json/Mishnah/Seder Nashim/Mishnah Ketubot/English/William Davidson Edition - English.json

{
    "language": "en",
    "title": "Mishnah Ketubot",
    "versionSource": "https://korenpub.com/collections/the-noe-edition-koren-talmud-bavli-1",
    "versionTitle": "William Davidson Edition - English",
    "status": "locked",
    "priority": 2.0,
    "license": "CC-BY-NC",
    "versionNotes": "English from The William Davidson digital edition of the <a href='https://www.korenpub.com/koren_en_usd/koren/talmud/koren-talmud-bavli-no.html'>Koren Noé Talmud</a>, with commentary by <a href='/adin-even-israel-steinsaltz'>Rabbi Adin Even-Israel Steinsaltz</a>",
    "shortVersionTitle": "Koren - Steinsaltz",
    "actualLanguage": "en",
    "languageFamilyName": "english",
    "isBaseText": false,
    "isSource": false,
    "direction": "ltr",
    "heTitle": "משנה כתובות",
    "categories": [
        "Mishnah",
        "Seder Nashim"
    ],
    "text": [
        [
            "<b>A virgin is married on Wednesday and a widow on Thursday.</b> The reason for the former is <b>that twice a week courts convene in the towns, on Monday and Thursday,</b> so <b>that if</b> the husband <b>had a claim concerning</b> the bride’s <b>virginity</b> when consummating the marriage on Wednesday night, <b>he would go early</b> the next day <b>to court</b> and make his claim.",
            "With regard to <b>a virgin, her marriage contract is two hundred dinars, and</b> with regard to <b>a widow,</b> her marriage contract <b>is one hundred</b> dinars. With regard to <b>a virgin</b> who is <b>a widow, a divorcée, or a <i>ḥalutza</i></b> who achieved that status <b>from</b> a state of <b>betrothal,</b> before marriage and before consummation of the marriage, for all of these <b>their marriage contract is two hundred</b> dinars, <b>and they are subject</b> to <b>a claim concerning</b> their <b>virginity,</b> as their presumptive status of virginity is intact. With regard to <b>a female convert, or a captive woman, or a maidservant, who were ransomed</b> with regard to the captive, or <b>who converted</b> with regard to the convert, <b>or who were freed</b> with regard to the maidservant, when they were <b>less than three years and one day old, their marriage contract is two hundred</b> dinars, as their presumptive status is that of a virgin. Even if they were subject to intercourse when they were younger than that age, the hymen remains intact. <b>And they are</b> subject to <b>a claim</b> concerning their <b>virginity.</b>",
            "With regard to <b>an adult man who engaged in intercourse with a minor girl</b> less than three years old; <b>or a minor boy</b> less than nine years old <b>who engaged in intercourse with an adult woman; or a</b> woman who had her hymen <b>ruptured by wood</b> or any other foreign object, for all these women <b>their marriage contract is two hundred</b> dinars, as their legal status is that of a virgin. This is <b>the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: The marriage contract</b> of a woman whose hymen was <b>ruptured by wood is one hundred dinars,</b> as physically, since her hymen is not intact, she is no longer a virgin.",
            "With regard to <b>a virgin</b> who is either a <b>widow,</b> a <b>divorcée, or a <i>ḥalutza</i></b> who achieved that status <b>from</b> a state of <b>marriage,</b> for all these women <b>their marriage contract is one hundred dinars,</b> <b>and they are not</b> subject to <b>a claim</b> concerning their <b>virginity.</b> Since they were married, even if they did not engage in intercourse with their husband, their presumptive status is that of non-virgins, and the second husband cannot claim that he was misled with regard to their status as virgins. And similarly, with regard to <b>a female convert, or a captive woman, or a maidservant, who were ransomed</b> with regard to the captive, or <b>who converted</b> with regard to the convert, <b>or who were freed</b> with regard to the maidservant, when they were <b>more than three years and one day old, their marriage contract is one hundred dinars and they are not</b> subject to <b>a claim</b> concerning their <b>virginity.</b> When they married, their presumptive status was that of a non-virgin.",
            "A man <b>who eats at</b> the house of <b>his father-in-law in Judea</b> after betrothal and <b>with-out witnesses</b> to attest to the fact that he was not alone with his betrothed <b>is unable to make a claim concerning virginity</b> after marriage <b>because</b> in accordance with the custom in Judea, the assumption is <b>that he secluded himself with her,</b> and the concern is that it was he who engaged in intercourse with her. For <b>both a widow</b> who is <b>an Israelite woman and a widow</b> who is the daughter <b>of priests, her marriage contract is one hundred dinars. A court of priests would collect</b> a marriage contract of <b>four hundred dinars for a virgin</b> daughter of a priest, twice the sum of the standard marriage contract for a virgin, <b>and the Sages did not reprimand them.</b>",
            "There is a case of one <b>who marries a woman and did not find her hymen</b> intact, and <b>she says: After you betrothed me I was raped, and his,</b> i.e., her husband’s, <b>field was inundated,</b> meaning that it is his misfortune that she is not a virgin, as she was raped after betrothal. <b>And he says: No; rather,</b> you were raped <b>before I betrothed you, and my transaction was a mistaken transaction. Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Eliezer say: She is deemed credible. Rabbi Yehoshua says:</b> It is <b>not</b> based on the statement emerging <b>from her mouth</b> that <b>we conduct our lives; rather, this</b> woman assumes <b>the presumptive status of one who engaged in intercourse when she was not yet betrothed and she misled him, until she brings proof</b> supporting <b>her statement.</b>",
            "In a case where <b>she says: I</b> am one whose hymen was <b>ruptured by wood,</b> i.e., she admits that her hymen is not intact but claims that it was not ruptured through intercourse, <b>and</b> the groom <b>says: No; rather, you are</b> one who was <b>trampled by a man,</b> and your hymen was ruptured through intercourse, <b>Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Eliezer say: She is deemed credible</b> and her claim is accepted because she certainly knows what actually happened. <b>Rabbi Yehoshua says:</b> It is <b>not</b> based on the statement emerging <b>from her mouth</b> that <b>we conduct our lives; rather, she</b> retains <b>the presumptive status of</b> one who <b>was trampled by a man, until she brings proof</b> supporting <b>her statement</b> that her hymen was ruptured by wood.",
            "If people <b>saw</b> a woman <b>speaking to one</b> man, but they did not recognize him, <b>and they said to her: What is the nature [<i>tivo</i>] of this man?</b> And she said to them: <b>He is a man</b> called <b>so-and-so and he is a priest; Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Eliezer say: She is deemed credible, and Rabbi Yehoshua says:</b> It is <b>not</b> based on the statement emerging <b>from her mouth</b> that <b>we conduct our lives. Rather, she</b> assumes <b>the presumptive status of</b> one who <b>engaged in intercourse with a Gibeonite or with a <i>mamzer</i>,</b> men of flawed lineage who disqualify her from marrying a priest, <b>until she brings proof</b> supporting <b>her statement.</b>",
            "Similarly, <b>if</b> a single woman <b>was pregnant, and</b> people <b>said to her: What is the nature of this fetus?</b> And she says to them: <b>It is from a man</b> called <b>so-and-so and he is a priest; Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Eliezer say: She is deemed credible, and Rabbi Yehoshua says:</b> It is <b>not</b> based on the statement emerging <b>from her mouth</b> that <b>we conduct our lives. Rather, she</b> assumes <b>the presumptive status of</b> one who <b>conceived from a Gibeonite or a <i>mamzer</i>, until she brings proof</b> supporting <b>her statement.</b>",
            "<b>Rabbi Yosei said:</b> There was <b>an incident involving a young girl who descended to fill</b> her jug with <b>water from the spring, and she was raped,</b> and the identity of the rapist was unknown. <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri said: If the majority of the people of the city marry</b> their daughters <b>to</b> members of the <b>priesthood, this young girl may be married to</b> a member of the priesthood."
        ],
        [
            "With regard to <b>a woman who was widowed or divorced,</b> and is now claiming payment of her marriage contract that is not before the court, and <b>she says: You married me</b> as <b>a virgin,</b> who is entitled to two hundred dinars, <b>and he says: No; rather, I married you</b> as <b>a widow,</b> who is entitled to one hundred dinars, then, <b>if there are witnesses that she went out</b> of her father’s house to her wedding <b>with a <i>hinnuma</i> or</b> with <b>her hair uncovered,</b> in a manner typical of virgins, payment of <b>her marriage contract is two hundred</b> dinars. <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka says: Even</b> testimony that there was <b>distribution of roasted grain,</b> which was customary at weddings of virgins, constitutes <b>proof</b> that she is a virgin.",
            "Several disputes between Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Yehoshua were cited previously with regard to the credibility accorded to the respective claims of parties to a dispute. Based on one of those disputes, the <i>tanna</i> adds: <b>And Rabbi Yehoshua concedes in</b> a case where <b>one says to another: This field,</b> which is currently in my possession, <b>belonged to your father and I purchased it from him, that he is deemed credible,</b> and his entire claim is accepted. The court accepts not only his admission that it once belonged to the other’s father, but also his statement that he purchased it. This is so, <b>as the mouth that prohibited,</b> i.e., claimed that the field had belonged to the other’s father, <b>is the mouth that permitted,</b> i.e., claimed that he purchased the field. Even if he had not admitted that it had belonged to the other’s father, the field would have remained in his possession. Therefore, his claim is accepted. <b>However, if there are witnesses that the field belonged to his father, and</b> the one who has the field in his possession <b>says: I purchased it from him, he is not deemed credible</b> and his claim is rejected.",
            "With regard to <b>the witnesses who said</b> in their testimony to ratify their signatures in a document: We signed the document and <b>this is our handwriting; however, we were compelled</b> to sign, or <b>we were minors</b> when we signed, or <b>we were disqualified witnesses,</b> e.g., we are relatives of one of the parties, <b>they are deemed credible.</b> Since the document is ratified on the basis of their testimony, it is likewise invalidated on the basis of their testimony. <b>However, if there are</b> other <b>witnesses</b> who testify <b>that it is their handwriting, or if their handwriting emerges</b> on a document <b>from another place,</b> enabling confirmation of their signatures by comparing the two documents, then the witnesses who signed the document <b>are not deemed credible.</b> The document is not invalidated based on their testimony, because ratification of the document is not dependent on their testimony, as their signatures can be authenticated independently.",
            "If <b>this</b> witness whose name is signed on a document <b>says:</b> This is <b>my handwriting and this is the handwriting of my fellow</b> witness, <b>and that</b> witness <b>says: This is my handwriting and that is the handwriting of my fellow</b> witness, <b>these</b> witnesses <b>are deemed credible</b> and the document is ratified, as together they provide testimony authenticating both signatures. If <b>this</b> witness <b>says: This is my handwriting, and that</b> witness <b>says: This is my handwriting,</b> and neither testifies with regard to the signature of the other, <b>they must add another</b> witness <b>with them</b> who will authenticate the signatures of the two witnesses, as otherwise, each of the witnesses would be testifying with regard to half the sum in the document; this is <b>the statement of Rabbi</b> Yehuda HaNasi. <b>And the Rabbis say: They need not add another</b> witness <b>with them. Rather, a person is deemed credible to say: This is my handwriting.</b> The testimony of the two signatories about their own signatures is sufficient.",
            "With regard to <b>a woman who said: I was a married woman and</b> now <b>I am a divorcée, she is deemed credible</b> and permitted to remarry, <b>as the mouth that prohibited</b> and established that she was married <b>is the mouth that permitted,</b> and established that she is divorced. <b>However, if there are witnesses that she was a married woman, and she says: I am a divorcée, she is not deemed credible.</b> Similarly, with regard to a woman who <b>said: I was taken captive but I am pure,</b> as I was not raped in captivity, <b>she is deemed credible</b> and permitted to marry a priest, <b>as the mouth that prohibited</b> and established that she was taken captive <b>is the mouth that permitted</b> and established that she was not defiled. <b>But if there are witnesses that she was taken captive, and she says: I am pure, she is not deemed credible. And if witnesses came after she married, this</b> woman need <b>not leave</b> her husband.",
            "In a case where witnesses testify that there are <b>two women who were taken captive,</b> and <b>this</b> woman <b>says: I was taken captive but I am pure, and that</b> woman <b>says: I was taken captive but I am pure, they are not deemed credible. And when this</b> woman <b>testifies about that</b> woman that she is pure and vice versa, <b>they are deemed credible.</b>",
            "<b>And likewise,</b> with regard to <b>two men</b> whose lineage is unknown, and <b>this</b> man <b>says: I am a priest, and that</b> man <b>says: I am a priest, they are not deemed credible. And when this</b> man <b>testifies about that</b> man that he is a priest and vice versa, <b>they are deemed credible.</b>",
            "Rabbi Yehuda says: One does not elevate a man <b>to priesthood on the basis of one witness.</b> Two witnesses are required for that purpose. <b>Rabbi Elazar says: When</b> is that the ruling? In a case <b>where there are challengers</b> to his claim that he is a priest. <b>However,</b> in a case <b>where there are no challengers, one elevates</b> a man <b>to priesthood on the basis of one witness. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says in the name of Rabbi Shimon, son of the deputy</b> High Priest: <b>One elevates</b> a man <b>to priesthood on the basis of one witness.</b>",
            "In the case of <b>a woman who was imprisoned by gentiles due to a monetary</b> offense committed by her husband, once she is released after he pays his debt, <b>she is permitted to her husband,</b> even if he is a priest. There is no concern that they violated her because their objective is to coerce the husband to pay his debt in exchange for her release. Were they to abuse her, it is possible that he would be unwilling to pay. However, if a woman was imprisoned <b>due to a capital</b> offense and sentenced to death, once she is released <b>she is forbidden to her husband</b> even if he is not a priest due to the concern that perhaps her captors violated her, and she acquiesced to one of them. With regard to <b>a city that was conquered by</b> an army laying <b>siege, all the women</b> married to <b>priests located in</b> the city <b>are unfit</b> and forbidden to their husbands, due to the concern that they were raped. <b>And if they have witnesses, even</b> if the witness is <b>a slave, even</b> if the witness is <b>a maidservant,</b> both of whom are generally disqualified as witnesses, <b>they are deemed credible. And a person is not deemed credible</b> to establish his status <b>by his own</b> testimony. Therefore, a woman is not deemed credible to claim that she was not violated. <b>Rabbi Zekharya ben HaKatzav said:</b> I swear by <b>this abode</b> of the Divine Presence that my wife’s <b>hand did not move from my hand from the time that the gentiles entered Jerusalem until they left,</b> and I know for a fact that she was not defiled. The Sages <b>said to him: A person cannot testify about himself.</b> The legal status of one’s wife is like his own status in this regard. Therefore, your testimony is not accepted, and your wife is forbidden to you.",
            "<b>And these are deemed credible to testify in their majority</b> with regard to <b>what they saw in their minority. A person is deemed credible to say: This is my father’s handwriting, and</b> to say: <b>This is my teacher’s handwriting; and</b> to say: <b>This is my brother’s handwriting,</b> even though he never saw their handwriting after reaching majority. § Similarly, one is deemed credible to say: <b>I was reminded of</b> the wedding of <b>so-and-so, who went out with a <i>hinnuma</i>, or</b> with <b>her hair uncovered</b> in a manner typical of virgins, and therefore, her marriage contract is two hundred dinars; <b>and</b> to say <b>that so-and-so would leave school to immerse</b> in order <b>to partake of <i>teruma</i>, and that he would share</b> <i>teruma</i> <b>with us at the threshing floor</b> and therefore he is a priest. Similarly, one is deemed credible to say: <b>This place is a <i>beit haperas</i>,</b> a field with a grave that was plowed, scattering the bones, and rendering the field a place of uncertain ritual impurity; <b>and</b> to say: <b>Until here we would come on Shabbat</b> and thereby determine the Shabbat boundary. <b>However, a person is neither deemed credible to say: So-and-so had a path in this place;</b> nor to say: <b>So-and-so had</b> a tract of land where they would perform the ritual of <b>standing</b> and sitting <b>and</b> deliver <b>a eulogy in that place,</b> thereby attesting that the land belongs to that person. The reason he is not deemed credible in those cases is that full-fledged testimony is required to remove property from the possession of its presumptive owner."
