earth, that is how distant you and I are from each other in sexual matters. 3) “I have been removed from the Jews”. This refers to a vow she made not to receive sexual benefit from Jews, which includes her husband. She may have made the vow because sexual intercourse is not pleasurable for her. The sages believed these statements because they assumed that a woman would not make such things up.", + "But subsequently they changed the ruling to prevent her from setting her eye on another and spoiling herself to her husband: She who said, “I am defiled unto you” must bring proof. “Heaven is between me and you” they [shall appease them] by a request. “I have been removed from the Jews” he [the husband] must annul his portion, and she may have relations with him, and she shall be removed from other Jews. When the sages saw that women were lying and using these claims to leave their husbands because they wanted to marry someone else, they came up with other solutions to these problems. These solutions did not allow the woman to force her husband to divorce her and pay her ketubah. 1) If she says that she has been raped, she must bring proof. Until she does so, she is not believed and she is not prohibited to her husband, nor is he forced to divorce her. 2) If she complains that her husband cannot function sexually, the sages should try to bring them together with words of reconciliation. This may have been the rabbinic equivalent of going to a sex therapist. 3) If she says that she made a vow not to have sex with Jews, the husband may annul that part of the vow that prohibits her from having sex specifically with him, and she will be prohibited from having sex with other Jews, even should she be subsequently divorced. Congratulations! We have finished Nedarim. It is a tradition at this point to thank God for helping us to finish learning the tractate and to commit ourselves to going back and relearning it, so that we may not forget it and so that its lessons will stay with us for all of our lives. Despite the fact that some of these mishnayoth may have been slightly obscure, we should remember what an important role vows played in the religious life of Jews in the mishnaic and talmudic periods. Vows were a way of turning everyday matters into issues of greater significance, from matters between human beings and other human beings, to matter between human beings and God. Learning the laws of vows, and especially how to get out of vows, shows us how humans can make mistakes, get out of them, and yet retain their ultimate covenant with God. Congratulations on making it through this difficult tractate. May you have the strength and time to keep on learning more Mishnah! Tomorrow we begin Nazir." + ] + ] + ] + }, + "schema": { + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה נדרים", + "enTitle": "English Explanation of Mishnah Nedarim", + "key": "English Explanation of Mishnah Nedarim", + "nodes": [ + { + "heTitle": "הקדמה", + "enTitle": "Introduction" + }, + { + "heTitle": "", + "enTitle": "" + } + ] + } +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Nashim/English Explanation of Mishnah Nedarim/English/merged.json b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Nashim/English Explanation of Mishnah Nedarim/English/merged.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..988367d6b52754db6a29000a85edcfbe30ea699f --- /dev/null +++ b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Nashim/English Explanation of Mishnah Nedarim/English/merged.json @@ -0,0 +1,546 @@ +{ + "title": "English Explanation of Mishnah Nedarim", + "language": "en", + "versionTitle": "merged", + "versionSource": "https://www.sefaria.org/English_Explanation_of_Mishnah_Nedarim", + "text": { + "Introduction": [ + "Tractate Nedarim deals with vows. It is found in Seder Nashim because the section of the Torah that deals most extensively with vows (Numbers 30:2-17) discusses a husband’s right to break his wife’s vows. ", + "Usually, the word “neder” or vow in the Bible refers to a voluntary sacrificial offering (see for instance Number 29:29). Vows were sometimes given on condition that something good happen to the giver (see Genesis 28:20-22 or Numbers 21:2). In that way they were similar to the way today a person might promise to give charity if something good happens, such as recovering from a disease. However, vows may have also been used in the Torah as a means by which a person prohibits something upon themselves. The way that this works is that a person says that something is forbidden to him/her like a voluntary sacrifice; in other words the object belongs to God and not to the person vowing. These types of vows may also be made with stipulations; for instance, if I don’t come to your house, may all bananas be like a sacrifice to me, and hence forbidden. Our mishnah discusses vows of this nature; a person says that a certain object will be to him a “korban”, a sacrifice.", + "In the ancient world vows were an important feature of a person’s religious life and people made them frequently. There were contradicting tendencies; both to make many vows, and to be fearful lest one break one’s vows. One result is that there developed a means of substituting other words for vows. For instance, instead of saying “qorban”, people would say “konam”. In this way a person could feel that he is not actually saying the vow. However, according to the mishnah, although these are only substitutes, their validity is the same as that of real phrasings of vows. ", + "The difference between a vow and an oath is that with a vow a person forbids an object to him/herself, whereas with an oath the person forbids himself to the object. A vow: “this bread is like a korban (a sacrifice) to me”. An oath: “I swear I will not eat this piece of bread”. However, it seems that people did not always keep straight the differences between vows and oaths.", + "Our tractate discusses women’s vows, who can break them (the husband or the father), when they can break them, and under what conditions. The breaking of women’s vows is mentioned by the Torah, and explicated by the Sages. ", + "According to the Torah only a woman’s vows may be broken by another, and only under certain circumstances. However, the Sages gave themselves the power to release people from their vows, at least under certain circumstances, usually if the vow was mistaken. This was probably one of the more important functions of the Sage in rabbinic times; to release people from vows which they no longer wanted to take. ", + "As a side note, that does not have to do strictly with the Mishnah, the custom of saying “Kol Nidre” on Yom Kippur is a later version of release from one’s vows. It was first recited in Geonic times (around the 10th century) and was meant to release a person from vows that they made that they may have forgotten. The popular idea that it is somehow related to persecuted Jews who were forced to convert does not have any basis, although it is a moving theory. There were Jewish leaders who attempted to abolish the Kol Nidre, including Orthodox leaders, but they were not successful. \n" + ], + "": [ + [ + [ + "Introduction\nNedarim begins by clarifying the validity of substitute words used for vows. Also mentioned in this mishnah are different types of vows, all of which are mentioned in the Torah. The second part of the mishnah deals with the validity of certain statements as oaths.", + "All the substitutes for vows have the validity of vows. Those for haramim have the validity of haramim, And those for oaths have the validity of oaths, And those for nazirite [vows] have the validity of nazirite [vows]. A substitute formula is just as effective at making a vow as is a regular vow formula. The mishnah lists several types of vows for which this is true. The first is a “neder”. The second is a “herem” (see Leviticus 27:28). The third is an oath (shevuah). The fourth are nazirite vows.", + "If one says to his fellow, “I am forbidden from you by a vow”; “I am separated from you”; “I am distanced from you”, “that I should eat from yours”, “that I should taste from yours”, he is prohibited. These are all valid vow formulas, even though he doesn’t formally say that the thing which he is forbidding upon himself would be like a sacrifice. In other words, a full formula would be “All of your food is like a sacrifice to me”. Instead he says one of the formulas in section 2, combined with one of the ones in section 2a and thus forms a vow. For instance he says, “I am forbidden from you by a vow that I should eat from yours”. Or “I am distanced from you that I should taste from yours”. In all such cases it is forbidden for the one taking a vow to subsequently eat from the other person’s food.", + "If he says: “I am banned to you”, Rabbi Akiba was inclined to rule stringently. This case is more questionable, whether the vow formula is valid. Rabbi Akiba rules that it is, but even he seems uncertain about his ruling.", + "[If one says] “As the vows of the wicked”, he has vowed in respect of being a nazirite, or a sacrifice, or an oath. [If he says] “As the vows of the fit”, he has said nothing. [But if he said] “As their freewill-offerings” he has vowed in respect of being nazirite and a sacrifice. If he says a regular vow formula and then tacks on at the end the words, “As the vows of the wicked” his vow is valid, whether it be a vow, a nazirite vow or an oath. Alternatively, there might be a nazirite walking by him and he says, “Behold I am like the vows of the wicked”, he is a nazirite. Or if he says, “Like the vows of the wicked I shall not eat from you”, he can’t eat from the person’s food. We can see here that vows are viewed negatively and those who vow frequently are considered to be wicked. However, if he says, “As the vows of the fit” his formula is not valid, since people who are “fit”, do not frequently make vows. We can certainly sense here that part of the intent of this mishnah is to relate a negative message about taking frequent vows. However, if he says, “like their free-will offerings”, then his vow is valid, because fit people do make vows to bring free-will offerings." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to discuss the various substitutes for vows. All of the cases here are words that sound like the normal word used for taking a vow, or a typical substitute.\nInterestingly, there is a debate in the Talmud over the source of these substitutes. R. Yochanan says that their source is the language of the Gentiles and Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says that the Sages invented them so that people would not actually say the real word.", + "One who says, “konam” “qonah” or “qonas”: these are the substitutes for korban. The normal substitute for “korban”, a sacrifice is “konam”. Our mishnah lists substitutes for “konam”. All are valid as vows.", + "“Herek” “herech” or “heref,” these are substitutes for herem. All of these are words that have just been slightly changed from the real word “herem” which we already saw in yesterday’s mishnah.", + "“Nazik” “naziah” “paziah” these are substitutes for nazirite vows. All of these are slight modifications of the word “nazir”, the Hebrew for nazirite.", + "“Shevuthah” “shekukah” or one who vows with the word “mota” these are substitutes for shevuah (an. The first two are slight modifications of “shevuah”, an oath. “Mota” is a modification of the Aramaic word, “momta”, which means oath. In all of these cases the substitution is effective." + ], + [ + "If one says “Not-unconsecrated food shall I not eat from you”, “Not fit”, or “Not pure”, “Clean” or “Unclean”, “Remnant” or “Piggul he is bound [by his vow].
[If one says, “May it be to me], as the lamb”, “As the Temple pens”, “As the wood [on the altar]”, “As the fire [on the altar]”, “As the altar”, “As the Temple” or “As Jerusalem”; [or] if one vowed by reference to the altar utensils, even though he did not mention “korban”, behold this one was vowed by a korban.
Rabbi Judah said: He who says “Jerusalem” has said nothing.
The normal way of making a prohibitive vow is for a person to say that a certain something is like a sacrifice, a “korban”, which is forbidden to him. Our mishnah talks about various ways in which a person can make a valid vow without actually saying the word “korban”. As we could see in the first two mishnayoth of Nedarim, people were hesitant to actually say the word “korban” and hence looked for substitutes.
Section one: In this section a person says something which is interpreted to mean “That which I eat from you should be to me like x”, and the “x” is prohibited to him and therefore he has prohibited the food upon himself. There are seven examples.
1) “Not-unconsecrated food”, meaning the food should be to the one swearing as if it were consecrated like a sacrifice.
2) “Not fit” interpreted to mean, not fit for people to eat but rather fit for sacrifice on the altar.
3) “Not pure” your food shall not be pure and permitted for me to eat, but rather set aside for sacrifice on the altar.
4) “Clean” your food shall be pure, as is a sacrifice, and hence not permitted to me.
5) “Unclean” your food shall be considered unclean to me, but clean for sacrifice on the altar.
(6+7) “Remnant” or “Piggul” your food shall be prohibited to me as remnant (sacrificial meat which has been kept too long after being sacrificed and is forbidden), or piggul (sacrificial meat prohibited because it was sacrificed with the wrong intent). Since both of these are forbidden, the vow is effective.
Section two: In this section the person swearing states that food that belongs to another should be to him like something in the Temple. Although he doesn’t say that the food is like a “korban”, these statements are sufficient to make the vow valid. The examples are 1) a sacrificial lamb; 2) pens in the Temple used to store the sacrifices; 3) the wood used to fuel the fire on the altar; 4) the fire itself; 5) the altar itself; 6) the Temple; 7) Jerusalem, which could be interpreted to refer to the sacrifices eaten in Jerusalem. A vow formula may also employ any of the utensils used at the altar. In all of these cases, even though he did not say that the food would be like a “korban”, the vow is valid and binding.
According to Rabbi Judah, saying that food should be “Jerusalem” is not sufficient because he may be referring to other things in Jerusalem besides the Temple. As we shall learn in the next mishnah, Rabbi Judah also holds that in order for the vow to be valid he has to say “Like x”, and not just “x” itself. Since he did not say “like Jerusalem”, the vow is not valid." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first three sections of this mishnah teach that instead of stating “korban” a person can name different types of sacrifices and his vow will still be effective.\nThe final section of the mishnah teaches that a person can make parts of his body forbidden to other people.", + "If one says “A korban”, “A wholly burnt-offering”, “A meal-offering”, “A sin-offering”, “A thanksgiving-offering”, “A peace-offering, should be that which I eat from you” he is bound [by his vow]. Rabbi Judah permitted [him]. In this section, instead of just stating “korban”, the person vowing names other types of sacrifices. The mishnah teaches that these are equally effective in forming vows. Rabbi Judah holds that since he didn’t say “like a …”, the vow is not valid.", + "[If he says] “The korban”, “like a korban”, “korban”, should be that which I eat from you he is bound [by his vow]. All of these ways of phrasing a vow are also valid.", + "If he says, “That which I shall not eat of yours should be a korban”, Rabbi Meir forbids [him]. In this case the person adds an additional negative to his statement. Instead of saying “that which I eat from you should be a korban”, he says “that which I shall not eat…”. Hence we might have interpreted the vow to meant that that which he doesn’t eat should be a korban, but that which he does eat should be permissible. Nevertheless Rabbi Meir rules that it is a valid vow, for the statement could also be interpreted to mean, “Your food is a korban to me, therefore I shall not eat from yours.”", + "If one says to his fellow, “Konam be my mouth which speaks with you”, “My hands which work for you” [or] “My feet which walk with you,’ he is forbidden. In these cases instead of stating that a certain object shall be prohibited, the person states that a certain part of his body shall not do something for his friend. Now usually one cannot make a prohibitive vow on an action. Prohibitive vows are only effective on things and not on intangibles. However, a person can make a prohibitive vow on a part of his body, since parts of bodies are things. For instance one can say “Konam be my mouth to you”, but not “Konam be my speech to you”; mouths have substance but speech does not." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "And these [vows] are not binding: [One who says] “What I eat of yours shall be unconsecrated”; “As the flesh of the swine”; “As an object of idolatrous worship”; “As hides pierced at the heart”; “As carrion”; “As terefoth”; “As abominations”; “As creeping things”; “As Aaron’s dough”; “As his terumah”--[in all these cases the vow is] not binding.
If one says to his wife, “Behold! You are like my mother to me”, he must be given an opening on other grounds, in order that he should not act lightly in such matters.
[If one says,] “Konam if I sleep”; “If I speak”; or “If I walk”; or if one says to his wife, “Konam if I cohabit with you,” he is liable to [the biblical prohibition] “he shall not break his word” (Numbers 30:.
[If he says,] “I swear] an oath not to sleep”, or, “talk,” or, “walk,” he is forbidden [to do so].
The first section of this mishnah deals with vows that are not binding. The second and third sections deal with vow that are semi-binding.
Section one: I shall explain each of these cases one at time.
“What I might eat of yours shall be unconsecrated”: Unconsecrated food is permitted, hence he has not stated that anything should be prohibited to him.
“As the flesh of the swine”: Vow formulas only work if the object used as a vow is something which can be vowed/dedicated to the Temple, such as an offering. While swine and the subsequent objects listed in this mishnah are forbidden, they cannot be offered to the Temple, and hence the vow is invalid.
“As an object of idolatrous worship”: This vow does not work for the same reason as above.
“As hides pierced at the heart”: These were used in idol worship.
“As carrion”; “As terefoth”; “As abominations”; “As creeping things”: These are all things which Jews may not eat. Carrion is an animal which was slaughtered improperly, “terefoth” are animals which died or would have died without being slaughtered. “Abominations and creeping things” are forbidden reptiles and other small animals, all of which are forbidden to eat. Again, the vow formula is ineffective because he didn’t vow using something which can be donated to the Temple.
“As Aaron’s dough”; “As his terumah”: These are both gifts that must be given to priests (Aaron’s sons). They are forbidden for consumption for non-priestly Jews. However, since one cannot offer them to the Temple, they cannot be used in vow formulas.
Section two: In this case, a husband attempts to forbid his wife to himself sexually, by stating that she should be to him like his mother, who is obviously prohibited to him (nothing Oedipal here). The vow does not work, since he didn’t use something that can be vowed as part of his vow formula. However, the rabbis did not want people to take these matters lightly and hence they said that he had to find an “opening” for breaking his vow. For this, he will need to see a Sage. We will learn more about how this is done towards the end of the tractate.
Section three: At the end of the previous chapter we learned that a vow does not work on something that has no substance. Therefore, when one says “Konam (a valid formula) that I should not do something” the vow is not valid, since actions do not have substance. However, our mishnah rules that the one who took such a vow should nevertheless keep his word. He still must follow the prohibition in Numbers 30:3, that a person must do all that he promised.
In contrast, oaths (shevuoth) can be made on actions, for an oath relates to the person and not to the object. Therefore, one who swears an oath not to do something is bound by Torah law to keep his word." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah compares vow formulas with oath formulas.", + "[If he says,] “A korban should be what I do not eat of yours”; “By a korban! If I eat of yours”; “What I do not eat of yours should not be a korban to me” the vow is not binding. I will explain each of these individually. “A korban should be what I do not eat of yours”: This is an ineffective vow, because he is not forbidding anything which he will eat. The only thing that is forbidden to him is that which he will not eat in any case. “By a korban! If I eat of yours”: This translation is based on an emendation to the mishnah, created by the Talmud. The mishnah itself states “A korban should be what I eat from you”. That should not be considered invalid formula. Therefore the Talmud suggests that the mishnah should read “By a korban! If I eat of yours.” He has not stated that the food should be forbidden, rather he has used the word “korban” to state that he will not eat from the other person. Such a formula is not valid in vows. “What I do not eat of yours should not be a korban to me”: We might have assumed that this double negative implies that what he doesn’t eat should not be a korban, but what he does eat should be a korban. However, this mishnah holds that we do not learn positive implications from negative statements. Saying that something will not be a korban does not mean that other things will.", + "[If he says], “An oath [that] I will not eat of yours”; “An oath that I eat of yours”; “No oath [that] I will not eat of yours” his oath is valid. All of the above formulas are valid if the word “shevuah” or oath is used instead of a vow. Again, I will explain them one at a time. [If he says], “An oath [that] I will not eat of yours”: This is a normal oath formula is certainly valid. “An oath that I will eat of yours”: It would seem that this statement should not cause him to be prohibited to eat from his fellow’s food. On the contrary it seems that he is saying that he will eat from his friend. The Talmud understands this to be referring to a case where Reuven is pressuring Shimon to eat at his house. Shimon says several times that he will not, and then finally blurts out “An oath that I will eat of yours”. The context of his saying makes it clear that Shimon’s intent was not to eat at Reuven’s home. However, in other contexts this is not an oath formula that would cause a prohibition. “No oath [that] I will not eat of yours”: We could deduce from here that although he has not made a prohibitive oath on that which he will not eat from his fellow, he has made a prohibitive oath on that which he will eat. Although above, in section one regarding vows we stated that we do not make positive deductions from negative statements, with regard to oaths we do.", + "In these instances oaths are more stringent than vows. There is [also] greater stringency in vows than in oaths. How so? If one says, “Konam be the sukkah that I make,”; “The lulav that I take”; “The tefillin that I put on”; as vows they are binding, but as oaths they are not, because one cannot swear to transgress the commandments. The mishnah now points out that since the vows made in section one were invalid whereas the oaths were valid, oaths are in some senses stricter than vows. However, in another matter vows are more strict. A person cannot take an oath not to observe a commandment, because he is already biblically obligated to observe the commandment. However, he could state that a given ritual object is forbidden to him with a “konam” vow. In such a case he is still obligated to perform the commandment. He just must perform it with another object." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to draw distinctions between vows and oaths.", + "There is a vow within a vow, but not an oath within an oath. This section teaches that there is an additional stringency in vows that does not exist for oaths. One can make two vows on the same thing but not two oaths. The mishnah will now explain how this can happen.", + "How is this so? If one declares, “Behold, I will be a nazir if I eat [this thing]”; “Behold, I will be a nazir if I eat [this thing]” and then he eats [it], he is liable for each and every one. “I swear that I will not eat [this thing]”, “I swear that I will not eat [this thing]” and then he eats [it], he is only liable for one oath. If a person said twice that he will be a nazir if he eats a certain thing, and then he eats that thing, he must be a nazir twice. Since an unspecified nazirite period is thirty days (we will learn more about this in the next tractate), this person must act as a nazir for sixty days. However, if he takes two oaths that he will not eat a certain thing, and then eats it, he is only liable for breaking one oath. If he breaks the oath intentionally he only receives one set of lashes, and if accidentally, he only brings one sacrifice." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with cases where it is unclear whether the person vowing used something which can be dedicated to the Temple in the vow formula, in which case the vow is binding, or whether he used something else, in which case the vow is not binding.", + "Unspecified vows are interpreted strictly, but if specified [they are interpreted] leniently. How so? This is an introductory rule which will guide the entire mishnah. If a person takes a vow and he himself is unclear what his intention was, whether it was to make a valid or invalid vow, we rule strictly and the vow is valid. However, if he states that his intention was to make an invalid vow, the vow is ruled invalid. The mishnah now lists several examples where it is unclear whether he made a valid vow by referring to something that may be donated to the Temple, or whether he referred to something which may not be donated to the Temple.", + "If one says, “Behold! This is to me as salted meat”; or “As wine of libation” If he vowed by that which is to Heaven, his vow is valid. If by that which is idolatrous, his vow is invalid. And if it was unspecified, his vow is valid. The first example is where a person says that a certain thing should either be to him like “salted meat” or “wine of libation”. Either could refer to something which could be put onto the altar. “Salted meat” could refer to a sacrifice and wine could refer to one of the libations offered at the Temple altar. Therefore, if his intention was to refer to something which was for “Heaven”, i.e. for the Temple, then his vow is valid. However, if his intention was that the object should be prohibited to him as is meat sacrificed for idols or wine offered to idols, his vow is invalid. As we have learned before, using a prohibited item in the vow formula does not make a vow work. If he didn’t know what his intention was, then the vow is ruled valid.", + "[If he says], “Behold! This is to me as herem” If as a herem to Heaven, his vow is valid; If as a herem to the priests, his vow is invalid. If it was unspecified, his vow is valid. A “herem” can either refer to an offering in the Temple, or it can refer to things that are given to the priests (see Numbers 18:14). If his intention was the former, the vow is valid, if the latter his vow is invalid. The reason is that once the “herem” was given to the priest, it is no longer forbidden for general consumption. Again, if he is unsure, the rule is strict.", + "“Behold! This is to me as a tithe” If he vowed, as tithes of beasts, his vow is valid. If as grain tithes, his vow is invalid. If unspecified, his vow is valid. There are several kinds of tithes. When a person vows that something should be like “tithe” to him, it could refer to animal tithes. If so, his vow is valid for animal tithes are sacrificed on the altar. However, if he refers to grain tithes, his vow is not valid, for anyone may eat grain tithes and they are not sacrificed but rather given to Levites.", + "“Behold! This is to me as terumah” If he vowed, as the terumah of the Temple-chamber, his vow is valid. If as the terumah of the threshing-floor, his vow is invalid. If unspecified, his vow is valid. The words of Rabbi Meir. There are several kinds of “terumah”. If he refers to “terumah of the Temple-chamber” his vow is invalid, for these were donations used to buy sacrifices. However, if he refers to the regular terumah given to priests, his vow is invalid, for this terumah is not offered to the Temple, but rather is for priests and forbidden to non-priests.", + "Rabbi Judah says: An unspecified reference to terumah in Judea is a valid vow, but not in Galilee, because the Galileans are unfamiliar with the terumah of the Temple-chamber. Unspecified references to haramim in Judea are not binding but in Galilee they are, because the Galileans are unfamiliar with priestly haramim. The previous section was according to Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Judah says that there are regional differences in our interpretation of vows. If he makes an unspecified vow using “terumah”, in Judea he may be referring to “terumah of the Temple-chamber”, and therefore his vow is valid. However, those of the Galilee, who live further away from the Temple, would not know as much about “terumah of the Temple-chamber” and hence we can assume that they were referring to the terumah given to priests. Similarly, unspecified vows using “herem” are interpreted leniently in Judea because they may refer to the “herem” of the priests, for many priests lived in Judea. In contrast, in the Galilee, “herem” would more typically refer to a sacrifice and therefore the vow is valid. We see here that Rabbi Judah assumes that the interpretation of the vow depends on the commonly used language of the one who vows. Since commonly used language will depend on geographical origin, it too must be taken into account." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with a person who makes a vow using language that would normally be valid for a vow, and then subsequently claims that he had an intention which would make the vow invalid. Most of these cases involve puns. In order to emphasize the puns, which are of course in Hebrew, I have transliterated many of the words.", + "If one vows by herem, and says, “I vowed only by a herem (a of the sea”; “Herem” can either refer to a type of vow, or to a fishing net. Obviously, if his intention was to the latter, then his vow is not valid.", + "[If he says] “By a korban”, and then says, “I vowed only by korbanot ( of kings”; The word “korban” usually means sacrifice, but it could mean gifts given to kings.", + "[If he says] “Behold! I myself ( am a korban”, and then says, “I vowed only by the etzem ( which I keep for the purpose of vowing”; Saying “I am a korban” is a way of obligating oneself to pay one’s worth to the Temple. The Torah lists how much each person is worth (see Leviticus 27). Therefore, saying “I am a korban” is a vow. However, one cannot vow with by using a bone, the same word as “I myself”.", + "[If he says,] “Konam be any benefit my wife has from me”, and then says, “I spoke only of my first wife, whom I have divorced” Usually when a husband refers to his wife, he refers to a wife to whom he is currently married. However, the word “wife” could refer to his previous wife.", + "Regarding none of these [vows] should they inquire [of a sage in order to break them], but if they inquire about them, they are punished and treated strictly, the words of Rabbi Meir. But the Sages say: they are given an opening on other grounds, in order that they should not act lightly with vows. The mishnah now provides the rule in all of these cases. All of these vows are not valid, for the person claims that his intention was not to make a vow. As we learned in yesterday’s mishnah, if a person vows and then explains that his intention was not to make a valid vow, his vow is not valid. Therefore, the person should not approach a sage to ask the sage to absolve him of his vow. However, if he nevertheless does approach the sage, Rabbi Meir says he should be punished and not absolved of his vow. This is because his very asking shows that he is an ignoramus, and Rabbi Meir holds that ignoramuses should not be allowed to get out of vows, so that they will not make more vows in the future. The Sages hold that the sage who is approached to dissolve the vow should find other grounds to dissolve the vow, for the Sages hold that such a vow is actually valid. Since the likelihood is that the person intended the vow to be valid, his claim that he intended something else is not accepted. If the sage wishes to dissolve the vow he can only do so on other grounds, the same way that he dissolves all vows. Furthermore, we teach him not to make frivolous vows, however he is not punished as Rabbi Meir says." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThe first four mishnayoth of this chapter deal with vows that use valid language but are nevertheless not valid because the person did not really intend for his vow to be valid. The first category is one who vowed in order to give himself or someone else more incentive to do something. This might be like today if someone says “I bet you a million dollars that I will do a certain thing”. If it doesn’t happen, no one expects the person to actually pay a million dollars. People say these things in order to give themselves more incentive.", + "Four types of vows the Sages have invalidated: Vows of incentive, vows of exaggeration, vows in error, and vows [broken] under pressure. The first section of the mishnah lists those vows which are not valid. The mishnah and the following mishnayoth will now bring examples of each.", + "Vows of incentive how so? If one was selling an article and said, “Konam that I will not reduce below a sela”; and the other replied, “Konam that I will not add above a shekel” both of them want [a price] of three denarii. In this scenario both the buyer and the seller make vows that they will not budge in their prices. One says he will not go above a shekel (two denarii) and the other says he won’t go below a sela (four denarii). Since their intention was for a price of three denarii, they may agree to that price.", + "Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob says: Also one who wishes to subject his friend to a vow to eat with him, may say: “Every vow which I may make in the future shall be void”, providing that he remembers this at the time of the vow. Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob says that one who wants to get his friend to eat at his place, and vows that if his friend does not do so all of his food will be forbidden to him, should say beforehand that all of his vows that he takes in the future shall be invalid, and then he need not keep his vow. However, when he makes the vow, he must remember that he made the original stipulation that his vows would not be valid. The above explanation of Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob’s statement is according to the words in our mishnah, where it seems as if he is stating one halakhah. However, the Talmud explains that Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob actually says two things. First of all, a vow taken to get another person to eat at one’s place, is a vow of incentive, and therefore need not be kept. Second, a person may state that all future vows will be invalid, and as long as he remembers this statement when he vows in the future, his vows will be invalid. By the way, the latter statement is one of the sources of the practice to nullify future vows at Kol Nidre on Yom Kippur." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first section of the mishnah illustrates vows of exaggeration and the second illustrates vows that were made in error.", + "Vows of exaggeration: If one says, “Konam if I did not see on this road as many as departed from Egypt”; “If I did not see a snake [as thick as the] the beam of an olive press. Vows of exaggeration need not be kept, because the person did not really intend to take a vow. His only intention was to exaggerate.", + "Vows in error: [If one says, “Konam,] if I ate or drank”, and then remembered that he had; “If I eat or drink” and then forgot [his vow] and ate or drank; “Konam be any benefit which my wife has from me, because she stole my purse or beat my child, and it was subsequently learnt that she had not beaten him nor stolen”; If one saw people eating [his] figs and said to them, “Let the figs be a korban to you,” and then discovered the people to be his father or his brothers. If others were with them: (1) Beth Shammai says: his father and brothers are permitted, but the rest are forbidden. (2) Beth Hillel says: all are permitted. This section teaches the important principle that vows made in error are invalid, and that a person has not broken his vow if he broke it in error. Furthermore, vows made based on false assumptions, such as that one’s wife stole something or beat one’s child, or the false presumption that people eating one’s figs should not be eating them, are also invalid. The final question in the mishnah is whether or not a vow can be half-valid, in other words valid with regard to some people and invalid with regard to others. In the case of the figs, both Beth Shammai and Beth Hillel agree that the brothers and father can eat, because the person who vowed intended to prohibit the figs only to strangers. However, Beth Shammai holds that the figs are prohibited to others who are there eating with them. Beth Hillel holds that since part of the vow isn’t valid, the whole vow is invalid." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah begins to discuss vows broken under pressure. There are actually two types of such vows. Our mishnah discusses the first type, whereby a person made a fully valid vow, but then due to circumstances beyond his control, was not able to keep the vow.", + "Vows [broken] under pressure: if one subjected his neighbor to a vow to eat with him, and then he or his son fell sick, or a river prevented him [from coming] such is a vow [broken] under pressure. In this case Reuven says to Shimon that Reuven’s things will be forbidden to Shimon if Shimon does not come over to eat at his house. Shimon intends to come but cannot due to his or his son’s sickness, or his inability to cross the river. The mishnah rules that when Reuven made the vow he did not intend for it to be valid if Shimon wanted to come but was prevented by circumstances beyond his control. His only intention was that his things should be prohibited to Shimon if Shimon did not come because he chose not to. Therefore, the vow is invalid." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses the second types of “forced vows”, those made under coercion. While all rabbis agree that one is allowed to make a false vow in order to protect oneself or one’s property, Beth Shammai and Beth Hillel disagree with regard to some of the details.", + "One may vow to murderers, robbers, or tax collectors that it [the produce which they demand] is terumah, even if it is not; [or] that it belongs to the royal house, even if it does not. One is allowed to make a false vow that one’s produce is terumah in order to prevent it from being taken away. What is strange here is that the mishnah assumes that while someone might be willing to murder, rob or illegitimately collect taxes, he will not take terumah. Indeed, this is truly hard to imagine; after all, what worse crime is there than murder. Albeck explains that the terumah vow refers only to tax collectors, who would not collect taxes from terumah. He refers to Josephus who says that the Romans allowed terumah to be exempt from taxes. The second false vow referred to is stating that the property belongs to the king. Indeed, it is easier to imagine a murderer or robber fearing taking property that belongs to the king.", + "Beth Shammai says: one may make any form of vow, except an oath; But Beth Hillel says: even an oath. The mishnah now begins a series of debates between Beth Shammai and Beth Hillel. Beth Shammai holds that since oaths are more consequential than vows, one may not make a false oath, even under this type of coercion. Beth Hillel says even false oaths may be made.", + "Beth Shammai says: he must not volunteer to vow; Beth Hillel says: he may do so. Beth Shammai says that one may not initiate taking the vow. If the murderer or robber did not ask the person to vow that the produce was terumah or belonged to the king, then he should not. Beth Hillel says even if not asked, he may take a vow.", + "Beth Shammai says: [he may vow] only as far as he makes him vow; Beth Hillel says: even in respect of what he does not make him vow. How so? If they said to him, say: “Konam be any benefit my wife has of me”, and he said, “Konam be any benefit my wife and children have of me,” (1) Beth Shammai says: his wife is permitted, but his children are forbidden; (2) Beth Hillel says: both are permitted. Beth Shammai says that the person should only vow exactly what was asked of him by the murderer/robber. If he, upon his own initiative, adds on to the vow, then that which he added has validity. Beth Hillel says he may add on, and just as his vow has no validity regarding that which the murderer/robber told to him to swear, so too the part he added has no validity." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with situations in which a person might attempt to take a vow to prevent either his saplings or his garment from being destroyed. In this case a person dedicates them to the Temple. Generally, when someone dedicates something to the Temple, if it can be sacrificed (such as a cow, sheep or grain) he may not redeem the item by giving money in its stead. However, if it cannot be sacrificed (a donkey, camel or bananas), then a person gives the worth of the item, and the item becomes non-sacred property.", + "[If one says,] “Behold these saplings are a korban if they are not cut down”; or, “This garment is a korban if it is not burnt”, they can be redeemed. If a person sees that something is about to happen to his saplings or to his garment, and he says that if the saplings are not cut down, or the garment is not burnt they should be a korban, they are dedicated to the Temple and they must be redeemed. We do not say that the vow was mistaken because he thought that the saplings would surely be cut down or that his garment would surely burn.", + "[If he says,] “Behold these saplings are a korban until they are cut down”; or, “This garment is a korban until it is burnt”, they cannot be redeemed. If he says that they are a korban “until they are cut down” he cannot redeem them, and if he does try to redeem them, they remain sanctified property. This is because he set a time for how long they are to remain a korban; until that time is up they cannot be taken out of that status. However, according to the Rambam, when the saplings are cut down, they are no longer a korban and he may use them as he wishes." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah and the remainder of the chapter deal with a person who vowed that he would not benefit from a certain type of person. These mishnayoth provide definitions who are those types of people.", + "He who vows [not to benefit] from seafarers, may benefit from land-dwellers; [But he who vows not to benefit] from land-dwellers, is forbidden [to benefit] even from seafarers, because seafarers are included in land-dwellers; not those who merely travel from Acco to Jaffa, but even those who sail away great distances [from land]. This mishnah teaches that the term “seafarers” does not include land-dwellers, and therefore if one vows not to benefit from seafarers he may derive benefit from land-dwellers. However, the term “land-dwellers” does include seafarers, because all seafarers occasionally come to land. This is obviously true for seafarers who make short journeys from Acco to Jaffa, but even for those who make long journeys. Therefore, if he makes a vow not to benefit from land-dwellers, he cannot derive benefit even from seafarers." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with a person who swears that he will not receive benefit from a type of people whom he calls “those who see the sun”.", + "He who vows [not to benefit] from those who see the sun, is forbidden [to benefit] even from the blind, because he meant those whom the sun sees. “Those who see the sun” does not only mean those who can see but can also mean those who live under the sun, i.e. everybody. Hence he may not benefit from anybody." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah teaches that one who vows not to benefit from “the black-haired” is forbidden to benefit from all men, but not from women and children.", + "He who vows [not to benefit] from the black-haired may not [benefit] from the bald or the gray-haired, but may [benefit] from women and children, because only men are called black-haired. The word “black-haired” is interpreted to be a reference to men, whether or not they have black hair, gray hair or no hair at all. Women are not called “black-haired” because they typically covered their hair. They were called “head-coverers”. Children were called “head revealers” because they went without a head covering. However, men were called “black-haired” because sometimes they covered their heads and sometimes they did not. Furthermore, nearly all men had black hair. Indeed, the only other hair color referred to in the mishnah is gray. No blondes or brunettes in Palestine in the Mishnaic period." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with someone who swore not to receive benefit either from those born or from those who are to be born.", + "One who vows [not to benefit] from those born may [benefit] from those to be born; from those to be born, he may not [benefit] from those born. Rabbi Meir permits [him to benefit] even from those to be born; But the Sages say: he meant all whose nature it is to be born. We will understand this mishnah better if we take note of the Hebrew. The word “those born” is “yilodim” and “those to be born” is “noladim”. The former term does not encompass the latter, and therefore, if one swears not to receive benefit from “yilodim” he may still receive benefit from those who are to be born, the “noladim”. However, the latter term does encompass the former, and therefore, one who swears not to receive benefit from “noladim” cannot benefit even from those who are already born. Rabbi Meir disagrees and holds that one who swears not to receive benefit from those who are to be born, the “noladim,” can receive benefit from those already born, the “yilodim”. To Rabbi Meir both terms are completely distinct. The Sages disagree. One who swears not to receive benefit from the “noladim” does not mean that he will not benefit from those who will be born, but rather from those whose nature it is to be born. This would encompass all of humanity." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nAccording to the Talmud, the Samaritans descend from a group of non-Jews brought to Samaria (the north of Israel) by the Assyrians, see II Kings 17. They are called by the rabbis Cutheans because many of them came from Cuta. There is a debate in the Talmud whether or not there conversion was sincere. They seem to have partially assimilated into Israel. The main difference between Samaritans and other Israelites is that their Temple was, and remains to this day, on Mt. Gerizim. They do not recognize Jerusalem as a place of importance. Besides this difference, they observed many commandments as did the other Israelites, certainly those in the Bible but even some not mentioned in the Bible. Our mishnah reflects these similarities and differences between Israelites and Samaritans. [For more information on the Samaritans see either the Encyclopedia Judaica, or check out The Jewish Encyclopedia, which can be found for free on-line at www.jewishencyclopedia.com.]", + "He who vows [not to benefit] from those who rest on the Sabbath, is forbidden [to benefit] both from Israelites and Samaritans (. Samaritans and Israelites both kept the Sabbath, and therefore one who swears not to receive benefit from “those who rest on the Sabbath” may benefit from neither. However, he may benefit from non-Jews who do not rest on the Sabbath.", + "If he vows [not to benefit] from garlic eaters, he may not benefit from Israelites and Samaritans (. According to most commentators, this refers to a custom to eat garlic on Friday evening in order to act as an aphrodisiac, for sexual relations, which are recommended on Friday night. Evidently, Samaritans observed this custom as well.", + "From those who go up to Jerusalem, he is forbidden [to benefit] from Israelites but from Samaritans ( he is permitted. As stated in the introduction, Samaritans did not worship in Jerusalem. Therefore, one who swears not to receive benefit from those who “go up to Jerusalem” may receive benefit from Samaritans." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis long mishnah actually contains several mishnayoth. The first part begins with a definition of the terms “Children of Noah” and “Children of Abraham”. The second part deals with vows not to benefit from Israelites and the third part deals with vows not to benefit from the uncircumcised or the circumcised. The mishnah ends with an ode to the importance of circumcision in Judaism.", + "[If one says,] “Konam that I do not benefit from the Children of Noah,” he may benefit from Israelites, and he is forbidden to benefit from the nations of the world. [If one says, “Konam] that I do not benefit from the seed of Abraham,” he is forbidden [to benefit] from Israelites, but permitted [to benefit] from the nations of the world. Technically speaking, all of humanity are the descendents of Noah, for only his family survived the flood. However, the term “Children of Noah” refers to non-Jews (Noahides, as in the “Noahide commandments”) and not to Jews. Similarly, the “Seed of Abraham” could refer to Ishmaelites, Edomites (descendents of Esau). However, it is taken as referring to Jews and not non-Jews. We should note that descent, both physical and spiritual from Abraham was a “hot” issue in Mishnaic times, and we often find it being debated in early Christian texts. In Christian texts we find Christian leaders telling Jews that although they are physical (carnal) descendents of Abraham, they are not his only spiritual descendents. In our mishnah we sees rabbis claiming that only Jews are Abraham’s descendents; non-Jews, although some of them may trace their roots to Abraham, are not actually his descendents. This polemic, which we may hear here between Jews and Christians, will sharpen at the end of this mishnah, which discusses the hottest topic between Jews and early Christians the importance of circumcision.", + "[If one says, “Konam] that I do not benefit from Israelites”, he may buy things from them for more [than their worth] and sell them for less. [If he says, “Konam] if Israelites benefit from me, he must buy from them for less and sell for more [than their worth], if they will listen to him. [If he says, “Konam] that I do not benefit from them, nor they from me”, he may benefit only from non-Jews. With regard to vows not to benefit from or give benefit to Israelites, the mishnah interprets these vows minimally. One who says that he will not benefit from Israelites is still allowed to buy from them, provided he pay more than the fair price, and sell to them, provided he buy at a higher price. Because he loses out, he is not considered as benefiting from them. One who says that he will not give benefit to Israelites, is still permitted to buy, but only at a price lower than the going rate, and sell, but only at a price higher than the going rate. Of course, in the latter case it will be more difficult to get someone to agree to do so with him. The only one who is totally prohibited from buying from or selling to Israelites is one who vows not to benefit from or give benefit to them. This person could only conduct business with non-Jews.", + "[If one says,] “Konam that I do not benefit from the uncircumcised”, he may benefit from uncircumcised Israelites but not from circumcised heathens”; [If one says, “Konam] that I do not benefit from the circumcised,” he is forbidden to benefit from uncircumcised Israelites but not from circumcised non-Jews, because “uncircumcised” is a term applicable only to non-Jews, as it says, “For all the nations are uncircumcised and all the house of Israel are uncircumcised in the heart” (Jeremiah 9:25). And it says, “And this uncircumcised Philistine shall be [as one of them]” (I Samuel 17:6). And it says, “Lest the daughters of the Philistines rejoice, lest the daughters of the uncircumcised exult” (II Samuel 1:20). Rabbi Eleazar ben Azariah says: The foreskin is loathsome, since it is a term of disgrace for the wicked, as it says, “For all the nations are uncircumcised”. Rabbi Ishmael says: Great is circumcision, since thirteen covenants were made upon it. Rabbi Yose says: Great is circumcision, for it overrides the Sabbath. Rabbi Joshua ben Karha says: Great is circumcision for Moses’s punishment for neglecting it was not suspended even for one hour. Rabbi Nehemiah says: Great is circumcision, since it overrides the laws of leprosy. Rabbi says: Great is circumcision, for despite all of the commandments which Abraham fulfilled he was not designated complete until he circumcised himself, as it says, “Walk before me, and be complete” (Genesis 17:1). Another explanation: “Great is circumcision, for were it not for it, the Holy One, Blessed Be He, would not have created the world, as it says, “Were it not for my covenant by day and night, I would not have appointed the ordinances of heaven and earth” (Jeremiah 33:35). The term “circumcised” refers to Jews, even to those Jews who are not circumcised, for either legitimate or illegitimate reasons. The term “uncircumcised” refers to non-Jews, even to those non-Jews who did circumcise (it is known that some non-Jews did practice circumcision, for instance Arabs and Egyptians). As a prooftext Jeremiah 9:25 is brought. According to this verse non-Jews are uncircumcised, no matter whom they are. Israelites, however, are circumcised in their foreskins, even if they are not always circumcised in their hearts. We should again note that there may exist a polemic in this mishnah with early Christianity. In Acts 7:51, Stephen says “You stiff-necked people, uncircumcised in heart”. In Romans 2:29, Paul says, “Rather, a real person is a Jew who is one inwardly, and real circumcision is a matter of the heart it is spiritual and not literal.” We can clearly see the distinction between the Jews and the Christians (who, of course, claimed at the time to be the true Jews). The Jews admit, based on Jeremiah, that they are not necessarily “uncircumcised of the heart”. A Jew still must strive to be better and to obey God’s commands. However, the validity of real circumcision (of the foreskin) is not lessened at all. Indeed, as a sign of God’s covenant, it is the primary commandment. It was certainly, the greatest distinguishing sign between Jew and non-Jew, both in the ancient world and to this day.", + "The mishnah now brings seven statements that emphasize the importance of circumcision. 1. The first of these statements connects to the verse used above from Jeremiah. This is the bridge to the rest of the mishnah. 2. In Genesis 17, the word “berith”, covenant, as in “berith milah”, the “covenant of circumcision”, is stated thirteen times. 3. Circumcision may be performed on the Sabbath, even though it involves the cutting of the flesh which is otherwise prohibited on the Sabbath. 4. In Exodus 4:24, on his way back to Egypt, despite Moses’s great merits, and despite the fact that God had just instructed him to lead the people out of Egypt, God almost kills him for not having circumcised his son. 5. Normally, one may not cut off a spot of leprosy (see Deuteronomy 24:8). However, if the spot of leprosy appears on the foreskin, it may be cut off. 6. Only after circumcision is Abraham called “complete”. 7. This verse mentions a covenant kept day and night. The midrash states that this must refer to circumcision, which exists on a person’s body both day and night. Indeed, were it not for this important commandment, God would not have created the world. There is little doubt in my mind that this long mishnah is aimed either at early Christians who denied the importance of physical circumcision, or at Hellenizing Jews, who refused to circumcise themselves, or “uncircumcised” themselves. Romans often forbade circumcision, and these statements, which may be slightly exaggerated, are meant to encourage Jews to maintain this commandment, one which would not have been easy, for both physical and social reasons, in the ancient world." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah and the subsequent mishnayoth discuss what is prohibited to a person who is under a vow not to benefit from his fellow. Note that these types of vows can be initiated by either party: Reuven may swear that Shimon may not benefit from Reuven’s property and Shimon may swear that he may not benefit from Reuven’s property.", + "The only difference between one who is under a vow not to benefit at all from his neighbor, and one who is under a vow prohibiting food benefit, is in respect of walking [on his property] and [the use of] utensils not employed in the preparation of food. There are two things which are permitted to one who is under a vow not to derive food benefit from his neighbor that are not permitted to one who may not benefit from his neighbor at all: walking on his property and the use of things not involved in the making of food. The next section of the mishnah will qualify this statement.", + "If a man is under a vow not to derive food benefit from his neighbor, he may not lend him a sifter, sieve, mill-stone or oven, but he may lend him a cloak, ring, garment, and earrings, and whatever is not employed in the preparation of food. In a place where things such as these are rented out, it is forbidden. A man who cannot derive food benefit from his neighbor may not borrow vessels which are involved in the making of food, but he may borrow things not involved in the making of food. However, if in such a place, the custom is to rent these things (a cloak etc.) then borrowing them is prohibited. For if the one who cannot receive benefit from his friend borrows these things without paying, he saves the money he would have otherwise had to spend. With that money he may now go and buy food. Indirectly, therefore, he has derived food benefit. Therefore, in such a place borrowing any item would be prohibited." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah and the remainder of the chapter teach what a person can do with/for his friend, even though he is under oath not to give any benefit to him.", + "If one is under a vow not to benefit from his neighbor, [his neighbor] may pay his shekel, pay off his debts, and return a lost article to him. Where payment is taken for this, the benefit should become sacred property. When the Temple still stood every Jew had to send a half shekel every year for the upkeep of the Temple. Even if Reuven cannot receive benefit from Shimon, Shimon may pay his half shekel. Similarly, Shimon may pay off Reuven’s debts. Both of these are permitted because Shimon is not giving money directly to Reuven. Shimon may also return a lost object to Reuven because he is only returning to Reuven what is already his. Furthermore, all Shimon is doing is fulfilling the mitzvah of returning lost objects. If people customarily offer financial rewards to someone who returns a lost object, Shimon may not turn down Reuven’s offer of a reward, because by doing so he would be giving financial benefit to Reuven. If Shimon does not want to just take the money, he may donate it to the Temple by making it sacred property. Other commentators explain that this last clause refers to a case where neither party may benefit from the other. They are still allowed to return each other’s lost property, for that is a mitzvah. However, if a reward is given it must go to charity. The one who returned the lost object cannot take the reward nor can the one who received it not give the reward, for in either case, someone would have received financial benefit." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to discuss what Shimon may do for Reuven who has sworn not to receive benefit from him. The first part of the mishnah discusses certain mitzvoth which might cost money. The second part deals with feeding those whom the person who cannot receive benefit has a responsibility to feed.", + "He may donate his terumah and his tithes with his consent. If Reuven cannot receive any benefit from Shimon, Shimon may still donate Reuven’s terumah and tithes, as long as Reuven consents. This could happen in two ways. First of all, Reuven could say that anyone who wants to donate his terumah or tithes may do so. Shimon may then take of Reuven’s produce and donate it. Alternatively, Shimon may donate of his own produce as if it was Reuven’s and thereby exempt Reuven from giving terumah or tithes. Reuven may not specifically tell Shimon to donate his terumah for then Shimon would be an agent of Reuven’s, which is forbidden.", + "He may offer up for him the bird sacrifices of zavim and zavoth and the bird sacrifices of women after childbirth, sin-offerings and guilt-offerings. When a person is purified from having been a zav or a zavah (some type of gonorrhea), s/he must bring bird sacrifices. Similarly, after having given birth, a woman must bring bird sacrifices. After sinning, a person must bring either a sin-offering or a guilt-offering, depending upon the sin. The mishnah teaches that if Shimon is a kohen, and Reuven cannot receive benefit from him, Shimon may still offer up his sacrifices, because kohanim are agents of God and are not considered the agents of those whose sacrifices they are offering.", + "He may teach him midrash, halakhoth and aggadoth, but not Scripture, yet he may teach his sons and daughters Scripture Shimon can teach Reuven midrash (explanation of Scripture), halakhah (mishnah) and aggadah (legends) because all of these are part of the oral Torah, and teachers of the oral Torah were not paid for their teaching. Therefore, Reuven is not receiving financial benefit. However, Shimon may not teach Reuven written Torah (Scripture) without receiving pay, because people customarily were paid for this. If Shimon forgoes his pay, Reuven will have received financial benefit. However, Shimon may teach Reuven’s sons and daughters Scripture, for this is a commandment placed upon the father. Shimon’s helping Reuven fulfill a commandment is not considered financial benefit, even though in reality, Reuven is saving money. Note, that this mishnah implies that a parent is obligated to teach his child Torah, more than he is obligated to learn Torah himself.", + "And he may support his wife and children, even though he is liable for their maintenance. Shimon may feed Reuven’s family, even though Reuven is obligated to do so. This is because Shimon is not giving anything to Reuven.", + "But he may not feed his beasts, whether clean or unclean. Rabbi Eliezer says: he may feed an unclean beast of his, but not a clean one. They said to him: what is the difference between an unclean and a clean beast? He replied to them, a clean beast, its life belongs to heaven, but its body is his own; but an unclean animal its body and life belongs to heaven. They said to him: The life of an unclean beast too belongs to heaven and the body is his own for if he wishes, he can sell it to a non-Jew or feed dogs with it. There is a debate whether or not Shimon may feed Reuven’s impure (unkosher) animal. All hold that he may not feed Reuven’s clean (kosher) animal, because that is giving Reuven money which he eventually might consume. However, the unkosher animal will not be eaten. Rabbi Eliezer argues that the impure animal’s flesh, when it dies, returns to God, just as its life-force does as well. Since the flesh doesn’t belong to its Jewish owner, Shimon may feed it and it is not considered direct benefit to Reuven. The other Sages argue that since Reuven may give the animal (its meat) to a non-Jew or feed it to a dog, by feeding it Shimon would be benefiting Reuven, and it is therefore prohibited." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe mishnah deals with several types of benefit that Shimon must refrain from giving Reuven who has sworn (or been sworn by Shimon) not to receive benefit from him.", + "If one is forbidden to benefit from his neighbor, and he pays him a visit [in sickness] he must stand, but not sit. Shimon may visit Reuven when he is sick, because that is a mitzvah. However, he shouldn’t sit with him for a long time, because that would be causing benefit to Reuven.", + "He may afford him a cure of life, but not a cure of money. The Talmud explains that Shimon may help cure Reuven for that is a commandment. However, he may not cure Reuven’s animal for that is a monetary benefit.", + "He may bathe together with him in a large bath, but not in a small one. If Shimon gets into a small bath with Reuven, he will raise the level of the bath water, and thereby benefit Reuven. Therefore he may not do so. However, he may get into a large bath with him where the water level will barely be raised.", + "He may sleep in a bed with him. Rabbi Judah said: in summer, but not in winter, because he thereby benefits him. He may [nevertheless] recline with him on a couch. He may sleep in bed with him, even though he warms up the bed. Rabbi Judah restricts this to the summer months, when it is warm anyway. However, even Rabbi Judah agrees that he may recline with him on the same couch, and we are not concerned lest he fall asleep.", + "[He may] eat at the same table with him but not out of the same bowl; but he may eat with him out of a bowl which returns. He may not eat with him out of the food trough put before laborers. Reuven may eat at the same table as Shimon, and we are not concerned lest Reuven eats from Shimon’s plate and thereby derives benefit. However, they may not eat out of the same communal bowl, lest Shimon intentionally leave the best part of the food for Reuven, and thereby cause him benefit. If the communal bowl was a “returning bowl” meaning one that was full of food, such that each person eating could eat his fill and still have leftovers, then they may share. In such a case, there is no concern that Shimon will leave food for Reuven because there is enough for everyone. They may not eat out of the same bowl put before laborers, because laborers are always hungry and there are never leftovers. Therefore, Shimon might eat less so that Reuven could eat more.", + "He may not work with him on the same furrow, the words of Rabbi Meir. But the Sages say: he may work at a distance from him. According to Rabbi Meir they may not work plowing the same furrow, since if Shimon works harder he will benefit Reuven by allowing him to work less. The Sages allow them to work in the same furrow, as long as they keep their distance." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nDuring the sabbatical (seventh) year, the produce that a person’s fields grow is legally ownerless and therefore anyone can enter anyone else’s fields and eat what he wishes.\nOur mishnah teaches about prohibitive vows and the sabbatical year.", + "He who is forbidden by vow to benefit from his neighbor, [if the vow was imposed] before the seventh year, may not enter his field, nor eat produce that hangs over [from the other’s property]. If Reuven takes a vow that Shimon shall not benefit from his property before the seventh year, Shimon may not enter Reuven’s field, because as we learned in mishnah one, when one is forbidden by vow to benefit from another, even walking in his field is forbidden. He may also not eat of the produce that hangs over from the field, even when in the seventh year. Although this produce is now ownerless, and Shimon is not benefiting from Reuven, since this produce was prohibited to Shimon, the seventh year does not make it permitted.", + "If [the vow was imposed] in the seventh year, he may not enter his field, but may eat of the produce that hangs over [from the other’s property]. If the vow was imposed in the seventh year, then Shimon still cannot go onto Reuven’s property. However, he may eat of the produce that hangs over the property line since Reuven did not own the produce when the vow was taken, such that he could forbidden it to Shimon.", + "If he was forbidden [merely] in respect of food, [and the vow was imposed] before the seventh year, he may enter his field, but may not eat of its fruits. If the vow was not prohibitive of all benefit, but just of food, then Shimon may enter Reuven’s property. However, if the vow was taken before the sabbatical year, then Shimon may still not eat the food.", + "But [if it was imposed] in the seventh year, he may enter [his field] and eat [of its fruits]. If the vow which only prohibited food was taken on the sabbatical year, Shimon may enter Reuven’s property and eat, for the produce was not Reuven’s to prohibit." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first section continues to discuss prohibitions applicable to a person who cannot derive benefit from another because of a vow. The second section is a digression from the topic of our chapter.", + "He who is forbidden by vow to benefit from his neighbor may not lend [objects] to him or borrow from him, lend [money] to him or receive from him a loan, sell to him or purchase from him. If Reuven cannot receive benefit from Shimon, he certainly may not borrow from him. Our mishnah teaches that he is prohibited even from lending to him, lest by doing so he also borrows. This fear of reciprocity is the reasoning that lies behind the following mutual prohibition as well. Obviously, Reuven cannot borrow money, but the mishnah teaches he may not even lend money to Shimon, lest he borrow as well. Reuven cannot sell or buy lest he benefit from either transaction.", + "One says to another, “Lend me your cow.” [The other] says, “It is not available.” [The first one] says, “Konam, if I ever plow my field with it’. If he generally plowed himself, he is forbidden, but others are permitted. But if he did not generally plow himself, he and others are forbidden. This section is not directly related to the larger topic of this chapter. It is brought here because it also has to do with lending and vowing. Reuven asks Shimon to borrow his cow to plow with it. Shimon responds that his cow is not available. Reuven, being somewhat impatient, takes a vow that he will never use Shimon’s cow to plow his field. The mishnah rules that if Reuven normally plows on his own, Shimon can lend him the cow and others can plow Reuven’s field with it. In other words, we interpret Reuven’s vow literally; Reuven cannot plow with it, but others can. However, if Reuven does not normally plow, then obviously when he said “Konam, if I ever plow my field with it”, then he meant “Konam, if my field is ever plowed with it.” Therefore, even others may not plow his field with Shimon’s cow." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with a situation in which Shimon is forbidden by a vow from receiving benefit from Reuven, yet is in need of financial help and Reuven wants to help him. The mishnah provides legal fictions by which Shimon may derive benefit from Reuven without actually transgressing his vow.", + "If one is forbidden by vow to benefit from his neighbor, and he has nothing to eat, he [the neighbor] can go to the shopkeeper and say, “So-and-so is forbidden by vow to benefit from me, and I do not know what to do.” The shopkeeper may then provide for him, and come and receive payment from him [the neighbor]. Shimon, who may not benefit at all from Reuven, has nothing to eat, and Reuven wishes to help him. Reuven cannot, of course, give directly to Shimon, but he may go to a shopkeeper and tell him that Shimon has nothing to eat, and that Reuven would like to do something. Reuven should not directly tell the shopkeeper to give food to Shimon, but rather should hint at it. The shopkeeper may then provide Shimon with food and receive payment from Reuven, without Shimon breaking his vow. The crucial factor here is that Reuven did not actually tell the shopkeeper to feed Shimon.", + "If he had to build his house, or his fence to set up, or his field to harvest, he [the neighbor] may go to laborers, and say, “So-and-so is forbidden by vow to benefit from me, and I do not know what to do.’ They may then work for him and come and receive wages from him [the neighbor]. In this case, Shimon had to (re)build his house, set up a fence, or harvest his field, but did not have any money to pay workers. Again, Reuven wants to help him (Reuven is quite a generous guy), but cannot do so directly because of the vow. As he did with the shopkeeper in the previous section, he may hint to laborers that Shimon needs work done for him, and that he would like to help Shimon, but doesn’t know what to do. The workers may then go to Shimon and afterwards collect their wages from Reuven. The mishnah needs to teach the second clause, even though the ruling should have been obvious after the first clause, in order to emphasize that this type of “legal fiction” is permitted even in cases not involving food. Since the case in section two is less likely to be a matter of life and death, we might have thought that in this case, the legal fiction would not be permitted. The mishnah therefore emphasizes that it is." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with a situation where Shimon who may not benefit from Reuven, is walking on the road with Reuven and Shimon runs out of food to eat. The question is, how can Reuven give food to Shimon without breaking the vow?", + "If they are walking together on the road, and he has nothing to eat, he can make a gift to a third person, and he is permitted [to eat] it. In this scenario, there is a third person walking on the road with Reuven and Shimon. Reuven may give the food to the third person, with the assumption that Shimon will take it from him. As long as Reuven does not give the food directly to Shimon, the vow has not been transgressed.", + "If there is no one else with them, he may put it on a stone or a wall and say, “This is free to whomever desires it”, and the other takes and eats it. Rabbi Yose prohibits this. According to the first opinion, if there is no third person walking with them, Reuven may put the food down and declare it legally ownerless and then Shimon may take it. Although it is obvious that Shimon is going to take the food, and no one has taken possession of it since Reuven had possession, this is still permitted. Rabbi Yose forbids this, and considers it to be no different than Reuven giving directly to Shimon." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nIn the time of the Mishnah, people’s homes opened into jointly possessed courtyards. The custom was to use the courtyard for various purposes, including cooking, grinding wheat and raising chickens. However, each resident could prevent the others from using the courtyard for such purposes.\nOur mishnah discusses a situation in which either both or one of the owners of the courtyard has taken a vow not to benefit from the other. The question is, can they still use the courtyard?", + "If joint owners [of a courtyard] made a vow not to benefit from one another, they may not enter the courtyard. Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob says: This one enters his own property and this one enters his own property. If both owners of the courtyard vowed not to benefit from the other, according to the first opinion neither may enter the courtyard at all. As we learned above (4:1), one who is not allowed by vow to benefit from another, may not walk on his property. Since the property is jointly owned, each one would be entering the other’s property. Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob holds that since in general both people can enter the courtyard, neither is really entering someone else’s property. At each point where he stands he could claim that this part is his. Therefore, both can enter the courtyard.", + "And both are forbidden to set up a mill-stone or an oven or raise chickens. Neither may use the courtyard for any of its normal uses. Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob would agree with this, since putting any of these things in the courtyard requires the neighbor’s permission, and in this case, permission cannot be granted.", + "If [only] one was forbidden by vow to benefit from the other, he may not enter the court. Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob says: He can say to the other, “I am entering into my own, and I am not entering into yours.’ If only one owner is prohibited by vow from benefiting from the other, he may not enter the courtyard. Again, Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob holds that this is permitted.", + "They force the one who vowed to sell his share [of the courtyard]. In such a case, the one who vowed must sell his share of the courtyard, lest he come to use the courtyard, which even Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob prohibits. However, this is only true if he himself swore not to benefit from his neighbor. If his neighbor swore that he should not benefit from him, he is not forced to sell his share of the courtyard." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is a continuation of yesterday’s mishnah. It again deals with the question of joint ownership of courtyards.", + "If a man from the street was forbidden by vow to benefit from one of them, he may not enter the courtyard. Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob says: He can say to him, “I am entering into your friend’s and not into yours.” Reuven and Shimon share a courtyard. Levi is prohibited by vow from benefiting from Reuven. According to the first opinion, Levi may not enter the courtyard, because by doing so, he would be benefiting from Reuven’s property. Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob says the same thing which he said in yesterday’s mishnah. Levi can enter the courtyard and tell Reuven that he is not benefiting from his property but rather from Shimon’s." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn the previous mishnayoth we learned rulings regarding entering a courtyard for someone who by vow is prohibited from receiving benefit from his neighbor. In this mishnah we learn the rules regarding other types of property: a bath-house, an olive press, a house and a field.", + "If one is forbidden by vow to benefit from his neighbor, and he owns a bath-house or an olive press which is leased to someone in the town, and he has an interest in them, he is forbidden [to make use of them]; If [he does] not [have an interest in them], he is permitted. Shimon is prohibited by vow from receiving benefit from Reuven, who owns a bath-house or an olive press. If Reuven rents the bath-house or olive press to a third party, but still retains an interest in them, for instance he gets a percentage of the profits or he did not rent out the whole thing, then Shimon may not enter them, for they are still partially Reuven’s property. However, if he retains no interest, and receives only a fixed sum as rent, then Shimon may enter. In the latter case when Shimon enters, he is entering a third person’s property, and it is therefore permitted.", + "If a man says to his neighbor, “Konam, if I enter your house”, or “[Konam] if I purchase your field”, and then [the owner] dies or sells it to another, he is permitted [to enter or buy it]; [But if he says] “Konam, if I enter this house”, or “[Konam] if I purchase this field”, and [the owner] dies or sells it to another, he is forbidden. If Shimon says to Reuven, “Konam if I enter your house” or “Konam if I purchase your field”, when Reuven dies or sells the property, Shimon may enter his house or buy his field, because it is no longer Reuven’s house or field. However, if he says “Konam, if I enter this house”, or “Konam, if I purchase this field”, he may not enter the house or buy the field even when they no longer belong to Reuven. In this case the house and the field itself are prohibited to him, no matter who owns them." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe point of this mishnah is to teach the status of people who may not benefit from one another vis a vis public property. There are two types of public property mentioned in our mishnah and explained in the following mishnah. The first is property which belongs to the people of a given city and the second is property which belongs to all of Israel. Included in the latter category are wells dug by pilgrims from Babylonia coming up to Jerusalem. Hence, the last category is called “things which belong to those who came up from Babylonia”.", + "[If a man says to his neighbor] “Behold, I am herem to you” the opposite party is forbidden [to derive benefit from the one who swore]. “Behold, you are herem to me” the one who swore is forbidden. “Behold, I am [herem] to you, and you are [herem] to me”, both are forbidden. The first section of the mishanh basically teaches an additional way in which people may prohibit others from benefiting from themselves, or prohibit themselves from benefiting from others. Each may declare himself “herem” forbidden property, to the other, or the other “herem” to himself. In such a way Reuven may prohibit Shimon from benefiting from him, and he may prohibit himself from benefiting from Shimon, or he may even do both in the same statement.", + "Both are permitted [to enjoy the use of] those things which belong to those who came up from Babylonia [to Jerusalem], but are forbidden [the use of] things that belong to that town. Although they may not benefit from each other, they may each still use “things which belong to those who came up from Babylonia [to Jerusalem]”. Each individual Jew is not considered an owner of these things, or even a partner in their ownership. Rather they belong collectively to the children of Israel. However, town property is owned in partnership by all of the members of the town. Therefore, it is treated like the common courtyard mentioned in mishnayoth one and two. If Reuven and Shimon cannot benefit from one another, then they may not use the commonly owned town property." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah explains the categories mentioned at the end of the previous mishnah. It also discusses how people can avoid some of the difficult consequences of being forbidden to derive benefit from one another.", + "What are the things that belong to those that came up from Babylonia [to Jerusalem]? For example the Temple Mount and the Temple courtyards and the well in the middle of the road. The things that belong to “those who came up from Babylonia” are mostly holy property, for example the Temple and the courtyards. Also included in this category are the wells dug for the pilgrims so that they would have water on their way over. Those who may not receive benefit from one another may still benefit from this type of property since individuals do not own shares in them, rather they are owned collectively.", + "What are the things that belong to that town? For example the public square, the bath-house, the synagogue, the ark, and the [sacred] scrolls. The city property includes most structures built specifically for a certain city, including the town square, synagogue, ark for keeping the scrolls and the scrolls themselves. Note that although these things are religious items, they still are jointly owned by the people of the city and not by all of Israel. Therefore, if people cannot benefit from one another, they may not benefit from this property as well.", + "And he should assign his portion to the Patriarch. Rabbi Judah says: it is the same whether he assigns it to the Patriarch or to a private individual. But what is the difference between one who assigns it to the Patriarch and one who assigns it to a private individual? If he assigns it to the Patriarch, he need not [formally] confer title. But the Sages say: both this and this require formal conferring of title, they mentioned the Patriarch in particular as this is usual. Rabbi Judah said: The Galileans need not assign [their portion], because their ancestors have already done so for them. This next section gives advice on how to deal with a situation in which Reuven cannot benefit from all municipal property because he cannot benefit from Shimon’s property and likewise Shimon may not benefit from municipal property because of Reuven’s partial ownership. After all, this could make life quite difficult. The solution is that both write out a document assigning their shares to the Patriarch, so that he owns their share of the municipal property. In this way, they will not be benefiting from each other’s property but from the Patriarch’s. Rabbi Judah says that they need not assign the property to the Patriarch but rather may assign it to any individual. The only difference between the two is that the transaction with the Patriarch does not require any formal transaction, whereas a transaction with an ordinary person does. The other Sages hold that no matter whom one assigns the property, a formal transaction is required. The only reason that the earlier halakhah mentioned assigning the property to the Patriarch was that this was the normal way of doing things. In other words, it is a suggestion and not mandatory. In contrast, Rabbi Judah would say that the halakhah mentions the Patriarch because it is easier to assign him property than to an ordinary individual. Nevertheless, he too would hold that this is not mandatory. Finally, Rabbi Judah says that in the Galilee the Patriarch is already the formal owner of all municipal property, and hence the entire problem will not arise." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses a subject already dealt with in 4:8, how a person who cannot benefit from another person may nevertheless derive benefit from him by there being a third party intermediary. Our mishnah teaches that when Reuven gives the property to Levi so that Shimon who cannot receive benefit from Reuven, may use the property, the gift needs to be complete. In reality, Levi need not do with the property as Reuven requested. A poignant story shall illustrate this.", + "If one is forbidden by vow to benefit from his neighbor and has nothing to eat, he may give it [the food] to a third party, and he is permitted to use it. This halakhah was basically taught above in mishnah 4:8. It is brought here as an introduction to the story.", + "It happened to one in Beth Horon that his father was forbidden to benefit from him. Now he [the son] was giving his son in marriage and he said to his neighbor, “The courtyard and the banquet are give to you as a gift, but they are yours only that my father may come and feast with us at the banquet.” He said to him, “If they are mine, let them be dedicated to heaven!” [The son] responded, “But I did not give you my property to dedicate it to heaven.” [The other] responded, “You gave me yours so that you and your father might eat and drink together and become reconciled to one another, while the sin [of a broken vow] should devolve upon his (i.e. head.” When the matter came before the Sages, they ruled: every gift which is not [so given] that if he [the recipient] dedicates it, it is dedicated, is no gift [at all]. The father could not enter his son’s courtyard or eat of his food, because he was forbidden by oath to benefit from his son. It is unclear how this situation arose, whether the father or the son initiated the vow. In any case, there was clearly strife in their past. Now that his own son is marrying, the son wants his father to be able to attend the wedding and join in the feast. To solve the problem he gives the courtyard and the food to a third party. However, the third party declares that it is all dedicated to the Temple, which would make it impossible to use for a feast. The Sages rule that since the son does not want the dedication to be valid, he did not really give it to the third party. Therefore it is still his, and his father may not come to the wedding. This is truly a sad situation, and it is clearly meant to demonstrate what disastrous results may arise from rashly-made vows taken against loved ones. Indeed, it may still ring as a warning in our ears, not to let our disagreements with family members cross the line of no return. It is a message that unfortunately too many families need." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nAs I previously explained, when we interpret what the one who swore intended by his vow, we interpret his words according to the normal way in which people talk. Our mishnah and those that follow explain how certain vows are to be interpreted based on this principle.", + "He who vows [not to eat] what is “cooked [mebushal] is permitted what is roasted or seethed. In Mishnaic Hebrew there are three types of cooking: boiling, roasting and seething. The latter refers to cooking something in water until it is really well-done (the way they used to serve vegetables in school lunches). Since people distinguish between these types of cooking, one who swears not to eat one type, is not prohibited from the other.", + "If he says, “Konam if I taste any cooked dish [tabshil]” he is forbidden [to eat] food loosely cooked in a pot, but is permitted [to eat] food solidly-cooked. He may also eat a lightly boiled egg and gourds put in ashes. If he says that he is forbidden to eat a “cooked dish”, “tabshil” in Hebrew, he may not eat food cooked loosely, such as food with a sauce. However, he may eat food cooked in a pot that comes out solid, such as cereals. Furthermore, the Talmud explains that “tabshil” refers to food eaten with bread, such as hummous or other spreads. Food not eaten with bread, such as hot cereal, is not called “tabshil”. He may eat a lightly-boiled egg and bitter gourds mixed with ashes which sweeten them since these are also not called “tabshil”. (This doesn’t really sound like it tastes so good, but then again, taste is culturally dependent.)" + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with a person who vows not to eat food which goes into a pot. The mishnah relates to two such types of food; 1) food that is totally boiled in the pot; 2) food that is lightly cooked in a pot and is finished cooking somewhere else, such as in a frying pan or in an oven.", + "He who vows abstinence from food prepared in a pot, is forbidden only from food boiled in a pot; If a person takes a vow forbidding himself from eating anything “prepared in a pot” he is only forbidden from eating things totally prepared in the pot, meaning that they were completely boiled in the pot. An example would be a grain dish, which in Talmudic times was boiled in water. He would still be permitted to eat things which had preliminary stages of their cooking in a pot and were later baked or fried.", + "But if he says, “Konam that I taste whatever goes down into a pot”, he is forbidden everything prepared in a pot. However, if he says “whatever goes down into a pot”, he is forbidden to eat anything that has at any time been in a pot." + ], + [ + "[He who vows abstinence] from what is pickled is forbidden only pickled vegetables; [If he says, “Konam,] if I taste anything pickled”, he is forbidden all pickled.
[He who vows abstinence] from what is seethed is forbidden only seethed meat; [If he says, “Konam,] if I taste anything seethed” he is forbidden every thing seethed.
[He who vows abstinence] from what is roasted is forbidden only roasted meat, the words of Rabbi Judah. [If he says, “Konam,] if I taste anything roasted” he is forbidden anything roasted.
[He who vows abstinence] from what is salted is forbidden only salted fish; [If he says, “Konam,] if I taste anything salted” he is forbidden anything salted.
In all of the clauses in this mishnah there is one type of food that is the typical example of food prepared in a certain way, yet there also exist other foods prepared in the same way. This is similar to the way we say “pickle” to refer to a pickled cucumber, or a “roast” to refer to roasted meat. There are other foods that are pickled but still no one says “I’ll have a pickled cucumber” because a pickle is a pickled cucumber.
The mishnah teaches whether a person who swears abstinence from a food prepared in a certain way is prohibited from all food prepared that way, or just the food that is usually referred to as being prepared in that way.
Section one: “Pickled” normally refers to pickled vegetables. Hence one who vows not to eat “what is pickled” is forbidden only to eat pickled vegetables. However, if he says “Konam if I taste anything pickled”, since he his statement applies that he wishes to forbid himself to anything pickled he may not eat anything “pickled”.
This same paradigm applies to all of the sections of the mishnah. “Seethed” (overly boiled) normally refers to seethed meat. “Roasted” normally refers to roasted meat. “Salted” normally refers to salted fish. All of these cases are exactly like the case of “pickled” as explained above." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses vows of abstinence from types of fish.", + "‘[Konam,] if I taste fish or fishes,” he is forbidden [to eat] them, whether large or small, salted or unsalted, raw or cooked. But he may eat chopped terith and brine. If one forbids himself to eat either “fish” or “fishes” he is forbidden to eat all kinds of fish. Since he used both plural and singular, he clearly intended to forbid himself from all fish. However he may eat chopped terith, because that is not called fish. Although I don’t know exactly what this was, I assume that it was so chopped up that people didn’t really think of it as fish. He may also eat the brine, the liquid that comes out of fish (sounds gross to me, but certain members of my family do seem to enjoy this).", + "He who vows [abstinence] from zahanah is forbidden chopped terith, but may eat brine and pickled fish brine. Zahanah is a foul-smelling mixture of different chopped fish, and hence one who vows not to eat zahanah, may also not eat chopped terith. However, he may still eat different types of brine.", + "He who vows [abstinence] from chopped terith may not eat of brine and pickled fish brine. Chopped terith includes in it brine and pickled fish brine. Therefore one who forbids himself from eating chopped terith may not eat any type of brine either." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses one who vows abstinence from different milk products.", + "He who vows [abstinence] from milk is permitted to eat curds. But Rabbi Yose forbids it. A person who vowed abstinence from milk may still eat curds, the water that remains after milk has been curdled into cheese. This is not called milk and hence is not forbidden. Rabbi Yose disagrees.", + "[He who vows abstinence] “from curds,” is permitted milk. Again, curds are not considered to be milk and hence one who forbids himself from eating curds may still drink milk.", + "Abba Shaul says: he who vows abstinence from cheese, is prohibited to eat [cheese], whether salted or unsalted. A vow of abstinence from cheese forbids one from eating any kind of cheese." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first part of our mishnah discusses what is prohibited when one vows to abstain from meat. The second part of the mishnah discusses the problem of a forbidden food (in this case forbidden through a vow) becoming mixed up with other permitted foods.", + "He who vows [abstinence] from meat may eat broth and meat sediment. But Rabbi Judah prohibits. One who vows not to eat meat, may still eat broth and the pieces of meat that stick to the pot (meat sediment) for those are not considered to be what the person intended when he vowed to abstain from “meat”. Rabbi Judah says that even the broth and meat sediment are prohibited.", + "Rabbi Judah said: it once happened that Rabbi Tarfon prohibited me from eating [even the] eggs boiled [with the meat]. They replied: That is so. When is this true? When he says “This meat is prohibited to me.” For if one vows [to abstain] from something, and it is mixed up with another thing, if there is a sufficient [amount of the prohibited food] to impart its taste [to the other] it is forbidden. To support his opinion, Rabbi Judah tells a story of how Rabbi Tarfon prohibited him from having even the eggs boiled with the meat. The reason is that the eggs had absorbed some of the taste of the meat. If even the eggs are prohibited, obviously the broth and the meat sediment should be prohibited as well. The Sages respond that the case where Rabbi Tarfon prohibited the eggs proves their point, for in that case the person said “This meat is prohibited to me” and not “Konam, the meat that I eat.” In the former case, he may not eat anything that has the taste of the prohibited meat, including the eggs cooked with it. However, in the latter case, his intention was to abstain only from things called “meat” and not from broth or meat sediments." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to illustrate the principle learned in yesterday’s mishnah. If one vows abstinence from a type of food, he may not eat anything which is called by that name. However, he may eat derivatives of the food as long as they are called by a different name. But, if one vows abstinence from a specific piece of food, i.e. “this piece of meat” or “this wine” he is forbidden to eat not only that piece of food but anything that has derived taste from it.\nThe mishnah discusses wine, grapes, olives and olive oil.", + "He who vows [abstinence] from wine, may eat food which contains the taste of wine. If he says, “Konam if I taste this wine”, and it falls into food, if it is sufficient to impart its taste [to the food] it is forbidden. If he vows to abstain from wine, he may still eat food that has wine in it, because it is not called “wine”. However, if he vows to abstain from “this wine” he may not eat anything which has received some taste from that specific wine.", + "He who vows [abstinence] from grapes is permitted wine; from olives, is permitted oil. If he says, “Konam if I taste these olives and grapes”, he is forbidden to eat them and [the liquids] that come out of them. Although grapes are generally made into wine and olives into olive oil, one who vows not to eat grapes or olives may still drink wine and use olive oil. However, if he forbids specific grapes or olives, he may not eat anything to which they impart their taste. Obviously, this would include wine made from the grapes or oil made from the olives." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nEmploying the example of dates and date honey, and winter grapes and winter grape vinegar, the mishnah discusses food derivatives that still partially retain the name of the foods from which they derive. An example today might be apples and apple juice. This differs from wine and oil (in the mishnah “oil” always refers to olive oil), which are not called “grape wine” or “olive oil”.", + "He who vows abstinence from dates is permitted date honey; from winter grapes, is permitted winter-grape vinegar. Rabbi Judah ben Bathyra said: if it bears the name of its origin, and he vows to abstain from it, he is forbidden [to benefit] from what comes from it. But the Sages permit it. He who vows abstinence from dates is permitted date honey; from winter grapes, is permitted winter-grape vinegar. Rabbi Judah ben Bathyra said: if it bears the name of its origin, and he vows to abstain from it, he is forbidden [to benefit] from what comes from it. But the Sages permit it. According to the sages, whose opinion is expressed here and at the end of the mishnah, although “date honey” and “winter grape vinegar” are called by the same name as “dates” and “winter grapes”, they are permitted to one who vowed to abstain from dates or winter grapes. [Winter grapes are a type of grape that ripens in late fall and are only used for making vinegar.] We assume that when he prohibited dates or winter grapes to himself, his intention was the dates or winter grapes themselves, and not anything that derives from them. Rabbi Judah ben Bathyra says that since they still retain the name of dates or winter-grapes, they are forbidden. This would be true in any case of a food which retains the name of the food from which it derives." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah teaches that if a person vows to abstain from a type of food, he may still eat another type of food that bears the same name, if that other food also has an accompanying name and is not called by the name itself. This rule will be clear from the examples.", + "He who vows abstinence from wine is permitted apple-wine; from oil, is permitted sesame oil; from honey, is permitted date honey; from vinegar, is permitted winter grape vinegar; from leeks, is permitted porrets; from vegetables, he is permitted field-vegetables, because it is an accompanying name. In all of the cases in this mishnah, a person vows abstinence from a certain food, but may still eat another food that has the same name, but also has an accompanying name. For instance, when a person vows to abstain from wine, his intention is grape wine and not apple wine. The same is true for honey, which is normally from bees and therefore date honey, which is not called “honey” is permitted. Porrets are a type of leek, but are not called “leeks”. Field-vegetables are vegetables that grow on their own in the fields. They are not called “vegetables”, whereas garden-grown vegetables are called “vegetables”." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn yesterday’s mishnah we learned that one who vows to abstain from certain foods may still have other foods that have the same name, if they also have an accompanying name. Today’s mishnah teaches that one who vows to abstain from certain other foods, may nevertheless also be prohibited from having foods which are in those foods.", + "[He who vows abstinence] from cabbage is forbidden asparagus; from asparagus, is permitted cabbage; From grits, is forbidden grits pottage; Rabbi Yose permits it; from grits pottage is permitted grits. From grits pottage, is forbidden garlic; Rabbi Yose permits it; from garlic, he is permitted grits pottage. From lentils, is forbidden lentil cakes; Rabbi Yose permits them; from lentil cakes, is permitted. In these cases one food includes other food, but the inclusion is not mutual. Cabbage (at least in Hebrew) includes asparagus. Therefore, one who vows not to have cabbage must also not have asparagus. However, asparagus does not include cabbage, and therefore one who vows not to have asparagus, may still have cabbage. “Grits pottage” is a dish that includes grits, oil and garlic. According to one opinion, since people sometimes call “grits pottage”, “grits”, one who vows not to have “grits pottage” may also not have “grits”. Rabbi Yose says that the two are usually called by different names. One who vows not to have “grits pottage” may also not have the garlic put into the pottage. Rabbi Yose disagrees and holds that by his vow he did not intend to include the garlic and therefore garlic is permitted. All agree that if he vowed to abstain from the garlic he may still have the pottage. One who vows not to have lentils may not have lentil cakes, for lentils are the prime ingredient of lentil cakes. Rabbi Yose again disagrees. However, all agree that if one vows not to have lentil cakes he may still have regular lentils. We can see a trend by now. One who vows not to have the main ingredient of a certain dish, may not eat the dish or the main ingredient separate from the dish. However, one who vows not to have the dish, may eat the main ingredient separate from the dish.", + "[If one says] “Konam, if I eat wheat [or] wheats,” he is forbidden both flour and bread. “If I eat grit [or], grits,” he is forbidden both raw and cooked. Rabbi Judah says: [If one says], “Konam, if I eat grits or wheat,” he may chew them raw. According to some commentators, the person vowing in this section used double language, and is therefore prohibited from wheat in any form. Others explain that the mishnah refers to a person who said “wheat” or “wheats” (which is proper diction in Hebrew), but not both. The same rule holds true for grit or grits. Rabbi Judah holds that one who vows not to have wheat or grits may still chew raw grains. “Wheat” refers to flour and “grits” refers to semi-processed kernels. Neither word is generally used to refer to raw, unprocessed kernels, and therefore they are still permitted to him." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah demonstrates one means by which the sages determined what a typical person’s intent might be when he prohibits to himself a specific food.", + "He who vows abstinence from vegetables is permitted gourds. Rabbi Akiba prohibits. They said to him: And does not a man say to his messenger “Bring me vegetables,” and he replies, “I could find only gourds.” He said to them: That is so! But would he say, “I could find only pulse?” For gourds are included in vegetables, while pulse is not. The argument in this mishnah is whether or not one who vows to abstain from vegetables must also abstain from gourds. In other words, are gourds a type of vegetable? The Sages argue that gourds are not included in vegetables, whereas Rabbi Akiva argues that they are. In order to prove their point, the sages point out to Rabbi Akiva that when a man sends his messenger to the market to buy vegetables, he might come back and say “I could find only gourds.” Gourds are not vegetables, and therefore he did not buy them. Rabbi Akiva responds that the messenger’s words prove his point. The messenger is asking if he should buy the gourds, because the gourds are included in vegetables. He would not say “I could find only pulse (legumes)” because pulse is different from vegetables. In summary, Rabbi Akiva finds the hypothetical response of the messenger to imply that gourds are included under the category of vegetables, whereas the rabbis find his reply to mean that they are not.", + "He is forbidden fresh Egyptian beans but permitted the dry species. Although the mishnah just stated that pulse is not included under the category of vegetables, wet Egyptian beans are." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nYesterday’s mishnah defined “vegetables”. Today’s mishnah defines two other terms: “produce” (tevuah) and “grain” (dagan). Note that the Hebrew words are not exactly equivalent to their English translations.", + "He who vows abstinence from grain is forbidden dry Egyptian beans, the words of Rabbi Meir. But the Sages say: only the five species of grain are forbidden him. According to Rabbi Meir “grain” includes dry Egyptian beans, which we learned yesterday were not included under the category of “vegetables”. The Sages disagree and say that “grain” refers only to one of the five species: wheat, barley, spelt, rye and oats.", + "Rabbi Meir says: He who vows abstinence from produce ( is forbidden only the five species; but one who vows abstinence from grain (, is forbidden all; yet he is permitted the fruits of the tree and vegetables. Whereas the Sages held that “grain” refers to the five species, Rabbi Meir holds that “produce” refers to the five species. Under the category of “grain” Rabbi Meir includes other things besides the five species, including pulse, as we learned in section one. The only thing not included in “produce” are fruits and vegetables." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nAfter having discussed at length vows of abstinence from food, the mishnah now discusses vows of abstinence from garments.", + "He who vows not to wear garments is permitted sack-cloth, curtain, and blanket wrapping. Sack-cloth, curtain and blanket-wrapping are not considered “garments”. Therefore, if one vows not to wear “garments”, he may still cover himself with these rough cloths.", + "If he says, “Konam, if wool comes upon me,” he may cover himself with wool shearings; [Konam] if flax comes upon me”, he may cover himself with stalks of flax. In this section we learn that if a person vows not to cover himself with a finished type of material, he may still wear the unfinished product. Thus, if he vows not to wear wool, he may still wear unprocessed wool shearings. If he vows not to wear flax (linen), he may still cover himself with unprocessed stalks of flax.", + "Rabbi Judah says: It all depends upon the person who vows, [thus:] if he was bearing a burden [with wool or flax] and perspires and had bad odor, and he said “Konam if wool or flax come upon me,” he may wear them, but not throw them [as a bundle] over his back. Rabbi Judah states a general rule applicable to the interpretation of vows; the situation in which the person vowed must be taken into account. Normally, when one vows that wool or flax should not come upon him, he means that he shall not wear them. However, if a person was carrying a heavy bundle of flax or wool, and sweating and emitting a foul odor because of his intense perspiration, and then said, “Konam, if wool or flax come upon me”, his intention was that he should not carry them. In such a situation, he may still wear them, but not throw them behind his back as a bundle." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses one who vows not to use a house or the upper story of a house.", + "One who vows not to benefit from a house is permitted the upper story, the words of Rabbi Meir. But the Sages say: the upper story is included in “house”. He who vows not to benefit from the upper story is permitted the use of the house. According to Rabbi Meir, when a person vows not to benefit from a “house” he may still make use of the upper story in that house. The Sages disagree and hold that the upper story is included in the house and therefore, one who vows not to use the house may also not use the upper story. However, one who vows not to use the upper story, may according to all opinions, still use the house. This is because the upper story is a specific part of the house, and hence one who vowed not to use it, certainly did not intend to prohibit upon himself the entire house." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nSection one of this mishnah deals with the definition of a bed and a couch. Section two deals with defining the borders of a city and a house, in cases where a person has vowed not to enter either.", + "One who vows abstinence from a bed is permitted a couch, the words of Rabbi Meir. But the Sages say: A couch is included in “bed”. If he vows abstinence from a couch, he is permitted the use of a bed. This section is similar to the yesterday’s mishnah and the dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Sages. Rabbi Meir holds that a couch and a bed are two separate items, and one who vows abstinence from one is permitted the other. The Sages hold that a “bed” is a collective name and includes couches. Therefore, one who vows abstinence from beds, is also prohibited from deriving benefit from couches. However, a “couch” is specific, and therefore one who vows not to derive benefit from couches may still derive benefit from beds.", + "One who vows not to benefit from a town, may enter the town’s [Shabbat] border but may not enter its outskirts. But one who vows not to benefit from a house, is forbidden [only] from the door-stop and inwards. This section deals with the border of areas which have been prohibited by a vow. One who vows not to enter a city, may still enter into the city’s Shabbat border. This is a perimeter around a city of 2000 amot, which is the distance a person can walk outside of the city on Shabbat. In Numbers 35:5, this area is referred to as “outside the city.” However, he may not enter its “outskirts”, a perimeter of 70 amot and four tefachim outside of the city. The Shabbat borders are measured from the end of the outskirts, and hence the outskirts are considered part of the city. In contrast, one who vows not to benefit from a house, may not enter from the place of the door and inwards. However, he may go onto the porch even though this area is similar to the “outskirts” of a city." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah teaches that sometimes, when a person prohibits a certain fruit to himself, he may not have that which grows from the fruit or that which is exchanged for the fruit. However, on other occasions only the actual fruit itself is prohibited.", + "[If one says] “Konam be these fruits to me”, “Konam they are for my mouth,” or “Konam they are to my mouth,” he is forbidden [to benefit] from what is exchanged for them or what grows from them. The three languages used in this section prohibit the one who vowed to receive any benefit from the fruit. This would include anything exchanged for that fruit or anything that grows from the fruit.", + "[If one says “Konam] if I eat or taste of them,” he is permitted [to benefit] from what is exchanged for them or what grows of them, if it is a thing of which the seed itself perishes, but if the seed does not perish, even that which grows out of that which [first] grew from it is forbidden. However, if he says “Konam if I eat or taste of these fruits”, he has only caused a prohibition on these fruits themselves. He has not created a blanket prohibition of receiving benefit from the fruits. Therefore, he may eat things that are exchanged for these fruits and he may eat things that grow from the seeds of the fruit. However, sometimes there is still a prohibition on deriving benefit from that which grows from the fruit. In order for what grows from the fruit to be permitted, the original seed must cease to exist. For instance, if one were to say “Konam if I eat this apple,” he may use the seed to grow a tree and eat the apples from the tree. However, if the seed doesn’t cease to exist, such as an onion (which they considered to be like a seed) he may not eat what grows from it, because the originally prohibited object still exists." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to teach when things which were exchanged for or grown from things prohibited by vow remain prohibited. The mishnah began to discuss this topic yesterday, and mishnah seven is largely the same as mishnah six. The difference is that today’s mishnah deals with the handiwork of a wife, which we learned in Ketuboth, belong to her husband. The husband can say that anything that she makes is “Konam”, i.e. prohibited to him.", + "If one says to his wife, “Konam be the work of your hands to me,” or ”Konam be they for my mouth, or “Konam be they to my mouth”, he is forbidden that which is exchanged for them or grown from them. Since in this case he has prohibited upon himself anything that is a result of what his wife does, he may not benefit even from what is exchanged for his wife’s handiwork, or what grows from it. “What grows from it” would refer to a case where she planted a tree. He may not benefit from the tree itself, nor from any trees that come from seeds produced by this tree.", + "[If he says “Konam] if I eat or taste [of what they produce],” he is permitted [to benefit] from what is exchanged for them or what grows of them, if it is a thing of which the seed itself perishes, but if the seed does not perish, even that which grows out of that which [first] grew from it is forbidden. In this case, he has prohibited upon himself only the food that his wife makes for him (I’m sure she will be quite insulted!). Therefore he may sell things that his wife makes for him and then use them to buy other things or he may use things grown from things his wife has made. Again, this is only true if there is nothing actually left over from the original; if the seed of the originally prohibited object still remains, the prohibition remains, as we explained yesterday." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to discuss a husband who forbids that which his wife produces. In the case in our mishnah he sets a time limit for the prohibition.", + "[If he says to his wife, “Konam that] what you will produce I will not eat from it until Pesach” or “That what you will produce, I will not wear until Pesach”, he may eat or wear after Pesach that which she produces before Pesach. In this section he vows not to eat of what she produces or wear things that she makes until Pesach. However, once Pesach passes he may eat anything she produced and wear anything she made, even before Pesach. The prohibition was on a time period and not on things made within that time period.", + "[If he says to his wife “Konam that] what you produce until Pesach I will not eat”, or “That what you produce until Pesach I will not wear”, what she produces before Pesach he may not eat after Pesach. In this case the prohibition was on anything made between the time of the vow and Pesach. In other words, the prohibition was not on the time period but on the objects themselves. Therefore, these things remain prohibited even after Pesach." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn this mishnah a husband make’s a vow that if his wife goes to her father’s house before a certain time, she shall not be able to benefit from him for a defined period of time.", + "[If he says, “Konam] be any benefit you have from me until Pesach, if you go to your father’s house until the festival [of Sukkot],” if she goes before Pesach she may not benefit from him until Pesach; if she goes after Pesach she is subject to, “he shall not break his word” (Numbers 30:3). The husband says to his wife after Sukkot that if she goes to her father’s house before the following Sukkot, she shall be forbidden to have any benefit from his (the husband's) things until Pesach. If she goes before Pesach to visit her father, she may not benefit from her husband until after Pesach. After Pesach the prohibitive vow has passed and she may derive benefit from his things. However, there is a problem if she goes to his house after Pesach for the time of prohibition created by the vow has already passed. Therefore the mishnah teaches that if she did benefit from him before Pesach, she should not go to her father’s house after Pesach. If she does go, she shall have broken the vow.", + "[If he says, “Konam] be any benefit you have from me until the festival [of Sukkot] if you go to your father’s house before Pesach”, if she goes before Pesach, she may not benefit from him until the festival [of Sukkot], but she is permitted to go after Pesach. If he vows that if she goes to her father’s house before Pesach, she shall not have any benefit from him until Sukkot, if she goes before Pesach she may not benefit from him until Sukkot. However, after Pesach it is permitted for her to go to her father’s house, for he vowed only that she shouldn’t go until Pesach." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with a person who sets a limit for his vow of a day, a week, a month, a year or a week of years (seven years, a sabbatical cycle). The mishnah teaches how long the vow is to last. As we shall see, this depends on how he expresses his vow, and when the set time is determined to expire.", + "[If one vows,] “Konam, if I taste wine today,” he is forbidden only until it gets dark. “Today” includes only the day time, and therefore by night the one who vowed not to drink wine may drink.", + "“This Sabbath,” he is forbidden the whole week and the Sabbath belongs to the past [week]; “Sabbath” in Mishnaic Hebrew can mean “week” and not just the Sabbath day itself. Therefore, one who vows not to drink wine on the Sabbath is prohibited from drinking all week. The Sabbath day which follows the week is counted with the previous week.", + "“This month,” he is forbidden the whole of that month, and the beginning of the [following] month belongs to the next month. The first of the new month counts as part of the subsequent month. Therefore, one who vows not to drink wine all month, may do so on the first of the next month.", + "“This year,” he is forbidden the whole year, and the beginning of the [following] year belongs to the next year. Similarly, the first day of the following year is counted with the following year.", + "“This week of years,” he is forbidden the whole of that week of years, and the [following] sabbatical year belongs to the past. In this section he prohibits himself from drinking wine for an entire cycle of sabbatical years, which is seven in number and is therefore called a week of years. The sabbatical year, like the Sabbath itself, is considered the last of the years in the cycle and therefore it belongs to the cycle which proceeds it.", + "But if he says, “One day,” “One Sabbath,” “One month,” “One year,” [or] “One week of years,” he is forbidden from day to day. In all of the above cases the one who vowed said, “Today”, “This Sabbath”, “This month” etc., which implies that the prohibition will last until the current day, week, month, etc., expires. However, if he says “One day”, “One week” etc., the vow must last the duration of the time he mentions. Therefore, no matter when he vows it will last as long as he said it would." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah discusses various ways one might phrase a vow when one’s intent is for the vow to be completed by or perhaps right after Pesach. The question asked is, does the language which the one who vowed used mean that the prohibition should include the seven days of the holiday or not?", + "[If one vows,] “Until Pesach,” he is forbidden until it arrives; If he says “Until Pesach” his intention is that the vow should last until Pesach begins. “Until” in the everyday speech of people means “until” but not including.", + "“Until it is [Pesach],” he is forbidden until it is completed. However, “Until it is Pesach” would include the entire holiday, because the entire holiday is still Pesach. Therefore, the vow lasts until Pesach is completed.", + "“Until before Pesach,”: Rabbi Meir says: he is forbidden until it arrives; Rabbi Yose says: he is forbidden until it is completed. There is a debate between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yose over the meaning of the phrase “Until before Pesach.” According to the former, this means before it arrives, whereas according to the latter this means until before the last hour of Pesach." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah provides a general rule for determining when time bound vows end.", + "[If he vows,] “Until the grain harvest, “Until the grape harvest”, or, “Until the olive harvest,” he is forbidden only until it arrives. As we shall learn in the second half of this mishnah, since harvests do not have set times, no matter how he vows, he will only be prohibited until the beginning of the harvest.", + "This is a general rule: Whatever has a fixed time and one vows, “Until it arrives,” he is forbidden until it arrives; if he says, “Until it be”, he is forbidden until it is over. But whatever has no fixed time, whether he says, “Until it be,” or “Until it arrives,” he is forbidden only until it arrives. The first half of this rule matches what we learned in yesterday’s mishnah. Since Pesach has a set time, if he said “Until it be” he is forbidden until Pesach is over. The second half of the rule matches what we learned in the above section. Since harvests have no set time, he is permitted as soon as the harvest begins, no matter how he vowed." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first section of the mishnah deals with a person who vows not to eat something until summer, which here is defined as referring to the summer harvest of figs, begins or ends. The second section teaches about someone who sets his vow to end at the beginning of the grain harvest.", + "[If he says,] “Until the summer,” or, “Until the summer shall be,” [he is forbidden] until people begin to bring [the figs] home in baskets. “Until the summer [harvest] is past,” [he is forbidden] until the knives are folded up [and put away]. The summer is the time of the harvest of figs. Since this is not a fixed time, it matters not whether he says “Until” or “Until it shall be”. In either case, the summer harvest is considered to begin when people begin to bring in figs in baskets. Merely bringing in a few loose figs would not be sufficient to consider the harvest as having begun. The harvest is considered over when the knives used to cut the figs, have been folded up and put away for the next season.", + "[If he vows,] “Until the harvest,” [he is forbidden] until the people begin reaping the wheat harvest, but not the barley harvest. If one vows not to eat something “Until the harvest”, he is assumed to be referring to the wheat harvest, which is “the” harvest, and not the barley harvest. Had he wished to refer to the barley harvest, he would have had to specify so.", + "It all depends on the place where he vowed: if in hill-country, the hill-country [harvest]; if in the valley, the valley harvest. The wheat harvest arrives at different times in different zones. Therefore, the beginning or end of his vow will depend upon the times of harvest typical in the zone in which he vows. If he was in the hill-country, the vow follows the harvest of the hill-country; if in the valley, it follows the harvest of the valley." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first two sections of our mishnah deal with a person who makes a vow which is to be completed either when the rains begin or when they end. It is important to remember that in Israel it only rains from the fall through the spring, roughly speaking from Sukkot until Pesach. In the late spring and summer it almost never rains, and even on the rare occasion that it does, such rain does not benefit the crops.\nThe third section deals with the problem of leap (intercalated) years. The Jewish year consists of twelve lunar months. To adjust the lunar calendar to the solar calendar, about once every three years an extra month is added. This month is called “second Adar”, for it falls after first Adar, the last month of the year (if we count from Nisan, as the Torah does).\nThe final section of the mishnah returns to the topic taken up above in mishnah 2, about when vows end if they were made “until Pesach.”", + "[If one vows,] “Until the rains,” [or], “Until the rains shall be”, [he is forbidden] until the second rainfall descends. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: until the [normal] time for the [second] rainfall is reached. According to the first opinion in the mishnah, if one vows “Until the rains,” or “Until the rains shall be,” the “rains” is understood to refer to the “second rainfall.” In ancient Israel they divided the rainfall into three seasons (all within the rainy season). In the Talmud they dispute when the second rainfall is; some say the seventh of Heshvan, some the 17th, and others the 23rd. Therefore, according to this opinion, he would have to wait for this date (according to whichever date is the accepted opinion) and then for it to rain. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says that the vow is over when the time is reached (whatever that date may be), even if it has not yet rained.", + "[If one vows,] “Until the rains cease,” [he is forbidden] until all of Nisan is completed, the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Judah says: Until Pesach is over. If he vows “Until the rains cease,”, Rabbi Meir holds that he must wait until Nisan is completed, for he holds that all of Nisan is still considered the rainy season. In contrast, Rabbi Judah considers the rainy season to have ended after Pesach, about a week before the end of Nisan.", + "[If one vows,] “Konam that I taste not wine for a year”, if the year is intercalated, he is forbidden during the year and its extension. [If one says,] “Until the beginning of Adar,” [he is forbidden] until the beginning of the first Adar; “Until the end of Adar,” until the end of the first Adar. If one vows not to have wine “this year”, if the Sages decide that the year must have an extra month added, he is prohibited during that month as well. The second month of Adar is considered part of the year. However, if he connects his vow to “Adar”, his intention was the first Adar, and therefore he is only prohibited until the beginning or end of Adar. This is probably because when he made his vow he did not know whether or not there would have even been a second Adar. Hence, his intention was clearly “first Adar”.", + "Rabbi Judah says: [If one vows, “Konam that I taste no wine until Pesach shall be,” he is forbidden only until Pesach night, for he meant until the hour when people usually drink wine. Rabbi Judah holds that “Until Pesach shall be” refers to right before Pesach night actually begins. Some commentators hold that Rabbi Judah disagrees with the opinion in mishnah two, according to which “Until Pesach shall be” refers to the end of Pesach, and therefore the vow lasts until Pesach is over. Other commentators hold that Rabbi Judah does not disagree with that opinion but rather the two mishnayoth refer to vows on two different vows, wine and other things. Rabbi Judah holds that if he says “Until Pesach shall be,” with regard to other prohibitions, his intention is until Pesach is over. However, with wine, since people drink wine on Pesach night, his intention was only until Pesach begins." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nAt the end of yesterday’s mishnah we learned that “Until Pesach shall be” refers to Pesach eve, for that is when people are accustomed to drinking wine at the Seder. Our mishnah lists other times of the year when people customarily eat certain things, namely meat on Yom Kippur eve and garlic on Friday eve.", + "If he vows, “Konam that I taste no meat until the fast [i.e., Yom Kippur] shall be,” he is forbidden only until the eve of the fast, for he merely meant until people usually eat meat. On the afternoon before the fast of Yom Kippur it is customary to eat meat. Therefore, one who vowed not to eat meat until Yom Kippur, meant that he will not eat meat until the eve of Yom Kippur, when people eat meat as their last meal before the fast.", + "Rabbi Yose, his son, says: “Konam, that I not taste garlic until the Sabbath,” he is forbidden only until Sabbath eve [i.e., Friday night], for he meant, until it is customary for people to eat garlic. As we learned in Nedarim 3:10, garlic was considered an aphrodisiac and hence was eaten by Jews on the Sabbath eve, a time considered proper for sexual relations. Therefore, one who vows not to eat garlic until the Sabbath, must have intended for garlic to be prohibited until Friday night, when people customarily eat garlic." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe final mishnah in chapter seven deals with cases where a person made a vow in order to spur someone or himself into doing something. The mishnah interprets his vows according to what their intent probably was.", + "If one says to his neighbor “Konam, what I benefit from you, if you do not come and take for your sons a kor of wheat and two barrels of wine,” the latter may annul his vow without the release of a sage, by declaring, “Did you vow for any other purpose but to honor me? This [refusal] is my honor.” The person vowing in this mishnah wanted to honor his friend by giving him wheat and wine for his son. It seems that the person receiving did not want to accept his generosity, so the person giving made a vow to urge him on. The mishnah teaches that this vow may be released even without the declaration of a sage, a process which we will learn about in chapter nine. The person receiving may in essence annul the vow by saying that since the vow was only intended for his own honor, he is honored by not accepting the gift.", + "Similarly, if one says to his neighbor, “Konam, what you benefit from me, if you do not give my son a kor of wheat and two barrels of wine”: Rabbi Meir says: he is forbidden until he gives; But the Sages say: he too can annul his vow without the release of a sage, by saying to him, “I regard it as though I have received it.” In this situation the one vowing wants his sons to receive a gift of wheat and wine from his friend. To urge his friend on, he makes a vow stating that if his friend does not give his sons such a gift, everything he owns will become prohibited to his friend. According to Rabbi Meir this vow stands and the friend cannot benefit from the one who vowed until he brings the wheat and wine. The Sages, however, rule that this vow too may be annulled without a sage’s intervention. The one who vowed may, if he regrets having made the vow, say that it is as if he has already received the goods and therefore the prohibition is void.", + "If they were urging him to marry his sister’s daughter, and he said, “Konam, what she benefits from me forever”; Likewise, if he is divorcing his wife and he said, “Konam, what my wife benefits from me forever,” they are permitted to benefit from him, because he meant only marriage. In these cases a man was being urged either to marry his sister’s daughter (a common phenomenon in mishnaic times, and not considered incestuous) or was divorcing his wife. In either case, he makes a vow that the woman should not benefit from him. The intent of the vow was to make sure this woman could not either become his wife or remain his wife. The mishnah rules that since the intent of the rule was merely to prevent himself in marriage to these women, they may still derive other types of benefit from him.", + "If he was urging his neighbor to eat at his house, and he replied, “Konam be your house which I do not enter,” or, “The drop of water that I do not drink,” he may enter his house and drink cold water because he only meant eating and drinking in general. In this case someone was urging his friend to eat over at his house. In order to increase the leverage on his friend, he said that if he didn’t come over to his house, the other’s house would be Konam (forbidden) to him, or that the other’s water would be Konam to him. Seemingly, as long as his friend doesn’t come to his house, he may not even enter his friend’s house, nor drink a simple cup of water. The mishnah, however, rules that his intent was to prohibit eating a full meal at his friend’s house. Therefore he may enter the house and drink water, although he may not sit down for a proper meal." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nIf a person makes a vow and then regrets his vow and wishes to be released from its prohibition, he may approach a Sage who has the power to release the vow. The Sage asks him questions and shows how the vow may have been mistaken and thereby annuls the vow. He also may go to a court of laypersons who also have the power to release vows. Our chapter deals with under what circumstances and how a Sage releases vows. The word for releasing vows in Hebrew is “patach”, to open. I have chosen to translate this as “release”, which in Hebrew would be “matir”, as in to permit.", + "Rabbi Eliezer says: They release a vow [by reference] to the honor of his father and mother but the Sages forbid. When one comes in front of a Sage to have his vows released, the Sage may ask him, “Had you known that by making such a vow you bring shame to your father and mother, would you have made such a vow?” If he shows regret, then the vow may be released. The Sages rule that such a technique is not valid, for he may lie in order not to let it be known that he would have taken such a vow in any case.", + "Rabbi Zadok said: Instead of releasing through the honor of his father and mother, they should release [by reference] to the honor of God. If so, there would be no vows! Rabbi Zadok also disagrees with Rabbi Eliezer. Were Sages allowed to use this technique to release vows, they might as well say, “Had you known that by making such a vow God considers you to be a disgrace, would you have made such a vow?” If such a technique were valid, there would be no more vows, because everyone could have them easily released.", + "But the Sages admit to Rabbi Eliezer that in a matter concerning himself and his father and mother one may release a vow [by reference] to the honor of his father and mother. The Sages agree though, that if the vow directly involved his father or mother, the Sage may make reference to their honor in order to release the vow. This might happen, if for instance, he vowed that his father or mother should not benefit from his property." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe debate in this mishnah is over whether or not a vow can be released if the one who vowed regrets his vow because of something that happened since the vow was made. The mishnah brings two examples of these types of situations. As in yesterday’s mishnah the Sages argue with Rabbi Eliezer.", + "Rabbi Eliezer also said: They release a vow by reference to a new fact; but the Sages forbid it. How is this so? If one said, “Konam that I will not benefit from so and so,” and he [the latter] then became a scribe, or was about to give his son in marriage, and he said, “Had I known that he would become a scribe or was about to give his son in marriage, I would not have vowed;” [Or if he said,] “Konam, is this house that I will not enter,” and it became a synagogue, and he declared, “Had I known that it would become a synagogue, I would not have vowed,” Rabbi Eliezer permits [the vow to be released],but the Sages forbid it. According to Rabbi Eliezer if something new happens since the vow was taken, the recent occurrence may be grounds to release the one who vowed from his vow. The mishnah illustrates this with two examples. In the first, a person vows that a certain so-and-so should not benefit from him, but then later on so-and-so either becomes a scribe, meaning a teacher of Bible, or is about to give his son in marriage. Similarly, one vows that he will not enter a certain house, and then it becomes a synagogue. The one who vowed claims that had he known these things would happen, he would not have made his vow. Rabbi Eliezer allows this new fact to be grounds for the release of the vow, but the sages do not. The Sages reason that since the new fact did not exist when he vowed, we cannot say that the vow was made by mistake. Rather the one who vowed did not take into account all future possibilities. That is not sufficient grounds for releasing the vow." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nWe learned above in mishnah 3:2 that if someone makes a vow based on a mistaken premise, he is not obligated to keep his vow, and he does not even need a sage to release the vow. Our mishnah discusses situations in which a person makes a vow that was not originally based on a mistaken premise, but the premise upon which the vow was based changes later. Rabbi Meir says that these are not really considered “new facts” (see previous mishnah) and therefore, the vow may be released using them as grounds. The sages disagree.", + "Rabbi Meir says: Some things are similar to a new fact, and yet are not [treated] as new; but the Sages do not agree with him. How so? If one says, “Konam that I do not marry so and so, because her father is wicked,” and [then] they say to him “He is dead,” or, “He has repented,”; “Konam is this house which I will not enter, because it contains a wild dog,” or, “because there is a snake in it,” and [then] they say to him, “The dog is dead,” or, “The serpent has been killed,” behold these are like new facts, yet actually not [treated] as new facts. But the sages do not agree with him. In both cases the person vowing states why he has made his vow and the premise was correct at the time of the vow. For instance, when he vowed not to marry the woman her father was wicked and alive. However, he subsequently died and therefore the reason for the vow ceased to exist. In the other case, when he vowed not to enter the house, the wild dog or snake was still alive and only died later. According to Rabbi Meir this is more similar to a vow based on a mistaken premise than to a new fact. Although the person did not say specifically, “Konam that I do not marry so and so as long as her wicked father is alive”, this was his intent. Therefore, although he is not automatically released from his vow (as he would have been if the premise had been mistaken) a sage may use this as a basis to release the vow. The Sages disagree and say that this too is a situation of a “new fact”, and as they said in the previous mishnah, so too here, a “new fact” cannot be used as the basis for the release of a vow." + ], + [ + "Rabbi Meir also said: They release [the vow] by using what is written in the Torah, and they say to him, “Had you known that you were violating [the prohibitions]:
“You shall not avenge” (Leviticus 19:18),
“You shall not bear a grudge” (ibid.),
“You shall not hate your kinsfolk in your heart (ibid., v. 17),
“Love your neighbor as yourself” (ibid., v. 18),
“Let him live by your side” (ibid. 25:37), for he might become poor and you would not be able to provide for him, [would you have vowed]?”. And should he reply, “Had I known that this is so, I would not have vowed,” he is permitted [the vow is absolved].
In this mishnah Rabbi Meir teaches that the Sages may tell a person that by making a vow prohibiting another person from using his things he has transgressed several commandments in the Torah, and if he expresses regret, they may use that regret as grounds for releasing the vow.
The type of vow being released in this mishnah is one in which a person prohibits his fellow Jew from benefiting from all or part of his property. This very act is actually a transgression of five separate commandments, four of which are found in Leviticus 19:17-18. The fifth commandment is that a Jew may not let his fellow become poor but rather they must live “side by side”, which is interpreted here to mean, that those who have means must aid those who do not. If the one who vows admits that had he known that his vow would cause him to transgress so many commandments he would not have vowed, he may be released from his vow.
In my opinion this mishnah is emblematic of Jewish social ethics. The mitzvot regarding concern for one’s neighbor and love for one’s fellow human being, are not merely ideals, left for individuals to pursue according to their own understanding. Rather they have real manifestations in this world and govern our everyday actions. Judaism is a religion in which ideals are translated into laws, which dictate precisely how a Jew is to live. The laws of “love” dictate that a vow which prohibits one’s property to another is a sinful vow which should be released." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIf a husband makes a vow that he shall not benefit from his wife he must divorce her and pay her ketubah. Our mishnah teaches that his vow may be released by reference to her ketubah.", + "They release a vow by reference to a wife’s kethubah. And it once happened that a man vowed not to benefit from his wife and her ketubah amounted to four hundred denarii. He went before Rabbi Akiva, who ordered him to pay her the ketubah [in full]. He said to him, “Rabbi! My father left eight hundred denarii, of which my brother took four hundred and I took four hundred. Isn’t it enough that she should receive two hundred and I two hundred?” Rabbi Akiva replied: even if you have to sell the hair of your head you must pay her her ketubah. He said to him, “Had I known that it is so, I would not have vowed.” And Rabbi Akiva released his vow. In this story the man must divorce his wife because he vowed not to receive benefit from her. There is no way that he can remain married without receiving some benefit from her because he is obligated to have sexual relations with her and would at that time receive benefit. However, when he divorces her he doesn’t want to pay her large ketubah. He goes in front of Rabbi Akiva to try to receive an exemption but Rabbi Akiva tells him he must pay the ketubah in full. He then complains that if he pays her entire ketubah he will be left with no inheritance. Rabbi Akiva, using illustrative language, tells him that even if he has to sell the hair on his head (assumedly he was not bald, or Rabbi Akiva was speaking tongue in cheek) he must pay her ketubah in full. The husband’s statement “Had I known that it is so, I would not have vowed” shows his regret and is therefore accepted as grounds for releasing the vow." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe specific topic of this mishnah is releasing a vow that a person made to fast on a day on which it is forbidden to fast. However, the second part of the mishnah discusses a rule of larger consequence: the overall validity of a vow when part of the vow has been released. The following two mishnayoth will continue to deal with this subject.", + "They release vows by reference to the sabbaths and festivals. If a person made a vow to fast on a day upon which it is forbidden to fast, for instance the Sabbath or one of the festivals, a sage may say to him, “If you had known that it was forbidden to fast on the Sabbath or on the festivals would you have still made your vow?” If he expresses regret the vow is released.", + "The earlier ruling was that for these days the vow is cancelled, but for others it is binding, until Rabbi Akiva came and taught: a vow which is partially released is entirely released. Originally, the rule was that the vow was released for the sabbath or festival days but if the vow to fast was for a longer period of time, then the vow retained its validity on the other days. Thus it would be forbidden for him to fast on the sabbath, but he would be obligated to fast the day before and the day after (depending on the length of his vow). This ruling was changed by Rabbi Akiva who said that a vow that had been partly released is entirely released. Note that we learned a similar principle above in 3:2. There we learned that if a vow is partially invalid, according to Beth Hillel it is entirely invalid. The principle of Rabbi Akiva in our mishnah continues from that Hillelian position. Rabbi Akiva says that just as a vow that was partially invalid from its inception is totally invalid, so too a vow that was later partially invalidated is completely invalidated." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah illustrates the principle taught by Rabbi Akiva at the end of yesterday’s mishnah, that a vow that has been partly released is entirely released.", + "How is this so?
If one says, “Konam that which I benefit from any of you,” if one [of those subject to the vow] was [subsequently] released, they are all released. If the one who vows groups a bunch of people collectively into his prohibitive vow, and then the vow is released for one of them, the vow is completely released. The vow could be released for one of them if for instance one of the group was his father and they asked the one who vowed, “Had you known that one of the group was your father, would you have vowed?” If he expresses regret, he is allowed to receive benefit not only from his father but from anyone else in the group as well.", + "[If he said, “Konam] that which I benefit from this one or this one”: if the first was released, all are released; if the last one was released, he is released, but the rest are forbidden. if the middle person was released, those [mentioned] after him are [also] released, but those [mentioned] before him are forbidden. In this case, he states the word “Konam” and then lists each individual person. If the vow to the first one was released, then they are all released. This is because the word “Konam” was attached to him, and it is as if the one who vowed made the entire vow dependent upon him. If the last one was released, then only he is released but the others are still prohibited. If the middle person was released, any one whose name follows him are also released, but those whose name preceded his are still forbidden. The reason that the general rule does not apply in this case is that since he mentioned each name specifically, it is as if they are separate vows. However, since the word “Konam” was only mentioned once, if one of the earlier people mentioned was released, anyone mentioned afterward will also always be released.", + "[If one says,] “Korban that which I benefit from this one, and from this one Korban,” they each require a separate release. In this section, the one vowing uses the word “Korban” (=Konam) with reference to each person. These are entirely separate vows, even though he only said one time “that which I benefit”. Therefore, they each require a separate release and even if one is released the others are still prohibited, both those before and those after." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to illustrate the principle that a vow that has been partially released is fully released.", + "“Konam is the one that I taste, because wine is damaging to the stomach.” They said to him, “But mature wine is beneficial to the stomach.” He is released in respect of mature wine, and not only in respect of mature wine, but of all wine. When the person vowed not to have wine, he stated that he is doing so because he believes that wine is bad for one’s stomach. People then pointed out to him that not all wine is bad for the stomach. Mature wine (aged at least three years) is not damaging for the stomach. [By the way, I don’t know if this is considered true today, so be on guard!] He then responded, “Had I known that mature wine is beneficial for the stomach, I would not have vowed.” The regret is sufficient to allow him to drink mature wine, and since the vow has been partially released, it is completely released.", + "“Konam the onions that I taste, because they are damaging to the heart.” They said to him, “But village onions are good for the heart,” He is released in respect of village onions, and not only of village onions, but of all onions. Such a case happened before Rabbi Meir, and he permitted all onions. This section basically teaches the same principle learned in the previous section. In addition, the mishnah relates that Rabbi Meir, a student of Rabbi Akiva’s, actually ruled this way in a case that came before him. We should note that in the eyes of the mishnah precedents are of extreme importance." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah returns to the central theme of the chapter, the release of vows. In the first mishnah we learned that vows cannot be released by reference to God, but that they may be released by reference to parents. Our mishnah discusses releasing the vow by reference to his own or to his children’s honor.", + "They release one’s vows [by reference] to his own honor and the honor of his children. They say to him, “Had you known that tomorrow they will say of you, ‘It is the regular habit of so-and-so to divorce his wife’; and concerning your daughters they will say, ‘They are the daughters of a divorced woman. What fault did he find in their mother to divorce her?’ If he replies, “Had I known that it is so, I would not have vowed,” he is released from his vow. The specific instance in this mishnah is one in which a man made a vow to divorce his wife. He then comes to the sage asking to be released from the vow. The sage says to him that after he divorces his wife, people will say things about him and his children behind his back. Of him they will say that he is a man who divorces frequently. Of his children they will say that they are the children of a divorced, and hence less than respectable woman. Their father would not have divorced her had he not found something wrong with her. If he expresses regret the sage may use this regret as grounds for releasing the vow. We should note that the attitude towards divorce expressed in this mishnah is probably not shared by most people today, nor was it shared by all in the time of the mishnah. According to some rabbis (and according to some early Christians), divorce was only permissible if the woman was adulterous. There were no other grounds for divorce. Most rabbis, including Beth Hillel and later Rabbi Akiva, were more lenient and allowed divorce more easily. For the former position, the children and indeed former husband of the divorced woman, were shamed. For Beth Hillel and Rabbi Akiva this was less so. Indeed, in American society, which was and still is to a certain extent dominated by Christian values, divorce is still considered by some to be a stain on one’s moral record. It is really only in the last few decades that attitudes toward divorce have changed. In Jewish law, while people may have looked askance at the children of divorced women, they were never really at a legal disadvantage." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah begins by describing another type of mistaken vow which is void. The second part of the mishnah tells a story with a quite poignant line from Rabbi Yishmael.\nBefore learning this mishnah we should note that in ancient Palestine light skin was considered more aesthetically pleasing than dark skin. This is probably explained simply by the fact that most people in this area of the world are dark-skinned. Light skin would be the rarer commodity, and as is typical, that which is unusual is held in greater esteem (after all, why are diamonds considered precious stones? Why are dandelions weeds and not flowers?). Furthermore, light skin is a sign of wealth, for fieldworkers do not have light skin. In any case, my point is that this attitude is geographically determined and is certainly not a statement on the inherent value of one skin color over another.", + "“Konam if I marry that ugly woman,” and she turns out to be beautiful; “That black-skinned woman,” and she turns out to be light-skinned; “That short woman,” and she turns out to be tall, he is permitted to marry her, not because she was ugly, and became beautiful, or black and became light-skinned, short and grew tall, but because the vow was made in error. The one who made the vow mistakenly thought the woman whom he did not want to marry was ugly, dark-skinned or short. When it turns out that she was beautiful, light-skinned or tall, the vow is released because it was mistaken. He need not even turn to a sage for this vow to be released.", + "And thus it happened with one who vowed not to benefit from his sister’s daughter, and she was taken into Rabbi Ishmael’s house and they made her beautiful. Rabbi Ishmael said to him, “My son! Did you vow not to benefit from this one!” He said, “No,” and Rabbi Ishmael permitted her [to him]. The story in this section is slightly different from the halakhah learned in the previous section. Here the ugly woman (his niece) actually was ugly and then was helped to become beautiful by those of the house of Rabbi Ishmael. This is a “new fact” (see mishnah two above), and Rabbi Ishmael holds that a “new fact” may be used to release a vow. When the man expresses regret from his vow, Rabbi Ishmael permits the woman to him.", + "In that hour Rabbi Ishmael wept and said, “The daughters of Israel are beautiful, but poverty disfigures them.” And when Rabbi Ishmael died, the daughters of Israel raised a lament, saying, “Daughters of Israel weep for Rabbi Ishmael.” And thus it is said too of Saul, “Daughters of Israel, weep for Saul” (II Samuel 1:24). After having beautified the woman, thereby permitting her to the man who had vowed, Rabbi Ishmael laments the state of Jewish women in his day. Rabbi Ishmael lived through and after the Bar Kochba revolt, a revolt that was quelled by the Romans in 135 and that may have been even more devastating than the destruction of the Temple. Rabbi Ishmael laments that the oppressive state in which they live prevents the inner beauty of Jewish women from being seen. We might add, that this oppressive state may have also made it more difficult for men to have seen through the women’s worn exteriors into the deeper layers of beauty. For such sentiments and recognition of the difficulties under which they live, and perhaps also for his outstanding abilities as a cosmetician (!), the daughters of Israel lament him at his death, just as they King Saul was lamented at his death." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThe final two chapters of Nedarim discuss a father’s and husband’s right to annul the vows of their daughters or wives. Whereas the release of vows, the topic of the previous chapter, is not mentioned in the Torah, chapter 30 of Numbers discusses the father/son’s right to annul vows at length. Indeed most of what we know about vows comes from the context of this chapter. Thus vs. 6 states, “But if her father restrains her on the day he finds out, none of her vows or self-imposed obligations shall stand.” Vs. 13 makes a similar statement concerning the husband.\nThere are several limits that the rabbis placed on this right of fathers/husbands. First of all, as we shall learn later in the chapter, not all vows may be annulled. Second, the father may annul his daughter’s vow only until she has reached what was considered majority age (12 ½). Beyond that age she was obligated, as are all people, to keep all her vows.\nOur mishnah discusses the betrothed young woman, one between the ages of 12 and 12 ½. This girl is still living in her father’s house and yet is already betrothed to another man. She is therefore a classic example of a borderline case, which as we have seen time and time again, is typically the focus of the Mishnah.", + "In the case of a betrothed young woman, her father and her betrothed husband annul her vows. If her father annulled [her vow] but not the husband, or if the husband annulled [it] but not the father, it is not annulled; and it goes without saying if one of them upheld [it]. The simple message of the mishnah is that since she is partly in her father’s domain, for she has not yet reached majority age and she is still living in his house, and partly in her betrothed husband’s domain, both parties must annul her vows. If either party does not annul the vow, or upholds the vow, the vow is not annulled." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to discuss the ability of fathers and husbands to annul their daughters’ or wives’ vows.", + "If the father dies, his authority does not pass over to the husband. If the husband dies, his authority passes over to the father. The mishnah is still discussing the betrothed young girl. Generally, both the father and husband must jointly annul her vows. If, while she is in this status, her father dies, her husband still cannot annul her vows on his own. This is because she is only betrothed and not fully married. A husband’s right to annul his wife’s vows on his own begins only at the point of marriage. In contrast, should her betrothed husband die, her father may annul her vows. This is because she was never fully married, nor has she reached majority age.", + "In this respect, the father’s power is greater than the husband’s. But in another respect, the husband’s power is greater than that of the father, for the husband can annul [her vows] when she is of majority age but the father cannot annul her vows when she is of majority age. After pointing out a way in which the father’s authority over his wife is greater than the husband’s, the mishnah now contrasts that with an example in which the husband’s ability to annul vows is greater. As we stated in yesterday’s mishnah, the father’s authority ends when his daughter reaches majority age. In contrast, the husband’s ability to annul his wife’s vows exists even when she is of majority age." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah teaches that while a full husband cannot annul vows his wife made before their marriage, a betrothed husband who annuls her vows jointly with her father has the ability to do so.", + "If one vowed as a betrothed woman, and then was divorced on that day and betrothed [again] on the same day, even a hundred times, her father and last betrothed husband can annul her vows. This is the general rule: as long as she has not passed out into her own control for even one hour, her father and last husband can annul her vows. If a woman takes a vow while she is betrothed and then on the same day is divorced and betrothed again to another man, the last husband and her father can still annul her vows. This all must occur on the same day, because as we shall learn in mishnah 8 and as is stated clearly in Numbers 30, the woman’s vows must be annulled that very day. The mishnah is teaching that although she vowed while betrothed to another man, the last betrothed husband may annul her previous vows because her father has continuously had the right to annul her vows. As is stated in the general rule at the end of the mishnah, should she be fully married or reach majority age, even for one hour and thereby leave her father’s control, her husband will not be able to annul her earlier vows." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nAs we mentioned in yesterday’s mishnah a father and husband jointly annul the vows of a betrothed girl who has not yet reached majority age. Furthermore, at this point the husband may annul vows that she took before she was betrothed. Once she is married, no one, neither her father nor her husband may annul the vows that she took before she was married.\nOur mishnah relates what Torah scholars would do in order to avoid this problem.", + "It is the practice of scholars, before the daughter of one of them departs from him, he says to her, “All the vows which you vowed in my house are annulled.” Likewise the husband, before she enters into his domain would say to her, “All the vows which you vowed before you entered my domain are annulled,” because once she enters into his domain he cannot annul them. Evidently husbands in general and husbands who are Torah scholars (and hence understand the halakhot) in particular did not want to be surprised to find out that they had married a woman who was restricted by vows. Furthermore, a father would not want his daughter to be caught by her husband with previously made restrictive vows, for that may be grounds for divorce without payment of the ketubah (see Ketuboth 7:7). Therefore, right before the girl would leave her father’s domain to enter her husband’s domain, both the father and husband would annul vows that she had previously taken. Once she enters his domain, the husband would no longer be able to annul previously taken vows. By the way, it seems likely that if we read between the lines of this mishnah, scholars married other scholars’ daughters. Rabbis formed a social class somewhat separate from other Jews and as a result, rabbis often married each others daughters." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn Mishnah Ketuboth 5:2 we learned that a girl who was betrothed and then reached majority age has 12 months during which she prepares herself for marriage. During this time he prepares himself and the wedding as well. A widow or a divorcee receives thirty days. If the betrothed husband does not marry her within this time, she receives her maintenance (cost of food) from him. In our mishnah, the Sages debate whether the husband also has the ability to annul her vows during this period.", + "[In the case of] a girl who has reached majority age who waited twelve months, or a widow [who waited] thirty days, Rabbi Eliezer says: since her [betrothed] husband is responsible for her maintenance, he may annul [her vows]. But the Sages say: the husband cannot annul [her vows] until she enters into his domain. Rabbi Eliezer holds that since he is responsible for her maintenance, in other words has financial responsibility for his betrothed wife’s well-being, he receives the right to annul her vows. In contrast, the Sages do not give him this right until she actually enters his domain. According to the Sages he should have married her after this time period had elapsed. Therefore, while he is penalized and liable to pay for her maintenance, he does not receive the right to annul her vows as would a full husband." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses a yavam’s rights to annul the vows of a woman who is awaiting yibbum or halitzah with him. To remind ourselves briefly, if a husband dies without children his wife is liable for either yibbum (levirate marriage) or halitzah (the release from levirate marriage) with his brother. Generally speaking, any brother may perform yibbum or halitzah.", + "If a woman waits for a yavam, whether for one or for two [yevamim]: Rabbi Eliezer says: he can annul [her vows]. Rabbi Joshua says: [only if she waits] for one, but not for two. Rabbi Akiva says: neither for one nor for two. There are three halakhic opinions in this section. According to Rabbi Eliezer, even if there are several brothers (yevamim) any one of them may annul her vows. According to Rabbi Joshua if there is only one yavam he may annul her vows but if there are more than one, neither may annul her vows. Rabbi Joshua believes that the connection between a yavam and his yevamah is strong enough that he may annul her vows but if there are two yevamim each prevents the other from doing so. Also, if there are two yevamim we don’t know who will end up performing yibbum and therefore neither may annul her vows. According to Rabbi Akiva a yavam never has the right to annul his yevamah’s vows.", + "Rabbi Eliezer said: if a man can annul the vows of a woman whom he himself acquired, isn’t it logical that can he annul those of a woman bequeathed to him by Heaven! Rabbi Akiva said to him: No! If you speak of a woman whom he himself acquires, that is because others have no rights in her; will you say [the same] of a woman given to him by Heaven, in whom others too have rights! Rabbi Joshua said to him: Akiva, your words apply to two yevamim; but what will you answer if there is only one yavam? He (Rabbi said to him (Rabbi: the yevamah is not as completely acquired to the yavam as a betrothed girl is to her [betrothed] husband. In this section the three rabbis argue out their respective positions. Rabbi Eliezer reasons that in a normal marriage a woman is acquired by the man himself (“acquisition” is one of the typical ways by which the mishnah refers to marriage) but in yibbum Heaven bequeaths the yevamah to the yavam. In other words the relation between the yavam and the yevamah is created at the moment of the brother’s death without any action by the yavam and therefore it is a stronger connection. If in the weaker acquisition the husband is allowed to annul vows, so too in the stronger acquisition. Rabbi Akiva responds by pointing out that the two situations are not truly analogous. If there are two or more yevamim then each has some rights in her, because any of them can perform yibbum or halitzah with her. However, in cases of normal marriage, only the betrothed husband has rights in her, for only he will be able to marry her. Rabbi Joshua points out that Rabbi Akiva’s refutation of Rabbi Eliezer holds true only if there is more than one yavam. If there is only one yavam he is the only one who has rights in her, and therefore he should be allowed to annul her vows. Why then does Rabbi Akiva say that he cannot. Rabbi Akiva responds again, this time with a more fundamental difference between normal marriage and yibbum. The union between a betrothed couple is stronger than the unity between a yavam and a yevamah (remember this is before yibbum has been performed; after yibbum she is his wife in all regards). A betrothed woman who has relations with a man other than her betrothed husband is an adulteress and is technically liable for the death penalty. In that sense Jewish betrothal works like marriage. In contrast, a yevamah who has relations with a man other than her yavam is not considered an adulteress and has merely broken a less severe commandment, one not punishable by death. From here we can deduce that the bond of betrothal is stronger and therefore a betrothed husband may annul his betrothed wife’s vows but a yavam may not do so for his yevamah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah discusses whether or not a husband can uphold or annul vows that his wife will take in the future.", + "If a man says to his wife, “All vows which you may vow from now until I return from such and such a place behold, they are upheld,” he has not said anything. Everyone agrees that the husband may not legally uphold vows that his wife has not yet taken. If, when he returns from the trip he hears that she has taken a vow and he wants to annul it, he still may do so, despite his earlier statement that her vows were upheld.", + "[If he said: All vows which you may vow from now until I return from such and such a place], behold, they are annulled,”: Rabbi Eliezer says: they are annulled; The Sages say: they are not annulled. Said Rabbi Eliezer: if he can annul vows which have already had the force of a prohibition, surely he can annul those which have not had the force of prohibition! They said to him: behold, it is said, “Her husband may uphold it, and her husband may annul it” (Numbers 30:14), that which has entered the category of upholding, has entered the category of annulment; but that which has not entered the category of upholding, has not entered the category of annulment. This section discusses the reverse situation, in which the husband wishes to annul vows that his wife takes while he is away. Rabbi Eliezer says this annulment is effective and the Sages say that it is not. Rabbi Eliezer argues that if a man can annul a vow that has already taken effect, he should be able to annul a vow before it has begun to be effective. A husband can annul vows on the day he hears them even though she vowed earlier (we will learn more about this tomorrow). In other words, even if she vowed earlier and therefore had to keep her vow before it was annulled, on the day that he hears of the vow he may still annul it. From here Rabbi Eliezer concludes that he certainly should be able to annul a vow that has not yet had a prohibitory force. The Sages respond with a midrash on a verse in Numbers. This verse compares upholding and annulling. Since, as we learned in section one, only a vow which has already been made can be upheld, so too only a vow that has already been made can be annulled. To the Sages their midrash is more authoritative and convincing than Rabbi Eliezer’s reasoning." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nNumbers 30:6, 9 imply that the husband or father must annul their wives’ or daughters’ vows on the day on which they heard of them. Our mishnah explains how this day is calculated.", + "The annulment of vows is the whole day. This may result in a stringency or in a leniency. How is this so? If she vowed on the eve of the Sabbath, he can annul on the eve of the sabbath and on the Sabbath day until nightfall. If she vowed just before nightfall, he can annul only until nightfall: for if night fell and he had not annulled it, he can no longer annul it. The period allotted for annulling vows is one whole day. That day is calculated by the calendar and not by counting 24 hours from the time the father/husband heard the vow. In other words, the vow must be annulled on the calendar day on which it was taken. Remember, the Jewish day is calculated from evening until evening. As the mishnah points out, sometimes this will result in a longer time and sometimes in a shorter time. For instance, if he hears of the vow on the eve of the Sabbath (late Friday afternoon, towards twilight), he has until nightfall the following night, when the Sabbath is over. This is because twilight is already considered part of the Sabbath and the Sabbath is not over until nightfall. However, if he hears of the vow just before nightfall on the Sabbath itself, he only has until nightfall. After that he may no longer annul the vow. The reason that the mishnah uses the example of the Sabbath and not any other day of the week is to teach that vows may be annulled on the Sabbath." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nNumbers 30:14 states, “Every vow and every sworn obligation of self-denial may be upheld by her husband or annulled by her husband.” From this verse the rabbis conclude that only vows which are of “self-denial” can be annulled. Furthermore, vs. 17 states, “These are the laws that the Lord commanded Moses between a man and his wife.” From this verse the rabbis learned that even if the vow is not one of self-denial, if it involves an issue between the woman and her husband, the man may annul the vow. This chapter discusses these issues.\nWe should note that by placing these limits on her vows, the rabbis limit the power the husband has over his wife. She has the ability to vow without his interference; only those things that will come in between their marriage or cause her to be denied something are subject to his approval.", + "And these are the vows which he can annul: vows which involve self-denial. [For instance:] “If I bathe” or “If I do not bathe;” “If I adorn myself,” or, “If I do not adorn myself.” Rabbi Yose says: these are not vows of self-denial. If the woman vows, “A certain something shall be konam (forbidden) to me if I bathe, but if I don’t bathe it shall be permitted to me,” the husband can annul her vow because not bathing or not adorning oneself is considered self-denial. Another interpretation of this mishnah is that the woman says, “Bathing is forbidden to me forever if I bathe today” or “A shevuah that I shall not bathe”. Again, since these are examples of self-denial the husband may annul the vow. Rabbi Yose does not believe that these are vows of self-denial. Rabbi Yose’s definition of vows self-denial will be brought up in the next mishnah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is the continuation of Rabbi Yose’s opinion, begun in yesterday’s mishnah. Yesterday Rabbi Yose said that if the wife vows not to adorn herself or not to bathe the husband cannot annul because these are not considered vows of self-denial. In our mishnah Rabbi Yose provides his definition of vows of self-denial.", + "But these are vows of self-denial:
If she says, “Konam be the produce of the [whole] world to me”, he can annul. If the woman forbids upon herself all produce everywhere the husband may annul the vow because this is certainly considered a vow of self-denial.", + "“Konam be the produce of this region to me,” he should bring her that of a different region. In this case he cannot annul the vow because he may bring her produce from another region.", + "“[Konam be] the produce of this shopkeeper to me”, he cannot annul. But if he can obtain his sustenance only from him, he can annul, the words of Rabbi Yose. Similarly, if she vows not to eat the produce of a certain shopkeeper, he may not break the vow because he may bring her produce from other shopkeepers. However, if the husband has a deal with the shopkeeper from whom she swore not to receive benefit, whereby the shopkeeper provides him with food on credit, then he may annul the vow. Since the husband will not be able to bring his wife food from the other shopkeepers who do not give to him on credit, he will not be able to provide her with food, and therefore her vow will be one of self-denial. The Sages disagree with Rabbi Yose and hold that even though she has sworn not to receive benefit only from one specific person and she could receive from others, this is still considered a vow of self-denial and the husband may annul it." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first section of the mishnah continues to discuss which vows a husband may annul. The second section of the mishnah discusses a person who swears that priests and Levites may not derive benefit from him.", + "[If she vows], “Konam, that which I benefit from mankind,” he cannot annul, and she can benefit from gleanings, forgotten sheaves, and the corners of the field. The husband cannot annul this vow because there are still people from whom she may receive benefit (food, clothing etc.). “Mankind” implies people other than her husband. Since her husband may still provide for her, this is not a vow of “self-denial”. Furthermore, she may still collect the produce which is mandated to be given to poor people from people’s fields. These do not actually belong to the owner of the field; rather they are considered ownerless. This includes “gleanings” which is the wheat which falls from people’s hands as they collect, forgotten sheaves, and the corners of fields.", + "[If one says], “Konam be the benefit which priests and Levites have from me”, they can take [from him] against his will. A person must give certain parts of his produce to priests and Levites. He must give terumah to priests and first tithe to Levites. If he vows that priests and Levites should not be able to derive benefit from him, they still may take terumah and tithe, because these do not actually belong to the one who vowed. The connection between this section and what we learned above is that just as things left for the poor do not actually belong to the owner of the field, so too terumah and tithes do not actually belong to the person who separates them to give them to the priests and Levites.", + "[But if he vows,] “Konam be the benefit these priests and Levites have from me,” other [priests and Levites] should take. In this case the one who vows does not prohibit all priests and Levites from benefiting from him, just certain priests or Levites. In this case the vow is effective and other priests and Levites should take the terumah or tithes. Although as we stated above the person does not own these, he has the right to choose to whom to give them. Therefore the vow is effective." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first part of the mishnah discusses a woman who vows not to provide benefit for either her own or her husband’s father or brother. The second part discusses a woman who vows not to provide benefit for her husband himself.", + "[If she vows,] “Konam that which I do for my father,” [or] “your father,” [or] “my brother,” [or] “your brother,” [the husband] cannot annul it. In all of these cases the woman vows that anything that she produces shall be forbidden to either her or her husband’s father or brother. Since none of these vows involves self-denial, the husband may not annul the vow.", + "[“Konam] “that which I do for you,” he need not annul it. Rabbi Akiva says: he should annul it, lest she make more than is fitting for him. Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri said: he should annul it, lest he divorce her and she thereby be forbidden to him. We learned in the fifth chapter of Ketuboth that a woman is obligated to perform certain duties for her husband and her handiwork belongs to him. Since she has this obligation, she may not vow that her husband may not benefit from her handiwork. In essence, she does not own her handiwork and therefore it is not hers to prohibit by vow. Rabbi Akiva points out that not all of the handiwork automatically goes to her husband. According to Ketuboth 5:9, she has a set amount of handiwork which she must do; anything over that amount she gets to keep. If so, the vow is potentially effective for this extra amount. Since if she does produce an extra amount, it will be difficult for a husband not to derive some benefit from it, he should annul the vow to avoid the potential problem. The reason that he has a right to annul the vow even though it is not a vow of self-denial is that this is something that comes between him and her. Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri points out that if the husband divorces his wife, the vow will become valid, since she is no longer obligated to provide him with her handiwork. Once divorced, he will also no longer be able to annul the vow. In such a case he would not be able to remarry her. To avoid this problem, Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri suggests that the husband annul the vow." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah teaches that if a husband/father annuls a vow of his wife/daughter but is mistaken with regard to who vowed, what type of vow they took or what was being prohibited, he must annul the vow again in order for it to be annulled.", + "If his wife vowed, and he thought that his daughter had vowed, or if his daughter vowed and he thought that his wife had vowed; In this case the husband/father was mistaken with regard to who vowed.", + "If she took the vow of a nazirite, and he thought that she had vowed by a korban, or if she vowed by a korban, and he thought that she vowed a nazirite vow; In this case the mistake was with regard to the type of prohibition. For instance, she vowed by a nazirite vow but her husband/father thought that the vow was a vow using a korban to prohibit wine (i.e. “wine is a korban to me”), or vice versa. Although in both cases she would be forbidden to have wine, the husband still annulled the wrong type of vow.", + "If she vowed [to abstain] from figs, and he thought that she vowed [to abstain] from grapes, or if she vowed [to abstain] from grapes and he thought that she vowed from figs, he must annul [the vow] again. In this case the husband was mistaken with regard to what was being prohibited, figs or grapes. In all three cases, since the husband did not have full grasp of who was vowing, what type of vow they were taking, or what they were prohibiting, he must annul the vow again. If he does not, the vow is valid." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah teaches that a vow that has been partially annulled is not annulled at all.\nWe should note that this is a different rule than that which we saw with regard to the releasing of vows done by a sage. There we saw that according to Rabbi Akiva a vow that has been partially released is fully released (9:6). According to the Talmud, Rabbi Akiva disagrees with our mishnah.", + "If she vows, “Konam these figs and grapes which I taste”, and he [the husband] confirms [the vow] in respect of figs, the whole [vow] is confirmed; In the cases in this mishnah, the woman vows not to have figs and grapes. If the husband confirms part of the vow, the whole vow is confirmed. After he has confirmed it, he can no longer annul it.", + "If he annuls it in respect of figs, it is not annulled, unless he annuls in respect of grapes too. However, if he annuls part of the vow, the whole vow is not annulled and she is still forbidden in respect to that which he annulled. In this case, she would be forbidden to have both figs and grapes. For the vow to be annulled he must annul the whole vow.", + "If she vows, “Konam the figs that I taste and these grapes that I taste”, they are two distinct vows. In this case the mishnah considers it as if she had taken two vows. Therefore, if he annuls the vow with respect to figs, that vow is annulled and she may have figs but she may not have grapes." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nYesterday we learned that if when the husband/father annulled his wife/daughter’s vow he did not have full comprehension of who vowed, what type of vow they took, or what they prohibited, he must annul it again.\nGenerally the vow may be annulled only on the day that the husband/father hears of the vow (see 10:5). However, in this case he may annul the vow when he learns the details, even though the day that he heard the vow has passed, because for him the day that he learns of the vows correct details is considered the day that he heard the vow.\nOur mishnah discusses a husband who did not know that he could annul the vow, or that there was even a vow to annul. The question is can he annul the vow when he learns that he has such a power, or that it was a vow.", + "[If the husband declares,] “I knew that there were vows, but I did not know that they could be annulled”, he may annul them [now]. In this case the husband/father knew that there was a vow, but did not know that he could annul the vow or that in general he can annul vows. The mishnah rules that he may annul the vow later when he learns that he has such a right. The day that he learns that he can annul vows is considered the “day that he heard the vow”.", + "[But if he says:] “I knew that I could annul them, but I did not know that this was a vow,” Rabbi Meir says: he cannot annul it, But the Sages say: he can annul. In this case the father/husband knew that he has the right to annul vows in general, but did not know that what his daughter/wife had said was considered a vow. Hence he did not annul the vow on the day that he heard the original remark. When he later learns that this was a vow, Rabbi Meir says he can no longer annul it. Since he knew on the day that he heard the vow that he can annul vows, he should have annulled what she had said in any case, even though he was not sure that it was a vow. The Sages, however, rule that he may still annul the vow when he learns that it was truly a vow. According to their opinion, this is the day that is actually called “the day that he heard the vow.”" + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses a situation in which a man is under a vow not to provide any benefit to his son-in-law. The mishnah teaches how the father may give money to his daughter without allowing his son-in-law to receive benefit.\nWe should note that this mishnah probably more properly belongs in chapter four where the mishnah discussed circumventing vows such as these. Assumedly, the mishnah is brought in this chapter because it mentions fathers and daughters.", + "If a man is under a vow that his son-in-law shall not benefit from him, and he wants to give money to his daughter, he must say to her, “This money is given to you as a gift, providing that your husband has no rights with it, [and it is only given to you] so that may put to your personal use.” If the father wants to give his daughter money he may make a stipulation that the son-in-law should have no rights to the money and that the only use for the money is for the personal use of the daughter. In this way, the father can circumvent the vow prohibiting his son-in-law from deriving benefit from him. Were the father not to make such a stipulation, the present would be a transgression of the vow because anything that the wife owns the husband has rights over as well." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe Torah states that a widow and a divorcee’s vows are binding. This ruling is seemingly obvious, for a widow and a divorcee do not have any husband who could possibly annul their vows. In order to prevent the Torah from being obvious, the mishnah finds situations in which the ruling is not so obvious.", + "After quoting the verse from Numbers, the mishnah proceeds to explain it in a way that it is not overly simple.", + "“But every vow of a widow and of a divorcee… shall be binding upon her” (Numbers 30:9).
How is this so? If she said, “Behold, I will be a nazirite after thirty days”, even if she married within the thirty days, he cannot annul it. In this case the woman vowed before she was married but vowed in such a way that the vow would not begin to take effect for another thirty days. During the thirty days before the vow takes effect, she was married. Although the vow begins to take effect when she is already married, her husband cannot annul it because she made the vow before she was married.", + "If she vows while in her husband’s domain, he can annul [the vow] for her. How is this so? If she said, “Behold, I will be a nazirite after thirty days,” [and her husband annulled it], even though she was widowed or divorced within the thirty days, it is annulled. This case is opposite to that in the previous section. Here the woman vows while still married, but stipulates that the vow will not take effect for another thirty days. While still married, before the vow takes effect, the husband annuls the vow. Even though by the time the vow took effect she was already divorced, since the husband annulled it while she was still married, the vow is annulled.", + "If she vowed on one day, and he divorced her on the same day and took her back on the same day, he cannot annul it. This is the general rule: once she has gone into her own domain [even] for a single hour, he cannot annul. In this case, she vowed while married, was then divorced and then remarried on the same day (seemingly a theoretical situation, or two people who have trouble making up their minds!). The mishnah teaches that the husband can no longer annul the vow that she took during their first marriage, even though the second marriage was on the very same day. In the last clause, containing the general rule, the mishnah explains that if she had gone out of her husband’s domain before he annulled the vow, he cannot subsequently annul the vow. This is what the Torah means when it states that a widow or divorcee must keep their vows. Sometimes they must keep them even though they made the vow when they were married." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nAt the end of the previous mishnah we learned that a girl who leaves her husband’s domain even for one moment does not return to have her vows annulled by this same husband. Our mishnah teaches that the same is true for a girl who leaves her father’s domain either by reaching majority age, by being married or by her father dying. The mishnah lists nine types of such women. The first three left their father’s domain by being married, the next three by their father dying and the final three by reaching majority age. Hence I have broken this mishnah down in three subsets of three.", + "Usually “young girl” refers to a girl who has not yet reached majority age (12 ½). However, here the term is used more loosely and includes even those girls who are already past 12 ½.", + "There are nine young girls whose vows stand: [1a] a girl who reached majority age who is [like] an orphan; [1b] a young girl [who vowed] and [then] reached majority age who is [like] an orphan; [1c] a young girl who has not yet reached majority age, who is [like] an orphan; [2a] a girl who reached majority age and whose father died; [2b] a young girl [who vowed] and [then] reached majority age and whose father died; [2c] a young girl who has not yet reached majority age and whose father died; [3a] a young girl whose father died, and after her father died she became of majority age; [3b] a girl who has reached majority age whose father is alive; [3c] a young girl who has reached majority age and whose father is alive. Rabbi Judah says: also one who married off his daughter while a minor, and she was widowed or divorced and returned to him [her father] and is still a young girl. The first section lists girls who were married off by their fathers when they were young (before 12 ½) and then were widowed or divorced. Since they were married, their fathers no longer have the ability to annul the vows. Halakhically they are considered “orphans during their father’s lifetime.” There are three types of girls in this category: 1) a girl who vowed after she had reached majority age; 2) a girl who vowed before reaching majority age and has now reached majority age; 3) a girl who is still considered a “young girl” (12-12 ½). Since all three of these girls have no husband and no father, their vows stand.", + "All three of these girls vowed after their fathers died and have never been married off. Since they have no husbands or fathers, their vows stand. The age categories are the same as in the previous section.", + "This section lists three girls whose fathers have no authority over them and therefore there is no one to annul their vows. In the first case the father is dead. In the second case she vowed after she had already reached majority age At this point the father may no longer annul her vows. In the third case she vowed before reaching 12 ½ but then reached majority age. According to one interpretation of the last section of this mishnah, Rabbi Judah adds a tenth girl to the list, the girl who was married off as a minor and then widowed or divorced and is still a young girl who has not reached 12 ½. Since she has been married, her father may no longer annul her vows, even though she is still a young girl." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah returns to discuss the category of vows made between the couple (“between him and her”) the type of vow that in general the husband has a right to annul.", + "[If she vows,] “Konam the benefit that I derive from my father or from your father if I make anything for you,” In the first case the wife says that she will not benefit from her or her husband’s father if she makes anything for her husband. Seemingly this is not the type of vow that the husband could annul because she could make something for him and then not benefit from her father or his father. This should not be considered a vow “between him and her”, the only type of vow that the husband can break.", + "Or, “Konam the benefit that I derive from you, if I make anything for my father or your father,” he can annul. Similarly this too is should not be a vow that the husband could annul because she could just refrain from making anything for her or her husband’s father. This also should not be considered a vow “between him and her.” Despite this, the mishnah rules that the husband may annul the vows. This is because the husband does not want work that his wife does for him to come between her and her father or his father. It is also disgraceful for him that she should not be allowed to do anything for her father or his father, lest she not be able to make anything for him. Therefore, in both cases he has the right to annul." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOne of the thorniest problems in halakhah is that a woman may not initiate divorce. If a woman is stuck in a bad marriage and wants to be divorced, it is difficult, if not impossible, for her to force her husband to divorce her and still receive her ketubah. We should however note that in talmudic times it was not impossible for a woman to force her husband to divorce her if she was willing to forego her ketubah. Unfortunately, today, even this is difficult.\nOur mishnah contains fascinating testimony regarding attempts that women made to force their husbands to divorce them. Originally, these attempts were effective, for the sages believed the woman’s claims. However, when they began to suspect these women of lying so that they could marry others, they changed the laws such that these claims would not be an effective means by which a woman could force her husband to give her a divorce and her ketubah.", + "
At first they would say that three women must be divorced and receive their ketubah: She who says: “I am defiled to you”; “Heaven is between me and you”; “I have been removed from the Jews.” The mishnah mentions three claims that used to work in forcing a husband to divorce his wife. 1) “I am defiled to you”. The Talmud explains that this claim is made by a priest’s wife who says that she has been raped. As we have learned, a priest may not stay married to his wife if she has had sexual intercourse with someone prohibited to her, even if the intercourse was against her consent. 2) “Heaven is between me and you”. Some commentators interpret this to be a veiled reference to the husband’s inability to perform the sexual act. She is saying, as distant as the heaven is from the earth, that is how distant you and I are from each other in sexual matters. 3) “I have been removed from the Jews”. This refers to a vow she made not to receive sexual benefit from Jews, which includes her husband. She may have made the vow because sexual intercourse is not pleasurable for her. The sages believed these statements because they assumed that a woman would not make such things up.", + "But subsequently they changed the ruling to prevent her from setting her eye on another and spoiling herself to her husband: She who said, “I am defiled unto you” must bring proof. “Heaven is between me and you” they [shall appease them] by a request. “I have been removed from the Jews” he [the husband] must annul his portion, and she may have relations with him, and she shall be removed from other Jews. When the sages saw that women were lying and using these claims to leave their husbands because they wanted to marry someone else, they came up with other solutions to these problems. These solutions did not allow the woman to force her husband to divorce her and pay her ketubah. 1) If she says that she has been raped, she must bring proof. Until she does so, she is not believed and she is not prohibited to her husband, nor is he forced to divorce her. 2) If she complains that her husband cannot function sexually, the sages should try to bring them together with words of reconciliation. This may have been the rabbinic equivalent of going to a sex therapist. 3) If she says that she made a vow not to have sex with Jews, the husband may annul that part of the vow that prohibits her from having sex specifically with him, and she will be prohibited from having sex with other Jews, even should she be subsequently divorced. Congratulations! We have finished Nedarim. It is a tradition at this point to thank God for helping us to finish learning the tractate and to commit ourselves to going back and relearning it, so that we may not forget it and so that its lessons will stay with us for all of our lives. Despite the fact that some of these mishnayoth may have been slightly obscure, we should remember what an important role vows played in the religious life of Jews in the mishnaic and talmudic periods. Vows were a way of turning everyday matters into issues of greater significance, from matters between human beings and other human beings, to matter between human beings and God. Learning the laws of vows, and especially how to get out of vows, shows us how humans can make mistakes, get out of them, and yet retain their ultimate covenant with God. Congratulations on making it through this difficult tractate. May you have the strength and time to keep on learning more Mishnah! Tomorrow we begin Nazir." + ] + ] + ] + }, + "versions": [ + [ + "Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp", + "http://learn.conservativeyeshiva.org/mishnah/" + ] + ], + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה נדרים", + "categories": [ + "Mishnah", + "Modern Commentary on Mishnah", + "English Explanation of Mishnah", + "Seder Nashim" + ], + "schema": { + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה נדרים", + "enTitle": "English Explanation of Mishnah Nedarim", + "key": "English Explanation of Mishnah Nedarim", + "nodes": [ + { + "heTitle": "הקדמה", + "enTitle": "Introduction" + }, + { + "heTitle": "", + "enTitle": "" + } + ] + } +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Nashim/English Explanation of Mishnah Yevamot/English/Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp.json b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Nashim/English Explanation of Mishnah Yevamot/English/Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..0c8837927eb5112bc9ce9137b09647461e65f792 --- /dev/null +++ b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Nashim/English Explanation of Mishnah Yevamot/English/Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp.json @@ -0,0 +1,802 @@ +{ + "language": "en", + "title": "English Explanation of Mishnah Yevamot", + "versionSource": "http://learn.conservativeyeshiva.org/mishnah/", + "versionTitle": "Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp", + "status": "locked", + "license": "CC-BY", + "shortVersionTitle": "Dr. Joshua Kulp", + "actualLanguage": "en", + "languageFamilyName": "english", + "isBaseText": true, + "isSource": true, + "isPrimary": true, + "direction": "ltr", + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה יבמות", + "categories": [ + "Mishnah", + "Modern Commentary on Mishnah", + "English Explanation of Mishnah", + "Seder Nashim" + ], + "text": { + "Introduction": [ + "The laws of levirate marriage are contained in Deuteronomy 25:5-10. According to these laws, if a husband dies without children, his brother should marry his widow and the first son that she bears shall be “accounted to the dead brother”. This is in order for the dead brother’s genealogical line to be continued. If the live brother refuses to marry his dead brother’s widow, she performs a ceremony known in the Mishnah as “halitzah”. This entails her taking off his shoe and spitting in his face (the rabbis understand this to mean spitting on the ground). After halitzah, the woman can marry whomever she chooses, as can a normal widow.", + "There are two instances of levirate marriage in the Tanakh, one involving Judah’s sons and daughter-in-law (Genesis 38) and one involving Ruth and Boaz (see Ruth 3:12 and chapter 4). Some of the legal details of these instances do not match those of Deuteronomy. It is sufficient to note that the rabbis follow the laws of Deuteronomy and do not derive the laws of levirate marriage from Genesis or Ruth. ", + "There are a few rules that we should explain here in the introduction, in order to make the learning of this sometimes difficult tractate simpler. First of all, a woman whose husband has died without children is forbidden to marry another man until she has levirate marriage or halitzah. Second, a man may not perform levirate marriage for a woman who is forbidden to him. For instance, if two brothers marry two sisters and one dies, the widow is not subject to the laws of levirate marriage, because her sister is married to the levir (a man cannot marry two sisters). Third, both betrothed women and married women are subject to the laws of levirate marriage. Fourth, levirate marriage is obligatory only for paternal brothers. ", + "There is some debate in the Talmud whether or not levirate marriage is currently preferable to halitzah. In post-Talmudic times, Ashkenazim held that halitzah was mandatory and they abolished levirate marriage. Certain Sephardi groups continued to practice levirate marriage until the formation of the State of Israel, which has adopted the Ashkenazi position. Much of these differences can be attributed to the fact that Ashkenazim banned bigamy, while most Sephardim did not.", + "The following is a list of Hebrew terms and their meaning. I will use these terms in transliteration because they are less cumbersome. I suggest you print this page so that you can reference it while we learn the tractate.", + "Halitzah—release from levirate marriage.", + "Halutzah—a woman who has performed halitzah. A priest cannot marry a halutzah. ", + "Ma’amar—the giving of money from the yavam to the yavamah, a parallel to the betrothal money given as “kiddushin” in normal marriages. According to the Torah there is no marital process for the widow who goes through yibbum. All that really happens is that he has relations with her, and thus yibbum is performed. However, the rabbis created an institution called “ma’amar” whereby the yavam would give her betrothal money similar to the betrothal money given in regular marriages (we will learn these laws in tractate Kiddushin). Ma’amar, however, does not make the woman the yavam’s full wife. The status of their marriage is only rabbinic. This will have many important implications in certain mishnayoth.", + "Mamzer—the child of an illicit union or the child of a mamzer. The Torah states, “A mamzer shall not be admitted into the congregation of the Lord” (Deuteronomy 23:3). We will see in the mishnah that there are several different opinions as to which type of illicit union creates a mamzer. A mamzer cannot marry a regular Israelite. I will not translate mamzer as “bastard”, as it is often translated, because in American lingo a “bastard” is also the child of an unmarried couple. This is untrue in Jewish law. ", + "Shomereth yavam (yavamah)—a woman who is subject to the laws of levirate marriage (i.e. her husband died without children).", + "Yavam—the living brother (there may be more than one, if the dead brother had two or more brothers.) In English he is called the levir.", + "Yibbum—levirate marriage.", + "Z’kukah—a woman with whom he is liable to have yibbum or halitzah, but with whom he has not yet done so. The word z’kukah comes from the word zikah which means “tied to” or “bound”. A z’kukah is bound to the yavam until halitzah or yibbum (then she is bound as a regular wife is to her husband). ", + "The first few chapters of Yevamoth are extremely complex. In order to make things simpler I will use names, generally Biblical one. Please don’t despair if you get lost. Once the principles become clear, most of the rest is just details.", + "Good luck! \n" + ], + "": [ + [ + [ + "Introduction\nIf a woman’s husband dies without children she is liable for yibbum to her husband’s brother. However, if she is forbidden to her husband’s brother because of an incest prohibition, she is not liable for yibbum. Our mishnah teaches which incest prohibitions exempt a woman from being liable for yibbum. Furthermore, the mishnah teaches that not only is the prohibited woman exempt from yibbum, but all of her rival wives (those who were also married to the dead husband) are exempt from yibbum. The mishnah states that this exemption is “ad infinitum”. This means that if one of this woman’s rival wives has yibbum with another brother, one to whom the wife prohibited to the other brother is not prohibited, and then this brother also dies, all of her rival wives from the second marriage are also exempt from yibbum.\nWe will explain each category of forbidden relationships and try to give concrete examples.", + "Fifteen [categories of] women exempt their rival wives and the rival wives of their rival wives and so on ad infinitum from halitzah and from yibbum. And these are they: (1) his daughter, (2) and the daughter of his daughter, (3) and the daughter of his son, (4) and the daughter of his wife, (5) and the daughter of her son (6) and the daughter of her daughter; (7) His mother-in-law and (8) his mother-in-law’s mother, (9) and his father-in-law’s mother; (10) His maternal sister and (11) his mother’s sister and (12) his wife’s sister (13) And his maternal brother’s wife; (14) and the wife of his brother who died before he was born, (15) And his daughter-in-law. All these exempt their rival wives and the rival wives of their rival wives, and so on, ad infinitum, from halitzah and from yibbum. If any of them died, or made a declaration of refusal, or were divorced, or were found incapable of procreation, their rivals are permitted. And you cannot say of a man’s mother-in-law, or the mother of his mother-in-law and of the mother of his father-in-law that they were found incapable of procreation or that they made a declaration of refusal. His daughter: Reuven and Shimon are brothers. Shimon marries Reuven’s daughter (this is permitted) and another woman. If Shimon dies, Reuven cannot perform yibbum with his daughter. Hence, she and her rival wives are exempt from yibbum or halitzah. And the daughter of his daughter, and the daughter of his son: These cases are the same as the case above, except Shimon married Reuven’s granddaughter and not his daughter. And the daughter of his wife and the daughter of her son and the daughter of her daughter: Meaning his wife’s descendents who are not his children. Even though these women are not blood relatives of his, they are still forbidden to him. His mother-in-law and his mother-in-law’s mother, and his father-in-law’s mother: In this case Shimon marries Reuven’ wife’s mother, or Reuven’s wife’s maternal or paternal grandmother. Since these women are all forbidden to Reuven, when Shimon dies without children they and their rival wives are exempt from yibbum. His maternal sister: Reuven and Shimon are paternal brothers. Shimon marries Reuven’s maternal sister. This is permitted since she does not share any parent with Shimon. When Shimon dies, she cannot have yibbum with Reuven, since he is her brother. Therefore, she and her rival wives are exempt. And his mother’s sister: Again, Reuven and Shimon are paternal brothers. Shimon marries Reuven’s mother’s sister, and then dies. Since she, as Reuven’s aunt, is prohibited to him, she and all of her rival wives are exempt from yibbum. And his wife’s sister: Reuven and Shimon marry two sisters. When Shimon dies, Reuven cannot marry his wife’s sister. This will be the typical case mentioned in many subsequent mishnayoth. And his maternal brother’s wife: Reuven and Shimon are maternal brothers and Reuven and Levi are paternal brothers. When Shimon dies Levi marries his widow (not through yibbum). She is permitted to him since Levi and Shimon are not brothers. When Levi dies, Reuven should have to do yibbum with his wife. However, she was originally Shimon’s wife and as Shimon’s wife she would not have had to do yibbum with Reuven, since yibbum is done only with paternal brothers. Since she was originally married to a man who made her forbidden to Reuven (the general prohibition of marrying your brother’s wife is true for both paternal and maternal brothers), she cannot have yibbum with him even after subsequent marriages. And the wife of his brother who died before he was born: Reuven marries a woman and dies before Shimon, his brother, is born. This woman has yibbum with Levi, a different brother. When Shimon grows up, Levi dies without children. Since Shimon was not alive when this woman married Reuven, he cannot have yibbum with her (this is learned exegetically from a verse). She and her rival wives are therefore exempt. And his daughter-in-law: Reuven and Shimon are brothers. When Reuven’s son dies, Shimon marries the widow. When Shimon dies, this woman, who used to be Reuven’s daughter-in-law, becomes liable to yibbum. Since she is forbidden to him, she and all of her rival wives are exempt. If any of them died, or made a declaration of refusal, or were divorced, or were found incapable of procreation, their rivals are permitted: If any of these women who were forbidden to the yavam, and therefore were themselves exempt and caused their rival wives to be exempt, were not married at the time of the brother’s death, the rival wives are permitted to have yibbum. The mishnah lists several ways in which the marriage could have been terminated. The two simplest are death and divorce. The “declaration of refusal” (me’un), refers to a case where an orphan girl’s marriage was arranged by her mother or brother. This type of marriage is different from the usual marriage, which is arranged by the father. Marriage arranged by a mother or brother is only of rabbinic status; therefore the girl has a right to refuse, and thereby annul the marriage upon her reaching majority age. “Incapable of procreation” (aylonit) refers to a woman who never reaches puberty. She is clearly female, but never looks like an adult female, i.e. she has no breasts or puberty hair. [An aylonit is not merely a woman who has not had children. She must also not look like an adult female.] By definition, this type of woman cannot procreate. Since she cannot procreate, she is not liable for yibbum. After all the purpose of yibbum is to have children. Since she is not subject to the laws of yibbum, the fact that she is prohibited to the yavam does not exempt her rival wives. In all of these cases, the brother dies after his marriage to the wife forbidden to his brother has already been terminated. Therefore, the forbidden (former) wives do not exempt their rival wives from yibbum. And you cannot say of a man’s mother-in-law, or the mother of his mother-in-law and of the mother of his father-in-law that they were found incapable of procreation or that they made a declaration of refusal: The mishnah merely points out that three of the above categories cannot fit two of the possibilities for terminating marriage. A woman who has already had children (by definition a mother-in-law has had children) cannot be considered “incapable of procreation”. Nor could she “refuse” a marriage, for refusal of marriage takes place upon reaching majority, and not afterwards." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is a continuation of the previous and it explains many of the details.", + "How do they exempt their rival wives? If his daughter or any other of these forbidden relatives was married to his brother who also had another wife, and he died, then just as his daughter is exempt so is her rival exempt. If his daughter’s rival went and married a second brother of his, who also had another wife, and he died, then just as the rival of his daughter is exempt so is his daughter’s rival’s rival exempt, even if there were a hundred [brothers]. How is it that if they had died, their rivals are permitted? If a man’s daughter or any other of these forbidden relatives was married to his brother who also had another wife, and his daughter died or was divorced, and afterwards his brother died, her rival is permitted. The rival of any one who can make a declaration of refusal but did not make a declaration of refusal, must perform halitzah and may not have yibbum. This section explains the opening statement of mishnah one, “Fifteen [categories of] women exempt their rival wives and the rival wives of their rival wives and so on ad infinitum from halitzah and from yibbum”. For the sake of clarity, I will explain it again here. Reuven and Shimon are brothers. Shimon marries Reuven’s daughter. When Shimon dies without children, Reuven cannot perform yibbum with his own daughter. Hence, she and all of her rival wives are not liable for yibbum. If Reuven and Shimon had a third brother, Levi, and Reuven’s daughter’s rival wife married Levi and then Levi died without children, the rival wife is not liable for yibbum with Reuven and neither are any of Levi’s other wives. This law is true even if there are 100 brothers. As an aside, this mishnah also teaches that if there was a third brother, for whom none of the dead brother’s wives was prohibited, they are liable to have yibbum or halitzah with him. The exemptions are only in a case where Reuven was the only brother.", + "This section explains the second section of mishnah one, “If any of them died, or made a declaration of refusal, or were divorced, or were found incapable of procreation, their rivals are permitted.” If Reuven’s daughter died or was divorced before Shimon, her husband, dies, her rival wives are permitted to have yibbum with Reuven. There is a special rule regarding the wife who could have made a declaration of refusal (meun) but did not. As we recall, this wife’s marriage, arranged by her brother or mother, is of only rabbinical status (and not biblical). Her liability to have yibbum is therefore only rabbinic and not biblical. If she were to refuse the marriage, the rival wives are certainly liable for yibbum. However, even if she does not, her rival wives are not totally exempt. They are rabbinically exempt, because the rival wife cannot have yibbum with the yavam, but they are biblically liable, because the rival wife was not biblically married to the brother. The solution in such a case is for the yavam to perform halitzah. As we shall see throughout the tractate, in cases of doubt whether or not yibbum should or can be performed, the solution is usually the performance of halitzah, which avoids the possibility of forbidden sexual relations." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nMishnah three introduces a different list of women which is compared to the list in mishnah one.", + "There are six relatives that are more restricted than these, in that they may be married only to strangers, marriage with their rivals is permitted: his mother and his father’s wife, his father’s sister, his paternal sister, his father’s brother’s wife and his paternal brother’s wife. The six women mentioned in this mishnah are considered “more restricted” because they cannot be married to a man’s paternal brother (remember, yibbum is restricted to only paternal brothers). For instance, a man’s mother cannot marry his paternal brother, because she is the wife of the paternal brother’s father, and it is forbidden to marry your father’s wife. Likewise, it is forbidden to marry one’s father’s sister, one’s sister (from either parent), one’s father’s brother’s wife or one’s brother’s wife. This last case can occur when one brother marries a woman and divorces her or dies with children. This wife is now forbidden to all of her dead or divorced husband’s brothers. In all of these cases, if one of these women was married to another man and their husband died, their rival wives may marry one of the brothers. The rival wife of a woman forbidden due to kinship is forbidden only when the forbidden women became eligible for yibbum. These women were never eligible for yibbum to these brothers, therefore their rival wives are permitted. Furthermore, even if the brother tried to marry one of these women, and then died, the rival wives are eligible for yibbum, since the marriage of the brother to the forbidden woman was not valid." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nMishnah four teaches us that the first three mishnayoth of the tractate were all according the opinion of Beth Hillel. Whereas Beth Hillel ruled that a woman whose rival wife is forbidden to the yavam is exempt from yibbum (as is the forbidden wife), Beth Shammai ruled that she must have yibbum or halitzah. The mishnah then lists a few correlating disputes on this matter.\nFinally, the mishnah sounds what is surely the most pluralistic note in the entire Mishnah: despite their many disagreements, Beth Hillel and Beth Shammai did not separate into two different sects.", + "Beth Shammai permits the rival wives to the surviving brothers, and Beth Hillel prohibits them. If they perform the halitzah, Beth Shammai disqualifies them from marrying a priest, and Beth Hillel makes the eligible. If they performed yibbum, Beth Shammai makes them eligible [to marry a priest], and Beth Hillel disqualifies them. Though these forbid and these permit, and these disqualify and these make eligible, Beth Shammai did not refrain from marrying women from [the families of] Beth Hillel, nor did Beth Hillel [refrain from marrying women] from [the families of] Beth Shammai. [With regard to] purity and impurity, which these declare pure and the others declare impure, neither of them refrained from using the utensils of the others for the preparation of food that was ritually clean. I have explained this section above in the introduction.", + "If the yavam should perform halitzah with the rival wife, according to Beth Shammai, this halitzah is valid and allows this woman to marry other men. Since a woman who has had halitzah is prohibited to a priest (just as a divorcee is forbidden to a priest), this woman is now prohibited to marry a priest. According to Beth Hillel, this was an unnecessary halitzah, for the woman could have married other men even without it. Since it was not true halitzah, she can still subsequently marry a priest.", + "If she has yibbum, full levirate marriage, Beth Shammai would consider this to be valid, as they stated in section one. Should this marriage end in the husband’s death, she could marry a priest, as can all widows. However, according to Beth Hillel, this yibbum was actually forbidden. Therefore this woman can no longer marry a priest, since all women who have engaged in forbidden sex cannot subsequently marry priests (we will learn more about this law later in the tractate).", + "In Jewish law the child of many forbidden unions is considered to be a mamzer (we will also learn these laws later in the tractate). A mamzer cannot marry a regular Israelite (Jew). In the above dispute, if the rival wife did perform yibbum, the child would be a mamzer according to Beth Hillel. Since this was not a situation requiring yibbum, the woman was biblically forbidden to her dead husband’s brother. If the rival wife married another man without yibbum or halitzah, the child of this subsequent marriage would be a mamzer according to Beth Shammai. This is because this woman married “out” while still bound to her yavam. This section teaches that although this dispute would have created children considered by some to be mamzers and others not to be, neither side refrained from marrying those from the other side. This is a remarkable note of pluralism in the Mishnah, indeed it seems that this ideology is what kept the rabbis from forming splinter groups. Although Beth Shammai and Beth Hillel disagreed on many topics, they continued to live together and intermarry. Unlike other groups, specifically the Dead Sea sect, which left Jerusalem over halakhic disputes with their opponents, the halakhic disputes between the rabbis did not cause them to break into many little groups. The mishnah further teaches that despite the fact that things that Beth Hillel considered pure, Beth Shammai considered impure, and vice versa, they did not refrain from eating together and from using each other’s utensils. Again, if we look at the group that did split, the Dead Sea sect, two of the halakhic issues which they considered the most important were marital laws and purity laws (sacrificial laws were also important.) The authors of the Dead Sea scrolls are constantly accusing their opponents of not properly observing marriage laws or purity laws. Despite the fact that Beth Shammai and Beth Hillel also debated these subjects, they did not refrain from marrying each other and from eating together. In other words, they remained one society." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah explains how “the wife of his brother who died before he was born” exempts her rival wife from yibbum. This category of women was mentioned in the first mishnah of chapter one (there it was the 14th category).", + "What is the case of “the wife of his brother who died before he was born”? If there were two brothers, and one of them died, and then a third brother was born, and then the second brother had yibbum with his dead brother’s wife and then died himself, the first woman is exempt as the wife of his brother who died before he was born, and the second wife [is exempt] because she is her rival wife. If he had ma’amar with her and died, the second wife, must perform halitzah but may not have yibbum. Reuven and Shimon are brothers and Shimon dies. Afterwards, Levi is born. Reuven then takes Shimon’s widow in yibbum. Afterwards Reuven also dies without children. This same widow, who was originally Shimon’s wife and then became Reuven’s wife, now technically should become liable to have yibbum or halitzah with Levi, the third brother. However, since Levi was not yet born when Shimon died, she is not liable for yibbum with Levi. Since she is exempt, all of her rival wives are exempt as well.", + "In order to understand this section, we must remind ourselves that ma’amar is the giving of money from the yavam to the yavamah, a parallel to the betrothal money given as “kiddushin” in regular marriages. As I explained in the introduction, according to the Torah there is no marital process for the widow who goes through yibbum. All that really happens is that he has relations with her, and thus yibbum is performed. However, the rabbis created an institution called “ma’amar” whereby the yavam would give her betrothal money similar to the betrothal money given in regular marriages (we will learn these laws in tractate Kiddushin). Ma’amar, however, does not make the woman the yavam’s full wife. The status of their marriage is only rabbinic. This will have many important implications in future mishnayoth. In our mishnah, Reuven does not have full yibbum with the woman, but only does ma’amar, and then dies. The woman therefore, is not biblically liable to have yibbum with Levi, the third brother, but only rabbinically liable. Since she is only rabbinically liable, her rival wife is not truly exempt, and according to biblical law she could have yibbum. However, since Reuven did perform ma’amar with the other wife, the rival wife can only have halitzah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to deal with the same topic as the previous mishnah, the exemption of “the wife of his brother who died before he was born” and her rival wife.", + "If there were two brothers and one of them died, and the second had yibbum with his dead brother’s wife, and after a [third] brother was born the second died, the first wife is exempt on account of her being the wife of his brother who died before he was born, while the second is exempt as her rival. If he had ma’amar with her, the second wife must perform the halitzah but she may not have yibbum. Rabbi Shimon says: he may have yibbum with either of them or perform halitzah for either of them. The scenario in this mishnah is only slightly different from that in the previous one. Again, Reuven and Shimon are brothers. Shimon dies and in this case Reuven has yibbum with Shimon’s wife even before Levi is born. In the previous mishnah Levi was born and then Reuven had yibbum with Shimon’s wife. When Reuven dies, his wife who had previously been married to Shimon is exempt from yibbum with Levi because she is “the wife of his brother who died before he was born”. The rival wife is again, also exempt. The innovation of this mishnah is that even though when Levi was born, the woman was no longer waiting to have yibbum, in other words she was at the time a regular wife to Reuven and not a shomeret yavam, and Reuven did not die before Levi was born, in any case she is forbidden to Levi because he was not yet born when Shimon died.", + "If Reuven had ma’amar with the woman and then died, according to the first opinion, the ruling is the same as it was in the previous mishnah. Since she is only partially Reuven’s wife, she does not fully exempt her rival wife from yibbum.", + "In this section we see that R. Shimon disagrees with the previous opinion and rules that in the case under discussion in this mishnah, either the wife who was formerly married to Shimon or the rival wives may have yibbum or halitzah. Since Levi was born when the woman was no longer a shomeret yavam, all connection she had to Shimon is lost. She only becomes liable for yibbum because of her marriage with Reuven, and Levi was born before Reuven died (unlike Shimon). Therefore, according to R. Shimon, Levi must have halitzah or yibbum with either wife. In other words this is only a normal case of a man’s wives becoming liable for yibbum. Note that the mishnah says that Levi performs halitzah, even though in reality the woman performs halitzah by taking off his shoe and spitting." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah gives some general principles for when a woman is liable for yibbum (or halitzah) and when she is forbidden/exempt.", + "A general rule has been said about the yavamah: Wherever she is prohibited as a forbidden relation, she may neither perform halitzah nor have yibbum. If her prohibition is due to a commandment or a prohibition due to holiness, she must perform halitzah but she may not have yibbum. If her sister is also her sister-in-law, she may perform halitzah or have yibbum. This general rule has been amply illustrated in the previous chapter and a half. If the yavamah was prohibited to her yavam according to the biblical laws of incest, she may not perform halitzah nor have yibbum. Indeed, she is not truly subject to the laws of yibbum, since the prohibition of incest “trumps” the obligation of yibbum.", + "This section mentions two lesser prohibitions, the “prohibition due to a commandment” and a “prohibition due to holiness. Tomorrow’s mishnah will explain what both of these categories are. Suffice it now to say that they are less consequential than the biblical incest prohibitions mentioned in the previous section. If a woman who is prohibited to her yavam in one of these ways should be liable for yibbum, she must perform halitzah but may not have yibbum. This is another way of stating that she is biblically liable for yibbum, but to avoid the problems that this type of yibbum would cause, the only option is halitzah.", + "If the sister of the prohibited woman is also her sister-in-law, meaning there is a situation in which two sisters married to two brothers, and then both brothers die and both women become liable for yibbum to a third brother, even though this brother is prohibited from one of the sisters, he can have yibbum or halitzah with the other. I will illustrate this complicated situation using names. Reuven, Shimon and Levi are brothers. Leah and Rachel are sisters. Leah marries Reuven and Shimon marries Rachel, and then both men die without children. Levi is married to Rachel’s daughter (from a marriage before she married Shimon). Levi can therefore not have yibbum with Rachel, since a man cannot marry a woman and her daughter. Nevertheless, Levi can have yibbum with Leah. Although in general a man cannot have yibbum with the sister of his yavamah (we will learn this in chapter three), in this case since Rachel was forbidden to him, she was never his yavamah. Therefore, Leah is permitted." + ], + [ + "Introduction Mishnah four defines the two categories mentioned in section two of mishnah three.", + "A “prohibition due to a commandment” [refers to] the secondary incest prohibitions forbidden by the scribes. “A prohibition due to holiness” [refers to the following forbidden relationships]: a widow to a high priest; a divorced woman, or one that had performed halitzah to a regular priest; a mamzereth or a netinah to an Israelite; and an Israelite woman to a natin or a mamzer. Women who are not themselves forbidden because of incest laws, but the scribes (rabbis) decreed that they were nevertheless prohibited are called “secondary incest prohibitions”. Some examples of “secondary incest prohibitions” are one’s grandmother and one’s son’s or daughter’s daughter-in-law. The reason that the rabbis prohibited these women is to keep people away from potential sin. That is to say, if it became permitted to have relations with your son’s daughter-in-law, you might think that relations with one’s own daughter-in-law are also permitted. These prohibitions are called “prohibitions due to commandments” due to the commandment to obey the words of the sages.", + "“Prohibitions due to holiness” are prohibitions that are not due to incest (or adultery) but rather to the sanctity of the priests (see Leviticus 21:6-7) or the sanctity of the people of Israel. A widow to a high priest: If a widow becomes liable for yibbum to a high priest, he must perform halitzah for her. He cannot have yibbum with her because she is prohibited to him (Leviticus 21:14). A divorced woman or one that had performed halitzah to a regular priest: If a previously divorced woman or a woman who had halitzath, should become liable for yibbum with a regular priest, she must perform halitzah and cannot have yibbum, since she is prohibited to him (Leviticus 21:7). Note that this situation will usually not happen because a divorced woman or one who had halitzah cannot marry a priest, and therefore, she should not have married the yavam’s (who is a priest) brother, who is also a priest. Nevertheless, if the brother transgressed and did marry a divorcee (marriage between a priest and a divorcee is prohibited but valid), and then died, the divorcee (who is now also a widow) has halitzah with the brother but not yibbum. A mamzereth or a netinah to an Israelite and an Israelite woman to a natin or a mamzer: A mamzer (or mamzereth, a female mamzer) is the child of a forbidden union (Deuteronomy 23:3. The definition of a mamzer appears in chapter 4:13). A natin (or a netinah, a female natin) is a descendent of a tribe of foreigners who converted through trickery in the days of Joshua and were declared temple slaves (Joshua 9:27). Neither of these categories of men or women can marry full Israelites. Therefore, if one of these people becomes liable to have yibbum with an Israelite, or if an Israelite becomes liable to have yibbum with one of them, they have halitzah and not yibbum." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nA wife of a deceased husband is liable for yibbum only if her husband had a brother and no sons. Our mishnah defines what types of brothers cause the woman to be obligated for yibbum and what types of sons exempt them.", + "If one has any kind of brother, [that brother] requires his brother’s wife to have yibbum, and he is his brother in every respect, except for a brother born from a female slave or a non-Jewish woman. If one has any kind of son, [that son] exempts his father’s wife from yibbum, and he is liable for striking or cursing [his father], and he is his son in every respect, except for the son of a female slave or a non-Jewish woman. Any kind of brother, even a mamzer, requires the brother’s wife to have yibbum or halitzah. This brother is his brother in every respect. For instance, if his brother is a mamzer, his brother is still eligible to inherit from him. If one brother is a priest and his brother is a mamzer, for instance his father was a priest and had an adulterous affair with a married woman and they had a child, the priest is still allowed to become impure to help bury his mamzer brother. [Priests can only become impure for their seven immediate relatives.] The only exception to this rule is his brother from a slave or non-Jew. Since the child of a slave or a non-Jewish woman is not considered to be related to his father, for the child is not Jewish, the child is not considered to be related to his paternal father.", + "This section basically teaches the same law with regard to a son. Any son exempts a wife from yibbum or halitzah, even a mamzer son. For instance, if a man had an adulterous affair and a child was born, and then the man subsequently married another woman and died without any more children, his wife is exempt from yibbum, because he already has a child. This child is considered his in all legal matters. For instance if he strikes or curses his father he is liable for the death penalty (see Exodus 21:15, 17). He inherits his father, and if his father is a priest his father may become impure in order to bury him. Again, the only exception is the son of a female slave or non-Jew, who is not considered to be related to his father." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah deals with the situation where a man has married one of two sisters but does not know which one he has married. The Mishnah mentions situations such as these quite frequently, not because they were realistic, but because they are useful for teaching law.\nIn order to understand the mishnah, we need to know that a man cannot have relations with a sister of a woman with whom he is liable to have yibbum or halitzah. A woman with whom he is liable to have yibbum or halitzah is called his “z’kukah”. He can’t have relations with the sister of his z’kukah, just as he can’t have relations with the sister of his wife.", + "If a man betrothed one of two sisters and does not know which of them he has betrothed, he must give a get (a bill of to this one and a get to this one. If he died, and he had a brother, the brother must perform halitzah for both of them. If he had two brothers, one is to perform halitzah and the other may have yibbum. If they both preempted and married them they do not take [the women] away from them. If a man betrothed one of two sisters and does not know which he betrothed, he must divorce both. He cannot divorce one and marry the other because it is forbidden to marry your wife’s sister, even after you have divorced your wife. In other words, if he divorces one and marries the other, he may have divorced the one that he betrothed and therefore it would be forbidden for him to marry the other.", + "If he dies, both sisters become liable for yibbum or halitzah to his brothers. If he has one brother, that brother cannot have yibbum with either because it is forbidden to have relations with the sister of a woman with whom you are liable to have yibbum (z’kukah). In other words, if he were to have yibbum with one of them, it could be that the other was the one who was really betrothed. Therefore, he must perform halitzah for both.", + "If there are two brothers, the first brother performs halitzah for one of the women and then the second brother can have yibbum with the other sister. The first brother should do halitzah because if he were to have yibbum he might be having relations with the sister who was not betrothed, and therefore he is having relations with the sister of his z’kukah (as in the above situation). However, after the first brother has halitzah with one of the sisters, there can be no problem for the second brother to have yibbum with the second sister. If she is the one who was betrothed to the dead brother, then he has yibbum with her, which is perfectly okay. If the other woman was the one betrothed, she has already had halitzah, and her ties to the brother are severed. Therefore, this woman is not the sister of his z’kukah.", + "If both brothers have yibbum with the two sisters, the court does not force them to separate, even though the first brother should have had halitzah. Although the brother who first performed yibbum may have originally had yibbum with the sister of his z’kukah, since her sister has now had yibbum, her ties to the other brother have been severed and neither brother is currently married to the sister of his z’kukah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to provides scenarios whereby two men betroth two women, but neither know who betrothed whom.\nFor the sake of clarity I will use names in explaining this complex mishnah. There are two families of men in the mishnah. The first family I will call Reuven, Shimon and Levi, who are all brothers. The second family of men I will call George, Bill and Ron, again all brothers. The two sisters in the mishnah I will again call Rachel and Leah. This should make the mishnah somewhat easier.", + "If two men betrothed two sisters and one does not know whom he betrothed and the other does not know whom he betrothed, this one gives two bills of divorce and the other gives two bills of divorce. If they died and this one has a brother and this one has a brother, this brother performs halitzah for both widows and this brother performs halitzah for both widows. If one has one brother and the other has two brothers, one brother performs halitzah for both widows and [as regards] the two, one performs halitzah and the other may perform yibbum. If they both preempted and married they do not take [the women] away from them. If this one had two brothers and the other had two brothers, one brother of one performs halitzah for one widow and one brother of the other performs halitzah with the other widow, [and then the other] brother of the first may have yibbum with the halutzah of the second and [the other] brother of the second may have yibbum with the halutzah of the first. If both preempted and performed halitzah, the [other] two must not perform yibbum, rather one must perform halitzah and the other may then have yibbum. If they both preempted and married they do not take [the women] away from them. Reuven and George betroth Rachel and Leah but neither knows who betrothed whom. They both must then divorce both women in order for the women to go marry other men.", + "If Reuven and George die, and each has only one brother (Shimon and Bill), Shimon must perform halitzah with both women and Bill must perform halitzah with both women. Neither can have yibbum with either women because each woman might be the sister of the woman with whom he is truly liable to have yibbum, the z’kukah (because we don’t know who betrothed whom).", + "If Reuven has two brothers, Shimon and Levi and George still only has Bill as a brother, Bill must have halitzah with both Rachel and Leah. With regard to Shimon and Levi, one brother must have halitzah with both women but the other brother can have yibbum. This rule was explained in the above mishnah as well. The second brother can have yibbum with either women because if she was truly the woman who Reuven betrothed, then yibbum is proper. If Reuven betrothed the other sister, then the sister with whom this brother now has yibbum is no longer the sister of his z’kukah, because this other sister has already received halitzah from his other brother.", + "As we learned above in mishnah six, if both brothers preemptively marry both sisters, they are not forced to have a divorce. Certainly the second marriage is okay, and even the first marriage was only problematic in the beginning, before the second sister had yibbum. Even though the woman whom he married may have once been the sister of his z’kukah, after she has had yibbum the other sister is no longer a z’kukah. For further explanation see mishnah six.", + "If both Reuven and George have two brothers, one brother of each dead brother has halitzah with both sisters. Let’s say that Shimon and Bill have halitzah with both sisters. Now Levi can have yibbum with the sister who had halitzah with George and Ron can have yibbum with the sister who had halitzah with Shimon. This is permitted because if this sister was the one whom his brother had betrothed than yibbum is proper. If she is not the correct sister, then his other brother has already had halitzah with the other woman and she is no longer a z’kukah. The reason that Levi cannot have yibbum with the sister who had halitzah with Shimon and that Ron can’t have yibbum with the sister who had halitzah with Bill is that it is forbidden to marry a woman with whom your brother had halitzah.", + "If Shimon and Levi preemptively perform halitzah with both Rachel and Leah, the other two, Bill and Ron, cannot both have yibbum with Rachel and Leah, because the first to do yibbum might do so with the sister of his z’kukah. Rather one (either Bill or Ron) should do halitzah and then the other may have yibbum.", + "Again, if Bill and Ron both do yibbum, after Shimon and Levi both performed halitzah, neither are forced to divorce them. This is the same ruling as in section four and in the previous mishnah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah gives a general rule about yibbum and then begins to discuss a different issue, namely one who is suspected of having relations with a woman who is forbidden to him.", + "The commandment to perform yibbum is upon the oldest brother. If a younger brother preempted him [by performing yibbum], he has acquired [a wife]. If a man is suspected of [having relations] with a slave and then she was freed, or with a non-Jewish woman who then converted, he must not marry her. If, however, he did marry her they do not take her away from him. If a man is suspected of [having relations] with a married woman, and then [in consequence] she was taken away from her husband, even though he married her, he must divorce her. Any brother of the deceased husband may perform yibbum or halitzah. However, the first option is supposed to go to the oldest remaining brother. If, contrary to what is supposed to happen, a younger brother does perform yibbum, the yibbum is valid and she is his wife. We will learn more about this in chapter four, mishnah five.", + "The three parts of this section all deal with a man who is suspected of having relations with a woman who is forbidden to him. In the first part, he is suspected of having relations with either a slave or a non-Jew. Both of these women are prohibited to him. Subsequently, the slave is freed (thereby becoming a fully Jewish woman) and the non-Jewish woman converts to Judaism. In their current state both women are permitted to him. Nevertheless, he is not allowed to marry them. There are two reasons given for this. One, so that people will not confirm the original rumor that he had relations with a woman forbidden to him. Two, so that people won’t say that she only converted in order to marry him. In contrast, if he is suspected of having an affair with a married woman, and then she is forced to separate from her husband, and the suspected adulterer marries her, the court imposes a divorce. Adultery is a much more serious crime than relations with non-Jews and therefore just a suspicion that he had adultery with her, rules out all future marriages. Note that this rule is ultimately meant to protect marriages. A man whose wife has had adultery can no longer remained married to her. To prevent a situation whereby she sets her eyes on another man and forces her husband to divorce her by committing adultery, the rabbis permanently forbade her to the adulterer. .", + "Questions for Further Thought:
• Why does section two follow section one? What is the connection, if any, between the two laws?" + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe second part of mishnah eight dealt with men who are suspected of having relations with women prohibited to them. Mishnah nine deals with men who are suspected of lying in order to free a woman of her husband so that they could marry her.", + "A man who brings a bill of divorce from a country beyond the sea and states, “it was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence”, must not marry the [divorcer’s] wife. [Similarly, if one states] “he died”, “I killed him”, or “We killed him”, he must not marry his wife. Rabbi Judah said: [If he says], “ I killed him”, the woman may not marry [any one]; [If, he states], “We killed him”, the woman may marry. A messenger who brings a bill of divorce from overseas must state “It was written in my presence and signed in my presence”. This is to ensure that the divorce document was done properly and that the husband actually requested that it be given (we will learn these laws in tractate Gittin). Our mishnah teaches that the messenger is not allowed to marry the divorcer’s wife, lest the messenger fake the get in order to marry her. His participation in “freeing” her of her husband, disqualifies him from subsequently marrying her.", + "Similarly, if a man testifies that a woman’s husband is dead, he may not marry her. Jewish law generally does not allow testimony with less than two witnesses. However, in the case of testimony about the death of a man, testimony that will allow her to remarry as a widow, only one witness is required. Since this man is our sole means of knowing that she is a widow, he cannot marry her, lest he lie in order to marry her. Even if he says “I killed him” or “We killed him” he cannot marry her.", + "A murderer is forbidden from testifying in a court of law. Therefore, according to Rabbi Judah, if one testifies that he murdered a woman’s husband, his testimony is disqualified and it turns out that there is no testimony to her husband’s death. Therefore, she cannot remarry. However, if he says, “We killed him” he may mean to say, “I was there when other people killed him”. Since he does not definitively say that he is a murderer, his testimony about the death of the woman’s husband is valid, and she may remarry." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nMishnah ten is a continuation of mishnah nine.", + "A sage who has pronounced a woman forbidden to her husband because of a vow must not marry her himself. If, however, a woman made a declaration of refusal or performed halitzah in his presence, he may marry her, since he [is part of a] court. If any of these had wives who [subsequently] died, [the other women] are permitted to marry them. If [the women] were married to others and were [subsequently] divorced, or widowed, they may be married to these. They are permitted to their sons or brothers. The sage may not marry the woman whom he has declared forbidden to her husband due to a vow. This could happen if the woman vowed to receive no benefit from her husband, and then came in front of the sage to release her vow (we will learn how a vow is released in tractate Nedarim). If the sage could not find an opening to release the vow, then the woman remains forbidden to her husband. The sage may not marry her lest he did not search hard to find a way to release the vow because he wanted to marry the woman himself. However, if a woman performs the declaration of refusal (an annulment of marriage made by a woman upon reaching majority in a case where her marriage was contracted by her brother or mother) or halitzah in front of a sage, that sage may still marry her. In this situation he is part of a court, and we are not suspicious of courts. Furthermore, with a court, if he wanted to illegally accept her declaration of refusal or halitzah just so that he could marry her, he would have to get the rest of the court to agree. Since this would not be so simple, we are not suspicious and he may marry her.", + "This section places certain limits on the preceding laws in this mishnah and the previous one. If these men, who testified and thereby allowed the woman to be freed from her husband (the one who brought the get, or the one who testified about the husband’s death or the sage who did not release the vow), had other wives at the time, then they may later, after their current wives die, marry these other women. Since at the time of their testimony there is little chance that they would marry the woman about whom they are testifying, they are not suspected of lying. Note that this mishnah assumes that bigamy is not common, even though it is permitted. Furthermore, if these women subsequently marry other men and then are again divorced or widowed, they may marry the men who testified in order to “free” them from their previous marriage. The fact that they married someone else first, means that the original testimony did not directly allow them to marry the one who brought the get, testified about the death or did not release the vow. The step in between gets rid of the suspicion that they were lying. Finally, these women may marry the children or brother of these men. While we suspect that one may lie in order to free a woman for himself, we do not have such suspicions for his son or brother." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nMishnayoth one through four are all one long mishnah dealing with a case of four brothers, whom we will call, Reuven, Shimon, Levi and Judah, two of whom married two sisters, Rachel and Leah.", + "Four brothers: two of whom were married to two sisters, if those who were married to the sisters died, behold these must perform halitzah but may not have yibbum. If they preemptively married them, they must divorce them. Rabbi Eliezer said: Beth Shammai holds that they may retain them, and Beth Hillel holds that they must divorce them. Reuven and Shimon marry Rachel and Leah and then both die. Rachel and Leah are technically liable for yibbum or halitzah with either Levi or Judah. The mishnah teaches that neither Levi nor Judah may have yibbum with either sister, because each sister is the sister of his z’kukah (a woman with whom he is liable to have either yibbum or halitzah). In other words Leah is liable to have yibbum or halitzah with each brother as is Rachel. They are both considered to be “z’kukah” to both brothers. If Levi or Judah were to have yibbum with either one, he would be having relations with the sister of his z’kukah, which is forbidden just as it is forbidden to have relations with one’s wife’s sister. Even after one sister has had halitzah with one of the other brothers, thereby ending her status as z’kukah, the other may not have yibbum because any one woman is forbidden to him at the time when she becomes liable for yibbum, remains forbidden forever.", + "If the brothers did marry the sisters, against the ruling in clause one, they must divorce them. Although the marriage is valid and therefore requires a divorce, it is forbidden and therefore a divorce is mandatory.", + "According to Rabbi Eliezer, the previous ruling is only according to Beth Hillel. Beth Shammai disagrees and rules that the marriage may be upheld." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to discuss variations that could arise from the scenario brought up in mishnah one.", + "If one of the sisters was forbidden to one [of the brothers] under the prohibition of incest, he is forbidden to marry her but may marry her sister, while the second brother is forbidden to marry either of them. [If one sister] was forbidden due to a commandment or due to holiness they both perform halitzah and may not be taken in yibbum. If one of the sister’s was forbidden to one of the remaining brothers because of one of the various incest laws, for instance he was already married to her daughter, she is not liable to have yibbum with him (as we learned in chapter one). Therefore he can marry the other sister, for she is not the sister of his z’kukah. Nevertheless, the other brother, to whom neither sister is forbidden, is still prohibited from marrying either sister, since each is the sister of his z’kukah.", + "In chapter two, mishnayoth two and three, we learned that there are two other categories of forbidden relationships besides primary incest prohibitions: secondary incest relationships prohibitions and prohibitions due to the inherent holiness of the priests (for instance divorcees are forbidden to priests) or of all of Israel (for instance the prohibition of a mamzer). If one of the sisters was forbidden to one of the remaining brothers due to one of these prohibitions, for instance he was a priest (and his paternal brothers were not), or he was a mamzer (and his paternal brothers were not) the two sisters must have halitzah and cannot have yibbum. This accords with what we learned in chapter two, that in any case where a woman becomes liable to have yibbum with a man prohibited to her due to a commandment or holiness, she must have halitzah and not yibbum." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis is the final mishnah which deals with the subject raised in mishnah one.", + "If one of the sisters was forbidden to one brother under the prohibition of incest and the other sister was forbidden to the other under the prohibition of incest, she who is forbidden to the one is permitted to the other and she who is forbidden to the other is permitted to the first. This is what they said: when her sister is her sister-in-law she may either perform halizah or be taken in yibbum. If each sister is prohibited to one brother due to an incest prohibition, for instance Levi is married to Rachel’s daughter and Judah is married to Leah’s daughter, Levi may have yibbum with Leah and Judah may have yibbum with Rachel. This is because each sister is a z’kukah to only one brother. Rachel is a z’kukah only to Judah and Leah only to Levi. When yibbum is performed neither brother is having relations with the sister of his z’kukah.", + "This refers to the end of mishnah 2:3. Rachel and Leah are both sisters and were sisters-in-law before Reuven and Shimon died. The only time that both Rachel and Leah could have yibbum with a brother is when both are forbidden to one brother through a prohibition of incest, as our mishnah describes. Note that our mishnah is actually quoting an earlier mishnah and explaining it. This phenomenon of mishnah explaining an older mishnah does occasionally occur in the Mishnah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah and the three that follow it, deal with situations in which there are three brothers, Reuven, Shimon and Levi, two of whom are married to two sisters, Rachel and Leah or a mother and her daughter, or a mother and her granddaughter. The commonality to all of these cases is that a man may not have relations with both of these women. Therefore, if both women should become liable for yibbum with the surviving brother, he may not have yibbum with either, because each one is the relative of his z’kukah (the other woman who becomes liable for yibbum). We have learned most of these rules above in mishnah two.", + "Three brothers: two of whom were married to two sisters, or to a woman and her daughter, or to a woman and her daughter’s daughter, or to a woman and her son’s daughter, behold, these must perform halitzah but may not be taken in yibbum. Rabbi Shimon exempts them. If one of them was forbidden to him by a prohibition of incest, he is forbidden to marry her but is permitted to marry her sister. If the prohibition is due to a commandment or to holiness, they must perform halitzah but may not be taken in yibbum. If Reuven marries Rachel and Shimon marries Leah, who are either sisters or a mother and her daughter or a mother and her granddaughter, and then Reuven and Shimon both die without children, Levi cannot have yibbum with either woman. This is because each woman is the immediate relative of the other woman who is his z’kukah. Just as we have learned before that one cannot marry the sister of a z’kukah, here we learn that one cannot marry the mother, daughter, grandmother or granddaughter of a z’kukah. Rabbi Shimon holds that since he cannot have yibbum with either one of them, neither are even obligated for yibbum.", + "If one of the two women was forbidden to him by a prohibition of incest, for instance if Leah’s daughter was married to Levi already, since Leah is not obligated for yibbum, Levi may have yibbum with Rachel (in this case Leah’s sister). We have already learned this rule in mishnah two.", + "If one of the two women was forbidden but only due to a prohibition of a commandment or a prohibition due to holiness, both women are technically liable for yibbum. Since he cannot have yibbum with either, he must do halitzah with both. Again, this law was learned above in mishnah two." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to deal with variants upon the situation where two of three brothers were married to two sisters.", + "Three brothers, two of whom were married to two sisters and the third was unmarried: When one of the sisters’ husbands died, the unmarried brother performed for her ma’amar, and then his second brother died: Beth Shammai says: his wife [remains] with him while the other is exempt because she is his wife’s sister. Beth Hillel however says that he must divorce his wife with a get and by halitzah, and his brother’s wife by halitzah. This is the case in regard to which they said: “woe to him because of his wife, and woe to him because of his brother’s wife.” Reuven and Shimon were married to Rachel and Leah, and Levi was unmarried. When Reuven dies, Levi performed ma’amar with Rachel. Ma’amar, as we have learned before, is an act parallel to betrothal with a regular woman, and is only done in the case of yibbum. Ma’amar is performed by the man giving a symbolic amount of money to the woman. Rachel becomes his quasi-fiancee after having ma’amar, but she is not fully his wife until he performs yibbum (intercourse). Before Levi can have yibbum with Rachel, Shimon also dies, thereby making Leah liable for yibbum. The question is now asked, can Levi continue to stay married to Rachel, even though he is liable to have yibbum with Rachel’s sister. According to Beth Shammai, the first woman (Rachel) remains Levi’s wife and Leah is exempt from either yibbum or halitzah. In other words, Beth Shammai sees in ma’amar a full marital act, one which makes Rachel Levi’s full wife. Since he is already married to Rachel, he cannot have yibbum with Leah, Rachel’s sister, and she is completely exempt. According to Beth Hillel, ma’amar does not make Rachel into a full wife, such that it would be biblically forbidden for Levi to marry her sister. Therefore, when Leah becomes obligated for yibbum, it is the case of two sisters who are both liable to have yibbum with the same man. As we have learned previously, in such a case both must have halitzah, and neither may have yibbum, since a man cannot marry the sister of his z’kukah. In addition, Rachel requires a get, since she did have ma’amar, which is an act of betrothal. The final clause of the mishnah relates that it is about such a case that people say, woe to him for losing his wife and woe to him for losing his brother’s wife. For without having done anything wrong, both of these women are prohibited to him." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe key to understanding the laws in these mishnayoth is that ma’amar, the equivalent of betrothal in cases of yibbum, does not create a full marriage between the yavam and the yavamah but does create a tie. Often the solution in cases where a woman has had ma’amar and then her husband dies without having done yibbum thereby making her obligated for yibbum with the other brother, is that she has halitzah but not yibbum.", + "Three brothers: two of whom were married to two sisters and the third was married to a stranger: If one of the sisters’ husbands died and the brother who was married to the stranger married his wife and then died himself, the first is exempt [from yibbum or halitzah] because she is his wife’s sister, and the second is exempt as her rival. If he had only had ma’amar with her and died, the stranger is to perform halitzah but may not be taken in yibbum. Three brothers: two of whom were married to two sisters and the third was married to a stranger: If the brother who was married to the stranger died, and one of the sisters’ husbands married his wife and then died himself, the first is exempt [from yibbum or halitzah] because she is his wife’s sister, and the second is exempt as her rival. If he had only had ma’amar with her and died, the stranger is to perform halitzah but may not be taken in yibbum. Reuven and Shimon are married to Rachel and Leah. Levi is married to Tovah, who is not a sister of Rachel or Leah (she is a “stranger”). When Reuven dies, Levi has yibbum with Rachel his wife. Subsequently Levi dies and Rachel and Tovah become liable to have yibbum or halitzah with Shimon. Rachel is exempt because Shimon is married to Leah, her sister. Tovah is exempt because she is Rachel’s rival wife (see chapter one, mishnah one).", + "If Levi had ma’amar with Rachel instead of full yibbum, and then Levi died, Rachel was not truly his wife in order to exempt Tovah as a rival wife. Therefore, Tovah must have halitzah, but still cannot have yibbum since Levi did have ma’amar with Rachel.", + "In this case, Levi dies and Reuven has yibbum with Tovah. When Reuven subsequently dies, Rachel and Tovah become obligated to have yibbum with Shimon. Rachel is exempt because Shimon is married to Leah, her sister. Tovah is exempt because she is Rachel’s rival wife (see chapter one, mishnah one).", + "If Reuven had ma’amar with Tovah instead of yibbum, and then he died, Tovah was not truly his wife and therefore the fact that Rachel is Leah’s sister does not exempt her from yibbum. She still must have halitzah because Reuven did have ma’amar with her." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to the discuss the situation of two brothers married to two sisters and a third brother married to a woman who is not a sister.", + "Three brothers: two of whom were married to two sisters and the third was married to a stranger: If one of the sisters’ husband died and the brother who was married to the stranger married his wife, and then the wife of the second brother died, and afterwards the brother who was married to the stranger died, behold she is forbidden to him forever, since she was forbidden to him for one moment. Three brothers: two of whom were married to two sisters and the third was married to a stranger. If one of the sisters’ husbands divorced his wife, and then the brother who was married to the stranger died, and he who had divorced his wife married her and then died,- this is a case concerning which they said: If any of them died or were divorced, their rivals are permitted. Reuven and Shimon are married to Rachel and Leah and Levi is married to Tovah. Reuven dies and Levi has yibbum with Rachel, and then Leah dies and then Levi dies (sounds a bit like a Shakespeare tragedy, doesn’t it!). In this case both Tovah and Rachel should become liable to have yibbum or halitzah with Shimon. Note that this is the second time that Rachel has become potentially liable for yibbum with Shimon, the first time when Reuven died and now when her current husband, Levi died. Our mishnah teaches that since she was exempt from yibbum with Shimon the first time, for at the moment he was married to her sister, she is exempt from yibbum the second time, even though Leah, her sister, is no longer alive. The fact that she was once forbidden to have yibbum with Shimon, means that she will always be forbidden to have yibbum with him. Tovah is also exempt because she is the rival wife of a woman exempt from yibbum.", + "Again, Reuven and Shimon are married to Rachel and Leah and Levi is married to Tovah. Reuven divorces Rachel, and then Levi dies, and Reuven has yibbum with Tovah, and then he dies. At this point Tovah becomes liable for yibbum with Shimon. The mishnah teaches that Tovah can have yibbum with Shimon even though Reuven was once married to the sister of Shimon’s wife. In other words, if Rachel had still been married to Reuven she would have been exempt from yibbum, and Tovah would have been exempt from yibbum, and hence forbidden to have yibbum (anyone exempt from yibbum may not have yibbum). Now that Rachel is no longer married to Reuven, Tovah can have yibbum. The mishnah refers to this law which has already been stated in chapter one, mishnah one." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah refers back to the first mishnah of the tractate, which stated that if one of the wives was forbidden to the yavam, and therefore did not require yibbum or halitzah, the rival wife was also exempt from yibbum or halitzah. In that mishnah (and in the previous mishnah of our chapter) we learned that if the forbidden wife had been divorced, the rival wife was again liable for yibbum or halitzah. Our mishnah teaches what happens to the rival wife if the forbidden wife was doubtfully divorced or only doubtfully married in the first place.", + "[If in any of these cases] the betrothal or divorce was in doubt, behold, these rivals must perform halitzah but may not be taken in yibbum. What is a case of doubtful betrothal? If when he threw to her betrothal money it was uncertain whether it fell nearer to him or nearer to her – this is a case of doubtful betrothal. [What is a case of] doubtful divorce? If he wrote a get in his own handwriting and it bore no signatures of witnesses, or if it bore signatures of witnesses but was note dated, or if it was dated but had the signature of only one witness this is a case of doubtful divorce. If the forbidden wife was doubtfully betrothed, then there is a doubt whether or not the rival wife must or even can have yibbum. If the divorce was valid, then the rival wife can and must have yibbum; if the divorce was invalid then the rival wife is exempt. Similarly, if there was a doubt about whether or not the wife forbidden to the yavam was even married in the first place, there is a doubt whether or not the rival wife must or can have yibbum. If the betrothal was valid, then the rival wife is exempt; if the betrothal was not valid, then the rival wife was never even this woman’s true rival wife, and hence she is liable for yibbum or halitzah.", + "This section and the next define potential cases of doubtful divorce and betrothal. We should note that there are other cases of doubtful divorce and betrothal that we will learn when we learn tractates Gittin and Kiddushin. A man may betroth his wife by throwing the money used for betrothal at her (money is one of the means by which a woman is legally betrothed), as long as it is closer to her than to him. [Note that the woman must always consent to becoming his betrothed. A man cannot throw money at any woman he wishes and thereby betroth her against her will]. If it was doubtful whether the money landed closer to him or closer to her, she is doubtfully betrothed.", + "A normal get (divorce document) is written by a scribe, is signed by two witnesses and is dated. If the two witnesses are missing, but the husband wrote the get himself, or it has two witnesses but no date, or one witness but it has the date, the get is valid according to the Torah but the sages stated that it was invalid (see Gittin 8:2, 9:4). If a woman were to get remarried using one of these divorce documents, the children from the second marriage are not mamzers (as they would be if she remarried without ever being divorced). Our mishnah considers these divorce documents cases of “doubtful divorce” since they are on the one hand valid (from Torah law) and on the other hand invalid (due to a stringency of the rabbis)." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is quite complex so I recommend paying careful attention to the details. If you are beginning to despair, we are almost out of the most complex section of Yevamoth.", + "Three brothers were married to three women who were strangers [to one another] and one of them died and the second brother did ma’amar with her and then he died, behold, these must perform halitzah but may not be taken in yibbum; for it is said “And one of them died…her husband’s brother shall unite with her” (Deuteronomy 25:5) only she who is bound due to one yavam but not she who is bound to due to two yavamim. R. Shimon says: he may have yibbum with whichever of these he wishes and then perform halitzah for the other. If two brothers were married to two sisters, and one of the brothers died, and afterwards the wife of the second brother died, behold, she is forbidden to him forever, since she was forbidden to him for one moment. Reuven, Shimon and Levi are married to Rachel, Tovah and Yael, none of whom are sisters. Reuven dies and Shimon does ma’amar with Rachel. When Shimon dies, Rachel and Tovah should, we would think, become liable for yibbum r halitzah with Levi. Our mishnah, using a midrash based on Deut. 25:5, states that neither woman may have yibbum with Levi. This is because Rachel is bound to Levi through her marriage to two of Levi’s brothers. She is still bound to him by force of her marriage with Reuven, because the ma’amar that Shimon did with her was not as strong as a full yibbum. [If Shimon had done yibbum, her ties to Reuven would have been fully severed.] She is bound to Levi through her marriage to Shimon because of the ma’amar she did do with him. In other words ma’amar is strong enough to create a relationship with the second brother, but not strong enough to sever the ties with the first brother. Therefore Rachel is bound to Levi through the force of her marriage to two brothers who are now deceased. The mishnah understands the words “And one of them died” to exclude a case where two brothers died. Since Rachel is exempt, her rival wife, Tovah, is also exempt. However, since ma’amar is not a biblical institution, and therefore the ties to Shimon are not complete, halitzah must be performed.", + "Rabbi Shimon holds that ma’amar either completely acquires the woman for the man who does ma’amar, in other words it creates a complete and valid relationship according to the Torah, or it doesn’t create any legal relationship whatsoever, not even a rabbinicly ordained marriage. If it creates a complete betrothal, then Rachel’s ties to her first husband, Reuven, are ended by Shimon’s ma’amar. When Shimon dies, she becomes liable to yibbum with Levi only because of her marriage to Shimon. If it doesn’t create any tie, then she was never at all married to Shimon, and she is liable for yibbum with Levi only because of her marriage to Reuven. In either case, she does not fit the category of one who is liable to yibbum through two dead husbands at the same time. Therefore, either of these wives may have yibbum. The second wife must have halitzah, lest the ma’amar not have created a tie with Shimon, and therefore Rachel became obligated for yibbum because of her marriage with Reuven and Tovah became obligated because of her marriage with Shimon. He cannot have yibbum with the second one as well, lest the ma’amar did create a tie, and a yavam cannot have yibbum with two wives of one dead husband.", + "Reuven and Shimon are married to Rachel and Leah. Reuven dies and Rachel then would become liable for yibbum with Shimon, except she is exempt because he is married to her sister. The mishnah teaches that even though Leah subsequently dies, and hence Rachel might be able to have yibbum with Shimon, she cannot because she was at one point forbidden to him. Note that this law was already explained in mishnah seven." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah discusses all of the potential violations that could occur in a case where two brothers betroth two women and the women are accidentally switched when the two couples enter the bridal chamber (huppah). In other words, Reuven has relations with Shimon’s wife and vice versa. Note that the mishnah is only discussing a situation where this occurred accidentally. Had the switch been intentional, they would all be intentional adulterers and the men would have to divorce their wives.", + "If two men betrothed two women, and as they were entering into the bridal chamber, they exchanged the one for the other, behold, they are guilty of having relations with a married woman. If they were brothers they are guilty of having relations with a brother’s wife. If they were sisters, they are guilty of having relations with a wife’s sister. If they were menstruants [they are guilty] of having relations with a menstruant. They must be kept apart for three months, lest they are pregnant. If they were minors incapable of bearing children, they may be returned [to their rightful husband] at once. If the women were of priestly families they are disqualified from eating terumah. At the time of the mishnah, in typical situations a man would betroth a woman and only some time later marry her. The marriage was actualized by him bringing her into the huppah, which was a true bridal chamber, and not the symbolic huppah used today. In the huppah the couple would have sexual relations. Once the woman is betrothed, she is considered like a full wife with regard to adultery. Therefore, if the two brides were switched, each brother who has relations with the other’s wife has violated the prohibition of adultery.", + "He has also violated the prohibition of having relations with your brother’s wife. See Leviticus 18:16 and 20:21.", + "If they were sisters he has also violated the prohibition of having relations with one’s wife’s sister. See Leviticus Leviticus 18:18.", + "If they were menstruating, the brothers have violated the prohibition of having relations with a menstruant. See Leviticus 18:19.", + "Before each wife can return to having relations with her lawful husband, she must wait three months, lest she was impregnated on her wedding night. The three months allows us to recognize whether the child is from the wrong husband. If she was impregnated by the wrong husband, the child will be a mamzer. If she was a minor who could not become pregnant, the three month waiting period is unnecessary.", + "If these women were from priestly families, they will no longer be allowed to eat terumah, for any woman who has had relations with someone forbidden to her, can no longer marry a priest or eat terumah. If her husband should die without children, she does not return to her priestly family and resume eating terumah, as would a normal widow in such a situation (see Leviticus 22:13)." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses the case where a yavam performs halitzah, but then the woman who had halitzah is found to be pregnant with the dead husband’s child.", + "A yavam performs halitzah for his yevamah, and she is subsequently found to be pregnant and she gives birth:
If the child is viable, he is permitted to marry her relatives and she is permitted to marry his relatives, and he does not disqualify her from marrying a priest. If the child is viable, meaning there was no miscarriage, then the halitzah was unnecessary, because only a husband who has no children cause his wives to be subject to yibbum. Since the halitzah was not necessary, all of the results of a man performing halitzah for a woman do not occur. He is permitted to marry her relatives and she is permitted to his relatives [mishnah 7 below will list which relatives are forbidden had the halitzah been necessary]. Furthermore, since the halitzah was unnecessary, she is not disqualified from subsequently marrying a priest, as a regular halutzah (a woman who has had halitzah is).", + "If the child is not viable, he is forbidden to marry her relatives and she is forbidden to marry his relatives, and he disqualifies her from marrying a priest. If the child was not viable, meaning she had a miscarriage, then the halitzah was necessary. Therefore, all of the results of a valid halitzah do occur. He is forbidden to marry her relatives and she may not marry his. She is considered a halutzah, and therefore she can no longer marry a priest." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah deals with a case where the yevamah is found to be pregnant after having yibbum. In the previous mishnah she was found pregnant after halitzah.", + "A yavam marries his yevamah and she is subsequently found to be pregnant, and she gives birth:
If the child is viable, he must divorce her and both are obligated to bring a sacrifice; If the child is viable, then the yibbum was unnecessary, for only the wives of childless husbands must go through yibbum. Not only was the yibbum unnecessary, but the marriage of the yavam to the yevamah was prohibited, for she is the wife of his brother [Marrying one’s brother’s wife is forbidden in all cases except for when yibbum is obligatory]. Therefore, he must divorce her and both must bring a sin-offering for having forbidden relations.", + "If the child is not viable, he may retain her [as a wife]. If the child was not viable, then the yibbum was valid and he may retain her as a wife. Neither must bring a sin-offering.", + "If it is doubtful whether it is a nine-months child of the first [husband] or a seven-months child of the second [husband] he must divorce her, and the child is legitimate, and they must bring an asham talui. If it is unclear whether the child was from the first husband, and the pregnancy was full-term, or the child was from the second husband (the yavam) and the pregnancy was only seven months long, then the yavam still must divorce her, lest the yibbum was unnecessary and she is forbidden to him because she is his brother’s wife. The child is not in any way illegitimate, whether or not it was from the first or second husband. Both the man and the woman must bring a sacrifice known as an “asham talui” (a dependent guilt-offering), which is brought when a person does not know whether or not what he did was sinful. In this case he has only transgressed if the child was not his. Note that the mishnah does not talk about an eight-month child. In the ancient world, it was considered impossible for a child born in the eighth month of pregnancy to live. Children born at nine or at seven months could live, but not those born after eight months. The rabbis also believed this “scientific” belief, and hence will often call a child born in the eighth month a “miscarriage”. If the child nevertheless lived, they probably assumed that they had counted the months wrong. The rabbis also developed a theory that there were two different types of pregnancies: a seven month and a nine month. If the child was born at eight months and lived, it must have been a seven month pregnancy that was overdue. If the child was born at eight months and died, it must have been a premature nine month pregnancy." + ], + [ + "Introduction In order to understand this mishnah, we must understand some background laws concerning a woman’s ownership of property, her dowry and her ketubah. When a man marries a woman he writes her a ketubah (a marriage document). In the ketubah is written the amount of money he will pay her upon divorce or his death. Additionally, some of the dowry that the woman brings into the marriage is written in the ketubah. Dowry can come in two forms. The first form is called “pluckable property” (nikhse melog). This is money that she brings from her father’s house that remain hers and the husband may not use. The husband has rights to the profit earned from this money during the marriage. He has no responsibility for the money. For instance, if she brings in a piece of land, the land is hers but the husband may use the fruits of the land. If the land should be taken by the Romans, he is not responsible to pay his wife the value of the land. Money that she receives as a gift or as an inheritance is part of this category. The second form is “property of iron sheep” (nikhse tzon barzel). This is written in the ketubah and hence the husband has responsibility for it, should the property be lost, stolen or destroyed. The husband may use the property. His sole responsibility is to return the value of the original property upon death or divorce. A wife may not sell either of these types of property without her husband’s permission. Neither may a husband sell the first type of dowry without his wife’s permission, since it is still hers. He may however sell “property of iron sheep”. Our mishnah discusses the status of the shomeret yavam, a widow who is waiting for her yavam to do yibbum or halitzah.", + "If a shomeret yavam came into possession of money: Beth Shammai and Beth Hillel agree that she may sell it or give it away, and that her act is legally valid. Beth Shammai and Beth Hillel agree that a shomereth yavam can sell new property that has come into her hands since the death of her first husband. She does not need the permission of the yavam, because he has not married her.", + "If she dies, what shall be done with her ketubah and with property that comes in and goes out with her? Beth Shammai says: the heirs of her husband are to share it with the heirs of her father; Beth Hillel says: the property is to remain with those in whose possession it is, the ketubah is to remain in the possession of the heirs of the husband and the property which comes in and goes out with her remains in the possession of the heirs of her father. If she dies, there is a dispute between the two houses concerning her inheritance. Usually a husband inherits his wife, but in this case she only had a yavam who had not yet performed yibbum. He is not fully her husband. Beth Shammai holds that the heirs of her husband, meaning the yavam who inherits from his dead brother, splits the money with the heirs of her father. The heirs of the father inherit since an unmarried woman is inherited by her father. Beth Hillel does not split the money evenly. Rather, each part of the inheritance remains where it is presumed to be. Since the ketubah, meaning the money paid from the husband to the wife upon death or divorce, is still with the husband’s estate, the husband’s inheritors collect this money. Additionally, the “property of iron sheep” is in her husband’s possession since he has full ownership over it. Therefore, the husband’s owners collect this as well. [This is Albeck’s explanation. The talmud explains that “property of iron sheep” is split between the husband’s and father’s inheritors.] The “pluckable property” is in the wife’s possession, since the husband cannot sell it. Therefore the wife’s father’s inheritors inherit this property." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is the final clause of yesterday’s mishnah, which discusses the shomeret yavam.", + "If he married her she is his wife in every respect save that her ketubah remains a debt on her first husband’s estate. When the yavam has yibbum with the shomeret yavam, she becomes his wife in every respect. If he wishes to divorce her he must give her a get and she doesn’t require halitzah. He can remarry her after divorcing her (provided she doesn’t remarry in between) and she is not forbidden as “his brother’s wife”. When she dies he inherits her. The only difference between her and a regular wife is that if he dies or divorces her, the ketubah is paid from the estate of the first husband. In any case, the rabbis declared that if the dead brother died penniless, the yavam must pay for her ketubah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah answers the question, which of the surviving brothers must or can perform yibbum or halitzah.", + "The commandment of yibbum is upon the eldest [of the surviving brothers]. If he declines, they pass in turn to all the other brothers. If they decline, they return to the eldest and say to him, “the commandment is upon you; either perform halitzah or yibbum.” As we taught above in chapter two, mishnah eight, the duty of yibbum is incumbent upon the eldest surviving brother. The other brothers should not perform yibbum until their elder brothers have declined the opportunity. However, as we learned there, if a younger brother does perform yibbum before the older brother has a chance to accept or decline, his yibbum is valid. If the eldest brother does not want to perform yibbum, all of the other brothers are given the opportunity, in order of their age. If they all do not wish to perform yibbum, they (perhaps referring to a court) return to the eldest brother and tells him that he must either perform yibbum or halitzah. He is not allowed to leave this woman hanging any longer. The mishnah also teaches that the duty of halitzah is also primarily upon the eldest surviving brother." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is a direct continuation of the previous one.", + "If he wished to suspend [his decision] until a minor becomes of age, or until the eldest returns from a country beyond the sea or [until a brother who was] a deaf-mute or an imbecile [should recover], he is not to be listened to, but is told, “the commandment is upon you; either perform halitzah or yibbum.” . If the eldest brother does not want to perform halitzah or yibbum, but rather wait until a younger brother becomes old enough to have yibbum with this woman, he is not listened to. Rather he is told that he must either perform yibbum or halitzah. The mishnah teaches that it is not fair to the woman to keep her waiting for halitzah. She has the right to be released now, so that she can go and marry whomever she wants. Similarly, if one of the younger brothers wants to wait for an older brother to return from abroad, or recover from deafness or from being an imbecile (this may be some sort of temporary insanity), they do not listen to him and force him to do yibbum or halitzah immediately. Note that a deaf-mute and an imbecile cannot contract yibbum or any type of marriage because they are considered to lack intelligence. As I have pointed out before, in mishnaic times real sign language did not exist, and therefore deaf-mutes could not really communicate. Now that sign language has been developed it is recognized that deaf-mutes do not inherently lack intelligence and they may contract marriage." + ], + [ + "Introduction The first half of this mishnah discusses how the brothers divide the inheritance from the dead brother. The second half of the mishnah teaches that when a man performs halitzah, he is thereafter forbidden to marry his halutzah’s relatives and she is forbidden to marry his.", + "He who performs halitzah with his yevamah, behold he is regarded as one of the other brothers in respect of inheritance. If the father was living, the estate belongs to the father. When a man dies without children, his primary inheritor is his father. If his father is not alive, then his brothers split the inheritance. When a man performs halitzah for his dead, childless brother’s widow, he now reverts to being like one of the other brothers with respect to his dead brothers inheritance. His having performed halitzah does not acquire for him any special rights vis-a-vis the inheritance. If his father was still alive, the father inherits as usual.", + "He who marries his yevamah acquires his brother’s estate. R. Judah said: in either case, if the father was living the estate belongs to the father. If, however, he performed yibbum, he has now taken the place of his dead brother. Therefore, according to the first opinion in the mishnah, he inherits his brother’s entire estate, even if the father is alive. R. Judah disagrees and holds that if the father is still alive, the father’s right to the inheritance trumps the yavam’s right.", + "He who performs halitzah with his yevamah, he is forbidden to marry her relatives and she is forbidden to marry his relatives: He is forbidden to marry her mother, her mother’s mother and her father’s mother; her daughter, her daughter’s daughter and her son’s daughter; and also her sister while she is alive. The other brothers are permitted. She is forbidden to marry his father and his father’s father; his son and his son’s son; his brother and his brother’s son. Just as a man cannot marry the relatives of his wife or his divorcee, so too, our mishnah teaches, a man cannot marry his halutzah’s relatives and she cannot marry his. The mishnah now lists which relatives are forbidden. These relatives are forbidden even if the halutzah should die, just as they are forbidden to a man should his divorcee die. The list includes her mother, grandmothers, daughter and granddaughters. The yavam may not marry the halutzah’s sister, but this prohibition is only while the halutzah is alive. After she dies he may marry them, just as a man may marry his divorcee’s sister after the divorcee dies. The mishnah teaches that only the brother who performs halitzah is forbidden from marrying her relatives. The other brothers of the deceased brother are not forbidden, since once halitzah has been performed their ties to her have been severed. The halutzah is forbidden to marry his relatives as well. These include his father and grandfathers, his son and grandsons, and his brother and his brother’s son. Note that most of these relatives would have been forbidden to her because of her marriage to the first brother. For instance, she cannot marry the father of the yavam, because he is also the father of her deceased husband and a man may not marry his daughter-in-law, even after his sons death.", + "A man is permitted to marry the relative of the rival of his halutzah but is forbidden to marry the rival of the relative of his halutzah. Although the rabbis declared that a man may not marry the relatives of his halutzah, he may marry the relatives of the rival wife of his halutzah. For instance, if Reuven dies and leaves two wives, Rachel and Tovah (not sisters), and Shimon performs halitzah for Rachel, even though he cannot marry Tovah, for she is the rival wife of his halutzah, he may marry Tovah’s relatives. The final piece of the mishnah presents the following scenario. Reuven dies leaving two wives, Rachel and Tovah, and Shimon performs halitzah for Rachel. Leah, Rachel’s sister was married to Chaim who is not related to Shimon. Chaim has another wife named Chana. Then Chaim dies. Just as Shimon cannot marry Rachel, because she is the relative of his halutzah, so too he cannot marry Chana, for she is the rival wife of the relative of his halutzah. This is how Rashi explains this piece, but there are others who explain it differently." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to teach that it is forbidden to marry the sister of one’s halutzah.", + "If he performed halitzah for his yevamah, and his brother married her sister and died, she must perform halitzah but may not be taken in yibbum. If Reuven performs halitzah for Rachel (who had been married to Shimon) and then Levi marries Leah, Rachel’s sister, and then Levi dies, Leah now falls in front of Reuven for yibbum or halitzah. Since Leah is the sister of his halutzah, Rachel, Reuven cannot have yibbum with her. However, since the prohibition of the sister of one’s halutzah is only of rabbinic origin (derabbanan), she must have halitzah and is not totally exempt.", + "Similarly if a man divorces his wife and his brother marries her sister and dies behold she is exempt from halitzah and from yibbum. Similarly, if Reuven divorces Rachel, and Shimon marries Leah and then Shimon dies childless, Leah is exempt from both halitzah and yibbum, since she is the sister of his former wife. Since this is biblically prohibited, Leah does not even need to have halitzah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nMishnah nine continues to discuss various scenarios of yibbum.", + "If the brother of the yavam had betrothed the sister of the shomeret yavam, in the name of Rabbi Judah ben Batera they said: they say to him “Wait until your older brother has done something”. Rachel becomes liable to have yibbum or halitzah with Reuven, her dead husband’s brothers. Before Shimon, the oldest surviving brother does yibbum or halitzah with her, Levi betroths Leah, Rachel’s sister. This is problematic because Leah is the sister of his z’kukah, a woman who is tied to him by her requiring yibbum or halitzah. However, the betrothal is valid. According to Rabbi Judah ben Batera, they tell Levi, the betrother, that he should not fully marry Leah until Shimon (or another brother) has done yibbum or halitzah with Rachel. That would end any ties between Rachel and Levi and allow Levi to fully marry Leah.", + "If his brother performed halitzah for her or married her, he may marry his [betrothed] wife. If Levi’s brother does halitzah or yibbum, Levi can now marry Leah.", + "If the yevamah died he may marry his [betrothed] wife. If Rachel dies, Levi can marry Leah, for she is no longer the sister of a woman tied to him. The woman who was tied to him is now dead.", + "If the yavam died, he must divorce his wife with a get and [release] his brother’s wife by halitzah. If Shimon dies, and there are no other brothers, Levi is now in quite a pickle. Levi must perform halitzah or yibbum for Rachel for he is the only surviving brother. However, he cannot do either while he is betrothed to Rachel’s sister Leah. Therefore he must first divorce Leah and then perform halitzah for Rachel. He cannot have yibbum with her because she is the sister of his divorcee. Furthermore, the mishnah teaches that although generally the sister of one’s divorcee is exempt from either yibbum or halitzah (as we learned in yesterday’s mishnah), in this case since the ties to Rachel existed before the betrothal to Leah, Rachel is not exempt." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah teaches that certain women must wait three months before remarrying in order that there will be no confusion as to whether the subsequent pregnancy is from the previous husband or the new husband.", + "The yevamah shall neither perform halitzah nor be taken in yibbum before three months have passed [since her husband’s death]. The yevamah may not perform halitzah or be taken in yibbum for three months lest she be pregnant with her first husband’s child. We encountered this problem in mishnayoth one and two of this chapter. There the mishnah dealt with the problems that could occur if she does get married or perform halitzah within this period. Here the mishnah states that in order to avoid those problems, she should wait three months.", + "Similarly all other women shall be neither be betrothed nor married before three months have passed. Whether they were virgins or non-virgins, whether divorcees or widows, whether married or betrothed. Rabbi Judah said: those who were married may be betrothed [immediately], and those who were betrothed may be married [immediately], with the exception of the betrothed women in Judea, because there the bridegroom was intimate with [his bride]. Rabbi Yose said: all [married] women may be betrothed [immediately] with the exception of the widow because of her mourning. The mishnah now broadens its scope and says that all widows and divorcees should not remarry within three months, again so that it is clear whose child the new baby is. Note that in these cases the only issue is inheritance and status of the child (i.e. is the child a kohen). There are now three opinions in the mishnah as to which women must wait three months. According to the first opinion, all women, even if they were merely betrothed must wait three months. Although generally betrothed women should not have had sexual relations with their husbands, and hence it should be clear that the pregnancy with her new husband is from him, she should still wait. The idea may be that in order not to create confusion, all women wait an equal period. According to Rabbi Judah a woman who was divorced or widowed from a full marriage may be betrothed within three months, because betrothal does not usually entail sexual relations. A woman who was divorced or widowed from betrothal may even be married within three months for the same reason. The only exception is the betrothed woman in Judea. According to this source and Mishnah Ketuboth 1:5, there was a suspicion that in Judea men might have relations with their betrothed wives before proper marriage. Therefore in Judea the betrothed woman is treated like a married woman and she must wait. Rabbi Yose says that all women may be betrothed within three months, but not widows. The reason that widows have to wait (and divorcees do not) is not in order to recognize whose child the new baby is, but because the widow cannot even be betrothed while mourning. We can see in this mishnah that betrothal was seen to be a joyous occasion and that they probably would celebrate it with a party. The Talmud states that this period is one month. Hence divorcees can be betrothed immediately and widows must wait a month. Of course, both would have to wait three months for proper marriage." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah teaches that one yavam can perform yibbum for several women if they were widows of different brothers. However, if they were all from the same brother he can have yibbum with only one of them.", + "If four brothers were married to four women, and they died, if the eldest [surviving brother] desires he may contract yibbum with all of them. In this case four widows from four different brothers all fall before the same brother for yibbum or halitzah. The mishnah teaches that this one yavam may have yibbum with all of them. The Talmud, however, notes a certain reservation. He is allowed to do so only if he is going to be able to provide well for them all. Bigamy was permitted under Jewish law, but only on the condition that the husband provide equally well for each wife. Also, the Talmud notes that it is not such a good idea to have four wives for there will be much strife in his home. Nevertheless, it is theoretically possible.", + "If a man was married to two women and died, sexual relations or halitzah with one of them exempts her rival. If two women who were married to the same brother fall in front of the yavam for yibbum, he need perform halitzah or yibbum for only one of them. He is not allowed to have yibbum nor halitzah with both.", + "If one of them was eligible [to marry a priest] and one ineligible [to marry a priest], then if he performs halitzah it should be to her who is ineligible, and if he contracts yibbum it may be with her who is eligible. If one of these two women was already ineligible to subsequently marry a kohen, for instance she was a divorcee from a previous marriage, the yavam should do halitzah with her and not with the other sister. This is because halitzah makes her forbidden to subsequently marry a kohen and there is no reason to needlessly disqualify the eligible widow from marrying a kohen. However, if he is going to do yibbum, he can have yibbum even with the sister eligible to the kohen, since this does not disqualify her from later marrying a priest." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah begins to discuss the definition of a mamzer, the child of an illicit union. The question that is asked is: which illicit unions produce children that are considered mamzers?", + "A man who remarried his divorced wife, or married his halutzah, or married the relative of his halutzah must divorce her, and the child is a mamzer; the words of Rabbi Akiva. But the Sages say: the child is not a mamzer. They agree that where a man married the relative of his divorcee the child is a mamzer. According to Deuteronomy 24:2-4 if a man divorces his wife and she remarries and then is divorced or widowed, the first husband may not remarry her. As we have seen throughout this tractate a man may not marry his halutzah or the relative of his halutzah (for instance her mother or daughter). Rabbi Akiva says that if the man does transgress and marry one of these women he must divorce her and the child is a mamzer. As we shall see in the next mishnah, Rabbi Akiva holds that the child of any illegal union is a mamzer. The Sages disagree and hold that the child is not a mamzer. As we shall see in the next mishnah, the Sages hold that a union that is a transgression of a negative commandment that is not punished by death or kareth does not create a mamzer. Since these transgressions are not punished by kareth, the child is not a mamzer. Furthermore, the prohibition of the sister of one’s halutzah is only derabbanan (of rabbinic origin) and therefore the child cannot be a mamzer. Marrying the relative of one’s divorcee is biblically prohibited and is punishable by kareth. Therefore the Sages agree with Rabbi Akiva that the child is a mamzer." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first section of this mishnah defines a mamzer. The second section teaches that the prohibition of a wife’s sister (Leviticus 18:18) is only while the wife is still alive, but is effective even if the couple is divorced. However, once the wife dies he may marry her sister.", + "Who is a mamzer? [The offspring of a union with] any relative with whom cohabitation is forbidden, the words of Rabbi Akiva. Shimon the Yemenite says: [The offspring of any union] for which one is obligated kareth at the hands of heaven; and the halachah is like his words. Rabbi Joshua says: [The offspring of any union] for which one is obligated death at the hands of a court.
Rabbi Shimon ben Azzai said: I found a scroll of genealogical records in Jerusalem, and it was written on it, “So-and-so is a mamzer [having been born] from an adulterous woman”, which confirms the view of Rabbi Joshua. In this section there are three opinions as to which type of forbidden unions create mamzers. Rabbi Akiva’s opinion is the strictest: any forbidden union of an incestuous nature creates a mamzer. This would preclude only forbidden unions that are not incestuous, such as a kohen and a divorcee. Shimon the Yemenite (who is not called rabbi) holds that any forbidden union punishable by kareth creates a mamzer. Shimon the Yemenite rejects Rabbi Akiva and holds that forbidden unions that are merely prohibited but not punishable by kareth or death do not create mamzers. An example of such a case is a shomeret yavam who gets remarried to an outsider without first having yibbum or halitzah with her yavam. According to Rabbi Akiva the child of such a marriage is a mamzer and according to Shimon the Yemenite the child is not. Interestingly, the mishnah explicitly states that the halakhah is according to this view. This is one of the few times that the Mishnah makes such a remark. Rabbi Joshua is even more lenient concerning the creation of mamzers. Only a union punishable by death creates mamzers. Rabbi Shimon ben Azzai claims that he found a scroll of genealogical records in which it was recorded that So-and-so was a mamzer because he was the son of an adulterous affair, which is punishable by death. From here he concludes that the halakhah is like Rabbi Joshua. However, Rabbi Akiva and Shimon the Yemenite could both claim that just because this mamzer was from an adulterous affair punishable by death does not prove that the halakhah is like Rabbi Joshua.", + "If a man’s wife died, he is permitted to marry her sister. If he divorced her and then she died he is permitted to marry her sister. If she was married to another man and died, he is permitted to marry her sister. If a man’s sister-in-law died, he may marry her sister. If he performed for her halitzah and then she died, he is permitted to marry her sister. This section teaches that the sister of one’s wife is only forbidden during the wife’s lifetime, even after divorce. This is stated explicitly in Leviticus 18:18, “Do not marry a woman as a rival to her sister and uncover her nakedness in the other’s lifetime.” Once the wife dies, whether while the couple is still married, after they are divorced or after her remarriage, the husband may marry her sister. However, if any of these things occur and the wife is still alive, he may not marry her sister. Similarly, a man cannot marry the sister of his yavamah while she is alive, even after he performed halitzah for her. However, after she dies he may marry her sister." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nIn order to understand this chapter we should review a few general issues of yibbum.\n1) According to the Torah the shomeret yavam becomes the yavam’s wife only through sexual intercourse. However, the Sages decreed that the yavam should first perform “ma’amar”, an act whereby he betroths her, either by money or by a document, the same way betrothal is enacted with other women. After ma’amar then the couple would have yibbum, enacted by sexual intercourse.\n2) A shomeret yavam’s ties to her yavam are biblically severed only through halitzah. However, the Sages decreed that if the yavam gives her a get, while it does not exempt her from halitzah, it makes the performance of yibbum forbidden. In other words it does in some sense sever the tie, thereby making her forbidden due to the prohibition of marrying a brother’s wife. Furthermore, after giving her a get he is forbidden to marry her rival wives, as are the rest of the brothers. He is also forbidden to marry any of her relatives. She is forbidden to marry a priest, as are all divorcees.\n3) If the yavam performed ma’amar and then changes his mind and doesn’t want to have yibbum with her, he must give her a get and perform halitzah. The get severs the ties created by ma’amar and the halitzah performs its usual function of exempting her from yibbum.", + "This mishnah is formulated in classic mishnaic style. It is terse, somewhat cryptic, easy to remember, and most importantly, it packs a lot of information into only a few words. Our job in explaining the mishnah will be to “unpack” it and decipher each clause. There is no [validity] to a get given after a get: If two women are widowed from one brother and both become liable for yibbum with one yavam and he gives the first one a get and then the second one a get, the get that was given to the second woman is meaningless and she is not considered to be a divorcee. As we stated in the above introduction, according to biblical law, a shomeret yavam does not receive a get. However the Sages decreed that a get is sufficient to make the other rival wives forbidden to the yavam and to make yibbum forbidden with the one who received the get. Since the second woman to receive the get is not a divorcee, the yavam may subsequently marry her relatives, and she may subsequently marry a priest. Nor to a ma’amar after a ma’amar: If one yavam does ma’amar to both of the women who become liable to him for yibbum, or two yavamim do ma’amar with one women who became liable for yibbum with either of them, the second ma’amar is meaningless. Although ma’amar is only of rabbinic origin, its strength is sufficient to render the acquisition of the yevamah as final. The second wife then received a meaningless ma’amar, for she was no longer liable for yibbum. Similarly, the second yavam performed a meaningless ma’amar for the woman was no longer available. Nor to an act of sexual intercourse after another act of sexual intercourse: If one yavam had intercourse, that is, an act of yibbum, with two yevamoth, the second act does not make that yevamah his wife. It is merely licentious sexual relations, for the woman is no longer liable for yibbum after her rival wife has had yibbum. She would not need a get in order to remarry. Nor to a halitzah after another halitzah: Whether one yavam performed halitzah for two yevamoth, or two yevamim performed halitzah for one yevamah, the second act of halitzah is meaningless, for the first act already severed all ties. The result is that the second woman to receive halitzah is not considered to be a halutzah.", + "However, the Sages say: There is [validity] to a get given after a get, and to a ma’amar after a ma’amar but not to an act of sexual intercourse after another act of sexual intercourse, or to a halitzah after another halitzah. The Sages disagree with the first two parts of Rabban Gamaliel’s statement. They hold that a yevamah who receives a get is not like one who has had halitzah. Since the one who receives a get still needs halitzah, the second get also has some validity. The fact that the second woman to receive a get is in some sense his divorcee, means that he cannot marry her relatives. She also could not subsequently marry a kohen. Similarly, the Sages hold that ma’amar does not acquire like yibbum. Since one who has been given ma’amar still needs yibbum to complete her becoming his wife, the second ma’amar does have some validity. The second woman to receive ma’amar would need a get to remarry, and the one who gave her ma’amar is subsequently forbidden to marry her relatives. In brief, we can see in this mishnah a debate concerning the power of rabbinic decrees. According to Rabban Gamaliel, the rabbinically decreed ma’amar and get for the yevamah are almost as strong as the biblically ordained yibbum and halitzah. According to the Sages, they are substantially weaker." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe remainder of the chapter gives various scenarios of a yavam’s releasing his yevamah from the necessity for yibbum. In order to understand these mishnayoth, it is important to keep in mind that a get (a divorce document) severs the ties created by ma’amar (an act of betrothal) and halitzah severs the ties created by the need for yibbum.", + "How [is the release from yibbum effected]?
If he performed ma'amar for his yevamah and gave her a get, she requires halitzah. When the yavam performed ma’amar he made the yevamah into his betrothed wife. When he subsequently gives her the get, he has ended the ties created by ma’amar. Since he never did yibbum or halitzah, she still requires halitzah to sever the ties created by the need for yibbum. He could not have yibbum with her because she is already his divorcee.", + "If he performed ma'amar and and did halizah, she requires a get. If he did ma’amar and then halitzah, she still needs a get to sever the ties created by the ma’amar. The halitzah is not sufficient to break the betrothal created by ma’amar. He cannot marry her because she is his halutzah.", + "If he performed ma’amar and then had intercourse with her, behold this is in accordance with the commandment. The normal, prescribed means of fulfilling the mitzvah of yibbum is for the yavam first to perform ma’amar and then, assumedly some time later, for them to have sexual relations. This is the same way that normal marriage is enacted: first the betrothal is done and then the couple begins to live together, today symbolized by the huppah (the wedding canopy). Since some time in the middle ages, Jews have combined the betrothal ceremony and the marriage proper into one event. " + ], + [ + "If the yavam gave her a get and then ma’amar, she needs [another] get and halitzah. As we learned above, only halitzah exempts the yevamah from her requirement for yibbum. When the yavam gave her a get, her ties to him were not completely severed. The only effect was that it was subsequently forbidden for him to have yibbum with her. When he then does ma’amar with her, she now requires another get in order to sever the ties created by this ma’amar. Finally, she still requires halitzah to sever the ties created by the need for yibbum.", + "If he gave her a get and then had intercourse with her, she needs [another] get and halitzah. In this case, after giving her the get, he has intercourse with her. This intercourse was forbidden, since she had already received a get. Therefore, since this was forbidden, it does not count as an act of yibbum. However, the mishnah teaches that it still has enough power to obligate him to give her another get, to sever the ties created by the intercourse [intercourse is one of the three means by which betrothals are contracted]. Finally, she still requires halitzah to sever the ties created by the need for yibbum.", + "If he gave her a get and then did halitzah, there is nothing after halitzah. Here the mishnah teaches that once he has performed halitzah, she is totally free and there is no longer anything preventing her from marrying anyone else.", + "If the yavam did halitzah and then he did ma’amar or gave her a get, or had intercourse with her; Or if he had intercourse with her and then did ma’amar, or gave her a get, or did halitzah, there is nothing after halitzah. The first part of this section teaches that once he does halitzah, whatever he does afterwards, be it give her ma’amar, a get or have intercourse, does not count for anything. The halitzah severs all ties and anything done afterwards is inconsequential. The second part of this section teaches that just as there is no validity to anything after halitzah, so too there is no validity to anything after yibbum. For instance, were he to do halitzah after having already performed yibbum, the halitzah would be inconsequential. Of course, if he gives her a get after having done yibbum she is a divorcee, as is any wife who receives a divorce. The mishnah intends only to teach that yibbum turns a yevamah into a full wife and halitzah totally exempts her from any subsequent need for yibbum.", + "[And the law is the same] whether there is one yevamah to one yavam or two yevamoth to one yavam. With regard to all the combinations that we have been learning in the previous mishnayoth, it matters not whether they were done by one yavam with one yevamah or with two different yevamoth. The general rule is always true: there is “something” after a get and after ma’amar, and after halitzah and yibbum there is nothing. The following mishnayoth will continue to explain these complex possibilities." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah demonstrates the different possibilities and combinations of halitzah, yibbum, ma’amar and a get and their consequences on a case where there is one yavam and two yevamoth (i.e. the brother who died without children left two wives).", + "How is this so?
If the yavam did ma'amar with this one and ma'amar with the other one, they need two letters of divorce and [one of them must have] halizah. The ma’amar performed with both yevamoth means that both require a get if they wish to marry someone else. In addition, one of them requires halitzah to end the ties created by their need for yibbum. As we recall, they don’t both need halitzah, since the halitzah of one wife exempts all of her rival wives. He could not have yibbum with either, since he gave ma’amar to both.", + "If he did ma'amar with one and gave a get to the other, the [first one] needs a get and [one of them must have] halitzah. In this case he must give the get to the first one, the one with whom he had ma’amar, and he can have halitzah with either. Again, the halitzah of either releases them both. He cannot have yibbum even with the one with whom he had ma’amar since he gave a get to her rival wife.", + "If he did ma'amar with one and had intercourse with the other, they need two gets and [one of them must have] halitzah. Once he had ma’amar with one wife, he should not have gone and had intercourse with the other wife. The intercourse was in an essence an ineffective act of yibbum. Therefore, they both need gets, one to end the ties created by the ma’amar and the other to end the ties created by the intercourse (which can be an act of betrothal) and one requires halitzah in order to release them both from the ties of yibbum.", + "If he had ma'amar with one and gave halitzah to the other, the first needs a get. Although in this case he did have halitzah with the second wife, the ma’amar that was previously done with the first wife means that she still needs a get. In other words, the ties created by the necessity of yibbum have already been severed, but there are still the ties created by the ma’amar. He could not have yibbum with her, since he has already done halitzah with the other wife, and it is forbidden to marry the wife of one’s halutzah.", + "If he gave a get to one and a get to the other, [one of them] requires halitzah. After having given a get to both women, he still needs to perform halitzah to totally release them. The get is not sufficient to sever those ties. However, he may not have yibbum with either woman since they both already received gets.", + "If he gave a get to one and had intercourse with the other, [the second one] requires a get and [one of them must have] halitzah. In this case, once he has given a get to the first wife, the yibbum done by intercourse with the second wife, was invalid. Therefore, he must give a get to the second wife, with whom he has already had intercourse, to sever the ties created by the intercourse. One of them still needs halitzah.", + "[If he gave] a get to one and had ma'amar with the other, [the second] requires a get and [one of them must have] halitzah. Similar to the previous case, if he gave a get to the first one, the ma’amar with second one is not valid. He could not subsequently have yibbum with her. However, he must still give her a get to sever the ties created by the ma’amar. As always, one of them still needs halitzah.", + "[If he gave] a get to one and halizah to the other, there is nothing after halitzah. As we learned in mishnah three, once he has performed an act of halitzah, there are no more steps which must be taken. Both women may now go marry other men." + ], + [ + "If he performed halitzah [for one] and then performed halitzah [for the other],
Or performed halitzah [for one] and did ma'amar [with the other], or gave her get, or had intercourse with her;
Or if he had intercourse [with one] and then with the other,
Or had intercourse [with one] and then ma'amar with the other, or gave her a get, or performed halitzah there is nothing after halitzah.
[There is no difference in the law] whether there was one yavam to two yevamoth or two yavamim to yevamah.
This mishnah continues to teach that once one of the yavamim has performed halitzah or yibbum with one of the yevamoth, any subsequent action done with the other yevamah, be it halitzah, a get, ma’amar or intercourse, is meaningless.
Section one: In this case the yavam has halitzah with one of the yevamoth and then halitzah with the other. As we will learn in section four, since the second halitzah was unnecessary, it has no effect. He can marry that halutzah’s relatives and she can marry his.
Section two: Similarly, if he has halitzah with one and then ma’amar, a get or intercourse with the other, the subsequent actions are invalid. The woman who received ma’amar does not need a get, nor does the woman with whom he had intercourse. The woman who received the get is not a divorcee but a widow, who may subsequently marry a kohen. In all of these cases, he can marry her relatives and she may marry his.
Sections three and four: These sections teach the same ruling, but with regard to yibbum, performed through intercourse. Once the yavam has yibbum with one of the yevamoth, all subsequent actions are invalid. Although the mishnah states only that “there is nothing after halitzah”, the meaning is that there is nothing after halitzah or yibbum, as was taught in mishnah one of our chapter.
Section five: The rule that there is nothing after halitzah (or yibbum) is true whether or not there was one yavam who had halitzah with one of two yevamoth (and then did something else with the other yevamah), or two yevamim, one of whom had halitzah or yibbum first with one yevamah (and then the other brother did something else with the same yevamah). In all cases, once one brother has had halitzah or yibbum with one yevamah, all subsequent actions are meaningless." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah, the last in this chapter, continues to define the principle that there can be no valid act after halitzah or yibbum.", + "[If the yavam] performed halitzah and then did ma’amar, gave her a get, or had intercourse with her; Or if he had intercourse with her and then did ma'amar, gave her a get, or performed halitzah, there is no valid act after halitzah,
Whether [it was performed] in the beginning, in the middle, or at the end. The beginning of this section (until the words “there is nothing after halitzah) was taught word for word above, in mishnah three. The reason that it is repeated here is as in introduction for issue of “beginning, the middle and the end”. The mishnah adds that with regard to halitzah, it doesn’t matter when the halitzah was performed, no subsequent acts (intercourse, a get or ma’amar) can have any validity. Since the halitzah totally severs the connection between the yavam and the yevamah, anything done afterwards can have no validity.", + "Concerning intercourse, if it took place first there is no valid act after it; If it occurred in the middle or at the end there can be a valid act after it. Rabbi Nehemiah says: with both intercourse and halizah, whether it took place in the beginning, in the middle, or at the end, there is no validity in any act that follows it. According to the first opinion in this section, intercourse works differently from halitzah. If done at the beginning, the yevamah becomes his full wife and any act done afterwards is meaningless with regard to the laws of yibbum. In other words, after yibbum she becomes his normal wife. However, if the intercourse is done after another act, such as giving her a get or doing ma’amar with a rival wife, there is potential validity to subsequent acts. For instance, if he gives her a get it is now forbidden for him to have yibbum with her but she still needs halitzah, since the get does not sever the ties created by the necessity for yibbum. If he now goes ahead and has intercourse with her, she still needs halitzah, for the intercourse was an invalid act of yibbum. Even though the get was only of a “derabbanan” status, since only halitzah can biblically exempt the woman, the subsequent act of yibbum is still invalid. The halitzah required after this failed act of yibbum means that “there is validity to an act after intercourse” if it is not the first act performed. According to Rabbi Nehemiah, it does not matter when the act of yibbum was performed, there is never validity to any subsequent act. Even if the yavam gave her a get before he did yibbum, the yibbum is still valid and she does not need halitzah. Rabbi Nehemiah holds that since the get makes it forbidden only “derabbanan” to have yibbum, the yibbum is biblically valid and therefore exempts the woman from a need for yibbum. The deeper argument between Rabbi Nehemiah and the sages is over the validity of rabbinicly decreed laws. According to the sages the rabbinic prohibition of having yibbum after having given a get, makes the yibbum invalid. According to Rabbi Nehemiah, since the get is only derabbanan, it does not have the power to invalidate the yibbum, which is of biblical status." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah teaches that any intercourse counts as an act yibbum.", + "One who has intercourse with his yevamah, whether in error or with presumption, whether under compulsion or of his own free will, even if he acted in error and she in presumption, or he in presumption and she in error, or he under compulsion and she not under compulsion, or she under compulsion and he not under compulsion, whether he only began to have intercourse or he completed having intercourse, he has acquired her as a wife. The laws do not make a distinction between different types of intercourse. Whether in error or with presumption: In error means that he did not know that she was his yevamah. With presumption means that he did not intend to fulfill the mitzvah of yibbum, but rather just to have intercourse with her for the sake of pleasure. Whether under compulsion or of his own free will: Under compulsion means that someone forced him to have relations with the yevamah. Of his own free will means that he intended to fulfill the mitzvah. Even if he acted in error and she in presumption: He did not know that she was the yevamah, but she knew that he was the yavam but she did not intend to fulfill the mitzvah. Or he in presumption and she in error: He did not intend to fulfill the mitzah and she did not know who he was. Or he under compulsion and she not under compulsion: He was forced and she intended to fulfill the mitzvah. Or she under compulsion and he not under compulsion: She was forced but he was not. The same is true if both were forced, or both were presumptuous. The intercourse always counts. Whether he only began to have intercourse or he completed having intercourse: It does not matter if they complete having intercourse (assumedly referring to ejaculation). The laws do not make a distinction between different types of intercourse. According to the talmud, this means that even “non-natural” intercourse (anal sex) counts as intercourse for the sake of yibbum. In all of these cases, the mere act of intercourse means that he has acquired her as a wife." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nWhile the previous mishnah served as a quasi-summary to the preceding chapters which all dealt with yibbum, our mishnah serves as a bridge to a new topic: forbidden relationships, specifically women who are forbidden to priests. We will deal with these laws for the next four chapters of Mishnah.", + "Similarly, one who has intercourse with any of the forbidden relatives listed in the Torah, or with any of those who are disqualified to marry him as, for instance, a widow to a high priest, a divorced woman or a halutzah to a common priest, a mamzeret or a netinah to an Israelite or the daughter of an Israelite to a mamzer or a nathin, he has disqualifed [her from marrying a priest], and the laws do not make a distinction between different types of intercourse. This mishnah states the same rule that was stated in the previous mishnah: with regard to forbidden sexual relations, any sexual intercourse counts (i.e. unintentional, under compulsion, etc.). Furthermore, the point of our mishnah is that once a woman has had forbidden sexual intercourse, she can no longer marry a priest. This is true whether the intercourse was forbidden because it was with a priest and she was forbidden to a priest, or if the intercourse was forbidden to Israelites as well (such as a mamzer and an Israelite). In all cases the woman is forbidden to subsequently marry a priest. [Note that a mamzeret and a netinah could not in any case marry a priest. This clause was taught here only to teach that it is forbidden to have any type of intercourse with a mamzeret or a netinah]." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah teaches when the daughter of a priest who is married to someone forbidden to her, loses the right to eat terumah, which is reserved only for priests and their families.", + "A widow to a high priest, a divorced woman or a halutzah to an ordinary priest they do not eat terumah from the point of betrothal. Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon declare them eligible. There are three laws which must be explained before we can understand this mishnah. First of all it is forbidden for a widow to marry a high priest and for a divorcee or a halutzah to marry an ordinary priest. If they do, the women lose the right to eat terumah, both as wives of the priest and as daughters of priestly fathers. Second of all, an unmarried daughter of a priest continues to eat terumah until she is married. Once she is married, should she be widowed or divorced without children she returns to eating terumah. If she was married to a non-kohen and she had children, when divorced or widowed she does not eat terumah. Third of all, a woman who has relations with someone who is forbidden to her can no longer eat terumah. According to the first opinion in the mishnah, as soon as the woman is betrothed to someone to whom she is forbidden, she loses her right to eat terumah. Although she is only betrothed, and has not had sexual intercourse, she already loses the right to eat terumah. According to Rabbis Elazar and Shimon, she only loses that right when she actually marries the kohen, to whom she is forbidden. At the point of marriage the women become what is known as halalot, or profaned women, who may not eat terumah.", + "If they became widows or were divorced after full marriage they are ineligible; If after betrothal they are eligible. If they were married and then divorced or widowed, all the sages agree that they do not return to their father’s domain to eat terumah. Since they were married to someone to whom they are forbidden, they lose this right forever. However, if they were divorced or widowed from betrothal, then they may return and eat terumah. In this case even the sages who held the first opinion of section one hold that they may eat terumah. They were forbidden to eat terumah when they were betrothed women, waiting to be married to men forbidden to them. Now that they will surely not marry these men, they may return to their father’s home to eat terumah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with the prohibition of a widow to a high priest. This prohibition is mentioned in Leviticus 21:14.", + "A high priest shall not marry a widow whether she became a widow after a betrothal or after a marriage. A high priest cannot marry any widow, even one who was only betrothed and not married before she became a widow.", + "He shall not marry one who has reached puberty. Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon permit him to marry one who has reached puberty, but he may not marry one who lost her virginity through a stick. Leviticus 21:13 states that the high priest must marry a betulah, commonly translated as a virgin. The word “betulah” can also mean, young, unmarried girl. It was probably assumed that most prepubescent, unmarried girls were also physiological virgins. Incidentally, in Greek literature, virgin was also not used the same way that modern English uses the word virgin. It could also denote a young, unmarried girl. In any case, since the Torah states that he must marry a “betulah” the sages rule that he may not marry a girl who has reached puberty, which is actually six months after the first physical signs of maturation. The common age for this is 12 ½. Before this, by legal definition a girl could not reach puberty. Meaning, even if she did it was not considered to be statuary puberty. According to Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon, the high priest may marry a post-pubescent girl. According to their definition, a betulah is defined as one who still is physiologically a virgin. Since this girl is, the high priest may marry her. However, he may not marry one who has lost her physical signs of virginity in any way, even not through sexual intercourse. In the Mishnah a girl who lost her hymen in a way other than through sexual intercourse is called a “mukat etz”, literally, hit with a stick.", + "[A priest who] betrothed a widow, and was subsequently appointed high priest, may bring her into marriage. It once happened with Joshua ben Gamla that he betrothed Marta the daughter of Boethus, and the king appointed him high priest, and he brought her into marriage. If a priest betrothed a widow, who is permitted to an ordinary priest, and then subsequently was appointed high priest, he may complete the marriage, even though as high priest he cannot marry a widow. In essence the marital bonds are secured before he became high priest and by merely completing them and bringing her into marriage, he is not transgressing the Torah’s prohibition of a widow to a high priest. The mishnah relates the story on Joshua ben Gamala who married Marta, the widowed daughter of a very wealthy man, and then became a high priest. Although she was a widow, he was still allowed to bring her into marriage. Note that the function of the story in this mishnah is probably to demonstrate that not only do the sages rule that this is allowed, but the priests actually did so. This point is crucial since often we see priests being even more strict than the law requires, at least on issues of marriage and status.", + "If a shomeret yavam became liable to have yibbum with an ordinary priest and then he was appointed high priest, even though he already did ma’amar, he may not bring her into marriage. A high priest whose brother died must perform halitzah but may not contract yibbum. The laws of yibbum are problematic for a high priest, because he cannot marry a widow. In general we can see that the positive commandment to perform yibbum does not “trump” the prohibition of marrying a widow. This section teaches that if a shomeret yavam became liable for yibbum with an ordinary priest, and then he became high priest, even if he did ma’amar, he cannot marry her. Although in the above section we saw that if an ordinary priest had betrothed a woman and then been appointed high priest he could marry her, since ma’amar is only of rabbinic status (and not biblical as is regular betrothal), it does not create enough of a tie to allow him to marry her. If he were to have yibbum, it would count as marrying a widow while a high priest, which is forbidden. The mishnah ends by quoting mishnah Sanhedrin 2:1, which states that if a high priest’s brother dies without children, the high priest must perform halitzah and cannot have yibbum." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nLeviticus 21:7 states that an ordinary priest may not marry a “zonah”, usually translated as a “harlot”. In rabbinic literature the word “zonah” is used to refer to any woman who is categorically forbidden to a priest, even if she was not literally a harlot. Our mishnah discusses the definition of a zonah.", + "An ordinary priest shall not marry a woman incapable of procreation, unless he already has a wife or children. Rabbi Judah said: even though he has a wife and children he shall not marry a woman incapable of procreation, since she is a zonah, as mentioned in the Torah. But the Sages said: the term zonah implies only a female convert, freed slavewoman and one who has been subjected to illicit intercourse. A woman incapable of procreation is called an “aylonit”. The definition of “aylonit” is a woman who has never developed signs of sexual maturity. In other words, an aylonit is not a woman who looks like a sexually mature woman but has not succeeded in becoming pregnant. Rather an aylonit is a woman, who is clearly a woman and not a man, but who never hit puberty. An ordinary priest cannot marry her, and according to the Talmud, even a regular Israelite cannot marry her, unless he has already fulfilled the commandment of procreation. The reason that the mishnah teaches that an ordinary priest cannot marry her and does not say that no one can marry her, is that Rabbi Judah holds that an ordinary priest cannot marry her even if he has a wife and children. According to the first opinion in the mishnah the problem with the aylonit is that she cannot procreate. Therefore, a person can only marry her if he has already fulfilled the mitzvah of procreation or has another wife, with whom he may potentially fulfill the mitzvah. According to Rabbi Judah, the aylonit is categorized as a “zonah”, who is always forbidden to a priest, even if he already has children or another wife. She is a “zonah”, for the priest married her knowing that she could not procreate. The Sages disagree and claim that an aylonit is not a zonah. The Sages define a zonah as a female convert, a freed slavewoman or a woman who has had illicit intercourse. The first two are forbidden under the assumption that they had relations with Gentiles or slaves before conversion or manumission. Although that intercourse was permitted at the time, it still renders them off-limits to the priest. The woman who has had illicit intercourse is any woman who has had intercourse with someone with whom she is forbidden to marry." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nSince the previous mishnah mentioned the aylonit, who cannot have children, our mishnah discusses the obligation of procreation.", + "A man shall not abstain from procreation unless he already has children. Beth Shammai says: two males, And Beth Hillel says: male and a female, for it says, “Male and female created he them” (Genesis 5:2). The point that this line in the mishnah is trying to make can be read in two subtly different ways. It may be that the point of the line is to teach that there is an obligation to procreate. In other words, without this directive people may have thought (and in ancient Judaism some sects did think) that God preferred people to be celibate and to forego children. Judaism teaches the opposite. Sexual relations are generally viewed in a positive light and having children is positive commandment. The other way to read the line, is that it is taken for granted that a person is obligated to procreate. The innovation of our mishnah is that a man does not need to keep on having children as long as possible. Once he has had two children, he may desist from procreation. Understanding the line this way, we would have a different view of the mishnah. Although it is still considered a commandment to procreate, a person might fulfill that mitzah with only two children and then devote his life to other things, such as the study of Torah. We should note that in any case, the Talmud teaches that even if a man has children he should remain married for marriage is a preferred state. Beth Shammai holds that a person needs two male children to have fulfilled the requirement. In the Talmud this is learned from a precedent set by Moses, who had two children and then separated from his wife (according to a midrash). From the story of the creation, where man and woman were created together, Beth Hillel learns that a person needs both a male and a female child to have fulfilled the mitzvah.", + "If a man married a woman and lived with her for ten years and she bore no child, he may not abstain [any longer from the duty of propagation]. If he divorced her she is permitted to marry another, and the second husband may also live with her for ten years. If she miscarried [the period of ten years] is counted from the time of her miscarriage. This section presents a halakhic ramification to the fact that Jews are commanded to procreate. If a man is married to a woman and for ten years they do not succeed in having children, he must either marry another wife or divorce the first wife and marry another wife. When bigamy was prohibited, only the second option remained. Note that the mishnah is rather lenient. Ten years is a long time to attempt to have children. The mishnah gives the couple the benefit of the doubt. Furthermore, the woman who could not succeed in having children with one man, is allowed to remarry. We might have thought that there would be an assumption of infertility. The mishnah fully realizes that the infertility might have been a problem with the man. Finally, if she has a miscarriage, the ten years begin to be counted again. Although the child was not even born, we have seen that the woman can get pregnant and that perhaps she will someday be able to have a viable child. I should also note, that although this halakhah is still on the books, it is not observed. Even ultraorthodox couples do not divorce if they don’t succeed in having children. The halakhah is simply ignored.", + "A man is commanded concerning the duty of propagation but not a woman. Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka says: Concerning both of them it is said, “And God blessed them; and said to them… “Be fruitful and multiply” (Genesis 1:28). According to the first opinion, only men are obligated to procreate. Rabbi Yohanan ben Baroka says that both men and women are obligated equally. We should note that although the first opinion sounds very chauvinistic, and it somewhat is, not being obligated to have children does free a woman to be more in control over her own reproductive process. Certainly the laws of birth control are more lenient if she is not obligated to have children. There is some excellent secondary literature on this issue. Judith Hauptman has a chapter on the topic in her book, “Rereading the Rabbis”. David Feldman’s book, “Birth Control in Jewish Law” also discusses the topic." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "If a widow [who married] a high priest, or if a divorced woman or a halutzah [who married] an ordinary priest brought in to her husband melog slaves and tzon barzel slaves, the melog slaves may not eat terumah but the tzon barzel slaves may eat of it.