        ],
        [
            "<b>These</b> are the cases of <b>young women for whom there is a fine</b> paid <b>to their</b> fathers by one who rapes them: <b>One who engages in intercourse with a <i>mamzeret</i>, or with a Gibeonite woman [<i>netina</i>],</b> who are given [<i>netunim</i>] to the service of the people and the altar (see Joshua 9:27), <b>or with a Samaritan woman [<i>kutit</i>].</b> In addition, the same applies to <b>one who engages in intercourse with a female convert, or with a captive woman, or with a maidservant,</b> provided <b>that</b> the captives <b>were ransomed,</b> or <b>that</b> the converts <b>converted, or that</b> the maidservants <b>were liberated</b> when they were <b>less than three years and one day old,</b> as only in that case do they maintain the presumptive status of a virgin. Similarly, <b>one who engages in intercourse with his sister,</b> i.e., he rapes her, <b>or with his father’s sister, or with his mother’s sister, or with his wife’s sister, or with his brother’s wife, or with his father’s brother’s wife</b> after they divorced, <b>or with a menstruating woman, there is a fine</b> paid. <b>Although there is <i>karet</i> for</b> engaging in relations with any of the women enumerated in this list, one is liable to pay the fine because <b>there is no court</b>-imposed <b>capital punishment.</b> In cases where there is a court-imposed death penalty, the rapist would be exempt from paying the fine.",
            "<b>And these</b> are the cases of young women <b>who do not</b> have <b>a fine</b> paid to their fathers when they are raped or seduced: <b>One who has intercourse with a convert or with a captive</b> woman <b>or with a</b> gentile <b>maidservant, who were redeemed, converted, or emancipated</b> when they were <b>more than three years and one day</b> old, as presumably they are no longer virgins. <b>Rabbi Yehuda says: A captive</b> woman <b>who was redeemed</b> remains <b>in her</b> state of <b>sanctity even though</b> she is <b>an adult,</b> as it cannot be stated that she certainly engaged in intercourse. The mishna resumes its list of the cases of young women who are not entitled to a fine when raped or seduced by the following men: In the case of <b>one who engages in intercourse with his daughter, with his daughter’s daughter, with his son’s daughter, with his wife’s daughter, with her son’s daughter,</b> or <b>with her daughter’s daughter; they do not</b> receive payment of <b>a fine.</b> That is <b>due to</b> the fact <b>that he is liable</b> to receive the <b>death</b> penalty, and <b>that their death</b> penalty is administered by <b>the court, and anyone who is liable</b> to receive the <b>death</b> penalty <b>does not pay money, as it is stated: “And yet no harm follow, he shall be punished”</b> (Exodus 21:22). This verse indicates that if a woman dies and the one who struck her is liable to receive the death penalty, he is exempt from payment.",
            "With regard to <b>a young woman who was betrothed and divorced,</b> and then raped, <b>Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: She does not</b> receive payment of a <b>fine</b> for her rape. <b>Rabbi Akiva says: She</b> receives payment of a <b>fine</b> for her rape <b>and her fine</b> is paid <b>to herself,</b> not her father, as since she was betrothed and divorced she is no longer subject to her father’s authority.",
            "<b>The seducer gives</b> the father of his victim <b>three things, and the rapist</b> gives the father <b>four.</b> The mishna specifies: <b>The seducer gives</b> the father payments for <b>humiliation, degradation, and</b> the <b>fine. A rapist adds</b> an addition to <b>his</b> payments, <b>as he</b> also <b>gives</b> payment for the <b>pain. What</b> are the differences <b>between</b> the <i>halakha</i> of <b>a rapist and</b> that of <b>a seducer? The rapist gives</b> payment for <b>the pain, and the seducer does not give</b> payment for <b>the pain. The rapist gives</b> payment <b>immediately, and the seducer</b> does not pay those payments immediately but only <b>when he releases</b> her. <b>The rapist drinks from his vessel [<i>atzitzo</i>],</b> i.e., marries the woman he raped, perforce, <b>and the seducer, if he wishes to release</b> her, <b>he releases</b> her.",
            "The mishna clarifies: <b>How does</b> the rapist <b>drink from his vessel? Even if</b> the woman he raped <b>is lame, even if she is blind, and even if she is afflicted with boils,</b> he is obligated to marry her and may not divorce her. However, if <b>a matter of licentiousness is found in her,</b> e.g., if she committed adultery, <b>or if she is unfit to enter the Jewish people,</b> e.g., if she is a <i>mamzeret</i>, <b>he is not permitted to sustain her</b> as his wife, <b>as it is stated: “And to him she shall be as a wife”</b> (Deuteronomy 22:29), from which it is inferred that she must be <b>a woman who is</b> legally <b>suitable for him.</b>",
            "With regard to <b>an orphan who was betrothed and divorced, Rabbi Elazar says: One who rapes</b> her <b>is obligated</b> to pay the fine, as she is a virgin young woman, <b>and one who seduces her is exempt</b> from payment. Because she is an orphan, or because she was betrothed and divorced, she is independent, and by consenting to the seduction she forgoes her right to the fine.",
            "<b>What is humiliation?</b> How is the payment for humiliation during rape or seduction assessed? It is <b>all based on the one who humiliated and the one who was humiliated.</b> The price will vary depending on the lineage of the family of the rape victim and the nature of the attacker. How is her <b>degradation</b> assessed? <b>One considers her as though she were a maidservant sold in the marketplace,</b> and assesses <b>how much she was worth</b> beforehand <b>and how much she is</b> currently <b>worth,</b> after the rape or seduction. The sum of the <b>fine is equal for all people, and</b> the principle is: <b>Any</b> payment <b>that has a fixed</b> sum <b>by Torah law is equal for all people,</b> regardless of the lineage and the physical state of the attacker or the victim.",
            "<b>Any place where there is sale</b> by a father of his minor daughter as a Hebrew maidservant, <b>there is no fine</b> if she is raped. <b>And any place where there is a fine,</b> when a young woman is raped; <b>there is no sale</b> by the father. The Gemara specifies: <b>A minor is subject to sale</b> by her father, <b>and she is not entitled to a fine</b> if she is raped. <b>A young woman is entitled to a fine</b> if she is raped <b>and is not subject to sale. A grown woman is neither subject to sale nor entitled to a fine.</b>",
            "<b>One who says: I seduced the daughter of so-and-so, pays</b> compensation for <b>humiliation and degradation</b> based <b>on his own</b> admission, <b>but does not pay</b> the <b>fine.</b> Similarly, <b>one who says: I stole, pays the principal,</b> the value of the stolen goods, <b>based on his own</b> admission, <b>but does not pay</b> the <b>double payment and</b> the <b>payment four and five</b> times the principal for the slaughter or sale of the sheep or ox that he stole. Likewise if he confessed: <b>My ox killed so-and-so, or:</b> My ox killed <b>an ox</b> belonging to <b>so-and-so, this</b> owner <b>pays</b> based <b>on his own</b> admission. However, if he said: <b>My ox killed a slave</b> belonging to <b>so-and-so, he does not pay</b> based <b>on his own</b> admission as that payment is a fine. <b>This is the principle: Anyone who pays more than what he damaged,</b> the payments are fines and therefore <b>he does not pay</b> based <b>on his own</b> admission. He pays only based on the testimony of others."
        ],
        [
            "In the case of <b>a young woman who was seduced,</b> the compensation for <b>her humiliation and her degradation and her fine</b> belong <b>to her father. And</b> the same applies to the compensation for <b>pain in</b> the case of a woman who was <b>raped.</b> If the young woman <b>stood trial</b> against the seducer or rapist <b>before the father died, these</b> payments belong <b>to her father,</b> as stated above. If <b>the father died</b> before he collected the money from the offender, the payments belong <b>to</b> her <b>brothers.</b> As the father’s heirs, they inherit the money to which he was entitled before he passed away. However, if <b>she did not manage to stand in judgment before the father died,</b> and she was subsequently awarded the money, the compensation belongs <b>to her,</b> as she is now under her own jurisdiction due to the fact that she no longer has a father. If <b>she stood trial before she reached majority,</b> the payments belong <b>to her father,</b> and if <b>the father died, they</b> belong <b>to</b> her <b>brothers,</b> who inherit the money notwithstanding the fact that she has become a grown woman since the trial. If <b>she did not manage to stand in judgment before she reached majority,</b> the money belongs <b>to her. Rabbi Shimon says:</b> Even <b>if</b> she stood trial in her father’s lifetime but <b>did not manage to collect</b> the payments <b>before the father died,</b> the brothers do not inherit this money, as it belongs <b>to her.</b> By contrast, with regard to <b>her earnings and</b> the lost <b>items</b> that <b>she</b> has <b>found, although she has not collected</b> them, e.g., she had yet to receive her wages, if <b>the father died they</b> belong <b>to</b> her <b>brothers.</b> These payments are considered the property of their father, as he was entitled to them before he passed away.",
            "<b>One who betroths his</b> minor <b>daughter</b> to a man, <b>and</b> the man subsequently <b>divorces her,</b> and her father then <b>betroths her</b> to another, <b>and she is widowed,</b> the payment specified in <b>her marriage contract,</b> even from her second husband, <b>is his,</b> i.e., it belongs to the father. However, if her father <b>married her</b> off <b>and</b> her husband <b>divorced her,</b> and her father then <b>married her</b> to another man <b>and she was widowed,</b> even the payment specified in <b>her marriage contract</b> from her first marriage <b>is hers. Rabbi Yehuda says</b> that the payment specified in <b>the first</b> marriage contract belongs <b>to</b> the <b>father. They said to him: If</b> it <b>was after he married her</b> off, even the first time, <b>her father no</b> longer <b>has authority over her.</b>",
            "In the case of a female <b>convert whose daughter converted with her and</b> later, as a young woman, the daughter <b>engaged in licentious sexual relations</b> when she was betrothed, <b>she is</b> executed <b>by strangulation,</b> not stoning, the method of execution that would be employed had she been born Jewish. <b>She has neither</b> the <i>halakha</i> of being executed at the <b>entrance to</b> her <b>father’s house,</b> as in the case of a woman who was born Jewish who committed this crime, <b>nor</b> does she receive <b>one hundred <i>sela</i></b> if her husband defamed her by falsely claiming that she had committed adultery. The reason is that the verses state “Israel” (Deuteronomy 22:19, 21) with regard to these <i>halakhot</i>, indicating that these <i>halakhot</i> apply only to those born as Jews. However, if the daughter’s <b>conception occurred</b> when her mother <b>was not</b> yet <b>in</b> a state of <b>sanctity,</b> i.e., when she was still a gentile, <b>but her birth</b> took place when her mother was <b>in</b> a state of <b>sanctity,</b> as her mother converted during her pregnancy, <b>this</b> daughter is punishable <b>by stoning</b> if she committed adultery as a betrothed young woman. However, <b>she has neither</b> the <i>halakha</i> of being executed at the <b>entrance to</b> her <b>father’s house, nor</b> the right to <b>one hundred <i>sela</i></b> if it turns out that her husband defamed her. If <b>her conception and birth occurred</b> when her mother <b>was in</b> a state of <b>sanctity,</b> i.e., after she converted, <b>she is like a</b> regular <b>Jewish woman in all matters.</b> If a young woman who is betrothed commits adultery and <b>she has a father but does not have an entrance to</b> her <b>father’s house,</b> i.e., if her father does not possess a house of his own, or if <b>she has an entrance to</b> her <b>father’s house but does not have a father,</b> as he has passed away, <b>she is</b> nevertheless executed <b>via stoning, as</b> the requirement that she is to be executed at the <b>entrance to her father’s house is stated only for a mitzva</b> but it is not an indispensable requirement.",
            "<b>A father has authority</b> over <b>his daughter</b> with regard to <b>her betrothal through money, through</b> a marriage <b>document, or through intercourse.</b> Likewise, a father <b>is entitled to items she</b> has <b>found, and to her earnings, and to</b> effect <b>the nullification of her vows,</b> i.e., a father may nullify his daughter’s vows. <b>And he accepts her bill of divorce</b> on her behalf if she is divorced from betrothal before she becomes a grown woman. <b>And</b> although he inherits her property when she dies, e.g., property she inherited from her mother’s family, <b>he does not consume the produce</b> of her property <b>during her lifetime.</b> If the daughter <b>married, the husband has more</b> rights and obligations <b>than</b> her father had before the marriage, <b>as he consumes the produce</b> of her property <b>during her lifetime, and he is obligated</b> to provide <b>her sustenance, her redemption</b> if she is captured, <b>and her burial</b> upon her death. <b>Rabbi Yehuda says: Even the poorest</b> man <b>of the Jewish people may not</b> provide <b>fewer than two flutes and a lamenting woman,</b> which it was customary to hire for a funeral, as these too are included in the duties of burial.",
            "Even after she is betrothed, a daughter <b>is always under her father’s authority until she enters</b> her <b>husband’s authority in marriage</b> via the wedding canopy. If the father <b>delivered</b> his daughter <b>to the husband’s messengers</b> to bring her to her husband and the wedding canopy, once she has been handed over <b>she is under the husband’s authority.</b> However, if <b>the father went with the husband’s messengers, or if the father’s messengers went with the husband’s messengers, she is</b> still <b>under the father’s authority,</b> as he has not fully delivered her to the husband’s messengers. If her father sent her with his own messengers <b>and the father’s messengers delivered</b> the woman <b>to the husband’s messengers,</b> from that moment onwards <b>she is under</b> her <b>husband’s authority.</b>",
            "<b>A father is not obligated to</b> provide <b>his daughter’s sustenance. This exposition was expounded</b> by <b>Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya before the Sages in the vineyard of Yavne:</b> Since the Sages instituted that after the father’s death, <b>the sons inherit</b> the sum of money specified in their mother’s marriage contract, <b>and the daughters are sustained</b> from their father’s estate, these the two <i>halakhot</i> are equated: <b>Just as the sons inherit only after the father’s death,</b> not during his lifetime, <b>so too, the daughters are sustained</b> from his property <b>only after their father’s death.</b>",
            "If a husband <b>did not write a marriage contract for</b> his wife, <b>a virgin collects two hundred</b> dinars <b>and a widow one hundred dinars</b> upon divorce or the husband’s death, <b>because it is a stipulation of the court</b> that a wife is entitled to these amounts. If <b>he wrote</b> in <b>her</b> marriage contract that she is entitled to <b>a field worth one hundred dinars instead of</b> the <b>two hundred dinars</b> to which she is actually entitled, <b>and he did not</b> additionally <b>write for her: All property I have</b> shall serve as a <b>guarantee for</b> the payment of <b>your marriage contract,</b> he is nevertheless <b>obligated</b> to pay the full two hundred dinars; and he cannot say that she should take only a mortgaged field for payment of her marriage contract, <b>as it is a stipulation of the court</b> that all his property is held as surety for the entire sum.",
            "Similarly, if <b>he did not write for her</b> in the marriage contract: <b>If you are taken captive I will redeem you and restore you to me as a wife, and in</b> the case <b>of a priestess,</b> i.e., the wife of a priest, who is prohibited to return to her husband if she has intercourse with another man even if she is raped, if he did not write: <b>I will return you to your</b> native <b>province,</b> he is nevertheless <b>obligated</b> to do so, <b>as it is a stipulation of the court.</b>",
            "If a woman <b>was taken captive,</b> her husband is <b>obligated to redeem her. And if he said:</b> I <b>hereby</b> give my wife <b>her bill of divorce and</b> the payment of <b>her marriage contract, and let her redeem herself, he is not permitted</b> to do so, as he already obligated himself to redeem her when he wrote the marriage contract. If his wife <b>was struck</b> with illness, he is <b>obligated to heal her,</b> i.e., to pay for her medical expenses. In this case, however, if <b>he said:</b> I <b>hereby</b> give my wife <b>her bill of divorce and</b> the payment of <b>her marriage contract, and let her heal herself, he is permitted</b> to do so.",
            "If the husband <b>did not write for her</b> in her marriage contract: Any <b>male children you will have from me will inherit the money of your marriage contract in addition to their portion</b> of the inheritance <b>that</b> they receive together <b>with their brothers,</b> he <b>is</b> nevertheless <b>obligated</b> as though he had written it, <b>as it is a stipulation of the court</b> and therefore takes effect even if it is not explicitly stated. ",
            "Likewise, if he omitted from the marriage contract the sentence: Any <b>female children you will have from me will sit in my house and be sustained from my property until they are taken by men,</b> i.e., until they are married, he <b>is</b> nevertheless <b>obligated</b> as though he had written it, <b>as it</b> too <b>is a stipulation of the court.</b>",
            "Similarly, if he omitted from the marriage contract the clause: <b>You will sit in my house and be sustained from my property all the days you live</b> as <b>a widow in my house,</b> he <b>is</b> nevertheless <b>obligated</b> as though he had written it, <b>as it is a stipulation of the court.</b> The mishna comments: <b>The residents of Jerusalem would write in this manner,</b> that a widow may remain in her husband’s house throughout her widowhood, and <b>the residents of the Galilee would write</b> in this manner as well, <b>like the inhabitants of Jerusalem.</b> In contrast, <b>the residents of Judea would write: Until the heirs want to give you your marriage contract. Consequently, if the heirs wish, they may give her marriage contract to her and release her,</b> and she must find her own living arrangements and provide for herself."
        ],
        [
            "<b>Although they said</b> as a principle that <b>a virgin collects two hundred</b> dinars as payment for her marriage contract <b>and</b> that <b>a widow</b> collects <b>one hundred dinars, if</b> the husband <b>wishes to add even</b> an additional <b>ten thousand</b> dinars, <b>he may add</b> it. If <b>she is</b> then <b>widowed or divorced, whether from betrothal</b> or <b>whether from marriage, she collects the entire</b> amount, including the additional sum. <b>Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya says:</b> If she is widowed or divorced <b>from marriage, she collects the total</b> amount, but if she is widowed or divorced <b>from betrothal, a virgin collects two hundred</b> dinars <b>and a widow one hundred</b> dinars. This is <b>because he wrote</b> the additional amount <b>for her</b> in the marriage contract <b>only in order to marry her.</b> <b>Rabbi Yehuda says</b> a related <i>halakha</i> with regard to the marriage contract: <b>If he wishes, he may write for a virgin a document for two hundred</b> dinars as is fitting for her, <b>and she may</b> then <b>write</b> a receipt stating: <b>I received one hundred dinars from you.</b> Even though she has not actually received the money, the receipt serves as a means for her to waive half of the amount due to her for her marriage contract. According to Rabbi Yehuda, the financial commitment in the marriage contract is a right due to the wife, which she may waive if she chooses to do so. <b>And</b> similarly, <b>for a widow</b> he may write <b>one hundred dinars</b> in the contract <b>and she may write</b> a receipt stating: <b>I received from you fifty dinars.</b> However, <b>Rabbi Meir says:</b> It is prohibited to do this, as <b>anyone who reduces</b> the amount of the marriage contract to less than <b>than two hundred</b> dinars <b>for a virgin or one hundred dinars for a widow, this</b> marital relationship amounts to <b>licentious sexual relations</b> because it is as if he did not write any marriage contract at all.",
            "One <b>gives a virgin twelve months from</b> the time <b>the husband asked</b> to marry <b>her</b> after having betrothed her, in order <b>to prepare herself</b> with clothes and jewelry for the marriage. <b>And just as</b> one <b>gives a woman</b> this amount of time, <b>so too</b> does one <b>give a man</b> an equivalent period of time <b>to prepare himself,</b> as he too needs time to prepare for the marriage. <b>However, in</b> the case of <b>a widow,</b> who already has items available from her previous marriage, she is given only <b>thirty days</b> to prepare. If <b>the</b> appointed <b>time</b> for the wedding <b>arrived and they did not get married</b> due to some delay on the part of the husband, then the woman <b>may partake of his</b> food. <b>And</b> if her husband is a priest, <b>she may partake of <i>teruma</i>,</b> even if she is an Israelite woman. The <i>tanna’im</i> disagree about the permission granted to a priest to sustain his betrothed with <i>teruma</i> before she is married to him. <b>Rabbi Tarfon says: He may give her all</b> of her required sustenance from <b><i>teruma</i>.</b> During her periods of impurity, e.g., menstruation, when she cannot partake of <i>teruma</i>, she may sell the <i>teruma</i> to a priest and use the proceeds to buy non-sacred food. <b>Rabbi Akiva says:</b> He must give her <b>half</b> of her needs from <b>non-sacred</b> food <b>and half</b> may be from <b><i>teruma</i>,</b> so that she can eat from the non-sacred food when she is ritually impure.",