The following are melog slaves: those who, if they die, are the wife’s loss and, if their value increases, are her profit. Even though it is the husband's duty to maintain them, they may not eat terumah.
The following are tzon barzel slaves: if they die, they are the loss of the husband and, if their value increases, they are a profit to him. Since he is responsible for them, they are permitted to eat terumah.
The slave of a kohen is allowed to eat terumah, which can only be eaten by kohanim and those under their domain (Leviticus 22:11). Our mishnah discusses the issue of slaves brought into a marriage by the wife as part of her dowry, in a case where the marriage was against the halakhah and therefore she herself cannot eat terumah.
When we learned mishnah 4:3, we discussed the terms “tzon barzel” and “melog” or “pluckable property”. This is what I wrote there:
Dowry can come in two forms. The first form is called “pluckable property” (nikhse melog). This is money that she brings from her father’s house that remain hers and the husband may not use. The husband has rights to the profit earned from this money during the marriage. He has no responsibility for the money. For instance, if she brings in a piece of land, the land is hers but the husband may use the fruits of the land. If the land should be taken by the Romans, he is not responsible to pay his wife the value of the land. Money that she receives as a gift or as an inheritance is part of this category.
The second form is “property of iron sheep” (nikhse tzon barzel). This is written in the ketubah and hence the husband has responsibility for it, should the property be lost, stolen or destroyed. The husband may use the property. His sole responsibility is to return the value of the original property upon death or divorce.
Section one: In the case of our mishnah, a woman who is not allowed to marry a kohen, nevertheless goes ahead and marries him. When she has intercourse with him, she becomes a halalah, a woman profaned from the priesthood, and she can no longer eat terumah, neither in her husband’s home nor in her father’s (if he was a kohen). Since she can no longer eat terumah, her slaves can also no longer eat terumah. The mishnah teaches that since tzon barzel slaves belong more to her husband than they do to her, they may eat terumah. Melog slaves, who belong more to her than to him, cannot eat terumah.
Section two: This section discusses the difference between melog and tzon barzel slaves. Melog slaves belong to the woman, although while the marriage is still going they work for the husband. The fact that they belong to the woman means that if they die it is her loss, and if they go up in value, it is her gain. Despite the fact that the husband must maintain them with food, clothing and shelter, they still belong to the woman. Since she cannot eat terumah due to her forbidden marriage, they too cannot eat terumah.
In contrast, tzon barzel slaves belong to the husband, and his only obligation is to pay their value back to the woman upon the termination of the marriage through death or divorce. If they die, he must still pay back the value. If they appreciate in value, it is his profit. Since he is responsible for their worth, meaning that if something happens to them he must pay back the woman for the loss, they may eat terumah.
In summary, the mishnah defines ownership by who profits or loses when the value of the slaves rises or falls. The obligation to maintain the slaves does not cause the husband to be the owner." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to discuss slaves that are part of a wife’s dowry and their ability to eat terumah, which depends on her status as a daughter of an Israelite or a priest, as well as the status of her husband, Israelite or priest.", + "If the daughter of an Israelite was married to a priest, and she brought him in slaves, they are permitted to eat terumah whether they are melog slaves, or tzon barzel slaves. When the daughter of an Israelite marries a priest she is allowed to eat terumah. The melog slaves (see yesterday’s mishnah for a definition of melog and tzon barzel) may eat terumah because they belong to her and she eats terumah. The tzon barzel slaves may eat terumah because they belong to her husband who is a priest, and a priest’s slaves eat terumah.", + "If the daughter of a priest was married to an Israelite and she brought him in slaves, they may not eat terumah whether they are melog slaves or tzon barzel slaves. When the daughter of a kohen is married to an Israel, she forfeits her right to eat terumah. Her melog slaves cannot continue to eat terumah because they are owned by her and she cannot eat. The tzon barzel slaves belong to the husband, who obviously cannot eat nor give them terumah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nWhen a man dies and leaves children, his wife’s status with regard to terumah goes according to the child’s status. If the father was a priest and his child eats terumah, the wife continues to do so as well. If the father was an Israelite, even if his wife was the daughter of a priest, if the father had a child with her, she does not go back to eating the terumah from her father’s house. In other words a child fixes a wife into the status of her husband.\nOur mishnah discusses a situation where a priest died while his wife was pregnant. The issue at hand is do the tzon barzel slaves, who are now in a sense owned by the fetus, eat terumah.", + "If the daughter of an Israelite was married to a priest who died and left her pregnant, her slaves may not eat terumah because of the share of the fetus, since a fetus prevents [its mother] from eating [terumah] but does not cause her to be able to eat [terumah], the words of Rabbi Yose. If a priest dies and leaves his wife pregnant, her tzon barzel slaves do not eat terumah, even if she has other children and she, her children and her melog slaves can eat terumah. This is because the fetus, as an inheritor of its father, has ownership over the tzon barzel slaves, and a fetus disqualifies its mother from eating terumah and does not qualify her to eat terumah. A fetus disqualifies its mother from eating terumah in that if she is the daughter of a priest who married an Israelite and he dies with no kids and she is pregnant, she does not return to her father’s home to eat terumah. In the opposite case, if she was the daughter of an Israelite married to a priest and her husband dies with no children and she is pregnant, the fetus does not allow her to eat terumah. Rabbi Yose reasons that just as a fetus does not allow a wife to eat terumah, so too it does not allow tzon barzel slaves to eat terumah.", + "They said to him: since you have testified to us concerning the daughter of an Israelite who was married to a priest, even concerning the daughter of a priest who was married to a priest, and he died and left her pregnant her slaves may not eat terumah because of the share of the fetus! The rabbis respond to Rabbi Yose, that if his testimony about the daughter of an Israelite married to a priest is correct, then even concerning the daughter of a priest married to a priest, if her husband died leaving her pregnant, her tzon barzel slaves do not eat terumah. After all, in either case we could explain that a fetus disqualifies tzon barzel slaves from eating terumah. The difficulty with this section is whether or not the rabbis disagree with Rabbi Yose. According to a literal reading of the mishnah they only point out a consequence of Rabbi Yose’s halakhah, without expressing their opinion on the matter. However, it would seem that they only point this out if they disagree with Rabbi Yose. According to the Talmud, the rabbis do disagree with Rabbi Yose. The rabbis hold that the fetus does not actually own the slaves and therefore cannot prevent them from eating terumah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first section of this mishnah broadens the category of those who disqualify women from eating terumah but cannot allow them to eat terumah.\nThe second two sections discuss cases of doubt.", + "A fetus, a yavam, betrothal, a deaf-mute, and a boy who is nine years and one day old, disqualify [a woman] from [terumah], but do not allow her to eat terumah, In all of the cases listed in this section, if the boy/man was an Israelite he disqualifies the woman from eating terumah, and if he was a priest, he does not allow his wife to eat terumah. For instance, if a priest dies and leaves his wife pregnant, the fetus does not allow her to eat terumah. If he was an Israelite and she was the daughter of a priest, the fetus disqualifies her from eating terumah. When the daughter of an Israelite is betrothed to a priest she does not yet begin to eat terumah. However, if she is the daughter of a priest betrothed to an Israelite she already loses the right to eat terumah. A deaf-mute cannot contract marriage, according to Torah law. This is because he is not considered to have intelligence. [As a side note, now that sign language has been developed this concept no longer exists.] The status of his marriage is only derabbanan (of rabbinic origin). If he is a priest he does not allow his wife to eat terumah, but if he is an Israelite he disqualifies her from eating terumah. Intercourse with a boy less than nine years and one day of age is not considered real intercourse. The mishnah teaches that once the boy reaches this age, if he has intercourse with a woman forbidden to him, he disqualifies her from eating terumah. However, if he is a priest, he does not cause her to be able to eat terumah, since a boy who has not reached puberty (concretized by the appearance of two pubic hairs) cannot contract betrothal or marriage.", + "If it is doubtful whether the boy is nine years and one day old or not, or whether he has produced two hairs or not, According to the Rambam, this section is the beginning of the second halakhah in this mishnah. If it is doubtful whether a boy is nine years old and he does yibbum with her, or it is doubtful whether he has reached puberty or not, and he does halitzah with her, the woman still requires another halitzah, lest the first yibbum or halitzah was done by a child incapable of such an action. However, she may not have subsequent yibbum, lest the first action was valid.", + "If a house collapsed upon a man and upon his brother’s daughter, and it is not known which of them died first, her rival must perform halitzah but may not be taken in yibbum. This section deals with another case of doubt. If a house falls on a husband and his wife, who is his brother’s daughter, and it is not known who died first, the rival wife must have halitzah and cannot have yibbum. She must have halitzah, lest her rival wife died first, and she was obligated to yibbum, because at the time of her husband’s death she had no rival wife who was forbidden to the yavam. She cannot have yibbum lest the husband died first, and therefore at the time of his death she was the rival wife of a woman forbidden to the yavam (the yavam’s sister)." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to discuss who gives a woman the right to eat terumah and who deprives her of such a right.", + "The rapist, the seducer and the insane man neither disqualify [a woman from eating terumah] nor do they allow her to eat [terumah].
If they are unfit to enter into the assembly of Israel they do disqualify [a woman from eating terumah]. How is this so? If an Israelite had intercourse with the daughter of a priest she continues to eat terumah.
If she becomes pregnant she may no longer eat terumah.
[Even if] she becomes pregnant she may not eat.
And if his father’s mother was the daughter of an Israelite married to a priest, she may not eat terumah;
And if his mother’s mother was the daughter of an Israelite married to a priest, she may eat terumah; This section teaches that intercourse outside the framework of marriage does not disqualify a woman from eating terumah, nor does it give the woman the right to eat terumah. The mishnah illustrates some of these principles. If an Israelite has intercourse with the daughter of a priest, whether that intercourse was rape or seduction (which means she consented), she continues to eat terumah. Only betrothal to an Israelite would disqualify her from eating terumah. However, if she becomes pregnant she loses her right to eat terumah. This is what we learned in the previous mishnah: a fetus can disqualify from eating terumah. If she should miscarry, she may resume eating terumah. If a priest has relations with the daughter of an Israelite, the intercourse does not allow her to eat terumah. In this case only full marriage will allow her to eat terumah. If she becomes pregnant she still does not eat terumah. This is because a fetus does not allow a woman to eat terumah. However, if she gives birth she can eat terumah. In this way, the power of the son is greater than the father, because the son allows her to eat terumah whereas the father did not. There are two other notes that we need to make on this section. An insane person cannot contract betrothal. Therefore, if he is a priest, his betrothal does not allow the wife to eat terumah. However, if he is an Israelite he does not disqualify the daughter of a priest from eating terumah. If any of these people were “forbidden from entering the assembly of Israel”, meaning they were mamzerim or netinim or another category of people forbidden from marrying Israelites (see Deuteronomy 22:2-4), they do disqualify the woman from eating terumah.", + "If the embryo was miscarried in her womb she may eat. If a priest had intercourse with the daughter of an Israelite, she may not eat terumah.
If she gave birth may eat.
A slave disqualifies a woman from eating terumah through intercourse but not as her offspring.
If she was the daughter of a priest married to an Israelite she may eat terumah.
If she was the daughter of a priest married to an Israelite she may not eat terumah. This section explains how it is that a woman can have a descendent who is a slave but not be disqualified from eating terumah. As a side note, the opening line states that if a woman has intercourse with a slave she is disqualified from eating terumah, since this is forbidden intercourse. If a woman has a son, and the son goes and has intercourse with a slave-woman, the child is a slave. This is because of the matrilineal principle. If the grandmother was the daughter of an Israelite married to a priest, and her husband and son die, the grandson does not bestow upon his grandmother the right to eat terumah. This is because he is not an Israelite. However, if the grandmother was the daughter of a priest married to an Israelite, and her son and husband die, she goes back to her father’s house to eat terumah. Again, the grandson who is not Jewish, does not effect her right to eat terumah.", + "It is found that the power of the son is greater than that of the father. How is this so? If the daughter of an Israelite was married to a priest or the daughter of a priest was married to an Israelite, and she bore a son by him, and the son went and had intercourse with a slave-woman who bore a son by him, such a son is a slave;
A mamzer disqualifies a woman from eating terumah and can allow her to eat terumah. How is this so? If the daughter of an Israelite was married to a priest or the daughter of a priest was married to an Israelite, and she bore a daughter by him, and the daughter went and married a slave or a Gentile who bore a son by him, such a son is a mamzer; This section teaches a law that is almost opposite of the last halakhah. If a woman has relations with a mamzer, she is disqualified from eating terumah, because this is forbidden relations. However, if a woman has a mamzer as a grandson, he may cause her to eat terumah. We will now explain. If a woman has a daughter and the daughter goes and is married to a slave or Gentile, the son born of such a marriage is a mamzer. [Note, that this halakhah was not accepted by many sages in the Talmud. Today such a child is not considered a mamzer]. If the grandmother was a daughter of an Israelite and she was married to a priest, and her husband and son die, the grandson does bestow upon his grandmother the right to eat terumah. This is because he is an Israelite, although he is a mamzer. However, if the grandmother was the daughter of a priest married to an Israelite, and her son and husband die, she does goes back to her father’s house to eat terumah. Again, the grandson who is Jewish, does effect her right to eat terumah. In summary the final two sections of this mishnah teach that a grandson who is Jewish can bestow upon his grandmother the right to eat terumah or cause her to lose that right. A mamzer, the child of a Jewish woman and non-Jewish man is Jewish. A non-Jewish grandchild, the child of a slave-woman and a Jewish man, neither gives a woman the right to eat terumah nor causes her to lose it." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah introduces the strange case where a woman can have a grandson who is a high priest and that high priest actually disqualifies her from eating terumah.", + "A high priest sometimes disqualifies [his mother’s mother] from being able to eat terumah. How is this so? If a priest’s daughter was married to an Israelite and she bore a daughter by him, and the daughter went and married a priest and bore a son by him, such a son is fit to be a high priest, to stand and serve at the altar. He allows his mother to eat terumah but disqualifies his mother’s mother. And she can say, “[May there] not be like my grandson the high priest who disqualified me from eating terumah.” If the daughter of a priest marries an Israelite, she loses the right to eat terumah as long as he is alive or she has a descendent through him. When she has a daughter and the daughter goes and marries a priest and has a son the son is a priest and is eligible to become a high priest. If his father dies, his mother may continue to eat terumah, because she has had a son. If his mother also dies, and his grandmother did not have any other children, she does not return to her father’s home (remember her father was a priest) to eat terumah, because she has a grandson through her marriage to the Israelite. Although her grandson might even be a high priest, he still prevents his grandmother from eating terumah. The mishnah then brings up the strange possible complaint of a grandmother, who has a grandson who is the high priest, and yet he disqualifies her from eating terumah. I imagine that if this was my Bubby, she would have gotten over the loss of terumah and just been proud of her grandson!" + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses the right of priests, their wives and their slaves to eat terumah if the priests have physical defects that might disqualify them from the priesthood.", + "An uncircumcised [priest] and all impure persons may not eat terumah. Their wives and slaves may eat terumah. An uncircumcised priest may not eat terumah. In the Talmud this is derived through an analogy with the passover sacrifice, which also may not be eaten by anyone who is uncircumcised (Exodus 12:44-48). Impure persons may not eat terumah. This refers to someone who is ritually impure, through anything that ritually defiles, such as scale disease, gonorrhea etc. This halakhah is stated explicitly in Leviticus 22:4-6. However, the wife and slaves of an uncircumcised priest and an impure person may eat terumah. This means that these men are priests, but that they themselves are disqualified from eating terumah due to their lack of circumcision or purity. This lack does not effect their household.", + "[A priest] whose testes are crushed or whose member is cut off, as well as their slaves, may eat terumah, but their wives may not. If, however, he did not know her after the his testes were crushed or his member was cut off, the wives may eat [terumah]. According to Deuteronomy 23:2, a man whose testes are crushed or whose member (penis) is cut off, may not enter into the assembly of God. This is understood to mean that they may not marry an Israelite woman. Our mishnah discusses a priest who has one of these physical defects. He may continue to eat terumah, as may his slaves, since he is a priest. However, his wife may not eat terumah since he was not allowed to marry her or have intercourse with her. We have already learned that once a woman has intercourse with someone forbidden to her she loses the right to eat terumah. However, if one of these physical defects occurred to him while he was married to her, and he does not continue to know (have intercourse) her afterwards, she may continue to eat terumah. The only reason that she loses her right to eat terumah is that she was disqualified by intercourse with someone forbidden to her. However, without such intercourse, she remains the wife of a priest and can continue to eat terumah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah defines the terms petzua dakkah and kerut shofkhah mentioned in Deuteronomy 23:2. These two categories of men cannot marry full Israelite women.", + "Who is considered a “petzua dakkah”? Anyone whose testes are wounded even one of them. A “petzua dakkah” is one who has even one of his testes wounded.", + "And a “kerut shofkhah”? A man whose member is cut off. If [any part] of the corona remained, even so much as a hair’s breadth, the man is regarded as fit [to serve as a priest]. A “kerut shofkha” is one whose penis has been cut off. However, if any of the crown remains, he is still a valid priest.", + "A man who testes are wounded, and one whose member is cut off, are permitted to marry a convert or a freed slave. They are only forbidden to enter into the congregation, as it is said “No one whose testes are crushed or whose member is cut off shall be admitted into the congregation of the Lord” (Deuteronomy 23:2). These two categories of men are permitted to marry converts and freed slaves, who according to this mishnah, are not considered to be part of “the congregation of the Lord”. Only those born as fit Israelites are considered to be part of “the congregation of the Lord”." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses the other categories of people who are forbidden to enter into the congregation of the Lord mentioned in Deuteronomy 23:4-9.", + "An Ammonite and a Moabite are forbidden [to enter into the congregation of the Lord] and their prohibition is for ever. However, their women are permitted at once. The prohibition of the Ammonite and Moabite (Deuteronomy 23:4) is eternal. This means that all of their descendents are forbidden from entering into marriage with an Israelite. Note that even should they convert, which they may, they are still prohibited from marrying Israelites. However, the prohibition of Ammonites and Moabites is only for the men. Women are permitted immediately. As soon as they convert, they may contract marriage with other Israelites. Indeed, Ruth was a Moabitess and one of her descendents was King David.", + "An Egyptian and an Edomite are forbidden only until the third generation, whether they are males or females. Rabbi Shimon permits their women immediately. Said Rabbi Shimon: This is a kal vehomer: if where the males are forbidden for all time the females are permitted immediately, where the males are forbidden only until the third generation how much more should the females be permitted immediately. They said to him: If this is a halakhah, we shall accept it; but if it is only a logical reference, there is a refutation. He replied: This is not so, I am in fact saying a halakhah. In contrast, the prohibition of Egyptian and Edomite converts is only temporary. Three generations after the conversion, they may intermarry with other Israelites. According to the first opinion in the mishnah, female Egyptian converts and female Edomite converts are also prohibited for three generations. This opinion probably reasons that since they will eventually be allowed to intermarry with Israelites, the temporary prohibition covers both males and females. Rabbi Shimon, on the other hand, takes a more lenient stance and allows females to marry Israelites immediately upon conversion. He is also consistent in explaining the verse. Since all of these verses use masculine language, they all exclude only the males and not the females. The Sages respond to Rabbi Shimon that if his halakhah is a tradition which he learned from his rabbis, they will accept it. However, if it is just based on reasoning they have a means by which to refute it. Their refutation is probably the logic that I presented as their reasoning above. Since Egyptians and Edomites are permitted after three generations, the females are not permitted immediately. Despite the fact that Rabbi Shimon’s original words appeared to have been based on logic, he responds that the halakhah is actually based on a tradition. In this mishnah we can clearly see the rabbinic preference for tradition over logic. The rabbis will only accept Rabbi Shimon’s ruling if it was one that he received from his rabbis. In such a case they would accept it even if they found the logic faulty. In response Rabbi Shimon pleads with them, claiming that his words are indeed a tradition.", + "Mamzerim and nethinim are forbidden, and their prohibition is forever, whether they be males or females. Concerning the mamzer and the netin, all of the sages agree that their prohibition is for all subsequent generations and that both men and women are prohibited. Deuteronomy 23:3 only states that mamzers are prohibited until the tenth generation. It doesn’t say, as does verse four concerning the Ammonite and Moabite, that they are prohibited forever. However, the rabbis employ a verbal analogy (a gezerah shavah) to compare the two. Just as it says “until the tenth generation” about the Ammonite and Moabite, and yet they are prohibited for all generations, so too the mamzer, about whom it also says, “until the tenth generation” is prohibited for all generations." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah contains a discussion about whether or not a eunuch is obligated to perform halitzah for his dead brother’s wife and whether or not halitzah is performed for his wife, should he die without children. Note that this issue is tied to the eunuch’s ability or lack thereof to have children. One who cannot have children would be less likely to be subject to the laws of halitzah and yibbum whose purpose is to supply children for the dead brother.", + "Rabbi Joshua said: I have heard that a eunuch performs halitzah and that halitzah is performed by others for his wife, and also that a eunuch does not perform halitzah and that no halitzah is performed for his wife, and I am unable to explain this. Rabbi Joshua transmits an old halakhah that he has heard, but that he doesn’t know how to explain. In these words we can see how halakhot were often transmitted in pithy, memorable phrases, such that later sages sometimes did not know how to explain them. Rabbi Joshua has heard that eunuchs are subject to the laws of halitzah and he has also heard the opposite. He does not know if these two halakhot apply to two different types of eunuchs or whether they contradict each other.", + "Rabbi Akiva said: I will explain it: a man-made eunuch performs halitzah and halitzah is also performed for his wife, because there was a time when he was fit [to have children]. A eunuch by nature neither performs halitzah nor is halitzah performed for his wife, since there never was a time when he was fit. Rabbi Akiva explains the puzzle brought up by Rabbi Joshua. The eunuch who was castrated by humans performs halitzah for his dead brother’s wife. [He cannot have yibbum, because he is forbidden to marry Israelites, as we learned above.] If he should die without children, halitzah or yibbum is performed for his wife. The reason that he is subject to the laws of yibbum is that he was at one time not a eunuch and he was fit to have children. In contrast, the eunuch who was born a eunuch was never fit to have children, and therefore is not subject to the laws of halitzah. Should he die, his wife is exempt from both halitzah and yibbum. Should his brother die, he does not perform halitzah for his widow.", + "Rabbi Eliezer said: Not so! Rather a eunuch by nature performs halitzah and halitzah is performed for his wife, because he may be cured. A man-made eunuch neither performs halitzah nor is halitzah performed for his wife, since he cannot be cured. Rabbi Eliezer offers the opposite reading and solution to the tradition transmitted by Rabbi Joshua. The eunuch who is subject to the laws of halitzah and yibbum is one who was born a eunuch, since he could potentially be cured, and then he could have children. A eunuch who was castrated by others cannot be cured (even today this is not a simple procedure). Therefore, he is not subject to the laws of halitzah and yibbum.", + "Rabbi Joshua ben Baterra testified concerning Ben Megusat, who was a man-made eunuch living in Jerusalem and they performed yibbum for his wife, thus confirming the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Joshua ben Batera testifies about a man-made eunuch, that they performed yibbum for his wife. This proves what Rabbi Akiva said, that man-made eunuchs are subject to the laws of halitzah and yibbum. Note that what proves that Rabbi Akiva is correct is a precedent, and not any inherent logic to his words." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses the performance of yibbum or halitzah by a eunuch or by an aylonit, a woman who has not developed signs of sexual maturity, and therefore by definition cannot procreate. Both of these categories are therefore people who cannot procreate. Since they cannot procreate they are excluded from the laws of halitzah and yibbum, as we learned in the previous mishnah.", + "The eunuch neither performs halitzah nor contracts yibbum. We have already seen this halakhah in the previous mishnah. Here it either refers to a man-made eunuch, who according to Rabbi Akiva does not perform halitzah. Alternatively, it refers to all eunuchs and this mishnah contains an opinion that disagrees with both opinions in the previous mishnah.", + "So too a woman who is incapable of procreation neither performs halizah nor is taken in yibbum. A woman who is physically incapable of procreating is not subject to the laws of halitzah or yibbum. Since the point of yibbum is procreation, those who cannot procreate are exempt.", + "If a eunuch performed halitzah for his yevamah, he does not disqualify her [from subsequently marrying a priest]. If he has intercourse with her he disqualifies her, since this is an act of fornication. Since a eunuch does not perform halitzah, there is no validity to an act of halitzah that he performs. If he nevertheless does so, he has not thereby disqualified the woman from subsequently marrying a priest. [A halutzah is forbidden to be married by a priest]. However, if he has intercourse with her, as an attempted act of yibbum, he has disqualified her from marrying a priest, because this was forbidden. Since she was not liable for yibbum, she is prohibited to him by the prohibition of being his brother’s wife. [Remember any time yibbum is not necessary, the prohibition of a brother’s wife is effective, even after the brother’s death]. Any woman who has had relations with a man forbidden to her is subsequently prohibited from marrying a priest.", + "Similarly where brothers performed halitzah for a woman incapable of procreation, they do not disqualify her [from marrying a priest]. If they have intercourse with her they do disqualify her, since this is an act of fornication. This section contains nearly the same laws with regard to the woman who cannot procreate. If one of the brothers performs halitzah he has not disqualified her from marrying a priest. However, if one of them tries to have yibbum with her, she is disqualified, because she was prohibited to him, as his brother’s wife." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with several categories of people who are of doubtful gender status. A hermaphrodite is a person who has the outer sexual signs of both a male and a female. A tumtum is a person who has no outer sexual signs.", + "If a priest who was eunuch by nature married the daughter of an Israelite, he confers upon her the right to eat terumah. A eunuch by nature is not forbidden from marrying Israelite women (he is not considered to be a “petzua daka”, one whose testes were crushed. Therefore, if he is a priest and he marries the daughter of an Israelite, the marriage is valid and he is allowed to eat terumah.", + "Rabbi Yose and Rabbi Shimon stated: if a priest who was an hermaphrodite married the daughter of an Israelite, he confers upon her the right to eat terumah. A priest who is a hermaphrodite is allowed to marry the daughter of an Israelite. With regard to marriage, he is treated as if he was fully male. Therefore, if he is a priest, his wife may eat terumah.", + "Rabbi Judah stated: if a tumtum was opened up and found to be a male, he may not perform halitzah, because he has the same status as a eunuch. A tumtum may have been born with his sexual organs covered by a thin sac of skin. Even if they open up this sac and find that he is male, he may not perform halitzah, since his status is like that of a eunuch. Assumedly, the tumtum cannot procreate and therefore is exempt from the laws of halitzah and yibbum.", + "The hermaphrodite may marry [a wife] but may not be married [by a man]. As we learned in section two, a hermaphrodite is treated like a male. He may marry a woman but may not be married by a man.", + "Rabbi Eliezer stated: concerning the hermaphrodite, [the one who has relations with him] is liable to be stoned like one [who has relations with] a male. According to Rabbi Eliezer, if another man has relations with a hermaphrodite, he is liable to be stoned, as are all men who engage in intercourse with other men. This is Rabbi Eliezer’s way of stating that the hermaphrodite is to be treated completely as if he is a male." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThe first two mishnayoth of this chapter list variations of women who are either permitted or forbidden to their husbands and to their yevamim (their husband’s brothers).\nThis chapter does not really teach new laws that were unknown from other places in the Yevamoth. Rather it organizes them in a different manner.", + "Some women are permitted to their husbands and forbidden to their yevamim, Others are permitted to their yevamim and forbidden to their husbands, Others are permitted to both, Others are forbidden to both.
[In all these cases the women] are permitted to their husbands and forbidden to their yevamim. This section is an introduction to this mishnah and the next. The different combinations will be explained as we proceed. Note how formulaic it is and how easy it must have been to remember.", + "These are the women who are permitted to their husbands and forbidden to their yevamim: An ordinary priest married a widow and had a brother who was a high priest; A halal married a woman who was fit and had a brother of legitimate status; An Israelite married the daughter of an Israelite and had a brother who was a mamzer, A mamzer married a mamzeret and had a brother who was an Israelite. The following cases are ones in which a woman is married to a man to whom she is permitted but should her husband die without children she would not be permitted to have yibbum with the yavam. An ordinary priest who married a widow and had a brother who was a high priest: An ordinary priest is allowed to marry a widow but the high priest may not. A halal who married a woman who was fit [to marry a priest] had a brother of legitimate status: A halal is the child of a priest and a woman who is forbidden to a priest (such as a divorcee). A halal may marry anyone. However, once a woman has relations with a halal, she also becomes a halalah. A halal may have a brother who was not a halal, if, for instance, his father was a priest and his mother was a divorcee and his brother’s mother was fit to marry a priest. In such a case the halal’s wife may not have yibbum with his brother because she is a halalah, and a priest cannot marry a halalah. An Israelite who married the daughter of an Israelite had a brother who was a mamzer: A mamzer may not marry the daughter of an Israelite. Therefore, the mamzer brother of an Israelite may not have yibbum with his dead brother’s wife. An Israelite might have a brother who is a mamzer if, for instance, his father had an affair with another woman while she was married. A mamzer married a mamzeret had a brother who was an Israelite: This is the reverse situation as that which we saw in the previous section." + ], + [ + "The following are permitted to their yevamim and forbidden to their husbands:
A high priest who betrothed a widow and has a brother who is an ordinary priest;
A fit [priest] who married a halalah and has a brother who is a halal;
An Israelite who married a mamzeret and has a brother who is a mamzeret;
A mamzer who married the daughter of an Israelite and has a brother who is an Israelite. [In these cases the women] are permitted to their yevamim and forbidden to their husbands.
The following are forbidden to both;
A high priest who married a widow has a brother who is a high priest, or who is an ordinary priest;
A fir [priest] who married a halalah and has a brother who was a fit [priest];
An Israelite who married a mamzeret and has a brother who is Israelite;
A mamzer who married the daughter of an Israelite and has a brother who is a mamzer, [In these cases the women] are forbidden to both [the husband and the yavam]. All other women are permitted to both their husbands and their yevamim.
This mishnah continues to list types of women who are either forbidden to their husbands or to their yevamim.
Section one: A high priest is not allowed to marry a widow. If he betroths a widow and then dies, his brother, the ordinary priest, may have yibbum with her. However, if he married her, she would fall into the category of a halalah, that is a woman who has been disqualified from the priesthood. She would then be forbidden to the yavam brother as well.
Section two: A priest may not marry a halalah. However, if he has a brother who is a halal (for instance they have different mothers), then the brother may have yibbum with her.
Section three: An Israelite may not marry a mamzeret. However, if he has a brother who is a mamzer (they have different mothers), then the brother may have yibbum with her.
Section four: The opposite situation of that in section three.
Section five: The mishnah now begins to list women who are forbidden both to their husbands and, should the husbands die, to the yavam as well.
If a high priest marries a widow and dies and his brother is also a high priest, just as the first marriage was prohibited, so too is yibbum. Furthermore, since the first marriage was consummated (and did not remain only a betrothal, as in section one above), the woman became a halalah and is therefore prohibited to his brother even if he is only an ordinary priest.
Section six: If a fit priest marries a halalah, who is forbidden to him, she may not have yibbum with his brother who is also a fit priest.
Section seven: Just as the mamzereth was forbidden to the first husband, who was an ordinary Israelite, so too she is forbidden to his brother, if he is an ordinary Israelite.
Section eight: Just as the Israelite woman was forbidden to her first husband, who was a mamzer, so too she is forbidden to his mamzer brother." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn mishnah 2:4, we learned that there are secondary incest prohibitions that were instituted by the scribes.", + "[Concerning] relatives of the second degree [of incest laws who are forbidden] by the words of the scribes:
[A woman who is] a second degree of kinship to the husband but not a second degree of kinship to the yavam, is forbidden to the husband and permitted to the yavam; A woman could be a second degree of kinship to her husband but not to her yavam if she was the husband’s grandmother, and her husband had a brother with the same father but not the same mother. The mishnah teaches that although the marriage was forbidden, she may still have yibbum. This is because the prohibition of second degree kinship is only of rabbinic origin.", + "[A woman who is] a second degree of kinship to the yavam but not a second degree of kinship to the husband is forbidden to the yavam and permitted to the husband; The same is true in the opposite case, if she is a second degree of kinship to her yavam but not to her husband. As we learned above in 2:3-4, in such a case she must have halitzah and not yibbum.", + "[A woman who is] a second degree of kinship to the one and to the other is forbidden to the one as well as to the other. If she was a second degree to both, she is forbidden to both.", + "She cannot claim her ketubah or usufruct or support money, or her worn clothes. The child is fit [to marry a priest], but the husband is compelled to divorce her. If a couple transgressed the rabbinic prohibition and the man married a woman who was a second degree of kinship, there are serious economic consequences for the woman. The woman does not receive her ketubah (marriage payment), nor does she receive in return the usufruct, meaning the profit that the husband accrued from the use of her property while they were married. She does not receive support (food, clothing or shelter), nor does she receive in return the reduction in the value of her things that he has used while married. However, the status of the child is not effected, since the level of prohibition was only derabbanan. He is forced to divorce her. In summary, the consequences of this forbidden marriage are mostly economic and they are mostly upon the woman.", + "A widow who was married to a high priest, a divorcee or halutzah who was married to an ordinary priest, a mamzer or a netinah who was married to an Israelite, or the daughter of an Israelite who was married to a natin or a mamzer is entitled to her ketubah. The mishnah now contrasts this type of forbidden marriage, with a marriage that was forbidden according to Torah law, but that was nevertheless an effective marriage. That is to say if a man betrothed one of these women, he has transgressed the prohibition, but she still requires a divorce. In all of these cases the woman receives her ketubah and all of the other rights listed in the mishnah. In the comparison of these two sections, we see that the consequences of marrying a second degree of kinship which is only a rabbinic prohibition are more serious than those of marrying one who is biblically prohibited. The reason is that a rabbinic prohibition needs the extra “strengthening” while the biblical prohibition does not." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses whether or not a woman eats terumah or tithe (which the Levites eat) in situations where she might be moving from an Israelite home to a priest’s domain, and whether she loses the right to eat terumah in situations where she might be leaving her priestly or Levite home and going to an Israelite home.", + "The daughter of an Israelite who was betrothed to a priest, or who was pregnant from a priest, or was a shomeret yavam to a priest; And similarly, the daughter of a priest [who was in such relationship] with an Israelite, may not eat terumah. The daughter of an Israelite may eat terumah when she is fully married to a priest. She may not eat terumah when she is merely betrothed. If she is pregnant but not married (either he died or she became pregnant before marriage) she may not eat terumah. Finally, if she is a shomeret yavam waiting to for yibbum with a priest, she may not eat terumah. However, if she was the daughter of a priest and the man was an Israelite in one of these situations, she loses the right to eat terumah. These states are in-between states, states where the woman may lose the right to eat terumah but may not gain the right. Note that we have taught exactly this halakhah in 7:4 above: the fetus, the yavam and betrothal disqualify her from eating terumah and cannot allow her to eat terumah.", + "The daughter of an Israelite who was betrothed to a Levite, or who was pregnant from a Levite, or was a shomeret yavam to a Levite; And similarly, the daughter of a Levite [who was in such a relationship] with an Israelite may not eat tithe. This section teaches the exact same laws with regard to tithes, which are eaten by Levites. The Talmud points out that according to the halakhah, a non-Levite may eat tithe (although he is commanded to give it to the Levite). Our mishnah goes according to Rabbi Meir who holds that only Levites can eat tithe.", + "The daughter of a Levite who was betrothed to a priest, or who was pregnant from a priest, or was a shomeret yavam to a priest; And similarly, the daughter of a priest [who was in such relationship] with a levite, may eat neither terumah nor tithe. The logic of this section is that a woman in one of these situations is not tied enough to the priest to eat terumah, nor does she remain tied enough to her Levite family to continue eating tithe. Note that according to this section, even priests cannot eat tithe." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nAs with all of the mishnayoth of this chapter, we don’t really learn any new information in this mishnah. What we see is a tightly organized literary structure, describing a situation where one woman moves in and out of the ability to eat terumah and tithe.", + "The daughter of an Israelite married to a priest may eat terumah. If he died and she has a son by him she may continue to eat terumah. If she was [subsequently] married to a Levite, she may eat tithe. If he died and she had a son by him, she may continue to eat tithe. If she was [subsequently] married to an Israelite she may eat neither terumah nor tithe. If he died and she has a son by him, she may eat neither terumah nor tithe. If her son by the Israelite died, she may again eat tithe. If her son by the Levite died she may again eat terumah. If her son by the priest died, she may eat neither terumah nor tithe. When the Israelite woman married the priest, she became able to eat terumah. Once he dies, she can still eat terumah because she has a son from him. When she marries a Levite she loses the ability to eat terumah, but she gains the ability to eat tithe. When he dies, she can still eat tithe because she has a son from him. When she then marries the Israelite, she loses her right to eat both tithe and terumah, because she has a son with him. At this point she has a son from each of her marriages. If her son from the Israelite now dies, she reverts back to her previous status. She can now eat tithe because of her son with the Levite. If this son dies, she now reverts to the previous status, which means she can again eat terumah because of her son with the priest. If he too dies, she goes back to her original Israelite family and can no longer eat tithe or terumah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah says basically the same thing as the previous one, but in a reverse order.", + "The daughter of a priest who was married to an Israelite may not eat terumah. If he died and she had a son by him she may not eat terumah. If she was [subsequently] married to a Levite she may eat tithe. If he died and she had a son by him she may eat tithe. If she was [subsequently] married to a priest she may eat terumah. If he died and she had a son by him she may eat terumah. If her son by the priest died she may not eat terumah. If her son by the levite died she may not eat tithe. If her son by the Israelite died she returns to the house of her father; And it is concerning such a woman that it is said, “And she returns to her father’s house, as in her youth, she may eat of her father’s bread” (Leviticus 22:13). This mishnah is the exact reverse of yesterday’s mishnah. The woman starts in a situation where she can eat terumah, but then loses that right when she marries an Israelite. If he dies, and she has had a son with him, she still cannot eat terumah. If she marries a Levite, she may now eat tithe. If he dies, and she has had a son with him, she can still eat tithe. If she now marries a priest, she can eat terumah. . If he dies, and she has had a son with him, she can still eat terumah. If this son dies, she goes back to eating tithe. If this son dies, she goes back to not being able to eat either, because of her son from the Israelite. If this son dies, she goes back to her original situation and she may eat terumah. As the verse says, she goes back to the situation of her father’s house." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah, and several mishnayoth which follow deal with the unfortunate situation where a woman thinks her husband has died, she gets remarried, has kids, and then her husband reappears. The mishnah lists the consequences of her now having unwittingly committed adultery.\nThe usual interpretation of this mishnah is that the marriage to the second husband was not valid, since a married woman cannot marry again. The penalties which she receives in this mishnah are because she didn’t check well enough to make sure her first husband is dead. As we shall see, this interpretation has certain difficulties.\nA teacher of mine, Professor Shamma Friedman, suggested an alternative explanation of the mishnah, an explanation that was based on a comparison of the mishnaic law with other laws found in ancient near eastern law codes, such as the Code of Hammurabi. He proposed that the mishnah actually means that she is married to both men at the same time. The problem with this is that it is forbidden to be married to two men at the same time. Since each marriage is valid but forbidden, she cannot stay married to either and doesn’t get the benefits of either marriage. In other words, both marriages are biblically valid, but each husband makes the other husband’s marriage illegitimate. According to this interpretation, the woman is not penalized for not having checked. Rather the problems she encounters are the result of her being married to two men at the same time.", + "A woman whose husband had gone to a country beyond the sea and they came and told her, “Your husband died”, married, and then her husband returned: She must leave this one and that one, and she also requires a get from this one and that one. She has no ketubah, no usufruct, no support money or worn clothes, neither from this one nor from that one. If she has taken anything from this one or that one, she must return it. The child from this one or that one is a mamzer. Neither this one nor that one may impurify himself for her. Neither this one and that one has a claim to whatever she may find, nor what she makes with her hands, nor to invalidate her vows. If she was the daughter of an Israelite, she becomes disqualified from marrying a priest; if the daughter of a Levite, from the eating of tithe; and if the daughter of a priest, from the eating of terumah. Neither the heirs of this one nor the heirs of that one are entitled to inherit her ketubah. And if [the husbands] die, the brother of the one and the brother of the other must perform halitzah, but may not contract yibbum. This section lists all of the results of her having married another man while her first husband is still alive. I will go through each one by one: She must leave this one and that one, and she also requires a get from this one and that one: She must be divorced from each of them, for she is forbidden to each. She also needs a get from each of them. According to the talmudic interpretation, the get from the second husband is only of rabbinic origin, for according to biblical law, she is not married to the second man. She has no ketubah, no usufruct, no support money or worn clothes, neither from this one nor from that one: She does not receive any of the financial benefits that she would have accrued from her husband. This clause was explained above in 9:3. If she has taken anything from this one or that one, she must return it: If she had taken any of these things to which she is not entitled, she must return them. Some times, in cases of doubt, possession is enough for a person not to have to return something. However, in this case, her possession is considered truly illegal and she must return what she took. The child from this one or that one is a mamzer: The child from the second husband is a mamzer because she gave birth to him while married to the first husband. Should she return to the first husband, the subsequent child will also be a mamzer. Neither this one nor that one may impurify himself for her: A priest is allowed to impurify himself to bury his wife. In this case, if either husband is a priest and she dies, they may not impurify themselves for her. Neither this one and that one has a claim to whatever she may find, nor what she makes with her hands, nor to invalidate her vows: These are all rights given to a husband during marriage. Since the marriage is now invalid, he loses all these rights. Invalidating vows is discussed in Numbers 30. If she was the daughter of an Israelite, she becomes disqualified from marrying a priest; if the daughter of a Levite, from the eating of tithe; and if the daughter of a priest, from the eating of terumah: The illicit marriage to the second husband disqualifies her from all rights that might be accrued from either kohanic or levitical status. The result is that she could no longer marry a priest nor eat tithe if her father was a Levite, nor eat terumah if her father was a priest. Neither the heirs of this one nor the heirs of that one are entitled to inherit her ketubah: According to a ketubah clause which we will see in chapter four of tractate Ketuboth, a woman’s male children inherit her ketubah. However, in this case they too are penalized and lose their inheritance. And if [the husbands] die, the brother of the one and the brother of the other must perform halitzah, but may not contract yibbum: Since both marriages were invalid, the brothers cannot perform yibbum. Note that according to the talmudic interpretation, the halitzah of the brother of the second husband is only of rabbinic origin, since according to Torah law the second marriage was not valid.", + "Rabbi Yose said: her ketubah remains a charge upon the estate of her first husband. The mishnah now brings up opinions that do not agree with the long list seen in section. Rabbi Yose holds that she does receive her ketubah from her first husband, since she only committed adultery unintentionally.", + "Rabbi Elazar said: the first husband is entitled to whatever she may find, and what she makes with her hands, and also has the right to invalidate her vows. Rabbi Elazar adds that the first husband continues to receive the economic benefits from his wife.", + "Rabbi Shimon said: intercourse or halitzah with the brother of the first husband exempts her rival, and the child from him is not a bastard. Rabbi Shimon holds that the brother of the first husband may have yibbum with her, and that by performing yibbum or halitzah, the rival wife is exempted from yibbum or halitzah. Assumedly he also holds that she does not need halitzah from the second husband’s brother. Finally, should she go back to her first husband, the child from such a relationship is not a mamzer.", + "If she married without an authorization, she may return to him. This section really belongs to the following mishnah. It teaches that if she married without the permission of the court, she is allowed to return to her first husband, because in this case the second marriage was totally accidental. However, if she married with the permission of the court, the second marriage is valid and all of the above listed results occur." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to discuss the situation of a woman who was told that her husband was dead and she remarried, and then her husband returned.", + "If she married with the authorization of the court, she must leave, but is exempt from bringing a sacrifice. If she married without the authorization of the court, she must leave and is liable to bring a sacrifice. The authority of the court is thus more greater in that it exempts her from the sacrifice. If she asked the court before she remarried, and they allowed her to remarry, she must leave her second husband, should her first husband return (she cannot return to her first husband either, as we saw in mishnah one). However, she is not liable to bring a sacrifice (sin offering) since she acted with the court’s permission. It is as if the court takes upon itself the responsibility for her accidentally having sinned. However, if she acted on her own without permission, she must bring a sin offering. The reason that she is able to bring a sin offering to atone for her sin is that her sin was unintentional; she didn’t know her husband was alive when she married someone else. Had she sinned intentionally, an offering would not have been effective.", + "If the court ruled that she may be married and she went and disgraced herself, she must bring a sacrifice, because the court permitted her only to marry. If the court ruled that she could remarry and she disgraced herself by marrying someone forbidden to her, for instance if she was a widow and she married the high priest, or if she was a divorcee and she remarried a priest, etc., she is liable to bring a sacrifice. When the court allowed her to remarry, the intention was a permitted marriage. By marrying someone not permitted to her, she is actually marrying on her own accord, and is therefore liable to bring a sacrifice as an unintentional sinner. Note that the sacrifice is for the adultery and not the forbidden marriage. Most forbidden marriages are not atoned for by sacrifices." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses other scenarios where a woman was told that her husband died and it turns out that the information she received was not 100 per cent correct.", + "If a woman whose husband and son went to a country beyond the sea was told, “Your husband died and your son died afterwards”, and she married again, and later she was told, “the [deaths] happened in the opposite order” she must leave, and any child born before or after is a mamzer. When this woman hears that her husband died while her son was still alive, she thinks that she is not liable for yibbum or halitzah, since her husband died while his son was alive. Therefore she remarried someone else, without halitzah or yibbum. When she finds out that she should have had yibbum, it turns out that she was a shomeret yavam who remarried without halitzah or yibbum. Our mishnah’s ruling goes according to Rabbi Akiva who rules that any children from such a marriage are mamzerim. This is true whether the child was born while her husband was alive or even if the child was born after her husband died, for she should have had halitzah or yibbum. She must also leave this marriage.", + "If she was told “Your son died and your husband died afterwards”, and she had yibbum, and afterwards she was told, “the [deaths] happened in the opposite order” she must leave, and any child born before or after is a mamzer. In this case she thought that she was liable for yibbum, so she went and had yibbum with her brother-in-law. Afterwards she finds out that she was exempt from yibbum, since her husband died while her son was still alive. Since the yibbum was forbidden, any child that she has with the yavam is a mamzer, whether or not he was born while her husband was still alive.", + "If she was told, “Your husband died”, and she married, and afterwards she was told, “He was alive but is now dead”, she must leave, and any child born before [the death of her first husband] is a mamzer, but one born after it is not a mamzer. In this case, at the point when she married the second husband, she was in fact married to the first husband. Therefore she must leave the second marriage. The child born before the first husband died is a mamzer, for the union was adulterous. However, the child born after the first husband died is not a mamzer. In other words, even though she must leave the second husband in any case, not every child that she has with him is a mamzer.", + "If she was told, “Your husband died”, and she was betrothed, and afterwards her husband appeared, she is permitted to return to him. Although the second one gave her a get he has not thereby disqualified her from marrying a priest. This Rabb Elazar ben Mathia expounded: “A woman divorced from her husband” (Leviticus 21:7) not from a man who is not her husband. If she is only betrothed to the second husband, and then she finds out that she is still married to the first husband, she may return to her first husband. In the other cases in our mishnah and in the previous one, she was forbidden to do so because she had, albeit unwittingly, committed adultery by having relations with the second husband. However, in this case, she has not had relations with the second husband, therefore she may return to the first. The mishnah further emphasizes that the second marriage is totally invalid by stating that even if the second husband gives her a get, she may still potentially someday marry a priest. This last halakhah is supported by a midrash by Rabbi Elazar ben Matya. Leviticus 21:7 states that a priest may not marry a woman “divorced from her husband”. The verse could have merely stated “divorced”. The extra words “from her husband” teach that if she is divorced from someone who is not her husband, a priest may still marry her." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah and the next discuss the ramifications of situations where a husband was told that his wife had died, and he married her sister.", + "If a man’s wife had gone to a country beyond the sea and he was told, “Your wife is dead”, and he married her sister, and afterwards his wife came back, [the latter] is permitted to return to him. He is permitted to marry the relatives of the second woman, and the second woman is permitted to marry his relatives. If the first wife died he is permitted to marry the second. The man’s marriage to his wife’s sister was obviously forbidden, since one cannot marry one’s wife’s sister. However, his original wife is permitted to return to him, since the second marriage was totally invalid. By his first wife returning to him, this would not count as marrying his wife’s (his second wife’s) sister. Furthermore, since the marriage was invalid, he may marry the second wife’s relatives (for instance her daughter). This is true even if he has had sexual relations with her. She too is permitted to marry his relatives. If his first wife dies, he can now remarry the second wife. Even though he already had relations with her when she was forbidden to him, since she is now permitted to him, he may marry her.", + "If he was told that his wife was dead, and he married her sister, and then he was told that she was then alive but had since died, any child born before [his first wife’s death] is a mamzer, but anyone born after [her death] is not a mamzer. This section teaches that any child he had with his wife’s sister while his wife was still alive is a mamzer, since this is a prohibited relationship, and punishable by kareth. However, children born after his original wife died are not mamzerim.", + "Rabbi Yose says: whoever disqualifies for others disqualifies for himself and whoever does not disqualify for others does not disqualify for himself. The Talmud explains that Rabbi Yose refers to a situation where Reuven was married to Leah and Moshe was married to Rachel, Leah’s sister. Leah and Moshe (Reuven’s wife and his brother-in-law) go abroad and Reuven receives a report that both of them have died. Reuven now marries Rachel, who he thinks is Moshe’s widow and his dead wife’s sister. When both Leah and Moshe come back, since Rachel is forbidden to return to Moshe (see mishnah one), Leah is forbidden to return to Reuven. The previous tanna would have held that while Rachel was forbidden to return to Moshe, Leah was permitted to return to Reuven. However, if there was a case where the woman whom he married was not forbidden to return to a previous husband, for instance she was not married or she married him (Reuven) without the permission of the court, since he does not make her forbidden to someone else, his own wife is not forbidden to return to him." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with a quite complicated situation in which a man marries a series of sisters, thinking that each previous one was dead, and then finds out that they are all alive. If we sort out all of the details, this braintwister shouldn’t be so bad.", + "If a man was told “Your wife is dead” and he married her paternal sister; [and when he was told] “She is dead’, he married her maternal sister; [and when he was told] “She is dead”, and he married her paternal sister; [and when he was told] “She is dead, he married her maternal sister; and later it was found that they were all alive, he is permitted to the first, third and fifth, and they exempt their rivals; But he is forbidden to the second and the fourth, and intercourse with one of these does not exempt her rival. A man was married to Rachel (1), and when told that she died, he married Hana (2), Rachel’s paternal sister. When told that Hana died, he married Tova (3), Hana’s maternal sister. Rachel (1) and Tova (3) do not share any parents. When told that Tova has died, he marries Yael (4), Tova’s paternal sister. Yael (4) does not share any parents with Rachel (1) or Hana (2). When told that Yael has died, he marries Rivka (5), Yael’s maternal sister. Rivka (5) does not share any parents with Rachel (1), Hana (2) or Tova (3). At this point, the hapless husband finds out that all of these women are still alive (you can just imagine the shock on the poor guy’s face!). The mishnah rules that he may stay married to the first, the third and the fifth. This means that even though the third woman is the second woman’s sister, and he is forbidden to the second woman, he may stay with the third (the same with the fifth, who is the fourth’s sister). This is because the marriage to the second and the fourth was not valid marriage, because he had already married the first and the third, and they were still alive. Since the marriage with the second and the fourth was not valid marriage, he is permitted to marry their sisters. The mishnah also teaches that the first, third and fifth women exempt their rival wives from the need for yibbum. This means that should this husband die without children, when one of his brothers does yibbum or halitzah with one of these women, the rest of the women are exempt. He is forbidden to stay married to the second and the fourth women, since they are the sisters of the first and third respectively. Since both of these women are not validly married, and therefore are not liable for yibbum or halitzah, should someone perform yibbum or halitzah with them, it would not exempt their rivals.", + "If he had intercourse with the second after the death of the first, he is permitted to the second and fourth, and they exempt their rivals; But he is forbidden to the third and the fifth, and intercourse with one of these does not exempt her rival. After the death of the first wife, he is permitted to have relations with the second wife. If he does so, then he can no longer stay with the third wife, and he can now have relations with the fourth wife (since the marriage with the third wife is now invalid). Since he can have relations with the fourth wife, he cannot stay married to the fifth wife. In this case, the second and fourth wife would be liable for yibbum and therefore they make their rival wives exempt. The third and fifth wife are not liable for yibbum, therefore they would not make their rival wives exempt." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses the ramifications of a boy, nine years and one day old, performing an act of yibbum, divorce, halitzah or ma’amar. The mishnah teaches that a boy of this age is capable of having sex which is a purely physical act. However, he does not have the requisite knowledge (da’at) to give a get, perform ma’amar or halitzah. One other issue which we must keep in mind while learning this mishnah is that once a woman awaiting yibbum (a shomeret yavam) has had one of these acts performed with her by one of the brothers, she may no longer marry any of the other brothers of her dead husband.\nWe should note that in the time of the Mishnah, not only was marriage considered possible at a very young age, but concepts of childhood were different. Our perception of childhood as extending well into one’s teens and our assumption that children deserve protection during these years and are not to be treated as adults, are, to a large extent, more modern perceptions. The mishnah, as we shall see, is therefore not squeamish about discussing sex and children. Today, in our society children are (or should be) distanced from sex.", + "A boy of the age of nine years and one day disqualifies [his sister-in-law for marriage] with his brothers, and his brothers disqualify her for him, but while he disqualifies her from the outset only, the brothers disqualify her from the outset and at the end. The first section of the mishnah is a brief, memorable way of stating that which will be explained in section two and in the following mishnayoth. I will explain the concepts as they are fleshed out in the mishnah.", + "How is this so? A boy of the age of nine years and one day who had intercourse with his sister-in-law disqualifies her [for marriage] with his brothers; If a boy of nine years and one day has intercourse with a shomeret yavam, that is his dead brother’s wife, the other, older brothers may no longer have yibbum/intercourse with her. This means that his act of intercourse “counts” sufficiently that she is tied to him, and no longer liable for yibbum or halitzah to the other brothers. Since she is no longer liable for yibbum or halitzah, they are forbidden to have intercourse with her.", + "The brothers disqualify her [for marriage with him] whether they had intercourse with her, did ma’amar, gave her a get or submitted to her halitzah. In contrast to the nine year old boy, the older brothers disqualify the shomeret yavam from having relations with any of the other brothers in four different ways: intercourse (yibbum), ma’amar (betrothal), divorce (get) and halitzah. Even though ma’amar and a get are only of rabbinic origin for the shomeret yavam, and she still requires halitzah before she may remarry, they are sufficient to disqualify her from the other brothers. The difference between the older brothers and the nine year old brother is that for the older brothers there are legal consequences to their performance of acts that require knowledge, such as ma’amar, divorce, or halitzah, whereas for the nine year old, there are legal consequence only to physical acts such as intercourse." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah explains the status of an act of sexual intercourse done by a boy who has reached nine years and one day old, but is not yet of majority age.", + "If a boy of the age of nine years and one day had intercourse with his yevamah and then his brother who was of the age of nine years and one day had intercourse with her, [the latter] disqualifies her for [the former]. Rabbi Shimon says: he does not render her unfit. As we learned yesterday, the sexual intercourse of a boy nine years and one day old has legal ramifications. In our case of yibbum, if a boy who has reached this age has relations with his yevamah, he disqualifies her from being permitted to have yibbum with another one of the brothers. However, this act of sexual intercourse is not sufficient to completely make her his wife. The Talmud states that it is not a “complete acquisition”, as it would be if he was of majority age. Therefore, when another brother, who has also reached this age, has intercourse with her, he causes her prohibited to the first brother. Since she has now had quasi-yibbum with two brothers (akin to ma’amar with two brothers, see above 5:1), she is forbidden to both. Rabbi Shimon holds that it is doubtful whether sexual intercourse with a boy nine years and one day old can acquire a woman as a wife. In our case, if it does, then she is the wife of the first brother, and the intercourse with the second brother does not disqualify her to the first. If such intercourse does not acquire her as a wife, then neither does the intercourse with the second brother, and she is not disqualified to the first brother. Should she wait around as a shomeret yavam until he is of majority age, he may then have yibbum with her. To summarize, the first opinion holds that an act of intercourse by a boy nine years and one day, certainly acquires a woman as a wife, but the acquisition is not complete. In contrast, Rabbi Shimon holds that it is uncertain whether this act of intercourse acquires. However, if it does acquire, it acquires fully." + ], + [ + "Introduction This mishnah continues to discuss the ramifications of an act of intercourse performed by a boy of the age of nine years and one day.", + "If a boy of the age of nine years and one day had intercourse with his yevamah and afterwards had intercourse with her rival wife, he has disqualified [both women for marriage] with himself. Rabbi Shimon says: he does not disqualify them. As we learned in yesterday’s mishnah, according to the rabbis an act of intercourse done by a boy nine years and one day old partially acquires a yevamah as a wife. It is akin to ma’amar, which also partially acquires the yevamah as a wife. Therefore, if the boy has intercourse first with one yevamah, and then with another one, who is also a yevamah, it is like giving ma’amar to two different yevamoth. In such a case, he may not marry either one. Rabbi Shimon holds that it is doubtful whether the sexual act of a boy nine years and one day old acquires a wife. Therefore, if it does make her his wife, then the first yevamah is his wife, and the intercourse with the second woman is inconsequential. If such an act does not acquire her as a wife, then neither did the intercourse with the second woman, and neither are prohibited to him. Therefore, according to Rabbi Shimon, when he reaches majority age he may marry either woman.", + "If a boy of the age of nine years and one day had intercourse with his yevamah and then died, she must undergo halitzah but may not be taken in yibbum. As stated above, intercourse with a boy nine years and one day old is legally equivalent to ma’amar. It therefore creates a tie to the yevamah, but does not totally remove the ties that she still has to her first husband. Should this boy now die, she has ties to two yevamim (two brothers, both of whom were her husband). As we learned in mishnah 3:9, when a woman has ties to two yevamim she must undergo halitzah, and may not have yibbum with another brother.", + "If he had married [any other] woman and she subsequently died, she is exempt [from both halitzah and yibbum]. If a boy nine years and one day old tries to marry a woman, and then he dies, she is not liable for yibbum or halitzah. This is because a boy this young cannot legally contract marriage. Throughout this chapter we have learned that there are some legal ramifications to his having sex with a woman. This section teaches that those ramifications are limited to the realm of yibbum. For regular marriage, there are no ramifications." + ], + [ + "If a boy of the age of nine years and one day had intercourse with his sister-in-law, and after he had come of age he married another woman and then died, if he had not known the first woman after he had become of age, the first one must have halitzah but may not be taken in yibbum, while the second may either have halitzah or yibbum.
Rabbi Shimon says: [the yavam] may perform yibbum with whichever one he wants, and he must perform halitzah for the other [woman].
[The same law applies] whether he is of the age of nine years and one day, or whether he is of the age of twenty years but had not produced two pubic hairs.
The final mishnah of chapter ten contains another dispute between the sages and Rabbi Shimon over the status of an act of intercourse performed by a nine year old boy. As we have learned before, according to the sages, such an act partially acquires the yevamah as his wife. According to Rabbi Shimon, it is doubtful whether the act acquires her as a wife, but if it does, she is fully his wife.
Section one: When the nine year old boy has relations with his yevamah, according to the sages, he partially acquires her as his wife. If he later dies, without having intercourse with her from the time he reached majority age, she may not have yibbum, as we learned in the previous mishnah, since she is tied to two yevamim (the minor and the brother who first married her). Had he had intercourse with her after having reached majority age, he would have completely severed her ties to her first husband, and she would be able to subsequently have yibbum.
Concerning the woman he married after having reached majority age, she may have either yibbum or halitzah. The question we must ask about this clause is why we would have thought that she is not allowed to have yibbum. The issue is connected to that which we learned in 3:9, concerning an adult who performed ma’amar with his yevamah, but before he had a chance to have yibbum with her he died. There we learned that just as she must have halitzah and not yibbum (since she is tied to two yevamim), so too must her rival wife. Our mishnah deals with a similar situation, where a man dies having ties equivalent to ma’amar with one wife, and full marriage with another wife. Either our mishnah disagrees with the opinion held in 3:9, or it makes a distinction between the two situations, holding that in one case the woman may have yibbum and in the other she may not.
Rabbi Shimon holds that an act of intercourse performed by a minor doubtfully acquires the yevamah as a wife. If it does acquire her as a wife, then she is fully his wife and she may have yibbum. If it does not acquire her as a wife, and he has not had relations with her since, then she was never the minor’s wife, and the woman may have yibbum with his brother (in this case she is still tied to the first brother). In either case, the yavam may have yibbum with either woman. He must have halitzah with the woman with whom he does not have yibbum or halitzah, lest the intercourse of a minor does not acquire. If this is so, then the second wife is not the rival wife of the first wife. If he had yibbum with the first wife, the second wife still needs to be released. If he had yibbum with the second wife, the first wife still needs halitzah on account of her previous marriage to the first brother. Whichever wife did not already have yibbum lest the intercourse of the minor does acquire, and then the surviving brother would have had yibbum with two yevamoth, which is forbidden.
Section two: The final section of the mishnah relates to the entire second half of the chapter (mishnayoth 6-9). A boy who reaches nine years of age is considered a minor until he reaches puberty, or until he reaches twenty years of age. According to the talmud, this is actually true until he reaches the age of 35. If at 35 he still has not shown signs of puberty, he is classified as a natural-born eunuch." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nA man may not marry the relatives of his wife (her mother, her daughter, her sister and some others) and he may not marry his father’s wife or his brother’s wife. Our mishnah discusses whether a man may marry the relatives of a woman with whom he, his father or his son has had intercourse but not married. It also deals with the question of whether or not it is prohibited to have intercourse (but not marriage) with the relatives of one’s wife.\nWe should note that the mishnah refers to two categories of women: one who has been raped and one who has been seduced. This is the common rabbinic way of referring to sex out of the bonds of marriage. The rabbis of the mishnah did not have a single word for extra-marital sex, and therefore referred to it using these terms which were used in other contexts.", + "A man is permitted to marry [the relative] of a woman [whom he has] raped or seduced. Although it is forbidden (according to halakhah it is impossible) to marry the relatives of one’s wife, a man may marry the relatives of a woman with whom he has had intercourse. The Torah forbids the marriage of a woman’s relatives only if he has had betrothal with that woman.", + "He who rapes or seduces [a relative] of his married wife, is guilty. In contrast, it is forbidden to have any type of sex, even extra-marital with the relatives of one’s wife. Since the relationship was sanctified by marriage, her relatives are prohibited.", + "A man may marry a woman whom his father has raped or seduced or a woman whom his son has raped or seduced. Rabbi Yehudah forbids [marriage] with a woman whom one’s father has raped or seduced. Although it is forbidden (and impossible) to marry one’s father’s wife or one’s son’s wife, the prohibition does not include a woman who had sex out of the bonds of marriage with the father or son. R. Yehudah prohibits sex with a woman who had sex with one’s father. In the talmud this is learned midrashically from Deuteronomy 23:1." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah refers to a convert’s participation in halitzah and yibbum.", + "The sons of a female convert who converted with her do not perform halitzah or yibbum, even if the one was not conceived in holiness but was born in holiness, and the other was both conceived and born in holiness. When a person crosses the boundary and converts into Judaism, he legally loses his genealogical ties to his former family. Therefore, when a woman converts with her sons, her sons lose their ties to their father and are no longer legally considered to be paternal brothers. Since only paternal brothers perform yibbum or halitzah, these brothers do not. Should the wife of one of them die, the other brothers do not perform halitzah and yibbum for her. The widow is exempt as if her husband did not have any paternal brothers. This law is true even if one of the brothers was conceived before the mother converted (not in holiness, see Deuteronomy 23:1) and born after she converted (in holiness) and the other brother conceived and born after she converted. Since at the time of the conception of the first brother the mother was not Jewish, the ties to his father do not carry over. Only if both brothers were both conceived and born after the mother had converted are they considered paternal brothers (assuming they have the same father).", + "So also [is the law] where the sons of a female slave were freed together with her. The same exact rules apply with regard to the freeing of a female slave. When a female slave is freed she becomes “fully Jewish”, and therefore the emancipation of slaves is somewhat like conversion." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah and the following two mishnayoth deal with a favorite rabbinic topic, especially in seder Nashim: people getting mixed up and not knowing who they are. We will see similar discussions in tractates Gittin and Kiddushin.\nIn the case in our mishnah, five boys from five women got mixed up, and nobody knows for sure who belongs to which mother. The problem is that should they die without children and they have brothers (or at least each woman has one other son who she knows is her son), they don’t know who is whose brother. This mishnah teaches an elegant, yet intricate way of solving the problem of who gets halitzah and yibbum from whom.\nIn my opinion these are rabbinic “mindbenders” that some times teach principles but do not reflect reality.", + "If the children of five women were mixed up and, when these mixed up children grew up, they took wives and then died, four perform halitzah for one [of the widows] and one contracts with her yibbum. [Then] he and three [brothers] perform halitzah to [another one of the widows] and one has with her yibbum. Thus every one [of the widows] has halitzah four times and yibbum once. After the five children were mixed up, they no longer know who their mother is, nor which of the women’s other sons are their brothers. When they grow up and take wives and then all die without children, it is unclear which brother of the dead, mixed up brothers should perform halitzah or yibbum for which widow. The mishnah states that first four brothers should perform halitzah for one widow, and then the fifth brother may have yibbum with her. If he was really her husband’s brother then the yibbum is done by the person who should do it. If one of the other brothers was really her husband’s brother, then she has already had halitzah and is free to marry someone else. Then the brother who has had yibbum with one widow, joins three other brothers and repeats the process with the second wife. She too has yibbum with the fifth brother. So on and so on they all repeat this process until each woman has halitzah four times and yibbum once. Note that there are other potential solutions to this problem. Four brothers could give halitzah to each woman and the fifth brother could have yibbum with each wife. Alternatively, all five brothers could have halitzah with all five wives. The mishnah probably chose this means of solving the problem so that all five wives would have one husband and no husband would perform yibbum more than once. Although bigamy was permitted in the time of the mishnah, it seems that monogamy was much more common and probably preferred." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with the complex situation where a mother’s son gets mixed up with her daughter-in-law’s son. Afterwards each woman has another son, such that it is unclear who is whose brother and who is whose father’s brother. I will try to use names to make the situation clearer. Sarah is the mother and Rebekah is the daughter-in-law. They give birth each to one son, Joe and Stanley, but they don’t know whose child is whose. They each also give birth to another son, Sarah to Moshe and Rebekah to Eli. Joe and Stanley might be Eli’s brother or his uncle. Joe and Stanley might be Moshe’s brother or his nephew. Our mishnah deals with cases of potential yibbum involving these four men.", + "If the child of a woman was mixed up with the child of her daughter-in-law and the mixed-up children grew up and married women and then died, the [other] sons of the daughter-in-law perform halitzah but may not contract yibbum, for it is uncertain whether she is the wife of his brother or the wife of his father’s brother. The [other] sons of the older woman either perform halitzah or yibbum, since the only doubt is whether she is the wife of his brother or the wife of his brother’s son. If Joe and Stanley each married a woman and then died without children, their wives become liable for yibbum or halitzah with either Moshe or Eli. Eli, Rebekah’s son, must perform halitzah for each woman for each might be the widow of his brother. He cannot have yibbum with either for either might be his father’s brother’s wife and it is forbidden to have relations with one’s father’s brother’s wife. After Eli has performed halitzah with both women, Moshe, Sarah’s son, may either have halitzah or yibbum with either. He may have yibbum with either for if she is his brother’s wife, then the yibbum is valid. If she is his wife of his brother’s son, he is still permitted to marry her for it is permitted to marry the wife of one’s brother’s son. This mishnah is based on the fact that it is permitted to marry one’s nephew’s wife but not one’s uncle’s wife.", + "If the not-mixed-up sons died then [with respect to the widows of the sons of the older woman] the mixed-up sons perform halitzah and may not have yibbum, since it is uncertain whether she is the wife of his brother or the wife of his father’s brother; [With respect to the widows] of the sons of the daughter-in-law one performs halitzah and the other [may] have yibbum. In this case, Moshe and Eli die and each woman becomes liable for halitzah to Joe and Stanley. Both Joe and Stanley must perform halitzah for Moshe’s wife, lest she be their dead brother’s wife. They may not have yibbum with her lest she be the wife of their father’s brother. With Eli’s wife one must have halitzah, lest she be his brother’s widow but then the other may have yibbum. Yibbum in this case is permitted because even if she is not his dead brother’s wife she is his brother’s son’s wife and it is permitted, as we learned above, to have relations with one’s brother’s son’s wife. In summary, if there is the possibility that the woman is his father’s brother’s wife, he may not have yibbum with her. If there is a possibility that she is his brother’s son’s wife he may have yibbum since this is permitted." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with a case where a priest’s wife’s child is mixed up with her slave’s child [this would have made a good TV movie]. Each kid doesn’t know whether he is the son of a priest or the son of a slave.", + "If the child of a priest’s wife was mixed-up with the child of her female slave, behold both may eat terumah and [together] they receive one share at the threshing-floor. They may not defile themselves for the dead nor may they marry any women whether these are eligible [for marriage with a priest] or ineligible. Since a slave owned by a priest or a priest’s wife can eat terumah, the mixed-up children can eat terumah, for both may eat terumah. When they go to the threshing-floor, the community is responsible to give them only one portion, for only one is a priest. Neither may defile themselves, because each one might be a priest who is prohibited from defiling himself by coming into contact with a dead body. Neither of them can marry any woman because if he is a priest he cannot marry a slave-woman and if he is a slave he can’t marry any woman eligible to marry a priest. Since there is no woman who can marry either a priest or a slave, these two men are stuck.", + "If when they grew up, the mixed-up children freed one another they may marry women who are eligible for marriage with a priest and they may not defile themselves for the dead. If they defiled themselves, they do not receive the penalty of forty lashes. When they grow up, each may free the other, since one is the owner of the other. At this point, one is a priest and one is a freed slave, but it is unclear who is who. They may now marry any woman they want, as long as she is eligible to marry a priest, since both categories of men may marry any woman eligible to marry a priest. Neither may marry a woman not eligible to marry a priest, for instance a convert, lest he be a priest. Neither may defile himself for the dead, since one is surely a priest. However, if one does defile himself, he is not lashed as is the normal punishment, for it is not certain that he was the priest. A person can only be punished if it was certain that he committed a transgression.", + "They may not eat terumah, but if they did eat they need not pay compensation either for the principal or [the additional] fifth. They are not to receive a share at the threshing-floor, but they may sell [their own] terumah and the proceeds are theirs. They receive no share in the holy things of the temple, and no holy things are given to them but others do not take their holy things from them. They are exempt from [giving to any priest] the shoulder, the cheeks and the maw, while the firstling of either of them should remain in the pasture until it contracts a blemish. They are not allowed to eat terumah, since either one might not be a priest. However, if they do eat terumah, they do not have to repay what they ate as do regular Israelites, since each can claim that he is the priest. They do not receive terumah at the threshing-floor, since either one might not be a priest. However, when they separate terumah from their own produce, they may sell it, since other priests cannot prove that the terumah does not rightfully belong to either one of them. In other words, they cannot eat terumah but they need not give it to a priest. They do not receive parts of sacrifices, and they are not given offerings to sacrifice for each is uncertain of his priestly status. However, if they come into possession of sacrifices, other priests may not take them away from them, for each can claim that no one can prove that he is not a priest. When they do bring a sacrifice, other priests may not take the parts of the animal normally given to the priests, for each can claim that he is a priest and no one can prove him wrong. If they have a first-born animal, they do not have to give it immediately to a priest, as is usual. Rather it should graze until it becomes blemished and not valid as a sacrifice. Then they may eat it or make other uses out of it (farming or for wool, etc.).", + "The restrictions relating to priests and the restrictions relating to Israelites are both imposed upon them. This section summarizes the entire mishnah. Basically, the law treats each mixed-up child as stringently as it would a priest (he can’t defile himself for the dead) and as stringently as it would an Israelite (he can’t eat terumah). However, as with regard to economic issues, other priests cannot make claims from him, since each son can always say to the other priests, “prove that I am not a priest.” Since there is a general rule that the burden of proof is upon the claimant, he is always exempt." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nAs we learned in chapter four, mishnah ten, a woman must wait three months between marriages in order to determine whether a subsequently born child is from the first or second husband. Our mishnah deals with a case where the woman did not wait and then bore a child seven months after being married to her second husband. In such a case it is unknown whether the child was a full-term child from the first husband or a prematurely born child from the second husband.", + "If a woman did not wait three months after [separation from] her husband, and married again and gave birth [to a son], and it is unknown whether it is a nine-months child by the first husband or a seven-months child by the second, if she had other sons by the first husband and other sons by the second, these must perform halitzah but may not contract yibbum. So too he, with their widows performs halitzah but may not contract yibbum. In this scenario, it is unclear whether this boy is a paternal brother of the children of the first father or of the second father. He is a maternal brother to all of them, but only paternal brothers are obligated by the laws of yibbum. Therefore, should he die without children, his widow must receive halitzah from one brother from the first father and from one brother from the second husband. They may not perform yibbum lest he was not their paternal brother. In this case since he is there maternal brother, marrying the widow would be forbidden. Similarly, if one of these brothers dies without children, the doubtful-son performs halitzah but not yibbum, lest he was not his brother.", + "If he had brothers by the first and also brothers by the second, but not by the same mother, he may either perform halitzah or contract yibbum, But as for them, one performs halitzah and the other may [then] contract yibbum. If he had brothers from the first husband and the second husband but these brothers were not from his mother, he may have halitzah or yibbum with any of their widows. With regard to the first husband’s son’s widow, if the first husband was his father, then he is performing yibbum correctly. If the second husband was his father, then the widows of the children of the first husband are like strangers (non-relatives) to him, and he may marry them. Note that this is only so if there was only one other son to the first husband. If he had other sons, his widow must receive halitzah from one of them first, lest the doubtful son was really the son of the second husband. With regard to the second husband’s son’s widow the same is also true. Either she is his brother’s widow or a stranger. In either case he may marry her. The difference between this case and that in section one is that these brothers do not share the same mother. If he (the doubtful-son) dies, then one brother from one father must perform halitzah and then the other can have yibbum. The second one may have yibbum because if he was his brother, then she is his brother’s widow, and yibbum is allowed. If he was not his brother, then she was not his brother’s widow, but she is permitted since she has already received yibbum from her brother-in-law (the son of the other husband)." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is a continuation of yesterday’s mishnah, which dealt with a situation in which it was unclear whether a woman’s former husband or current husband is the father of her child.", + "If one of [the two husbands] was an Israelite and the other a priest: He may only marry a woman who is eligible to marry a priest. He may not defile himself for the dead, but if he did defile himself he does not suffer the penalty of forty stripes. He may not eat terumah, but if he did eat he need not pay compensation either for the principal or [for the additional] fifth. He does not receive a share at the threshing-floor, but he may sell [his own] terumah and the profits are his. He receives no share in the holy things of the temple, no holy things are given to him, but he is not deprived of his own. He is exempt from [giving to any priest] the shoulder, the cheeks and the maw, while his firstling must remain in the pasture until it contracts a blemish. The restrictions relating to priests and the restrictions relating to Israelites are imposed upon him. In this case the child is not sure if he is a priest or an Israelite. Most of the laws here are the same as those we saw in mishnah five above, so I will not explain them again. In essence all of the strictures that apply to a priest apply to him, but he does not receive all of the benefits of being a priest, for he might be an Israelite.", + "If the two [husbands] were priests: He must be an onen mourner for them and they must be onenim mourners for him, but he may not defile himself for them, nor may they defile themselves for him. He may not inherit from them, but they may inherit from him. He is exempt if he strikes or curses the one or the other. He goes up [to serve] in the Temple watch of the one as well as of the other, but he does not receive a share [in the offerings]. If both served in the same watch, he receives a single portion. If both the first and second husband were priests, then this child is certainly a priest and may act as a priest and receive most priestly benefits. However there are certain complications that arise since he does not know who his father is. An “onen” is a mourner on the day that the person for whom he is mourning dies. An onen who is a priest may not serve in the Temple service. On the day that either of the husbands dies the son must act as an onen and cannot serve in the Temple. Similarly, if he dies before they do, they must act as an onen for them. Since this is a stringency it does apply. However, he may not defile himself in burying them and they may not defile themselves in burying him. This is because it is not certain which one is his father and a priest cannot defile himself for someone who is not his relative. He may not inherit from them, for each husband’s other inheritors can say that he needs to bring proof (which he cannot) that he is this husband’s son. The husbands split his inheritance, if he dies without sons. He is not liable for striking or cursing either one of them, since it is not certain which is his father. Note that were it certain which is his father, this is a capital offense. The priests were divided into 24 Temple watches, called mishmarim. Each week a different mishmar would serve. This son is responsible for serving with both father’s mishmar since this is considered a stringency. However, he does not receive the gifts that were divided amongst the priests of the mishmar, for each mishmar can say to him that he belongs to the other. However, if both fathers belonged to the same mishmar he may share in their gifts." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThe twelfth chapter of Yevamoth discusses how halitzah is performed. The first mishnah discusses the necessity of the presence of judges and what type of footwear she must remove from the yavam in order for the halitzah to be valid.", + "The commandment of halitzah must be performed in the presence of three judges, even though all the three are laymen. In describing halitzah, Deuteronomy 25:7 states, “And if the man does not wish to take his brother's wife, then his brother's wife shall go up to the gate to the elders, and say: 'My husband's brother refuses to raise up for his brother a name in Israel; he will not perform the duty of a husband's brother unto me.’” From here it is clear that halitzah must be performed in front of “elders”, interpreted by our mishnah to refer to a court. However, there is no need for expert judges, and mere “laymen” will do. This is probably because this is a ceremony and not a true court case.", + "If the woman performed the halitzah with a shoe, her halitzah is valid, [but if] with a felt sock it is invalid. If with a sandal to which a heel is attached it is valid, but [if with one] that has no heel it is invalid. [If the sandal was tied] below the knee the halitzah is valid, but if above the knee it is invalid. The Torah states that halitzah must be done with a shoe, which in the Torah refers to a leather shoe. Hence any kind of shoe made of leather is fit for halitzah, but not a shoe made of felt. In rabbinic Hebrew, a “shoe” is made of soft leather. A “sandal” which is made of hard leather is also acceptable for halitzah, provided that it have a heel. Deuteronomy 25:9 states that she “shall pull the sandal off his foot”. According to our mishnah, if the sandal’s straps were tied below the knee, she can fulfill the requirement to “pull the sandal off his foot”. If the straps are above the knee, then this requirement is not fulfilled. Others explain this last clause to refer to an amputee, that if his leg was cut off above the knee, halitzah cannot be performed, but if his leg was cut off below the knee halitzah may be performed." + ], + [ + "Introduction This mishnah relates laws concerning the shoe with which halitzah must be performed.", + "If the woman performed the halitzah with a sandal that did not belong to him, or with a wooden sandal, or with the one of the left foot [which he was wearing] on his right foot, the halitzah is valid. Deut. 25:9 says “she shall pull off his sandal”. From here we might have concluded that if the yavam did not own the sandal, the halitzah was invalid. Our mishnah teaches us that if the halitzah was performed with someone else’s shoe that the yavam was wearing it is still valid. Wooden sandals, although not the normal style of sandal, are nevertheless valid for halitzah, although not preferable. As long as the yavam wears the shoe on his right foot the halitzah is valid, even if it is his left shoe.", + "If she performed the halizah with a sandal too large [for him], in which, however, he is able to walk, or with one too small which, however, covers the greater part of his foot, her halizah is valid. The sandal which is used for halitzah should fit his foot. However, if it is too large or too small the halitzah is valid, provided he can use it as a sandal. This means that if it is too big he must be able to walk in it, and if it is too small, it must at least cover most of his foot.", + "If she performed the halitzah at night, her halitzah is valid. Rabbi Elazar disqualifies [halitzah at night]. In the previous mishnah we learned that halitzah is considered a “court matter” and therefore requires three judges. Monetary cases may be completed at night but must be begun during the day. Halitzah is somewhat of a monetary case, because after halitzah she collects her ketubah. The first opinion considers halitzah to be like the first stage of a trial and therefore it may take place at night, whereas according to R. Elazar it is like the last stage of a trial and therefore, must take place during the day.", + "[If she performed it] with [the yavam’s] left shoe, her halitzah is invalid, Rabbi Elazar validates it. According to the first opinion in the mishnah, halitzah must be performed with the shoe from the right foot, whereas R. Elazar holds that it may be also from the left foot." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThere are three acts in the halitzah ceremony: 1) the woman’s removal of the yavam’s shoe; 2) her spitting in front of him; 3) her recitation of the verses in Deuteronomy. Mishnah six below will deal with the recitations stated during the process of halitzah. Our mishnah deals with which acts are essential to a valid performance of halitzah.", + "If she took off his shoe and spat, but did not recite [the formula], her halitzah is valid. Although the recitation of the formula is required, if she does not do it, her halitzah is still valid. This is because all tannaim agree that words are not a deed and only deeds are absolutely essential to the performance of halitzah.", + "If she recited [the formula] and spat, but did not draw off the shoe, her halitzah is invalid. Drawing off the shoe is the most essential part of halitzah, without which the halitzah cannot be valid.", + "If she drew off the shoe and recited [the formula] but did not spit: R. Eliezer says her halitzah is invalid; and R. Akiva says: her halitzah is valid. R. Eliezer said to him: “‘So shall be done’ (Deut. 25:9), anything which is a deed is essential.” R. Akiva said to him: “From there is your proof!: ‘So shall be done to the man”, only that which is to be done to the man [is essential]. This section contains a debate over whether or not spitting is essential to the halitzah. According to R. Eliezer, since spitting is a deed, it is essential. This is derived from the words, “so shall be done” which are understood to mean that anything that is “done” is essential to the halitzah. R. Akiva rejects this proof by creatively reading the phrase “so shall be done to the man”. R. Akiva interprets this to mean anything done literally to the man’s body. Spitting is done to the man but not to his body, for according to rabbinic interpretation, she spits in front of him and not in his face as the verse implies." + ], + [ + "Introduction Halitzah requires what is called “da’at” or awareness/intent. That is both the woman and the man must fully understand that the halitzah permits her to marry others and causes her to become prohibited to the yavam. According to the rabbis, minors and deaf-mutes do not legally have da’at (now that deaf-mutes can learn to communicate, they are considered as having da’at). Our mishnah rules that deaf-mutes and minors cannot perform halitzah or have it performed to them.", + "If a deaf yavam submitted to halitzah or if a deaf yevamah performed halitzah, or if a halitzah was performed on a minor, the halizah is invalid. A deaf-mute and a minor can neither perform halitzah nor have halitzah performed upon them. In all such cases the halitzah is invalid and the woman is not free to marry. In the case of a deaf-mute yavam, this would mean that if there are other brothers one of them must perform halitzah. In the case of a deaf-mute yevamah, she could only be released with yibbum (which does not require da’at). In the case of the minor yavam, she must have halitzah with another of the brothers (if there are brothers) or wait for the minor to reach majority age.", + "If a minor yevamah performed halitzah she must again perform halitzah when she becomes of age; if she does not again perform it, the halitzah is invalid. The minor yevamah who performs halitzah must perform it again when she reaches age (12 ½). There are other versions of this mishnah which read that in such a case the halitzah is valid. According to this version, although the yavam cannot be a minor, the yevamah can. The reasoning behind this is that the Deut. 25:7 says “But if the man does not want”, man implying that a minor cannot make such a choice. There is no such word used in connection to the woman, therefore she may be a minor." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is concerned with an act of halitzah that was not done in the presence of three judges, as was required in mishnah one.\nNote the structure of this chapter: the first mishnah dealt with judges and now the mishnah returns to this subject. As we shall see, the next mishnah stands independent of the rest of the chapter. That means that the mishnah was deliberately written in a chiastic structure (abba).", + "If she performed halitzah in the presence of two men or in the presence of three men and one of them was discovered to be a relative or in any other way unfit [to act as judge], her halitzah is invalid. R. Shimon and R. Yohanan Ha-Sandelar declare it valid. And it once happened that a man submitted to halitzah between himself and herself in a prison, and when the case came before R. Akiva he declared the halitzah valid. According to the first opinion in the mishnah, without three valid judges, halitzah is invalid. “Unfit” refers to those unfit to testify as listed in Mishnah Sanhedrin 3:3-4. The list of which relatives are invalid to act as judges or witnesses is also found in the third chapter of Sanhedrin. However, according to R. Shimon, R. Yohanan Ha-Sandelar (the sandal maker ironic that a sandal maker is teaching laws of halitzah which uses a sandal), and their teacher, R. Akiva, the lack of three fit judges does not invalidate the halitzah. According to the Talmud, this case mentioned in the mishnah, was brought before R. Akiva while he was imprisoned for breaking the Roman decree not to teach Torah." + ], + [ + "The final mishnah of our chapter outlines the procedure of halitzah. Most of this mishnah is straightforward so I will only explain the parts that require commentary.", + "[This is the procedure in the performance of] the commandment of halitzah:He and his deceased brother’s wife come to the court, and they offer him appropriate advice, for it is said, “Then the elders of his city shall call him and speak to him” (Deut. 25:8). Verse 8 says that the elders must speak to the yavam. This is interpreted by our mishnah as giving him advice as to whether he should have yibbum or halitzah. The advice should be appropriate, meaning that if he is very old and she is young, or they are in some other way apparently not compatible, they court tells him that he should have halitzah and not yibbum.", + "[These sayings] were spoken in the holy tongue (Hebrew). Since the Torah says that these verses must be recited by him and by her, they must be recited in Hebrew. We will learn more about what things must be done in Hebrew and what can be done in other languages when we learn the seventh chapter of Sotah.", + "“Then his brother’s widow shall go up to him in the presence of the elders, pull the sandal off his foot and spit in his face” (verse 9) spit that the judges can see. Our mishnah interprets the words, “in the presence of the elders” to mean that the elders must be able to see the spit.", + "When Rabbi Hyrkanus was under the terebinth at Kefar Etam he dictated the reading and completed the entire section, the practice was established to complete the entire section. The judges would dictate to the yevamah what to say up until this verse. However, at first they would not dictate verse 10. However, at a later time period, Rabbi Hyrkanus began to dictate the final verse and that became the established practice." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction: Chapter thirteen discusses the marriage of a minor, her right to refuse and thereby annul the marriage when she reaches majority age and the implications that this has on the laws of yibbum.
According to the rabbinic understanding of the Torah, a father can marry off his daughter when she is a minor and cause her to be fully married (deoraita). This marriage can only be severed by death or divorce. If the father dies, the daughter cannot be fully married until she reaches majority age. The rabbis, however, gave the girl’s mother and brother the ability to marry her off while still a minor. The status of such a marriage is rabbinic (derabanan). Since this is a lesser form of marriage, she may “refuse” the marriage and any point until she is no longer a minor. Such a refusal is called “meun”. If she does the marriage is annulled and she does not even require a get.
Our mishnah contains five debates between Beth Shammai and Beth Hillel concerning this right of refusal.", + "Beth Shammai says: Only those who are betrothed may exercise the right of refusal; But Beth hillel says: Both those who are betrothed and those who are married. According to Beth Shammai only those who are betrothed are allowed to make a declaration of refusal and thereby leave their husbands without a get. Beth Hillel says even if she was married she may do so. According to the Talmud, Beth Shammai allows only the betrothed woman to refuse because if the married woman also was able to refuse, men would not want to spend the money involved in marrying a minor, lest she later refuse the marriage.", + "Beth Shammai says: [A declaration of refusal may be made] against a husband but not against a yavam; But Beth Hillel says: Either against a husband or against a yavam. If the minor girl was married off by her mother or brother and then her husband died, according to Beth Shammai she cannot make a declaration against her yavam. Rather she must wait until she reaches majority age and then request halitzah. However, according to Beth Hillel she may make such a declaration against the yavam as well. However, even though she has annulled her marriage to the yavam’s brother, she cannot at a later point marry the yavam, since she was at one point his brother’s wife.", + "Beth Shammai says: [The declaration] must be made in his presence, But Beth Hillel says: Either in his presence or not in his presence. According to Beth Shammai, she must make the declaration of refusal in front of him. According to Beth Hillel, this is not necessary.", + "Beth Shammai says: [The declaration must be made] before the court, But Beth Hillel says: Either before the court or not before the court. According to Beth Shammai, she must make the declaration of refusal in front of a court. According to Beth Hillel, this is not necessary.", + "Beth Hillel said to Beth Shammai: [A girl] may exercise the right of refusal while she is a minor even four or five times. Beth Shammai said to them: “The daughters of Israel are not ownerless property! Rather, either she makes a declaration of refusal and then waits until she is of age, or she makes a declaration of refusal and marries again [immediately]. According to Beth Hillel, as long as she is still a minor, she may be married off as many times as her brothers and mother wish and she may later refuse as many marriages as they offer. Beth Shammai offers a moral objection to this possibility, for through it a girl could be betrothed (but according to Beth Shammai not to several men without ever having received a get. Rather she either waits until she is an adult or makes a declaration of refusal and then marries immediately, at which point she could no longer refuse, according to Beth Shammai. Note that this last section is phrased differently than the previous sections. According to some mishnaic commentators, since Beth Shammai explains their position the halakhah is according to them in this section. In all of the other sections, the halakhah follows Beth Hillel, as it usually does." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah provides three statements as to which type of minor girl can be married off by her brother or mother and before reaching majority age make a declaration of refusal.", + "Which minor must make the declaration of refusal?
Any whose mother or brothers have given her in marriage with her consent. If they gave her in marriage without her consent she need not make any declaration of refusal. When the mother or brothers marry off the girl she must consent to the marriage. If she does, she may later on make a declaration of refusal and thereby annul the marriage. However, if she does not consent, she need not even make a declaration of refusal.", + "Rabbi Hanina ben Antigonus says: Any child who is unable to take care of her token of betrothal need not make any declaration of refusal. R. Hanina adds in another criterion for which type of girl must make a declaration of refusal in order to leave her marriage. If she was married off by her mother or brother at an age when she couldn’t even take care of her token of betrothal (either money or a document), then the marriage is totally invalid. According to the Rambam, a girl under six by definition cannot take care of her token of betrothal and a girl over ten can. Girls between six and ten are checked to see if they have this capability. If they do not, then they do not need to perform meun.", + "Rabbi Eliezer says: The act of a minor has no validity at all, rather [she is to be regarded] as one seduced. The daughter of an Israelite [who was married] to a priest may not eat terumah, and the daughter of a priest [who was married] to an Israelite may eat terumah. According to R. Eliezer, even if her brother or mother married her off, she is not considered fully married, rather she has the status of one who has been seduced. This is a way of stating that there is no validity to the marriage and therefore if she is the daughter of an Israelite “married” to a priest, she does not gain the right to eat terumah and if she is the daughter of a priest “married” to an Israelite she does not lose the right to eat terumah. According to the Talmud, although she is not at all married to him, R. Eliezer still requires her to make a declaration of meun to leave the marriage." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is a continuation of the previous mishnah.", + "Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob says: In the case of any hindrance that was due to the husband, she is considered to be his wife; But in the case of any hindrance that was not due to the husband she is not considered to be his wife. There are two explanations of this mishnah in the Babylonian Talmud and of what “a hindrance” is. According to one explanation, if while married to this man another man offers to marry her and she refuses that marriage because she prefers her current husband, then she is considered to be his wife. This is because she has expressed her opinion that she wishes to stay in the marriage, and it is unlikely that she will later make a declaration of refusal. In such a case if she was the daughter of an Israelite married to a priest, she may eat terumah, and if she was the daughter of a priest married to an Israelite she loses her right to eat terumah. However, if the hindrance was caused by another factor, for instance the new man was not right for her, then she has not expressed a definite desire to stay with her husband and therefore she is not considered his wife. According to the second explanation, if her husband gave her a get before she made a declaration of refusal, she is considered to have been his wife. The “hindrance” is the get. The consequences is that he is subsequently forbidden to marry her relatives and she his. However, if she makes a declaration of refusal, this is considered a hindrance from her. She is not considered his wife and therefore may marry his relatives, as we will learn in the upcoming mishnah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with various consequences of her refusing the marriage, especially on her subsequent marriages. Note that the mishnah does not talk about situations that are likely to arise. Rather by suggesting concrete cases, the mishnah teaches more abstract legal principles.", + "If a minor made a declaration of refusal against a man, he is permitted [to marry] her relatives and she is permitted to [marry] his relatives, and he does not disqualify her from[marrying] a priest. The declaration of refusal annuls the marriage, making it as if it never happened. Therefore, neither he nor she is subsequently forbidden to marry each other’s relatives, as would be the case with divorce. Since she is not a divorcee, she may later marry a priest.", + "If he gave her a get, he is forbidden to [marry] her relatives and she is forbidden to [marry] his relatives, and he also disqualifies her from [marrying] a priest. However, if he gave her a get, her status is that of a divorcee and the marriage was not annulled. Neither can marry each other’s relatives and she may not marry a priest. Although the marriage was only of rabbinic status, it is strong enough to create these prohibitions.", + "If he gave her a get and remarried her and then she a made a declaration of refusal against him, and then she was married to another man and became a widow or was divorced, she is permitted to return to him. If he gives her a get, and then remarries her (this is permitted if she has not yet married someone else) and then she makes a declaration of refusal and then marries someone else, if this last person divorces her or dies, she may still return to her first husband. Although generally a man may not remarry his divorcee if she has been married in the interim (see Deuteronomy 24:1-4), in this case the declaration of refusal, which came after the divorce, cancels the get and places her in the category of one who has refused her husband and takes her out of the category of a divorcee.", + "If she made a declaration of refusal against him and then he remarried her, and then he gave her a get and then she was married to another man and became a widow or was divorced, she is forbidden to return to him. However, in the opposite case, where she first makes a declaration of refusal, then returns to her husband and then is divorced, remarries, and is then divorced or widowed, she may not return to her first husband. Since the divorce was after the refusal, she is in the category of a divorcee.", + "This is the general rule: if divorce followed meun she is forbidden to return to him, and if meun followed divorce she is permitted to return to him. This general sums up what was learned in the previous two sections." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to deal with the remarriage of a girl who has made a declaration of refusal.", + "If a minor made a declaration of refusal against a man, and then she was married to another man who divorced her, and afterwards to another man against whom she made a declaration of refusal, and then to another man who divorced her: she is forbidden to return to any man from whom she was separated by a get, but is permitted to return to any man from whom she was separated by her declaration of refusal. In the scenario in this mishnah, a minor is married to a series of men, while she is still a minor. Against the first she makes a declaration of refusal, by the second she is divorced, against the third she makes another declaration of refusal and by the fourth she is divorced. She may now remarry the first or third since their marriage ended by declaration of refusal, and although she was remarried in the interim, since the original marriage ended with refusal it is as if it never existed. She cannot remarry the second and fourth husbands, by whom she was divorced, because she was married in the interim. Although the subsequent marriage was annulled and therefore should be treated as if it never happened, our mishnah teaches that it is still sufficient to prevent her from remarrying." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses whether or not a woman who has been divorced and remarried by the same man can have yibbum, should her husband die without children.", + "If a man divorced his wife and remarried her, she is permitted to marry the yavam; Rabbi Elazar forbids. When a man divorces his wife, she becomes forbidden to his brother under the category of “his brother’s divorcee”. In the case in our mishnah, a man divorces his wife, then remarries her and then dies without children, making her liable for yibbum. Although when she was divorced she was forbidden to her husband’s brother, since when her husband died she was married to him, she is in the category of “his dead brother’s wife” and if he had no children, she is liable for yibbum. Rabbi Elazar forbids this woman from having yibbum.", + "Similarly, if a man divorced an orphan and remarried her, she is permitted to marry the yavam; Rabbi Elazar forbids. The same rules apply with regard to a girl whose father had died (she is called an orphan even though her mother is alive) and was married off by her mother or brother, and then was divorced and remarried. Since at the time of death she was married to the yavam’s brother, she is permitted to have yibbum with him. Again Rabbi Elazar forbids this.", + "If a minor was given in marriage by her father and was divorced she is like an orphan in her father’s lifetime and then her husband remarried her, all agree that she is forbidden to marry the yavam. This section deals with a minor married off by her father. When she is divorced she is legally considered to be an “orphan in her father’s life”. This is because her father no longer has the ability to marry her off. Once she is married she never returns to her father’s domain. When her original husband remarries her while she is a minor, this marriage is only of “rabbinic” status because a minor cannot fully contract marriage without her father. In contrast her divorce was a regular “Toraitic” divorce because a minor can be fully divorced. Since the divorce was biblically valid and the remarriage only rabbinically valid, she is still “biblically” considered the yavam’s brother’s divorcee and all of the sages agree that she is forbidden to the yavam." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses situations where a woman becomes liable for yibbum or halitzah to her sister’s husband. Generally in such a case the woman is completely exempt. However, these cases are slightly different because at least on of the marriages is only of rabbinic status.", + "If two brothers were married to two sisters who were minors and orphans, and the husband of one of them died, [the widow] is free since she is the [the yavam’s] wife’s sister. The marriage of these two brothers to these two sisters is of rabbinic status, since they were married off by their brothers or mother. We might have thought that since this was so, the sister whose husband died needs halitzah from the yavam, even though the yavam is married to her sister (and hence yibbum is forbidden). This is because the ties created by the necessity of halitzah are biblical whereas the marriage is only rabbinic. The mishnah teaches that just as in a case of regular marriage where the widow is exempt from yibbum and halitzah, so too here she is exempt.", + "Similarly in the case of two deaf-mute [sisters]. The marriage of a girl deaf-mute is also only of rabbinic status, since she was legally considered by the rabbis to be lacking the required intelligence to contract marriage. This case is similar to the previous case because the marriage of both women is only of rabbinic status.", + "[If the two brothers were married to two sisters one of whom was] of age and [the other] a minor, if the husband of the minor died, the minor is free since she is the [the yavam’s] wife’s sister. In this case two brothers were married to two sisters, one of whom was of majority age and hence her marriage was of biblical status (deoraita) and one of whom was a minor, whose marriage was only of rabbinic status (derabbanan). If the husband of the minor died, she certainly does not need yibbum or halitzah from the other husband, because he is married to her sister. Since the marriage to the older sister is deoraita, there is no question about this case.", + "If the husband of the elder sister died: Rabbi Eliezer says the minor is to be instructed to make a declaration of refusal against him. Rabban Gamaliel says: If she made a declaration of refusal, then she did so; but if [she did] not, let her wait until she is of age and then she will be free since she is the [the yavam’s] wife's sister. Rabbi Joshua says: Woe to him because of his wife and woe to him because of his brother’s wife! He must allow his wife to go by [giving her] a get, and [he must let go] his brother’s wife through halitzah. The more difficult and controversial case is if the elder sister’s husband dies. She now needs yibbum or halitzah from a deoraita marriage, but her sister is already married, at least rabbinically to the yavam. If the yavam were to have halitzah with the older sister, the younger sister to whom he is married would become forbidden to him as his halutzah’s sister. Rabbi Eliezer says that in order to get out of this problematic situation, the court instructs the younger sister to make a declaration of refusal, thereby annulling the marriage and making it possible for the elder sister to have yibbum. According to Rabbi Eliezer, the ties that the older sister has to the yavam (the younger sister’s husband) makes the younger sister forbidden to her husband. Therefore the only solution is for the younger sister to make a declaration of refusal. Rabban Gamaliel disagrees with Rabbi Eliezer and does not hold that the ties to the older sister make the younger sister forbidden. Therefore, the younger sister can either make a declaration of refusal immediately, or she may remain with her husband and the older sister can wait until the younger sister reaches majority age at which time she, the older sister, becomes exempt from yibbum and halitzah because her yavam is biblically married to her sister. Rabbi Joshua says that in this case the husband/yavam will lose both his wife and his yevamah. Rabbi Joshua agrees with Rabbi Eliezer that his minor wife is now forbidden to him due to the biblical ties that he has with her sister. However, Rabbi Joshua disagrees with Rabbi Eliezer’s strategy of teaching her to make a declaration of refusal. This is because Rabbi Joshua holds that declarations of refusal are not desirable and that one should distance himself from them as much as possible. The yavam cannot have yibbum with the yevamah since she is now the sister of his divorcee. Therefore he must have halitzah with her. In this way, he loses both women. Question for Further Thought:  What is the difference between the first case and the last case? Why in one does she not require halitzah but in the other she might?" + ], + [ + "Introduction\nUsually when two women are married to a man and he dies without children, when one of the brothers performs yibbum or halitzah with one of the widows, the other is automatically exempt. Yibbum or halitzah are not performed for each wife. Our mishnah discusses situations in which at least one of the marriage was only “derabbanan” either because she was a minor or a deaf-mute. The general rule in such cases is that yibbum or halitzah with a wife whose marriage was only derabbanan does not exempt a wife whose marriage was deoraita. However, yibbum or halitzah with a wife whose marriage is deoraita does exempt a wife whose marriage was derabbanan. Furthermore, yibbum or halitzah with a wife whose marriage was derabbanan exempts another wife whose marriage was derabbanan, as long as both marriages were of the exact same status.", + "If a man who was married to two minors orphans died, intercourse or halitzah with one of them exempts her rival. In this section both marriages were “derabbanan”; therefore intercourse (yibbum) or halitzah by the yavam with one of the widows exempts the other one. Note that some commentators hold that the minor can perform halitzah only when she reaches majority age. Others hold that she may even do so as a minor (see above 12:4).", + "And the same is true with regard to two deaf women. Again both marriages are derabbanan therefore yibbum with one wife exempts the other. Note that in this case yibbum is the only option because as we learned in 12:4, a deaf-mute woman cannot perform halitzah.", + "[If a man was married to] a minor and to a deaf woman [and then died], intercourse with one of them does not exempt her rival. In this case, both marriages were derabbanan, but one was with a deaf-mute and one was with a minor. Since we don’t know who is “more” married, both require halitzah or yibbum. The minor may be “more” married because her marriage will be completed upon reaching majority age. On the other hand the deaf-mute may be more married because she is more capable of having intercourse.", + "If one was of sound senses and one was deaf, intercourse with the woman of sound senses exempts the deaf woman, but intercourse with the deaf woman does not exempt the woman of sound senses. In this case, one wife was of sound senses she was not a deaf-mute or insane and the other wife was a deaf-mute. Since the marriage with the former was of deoraita status, yibbum or halitzah with her exempts the latter. However, since the latter’s marriage was of derabbanan status, yibbum with her does not exempt the former.", + "If one was of age and the other a minor, intercourse with the one of age exempts the minor, but intercourse with the minor does not exempt the one of age. This section teaches the same rule as in the previous section; it just uses the example of a minor and a girl of majority age." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with a case where a man has intercourse with both of his brother’s widows, or he has intercourse with one and his brother has intercourse with the other.", + "If a man who was married to two orphans who were minors died, and the yavam had intercourse with one, and then he also had intercourse with the other, or his [the yavam’s] brother had intercourse with the other, he has not thereby disqualified the first [for him]; In this case the man had intercourse with both minor wives, or he had intercourse with one and his brother had intercourse with the other. In any case, the first minor widow is still permitted to the first yavam. This is because there is a doubt whether or not yibbum is truly effective in “acquiring” a minor as a wife. If it is effective, than the first act of yibbum makes her fully his wife, and the second act of intercourse is illicit but does not effect the first wife’s status. If it is ineffective, then he didn’t need to have yibbum with either minor widow, because they were not biblically married to his brother. In either case, he may remain married to the first one. He cannot stay with the second lest intercourse is effective for acquiring a minor and he has already acquired her rival wife.", + "And the same is true with regard to two deaf women. The same rule is true where both wives were deaf-mutes.", + "[If one was] a minor and the other deaf, and the yavam had intercourse with the minor and then he had intercourse with the deaf widow, or a brother of his had intercourse with the deaf widow, he has not disqualified the minor [for him]. In this case one widow was a deaf-mute and the other a minor. If the yavam had relations first with the minor and then with the deaf-mute, or the yavam’s brother had relations with the deaf-mute, the minor may remain married to the first yavam. This is for the same reasons that we explained above: if yibbum is effective in acquiring the minor, then she is married to the yavam and the intercourse with the deaf-mute wife is licentious, but does not effect the first wife’s status. If it is ineffective, then she was never liable for yibbum with him, because she was not married to his brother.", + "If the yavam had intercourse with the deaf widow and then he also had intercourse with the minor, or a brother of his had intercourse with the minor, he has disqualified the deaf widow [for him]. In this case, the yavam first has relations with the deaf-mute and then he or his brother has relations with the minor widow. In this case the deaf-mute wife becomes forbidden to him. This is because the “acquisition” of the deaf-mute is certainly valid, but is not a complete “acquisition”. The “acquisition” of the minor is doubtful, as we explained above, but if it does acquire it does so fully. If the acquisition of the minor was fully valid, then it disqualifies the deaf-mute, whose acquisition was only partially valid." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is a continuation of yesterday’s mishnah.", + "[If one was] of sound senses and the other deaf, and the yavam had intercourse with the woman of sound senses and then he also had intercourse with the deaf woman, or a brother of his had intercourse with the deaf woman, he does not disqualify the former [for him]. When the yavam has intercourse with the woman of sound senses, he fully acquires her as his wife. His subsequent act of intercourse, or his brother’s subsequent act of intercourse with her rival wife is licentious but does not effect the status of the first woman.", + "If the yavam had intercourse with the deaf woman, and then he also had intercourse with the woman of sound senses, or a brother of his had intercourse with the woman of sound senses, he disqualifies the deaf woman [for him]. As we learned yesterday, sexual intercourse does not effect a full acquisition of a deaf woman, but rather a partial acquisition. Therefore, there is the possibility of acquiring the second woman, and thereby creating a situation where both rival wives are somewhat “acquired” to him. Since it is forbidden to be with both, he must separate from both of them." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues the subject discussed in the previous two mishnayoth.", + "[If one was] of age and the other a minor, and the yavam had intercourse with the one who was of age, and then he had intercourse with the minor, or a brother of his had intercourse with the minor, he does not disqualify the elder for him. In this case one of the widows was of majority age and one was a minor. If the yavam has intercourse (yibbum) with the one who is of age she is fully acquired to him as a wife. If he or his brother subsequently have intercourse with the other widow the act is forbidden (for she was his brother’s wife) but does not effect the status of the one who already had yibbum.", + "If the yavam had intercourse with the minor, and then he also had intercourse with the one who was of age, or a brother of his had intercourse with the one who was of age, he disqualifies the minor [for him]. If the yavam first had intercourse with the minor, there is a doubt whether or not she is acquired to him. If he then has intercourse with the one who is of majority age, that act would be an act of yibbum if the act of intercourse with the minor did not acquire her. Since the older widow may be his wife through yibbum (or his brother’s wife) he is forbidden to remain married to the minor widow. He also cannot be with the older widow, lest the minor was successfully acquired through yibbum.", + "Rabbi Elazar says: the minor is to be instructed to make a declaration of refusal. Rabbi Elazar states that in such a case we should instruct the younger widow to make a declaration of refusal, thereby annulling the marriage. This would allow yibbum with the widow of majority age." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first half of this mishnah discusses the case of a minor yavam (up until now the mishnah has concentrated mostly on the minor yevamah).\nThe second half of the mishnah discusses the situation of a woman who claims that her yavam has not had yibbum with her and she wants halitzah.", + "If a yavam who was a minor had intercourse with a yevamah who was a minor, they should be brought up together. If a minor yavam who is legally capable of having sexual intercourse (over nine years old) has intercourse with a minor yevamah, he cannot divorce her because he cannot give a get until he reaches majority age. Therefore, they must remain together until they reach majority age, at which point they can decide whether to remain married or separate through divorce.", + "If he had intercourse with a yevamah who was of age, she should bring him up until he is of age. So too if he has intercourse with a yevamah who is of majority age; she must wait with him until he is of majority age.", + "If a yevamah declared within thirty days [after yibbum], “he has not had intercourse with me”, they force him to perform halitzah; The second part of the mishnah deals with a case where the yevamah claims that the yavam did not have intercourse with her, and she wants to have halitzah. If she makes this claim within thirty days, she is believed, and the court forces the husband to perform halitzah. This is because we assume that for thirty days the yavam may actually not have had yibbum with her.", + "[If her declaration was made] after thirty days, they request that he perform halitzah. If she makes this declaration after thirty days, she is no longer automatically believed, for there is an assumption that the yavam would not have waited for more than thirty days to have yibbum. In this case, all the court can do is request that he perform halitzah for her.", + "If he admits [that he did not have intercourse with her], they force him to perform halitzah. If he admits that he did not have yibbum with her, he is forced to have halitzah, even after twelve months. He has a responsibility to her and cannot just leave her hanging, legally bound to him and without the possibility of marrying another." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses a woman who made a vow not to receive any benefit from her yavam (her brother-in-law). Since sexual intercourse is a benefit, for it is pleasurable, she cannot have yibbum. The question is, is the yavam forced by the courtto perform halitzah for her, or is he merely requested to do so.", + "If a woman vowed to have no benefit from her yavam:
If the vow was made during the husband’s lifetime they force him to perform halitzah, If the woman made the vow while her husband was still alive, and her brother-in-law was not yet her yavam, and then her husband dies, the court forces the yavam to perform halitzah. This is because her vow was not made with the intention of subverting yibbum. She may have made her vow just because she really didn’t like her brother-in-law or for any other reason.", + "[If her vow was made] after the death of her husband, they request of him to perform halitzah. If she made the vow after her husband died, it was obviously made in attempt to circumvent yibbum. While the vow is still valid, and the yavam may not have yibbum with her, she is not automatically granted halitzah. Rather the court requests of the yavam to perform halitzah, but does not force him to do so.", + "If this was her intention, [even if her vow was made] during the lifetime of her husband, they request of him to perform halitzah. Similarly, if it was clear that she made the vow only to avoid yibbum, even if she made the vow when her husband was alive, the yavam is not forced to perform halitzah. She cannot use this vow as a means to circumvent yibbum. Her intention would have been clear if, for instance, she said that she was doing so in order to avoid yibbum." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis chapter is concerned with divorce or yibbum involving a deaf man and/or woman. As we have mentioned previously, according to the rabbis deaf-mutes lack “da’at”, which I translate as “awareness” and hence they cannot truly contract marriage. The marriage which they do contract is considered “derabbanan”, that is of rabbinic origin. I should note that although halakhically speaking deaf-mutes were considered to lack “da’at”, in reality the rabbis often recognize that deaf-mutes do not necessarily lack intelligence. Furthermore, as I stated in other opportunities, now that complex sign-language has been invented, deaf-mutes can be halakhically regarded as fully intelligent human beings.", + "If a deaf man married a woman of sound senses or a man of sound senses married a deaf woman he may, if he wishes, divorce her, and he may, if he wishes retain her; just as he marries by gestures so he divorces her by gestures. A deaf man can divorce a woman of sound senses by making gestures that make it clear that he wants to divorce her. Just as he can marry a woman by making gestures which make his intent clear, so too he can divorce her. A man of sound senses can divorce a deaf woman, even though she may not understand that she is being divorced. This is because a woman can be divorced against her will, as we shall see in section three below.", + "If a man of sound senses married a woman of sound senses and she became deaf, he may, if he wishes, divorce her; and he may, if he wishes, retain her. If she became insane he may not divorce her. If he became deaf or insane, he may never divorce her. Whereas in section one the marriage was only of rabbinic status (because one party was deaf at the time of marriage), in this section the marriage is of deoraita status because both parties were of sound senses at the time of marriage. Hence the law is different in this case. If she becomes deaf he may still divorce her, because she may be divorced against her will. However, if she becomes insane, he may not divorce her. This is a special measure of protection offered the wife so that she will still have a husband and be less subject to mistreatment by others. If the husband becomes deaf or insane he may not divorce her. Since the original marriage was of a higher status, he can no longer end the marriage when he lacks “da’at”.", + "Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri says: Why may a woman who became deaf be divorced while a man who became deaf may not divorce [his wife]? They answered him: a man who divorces is not like a woman who is divorced, for while a woman may be divorced with her consent and without her consent, a man can divorce only with his consent. In this section, through Rabbi Yochanan be Nuri’s question and the Sages answer, the discrimination between the divorce of a deaf woman and the divorce of a deaf man is explained. Since a woman can be divorced without her consent, she can still be divorced when she is legally incapable of consenting (when deaf or insane). Her consent is irrelevant. In contrast, a man must express his will to divorce a woman and hence if he is legally incapable of expressing his will, he may not divorce. I should note that this is one of the greatest examples of discrimination in Jewish law, but it was mostly corrected in the Middle Ages by Rabbenu Gershom who made a decree that a woman cannot be divorced against her will. Until this day, this is still the law." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah contains a debate about which type of deaf woman may be divorced.", + "Rabbi Nehunia ben Gudgada testified concerning a deaf-mute whose father had given her in marriage, that she could be sent away with a bill of divorcement; They said to him: the other also is similar to her. According to Rabbi Nehunia ben Gudgada a deaf minor who was married off by her father can be divorced against her will. In this case, although the marriage is deoraita (because it was arranged by the father), since a woman can be divorced against her will, she can still be divorced when she cannot express her will. The rabbis take this halakhah one step further, and state that even a woman who married herself off when of sound senses, can still be divorced should she go deaf. Note that we learned this law in the previous mishnah. The reason that it is restated is that it is a response to Rabbi Nehunian ben Gudgada’s testimony, which was also brought in Eduyoth 7:9." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah, and the rest of the chapter, deals with various combinations of marriages between deaf people and people of sound senses, and the possibility of yibbum, halitzah and divorce.", + "If two deaf brothers were married to two deaf sisters, or to two sisters who were of sound senses, or to two sisters one of whom was deaf and the other was of sound senses; And so also if two deaf sisters were married to two brothers who were of sound senses, or to two deaf brothers, or to two brothers one of whom was deaf and the other of sound senses: Behold these [women] are exempt from halitzah and from yibbum. In all of the cases in this section, there are two marriages between two brothers and two sisters, both of which are between a deaf person and another deaf person or a deaf person and a person of sound senses. In section one both brothers are deaf and in section two both sisters are deaf. In such a case the status of both marriages is rabbbinic (derabbanan). When one brother dies, his wife of derabbanan status becomes liable for yibbum with the other brother, who is married to her sister. Since she cannot marry him because he is married to her sister, she is exempt from both yibbum and halitzah. The key to understanding this mishnah is that both marriages are of equal status. The yavam’s obligation to have yibbum with her is only derabbanan as is his own marriage and therefore the woman is exempt.", + "If [the women] were strangers they must marry them, and if they wish to divorce them, they may do so. If the women were not related to each other, then there is no problem with yibbum. However, he may not perform halitzah since deaf men and deaf women cannot perform halitzah (see above 12:4). If he wishes, he may marry her and then divorce her. This is possible in this case because the original marriage of the yevamah to her husband was also only derabbanan. Therefore divorce through gestures is possible." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is similar to yesterday’s mishnah, the only difference being that in this case, one marriage is of deoraita status, whereas yesterday both were derabbanan.", + "If two brothers, one of whom was deaf and the other of sound senses, were married to two sisters who were of sound senses, and the deaf brother, the husband of the sister who was of sound senses, died, what should the brother of sound senses, the husband of the sister of sound senses, do? [Nothing, since she] is exempt, because she is his wife’s sister. In this case, when the deaf brother, who was the husband of the sister of sound senses, dies, his wife becomes liable for yibbum or halitzah with the husband of sound senses, who is married to her sister, who is also of sound senses. In this case the deaf widow is not obligated for yibbum or halitzah since her sister is married to the yavam, and that marriage is of deoraita status. As we have learned before, a woman who becomes liable for yibbum with someone prohibited to her is exempt from yibbum.", + "If the brother of sound senses, the husband of [the sister who was] of sound senses, died, what should the deaf brother, the husband of [the sister who was] of sound senses, do? He must release his wife with a get, while his brother’s wife is forbidden forever [to marry again]. This case is opposite. Here the husband of sound senses, married to the woman of sound senses dies, thereby making her liable for yibbum or halitzah with the deaf husband, married to her deaf sister. The deaf husband’s wife is now the sister of a woman with whom he is deoraita liable to have yibbum, but his own marriage is only of derabbanan status. Since the connection with his yevamah is of deoraita status, it is strong enough to make his own wife forbidden to him (one cannot marry the wife of his shomeret yavam, a woman with whom is liable to have yibbum). He must therefore divorce his deaf wife. His yevamah can never remarry because she cannot have yibbum or halitzah. She cannot have halitzah because he is deaf. He cannot have yibbum with her because he was derabbanan married to her sister and a man may not marry his wife’s sister, even after divorce." + ], + [ + "If two brothers of sound senses were married to two sisters one of whom was deaf and the other of sound senses, and the brother of sound senses, the husband of the deaf sister, died, what should the brother of sound senses, the husband of the sister who was of sound senses, do? [Nothing, since she is] exempt because she is his wife’s sister. In this scenario two brothers of sound senses are married to two sisters, one of whom is deaf. This means that one of the marriages is deoraita and the other derabbanan. If the brother married to the deaf sister dies, the deaf sister becomes liable for yibbum or halitzah with the other brother. Since this is forbidden because he is deoraita married to her sister, she is totally exempt.", + "If the brother of sound senses, the husband of the sister who was of sound senses, died, what should the brother of sound senses, the husband of the deaf sister, do? He must release his wife with a get and his brother’s wife by halitzah. In this case, the brother married to the sister of sound senses dies. This marriage was deoraita and therefore her ties to the yavam are of a deoraita status. The yavam is only derabbanan married to her sister, since she is deaf. Therefore, the yevamah is not exempt from yibbum or halitzah. Nevertheless the yavam cannot have yibbum with her because he is married to her sister. The only solution is for him to divorce his wife, who is forbidden to him as the sister of a woman tied to him through yibbum. Then he must have halitzah with the other sister. He cannot have yibbum because he was married to her sister, even though the marriage was only derabbanan." + ], + [ + "If two brothers, one of whom was deaf and the other of sound senses, were married to two sisters, one of whom was deaf and the other of sound senses, and the deaf brother, the husband of the deaf sister, died, what should the brother who was of sound senses, the husband of the sister who was of sound senses, do? [Nothing, since she is] exempt because she is his wife’s sister. In this case the marriage between the deaf brother and the deaf sister is derabbanan and the marriage between the brother of sound senses and the sister of sound senses is deoraita. If the deaf brother dies, the deaf sister becomes potentially liable for yibbum with the brother of sound senses. However, she is exempt because the brother of sound senses is already married to her sister, and their marriage is deoraita.", + "If the brother of sound senses, the husband of the sister who was of sound senses, died, what should the deaf brother, the husband of the deaf sister, do? He must release his wife with a get, while his brother’s wife is forever forbidden [to marry again]. In this case the brother of sound senses dies, and the sister of sound senses becomes liable for yibbum with the deaf brother. Even though she is his wife’s sister, she is not exempt because their marriage is only derabbanan. The deaf sister becomes forbidden to her deaf husband because she is the sister of a woman with whom he is liable to have yibbum. Furthermore, he must divorce her. The deaf brother cannot perform halitzah for the yevamah, because he is deaf. He cannot have yibbum with her because she is the sister of his former wife. Therefore she cannot remarry ever." + ], + [ + "If two brothers, one of whom was deaf and the other of sound senses, were married to two strangers who were of sound senses, and the deaf brother, the husband of the woman who was of sound senses, died, what should the brother of sound senses, the husband of the woman of sound senses, do? He either performs halitzah or yibbum. In this case the two brothers are married to two women who are not sisters. Therefore there is no problem of one being married to the sister of the yevamah. In the first section, the deaf brother dies. In such a case there is no problem, and the yavam can have halitzah or yibbum with the deaf brother’s widow, as is the case in a normal scenario.", + "If the brother of sound senses, the husband of the woman who was of sound senses, died, what should the deaf brother, the husband of the woman who was of sound senses, do? He must marry her and he may never divorce her. In this case the brother of sound senses dies, leaving his widow liable for yibbum or halitzah with the deaf brother. The deaf brother cannot have halitzah with her, because deaf people cannot perform halitzah. He may have yibbum with her, but he cannot afterwards ever divorce her. This is because his ties to her are deoraita due to her having been his yevamah. His ability to divorce is only derabbanan, and it is not strong enough to sever such a marriage." + ], + [ + "If two brothers of sound senses were married to two strangers, one of whom was of sound senses and the other deaf, and the brother of sound senses, the husband of the deaf woman died, what should the brother of sound senses, the husband of the woman of sound senses, do? He must marries her and if he wishes to divorce her he may do so. In this scenario, the brother of sound senses is married to a deaf woman and his brother, also of sound senses was married to a woman of sound senses. If the husband of the deaf woman dies, his brother must marry his widow. He cannot perform halitzah, because she is deaf. He can later divorce her, because he is of sound senses", + "If the brother of sound senses, the husband of the woman of sound senses, died, what should the brother of sound senses, the husband of the deaf woman, do? He may either perform halitzah or yibbum. If the brother of sound senses dies, his widow who is of sound senses becomes liable for yibbum or halitzah with the yavam. Since he is also of sound senses he may have yibbum or halitzah with her, as is the case in all normal scenarios." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis is the final mishnah of the chapter and it concludes the rather long series of mishnayot which we have seen throughout the entire chapter.", + "If two brothers, one of whom was deaf and the other of sound senses, were married to two strangers, one of whom was deaf and the other of sound senses, and the deaf brother, the husband of the deaf woman, died, what should the brother of sound senses, the husband of the woman of sound senses do? He must marry her, but if he wishes to divorce her he may do so. When the deaf brother, married to the deaf woman dies, she becomes liable for yibbum or halitzah with the brother of sound senses. She cannot have halitzah, because she is deaf. He must, therefore, have yibbum with her, but may afterwards divorce her, because deaf women can be divorced.", + "If the brother of sound senses, the husband of the woman of sound senses, died, what should the deaf brother, the husband of the deaf woman, do? He must marry her and he may never divorce her. If the brother of sound senses dies, his wife of sound senses becomes liable for yibbum with the deaf brother. He cannot have halitzah because he is deaf. He must therefore marry her. He cannot subsequently divorce her because his ties to her are deoraita (due to the deoraita nature of her previous marriage), whereas his ability to divorce is only derabbanan." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nChapters fifteen and sixteen deal with the acceptability of testimony concerning a woman’s husband’s death in a case where the death occurred abroad. The consequence of accepting such testimony is that she is allowed to remarry; in cases where the husband had no children she would be allowed to have yibbum with her husband’s brother.\nThe first few mishnayoth of this chapter deal with the wife’s own testimony as to her husband’s death. Generally speaking a woman’s testimony is unacceptable and a person cannot testify concerning their own matters. Nevertheless, in this case the wife’s testimony about her own husband’s death is acceptable because the rabbis did not want the woman to be unable to remarry. We should note that even in our days it is often difficult to ascertain whether someone died. This was a problem during the Shoah (the Holocaust) when nearly all witnesses to a person’s death were also dead. Recently, we witnessed this phenomenon in the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center. Verifying victim’s deaths took months and to a large degree relied on the testimony of those who saw them in the building or those who knew they should have been there that day. Imagine how much more difficult this must have been in the ancient world.", + "If a woman and her husband went to a country beyond the sea [at a time when there was] peace between him and her and [when there was also] peace in the world, and she came back and said, “My husband is dead”, she may marry again; and if she said, “My husband is dead [and he had no children]” she may contract yibbum. If at the time the couple traveled abroad there was no discord between the two of them and there were no wars being waged in the area to which they might have traveled, then she is believed to say that he died. The rabbis are suspicious that she might lie if there was discord, because by receiving permission to remarry when the husband was still alive, she would be causing herself to be prohibited to him when he returns. In such a way she could force him to divorce her. In other words, she might have a motive to lie. The reason that the rabbis are suspicious in a case where there is war, is that he might have been taken captive and she mistakenly assumed that he was dead. Therefore, if there was either discord between them or war in the world, she is not believed.", + "If there was peace between him and her, but war in the world, [or if there was] discord between him and her, but peace in the world, and she came back and said, ‘My husband is dead”, she is not believed. Rabbi Judah says: she is never believed unless she comes weeping and her garments are rent. They said to him: she may marry in either case. This section contains the opposites of those in section one. Rabbi Judah disagrees with the first opinion. He holds that unless she exhibits physical signs of mourning, she is never believed, even if there was peace between her and her husband and peace in the world. The sages respond to Rabbi Judah and state that whether or not she is crying and she shows physical signs of mourning she is believed. Such external signs would be easy to fake in any case and are therefore not material to the verity of her words." + ], + [ + "Bet Hillel says: we heard [such a tradition] only in respect of a woman who came from the harvest and [whose husband died] in the same country, and in a case similar to the one that happened.
Bet Shammai said to them: [the law is] the same whether the woman came from the harvest or from olive picking, or from grape picking, or from one country to another--the Sages spoke of the harvest only [because the incident to which they referred] occurred then.
Bet Hillel changed their view to rule in accordance with Bet Shammai.
This mishnah is a continuation of yesterday’s mishnah. It contains a debate between Bet Hillel and Bet Shammai over when a woman is believed to say that her husband died.
Section one: Bet Hillel limits the instances in which a woman is believed to say that her husband died. The only time she is believed is when she returned from working together with him at harvest time, and they were not returning from abroad but from the same country. This is similar to “the case that was” mentioned at the end of this section. The case to which the mishnah refers to is explained in the talmud as being a case where ten men went to work in a field and one was bitten by a snake and died. When the woman returned and said that her husband was dead, the court believed her and declared that women are believed when they testify that their husband had died. According to Bet Hillel, they are only believed in such a case because in such a case the husband’s death is so easily verifiable that it can be assumed that the woman would not lie.
Section two: Bet Shammai responds to Bet Hillel that although the law that a woman is believed to say that her husband died was connected to a certain case, it is not limited to that case or those like it. Rather a woman is believed to say that her husband died no matter where she returns from." + ], + [ + "Introduction In the previous mishnah Bet Hillel agreed with Bet Shammai that a woman who states that her husband died is to be believed, at least in most cases. In our mishnah, Bet Hillel states that her testimony allows her to remarry but not to receive her ketubah payment, the amount that a man owes a woman upon death or divorce. Bet Shammai holds that she also receives her ketubah payment. As in the previous mishnah, in the end Bet Hillel changes their opinion and agrees with Bet Shammai.", + "Bet Shammai says: she may marry and she receives her ketubah. Bet Hillel says: she may marry but she does not receive her ketubah. This section delineates the dispute between the two houses, as explained in the introduction above.", + "Bet Shammai said to them: you have permitted [what might be] the serious consequence of illicit intercourse, why should you not permit [the taking of her husband’s] money which is of less consequence! Bet Hillel said to them: we find that based on her testimony, the brothers may not receive their inheritance. Bet Shammai said to them: do we not learn this from her ketubah scroll wherein [her husband] writes to her “if you are married to another man, you will receive what is prescribed for you”! Bet Shammai reasons that if she was not telling the truth about her husband dying (either by intentionally lying or by having made a mistake) the consequences of her remarrying are graver than the consequences of her illegitimately taking money from her husband. Remarrying while still married is adultery, and if done with intention can be a capital offense. The monetary crime of taking her ketubah while her husband is still alive is at worst fraud, and the money can always be rightfully restored. Since the Sages allow her to remarry, despite the potential severity of the crime, they must allow her to recover her ketubah payment. Bet Hillel responds by citing a precedent. According to the accepted halakhah, a halakhah to which Bet Shammai agrees, when a woman testifies that her husband has died, his brothers do not inherit his money. This is because in monetary cases two witnesses are required. [Note: a man’s brothers inherit him if he did not have children.] Therefore, just as the brothers do not collect their inheritance, so too the woman does not collect her ketubah. Bet Shammai responds by citing the actual ketubah wording which states that if she marries another man she may collect the payment. Therefore, according to Bet Shammai, as soon as she is permitted to marry someone else, she may collect her ketubah. We should note that this is an interesting source of halakhah: the wording of the ketubah. Generally we would think that the halakhah would dictate the wording of the ketubah, but here we find the opposite. The ketubah, a secular document, becomes the source of Jewish law. This is not a common phenomenon in rabbinic literature but is found in several other places.", + "Bet Hillel changed their view to rule in accordance with Bet Shammai. Bet Hillel again changed their minds and ruled as did Bet Shammai. Therefore, even though the brothers do not receive their inheritance, the wife may collect her ketubah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah contains two mishnayoth, each dealing with a different topic. The first mishnah lists a few women who are not believed to testify that a woman’s husband has died.\nThe second mishnah discusses cases of contradictory testimony regarding the husband’s death.", + "All are believed to testify for her [concerning her husband’s death] except for her mother-in-law, the daughter of her mother-in-law, her rival wife, her sister-in-law and her husband’s daughter. Why is [the bringing of] a letter of divorce different [from testifying regarding] death?
The written document provides the proof. Although women are generally not allowed to testify in a court of law, in order to make it easier for women to remarry, women are allowed to testify that men have died. Even a woman’s own relatives can testify that her husband has died. The only exceptions are certain relatives who are not allowed to testify for fear that they will lie in order to entrap the woman in an illegal marriage, which will cause her current marriage to be terminated. These women might hate the wife for various reasons. The mother-in-law might hate her daughter-in-law because she thinks that she is not good enough for her son. The daughter of her mother-in-law might hate her because she might eventually take away her inheritance. The rival wife might hate her because they compete for the husband’s affections. Her sister-in-law might hate her, because if the husband dies without children, this wife could end up as her rival wife. The husband’s daughter might hate her because she sees this wife as trying to take her own mother’s place. Although these women are not allowed to testify that a woman has died, they are allowed to bring her get to her (we will learn this halakhah in Gittin 2:7). The mishnah asks, why are they allowed to bring the get but not allowed to testify that the husband has died. After all, both divorce and death end the marriage. The answer is that with a get, the document itself is what proves that the marriage is ended. The one who brings the document is not testifying as to the divorce, but is merely a messenger. However, testifying as to his death is actually testimony, not verifiable in another way.", + "If one witness stated, “he is dead”, and his wife married again, and another came and stated “he is not dead”, she need not leave [her new husband]. If one witness testifies that her husband died, and then she was remarried, and then another witness testifies that he did not die, she need not leave her new husband. However, if she did not marry before the second witness comes, she cannot remarry because there is now contradictory testimony.", + "If one witness said “he is dead” and two witnesses said “he is not dead”, even if she married again, she must leave him. If one witness testified that her husband died, and then she remarried, and then two testified that he is still alive, she must leave the second marriage. This is because we now have full testimony that her husband is alive and that the second marriage is illegitimate. The testimony of the one is nullified by the testimony of the two.", + "If two witnesses stated, “he is dead”, and one witness stated, “he is not dead”, even if she had not married, she may do so. If two testify that her husband is dead, she can remarry, even if one other person testifies that he is alive. Again, the testimony of the one is nullified by the testimony of the two." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to discuss contradictory testimony with regard to the husband’s death.", + "If one wife said “he is dead’ and the other wife said, “he is not dead” , the one who said, “he is dead” may marry again and she also receives her ketubah, while the one who said, “he is not dead”, may neither marry again nor does she receive her ketubah. This section and the following section deal with situations in which a man is married to more than one wife. If one wife says that he is dead and the other says he is not, the wife that says he is dead is treated like a widow, and the wife who says that he is not, is treated like she is still married to him. The reason why the first wife is allowed to remarry and collects her ketubah is that her rival wife is not allowed to testify about her, as we learned in the previous mishnah. The wife who says that he is alive, cannot obviously be allowed to remarry or collect her ketubah because she believes that he is alive.", + "If one wife said, “he is dead” and the other stated “he was killed”: Rabbi Meir says: since they contradict one another they may not marry again. Rabbi Judah and Rabbi Shimon say: since both admit that he is not alive, both may marry again. In this case, both wives agree that the husband is dead, but they disagree over whether he merely died or was killed. Rabbi Meir holds that since they contradict each other, neither may remarry. The Talmud teaches that Rabbi Meir also disagrees with the previous clause, where the wives also contradicted each other. While the previous opinion held that the wife who says that he is dead may remarry, Rabbi Meir holds that she may not. Rabbi Meir’s words are taught on this case, because here there is even a greater innovation: even though both agree that he is dead, since they disagree over the details they may not remarry. Rabbis Judah and Shimon hold that since they both agree that he is no longer alive, they may remarry.", + "If one witness says, “he is dead”, and another witness says “he is not dead’, Or if one woman says “he is dead”, and another woman says, “he is not dead’, she may not marry again. If two witnesses disagree over whether or not he is dead, she may not remarry. However, as we learned in the previous mishnah, if she remarried before the second witness said that he was alive, she need not leave the second marriage." + ], + [ + "If a woman and her husband went to a country beyond the sea, and she returned and stated, “my husband is dead”, she may be married again and she also receives her ketubah. However, her rival wife is forbidden to remarry.
If [her rival wife] was the daughter of an Israelite [who was married] to a priest, she is permitted to eat terumah, the words of Rabbi Tarfon.
Rabbi Akiva says: this is not a way that would lead her away from transgression, unless [it be enacted that] she shall be forbidden both to marry and to eat terumah.
This mishnah discusses a case where a man was married to more than one wife, and one wife claimed that he had died and the other wife was not able to know whether this was true.
In mishnah four we learned that a rival wife may not testify that a woman’s husband is dead. Therefore, in the situation in our mishnah, although one wife’s testimony is believed and she is allowed to remarry and collect her ketubah, the rival wife may not remarry. Unlike the previous mishnah, where the rival wife explicitly stated that he was not dead, in our situation, since the husband and the other wife were overseas, the wife who remained behind cannot know whether or not he is still alive.
Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva disagree over whether or not the rival wife may eat terumah after the other wife has stated that the husband is dead. This debate is only critical if she was from an Israelite family, she was married to a priest, and she had no children. In such a case, if her husband dies she is not allowed to eat terumah. According to Rabbi Tarfon, the halakhah is consistent: just as she is treated as if she is still married and not allowed to remarry, so too she may eat terumah, as if her husband was still alive.
Rabbi Akiva holds that allowing her to continue to eat terumah might lead her to transgress, because her husband might very well be dead. Rather, Rabbi Akiva is strict on both counts: she may not remarry lest her husband be alive but she may not eat terumah lest her husband is dead." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah contains three more debates between Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva, all somewhat similar to the one we learned yesterday.", + "If she stated, “my husband died first and my father-in-law died after him”, she may marry again and she also receives her ketubah, but her mother-in-law is forbidden [to remarry]. If [her mother-in-law] was the daughter of an Israelite [who was married] to a priest, she is permitted to eat terumah, the words of Rabbi Tarfon. Rabbi Akiva says: this is not a way that would lead her away from transgression, unless [it be enacted that] she shall be forbidden both to marry and to eat terumah. This section contains more or less the same debate that we learned in yesterday’s mishnah. The only innovation is that in this case, when the woman states that her father-in-law is dead, she has already stated that her own husband is dead, and therefore she is no longer her mother-in-law’s daughter-in-law. Therefore, we might have thought that in this case she is believed, and the mother-in-law may remarry. In order to prevent one from making this assumption, the debate between Rabbis Tarfon and Akiva is repeated here.", + "If a man betrothed one of five women and he does not know which of them he has betrothed, and each states, “he has betrothed me”, he gives a letter of divorce to every one of them, and he leaves one ketubah [sum] for them and withdraws, the words of Rabbi Tarfon. Rabbi Akiva says: this is not a way that would lead him away from transgression, unless he gives to each of them both a get and a ketubah. In this case, each woman claims to be married to one man, but the man admits to marrying only one of them. According to Rabbi Tarfon we treat each woman as if she might be married to him and he must give a get to each. However, since he will only admit to marrying one woman, he must pay only one ketubah sum. The sum is left in court, until it is clarified who he married. Rabbi Akiva argues that the solution to this problem needs to punish the man for having put these women into this predicament. In order to penalize him for his actions, he must pay a ketubah payment to each and every one.", + "If a man robbed one of five persons and does not know which of them he has robbed, and each one states, “he has robbed me”, he leaves the [amount of] the robbery among them and withdraws, the words of Rabbi Tarfon. Rabbi Akiva says: this is not a way that would lead them away from transgression, unless one pays [the full amount of the robbery] to every one [of the persons involved]. In this case, a man stole from one of five other people, but does not remember from whom he stole. Each person claims that he stole from him. Again, Rabbi Tarfon rules that the thief pays the sum he stole and gives it to the court until it can be clarified from whom he stole. Rabbi Akiva again wishes to punish the thief, and therefore obligates him to pay the amount stolen to each of the five. Note that in both cases Rabbi Akiva is not concerned that he is rewarding the four out of the five women or people from whom something has been stolen who are definitely lying. Perhaps this is because it is unclear (at least to us) which is lying, whereas it is clear that this person has stolen money, or betrothed a woman without bothering to remember whom he betrothed." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah deals with a situation where a woman goes abroad with a husband and a son and then returns claiming that both have died. The question is: is she liable for yibbum.", + "A woman who went with her husband to a country beyond the sea, and her son was with her, and who came back and stated, “my husband died and afterwards my son died”, is believed. If her husband died before the son died, then at the point of death she was not liable for yibbum (for her husband died at a point when he had kids). Since she went abroad under the assumption that she is not liable for yibbum, and she now returns claiming that this is still true, she is believed. This mishnah works according to a well-known principle whereby a person is believed if he does not change the status quo, but not necessarily believed if he does change it.", + "[If she stated] “my son died and afterwards my husband died”, she is not believed, but we are concerned that her words [might be true] and she must, therefore, perform halitzah but may not contract yibbum. In this case, she claims that the son died first and therefore when her husband died he had no children, leaving her liable for yibbum. Since she is changing the status quo that existed when she left, and now claiming that she is liable for yibbum, she is not entirely believed and she is not allowed to contract yibbum with her dead husband’s brother. However, since she might be telling the truth, and really be liable for yibbum, she first must perform halitzah and only then is she allowed to remarry." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to deal with a woman who returns from overseas and states that both her husband and son have died. The difference between this case and that found in the previous mishnah is that here her son was born abroad.", + "[If a woman states], “A son was given to me [while I was] in a country beyond the sea” and she also states, “my son died and afterwards my husband died”, she is believed. In this mishnah she leaves to travel abroad under the assumption that she is liable for yibbum should her husband die, because he has no children. If she comes back and states that she had a son, she has changed that status quo. However, if she says that the son died before the husband, then she reverts to the status quo of being liable for yibbum. Since she is ultimately maintaining the status quo, she is believed.", + "[If she states], “my husband died and afterwards my son died”, she is not believed, but we are concerned that her words [might be true] and she must, therefore, perform halitzah but may not contract yibbum. However, if she states that her husband died before her son died, she is changing the status quo because she is exempting herself from yibbum. Therefore, she is not believed, and she is not allowed to remarry without first having halitzah. She cannot have yibbum because she claims that her husband died before her son and therefore she is not liable for yibbum. In summary both this mishnah and yesterday’s mishnah teach that a woman is believed to retain the status quo but not to modify it. However, even though she cannot change status quo, she must have halitzah before she can remarry." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to discuss women who return from being abroad and come back and testify that their husbands and in this case brothers-in-law have died.", + "[If a woman states] “a brother-in-law was given to me [while I was] in a country beyond the sea”, and afterwards she states, “my husband died and afterwards my brother-in-law died” or “my brother-in-law died and afterwards my husband died”, she is believed. As we stated in the previous two mishnayoth, a woman is believed if she make a statement which does not change the status quo established when she left to travel abroad. If when she left she did not have a brother-in-law, and then she returns and states that her husband had a brother, but he died (in this case it doesn’t matter whether her husband died first or his brother) she is allowed to remarry without yibbum. After all, if she hadn’t stated that she had a brother-in-law, we would never have thought to make her wait until she had halitzah or yibbum to remarry.", + "If a woman and her husband and her brother-in-law went to a country beyond the sea, and she [on returning home] stated, “my husband died and afterwards my brother-in-law [died]” or “my brother-in-law [died] and afterwards my husband [died]” she is not believed; For a woman is not to be believed when she asserts “my brother-in-law is dead”, in order that she may marry again; Nor [is she believed when she states that] her sister is dead, in order that she may enter his house. In this case, the status quo when she left is that she had a brother-in-law. The mishnah teaches that a woman is never believed to state that her brother-in-law died. A woman is only believed to state that her husband died. The reason is that we assume a woman will make sure her husband is dead before she remarries. There is an assumption that she will not lie. Furthermore, if she was lying and he returns, the consequences for her are serious. However, there is no such assumption that a woman will not lie concerning her brother-in-law. She is also not believed to state that her sister died, so that she could marry her sister’s husband. Since even if her sister was alive, she would not cause serious consequences to herself by having relations with her sister’s husband, she might lie. We can see here a general pattern emerging: a person is less likely to lie if there are serious consequences awaiting him/her if he does lie. Therefore, in these types of situations, s/he is believed.", + "A man also is not believed when he states “my brother is dead”, so that he may have yibbum with his wife, nor [when he states that] his wife is dead, in order that he may marry her sister. Finally, a man is not believed to state that his brother has died, so that he might marry his brother’s wife, for the same reason we wrote above. Since there are no serious consequences for him if he is lying (and only serious consequences for her) he is not deemed trustworthy. So too a man is not believed to state that his wife has died in order to marry her sister for even if he was lying there are no serious consequences for him" + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction This mishnah deals with a woman whose husband died abroad and she is not sure whether or not she is obligated to have yibbum with his brother.", + "A woman whose husband and rival wife went to a country beyond the sea, and to whom people came and said, “your husband is dead”, must neither marry nor contract yibbum until she has ascertained whether her rival wife is pregnant. In this case, the husband and a rival wife went abroad, and at that time the husband had no children. Although the wife who remained behind is certain that her husband is dead, she does not know whether she is liable for yibbum, because she doesn’t know if her rival wife had children while abroad. Therefore she cannot remarry.", + "If she had a mother-in-law she need not be concerned [she had another son]. But if [the mother-in-law] departed while pregnant she must be concerned [that another son was born.