            "The mishna continues: A priest who is a <b><i>yavam</i>,</b> i.e., his brother died childless after betrothing a woman, <b>does not enable</b> his <i>yevama</i> <b>to partake of <i>teruma</i></b> by virtue of her relationship with him. <b>If she</b> had <b>completed six months</b> of the twelve-month wait for marriage <b>under the aegis of the husband,</b> and then he died, <b>and</b> she waited <b>six</b> more <b>months under the aegis of the <i>yavam</i>; or even</b> if she completed <b>all of</b> the necessary time <b>under the aegis of the husband except for one day</b> that she was <b>under the aegis of the <i>yavam</i>; or</b> if she completed <b>all of</b> the necessary time <b>under the aegis of the <i>yavam</i> except for one day</b> that she was <b>under the aegis of the husband,</b> she still <b>may not partake of <i>teruma</i>.</b> <b>This</b> set of rulings, concerning the permission granted a betrothed woman whose wedding date has arrived to partake of <i>teruma</i>, is in accordance with <b>the initial</b> version of the <b>mishna.</b> However, <b>a court</b> that convened <b>after them,</b> in a later generation, <b>said:</b> <b>A woman may not partake of <i>teruma</i> until she has</b> actually <b>entered the wedding canopy.</b>",
            "<b>If one consecrates his wife’s earnings,</b> meaning anything she produces, such as thread that she spins from wool, which, according to the Sages’ ordinance, belongs to her husband, <b>she may work and sustain</b> herself from her earnings, as the consecration is ineffective. However, there is a dispute with regard to <b>the surplus,</b> meaning any earnings she produces in excess of the amount she is required to produce for her husband. <b>Rabbi Meir says:</b> The surplus is <b>consecrated</b> property, and <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan the Cobbler says:</b> The surplus is also <b>non-sacred.</b>",
            "<b>And these are tasks that a wife</b> must <b>perform for her husband: She grinds</b> wheat into flour, <b>and bakes, and washes clothes, cooks, and nurses her child, makes</b> her husband’s <b>bed, and makes</b> thread <b>from wool</b> by spinning it. <b>If she brought him one maidservant,</b> i.e., brought the maidservant with her into the marriage, the maidservant will perform some of these tasks. Consequently, the wife <b>does not</b> need to <b>grind, and does not</b> need to <b>bake, and does not</b> need to <b>wash clothes.</b> If she brought him <b>two</b> maidservants, <b>she does not</b> need to <b>cook and does not</b> need to <b>nurse her child</b> if she does not want to, but instead may give the child to a wet nurse. If she brought him <b>three</b> maidservants, <b>she does not</b> need to <b>make his bed and does not</b> need to <b>make</b> thread <b>from wool.</b> If she brought him <b>four</b> maidservants, <b>she may sit in a chair [<i>katedra</i>]</b> like a queen and not do anything, as her maidservants do all of her work for her. <b>Rabbi Eliezer says: Even if she brought him a hundred maidservants, he can compel her to make</b> thread <b>from wool, since idleness leads to licentiousness.</b> Consequently, it is better for a woman to be doing some kind of work. <b>Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Even one who vows</b> that <b>his wife</b> is prohibited <b>from doing</b> any <b>work must divorce</b> her <b>and give</b> her the payment for her <b>marriage contract, since idleness leads to idiocy.</b>",
            "With regard to <b>one who vows</b> that <b>his wife</b> may not derive benefit <b>from marital relations</b> with him, <b>Beit Shammai say:</b> He may maintain this situation for up to <b>two weeks,</b> but beyond that he must divorce her and give her the payment for her marriage contract. <b>Beit Hillel say:</b> He must divorce her if it continues beyond <b>one week.</b> Apropos the husband’s obligation to his wife regarding marital relations, the Gemara mentions other aspects of this issue: <b>Students may leave</b> their homes and travel in order <b>to learn Torah without</b> their wives’ <b>permission</b> for up to <b>thirty days,</b> and <b>laborers</b> may leave their homes without their wives’ permission for up to <b>one week. The set interval</b> defining the frequency of a husband’s conjugal obligation to his wife <b>stated in the Torah</b> (see Exodus 21:10), unless the couple stipulated otherwise, varies according to the man’s occupation and proximity to his home: <b>Men of leisure,</b> who do not work, must engage in marital relations <b>every day, laborers</b> must do so <b>twice a week, donkey drivers once a week, camel drivers once every thirty days,</b> and <b>sailors once every six months.</b> This is <b>the statement of Rabbi Eliezer.</b>",
            "A woman <b>who rebels against her husband</b> is fined; <b>her marriage contract is reduced</b> by <b>seven dinars</b> each <b>week. Rabbi Yehuda says: Seven half-dinars [<i>terapa’ikin</i>]</b> each week. <b>Until when does he reduce</b> her marriage contract? <b>Until</b> the reductions are <b>equivalent to her marriage contract,</b> i.e., until he no longer owes her any money, at which point he divorces her without any payment. <b>Rabbi Yosei says: He can always continue to deduct</b> from the sum, even beyond that which is owed to her due to her marriage contract, <b>so that if she will receive an inheritance from another source, he can collect</b> the extra amount <b>from her. And similarly,</b> if a man <b>rebels against his wife,</b> he is fined and an extra <b>three dinars a week are added to her marriage contract. Rabbi Yehuda says: Three <i>terapa’ikin</i>.</b>",
            "If someone <b>feeds his wife by means of a third party</b> serving as a trustee, while the husband himself is not living with her for some reason, he may <b>not</b> give <b>her less than two <i>kav</i></b> of <b>wheat or four <i>kav</i></b> of <b>barley</b> a week for her sustenance. <b>Rabbi Yosei said: Only Rabbi Yishmael, who was near Edom, allotted her barley. And he</b> must <b>give her half a <i>kav</i></b> of <b>legumes, and half a <i>log</i></b> of <b>oil, and a <i>kav</i></b> of <b>dried figs or</b> the weight of <b>a <i>maneh</i></b> of <b>fig cakes. And if he does not have</b> these fruits, <b>he</b> must <b>apportion</b> for her <b>a corresponding</b> amount of <b>fruit from elsewhere.</b> <b>And he</b> must <b>give her a bed, a soft mat, and</b> a hard <b>mat. And he</b> must <b>give her a cap for her head, and a belt for her waist, and</b> new <b>shoes from Festival to Festival,</b> i.e., he must buy her new shoes each Festival. <b>And</b> he must purchase <b>garments</b> for her with a value <b>of fifty dinars from year to year.</b> The mishna comments: <b>And he may not give her new</b> clothes, which tend to be thick and warm, <b>in the summer, nor worn</b> garments <b>in the rainy season,</b> as these are too thin and she will be cold. <b>Rather, he should give her clothes</b> at a value <b>of fifty dinars in the rainy season, and she covers herself with</b> these same <b>worn</b> garments <b>in the summer</b> as well. <b>And</b> the leftover, <b>worn</b> clothes belong <b>to her.</b>",
            "In addition to the above, <b>he</b> must <b>give her</b> another <b>silver <i>ma’a</i></b> coin <b>for</b> the rest of <b>her needs. And she eats with him from Shabbat evening to Shabbat evening.</b> Although he may provide for her sustenance via a third party throughout the week, on Shabbat evening she has the right to eat together with him. <b>And if he does not give her a silver <i>ma’a</i></b> coin <b>for her needs, her earnings</b> belong <b>to her.</b> <b>And what</b> is the fixed amount <b>that she</b> must <b>earn for him?</b> She must spin wool in the <b>weight</b> of <b>five <i>sela</i></b> of threads of the <b>warp in Judea, which are</b> equivalent to <b>ten <i>sela</i></b> according <b>to</b> the measurements of the <b>Galilee, or the weight</b> of <b>ten <i>sela</i></b> of the threads of the <b>woof,</b> which are easier to prepare, <b>in Judea, which are</b> equivalent to <b>twenty <i>sela</i></b> according <b>to</b> the measurements used in the <b>Galilee. And if she is nursing</b> at the time, the required amount <b>is reduced from her earnings and is added</b> to the sum she receives <b>for her sustenance. In what</b> case <b>is this statement,</b> i.e., all these amounts and measurements, <b>said? With</b> regard to <b>the poorest of Jews,</b> i.e., these are the minimum requirements. <b>However, in the case of</b> a financially <b>prominent man, all</b> the amounts are increased <b>according to his prominence.</b>"
        ],
        [
            "A lost <b>object found by a wife and</b> the wife’s <b>earnings</b> belong <b>to her husband. And</b> with regard to <b>her inheritance,</b> the husband <b>enjoys the profits</b> of this property <b>in her lifetime.</b> If she is humiliated or injured, the perpetrator is liable to pay compensation for <b>her humiliation and her degradation,</b> as relevant. This payment belongs <b>to her.</b> <b>Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira says: When</b> it is an injury <b>that</b> is <b>in a concealed</b> part of the woman’s body, <b>she</b> receives <b>two parts,</b> i.e., two-thirds, of the payment for humiliation and degradation, <b>and</b> the husband receives <b>one</b> part, i.e., one-third, as the injury affects him as well. <b>And when</b> it is an injury <b>that</b> is <b>in an exposed</b> part of her body, <b>he</b> receives <b>two parts,</b> as he suffers public humiliation due to her condition, <b>and she</b> receives <b>one</b> part. <b>His</b> payment <b>should be given</b> to him <b>immediately. And</b> with <b>her</b> portion, <b>land should be purchased with it, and he enjoys the profits</b> of that property.",
            "In the case of <b>one who pledges</b> to set aside a sum of <b>money for his son-in-law</b> as part of a dowry, <b>and his son-in-law dies</b> before receiving the money, the terms of the dowry do not transfer to the brother, who is now the <i>yavam</i> of the widow. <b>The Sages said:</b> The father-in-law <b>can say</b> to the <i>yavam</i>: <b>To your brother, I wanted to give</b> this money, <b>but to you I do not want to give</b> it.",
            "The mishna addresses another matter. If the woman had <b>pledged to bring in for him one thousand dinars</b> in cash as a dowry, <b>he</b> then <b>pledges,</b> in the marriage contract, that he will give her <b>fifteen hundred dinars against them.</b> That is, he writes in the marriage document that in the event of divorce or his death, he will pay her that greater amount. <b>And against</b> the <b>appraisal</b> of goods such as utensils and other movable items that are included in the dowry, <b>he pledges one-fifth less</b> than the amount of the evaluation. This is because movable property is generally assessed at a value one-fifth higher than the actual value, and he cannot earn any money from these items. If the <b>appraisal</b> is set <b>at one hundred dinars and</b> the property <b>is</b> actually <b>worth one hundred dinars,</b> then since the appraisal is conducted at market value <b>he has</b> a claim to property worth <b>only one hundred dinars.</b> Likewise, he may not record a decreased sum of property. His recorded <b>appraisal</b> of the movable property that she brings into the marriage is <b>one hundred dinars</b> only when <b>she is giving thirty-one <i>sela</i> and</b> one <b>dinar,</b> equal to 125 dinars. This is because the actual value is one-fifth less than the inflated evaluation, as explained. <b>And</b> similarly, he pledges <b>four hundred</b> dinars against her assets only when <b>she is giving five hundred,</b> based on the inflated assessment of their worth, such that the real value is four hundred dinars. In contrast, <b>what</b> the <b>son-in-law pledges</b> according to the amount of the dowry that the bride brings, <b>he pledges one-fifth less</b> in the marriage contract, which is the actual value of the property.",
            "If <b>she pledged to bring him money</b> and not articles to serve as a dowry, <b>her <i>sela</i>,</b> i.e., four dinars, <b>becomes six</b> dinars with respect to the husband’s obligation in the marriage contract. This follows the standard outlined in the previous mishna: The groom increases his obligation by one half since he will profit from this money. Additionally, the <b>groom accepts upon himself</b> to give <b>ten</b> dinars <b>to the account</b> for her needs, <b>for each and every hundred dinars</b> that she brings. <b>Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Everything</b> is <b>in accordance with the regional custom.</b>",
            "With regard to <b>one who marries</b> off <b>his daughter</b> with the terms of the dowry <b>unspecified, he must not give her less than fifty dinars.</b> If the bride’s father <b>pledged to bring her</b> into the marriage <b>bare,</b> by saying that he refuses to give her anything, <b>the husband should not say: When I bring her into my house, I will clothe her with my clothing,</b> but not beforehand. <b>Rather, he must clothe her while she is yet in her father’s house,</b> and she enters the marriage with the clothing in hand. <b>And similarly,</b> with regard to a charity administrator <b>who marries</b> off <b>an orphan girl,</b> he <b>must not give her less than fifty dinars. If there are</b> sufficient resources <b>in the</b> charity <b>fund,</b> the charities <b>provide</b> even more <b>for her,</b> furnishing a dowry and her other needs <b>according to her dignity.</b>",
            "With regard to a minor <b>orphan girl whose mother or brothers married her off,</b> even <b>with her consent</b> to a small dowry, she retains her rights to a proper dowry. <b>And</b> thus, if they <b>wrote for her</b> a dowry <b>of one hundred or of fifty dinars, she may, upon reaching majority, exact from</b> her mother, or brothers, or their respective estates the sum of money <b>that is fit to be given to her</b> as a dowry, which is one-tenth of the family’s estate. Even if she agreed to forgo part of this sum as a minor, she may collect it as an adult. <b>Rabbi Yehuda says: If</b> the father <b>married off the first daughter</b> before he died, a dowry <b>should be given to the second</b> daughter <b>in the same manner that he gave</b> one <b>to the first</b> daughter. <b>And the Rabbis say:</b> There is no ready standard, since <b>sometimes a person</b> is <b>poor and</b> then <b>becomes wealthy, or</b> a person is <b>wealthy</b> and then <b>becomes poor,</b> so a family’s allowance for dowries is subject to change. <b>Rather,</b> the court <b>appraises the property and gives her</b> the appropriate sum.",
            "With regard to <b>one who transfers money</b> by means of a third party <b>for his daughter</b> to purchase a field after she marries, is the daughter allowed to assert control over the money? <b>If she says</b> after she marries: <b>My husband is trustworthy for me,</b> so give him the money to buy the property for me, her wishes are not honored. <b>The third party should execute</b> the agency <b>that was entrusted in his power;</b> this is <b>the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yosei says:</b> The daughter has authority: <b>And were it only a field and she wanted to sell it, it</b> could be <b>sold immediately.</b> Just as she would have authority to control the field, she may control the money assigned for her. The mishna qualifies: <b>In what</b> case <b>is this statement said? With</b> respect to <b>an adult woman. But with</b> respect to <b>a minor girl,</b> any <b>action of a minor girl is nothing</b> from a legal standpoint; a minor would have no authority in this matter."