Rabbi Joshua says: she need not be concerned. If the husband traveled abroad and at that time he had no brothers, his wife need not be concerned lest her mother-in-law gave birth to a child before her husband died. Perhaps this is because it is uncommon for a woman to give birth to another child after her older child is already married. Furthermore, even if the mother-in-law gave birth, only a male child will make the wife liable for yibbum. This distinguishes this case from the case in section where a child of other sex will exempt the wife from yibbum, and therefore we are concerned lest she be exempt. If, however, the mother-in-law was pregnant when she traveled, the daughter must be concerned, lest she gave birth to a male child. The wife must wait until she is certain that her mother-in-law did not have a boy. Rabbi Judah holds that in this case as well, the wife need not be concerned and may remarry immediately. This is because there are “two doubts”. The mother-in-law may have miscarried (as older women often do), and even if she gave birth to a viable child, the child might be female. In cases of “two doubts”, the halakhah is generally more lenient." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with a situation in which, while it may be assumed that a husband is dead, it cannot be assumed that his brother, the yavam is dead.\nWe should remind ourselves of two rules learned in the previous chapter: 1) a woman is believed when she says, “My husband is dead”; 2) a sister-in-law is not believed when she says, “Your husband is dead.”", + "Two sisters-in-law, one says, “My husband is dead”, and the other also says, “My husband is dead”, this one is forbidden on account of the husband of this one, and this one is forbidden on account of the husband of this one. Although in this case we believe each sister-in-law when she states that her own husband is dead, neither sister-in-law is free to remarry lest the yavam, her brother-in-law is alive. Even though each woman’s sister-in-law says that the other’s yavam is dead, sisters-in-law are not allowed to testify for one another, because they might hate each other. Our mishnah teaches that these women are not believed vis-a-vis the other, even though they are believed vis-a-vis themselves..", + "If one had witnesses and the other had no witnesses, she who has the witnesses is forbidden, while she who has no witnesses is permitted. If there are witnesses that one woman’s husband has died, the other woman may remarry without fear that he is alive and she is liable for yibbum. That is to say, she is believed with regard to her own husband, and the witnesses are believed with regard to the other husband (her yavam). However, the woman who has witnesses that her own husband died but does not have witnesses that her yavam died, cannot rely on her sister-in-law’s testimony that he died, and therefore cannot remarry.", + "If the one has children and the other has no children, she who has children is permitted and she who has no children is forbidden. The woman who had children is, of course, exempt from yibbum. The woman who did not have children is liable.", + "If they contracted yibbum, and the yevamim died, they are forbidden [to marry again]. Rabbi Elazar says: since they were permitted to marry the yevamim, they are subsequently permitted to marry any man. In this case two sisters-in-law, both of whom say, “My husband died”, have no witnesses and no children, and then have yibbum with two other brothers (not married to either of these two women). This is permitted, as we learned in 15:1. If afterwards, one of these brothers dies, the women may not remarry, lest the other brother-in-law still be alive, as we learned in section one. The innovation is that even though an assumption was made that both original husbands had died, and therefore both women were permitted to have yibbum, nevertheless, we continue to fear that one of the women is lying and that the other woman’s brother-in-law is still alive. Rabbi Elazar holds that since we made the assumption that both original husbands were dead, we cannot go back to assuming that they might be alive. Therefore the women are permitted to marry whomever they want, without fear that they are still tied to their brothers-in-law." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah provides rules of what a witness needs to see in order to testify that someone is dead.", + "They are allowed to testify only about the face with the nose, even though there were also marks on the man’s body or clothing. A person is identifiable only through his face and his nose. Therefore, if someone sees other parts of his body or face, but not his face and nose, he cannot testify that the person is dead.", + "They are allowed to testify only when his soul has departed, even though they have seen him cut up or crucified or being devoured by a wild beast. The person must already be dead in order to establish testimony of his death. It is not sufficient to see him being cut up, crucified or devoured by a wild beast. Even though his imminent death in these situations is nearly certain, this is not sufficient.", + "They are allowed to testify only [if they saw the body] within three days [of death]. The witness must testify within three days of the death. Otherwise the body may begin to decompose and identity cannot be provided with certainty.", + "Rabbi Judah ben Baba says: not all men, all places, or all times are alike. According to Rabbi Judah ben Baba it is impossible to set uniform rules for identifying bodies. Some men’s faces will change quicker than others at death, in some places decomposition will take place quicker, and much depends on the time of year as well (rain or sun). Therefore each situation must be ruled upon based on the circumstances of that situation." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with deciding whether a person who has entered into a body of water and not reappeared can be assumed to have drowned.", + "If a man fell into water, whether it had [a visible] end or not, his wife is forbidden [to marry again]. According to the first opinion in the mishnah, even though a man may have fallen into a large body of water and not reappeared, we cannot assume that he is dead. In the Talmud, this opinion is ascribed to Rabbi Meir. The Sages hold that if the water has an end, then his wife may remarry. If the water has an end and we did not see him come out, then we know that he didn’t come out the other side and we can assume that he has drowned. However, if the water has no end, he might have washed up alive on some distant shore and his wife should not remarry.", + "Rabbi Meir said: it once happened that a man fell into a large cistern and came out after three days. Rabbi Meir now offers a story that illustrates his principle, that even if the water has an end, the person might be alive. In such a case, if people saw that he didn’t come up, they might have left the place where he allegedly drowned, assuming that he was dead. Therefore, we cannot make such an assumption and his wife cannot remarry.", + "Rabbi Yose: it once happened that a blind man descended into a cave to immerse and his guide went down after him; and after waiting long enough for their souls to depart, permission was given to their wives to marry again. Rabbi Yose disagrees with Rabbi Meir. He brings a story where a blind man and his guide fell into a cave that had water in it and the Sages waited a while and then left and declared that the wife could remarry. If we extrapolate, we can conclude that if the water has an end, she may remarry.", + "Another incident occurred at Asia where a man was lowered into the sea, and only his leg was brought up, and the Sages ruled: [if the recovered leg contained the part] above the knee [the man’s wife] may marry again, [but if it contained only the part] below the knee, she may not marry again. This mishnah deals with a case where a person was cast into the sea and according to the Talmud he was bound. Later, they drag his leg out of the water. If when they drag the leg out of the water, it is from the knee and up, then we can assume that the person is dead. Even if he survived the loss of part of his leg, he would not be able to swim without a full leg. However, if only the lower part of the leg was cut off, the man might have been able to swim and he might have come out of the water somewhere else. Therefore his wife cannot remarry. Note that this mishnah became all too relevant in determining whether widows of Sept. 11 victims could remarry. Since the World Trade Center is like “water that has an end”, it can be assumed that someone who didn’t show up afterwards had indeed died, and his widow was allowed to remarry." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah talks about the acceptability of hearsay regarding a person’s death. Note that such testimony is generally not acceptable in a court of law. The Sages were lenient in these cases in order to make it somewhat easier for a woman to remarry.", + "Even if he only heard from women saying, “so-and-so is dead”, this is enough. If one hears women saying amongst themselves that a certain man has died, the one who overhears them may go to the court and testify as to his death. This is true even though the women themselves did not intend to testify. If they had intended to testify their testimony would certainly be acceptable, as we learned in the previous chapter. Indeed, they themselves may come to court.", + "Rabbi Judah says: even if he only heard children saying, “behold we are going to mourn for a man named so-and-so and to bury him” [it is enough]. A second category of people who cannot generally provide testimony is children. However, in this case, in order to make it easier to establish a man’s death, overhearing children speaking about a certain person’s funeral or burial is sufficient.", + "Whether [such statement was made] with the intention [of providing evidence] or was made with no such intention [it is valid]. Rabbi Judah ben Bava says: with an Israelite [the evidence is valid] only if the man had the intention [of acting as witness]. In the case of a non-Jew the evidence is invalid if his intention was [to act as witness]. According to the first opinion, hearing a person say that so-and-so is dead always allows the hearer to testify as to his death in court, whether or not the person intended to testify. Rabbi Judah ben Bava holds that an Israelite must intend to testify for the one who hears him to be able to repeat his words in court. A non-Jew’s words can be brought to court only if he doesn’t intend to testify. Note that there are some versions of the mishnah in which Rabbi Judah ben Bava says, “with an Israelite [the evidence is valid] even if the man had the intention [of acting as witness].” According to this reading, Rabbi Judah ben Bava agrees with the previous opinion about the Israelite’s testimony (it is acceptable whether or not he intended to testify), but disagrees about the non-Jew’s." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to discuss cases of hearsay or other less than perfect testimony about a person’s death.", + "They may testify [even if the body was seen] in candle light or in moonlight. Even if a witness only saw the person’s body in candle light or moonlight, he may subsequently testify that he was dead.", + "And a woman may be given permission to marry again on the evidence of a mere voice. It once happened that a man was standing on the top of a hill and cried, “so-and-so son of so-and-so from such-and-such a place is dead”, but when they went [to the top of the hill] they didn’t find anyone there. [Nevertheless], they allowed his wife to remarry. A “mere voice” is either an echo, or a voice heard from a large distance. In either case, if such a voice is heard saying that a certain person has died, his wife may remarry. This is illustrated in the next case, where people only hear from a distance someone say that so-and-so is dead. They never find the person who said it, so that they could interrogate him further. Nevertheless, the Sages allowed his wife to remarry.", + "In another instance, at Zalmon a person declared, “I am so-and-so son of so-and-so; a snake has bitten me, and I am dying”; and when they went [to examine the corpse] they did not recognize him, they [nevertheless] allowed his wife to remarry. In this case, that happened in Zalmon (found in the lower Galilee), the person himself stated that he was about to die. He also provided his full name. By the time the witnesses found the body, it had been disfigured and was not identifiable. In any case, since he had stated his name, his wife is allowed to remarry." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe final mishnah of Yevamoth relates some debates between rabbis over the testimony concerning a man’s death. In our mishnah these debates are set within historical frameworks which relate interesting information as to how the Sages made decisions and about the historical period in which they lived.", + "Rabbi Akiva said: When I went down to Nehardea to intercalate the year, I met Nehemiah of Bet D’li who said to me, “I heard that in the land of Israel no one, permits a [married] woman to marry again on the evidence of one witness, except Rabbi Judah ben Bava”. “That is so”, I told him. He said to me, “Tell them in my name: ‘You know that this country is in confusion because of marauders. I have received a tradition from Rabban Gamaliel the Elder: that they allow a [married] woman to remarry on the evidence of one witness’”. And when I came and recounted the conversation in the presence of Rabban Gamaliel he rejoiced at my words and exclaimed, “We have found a match for Rabbi Judah ben Bava!” As a result of this talk Rabban Gamaliel remembered that some men were once killed at Tel Arza, and that Rabban Gamaliel the Elder had allowed their wives to marry again on the evidence of one witness, and the law was established that they allow a woman to marry again on the evidence of one witness, and on the testimony of one [who states that he has heard] from another witness, from a slave, from a woman or from a female slave. This story takes place when Rabbi Akiva is going to Nehardea, which is in Babylonia, in order to intercalate the year, that is to decide whether an extra month must be added in order to adjust the lunar year to the solar year. Normally intercalation is done only in the land of Israel. This event must have occurred during a time of persecution, when courts could not gather in Israel to deal with calendar issues. In any case, when Rabbi Akiva arrives at Bet D’li a man named Nehemiah asks him if it is true that among the rabbis in Israel, only Rabbi Judah ben Bava rules that a woman may marry based on the testimony of a single witness. When Rabbi Akiva confirms this, Nehemiah apologizes that due to the marauders, he cannot reach the land of Israel to talk to the Israeli sages himself, but that he knows a tradition according to which Rabban Gamaliel the Elder allowed a woman to remarry upon the testimony of one witness. When Rabbi Akiva returns, he relates the tradition to the current patriarch, Rabban Gamaliel (Rabban Gamaliel the Elder’s grandson). Rabban Gamaliel rejoices, for a supporting tradition has been found for Rabbi Judah ben Bava’s tradition. Note that Rabban Gamaliel was previously not willing to accept Rabbi Judah ben Bava’s opinion, even though he obviously approved of it. Only when he learns of a supporting tradition, does he accept that a woman may remarry based on the testimony of one witness. After hearing Nehemiah’s words, Rabban Gamaliel himself remembers hearing of an incident where his grandfather permitted the wives of some fallen soldiers to remarry based on the testimony of one witness. At that precedent-setting incident, several others laws were established regarding testimony over a man’s death. Hearsay was declared acceptable, as was the testimony of women and slaves. That is to say the normal rules of testimony were suspended.", + "Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Joshua say: a woman is not be allowed to remarry on the evidence of one witness. Rabbi Akiva ruled: [a woman is not allowed to marry again] on the evidence of a woman, on that of a slave, on that of a female slave or on that of relatives. They said to him: It once happened that a number of Levites went to Tsoar, the city of palms, and one of them became ill on the way, and they left him in an inn. When they returned they asked the [female] innkeeper, “Where is our friend?” And she replied, “He is dead and I buried him”, and they allowed his wife to remarry. Should not then a priest’s wife [be believed at least as much] as an innkeeper!” He answered them: When she will [give such evidence] as the innkeeper [gave] she will be believed, for the innkeeper had brought out to them [the dead man’s] staff, his bag and the Torah scroll which he had with him. This section contains a debate between Rabbis Joshua, Eliezer, Akiva and perhaps other Sages, concerning these halakhot. Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Eliezer both disagree with the halakhah that seems to have been accepted by everyone in the mishnah, up until this point. They hold that for a woman to remarry she needs two valid witnesses to testify that her husband died. Rabbi Akiva, who lived a generation after Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Eliezer, and was a student of both of them, agreed partially with them, but also partially with Rabban Gamaliel. According to Rabbi Akiva, women, slaves and relatives cannot testify. However, one witness is sufficient. As a proof against Rabbi Akiva, the other Sages (probably not Rabbi Joshua or Rabbi Eliezer, who lived before Rabbi Akiva) bring a story where an innkeeper testified that someone staying at her inn had died, and the rabbis allowed his wife to remarry. If a mere innkeeper’s testimony is acceptable, then a woman of higher social standing, such as a priest’s wife, can surely testify in such a case. Rabbi Akiva answers that the innkeeper did not merely state that he had died, but she brought out his belongings as well. If the man had been alive, then he would not have left his belongings there. In such a case, where a woman has evidence that he died, she is believed. However, her testimony alone is not sufficient. Despite the fact that the tractate ends by stating that women may not testify about a man’s death, since all of the anonymous mishnayoth above allowed this, and allowed slaves and relatives to testify, as well as hearsay, the accepted halakhah is that all of these are permitted. Indeed, this is a classic case where we can sense that while the earlier tannaim were generally stricter, later tannaim, including the anonymous editors of the mishnah, were more lenient. Congratulations! We have finished Yevamoth. It is a tradition at this point to thank God for helping us to finish learning the tractate and to commit ourselves to going back and relearning it, so that we may not forget it and so that its lessons will stay with us for all of our lives. Tractate Yevamoth was the longest tractate we have yet learned (but it is not the longest in the Mishnah), and parts of it were quite confusing (especially the beginning). For those of you who have learned with us the entire tractate, a hearty Yasher Koach (congratulations). You have accomplished a great deal and you should be proud of yourselves. Many of the principles learned in Yevamoth will appear in other places in the Mishnah, especially in other mishnayoth in Seder Nashim. It will be an especially helpful tractate to remember. Tomorrow we begin to learn Ketuboth." + ] + ] + ] + }, + "schema": { + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה יבמות", + "enTitle": "English Explanation of Mishnah Yevamot", + "key": "English Explanation of Mishnah Yevamot", + "nodes": [ + { + "heTitle": "הקדמה", + "enTitle": "Introduction" + }, + { + "heTitle": "", + "enTitle": "" + } + ] + } +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Nashim/English Explanation of Mishnah Yevamot/English/merged.json b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Nashim/English Explanation of Mishnah Yevamot/English/merged.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..f10173b916ad0b9f4e0e68fd8828631802f148ca --- /dev/null +++ b/json/Mishnah/Modern Commentary on Mishnah/English Explanation of Mishnah/Seder Nashim/English Explanation of Mishnah Yevamot/English/merged.json @@ -0,0 +1,799 @@ +{ + "title": "English Explanation of Mishnah Yevamot", + "language": "en", + "versionTitle": "merged", + "versionSource": "https://www.sefaria.org/English_Explanation_of_Mishnah_Yevamot", + "text": { + "Introduction": [ + "The laws of levirate marriage are contained in Deuteronomy 25:5-10. According to these laws, if a husband dies without children, his brother should marry his widow and the first son that she bears shall be “accounted to the dead brother”. This is in order for the dead brother’s genealogical line to be continued. If the live brother refuses to marry his dead brother’s widow, she performs a ceremony known in the Mishnah as “halitzah”. This entails her taking off his shoe and spitting in his face (the rabbis understand this to mean spitting on the ground). After halitzah, the woman can marry whomever she chooses, as can a normal widow.", + "There are two instances of levirate marriage in the Tanakh, one involving Judah’s sons and daughter-in-law (Genesis 38) and one involving Ruth and Boaz (see Ruth 3:12 and chapter 4). Some of the legal details of these instances do not match those of Deuteronomy. It is sufficient to note that the rabbis follow the laws of Deuteronomy and do not derive the laws of levirate marriage from Genesis or Ruth. ", + "There are a few rules that we should explain here in the introduction, in order to make the learning of this sometimes difficult tractate simpler. First of all, a woman whose husband has died without children is forbidden to marry another man until she has levirate marriage or halitzah. Second, a man may not perform levirate marriage for a woman who is forbidden to him. For instance, if two brothers marry two sisters and one dies, the widow is not subject to the laws of levirate marriage, because her sister is married to the levir (a man cannot marry two sisters). Third, both betrothed women and married women are subject to the laws of levirate marriage. Fourth, levirate marriage is obligatory only for paternal brothers. ", + "There is some debate in the Talmud whether or not levirate marriage is currently preferable to halitzah. In post-Talmudic times, Ashkenazim held that halitzah was mandatory and they abolished levirate marriage. Certain Sephardi groups continued to practice levirate marriage until the formation of the State of Israel, which has adopted the Ashkenazi position. Much of these differences can be attributed to the fact that Ashkenazim banned bigamy, while most Sephardim did not.", + "The following is a list of Hebrew terms and their meaning. I will use these terms in transliteration because they are less cumbersome. I suggest you print this page so that you can reference it while we learn the tractate.", + "Halitzah—release from levirate marriage.", + "Halutzah—a woman who has performed halitzah. A priest cannot marry a halutzah. ", + "Ma’amar—the giving of money from the yavam to the yavamah, a parallel to the betrothal money given as “kiddushin” in normal marriages. According to the Torah there is no marital process for the widow who goes through yibbum. All that really happens is that he has relations with her, and thus yibbum is performed. However, the rabbis created an institution called “ma’amar” whereby the yavam would give her betrothal money similar to the betrothal money given in regular marriages (we will learn these laws in tractate Kiddushin). Ma’amar, however, does not make the woman the yavam’s full wife. The status of their marriage is only rabbinic. This will have many important implications in certain mishnayoth.", + "Mamzer—the child of an illicit union or the child of a mamzer. The Torah states, “A mamzer shall not be admitted into the congregation of the Lord” (Deuteronomy 23:3). We will see in the mishnah that there are several different opinions as to which type of illicit union creates a mamzer. A mamzer cannot marry a regular Israelite. I will not translate mamzer as “bastard”, as it is often translated, because in American lingo a “bastard” is also the child of an unmarried couple. This is untrue in Jewish law. ", + "Shomereth yavam (yavamah)—a woman who is subject to the laws of levirate marriage (i.e. her husband died without children).", + "Yavam—the living brother (there may be more than one, if the dead brother had two or more brothers.) In English he is called the levir.", + "Yibbum—levirate marriage.", + "Z’kukah—a woman with whom he is liable to have yibbum or halitzah, but with whom he has not yet done so. The word z’kukah comes from the word zikah which means “tied to” or “bound”. A z’kukah is bound to the yavam until halitzah or yibbum (then she is bound as a regular wife is to her husband). ", + "The first few chapters of Yevamoth are extremely complex. In order to make things simpler I will use names, generally Biblical one. Please don’t despair if you get lost. Once the principles become clear, most of the rest is just details.", + "Good luck! \n" + ], + "": [ + [ + [ + "Introduction\nIf a woman’s husband dies without children she is liable for yibbum to her husband’s brother. However, if she is forbidden to her husband’s brother because of an incest prohibition, she is not liable for yibbum. Our mishnah teaches which incest prohibitions exempt a woman from being liable for yibbum. Furthermore, the mishnah teaches that not only is the prohibited woman exempt from yibbum, but all of her rival wives (those who were also married to the dead husband) are exempt from yibbum. The mishnah states that this exemption is “ad infinitum”. This means that if one of this woman’s rival wives has yibbum with another brother, one to whom the wife prohibited to the other brother is not prohibited, and then this brother also dies, all of her rival wives from the second marriage are also exempt from yibbum.\nWe will explain each category of forbidden relationships and try to give concrete examples.", + "Fifteen [categories of] women exempt their rival wives and the rival wives of their rival wives and so on ad infinitum from halitzah and from yibbum. And these are they: (1) his daughter, (2) and the daughter of his daughter, (3) and the daughter of his son, (4) and the daughter of his wife, (5) and the daughter of her son (6) and the daughter of her daughter; (7) His mother-in-law and (8) his mother-in-law’s mother, (9) and his father-in-law’s mother; (10) His maternal sister and (11) his mother’s sister and (12) his wife’s sister (13) And his maternal brother’s wife; (14) and the wife of his brother who died before he was born, (15) And his daughter-in-law. All these exempt their rival wives and the rival wives of their rival wives, and so on, ad infinitum, from halitzah and from yibbum. If any of them died, or made a declaration of refusal, or were divorced, or were found incapable of procreation, their rivals are permitted. And you cannot say of a man’s mother-in-law, or the mother of his mother-in-law and of the mother of his father-in-law that they were found incapable of procreation or that they made a declaration of refusal. His daughter: Reuven and Shimon are brothers. Shimon marries Reuven’s daughter (this is permitted) and another woman. If Shimon dies, Reuven cannot perform yibbum with his daughter. Hence, she and her rival wives are exempt from yibbum or halitzah. And the daughter of his daughter, and the daughter of his son: These cases are the same as the case above, except Shimon married Reuven’s granddaughter and not his daughter. And the daughter of his wife and the daughter of her son and the daughter of her daughter: Meaning his wife’s descendents who are not his children. Even though these women are not blood relatives of his, they are still forbidden to him. His mother-in-law and his mother-in-law’s mother, and his father-in-law’s mother: In this case Shimon marries Reuven’ wife’s mother, or Reuven’s wife’s maternal or paternal grandmother. Since these women are all forbidden to Reuven, when Shimon dies without children they and their rival wives are exempt from yibbum. His maternal sister: Reuven and Shimon are paternal brothers. Shimon marries Reuven’s maternal sister. This is permitted since she does not share any parent with Shimon. When Shimon dies, she cannot have yibbum with Reuven, since he is her brother. Therefore, she and her rival wives are exempt. And his mother’s sister: Again, Reuven and Shimon are paternal brothers. Shimon marries Reuven’s mother’s sister, and then dies. Since she, as Reuven’s aunt, is prohibited to him, she and all of her rival wives are exempt from yibbum. And his wife’s sister: Reuven and Shimon marry two sisters. When Shimon dies, Reuven cannot marry his wife’s sister. This will be the typical case mentioned in many subsequent mishnayoth. And his maternal brother’s wife: Reuven and Shimon are maternal brothers and Reuven and Levi are paternal brothers. When Shimon dies Levi marries his widow (not through yibbum). She is permitted to him since Levi and Shimon are not brothers. When Levi dies, Reuven should have to do yibbum with his wife. However, she was originally Shimon’s wife and as Shimon’s wife she would not have had to do yibbum with Reuven, since yibbum is done only with paternal brothers. Since she was originally married to a man who made her forbidden to Reuven (the general prohibition of marrying your brother’s wife is true for both paternal and maternal brothers), she cannot have yibbum with him even after subsequent marriages. And the wife of his brother who died before he was born: Reuven marries a woman and dies before Shimon, his brother, is born. This woman has yibbum with Levi, a different brother. When Shimon grows up, Levi dies without children. Since Shimon was not alive when this woman married Reuven, he cannot have yibbum with her (this is learned exegetically from a verse). She and her rival wives are therefore exempt. And his daughter-in-law: Reuven and Shimon are brothers. When Reuven’s son dies, Shimon marries the widow. When Shimon dies, this woman, who used to be Reuven’s daughter-in-law, becomes liable to yibbum. Since she is forbidden to him, she and all of her rival wives are exempt. If any of them died, or made a declaration of refusal, or were divorced, or were found incapable of procreation, their rivals are permitted: If any of these women who were forbidden to the yavam, and therefore were themselves exempt and caused their rival wives to be exempt, were not married at the time of the brother’s death, the rival wives are permitted to have yibbum. The mishnah lists several ways in which the marriage could have been terminated. The two simplest are death and divorce. The “declaration of refusal” (me’un), refers to a case where an orphan girl’s marriage was arranged by her mother or brother. This type of marriage is different from the usual marriage, which is arranged by the father. Marriage arranged by a mother or brother is only of rabbinic status; therefore the girl has a right to refuse, and thereby annul the marriage upon her reaching majority age. “Incapable of procreation” (aylonit) refers to a woman who never reaches puberty. She is clearly female, but never looks like an adult female, i.e. she has no breasts or puberty hair. [An aylonit is not merely a woman who has not had children. She must also not look like an adult female.] By definition, this type of woman cannot procreate. Since she cannot procreate, she is not liable for yibbum. After all the purpose of yibbum is to have children. Since she is not subject to the laws of yibbum, the fact that she is prohibited to the yavam does not exempt her rival wives. In all of these cases, the brother dies after his marriage to the wife forbidden to his brother has already been terminated. Therefore, the forbidden (former) wives do not exempt their rival wives from yibbum. And you cannot say of a man’s mother-in-law, or the mother of his mother-in-law and of the mother of his father-in-law that they were found incapable of procreation or that they made a declaration of refusal: The mishnah merely points out that three of the above categories cannot fit two of the possibilities for terminating marriage. A woman who has already had children (by definition a mother-in-law has had children) cannot be considered “incapable of procreation”. Nor could she “refuse” a marriage, for refusal of marriage takes place upon reaching majority, and not afterwards." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is a continuation of the previous and it explains many of the details.", + "How do they exempt their rival wives? If his daughter or any other of these forbidden relatives was married to his brother who also had another wife, and he died, then just as his daughter is exempt so is her rival exempt. If his daughter’s rival went and married a second brother of his, who also had another wife, and he died, then just as the rival of his daughter is exempt so is his daughter’s rival’s rival exempt, even if there were a hundred [brothers]. How is it that if they had died, their rivals are permitted? If a man’s daughter or any other of these forbidden relatives was married to his brother who also had another wife, and his daughter died or was divorced, and afterwards his brother died, her rival is permitted. The rival of any one who can make a declaration of refusal but did not make a declaration of refusal, must perform halitzah and may not have yibbum. This section explains the opening statement of mishnah one, “Fifteen [categories of] women exempt their rival wives and the rival wives of their rival wives and so on ad infinitum from halitzah and from yibbum”. For the sake of clarity, I will explain it again here. Reuven and Shimon are brothers. Shimon marries Reuven’s daughter. When Shimon dies without children, Reuven cannot perform yibbum with his own daughter. Hence, she and all of her rival wives are not liable for yibbum. If Reuven and Shimon had a third brother, Levi, and Reuven’s daughter’s rival wife married Levi and then Levi died without children, the rival wife is not liable for yibbum with Reuven and neither are any of Levi’s other wives. This law is true even if there are 100 brothers. As an aside, this mishnah also teaches that if there was a third brother, for whom none of the dead brother’s wives was prohibited, they are liable to have yibbum or halitzah with him. The exemptions are only in a case where Reuven was the only brother.", + "This section explains the second section of mishnah one, “If any of them died, or made a declaration of refusal, or were divorced, or were found incapable of procreation, their rivals are permitted.” If Reuven’s daughter died or was divorced before Shimon, her husband, dies, her rival wives are permitted to have yibbum with Reuven. There is a special rule regarding the wife who could have made a declaration of refusal (meun) but did not. As we recall, this wife’s marriage, arranged by her brother or mother, is of only rabbinical status (and not biblical). Her liability to have yibbum is therefore only rabbinic and not biblical. If she were to refuse the marriage, the rival wives are certainly liable for yibbum. However, even if she does not, her rival wives are not totally exempt. They are rabbinically exempt, because the rival wife cannot have yibbum with the yavam, but they are biblically liable, because the rival wife was not biblically married to the brother. The solution in such a case is for the yavam to perform halitzah. As we shall see throughout the tractate, in cases of doubt whether or not yibbum should or can be performed, the solution is usually the performance of halitzah, which avoids the possibility of forbidden sexual relations." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nMishnah three introduces a different list of women which is compared to the list in mishnah one.", + "There are six relatives that are more restricted than these, in that they may be married only to strangers, marriage with their rivals is permitted: his mother and his father’s wife, his father’s sister, his paternal sister, his father’s brother’s wife and his paternal brother’s wife. The six women mentioned in this mishnah are considered “more restricted” because they cannot be married to a man’s paternal brother (remember, yibbum is restricted to only paternal brothers). For instance, a man’s mother cannot marry his paternal brother, because she is the wife of the paternal brother’s father, and it is forbidden to marry your father’s wife. Likewise, it is forbidden to marry one’s father’s sister, one’s sister (from either parent), one’s father’s brother’s wife or one’s brother’s wife. This last case can occur when one brother marries a woman and divorces her or dies with children. This wife is now forbidden to all of her dead or divorced husband’s brothers. In all of these cases, if one of these women was married to another man and their husband died, their rival wives may marry one of the brothers. The rival wife of a woman forbidden due to kinship is forbidden only when the forbidden women became eligible for yibbum. These women were never eligible for yibbum to these brothers, therefore their rival wives are permitted. Furthermore, even if the brother tried to marry one of these women, and then died, the rival wives are eligible for yibbum, since the marriage of the brother to the forbidden woman was not valid." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nMishnah four teaches us that the first three mishnayoth of the tractate were all according the opinion of Beth Hillel. Whereas Beth Hillel ruled that a woman whose rival wife is forbidden to the yavam is exempt from yibbum (as is the forbidden wife), Beth Shammai ruled that she must have yibbum or halitzah. The mishnah then lists a few correlating disputes on this matter.\nFinally, the mishnah sounds what is surely the most pluralistic note in the entire Mishnah: despite their many disagreements, Beth Hillel and Beth Shammai did not separate into two different sects.", + "Beth Shammai permits the rival wives to the surviving brothers, and Beth Hillel prohibits them. If they perform the halitzah, Beth Shammai disqualifies them from marrying a priest, and Beth Hillel makes the eligible. If they performed yibbum, Beth Shammai makes them eligible [to marry a priest], and Beth Hillel disqualifies them. Though these forbid and these permit, and these disqualify and these make eligible, Beth Shammai did not refrain from marrying women from [the families of] Beth Hillel, nor did Beth Hillel [refrain from marrying women] from [the families of] Beth Shammai. [With regard to] purity and impurity, which these declare pure and the others declare impure, neither of them refrained from using the utensils of the others for the preparation of food that was ritually clean. I have explained this section above in the introduction.", + "If the yavam should perform halitzah with the rival wife, according to Beth Shammai, this halitzah is valid and allows this woman to marry other men. Since a woman who has had halitzah is prohibited to a priest (just as a divorcee is forbidden to a priest), this woman is now prohibited to marry a priest. According to Beth Hillel, this was an unnecessary halitzah, for the woman could have married other men even without it. Since it was not true halitzah, she can still subsequently marry a priest.", + "If she has yibbum, full levirate marriage, Beth Shammai would consider this to be valid, as they stated in section one. Should this marriage end in the husband’s death, she could marry a priest, as can all widows. However, according to Beth Hillel, this yibbum was actually forbidden. Therefore this woman can no longer marry a priest, since all women who have engaged in forbidden sex cannot subsequently marry priests (we will learn more about this law later in the tractate).", + "In Jewish law the child of many forbidden unions is considered to be a mamzer (we will also learn these laws later in the tractate). A mamzer cannot marry a regular Israelite (Jew). In the above dispute, if the rival wife did perform yibbum, the child would be a mamzer according to Beth Hillel. Since this was not a situation requiring yibbum, the woman was biblically forbidden to her dead husband’s brother. If the rival wife married another man without yibbum or halitzah, the child of this subsequent marriage would be a mamzer according to Beth Shammai. This is because this woman married “out” while still bound to her yavam. This section teaches that although this dispute would have created children considered by some to be mamzers and others not to be, neither side refrained from marrying those from the other side. This is a remarkable note of pluralism in the Mishnah, indeed it seems that this ideology is what kept the rabbis from forming splinter groups. Although Beth Shammai and Beth Hillel disagreed on many topics, they continued to live together and intermarry. Unlike other groups, specifically the Dead Sea sect, which left Jerusalem over halakhic disputes with their opponents, the halakhic disputes between the rabbis did not cause them to break into many little groups. The mishnah further teaches that despite the fact that things that Beth Hillel considered pure, Beth Shammai considered impure, and vice versa, they did not refrain from eating together and from using each other’s utensils. Again, if we look at the group that did split, the Dead Sea sect, two of the halakhic issues which they considered the most important were marital laws and purity laws (sacrificial laws were also important.) The authors of the Dead Sea scrolls are constantly accusing their opponents of not properly observing marriage laws or purity laws. Despite the fact that Beth Shammai and Beth Hillel also debated these subjects, they did not refrain from marrying each other and from eating together. In other words, they remained one society." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah explains how “the wife of his brother who died before he was born” exempts her rival wife from yibbum. This category of women was mentioned in the first mishnah of chapter one (there it was the 14th category).", + "What is the case of “the wife of his brother who died before he was born”? If there were two brothers, and one of them died, and then a third brother was born, and then the second brother had yibbum with his dead brother’s wife and then died himself, the first woman is exempt as the wife of his brother who died before he was born, and the second wife [is exempt] because she is her rival wife. If he had ma’amar with her and died, the second wife, must perform halitzah but may not have yibbum. Reuven and Shimon are brothers and Shimon dies. Afterwards, Levi is born. Reuven then takes Shimon’s widow in yibbum. Afterwards Reuven also dies without children. This same widow, who was originally Shimon’s wife and then became Reuven’s wife, now technically should become liable to have yibbum or halitzah with Levi, the third brother. However, since Levi was not yet born when Shimon died, she is not liable for yibbum with Levi. Since she is exempt, all of her rival wives are exempt as well.", + "In order to understand this section, we must remind ourselves that ma’amar is the giving of money from the yavam to the yavamah, a parallel to the betrothal money given as “kiddushin” in regular marriages. As I explained in the introduction, according to the Torah there is no marital process for the widow who goes through yibbum. All that really happens is that he has relations with her, and thus yibbum is performed. However, the rabbis created an institution called “ma’amar” whereby the yavam would give her betrothal money similar to the betrothal money given in regular marriages (we will learn these laws in tractate Kiddushin). Ma’amar, however, does not make the woman the yavam’s full wife. The status of their marriage is only rabbinic. This will have many important implications in future mishnayoth. In our mishnah, Reuven does not have full yibbum with the woman, but only does ma’amar, and then dies. The woman therefore, is not biblically liable to have yibbum with Levi, the third brother, but only rabbinically liable. Since she is only rabbinically liable, her rival wife is not truly exempt, and according to biblical law she could have yibbum. However, since Reuven did perform ma’amar with the other wife, the rival wife can only have halitzah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to deal with the same topic as the previous mishnah, the exemption of “the wife of his brother who died before he was born” and her rival wife.", + "If there were two brothers and one of them died, and the second had yibbum with his dead brother’s wife, and after a [third] brother was born the second died, the first wife is exempt on account of her being the wife of his brother who died before he was born, while the second is exempt as her rival. If he had ma’amar with her, the second wife must perform the halitzah but she may not have yibbum. Rabbi Shimon says: he may have yibbum with either of them or perform halitzah for either of them. The scenario in this mishnah is only slightly different from that in the previous one. Again, Reuven and Shimon are brothers. Shimon dies and in this case Reuven has yibbum with Shimon’s wife even before Levi is born. In the previous mishnah Levi was born and then Reuven had yibbum with Shimon’s wife. When Reuven dies, his wife who had previously been married to Shimon is exempt from yibbum with Levi because she is “the wife of his brother who died before he was born”. The rival wife is again, also exempt. The innovation of this mishnah is that even though when Levi was born, the woman was no longer waiting to have yibbum, in other words she was at the time a regular wife to Reuven and not a shomeret yavam, and Reuven did not die before Levi was born, in any case she is forbidden to Levi because he was not yet born when Shimon died.", + "If Reuven had ma’amar with the woman and then died, according to the first opinion, the ruling is the same as it was in the previous mishnah. Since she is only partially Reuven’s wife, she does not fully exempt her rival wife from yibbum.", + "In this section we see that R. Shimon disagrees with the previous opinion and rules that in the case under discussion in this mishnah, either the wife who was formerly married to Shimon or the rival wives may have yibbum or halitzah. Since Levi was born when the woman was no longer a shomeret yavam, all connection she had to Shimon is lost. She only becomes liable for yibbum because of her marriage with Reuven, and Levi was born before Reuven died (unlike Shimon). Therefore, according to R. Shimon, Levi must have halitzah or yibbum with either wife. In other words this is only a normal case of a man’s wives becoming liable for yibbum. Note that the mishnah says that Levi performs halitzah, even though in reality the woman performs halitzah by taking off his shoe and spitting." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah gives some general principles for when a woman is liable for yibbum (or halitzah) and when she is forbidden/exempt.", + "A general rule has been said about the yavamah: Wherever she is prohibited as a forbidden relation, she may neither perform halitzah nor have yibbum. If her prohibition is due to a commandment or a prohibition due to holiness, she must perform halitzah but she may not have yibbum. If her sister is also her sister-in-law, she may perform halitzah or have yibbum. This general rule has been amply illustrated in the previous chapter and a half. If the yavamah was prohibited to her yavam according to the biblical laws of incest, she may not perform halitzah nor have yibbum. Indeed, she is not truly subject to the laws of yibbum, since the prohibition of incest “trumps” the obligation of yibbum.", + "This section mentions two lesser prohibitions, the “prohibition due to a commandment” and a “prohibition due to holiness. Tomorrow’s mishnah will explain what both of these categories are. Suffice it now to say that they are less consequential than the biblical incest prohibitions mentioned in the previous section. If a woman who is prohibited to her yavam in one of these ways should be liable for yibbum, she must perform halitzah but may not have yibbum. This is another way of stating that she is biblically liable for yibbum, but to avoid the problems that this type of yibbum would cause, the only option is halitzah.", + "If the sister of the prohibited woman is also her sister-in-law, meaning there is a situation in which two sisters married to two brothers, and then both brothers die and both women become liable for yibbum to a third brother, even though this brother is prohibited from one of the sisters, he can have yibbum or halitzah with the other. I will illustrate this complicated situation using names. Reuven, Shimon and Levi are brothers. Leah and Rachel are sisters. Leah marries Reuven and Shimon marries Rachel, and then both men die without children. Levi is married to Rachel’s daughter (from a marriage before she married Shimon). Levi can therefore not have yibbum with Rachel, since a man cannot marry a woman and her daughter. Nevertheless, Levi can have yibbum with Leah. Although in general a man cannot have yibbum with the sister of his yavamah (we will learn this in chapter three), in this case since Rachel was forbidden to him, she was never his yavamah. Therefore, Leah is permitted." + ], + [ + "Introduction Mishnah four defines the two categories mentioned in section two of mishnah three.", + "A “prohibition due to a commandment” [refers to] the secondary incest prohibitions forbidden by the scribes. “A prohibition due to holiness” [refers to the following forbidden relationships]: a widow to a high priest; a divorced woman, or one that had performed halitzah to a regular priest; a mamzereth or a netinah to an Israelite; and an Israelite woman to a natin or a mamzer. Women who are not themselves forbidden because of incest laws, but the scribes (rabbis) decreed that they were nevertheless prohibited are called “secondary incest prohibitions”. Some examples of “secondary incest prohibitions” are one’s grandmother and one’s son’s or daughter’s daughter-in-law. The reason that the rabbis prohibited these women is to keep people away from potential sin. That is to say, if it became permitted to have relations with your son’s daughter-in-law, you might think that relations with one’s own daughter-in-law are also permitted. These prohibitions are called “prohibitions due to commandments” due to the commandment to obey the words of the sages.", + "“Prohibitions due to holiness” are prohibitions that are not due to incest (or adultery) but rather to the sanctity of the priests (see Leviticus 21:6-7) or the sanctity of the people of Israel. A widow to a high priest: If a widow becomes liable for yibbum to a high priest, he must perform halitzah for her. He cannot have yibbum with her because she is prohibited to him (Leviticus 21:14). A divorced woman or one that had performed halitzah to a regular priest: If a previously divorced woman or a woman who had halitzath, should become liable for yibbum with a regular priest, she must perform halitzah and cannot have yibbum, since she is prohibited to him (Leviticus 21:7). Note that this situation will usually not happen because a divorced woman or one who had halitzah cannot marry a priest, and therefore, she should not have married the yavam’s (who is a priest) brother, who is also a priest. Nevertheless, if the brother transgressed and did marry a divorcee (marriage between a priest and a divorcee is prohibited but valid), and then died, the divorcee (who is now also a widow) has halitzah with the brother but not yibbum. A mamzereth or a netinah to an Israelite and an Israelite woman to a natin or a mamzer: A mamzer (or mamzereth, a female mamzer) is the child of a forbidden union (Deuteronomy 23:3. The definition of a mamzer appears in chapter 4:13). A natin (or a netinah, a female natin) is a descendent of a tribe of foreigners who converted through trickery in the days of Joshua and were declared temple slaves (Joshua 9:27). Neither of these categories of men or women can marry full Israelites. Therefore, if one of these people becomes liable to have yibbum with an Israelite, or if an Israelite becomes liable to have yibbum with one of them, they have halitzah and not yibbum." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nA wife of a deceased husband is liable for yibbum only if her husband had a brother and no sons. Our mishnah defines what types of brothers cause the woman to be obligated for yibbum and what types of sons exempt them.", + "If one has any kind of brother, [that brother] requires his brother’s wife to have yibbum, and he is his brother in every respect, except for a brother born from a female slave or a non-Jewish woman. If one has any kind of son, [that son] exempts his father’s wife from yibbum, and he is liable for striking or cursing [his father], and he is his son in every respect, except for the son of a female slave or a non-Jewish woman. Any kind of brother, even a mamzer, requires the brother’s wife to have yibbum or halitzah. This brother is his brother in every respect. For instance, if his brother is a mamzer, his brother is still eligible to inherit from him. If one brother is a priest and his brother is a mamzer, for instance his father was a priest and had an adulterous affair with a married woman and they had a child, the priest is still allowed to become impure to help bury his mamzer brother. [Priests can only become impure for their seven immediate relatives.] The only exception to this rule is his brother from a slave or non-Jew. Since the child of a slave or a non-Jewish woman is not considered to be related to his father, for the child is not Jewish, the child is not considered to be related to his paternal father.", + "This section basically teaches the same law with regard to a son. Any son exempts a wife from yibbum or halitzah, even a mamzer son. For instance, if a man had an adulterous affair and a child was born, and then the man subsequently married another woman and died without any more children, his wife is exempt from yibbum, because he already has a child. This child is considered his in all legal matters. For instance if he strikes or curses his father he is liable for the death penalty (see Exodus 21:15, 17). He inherits his father, and if his father is a priest his father may become impure in order to bury him. Again, the only exception is the son of a female slave or non-Jew, who is not considered to be related to his father." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah deals with the situation where a man has married one of two sisters but does not know which one he has married. The Mishnah mentions situations such as these quite frequently, not because they were realistic, but because they are useful for teaching law.\nIn order to understand the mishnah, we need to know that a man cannot have relations with a sister of a woman with whom he is liable to have yibbum or halitzah. A woman with whom he is liable to have yibbum or halitzah is called his “z’kukah”. He can’t have relations with the sister of his z’kukah, just as he can’t have relations with the sister of his wife.", + "If a man betrothed one of two sisters and does not know which of them he has betrothed, he must give a get (a bill of to this one and a get to this one. If he died, and he had a brother, the brother must perform halitzah for both of them. If he had two brothers, one is to perform halitzah and the other may have yibbum. If they both preempted and married them they do not take [the women] away from them. If a man betrothed one of two sisters and does not know which he betrothed, he must divorce both. He cannot divorce one and marry the other because it is forbidden to marry your wife’s sister, even after you have divorced your wife. In other words, if he divorces one and marries the other, he may have divorced the one that he betrothed and therefore it would be forbidden for him to marry the other.", + "If he dies, both sisters become liable for yibbum or halitzah to his brothers. If he has one brother, that brother cannot have yibbum with either because it is forbidden to have relations with the sister of a woman with whom you are liable to have yibbum (z’kukah). In other words, if he were to have yibbum with one of them, it could be that the other was the one who was really betrothed. Therefore, he must perform halitzah for both.", + "If there are two brothers, the first brother performs halitzah for one of the women and then the second brother can have yibbum with the other sister. The first brother should do halitzah because if he were to have yibbum he might be having relations with the sister who was not betrothed, and therefore he is having relations with the sister of his z’kukah (as in the above situation). However, after the first brother has halitzah with one of the sisters, there can be no problem for the second brother to have yibbum with the second sister. If she is the one who was betrothed to the dead brother, then he has yibbum with her, which is perfectly okay. If the other woman was the one betrothed, she has already had halitzah, and her ties to the brother are severed. Therefore, this woman is not the sister of his z’kukah.", + "If both brothers have yibbum with the two sisters, the court does not force them to separate, even though the first brother should have had halitzah. Although the brother who first performed yibbum may have originally had yibbum with the sister of his z’kukah, since her sister has now had yibbum, her ties to the other brother have been severed and neither brother is currently married to the sister of his z’kukah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to provides scenarios whereby two men betroth two women, but neither know who betrothed whom.\nFor the sake of clarity I will use names in explaining this complex mishnah. There are two families of men in the mishnah. The first family I will call Reuven, Shimon and Levi, who are all brothers. The second family of men I will call George, Bill and Ron, again all brothers. The two sisters in the mishnah I will again call Rachel and Leah. This should make the mishnah somewhat easier.", + "If two men betrothed two sisters and one does not know whom he betrothed and the other does not know whom he betrothed, this one gives two bills of divorce and the other gives two bills of divorce. If they died and this one has a brother and this one has a brother, this brother performs halitzah for both widows and this brother performs halitzah for both widows. If one has one brother and the other has two brothers, one brother performs halitzah for both widows and [as regards] the two, one performs halitzah and the other may perform yibbum. If they both preempted and married they do not take [the women] away from them. If this one had two brothers and the other had two brothers, one brother of one performs halitzah for one widow and one brother of the other performs halitzah with the other widow, [and then the other] brother of the first may have yibbum with the halutzah of the second and [the other] brother of the second may have yibbum with the halutzah of the first. If both preempted and performed halitzah, the [other] two must not perform yibbum, rather one must perform halitzah and the other may then have yibbum. If they both preempted and married they do not take [the women] away from them. Reuven and George betroth Rachel and Leah but neither knows who betrothed whom. They both must then divorce both women in order for the women to go marry other men.", + "If Reuven and George die, and each has only one brother (Shimon and Bill), Shimon must perform halitzah with both women and Bill must perform halitzah with both women. Neither can have yibbum with either women because each woman might be the sister of the woman with whom he is truly liable to have yibbum, the z’kukah (because we don’t know who betrothed whom).", + "If Reuven has two brothers, Shimon and Levi and George still only has Bill as a brother, Bill must have halitzah with both Rachel and Leah. With regard to Shimon and Levi, one brother must have halitzah with both women but the other brother can have yibbum. This rule was explained in the above mishnah as well. The second brother can have yibbum with either women because if she was truly the woman who Reuven betrothed, then yibbum is proper. If Reuven betrothed the other sister, then the sister with whom this brother now has yibbum is no longer the sister of his z’kukah, because this other sister has already received halitzah from his other brother.", + "As we learned above in mishnah six, if both brothers preemptively marry both sisters, they are not forced to have a divorce. Certainly the second marriage is okay, and even the first marriage was only problematic in the beginning, before the second sister had yibbum. Even though the woman whom he married may have once been the sister of his z’kukah, after she has had yibbum the other sister is no longer a z’kukah. For further explanation see mishnah six.", + "If both Reuven and George have two brothers, one brother of each dead brother has halitzah with both sisters. Let’s say that Shimon and Bill have halitzah with both sisters. Now Levi can have yibbum with the sister who had halitzah with George and Ron can have yibbum with the sister who had halitzah with Shimon. This is permitted because if this sister was the one whom his brother had betrothed than yibbum is proper. If she is not the correct sister, then his other brother has already had halitzah with the other woman and she is no longer a z’kukah. The reason that Levi cannot have yibbum with the sister who had halitzah with Shimon and that Ron can’t have yibbum with the sister who had halitzah with Bill is that it is forbidden to marry a woman with whom your brother had halitzah.", + "If Shimon and Levi preemptively perform halitzah with both Rachel and Leah, the other two, Bill and Ron, cannot both have yibbum with Rachel and Leah, because the first to do yibbum might do so with the sister of his z’kukah. Rather one (either Bill or Ron) should do halitzah and then the other may have yibbum.", + "Again, if Bill and Ron both do yibbum, after Shimon and Levi both performed halitzah, neither are forced to divorce them. This is the same ruling as in section four and in the previous mishnah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah gives a general rule about yibbum and then begins to discuss a different issue, namely one who is suspected of having relations with a woman who is forbidden to him.", + "The commandment to perform yibbum is upon the oldest brother. If a younger brother preempted him [by performing yibbum], he has acquired [a wife]. If a man is suspected of [having relations] with a slave and then she was freed, or with a non-Jewish woman who then converted, he must not marry her. If, however, he did marry her they do not take her away from him. If a man is suspected of [having relations] with a married woman, and then [in consequence] she was taken away from her husband, even though he married her, he must divorce her. Any brother of the deceased husband may perform yibbum or halitzah. However, the first option is supposed to go to the oldest remaining brother. If, contrary to what is supposed to happen, a younger brother does perform yibbum, the yibbum is valid and she is his wife. We will learn more about this in chapter four, mishnah five.", + "The three parts of this section all deal with a man who is suspected of having relations with a woman who is forbidden to him. In the first part, he is suspected of having relations with either a slave or a non-Jew. Both of these women are prohibited to him. Subsequently, the slave is freed (thereby becoming a fully Jewish woman) and the non-Jewish woman converts to Judaism. In their current state both women are permitted to him. Nevertheless, he is not allowed to marry them. There are two reasons given for this. One, so that people will not confirm the original rumor that he had relations with a woman forbidden to him. Two, so that people won’t say that she only converted in order to marry him. In contrast, if he is suspected of having an affair with a married woman, and then she is forced to separate from her husband, and the suspected adulterer marries her, the court imposes a divorce. Adultery is a much more serious crime than relations with non-Jews and therefore just a suspicion that he had adultery with her, rules out all future marriages. Note that this rule is ultimately meant to protect marriages. A man whose wife has had adultery can no longer remained married to her. To prevent a situation whereby she sets her eyes on another man and forces her husband to divorce her by committing adultery, the rabbis permanently forbade her to the adulterer. .", + "Questions for Further Thought:
• Why does section two follow section one? What is the connection, if any, between the two laws?" + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe second part of mishnah eight dealt with men who are suspected of having relations with women prohibited to them. Mishnah nine deals with men who are suspected of lying in order to free a woman of her husband so that they could marry her.", + "A man who brings a bill of divorce from a country beyond the sea and states, “it was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence”, must not marry the [divorcer’s] wife. [Similarly, if one states] “he died”, “I killed him”, or “We killed him”, he must not marry his wife. Rabbi Judah said: [If he says], “ I killed him”, the woman may not marry [any one]; [If, he states], “We killed him”, the woman may marry. A messenger who brings a bill of divorce from overseas must state “It was written in my presence and signed in my presence”. This is to ensure that the divorce document was done properly and that the husband actually requested that it be given (we will learn these laws in tractate Gittin). Our mishnah teaches that the messenger is not allowed to marry the divorcer’s wife, lest the messenger fake the get in order to marry her. His participation in “freeing” her of her husband, disqualifies him from subsequently marrying her.", + "Similarly, if a man testifies that a woman’s husband is dead, he may not marry her. Jewish law generally does not allow testimony with less than two witnesses. However, in the case of testimony about the death of a man, testimony that will allow her to remarry as a widow, only one witness is required. Since this man is our sole means of knowing that she is a widow, he cannot marry her, lest he lie in order to marry her. Even if he says “I killed him” or “We killed him” he cannot marry her.", + "A murderer is forbidden from testifying in a court of law. Therefore, according to Rabbi Judah, if one testifies that he murdered a woman’s husband, his testimony is disqualified and it turns out that there is no testimony to her husband’s death. Therefore, she cannot remarry. However, if he says, “We killed him” he may mean to say, “I was there when other people killed him”. Since he does not definitively say that he is a murderer, his testimony about the death of the woman’s husband is valid, and she may remarry." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nMishnah ten is a continuation of mishnah nine.", + "A sage who has pronounced a woman forbidden to her husband because of a vow must not marry her himself. If, however, a woman made a declaration of refusal or performed halitzah in his presence, he may marry her, since he [is part of a] court. If any of these had wives who [subsequently] died, [the other women] are permitted to marry them. If [the women] were married to others and were [subsequently] divorced, or widowed, they may be married to these. They are permitted to their sons or brothers. The sage may not marry the woman whom he has declared forbidden to her husband due to a vow. This could happen if the woman vowed to receive no benefit from her husband, and then came in front of the sage to release her vow (we will learn how a vow is released in tractate Nedarim). If the sage could not find an opening to release the vow, then the woman remains forbidden to her husband. The sage may not marry her lest he did not search hard to find a way to release the vow because he wanted to marry the woman himself. However, if a woman performs the declaration of refusal (an annulment of marriage made by a woman upon reaching majority in a case where her marriage was contracted by her brother or mother) or halitzah in front of a sage, that sage may still marry her. In this situation he is part of a court, and we are not suspicious of courts. Furthermore, with a court, if he wanted to illegally accept her declaration of refusal or halitzah just so that he could marry her, he would have to get the rest of the court to agree. Since this would not be so simple, we are not suspicious and he may marry her.", + "This section places certain limits on the preceding laws in this mishnah and the previous one. If these men, who testified and thereby allowed the woman to be freed from her husband (the one who brought the get, or the one who testified about the husband’s death or the sage who did not release the vow), had other wives at the time, then they may later, after their current wives die, marry these other women. Since at the time of their testimony there is little chance that they would marry the woman about whom they are testifying, they are not suspected of lying. Note that this mishnah assumes that bigamy is not common, even though it is permitted. Furthermore, if these women subsequently marry other men and then are again divorced or widowed, they may marry the men who testified in order to “free” them from their previous marriage. The fact that they married someone else first, means that the original testimony did not directly allow them to marry the one who brought the get, testified about the death or did not release the vow. The step in between gets rid of the suspicion that they were lying. Finally, these women may marry the children or brother of these men. While we suspect that one may lie in order to free a woman for himself, we do not have such suspicions for his son or brother." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nMishnayoth one through four are all one long mishnah dealing with a case of four brothers, whom we will call, Reuven, Shimon, Levi and Judah, two of whom married two sisters, Rachel and Leah.", + "Four brothers: two of whom were married to two sisters, if those who were married to the sisters died, behold these must perform halitzah but may not have yibbum. If they preemptively married them, they must divorce them. Rabbi Eliezer said: Beth Shammai holds that they may retain them, and Beth Hillel holds that they must divorce them. Reuven and Shimon marry Rachel and Leah and then both die. Rachel and Leah are technically liable for yibbum or halitzah with either Levi or Judah. The mishnah teaches that neither Levi nor Judah may have yibbum with either sister, because each sister is the sister of his z’kukah (a woman with whom he is liable to have either yibbum or halitzah). In other words Leah is liable to have yibbum or halitzah with each brother as is Rachel. They are both considered to be “z’kukah” to both brothers. If Levi or Judah were to have yibbum with either one, he would be having relations with the sister of his z’kukah, which is forbidden just as it is forbidden to have relations with one’s wife’s sister. Even after one sister has had halitzah with one of the other brothers, thereby ending her status as z’kukah, the other may not have yibbum because any one woman is forbidden to him at the time when she becomes liable for yibbum, remains forbidden forever.", + "If the brothers did marry the sisters, against the ruling in clause one, they must divorce them. Although the marriage is valid and therefore requires a divorce, it is forbidden and therefore a divorce is mandatory.", + "According to Rabbi Eliezer, the previous ruling is only according to Beth Hillel. Beth Shammai disagrees and rules that the marriage may be upheld." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to discuss variations that could arise from the scenario brought up in mishnah one.", + "If one of the sisters was forbidden to one [of the brothers] under the prohibition of incest, he is forbidden to marry her but may marry her sister, while the second brother is forbidden to marry either of them. [If one sister] was forbidden due to a commandment or due to holiness they both perform halitzah and may not be taken in yibbum. If one of the sister’s was forbidden to one of the remaining brothers because of one of the various incest laws, for instance he was already married to her daughter, she is not liable to have yibbum with him (as we learned in chapter one). Therefore he can marry the other sister, for she is not the sister of his z’kukah. Nevertheless, the other brother, to whom neither sister is forbidden, is still prohibited from marrying either sister, since each is the sister of his z’kukah.", + "In chapter two, mishnayoth two and three, we learned that there are two other categories of forbidden relationships besides primary incest prohibitions: secondary incest relationships prohibitions and prohibitions due to the inherent holiness of the priests (for instance divorcees are forbidden to priests) or of all of Israel (for instance the prohibition of a mamzer). If one of the sisters was forbidden to one of the remaining brothers due to one of these prohibitions, for instance he was a priest (and his paternal brothers were not), or he was a mamzer (and his paternal brothers were not) the two sisters must have halitzah and cannot have yibbum. This accords with what we learned in chapter two, that in any case where a woman becomes liable to have yibbum with a man prohibited to her due to a commandment or holiness, she must have halitzah and not yibbum." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis is the final mishnah which deals with the subject raised in mishnah one.", + "If one of the sisters was forbidden to one brother under the prohibition of incest and the other sister was forbidden to the other under the prohibition of incest, she who is forbidden to the one is permitted to the other and she who is forbidden to the other is permitted to the first. This is what they said: when her sister is her sister-in-law she may either perform halizah or be taken in yibbum. If each sister is prohibited to one brother due to an incest prohibition, for instance Levi is married to Rachel’s daughter and Judah is married to Leah’s daughter, Levi may have yibbum with Leah and Judah may have yibbum with Rachel. This is because each sister is a z’kukah to only one brother. Rachel is a z’kukah only to Judah and Leah only to Levi. When yibbum is performed neither brother is having relations with the sister of his z’kukah.", + "This refers to the end of mishnah 2:3. Rachel and Leah are both sisters and were sisters-in-law before Reuven and Shimon died. The only time that both Rachel and Leah could have yibbum with a brother is when both are forbidden to one brother through a prohibition of incest, as our mishnah describes. Note that our mishnah is actually quoting an earlier mishnah and explaining it. This phenomenon of mishnah explaining an older mishnah does occasionally occur in the Mishnah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah and the three that follow it, deal with situations in which there are three brothers, Reuven, Shimon and Levi, two of whom are married to two sisters, Rachel and Leah or a mother and her daughter, or a mother and her granddaughter. The commonality to all of these cases is that a man may not have relations with both of these women. Therefore, if both women should become liable for yibbum with the surviving brother, he may not have yibbum with either, because each one is the relative of his z’kukah (the other woman who becomes liable for yibbum). We have learned most of these rules above in mishnah two.", + "Three brothers: two of whom were married to two sisters, or to a woman and her daughter, or to a woman and her daughter’s daughter, or to a woman and her son’s daughter, behold, these must perform halitzah but may not be taken in yibbum. Rabbi Shimon exempts them. If one of them was forbidden to him by a prohibition of incest, he is forbidden to marry her but is permitted to marry her sister. If the prohibition is due to a commandment or to holiness, they must perform halitzah but may not be taken in yibbum. If Reuven marries Rachel and Shimon marries Leah, who are either sisters or a mother and her daughter or a mother and her granddaughter, and then Reuven and Shimon both die without children, Levi cannot have yibbum with either woman. This is because each woman is the immediate relative of the other woman who is his z’kukah. Just as we have learned before that one cannot marry the sister of a z’kukah, here we learn that one cannot marry the mother, daughter, grandmother or granddaughter of a z’kukah. Rabbi Shimon holds that since he cannot have yibbum with either one of them, neither are even obligated for yibbum.", + "If one of the two women was forbidden to him by a prohibition of incest, for instance if Leah’s daughter was married to Levi already, since Leah is not obligated for yibbum, Levi may have yibbum with Rachel (in this case Leah’s sister). We have already learned this rule in mishnah two.", + "If one of the two women was forbidden but only due to a prohibition of a commandment or a prohibition due to holiness, both women are technically liable for yibbum. Since he cannot have yibbum with either, he must do halitzah with both. Again, this law was learned above in mishnah two." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to deal with variants upon the situation where two of three brothers were married to two sisters.", + "Three brothers, two of whom were married to two sisters and the third was unmarried: When one of the sisters’ husbands died, the unmarried brother performed for her ma’amar, and then his second brother died: Beth Shammai says: his wife [remains] with him while the other is exempt because she is his wife’s sister. Beth Hillel however says that he must divorce his wife with a get and by halitzah, and his brother’s wife by halitzah. This is the case in regard to which they said: “woe to him because of his wife, and woe to him because of his brother’s wife.” Reuven and Shimon were married to Rachel and Leah, and Levi was unmarried. When Reuven dies, Levi performed ma’amar with Rachel. Ma’amar, as we have learned before, is an act parallel to betrothal with a regular woman, and is only done in the case of yibbum. Ma’amar is performed by the man giving a symbolic amount of money to the woman. Rachel becomes his quasi-fiancee after having ma’amar, but she is not fully his wife until he performs yibbum (intercourse). Before Levi can have yibbum with Rachel, Shimon also dies, thereby making Leah liable for yibbum. The question is now asked, can Levi continue to stay married to Rachel, even though he is liable to have yibbum with Rachel’s sister. According to Beth Shammai, the first woman (Rachel) remains Levi’s wife and Leah is exempt from either yibbum or halitzah. In other words, Beth Shammai sees in ma’amar a full marital act, one which makes Rachel Levi’s full wife. Since he is already married to Rachel, he cannot have yibbum with Leah, Rachel’s sister, and she is completely exempt. According to Beth Hillel, ma’amar does not make Rachel into a full wife, such that it would be biblically forbidden for Levi to marry her sister. Therefore, when Leah becomes obligated for yibbum, it is the case of two sisters who are both liable to have yibbum with the same man. As we have learned previously, in such a case both must have halitzah, and neither may have yibbum, since a man cannot marry the sister of his z’kukah. In addition, Rachel requires a get, since she did have ma’amar, which is an act of betrothal. The final clause of the mishnah relates that it is about such a case that people say, woe to him for losing his wife and woe to him for losing his brother’s wife. For without having done anything wrong, both of these women are prohibited to him." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe key to understanding the laws in these mishnayoth is that ma’amar, the equivalent of betrothal in cases of yibbum, does not create a full marriage between the yavam and the yavamah but does create a tie. Often the solution in cases where a woman has had ma’amar and then her husband dies without having done yibbum thereby making her obligated for yibbum with the other brother, is that she has halitzah but not yibbum.", + "Three brothers: two of whom were married to two sisters and the third was married to a stranger: If one of the sisters’ husbands died and the brother who was married to the stranger married his wife and then died himself, the first is exempt [from yibbum or halitzah] because she is his wife’s sister, and the second is exempt as her rival. If he had only had ma’amar with her and died, the stranger is to perform halitzah but may not be taken in yibbum. Three brothers: two of whom were married to two sisters and the third was married to a stranger: If the brother who was married to the stranger died, and one of the sisters’ husbands married his wife and then died himself, the first is exempt [from yibbum or halitzah] because she is his wife’s sister, and the second is exempt as her rival. If he had only had ma’amar with her and died, the stranger is to perform halitzah but may not be taken in yibbum. Reuven and Shimon are married to Rachel and Leah. Levi is married to Tovah, who is not a sister of Rachel or Leah (she is a “stranger”). When Reuven dies, Levi has yibbum with Rachel his wife. Subsequently Levi dies and Rachel and Tovah become liable to have yibbum or halitzah with Shimon. Rachel is exempt because Shimon is married to Leah, her sister. Tovah is exempt because she is Rachel’s rival wife (see chapter one, mishnah one).", + "If Levi had ma’amar with Rachel instead of full yibbum, and then Levi died, Rachel was not truly his wife in order to exempt Tovah as a rival wife. Therefore, Tovah must have halitzah, but still cannot have yibbum since Levi did have ma’amar with Rachel.", + "In this case, Levi dies and Reuven has yibbum with Tovah. When Reuven subsequently dies, Rachel and Tovah become obligated to have yibbum with Shimon. Rachel is exempt because Shimon is married to Leah, her sister. Tovah is exempt because she is Rachel’s rival wife (see chapter one, mishnah one).", + "If Reuven had ma’amar with Tovah instead of yibbum, and then he died, Tovah was not truly his wife and therefore the fact that Rachel is Leah’s sister does not exempt her from yibbum. She still must have halitzah because Reuven did have ma’amar with her." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to the discuss the situation of two brothers married to two sisters and a third brother married to a woman who is not a sister.", + "Three brothers: two of whom were married to two sisters and the third was married to a stranger: If one of the sisters’ husband died and the brother who was married to the stranger married his wife, and then the wife of the second brother died, and afterwards the brother who was married to the stranger died, behold she is forbidden to him forever, since she was forbidden to him for one moment. Three brothers: two of whom were married to two sisters and the third was married to a stranger. If one of the sisters’ husbands divorced his wife, and then the brother who was married to the stranger died, and he who had divorced his wife married her and then died,- this is a case concerning which they said: If any of them died or were divorced, their rivals are permitted. Reuven and Shimon are married to Rachel and Leah and Levi is married to Tovah. Reuven dies and Levi has yibbum with Rachel, and then Leah dies and then Levi dies (sounds a bit like a Shakespeare tragedy, doesn’t it!). In this case both Tovah and Rachel should become liable to have yibbum or halitzah with Shimon. Note that this is the second time that Rachel has become potentially liable for yibbum with Shimon, the first time when Reuven died and now when her current husband, Levi died. Our mishnah teaches that since she was exempt from yibbum with Shimon the first time, for at the moment he was married to her sister, she is exempt from yibbum the second time, even though Leah, her sister, is no longer alive. The fact that she was once forbidden to have yibbum with Shimon, means that she will always be forbidden to have yibbum with him. Tovah is also exempt because she is the rival wife of a woman exempt from yibbum.", + "Again, Reuven and Shimon are married to Rachel and Leah and Levi is married to Tovah. Reuven divorces Rachel, and then Levi dies, and Reuven has yibbum with Tovah, and then he dies. At this point Tovah becomes liable for yibbum with Shimon. The mishnah teaches that Tovah can have yibbum with Shimon even though Reuven was once married to the sister of Shimon’s wife. In other words, if Rachel had still been married to Reuven she would have been exempt from yibbum, and Tovah would have been exempt from yibbum, and hence forbidden to have yibbum (anyone exempt from yibbum may not have yibbum). Now that Rachel is no longer married to Reuven, Tovah can have yibbum. The mishnah refers to this law which has already been stated in chapter one, mishnah one." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah refers back to the first mishnah of the tractate, which stated that if one of the wives was forbidden to the yavam, and therefore did not require yibbum or halitzah, the rival wife was also exempt from yibbum or halitzah. In that mishnah (and in the previous mishnah of our chapter) we learned that if the forbidden wife had been divorced, the rival wife was again liable for yibbum or halitzah. Our mishnah teaches what happens to the rival wife if the forbidden wife was doubtfully divorced or only doubtfully married in the first place.", + "[If in any of these cases] the betrothal or divorce was in doubt, behold, these rivals must perform halitzah but may not be taken in yibbum. What is a case of doubtful betrothal? If when he threw to her betrothal money it was uncertain whether it fell nearer to him or nearer to her – this is a case of doubtful betrothal. [What is a case of] doubtful divorce? If he wrote a get in his own handwriting and it bore no signatures of witnesses, or if it bore signatures of witnesses but was note dated, or if it was dated but had the signature of only one witness this is a case of doubtful divorce. If the forbidden wife was doubtfully betrothed, then there is a doubt whether or not the rival wife must or even can have yibbum. If the divorce was valid, then the rival wife can and must have yibbum; if the divorce was invalid then the rival wife is exempt. Similarly, if there was a doubt about whether or not the wife forbidden to the yavam was even married in the first place, there is a doubt whether or not the rival wife must or can have yibbum. If the betrothal was valid, then the rival wife is exempt; if the betrothal was not valid, then the rival wife was never even this woman’s true rival wife, and hence she is liable for yibbum or halitzah.", + "This section and the next define potential cases of doubtful divorce and betrothal. We should note that there are other cases of doubtful divorce and betrothal that we will learn when we learn tractates Gittin and Kiddushin. A man may betroth his wife by throwing the money used for betrothal at her (money is one of the means by which a woman is legally betrothed), as long as it is closer to her than to him. [Note that the woman must always consent to becoming his betrothed. A man cannot throw money at any woman he wishes and thereby betroth her against her will]. If it was doubtful whether the money landed closer to him or closer to her, she is doubtfully betrothed.", + "A normal get (divorce document) is written by a scribe, is signed by two witnesses and is dated. If the two witnesses are missing, but the husband wrote the get himself, or it has two witnesses but no date, or one witness but it has the date, the get is valid according to the Torah but the sages stated that it was invalid (see Gittin 8:2, 9:4). If a woman were to get remarried using one of these divorce documents, the children from the second marriage are not mamzers (as they would be if she remarried without ever being divorced). Our mishnah considers these divorce documents cases of “doubtful divorce” since they are on the one hand valid (from Torah law) and on the other hand invalid (due to a stringency of the rabbis)." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is quite complex so I recommend paying careful attention to the details. If you are beginning to despair, we are almost out of the most complex section of Yevamoth.", + "Three brothers were married to three women who were strangers [to one another] and one of them died and the second brother did ma’amar with her and then he died, behold, these must perform halitzah but may not be taken in yibbum; for it is said “And one of them died…her husband’s brother shall unite with her” (Deuteronomy 25:5) only she who is bound due to one yavam but not she who is bound to due to two yavamim. R. Shimon says: he may have yibbum with whichever of these he wishes and then perform halitzah for the other. If two brothers were married to two sisters, and one of the brothers died, and afterwards the wife of the second brother died, behold, she is forbidden to him forever, since she was forbidden to him for one moment. Reuven, Shimon and Levi are married to Rachel, Tovah and Yael, none of whom are sisters. Reuven dies and Shimon does ma’amar with Rachel. When Shimon dies, Rachel and Tovah should, we would think, become liable for yibbum r halitzah with Levi. Our mishnah, using a midrash based on Deut. 25:5, states that neither woman may have yibbum with Levi. This is because Rachel is bound to Levi through her marriage to two of Levi’s brothers. She is still bound to him by force of her marriage with Reuven, because the ma’amar that Shimon did with her was not as strong as a full yibbum. [If Shimon had done yibbum, her ties to Reuven would have been fully severed.] She is bound to Levi through her marriage to Shimon because of the ma’amar she did do with him. In other words ma’amar is strong enough to create a relationship with the second brother, but not strong enough to sever the ties with the first brother. Therefore Rachel is bound to Levi through the force of her marriage to two brothers who are now deceased. The mishnah understands the words “And one of them died” to exclude a case where two brothers died. Since Rachel is exempt, her rival wife, Tovah, is also exempt. However, since ma’amar is not a biblical institution, and therefore the ties to Shimon are not complete, halitzah must be performed.", + "Rabbi Shimon holds that ma’amar either completely acquires the woman for the man who does ma’amar, in other words it creates a complete and valid relationship according to the Torah, or it doesn’t create any legal relationship whatsoever, not even a rabbinicly ordained marriage. If it creates a complete betrothal, then Rachel’s ties to her first husband, Reuven, are ended by Shimon’s ma’amar. When Shimon dies, she becomes liable to yibbum with Levi only because of her marriage to Shimon. If it doesn’t create any tie, then she was never at all married to Shimon, and she is liable for yibbum with Levi only because of her marriage to Reuven. In either case, she does not fit the category of one who is liable to yibbum through two dead husbands at the same time. Therefore, either of these wives may have yibbum. The second wife must have halitzah, lest the ma’amar not have created a tie with Shimon, and therefore Rachel became obligated for yibbum because of her marriage with Reuven and Tovah became obligated because of her marriage with Shimon. He cannot have yibbum with the second one as well, lest the ma’amar did create a tie, and a yavam cannot have yibbum with two wives of one dead husband.", + "Reuven and Shimon are married to Rachel and Leah. Reuven dies and Rachel then would become liable for yibbum with Shimon, except she is exempt because he is married to her sister. The mishnah teaches that even though Leah subsequently dies, and hence Rachel might be able to have yibbum with Shimon, she cannot because she was at one point forbidden to him. Note that this law was already explained in mishnah seven." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah discusses all of the potential violations that could occur in a case where two brothers betroth two women and the women are accidentally switched when the two couples enter the bridal chamber (huppah). In other words, Reuven has relations with Shimon’s wife and vice versa. Note that the mishnah is only discussing a situation where this occurred accidentally. Had the switch been intentional, they would all be intentional adulterers and the men would have to divorce their wives.", + "If two men betrothed two women, and as they were entering into the bridal chamber, they exchanged the one for the other, behold, they are guilty of having relations with a married woman. If they were brothers they are guilty of having relations with a brother’s wife. If they were sisters, they are guilty of having relations with a wife’s sister. If they were menstruants [they are guilty] of having relations with a menstruant. They must be kept apart for three months, lest they are pregnant. If they were minors incapable of bearing children, they may be returned [to their rightful husband] at once. If the women were of priestly families they are disqualified from eating terumah. At the time of the mishnah, in typical situations a man would betroth a woman and only some time later marry her. The marriage was actualized by him bringing her into the huppah, which was a true bridal chamber, and not the symbolic huppah used today. In the huppah the couple would have sexual relations. Once the woman is betrothed, she is considered like a full wife with regard to adultery. Therefore, if the two brides were switched, each brother who has relations with the other’s wife has violated the prohibition of adultery.", + "He has also violated the prohibition of having relations with your brother’s wife. See Leviticus 18:16 and 20:21.", + "If they were sisters he has also violated the prohibition of having relations with one’s wife’s sister. See Leviticus Leviticus 18:18.", + "If they were menstruating, the brothers have violated the prohibition of having relations with a menstruant. See Leviticus 18:19.", + "Before each wife can return to having relations with her lawful husband, she must wait three months, lest she was impregnated on her wedding night. The three months allows us to recognize whether the child is from the wrong husband. If she was impregnated by the wrong husband, the child will be a mamzer. If she was a minor who could not become pregnant, the three month waiting period is unnecessary.", + "If these women were from priestly families, they will no longer be allowed to eat terumah, for any woman who has had relations with someone forbidden to her, can no longer marry a priest or eat terumah. If her husband should die without children, she does not return to her priestly family and resume eating terumah, as would a normal widow in such a situation (see Leviticus 22:13)." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses the case where a yavam performs halitzah, but then the woman who had halitzah is found to be pregnant with the dead husband’s child.", + "A yavam performs halitzah for his yevamah, and she is subsequently found to be pregnant and she gives birth:
If the child is viable, he is permitted to marry her relatives and she is permitted to marry his relatives, and he does not disqualify her from marrying a priest. If the child is viable, meaning there was no miscarriage, then the halitzah was unnecessary, because only a husband who has no children cause his wives to be subject to yibbum. Since the halitzah was not necessary, all of the results of a man performing halitzah for a woman do not occur. He is permitted to marry her relatives and she is permitted to his relatives [mishnah 7 below will list which relatives are forbidden had the halitzah been necessary]. Furthermore, since the halitzah was unnecessary, she is not disqualified from subsequently marrying a priest, as a regular halutzah (a woman who has had halitzah is).", + "If the child is not viable, he is forbidden to marry her relatives and she is forbidden to marry his relatives, and he disqualifies her from marrying a priest. If the child was not viable, meaning she had a miscarriage, then the halitzah was necessary. Therefore, all of the results of a valid halitzah do occur. He is forbidden to marry her relatives and she may not marry his. She is considered a halutzah, and therefore she can no longer marry a priest." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah deals with a case where the yevamah is found to be pregnant after having yibbum. In the previous mishnah she was found pregnant after halitzah.", + "A yavam marries his yevamah and she is subsequently found to be pregnant, and she gives birth:
If the child is viable, he must divorce her and both are obligated to bring a sacrifice; If the child is viable, then the yibbum was unnecessary, for only the wives of childless husbands must go through yibbum. Not only was the yibbum unnecessary, but the marriage of the yavam to the yevamah was prohibited, for she is the wife of his brother [Marrying one’s brother’s wife is forbidden in all cases except for when yibbum is obligatory]. Therefore, he must divorce her and both must bring a sin-offering for having forbidden relations.", + "If the child is not viable, he may retain her [as a wife]. If the child was not viable, then the yibbum was valid and he may retain her as a wife. Neither must bring a sin-offering.", + "If it is doubtful whether it is a nine-months child of the first [husband] or a seven-months child of the second [husband] he must divorce her, and the child is legitimate, and they must bring an asham talui. If it is unclear whether the child was from the first husband, and the pregnancy was full-term, or the child was from the second husband (the yavam) and the pregnancy was only seven months long, then the yavam still must divorce her, lest the yibbum was unnecessary and she is forbidden to him because she is his brother’s wife. The child is not in any way illegitimate, whether or not it was from the first or second husband. Both the man and the woman must bring a sacrifice known as an “asham talui” (a dependent guilt-offering), which is brought when a person does not know whether or not what he did was sinful. In this case he has only transgressed if the child was not his. Note that the mishnah does not talk about an eight-month child. In the ancient world, it was considered impossible for a child born in the eighth month of pregnancy to live. Children born at nine or at seven months could live, but not those born after eight months. The rabbis also believed this “scientific” belief, and hence will often call a child born in the eighth month a “miscarriage”. If the child nevertheless lived, they probably assumed that they had counted the months wrong. The rabbis also developed a theory that there were two different types of pregnancies: a seven month and a nine month. If the child was born at eight months and lived, it must have been a seven month pregnancy that was overdue. If the child was born at eight months and died, it must have been a premature nine month pregnancy." + ], + [ + "Introduction In order to understand this mishnah, we must understand some background laws concerning a woman’s ownership of property, her dowry and her ketubah. When a man marries a woman he writes her a ketubah (a marriage document). In the ketubah is written the amount of money he will pay her upon divorce or his death. Additionally, some of the dowry that the woman brings into the marriage is written in the ketubah. Dowry can come in two forms. The first form is called “pluckable property” (nikhse melog). This is money that she brings from her father’s house that remain hers and the husband may not use. The husband has rights to the profit earned from this money during the marriage. He has no responsibility for the money. For instance, if she brings in a piece of land, the land is hers but the husband may use the fruits of the land. If the land should be taken by the Romans, he is not responsible to pay his wife the value of the land. Money that she receives as a gift or as an inheritance is part of this category. The second form is “property of iron sheep” (nikhse tzon barzel). This is written in the ketubah and hence the husband has responsibility for it, should the property be lost, stolen or destroyed. The husband may use the property. His sole responsibility is to return the value of the original property upon death or divorce. A wife may not sell either of these types of property without her husband’s permission. Neither may a husband sell the first type of dowry without his wife’s permission, since it is still hers. He may however sell “property of iron sheep”. Our mishnah discusses the status of the shomeret yavam, a widow who is waiting for her yavam to do yibbum or halitzah.", + "If a shomeret yavam came into possession of money: Beth Shammai and Beth Hillel agree that she may sell it or give it away, and that her act is legally valid. Beth Shammai and Beth Hillel agree that a shomereth yavam can sell new property that has come into her hands since the death of her first husband. She does not need the permission of the yavam, because he has not married her.", + "If she dies, what shall be done with her ketubah and with property that comes in and goes out with her? Beth Shammai says: the heirs of her husband are to share it with the heirs of her father; Beth Hillel says: the property is to remain with those in whose possession it is, the ketubah is to remain in the possession of the heirs of the husband and the property which comes in and goes out with her remains in the possession of the heirs of her father. If she dies, there is a dispute between the two houses concerning her inheritance. Usually a husband inherits his wife, but in this case she only had a yavam who had not yet performed yibbum. He is not fully her husband. Beth Shammai holds that the heirs of her husband, meaning the yavam who inherits from his dead brother, splits the money with the heirs of her father. The heirs of the father inherit since an unmarried woman is inherited by her father. Beth Hillel does not split the money evenly. Rather, each part of the inheritance remains where it is presumed to be. Since the ketubah, meaning the money paid from the husband to the wife upon death or divorce, is still with the husband’s estate, the husband’s inheritors collect this money. Additionally, the “property of iron sheep” is in her husband’s possession since he has full ownership over it. Therefore, the husband’s owners collect this as well. [This is Albeck’s explanation. The talmud explains that “property of iron sheep” is split between the husband’s and father’s inheritors.] The “pluckable property” is in the wife’s possession, since the husband cannot sell it. Therefore the wife’s father’s inheritors inherit this property." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is the final clause of yesterday’s mishnah, which discusses the shomeret yavam.", + "If he married her she is his wife in every respect save that her ketubah remains a debt on her first husband’s estate. When the yavam has yibbum with the shomeret yavam, she becomes his wife in every respect. If he wishes to divorce her he must give her a get and she doesn’t require halitzah. He can remarry her after divorcing her (provided she doesn’t remarry in between) and she is not forbidden as “his brother’s wife”. When she dies he inherits her. The only difference between her and a regular wife is that if he dies or divorces her, the ketubah is paid from the estate of the first husband. In any case, the rabbis declared that if the dead brother died penniless, the yavam must pay for her ketubah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah answers the question, which of the surviving brothers must or can perform yibbum or halitzah.", + "The commandment of yibbum is upon the eldest [of the surviving brothers]. If he declines, they pass in turn to all the other brothers. If they decline, they return to the eldest and say to him, “the commandment is upon you; either perform halitzah or yibbum.” As we taught above in chapter two, mishnah eight, the duty of yibbum is incumbent upon the eldest surviving brother. The other brothers should not perform yibbum until their elder brothers have declined the opportunity. However, as we learned there, if a younger brother does perform yibbum before the older brother has a chance to accept or decline, his yibbum is valid. If the eldest brother does not want to perform yibbum, all of the other brothers are given the opportunity, in order of their age. If they all do not wish to perform yibbum, they (perhaps referring to a court) return to the eldest brother and tells him that he must either perform yibbum or halitzah. He is not allowed to leave this woman hanging any longer. The mishnah also teaches that the duty of halitzah is also primarily upon the eldest surviving brother." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is a direct continuation of the previous one.", + "If he wished to suspend [his decision] until a minor becomes of age, or until the eldest returns from a country beyond the sea or [until a brother who was] a deaf-mute or an imbecile [should recover], he is not to be listened to, but is told, “the commandment is upon you; either perform halitzah or yibbum.” . If the eldest brother does not want to perform halitzah or yibbum, but rather wait until a younger brother becomes old enough to have yibbum with this woman, he is not listened to. Rather he is told that he must either perform yibbum or halitzah. The mishnah teaches that it is not fair to the woman to keep her waiting for halitzah. She has the right to be released now, so that she can go and marry whomever she wants. Similarly, if one of the younger brothers wants to wait for an older brother to return from abroad, or recover from deafness or from being an imbecile (this may be some sort of temporary insanity), they do not listen to him and force him to do yibbum or halitzah immediately. Note that a deaf-mute and an imbecile cannot contract yibbum or any type of marriage because they are considered to lack intelligence. As I have pointed out before, in mishnaic times real sign language did not exist, and therefore deaf-mutes could not really communicate. Now that sign language has been developed it is recognized that deaf-mutes do not inherently lack intelligence and they may contract marriage." + ], + [ + "Introduction The first half of this mishnah discusses how the brothers divide the inheritance from the dead brother. The second half of the mishnah teaches that when a man performs halitzah, he is thereafter forbidden to marry his halutzah’s relatives and she is forbidden to marry his.", + "He who performs halitzah with his yevamah, behold he is regarded as one of the other brothers in respect of inheritance. If the father was living, the estate belongs to the father. When a man dies without children, his primary inheritor is his father. If his father is not alive, then his brothers split the inheritance. When a man performs halitzah for his dead, childless brother’s widow, he now reverts to being like one of the other brothers with respect to his dead brothers inheritance. His having performed halitzah does not acquire for him any special rights vis-a-vis the inheritance. If his father was still alive, the father inherits as usual.", + "He who marries his yevamah acquires his brother’s estate. R. Judah said: in either case, if the father was living the estate belongs to the father. If, however, he performed yibbum, he has now taken the place of his dead brother. Therefore, according to the first opinion in the mishnah, he inherits his brother’s entire estate, even if the father is alive. R. Judah disagrees and holds that if the father is still alive, the father’s right to the inheritance trumps the yavam’s right.", + "He who performs halitzah with his yevamah, he is forbidden to marry her relatives and she is forbidden to marry his relatives: He is forbidden to marry her mother, her mother’s mother and her father’s mother; her daughter, her daughter’s daughter and her son’s daughter; and also her sister while she is alive. The other brothers are permitted. She is forbidden to marry his father and his father’s father; his son and his son’s son; his brother and his brother’s son. Just as a man cannot marry the relatives of his wife or his divorcee, so too, our mishnah teaches, a man cannot marry his halutzah’s relatives and she cannot marry his. The mishnah now lists which relatives are forbidden. These relatives are forbidden even if the halutzah should die, just as they are forbidden to a man should his divorcee die. The list includes her mother, grandmothers, daughter and granddaughters. The yavam may not marry the halutzah’s sister, but this prohibition is only while the halutzah is alive. After she dies he may marry them, just as a man may marry his divorcee’s sister after the divorcee dies. The mishnah teaches that only the brother who performs halitzah is forbidden from marrying her relatives. The other brothers of the deceased brother are not forbidden, since once halitzah has been performed their ties to her have been severed. The halutzah is forbidden to marry his relatives as well. These include his father and grandfathers, his son and grandsons, and his brother and his brother’s son. Note that most of these relatives would have been forbidden to her because of her marriage to the first brother. For instance, she cannot marry the father of the yavam, because he is also the father of her deceased husband and a man may not marry his daughter-in-law, even after his sons death.", + "A man is permitted to marry the relative of the rival of his halutzah but is forbidden to marry the rival of the relative of his halutzah. Although the rabbis declared that a man may not marry the relatives of his halutzah, he may marry the relatives of the rival wife of his halutzah. For instance, if Reuven dies and leaves two wives, Rachel and Tovah (not sisters), and Shimon performs halitzah for Rachel, even though he cannot marry Tovah, for she is the rival wife of his halutzah, he may marry Tovah’s relatives. The final piece of the mishnah presents the following scenario. Reuven dies leaving two wives, Rachel and Tovah, and Shimon performs halitzah for Rachel. Leah, Rachel’s sister was married to Chaim who is not related to Shimon. Chaim has another wife named Chana. Then Chaim dies. Just as Shimon cannot marry Rachel, because she is the relative of his halutzah, so too he cannot marry Chana, for she is the rival wife of the relative of his halutzah. This is how Rashi explains this piece, but there are others who explain it differently." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to teach that it is forbidden to marry the sister of one’s halutzah.", + "If he performed halitzah for his yevamah, and his brother married her sister and died, she must perform halitzah but may not be taken in yibbum. If Reuven performs halitzah for Rachel (who had been married to Shimon) and then Levi marries Leah, Rachel’s sister, and then Levi dies, Leah now falls in front of Reuven for yibbum or halitzah. Since Leah is the sister of his halutzah, Rachel, Reuven cannot have yibbum with her. However, since the prohibition of the sister of one’s halutzah is only of rabbinic origin (derabbanan), she must have halitzah and is not totally exempt.", + "Similarly if a man divorces his wife and his brother marries her sister and dies behold she is exempt from halitzah and from yibbum. Similarly, if Reuven divorces Rachel, and Shimon marries Leah and then Shimon dies childless, Leah is exempt from both halitzah and yibbum, since she is the sister of his former wife. Since this is biblically prohibited, Leah does not even need to have halitzah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nMishnah nine continues to discuss various scenarios of yibbum.", + "If the brother of the yavam had betrothed the sister of the shomeret yavam, in the name of Rabbi Judah ben Batera they said: they say to him “Wait until your older brother has done something”. Rachel becomes liable to have yibbum or halitzah with Reuven, her dead husband’s brothers. Before Shimon, the oldest surviving brother does yibbum or halitzah with her, Levi betroths Leah, Rachel’s sister. This is problematic because Leah is the sister of his z’kukah, a woman who is tied to him by her requiring yibbum or halitzah. However, the betrothal is valid. According to Rabbi Judah ben Batera, they tell Levi, the betrother, that he should not fully marry Leah until Shimon (or another brother) has done yibbum or halitzah with Rachel. That would end any ties between Rachel and Levi and allow Levi to fully marry Leah.", + "If his brother performed halitzah for her or married her, he may marry his [betrothed] wife. If Levi’s brother does halitzah or yibbum, Levi can now marry Leah.", + "If the yevamah died he may marry his [betrothed] wife. If Rachel dies, Levi can marry Leah, for she is no longer the sister of a woman tied to him. The woman who was tied to him is now dead.", + "If the yavam died, he must divorce his wife with a get and [release] his brother’s wife by halitzah. If Shimon dies, and there are no other brothers, Levi is now in quite a pickle. Levi must perform halitzah or yibbum for Rachel for he is the only surviving brother. However, he cannot do either while he is betrothed to Rachel’s sister Leah. Therefore he must first divorce Leah and then perform halitzah for Rachel. He cannot have yibbum with her because she is the sister of his divorcee. Furthermore, the mishnah teaches that although generally the sister of one’s divorcee is exempt from either yibbum or halitzah (as we learned in yesterday’s mishnah), in this case since the ties to Rachel existed before the betrothal to Leah, Rachel is not exempt." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah teaches that certain women must wait three months before remarrying in order that there will be no confusion as to whether the subsequent pregnancy is from the previous husband or the new husband.", + "The yevamah shall neither perform halitzah nor be taken in yibbum before three months have passed [since her husband’s death]. The yevamah may not perform halitzah or be taken in yibbum for three months lest she be pregnant with her first husband’s child. We encountered this problem in mishnayoth one and two of this chapter. There the mishnah dealt with the problems that could occur if she does get married or perform halitzah within this period. Here the mishnah states that in order to avoid those problems, she should wait three months.", + "Similarly all other women shall be neither be betrothed nor married before three months have passed. Whether they were virgins or non-virgins, whether divorcees or widows, whether married or betrothed. Rabbi Judah said: those who were married may be betrothed [immediately], and those who were betrothed may be married [immediately], with the exception of the betrothed women in Judea, because there the bridegroom was intimate with [his bride]. Rabbi Yose said: all [married] women may be betrothed [immediately] with the exception of the widow because of her mourning. The mishnah now broadens its scope and says that all widows and divorcees should not remarry within three months, again so that it is clear whose child the new baby is. Note that in these cases the only issue is inheritance and status of the child (i.e. is the child a kohen). There are now three opinions in the mishnah as to which women must wait three months. According to the first opinion, all women, even if they were merely betrothed must wait three months. Although generally betrothed women should not have had sexual relations with their husbands, and hence it should be clear that the pregnancy with her new husband is from him, she should still wait. The idea may be that in order not to create confusion, all women wait an equal period. According to Rabbi Judah a woman who was divorced or widowed from a full marriage may be betrothed within three months, because betrothal does not usually entail sexual relations. A woman who was divorced or widowed from betrothal may even be married within three months for the same reason. The only exception is the betrothed woman in Judea. According to this source and Mishnah Ketuboth 1:5, there was a suspicion that in Judea men might have relations with their betrothed wives before proper marriage. Therefore in Judea the betrothed woman is treated like a married woman and she must wait. Rabbi Yose says that all women may be betrothed within three months, but not widows. The reason that widows have to wait (and divorcees do not) is not in order to recognize whose child the new baby is, but because the widow cannot even be betrothed while mourning. We can see in this mishnah that betrothal was seen to be a joyous occasion and that they probably would celebrate it with a party. The Talmud states that this period is one month. Hence divorcees can be betrothed immediately and widows must wait a month. Of course, both would have to wait three months for proper marriage." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah teaches that one yavam can perform yibbum for several women if they were widows of different brothers. However, if they were all from the same brother he can have yibbum with only one of them.", + "If four brothers were married to four women, and they died, if the eldest [surviving brother] desires he may contract yibbum with all of them. In this case four widows from four different brothers all fall before the same brother for yibbum or halitzah. The mishnah teaches that this one yavam may have yibbum with all of them. The Talmud, however, notes a certain reservation. He is allowed to do so only if he is going to be able to provide well for them all. Bigamy was permitted under Jewish law, but only on the condition that the husband provide equally well for each wife. Also, the Talmud notes that it is not such a good idea to have four wives for there will be much strife in his home. Nevertheless, it is theoretically possible.", + "If a man was married to two women and died, sexual relations or halitzah with one of them exempts her rival. If two women who were married to the same brother fall in front of the yavam for yibbum, he need perform halitzah or yibbum for only one of them. He is not allowed to have yibbum nor halitzah with both.", + "If one of them was eligible [to marry a priest] and one ineligible [to marry a priest], then if he performs halitzah it should be to her who is ineligible, and if he contracts yibbum it may be with her who is eligible. If one of these two women was already ineligible to subsequently marry a kohen, for instance she was a divorcee from a previous marriage, the yavam should do halitzah with her and not with the other sister. This is because halitzah makes her forbidden to subsequently marry a kohen and there is no reason to needlessly disqualify the eligible widow from marrying a kohen. However, if he is going to do yibbum, he can have yibbum even with the sister eligible to the kohen, since this does not disqualify her from later marrying a priest." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah begins to discuss the definition of a mamzer, the child of an illicit union. The question that is asked is: which illicit unions produce children that are considered mamzers?", + "A man who remarried his divorced wife, or married his halutzah, or married the relative of his halutzah must divorce her, and the child is a mamzer; the words of Rabbi Akiva. But the Sages say: the child is not a mamzer. They agree that where a man married the relative of his divorcee the child is a mamzer. According to Deuteronomy 24:2-4 if a man divorces his wife and she remarries and then is divorced or widowed, the first husband may not remarry her. As we have seen throughout this tractate a man may not marry his halutzah or the relative of his halutzah (for instance her mother or daughter). Rabbi Akiva says that if the man does transgress and marry one of these women he must divorce her and the child is a mamzer. As we shall see in the next mishnah, Rabbi Akiva holds that the child of any illegal union is a mamzer. The Sages disagree and hold that the child is not a mamzer. As we shall see in the next mishnah, the Sages hold that a union that is a transgression of a negative commandment that is not punished by death or kareth does not create a mamzer. Since these transgressions are not punished by kareth, the child is not a mamzer. Furthermore, the prohibition of the sister of one’s halutzah is only derabbanan (of rabbinic origin) and therefore the child cannot be a mamzer. Marrying the relative of one’s divorcee is biblically prohibited and is punishable by kareth. Therefore the Sages agree with Rabbi Akiva that the child is a mamzer." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first section of this mishnah defines a mamzer. The second section teaches that the prohibition of a wife’s sister (Leviticus 18:18) is only while the wife is still alive, but is effective even if the couple is divorced. However, once the wife dies he may marry her sister.", + "Who is a mamzer? [The offspring of a union with] any relative with whom cohabitation is forbidden, the words of Rabbi Akiva. Shimon the Yemenite says: [The offspring of any union] for which one is obligated kareth at the hands of heaven; and the halachah is like his words. Rabbi Joshua says: [The offspring of any union] for which one is obligated death at the hands of a court.
Rabbi Shimon ben Azzai said: I found a scroll of genealogical records in Jerusalem, and it was written on it, “So-and-so is a mamzer [having been born] from an adulterous woman”, which confirms the view of Rabbi Joshua. In this section there are three opinions as to which type of forbidden unions create mamzers. Rabbi Akiva’s opinion is the strictest: any forbidden union of an incestuous nature creates a mamzer. This would preclude only forbidden unions that are not incestuous, such as a kohen and a divorcee. Shimon the Yemenite (who is not called rabbi) holds that any forbidden union punishable by kareth creates a mamzer. Shimon the Yemenite rejects Rabbi Akiva and holds that forbidden unions that are merely prohibited but not punishable by kareth or death do not create mamzers. An example of such a case is a shomeret yavam who gets remarried to an outsider without first having yibbum or halitzah with her yavam. According to Rabbi Akiva the child of such a marriage is a mamzer and according to Shimon the Yemenite the child is not. Interestingly, the mishnah explicitly states that the halakhah is according to this view. This is one of the few times that the Mishnah makes such a remark. Rabbi Joshua is even more lenient concerning the creation of mamzers. Only a union punishable by death creates mamzers. Rabbi Shimon ben Azzai claims that he found a scroll of genealogical records in which it was recorded that So-and-so was a mamzer because he was the son of an adulterous affair, which is punishable by death. From here he concludes that the halakhah is like Rabbi Joshua. However, Rabbi Akiva and Shimon the Yemenite could both claim that just because this mamzer was from an adulterous affair punishable by death does not prove that the halakhah is like Rabbi Joshua.", + "If a man’s wife died, he is permitted to marry her sister. If he divorced her and then she died he is permitted to marry her sister. If she was married to another man and died, he is permitted to marry her sister. If a man’s sister-in-law died, he may marry her sister. If he performed for her halitzah and then she died, he is permitted to marry her sister. This section teaches that the sister of one’s wife is only forbidden during the wife’s lifetime, even after divorce. This is stated explicitly in Leviticus 18:18, “Do not marry a woman as a rival to her sister and uncover her nakedness in the other’s lifetime.” Once the wife dies, whether while the couple is still married, after they are divorced or after her remarriage, the husband may marry her sister. However, if any of these things occur and the wife is still alive, he may not marry her sister. Similarly, a man cannot marry the sister of his yavamah while she is alive, even after he performed halitzah for her. However, after she dies he may marry her sister." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nIn order to understand this chapter we should review a few general issues of yibbum.\n1) According to the Torah the shomeret yavam becomes the yavam’s wife only through sexual intercourse. However, the Sages decreed that the yavam should first perform “ma’amar”, an act whereby he betroths her, either by money or by a document, the same way betrothal is enacted with other women. After ma’amar then the couple would have yibbum, enacted by sexual intercourse.\n2) A shomeret yavam’s ties to her yavam are biblically severed only through halitzah. However, the Sages decreed that if the yavam gives her a get, while it does not exempt her from halitzah, it makes the performance of yibbum forbidden. In other words it does in some sense sever the tie, thereby making her forbidden due to the prohibition of marrying a brother’s wife. Furthermore, after giving her a get he is forbidden to marry her rival wives, as are the rest of the brothers. He is also forbidden to marry any of her relatives. She is forbidden to marry a priest, as are all divorcees.\n3) If the yavam performed ma’amar and then changes his mind and doesn’t want to have yibbum with her, he must give her a get and perform halitzah. The get severs the ties created by ma’amar and the halitzah performs its usual function of exempting her from yibbum.", + "This mishnah is formulated in classic mishnaic style. It is terse, somewhat cryptic, easy to remember, and most importantly, it packs a lot of information into only a few words. Our job in explaining the mishnah will be to “unpack” it and decipher each clause. There is no [validity] to a get given after a get: If two women are widowed from one brother and both become liable for yibbum with one yavam and he gives the first one a get and then the second one a get, the get that was given to the second woman is meaningless and she is not considered to be a divorcee. As we stated in the above introduction, according to biblical law, a shomeret yavam does not receive a get. However the Sages decreed that a get is sufficient to make the other rival wives forbidden to the yavam and to make yibbum forbidden with the one who received the get. Since the second woman to receive the get is not a divorcee, the yavam may subsequently marry her relatives, and she may subsequently marry a priest. Nor to a ma’amar after a ma’amar: If one yavam does ma’amar to both of the women who become liable to him for yibbum, or two yavamim do ma’amar with one women who became liable for yibbum with either of them, the second ma’amar is meaningless. Although ma’amar is only of rabbinic origin, its strength is sufficient to render the acquisition of the yevamah as final. The second wife then received a meaningless ma’amar, for she was no longer liable for yibbum. Similarly, the second yavam performed a meaningless ma’amar for the woman was no longer available. Nor to an act of sexual intercourse after another act of sexual intercourse: If one yavam had intercourse, that is, an act of yibbum, with two yevamoth, the second act does not make that yevamah his wife. It is merely licentious sexual relations, for the woman is no longer liable for yibbum after her rival wife has had yibbum. She would not need a get in order to remarry. Nor to a halitzah after another halitzah: Whether one yavam performed halitzah for two yevamoth, or two yevamim performed halitzah for one yevamah, the second act of halitzah is meaningless, for the first act already severed all ties. The result is that the second woman to receive halitzah is not considered to be a halutzah.", + "However, the Sages say: There is [validity] to a get given after a get, and to a ma’amar after a ma’amar but not to an act of sexual intercourse after another act of sexual intercourse, or to a halitzah after another halitzah. The Sages disagree with the first two parts of Rabban Gamaliel’s statement. They hold that a yevamah who receives a get is not like one who has had halitzah. Since the one who receives a get still needs halitzah, the second get also has some validity. The fact that the second woman to receive a get is in some sense his divorcee, means that he cannot marry her relatives. She also could not subsequently marry a kohen. Similarly, the Sages hold that ma’amar does not acquire like yibbum. Since one who has been given ma’amar still needs yibbum to complete her becoming his wife, the second ma’amar does have some validity. The second woman to receive ma’amar would need a get to remarry, and the one who gave her ma’amar is subsequently forbidden to marry her relatives. In brief, we can see in this mishnah a debate concerning the power of rabbinic decrees. According to Rabban Gamaliel, the rabbinically decreed ma’amar and get for the yevamah are almost as strong as the biblically ordained yibbum and halitzah. According to the Sages, they are substantially weaker." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe remainder of the chapter gives various scenarios of a yavam’s releasing his yevamah from the necessity for yibbum. In order to understand these mishnayoth, it is important to keep in mind that a get (a divorce document) severs the ties created by ma’amar (an act of betrothal) and halitzah severs the ties created by the need for yibbum.", + "How [is the release from yibbum effected]?
If he performed ma'amar for his yevamah and gave her a get, she requires halitzah. When the yavam performed ma’amar he made the yevamah into his betrothed wife. When he subsequently gives her the get, he has ended the ties created by ma’amar. Since he never did yibbum or halitzah, she still requires halitzah to sever the ties created by the need for yibbum. He could not have yibbum with her because she is already his divorcee.", + "If he performed ma'amar and and did halizah, she requires a get. If he did ma’amar and then halitzah, she still needs a get to sever the ties created by the ma’amar. The halitzah is not sufficient to break the betrothal created by ma’amar. He cannot marry her because she is his halutzah.", + "If he performed ma’amar and then had intercourse with her, behold this is in accordance with the commandment. The normal, prescribed means of fulfilling the mitzvah of yibbum is for the yavam first to perform ma’amar and then, assumedly some time later, for them to have sexual relations. This is the same way that normal marriage is enacted: first the betrothal is done and then the couple begins to live together, today symbolized by the huppah (the wedding canopy). Since some time in the middle ages, Jews have combined the betrothal ceremony and the marriage proper into one event. " + ], + [ + "If the yavam gave her a get and then ma’amar, she needs [another] get and halitzah. As we learned above, only halitzah exempts the yevamah from her requirement for yibbum. When the yavam gave her a get, her ties to him were not completely severed. The only effect was that it was subsequently forbidden for him to have yibbum with her. When he then does ma’amar with her, she now requires another get in order to sever the ties created by this ma’amar. Finally, she still requires halitzah to sever the ties created by the need for yibbum.", + "If he gave her a get and then had intercourse with her, she needs [another] get and halitzah. In this case, after giving her the get, he has intercourse with her. This intercourse was forbidden, since she had already received a get. Therefore, since this was forbidden, it does not count as an act of yibbum. However, the mishnah teaches that it still has enough power to obligate him to give her another get, to sever the ties created by the intercourse [intercourse is one of the three means by which betrothals are contracted]. Finally, she still requires halitzah to sever the ties created by the need for yibbum.", + "If he gave her a get and then did halitzah, there is nothing after halitzah. Here the mishnah teaches that once he has performed halitzah, she is totally free and there is no longer anything preventing her from marrying anyone else.", + "If the yavam did halitzah and then he did ma’amar or gave her a get, or had intercourse with her; Or if he had intercourse with her and then did ma’amar, or gave her a get, or did halitzah, there is nothing after halitzah. The first part of this section teaches that once he does halitzah, whatever he does afterwards, be it give her ma’amar, a get or have intercourse, does not count for anything. The halitzah severs all ties and anything done afterwards is inconsequential. The second part of this section teaches that just as there is no validity to anything after halitzah, so too there is no validity to anything after yibbum. For instance, were he to do halitzah after having already performed yibbum, the halitzah would be inconsequential. Of course, if he gives her a get after having done yibbum she is a divorcee, as is any wife who receives a divorce. The mishnah intends only to teach that yibbum turns a yevamah into a full wife and halitzah totally exempts her from any subsequent need for yibbum.", + "[And the law is the same] whether there is one yevamah to one yavam or two yevamoth to one yavam. With regard to all the combinations that we have been learning in the previous mishnayoth, it matters not whether they were done by one yavam with one yevamah or with two different yevamoth. The general rule is always true: there is “something” after a get and after ma’amar, and after halitzah and yibbum there is nothing. The following mishnayoth will continue to explain these complex possibilities." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah demonstrates the different possibilities and combinations of halitzah, yibbum, ma’amar and a get and their consequences on a case where there is one yavam and two yevamoth (i.e. the brother who died without children left two wives).", + "How is this so?
If the yavam did ma'amar with this one and ma'amar with the other one, they need two letters of divorce and [one of them must have] halizah. The ma’amar performed with both yevamoth means that both require a get if they wish to marry someone else. In addition, one of them requires halitzah to end the ties created by their need for yibbum. As we recall, they don’t both need halitzah, since the halitzah of one wife exempts all of her rival wives. He could not have yibbum with either, since he gave ma’amar to both.", + "If he did ma'amar with one and gave a get to the other, the [first one] needs a get and [one of them must have] halitzah. In this case he must give the get to the first one, the one with whom he had ma’amar, and he can have halitzah with either. Again, the halitzah of either releases them both. He cannot have yibbum even with the one with whom he had ma’amar since he gave a get to her rival wife.", + "If he did ma'amar with one and had intercourse with the other, they need two gets and [one of them must have] halitzah. Once he had ma’amar with one wife, he should not have gone and had intercourse with the other wife. The intercourse was in an essence an ineffective act of yibbum. Therefore, they both need gets, one to end the ties created by the ma’amar and the other to end the ties created by the intercourse (which can be an act of betrothal) and one requires halitzah in order to release them both from the ties of yibbum.", + "If he had ma'amar with one and gave halitzah to the other, the first needs a get. Although in this case he did have halitzah with the second wife, the ma’amar that was previously done with the first wife means that she still needs a get. In other words, the ties created by the necessity of yibbum have already been severed, but there are still the ties created by the ma’amar. He could not have yibbum with her, since he has already done halitzah with the other wife, and it is forbidden to marry the wife of one’s halutzah.", + "If he gave a get to one and a get to the other, [one of them] requires halitzah. After having given a get to both women, he still needs to perform halitzah to totally release them. The get is not sufficient to sever those ties. However, he may not have yibbum with either woman since they both already received gets.", + "If he gave a get to one and had intercourse with the other, [the second one] requires a get and [one of them must have] halitzah. In this case, once he has given a get to the first wife, the yibbum done by intercourse with the second wife, was invalid. Therefore, he must give a get to the second wife, with whom he has already had intercourse, to sever the ties created by the intercourse. One of them still needs halitzah.", + "[If he gave] a get to one and had ma'amar with the other, [the second] requires a get and [one of them must have] halitzah. Similar to the previous case, if he gave a get to the first one, the ma’amar with second one is not valid. He could not subsequently have yibbum with her. However, he must still give her a get to sever the ties created by the ma’amar. As always, one of them still needs halitzah.", + "[If he gave] a get to one and halizah to the other, there is nothing after halitzah. As we learned in mishnah three, once he has performed an act of halitzah, there are no more steps which must be taken. Both women may now go marry other men." + ], + [ + "If he performed halitzah [for one] and then performed halitzah [for the other],
Or performed halitzah [for one] and did ma'amar [with the other], or gave her get, or had intercourse with her;
Or if he had intercourse [with one] and then with the other,
Or had intercourse [with one] and then ma'amar with the other, or gave her a get, or performed halitzah there is nothing after halitzah.
[There is no difference in the law] whether there was one yavam to two yevamoth or two yavamim to yevamah.
This mishnah continues to teach that once one of the yavamim has performed halitzah or yibbum with one of the yevamoth, any subsequent action done with the other yevamah, be it halitzah, a get, ma’amar or intercourse, is meaningless.
Section one: In this case the yavam has halitzah with one of the yevamoth and then halitzah with the other. As we will learn in section four, since the second halitzah was unnecessary, it has no effect. He can marry that halutzah’s relatives and she can marry his.
Section two: Similarly, if he has halitzah with one and then ma’amar, a get or intercourse with the other, the subsequent actions are invalid. The woman who received ma’amar does not need a get, nor does the woman with whom he had intercourse. The woman who received the get is not a divorcee but a widow, who may subsequently marry a kohen. In all of these cases, he can marry her relatives and she may marry his.
Sections three and four: These sections teach the same ruling, but with regard to yibbum, performed through intercourse. Once the yavam has yibbum with one of the yevamoth, all subsequent actions are invalid. Although the mishnah states only that “there is nothing after halitzah”, the meaning is that there is nothing after halitzah or yibbum, as was taught in mishnah one of our chapter.