        ],
        [
            "With regard to <b>one who vows</b> and obligates <b>his wife,</b> prohibiting her <b>from benefiting from him</b> or his property, if his vow will remain in effect for <b>up to thirty days, he must appoint a trustee [<i>parnas</i>]</b> to support her. But if the vow will remain in effect for <b>more than this</b> amount of time, <b>he must divorce</b> her <b>and give</b> her the payment of her <b>marriage contract.</b> <b>Rabbi Yehuda says: If</b> the husband is an <b>Israelite,</b> then if his vow will remain in effect for up to <b>one month, he may maintain</b> her as his wife; <b>and</b> if it will be <b>two</b> months, <b>he must divorce</b> her <b>and give</b> her the payment of her <b>marriage contract.</b> But <b>if</b> he is <b>a priest,</b> then he is given extra time: If the vow will remain in effect for up to <b>two</b> months, <b>he may maintain</b> her, <b>and</b> if it will be <b>three</b> months, <b>he must divorce</b> her <b>and give</b> her the payment of her <b>marriage contract.</b> The reason for this is that it is prohibited for a priest to marry a divorcée, including his own ex-wife, and therefore if he divorces her and later regrets his decision he will not be able to take her back.",
            "<b>One who vows</b> and obligates <b>his wife,</b> requiring her <b>not to taste a particular type of produce, must divorce</b> her <b>and give</b> her the payment of her <b>marriage contract. Rabbi Yehuda says: If</b> he is an <b>Israelite,</b> then if the vow will remain in effect for <b>one day he may maintain</b> her as his wife, but if it will be <b>two</b> days <b>he must divorce</b> her <b>and give</b> her the payment of her <b>marriage contract. And if</b> he is <b>a priest,</b> then if the vow will be in effect for <b>two</b> days <b>he may maintain</b> her; for <b>three</b> days <b>he must divorce</b> her <b>and give</b> her the payment of her <b>marriage contract.</b>",
            "<b>One who vows</b> and obligates <b>his wife,</b> requiring her <b>not to adorn herself with a particular type</b> of perfume, <b>must divorce</b> her <b>and give</b> her the payment of her <b>marriage contract. Rabbi Yosei says</b> that one must distinguish between different types of women: <b>For poor women,</b> this applies only <b>when he did not establish a set amount of time</b> for the vow, <b>and for wealthy women,</b> who are accustomed to adorning themselves more elaborately, if she is prohibited from doing so for <b>thirty days,</b> he must divorce her and give her the payment of her marriage contract.",
            "With regard to <b>one who vows</b> and obligates <b>his wife not to go to her father’s house, when</b> her father <b>is with her in the</b> same <b>city,</b> if the vow is to be in effect up to <b>one month, he may maintain</b> her as his wife. If the vow is for <b>two</b> months, <b>he must divorce</b> her <b>and give</b> her the payment of her <b>marriage contract. And when</b> her father <b>is in a different city,</b> if the vow is to be in effect until at most <b>one pilgrim Festival,</b> i.e., until the next pilgrim Festival, <b>he may maintain</b> her as his wife. Although the wife often visits her parents during the Festival, she is capable of refraining one time. For <b>three</b> Festivals, however, <b>he must divorce</b> her <b>and give</b> her the payment of her <b>marriage contract.</b>",
            "Additionally, <b>one who vows</b> and obligates <b>his wife not to go to a house of mourning</b> to console the mourners, <b>or to a house of feasting</b> for a wedding, <b>must divorce</b> her <b>and give</b> her the payment of her <b>marriage contract.</b> Why is this so? <b>Because</b> it is as if he were <b>locking</b> a door <b>in front of her. And if he claimed</b> he did so <b>due to something else,</b> meaning he is concerned about inappropriate conduct there, <b>he is permitted</b> to do so. If <b>he said to her:</b> The vow will be void <b>on condition that you tell so-and-so what you told me, or what I told you, or</b> on condition that <b>she fill</b> something up <b>and pour</b> it <b>into the refuse, he must divorce</b> her <b>and give</b> her the payment of her <b>marriage contract.</b> The Gemara will explain all of these cases thoroughly.",
            "<b>And these</b> are examples of women who may be <b>divorced without</b> payment of their <b>marriage contract:</b> A woman <b>who violates</b> the <b>precepts of Moses,</b> i.e., <i>halakha</i>, <b>or</b> the precepts of <b>Jewish</b> women, i.e., custom. The Mishna explains: <b>And who is</b> categorized as a woman who violates the <b>precepts of Moses?</b> This includes cases such as when <b>she feeds him</b> food <b>that has not been tithed, or she engages in sexual intercourse with him</b> while she has the legal status of <b>a menstruating woman, or she does not separate a portion of dough to be given to a priest [<i>ḥalla</i>], or she vows and does not fulfill</b> her vows. <b>And who is</b> considered a woman who violates the <b>precepts of Jewish</b> women? One who, for example, <b>goes out</b> of her house, <b>and her head,</b> i.e., her hair, is <b>uncovered; or</b> she <b>spins</b> wool <b>in the</b> public <b>marketplace; or</b> she <b>speaks with every man</b> she encounters. <b>Abba Shaul says: Also one who curses his,</b> i.e., her husband’s, <b>parents in his presence. Rabbi Tarfon says: Also a loud woman. And who is</b> defined as <b>a loud woman? When she speaks inside her house and her neighbors hear her voice.</b>",
            "In the case of <b>one who betroths a woman on condition that there are no vows</b> incumbent <b>upon her, and</b> it was subsequently <b>discovered</b> that there are <b>vows</b> incumbent <b>upon her, she is not betrothed.</b> This is because if the condition is not fulfilled, the betrothal is nullified. If <b>he married her without specification and</b> it was subsequently <b>discovered</b> that <b>vows</b> were incumbent <b>upon her, she</b> may be <b>divorced without</b> payment of her <b>marriage contract,</b> since he discovered a deficiency about which she had not initially informed him. However, this does not invalidate the betrothal, since he did not make any explicit condition. If he betrothed her <b>on condition that she has no blemishes, and</b> it was subsequently <b>discovered</b> that <b>she</b> did have <b>blemishes, she is not betrothed.</b> But if <b>he married her without specification, and</b> it was subsequently <b>discovered</b> that <b>she</b> had <b>blemishes, she</b> may be <b>divorced without</b> payment of her <b>marriage contract.</b> The mishna clarifies what qualifies as a blemish: <b>All of the blemishes</b> that are listed in tractate <i>Bekhorot</i> involving significant physical deformities <b>that disqualify priests</b> from service similarly <b>disqualify</b> betrothal of <b>women,</b> as a mistaken transaction.",
            "If <b>she has blemishes and she is still in her father’s house,</b> as she has not yet gotten married, <b>the father must bring proof that these blemishes appeared on her after she became betrothed, and</b> therefore <b>his field was flooded,</b> i.e., it is the husband’s misfortune, since she developed the problem after the betrothal. But if she has already gotten married and <b>entered the husband’s domain</b> when her blemishes are discovered, <b>the husband must bring proof that she had these blemishes before she was betrothed, and</b> consequently <b>the transaction</b> of betrothal <b>was a mistaken transaction.</b> This is <b>the statement of Rabbi Meir. But the Rabbis say: In what</b> case <b>is this statement,</b> that a husband can claim to have found blemishes in his wife, on account of which he wants to void the betrothal, <b>said? With regard to hidden blemishes.</b> <b>But with regard to visible blemishes, he cannot claim</b> that the betrothal was in error, as he presumably saw and accepted them before the betrothal. <b>And if there is a bathhouse in the city,</b> where all the women go to bathe, <b>even</b> with regard to <b>hidden blemishes he cannot</b> make this <b>claim, because he examines her through</b> the agency of <b>his female relatives.</b> He would have asked one of his relatives to look over the woman he is about to marry.",
            "In the case of <b>a man who developed blemishes</b> after marriage, the court <b>does not force him to divorce</b> his wife. <b>Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: In what</b> case <b>is this statement said?</b> It is said <b>with regard to minor blemishes. However, with regard to major blemishes,</b> which will be defined later in the Gemara, the court <b>does force him to divorce</b> her.",
            "<b>And these</b> are the defects <b>for which</b> the court <b>forces him to divorce</b> her: One <b>afflicted with boils; or one who has a polyp; or one who</b> works as <b>a gatherer, or one who</b> works as <b>a melder of copper, or one who</b> works as <b>a tanner</b> of hides, all of whose work involves handling foul-smelling materials. <b>Whether</b> he <b>had</b> these defects <b>before they</b> got <b>married, or whether they developed after they</b> got <b>married,</b> the court forces them to divorce. <b>And with regard to all of these, Rabbi Meir said: Even though he stipulated with her</b> ahead of time that he suffers from this particular ailment or this is his line of work, <b>she can</b> nevertheless demand a divorce and <b>say: I thought I could accept</b> this issue <b>but now</b> I realize <b>I cannot accept</b> it. <b>And the Rabbis say:</b> If she initially agreed <b>she must accept it against her will, apart from</b> a situation in which her husband is <b>afflicted with boils.</b> In that case the Rabbis concede that he must divorce her, <b>because</b> the disease <b>consumes</b> his flesh when they engage in marital relations. The mishna relates an additional account: <b>An incident</b> occurred <b>in Sidon involving a certain tanner who died</b> childless, <b>and he had a brother</b> who was also <b>a tanner.</b> This brother was required to enter into levirate marriage with the widow. <b>The Sages said: She can say: I could accept</b> living with a tanner <b>for your brother but I cannot accept it for you,</b> and therefore he must perform <i>ḥalitza</i> with her."
        ],
        [
            "With regard to a <b>woman to whom property was bequeathed before she was betrothed,</b> and she was then betrothed, <b>Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel agree that she may sell or give</b> the property as a gift, <b>and</b> the transaction <b>is valid.</b> However, if the property <b>was bequeathed to her after she was betrothed, Beit Shammai say: She may sell</b> it as long as she is betrothed, <b>and Beit Hillel say: She may not sell</b> it. Both <b>these,</b> Beit Shammai, <b>and those,</b> Beit Hillel, <b>agree that if she sold</b> it <b>or gave</b> it away as a gift, the transaction is <b>valid.</b> <b>Rabbi Yehuda said</b> that <b>the Sages said before Rabban Gamliel: Since he acquired the woman</b> herself through betrothal, will he <b>not acquire the property</b> from the moment of their betrothal? Why, then, is her transaction valid? Rabban Gamliel <b>said to them: With regard to the new</b> property that she inherited after marriage, <b>we are ashamed,</b> because it is unclear why she cannot sell it, as it is hers; <b>and you</b> also seek to <b>impose upon us</b> a prohibition with regard to <b>the old</b> property that she owned beforehand? If the property <b>was bequeathed to her after she was married,</b> both <b>these,</b> Beit Shammai, <b>and those,</b> Beit Hillel, <b>agree that if she sold</b> the property <b>or gave</b> it away, <b>the husband may repossess</b> it <b>from the purchasers.</b> If she inherited the property <b>before she was married and</b> then <b>was married, Rabban Gamliel says: If she sold or gave</b> the property away, the transaction is <b>valid. Rabbi Ḥanina ben Akavya said</b> that the Sages <b>said before Rabban Gamliel: Since he acquired the woman</b> through marriage, will he <b>not acquire the property?</b> Rabban Gamliel <b>said to them: With regard to the new</b> property <b>we are ashamed, and you</b> also seek to <b>impose upon us</b> a prohibition with regard to <b>the old</b> property?",
            "<b>Rabbi Shimon distinguishes between</b> one type of <b>property and</b> another type of <b>property: Property that is known to the husband she may not sell</b> once she is married, <b>and if she sold</b> it <b>or gave</b> it away, the transaction is <b>void.</b> Property <b>that is unknown to the husband she may not sell, but if she sold</b> it <b>or gave</b> it away, the transaction is <b>valid.</b>",
            "If <b>money was bequeathed to</b> a woman as an inheritance while she was married, <b>land is acquired with it, and</b> the husband <b>consumes the produce</b> of the land while the principal remains hers. If she inherited <b>produce that is detached from the ground,</b> it is considered like money; therefore, <b>land is acquired with it and he consumes the produce</b> of the land. With regard to <b>produce that is attached to the ground, Rabbi Meir says: One evaluates how much</b> the land is <b>worth with</b> the <b>produce, and how much it is worth without</b> the <b>produce, and</b> the difference between these sums is the <b>surplus</b> value that belongs to the woman. <b>Land is</b> then <b>acquired with</b> the surplus <b>and he consumes the produce. And the Rabbis say: That which is attached to the ground is his,</b> as he is entitled to the produce from her property and he may therefore eat from it. <b>And that which is detached from the ground</b> is <b>hers,</b> like all other money she brings to the marriage, <b>and land is acquired with it and he consumes the produce.</b>",
            "<b>Rabbi Shimon says:</b> In a <b>case where his right is superior upon her entrance</b> to the marriage, <b>his right is inferior upon her exit</b> if he divorces her. Conversely, in a <b>case where his right is inferior upon her entrance, his right is superior upon her exit. How so?</b> With regard to <b>produce that is attached to the ground,</b> if she married while owning such produce, <b>upon her entrance</b> it is <b>his,</b> in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, <b>and upon her exit,</b> when he divorces her, it is <b>hers,</b> as it is considered part of her property. <b>But</b> in the case of produce <b>that is detached from the ground, upon her entrance</b> it is <b>hers, and</b> if such produce is detached before their divorce, <b>upon her exit</b> it is <b>his,</b> as he was already entitled to all the produce of her property.",
            "If <b>elderly slaves or maidservants were bequeathed to her, they are sold and land is acquired with them, and</b> the husband <b>consumes the produce</b> of the land. <b>Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: She</b> need <b>not sell</b> these slaves and maidservants, <b>because they are assets of her paternal family,</b> and it would be shameful to the family if they were sold to others. Likewise, if <b>old olive</b> trees <b>or grapevines were bequeathed to her, they are sold and land is acquired with them, and he consumes the produce. Rabbi Yehuda says: She</b> need <b>not sell</b> them, <b>because they are assets of her paternal family.</b> With regard to <b>one who pays expenditures for his wife’s property</b> in an effort to improve it, if <b>he paid a large</b> amount in expenditures <b>and ate</b> only <b>a small</b> amount of produce before he divorced her, or if he paid <b>a small</b> amount in expenditures <b>and ate a large</b> quantity of produce, <b>that which he spent he has spent, and that which he ate he has eaten.</b> Therefore, none of it need be returned. However, if he <b>paid</b> expenditures for the property <b>and did not eat</b> any part of it, <b>he takes an oath</b> with regard to <b>how much he paid and</b> then <b>takes</b> his expenditures. ",
            "When a married man dies childless, his brother, the <i>yavam</i>, is obligated to perform levirate marriage or release the widow, the <i>yevama</i>, through a ceremony known as <i>ḥalitza</i>. With regard to <b>a widow waiting for her <i>yavam</i> who</b> had <b>property bequeathed to her, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel agree that she may sell or give</b> this property away, <b>and</b> the transaction is <b>valid.</b> If this woman <b>died, what should they do with her marriage contract and with the property that comes and goes with her,</b> i.e., her usufruct property? <b>Beit Shammai say:</b> Since she was not yet remarried, <b>the husband’s heirs,</b> such as his brothers or father, <b>divide</b> the property <b>with</b> her <b>father’s heirs. And Beit Hillel say: The property</b> retains <b>its</b> previous ownership <b>status, and</b> therefore the <b>marriage contract</b> is <b>in the possession of the husband’s heirs,</b> as they are responsible for its payment. As for the <b>property that comes and goes with her,</b> it is <b>in the possession of the heirs of the</b> woman’s <b>father,</b> as it belongs to the woman.",
            "If <b>his</b> deceased <b>brother left money</b> as part of his estate, <b>land</b> to be used as a lien on her marriage contract <b>is acquired with it, and</b> the <i>yavam</i> <b>consumes the produce.</b> Similarly, if the deceased brother left <b>produce that is detached from the ground, land is acquired with it and</b> the <i>yavam</i> <b>consumes the produce.</b> If he left behind produce <b>that is attached to the ground, Rabbi Meir says: One evaluates</b> the properties to determine <b>how much they are worth with</b> the <b>produce, and how much they are worth without</b> the <b>produce. And</b> as for <b>the surplus,</b> which is the value of the produce, <b>land is acquired with it and</b> the <i>yavam</i> <b>consumes the produce.</b> <b>And the Rabbis say: Produce that is attached to the ground</b> is <b>his.</b> Therefore, it is not used in the purchase of land, but the <i>yavam</i> may eat it. As for the produce <b>that is detached from the ground,</b> which is not mortgaged to her marriage contract, <b>whoever</b> takes possession <b>first has acquired it.</b> If the <i>yavam</i> takes possession of the property <b>first,</b> he <b>has acquired</b> it and may use it as he wishes, but if <b>she</b> is <b>first, land is acquired with it and he consumes the produce.</b> After the <i>yavam</i> has <b>married her, her</b> legal status is <b>that of his wife in every sense, except that</b> the responsibility for payment of <b>her marriage contract</b> is carried out <b>through</b> mortgaging <b>the property of her first husband,</b> not that of the <i>yavam</i>.",
            "Therefore, the <i>yavam</i> <b>may not say to her: Your marriage contract is placed on the table.</b> He may not set aside a designated sum of money for this payment. <b>Rather, all</b> of the first husband’s <b>property is mortgaged for her marriage contract</b> as long as he has not divorced her. <b>And similarly,</b> in general <b>a man may not say to his wife: Your marriage contract is placed on the table. Rather, all his property is mortgaged for her marriage contract.</b> If the <i>yavam</i> <b>divorced her</b> after performing levirate marriage, <b>she has only her marriage contract,</b> as she does not retain any rights to the rest of her first husband’s property. If he subsequently <b>remarried her, she is like all women, and she has nothing but her marriage contract.</b> In this case, the property of her first husband is no longer pledged for the payment of her marriage contract."