Section five: The rule that there is nothing after halitzah (or yibbum) is true whether or not there was one yavam who had halitzah with one of two yevamoth (and then did something else with the other yevamah), or two yevamim, one of whom had halitzah or yibbum first with one yevamah (and then the other brother did something else with the same yevamah). In all cases, once one brother has had halitzah or yibbum with one yevamah, all subsequent actions are meaningless." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah, the last in this chapter, continues to define the principle that there can be no valid act after halitzah or yibbum.", + "[If the yavam] performed halitzah and then did ma’amar, gave her a get, or had intercourse with her; Or if he had intercourse with her and then did ma'amar, gave her a get, or performed halitzah, there is no valid act after halitzah,
Whether [it was performed] in the beginning, in the middle, or at the end. The beginning of this section (until the words “there is nothing after halitzah) was taught word for word above, in mishnah three. The reason that it is repeated here is as in introduction for issue of “beginning, the middle and the end”. The mishnah adds that with regard to halitzah, it doesn’t matter when the halitzah was performed, no subsequent acts (intercourse, a get or ma’amar) can have any validity. Since the halitzah totally severs the connection between the yavam and the yevamah, anything done afterwards can have no validity.", + "Concerning intercourse, if it took place first there is no valid act after it; If it occurred in the middle or at the end there can be a valid act after it. Rabbi Nehemiah says: with both intercourse and halizah, whether it took place in the beginning, in the middle, or at the end, there is no validity in any act that follows it. According to the first opinion in this section, intercourse works differently from halitzah. If done at the beginning, the yevamah becomes his full wife and any act done afterwards is meaningless with regard to the laws of yibbum. In other words, after yibbum she becomes his normal wife. However, if the intercourse is done after another act, such as giving her a get or doing ma’amar with a rival wife, there is potential validity to subsequent acts. For instance, if he gives her a get it is now forbidden for him to have yibbum with her but she still needs halitzah, since the get does not sever the ties created by the necessity for yibbum. If he now goes ahead and has intercourse with her, she still needs halitzah, for the intercourse was an invalid act of yibbum. Even though the get was only of a “derabbanan” status, since only halitzah can biblically exempt the woman, the subsequent act of yibbum is still invalid. The halitzah required after this failed act of yibbum means that “there is validity to an act after intercourse” if it is not the first act performed. According to Rabbi Nehemiah, it does not matter when the act of yibbum was performed, there is never validity to any subsequent act. Even if the yavam gave her a get before he did yibbum, the yibbum is still valid and she does not need halitzah. Rabbi Nehemiah holds that since the get makes it forbidden only “derabbanan” to have yibbum, the yibbum is biblically valid and therefore exempts the woman from a need for yibbum. The deeper argument between Rabbi Nehemiah and the sages is over the validity of rabbinicly decreed laws. According to the sages the rabbinic prohibition of having yibbum after having given a get, makes the yibbum invalid. According to Rabbi Nehemiah, since the get is only derabbanan, it does not have the power to invalidate the yibbum, which is of biblical status." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah teaches that any intercourse counts as an act yibbum.", + "One who has intercourse with his yevamah, whether in error or with presumption, whether under compulsion or of his own free will, even if he acted in error and she in presumption, or he in presumption and she in error, or he under compulsion and she not under compulsion, or she under compulsion and he not under compulsion, whether he only began to have intercourse or he completed having intercourse, he has acquired her as a wife. The laws do not make a distinction between different types of intercourse. Whether in error or with presumption: In error means that he did not know that she was his yevamah. With presumption means that he did not intend to fulfill the mitzvah of yibbum, but rather just to have intercourse with her for the sake of pleasure. Whether under compulsion or of his own free will: Under compulsion means that someone forced him to have relations with the yevamah. Of his own free will means that he intended to fulfill the mitzvah. Even if he acted in error and she in presumption: He did not know that she was the yevamah, but she knew that he was the yavam but she did not intend to fulfill the mitzvah. Or he in presumption and she in error: He did not intend to fulfill the mitzah and she did not know who he was. Or he under compulsion and she not under compulsion: He was forced and she intended to fulfill the mitzvah. Or she under compulsion and he not under compulsion: She was forced but he was not. The same is true if both were forced, or both were presumptuous. The intercourse always counts. Whether he only began to have intercourse or he completed having intercourse: It does not matter if they complete having intercourse (assumedly referring to ejaculation). The laws do not make a distinction between different types of intercourse. According to the talmud, this means that even “non-natural” intercourse (anal sex) counts as intercourse for the sake of yibbum. In all of these cases, the mere act of intercourse means that he has acquired her as a wife." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nWhile the previous mishnah served as a quasi-summary to the preceding chapters which all dealt with yibbum, our mishnah serves as a bridge to a new topic: forbidden relationships, specifically women who are forbidden to priests. We will deal with these laws for the next four chapters of Mishnah.", + "Similarly, one who has intercourse with any of the forbidden relatives listed in the Torah, or with any of those who are disqualified to marry him as, for instance, a widow to a high priest, a divorced woman or a halutzah to a common priest, a mamzeret or a netinah to an Israelite or the daughter of an Israelite to a mamzer or a nathin, he has disqualifed [her from marrying a priest], and the laws do not make a distinction between different types of intercourse. This mishnah states the same rule that was stated in the previous mishnah: with regard to forbidden sexual relations, any sexual intercourse counts (i.e. unintentional, under compulsion, etc.). Furthermore, the point of our mishnah is that once a woman has had forbidden sexual intercourse, she can no longer marry a priest. This is true whether the intercourse was forbidden because it was with a priest and she was forbidden to a priest, or if the intercourse was forbidden to Israelites as well (such as a mamzer and an Israelite). In all cases the woman is forbidden to subsequently marry a priest. [Note that a mamzeret and a netinah could not in any case marry a priest. This clause was taught here only to teach that it is forbidden to have any type of intercourse with a mamzeret or a netinah]." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah teaches when the daughter of a priest who is married to someone forbidden to her, loses the right to eat terumah, which is reserved only for priests and their families.", + "A widow to a high priest, a divorced woman or a halutzah to an ordinary priest they do not eat terumah from the point of betrothal. Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon declare them eligible. There are three laws which must be explained before we can understand this mishnah. First of all it is forbidden for a widow to marry a high priest and for a divorcee or a halutzah to marry an ordinary priest. If they do, the women lose the right to eat terumah, both as wives of the priest and as daughters of priestly fathers. Second of all, an unmarried daughter of a priest continues to eat terumah until she is married. Once she is married, should she be widowed or divorced without children she returns to eating terumah. If she was married to a non-kohen and she had children, when divorced or widowed she does not eat terumah. Third of all, a woman who has relations with someone who is forbidden to her can no longer eat terumah. According to the first opinion in the mishnah, as soon as the woman is betrothed to someone to whom she is forbidden, she loses her right to eat terumah. Although she is only betrothed, and has not had sexual intercourse, she already loses the right to eat terumah. According to Rabbis Elazar and Shimon, she only loses that right when she actually marries the kohen, to whom she is forbidden. At the point of marriage the women become what is known as halalot, or profaned women, who may not eat terumah.", + "If they became widows or were divorced after full marriage they are ineligible; If after betrothal they are eligible. If they were married and then divorced or widowed, all the sages agree that they do not return to their father’s domain to eat terumah. Since they were married to someone to whom they are forbidden, they lose this right forever. However, if they were divorced or widowed from betrothal, then they may return and eat terumah. In this case even the sages who held the first opinion of section one hold that they may eat terumah. They were forbidden to eat terumah when they were betrothed women, waiting to be married to men forbidden to them. Now that they will surely not marry these men, they may return to their father’s home to eat terumah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with the prohibition of a widow to a high priest. This prohibition is mentioned in Leviticus 21:14.", + "A high priest shall not marry a widow whether she became a widow after a betrothal or after a marriage. A high priest cannot marry any widow, even one who was only betrothed and not married before she became a widow.", + "He shall not marry one who has reached puberty. Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon permit him to marry one who has reached puberty, but he may not marry one who lost her virginity through a stick. Leviticus 21:13 states that the high priest must marry a betulah, commonly translated as a virgin. The word “betulah” can also mean, young, unmarried girl. It was probably assumed that most prepubescent, unmarried girls were also physiological virgins. Incidentally, in Greek literature, virgin was also not used the same way that modern English uses the word virgin. It could also denote a young, unmarried girl. In any case, since the Torah states that he must marry a “betulah” the sages rule that he may not marry a girl who has reached puberty, which is actually six months after the first physical signs of maturation. The common age for this is 12 ½. Before this, by legal definition a girl could not reach puberty. Meaning, even if she did it was not considered to be statuary puberty. According to Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon, the high priest may marry a post-pubescent girl. According to their definition, a betulah is defined as one who still is physiologically a virgin. Since this girl is, the high priest may marry her. However, he may not marry one who has lost her physical signs of virginity in any way, even not through sexual intercourse. In the Mishnah a girl who lost her hymen in a way other than through sexual intercourse is called a “mukat etz”, literally, hit with a stick.", + "[A priest who] betrothed a widow, and was subsequently appointed high priest, may bring her into marriage. It once happened with Joshua ben Gamla that he betrothed Marta the daughter of Boethus, and the king appointed him high priest, and he brought her into marriage. If a priest betrothed a widow, who is permitted to an ordinary priest, and then subsequently was appointed high priest, he may complete the marriage, even though as high priest he cannot marry a widow. In essence the marital bonds are secured before he became high priest and by merely completing them and bringing her into marriage, he is not transgressing the Torah’s prohibition of a widow to a high priest. The mishnah relates the story on Joshua ben Gamala who married Marta, the widowed daughter of a very wealthy man, and then became a high priest. Although she was a widow, he was still allowed to bring her into marriage. Note that the function of the story in this mishnah is probably to demonstrate that not only do the sages rule that this is allowed, but the priests actually did so. This point is crucial since often we see priests being even more strict than the law requires, at least on issues of marriage and status.", + "If a shomeret yavam became liable to have yibbum with an ordinary priest and then he was appointed high priest, even though he already did ma’amar, he may not bring her into marriage. A high priest whose brother died must perform halitzah but may not contract yibbum. The laws of yibbum are problematic for a high priest, because he cannot marry a widow. In general we can see that the positive commandment to perform yibbum does not “trump” the prohibition of marrying a widow. This section teaches that if a shomeret yavam became liable for yibbum with an ordinary priest, and then he became high priest, even if he did ma’amar, he cannot marry her. Although in the above section we saw that if an ordinary priest had betrothed a woman and then been appointed high priest he could marry her, since ma’amar is only of rabbinic status (and not biblical as is regular betrothal), it does not create enough of a tie to allow him to marry her. If he were to have yibbum, it would count as marrying a widow while a high priest, which is forbidden. The mishnah ends by quoting mishnah Sanhedrin 2:1, which states that if a high priest’s brother dies without children, the high priest must perform halitzah and cannot have yibbum." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nLeviticus 21:7 states that an ordinary priest may not marry a “zonah”, usually translated as a “harlot”. In rabbinic literature the word “zonah” is used to refer to any woman who is categorically forbidden to a priest, even if she was not literally a harlot. Our mishnah discusses the definition of a zonah.", + "An ordinary priest shall not marry a woman incapable of procreation, unless he already has a wife or children. Rabbi Judah said: even though he has a wife and children he shall not marry a woman incapable of procreation, since she is a zonah, as mentioned in the Torah. But the Sages said: the term zonah implies only a female convert, freed slavewoman and one who has been subjected to illicit intercourse. A woman incapable of procreation is called an “aylonit”. The definition of “aylonit” is a woman who has never developed signs of sexual maturity. In other words, an aylonit is not a woman who looks like a sexually mature woman but has not succeeded in becoming pregnant. Rather an aylonit is a woman, who is clearly a woman and not a man, but who never hit puberty. An ordinary priest cannot marry her, and according to the Talmud, even a regular Israelite cannot marry her, unless he has already fulfilled the commandment of procreation. The reason that the mishnah teaches that an ordinary priest cannot marry her and does not say that no one can marry her, is that Rabbi Judah holds that an ordinary priest cannot marry her even if he has a wife and children. According to the first opinion in the mishnah the problem with the aylonit is that she cannot procreate. Therefore, a person can only marry her if he has already fulfilled the mitzvah of procreation or has another wife, with whom he may potentially fulfill the mitzvah. According to Rabbi Judah, the aylonit is categorized as a “zonah”, who is always forbidden to a priest, even if he already has children or another wife. She is a “zonah”, for the priest married her knowing that she could not procreate. The Sages disagree and claim that an aylonit is not a zonah. The Sages define a zonah as a female convert, a freed slavewoman or a woman who has had illicit intercourse. The first two are forbidden under the assumption that they had relations with Gentiles or slaves before conversion or manumission. Although that intercourse was permitted at the time, it still renders them off-limits to the priest. The woman who has had illicit intercourse is any woman who has had intercourse with someone with whom she is forbidden to marry." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nSince the previous mishnah mentioned the aylonit, who cannot have children, our mishnah discusses the obligation of procreation.", + "A man shall not abstain from procreation unless he already has children. Beth Shammai says: two males, And Beth Hillel says: male and a female, for it says, “Male and female created he them” (Genesis 5:2). The point that this line in the mishnah is trying to make can be read in two subtly different ways. It may be that the point of the line is to teach that there is an obligation to procreate. In other words, without this directive people may have thought (and in ancient Judaism some sects did think) that God preferred people to be celibate and to forego children. Judaism teaches the opposite. Sexual relations are generally viewed in a positive light and having children is positive commandment. The other way to read the line, is that it is taken for granted that a person is obligated to procreate. The innovation of our mishnah is that a man does not need to keep on having children as long as possible. Once he has had two children, he may desist from procreation. Understanding the line this way, we would have a different view of the mishnah. Although it is still considered a commandment to procreate, a person might fulfill that mitzah with only two children and then devote his life to other things, such as the study of Torah. We should note that in any case, the Talmud teaches that even if a man has children he should remain married for marriage is a preferred state. Beth Shammai holds that a person needs two male children to have fulfilled the requirement. In the Talmud this is learned from a precedent set by Moses, who had two children and then separated from his wife (according to a midrash). From the story of the creation, where man and woman were created together, Beth Hillel learns that a person needs both a male and a female child to have fulfilled the mitzvah.", + "If a man married a woman and lived with her for ten years and she bore no child, he may not abstain [any longer from the duty of propagation]. If he divorced her she is permitted to marry another, and the second husband may also live with her for ten years. If she miscarried [the period of ten years] is counted from the time of her miscarriage. This section presents a halakhic ramification to the fact that Jews are commanded to procreate. If a man is married to a woman and for ten years they do not succeed in having children, he must either marry another wife or divorce the first wife and marry another wife. When bigamy was prohibited, only the second option remained. Note that the mishnah is rather lenient. Ten years is a long time to attempt to have children. The mishnah gives the couple the benefit of the doubt. Furthermore, the woman who could not succeed in having children with one man, is allowed to remarry. We might have thought that there would be an assumption of infertility. The mishnah fully realizes that the infertility might have been a problem with the man. Finally, if she has a miscarriage, the ten years begin to be counted again. Although the child was not even born, we have seen that the woman can get pregnant and that perhaps she will someday be able to have a viable child. I should also note, that although this halakhah is still on the books, it is not observed. Even ultraorthodox couples do not divorce if they don’t succeed in having children. The halakhah is simply ignored.", + "A man is commanded concerning the duty of propagation but not a woman. Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka says: Concerning both of them it is said, “And God blessed them; and said to them… “Be fruitful and multiply” (Genesis 1:28). According to the first opinion, only men are obligated to procreate. Rabbi Yohanan ben Baroka says that both men and women are obligated equally. We should note that although the first opinion sounds very chauvinistic, and it somewhat is, not being obligated to have children does free a woman to be more in control over her own reproductive process. Certainly the laws of birth control are more lenient if she is not obligated to have children. There is some excellent secondary literature on this issue. Judith Hauptman has a chapter on the topic in her book, “Rereading the Rabbis”. David Feldman’s book, “Birth Control in Jewish Law” also discusses the topic." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "If a widow [who married] a high priest, or if a divorced woman or a halutzah [who married] an ordinary priest brought in to her husband melog slaves and tzon barzel slaves, the melog slaves may not eat terumah but the tzon barzel slaves may eat of it.
The following are melog slaves: those who, if they die, are the wife’s loss and, if their value increases, are her profit. Even though it is the husband's duty to maintain them, they may not eat terumah.
The following are tzon barzel slaves: if they die, they are the loss of the husband and, if their value increases, they are a profit to him. Since he is responsible for them, they are permitted to eat terumah.
The slave of a kohen is allowed to eat terumah, which can only be eaten by kohanim and those under their domain (Leviticus 22:11). Our mishnah discusses the issue of slaves brought into a marriage by the wife as part of her dowry, in a case where the marriage was against the halakhah and therefore she herself cannot eat terumah.
When we learned mishnah 4:3, we discussed the terms “tzon barzel” and “melog” or “pluckable property”. This is what I wrote there:
Dowry can come in two forms. The first form is called “pluckable property” (nikhse melog). This is money that she brings from her father’s house that remain hers and the husband may not use. The husband has rights to the profit earned from this money during the marriage. He has no responsibility for the money. For instance, if she brings in a piece of land, the land is hers but the husband may use the fruits of the land. If the land should be taken by the Romans, he is not responsible to pay his wife the value of the land. Money that she receives as a gift or as an inheritance is part of this category.
The second form is “property of iron sheep” (nikhse tzon barzel). This is written in the ketubah and hence the husband has responsibility for it, should the property be lost, stolen or destroyed. The husband may use the property. His sole responsibility is to return the value of the original property upon death or divorce.
Section one: In the case of our mishnah, a woman who is not allowed to marry a kohen, nevertheless goes ahead and marries him. When she has intercourse with him, she becomes a halalah, a woman profaned from the priesthood, and she can no longer eat terumah, neither in her husband’s home nor in her father’s (if he was a kohen). Since she can no longer eat terumah, her slaves can also no longer eat terumah. The mishnah teaches that since tzon barzel slaves belong more to her husband than they do to her, they may eat terumah. Melog slaves, who belong more to her than to him, cannot eat terumah.
Section two: This section discusses the difference between melog and tzon barzel slaves. Melog slaves belong to the woman, although while the marriage is still going they work for the husband. The fact that they belong to the woman means that if they die it is her loss, and if they go up in value, it is her gain. Despite the fact that the husband must maintain them with food, clothing and shelter, they still belong to the woman. Since she cannot eat terumah due to her forbidden marriage, they too cannot eat terumah.
In contrast, tzon barzel slaves belong to the husband, and his only obligation is to pay their value back to the woman upon the termination of the marriage through death or divorce. If they die, he must still pay back the value. If they appreciate in value, it is his profit. Since he is responsible for their worth, meaning that if something happens to them he must pay back the woman for the loss, they may eat terumah.
In summary, the mishnah defines ownership by who profits or loses when the value of the slaves rises or falls. The obligation to maintain the slaves does not cause the husband to be the owner." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to discuss slaves that are part of a wife’s dowry and their ability to eat terumah, which depends on her status as a daughter of an Israelite or a priest, as well as the status of her husband, Israelite or priest.", + "If the daughter of an Israelite was married to a priest, and she brought him in slaves, they are permitted to eat terumah whether they are melog slaves, or tzon barzel slaves. When the daughter of an Israelite marries a priest she is allowed to eat terumah. The melog slaves (see yesterday’s mishnah for a definition of melog and tzon barzel) may eat terumah because they belong to her and she eats terumah. The tzon barzel slaves may eat terumah because they belong to her husband who is a priest, and a priest’s slaves eat terumah.", + "If the daughter of a priest was married to an Israelite and she brought him in slaves, they may not eat terumah whether they are melog slaves or tzon barzel slaves. When the daughter of a kohen is married to an Israel, she forfeits her right to eat terumah. Her melog slaves cannot continue to eat terumah because they are owned by her and she cannot eat. The tzon barzel slaves belong to the husband, who obviously cannot eat nor give them terumah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nWhen a man dies and leaves children, his wife’s status with regard to terumah goes according to the child’s status. If the father was a priest and his child eats terumah, the wife continues to do so as well. If the father was an Israelite, even if his wife was the daughter of a priest, if the father had a child with her, she does not go back to eating the terumah from her father’s house. In other words a child fixes a wife into the status of her husband.\nOur mishnah discusses a situation where a priest died while his wife was pregnant. The issue at hand is do the tzon barzel slaves, who are now in a sense owned by the fetus, eat terumah.", + "If the daughter of an Israelite was married to a priest who died and left her pregnant, her slaves may not eat terumah because of the share of the fetus, since a fetus prevents [its mother] from eating [terumah] but does not cause her to be able to eat [terumah], the words of Rabbi Yose. If a priest dies and leaves his wife pregnant, her tzon barzel slaves do not eat terumah, even if she has other children and she, her children and her melog slaves can eat terumah. This is because the fetus, as an inheritor of its father, has ownership over the tzon barzel slaves, and a fetus disqualifies its mother from eating terumah and does not qualify her to eat terumah. A fetus disqualifies its mother from eating terumah in that if she is the daughter of a priest who married an Israelite and he dies with no kids and she is pregnant, she does not return to her father’s home to eat terumah. In the opposite case, if she was the daughter of an Israelite married to a priest and her husband dies with no children and she is pregnant, the fetus does not allow her to eat terumah. Rabbi Yose reasons that just as a fetus does not allow a wife to eat terumah, so too it does not allow tzon barzel slaves to eat terumah.", + "They said to him: since you have testified to us concerning the daughter of an Israelite who was married to a priest, even concerning the daughter of a priest who was married to a priest, and he died and left her pregnant her slaves may not eat terumah because of the share of the fetus! The rabbis respond to Rabbi Yose, that if his testimony about the daughter of an Israelite married to a priest is correct, then even concerning the daughter of a priest married to a priest, if her husband died leaving her pregnant, her tzon barzel slaves do not eat terumah. After all, in either case we could explain that a fetus disqualifies tzon barzel slaves from eating terumah. The difficulty with this section is whether or not the rabbis disagree with Rabbi Yose. According to a literal reading of the mishnah they only point out a consequence of Rabbi Yose’s halakhah, without expressing their opinion on the matter. However, it would seem that they only point this out if they disagree with Rabbi Yose. According to the Talmud, the rabbis do disagree with Rabbi Yose. The rabbis hold that the fetus does not actually own the slaves and therefore cannot prevent them from eating terumah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first section of this mishnah broadens the category of those who disqualify women from eating terumah but cannot allow them to eat terumah.\nThe second two sections discuss cases of doubt.", + "A fetus, a yavam, betrothal, a deaf-mute, and a boy who is nine years and one day old, disqualify [a woman] from [terumah], but do not allow her to eat terumah, In all of the cases listed in this section, if the boy/man was an Israelite he disqualifies the woman from eating terumah, and if he was a priest, he does not allow his wife to eat terumah. For instance, if a priest dies and leaves his wife pregnant, the fetus does not allow her to eat terumah. If he was an Israelite and she was the daughter of a priest, the fetus disqualifies her from eating terumah. When the daughter of an Israelite is betrothed to a priest she does not yet begin to eat terumah. However, if she is the daughter of a priest betrothed to an Israelite she already loses the right to eat terumah. A deaf-mute cannot contract marriage, according to Torah law. This is because he is not considered to have intelligence. [As a side note, now that sign language has been developed this concept no longer exists.] The status of his marriage is only derabbanan (of rabbinic origin). If he is a priest he does not allow his wife to eat terumah, but if he is an Israelite he disqualifies her from eating terumah. Intercourse with a boy less than nine years and one day of age is not considered real intercourse. The mishnah teaches that once the boy reaches this age, if he has intercourse with a woman forbidden to him, he disqualifies her from eating terumah. However, if he is a priest, he does not cause her to be able to eat terumah, since a boy who has not reached puberty (concretized by the appearance of two pubic hairs) cannot contract betrothal or marriage.", + "If it is doubtful whether the boy is nine years and one day old or not, or whether he has produced two hairs or not, According to the Rambam, this section is the beginning of the second halakhah in this mishnah. If it is doubtful whether a boy is nine years old and he does yibbum with her, or it is doubtful whether he has reached puberty or not, and he does halitzah with her, the woman still requires another halitzah, lest the first yibbum or halitzah was done by a child incapable of such an action. However, she may not have subsequent yibbum, lest the first action was valid.", + "If a house collapsed upon a man and upon his brother’s daughter, and it is not known which of them died first, her rival must perform halitzah but may not be taken in yibbum. This section deals with another case of doubt. If a house falls on a husband and his wife, who is his brother’s daughter, and it is not known who died first, the rival wife must have halitzah and cannot have yibbum. She must have halitzah, lest her rival wife died first, and she was obligated to yibbum, because at the time of her husband’s death she had no rival wife who was forbidden to the yavam. She cannot have yibbum lest the husband died first, and therefore at the time of his death she was the rival wife of a woman forbidden to the yavam (the yavam’s sister)." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to discuss who gives a woman the right to eat terumah and who deprives her of such a right.", + "The rapist, the seducer and the insane man neither disqualify [a woman from eating terumah] nor do they allow her to eat [terumah].
If they are unfit to enter into the assembly of Israel they do disqualify [a woman from eating terumah]. How is this so? If an Israelite had intercourse with the daughter of a priest she continues to eat terumah.
If she becomes pregnant she may no longer eat terumah.
[Even if] she becomes pregnant she may not eat.
And if his father’s mother was the daughter of an Israelite married to a priest, she may not eat terumah;
And if his mother’s mother was the daughter of an Israelite married to a priest, she may eat terumah; This section teaches that intercourse outside the framework of marriage does not disqualify a woman from eating terumah, nor does it give the woman the right to eat terumah. The mishnah illustrates some of these principles. If an Israelite has intercourse with the daughter of a priest, whether that intercourse was rape or seduction (which means she consented), she continues to eat terumah. Only betrothal to an Israelite would disqualify her from eating terumah. However, if she becomes pregnant she loses her right to eat terumah. This is what we learned in the previous mishnah: a fetus can disqualify from eating terumah. If she should miscarry, she may resume eating terumah. If a priest has relations with the daughter of an Israelite, the intercourse does not allow her to eat terumah. In this case only full marriage will allow her to eat terumah. If she becomes pregnant she still does not eat terumah. This is because a fetus does not allow a woman to eat terumah. However, if she gives birth she can eat terumah. In this way, the power of the son is greater than the father, because the son allows her to eat terumah whereas the father did not. There are two other notes that we need to make on this section. An insane person cannot contract betrothal. Therefore, if he is a priest, his betrothal does not allow the wife to eat terumah. However, if he is an Israelite he does not disqualify the daughter of a priest from eating terumah. If any of these people were “forbidden from entering the assembly of Israel”, meaning they were mamzerim or netinim or another category of people forbidden from marrying Israelites (see Deuteronomy 22:2-4), they do disqualify the woman from eating terumah.", + "If the embryo was miscarried in her womb she may eat. If a priest had intercourse with the daughter of an Israelite, she may not eat terumah.
If she gave birth may eat.
A slave disqualifies a woman from eating terumah through intercourse but not as her offspring.
If she was the daughter of a priest married to an Israelite she may eat terumah.
If she was the daughter of a priest married to an Israelite she may not eat terumah. This section explains how it is that a woman can have a descendent who is a slave but not be disqualified from eating terumah. As a side note, the opening line states that if a woman has intercourse with a slave she is disqualified from eating terumah, since this is forbidden intercourse. If a woman has a son, and the son goes and has intercourse with a slave-woman, the child is a slave. This is because of the matrilineal principle. If the grandmother was the daughter of an Israelite married to a priest, and her husband and son die, the grandson does not bestow upon his grandmother the right to eat terumah. This is because he is not an Israelite. However, if the grandmother was the daughter of a priest married to an Israelite, and her son and husband die, she goes back to her father’s house to eat terumah. Again, the grandson who is not Jewish, does not effect her right to eat terumah.", + "It is found that the power of the son is greater than that of the father. How is this so? If the daughter of an Israelite was married to a priest or the daughter of a priest was married to an Israelite, and she bore a son by him, and the son went and had intercourse with a slave-woman who bore a son by him, such a son is a slave;
A mamzer disqualifies a woman from eating terumah and can allow her to eat terumah. How is this so? If the daughter of an Israelite was married to a priest or the daughter of a priest was married to an Israelite, and she bore a daughter by him, and the daughter went and married a slave or a Gentile who bore a son by him, such a son is a mamzer; This section teaches a law that is almost opposite of the last halakhah. If a woman has relations with a mamzer, she is disqualified from eating terumah, because this is forbidden relations. However, if a woman has a mamzer as a grandson, he may cause her to eat terumah. We will now explain. If a woman has a daughter and the daughter goes and is married to a slave or Gentile, the son born of such a marriage is a mamzer. [Note, that this halakhah was not accepted by many sages in the Talmud. Today such a child is not considered a mamzer]. If the grandmother was a daughter of an Israelite and she was married to a priest, and her husband and son die, the grandson does bestow upon his grandmother the right to eat terumah. This is because he is an Israelite, although he is a mamzer. However, if the grandmother was the daughter of a priest married to an Israelite, and her son and husband die, she does goes back to her father’s house to eat terumah. Again, the grandson who is Jewish, does effect her right to eat terumah. In summary the final two sections of this mishnah teach that a grandson who is Jewish can bestow upon his grandmother the right to eat terumah or cause her to lose that right. A mamzer, the child of a Jewish woman and non-Jewish man is Jewish. A non-Jewish grandchild, the child of a slave-woman and a Jewish man, neither gives a woman the right to eat terumah nor causes her to lose it." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah introduces the strange case where a woman can have a grandson who is a high priest and that high priest actually disqualifies her from eating terumah.", + "A high priest sometimes disqualifies [his mother’s mother] from being able to eat terumah. How is this so? If a priest’s daughter was married to an Israelite and she bore a daughter by him, and the daughter went and married a priest and bore a son by him, such a son is fit to be a high priest, to stand and serve at the altar. He allows his mother to eat terumah but disqualifies his mother’s mother. And she can say, “[May there] not be like my grandson the high priest who disqualified me from eating terumah.” If the daughter of a priest marries an Israelite, she loses the right to eat terumah as long as he is alive or she has a descendent through him. When she has a daughter and the daughter goes and marries a priest and has a son the son is a priest and is eligible to become a high priest. If his father dies, his mother may continue to eat terumah, because she has had a son. If his mother also dies, and his grandmother did not have any other children, she does not return to her father’s home (remember her father was a priest) to eat terumah, because she has a grandson through her marriage to the Israelite. Although her grandson might even be a high priest, he still prevents his grandmother from eating terumah. The mishnah then brings up the strange possible complaint of a grandmother, who has a grandson who is the high priest, and yet he disqualifies her from eating terumah. I imagine that if this was my Bubby, she would have gotten over the loss of terumah and just been proud of her grandson!" + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses the right of priests, their wives and their slaves to eat terumah if the priests have physical defects that might disqualify them from the priesthood.", + "An uncircumcised [priest] and all impure persons may not eat terumah. Their wives and slaves may eat terumah. An uncircumcised priest may not eat terumah. In the Talmud this is derived through an analogy with the passover sacrifice, which also may not be eaten by anyone who is uncircumcised (Exodus 12:44-48). Impure persons may not eat terumah. This refers to someone who is ritually impure, through anything that ritually defiles, such as scale disease, gonorrhea etc. This halakhah is stated explicitly in Leviticus 22:4-6. However, the wife and slaves of an uncircumcised priest and an impure person may eat terumah. This means that these men are priests, but that they themselves are disqualified from eating terumah due to their lack of circumcision or purity. This lack does not effect their household.", + "[A priest] whose testes are crushed or whose member is cut off, as well as their slaves, may eat terumah, but their wives may not. If, however, he did not know her after the his testes were crushed or his member was cut off, the wives may eat [terumah]. According to Deuteronomy 23:2, a man whose testes are crushed or whose member (penis) is cut off, may not enter into the assembly of God. This is understood to mean that they may not marry an Israelite woman. Our mishnah discusses a priest who has one of these physical defects. He may continue to eat terumah, as may his slaves, since he is a priest. However, his wife may not eat terumah since he was not allowed to marry her or have intercourse with her. We have already learned that once a woman has intercourse with someone forbidden to her she loses the right to eat terumah. However, if one of these physical defects occurred to him while he was married to her, and he does not continue to know (have intercourse) her afterwards, she may continue to eat terumah. The only reason that she loses her right to eat terumah is that she was disqualified by intercourse with someone forbidden to her. However, without such intercourse, she remains the wife of a priest and can continue to eat terumah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah defines the terms petzua dakkah and kerut shofkhah mentioned in Deuteronomy 23:2. These two categories of men cannot marry full Israelite women.", + "Who is considered a “petzua dakkah”? Anyone whose testes are wounded even one of them. A “petzua dakkah” is one who has even one of his testes wounded.", + "And a “kerut shofkhah”? A man whose member is cut off. If [any part] of the corona remained, even so much as a hair’s breadth, the man is regarded as fit [to serve as a priest]. A “kerut shofkha” is one whose penis has been cut off. However, if any of the crown remains, he is still a valid priest.", + "A man who testes are wounded, and one whose member is cut off, are permitted to marry a convert or a freed slave. They are only forbidden to enter into the congregation, as it is said “No one whose testes are crushed or whose member is cut off shall be admitted into the congregation of the Lord” (Deuteronomy 23:2). These two categories of men are permitted to marry converts and freed slaves, who according to this mishnah, are not considered to be part of “the congregation of the Lord”. Only those born as fit Israelites are considered to be part of “the congregation of the Lord”." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses the other categories of people who are forbidden to enter into the congregation of the Lord mentioned in Deuteronomy 23:4-9.", + "An Ammonite and a Moabite are forbidden [to enter into the congregation of the Lord] and their prohibition is for ever. However, their women are permitted at once. The prohibition of the Ammonite and Moabite (Deuteronomy 23:4) is eternal. This means that all of their descendents are forbidden from entering into marriage with an Israelite. Note that even should they convert, which they may, they are still prohibited from marrying Israelites. However, the prohibition of Ammonites and Moabites is only for the men. Women are permitted immediately. As soon as they convert, they may contract marriage with other Israelites. Indeed, Ruth was a Moabitess and one of her descendents was King David.", + "An Egyptian and an Edomite are forbidden only until the third generation, whether they are males or females. Rabbi Shimon permits their women immediately. Said Rabbi Shimon: This is a kal vehomer: if where the males are forbidden for all time the females are permitted immediately, where the males are forbidden only until the third generation how much more should the females be permitted immediately. They said to him: If this is a halakhah, we shall accept it; but if it is only a logical reference, there is a refutation. He replied: This is not so, I am in fact saying a halakhah. In contrast, the prohibition of Egyptian and Edomite converts is only temporary. Three generations after the conversion, they may intermarry with other Israelites. According to the first opinion in the mishnah, female Egyptian converts and female Edomite converts are also prohibited for three generations. This opinion probably reasons that since they will eventually be allowed to intermarry with Israelites, the temporary prohibition covers both males and females. Rabbi Shimon, on the other hand, takes a more lenient stance and allows females to marry Israelites immediately upon conversion. He is also consistent in explaining the verse. Since all of these verses use masculine language, they all exclude only the males and not the females. The Sages respond to Rabbi Shimon that if his halakhah is a tradition which he learned from his rabbis, they will accept it. However, if it is just based on reasoning they have a means by which to refute it. Their refutation is probably the logic that I presented as their reasoning above. Since Egyptians and Edomites are permitted after three generations, the females are not permitted immediately. Despite the fact that Rabbi Shimon’s original words appeared to have been based on logic, he responds that the halakhah is actually based on a tradition. In this mishnah we can clearly see the rabbinic preference for tradition over logic. The rabbis will only accept Rabbi Shimon’s ruling if it was one that he received from his rabbis. In such a case they would accept it even if they found the logic faulty. In response Rabbi Shimon pleads with them, claiming that his words are indeed a tradition.", + "Mamzerim and nethinim are forbidden, and their prohibition is forever, whether they be males or females. Concerning the mamzer and the netin, all of the sages agree that their prohibition is for all subsequent generations and that both men and women are prohibited. Deuteronomy 23:3 only states that mamzers are prohibited until the tenth generation. It doesn’t say, as does verse four concerning the Ammonite and Moabite, that they are prohibited forever. However, the rabbis employ a verbal analogy (a gezerah shavah) to compare the two. Just as it says “until the tenth generation” about the Ammonite and Moabite, and yet they are prohibited for all generations, so too the mamzer, about whom it also says, “until the tenth generation” is prohibited for all generations." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah contains a discussion about whether or not a eunuch is obligated to perform halitzah for his dead brother’s wife and whether or not halitzah is performed for his wife, should he die without children. Note that this issue is tied to the eunuch’s ability or lack thereof to have children. One who cannot have children would be less likely to be subject to the laws of halitzah and yibbum whose purpose is to supply children for the dead brother.", + "Rabbi Joshua said: I have heard that a eunuch performs halitzah and that halitzah is performed by others for his wife, and also that a eunuch does not perform halitzah and that no halitzah is performed for his wife, and I am unable to explain this. Rabbi Joshua transmits an old halakhah that he has heard, but that he doesn’t know how to explain. In these words we can see how halakhot were often transmitted in pithy, memorable phrases, such that later sages sometimes did not know how to explain them. Rabbi Joshua has heard that eunuchs are subject to the laws of halitzah and he has also heard the opposite. He does not know if these two halakhot apply to two different types of eunuchs or whether they contradict each other.", + "Rabbi Akiva said: I will explain it: a man-made eunuch performs halitzah and halitzah is also performed for his wife, because there was a time when he was fit [to have children]. A eunuch by nature neither performs halitzah nor is halitzah performed for his wife, since there never was a time when he was fit. Rabbi Akiva explains the puzzle brought up by Rabbi Joshua. The eunuch who was castrated by humans performs halitzah for his dead brother’s wife. [He cannot have yibbum, because he is forbidden to marry Israelites, as we learned above.] If he should die without children, halitzah or yibbum is performed for his wife. The reason that he is subject to the laws of yibbum is that he was at one time not a eunuch and he was fit to have children. In contrast, the eunuch who was born a eunuch was never fit to have children, and therefore is not subject to the laws of halitzah. Should he die, his wife is exempt from both halitzah and yibbum. Should his brother die, he does not perform halitzah for his widow.", + "Rabbi Eliezer said: Not so! Rather a eunuch by nature performs halitzah and halitzah is performed for his wife, because he may be cured. A man-made eunuch neither performs halitzah nor is halitzah performed for his wife, since he cannot be cured. Rabbi Eliezer offers the opposite reading and solution to the tradition transmitted by Rabbi Joshua. The eunuch who is subject to the laws of halitzah and yibbum is one who was born a eunuch, since he could potentially be cured, and then he could have children. A eunuch who was castrated by others cannot be cured (even today this is not a simple procedure). Therefore, he is not subject to the laws of halitzah and yibbum.", + "Rabbi Joshua ben Baterra testified concerning Ben Megusat, who was a man-made eunuch living in Jerusalem and they performed yibbum for his wife, thus confirming the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Joshua ben Batera testifies about a man-made eunuch, that they performed yibbum for his wife. This proves what Rabbi Akiva said, that man-made eunuchs are subject to the laws of halitzah and yibbum. Note that what proves that Rabbi Akiva is correct is a precedent, and not any inherent logic to his words." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses the performance of yibbum or halitzah by a eunuch or by an aylonit, a woman who has not developed signs of sexual maturity, and therefore by definition cannot procreate. Both of these categories are therefore people who cannot procreate. Since they cannot procreate they are excluded from the laws of halitzah and yibbum, as we learned in the previous mishnah.", + "The eunuch neither performs halitzah nor contracts yibbum. We have already seen this halakhah in the previous mishnah. Here it either refers to a man-made eunuch, who according to Rabbi Akiva does not perform halitzah. Alternatively, it refers to all eunuchs and this mishnah contains an opinion that disagrees with both opinions in the previous mishnah.", + "So too a woman who is incapable of procreation neither performs halizah nor is taken in yibbum. A woman who is physically incapable of procreating is not subject to the laws of halitzah or yibbum. Since the point of yibbum is procreation, those who cannot procreate are exempt.", + "If a eunuch performed halitzah for his yevamah, he does not disqualify her [from subsequently marrying a priest]. If he has intercourse with her he disqualifies her, since this is an act of fornication. Since a eunuch does not perform halitzah, there is no validity to an act of halitzah that he performs. If he nevertheless does so, he has not thereby disqualified the woman from subsequently marrying a priest. [A halutzah is forbidden to be married by a priest]. However, if he has intercourse with her, as an attempted act of yibbum, he has disqualified her from marrying a priest, because this was forbidden. Since she was not liable for yibbum, she is prohibited to him by the prohibition of being his brother’s wife. [Remember any time yibbum is not necessary, the prohibition of a brother’s wife is effective, even after the brother’s death]. Any woman who has had relations with a man forbidden to her is subsequently prohibited from marrying a priest.", + "Similarly where brothers performed halitzah for a woman incapable of procreation, they do not disqualify her [from marrying a priest]. If they have intercourse with her they do disqualify her, since this is an act of fornication. This section contains nearly the same laws with regard to the woman who cannot procreate. If one of the brothers performs halitzah he has not disqualified her from marrying a priest. However, if one of them tries to have yibbum with her, she is disqualified, because she was prohibited to him, as his brother’s wife." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with several categories of people who are of doubtful gender status. A hermaphrodite is a person who has the outer sexual signs of both a male and a female. A tumtum is a person who has no outer sexual signs.", + "If a priest who was eunuch by nature married the daughter of an Israelite, he confers upon her the right to eat terumah. A eunuch by nature is not forbidden from marrying Israelite women (he is not considered to be a “petzua daka”, one whose testes were crushed. Therefore, if he is a priest and he marries the daughter of an Israelite, the marriage is valid and he is allowed to eat terumah.", + "Rabbi Yose and Rabbi Shimon stated: if a priest who was an hermaphrodite married the daughter of an Israelite, he confers upon her the right to eat terumah. A priest who is a hermaphrodite is allowed to marry the daughter of an Israelite. With regard to marriage, he is treated as if he was fully male. Therefore, if he is a priest, his wife may eat terumah.", + "Rabbi Judah stated: if a tumtum was opened up and found to be a male, he may not perform halitzah, because he has the same status as a eunuch. A tumtum may have been born with his sexual organs covered by a thin sac of skin. Even if they open up this sac and find that he is male, he may not perform halitzah, since his status is like that of a eunuch. Assumedly, the tumtum cannot procreate and therefore is exempt from the laws of halitzah and yibbum.", + "The hermaphrodite may marry [a wife] but may not be married [by a man]. As we learned in section two, a hermaphrodite is treated like a male. He may marry a woman but may not be married by a man.", + "Rabbi Eliezer stated: concerning the hermaphrodite, [the one who has relations with him] is liable to be stoned like one [who has relations with] a male. According to Rabbi Eliezer, if another man has relations with a hermaphrodite, he is liable to be stoned, as are all men who engage in intercourse with other men. This is Rabbi Eliezer’s way of stating that the hermaphrodite is to be treated completely as if he is a male." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThe first two mishnayoth of this chapter list variations of women who are either permitted or forbidden to their husbands and to their yevamim (their husband’s brothers).\nThis chapter does not really teach new laws that were unknown from other places in the Yevamoth. Rather it organizes them in a different manner.", + "Some women are permitted to their husbands and forbidden to their yevamim, Others are permitted to their yevamim and forbidden to their husbands, Others are permitted to both, Others are forbidden to both.
[In all these cases the women] are permitted to their husbands and forbidden to their yevamim. This section is an introduction to this mishnah and the next. The different combinations will be explained as we proceed. Note how formulaic it is and how easy it must have been to remember.", + "These are the women who are permitted to their husbands and forbidden to their yevamim: An ordinary priest married a widow and had a brother who was a high priest; A halal married a woman who was fit and had a brother of legitimate status; An Israelite married the daughter of an Israelite and had a brother who was a mamzer, A mamzer married a mamzeret and had a brother who was an Israelite. The following cases are ones in which a woman is married to a man to whom she is permitted but should her husband die without children she would not be permitted to have yibbum with the yavam. An ordinary priest who married a widow and had a brother who was a high priest: An ordinary priest is allowed to marry a widow but the high priest may not. A halal who married a woman who was fit [to marry a priest] had a brother of legitimate status: A halal is the child of a priest and a woman who is forbidden to a priest (such as a divorcee). A halal may marry anyone. However, once a woman has relations with a halal, she also becomes a halalah. A halal may have a brother who was not a halal, if, for instance, his father was a priest and his mother was a divorcee and his brother’s mother was fit to marry a priest. In such a case the halal’s wife may not have yibbum with his brother because she is a halalah, and a priest cannot marry a halalah. An Israelite who married the daughter of an Israelite had a brother who was a mamzer: A mamzer may not marry the daughter of an Israelite. Therefore, the mamzer brother of an Israelite may not have yibbum with his dead brother’s wife. An Israelite might have a brother who is a mamzer if, for instance, his father had an affair with another woman while she was married. A mamzer married a mamzeret had a brother who was an Israelite: This is the reverse situation as that which we saw in the previous section." + ], + [ + "The following are permitted to their yevamim and forbidden to their husbands:
A high priest who betrothed a widow and has a brother who is an ordinary priest;
A fit [priest] who married a halalah and has a brother who is a halal;
An Israelite who married a mamzeret and has a brother who is a mamzeret;
A mamzer who married the daughter of an Israelite and has a brother who is an Israelite. [In these cases the women] are permitted to their yevamim and forbidden to their husbands.
The following are forbidden to both;
A high priest who married a widow has a brother who is a high priest, or who is an ordinary priest;
A fir [priest] who married a halalah and has a brother who was a fit [priest];
An Israelite who married a mamzeret and has a brother who is Israelite;
A mamzer who married the daughter of an Israelite and has a brother who is a mamzer, [In these cases the women] are forbidden to both [the husband and the yavam]. All other women are permitted to both their husbands and their yevamim.
This mishnah continues to list types of women who are either forbidden to their husbands or to their yevamim.
Section one: A high priest is not allowed to marry a widow. If he betroths a widow and then dies, his brother, the ordinary priest, may have yibbum with her. However, if he married her, she would fall into the category of a halalah, that is a woman who has been disqualified from the priesthood. She would then be forbidden to the yavam brother as well.
Section two: A priest may not marry a halalah. However, if he has a brother who is a halal (for instance they have different mothers), then the brother may have yibbum with her.
Section three: An Israelite may not marry a mamzeret. However, if he has a brother who is a mamzer (they have different mothers), then the brother may have yibbum with her.
Section four: The opposite situation of that in section three.
Section five: The mishnah now begins to list women who are forbidden both to their husbands and, should the husbands die, to the yavam as well.
If a high priest marries a widow and dies and his brother is also a high priest, just as the first marriage was prohibited, so too is yibbum. Furthermore, since the first marriage was consummated (and did not remain only a betrothal, as in section one above), the woman became a halalah and is therefore prohibited to his brother even if he is only an ordinary priest.
Section six: If a fit priest marries a halalah, who is forbidden to him, she may not have yibbum with his brother who is also a fit priest.
Section seven: Just as the mamzereth was forbidden to the first husband, who was an ordinary Israelite, so too she is forbidden to his brother, if he is an ordinary Israelite.
Section eight: Just as the Israelite woman was forbidden to her first husband, who was a mamzer, so too she is forbidden to his mamzer brother." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nIn mishnah 2:4, we learned that there are secondary incest prohibitions that were instituted by the scribes.", + "[Concerning] relatives of the second degree [of incest laws who are forbidden] by the words of the scribes:
[A woman who is] a second degree of kinship to the husband but not a second degree of kinship to the yavam, is forbidden to the husband and permitted to the yavam; A woman could be a second degree of kinship to her husband but not to her yavam if she was the husband’s grandmother, and her husband had a brother with the same father but not the same mother. The mishnah teaches that although the marriage was forbidden, she may still have yibbum. This is because the prohibition of second degree kinship is only of rabbinic origin.", + "[A woman who is] a second degree of kinship to the yavam but not a second degree of kinship to the husband is forbidden to the yavam and permitted to the husband; The same is true in the opposite case, if she is a second degree of kinship to her yavam but not to her husband. As we learned above in 2:3-4, in such a case she must have halitzah and not yibbum.", + "[A woman who is] a second degree of kinship to the one and to the other is forbidden to the one as well as to the other. If she was a second degree to both, she is forbidden to both.", + "She cannot claim her ketubah or usufruct or support money, or her worn clothes. The child is fit [to marry a priest], but the husband is compelled to divorce her. If a couple transgressed the rabbinic prohibition and the man married a woman who was a second degree of kinship, there are serious economic consequences for the woman. The woman does not receive her ketubah (marriage payment), nor does she receive in return the usufruct, meaning the profit that the husband accrued from the use of her property while they were married. She does not receive support (food, clothing or shelter), nor does she receive in return the reduction in the value of her things that he has used while married. However, the status of the child is not effected, since the level of prohibition was only derabbanan. He is forced to divorce her. In summary, the consequences of this forbidden marriage are mostly economic and they are mostly upon the woman.", + "A widow who was married to a high priest, a divorcee or halutzah who was married to an ordinary priest, a mamzer or a netinah who was married to an Israelite, or the daughter of an Israelite who was married to a natin or a mamzer is entitled to her ketubah. The mishnah now contrasts this type of forbidden marriage, with a marriage that was forbidden according to Torah law, but that was nevertheless an effective marriage. That is to say if a man betrothed one of these women, he has transgressed the prohibition, but she still requires a divorce. In all of these cases the woman receives her ketubah and all of the other rights listed in the mishnah. In the comparison of these two sections, we see that the consequences of marrying a second degree of kinship which is only a rabbinic prohibition are more serious than those of marrying one who is biblically prohibited. The reason is that a rabbinic prohibition needs the extra “strengthening” while the biblical prohibition does not." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses whether or not a woman eats terumah or tithe (which the Levites eat) in situations where she might be moving from an Israelite home to a priest’s domain, and whether she loses the right to eat terumah in situations where she might be leaving her priestly or Levite home and going to an Israelite home.", + "The daughter of an Israelite who was betrothed to a priest, or who was pregnant from a priest, or was a shomeret yavam to a priest; And similarly, the daughter of a priest [who was in such relationship] with an Israelite, may not eat terumah. The daughter of an Israelite may eat terumah when she is fully married to a priest. She may not eat terumah when she is merely betrothed. If she is pregnant but not married (either he died or she became pregnant before marriage) she may not eat terumah. Finally, if she is a shomeret yavam waiting to for yibbum with a priest, she may not eat terumah. However, if she was the daughter of a priest and the man was an Israelite in one of these situations, she loses the right to eat terumah. These states are in-between states, states where the woman may lose the right to eat terumah but may not gain the right. Note that we have taught exactly this halakhah in 7:4 above: the fetus, the yavam and betrothal disqualify her from eating terumah and cannot allow her to eat terumah.", + "The daughter of an Israelite who was betrothed to a Levite, or who was pregnant from a Levite, or was a shomeret yavam to a Levite; And similarly, the daughter of a Levite [who was in such a relationship] with an Israelite may not eat tithe. This section teaches the exact same laws with regard to tithes, which are eaten by Levites. The Talmud points out that according to the halakhah, a non-Levite may eat tithe (although he is commanded to give it to the Levite). Our mishnah goes according to Rabbi Meir who holds that only Levites can eat tithe.", + "The daughter of a Levite who was betrothed to a priest, or who was pregnant from a priest, or was a shomeret yavam to a priest; And similarly, the daughter of a priest [who was in such relationship] with a levite, may eat neither terumah nor tithe. The logic of this section is that a woman in one of these situations is not tied enough to the priest to eat terumah, nor does she remain tied enough to her Levite family to continue eating tithe. Note that according to this section, even priests cannot eat tithe." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nAs with all of the mishnayoth of this chapter, we don’t really learn any new information in this mishnah. What we see is a tightly organized literary structure, describing a situation where one woman moves in and out of the ability to eat terumah and tithe.", + "The daughter of an Israelite married to a priest may eat terumah. If he died and she has a son by him she may continue to eat terumah. If she was [subsequently] married to a Levite, she may eat tithe. If he died and she had a son by him, she may continue to eat tithe. If she was [subsequently] married to an Israelite she may eat neither terumah nor tithe. If he died and she has a son by him, she may eat neither terumah nor tithe. If her son by the Israelite died, she may again eat tithe. If her son by the Levite died she may again eat terumah. If her son by the priest died, she may eat neither terumah nor tithe. When the Israelite woman married the priest, she became able to eat terumah. Once he dies, she can still eat terumah because she has a son from him. When she marries a Levite she loses the ability to eat terumah, but she gains the ability to eat tithe. When he dies, she can still eat tithe because she has a son from him. When she then marries the Israelite, she loses her right to eat both tithe and terumah, because she has a son with him. At this point she has a son from each of her marriages. If her son from the Israelite now dies, she reverts back to her previous status. She can now eat tithe because of her son with the Levite. If this son dies, she now reverts to the previous status, which means she can again eat terumah because of her son with the priest. If he too dies, she goes back to her original Israelite family and can no longer eat tithe or terumah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah says basically the same thing as the previous one, but in a reverse order.", + "The daughter of a priest who was married to an Israelite may not eat terumah. If he died and she had a son by him she may not eat terumah. If she was [subsequently] married to a Levite she may eat tithe. If he died and she had a son by him she may eat tithe. If she was [subsequently] married to a priest she may eat terumah. If he died and she had a son by him she may eat terumah. If her son by the priest died she may not eat terumah. If her son by the levite died she may not eat tithe. If her son by the Israelite died she returns to the house of her father; And it is concerning such a woman that it is said, “And she returns to her father’s house, as in her youth, she may eat of her father’s bread” (Leviticus 22:13). This mishnah is the exact reverse of yesterday’s mishnah. The woman starts in a situation where she can eat terumah, but then loses that right when she marries an Israelite. If he dies, and she has had a son with him, she still cannot eat terumah. If she marries a Levite, she may now eat tithe. If he dies, and she has had a son with him, she can still eat tithe. If she now marries a priest, she can eat terumah. . If he dies, and she has had a son with him, she can still eat terumah. If this son dies, she goes back to eating tithe. If this son dies, she goes back to not being able to eat either, because of her son from the Israelite. If this son dies, she goes back to her original situation and she may eat terumah. As the verse says, she goes back to the situation of her father’s house." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah, and several mishnayoth which follow deal with the unfortunate situation where a woman thinks her husband has died, she gets remarried, has kids, and then her husband reappears. The mishnah lists the consequences of her now having unwittingly committed adultery.\nThe usual interpretation of this mishnah is that the marriage to the second husband was not valid, since a married woman cannot marry again. The penalties which she receives in this mishnah are because she didn’t check well enough to make sure her first husband is dead. As we shall see, this interpretation has certain difficulties.\nA teacher of mine, Professor Shamma Friedman, suggested an alternative explanation of the mishnah, an explanation that was based on a comparison of the mishnaic law with other laws found in ancient near eastern law codes, such as the Code of Hammurabi. He proposed that the mishnah actually means that she is married to both men at the same time. The problem with this is that it is forbidden to be married to two men at the same time. Since each marriage is valid but forbidden, she cannot stay married to either and doesn’t get the benefits of either marriage. In other words, both marriages are biblically valid, but each husband makes the other husband’s marriage illegitimate. According to this interpretation, the woman is not penalized for not having checked. Rather the problems she encounters are the result of her being married to two men at the same time.", + "A woman whose husband had gone to a country beyond the sea and they came and told her, “Your husband died”, married, and then her husband returned: She must leave this one and that one, and she also requires a get from this one and that one. She has no ketubah, no usufruct, no support money or worn clothes, neither from this one nor from that one. If she has taken anything from this one or that one, she must return it. The child from this one or that one is a mamzer. Neither this one nor that one may impurify himself for her. Neither this one and that one has a claim to whatever she may find, nor what she makes with her hands, nor to invalidate her vows. If she was the daughter of an Israelite, she becomes disqualified from marrying a priest; if the daughter of a Levite, from the eating of tithe; and if the daughter of a priest, from the eating of terumah. Neither the heirs of this one nor the heirs of that one are entitled to inherit her ketubah. And if [the husbands] die, the brother of the one and the brother of the other must perform halitzah, but may not contract yibbum. This section lists all of the results of her having married another man while her first husband is still alive. I will go through each one by one: She must leave this one and that one, and she also requires a get from this one and that one: She must be divorced from each of them, for she is forbidden to each. She also needs a get from each of them. According to the talmudic interpretation, the get from the second husband is only of rabbinic origin, for according to biblical law, she is not married to the second man. She has no ketubah, no usufruct, no support money or worn clothes, neither from this one nor from that one: She does not receive any of the financial benefits that she would have accrued from her husband. This clause was explained above in 9:3. If she has taken anything from this one or that one, she must return it: If she had taken any of these things to which she is not entitled, she must return them. Some times, in cases of doubt, possession is enough for a person not to have to return something. However, in this case, her possession is considered truly illegal and she must return what she took. The child from this one or that one is a mamzer: The child from the second husband is a mamzer because she gave birth to him while married to the first husband. Should she return to the first husband, the subsequent child will also be a mamzer. Neither this one nor that one may impurify himself for her: A priest is allowed to impurify himself to bury his wife. In this case, if either husband is a priest and she dies, they may not impurify themselves for her. Neither this one and that one has a claim to whatever she may find, nor what she makes with her hands, nor to invalidate her vows: These are all rights given to a husband during marriage. Since the marriage is now invalid, he loses all these rights. Invalidating vows is discussed in Numbers 30. If she was the daughter of an Israelite, she becomes disqualified from marrying a priest; if the daughter of a Levite, from the eating of tithe; and if the daughter of a priest, from the eating of terumah: The illicit marriage to the second husband disqualifies her from all rights that might be accrued from either kohanic or levitical status. The result is that she could no longer marry a priest nor eat tithe if her father was a Levite, nor eat terumah if her father was a priest. Neither the heirs of this one nor the heirs of that one are entitled to inherit her ketubah: According to a ketubah clause which we will see in chapter four of tractate Ketuboth, a woman’s male children inherit her ketubah. However, in this case they too are penalized and lose their inheritance. And if [the husbands] die, the brother of the one and the brother of the other must perform halitzah, but may not contract yibbum: Since both marriages were invalid, the brothers cannot perform yibbum. Note that according to the talmudic interpretation, the halitzah of the brother of the second husband is only of rabbinic origin, since according to Torah law the second marriage was not valid.", + "Rabbi Yose said: her ketubah remains a charge upon the estate of her first husband. The mishnah now brings up opinions that do not agree with the long list seen in section. Rabbi Yose holds that she does receive her ketubah from her first husband, since she only committed adultery unintentionally.", + "Rabbi Elazar said: the first husband is entitled to whatever she may find, and what she makes with her hands, and also has the right to invalidate her vows. Rabbi Elazar adds that the first husband continues to receive the economic benefits from his wife.", + "Rabbi Shimon said: intercourse or halitzah with the brother of the first husband exempts her rival, and the child from him is not a bastard. Rabbi Shimon holds that the brother of the first husband may have yibbum with her, and that by performing yibbum or halitzah, the rival wife is exempted from yibbum or halitzah. Assumedly he also holds that she does not need halitzah from the second husband’s brother. Finally, should she go back to her first husband, the child from such a relationship is not a mamzer.", + "If she married without an authorization, she may return to him. This section really belongs to the following mishnah. It teaches that if she married without the permission of the court, she is allowed to return to her first husband, because in this case the second marriage was totally accidental. However, if she married with the permission of the court, the second marriage is valid and all of the above listed results occur." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to discuss the situation of a woman who was told that her husband was dead and she remarried, and then her husband returned.", + "If she married with the authorization of the court, she must leave, but is exempt from bringing a sacrifice. If she married without the authorization of the court, she must leave and is liable to bring a sacrifice. The authority of the court is thus more greater in that it exempts her from the sacrifice. If she asked the court before she remarried, and they allowed her to remarry, she must leave her second husband, should her first husband return (she cannot return to her first husband either, as we saw in mishnah one). However, she is not liable to bring a sacrifice (sin offering) since she acted with the court’s permission. It is as if the court takes upon itself the responsibility for her accidentally having sinned. However, if she acted on her own without permission, she must bring a sin offering. The reason that she is able to bring a sin offering to atone for her sin is that her sin was unintentional; she didn’t know her husband was alive when she married someone else. Had she sinned intentionally, an offering would not have been effective.", + "If the court ruled that she may be married and she went and disgraced herself, she must bring a sacrifice, because the court permitted her only to marry. If the court ruled that she could remarry and she disgraced herself by marrying someone forbidden to her, for instance if she was a widow and she married the high priest, or if she was a divorcee and she remarried a priest, etc., she is liable to bring a sacrifice. When the court allowed her to remarry, the intention was a permitted marriage. By marrying someone not permitted to her, she is actually marrying on her own accord, and is therefore liable to bring a sacrifice as an unintentional sinner. Note that the sacrifice is for the adultery and not the forbidden marriage. Most forbidden marriages are not atoned for by sacrifices." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses other scenarios where a woman was told that her husband died and it turns out that the information she received was not 100 per cent correct.", + "If a woman whose husband and son went to a country beyond the sea was told, “Your husband died and your son died afterwards”, and she married again, and later she was told, “the [deaths] happened in the opposite order” she must leave, and any child born before or after is a mamzer. When this woman hears that her husband died while her son was still alive, she thinks that she is not liable for yibbum or halitzah, since her husband died while his son was alive. Therefore she remarried someone else, without halitzah or yibbum. When she finds out that she should have had yibbum, it turns out that she was a shomeret yavam who remarried without halitzah or yibbum. Our mishnah’s ruling goes according to Rabbi Akiva who rules that any children from such a marriage are mamzerim. This is true whether the child was born while her husband was alive or even if the child was born after her husband died, for she should have had halitzah or yibbum. She must also leave this marriage.", + "If she was told “Your son died and your husband died afterwards”, and she had yibbum, and afterwards she was told, “the [deaths] happened in the opposite order” she must leave, and any child born before or after is a mamzer. In this case she thought that she was liable for yibbum, so she went and had yibbum with her brother-in-law. Afterwards she finds out that she was exempt from yibbum, since her husband died while her son was still alive. Since the yibbum was forbidden, any child that she has with the yavam is a mamzer, whether or not he was born while her husband was still alive.", + "If she was told, “Your husband died”, and she married, and afterwards she was told, “He was alive but is now dead”, she must leave, and any child born before [the death of her first husband] is a mamzer, but one born after it is not a mamzer. In this case, at the point when she married the second husband, she was in fact married to the first husband. Therefore she must leave the second marriage. The child born before the first husband died is a mamzer, for the union was adulterous. However, the child born after the first husband died is not a mamzer. In other words, even though she must leave the second husband in any case, not every child that she has with him is a mamzer.", + "If she was told, “Your husband died”, and she was betrothed, and afterwards her husband appeared, she is permitted to return to him. Although the second one gave her a get he has not thereby disqualified her from marrying a priest. This Rabb Elazar ben Mathia expounded: “A woman divorced from her husband” (Leviticus 21:7) not from a man who is not her husband. If she is only betrothed to the second husband, and then she finds out that she is still married to the first husband, she may return to her first husband. In the other cases in our mishnah and in the previous one, she was forbidden to do so because she had, albeit unwittingly, committed adultery by having relations with the second husband. However, in this case, she has not had relations with the second husband, therefore she may return to the first. The mishnah further emphasizes that the second marriage is totally invalid by stating that even if the second husband gives her a get, she may still potentially someday marry a priest. This last halakhah is supported by a midrash by Rabbi Elazar ben Matya. Leviticus 21:7 states that a priest may not marry a woman “divorced from her husband”. The verse could have merely stated “divorced”. The extra words “from her husband” teach that if she is divorced from someone who is not her husband, a priest may still marry her." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah and the next discuss the ramifications of situations where a husband was told that his wife had died, and he married her sister.", + "If a man’s wife had gone to a country beyond the sea and he was told, “Your wife is dead”, and he married her sister, and afterwards his wife came back, [the latter] is permitted to return to him. He is permitted to marry the relatives of the second woman, and the second woman is permitted to marry his relatives. If the first wife died he is permitted to marry the second. The man’s marriage to his wife’s sister was obviously forbidden, since one cannot marry one’s wife’s sister. However, his original wife is permitted to return to him, since the second marriage was totally invalid. By his first wife returning to him, this would not count as marrying his wife’s (his second wife’s) sister. Furthermore, since the marriage was invalid, he may marry the second wife’s relatives (for instance her daughter). This is true even if he has had sexual relations with her. She too is permitted to marry his relatives. If his first wife dies, he can now remarry the second wife. Even though he already had relations with her when she was forbidden to him, since she is now permitted to him, he may marry her.", + "If he was told that his wife was dead, and he married her sister, and then he was told that she was then alive but had since died, any child born before [his first wife’s death] is a mamzer, but anyone born after [her death] is not a mamzer. This section teaches that any child he had with his wife’s sister while his wife was still alive is a mamzer, since this is a prohibited relationship, and punishable by kareth. However, children born after his original wife died are not mamzerim.", + "Rabbi Yose says: whoever disqualifies for others disqualifies for himself and whoever does not disqualify for others does not disqualify for himself. The Talmud explains that Rabbi Yose refers to a situation where Reuven was married to Leah and Moshe was married to Rachel, Leah’s sister. Leah and Moshe (Reuven’s wife and his brother-in-law) go abroad and Reuven receives a report that both of them have died. Reuven now marries Rachel, who he thinks is Moshe’s widow and his dead wife’s sister. When both Leah and Moshe come back, since Rachel is forbidden to return to Moshe (see mishnah one), Leah is forbidden to return to Reuven. The previous tanna would have held that while Rachel was forbidden to return to Moshe, Leah was permitted to return to Reuven. However, if there was a case where the woman whom he married was not forbidden to return to a previous husband, for instance she was not married or she married him (Reuven) without the permission of the court, since he does not make her forbidden to someone else, his own wife is not forbidden to return to him." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with a quite complicated situation in which a man marries a series of sisters, thinking that each previous one was dead, and then finds out that they are all alive. If we sort out all of the details, this braintwister shouldn’t be so bad.", + "If a man was told “Your wife is dead” and he married her paternal sister; [and when he was told] “She is dead’, he married her maternal sister; [and when he was told] “She is dead”, and he married her paternal sister; [and when he was told] “She is dead, he married her maternal sister; and later it was found that they were all alive, he is permitted to the first, third and fifth, and they exempt their rivals; But he is forbidden to the second and the fourth, and intercourse with one of these does not exempt her rival. A man was married to Rachel (1), and when told that she died, he married Hana (2), Rachel’s paternal sister. When told that Hana died, he married Tova (3), Hana’s maternal sister. Rachel (1) and Tova (3) do not share any parents. When told that Tova has died, he marries Yael (4), Tova’s paternal sister. Yael (4) does not share any parents with Rachel (1) or Hana (2). When told that Yael has died, he marries Rivka (5), Yael’s maternal sister. Rivka (5) does not share any parents with Rachel (1), Hana (2) or Tova (3). At this point, the hapless husband finds out that all of these women are still alive (you can just imagine the shock on the poor guy’s face!). The mishnah rules that he may stay married to the first, the third and the fifth. This means that even though the third woman is the second woman’s sister, and he is forbidden to the second woman, he may stay with the third (the same with the fifth, who is the fourth’s sister). This is because the marriage to the second and the fourth was not valid marriage, because he had already married the first and the third, and they were still alive. Since the marriage with the second and the fourth was not valid marriage, he is permitted to marry their sisters. The mishnah also teaches that the first, third and fifth women exempt their rival wives from the need for yibbum. This means that should this husband die without children, when one of his brothers does yibbum or halitzah with one of these women, the rest of the women are exempt. He is forbidden to stay married to the second and the fourth women, since they are the sisters of the first and third respectively. Since both of these women are not validly married, and therefore are not liable for yibbum or halitzah, should someone perform yibbum or halitzah with them, it would not exempt their rivals.", + "If he had intercourse with the second after the death of the first, he is permitted to the second and fourth, and they exempt their rivals; But he is forbidden to the third and the fifth, and intercourse with one of these does not exempt her rival. After the death of the first wife, he is permitted to have relations with the second wife. If he does so, then he can no longer stay with the third wife, and he can now have relations with the fourth wife (since the marriage with the third wife is now invalid). Since he can have relations with the fourth wife, he cannot stay married to the fifth wife. In this case, the second and fourth wife would be liable for yibbum and therefore they make their rival wives exempt. The third and fifth wife are not liable for yibbum, therefore they would not make their rival wives exempt." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses the ramifications of a boy, nine years and one day old, performing an act of yibbum, divorce, halitzah or ma’amar. The mishnah teaches that a boy of this age is capable of having sex which is a purely physical act. However, he does not have the requisite knowledge (da’at) to give a get, perform ma’amar or halitzah. One other issue which we must keep in mind while learning this mishnah is that once a woman awaiting yibbum (a shomeret yavam) has had one of these acts performed with her by one of the brothers, she may no longer marry any of the other brothers of her dead husband.\nWe should note that in the time of the Mishnah, not only was marriage considered possible at a very young age, but concepts of childhood were different. Our perception of childhood as extending well into one’s teens and our assumption that children deserve protection during these years and are not to be treated as adults, are, to a large extent, more modern perceptions. The mishnah, as we shall see, is therefore not squeamish about discussing sex and children. Today, in our society children are (or should be) distanced from sex.", + "A boy of the age of nine years and one day disqualifies [his sister-in-law for marriage] with his brothers, and his brothers disqualify her for him, but while he disqualifies her from the outset only, the brothers disqualify her from the outset and at the end. The first section of the mishnah is a brief, memorable way of stating that which will be explained in section two and in the following mishnayoth. I will explain the concepts as they are fleshed out in the mishnah.", + "How is this so? A boy of the age of nine years and one day who had intercourse with his sister-in-law disqualifies her [for marriage] with his brothers; If a boy of nine years and one day has intercourse with a shomeret yavam, that is his dead brother’s wife, the other, older brothers may no longer have yibbum/intercourse with her. This means that his act of intercourse “counts” sufficiently that she is tied to him, and no longer liable for yibbum or halitzah to the other brothers. Since she is no longer liable for yibbum or halitzah, they are forbidden to have intercourse with her.", + "The brothers disqualify her [for marriage with him] whether they had intercourse with her, did ma’amar, gave her a get or submitted to her halitzah. In contrast to the nine year old boy, the older brothers disqualify the shomeret yavam from having relations with any of the other brothers in four different ways: intercourse (yibbum), ma’amar (betrothal), divorce (get) and halitzah. Even though ma’amar and a get are only of rabbinic origin for the shomeret yavam, and she still requires halitzah before she may remarry, they are sufficient to disqualify her from the other brothers. The difference between the older brothers and the nine year old brother is that for the older brothers there are legal consequences to their performance of acts that require knowledge, such as ma’amar, divorce, or halitzah, whereas for the nine year old, there are legal consequence only to physical acts such as intercourse." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah explains the status of an act of sexual intercourse done by a boy who has reached nine years and one day old, but is not yet of majority age.", + "If a boy of the age of nine years and one day had intercourse with his yevamah and then his brother who was of the age of nine years and one day had intercourse with her, [the latter] disqualifies her for [the former]. Rabbi Shimon says: he does not render her unfit. As we learned yesterday, the sexual intercourse of a boy nine years and one day old has legal ramifications. In our case of yibbum, if a boy who has reached this age has relations with his yevamah, he disqualifies her from being permitted to have yibbum with another one of the brothers. However, this act of sexual intercourse is not sufficient to completely make her his wife. The Talmud states that it is not a “complete acquisition”, as it would be if he was of majority age. Therefore, when another brother, who has also reached this age, has intercourse with her, he causes her prohibited to the first brother. Since she has now had quasi-yibbum with two brothers (akin to ma’amar with two brothers, see above 5:1), she is forbidden to both. Rabbi Shimon holds that it is doubtful whether sexual intercourse with a boy nine years and one day old can acquire a woman as a wife. In our case, if it does, then she is the wife of the first brother, and the intercourse with the second brother does not disqualify her to the first. If such intercourse does not acquire her as a wife, then neither does the intercourse with the second brother, and she is not disqualified to the first brother. Should she wait around as a shomeret yavam until he is of majority age, he may then have yibbum with her. To summarize, the first opinion holds that an act of intercourse by a boy nine years and one day, certainly acquires a woman as a wife, but the acquisition is not complete. In contrast, Rabbi Shimon holds that it is uncertain whether this act of intercourse acquires. However, if it does acquire, it acquires fully." + ], + [ + "Introduction This mishnah continues to discuss the ramifications of an act of intercourse performed by a boy of the age of nine years and one day.", + "If a boy of the age of nine years and one day had intercourse with his yevamah and afterwards had intercourse with her rival wife, he has disqualified [both women for marriage] with himself. Rabbi Shimon says: he does not disqualify them. As we learned in yesterday’s mishnah, according to the rabbis an act of intercourse done by a boy nine years and one day old partially acquires a yevamah as a wife. It is akin to ma’amar, which also partially acquires the yevamah as a wife. Therefore, if the boy has intercourse first with one yevamah, and then with another one, who is also a yevamah, it is like giving ma’amar to two different yevamoth. In such a case, he may not marry either one. Rabbi Shimon holds that it is doubtful whether the sexual act of a boy nine years and one day old acquires a wife. Therefore, if it does make her his wife, then the first yevamah is his wife, and the intercourse with the second woman is inconsequential. If such an act does not acquire her as a wife, then neither did the intercourse with the second woman, and neither are prohibited to him. Therefore, according to Rabbi Shimon, when he reaches majority age he may marry either woman.", + "If a boy of the age of nine years and one day had intercourse with his yevamah and then died, she must undergo halitzah but may not be taken in yibbum. As stated above, intercourse with a boy nine years and one day old is legally equivalent to ma’amar. It therefore creates a tie to the yevamah, but does not totally remove the ties that she still has to her first husband. Should this boy now die, she has ties to two yevamim (two brothers, both of whom were her husband). As we learned in mishnah 3:9, when a woman has ties to two yevamim she must undergo halitzah, and may not have yibbum with another brother.", + "If he had married [any other] woman and she subsequently died, she is exempt [from both halitzah and yibbum]. If a boy nine years and one day old tries to marry a woman, and then he dies, she is not liable for yibbum or halitzah. This is because a boy this young cannot legally contract marriage. Throughout this chapter we have learned that there are some legal ramifications to his having sex with a woman. This section teaches that those ramifications are limited to the realm of yibbum. For regular marriage, there are no ramifications." + ], + [ + "If a boy of the age of nine years and one day had intercourse with his sister-in-law, and after he had come of age he married another woman and then died, if he had not known the first woman after he had become of age, the first one must have halitzah but may not be taken in yibbum, while the second may either have halitzah or yibbum.
Rabbi Shimon says: [the yavam] may perform yibbum with whichever one he wants, and he must perform halitzah for the other [woman].
[The same law applies] whether he is of the age of nine years and one day, or whether he is of the age of twenty years but had not produced two pubic hairs.
The final mishnah of chapter ten contains another dispute between the sages and Rabbi Shimon over the status of an act of intercourse performed by a nine year old boy. As we have learned before, according to the sages, such an act partially acquires the yevamah as his wife. According to Rabbi Shimon, it is doubtful whether the act acquires her as a wife, but if it does, she is fully his wife.
Section one: When the nine year old boy has relations with his yevamah, according to the sages, he partially acquires her as his wife. If he later dies, without having intercourse with her from the time he reached majority age, she may not have yibbum, as we learned in the previous mishnah, since she is tied to two yevamim (the minor and the brother who first married her). Had he had intercourse with her after having reached majority age, he would have completely severed her ties to her first husband, and she would be able to subsequently have yibbum.
Concerning the woman he married after having reached majority age, she may have either yibbum or halitzah. The question we must ask about this clause is why we would have thought that she is not allowed to have yibbum. The issue is connected to that which we learned in 3:9, concerning an adult who performed ma’amar with his yevamah, but before he had a chance to have yibbum with her he died. There we learned that just as she must have halitzah and not yibbum (since she is tied to two yevamim), so too must her rival wife. Our mishnah deals with a similar situation, where a man dies having ties equivalent to ma’amar with one wife, and full marriage with another wife. Either our mishnah disagrees with the opinion held in 3:9, or it makes a distinction between the two situations, holding that in one case the woman may have yibbum and in the other she may not.
Rabbi Shimon holds that an act of intercourse performed by a minor doubtfully acquires the yevamah as a wife. If it does acquire her as a wife, then she is fully his wife and she may have yibbum. If it does not acquire her as a wife, and he has not had relations with her since, then she was never the minor’s wife, and the woman may have yibbum with his brother (in this case she is still tied to the first brother). In either case, the yavam may have yibbum with either woman. He must have halitzah with the woman with whom he does not have yibbum or halitzah, lest the intercourse of a minor does not acquire. If this is so, then the second wife is not the rival wife of the first wife. If he had yibbum with the first wife, the second wife still needs to be released. If he had yibbum with the second wife, the first wife still needs halitzah on account of her previous marriage to the first brother. Whichever wife did not already have yibbum lest the intercourse of the minor does acquire, and then the surviving brother would have had yibbum with two yevamoth, which is forbidden.