        ],
        [
            "<b>One who writes for his wife</b> in a document the declaration: <b>I have no legal</b> dealings <b>or involvement with your property,</b> thereby relinquishing his rights to her possessions, <b>may</b> nevertheless <b>consume the produce</b> of her property <b>in her lifetime. And if she dies</b> before him, <b>he inherits</b> from <b>her. If</b> this is <b>so,</b> if he still retains his rights, <b>why</b> would he <b>write for her: I have no legal</b> dealings <b>or involvement with your property?</b> The result of this declaration is <b>that if she sold or gave</b> away her property, the transaction is <b>binding,</b> and he cannot claim it. If <b>he writes for her: I have no legal</b> dealings <b>or involvement with your property or with its produce, he may not consume the produce</b> of her property <b>during her lifetime, but if she dies he</b> still retains the right to <b>inherit</b> from <b>her. Rabbi Yehuda says: He always consumes the produce of the produce.</b> Although he has waived his rights to consume the produce itself, it becomes her usufruct property, whose yield belongs to him. He remains entitled to the produce of the produce <b>until he writes for her: I have no legal</b> dealings <b>or involvement with your property, or with its produce, or with the produce of its produce forever.</b> If <b>he writes for her: I have no legal</b> dealings <b>or involvement with your property or with its produce, or with the produce of its produce, in your lifetime and after your death, he may not consume the produce</b> of her property <b>in her lifetime. And if she dies, he does not inherit</b> from <b>her. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: If she dies, he does inherit</b> from <b>her, because</b> he <b>stipulates counter to that which is written in the Torah.</b> According to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, a husband inherits from his wife by Torah law, <b>and whoever stipulates counter to that which is written in the Torah, his stipulation is void.</b>",
            "With regard to <b>one who died and left</b> behind <b>a wife, and a creditor</b> to whom he owed money, <b>and heirs,</b> all of whom claim payment from his property, <b>and he had a deposit or a loan in the possession of others, Rabbi Tarfon says:</b> The deposit or the loan <b>will be given to the weakest</b> one <b>of them,</b> i.e., the one most in need of the money. <b>Rabbi Akiva says: One is not merciful in judgment.</b> If the <i>halakha</i> is that it belongs to one party, one follows the <i>halakha</i> and leaves aside considerations of mercy. <b>Rather,</b> the <i>halakha</i> is that the money <b>will be given to the heirs, as all</b> people who wish to exact payment from orphans <b>require an oath</b> before they collect their debt, <b>but the heirs do not require an oath.</b> They therefore have a more absolute right than the others to their father’s property.",
            "If the deceased <b>left</b> behind <b>produce</b> that was <b>detached from the ground, whoever first</b> took possession <b>of them</b> as compensation for what was owed, whether the creditor, the wife, or the heirs, <b>acquired</b> the produce. If the <b>wife acquired</b> this produce and it was worth <b>more than</b> the payment of <b>her marriage contract, or the creditor</b> acquired this produce and it was worth <b>more than</b> the value of <b>his debt,</b> what should be done with <b>the surplus? Rabbi Tarfon says:</b> It <b>will be given to the weakest</b> one <b>of them,</b> either the creditor or the wife, depending on the circumstances. <b>Rabbi Akiva says: One is not merciful in judgment. Rather, it will be given to the heirs, as all</b> people who wish to exact payment from orphans <b>require an oath</b> before they collect their debt, <b>but the heirs do not require an oath.</b>",
            "If there is <b>one who establishes his wife</b> as a <b>storekeeper</b> in his store, <b>or</b> if <b>he appointed her</b> as a <b>steward</b> to handle his property and workers, <b>this</b> one, i.e., the husband, can <b>administer an oath to her,</b> having her state that she did not appropriate any of his possessions, <b>whenever he wants. Rabbi Eliezer says:</b> He can administer an oath <b>even with regard to</b> the products of <b>her spindle and for her dough,</b> which are matters related to the household, and not her function as a storekeeper.",
            "If <b>one wrote to</b> his wife in the marriage contract: <b>I do not have</b> the right to administer <b>a vow or an oath upon you,</b> he <b>cannot administer an oath to her.However, he can administer an oath to her heirs, and to those who come on her authority,</b> either as her representatives or because they purchased her marriage contract. If the husband wrote: <b>I do not have</b> the right to administer <b>a vow or an oath upon you, or upon your heirs, or upon those who come on your authority,</b> he <b>cannot administer an oath</b> to <b>her; not to her, nor her heirs, nor those who come on her authority. But</b> the husband’s <b>heirs can administer an oath to her, and to her heirs, and to those who come on her authority.</b> If he wrote: <b>Neither I, nor my heirs, nor those who come on my authority have</b> the right to administer <b>a vow or an oath upon you, or upon your heirs, or upon those who come on your authority,</b> he <b>cannot administer an oath</b> to <b>her</b> or to them; <b>not he, nor his heirs, nor those who come on his authority</b> may administer an oath, <b>not to her, nor</b> to <b>her heirs, nor</b> to <b>those who come on her authority.</b>",
            "If a woman who was exempted from an oath by her husband <b>went from her husband’s grave,</b> immediately after her husband’s death, <b>to her father’s house,</b> without handling her late husband’s property, <b>or</b> in a case <b>where she returned to her father-in-law’s house and did not become a steward</b> over the property at all throughout this period, then <b>the heirs cannot administer an oath to her</b> with regard to her actions in their father’s lifetime, as the husband exempted her from an oath to the heirs. <b>And if she became a steward, the heirs may administer an oath to her about the future,</b> i.e., anything she did with the property after the death of her husband, <b>but they cannot administer an oath to her with regard to what</b> took place <b>in the past,</b> during her husband’s lifetime.",
            "A woman <b>who vitiates her marriage contract</b> by acknowledging that she has received partial payment <b>can collect</b> the rest of her marriage contract <b>only by</b> means of <b>an oath.</b> Similarly, if <b>one witness testifies that</b> her marriage contract <b>is paid, she can collect</b> it <b>only by</b> means of <b>an oath.</b>In any case where she seeks to claim her marriage contract <b>from the property of orphans, or from liened property</b> that has been sold to a third party, <b>or when not in</b> her husband’s <b>presence,</b> she <b>can collect</b> it <b>only by</b> means of <b>an oath.</b>",
            "The mishna elaborates: With regard to a woman <b>who vitiates her marriage contract, how so,</b> how does this situation arise? If <b>her marriage contract was a thousand dinars, and</b> her husband <b>said to her: You</b> already <b>received your marriage contract, and she says: I received only one hundred dinars,</b> she has made a partial admission and <b>can collect</b> her marriage contract <b>only</b> by means of <b>an oath.</b> If <b>one witness testifies that</b> her marriage contract <b>is paid, how so?</b> If <b>her marriage contract was a thousand dinars, and</b> her husband <b>said to her: You</b> already <b>received your marriage contract, and she says: I did not receive</b> payment, <b>and one witness testifies about</b> the marriage contract <b>that it is paid,</b> she <b>can collect</b> it <b>only by</b> means of <b>an oath.</b> <b>From liened property, how so?</b> If while they were married the husband <b>sold his property to others, and she</b> comes to <b>collect</b> her marriage contract <b>from the purchasers, she can collect</b> it <b>only by</b> means of <b>an oath.</b> She may seize property from the purchasers because her husband’s obligation undertaken in the marriage contract predates his obligation in the document of sale. <b>From the property of orphans, how so?</b> If the husband <b>died and left his property to orphans, and she</b> comes to <b>collect</b> her marriage contract <b>from the orphans,</b> she <b>can collect</b> it <b>only by</b> means of <b>an oath.</b> <b>Or when not in his presence, how so?</b> If <b>he went</b> to <b>a country overseas and</b> sent her a bill of divorce, so that <b>she collects</b> her marriage contract <b>when not in his presence,</b> she <b>can collect</b> it <b>only by</b> means of <b>an oath.</b> <b>Rabbi Shimon says: Whenever she claims</b> payment of <b>her marriage contract, the heirs administer an oath to her. And if she does not claim</b> payment of <b>her marriage contract, the heirs do not administer an oath to her.</b>",
            "In a case where a woman <b>produced a bill of divorce and it</b> was <b>unaccompanied by a marriage contract,</b> and she demands that her husband pay her marriage contract, <b>she collects</b> payment of <b>her marriage contract,</b> and he cannot claim that he already paid it. If she produced <b>a marriage contract, and it</b> was <b>unaccompanied by a bill of divorce,</b> and <b>she says: My bill of divorce was lost, and he says:</b> Just as your bill of divorce was lost, so too <b>my receipt</b> for the payment of your marriage contract <b>was lost; and likewise,</b> in a case of <b>a creditor who produced a promissory note</b> after the Sabbatical Year, <b>unaccompanied by a document that prevents the Sabbatical Year from forgiving an outstanding debt [<i>prosbol</i>],</b> and demanded payment of the debt, <b>these</b> debts <b>may not be collected.</b> <b>Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: From the</b> time of <b>danger and onward,</b> after the ruling authorities banned the performance of mitzvot, people would destroy a bill of divorce or a <i>prosbol</i> immediately after they were signed, <b>a woman collects</b> payment of <b>her marriage contract without a bill of divorce, and a creditor collects</b> debts owed to him <b>without a <i>prosbol</i>.</b> The assumption is that due to the circumstances these documents were written but were not preserved. If a woman had <b>two bills of divorce and two marriage contracts</b> as a result of her divorce and remarriage to the same man, the fact that she is in possession of these documents proves that she was never paid for her first marriage contract, and she <b>collects two marriage contracts.</b> If she was in possession of <b>two marriage contracts and</b> only <b>one bill of divorce; or</b> if she had one <b>marriage contract and two bills of divorce; or</b> if she had <b>a marriage contract, a bill of divorce, and</b> witnesses to her husband’s <b>death</b> after their remarriage, <b>she collects</b> payment of <b>only one marriage contract.</b> This is because there is a presumption <b>that one who divorces his wife and remarries her, remarries her with the intention</b> of using her <b>first marriage contract,</b> and she agrees that she collects payment of only the original document. This is the presumption, unless he wrote another marriage contract for her. In the case of <b>a minor who was married</b> off <b>by his father,</b> the wife’s <b>marriage contract</b> that the minor wrote <b>is valid</b> even after the husband comes of age. He cannot excuse himself by saying that it was drafted when he was a minor, <b>as</b> it is <b>on this condition,</b> the terms of this marriage contract, that <b>he maintained her</b> as his wife upon his maturity. Similarly, in the case of <b>a convert whose wife converted with him,</b> the <b>marriage contract</b> that she had as a gentile <b>is valid, for on this condition he maintained her</b> as his wife."