Section two: The final section of the mishnah relates to the entire second half of the chapter (mishnayoth 6-9). A boy who reaches nine years of age is considered a minor until he reaches puberty, or until he reaches twenty years of age. According to the talmud, this is actually true until he reaches the age of 35. If at 35 he still has not shown signs of puberty, he is classified as a natural-born eunuch." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nA man may not marry the relatives of his wife (her mother, her daughter, her sister and some others) and he may not marry his father’s wife or his brother’s wife. Our mishnah discusses whether a man may marry the relatives of a woman with whom he, his father or his son has had intercourse but not married. It also deals with the question of whether or not it is prohibited to have intercourse (but not marriage) with the relatives of one’s wife.\nWe should note that the mishnah refers to two categories of women: one who has been raped and one who has been seduced. This is the common rabbinic way of referring to sex out of the bonds of marriage. The rabbis of the mishnah did not have a single word for extra-marital sex, and therefore referred to it using these terms which were used in other contexts.", + "A man is permitted to marry [the relative] of a woman [whom he has] raped or seduced. Although it is forbidden (according to halakhah it is impossible) to marry the relatives of one’s wife, a man may marry the relatives of a woman with whom he has had intercourse. The Torah forbids the marriage of a woman’s relatives only if he has had betrothal with that woman.", + "He who rapes or seduces [a relative] of his married wife, is guilty. In contrast, it is forbidden to have any type of sex, even extra-marital with the relatives of one’s wife. Since the relationship was sanctified by marriage, her relatives are prohibited.", + "A man may marry a woman whom his father has raped or seduced or a woman whom his son has raped or seduced. Rabbi Yehudah forbids [marriage] with a woman whom one’s father has raped or seduced. Although it is forbidden (and impossible) to marry one’s father’s wife or one’s son’s wife, the prohibition does not include a woman who had sex out of the bonds of marriage with the father or son. R. Yehudah prohibits sex with a woman who had sex with one’s father. In the talmud this is learned midrashically from Deuteronomy 23:1." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah refers to a convert’s participation in halitzah and yibbum.", + "The sons of a female convert who converted with her do not perform halitzah or yibbum, even if the one was not conceived in holiness but was born in holiness, and the other was both conceived and born in holiness. When a person crosses the boundary and converts into Judaism, he legally loses his genealogical ties to his former family. Therefore, when a woman converts with her sons, her sons lose their ties to their father and are no longer legally considered to be paternal brothers. Since only paternal brothers perform yibbum or halitzah, these brothers do not. Should the wife of one of them die, the other brothers do not perform halitzah and yibbum for her. The widow is exempt as if her husband did not have any paternal brothers. This law is true even if one of the brothers was conceived before the mother converted (not in holiness, see Deuteronomy 23:1) and born after she converted (in holiness) and the other brother conceived and born after she converted. Since at the time of the conception of the first brother the mother was not Jewish, the ties to his father do not carry over. Only if both brothers were both conceived and born after the mother had converted are they considered paternal brothers (assuming they have the same father).", + "So also [is the law] where the sons of a female slave were freed together with her. The same exact rules apply with regard to the freeing of a female slave. When a female slave is freed she becomes “fully Jewish”, and therefore the emancipation of slaves is somewhat like conversion." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah and the following two mishnayoth deal with a favorite rabbinic topic, especially in seder Nashim: people getting mixed up and not knowing who they are. We will see similar discussions in tractates Gittin and Kiddushin.\nIn the case in our mishnah, five boys from five women got mixed up, and nobody knows for sure who belongs to which mother. The problem is that should they die without children and they have brothers (or at least each woman has one other son who she knows is her son), they don’t know who is whose brother. This mishnah teaches an elegant, yet intricate way of solving the problem of who gets halitzah and yibbum from whom.\nIn my opinion these are rabbinic “mindbenders” that some times teach principles but do not reflect reality.", + "If the children of five women were mixed up and, when these mixed up children grew up, they took wives and then died, four perform halitzah for one [of the widows] and one contracts with her yibbum. [Then] he and three [brothers] perform halitzah to [another one of the widows] and one has with her yibbum. Thus every one [of the widows] has halitzah four times and yibbum once. After the five children were mixed up, they no longer know who their mother is, nor which of the women’s other sons are their brothers. When they grow up and take wives and then all die without children, it is unclear which brother of the dead, mixed up brothers should perform halitzah or yibbum for which widow. The mishnah states that first four brothers should perform halitzah for one widow, and then the fifth brother may have yibbum with her. If he was really her husband’s brother then the yibbum is done by the person who should do it. If one of the other brothers was really her husband’s brother, then she has already had halitzah and is free to marry someone else. Then the brother who has had yibbum with one widow, joins three other brothers and repeats the process with the second wife. She too has yibbum with the fifth brother. So on and so on they all repeat this process until each woman has halitzah four times and yibbum once. Note that there are other potential solutions to this problem. Four brothers could give halitzah to each woman and the fifth brother could have yibbum with each wife. Alternatively, all five brothers could have halitzah with all five wives. The mishnah probably chose this means of solving the problem so that all five wives would have one husband and no husband would perform yibbum more than once. Although bigamy was permitted in the time of the mishnah, it seems that monogamy was much more common and probably preferred." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with the complex situation where a mother’s son gets mixed up with her daughter-in-law’s son. Afterwards each woman has another son, such that it is unclear who is whose brother and who is whose father’s brother. I will try to use names to make the situation clearer. Sarah is the mother and Rebekah is the daughter-in-law. They give birth each to one son, Joe and Stanley, but they don’t know whose child is whose. They each also give birth to another son, Sarah to Moshe and Rebekah to Eli. Joe and Stanley might be Eli’s brother or his uncle. Joe and Stanley might be Moshe’s brother or his nephew. Our mishnah deals with cases of potential yibbum involving these four men.", + "If the child of a woman was mixed up with the child of her daughter-in-law and the mixed-up children grew up and married women and then died, the [other] sons of the daughter-in-law perform halitzah but may not contract yibbum, for it is uncertain whether she is the wife of his brother or the wife of his father’s brother. The [other] sons of the older woman either perform halitzah or yibbum, since the only doubt is whether she is the wife of his brother or the wife of his brother’s son. If Joe and Stanley each married a woman and then died without children, their wives become liable for yibbum or halitzah with either Moshe or Eli. Eli, Rebekah’s son, must perform halitzah for each woman for each might be the widow of his brother. He cannot have yibbum with either for either might be his father’s brother’s wife and it is forbidden to have relations with one’s father’s brother’s wife. After Eli has performed halitzah with both women, Moshe, Sarah’s son, may either have halitzah or yibbum with either. He may have yibbum with either for if she is his brother’s wife, then the yibbum is valid. If she is his wife of his brother’s son, he is still permitted to marry her for it is permitted to marry the wife of one’s brother’s son. This mishnah is based on the fact that it is permitted to marry one’s nephew’s wife but not one’s uncle’s wife.", + "If the not-mixed-up sons died then [with respect to the widows of the sons of the older woman] the mixed-up sons perform halitzah and may not have yibbum, since it is uncertain whether she is the wife of his brother or the wife of his father’s brother; [With respect to the widows] of the sons of the daughter-in-law one performs halitzah and the other [may] have yibbum. In this case, Moshe and Eli die and each woman becomes liable for halitzah to Joe and Stanley. Both Joe and Stanley must perform halitzah for Moshe’s wife, lest she be their dead brother’s wife. They may not have yibbum with her lest she be the wife of their father’s brother. With Eli’s wife one must have halitzah, lest she be his brother’s widow but then the other may have yibbum. Yibbum in this case is permitted because even if she is not his dead brother’s wife she is his brother’s son’s wife and it is permitted, as we learned above, to have relations with one’s brother’s son’s wife. In summary, if there is the possibility that the woman is his father’s brother’s wife, he may not have yibbum with her. If there is a possibility that she is his brother’s son’s wife he may have yibbum since this is permitted." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with a case where a priest’s wife’s child is mixed up with her slave’s child [this would have made a good TV movie]. Each kid doesn’t know whether he is the son of a priest or the son of a slave.", + "If the child of a priest’s wife was mixed-up with the child of her female slave, behold both may eat terumah and [together] they receive one share at the threshing-floor. They may not defile themselves for the dead nor may they marry any women whether these are eligible [for marriage with a priest] or ineligible. Since a slave owned by a priest or a priest’s wife can eat terumah, the mixed-up children can eat terumah, for both may eat terumah. When they go to the threshing-floor, the community is responsible to give them only one portion, for only one is a priest. Neither may defile themselves, because each one might be a priest who is prohibited from defiling himself by coming into contact with a dead body. Neither of them can marry any woman because if he is a priest he cannot marry a slave-woman and if he is a slave he can’t marry any woman eligible to marry a priest. Since there is no woman who can marry either a priest or a slave, these two men are stuck.", + "If when they grew up, the mixed-up children freed one another they may marry women who are eligible for marriage with a priest and they may not defile themselves for the dead. If they defiled themselves, they do not receive the penalty of forty lashes. When they grow up, each may free the other, since one is the owner of the other. At this point, one is a priest and one is a freed slave, but it is unclear who is who. They may now marry any woman they want, as long as she is eligible to marry a priest, since both categories of men may marry any woman eligible to marry a priest. Neither may marry a woman not eligible to marry a priest, for instance a convert, lest he be a priest. Neither may defile himself for the dead, since one is surely a priest. However, if one does defile himself, he is not lashed as is the normal punishment, for it is not certain that he was the priest. A person can only be punished if it was certain that he committed a transgression.", + "They may not eat terumah, but if they did eat they need not pay compensation either for the principal or [the additional] fifth. They are not to receive a share at the threshing-floor, but they may sell [their own] terumah and the proceeds are theirs. They receive no share in the holy things of the temple, and no holy things are given to them but others do not take their holy things from them. They are exempt from [giving to any priest] the shoulder, the cheeks and the maw, while the firstling of either of them should remain in the pasture until it contracts a blemish. They are not allowed to eat terumah, since either one might not be a priest. However, if they do eat terumah, they do not have to repay what they ate as do regular Israelites, since each can claim that he is the priest. They do not receive terumah at the threshing-floor, since either one might not be a priest. However, when they separate terumah from their own produce, they may sell it, since other priests cannot prove that the terumah does not rightfully belong to either one of them. In other words, they cannot eat terumah but they need not give it to a priest. They do not receive parts of sacrifices, and they are not given offerings to sacrifice for each is uncertain of his priestly status. However, if they come into possession of sacrifices, other priests may not take them away from them, for each can claim that no one can prove that he is not a priest. When they do bring a sacrifice, other priests may not take the parts of the animal normally given to the priests, for each can claim that he is a priest and no one can prove him wrong. If they have a first-born animal, they do not have to give it immediately to a priest, as is usual. Rather it should graze until it becomes blemished and not valid as a sacrifice. Then they may eat it or make other uses out of it (farming or for wool, etc.).", + "The restrictions relating to priests and the restrictions relating to Israelites are both imposed upon them. This section summarizes the entire mishnah. Basically, the law treats each mixed-up child as stringently as it would a priest (he can’t defile himself for the dead) and as stringently as it would an Israelite (he can’t eat terumah). However, as with regard to economic issues, other priests cannot make claims from him, since each son can always say to the other priests, “prove that I am not a priest.” Since there is a general rule that the burden of proof is upon the claimant, he is always exempt." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nAs we learned in chapter four, mishnah ten, a woman must wait three months between marriages in order to determine whether a subsequently born child is from the first or second husband. Our mishnah deals with a case where the woman did not wait and then bore a child seven months after being married to her second husband. In such a case it is unknown whether the child was a full-term child from the first husband or a prematurely born child from the second husband.", + "If a woman did not wait three months after [separation from] her husband, and married again and gave birth [to a son], and it is unknown whether it is a nine-months child by the first husband or a seven-months child by the second, if she had other sons by the first husband and other sons by the second, these must perform halitzah but may not contract yibbum. So too he, with their widows performs halitzah but may not contract yibbum. In this scenario, it is unclear whether this boy is a paternal brother of the children of the first father or of the second father. He is a maternal brother to all of them, but only paternal brothers are obligated by the laws of yibbum. Therefore, should he die without children, his widow must receive halitzah from one brother from the first father and from one brother from the second husband. They may not perform yibbum lest he was not their paternal brother. In this case since he is there maternal brother, marrying the widow would be forbidden. Similarly, if one of these brothers dies without children, the doubtful-son performs halitzah but not yibbum, lest he was not his brother.", + "If he had brothers by the first and also brothers by the second, but not by the same mother, he may either perform halitzah or contract yibbum, But as for them, one performs halitzah and the other may [then] contract yibbum. If he had brothers from the first husband and the second husband but these brothers were not from his mother, he may have halitzah or yibbum with any of their widows. With regard to the first husband’s son’s widow, if the first husband was his father, then he is performing yibbum correctly. If the second husband was his father, then the widows of the children of the first husband are like strangers (non-relatives) to him, and he may marry them. Note that this is only so if there was only one other son to the first husband. If he had other sons, his widow must receive halitzah from one of them first, lest the doubtful son was really the son of the second husband. With regard to the second husband’s son’s widow the same is also true. Either she is his brother’s widow or a stranger. In either case he may marry her. The difference between this case and that in section one is that these brothers do not share the same mother. If he (the doubtful-son) dies, then one brother from one father must perform halitzah and then the other can have yibbum. The second one may have yibbum because if he was his brother, then she is his brother’s widow, and yibbum is allowed. If he was not his brother, then she was not his brother’s widow, but she is permitted since she has already received yibbum from her brother-in-law (the son of the other husband)." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is a continuation of yesterday’s mishnah, which dealt with a situation in which it was unclear whether a woman’s former husband or current husband is the father of her child.", + "If one of [the two husbands] was an Israelite and the other a priest: He may only marry a woman who is eligible to marry a priest. He may not defile himself for the dead, but if he did defile himself he does not suffer the penalty of forty stripes. He may not eat terumah, but if he did eat he need not pay compensation either for the principal or [for the additional] fifth. He does not receive a share at the threshing-floor, but he may sell [his own] terumah and the profits are his. He receives no share in the holy things of the temple, no holy things are given to him, but he is not deprived of his own. He is exempt from [giving to any priest] the shoulder, the cheeks and the maw, while his firstling must remain in the pasture until it contracts a blemish. The restrictions relating to priests and the restrictions relating to Israelites are imposed upon him. In this case the child is not sure if he is a priest or an Israelite. Most of the laws here are the same as those we saw in mishnah five above, so I will not explain them again. In essence all of the strictures that apply to a priest apply to him, but he does not receive all of the benefits of being a priest, for he might be an Israelite.", + "If the two [husbands] were priests: He must be an onen mourner for them and they must be onenim mourners for him, but he may not defile himself for them, nor may they defile themselves for him. He may not inherit from them, but they may inherit from him. He is exempt if he strikes or curses the one or the other. He goes up [to serve] in the Temple watch of the one as well as of the other, but he does not receive a share [in the offerings]. If both served in the same watch, he receives a single portion. If both the first and second husband were priests, then this child is certainly a priest and may act as a priest and receive most priestly benefits. However there are certain complications that arise since he does not know who his father is. An “onen” is a mourner on the day that the person for whom he is mourning dies. An onen who is a priest may not serve in the Temple service. On the day that either of the husbands dies the son must act as an onen and cannot serve in the Temple. Similarly, if he dies before they do, they must act as an onen for them. Since this is a stringency it does apply. However, he may not defile himself in burying them and they may not defile themselves in burying him. This is because it is not certain which one is his father and a priest cannot defile himself for someone who is not his relative. He may not inherit from them, for each husband’s other inheritors can say that he needs to bring proof (which he cannot) that he is this husband’s son. The husbands split his inheritance, if he dies without sons. He is not liable for striking or cursing either one of them, since it is not certain which is his father. Note that were it certain which is his father, this is a capital offense. The priests were divided into 24 Temple watches, called mishmarim. Each week a different mishmar would serve. This son is responsible for serving with both father’s mishmar since this is considered a stringency. However, he does not receive the gifts that were divided amongst the priests of the mishmar, for each mishmar can say to him that he belongs to the other. However, if both fathers belonged to the same mishmar he may share in their gifts." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThe twelfth chapter of Yevamoth discusses how halitzah is performed. The first mishnah discusses the necessity of the presence of judges and what type of footwear she must remove from the yavam in order for the halitzah to be valid.", + "The commandment of halitzah must be performed in the presence of three judges, even though all the three are laymen. In describing halitzah, Deuteronomy 25:7 states, “And if the man does not wish to take his brother's wife, then his brother's wife shall go up to the gate to the elders, and say: 'My husband's brother refuses to raise up for his brother a name in Israel; he will not perform the duty of a husband's brother unto me.’” From here it is clear that halitzah must be performed in front of “elders”, interpreted by our mishnah to refer to a court. However, there is no need for expert judges, and mere “laymen” will do. This is probably because this is a ceremony and not a true court case.", + "If the woman performed the halitzah with a shoe, her halitzah is valid, [but if] with a felt sock it is invalid. If with a sandal to which a heel is attached it is valid, but [if with one] that has no heel it is invalid. [If the sandal was tied] below the knee the halitzah is valid, but if above the knee it is invalid. The Torah states that halitzah must be done with a shoe, which in the Torah refers to a leather shoe. Hence any kind of shoe made of leather is fit for halitzah, but not a shoe made of felt. In rabbinic Hebrew, a “shoe” is made of soft leather. A “sandal” which is made of hard leather is also acceptable for halitzah, provided that it have a heel. Deuteronomy 25:9 states that she “shall pull the sandal off his foot”. According to our mishnah, if the sandal’s straps were tied below the knee, she can fulfill the requirement to “pull the sandal off his foot”. If the straps are above the knee, then this requirement is not fulfilled. Others explain this last clause to refer to an amputee, that if his leg was cut off above the knee, halitzah cannot be performed, but if his leg was cut off below the knee halitzah may be performed." + ], + [ + "Introduction This mishnah relates laws concerning the shoe with which halitzah must be performed.", + "If the woman performed the halitzah with a sandal that did not belong to him, or with a wooden sandal, or with the one of the left foot [which he was wearing] on his right foot, the halitzah is valid. Deut. 25:9 says “she shall pull off his sandal”. From here we might have concluded that if the yavam did not own the sandal, the halitzah was invalid. Our mishnah teaches us that if the halitzah was performed with someone else’s shoe that the yavam was wearing it is still valid. Wooden sandals, although not the normal style of sandal, are nevertheless valid for halitzah, although not preferable. As long as the yavam wears the shoe on his right foot the halitzah is valid, even if it is his left shoe.", + "If she performed the halizah with a sandal too large [for him], in which, however, he is able to walk, or with one too small which, however, covers the greater part of his foot, her halizah is valid. The sandal which is used for halitzah should fit his foot. However, if it is too large or too small the halitzah is valid, provided he can use it as a sandal. This means that if it is too big he must be able to walk in it, and if it is too small, it must at least cover most of his foot.", + "If she performed the halitzah at night, her halitzah is valid. Rabbi Elazar disqualifies [halitzah at night]. In the previous mishnah we learned that halitzah is considered a “court matter” and therefore requires three judges. Monetary cases may be completed at night but must be begun during the day. Halitzah is somewhat of a monetary case, because after halitzah she collects her ketubah. The first opinion considers halitzah to be like the first stage of a trial and therefore it may take place at night, whereas according to R. Elazar it is like the last stage of a trial and therefore, must take place during the day.", + "[If she performed it] with [the yavam’s] left shoe, her halitzah is invalid, Rabbi Elazar validates it. According to the first opinion in the mishnah, halitzah must be performed with the shoe from the right foot, whereas R. Elazar holds that it may be also from the left foot." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThere are three acts in the halitzah ceremony: 1) the woman’s removal of the yavam’s shoe; 2) her spitting in front of him; 3) her recitation of the verses in Deuteronomy. Mishnah six below will deal with the recitations stated during the process of halitzah. Our mishnah deals with which acts are essential to a valid performance of halitzah.", + "If she took off his shoe and spat, but did not recite [the formula], her halitzah is valid. Although the recitation of the formula is required, if she does not do it, her halitzah is still valid. This is because all tannaim agree that words are not a deed and only deeds are absolutely essential to the performance of halitzah.", + "If she recited [the formula] and spat, but did not draw off the shoe, her halitzah is invalid. Drawing off the shoe is the most essential part of halitzah, without which the halitzah cannot be valid.", + "If she drew off the shoe and recited [the formula] but did not spit: R. Eliezer says her halitzah is invalid; and R. Akiva says: her halitzah is valid. R. Eliezer said to him: “‘So shall be done’ (Deut. 25:9), anything which is a deed is essential.” R. Akiva said to him: “From there is your proof!: ‘So shall be done to the man”, only that which is to be done to the man [is essential]. This section contains a debate over whether or not spitting is essential to the halitzah. According to R. Eliezer, since spitting is a deed, it is essential. This is derived from the words, “so shall be done” which are understood to mean that anything that is “done” is essential to the halitzah. R. Akiva rejects this proof by creatively reading the phrase “so shall be done to the man”. R. Akiva interprets this to mean anything done literally to the man’s body. Spitting is done to the man but not to his body, for according to rabbinic interpretation, she spits in front of him and not in his face as the verse implies." + ], + [ + "Introduction Halitzah requires what is called “da’at” or awareness/intent. That is both the woman and the man must fully understand that the halitzah permits her to marry others and causes her to become prohibited to the yavam. According to the rabbis, minors and deaf-mutes do not legally have da’at (now that deaf-mutes can learn to communicate, they are considered as having da’at). Our mishnah rules that deaf-mutes and minors cannot perform halitzah or have it performed to them.", + "If a deaf yavam submitted to halitzah or if a deaf yevamah performed halitzah, or if a halitzah was performed on a minor, the halizah is invalid. A deaf-mute and a minor can neither perform halitzah nor have halitzah performed upon them. In all such cases the halitzah is invalid and the woman is not free to marry. In the case of a deaf-mute yavam, this would mean that if there are other brothers one of them must perform halitzah. In the case of a deaf-mute yevamah, she could only be released with yibbum (which does not require da’at). In the case of the minor yavam, she must have halitzah with another of the brothers (if there are brothers) or wait for the minor to reach majority age.", + "If a minor yevamah performed halitzah she must again perform halitzah when she becomes of age; if she does not again perform it, the halitzah is invalid. The minor yevamah who performs halitzah must perform it again when she reaches age (12 ½). There are other versions of this mishnah which read that in such a case the halitzah is valid. According to this version, although the yavam cannot be a minor, the yevamah can. The reasoning behind this is that the Deut. 25:7 says “But if the man does not want”, man implying that a minor cannot make such a choice. There is no such word used in connection to the woman, therefore she may be a minor." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is concerned with an act of halitzah that was not done in the presence of three judges, as was required in mishnah one.\nNote the structure of this chapter: the first mishnah dealt with judges and now the mishnah returns to this subject. As we shall see, the next mishnah stands independent of the rest of the chapter. That means that the mishnah was deliberately written in a chiastic structure (abba).", + "If she performed halitzah in the presence of two men or in the presence of three men and one of them was discovered to be a relative or in any other way unfit [to act as judge], her halitzah is invalid. R. Shimon and R. Yohanan Ha-Sandelar declare it valid. And it once happened that a man submitted to halitzah between himself and herself in a prison, and when the case came before R. Akiva he declared the halitzah valid. According to the first opinion in the mishnah, without three valid judges, halitzah is invalid. “Unfit” refers to those unfit to testify as listed in Mishnah Sanhedrin 3:3-4. The list of which relatives are invalid to act as judges or witnesses is also found in the third chapter of Sanhedrin. However, according to R. Shimon, R. Yohanan Ha-Sandelar (the sandal maker ironic that a sandal maker is teaching laws of halitzah which uses a sandal), and their teacher, R. Akiva, the lack of three fit judges does not invalidate the halitzah. According to the Talmud, this case mentioned in the mishnah, was brought before R. Akiva while he was imprisoned for breaking the Roman decree not to teach Torah." + ], + [ + "The final mishnah of our chapter outlines the procedure of halitzah. Most of this mishnah is straightforward so I will only explain the parts that require commentary.", + "[This is the procedure in the performance of] the commandment of halitzah:He and his deceased brother’s wife come to the court, and they offer him appropriate advice, for it is said, “Then the elders of his city shall call him and speak to him” (Deut. 25:8). Verse 8 says that the elders must speak to the yavam. This is interpreted by our mishnah as giving him advice as to whether he should have yibbum or halitzah. The advice should be appropriate, meaning that if he is very old and she is young, or they are in some other way apparently not compatible, they court tells him that he should have halitzah and not yibbum.", + "[These sayings] were spoken in the holy tongue (Hebrew). Since the Torah says that these verses must be recited by him and by her, they must be recited in Hebrew. We will learn more about what things must be done in Hebrew and what can be done in other languages when we learn the seventh chapter of Sotah.", + "“Then his brother’s widow shall go up to him in the presence of the elders, pull the sandal off his foot and spit in his face” (verse 9) spit that the judges can see. Our mishnah interprets the words, “in the presence of the elders” to mean that the elders must be able to see the spit.", + "When Rabbi Hyrkanus was under the terebinth at Kefar Etam he dictated the reading and completed the entire section, the practice was established to complete the entire section. The judges would dictate to the yevamah what to say up until this verse. However, at first they would not dictate verse 10. However, at a later time period, Rabbi Hyrkanus began to dictate the final verse and that became the established practice." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction: Chapter thirteen discusses the marriage of a minor, her right to refuse and thereby annul the marriage when she reaches majority age and the implications that this has on the laws of yibbum.
According to the rabbinic understanding of the Torah, a father can marry off his daughter when she is a minor and cause her to be fully married (deoraita). This marriage can only be severed by death or divorce. If the father dies, the daughter cannot be fully married until she reaches majority age. The rabbis, however, gave the girl’s mother and brother the ability to marry her off while still a minor. The status of such a marriage is rabbinic (derabanan). Since this is a lesser form of marriage, she may “refuse” the marriage and any point until she is no longer a minor. Such a refusal is called “meun”. If she does the marriage is annulled and she does not even require a get.
Our mishnah contains five debates between Beth Shammai and Beth Hillel concerning this right of refusal.", + "Beth Shammai says: Only those who are betrothed may exercise the right of refusal; But Beth hillel says: Both those who are betrothed and those who are married. According to Beth Shammai only those who are betrothed are allowed to make a declaration of refusal and thereby leave their husbands without a get. Beth Hillel says even if she was married she may do so. According to the Talmud, Beth Shammai allows only the betrothed woman to refuse because if the married woman also was able to refuse, men would not want to spend the money involved in marrying a minor, lest she later refuse the marriage.", + "Beth Shammai says: [A declaration of refusal may be made] against a husband but not against a yavam; But Beth Hillel says: Either against a husband or against a yavam. If the minor girl was married off by her mother or brother and then her husband died, according to Beth Shammai she cannot make a declaration against her yavam. Rather she must wait until she reaches majority age and then request halitzah. However, according to Beth Hillel she may make such a declaration against the yavam as well. However, even though she has annulled her marriage to the yavam’s brother, she cannot at a later point marry the yavam, since she was at one point his brother’s wife.", + "Beth Shammai says: [The declaration] must be made in his presence, But Beth Hillel says: Either in his presence or not in his presence. According to Beth Shammai, she must make the declaration of refusal in front of him. According to Beth Hillel, this is not necessary.", + "Beth Shammai says: [The declaration must be made] before the court, But Beth Hillel says: Either before the court or not before the court. According to Beth Shammai, she must make the declaration of refusal in front of a court. According to Beth Hillel, this is not necessary.", + "Beth Hillel said to Beth Shammai: [A girl] may exercise the right of refusal while she is a minor even four or five times. Beth Shammai said to them: “The daughters of Israel are not ownerless property! Rather, either she makes a declaration of refusal and then waits until she is of age, or she makes a declaration of refusal and marries again [immediately]. According to Beth Hillel, as long as she is still a minor, she may be married off as many times as her brothers and mother wish and she may later refuse as many marriages as they offer. Beth Shammai offers a moral objection to this possibility, for through it a girl could be betrothed (but according to Beth Shammai not to several men without ever having received a get. Rather she either waits until she is an adult or makes a declaration of refusal and then marries immediately, at which point she could no longer refuse, according to Beth Shammai. Note that this last section is phrased differently than the previous sections. According to some mishnaic commentators, since Beth Shammai explains their position the halakhah is according to them in this section. In all of the other sections, the halakhah follows Beth Hillel, as it usually does." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah provides three statements as to which type of minor girl can be married off by her brother or mother and before reaching majority age make a declaration of refusal.", + "Which minor must make the declaration of refusal?
Any whose mother or brothers have given her in marriage with her consent. If they gave her in marriage without her consent she need not make any declaration of refusal. When the mother or brothers marry off the girl she must consent to the marriage. If she does, she may later on make a declaration of refusal and thereby annul the marriage. However, if she does not consent, she need not even make a declaration of refusal.", + "Rabbi Hanina ben Antigonus says: Any child who is unable to take care of her token of betrothal need not make any declaration of refusal. R. Hanina adds in another criterion for which type of girl must make a declaration of refusal in order to leave her marriage. If she was married off by her mother or brother at an age when she couldn’t even take care of her token of betrothal (either money or a document), then the marriage is totally invalid. According to the Rambam, a girl under six by definition cannot take care of her token of betrothal and a girl over ten can. Girls between six and ten are checked to see if they have this capability. If they do not, then they do not need to perform meun.", + "Rabbi Eliezer says: The act of a minor has no validity at all, rather [she is to be regarded] as one seduced. The daughter of an Israelite [who was married] to a priest may not eat terumah, and the daughter of a priest [who was married] to an Israelite may eat terumah. According to R. Eliezer, even if her brother or mother married her off, she is not considered fully married, rather she has the status of one who has been seduced. This is a way of stating that there is no validity to the marriage and therefore if she is the daughter of an Israelite “married” to a priest, she does not gain the right to eat terumah and if she is the daughter of a priest “married” to an Israelite she does not lose the right to eat terumah. According to the Talmud, although she is not at all married to him, R. Eliezer still requires her to make a declaration of meun to leave the marriage." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is a continuation of the previous mishnah.", + "Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob says: In the case of any hindrance that was due to the husband, she is considered to be his wife; But in the case of any hindrance that was not due to the husband she is not considered to be his wife. There are two explanations of this mishnah in the Babylonian Talmud and of what “a hindrance” is. According to one explanation, if while married to this man another man offers to marry her and she refuses that marriage because she prefers her current husband, then she is considered to be his wife. This is because she has expressed her opinion that she wishes to stay in the marriage, and it is unlikely that she will later make a declaration of refusal. In such a case if she was the daughter of an Israelite married to a priest, she may eat terumah, and if she was the daughter of a priest married to an Israelite she loses her right to eat terumah. However, if the hindrance was caused by another factor, for instance the new man was not right for her, then she has not expressed a definite desire to stay with her husband and therefore she is not considered his wife. According to the second explanation, if her husband gave her a get before she made a declaration of refusal, she is considered to have been his wife. The “hindrance” is the get. The consequences is that he is subsequently forbidden to marry her relatives and she his. However, if she makes a declaration of refusal, this is considered a hindrance from her. She is not considered his wife and therefore may marry his relatives, as we will learn in the upcoming mishnah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with various consequences of her refusing the marriage, especially on her subsequent marriages. Note that the mishnah does not talk about situations that are likely to arise. Rather by suggesting concrete cases, the mishnah teaches more abstract legal principles.", + "If a minor made a declaration of refusal against a man, he is permitted [to marry] her relatives and she is permitted to [marry] his relatives, and he does not disqualify her from[marrying] a priest. The declaration of refusal annuls the marriage, making it as if it never happened. Therefore, neither he nor she is subsequently forbidden to marry each other’s relatives, as would be the case with divorce. Since she is not a divorcee, she may later marry a priest.", + "If he gave her a get, he is forbidden to [marry] her relatives and she is forbidden to [marry] his relatives, and he also disqualifies her from [marrying] a priest. However, if he gave her a get, her status is that of a divorcee and the marriage was not annulled. Neither can marry each other’s relatives and she may not marry a priest. Although the marriage was only of rabbinic status, it is strong enough to create these prohibitions.", + "If he gave her a get and remarried her and then she a made a declaration of refusal against him, and then she was married to another man and became a widow or was divorced, she is permitted to return to him. If he gives her a get, and then remarries her (this is permitted if she has not yet married someone else) and then she makes a declaration of refusal and then marries someone else, if this last person divorces her or dies, she may still return to her first husband. Although generally a man may not remarry his divorcee if she has been married in the interim (see Deuteronomy 24:1-4), in this case the declaration of refusal, which came after the divorce, cancels the get and places her in the category of one who has refused her husband and takes her out of the category of a divorcee.", + "If she made a declaration of refusal against him and then he remarried her, and then he gave her a get and then she was married to another man and became a widow or was divorced, she is forbidden to return to him. However, in the opposite case, where she first makes a declaration of refusal, then returns to her husband and then is divorced, remarries, and is then divorced or widowed, she may not return to her first husband. Since the divorce was after the refusal, she is in the category of a divorcee.", + "This is the general rule: if divorce followed meun she is forbidden to return to him, and if meun followed divorce she is permitted to return to him. This general sums up what was learned in the previous two sections." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to deal with the remarriage of a girl who has made a declaration of refusal.", + "If a minor made a declaration of refusal against a man, and then she was married to another man who divorced her, and afterwards to another man against whom she made a declaration of refusal, and then to another man who divorced her: she is forbidden to return to any man from whom she was separated by a get, but is permitted to return to any man from whom she was separated by her declaration of refusal. In the scenario in this mishnah, a minor is married to a series of men, while she is still a minor. Against the first she makes a declaration of refusal, by the second she is divorced, against the third she makes another declaration of refusal and by the fourth she is divorced. She may now remarry the first or third since their marriage ended by declaration of refusal, and although she was remarried in the interim, since the original marriage ended with refusal it is as if it never existed. She cannot remarry the second and fourth husbands, by whom she was divorced, because she was married in the interim. Although the subsequent marriage was annulled and therefore should be treated as if it never happened, our mishnah teaches that it is still sufficient to prevent her from remarrying." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses whether or not a woman who has been divorced and remarried by the same man can have yibbum, should her husband die without children.", + "If a man divorced his wife and remarried her, she is permitted to marry the yavam; Rabbi Elazar forbids. When a man divorces his wife, she becomes forbidden to his brother under the category of “his brother’s divorcee”. In the case in our mishnah, a man divorces his wife, then remarries her and then dies without children, making her liable for yibbum. Although when she was divorced she was forbidden to her husband’s brother, since when her husband died she was married to him, she is in the category of “his dead brother’s wife” and if he had no children, she is liable for yibbum. Rabbi Elazar forbids this woman from having yibbum.", + "Similarly, if a man divorced an orphan and remarried her, she is permitted to marry the yavam; Rabbi Elazar forbids. The same rules apply with regard to a girl whose father had died (she is called an orphan even though her mother is alive) and was married off by her mother or brother, and then was divorced and remarried. Since at the time of death she was married to the yavam’s brother, she is permitted to have yibbum with him. Again Rabbi Elazar forbids this.", + "If a minor was given in marriage by her father and was divorced she is like an orphan in her father’s lifetime and then her husband remarried her, all agree that she is forbidden to marry the yavam. This section deals with a minor married off by her father. When she is divorced she is legally considered to be an “orphan in her father’s life”. This is because her father no longer has the ability to marry her off. Once she is married she never returns to her father’s domain. When her original husband remarries her while she is a minor, this marriage is only of “rabbinic” status because a minor cannot fully contract marriage without her father. In contrast her divorce was a regular “Toraitic” divorce because a minor can be fully divorced. Since the divorce was biblically valid and the remarriage only rabbinically valid, she is still “biblically” considered the yavam’s brother’s divorcee and all of the sages agree that she is forbidden to the yavam." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses situations where a woman becomes liable for yibbum or halitzah to her sister’s husband. Generally in such a case the woman is completely exempt. However, these cases are slightly different because at least on of the marriages is only of rabbinic status.", + "If two brothers were married to two sisters who were minors and orphans, and the husband of one of them died, [the widow] is free since she is the [the yavam’s] wife’s sister. The marriage of these two brothers to these two sisters is of rabbinic status, since they were married off by their brothers or mother. We might have thought that since this was so, the sister whose husband died needs halitzah from the yavam, even though the yavam is married to her sister (and hence yibbum is forbidden). This is because the ties created by the necessity of halitzah are biblical whereas the marriage is only rabbinic. The mishnah teaches that just as in a case of regular marriage where the widow is exempt from yibbum and halitzah, so too here she is exempt.", + "Similarly in the case of two deaf-mute [sisters]. The marriage of a girl deaf-mute is also only of rabbinic status, since she was legally considered by the rabbis to be lacking the required intelligence to contract marriage. This case is similar to the previous case because the marriage of both women is only of rabbinic status.", + "[If the two brothers were married to two sisters one of whom was] of age and [the other] a minor, if the husband of the minor died, the minor is free since she is the [the yavam’s] wife’s sister. In this case two brothers were married to two sisters, one of whom was of majority age and hence her marriage was of biblical status (deoraita) and one of whom was a minor, whose marriage was only of rabbinic status (derabbanan). If the husband of the minor died, she certainly does not need yibbum or halitzah from the other husband, because he is married to her sister. Since the marriage to the older sister is deoraita, there is no question about this case.", + "If the husband of the elder sister died: Rabbi Eliezer says the minor is to be instructed to make a declaration of refusal against him. Rabban Gamaliel says: If she made a declaration of refusal, then she did so; but if [she did] not, let her wait until she is of age and then she will be free since she is the [the yavam’s] wife's sister. Rabbi Joshua says: Woe to him because of his wife and woe to him because of his brother’s wife! He must allow his wife to go by [giving her] a get, and [he must let go] his brother’s wife through halitzah. The more difficult and controversial case is if the elder sister’s husband dies. She now needs yibbum or halitzah from a deoraita marriage, but her sister is already married, at least rabbinically to the yavam. If the yavam were to have halitzah with the older sister, the younger sister to whom he is married would become forbidden to him as his halutzah’s sister. Rabbi Eliezer says that in order to get out of this problematic situation, the court instructs the younger sister to make a declaration of refusal, thereby annulling the marriage and making it possible for the elder sister to have yibbum. According to Rabbi Eliezer, the ties that the older sister has to the yavam (the younger sister’s husband) makes the younger sister forbidden to her husband. Therefore the only solution is for the younger sister to make a declaration of refusal. Rabban Gamaliel disagrees with Rabbi Eliezer and does not hold that the ties to the older sister make the younger sister forbidden. Therefore, the younger sister can either make a declaration of refusal immediately, or she may remain with her husband and the older sister can wait until the younger sister reaches majority age at which time she, the older sister, becomes exempt from yibbum and halitzah because her yavam is biblically married to her sister. Rabbi Joshua says that in this case the husband/yavam will lose both his wife and his yevamah. Rabbi Joshua agrees with Rabbi Eliezer that his minor wife is now forbidden to him due to the biblical ties that he has with her sister. However, Rabbi Joshua disagrees with Rabbi Eliezer’s strategy of teaching her to make a declaration of refusal. This is because Rabbi Joshua holds that declarations of refusal are not desirable and that one should distance himself from them as much as possible. The yavam cannot have yibbum with the yevamah since she is now the sister of his divorcee. Therefore he must have halitzah with her. In this way, he loses both women. Question for Further Thought:  What is the difference between the first case and the last case? Why in one does she not require halitzah but in the other she might?" + ], + [ + "Introduction\nUsually when two women are married to a man and he dies without children, when one of the brothers performs yibbum or halitzah with one of the widows, the other is automatically exempt. Yibbum or halitzah are not performed for each wife. Our mishnah discusses situations in which at least one of the marriage was only “derabbanan” either because she was a minor or a deaf-mute. The general rule in such cases is that yibbum or halitzah with a wife whose marriage was only derabbanan does not exempt a wife whose marriage was deoraita. However, yibbum or halitzah with a wife whose marriage is deoraita does exempt a wife whose marriage was derabbanan. Furthermore, yibbum or halitzah with a wife whose marriage was derabbanan exempts another wife whose marriage was derabbanan, as long as both marriages were of the exact same status.", + "If a man who was married to two minors orphans died, intercourse or halitzah with one of them exempts her rival. In this section both marriages were “derabbanan”; therefore intercourse (yibbum) or halitzah by the yavam with one of the widows exempts the other one. Note that some commentators hold that the minor can perform halitzah only when she reaches majority age. Others hold that she may even do so as a minor (see above 12:4).", + "And the same is true with regard to two deaf women. Again both marriages are derabbanan therefore yibbum with one wife exempts the other. Note that in this case yibbum is the only option because as we learned in 12:4, a deaf-mute woman cannot perform halitzah.", + "[If a man was married to] a minor and to a deaf woman [and then died], intercourse with one of them does not exempt her rival. In this case, both marriages were derabbanan, but one was with a deaf-mute and one was with a minor. Since we don’t know who is “more” married, both require halitzah or yibbum. The minor may be “more” married because her marriage will be completed upon reaching majority age. On the other hand the deaf-mute may be more married because she is more capable of having intercourse.", + "If one was of sound senses and one was deaf, intercourse with the woman of sound senses exempts the deaf woman, but intercourse with the deaf woman does not exempt the woman of sound senses. In this case, one wife was of sound senses she was not a deaf-mute or insane and the other wife was a deaf-mute. Since the marriage with the former was of deoraita status, yibbum or halitzah with her exempts the latter. However, since the latter’s marriage was of derabbanan status, yibbum with her does not exempt the former.", + "If one was of age and the other a minor, intercourse with the one of age exempts the minor, but intercourse with the minor does not exempt the one of age. This section teaches the same rule as in the previous section; it just uses the example of a minor and a girl of majority age." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with a case where a man has intercourse with both of his brother’s widows, or he has intercourse with one and his brother has intercourse with the other.", + "If a man who was married to two orphans who were minors died, and the yavam had intercourse with one, and then he also had intercourse with the other, or his [the yavam’s] brother had intercourse with the other, he has not thereby disqualified the first [for him]; In this case the man had intercourse with both minor wives, or he had intercourse with one and his brother had intercourse with the other. In any case, the first minor widow is still permitted to the first yavam. This is because there is a doubt whether or not yibbum is truly effective in “acquiring” a minor as a wife. If it is effective, than the first act of yibbum makes her fully his wife, and the second act of intercourse is illicit but does not effect the first wife’s status. If it is ineffective, then he didn’t need to have yibbum with either minor widow, because they were not biblically married to his brother. In either case, he may remain married to the first one. He cannot stay with the second lest intercourse is effective for acquiring a minor and he has already acquired her rival wife.", + "And the same is true with regard to two deaf women. The same rule is true where both wives were deaf-mutes.", + "[If one was] a minor and the other deaf, and the yavam had intercourse with the minor and then he had intercourse with the deaf widow, or a brother of his had intercourse with the deaf widow, he has not disqualified the minor [for him]. In this case one widow was a deaf-mute and the other a minor. If the yavam had relations first with the minor and then with the deaf-mute, or the yavam’s brother had relations with the deaf-mute, the minor may remain married to the first yavam. This is for the same reasons that we explained above: if yibbum is effective in acquiring the minor, then she is married to the yavam and the intercourse with the deaf-mute wife is licentious, but does not effect the first wife’s status. If it is ineffective, then she was never liable for yibbum with him, because she was not married to his brother.", + "If the yavam had intercourse with the deaf widow and then he also had intercourse with the minor, or a brother of his had intercourse with the minor, he has disqualified the deaf widow [for him]. In this case, the yavam first has relations with the deaf-mute and then he or his brother has relations with the minor widow. In this case the deaf-mute wife becomes forbidden to him. This is because the “acquisition” of the deaf-mute is certainly valid, but is not a complete “acquisition”. The “acquisition” of the minor is doubtful, as we explained above, but if it does acquire it does so fully. If the acquisition of the minor was fully valid, then it disqualifies the deaf-mute, whose acquisition was only partially valid." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is a continuation of yesterday’s mishnah.", + "[If one was] of sound senses and the other deaf, and the yavam had intercourse with the woman of sound senses and then he also had intercourse with the deaf woman, or a brother of his had intercourse with the deaf woman, he does not disqualify the former [for him]. When the yavam has intercourse with the woman of sound senses, he fully acquires her as his wife. His subsequent act of intercourse, or his brother’s subsequent act of intercourse with her rival wife is licentious but does not effect the status of the first woman.", + "If the yavam had intercourse with the deaf woman, and then he also had intercourse with the woman of sound senses, or a brother of his had intercourse with the woman of sound senses, he disqualifies the deaf woman [for him]. As we learned yesterday, sexual intercourse does not effect a full acquisition of a deaf woman, but rather a partial acquisition. Therefore, there is the possibility of acquiring the second woman, and thereby creating a situation where both rival wives are somewhat “acquired” to him. Since it is forbidden to be with both, he must separate from both of them." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues the subject discussed in the previous two mishnayoth.", + "[If one was] of age and the other a minor, and the yavam had intercourse with the one who was of age, and then he had intercourse with the minor, or a brother of his had intercourse with the minor, he does not disqualify the elder for him. In this case one of the widows was of majority age and one was a minor. If the yavam has intercourse (yibbum) with the one who is of age she is fully acquired to him as a wife. If he or his brother subsequently have intercourse with the other widow the act is forbidden (for she was his brother’s wife) but does not effect the status of the one who already had yibbum.", + "If the yavam had intercourse with the minor, and then he also had intercourse with the one who was of age, or a brother of his had intercourse with the one who was of age, he disqualifies the minor [for him]. If the yavam first had intercourse with the minor, there is a doubt whether or not she is acquired to him. If he then has intercourse with the one who is of majority age, that act would be an act of yibbum if the act of intercourse with the minor did not acquire her. Since the older widow may be his wife through yibbum (or his brother’s wife) he is forbidden to remain married to the minor widow. He also cannot be with the older widow, lest the minor was successfully acquired through yibbum.", + "Rabbi Elazar says: the minor is to be instructed to make a declaration of refusal. Rabbi Elazar states that in such a case we should instruct the younger widow to make a declaration of refusal, thereby annulling the marriage. This would allow yibbum with the widow of majority age." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe first half of this mishnah discusses the case of a minor yavam (up until now the mishnah has concentrated mostly on the minor yevamah).\nThe second half of the mishnah discusses the situation of a woman who claims that her yavam has not had yibbum with her and she wants halitzah.", + "If a yavam who was a minor had intercourse with a yevamah who was a minor, they should be brought up together. If a minor yavam who is legally capable of having sexual intercourse (over nine years old) has intercourse with a minor yevamah, he cannot divorce her because he cannot give a get until he reaches majority age. Therefore, they must remain together until they reach majority age, at which point they can decide whether to remain married or separate through divorce.", + "If he had intercourse with a yevamah who was of age, she should bring him up until he is of age. So too if he has intercourse with a yevamah who is of majority age; she must wait with him until he is of majority age.", + "If a yevamah declared within thirty days [after yibbum], “he has not had intercourse with me”, they force him to perform halitzah; The second part of the mishnah deals with a case where the yevamah claims that the yavam did not have intercourse with her, and she wants to have halitzah. If she makes this claim within thirty days, she is believed, and the court forces the husband to perform halitzah. This is because we assume that for thirty days the yavam may actually not have had yibbum with her.", + "[If her declaration was made] after thirty days, they request that he perform halitzah. If she makes this declaration after thirty days, she is no longer automatically believed, for there is an assumption that the yavam would not have waited for more than thirty days to have yibbum. In this case, all the court can do is request that he perform halitzah for her.", + "If he admits [that he did not have intercourse with her], they force him to perform halitzah. If he admits that he did not have yibbum with her, he is forced to have halitzah, even after twelve months. He has a responsibility to her and cannot just leave her hanging, legally bound to him and without the possibility of marrying another." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah discusses a woman who made a vow not to receive any benefit from her yavam (her brother-in-law). Since sexual intercourse is a benefit, for it is pleasurable, she cannot have yibbum. The question is, is the yavam forced by the courtto perform halitzah for her, or is he merely requested to do so.", + "If a woman vowed to have no benefit from her yavam:
If the vow was made during the husband’s lifetime they force him to perform halitzah, If the woman made the vow while her husband was still alive, and her brother-in-law was not yet her yavam, and then her husband dies, the court forces the yavam to perform halitzah. This is because her vow was not made with the intention of subverting yibbum. She may have made her vow just because she really didn’t like her brother-in-law or for any other reason.", + "[If her vow was made] after the death of her husband, they request of him to perform halitzah. If she made the vow after her husband died, it was obviously made in attempt to circumvent yibbum. While the vow is still valid, and the yavam may not have yibbum with her, she is not automatically granted halitzah. Rather the court requests of the yavam to perform halitzah, but does not force him to do so.", + "If this was her intention, [even if her vow was made] during the lifetime of her husband, they request of him to perform halitzah. Similarly, if it was clear that she made the vow only to avoid yibbum, even if she made the vow when her husband was alive, the yavam is not forced to perform halitzah. She cannot use this vow as a means to circumvent yibbum. Her intention would have been clear if, for instance, she said that she was doing so in order to avoid yibbum." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nThis chapter is concerned with divorce or yibbum involving a deaf man and/or woman. As we have mentioned previously, according to the rabbis deaf-mutes lack “da’at”, which I translate as “awareness” and hence they cannot truly contract marriage. The marriage which they do contract is considered “derabbanan”, that is of rabbinic origin. I should note that although halakhically speaking deaf-mutes were considered to lack “da’at”, in reality the rabbis often recognize that deaf-mutes do not necessarily lack intelligence. Furthermore, as I stated in other opportunities, now that complex sign-language has been invented, deaf-mutes can be halakhically regarded as fully intelligent human beings.", + "If a deaf man married a woman of sound senses or a man of sound senses married a deaf woman he may, if he wishes, divorce her, and he may, if he wishes retain her; just as he marries by gestures so he divorces her by gestures. A deaf man can divorce a woman of sound senses by making gestures that make it clear that he wants to divorce her. Just as he can marry a woman by making gestures which make his intent clear, so too he can divorce her. A man of sound senses can divorce a deaf woman, even though she may not understand that she is being divorced. This is because a woman can be divorced against her will, as we shall see in section three below.", + "If a man of sound senses married a woman of sound senses and she became deaf, he may, if he wishes, divorce her; and he may, if he wishes, retain her. If she became insane he may not divorce her. If he became deaf or insane, he may never divorce her. Whereas in section one the marriage was only of rabbinic status (because one party was deaf at the time of marriage), in this section the marriage is of deoraita status because both parties were of sound senses at the time of marriage. Hence the law is different in this case. If she becomes deaf he may still divorce her, because she may be divorced against her will. However, if she becomes insane, he may not divorce her. This is a special measure of protection offered the wife so that she will still have a husband and be less subject to mistreatment by others. If the husband becomes deaf or insane he may not divorce her. Since the original marriage was of a higher status, he can no longer end the marriage when he lacks “da’at”.", + "Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri says: Why may a woman who became deaf be divorced while a man who became deaf may not divorce [his wife]? They answered him: a man who divorces is not like a woman who is divorced, for while a woman may be divorced with her consent and without her consent, a man can divorce only with his consent. In this section, through Rabbi Yochanan be Nuri’s question and the Sages answer, the discrimination between the divorce of a deaf woman and the divorce of a deaf man is explained. Since a woman can be divorced without her consent, she can still be divorced when she is legally incapable of consenting (when deaf or insane). Her consent is irrelevant. In contrast, a man must express his will to divorce a woman and hence if he is legally incapable of expressing his will, he may not divorce. I should note that this is one of the greatest examples of discrimination in Jewish law, but it was mostly corrected in the Middle Ages by Rabbenu Gershom who made a decree that a woman cannot be divorced against her will. Until this day, this is still the law." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah contains a debate about which type of deaf woman may be divorced.", + "Rabbi Nehunia ben Gudgada testified concerning a deaf-mute whose father had given her in marriage, that she could be sent away with a bill of divorcement; They said to him: the other also is similar to her. According to Rabbi Nehunia ben Gudgada a deaf minor who was married off by her father can be divorced against her will. In this case, although the marriage is deoraita (because it was arranged by the father), since a woman can be divorced against her will, she can still be divorced when she cannot express her will. The rabbis take this halakhah one step further, and state that even a woman who married herself off when of sound senses, can still be divorced should she go deaf. Note that we learned this law in the previous mishnah. The reason that it is restated is that it is a response to Rabbi Nehunian ben Gudgada’s testimony, which was also brought in Eduyoth 7:9." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah, and the rest of the chapter, deals with various combinations of marriages between deaf people and people of sound senses, and the possibility of yibbum, halitzah and divorce.", + "If two deaf brothers were married to two deaf sisters, or to two sisters who were of sound senses, or to two sisters one of whom was deaf and the other was of sound senses; And so also if two deaf sisters were married to two brothers who were of sound senses, or to two deaf brothers, or to two brothers one of whom was deaf and the other of sound senses: Behold these [women] are exempt from halitzah and from yibbum. In all of the cases in this section, there are two marriages between two brothers and two sisters, both of which are between a deaf person and another deaf person or a deaf person and a person of sound senses. In section one both brothers are deaf and in section two both sisters are deaf. In such a case the status of both marriages is rabbbinic (derabbanan). When one brother dies, his wife of derabbanan status becomes liable for yibbum with the other brother, who is married to her sister. Since she cannot marry him because he is married to her sister, she is exempt from both yibbum and halitzah. The key to understanding this mishnah is that both marriages are of equal status. The yavam’s obligation to have yibbum with her is only derabbanan as is his own marriage and therefore the woman is exempt.", + "If [the women] were strangers they must marry them, and if they wish to divorce them, they may do so. If the women were not related to each other, then there is no problem with yibbum. However, he may not perform halitzah since deaf men and deaf women cannot perform halitzah (see above 12:4). If he wishes, he may marry her and then divorce her. This is possible in this case because the original marriage of the yevamah to her husband was also only derabbanan. Therefore divorce through gestures is possible." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah is similar to yesterday’s mishnah, the only difference being that in this case, one marriage is of deoraita status, whereas yesterday both were derabbanan.", + "If two brothers, one of whom was deaf and the other of sound senses, were married to two sisters who were of sound senses, and the deaf brother, the husband of the sister who was of sound senses, died, what should the brother of sound senses, the husband of the sister of sound senses, do? [Nothing, since she] is exempt, because she is his wife’s sister. In this case, when the deaf brother, who was the husband of the sister of sound senses, dies, his wife becomes liable for yibbum or halitzah with the husband of sound senses, who is married to her sister, who is also of sound senses. In this case the deaf widow is not obligated for yibbum or halitzah since her sister is married to the yavam, and that marriage is of deoraita status. As we have learned before, a woman who becomes liable for yibbum with someone prohibited to her is exempt from yibbum.", + "If the brother of sound senses, the husband of [the sister who was] of sound senses, died, what should the deaf brother, the husband of [the sister who was] of sound senses, do? He must release his wife with a get, while his brother’s wife is forbidden forever [to marry again]. This case is opposite. Here the husband of sound senses, married to the woman of sound senses dies, thereby making her liable for yibbum or halitzah with the deaf husband, married to her deaf sister. The deaf husband’s wife is now the sister of a woman with whom he is deoraita liable to have yibbum, but his own marriage is only of derabbanan status. Since the connection with his yevamah is of deoraita status, it is strong enough to make his own wife forbidden to him (one cannot marry the wife of his shomeret yavam, a woman with whom is liable to have yibbum). He must therefore divorce his deaf wife. His yevamah can never remarry because she cannot have yibbum or halitzah. She cannot have halitzah because he is deaf. He cannot have yibbum with her because he was derabbanan married to her sister and a man may not marry his wife’s sister, even after divorce." + ], + [ + "If two brothers of sound senses were married to two sisters one of whom was deaf and the other of sound senses, and the brother of sound senses, the husband of the deaf sister, died, what should the brother of sound senses, the husband of the sister who was of sound senses, do? [Nothing, since she is] exempt because she is his wife’s sister. In this scenario two brothers of sound senses are married to two sisters, one of whom is deaf. This means that one of the marriages is deoraita and the other derabbanan. If the brother married to the deaf sister dies, the deaf sister becomes liable for yibbum or halitzah with the other brother. Since this is forbidden because he is deoraita married to her sister, she is totally exempt.", + "If the brother of sound senses, the husband of the sister who was of sound senses, died, what should the brother of sound senses, the husband of the deaf sister, do? He must release his wife with a get and his brother’s wife by halitzah. In this case, the brother married to the sister of sound senses dies. This marriage was deoraita and therefore her ties to the yavam are of a deoraita status. The yavam is only derabbanan married to her sister, since she is deaf. Therefore, the yevamah is not exempt from yibbum or halitzah. Nevertheless the yavam cannot have yibbum with her because he is married to her sister. The only solution is for him to divorce his wife, who is forbidden to him as the sister of a woman tied to him through yibbum. Then he must have halitzah with the other sister. He cannot have yibbum because he was married to her sister, even though the marriage was only derabbanan." + ], + [ + "If two brothers, one of whom was deaf and the other of sound senses, were married to two sisters, one of whom was deaf and the other of sound senses, and the deaf brother, the husband of the deaf sister, died, what should the brother who was of sound senses, the husband of the sister who was of sound senses, do? [Nothing, since she is] exempt because she is his wife’s sister. In this case the marriage between the deaf brother and the deaf sister is derabbanan and the marriage between the brother of sound senses and the sister of sound senses is deoraita. If the deaf brother dies, the deaf sister becomes potentially liable for yibbum with the brother of sound senses. However, she is exempt because the brother of sound senses is already married to her sister, and their marriage is deoraita.", + "If the brother of sound senses, the husband of the sister who was of sound senses, died, what should the deaf brother, the husband of the deaf sister, do? He must release his wife with a get, while his brother’s wife is forever forbidden [to marry again]. In this case the brother of sound senses dies, and the sister of sound senses becomes liable for yibbum with the deaf brother. Even though she is his wife’s sister, she is not exempt because their marriage is only derabbanan. The deaf sister becomes forbidden to her deaf husband because she is the sister of a woman with whom he is liable to have yibbum. Furthermore, he must divorce her. The deaf brother cannot perform halitzah for the yevamah, because he is deaf. He cannot have yibbum with her because she is the sister of his former wife. Therefore she cannot remarry ever." + ], + [ + "If two brothers, one of whom was deaf and the other of sound senses, were married to two strangers who were of sound senses, and the deaf brother, the husband of the woman who was of sound senses, died, what should the brother of sound senses, the husband of the woman of sound senses, do? He either performs halitzah or yibbum. In this case the two brothers are married to two women who are not sisters. Therefore there is no problem of one being married to the sister of the yevamah. In the first section, the deaf brother dies. In such a case there is no problem, and the yavam can have halitzah or yibbum with the deaf brother’s widow, as is the case in a normal scenario.", + "If the brother of sound senses, the husband of the woman who was of sound senses, died, what should the deaf brother, the husband of the woman who was of sound senses, do? He must marry her and he may never divorce her. In this case the brother of sound senses dies, leaving his widow liable for yibbum or halitzah with the deaf brother. The deaf brother cannot have halitzah with her, because deaf people cannot perform halitzah. He may have yibbum with her, but he cannot afterwards ever divorce her. This is because his ties to her are deoraita due to her having been his yevamah. His ability to divorce is only derabbanan, and it is not strong enough to sever such a marriage." + ], + [ + "If two brothers of sound senses were married to two strangers, one of whom was of sound senses and the other deaf, and the brother of sound senses, the husband of the deaf woman died, what should the brother of sound senses, the husband of the woman of sound senses, do? He must marries her and if he wishes to divorce her he may do so. In this scenario, the brother of sound senses is married to a deaf woman and his brother, also of sound senses was married to a woman of sound senses. If the husband of the deaf woman dies, his brother must marry his widow. He cannot perform halitzah, because she is deaf. He can later divorce her, because he is of sound senses", + "If the brother of sound senses, the husband of the woman of sound senses, died, what should the brother of sound senses, the husband of the deaf woman, do? He may either perform halitzah or yibbum. If the brother of sound senses dies, his widow who is of sound senses becomes liable for yibbum or halitzah with the yavam. Since he is also of sound senses he may have yibbum or halitzah with her, as is the case in all normal scenarios." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis is the final mishnah of the chapter and it concludes the rather long series of mishnayot which we have seen throughout the entire chapter.", + "If two brothers, one of whom was deaf and the other of sound senses, were married to two strangers, one of whom was deaf and the other of sound senses, and the deaf brother, the husband of the deaf woman, died, what should the brother of sound senses, the husband of the woman of sound senses do? He must marry her, but if he wishes to divorce her he may do so. When the deaf brother, married to the deaf woman dies, she becomes liable for yibbum or halitzah with the brother of sound senses. She cannot have halitzah, because she is deaf. He must, therefore, have yibbum with her, but may afterwards divorce her, because deaf women can be divorced.", + "If the brother of sound senses, the husband of the woman of sound senses, died, what should the deaf brother, the husband of the deaf woman, do? He must marry her and he may never divorce her. If the brother of sound senses dies, his wife of sound senses becomes liable for yibbum with the deaf brother. He cannot have halitzah because he is deaf. He must therefore marry her. He cannot subsequently divorce her because his ties to her are deoraita (due to the deoraita nature of her previous marriage), whereas his ability to divorce is only derabbanan." + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction\nChapters fifteen and sixteen deal with the acceptability of testimony concerning a woman’s husband’s death in a case where the death occurred abroad. The consequence of accepting such testimony is that she is allowed to remarry; in cases where the husband had no children she would be allowed to have yibbum with her husband’s brother.\nThe first few mishnayoth of this chapter deal with the wife’s own testimony as to her husband’s death. Generally speaking a woman’s testimony is unacceptable and a person cannot testify concerning their own matters. Nevertheless, in this case the wife’s testimony about her own husband’s death is acceptable because the rabbis did not want the woman to be unable to remarry. We should note that even in our days it is often difficult to ascertain whether someone died. This was a problem during the Shoah (the Holocaust) when nearly all witnesses to a person’s death were also dead. Recently, we witnessed this phenomenon in the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center. Verifying victim’s deaths took months and to a large degree relied on the testimony of those who saw them in the building or those who knew they should have been there that day. Imagine how much more difficult this must have been in the ancient world.", + "If a woman and her husband went to a country beyond the sea [at a time when there was] peace between him and her and [when there was also] peace in the world, and she came back and said, “My husband is dead”, she may marry again; and if she said, “My husband is dead [and he had no children]” she may contract yibbum. If at the time the couple traveled abroad there was no discord between the two of them and there were no wars being waged in the area to which they might have traveled, then she is believed to say that he died. The rabbis are suspicious that she might lie if there was discord, because by receiving permission to remarry when the husband was still alive, she would be causing herself to be prohibited to him when he returns. In such a way she could force him to divorce her. In other words, she might have a motive to lie. The reason that the rabbis are suspicious in a case where there is war, is that he might have been taken captive and she mistakenly assumed that he was dead. Therefore, if there was either discord between them or war in the world, she is not believed.", + "If there was peace between him and her, but war in the world, [or if there was] discord between him and her, but peace in the world, and she came back and said, ‘My husband is dead”, she is not believed. Rabbi Judah says: she is never believed unless she comes weeping and her garments are rent. They said to him: she may marry in either case. This section contains the opposites of those in section one. Rabbi Judah disagrees with the first opinion. He holds that unless she exhibits physical signs of mourning, she is never believed, even if there was peace between her and her husband and peace in the world. The sages respond to Rabbi Judah and state that whether or not she is crying and she shows physical signs of mourning she is believed. Such external signs would be easy to fake in any case and are therefore not material to the verity of her words." + ], + [ + "Bet Hillel says: we heard [such a tradition] only in respect of a woman who came from the harvest and [whose husband died] in the same country, and in a case similar to the one that happened.
Bet Shammai said to them: [the law is] the same whether the woman came from the harvest or from olive picking, or from grape picking, or from one country to another--the Sages spoke of the harvest only [because the incident to which they referred] occurred then.
Bet Hillel changed their view to rule in accordance with Bet Shammai.
This mishnah is a continuation of yesterday’s mishnah. It contains a debate between Bet Hillel and Bet Shammai over when a woman is believed to say that her husband died.
Section one: Bet Hillel limits the instances in which a woman is believed to say that her husband died. The only time she is believed is when she returned from working together with him at harvest time, and they were not returning from abroad but from the same country. This is similar to “the case that was” mentioned at the end of this section. The case to which the mishnah refers to is explained in the talmud as being a case where ten men went to work in a field and one was bitten by a snake and died. When the woman returned and said that her husband was dead, the court believed her and declared that women are believed when they testify that their husband had died. According to Bet Hillel, they are only believed in such a case because in such a case the husband’s death is so easily verifiable that it can be assumed that the woman would not lie.
Section two: Bet Shammai responds to Bet Hillel that although the law that a woman is believed to say that her husband died was connected to a certain case, it is not limited to that case or those like it. Rather a woman is believed to say that her husband died no matter where she returns from." + ], + [ + "Introduction In the previous mishnah Bet Hillel agreed with Bet Shammai that a woman who states that her husband died is to be believed, at least in most cases. In our mishnah, Bet Hillel states that her testimony allows her to remarry but not to receive her ketubah payment, the amount that a man owes a woman upon death or divorce. Bet Shammai holds that she also receives her ketubah payment. As in the previous mishnah, in the end Bet Hillel changes their opinion and agrees with Bet Shammai.", + "Bet Shammai says: she may marry and she receives her ketubah. Bet Hillel says: she may marry but she does not receive her ketubah. This section delineates the dispute between the two houses, as explained in the introduction above.", + "Bet Shammai said to them: you have permitted [what might be] the serious consequence of illicit intercourse, why should you not permit [the taking of her husband’s] money which is of less consequence! Bet Hillel said to them: we find that based on her testimony, the brothers may not receive their inheritance. Bet Shammai said to them: do we not learn this from her ketubah scroll wherein [her husband] writes to her “if you are married to another man, you will receive what is prescribed for you”! Bet Shammai reasons that if she was not telling the truth about her husband dying (either by intentionally lying or by having made a mistake) the consequences of her remarrying are graver than the consequences of her illegitimately taking money from her husband. Remarrying while still married is adultery, and if done with intention can be a capital offense. The monetary crime of taking her ketubah while her husband is still alive is at worst fraud, and the money can always be rightfully restored. Since the Sages allow her to remarry, despite the potential severity of the crime, they must allow her to recover her ketubah payment. Bet Hillel responds by citing a precedent. According to the accepted halakhah, a halakhah to which Bet Shammai agrees, when a woman testifies that her husband has died, his brothers do not inherit his money. This is because in monetary cases two witnesses are required. [Note: a man’s brothers inherit him if he did not have children.] Therefore, just as the brothers do not collect their inheritance, so too the woman does not collect her ketubah. Bet Shammai responds by citing the actual ketubah wording which states that if she marries another man she may collect the payment. Therefore, according to Bet Shammai, as soon as she is permitted to marry someone else, she may collect her ketubah. We should note that this is an interesting source of halakhah: the wording of the ketubah. Generally we would think that the halakhah would dictate the wording of the ketubah, but here we find the opposite. The ketubah, a secular document, becomes the source of Jewish law. This is not a common phenomenon in rabbinic literature but is found in several other places.", + "Bet Hillel changed their view to rule in accordance with Bet Shammai. Bet Hillel again changed their minds and ruled as did Bet Shammai. Therefore, even though the brothers do not receive their inheritance, the wife may collect her ketubah." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah contains two mishnayoth, each dealing with a different topic. The first mishnah lists a few women who are not believed to testify that a woman’s husband has died.\nThe second mishnah discusses cases of contradictory testimony regarding the husband’s death.", + "All are believed to testify for her [concerning her husband’s death] except for her mother-in-law, the daughter of her mother-in-law, her rival wife, her sister-in-law and her husband’s daughter. Why is [the bringing of] a letter of divorce different [from testifying regarding] death?
The written document provides the proof. Although women are generally not allowed to testify in a court of law, in order to make it easier for women to remarry, women are allowed to testify that men have died. Even a woman’s own relatives can testify that her husband has died. The only exceptions are certain relatives who are not allowed to testify for fear that they will lie in order to entrap the woman in an illegal marriage, which will cause her current marriage to be terminated. These women might hate the wife for various reasons. The mother-in-law might hate her daughter-in-law because she thinks that she is not good enough for her son. The daughter of her mother-in-law might hate her because she might eventually take away her inheritance. The rival wife might hate her because they compete for the husband’s affections. Her sister-in-law might hate her, because if the husband dies without children, this wife could end up as her rival wife. The husband’s daughter might hate her because she sees this wife as trying to take her own mother’s place. Although these women are not allowed to testify that a woman has died, they are allowed to bring her get to her (we will learn this halakhah in Gittin 2:7). The mishnah asks, why are they allowed to bring the get but not allowed to testify that the husband has died. After all, both divorce and death end the marriage. The answer is that with a get, the document itself is what proves that the marriage is ended. The one who brings the document is not testifying as to the divorce, but is merely a messenger. However, testifying as to his death is actually testimony, not verifiable in another way.", + "If one witness stated, “he is dead”, and his wife married again, and another came and stated “he is not dead”, she need not leave [her new husband]. If one witness testifies that her husband died, and then she was remarried, and then another witness testifies that he did not die, she need not leave her new husband. However, if she did not marry before the second witness comes, she cannot remarry because there is now contradictory testimony.", + "If one witness said “he is dead” and two witnesses said “he is not dead”, even if she married again, she must leave him. If one witness testified that her husband died, and then she remarried, and then two testified that he is still alive, she must leave the second marriage. This is because we now have full testimony that her husband is alive and that the second marriage is illegitimate. The testimony of the one is nullified by the testimony of the two.", + "If two witnesses stated, “he is dead”, and one witness stated, “he is not dead”, even if she had not married, she may do so. If two testify that her husband is dead, she can remarry, even if one other person testifies that he is alive. Again, the testimony of the one is nullified by the testimony of the two." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to discuss contradictory testimony with regard to the husband’s death.", + "If one wife said “he is dead’ and the other wife said, “he is not dead” , the one who said, “he is dead” may marry again and she also receives her ketubah, while the one who said, “he is not dead”, may neither marry again nor does she receive her ketubah. This section and the following section deal with situations in which a man is married to more than one wife. If one wife says that he is dead and the other says he is not, the wife that says he is dead is treated like a widow, and the wife who says that he is not, is treated like she is still married to him. The reason why the first wife is allowed to remarry and collects her ketubah is that her rival wife is not allowed to testify about her, as we learned in the previous mishnah. The wife who says that he is alive, cannot obviously be allowed to remarry or collect her ketubah because she believes that he is alive.", + "If one wife said, “he is dead” and the other stated “he was killed”: Rabbi Meir says: since they contradict one another they may not marry again. Rabbi Judah and Rabbi Shimon say: since both admit that he is not alive, both may marry again. In this case, both wives agree that the husband is dead, but they disagree over whether he merely died or was killed. Rabbi Meir holds that since they contradict each other, neither may remarry. The Talmud teaches that Rabbi Meir also disagrees with the previous clause, where the wives also contradicted each other. While the previous opinion held that the wife who says that he is dead may remarry, Rabbi Meir holds that she may not. Rabbi Meir’s words are taught on this case, because here there is even a greater innovation: even though both agree that he is dead, since they disagree over the details they may not remarry. Rabbis Judah and Shimon hold that since they both agree that he is no longer alive, they may remarry.", + "If one witness says, “he is dead”, and another witness says “he is not dead’, Or if one woman says “he is dead”, and another woman says, “he is not dead’, she may not marry again. If two witnesses disagree over whether or not he is dead, she may not remarry. However, as we learned in the previous mishnah, if she remarried before the second witness said that he was alive, she need not leave the second marriage." + ], + [ + "If a woman and her husband went to a country beyond the sea, and she returned and stated, “my husband is dead”, she may be married again and she also receives her ketubah. However, her rival wife is forbidden to remarry.
If [her rival wife] was the daughter of an Israelite [who was married] to a priest, she is permitted to eat terumah, the words of Rabbi Tarfon.
Rabbi Akiva says: this is not a way that would lead her away from transgression, unless [it be enacted that] she shall be forbidden both to marry and to eat terumah.
This mishnah discusses a case where a man was married to more than one wife, and one wife claimed that he had died and the other wife was not able to know whether this was true.
In mishnah four we learned that a rival wife may not testify that a woman’s husband is dead. Therefore, in the situation in our mishnah, although one wife’s testimony is believed and she is allowed to remarry and collect her ketubah, the rival wife may not remarry. Unlike the previous mishnah, where the rival wife explicitly stated that he was not dead, in our situation, since the husband and the other wife were overseas, the wife who remained behind cannot know whether or not he is still alive.
Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva disagree over whether or not the rival wife may eat terumah after the other wife has stated that the husband is dead. This debate is only critical if she was from an Israelite family, she was married to a priest, and she had no children. In such a case, if her husband dies she is not allowed to eat terumah. According to Rabbi Tarfon, the halakhah is consistent: just as she is treated as if she is still married and not allowed to remarry, so too she may eat terumah, as if her husband was still alive.
Rabbi Akiva holds that allowing her to continue to eat terumah might lead her to transgress, because her husband might very well be dead. Rather, Rabbi Akiva is strict on both counts: she may not remarry lest her husband be alive but she may not eat terumah lest her husband is dead." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah contains three more debates between Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva, all somewhat similar to the one we learned yesterday.", + "If she stated, “my husband died first and my father-in-law died after him”, she may marry again and she also receives her ketubah, but her mother-in-law is forbidden [to remarry]. If [her mother-in-law] was the daughter of an Israelite [who was married] to a priest, she is permitted to eat terumah, the words of Rabbi Tarfon. Rabbi Akiva says: this is not a way that would lead her away from transgression, unless [it be enacted that] she shall be forbidden both to marry and to eat terumah. This section contains more or less the same debate that we learned in yesterday’s mishnah. The only innovation is that in this case, when the woman states that her father-in-law is dead, she has already stated that her own husband is dead, and therefore she is no longer her mother-in-law’s daughter-in-law. Therefore, we might have thought that in this case she is believed, and the mother-in-law may remarry. In order to prevent one from making this assumption, the debate between Rabbis Tarfon and Akiva is repeated here.", + "If a man betrothed one of five women and he does not know which of them he has betrothed, and each states, “he has betrothed me”, he gives a letter of divorce to every one of them, and he leaves one ketubah [sum] for them and withdraws, the words of Rabbi Tarfon. Rabbi Akiva says: this is not a way that would lead him away from transgression, unless he gives to each of them both a get and a ketubah. In this case, each woman claims to be married to one man, but the man admits to marrying only one of them. According to Rabbi Tarfon we treat each woman as if she might be married to him and he must give a get to each. However, since he will only admit to marrying one woman, he must pay only one ketubah sum. The sum is left in court, until it is clarified who he married. Rabbi Akiva argues that the solution to this problem needs to punish the man for having put these women into this predicament. In order to penalize him for his actions, he must pay a ketubah payment to each and every one.", + "If a man robbed one of five persons and does not know which of them he has robbed, and each one states, “he has robbed me”, he leaves the [amount of] the robbery among them and withdraws, the words of Rabbi Tarfon. Rabbi Akiva says: this is not a way that would lead them away from transgression, unless one pays [the full amount of the robbery] to every one [of the persons involved]. In this case, a man stole from one of five other people, but does not remember from whom he stole. Each person claims that he stole from him. Again, Rabbi Tarfon rules that the thief pays the sum he stole and gives it to the court until it can be clarified from whom he stole. Rabbi Akiva again wishes to punish the thief, and therefore obligates him to pay the amount stolen to each of the five. Note that in both cases Rabbi Akiva is not concerned that he is rewarding the four out of the five women or people from whom something has been stolen who are definitely lying. Perhaps this is because it is unclear (at least to us) which is lying, whereas it is clear that this person has stolen money, or betrothed a woman without bothering to remember whom he betrothed." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nOur mishnah deals with a situation where a woman goes abroad with a husband and a son and then returns claiming that both have died. The question is: is she liable for yibbum.", + "A woman who went with her husband to a country beyond the sea, and her son was with her, and who came back and stated, “my husband died and afterwards my son died”, is believed. If her husband died before the son died, then at the point of death she was not liable for yibbum (for her husband died at a point when he had kids). Since she went abroad under the assumption that she is not liable for yibbum, and she now returns claiming that this is still true, she is believed. This mishnah works according to a well-known principle whereby a person is believed if he does not change the status quo, but not necessarily believed if he does change it.", + "[If she stated] “my son died and afterwards my husband died”, she is not believed, but we are concerned that her words [might be true] and she must, therefore, perform halitzah but may not contract yibbum. In this case, she claims that the son died first and therefore when her husband died he had no children, leaving her liable for yibbum. Since she is changing the status quo that existed when she left, and now claiming that she is liable for yibbum, she is not entirely believed and she is not allowed to contract yibbum with her dead husband’s brother. However, since she might be telling the truth, and really be liable for yibbum, she first must perform halitzah and only then is she allowed to remarry." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to deal with a woman who returns from overseas and states that both her husband and son have died. The difference between this case and that found in the previous mishnah is that here her son was born abroad.", + "[If a woman states], “A son was given to me [while I was] in a country beyond the sea” and she also states, “my son died and afterwards my husband died”, she is believed. In this mishnah she leaves to travel abroad under the assumption that she is liable for yibbum should her husband die, because he has no children. If she comes back and states that she had a son, she has changed that status quo. However, if she says that the son died before the husband, then she reverts to the status quo of being liable for yibbum. Since she is ultimately maintaining the status quo, she is believed.", + "[If she states], “my husband died and afterwards my son died”, she is not believed, but we are concerned that her words [might be true] and she must, therefore, perform halitzah but may not contract yibbum. However, if she states that her husband died before her son died, she is changing the status quo because she is exempting herself from yibbum. Therefore, she is not believed, and she is not allowed to remarry without first having halitzah. She cannot have yibbum because she claims that her husband died before her son and therefore she is not liable for yibbum. In summary both this mishnah and yesterday’s mishnah teach that a woman is believed to retain the status quo but not to modify it. However, even though she cannot change status quo, she must have halitzah before she can remarry." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to discuss women who return from being abroad and come back and testify that their husbands and in this case brothers-in-law have died.", + "[If a woman states] “a brother-in-law was given to me [while I was] in a country beyond the sea”, and afterwards she states, “my husband died and afterwards my brother-in-law died” or “my brother-in-law died and afterwards my husband died”, she is believed. As we stated in the previous two mishnayoth, a woman is believed if she make a statement which does not change the status quo established when she left to travel abroad. If when she left she did not have a brother-in-law, and then she returns and states that her husband had a brother, but he died (in this case it doesn’t matter whether her husband died first or his brother) she is allowed to remarry without yibbum. After all, if she hadn’t stated that she had a brother-in-law, we would never have thought to make her wait until she had halitzah or yibbum to remarry.", + "If a woman and her husband and her brother-in-law went to a country beyond the sea, and she [on returning home] stated, “my husband died and afterwards my brother-in-law [died]” or “my brother-in-law [died] and afterwards my husband [died]” she is not believed; For a woman is not to be believed when she asserts “my brother-in-law is dead”, in order that she may marry again; Nor [is she believed when she states that] her sister is dead, in order that she may enter his house. In this case, the status quo when she left is that she had a brother-in-law. The mishnah teaches that a woman is never believed to state that her brother-in-law died. A woman is only believed to state that her husband died. The reason is that we assume a woman will make sure her husband is dead before she remarries. There is an assumption that she will not lie. Furthermore, if she was lying and he returns, the consequences for her are serious. However, there is no such assumption that a woman will not lie concerning her brother-in-law. She is also not believed to state that her sister died, so that she could marry her sister’s husband. Since even if her sister was alive, she would not cause serious consequences to herself by having relations with her sister’s husband, she might lie. We can see here a general pattern emerging: a person is less likely to lie if there are serious consequences awaiting him/her if he does lie. Therefore, in these types of situations, s/he is believed.", + "A man also is not believed when he states “my brother is dead”, so that he may have yibbum with his wife, nor [when he states that] his wife is dead, in order that he may marry her sister. Finally, a man is not believed to state that his brother has died, so that he might marry his brother’s wife, for the same reason we wrote above. Since there are no serious consequences for him if he is lying (and only serious consequences for her) he is not deemed trustworthy. So too a man is not believed to state that his wife has died in order to marry her sister for even if he was lying there are no serious consequences for him" + ] + ], + [ + [ + "Introduction This mishnah deals with a woman whose husband died abroad and she is not sure whether or not she is obligated to have yibbum with his brother.", + "A woman whose husband and rival wife went to a country beyond the sea, and to whom people came and said, “your husband is dead”, must neither marry nor contract yibbum until she has ascertained whether her rival wife is pregnant. In this case, the husband and a rival wife went abroad, and at that time the husband had no children. Although the wife who remained behind is certain that her husband is dead, she does not know whether she is liable for yibbum, because she doesn’t know if her rival wife had children while abroad. Therefore she cannot remarry.", + "If she had a mother-in-law she need not be concerned [she had another son]. But if [the mother-in-law] departed while pregnant she must be concerned [that another son was born.
Rabbi Joshua says: she need not be concerned. If the husband traveled abroad and at that time he had no brothers, his wife need not be concerned lest her mother-in-law gave birth to a child before her husband died. Perhaps this is because it is uncommon for a woman to give birth to another child after her older child is already married. Furthermore, even if the mother-in-law gave birth, only a male child will make the wife liable for yibbum. This distinguishes this case from the case in section where a child of other sex will exempt the wife from yibbum, and therefore we are concerned lest she be exempt. If, however, the mother-in-law was pregnant when she traveled, the daughter must be concerned, lest she gave birth to a male child. The wife must wait until she is certain that her mother-in-law did not have a boy. Rabbi Judah holds that in this case as well, the wife need not be concerned and may remarry immediately. This is because there are “two doubts”. The mother-in-law may have miscarried (as older women often do), and even if she gave birth to a viable child, the child might be female. In cases of “two doubts”, the halakhah is generally more lenient." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with a situation in which, while it may be assumed that a husband is dead, it cannot be assumed that his brother, the yavam is dead.\nWe should remind ourselves of two rules learned in the previous chapter: 1) a woman is believed when she says, “My husband is dead”; 2) a sister-in-law is not believed when she says, “Your husband is dead.”", + "Two sisters-in-law, one says, “My husband is dead”, and the other also says, “My husband is dead”, this one is forbidden on account of the husband of this one, and this one is forbidden on account of the husband of this one. Although in this case we believe each sister-in-law when she states that her own husband is dead, neither sister-in-law is free to remarry lest the yavam, her brother-in-law is alive. Even though each woman’s sister-in-law says that the other’s yavam is dead, sisters-in-law are not allowed to testify for one another, because they might hate each other. Our mishnah teaches that these women are not believed vis-a-vis the other, even though they are believed vis-a-vis themselves..", + "If one had witnesses and the other had no witnesses, she who has the witnesses is forbidden, while she who has no witnesses is permitted. If there are witnesses that one woman’s husband has died, the other woman may remarry without fear that he is alive and she is liable for yibbum. That is to say, she is believed with regard to her own husband, and the witnesses are believed with regard to the other husband (her yavam). However, the woman who has witnesses that her own husband died but does not have witnesses that her yavam died, cannot rely on her sister-in-law’s testimony that he died, and therefore cannot remarry.", + "If the one has children and the other has no children, she who has children is permitted and she who has no children is forbidden. The woman who had children is, of course, exempt from yibbum. The woman who did not have children is liable.", + "If they contracted yibbum, and the yevamim died, they are forbidden [to marry again]. Rabbi Elazar says: since they were permitted to marry the yevamim, they are subsequently permitted to marry any man. In this case two sisters-in-law, both of whom say, “My husband died”, have no witnesses and no children, and then have yibbum with two other brothers (not married to either of these two women). This is permitted, as we learned in 15:1. If afterwards, one of these brothers dies, the women may not remarry, lest the other brother-in-law still be alive, as we learned in section one. The innovation is that even though an assumption was made that both original husbands had died, and therefore both women were permitted to have yibbum, nevertheless, we continue to fear that one of the women is lying and that the other woman’s brother-in-law is still alive. Rabbi Elazar holds that since we made the assumption that both original husbands were dead, we cannot go back to assuming that they might be alive. Therefore the women are permitted to marry whomever they want, without fear that they are still tied to their brothers-in-law." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah provides rules of what a witness needs to see in order to testify that someone is dead.", + "They are allowed to testify only about the face with the nose, even though there were also marks on the man’s body or clothing. A person is identifiable only through his face and his nose. Therefore, if someone sees other parts of his body or face, but not his face and nose, he cannot testify that the person is dead.", + "They are allowed to testify only when his soul has departed, even though they have seen him cut up or crucified or being devoured by a wild beast. The person must already be dead in order to establish testimony of his death. It is not sufficient to see him being cut up, crucified or devoured by a wild beast. Even though his imminent death in these situations is nearly certain, this is not sufficient.", + "They are allowed to testify only [if they saw the body] within three days [of death]. The witness must testify within three days of the death. Otherwise the body may begin to decompose and identity cannot be provided with certainty.", + "Rabbi Judah ben Baba says: not all men, all places, or all times are alike. According to Rabbi Judah ben Baba it is impossible to set uniform rules for identifying bodies. Some men’s faces will change quicker than others at death, in some places decomposition will take place quicker, and much depends on the time of year as well (rain or sun). Therefore each situation must be ruled upon based on the circumstances of that situation." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah deals with deciding whether a person who has entered into a body of water and not reappeared can be assumed to have drowned.", + "If a man fell into water, whether it had [a visible] end or not, his wife is forbidden [to marry again]. According to the first opinion in the mishnah, even though a man may have fallen into a large body of water and not reappeared, we cannot assume that he is dead. In the Talmud, this opinion is ascribed to Rabbi Meir. The Sages hold that if the water has an end, then his wife may remarry. If the water has an end and we did not see him come out, then we know that he didn’t come out the other side and we can assume that he has drowned. However, if the water has no end, he might have washed up alive on some distant shore and his wife should not remarry.", + "Rabbi Meir said: it once happened that a man fell into a large cistern and came out after three days. Rabbi Meir now offers a story that illustrates his principle, that even if the water has an end, the person might be alive. In such a case, if people saw that he didn’t come up, they might have left the place where he allegedly drowned, assuming that he was dead. Therefore, we cannot make such an assumption and his wife cannot remarry.", + "Rabbi Yose: it once happened that a blind man descended into a cave to immerse and his guide went down after him; and after waiting long enough for their souls to depart, permission was given to their wives to marry again. Rabbi Yose disagrees with Rabbi Meir. He brings a story where a blind man and his guide fell into a cave that had water in it and the Sages waited a while and then left and declared that the wife could remarry. If we extrapolate, we can conclude that if the water has an end, she may remarry.", + "Another incident occurred at Asia where a man was lowered into the sea, and only his leg was brought up, and the Sages ruled: [if the recovered leg contained the part] above the knee [the man’s wife] may marry again, [but if it contained only the part] below the knee, she may not marry again. This mishnah deals with a case where a person was cast into the sea and according to the Talmud he was bound. Later, they drag his leg out of the water. If when they drag the leg out of the water, it is from the knee and up, then we can assume that the person is dead. Even if he survived the loss of part of his leg, he would not be able to swim without a full leg. However, if only the lower part of the leg was cut off, the man might have been able to swim and he might have come out of the water somewhere else. Therefore his wife cannot remarry. Note that this mishnah became all too relevant in determining whether widows of Sept. 11 victims could remarry. Since the World Trade Center is like “water that has an end”, it can be assumed that someone who didn’t show up afterwards had indeed died, and his widow was allowed to remarry." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah talks about the acceptability of hearsay regarding a person’s death. Note that such testimony is generally not acceptable in a court of law. The Sages were lenient in these cases in order to make it somewhat easier for a woman to remarry.", + "Even if he only heard from women saying, “so-and-so is dead”, this is enough. If one hears women saying amongst themselves that a certain man has died, the one who overhears them may go to the court and testify as to his death. This is true even though the women themselves did not intend to testify. If they had intended to testify their testimony would certainly be acceptable, as we learned in the previous chapter. Indeed, they themselves may come to court.", + "Rabbi Judah says: even if he only heard children saying, “behold we are going to mourn for a man named so-and-so and to bury him” [it is enough]. A second category of people who cannot generally provide testimony is children. However, in this case, in order to make it easier to establish a man’s death, overhearing children speaking about a certain person’s funeral or burial is sufficient.", + "Whether [such statement was made] with the intention [of providing evidence] or was made with no such intention [it is valid]. Rabbi Judah ben Bava says: with an Israelite [the evidence is valid] only if the man had the intention [of acting as witness]. In the case of a non-Jew the evidence is invalid if his intention was [to act as witness]. According to the first opinion, hearing a person say that so-and-so is dead always allows the hearer to testify as to his death in court, whether or not the person intended to testify. Rabbi Judah ben Bava holds that an Israelite must intend to testify for the one who hears him to be able to repeat his words in court. A non-Jew’s words can be brought to court only if he doesn’t intend to testify. Note that there are some versions of the mishnah in which Rabbi Judah ben Bava says, “with an Israelite [the evidence is valid] even if the man had the intention [of acting as witness].” According to this reading, Rabbi Judah ben Bava agrees with the previous opinion about the Israelite’s testimony (it is acceptable whether or not he intended to testify), but disagrees about the non-Jew’s." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThis mishnah continues to discuss cases of hearsay or other less than perfect testimony about a person’s death.", + "They may testify [even if the body was seen] in candle light or in moonlight. Even if a witness only saw the person’s body in candle light or moonlight, he may subsequently testify that he was dead.", + "And a woman may be given permission to marry again on the evidence of a mere voice. It once happened that a man was standing on the top of a hill and cried, “so-and-so son of so-and-so from such-and-such a place is dead”, but when they went [to the top of the hill] they didn’t find anyone there. [Nevertheless], they allowed his wife to remarry. A “mere voice” is either an echo, or a voice heard from a large distance. In either case, if such a voice is heard saying that a certain person has died, his wife may remarry. This is illustrated in the next case, where people only hear from a distance someone say that so-and-so is dead. They never find the person who said it, so that they could interrogate him further. Nevertheless, the Sages allowed his wife to remarry.", + "In another instance, at Zalmon a person declared, “I am so-and-so son of so-and-so; a snake has bitten me, and I am dying”; and when they went [to examine the corpse] they did not recognize him, they [nevertheless] allowed his wife to remarry. In this case, that happened in Zalmon (found in the lower Galilee), the person himself stated that he was about to die. He also provided his full name. By the time the witnesses found the body, it had been disfigured and was not identifiable. In any case, since he had stated his name, his wife is allowed to remarry." + ], + [ + "Introduction\nThe final mishnah of Yevamoth relates some debates between rabbis over the testimony concerning a man’s death. In our mishnah these debates are set within historical frameworks which relate interesting information as to how the Sages made decisions and about the historical period in which they lived.", + "Rabbi Akiva said: When I went down to Nehardea to intercalate the year, I met Nehemiah of Bet D’li who said to me, “I heard that in the land of Israel no one, permits a [married] woman to marry again on the evidence of one witness, except Rabbi Judah ben Bava”. “That is so”, I told him. He said to me, “Tell them in my name: ‘You know that this country is in confusion because of marauders. I have received a tradition from Rabban Gamaliel the Elder: that they allow a [married] woman to remarry on the evidence of one witness’”. And when I came and recounted the conversation in the presence of Rabban Gamaliel he rejoiced at my words and exclaimed, “We have found a match for Rabbi Judah ben Bava!” As a result of this talk Rabban Gamaliel remembered that some men were once killed at Tel Arza, and that Rabban Gamaliel the Elder had allowed their wives to marry again on the evidence of one witness, and the law was established that they allow a woman to marry again on the evidence of one witness, and on the testimony of one [who states that he has heard] from another witness, from a slave, from a woman or from a female slave. This story takes place when Rabbi Akiva is going to Nehardea, which is in Babylonia, in order to intercalate the year, that is to decide whether an extra month must be added in order to adjust the lunar year to the solar year. Normally intercalation is done only in the land of Israel. This event must have occurred during a time of persecution, when courts could not gather in Israel to deal with calendar issues. In any case, when Rabbi Akiva arrives at Bet D’li a man named Nehemiah asks him if it is true that among the rabbis in Israel, only Rabbi Judah ben Bava rules that a woman may marry based on the testimony of a single witness. When Rabbi Akiva confirms this, Nehemiah apologizes that due to the marauders, he cannot reach the land of Israel to talk to the Israeli sages himself, but that he knows a tradition according to which Rabban Gamaliel the Elder allowed a woman to remarry upon the testimony of one witness. When Rabbi Akiva returns, he relates the tradition to the current patriarch, Rabban Gamaliel (Rabban Gamaliel the Elder’s grandson). Rabban Gamaliel rejoices, for a supporting tradition has been found for Rabbi Judah ben Bava’s tradition. Note that Rabban Gamaliel was previously not willing to accept Rabbi Judah ben Bava’s opinion, even though he obviously approved of it. Only when he learns of a supporting tradition, does he accept that a woman may remarry based on the testimony of one witness. After hearing Nehemiah’s words, Rabban Gamaliel himself remembers hearing of an incident where his grandfather permitted the wives of some fallen soldiers to remarry based on the testimony of one witness. At that precedent-setting incident, several others laws were established regarding testimony over a man’s death. Hearsay was declared acceptable, as was the testimony of women and slaves. That is to say the normal rules of testimony were suspended.", + "Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Joshua say: a woman is not be allowed to remarry on the evidence of one witness. Rabbi Akiva ruled: [a woman is not allowed to marry again] on the evidence of a woman, on that of a slave, on that of a female slave or on that of relatives. They said to him: It once happened that a number of Levites went to Tsoar, the city of palms, and one of them became ill on the way, and they left him in an inn. When they returned they asked the [female] innkeeper, “Where is our friend?” And she replied, “He is dead and I buried him”, and they allowed his wife to remarry. Should not then a priest’s wife [be believed at least as much] as an innkeeper!” He answered them: When she will [give such evidence] as the innkeeper [gave] she will be believed, for the innkeeper had brought out to them [the dead man’s] staff, his bag and the Torah scroll which he had with him. This section contains a debate between Rabbis Joshua, Eliezer, Akiva and perhaps other Sages, concerning these halakhot. Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Eliezer both disagree with the halakhah that seems to have been accepted by everyone in the mishnah, up until this point. They hold that for a woman to remarry she needs two valid witnesses to testify that her husband died. Rabbi Akiva, who lived a generation after Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Eliezer, and was a student of both of them, agreed partially with them, but also partially with Rabban Gamaliel. According to Rabbi Akiva, women, slaves and relatives cannot testify. However, one witness is sufficient. As a proof against Rabbi Akiva, the other Sages (probably not Rabbi Joshua or Rabbi Eliezer, who lived before Rabbi Akiva) bring a story where an innkeeper testified that someone staying at her inn had died, and the rabbis allowed his wife to remarry. If a mere innkeeper’s testimony is acceptable, then a woman of higher social standing, such as a priest’s wife, can surely testify in such a case. Rabbi Akiva answers that the innkeeper did not merely state that he had died, but she brought out his belongings as well. If the man had been alive, then he would not have left his belongings there. In such a case, where a woman has evidence that he died, she is believed. However, her testimony alone is not sufficient. Despite the fact that the tractate ends by stating that women may not testify about a man’s death, since all of the anonymous mishnayoth above allowed this, and allowed slaves and relatives to testify, as well as hearsay, the accepted halakhah is that all of these are permitted. Indeed, this is a classic case where we can sense that while the earlier tannaim were generally stricter, later tannaim, including the anonymous editors of the mishnah, were more lenient. Congratulations! We have finished Yevamoth. It is a tradition at this point to thank God for helping us to finish learning the tractate and to commit ourselves to going back and relearning it, so that we may not forget it and so that its lessons will stay with us for all of our lives. Tractate Yevamoth was the longest tractate we have yet learned (but it is not the longest in the Mishnah), and parts of it were quite confusing (especially the beginning). For those of you who have learned with us the entire tractate, a hearty Yasher Koach (congratulations). You have accomplished a great deal and you should be proud of yourselves. Many of the principles learned in Yevamoth will appear in other places in the Mishnah, especially in other mishnayoth in Seder Nashim. It will be an especially helpful tractate to remember. Tomorrow we begin to learn Ketuboth." + ] + ] + ] + }, + "versions": [ + [ + "Mishnah Yomit by Dr. Joshua Kulp", + "http://learn.conservativeyeshiva.org/mishnah/" + ] + ], + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה יבמות", + "categories": [ + "Mishnah", + "Modern Commentary on Mishnah", + "English Explanation of Mishnah", + "Seder Nashim" + ], + "schema": { + "heTitle": "ביאור אנגלי על משנה יבמות", + "enTitle": "English Explanation of Mishnah Yevamot", + "key": "English Explanation of Mishnah Yevamot", + "nodes": [ + { + "heTitle": "הקדמה", + "enTitle": "Introduction" + }, + { + "heTitle": "", + "enTitle": "" + } + ] + } +} \ No newline at end of file