        ],
        [
            "In the case of <b>one who was married to two women and died, the first</b> woman he married <b>precedes the second</b> in collecting the payment specified in her marriage contract if there are insufficient funds to pay both, because her document is dated earlier. So too, if the wives died after their husband before they received payment for their marriage contracts, <b>the heirs of the first</b> wife <b>precede the heirs of the second</b> wife in collecting these payments. If <b>he married a first</b> woman <b>and she</b> subsequently <b>died,</b> and he then <b>married a second</b> woman <b>and he</b> subsequently <b>died, the second</b> wife <b>and her heirs precede the heirs of the first</b> wife. This is because the marriage contract of the second wife is considered a debt that the estate of the deceased is required to pay, whereas the claim of the heirs of the first wife is based on the stipulation in the marriage contract that male children inherit their mother’s marriage contract. Heirs receive their share of the estate only from property that remains after all debts have been settled.",
            "In the case of <b>one who was married to two women and</b> the women <b>died, and subsequently he died, and the orphans</b> of one of the wives <b>are</b> now <b>seeking</b> to collect the payment specified in <b>their mother’s marriage contract,</b> i.e., the marriage contract concerning male children, <b>but there is only enough</b> in the estate to pay the value of the <b>two marriage contracts,</b> the marriage contract concerning male children cannot be collected, and the sons <b>distribute</b> the estate <b>equally</b> among themselves according to the biblical laws of inheritance. If <b>there was a surplus of a dinar</b> left <b>there,</b> in the estate, beyond the value of the two marriage contracts, then <b>these</b> sons <b>collect their mother’s marriage contract and those</b> sons <b>collect their mother’s marriage contract,</b> and the remaining property valued at a dinar is divided equally among all the sons. <b>If the orphans</b> who are entitled to receive the marriage settlement of greater value <b>say: We inflate</b> the value of <b>our father’s property by a dinar,</b> i.e., we agree to evaluate the property we will receive for our mother’s marriage settlement at a value higher than the market value so that there will be a dinar left in the estate after the two marriage contracts have been paid, <b>so that they can collect their mother’s marriage contract,</b> the court does <b>not listen to them. Rather,</b> the value of <b>the property is appraised in court,</b> and the distribution of the estate is based on that evaluation.",
            "If <b>there was potential</b> inheritance <b>there,</b> meaning that there was no surplus of a dinar in the existing properties of the estate, but there was property that was expected to be paid to the estate and which would increase the overall value of the estate so that there would be a surplus of a dinar after the payment of the marriage contracts, these properties <b>are not</b> considered to be <b>in</b> the <b>possession</b> of the estate in determining the total value of the estate. <b>Rabbi Shimon says: Even if there is property that does not</b> serve as <b>guarantee</b> for a loan, i.e., movable property, there in the estate, <b>it does not</b> have <b>any</b> impact on the value of the estate. The marriage contracts concerning male children are not collected <b>unless there is property that</b> serves as <b>a guarantee,</b> i.e., land, <b>exceeding the</b> value of the <b>two marriage contracts</b> by at least one additional <b>dinar.</b>",
            "In the case of <b>one who was married</b> to <b>three women and died</b> and <b>the marriage contract of this</b> wife was for <b>one hundred dinars and</b> the marriage contract <b>of this</b> second wife was for <b>two hundred</b> dinars, <b>and</b> the marriage contract <b>of this</b> third wife was for <b>three hundred,</b> and all three contracts were issued on the same date so that none of the wives has precedence over any of the others, <b>and</b> the total value of the estate is <b>only one hundred dinars,</b> the wives <b>divide</b> the estate <b>equally.</b> If <b>there were two hundred</b> dinars in the estate, the one whose marriage contract was <b>for one hundred dinars takes fifty</b> dinars, while those whose contracts were <b>for two hundred and three hundred</b> dinars take <b>three</b> dinars <b>of gold each,</b> which are the equivalent of seventy-five silver dinars. If <b>there were three hundred</b> dinars in the estate, the one whose marriage contract was <b>for one hundred</b> dinars <b>takes fifty</b> dinars, the one whose contract was <b>for two hundred</b> dinars <b>takes one hundred</b> dinars, <b>and the one whose</b> contract was <b>for three hundred</b> dinars takes <b>six</b> dinars <b>of gold,</b> the equivalent of one hundred and fifty silver dinars. <b>Similarly, three</b> individuals <b>who deposited</b> money <b>into a purse,</b> i.e., invested different amounts of money into a joint business venture: If they <b>incurred a loss or earned a profit,</b> and now choose to dissolve the partnership, <b>they divide</b> the assets <b>in this manner,</b> i.e., based upon the amount that each of them initially invested in the partnership.",
            "In the case of <b>one who was married</b> to <b>four women and died, the</b> woman he married <b>first precedes the</b> woman he married <b>second</b> in claiming her marriage contract, <b>the second</b> precedes <b>the third, and the third</b> precedes <b>the fourth. And</b> the <b>first</b> wife <b>takes an oath to the second</b> that she has taken nothing from the jointly owned properties of the estate in an unlawful manner, <b>and</b> the <b>second</b> takes an oath <b>to the third, and</b> the <b>third to the fourth. The fourth</b> wife <b>is paid</b> her share <b>without</b> having to take <b>an oath. Ben Nanas says: Should she gain</b> this advantage merely <b>because she is last?</b> After all, she too is being paid from property that would otherwise go to the orphans. Rather, <b>she too is not paid without an oath.</b> However, <b>if all of</b> the marriage contracts <b>were issued on the same day, whichever</b> wife’s marriage contract <b>precedes</b> that of <b>another, even by a single hour, has acquired</b> the right to be paid first. <b>And so,</b> the practice <b>in Jerusalem</b> was that <b>they would write the hours</b> when the documents had been signed on the documents, in order to enable the document holder to demonstrate that his or her document preceded that of another. If <b>all</b> the contracts <b>were issued in the same hour and there is only one hundred dinars</b> from which to pay all of them, all of the women <b>divide</b> the money <b>equally.</b>",
            "In a case of <b>one who was married</b> to <b>two women and sold his field, and the</b> wife whom he married <b>first wrote to the purchaser: I do not have</b> any <b>legal</b> dealings <b>or involvement with you,</b> then <b>the second</b> wife, who did not relinquish her claim to repossess this property, <b>may appropriate</b> the field <b>from the purchaser</b> as payment of her marriage contract. This is because the property was liened for the payment of her marriage contract before it was sold to this purchaser. Then, <b>the first</b> wife can appropriate the field <b>from the second</b> as payment for her marriage contract, since her marriage contract predates that of the second wife. <b>The purchaser</b> can then appropriate the field <b>from the first</b> wife, due to the fact that she relinquished her rights vis-à-vis the purchaser. They <b>continue</b> to do so according to this <b>cycle [<i>ḥalila</i>] until they</b> agree on a <b>compromise between them. And so too,</b> with regard to <b>a creditor, and so too,</b> with regard to <b>a female creditor.</b>"
        ],
        [
            "<b>A widow is sustained from the property of orphans. Her earnings belong to them, and they are not obligated</b> to see <b>to her burial. Her heirs,</b> who <b>inherit her marriage contract, are obligated</b> to see <b>to her burial.</b>",
            "<b>A widow, whether</b> widowed <b>from betrothal or from marriage, sells</b> her husband’s property <b>when not in court.</b> <b>Rabbi Shimon says:</b> A widow <b>from marriage sells when not in court,</b> but a widow <b>from betrothal may sell only in court, because she does not receive sustenance</b> from her husband’s property. She receives only her marriage contract, <b>and anyone who does not receive sustenance may sell only in court.</b>",
            "If a woman <b>sold all or part of her marriage contract,</b> or if <b>she mortgaged all or part of her marriage contract,</b> or if <b>she gave</b> away as a gift <b>all or part of her marriage contract to another,</b> then <b>she sells the remainder only in court. And the Rabbis say: She sells even four or five times,</b> and she is not obligated to sell everything at one time. <b>And</b> despite selling several times, she <b>sells for</b> her <b>sustenance</b> even <b>when not in court, and she writes</b> in the bill of sale: <b>I sold</b> this <b>for</b> my <b>sustenance.And a divorcée,</b> who does not receive sustenance, <b>sells only in court.</b>",
            "In the case of <b>a widow whose marriage contract was</b> worth <b>two hundred</b> dinars <b>and she sold</b> property that was <b>worth one hundred dinars for two hundred</b> dinars, <b>or</b> if she sold property <b>worth two hundred</b> dinars <b>for one hundred dinars, she has received</b> payment of <b>her marriage contract</b> and can demand nothing more. If <b>her marriage contract was</b> worth <b>one hundred dinars and she sold</b> property <b>worth one hundred dinars and a dinar for one hundred dinars, the sale is void</b> because she sold property that did not belong to her. <b>Even</b> if <b>she says: I will return</b> the additional <b>dinar to the heirs,</b> the <b>sale is</b> nevertheless <b>void.</b> <b>Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Actually, the sale is valid.</b> It is not considered an invalid sale <b>until there is</b> an error so extreme that had there been no mistake, <b>there would have remained in the field an area required for sowing nine <i>kav</i> of seed,</b> the smallest area of land worth working. In that case, the orphans can reasonably claim that they are unwilling to give up on the land that belongs to them. However, if the error is less than this, it is enough if she returns the remainder to the orphans. <b>And</b> in the case of <b>a garden,</b> the sale is void if, had there been no error, there would have remained <b>an area required for sowing a half-<i>kav</i> of seed,</b> as this is the smallest size of garden worth working. <b>Or, according to the statement of Rabbi Akiva, an area required for sowing a quarter-<i>kav</i> of seed.</b> If <b>her marriage contract was</b> worth <b>four hundred dinars, and she sold</b> property <b>to this</b> one <b>for one hundred dinars, and</b> she sold property <b>to that</b> one <b>for one hundred dinars,</b> and again to a third one, <b>and</b> she sold property <b>to the last one worth one hundred dinars and a dinar for</b> only <b>one hundred dinars,</b> the sale <b>of the last</b> property <b>is void,</b> as the price she charged was below the market value. <b>And all of the others, their sale is valid,</b> as they were sold for the correct price.",
            "The <i>halakha</i> with regard to <b>the assessment of the judges</b> of the value of a piece of property in order to sell it is as follows: <b>Where they decreased</b> the price by <b>one-sixth</b> of its market value <b>or added one-sixth</b> to its market value, <b>their sale is void.</b> <b>Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Their sale is valid. If</b> it were <b>so</b> that the sale is void, then <b>what advantage</b> is there to <b>the power of the court</b> over an ordinary person? <b>However, if they made a document of inspection,</b> i.e., an announcement that people should come to inspect the field and bid on the property, then <b>even if they sold</b> property <b>worth one hundred dinars for two hundred</b> dinars, <b>or</b> sold property <b>worth two hundred</b> dinars <b>for one hundred dinars, their sale is valid,</b> as the transaction was agreed upon and done publicly.",
            "An orphan girl who was married off by her mother or brother before reaching the age of majority may refuse to continue living with her husband upon reaching the age of majority, thereby retroactively annulling their marriage. In the case of <b>one who refuses</b> to continue living with her husband in this manner; and in the case of a woman who is <b>a secondary</b> forbidden <b>relative</b> by rabbinic law; <b>and</b> in the case of <b>a sexually underdeveloped woman [<i>ailonit</i>],</b> who is incapable of bearing children, each of these women <b>is not entitled to</b> payment of <b>a marriage contract; and</b> they are <b>not</b> entitled to remuneration for the <b>produce</b> that the husband consumed; <b>and</b> they are <b>not</b> entitled to <b>sustenance; and</b> they are <b>not</b> entitled to their <b>worn clothes</b> that were brought in to the marriage as part of their dowry and became worn out during the marriage. <b>If, from the start, he married her with the understanding</b> that she is <b>an <i>ailonit</i>,</b> then <b>she is entitled to</b> payment of <b>a marriage contract.</b> In the case of <b>a widow</b> who married <b>a High Priest;</b> or <b>a divorcée or a <i>yevama</i> who performed <i>ḥalitza</i></b> and later married <b>a common priest;</b> or <b>a daughter born from an incestuous or adulterous relationship [<i>mamzeret</i>]</b> who married an Israelite; <b>or a Gibeonite woman</b> who married <b>an Israelite;</b> or <b>a Jewish woman</b> who married <b>a Gibeonite or a <i>mamzer</i>,</b> although each of these unions is prohibited by Torah law, the woman is still <b>entitled to</b> payment of <b>a marriage contract.</b>"
        ],
        [
            "<b>One who marries a woman, and she stipulated with him that he would sustain her daughter</b> from another man for <b>five years, is obligated to sustain her</b> daughter for <b>five years.</b> If, in the course of those five years they were divorced and the woman <b>was married to another</b> man, <b>and she stipulated with him that he would sustain her daughter</b> for <b>five years, he</b> too <b>is obligated to sustain her</b> for <b>five years. The first</b> husband <b>may not say: When she comes to me, I will sustain her. Rather, he brings her sustenance to her, to the place where her mother</b> lives. <b>And likewise, both of them may not</b> jointly <b>say: We will sustain</b> the girl <b>as one</b> in a partnership. <b>Rather, one sustains her,</b> providing her with food, while <b>the other gives her the monetary</b> value <b>of the sustenance.</b>",
            "If the daughter <b>was married</b> during this period, her <b>husband provides her</b> with the <b>sustenance</b> customarily provided by a husband for his wife, <b>and</b> the two men obligated to sustain her due to agreements with her mother <b>provide her with the monetary value of the sustenance.</b> If the two husbands of the mother <b>died, their daughters are sustained from unsold property, and she,</b> their wife’s daughter, whom they agreed to sustain, <b>is sustained</b> even <b>from liened property</b> that was sold. This is <b>due to</b> the fact <b>that her</b> legal status is <b>like</b> that of <b>a creditor,</b> given that he is contractually obligated to support her. <b>The perspicacious</b> ones <b>would write</b> an explicit stipulation into the agreement: I agree <b>on the condition that I will sustain your daughter for five years</b> only <b>as long as you are with me.</b> Then they would not be obligated to sustain a girl who is not their daughter when they are no longer married to the girl’s mother.",
            "In the case of <b>a widow who said: I do not want to move from my husband’s house,</b> but instead I wish to remain there, <b>the heirs are not able to say to her: Go to your father’s house and we will sustain you. Rather, they sustain her</b> in her husband’s house <b>and they give her living quarters befitting her dignity.</b> However, if <b>she said: I do not want to move from my father’s house,</b> and you should bring me my support there, <b>the heirs are able to say to her: If you are</b> living <b>with us, you</b> will <b>have sustenance</b> from us, <b>but if you are not</b> living <b>with us, you</b> will <b>not have sustenance</b> from us. <b>If she argued</b> that she does not wish to live in her deceased husband’s house <b>because she is young, and they,</b> the heirs, <b>are</b> also <b>young,</b> and it is improper for them to be living in the same house together, then <b>they sustain her and she</b> stays <b>in her father’s house.</b>",
            "<b>As long as</b> a widow <b>is</b> living <b>in the house of her father</b> and is being supported by her husband’s heirs, <b>she may always collect</b> payment of <b>her marriage contract,</b> even after many years. <b>As long as she is</b> living <b>in the house of her husband, she may collect</b> payment of <b>her marriage contract until twenty-five years</b> later, at which point she may no longer collect the payment. This is <b>because there is</b> enough time <b>in twenty-five years for her to do favors</b> and give to others, thereby spending the resources of the orphans, until what she has spent <b>equals</b> the value of <b>her marriage contract.</b> This is <b>the statement of Rabbi Meir, who said</b> it <b>in the name of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.</b> <b>And the Rabbis say</b> the opposite: <b>As long as she is</b> residing <b>in the house of her husband she may always collect</b> payment of <b>her marriage contract,</b> since during this time the heirs are caring for her and she is therefore embarrassed to sue them for payment of her marriage contract. However, <b>as long as she is in the house of her father she may collect</b> payment of <b>her marriage contract until twenty-five years</b> later, and if by then she has not sued for it, it is assumed that she has waived her rights to it. If <b>she died, her heirs mention her marriage contract</b> up <b>until twenty-five years</b> later."
        ],
        [
            "<b>There were two</b> prominent <b>judges</b> who issued <b>decrees in Jerusalem, Admon and Ḥanan ben Avishalom. Ḥanan states two matters</b> about which the Sages disagreed; <b>Admon states seven.</b> The mishna elaborates: With regard to the case of <b>one who went overseas and his wife is demanding sustenance,</b> claiming that her husband left her without funds and she is seeking a ruling that would provide for her from her husband’s property, <b>Ḥanan says:</b> <b>She takes an oath at the end</b> of their marriage, i.e., when she learns that her husband died. The oath is to the effect that he did not leave her any funds when he departed overseas, as she is claiming full payment of her marriage contract. <b>And she does not take an oath at the outset</b> of his trip overseas, when she demands support soon after his departure. <b>The sons of High Priests disagreed with</b> Ḥanan’s opinion <b>and said: She takes an oath</b> both <b>at the outset and at the end. Rabbi Dosa ben Harkinas said:</b> The <i>halakha</i> is <b>in accordance with their statement,</b> i.e., that of the sons of the High Priests. <b>Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai said</b> that <b>Ḥanan spoke well: She takes an oath only at the end.</b>",
            "In the case of a husband <b>who went overseas, and someone arose and sustained his wife</b> in his absence, and upon the husband’s return the provider demands from him the money he spent on his wife, <b>Ḥanan says:</b> He has <b>lost his money,</b> i.e., the husband is not obligated to repay him, as the provider acted of his own free will and was not instructed to do so by the husband. <b>The sons of High Priests disagreed</b> with Ḥanan’s opinion <b>and said:</b> The man <b>swears how much he spent</b> on behalf of the woman, <b>and he takes</b> that sum from the husband. <b>Rabbi Dosa ben Harkinas said</b> that the <i>halakha</i> is <b>in accordance with their statement. Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Zakkai said: Ḥanan spoke well</b> in this case, as this man is like one who <b>placed his money on the horn of a deer</b> in midflight, i.e., he has no reasonable expectation of reimbursement.",
            "<b>Admon states</b> a dissenting opinion to that of the Rabbis in <b>seven</b> cases. The mishna elaborates: With regard to <b>one who died and left</b> behind both <b>sons and daughters, when the estate is large the sons inherit</b> the property <b>and the daughters are provided with sustenance</b> from it. <b>And with regard to a small estate,</b> which is insufficient to provide for both the sons and the daughters, <b>the daughters are provided with sustenance and the sons</b> have neither inheritance nor sustenance, and therefore, if they have no other means with which to support themselves, they must <b>go round</b> begging <b>at the doors. Admon says: Because I am a male,</b> will <b>I lose out? Rabban Gamliel said: I see</b> as correct <b>the statement of Admon.</b>",
            "The mishna cites another case involving a dispute between Admon and the Rabbis. With regard to <b>one who claims</b> that <b>another</b> owes him <b>jugs of oil, and</b> the other <b>admits to</b> the claim of <b>pitchers</b> but not the oil, <b>Admon says: Since he made a partial admission to the claim, he takes an oath</b> swearing that he owes only what he has admitted to and no more. <b>And the Rabbis say: The partial admission</b> in this case <b>is not of the same type as the claim,</b> as the claim specified oil and the admission referred to pitchers. <b>Rabban Gamliel said: I see</b> as correct <b>the statement of Admon.</b>",
            "The mishna states another case involving a ruling of Admon. With regard to one who promises and <b>apportions money for his son-in-law</b> as a dowry, <b>and he went bankrupt,</b> and he now claims that he does not have the money to fulfill his financial obligations, the betrothed woman can be left to <b>sit</b> unwed in her father’s house <b>until her head turns white.</b> If the groom does not wish to marry without a dowry he cannot be forced to do so, as the father failed to fulfill his promise. <b>Admon says</b> that <b>she can say: Had I apportioned</b> the money <b>myself</b> and broken my promise, I would agree to <b>sit until my head turns white.</b> However, <b>now that</b> my <b>father</b> was the one who <b>apportioned</b> the dowry, <b>what can I do? Either marry</b> me <b>or release</b> me by a bill of divorce. <b>Rabban Gamliel said: I see</b> as correct <b>the statement of Admon.</b>",
            "With regard to <b>one who contests</b> ownership <b>of a field,</b> claiming that a field under the control of someone else actually belongs to him, <b>and</b> the claimant himself <b>is signed as a witness on</b> the bill of sale to that other person, <b>Admon says:</b> His signature does not disprove his claim of ownership of the property, as it is possible that the claimant said to himself: <b>The second</b> person <b>is easier for me,</b> as I can reason with him, <b>but the first</b> owner, who sold the field to the current holder, <b>is more difficult</b> to deal with <b>than him.</b> The claimant might have been afraid to protest against the first one, who is perhaps violent, and therefore he was even willing to sign as a witness to transfer the field to the control of someone more amenable to his ensuing protest. <b>And the Rabbis say: He</b> has <b>lost his right</b> to contest ownership, as he signed a bill of sale that states that the field belongs to the present holder. If <b>he established</b> that field <b>as a marker for another</b> field, everyone agrees that <b>he</b> has <b>lost his right.</b> In other words, if the claimant wrote a document concerning another field and in that document he listed the first field as a boundary marker and described it as belonging to someone else, even Admon concedes that he has lost his right, as he had no reason to say it belonged to someone else other than his belief this was in fact the case.",
            "With regard to <b>one who went overseas and</b> in the meantime <b>the path</b> leading <b>to his field was lost,</b> e.g., the path he used to reach his land was taken over by the owner of the field through which it passed, so that its exact position is now unknown, <b>Admon says: Let him go</b> to his field <b>by the shortest</b> possible route. <b>And the Rabbis say: Let him buy himself a path</b> from an owner of a neighboring field at whatever price he can, even if it is <b>one hundred dinars [<i>maneh</i>], or let him fly through the air.</b>",
            "With regard to <b>one who produces a promissory note against another, and this</b> borrower <b>produced</b> a bill of sale dated after the promissory note that states <b>that</b> the lender <b>sold him a field</b> of his, <b>Admon says</b> that the borrower <b>can say: Were I</b> really <b>indebted to you, you should have collected your</b> loan <b>when you sold me the field,</b> and you would not have needed to sell it. <b>And the Rabbis say:</b> This is no proof, as it is possible that <b>this</b> lender <b>was perspicacious, as he sold</b> the borrower <b>the land</b> for a good reason, <b>because now he can take</b> the field as <b>collateral from him</b> in lieu of the outstanding loan.",
            "With regard to <b>two</b> people <b>who</b> each <b>produced a promissory note</b> of a monetary debt <b>against the other, Admon says:</b> The one holding the note with the later date can say to the first: <b>If I owed you</b> money, <b>how</b> is it that <b>you are borrowing from me?</b> You should have sued to collect your debt. This is proof that your document is a forgery. <b>And the Rabbis say: This one collects his promissory note, and that one collects his promissory note.</b>",
            "Eretz Yisrael is divided into <b>three</b> separate <b>lands</b> with regard <b>to marriage: Judea, Transjordan, and the Galilee.</b> If a man marries a woman in one of these lands he may <b>not remove</b> her <b>from</b> one <b>town to</b> another <b>town</b> in another of these lands or <b>from</b> one <b>city to</b> another <b>city,</b> i.e., he cannot compel her to move to another land. <b>However, in the same land one may remove her from</b> one <b>town to</b> another <b>town</b> or <b>from</b> one <b>city to</b> another <b>city.</b> <b>However,</b> even within the same land one may <b>not</b> force his wife to move <b>from a town to a city, nor from a city to a town.</b> The mishna adds: <b>One may remove</b> his wife <b>from a noxious residence to a pleasant residence,</b> even if it is in another land. <b>However,</b> one may <b>not</b> compel his wife to move <b>from a pleasant residence to a noxious residence. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says:</b> One may <b>also not</b> remove her <b>from a noxious residence to a pleasant residence, because a pleasant residence tests</b> the individual, i.e., one accustomed to certain environments can suffer even in more comfortable living quarters.",
            "<b>All</b> may force their family <b>to ascend to Eretz Yisrael,</b> i.e., one may compel his family and household to immigrate to Eretz Yisrael, <b>but all may not remove</b> others from Eretz Yisrael, as one may not coerce one’s family to leave. Likewise, <b>all</b> may force their family <b>to ascend to Jerusalem, and all may not,</b> i.e., no one may, <b>remove</b> them from Jerusalem. <b>Both men and women</b> may force the other spouse to immigrate to Eretz Yisrael or to move to Jerusalem. The mishna lists other halakhic distinctions between various geographic locations: If one <b>married a woman in Eretz Yisrael and divorced her in Eretz Yisrael,</b> and the currency of the sum in the marriage contract was not specified, <b>he gives her</b> the sum of her marriage contract <b>in the currency of Eretz Yisrael.</b> If one <b>married a woman in Eretz Yisrael and divorced her in Cappadocia,</b> where the currency holds greater value, <b>he gives her the currency of Eretz Yisrael.</b> If one <b>married a woman in Cappadocia and divorced her in Eretz Yisrael, he</b> likewise <b>gives her the currency of Eretz Yisrael. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: He gives her the currency of Cappadocia.</b> Everyone agrees that if one <b>married a woman in Cappadocia and divorced her in Cappadocia, he gives her the currency of Cappadocia.</b>"
        ]
    ],
    "sectionNames": [
        "Chapter",
        "Mishnah"
    ]
}